[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

PIPELINE SAFETY: REVIEWING IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE PIPES ACT OF 2020 AND EXAMINING
FUTURE SAFETY NEEDS

=======================================================================

(118-4)

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON RAILROADS, PIPELINES,
AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

__________

MARCH 8, 2023

__________

Printed for the use of the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Available online at: https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-
transportation?path=/browsecommittee/chamber/house/committee/
transportation

________

U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
54-072 PDF WASHINGTON : 2024

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COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

Sam Graves, Missouri, Chairman
Rick Larsen, Washington, Eric A. ``Rick'' Crawford,
Ranking Member Arkansas
Eleanor Holmes Norton, Daniel Webster, Florida
District of Columbia Thomas Massie, Kentucky
Grace F. Napolitano, California Scott Perry, Pennsylvania
Steve Cohen, Tennessee Brian Babin, Texas
John Garamendi, California Garret Graves, Louisiana
Henry C. ``Hank'' Johnson, Jr., Georgiavid Rouzer, North Carolina
Andre Carson, Indiana Mike Bost, Illinois
Dina Titus, Nevada Doug LaMalfa, California
Jared Huffman, California Bruce Westerman, Arkansas
Julia Brownley, California Brian J. Mast, Florida
Frederica S. Wilson, Florida Jenniffer Gonzalez-Colon,
Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey Puerto Rico
Mark DeSaulnier, California Pete Stauber, Minnesota
Salud O. Carbajal, California Tim Burchett, Tennessee
Greg Stanton, Arizona, Dusty Johnson, South Dakota
Vice Ranking Member Jefferson Van Drew, New Jersey,
Colin Z. Allred, Texas Vice Chairman
Sharice Davids, Kansas Troy E. Nehls, Texas
Jesus G. ``Chuy'' Garcia, Illinois Lance Gooden, Texas
Chris Pappas, New Hampshire Tracey Mann, Kansas
Seth Moulton, Massachusetts Burgess Owens, Utah
Jake Auchincloss, Massachusetts Rudy Yakym III, Indiana
Marilyn Strickland, Washington Lori Chavez-DeRemer, Oregon
Troy A. Carter, Louisiana Chuck Edwards, North Carolina
Patrick Ryan, New York Thomas H. Kean, Jr., New Jersey
Mary Sattler Peltola, Alaska Anthony D'Esposito, New York
Robert Menendez, New Jersey Eric Burlison, Missouri
Val T. Hoyle, Oregon John James, Michigan
Emilia Strong Sykes, Ohio Derrick Van Orden, Wisconsin
Hillary J. Scholten, Michigan Brandon Williams, New York
Valerie P. Foushee, North Carolina Marcus J. Molinaro, New York
Mike Collins, Georgia
Mike Ezell, Mississippi
John S. Duarte, California
Aaron Bean, Florida

Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials

Troy E. Nehls, Texas, Chairman
Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey, Brian Babin, Texas
Ranking Member David Rouzer, North Carolina
Frederica S. Wilson, Florida Mike Bost, Illinois
Seth Moulton, Massachusetts Doug LaMalfa, California
Troy A. Carter, Louisiana Bruce Westerman, Arkansas
Andre Carson, Indiana Pete Stauber, Minnesota
Mark DeSaulnier, California Tim Burchett, Tennessee
Marilyn Strickland, Washington Dusty Johnson, South Dakota
Valerie P. Foushee, North Carolina, Lance Gooden, Texas
Vice Ranking Member Tracey Mann, Kansas
Grace F. Napolitano, California Rudy Yakym III, Indiana
Steve Cohen, Tennessee Thomas H. Kean, Jr., New Jersey
Henry C. ``Hank'' Johnson, Jr., Georgiaic Burlison, Missouri
Jared Huffman, California Brandon Williams, New York,
Jesus G. ``Chuy'' Garcia, Illinois Vice Chairman
Robert Menendez, New Jersey Marcus J. Molinaro, New York
Rick Larsen, Washington (Ex Officio) John S. Duarte, California
Sam Graves, Missouri (Ex Officio)

CONTENTS

Page

Summary of Subject Matter........................................ vii

STATEMENTS OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE

Hon. Troy E. Nehls, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Texas, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines,
and Hazardous Materials, opening statement..................... 1
Prepared statement........................................... 2
Hon. Donald M. Payne, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the
State of New Jersey, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials, opening
statement...................................................... 13
Prepared statement........................................... 14
Hon. Rick Larsen, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Washington, and Ranking Member, Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, opening statement.............................. 15
Prepared statement........................................... 17

WITNESSES

Tristan Brown, Deputy Administrator, Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), oral statement........ 19
Prepared statement........................................... 21
Andrew J. Black, President and Chief Executive Officer, Liquid
Energy Pipeline Association (LEPA), oral statement............. 28
Prepared statement........................................... 30
Kenneth W. Grubb, Chief Operating Officer, Natural Gas Pipelines,
Kinder Morgan, Inc., on behalf of the Interstate Natural Gas
Association of America (INGAA), oral statement................. 36
Prepared statement........................................... 38
Bill Caram, Executive Director, Pipeline Safety Trust, oral
statement...................................................... 41
Prepared statement........................................... 43

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD

Submissions for the Record by Hon. Troy E. Nehls:
Letter of March 8, 2023, to Hon. Troy E. Nehls, Chairman, and
Hon. Donald M. Payne, Jr., Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials, from Stuart
Saulters, Vice President of Government Relations, American
Public Gas Association..................................... 4
Statement of the American Petroleum Institute................ 5
Press Release of March 8, 2023, from the Distribution
Contractors Association and the United Association of Union
Plumbers and Pipefitters................................... 12
Letter of March 22, 2023, to Hon. Sam Graves, Chairman, and
Hon. Rick Larsen, Ranking Member, Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure, from Geoff Moody, Senior
Vice President, Government Relations and Policy, American
Fuel and Petrochemical Manufacturers....................... 87
Letter of March 7, 2023, to Hon. Troy E. Nehls, Chairman, and
Donald M. Payne, Jr., Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials, and Hon. Sam
Graves, Chairman, and Hon. Rick Larsen, Ranking Member,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, from Edwin H.
``Skip'' Williams, Bellingham City Council (Washington State),
Submitted for the Record by Hon. Rick Larsen................... 16

APPENDIX

Questions to Tristan Brown, Deputy Administrator, Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), from:
Hon. Troy E. Nehls........................................... 89
Hon. Donald M. Payne, Jr..................................... 107
Hon. Mike Bost............................................... 109
Questions to Andrew J. Black, President and Chief Executive
Officer, Liquid Energy Pipeline Association (LEPA), from Hon.
Donald M. Payne, Jr............................................ 110
Questions to Kenneth W. Grubb, Chief Operating Officer, Natural
Gas Pipelines, Kinder Morgan, Inc., on behalf of the Interstate
Natural Gas Association of America (INGAA), from Hon. Donald M.
Payne, Jr...................................................... 110
Questions to Bill Caram, Executive Director, Pipeline Safety
Trust, from:
Hon. Troy E. Nehls........................................... 112
Hon. Donald M. Payne, Jr..................................... 112
Hon. Mike Bost............................................... 113

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March 3, 2023

SUMMARY OF SUBJECT MATTER

TO: LMembers, Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines,
and Hazardous Materials
FROM: LStaff, Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and
Hazardous Materials
RE: LSubcommittee Hearing on ``Pipeline Safety:
Reviewing Implementation of the PIPES Act of 2020 and Examining
Future Safety Needs.''
_______________________________________________________________________

I. PURPOSE

The Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous
Materials will meet on March 8, 2023, at 10:00 a.m. ET in 2167
Rayburn House Office Building to hold a hearing titled
``Pipeline Safety: Reviewing Implementation of the PIPES Act of
2020 and Examining Future Safety Needs.'' The purpose of this
hearing is to examine the progress of the Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) in
implementing the Protecting Our Infrastructure of Pipelines and
Enhancing Safety Act of 2020 (P.L. 116-260, PIPES Act of 2020)
and examining future needs in pipeline safety.

II. BACKGROUND

ABOUT THE AGENCY

The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
(PHMSA) was created under the Norman Y. Mineta Research and
Special Programs Improvement Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-426, ``2004
Act''). Prior to enactment of the 2004 Act, the Department of
Transportation's (DOT) Research and Special Programs
Administration administered the DOT's pipeline and hazardous
materials safety programs.\1\ PHMSA's mission is to protect
people and the environment by advancing the safe transportation
of energy through 3.4 million miles of natural gas and
hazardous liquid pipelines, which account for the
transportation of 65 percent of the energy commodities consumed
in the United States. PHMSA also is charged with the safe and
secure movement of over one million daily shipments of
hazardous materials by all modes of transportation.\2\
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\1\ Norman Y. Mineta Research and Special Programs Improvement Act
of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-426 [hereinafter the 2004 Act].
\2\ See Pub. L. No.117-58; see also PHMSA, Pipeline Safety Program
Budget and Grants Presentation (Jan. 25, 2023) (on file with Comm.)
[hereinafter PHMSA Budget and Grants Presentation].
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The first statute regulating pipeline safety was the
Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968, which Congress amended
in 1976.\3\ Congress added hazardous liquid pipelines to the
statute in the Pipeline Safety Act of 1970.\4\ Recent enacted
legislation regulating the safety of natural gas and hazardous
liquid pipeline facilities for which mandates remain
outstanding include the Protecting our Infrastructure of
Pipelines and Enhancing Safety Act of 2016, and the Protecting
our Infrastructure of Pipelines and Enhancing Safety (PIPES)
Act of 2020.\5\ The current authorization expires at the end of
Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 on September 30, 2023.\6\
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\3\ Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-481
(amended by the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act Amendments of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-477, 90 Stat. 2073).
\4\ Pipeline Safety Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 96-129.
\5\ Pipeline Safety Reauthorization Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
561, 102 Stat. 2805; Pipeline Safety Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-508,
106 Stat. 3289; Accountable Pipeline Safety and Partnership Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-304, 110 Stat. 3793; Pipeline Safety Improvement
Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-355, 116 Stat. 1757; The 2004 Act;
Pipeline Inspection, Protection, Enforcement and Safety Act of 2006,
Pub. L. No. 109-468, 120 Stat. 3486; Pipelines Safety, Regulatory
Certainty, and Job Creation Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-90, 125 Stat.
1904; the Protecting our Infrastructure of Pipelines and Enhancing
Safety Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-183, 130 Stat. 514; Protecting Our
Infrastructure of Pipelines and Enhancing Safety Act of 2020, Pub. L.
No. 116-260 [hereinafter PIPES Act of 2020].
\6\ PIPES Act of 2020, Sec. 101.
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PIPELINE SAFETY FRAMEWORK

Safety regulations differ depending on the nature of the
pipeline and the commodity that is moving through it. PHMSA's
regulations govern pipelines and facilities that transport
natural gas separately from those that transport hazardous
liquid.\7\ Additionally, the pipelines and facilities used to
transport natural gas and hazardous liquids vary in operating
pressures, diameter size, intended purpose, and proximity to
populated areas.\8\ This infrastructure includes:
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\7\ 49 C.F.R. Sec. Sec. 192, 195 (2023).
\8\ Id.
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LDistribution pipelines: These pipelines transport
natural gas to commercial and residential end-users. Gas
distribution pipelines tend to be smaller in diameter and
operate at lower pressures.\9\ PHMSA estimates there are 2.3
million miles of gas distribution lines, much of which are
intrastate pipelines.\10\ There are no hazardous liquid
distribution pipelines.\11\
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\9\ PHMSA, Fact Sheet: Distribution Pipelines, available at https:/
/primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/FactSheets/FSDistributionPipelines.htm (last
updated Feb. 26, 2018).
\10\ PHMSA Budget and Grants Presentation supra note 2.
\11\ GAO, GAO-12-388, Pipeline Safety, Collecting Data And Sharing
Information on Federally Unregulated Gathering Pipelines Could Help
Enhance Safety 3 (2022), available at https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-
12-388.pdf.
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LTransmission pipelines: These pipelines transport
energy products from treatment and processing facilities to
bulk customers, storage facilities, and local distribution
networks.\12\ The products transported can include natural gas
and hazardous liquids \13\ Transmission pipelines can range in
size from several inches to several feet in diameter and are
designed to operate from relatively low pressures to high
pressures.\14\ These lines can operate within a single State or
span hundreds of miles, crossing one or more State lines.\15\
PHMSA estimates there are 301,484 miles of gas interstate
transmission lines.\16\
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\12\ PHMSA, Fact Sheet: Transmission Pipelines, available at
https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/FactSheets/
FSTransmissionPipelines.htm (last updated Jan. 2018).
\13\ PHMSA, Pipeline Miles and Facilities 2010+, available at
https://portal.phmsa.dot.gov/
analytics/
saw.dll?Portalpages&PortalPath=%2Fshared%2FPDM%20Public%20Website%2F_
portal%2FPublic%20Reports&Page=Infrastructure (last updated Jan. 28,
2022) [hereinafter Pipeline Miles].
\14\ PHMSA, Fact Sheet: Transmission Pipelines, available at
https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/FactSheets/
FSTransmissionPipelines.htm (last updated Jan. 11, 2018).
\15\ PHMSA, State Programs Overview, available at https://
www.phmsa.dot.gov/working-phmsa/state-programs/state-programs-overview
(last updated Sep. 16, 2022) [hereinafter State Programs Overview].
\16\ PHMSA Budget and Grants Presentation supra note 2.
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LGathering lines: These lines transport natural
gas from the production site to a central collection point.
PHMSA currently regulates 488,064 miles of gas gathering
lines.\17\ Historically, gathering lines were built in lower
populated areas, had smaller diameters than transmission lines,
and operated at pressures and flow lower than transmission
lines.\18\ However, as new gas development occurs around the
country, regulators are considering the impacts of producers
building larger diameter and higher pressure gathering lines
and a growing national population.\19\
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\17\ PHMSA, Safety of Gas Gathering Pipelines (Jan. 8, 2019),
available at https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/meetings/FilGet.mtg?fil=1029.
\18\ PHMSA, Fact Sheet: Gathering Pipelines, available at https://
primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/factsheets/fsgatheringpipelines.htm (Jan. 12,
2018).
\19\ See PHSMA, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Pipeline Safety:
Safety of Gas Transmission and Gathering Pipelines, 81 Fed. Reg. 29,830
(Apr 8, 2016.) available at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-
2016-05-13/pdf/2016-11240.pdf.
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LHazardous liquid pipelines: These pipelines
transport liquid petroleum and other types of liquid energy
from sources of origin to refineries and chemical plants, and
in some cases to storage or distribution facilities.\20\
According to PHMSA, hazardous liquids traverse the United
States through approximately 260,000 miles of hazardous liquid
pipelines.\21\ Hazardous liquids can include energy sources
such as crude oil, refined petroleum products, highly volatile
liquids, and anhydrous ammonia, and carbon dioxide in the
supercritical (fluid or vapor) state.\22\ Hazardous liquids can
be transported by transmission and gathering lines.\23\
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\20\ Pipeline Safety Trust, Hazardous Liquid Pipelines--Basics and
Issues, available at https://pstrust.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/
2015-PST-Briefing-Paper-03-HazLiquidBasics.pdf (last updated Sept.
2015) [hereinafter Hazardous Liquid Pipelines--Basics and Issues].
\21\ PHMSA, PHMSA Presentation: Pipeline Safety Program Budget and
Grants, (Jan. 25, 2023) (on file with Comm.); see also Pipeline Miles,
supra note 13.
\22\ Hazardous Liquid Pipelines--Basics and Issues, supra note 20.
\23\ Id.
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LLiquefied natural gas (LNG) facilities: These
facilities are used for converting, transporting, or storing
LNG. There are several Federal agencies involved in the
regulation of LNG.\24\ Historically, PHMSA has regulated peak
shaving facilities and satellite facilities where LNG has been
used to manage capacity during times of peak demand. PHMSA also
regulates import terminals.\25\ Market changes led to a rapid
growth in export terminals; however, PHMSA regulations
governing LNG facilities predate such expansion.\26\ In 2022,
the United States became the world's top LNG exporter tied with
Qatar.\27\ To address these changes, the PIPES Act of 2016 and
the PIPES Act of 2020 mandated that PHMSA update its safety
regulations for LNG facilities. PHMSA estimates it will
complete this regulation by September 2023.\28\
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\24\ PHMSA, Jurisdiction of LNG Plants, available at https://
www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/liquified-natural-gas/jurisdiction-lng-
plants (last updated Jan. 31, 2018); see also 49 C.F.R. Sec. 193.2001
(2023).
\25\ See PHMSA, LNG Facility Siting, available at https://
www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/liquified-natural-gas/lng-facility-siting.
\26\ 49 C.F.R. Sec. 193.
\27\ Stephen Stapczynski, U.S. Surges to Top of LNG Exporter Ranks
on Breakneck Growth, Bloomberg, (Jan. 2, 2023), available at https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-01-03/us-surges-to-top-of-lng-
exporter-ranks-on-breakneck-growth.
\28\ PHMSA, PIPES Act Web Chart, available at https://
www.phmsa.dot.gov/legislative-mandates/pipes-act-web-chart (last
updated Jan. 24, 2023) [hereinafter Pipes Act Web Chart].
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PHMSA'S PIPELINE SAFETY OVERSIGHT

PHMSA sets Federal minimum safety standards for pipeline
safety functions, including developing, issuing, and enforcing
regulations for the safe transportation of natural gas
(including liquefied natural gas) and hazardous liquids by
pipeline through the Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS).\29\ The
Agency's regulatory programs are focused on the design,
construction, operation, and maintenance or abandonment of
pipeline facilities, and in the construction, operation, and
maintenance of LNG facilities.\30\ The Agency has jurisdiction
over transportation-related facilities; not drilling, siting,
or production facilities.\31\
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\29\ PHMSA, Office of Pipeline Safety, available at https://
www.phmsa.dot.gov/about-phmsa/offices/office-pipeline-safety (last
updated Dec. 13, 2018).
\30\ PHMSA, Pipeline Safety Regulations, available at https://
primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/SafetyStandards.htm?nocache=8847.
\31\ See PHMSA, PHMSA Regulations, available at https://
www.phmsa.dot.gov/regulations (last updated May 5, 2021); see also
FERC, Natural Gas Pipelines, available at https://www.ferc.gov/
industries-data/natural-gas/overview/natural-gas-pipelines (last
updated Feb. 10, 2021); see also Library of Cong., Oil and Gas
Industry: A Research Guide, available at https://guides.loc.gov/oil-
and-gas-industry/laws/agencies.
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PHMSA has long-experienced difficulty in recruiting and
maintaining an inspection workforce capable of meeting PHMSA's
oversight needs, as it often competes with industry for
personnel.\32\ As with previous reauthorization laws, the PIPES
Act of 2020 required PHMSA to ensure the number of pipeline
inspection and enforcement personnel did not fall below certain
levels (224 in FY 21, 235 in FY 22, and 247 in FY 23).\33\ It
also directed PHMSA to hire eight fulltime employees to
finalize outstanding and new congressional mandates, and to
seek OPM authority to use recruitment and retention incentives,
such as special pay rates, coupled with continued service
agreements, that similarly situated agencies have found
effective at hiring and retaining staff.\34\
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\32\ DOT Inspector General, PHMSA Has Improved Its Workforce
Management but Planning, Hiring, and Retention Challenges Remain 2
(2017), available at https://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/default/files/
PHMSA%20Workforce%20Final%20Report%20112117-ST2018010.pdf [hereinafter
PHMSA Workforce Report].
\33\ PIPES Act of 2020, supra note 5 Sec. 102.
\34\ Id.; see also PHMSA Workforce Report, supra note 32.
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When violations of PHMSA's regulations occur, the Agency
has several enforcement mechanisms it can use. These include
the issuance of a warning letter, a notice of probable
violation, or a corrective action order.\35\ The Agency may
also issue fines for non-compliance.\36\ In 2022, PHMSA closed
227 enforcement cases.\37\
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\35\ See 49 C.F.R. Sec. 190.205 (2023) (allowing for letter
notifying an operator of alleged violations and directs them to correct
the violation or be subject to additional enforcement action); 49
C.F.R. Sec. 190.207 (2023) (providing for a Regional Director to serve
a notice--commonly issued after routine inspections, incident
investigations, and other activity--alleging specific regulatory
violations and proposing remedial action or civil penalties); 49 C.F.R.
Sec. 190.233 (2023) (providing for the Associate Administrator to
issue an order finding a particular situation represents a serious
hazard to life, property, or the environment and directing certain
actions to be taken, up to and including shutdown of the pipeline
system).
\36\ See PHMSA, Civil Penalty Summary, available at https://
www.phmsa.dot.gov/regulatory-compliance/pipeline/enforcement/civil-
penalty-summary (last updated Jan. 25, 2023).
\37\ See PHMSA, Listing of Cases Initiated, available at https://
primis.phmsa.dot.gov/
comm/reports/enforce/CasesOpen_opid_0.html?nocache=745#_TP_1_tab_2.
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STATES' PIPELINE SAFETY OVERSIGHT

PHMSA supports states' oversight work by authorizing states
to assume certain aspects of pipeline safety for intrastate gas
pipelines, hazardous liquid pipelines, and underground natural
gas storage through certifications and agreements with PHMSA
under 49 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 60105 and 60106(a). The Agency also
authorizes states with certifications to participate in the
oversight of interstate pipeline transportation through
agreements under 49 U.S.C. Sec. 60106(b). States with
certified pipeline safety programs may impose additional
standards for intrastate pipelines and facilities so long as
they are compatible with the minimum Federal standards issued
by PHMSA.\38\
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\38\ State Programs Overview, supra note 16.
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CYBERSECURITY

Regarding cybersecurity, PHMSA signed an annex to its
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) that identifies TSA as the lead
entity for pipeline security, which has included cybersecurity
threats.\39\ In May 2021, the Colonial Pipeline sustained a
ransomware attack, causing the operator to shut down the
pipeline for six days.\40\ PHMSA issued a Notice of Probable
Violation (NOPV) and Proposed Compliance Order, and proposed
civil penalties of $986,400. The NOPV alleges that failures to
adequately plan and prepare for a manual restart and shutdown
operation contributed to the national impacts when the pipeline
remained out of service after the May 2021 cyberattack.\41\
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\39\ PHSMA, Annex to the Memorandum of Understanding Between the
Department of Homeland Security and DOT Concerning TSA and PHMSA
Cooperation on Pipeline Transportation Security and Safety (Feb. 2020),
available at https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot.gov/files/docs/
regulatory-compliance/phmsa-guidance/73466/phmsa-tsa-mou-
annexexecuted.pdf.
\40\ Vanessa Romo, Panic Drives Gas Shortages After Colonial
Pipeline Ransomware Attack, NPR, (May 11, 2021), available at https://
www.npr.org/2021/05/11/996044288/panic-drives-gas-shortages-after-
colonial-pipeline-ransomware-attack.
\41\ Letter from Gregory Alan Ochs, Dir., Central Region, Off. of
Pipeline Safety, PHMSA to Joseph A. Blount, President and Chief
Executive Officer, Colonial Pipeline Company (May 5, 2022) (notifying
of probable violation, proposed civil penalty, and proposed compliance
order), available at https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot.gov/
files/2022-05/32022026_Colonial_Pipeline_
NOPV_PCP_PCO_05052022.pdf.
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III. PIPELINE SAFETY LEGISLATION

In 2021 and 2022, PHMSA finalized seven mandates, including
four from the PIPES Act of 2011: Safety of Gas Transmission
Pipelines; Discretionary Integrity Management Improvements;
Safety of Gas Gathering Pipelines; Amendments to Parts 192 and
195 to require Valve Installation and Minimum Rupture Detection
Standards.\42\ These final rules completed congressional
responses to catastrophic pipeline failures, such as the fatal
explosion of a gas transmission pipeline in San Bruno,
California in 2010 and the release of one million barrels of
crude oil near Marshall, Michigan in 2010.\43\ PHMSA also
issued an interim final rule on Coastal Ecological Unusually
Sensitive Areas, a mandate from the PIPES Act of 2016 and the
PIPES Act of 2020.\44\ One mandate from the PIPES Act of 2016
is outstanding: finalizing updates to regulations governing LNG
facilities.\45\
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\42\ Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Transmission Pipelines: Repair
Criteria, Integrity Management Improvements, Cathodic Protection,
Management of Change, and Other Related Amendments, 87 Fed. Reg. 52,224
(Aug. 24, 2022), available at https://www.federalregister.gov/
documents/2022/08/24/2022-17031/pipeline-safety-safety-of-gas-
transmission-pipelines-repair-criteria-integrity-management; Pipeline
Safety: Safety of Gas Gathering Pipelines: Extension of Reporting
Requirements, Regulation of Large, High-Pressure Lines, and Other
Related Amendments: Response to a Petition for Reconsideration;
Technical Corrections; Issuance of Limited Enforcement Discretion, 87
Fed. Reg. 26,296, available at https://www.federalregister.gov/
documents/2022/05/04/2022-09474/pipeline-safety-safety-of-gas-
gathering-pipelines-extension-of-reporting-requirements-regulation-of;
Pipeline Safety: Requirement of Valve Installation and Minimum Rupture
Detection Standards, 87 Fed. Reg. 20,940 (Apr. 8, 2022), available at
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/04/08/2022-07133/
pipeline-safety-requirement-of-valve-installation-and-minimum-rupture-
detection-standards.
\43\ Id.
\44\ Pipes Act Web Chart, supra note 28.
\45\ PIPES Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-183, Sec. 27, 130 Stat.
514; PIPES Act of 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-260, Sec. 110, 134 Stat. 620;
See Off. of Info. and Regulatory Affairs, PHMSA, DOT, Pipeline Safety:
Amendment to Liquefied Natural Gas facilities (2018), available at
https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/
eAgendaViewRule?pubId=201810&RIN=2137-AF45.
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In 2020, Congress enacted the PIPES Act of 2020, which
directed PHMSA to:
LDetermine whether to issue a notice of proposed
rulemaking on class location change requirements and to advance
the rulemaking process if it makes a positive determination;
\46\
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\46\ PIPES Act of 2020, supra note 5, Sec. 115.
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LFrequently report publicly on progress made
toward completing outstanding mandates; \47\
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\47\ Id. Sec. 106.
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LUpdate distribution pipeline safety regulations
in response to the September 2018 distribution pipeline
explosions in the Merrimack Valley region of Massachusetts;
\48\
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\48\ Id. at Title II.
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LPrioritize completion of a final rulemaking on
gas gathering lines and direct GAO to study capabilities of
mapping gathering lines; \49\
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\49\ Id. Sec. 112.
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LStrengthen whistleblower protections; \50\
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\50\ Id. Sec. 116.
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LUpdate its current regulations for large-scale
LNG facilities and allowing it to establish an LNG Center of
Excellence; \51\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\51\ Id. Sec. Sec. 110, 111.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
LIssue regulations prescribing the applicability
of pipeline safety requirements to certain idled pipelines;
\52\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\52\ Id. Sec. 109.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
LCreate a technology pilot program, which allows
pipeline operators to test and evaluate innovative technologies
or practices on their systems that improve pipeline safety;
\53\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\53\ Id. Sec. 104.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
LEnter into agreement with the National Academies
of Science to study potential methods or standards for
installing automatic or remote-controlled shut-off valves on
pipelines located in certain sensitive areas; \54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\54\ Id. Sec. 119.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
LIssue regulations directing distribution,
transmission, and gathering pipeline operators to conduct leak
detection and repair programs that protect the environment and
pipeline safety, requiring use of advanced leak detection
technologies; \55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\55\ Id. Sec. Sec. 113, 114.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
LRequire broader transmission of safety-related
condition reports to include state authorities, Tribes, and
emergency response and planning entities; \56\ and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\56\ Id. Sec. 121.
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LPrioritize a rulemaking to protect unusually
sensitive areas and require operators of certain hazardous
liquid pipelines to use internal inspection technology at least
once every 12 months and establish procedures for assessing
potential impacts by marine vessels.\57\
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\57\ Id. Sec. 120.
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IV. FUTURE NEEDS IN PIPELINE SAFETY

PIPELINE SAFETY INCIDENTS

PHMSA reports that in 2022, 631 pipeline incidents
occurred, from which 10 individuals died, 24 were injured, and
property damages totaled more than $685 million.\58\ Of these
incidents, 17 were classified as serious and 267 were
significant.\59\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\58\ PHMSA, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Administration
Pipeline Safety Incidents 20 Year Trends, available at https://
portal.phmsa.dot.gov/analytics/saw.dll?Portalpages&Portal
Path=%2Fshared%2FPDM%20Public%20Website%2F_portal%2FSC%20Incident
%20Trend&Page=All%20Reported [hereinafter PHMSA 20 Year Trends].
\59\ Id. (explaining Serious incidents involve a fatality or injury
requiring in-patient hospitalization and that significant incidents
involve a fatality or injury requiring in-patient hospitalization,
$50,000 or more in total costs, highly volatile liquid releases of five
barrels or more or other liquid release of 50 barrels or more, or
liquid releases resulting in an unintentional fire or explosion).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

CARBON DIOXIDE PIPELINE TRANSPORTATION

There are approximately 5,000 miles of pipeline
transporting CO2 primarily for enhanced oil
recovery.\60\ Carbon capture, utilization, and sequestration
(CCUS) is a process that captures CO2 emissions from
sources, such as power plants, and either reuses or stores it
so it will not enter the atmosphere.\61\ The Infrastructure
Investment and Jobs Act (P.L. 117-58) establishes a Carbon
Dioxide Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation
(CIFIA) program for CO2 pipelines and authorizes
$2.1 billion over five years for low-interest CIFIA loans and
grants through the Department of Energy (DOE).\62\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\60\ Paul W. Parfomak, Cong. Rsch. Serv., IN11944, Carbon Dioxide
Pipelines: Safety Issues, (2022), available at https://
crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN11944.
\61\ DOE, Carbon Capture, Utilization & Storage, available at
https://www.energy.gov/carbon-capture-utilization-storage.
\62\ Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 117-58,
Division D, 135 Stat. 429, 923.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CO2 can be transported in various states.
Currently, nearly all CO2 is transported in a
supercritical state (a dense fluid or vapor phase between a
liquid and gas) and is regulated under 49 CFR Part 195.\63\
Future carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) pipeline projects
may be transported in a subcritical state (a liquid) or a
gas.\64\ PHMSA hazardous liquid regulations address
CO2 that is transported as a fluid compressed to a
supercritical state and is 90% pure CO2.\65\ The
potential future use of CO2 with higher levels of
impurities which may be transported as a liquid or gas are not
regulated by PHMSA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\63\ DOE, Meeting the Dual Challenge, a Roadmap to At-Scale
Deployment of Carbon Capture, Use, and Storage 6-4 (2019), available at
https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/
files/2021-06/2019%20-%20Meeting%20the%20Dual%20Challenge%20Vol%20III
%20Chapter%206.pdf.
\64\ Richard B. Kuprewicz, Accufacts' Perspectives on the State of
Federal Carbon Dioxide Transmission Pipeline Safety Regulations as It
Relates to Carbon Capture, Utilization, and Sequestration Within the
U.S., Prepared for Pipeline Safety Trust 4 (2022), available at https:/
/pstrust.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/3-23-22-Final-Accufacts-CO2-
Pipeline-Report2.pdf [hereinafter Accufacts Perspectives].
\65\ 49 C.F.R. Sec. 195.2.
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CO2 is colorless and odorless and in
concentrations is an asphyxiant, displacing the oxygen in air
and causing negative health impacts.\66\ On February 22, 2020,
in Satartia, Mississippi, Denbury's 24-inch Delhi Pipeline
ruptured, releasing liquid CO2 that immediately
began to vaporize.\67\ 200 people surrounding the rupture
location were evacuated, and 45 people were taken to the
hospital.\68\ PHMSA's investigation identified contributing
factors to the accident, including lack of assessment of
geohazards in plans and procedures, underestimating the
potential affected areas that could be impacted by a release in
its CO2 dispersion model, and not notifying local
responders to advise them of a potential failure.\69\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\66\ Accufacts Perspectives, supra note 64.
\67\ PHSMA Failure Investigation Report, Denbury Gulf Coast
Pipelines, LLC, available at https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/
phmsa.dot.gov/files/2022-05/Failure%20Investigation
%20Report%20-%20Denbury%20Gulf%20Coast%20Pipeline.pdf.
\68\ Id.
\69\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

HYDROGEN PIPELINE TRANSPORTATION

As of December 2020, there were 1,608 miles of hydrogen
pipeline in the United States, primarily on the Gulf Coast.\70\
Today, almost all hydrogen is consumed by the oil industry or
chemical industry; however, hydrogen pipeline expansion may
occur to coincide with emerging hydrogen hubs that offer
hydrogen to end users for purposes such as mobility, goods
movement, heat for manufacturing processes, and other
services.\71\ Some United States pipeline operators have
initiated projects to blend hydrogen and methane in natural gas
pipelines.\72\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\70\ Paul W. Parfomak, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R46700, Pipeline
Transportation of Hydrogen: Regulation, Research, and Policy (2021),
available at https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46700.
\71\ Martin C. Offutt, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R47289, Hydrogen Hubs and
Demonstrating the Hydrogen Energy Value Chain, (2022), available at
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47289.
\72\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

V. WITNESSES

LTristan Brown, Deputy Administrator, Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA)
LAndrew Black, President and CEO, Liquid Energy
Pipeline Association (LEPA)
LKenneth W. Grubb, Chief Operating Officer--Gas
Pipelines, Kinder Morgan, Inc.
LBill Caram, Executive Director, Pipeline Safety
Trust

PIPELINE SAFETY: REVIEWING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PIPES ACT OF 2020 AND
EXAMINING FUTURE SAFETY NEEDS

----------

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 8, 2023

House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous
Materials,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m. in
room 2167 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Troy E. Nehls
(Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Nehls. The Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and
Hazardous Materials will come to order.
I ask unanimous consent that the chairman be authorized to
declare a recess at any time during today's hearing.
Without objection, so ordered.
I also ask unanimous consent that Members not on the
subcommittee be permitted to sit with the subcommittee at
today's hearing and ask questions.
Without objection, so ordered.
I now recognize myself for an opening statement for 5
minutes.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TROY E. NEHLS OF TEXAS, CHAIRMAN,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON RAILROADS, PIPELINES, AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS

Mr. Nehls. Today's hearing will examine implementation of
the Protecting Our Infrastructure of Pipelines and Enhancing
Safety Act of 2020, or PIPES 2020 Act, as well as future needs
and pipeline safety.
The United States has the largest pipeline network in the
world, consisting of about 3.4 million miles of pipeline. The
oil and natural gas industry generates about 11.3 million
American jobs and accounts for nearly 8 percent of the United
States gross domestic product, which is an economic impact of
about $1.7 trillion--with a T--per year. The United States is
now a leading exporter of energy to the rest of the world, and
investments made by the energy sector will continue to provide
high-paying jobs for a diversifying workforce and promote
domestic energy security.
Pipelines are critical infrastructure for supporting our
energy sector and represent the safest, most efficient, most
environmentally friendly mode of transporting energy. Pipelines
are an essential part of the energy supply chain and ensure
communities across the country and our allies abroad have
access to affordable and reliable American energy. The recent
supply chain crisis and rising inflation, coupled with the war
in Ukraine, demonstrate the importance of having reliable, easy
access to energy and the negative consequences of restricting
or cutting off our energy supply.
The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration,
or PHMSA, is the Federal agency responsible for overseeing the
safe and reliable operation of the United States pipeline
network. Promoting pipeline safety has been a priority for
Congress, which enacted several bipartisan laws in recent years
to reauthorize crucial pipeline safety programs at PHMSA and
direct the agency to initiate actions that advance pipeline
safety.
The 2020 pipeline safety reauthorization made advances in
safety through some commonsense policy and a balanced, not
overly burdensome, regulatory approach. And it is essential
that Congress ensure PHMSA is prioritizing and implementing
prior congressional mandates and does not impermissibly favor
administration priorities over these mandates. PHMSA must
prioritize hiring competent pipeline safety inspectors, not
more lawyers, and must keep its focus on protecting people and
the environment by advancing the safety and reliability of
pipelines.
Today, we will hear from PHMSA on progress made towards
implementing the PIPES 2020 Act and how it is working to meet
the requirements set by Congress. Pipeline safety is a
collaborative effort between PHMSA, State governments,
industry, and the public. We must continue to promote
cooperation between stakeholders and regulators to find a
balanced approach that fosters innovation in technology and
implementation of best safety practices.
I am looking forward to hearing from industry and public
safety representatives today about some of these practices and
new technologies that can help us improve safety. This includes
how we can support the development of infrastructure to
transport new and emerging fuels such as carbon dioxide and
hydrogen and how innovative technology and operations are being
used to improve inspections, leak detection, leak prevention,
and the overall safety of pipeline networks.
As Congress looks to the next pipeline safety
reauthorization, we must embrace ways in which the industry and
regulators can work together to achieve our goal of zero
pipeline incidents. I hope to renew the tradition of passing a
bipartisan pipeline safety bill from this committee, and I look
forward to working with the ranking member, my colleagues on
both sides of the aisle, and the Senate to accomplish this
important goal.
[Mr. Nehls' prepared statement follows:]

Prepared Statement of Hon. Troy E. Nehls, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Texas, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Railroads,
Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials
The United States has the largest pipeline network in the world,
consisting of about 3.4 million miles of pipeline. The oil and natural
gas industry generates about 11.3 million American jobs and accounts
for nearly 8 percent of the United States' gross domestic product,
which is an economic impact of about $1.7 trillion per year. The United
States is now a leading exporter of energy to the rest of the world.
Investments by the energy sector will continue to provide high paying
jobs for a diversifying workforce and promote domestic energy security.
Pipelines are critical infrastructure for supporting our energy
sector and represent the safest, most efficient, most environmentally
friendly mode of transporting energy. Pipelines are an essential part
of the energy supply chain and ensure communities across the country,
and our allies abroad, have access to affordable and reliable American
energy. The recent supply chain crisis and rising inflation, coupled
with the war in Ukraine, demonstrate the importance of having reliable,
easy access to energy and the negative consequences of restricting or
cutting off our energy supply.
The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA)
is the Federal agency responsible for overseeing the safe and reliable
operation of the United States pipeline network. Promoting pipeline
safety has been a priority for Congress, which enacted several
bipartisan laws in recent years to reauthorize crucial pipeline safety
programs at PHMSA and direct the agency to initiate actions that
advance pipeline safety.
The 2020 pipeline safety reauthorization made advances in safety
through some commonsense policy and a balanced, not overly burdensome,
regulatory approach. It is essential that Congress ensure PHMSA is
prioritizing and implementing prior congressional mandates and does not
impermissibly favor Administration priorities over these mandates.
PHMSA must prioritize hiring competent pipeline safety inspectors, not
more lawyers, and must keep its focus on protecting people and the
environment by advancing the safety and reliability of pipelines.
Today, we will hear from PHMSA on progress made towards
implementing the PIPES 2020 Act and how it is working to meet the
requirements set by Congress. Pipeline safety is a collaborative effort
between PHMSA, state governments, industry, and the public. We must
continue to promote cooperation between stakeholders and regulators to
find a balanced approach that fosters innovation in technology and
implementation of best safety practices.
I am looking forward to hearing from industry and public safety
representatives today about some of these practices and new
technologies that can help us improve safety. This includes how we can
support the development of infrastructure to transport new and emerging
fuels such as carbon dioxide and hydrogen, and how innovative
technology and operations are being used to improve inspections, leak
detection, leak prevention, and the overall safety of pipeline
networks.
As Congress looks to the next pipeline safety reauthorization, we
must embrace ways in which industry and regulators can work together to
achieve our goal of zero pipeline incidents. I hope to renew the
tradition of passing a bipartisan pipeline safety bill from this
Committee, and I look forward to working with the Ranking Member, my
colleagues on both sides of the aisle, and the Senate to accomplish
this important goal.

Mr. Nehls. I have a few documents to enter into the record.
I ask unanimous consent to enter into the record the following
items: a March 8, 2023, letter from the American Public Gas
Association; a March 8, 2023, statement from the American
Petroleum Institute; and a March 8, 2023, press release from
the Distribution Contractors Association and the United
Association of Union Plumbers and Pipefitters.
And without objection, so ordered.
[The information follows:]

Letter of March 8, 2023, to Hon. Troy E. Nehls, Chairman, and Hon.
Donald M. Payne, Jr., Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Railroads,
Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials, from Stuart Saulters, Vice
President of Government Relations, American Public Gas Association,
Submitted for the Record by Hon. Troy E. Nehls
March 8, 2023.
The Honorable Troy Nehls,
Chairman,
Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, 2164 Rayburn
House Office Building, Washington, DC 20515.
The Honorable Donald M. Payne, Jr.,
Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, 2165 Rayburn
House Office Building, Washington, DC 20515.

Re: Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials
(Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure) Hearing: Pipeline
Safety: Reviewing Implementation of the PIPES Act of 2020 and Examining
Future Safety Needs.

The American Public Gas Association (``APGA'') is the trade
association representing more than 730 communities across the U.S. that
own and operate their retail natural gas distribution entities. These
include not-for-profit gas distribution systems owned by municipalities
and other local government entities, all accountable to the citizens
they serve. As such, APGA's members are critical stakeholders impacted
by reauthorization of pipeline safety programs at the Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (``PHMSA'') within the United
States Department of Transportation (``DOT''). With reauthorization
needed in the 118th Congress, we appreciate your holding a hearing on
the implementation of the PIPES Act of 2020 and examining future safety
needs.
Public gas utilities focus on safe operations, and effective
pipeline safety programs implemented by our federal regulator supports
our member's ability to deliver energy to Americans. Following are
APGA's legislative priorities for consideration during reauthorization
discussions.
1. Consider extending the Natural Gas Distribution Infrastructure
Safety and Modernization (``NGDISM'') Grants
The grant program is set to expire after five years, Fiscal Year
(``FY'') 2026. However, grant award winners can still access awarded
money for ten years. This allows reimbursements even after PHMSA stops
awarding new funding.
APGA's members have demonstrated tremendous demand for the program.
More money was requested in the first funding cycle, about $1.25
billion, than is available for the program in its entirety, $1 billion
over 5 years.
PHMSA needed more time than originally anticipated to stand up the
program, and as of March 3rd, PHMSA still has not announced the
utilities provisionally selected for FY 2022. As well, the grant
agreements won't be fully executed until the National Environmental
Policy Act (``NEPA'') Tier 2 Environmental Review process is completed
later in 2023.
PHMSA and Congress seemed to want to target smaller systems with
fewer resources through the NGDISM grant program. But many of them were
not able to participate in the first funding cycle because they lack
the staff and time to devote to grant writing. As well, APGA
understands these smaller utilities are interested in learning from
successful first round grant recipients to use their resources more
efficiently in future funding cycles. The second funding cycle may open
before awards are made for the first, which may discourage the smallest
systems from applying until year three. Of note, only 179 of the 999
systems eligible applied in 2022.
2. Consider Language Strengthening the Advisory Committee Process
In recent years, PHMSA has occasionally disregarded the
recommendations it receives from its Advisory Committees. While it is
rare, the impacts are significant. As legislation to reauthorize
pipeline safety programs is drafted, APGA would be very interested in
engaging with the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on
establishing a more formal requirement for how often the Advisory
Committees should be meeting and how PHMSA should treat recommendations
from these groups.
3. Maintain PHMSA's Cost-Benefit Analysis Requirement
PHMSA must meet a unique cost-benefit analysis requirement before
promulgating a new rule. The pipeline safety regulator must ensure its
justification for any rulemaking is appropriate prior to sending it to
the Office of Management and Budget (``OMB'') for review. APGA believes
this step results in effective, transparent, and comprehensive
regulations and should be maintained.
4. Adequate Funding for PHMSA and their State Partners
APGA believes that a strong pipeline safety regulator ultimately
leads to effective regulations and enhanced pipeline safety. APGA
supports PHMSA's full funding and encourages allocation of resources to
their state pipeline safety partners. These state partners are
responsible for ensuring natural gas distribution operators comply with
federal and state, if applicable, pipeline safety regulations.

APGA hopes the above input will be helpful to the Committee. Please
do not hesitate to contact me with any additional questions.
Respectfully submitted,
Stuart Saulters,
Vice President of Government Relations, American Public Gas
Association.

Statement of the American Petroleum Institute, Submitted for the Record
by Hon. Troy E. Nehls
On behalf of the American Petroleum Institute (API) \1\, we
appreciate the opportunity to submit testimony as part of this
important hearing addressing pipeline safety, and the reauthorization
of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA)
and the pipeline safety program in 2023.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ API represents all segments of America's oil and natural gas
industry, which supports more than 11 million U.S. jobs and is backed
by a growing grassroots movement of millions of Americans. Our nearly
600 members produce, process, and distribute the majority of the
nation's energy, and participate in the API Energy Excellence program,
which is accelerating environmental and safety progress by fostering
new technologies and transparent reporting. API was formed in 1919 as a
standards-setting organization and has developed more than 700
standards to enhance operational and environmental safety, efficiency,
and sustainability. Through the API Climate Action Framework and
related initiatives such as The Environmental Partnership, significant
efforts are being conducted by the oil and natural gas industry to
balance the increasing demand for affordable and reliable energy
products with environmental performance and stewardship.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The need for sound energy policy has never been more critical. A
modern U.S. infrastructure system, including robust pipeline
infrastructure, is crucial to providing a reliable energy supply to
every community in America. Every day, a vast network of pipeline
infrastructure serves Americans across the country, with more than
530,000 miles of transmission pipelines--the majority underground--
safely delivering crude oil, petroleum products, natural gas, natural
gas liquids, low carbon energy products and ethanol to consumers. With
abundant energy resources, America continues to chart a reliable path
that directly addresses today's domestic and global energy challenges
by strengthening our country's energy security while helping allies
around the world.
These US energy resources have spurred community growth and
security, and we have developed them while protecting the environment.
The pipeline industry is developing new technologies and innovations
every day to safely deliver affordable, reliable energy to consumers
while reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. As our industry
continues to advance a lower carbon future, it is imperative that the
regulatory environment and PHMSA are responsive to both current and
potential future safety challenges faced by operators.
As Congress considers the reauthorization of PHMSA and safety
programs over the coming year, we urge policymakers to enact policies
that capitalize on the power of American oil, natural gas, and
liquified natural gas (LNG) operators by maximizing our investment in
state-of-the-art technology and sustainable operations while
recognizing the important role our communities play in advancing
safety.
Energy Security
American energy leadership is vital, perhaps more than ever, for
American prosperity and security in uncertain times, and for the world.
A global energy crisis--driven by surging post-pandemic demand
outstripping supply and exacerbated by Russia's invasion of Ukraine--
has shown that the world needs more natural gas and oil, not less.
America can and should lead the world out of this crisis. The U.S. is
the world's leading producer of natural gas and oil and, with the right
regulations and policies, must champion a reliable path forward that
directly addresses today's energy challenges.
Europe's energy struggles show what can happen when countries lean
too much, too soon on still-developing energy sources and energy from
unstable regions while turning away from reliable natural gas and oil
resources. Natural gas and oil are projected to provide nearly 50% of
the world's energy in 2050 \2\. Abundant American natural gas and oil
should be prioritized as a long-term strategic asset and a foundation
for economic growth and strengthened energy security, today and
tomorrow. Our energy resources also will provide opportunity, for
decades to come, for other energy sources to mature and take on more
significant roles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/ieo/consumption/sub-topic-01.php
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although oil and natural gas companies increased production this
year to meet rising energy demand \3\, more is required as populations
and energy needs grow. America lacks sufficient infrastructure for the
future--including new natural gas and oil pipelines as well as
investment in maintaining existing infrastructure--to move energy from
production areas to refineries and processing facilities and then to
places where it is needed by American families and businesses. Our
energy infrastructure is a critical component of the oil and natural
gas supply chain, consisting of terminals, underground and above ground
storage facilities, pipelines, railcars, trucks, ships, and marine
vessels. Ensuring we have a robust energy infrastructure system that
keeps pace with growing production and demand is essential to helping
provide American families and businesses with reliable access to
affordable energy. Additionally, export infrastructure is needed so
that America can aid allies abroad and project leadership in global
markets, while also supporting domestic production and economic
benefits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ https://www.api.org/-/media/Files/misc/Rystad-Energy-APIs-10-
in-2022-Policy-Plan-Quantification-of-Policy-Impacts
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We need not return to growing dependence on foreign suppliers.
Quite the opposite: American energy must lead in this space, through
more domestic production and modernized infrastructure. If America
doesn't lead, others will. We have the resources, yet sound energy
infrastructure policymaking is critical to ensure America and other
nations alike can have access to reliable US energy sources.
Commitment to Pipeline Safety
Industry's commitment to safe operations is evident by the strong
safety record of the pipeline system that delivers oil, natural gas,
and petroleum products. Protecting the public and the environment is
the top priority for pipeline operators and a central component to
pipeline design, construction, and maintenance. Ultimately, the
development of a comprehensive pipeline safety system is the product of
a shared commitment from key entities in the stakeholder community. The
first element involves the federal and state governments, which provide
the safety regulations for the industry. Next is the contribution of
the industry trade associations that, with the help of other
stakeholders including the public, help to develop industry standards,
guidance, recommendations, and leading practices. The third key entity
is individual companies who make the commitment to develop and
implement effective safety programs. While each of these functions are
critically important to advancing safety in the pipeline industry, the
true effectiveness of the pipeline safety program exists because these
functions complement one another through the coordination and
collaboration of all three of these entities.
API, our allied oil and natural gas trades, and our members are
fully committed to maintaining the highest standards and establishing a
strong foundation with the public by continually endeavoring for
improvement through enhanced safety operations. And while greater than
99 percent of oil, natural gas and their products reach their
destination without incident, pipeline companies are striving to
continuously improve performance and address the remaining fraction of
a percent to reach our shared industry-wide goal of zero incidents. The
industry's ability to continually advance the safety of oil and natural
gas pipeline operations is based on three critical elements: (1)
people, (2) technology, and (3) safety culture. Each of these is
intertwined with the others to create a comprehensive and cohesive
safety program. Education and training are constantly provided to
industry employees to ensure they can operate using the latest and most
advanced technologies. Similarly, employees are committed to developing
a culture of safety that is continually assessed and improved. This
three-pronged approach is designed first and foremost to prevent an
incident from ever happening, but also ensures that the industry is
prepared for any incident and can effectively respond in the rare
instance that an incident occurs.
Effective Regulatory Process
API and its members appreciate the emphasis PHMSA has placed on
addressing congressional mandates from prior pipeline safety
reauthorizations. However, we ask PHMSA to continue to advance
important industry rulemakings mandated by Congress in the PIPES Act of
2020, specifically leak detection and repair, LNG facility safety,
class location changes, and pipeline operating status for ``idle''
pipe. In doing so we ask PHMSA to maintain sight of the importance of a
holistic, performance-based regulatory approach that maximizes the
industry's ability to use the latest advances in new technologies and
leading engineering practices to manage pipeline safety risk.
Furthermore, as part of that process, we support the collaborative
approach to reviewing regulations carried out by PHMSA's Technical
Advisory Committees (Advisory Committee). The Advisory Committee
process is a transparent and balanced forum that has demonstrated the
ability to build consensus around complex regulatory issues. To that
end, we have concern with the limited number of Advisory Committee
meetings held over the last several years and the number of Advisory
Committee recommendations that have not been incorporated into final
regulations despite consensus within the groups. As such, we encourage
Congress to consider the inclusion of some accountability measures
within reauthorization, including a set number of meetings required
each year and reporting by the Secretary on those Advisory Committee
recommendations that are not being considered by PHMSA in rulemaking.
Additionally, performing a reasoned cost-benefit analysis before
making significant regulatory changes must continue to be a part of the
regulatory process. PHMSA's cost-benefit analyses provide valuable
input to the public comment and advisory committee review processes.
Since there are usually multiple practical alternatives to achieve any
particular pipeline safety objective, the cost-benefit analysis helps
PHMSA, and industry and public stakeholders, compare and contrast the
alternatives and identify the best option.
A statutory requirement to consider costs and benefits in health,
safety, and environmental regulations is not unique to PHMSA. Congress
has similarly required the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA), the Mine Safety and Health Administration
(MSHA), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to analyze costs
and benefits during rulemaking. An excellent example of the important
role cost-benefit plays in the regulatory process is PHMSA's
consideration of class location changes for natural gas transmission
pipelines through rulemaking. With today's processes and technologies,
pipeline safety can be managed effectively and at an equivalent level
of safety through data-driven inspection and maintenance, instead of
costly, unnecessary, and arbitrary pipe replacements required by the
current class location change regulations.
Well Trained and Efficient Regulator
As PHMSA and the energy industry together continue to drive toward
our shared goal of zero pipeline incidents, a modernized regulator with
the necessary tools, well-trained staff, streamlined programs and data
transparency can bring needed certainty and consistency into the
regulatory and oversight process. The oil and natural gas industry
believes that PHMSA pipeline inspectors must be well trained and
qualified to effectively fulfill the obligations placed upon them and
the agency. However, pipeline inspectors frequently come into PHMSA
with limited pipeline safety experience, and those that already have or
gain experience often depart the agency to pursue more lucrative
opportunities. As such, similar to other agency hiring authority for
specialty positions, the ability to compensate pipeline inspectors at
market rates through PHMSA's use of Schedule A employees with
streamlined hiring and flexible pay levels would enhance PHMSA's
ability to attract and retain expert pipeline inspectors.
Lastly, multiple repetitive and redundant inspections of operator
procedures and programs are conducted by PHMSA regional offices, state
pipeline regulatory agencies, and local authorities (e.g., state
utility boards, public utility commissions) that evaluate a consistent
set of company procedures regardless of jurisdiction. As an industry,
we have concerns with how this multitude of agencies collaborates and
communicates and the impact it can have on pipeline operators who are
focusing resources on improving safety programs. As such, Congress
should consider an independent review and evaluation of PHMSA and State
inspection programs' interaction to identify opportunities for improved
collaboration and to reduce redundant inspection activities.
The Importance of API Pipeline Standards
Safety is a core value of the oil and natural gas industry.
Pipeline operating companies are committed to enhancing the safety of
our workers and protecting the communities and environments where we
are present. At API, we establish and disseminate standards and best
practices across the industry to ensure the highest level of safety and
achieve our collective goal of operating with zero incidents. Since
1924, API has been the leader in developing voluntary, consensus-based,
and internationally recognized industry standards that promote safety
and reliability. Our standards program is accredited by the American
National Standards Institute (ANSI), the same organization that
accredits similar programs at several national laboratories. In
creating these industry consensus standards and recommended practices
(RPs), API partners with technical experts from government, academia,
and industry. This work supports the fulfillment of the National
Technology Transfer and Advancement Act (NTTAA), which mandates that
federal agencies use technical standards developed and adopted by
voluntary consensus standards bodies, as opposed to using government-
unique standards. Currently, API has more than 800 standards that are
used globally by oil and natural gas operators, as well as referenced
by the international regulatory community. They are key to the global
energy sector, streamlining regulation across borders, improving
safety, and minimizing economic inefficiencies. Here in the US, these
standards are referenced more than 650 times in federal regulations,
covering multiple government agencies, including PHMSA. Additionally,
API's standards are the most widely cited petroleum industry standards
by state regulators, with 240 API standards cited over 4,130 times in
state-based regulations. Finally, API's standards are also the most
widely cited standards by international regulators in the 14 major
producing regions.\4\
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\4\ OGP Report No. 426, Regulators' Use of Standards, March 2010
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite the current lack of certainty in the regulatory process,
the industry continues to proactively advance safety through the
development of standards and best practices. API continues to develop
and revise critical standards and recommended practices for prevention,
mitigation, and response activities to address pipeline safety.
Specifically, API has developed a number of standards in close
coordination with subject matter experts from government, academia and
industry. API RP 1173, Pipeline Safety Management Systems (Pipeline
SMS), provides the framework for managing complex operations with
safety as the top priority. It provides established guidelines for
pipeline operating companies and contractors to manage risk, promote
best practices, and build a strong safety culture throughout an
organization. Safety culture must be organically strengthened from
within an organization, which is why a voluntary regime is so important
for the industry's implementation of SMS.
Recognizing the role of stakeholder input and public engagement as
critical elements in addressing pipeline safety challenges, industry
has partnered with government representatives and public advocates to
develop API RP 1185, Pipeline Public Engagement. The document follows
the same ``Plan-Do-Check-Act'' cycle of continuous improvement as in
API RP 1173 to regularly assess and improve public engagement in the
communities where pipelines operate, including environmental justice
populations. As U.S. production continues to grow and pipeline capacity
increases to keep pace, operators are motivated to develop a management
system that ensures new pipelines are built to the appropriate
specifications, keeping safety as the top priority. API RP 1177, Steel
Pipeline Construction Quality Management Systems, outlines the steps
needed for constructing safe steel pipelines, from purchasing the
correct material to completing the safety and integrity inspections
prior to initiating operation. Additionally, API continues to develop
new standards and revise and update current standards that are focused
on maintaining the integrity of pipeline infrastructure and ensuring
continued safe operation of pipeline systems. Examples include RP 1176
(Assessment and Management of Cracking in Pipelines), RP 1181 (Pipeline
Operating Status), RP 1183 (Assessment and Management of Dents in
Pipelines), and an RP under development for geohazard integrity
management (RP 1187).
While pipeline operators are taking significant steps to meet the
goal of zero incidents, they must have a comprehensive mitigation
strategy to reduce the impact should a release occur. Developed with
industry, regulator, and broader stakeholder input, API RP 1175,
Pipeline Leak Detection--Program Management, outlines how to use
multiple leak detection tools--such as aerial overflights, ground
patrols, and computational pipeline monitoring--to create a robust and
holistic program to identify a leak as soon as it occurs. In addition,
the RP encourages senior leaders within pipeline operating companies to
instill a leak detection culture that promotes safety and ensures
employees are properly trained to aid in mitigating incidents. Pipeline
companies have robust operator qualification (OQ) programs that ensure
their personnel and contractor personnel are competent to perform
pipeline operations and maintenance duties, and continuous training and
testing to verify the skills of qualified employees is an ongoing and
critical effort of operators. API has also developed RP 1161, Pipeline
Operator Qualification, to give operators direction on ensuring those
individuals performing important tasks that relate to pipeline
operations and safety are appropriately trained and competent.
Should an incident occur, pipeline operators are ready to respond.
Through coordinated emergency response programs with federal, state and
local first responders and agencies, operators ensure timely, seamless,
and effective responses. API RP 1174, Onshore Hazardous Liquid Pipeline
Emergency Preparedness and Response, which was developed with input
from operators, regulators, and first responders, seeks to improve
emergency response capabilities by providing a management system and
framework for operators to ensure they are prepared to respond to any
event and coordinate response actions with both our government and
first responder partners in an efficient manner. RPs 1161 and 1174 are
just a few of the available documents developed in collaboration with
federal and state regulators, academics and other interested
stakeholders, which through effective implementation and training will
help improve safety across the industry.
Pipeline Safety Reauthorization Priorities
As stated earlier, to improve upon our strong safety record and
reach our goal of zero pipeline incidents, it is imperative that the
regulatory environment and PHMSA be positioned to meet current and
future safety challenges. As such, there are three priority areas where
PHMSA reauthorization can support the shared objective of industry and
the regulating agency in advancing pipeline safety.
1. Recognizing Role of Technology, Innovation, and Leading Practices in
Reaching Zero
As an industry dependent on technology and leading engineering
practices, pipeline operators want flexibility to implement and utilize
the latest tools, methodologies and industry standards to appropriately
manage safety risks on their facilities. However, companies are, in
many instances, unable to utilize the latest technology and leading
engineering practices because of the requirements associated with
outdated regulations coupled with the burdensome approval process in
the use of alternative safety technology. To facilitate the
demonstration of an operator's effective use of state-of-the-art
technology and risk-based approaches, the PIPES Act of 2020 included a
provision that established a technology pilot program. Although a step
in the right direction, the onerous nature of the program application
requirements imposed by PHMSA proved to be an impediment to operators
pursuing opportunities for testing new technology, and counter to the
intent of the Congressional mandate. However, we believe the program
still has merit and should be reauthorized in 2023 but more importantly
modified to include more streamlined parameters that encourage, rather
than discourage, an operator to participate.
For decades, a strong culture of sharing and learning has been at
the center of our industry's efforts to advance pipeline safety. This
includes individual company and peer to peer shares as well as annual
industry wide events to openly share information and lessons learned
across a broad range of topic areas, including pipeline system
incidents, near misses, industry best practices, and improvements made
to pipeline safety programs through practical experiences. This
commitment and willingness to proactively share information on the part
of our operators has been an effective tool to drive continuous
improvement across the industry. That said, over time, the industry has
evolved to recognize that there are even greater opportunities to learn
from one another. As such, we continue to support the establishment of
a more formal voluntary information sharing framework with the right
protections, similar in nature and function to the successful Federal
Aviation Administration and airline industry's voluntary information
sharing framework. This multi-stakeholder center of excellence for the
energy pipeline sector based on the proposed framework from the PHMSA
Voluntary Information Sharing (VIS) effort from the PIPES Act of 2016,
is a starting point. Congress should consider including language that
encourages the use of academic institutions to house or play a role in
the new Center location, in particular, institutions that have strong
energy programs.
The PHMSA National Pipeline Mapping System (NPMS) represents the
system of record upon which pipeline operators determine whether a
pipeline segment directly intersects or ``could affect'' a High
Consequence Area (HCA) and, as a result, which segments of a pipeline
system require an Integrity Management Program (IMP). Recent experience
of pipeline operators in updating HCA analysis for their systems has
shown errors in the NPMS data layers for certain HCA categories, and
questions have been raised about the sources of scientific studies and
frequency of updating the information used to develop the data layers.
Transparency and improvements in the process followed by PHMSA need to
be provided, and industry review and participation in the process
should be considered.
Lastly, there are more than 650 API standards referenced in Federal
regulation. As these standards are improved through the American
National Standards Institute (ANSI)-accredited process at a minimum of
every 5 years, Federal regulations where standards were deemed
appropriate for incorporation by reference, often are unable to be
updated in a timely manner. As such, they do not keep pace with
advances in pipeline safety technology and modern engineering practices
incorporated into leading industry standards. Currently, approximately
50 percent of the instances where PHMSA cites API standards are not
referencing the most recent version of those standards. For those API
standards incorporated by reference that are updated, PHMSA should
execute a more frequent review that can use the existing rulemaking
process to incorporate the latest edition. We ask that Congress
consider a requirement for PHMSA to ensure regulations are updated to
reflect the latest edition of incorporated by reference standards
within two years of completion.
2. Proactively Advancing a Safe and Sustainable Energy Future
Pipeline operators continue to address the challenge of climate
change while providing affordable, safe and reliable energy. The oil
and natural gas industry is also committed to building tools and
implementing practices to enhance sustainability throughout its
operations, and advancing a lower carbon future while reliably
delivering energy products to meet increasing demand in the US, and
low-carbon solutions are critical to achieving this goal. As the
industry continues to invest in energy innovations like hydrogen
(H2) and renewable natural gas (RNG) that will fuel the low-
carbon future, a robust carbon dioxide (CO2) infrastructure
system, including pipelines, is vital to meeting environmental
commitments to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.
As we embrace a low carbon energy future, it is imperative that
pipeline safety regulations reflect current safety risks, consider
existing industry standards pertaining to CO2 and hydrogen
pipeline construction and operation, and incorporate the latest
findings from PHMSA-sponsored and industry funded research and
development for new pipeline systems and repurposing of existing energy
pipeline infrastructure. Regulatory updates should consider an
assessment of the adequacy of Parts of 49 CFR that specifically address
CO2 pipeline safety for all phases of CO2 in
pipeline transportation (i.e., supercritical, liquid, gas). As industry
continues to develop new standards and Recommended Practices for
CO2 pipeline safety, it will also be important for PHMSA to
consider and ensure timely incorporation by reference into regulations.
As a standard setting organization, API strongly supports the
development of updates to CO2 pipeline safety regulations to
address transporting CO2 in a gas phase based on existing
standards developed through API, the American Society of Mechanical
Engineers (ASME), the Association for Materials Protection and
Performance (AMPP), and the International Standards Organization (ISO).
The update to these regulations will require close coordination with
Department of Energy (DOE), PHMSA, and Pipeline Research Council
International (PRCI) to ensure incorporation of research and technology
development programs that address design, construction, operations, and
inspection and maintenance, and to defer development of new regulations
until the research is completed and results from that work are
available.
Also, in carrying out its responsibility to provide safe, reliable,
and affordable energy, our industry is committed to sustainable
operations and risk-based inspection programs that focus on reducing
harmful emissions. Specifically, as it relates to the inspection of
above ground storage tanks, operators look to the latest technologies
and leading engineering practices based on industry standards to
identify risks without taking tanks out of service. As a result, by
decreasing the frequency of visual inspections, operators are able to
reduce unnecessary releases of VOCs associated with preparing tanks for
inspection. However, as previously discussed, approximately 50 percent
of the API standards that are cited by PHMSA in federal pipeline safety
regulations are not referencing the most recent edition of those
standards which includes API Standard 653, Standards for Tank
Inspection, Repair, Alteration and Reconstruction and as such do not
reflect current leading industry approaches for tank inspections. This
includes risk-based approaches similar to what has been accepted by
other federal and state agencies, including the EPA's Spill Prevention,
Control and Countermeasure (SPCC) program. Thus, operators are required
to take their aboveground storage tanks out of service at predetermined
intervals with no added benefit to safety, which unnecessarily
increases VOC emissions. PHMSA should acknowledge the value of
technology and leading engineering practices, and we are asking
Congress to require PHMSA through rulemaking to help reduce
environmental impacts by allowing more proactive operator use of risk-
based tank inspection protocols through the incorporation of the latest
edition of API Standard 653 by reference.
Lastly, pipeline safety can be managed effectively through data-
driven inspection and maintenance, instead of the arbitrary pipe
replacements required by the current class location change regulations.
Class location regulations result in unnecessary replacement projects
that can disrupt natural gas service and release up to 800 million
standard cubic feet of natural gas every year, which is equivalent to
the annual natural gas use of over 12,000 homes. Each year the class
location changes regulations and diverts hundreds of millions of
dollars towards replacing less than 75 miles of pipe. There are many
more productive ways to expend these substantial resources. For
example, for the same cost of replacing 75 miles of pipe, we could
instead assess 25,000 miles of pipelines with in-line inspection tools
that would reduce the risk of potential incidents that could impact
people or the environment. As such, as mandated by Congress in the 2020
PIPES Act, PHMSA needs to publish a final rule on class location
changes.
3. Embracing and Recognizing Communities as Partners in Safety
As the industry expands oil and natural gas infrastructure, it is
incumbent on pipeline operators to establish local relationships,
address performance issues and engage community stakeholders. The
industry's commitment to being a good neighbor throughout the lifecycle
of a pipeline requires ongoing dialogue with local communities and
other key stakeholders. API continues to spearhead efforts on public
and community engagement initiatives to reinforce industry's social
license to operate. The center of API's stakeholder and public
engagement strategic goal continues to be the development of
Recommended Practice (RP) 1185, Pipeline Public Engagement, which
addresses critical topics such as environmental justice, engagement
with landowners and tenants, and other issues concerning effective
community engagement throughout the entire lifecycle of a pipeline.
Additionally, API recently published the third edition of RP 1162,
Public Awareness Programs for Pipeline Operators and is in the process
of developing an implementation guidance website. The 3rd edition
includes significant updates that reflect more forward leaning industry
approaches to engaging with and raising public and stakeholder
awareness of pipeline operations and important safety programs along
pipeline right of ways that protect the public and environment.
Specifically, this provision expands the current requirements of
pipeline operator public awareness programs, incorporating the latest
mechanism for sharing information, expanding risk communications, and
establishing processes for evaluating the effectiveness of programs.
API strongly encourages PHMSA to initiate a rulemaking to consider the
inclusion of the latest edition of RP 1162 (3rd edition).
Lastly, API remains committed to building tools and platforms to
help the industry enhance and expand a culture of safety and
sustainability across all operations. As such, API published
conservation guidelines for right of way (ROW) ecological and habitat
management and is working with member companies in partnership with
NGOs, such as Pheasants Forever, in implementing conservation projects
throughout the United States. Built upon adaptive management
principles, the API Conservation Program takes an integrated and
systematic approach in sustaining ROW land management that is value-
driven and enhances safety, community benefits, operational
efficiencies, and a healthier ecosystem while maintaining state and
federal regulatory compliance and considering associated risk and cost.
As pipeline operators continue to advance conservation programs, it is
important that the regulations recognize these alternative approaches
and allow pipeline operators to maintain right of ways using non-
traditional methods including conservation, habitat management and
other related programs while ensuring pipelines can be effectively
monitored through required surveys. Conservation and habitat management
programs may require alternatives to existing requirements for line
markers and leak detection methodologies, etc. As such, API would like
changes to statute and ultimately regulations that recognize the
importance of approaching right of way maintenance in non-traditional
ways, while still meeting regulatory requirements for safety.
Conclusion
Safety of the public and the environment is our industry's top
priority, and collaboration with PHMSA only strengthens our ability to
transport our products across America with the fewest possible number
of incidents. We are committed to promoting safety in all our
operations, helping to ensure that American families and businesses can
efficiently access affordable and reliable energy. Thank you for the
opportunity to provide comments in advance of the hearing and
deliberations on pipeline safety reauthorization.

Press Release of March 8, 2023, from the Distribution Contractors
Association and the United Association of Union Plumbers and
Pipefitters, Submitted for the Record by Hon. Troy E. Nehls
Contact:
Eben M. Wyman
(703) 740-6126
eben@wymanassociates.net
For Immediate Release

March 8, 2023
Construction Entities Call for Punishment for Pipeline Attacks,
Improved Mapping in Pipeline Safety Hearing
Richardson, TX--The Distribution Contractors Association (DCA) and
the United Association of Union Plumbers and Pipefitters (UA) urge
Congress to take action to address the enduring problem of physical
attacks on critical energy infrastructure. In addition, Congress should
include provisions to encourage the use of geographic information
systems (GIS) mapping as part of these damage prevention programs. On
Wednesday, the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee's
Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials held a
hearing on ``Pipeline Safety: Reviewing Implementation of the PIPES Act
of 2020 and Examining Future Safety Needs.''
The hearing was held to evaluate efforts to meet the mandates
included in the Protecting Our Infrastructure of Pipelines and
Enhancing Safety (PIPES) Act of 2020 at a time when the Committee
intends to reauthorize the federal pipeline safety program this year.
These organizations are advocating on a range of issues pending in this
year's pipeline safety discussion, including suggested actions to curb
physical attacks on energy infrastructure and to encourage the use of
GIS mapping.
Protection of Critical Infrastructure from Physical Attacks
``While criminal attacks on pipeline infrastructure is not headline
news anymore, sabotage on natural gas pipelines is an enduring problem
and needs to be addressed,'' said Rob Darden, Executive Vice President
of DCA. ``While DCA supports the right for peaceful activism, including
peaceful protests, we strongly support legislative language that would
hold those who engage in criminal activities during protests more
accountable.''
``In addition, pipeline facilities under construction should be
included within the scope of this provision. While interfering or
tampering with the operation of a pipeline would clearly compromise
pipeline safety, vandalism and destruction of nearby equipment used to
build a pipeline can be just as dangerous,'' says Darden. ``For
example, setting construction equipment on fire near a natural gas
pipeline can be as dangerous as turning a valve.''
``United Association members are the best trained and most highly
skilled craftspeople in the industry--and we work tirelessly to provide
reliable and affordable energy to millions of Americans. Sadly,
physical attacks on pipeline infrastructure itself and even our
equipment and jobsites compromise our shared goals and put the safety
of our members at risk,'' said Mark McManus, General President of the
United Association. ``Strong bipartisan action to hold perpetrators
accountable, and to curb future attacks, is essential to protecting our
members on the jobsite and ensuring we can meet our shared energy
goals.''
GIS Mapping
The PIPES Act of 2020 include provisions to require operators of
gas distribution pipelines to ``identify and manage traceable,
reliable, and complete records, including maps and other drawings,''
and language that will ensure that this documentation is ``accessible
to all personnel responsible for performing or overseeing relevant
construction or engineering work.'' DCA and the UA believe increased
use of GIS is the most effective method of mapping underground
facilities, including natural gas pipelines.
``Accurate mapping of underground facilities is a fundamental part
of accurate and timely locating,'' Darden said. ``Ensuring the use of
GIS should be considered a priority as pipeline safety legislation is
developed and considered.''
GIS connects data to a map, integrating location data with a range
of limiting information regarding the subsurface facilities in that
area, and it allows for layering of data tied to geographic points.
Rather than restricting the user to limited features on a static map,
GIS mapping allows for viewing customizable combinations of data layers
in a single dynamic tool.

# # #

The Distribution Contractors Association represents contractors,
suppliers and manufacturers who provide distribution construction
services including installation, replacement and rehabilitation of gas
pipelines and fiber optic, cable and duct systems in communities across
the country.

Founded in 1889, the United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices
of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry of the United States and
Canada, AFL-CIO, CLC (UA) proudly represents more than 362,000 highly
skilled journeymen and apprentice plumbers, pipefitters, pipeliners,
sprinkler fitters, welders, and HVACR service techs in the US and
Canada. The UA is an affiliate of the AFL-CIO, North America's Building
Trades Unions (NABTU), and the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC).

Mr. Nehls. In closing, I want to thank our witnesses for
coming today. I appreciate you being here.
I will now yield back and recognize Ranking Member Payne
for 5 minutes for an opening statement.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD M. PAYNE, Jr., OF NEW JERSEY,
RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON RAILROADS, PIPELINES, AND
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS

Mr. Payne. Thank you, Chairman Nehls. It is an honor and a
privilege to serve on this committee with you, and I am looking
forward to your leadership and the bipartisan manner which you
have already demonstrated. It is greatly appreciated.
I would like to also thank Chairman Graves for his help,
and also thank Ranking Member Larsen for being here, and all
the witnesses that are with us today. Thank you.
Before I get to the subject of today's hearing, I want to
note that this is the first hearing of the Subcommittee on
Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials this Congress,
and the first following Norfolk Southern derailment in East
Palestine, Ohio. This has been followed by additional Norfolk
Southern derailments in southeast Michigan and Springfield,
Ohio. Just this week, a Norfolk Southern employee lost his life
in a collision in Cleveland.
Chairman Nehls, thank you for visiting East Palestine
immediately following the derailment. I look forward to working
with you this Congress to tackle freight and rail safety.
I am pleased that the Senate has put forth a bipartisan
freight rail safety bill, and I am hopeful that we can do the
same on this side.
The safe operation of pipelines is vital to protect both
our energy needs and the communities these pipelines run
through.
These are not just abstract concerns. Just last December, a
pipeline operated by TC Energy ruptured in northeast Kansas,
spilling over 14,000 barrels of crude oil. If you have a hard
time visualizing 14,000 barrels, it's the same volume as 20
rail tank cars.
In Linden, New Jersey, in my district, a pipeline operated
by Buckeye Partners ruptured and spilled 350 barrels adjacent
to a fragile wetland in March 2021.
We must learn lessons from these incidents as well as the
Denbury incident in Satartia, Mississippi, the Beta Offshore
incident in San Pedro Bay, California, and the Freeport LNG
incident in Quintana Island.
PHMSA reports that in 2022, 631 pipeline incidents
occurred, from which 10 individuals died, 24 were injured, and
property damages totaled more than $680 million. Of these
incidents, 17 were serious and 267 were significant.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today about
their commitment to safety, if PHMSA has the resources
necessary to hold bad actors accountable, and how can we make
sure that what goes into pipelines stays in the pipes.
I am also interested to hear about PHMSA's progress on
carbon dioxide pipeline rulemaking.
The safe transmission of carbon dioxide to sequester
locations is vital to meeting our carbon reduction goals, and I
want to make sure this can be implemented without delay.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the time, and I yield back.
[Mr. Payne's prepared statement follows:]

Prepared Statement of Hon. Donald M. Payne, Jr., a Representative in
Congress from the State of New Jersey, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee
on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials
Thank you, Chairman Nehls, Chairman Graves, Ranking Member Larsen,
and all our witnesses for being with us today.
Before I get to the subject of today's hearing, I want to note that
this is the first hearing of the Railroad Subcommittee this Congress
and the first following the Norfolk Southern derailment in East
Palestine, Ohio.
This has been followed by additional Norfolk Southern derailments
in Southeast Michigan and Springfield, Ohio
Just this week a Norfolk Southern employee lost his life in a
collision in Cleveland.
Chairman Nehls, thank you for visiting East Palestine immediately
following the derailment.
I look forward to working with you this Congress to tackle freight
rail safety.
I'm pleased that the Senate has put forth a bipartisan freight rail
safety bill and I'm hopeful that we can do the same over here.
The safe operation of pipelines is vital to protecting both our
energy needs and the communities these pipelines run through.
These are not just abstract concerns.
Just last December, a pipeline operated by TC Energy ruptured in
northeast Kansas, spilling over 14,000 barrels of crude oil.
If you have a hard time visualizing 14,000 barrels, it's the same
volume as 20 rail tank cars.
In Linden, New Jersey, in my district, a pipeline operated by
Buckeye Partners ruptured and spilled 350 barrels adjacent to a fragile
wetland in March 2021.
We must learn lessons from these incidents as well as the Denbury
incident in Satartia, Mississippi, the Beta Offshore incident in San
Pedro Bay, California, and the Freeport LNG incident in Quintana
Island.
PHMSA reports that in 2022, 631 pipeline incidents occurred, from
which 10 individuals died, 24 were injured, and property damages
totaled more than 680 million dollars.
Of these incidents, 17 were serious and 267 were significant.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today about their
commitment to safety, if PHMSA has the resources necessary to hold bad
actors accountable, and how we can make sure that what goes into
pipelines stays in the pipes.
I'm also interested to hear about PHMSA's progress on carbon
dioxide pipeline rulemaking.
The safe transmission of carbon dioxide to sequester locations is
vital to meeting our carbon reduction goals, and I want to make sure
this can be implemented without delay.
Thank you again Mr. Chairman, and I yield back my time.

Mr. Nehls. Thank you, Mr. Payne. I appreciate that. I now
recognize the ranking member of the full committee, Mr. Larsen,
for 5 minutes for an opening statement.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICK LARSEN OF WASHINGTON, RANKING
MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

Mr. Larsen of Washington. Thank you. Thank you, Chair Nehls
and Ranking Member Payne, for calling this hearing on pipeline
safety.
On June 10, 1999, a pipeline explosion in Bellingham,
Washington, claimed the lives of two 10-year-old boys and a
young man of 18 years. The explosion released 237,000 gallons
of gasoline into Whatcom Creek that flowed through Whatcom
Falls Park in Bellingham, Washington. The ensuing fireball
caused millions of dollars of damage, shocked the community
that day, and is still a seminal moment in the history of the
town of Bellingham.
It is that explosion that spurred my commitment, which has
been steadfast over the last 20 years, to the highest level of
pipeline safety. For my entire tenure in Congress, I have
fought to reduce the risk of pipeline incidents, promote
transparency of pipeline safety information for local
communities, and increase accountability for pipeline
operators.
Mr. Chair, I ask unanimous consent to submit a letter for
the record from a parent of one of the boys killed in the
explosion in my district, Bellingham City Council Member Skip
Williams. This letter outlines a number of recommendations to
improve the safety and oversight of our pipeline system. So, I
ask unanimous consent to enter that in the record.
Mr. Nehls. Without objection, so ordered.
[The information follows:]

Letter of March 7, 2023, to Hon. Troy E. Nehls, Chairman, and Donald M.
Payne, Jr., Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and
Hazardous Materials, and Hon. Sam Graves, Chairman, and Hon. Rick
Larsen, Ranking Member, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
from Edwin H. ``Skip'' Williams, Bellingham City Council (Washington
State), Submitted for the Record by Hon. Rick Larsen
March 7, 2023.
The Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials of
the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,

Representative Troy Nehls, Subcommittee Chair,
Representative Donald Payne, Subcommittee Ranking Member,
Representative Sam Graves, Transportation and Infrastructure Committee
Chair,
Representative Rick Larsen, Transportation and Infrastructure Committee
Ranking Member,

Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, DC.

RE: Reviewing implementation of the PIPES Act of 2020 and Examining
Future Pipeline Safety Needs

Dear Subcommittee members,
I am Edwin H ``Skip'' Williams, a 30-year resident of the city of
Bellingham, Washington, currently serving as a member of the Bellingham
City Council. Thank you for allowing me to address your subcommittee
hearing voicing my support for the overall need of pipeline safety and,
more specifically, the elements addressed in the implementation of the
PIPES Act of 2020 and your examination of future pipeline needs.
My family and I are victims of the Olympic Pipeline explosion that
occurred in our city in 1999 where we lost one of our children. When
the Olympic pipeline exploded there seemed to be very few regulations,
industry practices, or oversight regarding pipeline safety. The
elements that did exist did not seem to be enforced very consistently
if at all. This event in our community highlighted the need for
research, consistent industry safety standards regarding best
practices, and oversight from all levels of government in order to
enforce these safety standards.
I strongly believe that there needs to be open communications
between pipeline operators, local communities, and federal and state
governmental agencies in order to avoid pipeline accidents such as the
Olympic Pipeline explosion.
As I read through the summary of the issues being considered by the
committee for implementation of the PIPES Act of 2020 and the
committee's examination of future safety needs, I see the following as
priorities:
1. Providing greater resources at the state and local level to
increase the number of pipeline inspectors.
2. Eliminating the backlog of rulemaking through greater
congressional oversight and additional resources.
3. Minimizing leaks and releases into our environment by requiring
updated inspection and maintenance plans of pipeline operators.
4. The study of methods to improve pipeline integrity in order to
address risks posed by ageing cast iron pipes and low pressure systems.

I feel strongly that these are all significant steps forward
improving the oversight protections and maintaining the integrity of
our pipeline system.
I greatly appreciate the opportunity to share my perspective on
pipeline safety with the subcommittee. If you would like to discuss
these concerns with me further, please feel free to contact me.
Sincerely,
Edwin H. ``Skip'' Williams,
Bellingham City Council.

Per Washington state law RCW 42.56, my written communications are
public records and are subject to public disclosure requirements.

Mr. Larsen of Washington. I share many of Council Member
Williams' views, and as ranking member, I will ensure that this
committee's work to reauthorize the PIPES Act of 2020 puts
safety at the forefront of every policy decision.
Putting safety first means greater oversight and
accountability of the activities of pipeline operators. It
means greater transparency for local communities and the
public. Reducing the risk of incidents means applying safety
requirements, where appropriate, to existing pipeline
infrastructure. PHMSA, the agency, cannot effectively do its
job if the infrastructure already in the ground is off limits
to safety regulation.
Improving safety means preventing incidents. PHMSA needs to
have the resources and staff to inspect pipelines, conduct
investigations if incidents occur, and take appropriate
enforcement action.
I am especially pleased that we will hear detailed
recommendations on what actions Congress can take to advance
safety from a fellow Washingtonian and constituent from Whatcom
County on today's panel, Bill Caram, executive director of the
Pipeline Safety Trust. The Trust was formed following the
deadly Olympic pipeline explosion in my district. I think you
will hear from Bill that the Pipeline Safety Trust is both a
watchdog and also can be a partner with communities and with
industry to ensure long-term safety.
I appreciate each of our witnesses, as well, being here
today. I want to welcome PHMSA Deputy Administrator Tristan
Brown, who visited the district to tour the Olympic pipeline
site in Bellingham.
PHMSA has a new charge, as well, since the enactment of the
Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, to distribute $1 billion over 5
years under the first-ever Natural Gas Distribution
Infrastructure Safety and Modernization grant program. The $200
million available to municipalities and community-owned
utilities in fiscal year 2022 is the first installment of this
funding to repair or replace natural gas pipelines and help
reduce incidents and improve safety. And this is just the
beginning.
All safety responsibility, though, must not fall to PHMSA.
I encourage the involvement of communities and public interest
organizations in pipeline safety, and I support ongoing grants
to support the 400 State-based safety inspectors of intrastate
pipelines and local distribution systems.
Finally, as we convene the Subcommittee on Railroads,
Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials for the first time in this
Congress, I do want to call attention to the request from
Members on my side of the aisle, led by Ranking Member Payne
and Representative Sykes, that this committee hold a hearing on
the Norfolk Southern derailment in East Palestine, Ohio. I
endorse and support their efforts.
Pipelines play a critical role in the Nation's
infrastructure and the daily lives of Americans. And we are
here today to make sure the national pipeline network safely
delivers essential energy products across the country. I look
forward to today's discussion.
[Mr. Larsen of Washington's prepared statement follows:]

Prepared Statement of Hon. Rick Larsen, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Washington, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure
Thank you, Chairman Graves, Chairman Nehls and Ranking Member Payne
for calling this hearing on pipeline safety.
On June 10, 1999, a pipeline explosion in Bellingham, WA claimed
the lives of two 10-year-old boys and a young man of 18 years. The
explosion also released 237,000 gallons of gasoline into Whatcom Creek
that flowed through Whatcom Falls Park in Bellingham, Washington. The
ensuing fireball caused millions of dollars of damage. It shocked the
community that day and is still a seminal moment in the history of the
town of Bellingham.
This explosion spurred my commitment, which has been steadfast for
over 20 years, to the highest level of pipeline safety. For my entire
tenure in Congress, I have fought to reduce the risk of pipeline
incidents, promote transparency of pipeline safety information for
local communities and increase accountability for pipeline operators.
I ask unanimous consent to submit a letter for the record from a
parent of one of the boys killed in the explosion in my district,
Bellingham City Council Member Skip Williams. This letter outlines a
number of recommendations to improve the safety and oversight of our
pipeline system.
I share many of Councilmember Williams' views and as Ranking
Member, I will ensure that this Committee's work to reauthorize the
PIPES Act of 2020 puts safety at the forefront of every policy
decision.
Putting safety first means greater oversight and accountability of
the activities of pipeline operators. It also means greater
transparency for local communities and the public.
Reducing the risk of incidents means applying safety requirements,
where appropriate, to existing pipeline infrastructure. PHMSA cannot
effectively do its job if infrastructure already in the ground is off
limits to safety regulation.
Improving safety means preventing incidents. PHMSA needs to have
the resources and staff to inspect pipelines, conduct investigations if
incidents occur, and take appropriate enforcement action.
I am especially pleased that we will hear detailed recommendations
on what actions Congress can take to advance safety from a fellow
Washingtonian--and constituent from Whatcom County--on today's panel:
Bill Caram, Executive Director of the Pipeline Safety Trust. The Trust
was formed following the deadly Olympic Pipeline explosion in my
district. I think you will hear from Bill that the Pipeline Safety
Trust is both a watch dog and can also be a partner with communities
and with industry to ensure long-term safety.
I appreciate each of our witnesses being here today. I want to
welcome PHMSA Deputy Administrator Tristan Brown, who visited
Washington's Second District to tour the Olympic pipeline site in
Bellingham.
PHMSA has a new charge, since the enactment of the Bipartisan
Infrastructure Law (BIL), to distribute $1 billion over five years
under the first ever Natural Gas Distribution Infrastructure Safety and
Modernization grant program. The $200 million available to
municipalities and community-owned utilities in FY 2022 is the first
installment of this funding to repair or replace natural gas pipelines
and help reduce incidents and improve safety. This is just the
beginning.
All safety responsibility must not fall to PHMSA. I encourage the
involvement of communities and public interest organizations in
pipeline safety. I support ongoing grants to support the 400 state-
based safety inspectors of intrastate pipelines and local distribution
systems.
Finally, as we convene the Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines,
and Hazardous Materials for the first time in this Congress, I call to
attention the request from Members on my side of the aisle, led by
Ranking Member Payne and Rep. Sykes, that this Committee hold a hearing
on the Norfolk Southern derailment in East Palestine, Ohio. I endorse
and support their efforts.
Pipelines play a critical role in the nation's infrastructure and
the daily lives of Americans. We are here today to make sure the
national pipeline network safely delivers essential energy products
across the country. I look forward to today's discussion.

Mr. Larsen of Washington. With that, I yield back. Thank
you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Nehls. Mr. Larsen yields. Again, I would like to
welcome our witnesses, and thank you for being here today.
I ask unanimous consent that the witnesses' full statements
be included in the record.
Without objection, so ordered.
As your written testimony has been made part of the record,
the subcommittee asks that you limit your oral remarks to 5
minutes.
With that, Deputy Administrator Brown, you are recognized
for 5 minutes for your testimony.

TESTIMONY OF TRISTAN BROWN, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, PIPELINE AND
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION (PHMSA); ANDREW J.
BLACK, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, LIQUID ENERGY
PIPELINE ASSOCIATION (LEPA); KENNETH W. GRUBB, CHIEF OPERATING
OFFICER, NATURAL GAS PIPELINES, KINDER MORGAN, INC., ON BEHALF
OF THE INTERSTATE NATURAL GAS ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA (INGAA);
AND BILL CARAM, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, PIPELINE SAFETY TRUST

TESTIMONY OF TRISTAN BROWN, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, PIPELINE AND
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION (PHMSA)

Mr. Brown. Thank you, Chairman Nehls. Thank you, Ranking
Member Payne. Thank you, Ranking Member Larsen. And to the rest
of the committee, welcome to the new Members, and welcome back
to the returning Members.
At the Department of Transportation and within PHMSA,
safety is the top priority of Secretary Buttigieg, Deputy
Secretary Trottenberg, myself, and all of the employees at
PHMSA. We all appreciate this subcommittee's interest and
support for strengthening pipeline safety across our country.
PHMSA is responsible for overseeing the safe transport of
hazardous materials through pipelines and also via other modes
of transportation, including planes, trains, trucks,
automobiles, and vessels. On that note, although I am here with
a panel of pipeline experts to discuss PHMSA's work in
advancing pipeline safety, I want to take this chance to
acknowledge that, as an agency, as a Department, and across the
Federal Government, we remain focused on holding Norfolk
Southern accountable for the terrible tragedy in East
Palestine, Ohio. And we will continue to provide support to
that community and to the National Transportation Safety
Board's investigation.
Over the years, despite oftentimes fierce opposition from
the industries we regulate, PHMSA has worked to strengthen
safety measures for transporting hazardous materials, and we
look forward to working with Members on both sides of the aisle
to continue those efforts by statute, by regulation, or any
other means of achieving results for the people of East
Palestine and many other communities that have suffered similar
incidents in the past.
PHMSA's oversight of hazardous materials via other modes
includes nearly 1 in 10 goods that are transported in the
United States, everything from nuclear waste to lithium-ion
batteries to explosives used in excavation mining and energy
production. In the United States, nearly two-thirds of the
energy we consume is transported via a pipeline that we
regulate.
Over the past few decades, growth in energy production in
the United States has increased to record levels over the last
few years. Concurrently, U.S. transportation of these products
has increased, and exports of energy have also reached record
levels. This has placed new and heightened demands on our
pipeline and refined product storage infrastructure, as well as
export facilities such as LNG terminals, which PHMSA also
regulates.
Under Secretary Buttigieg's leadership, PHMSA has been
focused on executing bipartisan congressional mandates in the
PIPES Act of 2020, historic infrastructure investments that
came from the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law of 2021 that
Ranking Member Larsen mentioned, strengthening our safety
mission, and ensuring the U.S. maintains the most efficient and
competitive transportation system in the world.
The bipartisan PIPES Act of 2020 significantly strengthened
PHMSA's jurisdiction related to the minimization of methane
emissions across all of our regulated entities in an effort to
improve public safety and protect our environment. Our efforts
on this front include completing three major legacy pipeline
safety rulemakings, each of which were more than a decade in
the making, including new regulations on 400,000 miles of gas
gathering pipelines, pipeline rupture detection and rupture
mitigation valve installation, and Coastal Ecological Unusually
Sensitive Areas, including the Great Lakes.
Our regulatory agenda over the past 2 years has been
exceptionally full. PHMSA has been hard at work closing out
years' long--and in some cases, decades' long--efforts on final
rules, as well as initiating important new rulemakings from the
2020 PIPES Act.
However, with all of the good work that is being done to
advance pipeline safety by the promulgation of new rules, PHMSA
has faced a new normal in terms of increased challenges to its
rulemakings. This is resulting in longer development timelines
and diversion of personnel resources to respond to legal
challenges. That time could otherwise be utilized to advance
the myriad congressional directives and regulatory priorities
of the agency and stakeholders.
Regardless of these challenges, PHMSA won't be swayed from
its mission. PHMSA has initiated several priority rulemakings
that look to address important PIPES Act mandates and emerging
safety issues, including leak detection and leak repair, the
safety of gas distribution pipelines, updated LNG facilities
regulations, and an overhaul of the safety requirements for
pipelines transporting carbon dioxide.
As previously noted, PHMSA's oversight responsibilities
continue to grow, both in terms of the types of facilities we
regulate, as well as the number of facilities we regulate. And
we have had to continuously operate relatively leaner, as
compared to our expanded universe of regulated facilities. To
meet congressional directives to improve efforts to attract and
retain pipeline engineers and inspectors, PHMSA has undertaken
new recruitment and retention efforts, has kept up with the
hiring mandates included in the PIPES Act, both for inspectors
as well as for regulatory personnel, that have helped lead the
agency to some of its most important, productive years ever, in
terms of both finalizing rulemakings, as well as enforcement
actions, and has reduced the trend in hazardous materials
pipeline incidents.
In closing, thank you again for the opportunity to engage
with you on the critical issues facing PHMSA and, in turn,
facing a major component of the largest, most sophisticated
energy transportation system in the world. We look forward to
continuing to work with you to improve pipeline and hazardous
materials safety, and to reduce associated environmental
impacts. I look forward to your questions.
[Mr. Brown's prepared statement follows:]

Prepared Statement of Tristan Brown, Deputy Administrator, Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA)
Introduction
Chairman Nehls, Ranking Member Payne, Jr., and members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify today on the U.S.
Department of Transportation's (DOT) Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration's (PHMSA) pipeline safety program. I appreciate
this subcommittee's support for strengthening pipeline safety across
our country. I am here on a panel of pipeline safety experts to discuss
PHMSA's work advancing pipeline safety, but I want to acknowledge that
as an agency, as a department, and across the Federal Government, we
also remain focused on holding Norfolk Southern accountable for the
terrible tragedy in East Palestine, OH--and will continue to provide
support to that community and to the National Transportation Safety
Board, the independent lead investigator. Over the years, despite often
fierce opposition from the industries we regulate, PHMSA has worked to
strengthen safety measures for transporting hazardous materials via
rail and other modes of transportation, We look forward to working with
members on both sides of the aisle to continue those efforts by
statute, by regulation, or any other means of achieving results for the
people of East Palestine and many other communities that have suffered
similar incidents in the past.
At DOT, and within PHMSA, safety is the top priority for Secretary
Buttigieg, Deputy Secretary Trottenberg, me, and all of the employees
at PHMSA. Specifically, PHMSA is responsible for overseeing the safe
transport of hazardous materials--through pipelines and also via other
modes of transportation--including planes, trains, trucks, and vessels.
PHMSA oversees the safe design, operation, and maintenance of the
Nation's nearly 3.4 million miles of oil, gas, and other hazardous
materials pipeline facilities for hydrogen, carbon dioxide, and other
emerging fuels. Additionally, PHMSA's oversight of hazardous materials
via other modes includes nearly 1 in 10 goods that are transported in
the U.S., everything from nuclear waste to lithium-ion batteries, to
explosives used in excavation, mining, and energy production. PHMSA
also chairs the International Civil Aviation Organization's Dangerous
Goods Panel, the international standards making body that sets the
global framework for the safe and efficient transport of these
materials across borders and around the world.
Under Secretary Buttigieg's leadership, PHMSA has been focused on
executing bipartisan congressional mandates in the Protecting our
Infrastructure of Pipelines and Enhancing Safety Act of 2020 (PIPES Act
of 2020), historic infrastructure investments from the Infrastructure
Investment and Jobs Act of 2021, strengthening our safety mission, and
ensuring that the U.S. has the safest, most efficient and competitive
transportation system in the world.
From the standpoint of the volume of work before us as an agency,
the challenges in carrying out our safety mission have never been
greater. We oversee an aging infrastructure that requires robust
maintenance, and, when needed, replacement. Most of the cross-country
pipeline infrastructure was built shortly after World War II--meaning
many pipelines are over 80 years old--and there are even a few gas
distribution segments that were installed during the Civil War era,
more than 150 years ago.
PHMSA has been integral to the whole-of-government approach to
mitigating unnecessary greenhouse gas emissions--an essential component
of operating the safest, most efficient and economically competitive
transportation and energy system of the 21st century.
Nearly two-thirds of the energy we consume in the U.S. is
transported via pipeline. Over the past few decades, growth in energy
production in the United States has increased to record levels.
Concurrently, U.S. transportation of these products has necessarily
increased, and exports of energy have--according to the Energy
Information Administration--also reached record levels. This has placed
new and heightened demands on our pipeline and refined products storage
infrastructure, as well as export facilities, such as liquefied natural
gas (LNG) terminals, which PHMSA also regulates.
The bipartisan PIPES Act of 2020 significantly strengthened PHMSA's
jurisdiction related to the minimization of methane emissions across
all of our regulated entities in an effort to improve public safety and
protect our environment. Our efforts on this front include completing
three major legacy pipeline safety rulemakings, each of which was more
than a decade in the making, including new regulations on 400,000 miles
of ``gas gathering'' pipelines--significantly increased by the fracking
boom that began in the 2000s but remained unregulated at the Federal
level until this past year. Since the enactment of the PIPES Act of
2020, Congress has added new incentives for infrastructure aimed at
decarbonizing energy and industrial sectors. Both the Infrastructure
Investment and Jobs Act and the Inflation Reduction Act include
significant incentives for the build-out of the hydrogen and carbon
capture utilization and storage (CCUS) sectors. To address new risks--
both safety and environmental--related to this infrastructure, PHMSA
has focused on strengthening its regulations and improving its research
in these areas. On the other side of the agency, which focuses on
hazardous materials transportation via other modes of transportation,
the agency has focused on improving safety in the transportation of
hydrogen and other cryogenic materials--via truck, train, plane, and
vessel--which is seeing new technology development and investments from
nearly every sector of the economy.
Also, since the enactment of the PIPES Act of 2020, PHMSA has
worked with Congress to advance its first-ever infrastructure grant
program, via the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act. The Natural
Gas Distribution Infrastructure Safety and Modernization (NGDISM) Grant
Program provides $1 billion spread over five years to improve the
safety of high-risk, leak-prone legacy natural gas distribution
infrastructure with a specific emphasis on benefiting underserved rural
and urban communities, among other considerations. Eligible entities
are municipality- or community-owned utilities, and funds are available
to these entities seeking assistance in repairing, rehabilitating, or
replacing high-risk, leak-prone natural gas distribution
infrastructure. Funds may also be used to acquire equipment to assist
in identifying and reducing natural gas distribution pipeline incidents
and fatalities. This grant funding will help communities of all sizes
make their infrastructure safer, create good jobs, reduce heat-trapping
methane from the atmosphere, and reduce the risks of fatality and
serious injury for residents and businesses. As of this hearing, we
expect to announce the first round of these grants imminently.
Rulemaking
Our regulatory agenda over the past two years has been
exceptionally full. PHMSA has been hard at work closing out years-long,
and in some cases decade-long, efforts on final rules as well as
initiating important new rulemakings from the 2020 PIPES Act.
Some of PHMSA's recently completed final rules include the sibling
rules to the Safety of Gas Transmission Pipelines final rule that we
published in 2019, including improved regulation of higher-risk gas
gathering pipelines; the 400,000 miles of additional pipelines
previously mentioned; required reporting of safety information for all
gas gathering pipelines; improved repair criteria for gas transmission
pipelines; and other enhanced safety requirements for gas transmission
pipelines regarding corrosion control, management of change, and
inspections following extreme weather events.
Additionally, in April of 2022, PHMSA published the long-awaited
final rule addressing rupture detection and rupture-mitigation valve
installation for many gas transmission, hazardous liquid, and gas and
hazardous liquid gathering pipelines, including carbon dioxide lines.
Among other important provisions, this rule requires the installation
of remote-control or automatic-shutoff valves, or equivalent
technology, that can close within 30 minutes of an operator being
notified of a potential rupture--saving lives and reducing methane
emissions.
In response to Congress' very stringent timeline for issuing a
final rule for Coastal Ecological Unusually Sensitive Areas (90 days),
PHMSA issued an Interim Final Rule to include additional coastal
waters, the Great Lakes, and coastal beaches within the definition of
an ``unusually sensitive area'' for the purposes of resilience and risk
reduction through hazardous liquid pipeline integrity management--
strengthening protections for these treasured natural environments.
PHMSA subsequently held a Liquid Pipeline Advisory Committee meeting on
the rulemaking and emerged from that meeting with recommendations to
help finalize this rule while addressing stakeholder concerns.
PHMSA has initiated several priority rulemakings that look to
address important PIPES Act of 2020 mandates and emerging safety
issues, including leak detection and leak repair, the safety of gas
distribution pipelines (as directed in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline
Safety Act), updated LNG facilities regulations, and an overhaul of the
safety requirements for pipelines transporting carbon dioxide.
As required by Congress, PHMSA continues to update the Federal
pipeline safety regulations (PSRs) to reflect new and revised voluntary
consensus standards developed and adopted by standards-setting bodies
(see e.g., PHMSA's periodic standards update rulemakings). We
understand how important updating and aligning standards can be to
ensure the PSR include up-to-date standards that reflect current best
practices and technologies--and to serve as a higher bar, from which
the regulated community can continue to improve.
Finally, PHMSA published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) in
October 2020 for Class Location Change Requirements. As you are aware,
PHMSA is required by statute to hold advisory committee meetings on our
proposed rules to solicit recommendations to ensure our rulemakings are
reasonable, feasible, cost-effective, and practicable. These advisory
committee meetings have helped derive consensus around highly technical
regulatory policies. The PIPES Act of 2020 requires PHMSA to hold an
advisory committee meeting on the NPRM for this rule. Based on the
aggressive timelines and safety priorities included in the PIPES Act of
2020, PHMSA is working to make efficient use of agency resources and
advisory committee members' time and anticipates holding an advisory
committee meeting on the NPRM in conjunction with publishing the most
important safety agenda items identified by Congress.
It is important to point out that rulemaking is designed to be an
iterative process that encourages maximum participation by all
stakeholders and rigorous analysis in support of decision making. This
process helps ensure the promulgation of comprehensive rules that
protect the public and the environment and meet our statutory
requirement for rules with benefits that exceed their costs. PHMSA
holds public meetings and workshops and conducts significant outreach
prior to rulemakings, using the information gathered to establish a
legal record and to strive to craft the most effective rules possible.
Such collaboration, well in advance of the rulemaking process, allows
PHMSA to identify concerns and potential solutions and to allocate its
limited resources where they are needed most. In the past, these
comprehensive efforts have also helped avoid expending additional
resources on legal challenges.
In addition to congressionally mandated rules, many of PHMSA's
rulemakings underway address important recommendations from the
National Transportation Safety Board, resulting from safety issues
identified during investigations in the aftermath of some tragic
accidents. PHMSA's rules also address recommendations from the U.S.
Government Accountability Office (GAO), the DOT Inspector General (DOT
IG), and the agency's own safety findings. When PHMSA proceeds with
such rulemakings identified by independent sources, it must make sure
that its regulations account for known safety issues, technological
feasibility, and cost-effectiveness.
Increased litigation
With all the good work that is being done to advance pipeline
safety by the promulgation of new rules, PHMSA also faces a new normal
in terms of increased challenges to its rulemakings, resulting in
longer development timelines and diversion of personnel resources to
respond to legal challenges--which could otherwise be utilized to
advance the myriad congressional directives and regulatory priorities
of the agency and stakeholders.
PHMSA has also seen a dramatic increase in interest in its
rulemakings pertaining to energy resources. By way of example, PHMSA's
LNG by Rail Suspension NPRM, issued in November 2021, has had over
7,000 comments--including a coordinated letter-writing campaign by
environmental advocacy organizations and a letter signed by over 20
State Attorneys General, as well as many members of the House of
Representatives on both sides of the aisle.
Specifically, PHMSA has finalized four major rulemakings over the
last year, and each of which has been the subject of judicial and/or
administrative challenges. PHMSA currently faces pending litigation
brought by pipeline industry trade groups on the Gas Gathering Final
Rule, Valve Installation and Repair Final Rule, among others, from
stakeholder groups and governments, across the spectrum.
PHMSA rulemaking resources are consequently spread thin. The same
subject matter experts, attorneys, and economists who develop new PHMSA
rules are also the ones who must help develop the briefs and arguments
to respond to legal challenges after issuance.
Enforcement and Compliance
While PHMSA's enforcement cases have remained relatively steady, we
have set records for our proposed civil penalties in 2021 and again in
2022. These cases, many of which are still being adjudicated, include
the worst carbon dioxide pipeline incident on record as well as a case
related to the 2021 Colonial Pipeline cybersecurity incident. PHMSA
continues to pursue 100% collections of the civil penalties it has
imposed; however, some operators with smaller civil penalties have
significantly delayed paying the penalties they owe.
In terms of forward-looking, potential rulemakings, the PSRs
currently include emergency planning, response, and timely notification
requirements for pipeline operators. However, incidents involving, for
example, carbon dioxide pipelines as well as LNG facilities, do not
necessarily require communications to communities who rightfully have
an increased fear of these facilities after a safety incident occurs.
PHMSA will look to its rulemaking authorities to help address the lack
of post-incident communications but we also welcome congressional ideas
in this space.
Another issue we're examining involves the safety and performance
of pipes manufactured outside of the U.S. Many larger operators deploy
their own inspectors when utilizing foreign-made pipe in their
projects--in order to ensure maximum safety and performance. However,
when those U.S. companies find non-spec pipe (pipe not meeting Federal
or industry standards), they may simply refuse to purchase it--which
may result in another U.S. pipeline construction company ultimately
purchasing or utilizing the same non-spec piping. On the hazardous
materials side of our agency, PHMSA deploys inspectors across the globe
to ensure products that are moving hazardous materials in the U.S. are
inspected by U.S. inspectors. PHMSA is conducting analysis to better
understand if non-spec foreign made pipes are being utilized in the
U.S.
Research and Innovation
While PHMSA continues to advance pipeline safety by strengthening
its regulations and enhancing its inspector training, inspections, and
enforcement programs, many of the root causes of incidents are best
addressed through research and technological innovation.
PHMSA's Pipeline Safety Research Program works with academia, the
regulated community, private research consortiums and federal partners
to sponsor research and development (R&D) projects focused on providing
near-term solutions for pipeline transportation infrastructure issues
that will improve safety, reduce environmental impact, and enhance
reliability.
Hydrogen/Carbon Dioxide (CO2)
In FY 2022, PHMSA awarded approximately $6 million in research
investments on hydrogen projects. Specifically, under the Competitive
Academic Agreement Program, PHMSA awarded two projects on pipeline
infrastructure and modernization for hydrogen networks to two
universities. These research opportunities expose students to the
pipeline safety sector to encourage them to join the federal or state
pipeline safety workforce or the private sector after graduation. PHMSA
also leverages the University Transportation Centers Program to meet
its research needs.
Also, in FY 2022, PHMSA awarded four projects related to hydrogen
pipelines and storage, under our Core Research Program, totaling just
over $2 million. These projects will research the safe transportation
and storage of hydrogen via repurposing existing infrastructure used
for natural gas transport and underground storage, improving hydrogen
leak detection, and characterizing hydrogen-specific pipeline integrity
threats.
PHMSA is collaborating with the Department of Energy (DOE) and
other DOT modes on developing a Memorandum of Understanding to
establish collaborative partnerships on R&D and safety associated with
the transport of carbon dioxide and hydrogen via pipelines, rail,
barge, ship, and truck.
Lastly, PHMSA announced last year new research topics to better
determine impact areas for the safer operations of carbon dioxide
pipelines. The results of this may help inform a current rulemaking
related to carbon dioxide pipelines but congressional attention related
to these issues is also welcome.
LNG
Recent global fluctuations in natural gas supplies as well as a
transition from more carbon-intensive energy sources continue to spark
investments in LNG. Currently, there are eight LNG export terminals
with a total LNG production capacity of approximately 14 billion
standard cubic feet per day (bcf/d) in the United States. There are
also five LNG projects under construction, which will add an estimated
11.9 bcf/d in LNG production capacity. To that end PHMSA has funded 14
R&D LNG-safety-related research projects since 2007; with nine
completed/closed and five currently active, all totaling $5.7 million.
Additionally, in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023,
Congress allocated up to $8.4 million to PHMSA for the creation of an
LNG Center of Excellence aimed at positioning the United States as the
leader and foremost expert in LNG operations--including safety and
environmental performance. PHMSA has already initiated planning for the
establishment of the Center which will enhance U.S. LNG operations and
safety education and oversight and may result in LNG regulatory
improvements. It will also serve as a repository of information and
facilitate collaboration among stakeholders to enhance safety and
environmental performance through research.
Funding for State Pipeline Safety Programs
Since 1970, when a national, uniform standard of pipeline safety
regulations was published, states have had the authority, through
PHMSA, to regulate the safety of intrastate pipelines. Under the
authority of Sections 60105 and 60106 of Title 49 U.S. Code (49 U.S.C.)
for state pipeline safety program certifications, states have been
allowed to assume safety authority for the inspection and enforcement
of intrastate pipelines. PHMSA sets the minimum Federal regulations for
pipeline safety, which the participating states then adopt into their
state code and enforce. States are allowed, under 49 U.S.C. Section
60104(c), to adopt more stringent safety standards than the minimum
standards PHMSA sets. This allows states to codify and enforce
regulations that deal with specific, regional (or local) risks that
might not be feasible or cost-beneficial to regulate at the Federal
level. Many states have established safety regulations that are more
stringent than the Federal regulations.
PHMSA relies on this extremely important partnership to accomplish
its safety mission, which is to protect people and the environment by
advancing the safe transportation of energy and other hazardous
materials that are essential to our daily lives. New pipeline safety
regulations and new infrastructure (such as gas gathering lines)
specific to state safety authority have and will continue to require
state pipeline safety programs to increase staff--in order to handle
the additional infrastructure oversight responsibilities. These state
pipeline safety programs employ approximately 435 inspectors who are
responsible for inspecting over 85 percent of the Nation's pipeline
infrastructure through certification with PHMSA.
The PIPES Act of 2020 allows PHMSA to pay not more than 80 percent
of the total cost of the personnel, equipment, and activities
reasonably required by the state agency for the conduct of its pipeline
safety program during a given calendar year. This was changed from 50
percent in the 2006 PIPES Act. However, for fiscal years 2019 to 2021
State Base Grant federal funding covered less than 70 percent of the
actual total state program costs. The actual federal funding is
estimated to be approximately 60 percent of the state program's total
costs for fiscal year 2022. Unfortunately, current year 2023 federal
funding is estimated to be only 56 percent of the total state program
costs--due, in part, to increasing needs from states. This is another
area where we welcome congressional ideas on how to support states and
their vital role in implementing many of the new regulations previously
discussed.
Control Room Management and Cyber Security
Not only is the industry facing expansion in the number of
regulated pipeline miles and changes in product demand, both industry
and regulators are addressing the growing threat of cyberattacks.
PHMSA, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and DOE have a
mutual interest in ensuring coordinated, consistent, and effective
activities that improve transportation security. PHMSA's safety
oversight of pipeline control rooms forms a nexus with TSA's
cybersecurity oversight, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security
Agency's (CISA's) role as the national coordinator for critical
infrastructure security, and DOE's national energy management. The 2021
cyber-attack on Colonial Pipeline demonstrated how critical it is for a
whole-of-government approach to safeguarding our Nation's critical
infrastructure--as well as collaboration with the private sector when
it comes to planning and communications.
PHMSA is leveraging its authorities to inspect and enforce three
components of pipeline operations including pipeline control room
regulations, integrity management plan requirements, and emergency
response plan regulations by incorporating cybersecurity questions in
inspections that focus on considering cyber as a risk and having
emergency response plans in place that consider the threat of
cyberattacks as well as envision measures to mitigate impacts to
operations. PHMSA has also engaged with CISA and TSA on cybersecurity
exercises for pipeline operators.
To help advance our safety mission as it relates to cybersecurity,
PHMSA is in the process of hiring pipeline and cybersecurity experts to
assist in control room management inspections and provide cyber
expertise support to PHMSA leadership. Cyber specialists can better
identify pipeline infrastructure-related cyber risks, incidents, and
significant issues that PHMSA currently lacks expertise in. This would
help increase information sharing, create better understanding between
agencies, and identify key issues between the nexus point of safety and
security.
PHMSA is increasing cybersecurity training opportunities for its
staff, as well as the staff of its state partners. By expanding the
knowledge base of inspectors, we are better positioned to identify
risks during routine control room inspections and coordinate when
needed with colleagues in TSA.
PHMSA is also developing an adaptable emergency preparedness plan
that will address the Agency's response to all-threat, all-hazard,
notice and no-notice incidents, including cybersecurity. As part of the
process, PHMSA is developing an organizational framework to respond to
those incidents, formal situational reporting internal and external to
PHMSA, formal information sharing processes, and specific coordination
methods between PHMSA, TSA, CISA, DOT Operating Administrations, DOE,
and the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
OIG inspection, GAO audits, and NTSB recommendations
In terms of PHMSA's compliance and inspection program, we recently
underwent a DOT IG audit, which was initiated in May 2022, to review
PHMSA's implementation of its Integrated Inspection Program. Throughout
the audit, the PHMSA team provided detailed overviews and walkthroughs
of its Integrated Inspection Program, including, but not limited to
planning, training, inspection conduct, and governing policies. PHMSA
even organized and facilitated the OIG's participation in several
ongoing integrated inspections, and, at PHMSA's invitation, OIG
personnel attended the Office of Pipeline Safety's annual inspection
planning meeting in October 2022. The DOT IG provided helpful feedback
and we consider the audit to have been beneficial to PHMSA's continual
improvement. PHMSA learned valuable lessons and received three DOT IG
recommendations. We continue to have a constructive working
relationship with the DOT IG, and the audit helped us to continue to
move toward our common goal of advancing pipeline safety.
In August 2020, the GAO published a study finding Federal agencies
have incorporated most but not all key collaboration practices in the
permitting processes for export facilities for LNG. The GAO identified
key practices for PHMSA, that can help sustain collaboration among
federal agencies.
PHMSA's team worked with GAO to adopt a process for conducting
standards-specific reviews approximately every two to three years. The
new process will ensure that a sufficient review is conducted and that
PHMSA makes appropriate determinations about whether to update
standards.
When it comes to our work with the National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB), PHMSA is addressing recommendations that include
requiring control room operators to notify emergency call centers in
impacted communities when potential ruptures take place, equip control
rooms with supervisory controls and data acquisition systems to
pinpoint leaks along transmission lines, and amend Title 49, Code of
Federal Regulations (CFR) to require automatic shutoff valves or
remote-control valves at high consequence areas. We continue working to
resolve any open recommendations--some of which we are constrained by
resources and some by statutes--such as the congressional prohibition
on applying the Automatic/Remote Shut Off Valve Rule to existing
pipelines.
PHMSA continues to work with NTSB to address recommendations that
have been made following other natural gas and hazardous liquid
accidents. We collaborate with NTSB often, including opportunities for
cross-training of our respective staff. We'll continue to engage with
NTSB as a partner in advancing safety.
All of these efforts are important because continual improvement is
a key principle of safety management systems and high-reliability
organizations, and one we embrace for both the agency and the
industries we regulate.
Transparency, Equity, Environmental Justice, and Outreach to
Underserved Communities
To both implement the President's executive orders on equity (EO
13985 and EO 14008), as well as to help address historic inequities in
the transportation system, PHMSA's Office of Pipeline Safety has
expanded its efforts to make public pipeline safety incidents and
enforcement data (which was also recently the subject of a GAO report
that lauded PHMSA's transparency and encouraged further actions).
Specifically, PHMSA has created a publicly available pilot, interactive
mapping tool that allows users to view the location of pipeline
incidents, as well as a geographic overlay with underserved
communities.
When PHMSA first viewed the preliminary information from this tool,
staff felt inspired to act--to help ensure all communities are
receiving requisite safety protections. As part of this effort, PHMSA
has engaged our state and federal partners, as well as stakeholders, to
share our findings, and they, too, are engaging in dialogues with
pipeline operators to ensure maintenance and safety measures do not
leave underserved communities behind.
These communities are identified through U.S. Census and internal
DOT/PHMSA data focused on underserved and transportation-disadvantaged
communities that have experienced excavation damages, and other
pipeline incidents and accidents.
PHMSA has also expanded its public outreach and education on
pipeline awareness and safety as well as community-based excavation
damage prevention initiatives to historically underserved and
socioeconomically challenged geographic areas.
Increased Engagement with the Public
PHMSA is committed to enhancing all stakeholder engagement and has
increased the number of public meetings and information briefings it
hosts--holding four public meetings and information briefings so far in
FY 2023, with additional public meetings and information briefings
planned. Personally, I have visited community members and victims, on-
site, where pipeline facilities have failed (e.g. Kalamazoo, MI;
Bellingham, WA; Satartia, MS; and Freeport, TX).
PHMSA has also increased its engagement with public interest groups
like the Pipeline Safety Trust, pipeline worker labor unions, and
environmental groups, actively participating in conferences and
meetings to hold a two-way dialogue on important pipeline safety
issues, emphasizing that pipeline safety is a shared responsibility.
In November and December 2022, PHMSA partnered with the DOE in a
series of Community Engagement Workshops on Carbon Capture,
Utilization, and Storage and continues to serve as a resource regarding
pipelines to DOE and the public. PHMSA has also supported requests from
individuals and groups to participate in meetings to discuss
CO2 pipeline projects to listen to concerns on safety,
environmental justice, environmental impacts, and emergency response
preparedness, as well as meet with representatives at the state
legislature level. As previously noted, in May of 2022, I personally
visited the community of Satartia, MS--about an hour northwest of
Jackson--the site of one of the worst carbon dioxide pipeline incidents
in history, in order to hear directly from the community and first
responders that helped the community during that serious incident.
Similarly, just yesterday I visited with members of the community
in and around Freeport, TX, which is home to the Freeport LNG facility.
In June of 2022, an explosion at the facility resulted in a massive
fireball and understandably left lasting concerns with the community.
In February of this year, PHMSA, along with our co-regulators of LNG
export facilities (the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and the
U.S. Coast Guard) held a town hall meeting in the community--with
simultaneous bilingual translation--to help inform the surrounding
community members of our work to investigate the incident and require
changes needed to enhance safety at the facility.
In 2022, PHMSA's Office of Pipeline Safety participated in nearly
220 public meetings, events, and conferences to educate our
stakeholders on pipeline safety and damage prevention initiatives and
to address questions about the Federal pipeline safety regulations or
concerns about pipeline-related matters. PHMSA continues to promote the
`Call 811 Program' through participation in events as well as through
social media and digital campaigns encouraging safe digging practices.
Efficiencies in Oversight, Taxpayer Stewardship, and Focus on Employees
Roughly 169 midstream oil and gas industry projects are expected to
begin operations in the United States from 2021 to 2025, according to
the Pipeline and Gas Journal. Over the last five years, liquid pipeline
incidents have fallen by 21% while pipeline mileage and barrels
delivered have increased by more than 27%. As previously noted, and to
put it simply, our oversight responsibilities continue to grow both in
terms of the types of facilities we regulate as well as the number of
facilities we regulate: PHMSA has increasing responsibility for LNG
facilities, underground natural gas storage, as well as natural gas
gathering lines. PHMSA's budget, excluding the new gas distribution
grant program, does not grow at a rate commensurate with its
responsibilities. Consequently, PHMSA has had to continuously operate
relatively leaner as compared to our expanded universe of regulated
facilities. To this end, PHMSA has also utilized advisory bulletins,
public meetings, research solicitations, and increased collaboration
with coregulators such as the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the
Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Interior, the U.S.
Coast Guard, and our state partners through collaboration with the
National Association of Pipeline Safety Representatives.
Hiring times at PHMSA have been reduced by 25% unfortunately--due
in part to the pandemic--PHMSA was not spared the so-called great
resignation, losing many individuals to both retirements and other
departures. But PHMSA is exploring ways to continue to improve the
agency's hiring and recruitment to make it both more efficient and
effective in recruiting and retaining talented applicants.
On the hiring, recruitment, and retention front, unfortunately--due
in part to the pandemic--PHMSA was not spared the so-called great
resignation, losing many individuals to both retirements and other
departures.
To meet congressional directives to improve efforts to attract and
retain pipeline engineers and inspectors, PHMSA has undertaken new
recruitment and retention efforts--seeking approval from the Office of
Personnel Management to increase special pay rates for some engineer
inspectors--commensurate with similar federal special pay rates,
developing new tuition reimbursement efforts, and utilizing new online
recruitment methods. PHMSA is also utilizing the Department of
Defense's Operation Warfighter (OWF) program that matches qualified
wounded, ill, and injured Service members with federal internships for
veterans to gain valuable work experience during their recovery and
rehabilitation--and create a pathway from the military to permanent
employment. PHMSA has kept up with the PIPES Act of 2020 hiring
mandates--both for inspectors as well as for regulatory personnel, that
have helped lead the agency to some of its most productive years ever
in terms of both finalizing regulations as well as enforcement actions
and a reduction trend in hazardous materials and pipeline incidents.
PHMSA has also utilized technologies like iPads to eliminate
paperwork for inspectors--which has resulted in more efficient use of
inspectors' time and increased the accuracy and standardization of
inspections.
On an agency-wide basis, PHMSA has reduced or eliminated its use of
nearly two dozen disparate software systems in favor of less costly,
integrated systems. PHMSA is utilizing the cost savings of this nature
to continue investing in more long-term, cost-saving programs.
Conclusion
In closing, I would like to thank you again for the opportunity to
engage with you on the critical issues facing PHMSA and in turn facing
a major component of the largest, most sophisticated energy
transportation system in the world. And most importantly, I would like
to emphasize my deep gratitude to the nearly 600 full-time federal
employees and nearly 200 contractors that make up what I believe is the
most unsung agency in the Federal Government. Congress has charged us
with tremendous responsibilities--from ensuring the safe transportation
of some of the most valuable goods that move in commerce, like
satellites and spacecraft, as well as some of the most essential goods
like fertilizer used on our farms, which can be transported by
pipeline. As we take on ever greater oversight responsibilities with
oversight of the build-out of carbon dioxide and hydrogen pipelines and
other energy products of the future, PHMSA must either continue to grow
our resources, or continue to reassess multiple and increasing
priorities with the same amount of resources.
We look forward to continuing to work with Congress to improve
pipeline and hazardous materials safety and to reduce associated
environmental impacts.
Thank you again for inviting me here today. I look forward to your
questions.

Mr. Nehls. Thank you, Mr. Brown.
Mr. Black, you are now recognized for 5 minutes.

TESTIMONY OF ANDREW J. BLACK, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OFFICER, LIQUID ENERGY PIPELINE ASSOCIATION (LEPA)

Mr. Black. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and
members of the subcommittee. I am Andy Black, president and CEO
of the Liquid Energy Pipeline Association.
LEPA represents pipeline owners and operators delivering
transportation fuels like gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel;
transportation feedstocks like crude oil; home heating fuels
like propane; industrial feedstocks like ethane; and low-carbon
solutions like renewable diesel, carbon dioxide, and liquefied
petroleum gas. We have over 50 members delivering over 20
billion barrels annually across a pipeline network of nearly
230,000 miles.
As Congress examines Federal pipeline safety, let me begin
by providing some data and information on the current state of
liquid pipeline safety. According to publicly available data
from PHMSA, pipelines are the safest way to transport energy,
and they are getting safer. Over the last 5 years, total
incidents from liquid pipelines have dropped 25 percent.
Incidents impacting people and the environment are down 15
percent. This last metric, incidents impacting people and the
environment, was developed jointly by PHMSA, the Pipeline
Safety Trust, and industry under the recommendation of the
National Transportation Safety Board.
Not only are pipelines getting safer, they are the safest
way to deliver energy. A report for Congress completed by PHMSA
compared incident and spill rates across pipeline, rail, and
trucks. PHMSA found pipelines have a lower incident rate per
barrel of crude oil shipped compared to rail or truck, and the
lowest percentage of crude oil released compared to rail or
truck.
Administration analysis and conclusion that pipelines are
the safest way to deliver energy is also bipartisan. Secretary
Hillary Clinton's State Department found not only would a major
proposed pipeline be the safest way to deliver energy, it would
be safer and have less impact on the environment than taking no
action at all. The Obama administration found rejecting that
pipeline project and shipping the same energy by rail would
increase the risk of oil release by over 800 times, and barrels
released by 2.6 times. In many locations, shipment by rail or
truck is necessary and generally a safe delivery mode. But we
are proud that pipelines are the safest way to deliver the
energy American consumers need and want.
We are also not resting on improving pipeline safety. In
partnership with the American Petroleum Institute, we have
ongoing initiatives to improve public engagement, develop best
practices for managing geohazards and seismicity, improve
pipeline inspection technologies, implement pipeline safety
management systems, and share safety improvement lessons from
pipeline incidents and near misses. Before that, in the last
several years, we have completed initiatives on crack
management, pipeline integrity management, data integration,
hydro testing, and emergency response.
We look forward to Congress reauthorizing Federal pipeline
safety provisions and making improvements to PHMSA pipeline
programs. LEPA recommends improvements in three categories:
leveraging safety technologies and knowledge; safe, low-carbon
future; and improving PHMSA safety programs. I have attached to
my testimony brief summaries of each of our recommendations; I
will highlight two today.
First, a continuing frustration for pipeline operators is
how old are some of PHMSA's regulations. Key requirements for
inspecting and repairing pipelines are now over 20 years old.
The pipeline technologies and analytic methods on which they
are based are woefully out of date, replaced by proven
technology and analytics and engineering methods that PHMSA
should reflect in its regulations, but often does not.
Congress in the 2020 PIPES Act, section 104, authorized a
pipeline safety technology demonstration program to demonstrate
cutting-edge pipeline safety technologies and advanced
analytics. Thank you, Congress. But PHMSA, in implementing the
program, added a number of administrative hurdles and
requirements beyond what Congress mandated, making the program
untenable. We have proposals to unlock this program and others
from unnecessary Government redtape.
Second, the pipeline industry supports updating regulatory
requirements for low-carbon solutions. A major build-out of
CO2 pipelines is necessary to transport
CO2 from where it is captured to where it can be
stored permanently out of harm's way. Without a new network of
CO2 pipelines, we will not meet our goals for
reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
There are already dozens of Federal regulatory requirements
administered by PHMSA covering CO2 pipeline safety,
design, construction, operation, maintenance, pressure testing,
and more. In a handful of discrete areas, PHMSA requirements
would benefit from updates reflecting the latest safety
approaches and learnings. We believe a targeted approach is the
best way for PHMSA to issue new requirements quickly. This
would also help PHMSA to avoid getting bogged down in an open-
ended exercise that, like other PHMSA rulemakings, can take
many years.
I am happy to answer any questions, and I thank the
subcommittee for the opportunity to testify.
[Mr. Black's prepared statement follows:]

Prepared Statement of Andrew J. Black, President and Chief Executive
Officer, Liquid Energy Pipeline Association (LEPA)
Thank you, Chair, Ranking Member, and members of the subcommittee.
My name is Andy Black and I am President and CEO of the Liquid Energy
Pipeline Association. LEPA represents pipeline owners and operators
delivering transportation fuels like gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel,
transportation feedstocks like crude oil, home heating fuels like
propane and home heating oil, industrial feedstocks like ethane and
butane, and low carbon solutions like renewable diesel, liquified
petroleum gas and carbon dioxide. We have over 50 member companies
delivering over 20 billion barrels annually across a nearly a 230,000-
mile network of pipelines.
As Congress examines federal pipeline safety provisions and
programs, let me first begin by providing some data and information on
the current state of liquids pipeline safety. According to publicly
available government data from PHMSA, pipelines are the safest way to
transport energy and they are getting safer.
Over the last 5 years, total incidents from liquids pipelines have
dropped over 25%. Incidents impacting people or the environment are
down 15%. This last metric, Incidents Impacting People or the
Environment, was developed jointly by PHMSA, the Pipeline Safety Trust
and industry under the recommendation of the National Transportation
Safety Board. NTSB asked the pipeline community to identify the most
meaningful metric for measuring pipeline safety. You'll hear from
witnesses about various metrics and PHMSA certainly tracks many. But we
agree that Incidents Impacting People or the Environment are the most
meaningful and are gratified they are down 15% over the last 5 years.
Not only are pipelines getting safer, they are the safest way to
deliver energy. A 2018 report completed by PHMSA at the direction of
the Senate Appropriations Committee \i\, compared incident and spill
rates across pipeline, rail and trucks. PHMSA found pipelines have a
lower incident rate per barrel of crude oil shipped compared to rail or
truck. PHMSA also found pipelines result in the lowest percentage of
crude oil released compared to rail or truck.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\i\ Report on Delivering Crude Oil by Truck, Rail, and Pipeline,
Office of Hazardous Materials Safety, U.S. Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration, 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Administration analysis and conclusion that pipelines are the
safest way to deliver energy is also bipartisan. Secretary Hillary
Clinton's State Department during the Obama administration \ii\ found
not only would a major proposed pipeline be the safest way to deliver
energy, it would be safer and have less impact on the environment than
taking no action at all. The Obama administration found rejecting that
pipeline project and shipping the same energy by rail increased the
risk of oil release by over 800 times and barrels released by 2.6
times.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\ii\ Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement for the
Keystone XL Project, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental
and Scientific Affairs, U.S. Department of State, 2014.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We certainly understand in many locations shipment by rail or truck
is necessary and generally a safe delivery mode on their own. But we
are proud that pipelines are the safest way to deliver the energy
American consumers need and want.
We also are not resting on improving pipeline safety. The pipeline
industry wants to reduce the number of incidents and barrels released
even further. That is why we partner with the American Petroleum
Institute and our member companies on numerous industry-wide
initiatives to improve pipeline safety.
We have ongoing industry-wide initiatives to improve public
engagement, develop best practices for managing geohazards and
seismicity, improve pipeline inspection technologies, implement
pipeline safety management systems, and share safety improvement
lessons from pipeline incidents and near misses across our pipeline
community. In the last several years, we have completed initiatives on
crack management, pipeline integrity management, data integration,
hydrotesting and emergency response. Our upcoming API-LEPA strategic
plan for pipeline excellence will include new goals on cybersecurity,
attracting, training and retaining quality personnel, and low carbon
solutions. We will release that in May and will look forward to
briefing the committee and member offices on its safety programs.
We also look forward to Congress reauthorizing federal pipeline
safety provisions and making improvements to PHMSA pipeline programs.
LEPA recommends pipeline safety improvements in three categories: 1)
Leveraging Safety Technology and Knowledge, 2) Safe Low Carbon Future,
and 3) Improving PHMSA Safety Programs.
I have attached to my testimony further brief summaries of each of
our specific recommendations and so will highlight just a few here
today. A continuing frustration for pipeline operators is how old are
some of PHMSA's regulations. Key requirements for inspecting and
repairing pipelines are now over 20 years old. The pipeline
technologies and analytic methods on which they were based are woefully
out of date, replaced by new technologies and analytic methods that
PHMSA should reflect in its regulations but often does not. Congress in
the 2020 PIPES Act authorized a program to demonstrate cutting edge
pipeline safety technologies and advanced analytics. The hope is data
from these technology pilots would help PHMSA modernize their
regulations. However, PHMSA in implementing the program added a number
of additional administrative hurdles and requirements beyond what
Congress mandated, making the program untenable. We have proposals to
unlock this program and others from unnecessary government red tape.
The pipeline industry also supports updating regulatory
requirements for low carbon solutions, such as carbon dioxide
pipelines. A major buildout of CO2 pipelines is necessary to
transport CO2 from where it is captured to where we will
store it permanently out of harm's way. Without a new network of
CO2 pipelines, we will not meet goals for reducing
greenhouse gas emissions. We want policymakers and the public to know
these CO2 pipeline systems will be covered by federal
pipeline safety requirements. Many do not know there are already dozens
of federal regulatory requirements administered by PHMSA covering
CO2 pipeline safety. However, we agree that in a handful of
discreet areas, PHMSA requirements would benefit from updates
reflecting the latest safety approaches and learnings. We also believe
a targeted approach is the best way for PHMSA to issue new requirements
quickly. This would also help PHMSA avoid getting bogged down in an
open-ended exercise that like other recent PHMSA rulemakings could take
many years.
We also support PHMSA having the expert pipeline safety personnel
it needs to complete its mission. Congress often places new regulatory
mandates on PHMSA. Similarly, lessons learned from incidents, advances
in technology, or our changing infrastructure systems can drive the
need for PHMSA to issue guidance or undertake rulemakings. We encourage
Congress to help PHMSA get the experts on pipeline safety it needs to
meet the expectations of Congress and the public.
On this or any of our proposals or those under consideration by the
subcommittee I'm happy to answer questions and thank the subcommittee
again for inviting me to testify today.
Attachment
LEGISLATIVE PRIORITIES
2023 Pipeline Safety Reauthorization
The Liquid Energy Pipeline Association (LEPA) represents over 50
pipeline operators with nearly 230,000 miles of pipelines across
America delivering affordable, reliable and plentiful energy to
American drivers, families, farmers, workers and shoppers.
LEPA members deliver transportation fuels like gasoline, diesel and
jet fuel, agriculture and rural home heating fuels like propane,
heating fuels for the Northeastern U.S. like fuel oil and ultra low
sulfur diesel, industrial feedstocks like ethane and butane,
transportation fuel feedstocks like crude oil, and low carbon solutions
like renewable diesel, ethanol, liquified petroleum gas and carbon
dioxide. LEPA urges Congress to consider the following as they review
federal pipeline safety laws in 2023:
1. Leverage Safety Technology & Knowledge
Hi-tech inspection and analytical tools, like an MRI or ultrasound
in the doctor's office, are available for pipeline safety. However, key
parts of PHMSA safety regulations are over 20 years old and do not
reflect the latest advances in technology or know-how. Congress can do
more to help modernize pipeline safety programs.
Improve Pipeline Safety Technology Demonstration Program
Promote Safety Sharing through Voluntary Information
Systems
Modernize Pipeline Incident Notification with Online
Filing
Allow Risk-Based Inspections for Storage Tanks
Incorporate Leading Safety Standards into Program
Requirements
2. Safe Low Carbon Future
Pipelines are the safest way to deliver liquid products, including
low carbon economy byproducts like carbon dioxide. While existing
federal regulatory requirements on CO2 pipelines are
extensive, Congress can provide additional safety measures and
clarifications to close remaining gaps in pipeline safety programs.
Update CO2 Pipeline Safety Standards
Clarify Methane Regulation Scope
3. Improve PHMSA Safety Programs
PHMSA, like the pipeline operators it oversees, can also benefit
from adjustments reflecting continuous improvement efforts. Congress
can help PHMSA increase the effectiveness and transparency of its
pipeline safety programs and requirements.
Optimize PHMSA Valve Inspection Scope
Increase PHMSA Inspection Program Transparency
Focus PHMSA Special Permit Program
Improve PHMSA Enforcement Processes
Provide Expert Pipeline Safety Regulatory Personnel
Enhance Pipeline Right of Way Management
Jumpstart Required Regulation of Idled Pipe
Close Loophole in Penalties for Pipeline Attacks

Improve Pipeline Safety Technology Demonstration Program

Action Needed:
Congress should prevent bureaucratic red tape from stifling new
technologies and analytics that could improve pipeline safety.
Background:
In the 2020 PIPES Act, Congress recognized pipeline safety could
benefit from harnessing the latest hi-tech inspection technologies and
analytics. Congress authorized PHMSA to conduct a pipeline safety
technology demonstration pilot program under certain conditions.
However, PHMSA added a host of additional administrative, regulatory
and legal conditions to the program, effectively preventing its use.
Status:
PHMSA has received no applications to conduct technology pilots.
Pipeline operators cite the additional conditions PHMSA imposed in its
implementation guidance as making the program infeasible.

Promote Safety Sharing through Voluntary Information Systems

Action Needed:
Congress should authorize a Voluntary Information Sharing (VIS)
program based on the recommendations of the public advisory committee
formed pursuant to the 2016 pipeline safety reauthorization law.
Background:
Programs where regulators, operators, vendors, unions and safety
advocates can share information, with appropriate legal protections,
and develop joint safety recommendations, have found success at FAA.
Interested stakeholders developed a legislative proposal to implement
recommendations of the Congressional VIS public advisory committee.
That language did not reach consensus before the 2020 Pipes Act.
Status:
Stakeholders appear to have agreement on draft legislative language
after overcoming remaining issues which prevented VIS inclusion in the
2020 Pipes Act.

Modernize Pipeline Incident Notification with Online Filing

Action Needed:
Congress should require the National Response Center (NRC) to
develop and allow use of a simple and quick online incident
notification system.
Background:
The NRC currently requires placing a telephone call to the NRC to
notify it of a pipeline incident. Operators and regulators have
experienced lengthy delays waiting for a live person to answer the
phone at NRC. In the decades since the NRC first established its
telephone requirement, web-based applications accessed online now allow
for simple and quick notification to all stakeholders.
Status:
Online notification of pipeline incidents, such as through a simple
online app, is not currently available.

Allow Risk-Based Inspections for Storage Tanks

Action Needed:
Congress should prevent unnecessary greenhouse gas and air
pollutant emissions, worker safety threats and hazardous waste by
allowing risk-based storage tank inspections.
Background:
PHMSA regulation requires inspection of petroleum storage tanks on
fixed schedules, regardless of their actual maintenance needs. The
early draining and cleanout of tanks to perform unneeded inspections
releases greenhouse gas emissions and air pollutants, subjects workers
to unnecessary risks in confined spaces, and creates hazardous waste
needing disposal. Current industry standards on tank inspection are
already accepted by other federal and state agencies, including EPA's
program.
Status:
Engineering assessments methods to set maintenance schedules that
avoid climate, environmental and worker impacts are available for PHMSA
to incorporate into regulation.

Incorporate Leading Safety Standards into Program Requirements

Action Needed:
Congress should direct PHMSA to review pipeline safety best
practices and incorporate in a timely manner, where appropriate.
Congress should also encourage PHMSA to participate more fully in the
standard setting process.
Background:
Pipeline operators develop industry-wide best practices in an open
and multi-stakeholder collaborative process certified by the American
National Standards Institute. These practices are technical documents
developed by engineers and PHMSA has incorporated several into their
regulations.
Status:
PHMSA is often slow to incorporate the latest editions of best
practice standards. LEPA's legislative proposal would require PHMSA to
review the latest editions to regulated industry standards in a timely
manner and incorporate them where appropriate through the regular
notice and comment process.

Update CO2 Pipeline Safety Standards

Action Needed:
Congress should direct PHMSA to update existing carbon dioxide
pipeline safety regulations in key areas.
Background:
Current federal pipeline safety requirements already regulate
CO2 pipeline design, construction, operation, maintenance
and emergency response. However, there are targeted areas in system
coverage, impact modeling, maintenance and emergency response where
PHMSA can do more to address the specific needs of CO2
pipelines. These additions will promote new low carbon infrastructure.
Status:
While PHMSA has announced general plans to impose additional
CO2 regulation in the future, an opportunity exists to
direct PHMSA to act more quickly in key areas that will improve
CO2 pipeline safety.

Clarify PHMSA Methane Regulation Scope

Action Needed:
Congress should clarify the 2020 PIPES Act provisions covering
methane monitoring and mitigation from natural gas pipelines does not
apply to hazardous liquids pipelines.
Background:
The 2020 PIPES Act requires PHMSA to issue regulations for the
monitoring and mitigation of methane from natural gas pipelines.
Hazardous liquids pipelines delivering crude oil, gasoline, diesel fuel
or other energy liquids do not transport or release methane and the
PIPES Act does not include them. However, some PHMSA inspectors are
attempting to require hazardous liquids pipeline operators to update
their inspection and maintenance plans to meet methane monitoring and
mitigation program requirements.
Status:
PHMSA interpretation and implementation of the 2020 PIPES Act
methane provisions remains uneven.

Optimize PHMSA Valve Inspection Scope

Action Needed:
Congress should direct PHMSA to revise its recent pipeline rupture
rule to only apply additional inspection requirements to valves related
to pipeline ruptures, and drop misapplied inspection requirements of
all valves, including those which would not contribute to or limit a
rupture.
Background:
In 2022, PHMSA required semi-annual inspection of valves that could
mitigate the extent of a pipeline rupture. However, between the
proposed and final versions of the rule PHMSA without notice expanded
the requirement to include all valves, even those unrelated to
addressing ruptures. PHMSA claims this expansion was unintended but has
not addressed the legal uncertainty created by the change.
Status:
Informal PHMSA discussions to issue guidance would not change the
clear regulatory language and legal liability presented by the final
regulation.

Increase PHMSA Inspection Program Transparency

Action Needed:
Congress should require PHMSA annually to share publicly its
inspection priorities and number of federal and state inspections of
pipelines across PHMSA regions. PHMSA should also ensure any guidance
used by PHMSA inspectors is publicly available.
Background:
The current system of PHMSA region inspections and state inspection
of pipelines can lead to unbalanced and duplicative inspection patterns
across the country. More transparency would help ensure PHMSA's
inspection program is meeting pipeline safety priorities.
Status:
While PHMSA is transparent with public sharing of its enforcement
activities, PHMSA does not publicly share its inspection priorities or
numbers of inspections across PHMSA regions and states.

Focus PHMSA Special Permit Program

Action Needed:
Congress should direct PHMSA to focus requirements of its special
permit program on issues presented by the permit request and require
timely review of applications.
Background:
Key PHMSA inspection and maintenance regulations are over 20 years
old reflecting outdated technology and knowledge of the time. Federal
law authorizes PHMSA to issue special permits varying from existing
regulations as long they achieve equal levels of safety or are
consistent with the public interest. However, PHMSA's special permit
implementation program has grown over the years to include numerous
requirements unrelated to the variances sought. Permit reviews can also
take multiple years.
Status:
PHMSA's special permit process remains stuck in unnecessary
requirements, reviews and delays.

Improve PHMSA Enforcement Processes

Action Needed:
Congress should direct PHMSA to establish a process when opening
PHMSA enforcement proceedings to the public.
Background:
PHMSA historically conducted informal enforcement proceedings
without public attendance. Public interest in pipeline cases is growing
and PHMSA has allowed public attendance. PHMSA should set an orderly
process for public attendance and protection of confidential
information during proceedings.
Status:
There is no established process when opening PHMSA enforcement
proceedings to the public.

Provide Expert Pipeline Safety Regulatory Personnel

Action Needed:
Congress should direct DOT and PHMSA to hire experienced pipeline
safety regulatory personnel.
Background:
PHMSA is a small agency with personnel limitations that prevent it
from timely addressing Congressional mandates and evolving pipeline
safety needs. The 2020 PIPES Act authorized PHMSA to hire additional
inspection and regulatory personnel. PHMSA used the resources to hire
environmental policy experts and develop a methane monitoring and
mitigation rulemaking. Work on other pipeline safety priorities face
years of delay.
Status:
DOT human resources requirements placed on PHMSA limited hiring to
junior personnel with less skill and experience. There are no
requirements to hire pipeline safety expertise.

Enhance Pipeline Right of Way Management

Action Needed:
Congress should direct PHMSA to allow pipeline right of way
conservation practices that benefit habitat and the environment.
Background:
PHMSA regulations requires activities along pipeline rights of way
which can prevent natural habitat benefitting local wildlife and the
environment. Conservation practices are available that balance pipeline
monitoring and conservation.
Status:
Pipeline industry conservation initiatives are available for
operator use if PHMSA allows the practice.

Jump Start Required Regulation of Idled Pipe

Action Needed:
Congress should direct PHMSA to complete the Congressionally
mandated idled pipe rulemaking.
Background:
Operators sometimes suspend service on pipeline systems to reflect
market conditions and temporary lack of demand for product movement
along certain routes. However, no current PHMSA regulations govern
maintenance and monitoring of pipelines in an idled status or the steps
they must take to return to full service. Congress in the 2020 PIPES
Act mandated PHMSA issue regulations addressing idled pipe.
Status:
The Congressionally mandated 2-year deadline for PHMSA to complete
an idled pipeline rulemaking expired December 2022. PHMSA regulatory
agenda currently predicts it will not issue a proposal before November
2023 with a future finalization date undetermined.

Close Loophole in Penalties for Pipeline Attacks

Action Needed:
Congress should close loophole in criminal penalties for pipeline
attacks that are dangerous but do not result in damage.
Background:
Multiple past cases of attacks on pipelines and pipeline
infrastructure posed a danger to the attackers, general public and
environment. The federal government has obtained convictions on attacks
resulting in physical damage to energy infrastructure. However, attacks
that manipulate pipeline valves or other equipment, while not resulting
in physical damage, are still dangerous due to risk of explosion or
product release from a pressure buildup and rupture. Judges have
dismissed prosecution of such cases because they did not result in
physical damage, as the statute is currently interpreted.
Status:
Provisions exist in Title 18 against damaging energy infrastructure
and Title 49 against damaging or destroying pipeline infrastructure,
but there are no provisions against dangerous non-damaging activities.

Mr. Nehls. Thank you, Mr. Black.
Mr. Grubb, you are now recognized for 5 minutes.

TESTIMONY OF KENNETH W. GRUBB, CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER, NATURAL
GAS PIPELINES, KINDER MORGAN, INC., ON BEHALF OF THE INTERSTATE
NATURAL GAS ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA (INGAA)

Mr. Grubb. Chairman Nehls, Ranking Member Payne, and
members of the subcommittee, good morning. My name is Kenneth
Grubb, and I am the chief operating officer for natural gas
pipelines at Kinder Morgan. As an engineer with over 30 years
of experience in the pipeline sector, I appreciate the
opportunity to testify before your subcommittee today.
Kinder Morgan is one of the largest energy infrastructure
companies in North America. We have an interest in or operate
approximately 82,000 miles of pipeline that transport natural
gas and other products that are essential to daily lives.
Kinder Morgan is a member of the Interstate Natural Gas
Association of America, also known as INGAA, which is a trade
association that represents the interstate natural gas pipeline
and storage industry. I am here today representing INGAA.
INGAA's members transport the vast majority of the natural
gas consumed in the United States through a network of
approximately 200,000 miles of interstate transmission
pipelines. These transmission pipelines are critical
infrastructure systems spanning multiple States, and deliver
natural gas to end users such as local distribution companies,
electricity generators, industrial manufacturers, and LNG
export facilities.
Natural gas is the cleanest burning fossil fuel, and as
demand for energy increases, expanded use of natural gas has
helped improve air quality across the country by offsetting the
use of higher carbon-intensive fuels. According to the Energy
Information Administration, between 2005 and 2019, carbon
dioxide emissions from the U.S. power sector declined by 33
percent, with natural gas accounting for more than half of
those reductions.
Additionally, INGAA's members are committed to working
together as an industry towards achieving net-zero greenhouse
gas emissions by 2050. With that said, there are four key
points I wish to make today.
First, INGAA's number-one priority is safety, and we
support having a strong safety regulator. Regulators and
industry experts alike, including the U.S. Department of
Transportation and PHMSA, have agreed for decades that
pipelines are the safest mode of energy transportation.
Accidents are rare, and INGAA's members are committed to making
them increasingly infrequent. INGAA's members work every day
towards a goal of zero pipeline incidents. To help achieve this
goal, INGAA fundamentally believes in having a strong safety
regulator, and we also support robust, durable regulations
written by PHMSA to ensure the safety of our Nation's pipeline
systems.
Second, PHMSA should complete its work on the class
location rulemaking and issue a final rule. INGAA's top
regulatory priority is completion of the class location
rulemaking, which presents opportunities to increase safety and
protect the environment. Existing regulations affecting this
issue are over 50 years old. It is long overdue to update them
to reflect modern safety technologies. Every year this
regulation is not final, we estimate that 800 million standard
cubic feet of natural gas is unnecessarily released to the
atmosphere.
Additionally, INGAA members unnecessarily spend between
$200 and $300 million per year to replace perfectly safe pipe.
INGAA is hopeful that PHMSA will quickly finalize this crucial
rule.
Third, the Gas Pipeline Advisory Committee, also known as
GPAC, strengthens rulemakings and should meet more frequently.
The GPAC, which provides technical safety guidance to PHMSA, is
comprised of equal representation from the natural gas
industry, Federal and State agencies, and the public. Until
recently, GPAC met frequently. However, since January 2021, the
GPAC has only met once. With the known benefits of GPAC, INGAA
believes that Congress should consider requiring PHMSA to hold
at least two GPAC meetings per year.
Lastly, PHMSA should prioritize hiring safety engineers to
assist with its rulemakings. INGAA recognizes that pipeline
safety regulations are complicated and often take years to
write. To help assist with rulemaking backlogs that frequently
occur, PHMSA should hire more safety engineers who already
understand pipeline systems. This will result in a more
efficient process to produce effective rules.
In conclusion, I truly appreciate the opportunity to
testify in front of your subcommittee today. Your efforts are
critical to ensuring PHMSA has the resources and direction
necessary to continually improve safety in our industry.
I look forward to your questions, and I thank you for your
time.
[Mr. Grubb's prepared statement follows:]

Prepared Statement of Kenneth W. Grubb, Chief Operating Officer,
Natural Gas Pipelines, Kinder Morgan, Inc., on behalf of the Interstate
Natural Gas Association of America (INGAA)
Chairman Nehls, Ranking Member Payne, and Members of the
Subcommittee:
Good morning. My name is Kenneth Grubb, and I am the Chief
Operating Officer for Natural Gas Pipelines at Kinder Morgan.
Kinder Morgan is one of the largest energy infrastructure companies
in North America. Access to reliable, affordable energy is a critical
component to improving lives around the world, and we are committed to
providing energy transportation and storage services in a safe,
efficient, and environmentally responsible manner for the benefit of
people, communities, and businesses we serve. We have an interest in or
operate approximately 82,000 miles of pipelines, 140 terminals, 700
billion cubic feet (Bcf) of working natural gas storage capacity and
have renewable natural gas generation capacity of approximately 2.2 Bcf
per year of gross production with up to an additional 5.2 Bcf in
development. Our pipelines transport natural gas, renewable fuels,
refined petroleum products, crude oil, condensate, CO2 and
other products, and our terminals store and handle various commodities
including gasoline, diesel fuel, chemicals, ethanol, metals and
petroleum coke.
Kinder Morgan is a member of the Interstate Natural Gas Association
of America (INGAA), which is a trade association that represents the
interstate natural gas pipeline and storage industry. I am here today
representing INGAA.
INGAA's members transport the vast majority of the natural gas
consumed in the United States through a network of approximately
200,000 miles of interstate transmission pipelines. These transmission
pipelines are analogous to the interstate highway system; in other
words, they are large capacity, critical infrastructure systems
spanning multiple states or regions to deliver natural gas to end users
such as local distribution companies, electricity generators,
industrial manufacturers and LNG export facilities.
I serve as Chief Operating Officer (COO) of the Natural Gas
Pipelines Group for Kinder Morgan, Inc. In this capacity, I am
responsible for all operational activities of the Kinder Morgan Natural
Gas Pipelines Group, which encompasses approximately 70,000 miles of
pipelines including natural gas transmission, gas storage, gathering,
and processing facilities. I have served in this capacity since 2017.
Before assuming this role, I held various other roles in operations,
engineering, system design, project management, and construction and
have over 32 years of experience in the energy sector.
For more than a decade, the shale revolution has gifted our country
with abundant natural gas supplies, which has elevated the need for
additional infrastructure to move it around the country. Pipelines make
it possible to deliver North America's abundant natural gas reserves to
fuel our homes, businesses, and the American economy, and are the
safest and most efficient way to transport this critical energy source.
INGAA's members deliver clean, abundant, affordable natural gas
throughout North America. Natural gas is the cleanest burning fossil
fuel and, as demand for energy increases, expanded use of natural gas
has helped improve air quality across the country by offsetting the use
of higher carbon-intensive fuels. According to the Energy Information
Administration, between 2005-2019, carbon dioxide emissions from the
U.S. power sector declined by 33 percent, with natural gas accounting
for more than half of those reductions. INGAA's members are committed
to modernizing our nation's interstate natural gas delivery network
infrastructure, lowering emissions from our operations, and mitigating
the impacts of climate change by working together as an industry
towards achieving net-zero greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2050.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify at this hearing. There are
four key points I wish to make in this testimony on behalf of the
natural gas transmission pipeline industry.
1. INGAA's number one priority is safety, and we support having a
strong safety regulator.
Regulators and industry experts alike, including the U.S.
Department of Transportation and the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration (PHMSA), have agreed for decades that pipelines
are the safest mode of energy transportation. Accidents are rare, and
INGAA's members are committed to making them increasingly infrequent.
INGAA's members work every day towards a goal of zero pipeline
incidents.
INGAA fundamentally believes in having a strong safety regulator.
For years, INGAA has sought robust, durable regulations led by PHMSA to
ensure that all operators are held accountable to operate their systems
in the safest manner possible. We take our commitment to safety
seriously and appreciate the role that PHMSA plays to ensure that
industry keeps its focus, and the public can have confidence in the
safety and reliability of natural gas pipelines.
Pipeline companies consider safety every step of the way, from
planning, to construction, to maintenance. Our members purchase top-
quality materials, address any potential safety or security issues
during the pipeline planning and citing process, and conduct consistent
quality and safety checks throughout the construction process. Once
operational, pipeline companies work to prevent releases by evaluating,
inspecting, and maintaining pipelines.
Kinder Morgan is committed to the safe operations of our assets.
Our pipeline and personal safety program metrics along with our safety
goals are transparent to the public and are prominently posted on our
website. We remain engaged with PHMSA and in-line inspection (ILI) tool
vendors to further the development of ILI tool technology. As an
example, one of Kinder Morgan's pipelines was the first to gain PHMSA
acceptance to utilize Electro-Magnetic Acoustic Transducer (EMAT)
technology to assess for the presence of environmentally induced
cracking threats in lieu of the traditional hydrostatic testing
technology that was used to manage these threats previously.
As part of on-going safety, pipeline companies conduct integrity
management and continuous improvement programs in the areas of
evaluation, inspection, and maintenance. A key component of integrity
management programs is the use of ILI tools, sometimes called ``smart
pigs.'' Pipeline companies run these tools to detect any potentially
harmful defects in the pipeline. These modern methods of pipe
inspection have improved greatly over the last 30 years and are more
effective, efficient, and environmentally sound compared to other
assessment methods, with the added benefit of not significantly
interrupting the operation of the pipeline.
INGAA's commitment to safety has been an essential priority for
years. After the unfortunate and tragic incident in San Bruno,
California, in 2010, INGAA member companies worked proactively to
improve the industry's safety performance. This effort developed a set
of guiding principles for pipeline safety, anchored around a goal of
zero pipeline incidents, titled the ``Integrity Management, Continuous
Improvement'' (IMCI) program. Since its inception, our industry has
made rapid advances in safety technology and practices in continuous
pursuit of our achieving this goal.
INGAA members recently updated the IMCI program to ensure the
reliability and resiliency of our infrastructure as we work to safely
support the energy transition and evolve to a net-zero GHG economy.
Similar to the EMAT technology previously mentioned, we also focused on
advancing safety from newer technologies that will hopefully become
more widespread throughout the industry and by regulators. This updated
effort, titled IMCI 2.0 was created with the input of PHMSA, the
National Transportation Safety Board, the National Association of
Regulatory Utility Commissioners, the National Association of Pipeline
Safety Representatives, and the Pipeline Safety Trust. The IMCI effort
follows five guiding principles:
1. Our goal is zero incidents;
2. We are committed to a strong safety culture;
3. We will be relentless in our pursuit of improving by learning;
4. We are committed to implementing and continuously improving
pipeline safety; management systems, and;
5. We will regularly engage our stakeholders.

INGAA's work on the IMCI 2.0 program is nearly complete and we plan
to share the results with key stakeholders later this year.
2. PHMSA should complete its work on the class location rulemaking and
issue a final rule.
INGAA's top regulatory priority with PHMSA is completion of the
class location rulemaking, which presents opportunities to increase
safety and protect the environment. The class location change
regulations have not been substantively updated in over 50 years and
revising them has been an INGAA goal for more than two decades. We were
pleased that PHMSA issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) on the
class location rule in October 2020. We were also greatly appreciative
that Congress included a provision in the enacted 2020 PIPES Act that
required the agency to hold a Gas Pipeline Advisory Committee (GPAC)
meeting to review the NPRM by the end of 2021.
This proposed rulemaking would address scenarios where population
changes around our pipelines necessitate changes to existing pipeline
infrastructure. When a class location change occurs, the current
regulations may require operators to replace the existing pipe even
when an engineering assessment, including modern inspection tools, has
shown it to be in safe, operational condition. The advancements in ILI
tools and other safety technologies help enhance company decision
making to make repairs and, in many cases, lessen the need for
disruptive pipe replacements.
This causes two main problems. When PHMSA requires operators to
replace pipes, operators must ensure that no gas is in the pipe they
are about to replace, which results in service disruptions and natural
gas being released to the atmosphere. Secondly, INGAA estimates that
the existing requirements costs its members $200-$300 million per year
to unnecessarily replace perfectly safe pipe. These funds could be
better used to address other aspects of our safety systems.
INGAA also estimates that class change pipe replacements under the
current regulations result in up to 800 million standard cubic feet of
natural gas blowdowns to the atmosphere annually. To put that into
perspective, this quantity of gas could meet the needs of over 10,000
homes for a year and has the same GHG reduction benefits of removing
80,000 cars from the road. The single best way to further reduce
methane emissions by the natural gas pipeline industry is to decrease
the number of ``blow downs'' or voluntary releases of gas. Finalizing
the rulemaking would substantially decrease methane emissions by
stopping these unnecessary releases of gas into the atmosphere.
Historically, in place of a class location pipeline replacement
change, INGAA members have submitted special permit applications to
prove the safety of their pipes. However, these applications are
burdensome to not only the industry, but also to PHMSA. Some of the
problems include the process changing regularly and that it can take up
to three years to approve a single permit. Finalizing this rule will
provide regulatory certainty and consistency for industry stakeholders
and the regulator.
INGAA is hopeful that PHMSA will hold a GPAC meeting as soon as
possible and issue this crucial rule to improve safety and meet the
collective goal of industry and the Biden Administration to lower GHG
emissions.
3. The Gas Pipeline Advisory Committee (GPAC) strengthens rulemakings
and should meet more frequently.
The GPAC is an advisory committee to the Department of
Transportation and PHMSA on matters of natural gas pipeline safety and
regulatory oversight. The GPAC is comprised of 15 members, with equal
representation from the natural gas industry, federal and state
agencies, and the public (such as safety advocates and emergency
managers). GPAC's stated role is to review PHMSA's proposed regulatory
initiatives to ensure the technical feasibility, reasonableness, cost-
effectiveness, and practicability of each proposal. PHMSA is not bound
by GPAC recommendations but must include its rationale for disagreeing
with the recommendations in the preamble text of final rules. These
processes are required by statute.
GPAC can play an important role in completing our collective
objective to enhance gas pipeline safety regulations. The time needed
to complete a rulemaking is affected, in part, by the quantity and
quality of dialogue with impacted stakeholders. Their dialogue is
especially important when the subject of a rulemaking is a complex,
technical topic such as pipeline safety regulation. New rules should
leverage stakeholder knowledge and expertise to facilitate the
deployment of new technologies and practices that are more effective
and efficient, and less disruptive than the legacy methods that may be
reflected in existing regulations.
Until recently, GPAC met regularly to consider important rules and
discuss important safety advancements. However, since January 2021, the
GPAC has only met once. With the known benefits of GPAC, INGAA believes
that Congress should consider requiring PHMSA to hold at least two GPAC
meetings per year.
Furthermore, PHMSA has chosen to disagree with a number of
unanimous GPAC recommendations to multiple recent important final
rules. While INGAA does not challenge PHMSA's independence to make
these decisions, we believe that Congress can strengthen transparency
by receiving detailed briefings from PHMSA on their rationales for
these conclusions soon after issuing final rules.
4. PHMSA should prioritize hiring safety engineers to assist with its
rulemakings.
As I stated earlier, INGAA appreciates the important role of having
a strong safety regulator. An effective way to remain strong is for
PHMSA to invest in hiring qualified safety engineers to assist with
writing rules.
INGAA recognizes that pipeline safety regulations are complicated
and often take years of work to be drafted and implemented. To help
assist with the rulemaking backlogs that frequently occur, adding
safety engineers to PHMSA's team who already understand pipeline
systems and federal code would be a great asset to the agency.
INGAA was pleased that Congress included in Section 102 of the
PIPES Act of 2020 provisions requiring PHMSA to hire ``eight full-time
employees with subject matter expertise in pipeline safety, pipeline
facilities, and pipeline systems to finalize outstanding rulemakings
and fulfill congressional mandates.'' We are hopeful that PHMSA can
successfully hire safety engineers to fulfil this requirement in a
timely manner.
In conclusion, I truly appreciate the opportunity to testify in
front of your Subcommittee today. Your efforts are critical to ensuring
that PHMSA has the resources and direction necessary to continually
improve safety in our industry.

Mr. Nehls. Thank you, Mr. Grubb.
Mr. Caram, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

TESTIMONY OF BILL CARAM, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, PIPELINE SAFETY
TRUST

Mr. Caram. Thank you, Chairman Nehls, Ranking Member Payne,
and members of the subcommittee for the opportunity to speak
today on pipeline safety.
My organization, the Pipeline Safety Trust, was formed
after the devastating Olympic pipeline tragedy that stole the
lives of three boys in Bellingham, Washington, in 1999, a
tragedy Ranking Member Larsen so eloquently described.
The U.S. Justice Department was so appalled at the
operations of the pipeline company and the lax oversight from
the Federal Government that they asked the Federal courts to
set aside money from the settlement to create the Pipeline
Safety Trust as an independent national watchdog over the
pipeline industry and its regulators. And it is with that
spirit that I am speaking to you today.
Everyone here today values safe communities, and we all
share the goal of zero incidents. However, pipeline failures
continue unabated, and we now face a potential new generation
of nonhydrocarbon pipelines posing their own unique risks to
our communities, and making our goal of zero incidents even
further out of reach.
Since the last pipeline safety legislation was passed in
December of 2020, a bit over 2 years ago, our Nation's
pipelines have had over 1,300 reportable failures, more than 1
per day, killed or injured to the point of in-patient
hospitalization 74 people, and caused nearly $1 billion in
property damage. These failures include recent tragedies like
the El Paso gas transmission pipeline explosion that killed
two, including a 14-year-old girl, and the Consumers Energy
explosion in Flint, Michigan, that killed two, including a 3-
year-old girl, and also many high-profile hazardous liquid
failures spilling millions of gallons of oil and gasoline into
our rivers, oceans, and groundwater, including Colonial
Pipeline's more than 2-million-gallon gasoline spill in a
nature preserve in Huntersville, North Carolina.
To give a brief overview of our Nation's state of pipeline
safety, I am sad to say that, when looking at the data, we
haven't made much progress. We can, of course, pick out time
periods to show trends either going up or down. However, going
back to 2010, which I believe to be an objective starting
point, since that is when PHMSA changed some of its reporting
criteria, incident trends on all categories of pipelines,
including incidents impacting people or the environment, are
statistically flat. We are not making progress.
To start making a real difference on pipeline safety.
Congress needs to remove the statutory handcuffs it has placed
on the rules PHMSA can produce. PHMSA is the only agency with a
statutory cost-benefit requirement, an especially difficult
hurdle to clear for infrastructure with low probabilities of
failure, yet enormously devastating consequences.
PHMSA is also prohibited by statute from adopting design,
initial testing, and construction standards that would apply to
the existing 3 million miles of existing pipelines. Because of
this nonapplication clause, PHMSA has been unable to require
rupture mitigation valves in high-consequence areas--an NTSB
recommendation after PG&E's pipeline tragedy in San Bruno,
California, in 2010. Of course, it is the aging infrastructure
of existing pipelines that need this kind of lifesaving
technology the most.
I want to take a moment to discuss one specific pipeline
failure from 2020, a carbon dioxide pipeline operated by
Denbury that failed near Satartia, Mississippi. Carbon dioxide
is an asphyxiant that is heavier than air, and can therefore
travel in dangerous and even lethal concentrations for long
distances, displacing oxygen.
Nearly the entire community of 200 in Satartia was
evacuated, with 45 of them seeking treatment at the hospital.
Residents lost consciousness, had seizures, foamed at the
mouth. First responders heroically pulled many to safety while
donning scuba gear, probably saving lives, their truck engines
unable to operate in the oxygen-deprived environment. The
community of Satartia is incredibly lucky to not have suffered
any fatalities.
As Congress has highly incentivized carbon capture and
sequestration, communities are looking at a potentially
enormous buildout of CO2 pipelines. Currently
relatively rare and remote, experts are predicting a future
with 20 times or more the amount of CO2 pipelines,
and much closer to communities.
On top of this, they are dangerously unregulated. Current
PHMSA standards only regulate CO2 pipelines if in a
supercritical fluid with more than 90 percent purity.
Therefore, gas and liquid CO2 pipelines are
unregulated. Many man-made sources of CO2 can have
much higher levels of impurities that pose public health and
pipeline integrity issues such as corrosion. There are no PHMSA
standards on levels of these dangerous impurities. Congress
should mandate that PHMSA regulate these and the other equally
frightening regulatory gaps that need to be addressed before
the public can have any kind of confidence in a potential
national buildout of CO2 pipelines.
In order to honor the value we place on safe communities,
Congress needs to give PHMSA more authority, more resources,
and implement the safety recommendations I have detailed in my
written testimony.
Thank you again for inviting me to testify today. I look
forward to answering any questions the subcommittee may have
and helping Congress improve the Nation's state of pipeline
safety.
[Mr. Caram's prepared statement follows:]

Prepared Statement of Bill Caram, Executive Director, Pipeline Safety
Trust
Good morning, Chairman Nehls, Ranking Member Payne, Committee Chair
Graves, Committee Ranking Member Larsen, and members of the Committee.
Thank you for inviting me to speak today on the vital subject of
pipeline safety. My name is Bill Caram, and I am the Executive Director
of the Pipeline Safety Trust.
The Pipeline Safety Trust was created after the Olympic Pipe Line
tragedy in Bellingham, Washington in 1999. That entirely preventable
failure spilled nearly a quarter-million gallons of gasoline into a
beautiful salmon stream in the heart of our community which eventually
ignited and killed three boys. The U.S. Justice Department was so
appalled at the operations of the pipeline company and equally appalled
at the lax oversight from the federal government, that they asked the
federal courts to set aside money from the settlement to create the
Pipeline Safety Trust as an independent national watchdog organization
over the pipeline industry and its regulators.
We work to ensure that no other community must endure the senseless
grief that Bellingham has had to experience from a pipeline tragedy.
Sadly, there have been many senseless pipeline tragedies and disasters
since Bellingham. I am here today, hoping that we can continue to work
together in a bipartisan way, to help us move towards our shared goal
of zero incidents. Today I would like to focus my testimony on:
Overview of the state of U.S. pipeline safety
Critical pipeline safety issues
+ Eliminate cost-benefit requirements under 49 U.S.C. Sec.
60102
+ Eliminate the nonapplication clause in 49 U.S.C. Sec.
60104(b)
+ Include mandamus clause
+ Prohibit reportable unintended releases
+ Increase authorized appropriations and add recruitment and
retention flexibility
+ Require rupture mitigation valves on existing gas pipelines in
High Consequence Areas
+ Improve carbon dioxide pipeline safety regulations
+ Improve hydrogen pipeline safety
+ Improve geohazard mitigation regulations
+ Natural gas incident reporting
Public transparency improvements
+ National Pipeline Mapping System (NPMS) Improvements
+ Require operators to disclose certain safety information
+ Improve reporting data metrics
+ Create Office of Public Engagement
Other needed safety improvements
+ Increase penalties
+ Eliminate natural gas operator's choice in determining High
Consequence Areas
+ Close class location loophole on building occupancy
+ Eliminate safety related condition report exemptions
+ Require mandatory reporting of liquid over-pressurization
events
+ Require improvements to state 811 damage prevention programs
+ Mandate offshore pipeline safety improvements
+ Clarify ``confirmed discovery'' definition
Appendix
+ Statutory and regulatory language where appropriate
Overview of the State of U.S. Pipeline Safety
Since Congress passed the PIPES Act of 2020, a little over two
years ago, there have been 1,300 reportable pipeline failures, more
than one per day, 74 people have been either killed or injured to the
point of in-patient hospitalization, and nearly $1 Billion in property
damage.
While everyone on today's panel supports the goal of zero
incidents, unfortunately, we have a long way to go. While you can slice
and dice data opportunistically to demonstrate progress, when you look
at the PHMSA reported data objectively, we are not making real progress
on pipeline safety. My organization looked at the data going back to
2010 since that is when PHMSA changed some reporting. That is the
longest period we can analyze without some data manipulation, and we
believe that to be an objective starting point. Total incidents for gas
and hazardous liquids show a trend line going down very slightly--a
basically flat line with no real progress over the past twelve years.

Source: PHMSA Incident and Mileage Data (2023)

Filtering for only those incidents deemed ``significant'' by PHMSA,
we see a trend that is slightly increasing. For all the progress the
industry touts on technological advancements and safety management
systems, we are not moving towards our target of zero incidents.
Also of concern is the fact that approximately two-thirds of all
incidents and significant incidents are from causes that are under the
operator's direct control such as corrosion, incorrect operations,
equipment failures, and problems with materials, welds, and equipment.

Over the past twenty years, regulators and industry have focused
much emphasis in reducing pipeline incidents on ``Integrity
Management'' efforts in ``High Consequence Areas.'' The theory behind
Integrity Management programs makes perfect sense--focus efforts in
those areas where the most harm to people and the environment may
occur, work hard to identify all risks in those areas, put into place
programs to test for and mitigate those risks, and implement a
continuous improvement program to drive down the number of failures.
Unfortunately, for both hazardous liquid and gas transmission
pipelines these Integrity Management programs do not seem to have lived
up to their promise. Incident rates within High Consequence Areas as
compared to outside HCAs continue to climb in the case of hazardous
liquid pipelines and do no better with regards to gas transmission
pipelines. These two graphs, generated from PHMSA's Integrity
Management Data, demonstrate our concern with current integrity
management programs. Some in the industry argue that older,
prescriptive class location rules can now be relaxed because of the
implementation of Integrity Management, but as the graphs show: It is
too early to go to a performance-based Integrity Management system
until the industry can prove that Integrity Management works as it
should.
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

The below chart visualizes the ratio of incident rates inside HCAs
vs outside. Values above zero mean that HCA rates are worse inside an
HCA vs outside, meaning Integrity Management programs are not working.
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Incident Rate = Incidents per 1,000 Miles
Source: PHMSA Annual Reports, Flagged Files, and Mileage Data (2005-
Present)

Critical Pipeline Safety Issues
Please note, suggested statutory and regulatory language is
provided for each issue, when applicable, in the appendix at the end of
this testimony.
Eliminate cost-benefit requirements under 49 U.S.C. Sec. 60102
PHMSA rulemaking is subject to two sets of cost-benefit
requirements: one under the Pipeline Safety Act and one under Executive
Order 12866, which requires an economic analysis of every major rule
reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget. While the additional
analysis does not mandate that the benefit of new regulations outweigh
the cost, that is often how the industry and PHMSA itself views this
requirement--making passage of new regulations difficult or nearly
impossible in some areas. In fact, the industry, represented by
American Petroleum Institute (API) and GPA Midstream, are suing PHMSA
over its new gas gathering rule.\1\
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\1\ Tom DiChristopher, Pipeline Industry Takes Dispute Over US
Gathering Line Rule to Court, S&P Global (June 7, 2022) https://
www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-
headlines/pipeline-industry-takes-dispute-over-us-gathering-line-rule-
to-court-70713022.
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In 1996, a concerted Congressional effort was made to insert cost-
benefit analysis requirements into rulemaking requirements under a
whole host of environmental protection and health statutes, presumably
to reduce regulatory burden and codify the requirements for regulatory
cost benefit analyses put in place by Presidents Reagan and Clinton in
Executive Orders. Those Congressional efforts ultimately fell short of
widespread success because so many members of Congress realized how
such measures in the statute would provide a well-funded industry a
strong litigation hook that would make easy to challenge new
regulations and nearly impossible to protect people's health and
safety. The 1996 reauthorization of the pipeline safety program, based
solely on timing, represents the only health and safety or
environmental protection statute where such an explicit directive to an
administrative agency to base regulation of risk on a cost-benefit test
was inserted into law.\2\
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\2\ Sara Gosman, Justifying Safety: The Paradox of Rationality,
Social Sci. Res. Network (Apr. 22, 2017).
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We urge Congress to put PHMSA's rulemaking on an even playing field
with all other agencies by amending 49 U.S.C. Sec. 60102 to eliminate
references to the risk assessment/cost-benefit analysis in Sec.
60102(b)(2)(D) and (E); Sec. 60102(b)(3), (4), (5) and (6). PHMSA
would remain subject to the requirements of the Executive Orders
requiring a cost benefit analysis of major rules proposed by any
agency, and the requirements for transparency in rulemaking provided by
the existing statute and procedures.
Eliminate the Nonapplication Clause in 49 U.S.C. Sec. 60104(b)
49 U.S.C. Sec. 60104(b) specifically prohibits PHMSA from adopting
a design, installation, construction, initial inspection, or initial
testing standard from applying to existing pipelines.
After PGE's tragic failure in San Bruno, CA, when operators were
unable to close valves and isolate the fuel feeding the blowtorch
destroying a neighborhood for nearly two hours, NTSB recommended PHMSA
require operators to install Automatic-Shut-Off or Remote-Controlled
Valves in all High-Consequence Areas (HCAs), including existing
pipelines.\3\ Even if such a regulation could survive the statutory
cost-benefit requirement, it would be prohibited by section 60104(b).
This means that despite the fact that the science behind safe pipeline
operation continues to develop, there will almost always be thousands
or even millions of miles of operational pipelines to which improved
safety standards will never apply. Often, it is the ageing pipelines
that need these minimum safety improvements the most. Additionally,
this is a critical problem at this moment in history, when
congressional investments have been made that have spurred interest in
developing carbon dioxide and hydrogen pipelines. Because of the
nonapplication clause, if PHMSA does modernize its woefully out-of-date
CO2 pipeline construction standards or develop special
standards for hydrogen pipelines prior to their construction, the
regulations will not apply to any pipelines already in the ground.
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\3\ Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., Accident Report: Pacific Gas and
Electric Company Natural Gas Transmission Pipeline Rupture and Fire San
Bruno, California September 9, 2010, NSTB/PAR-11/01 (Aug. 30, 2011)
https://tinyurl.com/56tfuw9w
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Congress should eliminate the nonapplication clause found at 49
U.S.C. Sec. 60104(b) to ensure that design, installation,
construction, initial inspection, and initial testing standards can
apply to existing pipelines when appropriate.
Include Mandamus Clause
In 2015, the City of San Francisco, after witnessing the terrible
nearby tragedy in San Bruno, felt so strongly that PHMSA was failing to
uphold the statutory requirements and Congressional mandates under the
Pipeline Safety Act that it went to court to force PHMSA to do so. The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, without addressing the merits of the
case, dismissed the case with an opinion holding that the Pipeline
Safety Act does not provide the basis of a mandamus action to force
PHMSA to carry out a duty under the Act.\4\ The court relied, in part,
on the absence of any explicit mandamus remedy at 49 U.S.C. Sec. 60121
(``Actions by private persons'').
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\4\ City & County of San Francisco v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., No.
12-cv-0711 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2013) (granting motion to dismiss)
https://tinyurl.com/kecae69f.
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The Trust strongly believes that local and state governments, and
others, should be able to ask the courts to carry out what Congress has
required of it in statute. This is a common protection in many other
laws. We urge Congress to include the following language in this year's
reauthorization to close this loophole.
Prohibit Reportable Unintended Releases
In 2013, a major failure occurred on ExxonMobil's Pegasus Pipeline
in Arkansas causing 134,000 gallons of crude oil to spill into a
neighborhood, contaminating homes and yards, a creek, wetlands, and
Lake Conway. In a review of the PHMSA enforcement action following the
2013 spill, the Fifth Circuit found that an operator can cause a
reportable incident, or even a significant incident, without
necessarily having violated a safety regulation.\5\ As written, the
pipeline safety statutes do not expressly prohibit the release of gas
or hazardous liquid from a pipeline.
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\5\ ExxonMobil Pipeline Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., Order on
Petition for Review, No. 16-60448 (Aug. 14, 2017) https://
www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/16/16-60448-CV0.pdf.
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To close that loophole, the Pipeline Safety Trust proposes that
section 60118 be amended to require operators to avoid releases of gas
or hazardous liquids in quantities that would make them reportable
incidents under PHMSA regulations. This section is subject to
enforcement by PHMSA under Sec. 60122 or by the Attorney General under
Sec. 60120.
Increase Authorized Appropriations and Add Recruitment and Retention
Flexibility
PHMSA, already a notoriously underfunded and understaffed agency,
has had large increases in Congressional mandates without a
corresponding increase in funding. For example, nearly 100,000 miles of
gas gathering lines have finally come under PHMSA regulations and
another approximately 300,000 miles are under new reporting
requirements. Also on the horizon is a new generation of pipelines
carrying carbon dioxide and hydrogen, requiring new expertise and
personnel. State programs, responsible for oversight of more than 80%
of the nation's pipeline mileage, are also feeling the squeeze on their
capacity.
PHMSA has long been considered underfunded and understaffed and
therefore reliant on the industry it is tasked to regulate for
technical expertise on rulemaking. A 2015 Politico investigation \6\
found that PHMSA is an agency ``that lacks the manpower to inspect the
nation's . . . oil and gas lines, that grants the industry it regulates
significant power to influence the rule-making process, and that has
stubbornly failed to take a more aggressive regulatory role, even when
ordered by Congress to do so.'' PHMSA has also long had difficulty in
attracting and retaining experienced personnel as the industry often
hires staff away at higher salaries.
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\6\ Andrea Restuccia and Elana Shor, Pipelines Blow Up and People
Die, Politico (Apr. 21, 2015) https://www.politico.com/story/2015/04/
the-little-pipeline-agency-that-couldnt-217227
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Critical components to changing this culture are authorizing
significantly more funding and allowing more flexibility in the
recruitment and retainment of experienced personnel. We also recommend
a significant increase to authorized funding of PHMSA's state programs.
Congress should, when amending Section 60125 of title 49,
subsection (a), include a substantial increase to PHMSA's authorized
funding to reflect the enormous increase in their charge as previously
described. Congress should also include a substantial increase for the
State Pipeline Safety Grant Program authorized in Section 60107 of
title 49.
Require Rupture Mitigation Valves on Existing Gas Pipelines in High
Consequence Areas
Advancements to rupture mitigation valve technology have been made
and adopted into PHMSA's regulations, but these regulations do not
apply to existing pipelines, even on older pipes in areas that could
affect densely populated areas. Arguably these are the pipelines that
need this technology the most.
In 2022, PHMSA revised its pipeline safety regulations to require
rupture mitigation valves (RMVs), or alternative equivalent
technologies, to newly constructed or entirely replaced onshore gas
transmission, Type A gas gathering, and hazardous liquid pipelines with
diameters of 6 inches or greater.\7\ The rule did not, however, require
operators to retrofit older pipes because of the nonapplication clause
found at 49 U.S.C. Sec. `104(b), which prohibits the Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) from promulgating
regulations to existing facilities. Because of this, PHMSA fell short
of adequately implementing NTSB's recommendation.\8\
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\7\ Pipeline Safety: Requirement of Valve Installation and Minimum
Rupture Detection Standards, 87 Fed. Reg. 20,940-992 (Apr. 8, 2022).
\8\ Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., Press Release: NTSB Issues Response
to PHMSA's Valve and Rupture Detection Rule, (Apr. 1, 2022) https://
www.ntsb.gov/news/press-releases/Pages/NR20220401B.aspx
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Excluding certain pipelines from implementation of critical safety
technology based on age is dangerous. Older pipes are likely more prone
to failure, and it is arbitrary to require critical safety technology
on some but not all pipelines. Requiring operator to retrofit older
pipelines with RMVs in HCAs would protect areas with more people and
buildings that could be affected by a failure. 49 C.F.R. Sec. 192.903.
Because of the nonapplication clause, however, Congress must draft
self-executing language for PHMSA to have the authority to promulgate
these regulations.ggested language is provided in the appendix.
Improve Carbon Dioxide Pipeline Safety Regulations
Given the Congressional incentives driving carbon capture and
sequestration investment, many experts expect a large increase in the
mileage of the nation's carbon dioxide (CO2) pipelines. Once
relatively rare and remote, these pipelines will soon be much closer to
people and communities. The Denbury CO2 pipeline failure in
Satartia, MS demonstrated the unique safety risks that these pipelines
pose. An asphyxiant that is heavier than air, CO2 can move
as a plume in a dangerous and even lethal concentration close to the
ground for long distances after a failure. Current PHMSA safety
regulations are inappropriate and insufficient, as described in a
Pipeline Safety Trust report.\9\
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\9\ Accufacts, Inc., Accufacts' Perspectives on the State of
Federal Carbon Dioxide Transmission Pipeline Safety Regulations as it
Relates to Carbon Capture, Utilization, and Sequestration within the
U.S. (Mar. 23, 2022) https://pstrust.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/3-
23-22-Final-Accufacts-CO2-Pipeline-Report2.pdf
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The current definition of ``carbon dioxide'' in the
federal pipeline safety regulation does not apply to all CO2
pipelines that may be developed for CCS projects.
+ Currently, only CO2 that is moved in a
supercritical state is regulated under the current definition, meaning
gaseous and liquid CO2 pipelines are not currently
regulated.
There is currently no defined safe distance or plume
dispersion model for developing a potential impact radius (PIR) along
CO2 pipelines.
+ CO2 has unique physical properties which warrant
the development of a unique PIR zone to be promulgated into federal
pipeline regulation.
There is currently no requirement to add an odorant to
transported CO2.
+ Carbon dioxide is odorless, colorless, doesn't burn, and is
heavier than air meaning that releases are harder to observe and
therefore avoid.
The unique physical properties of CO2 moved at
high pressures through pipelines can cause running ductile fractures
upon rupturing.
+ This essentially means that a pipe has a higher likelihood of
opening up like a zipper when a rupture occurs, leading to more product
being released over a shorter period of time and potentially violent
and dangerous pipe shrapnel.
Contaminants within CO2 products being
transported can jeopardize the integrity of the pipeline.
+ Water, when mixed with carbon dioxide, can form carbonic acid
which can rapidly erode carbon steel.
+ Different industries can produce numerous other contaminants,
including SOx and NOx, which can be toxic to public health, affect the
temperature and pressure of the product, and/or cause corrosion,
potentially impacting the safe operation of the pipeline.
The risks associated with the conversion of existing
transmission pipelines to CO2 service have not been fully
investigated.
+ Given the unique properties of CO2 mentioned
previously, pipeline conversions have the potential to be at higher
risk of failure from CO2 service than conventional
hydrocarbon or even new construction CO2 pipelines.

For the public to have any confidence in the safety of these
pipelines proposed through communities, regulations need to be
modernized. However, given the small number of existing mileage of
CO2 pipelines, PHMSA may not have enough information to
preemptively justify the cost of such improvements.
Congress should require PHMSA to promulgate rules addressing each
of the above-listed regulatory gaps. Given CO2's physical
properties, unique safety risks, and ability to be transported in
multiple phases, PHMSA should allot CO2 its own section of
code, CFR Part 197. These rules should not be subject to PHMSA's
statutory cost-benefit requirement.
Improve Hydrogen Pipeline Safety
Hydrogen has been highly incentivized in recent legislation such as
the Production Tax Credit in the Inflation Reduction Act. Gas
distribution operators are considering blending hydrogen into existing
gas distribution infrastructure and the trade group the American Gas
Association includes hydrogen blends of 20% as a key component of their
Net Zero plan for the industry.\10\ However, hydrogen transportation by
pipeline poses many safety risks and key knowledge gaps remain. The
risks run highest when the pipelines are near people. At least one
operator in Hawaii has blended hydrogen, however that system is unique
enough that it likely cannot serve as a model for the rest of the
country.
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\10\ American Gas Association, Net Zero Emissions Opportunities for
Gas Utilities (Feb. 8, 2022) https://www.aga.org/wp-content/uploads/
2022/02/aga-net-zero-emissions-opportunities-for-gas-utilities.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hydrogen has a much higher flammability range than methane and is
known to embrittle certain types of steel pipelines. A report on
blending hydrogen commissioned by the California Public Utility
Commission from University of California Riverside found an alarming
number of safety risks and knowledge gaps. A report by Accufacts
commissioned by the Pipeline Safety Trust \11\ stated that the weakest
safety link for hydrogen blends in the distribution system were the
pipes inside residences. Additionally, hydrogen has less energy density
by volume of methane, so any blend will only deliver about a third of
the greenhouse gas emissions (e.g., a 20% blend of hydrogen will reduce
greenhouse gas emissions by less than 7%). Hydrogen is also a potent
indirect greenhouse gas itself with a propensity to leak, therefore
leaks could quickly erode all the intended climate benefits.\12\
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\11\ Accufacts, Inc., Safety of Hydrogen Transportations by Gas
Pipeline (Nov. 28, 2022) https://pstrust.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/
11/11-28-22-Final-Accufacts-Hydrogen-Pipeline-Report.pdf
\12\ Pipeline Safety Trust, Hydrogen Pipeline Safety Summary for
Policymakers https://pstrust.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/
hydrogen_pipeline_safety_summary_1_18_23.pdf
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Congress should prohibit new hydrogen blends in gas distribution
systems until the National Academy of Sciences has issued a report from
both a safety and climate perspective.
Require Blended Products to be Reported to PHMSA
An operator is only required to report the ``predominant product''
in a natural gas pipeline system to PHMSA. This has been interpreted to
mean only reporting a product that is >50% present, overwhelmingly
methane/natural gas.
Currently operators blend products such as propane or hydrogen into
existing systems at unknown rates. In December 2022, CenterPoint Energy
blended propane into its Southern Indiana natural gas distribution
system incorrectly and triggered hundreds of carbon monoxide events,
sending four people to the hospital.\13\ One operator in Hawaii is
blending hydrogen into its gas distribution system, which we only known
because they have volunteered the information.
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\13\ Pipeline Safety Trust, CenterPoint Energy's Apology Not Enough
(Feb. 8, 2023) https://pstrust.org/centerpoint-energys-apology-not-
enough-more-must-be-done-to-protect-our-communities-from-pipeline-
incidents/
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Congress should require operators to report to PHMSA blended, non-
predominant products that at any point in time exceed 3% by volume.
Improve Geohazard Mitigation Regulations
There have been a number of recent, serious pipeline failures due
to land movement and other geological hazards. The 2020 Enbridge
failure in Hillsboro, Kentucky; the 2020 Denbury CO2
pipeline failure in Satartia, MS (45 people sought treatment at the
hospital); and the 2022 Marathon Pipe Line spill in Edwardsville, IL
(165,000 gallons of crude spilled in and near creek) were all due to
land movement. PHMSA has issued multiple Advisory Bulletins to
operators on geohazard threat mitigation. Operators are required to
mitigate against any threat within High Consequence Areas, but do not
have any specific requirement to mitigate against geohazards outside of
those areas. If we are committed to zero incidents, we need to address
the risk of geohazards such as land movement, river scouring, and other
geologic threats to pipeline integrity.
Congress should amend 49 U.S.C. Sec. 60108 to require operators to
include geohazard mitigation in their inspection and maintenance plans.
Natural Gas Incident Reporting
PHMSA can only regulate against issues that it is aware of.
Unfortunately, shortcomings in PHMSA's incident reporting regulations
keep it in the dark because its regulations only require reporting if
certain thresholds are met. Consequently, many large and potentially
dangerous incidents are not reported to the administration. This means
that that PHMSA's safety data likely underrepresents incident
prevalence and that the opportunity to use these incidents as a
learning opportunity is lost. The Pipeline Safety Trust recommends that
Congress direct PHMSA to amend part 191 of its pipeline regulations and
reporting forms to modernize the requirements for reportable incidents.
More detail, statutory language, and proposed regulatory amendments are
provided in the appendix.
Reporting of Fires and Explosions--Gas pipeline leaks are far more
likely to result in immediate combustion and fire than hazardous liquid
leaks. This places public safety and the environment at risk. Yet
unlike hazardous liquid pipeline operators, gas pipeline operators are
not required to report incidents which result in fire or explosion that
do not meet other reporting requirements. 49 C.F.R. Sec. 191.5; Sec.
191.3. Congress should require PHMSA to make reporting of fires and
explosions associated with gas pipelines mandatory.
Property Damage Thresholds--Until recently, the property damage
thresholds for reporting incidents to PHMSA was $50,000 for both gas
and hazardous liquid pipelines. However, in 2021, PHMSA issued final
rule in response to industry feedback that the threshold was too low
for gas pipelines. 86 Fed. Reg. 2219. This rule increased the gas
incident reporting threshold for property damage to $122,000, to be
adjusted annually for inflation. 49 C.F.R. pt. 191, app'x. With record
inflation, the current threshold stands at a staggering $129,300. The
gas rule excludes the value of the gas itself, which is also distinct
from the liquid rule.
There is no reason the property damage incident reporting
thresholds to differ to such an extreme. This is especially true given
the fact that methane is a major contributor to climate change and
presents a dangerous threat to the public when leaked from pipeline
infrastructure. Congress should require PHMSA to make the threshold for
reporting of property damage for hazardous liquid and natural gas
pipelines equal by lowering the property damage threshold for natural
gas incidents back to $50,000 and require that the cost of lost product
be included in this calculation. $50,000 is still a substantial amount
of money for a member of the public, even if it is not for wealthy oil
and gas companies.
Reporting of Gas Releases--PHMSA regulations require hazardous
liquid releases as small as 5 gallons to be reported. 49 C.F.R. Sec.
195.50(b). By comparison, natural gas regulations, drafted before the
collective consensus that methane emissions are a major contributor to
climate change, are extremely permissible, requiring reporting only if
an incident is an ``unintentional estimated'' release of three million
cubic feet or more. Id. at Sec. 191.3(1)(iii). Not only is the release
required to be unintentional, but the threshold is unjustifiably high.
For context, an operator can release enough gas to power over 17,000
U.S. homes without reporting the incident to PHMSA.\14\
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\14\ Am. Gas Ass'n, Natural Gas: The Facts (2019) https://
tinyurl.com/sfhm36nv (``On a daily basis, the average U.S. home uses
175 cubic feet of natural gas.'').
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Congress should require PHMSA to acknowledge the seriousness of
methane emissions and reduce the reporting threshold for gas pipelines
to 50,000 cubic feet, regardless of intent. Operators are already
required to minimize intentional and accidental releases,\15\ they
should already have capacity to monitor for releases and be required to
report them to PHMSA.
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\15\ Protecting our Infrastructure of Pipelines and Enhancing
Safety Act of 2020, S. 2299, 116th Cong. Sec. 114 (2020).
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Public Transparency Improvements
National Pipeline Mapping System (NPMS) Improvements
PHMSA's National Pipeline Mapping System (NPMS) is one of the main
ways the public can learn about pipelines in their area. However, they
are often left in the dark with much needed information hidden from
public view.
NPMS is a dataset containing locations of and information about gas
transmission and hazardous liquid pipelines and Liquefied Natural Gas
(LNG) plants which are under the jurisdiction of PHMSA. The NPMS also
contains voluntarily submitted breakout tank data. The data is used by
PHMSA for emergency response, pipeline inspections, regulatory
management and compliance, and analysis purposes. It is used by
government officials, pipeline operators, and the general public for a
variety of tasks including emergency response, smart growth planning,
critical infrastructure protection, and environmental protection.
NPMS offers operator and pipeline specific data to the public,
first responders, and local governments. There are different versions
of NPMS, depending on the user. The general public can see pipeline
maps of one county at a time, with limited information about included
pipelines and incidents. Approved government officials or pipeline
operators gain access to more detailed pipeline maps with High
Consequence Areas identified and additional scope and detail. Gathering
pipelines and distribution pipelines are not included.
Both Congress, through statutory mandates, and the NTSB, through
recommendations, have stressed the importance of public access to this
information. The PST believes strongly in the supportive role the
public can play as a partner in safer pipelines, but that partnership
is only as good as the information the public can access. Given that,
there are several shortfalls with NPMS. The current accuracy and detail
of the NPMS data are not sufficient to adequately assist local
communities who are planning or preparing for potential emergencies.
Also, no HCAs are viewable on the public maps which is problematic and
needs to be changed. In fact, there is already a statutory requirement,
from the Pipeline Safety Regulatory Certainty and Job Creation Act of
2011, to incorporate HCAs into NPMS and update biennially. Congress
should finish what it started and give the public, first responders,
and local governments access to this critical information.
Congress should also require the mapping of gathering pipelines.
Gas gathering pipelines have grown in diameter and pressure in recent
years and their safety risks can be indistinguishable from gas
transmission pipelines in some cases. All users of NPMS need to be able
to see where gathering lines are located.
Require Operators to Disclose Certain Safety Information
The public deserves more transparency about the levels of risk they
face from pipelines in their communities and near their homes.
Unfortunately, this information is often shielded from the public eye:
Concerned citizens cannot obtain information about High Consequence
Areas (HCAs), Medium Consequence Areas (MCAs), Potential Impact Radii
(PIRs), or class locations nor can they obtain pipe size or pressure
information, such as Maximum Operating Pressure (MOP) or Maximum
Allowable Operating Pressure (MAOP). Operators are already submitting
some of this information to PHMSA, but it only discloses minimal
information to the public, such as approximate location and operator
name via the NPMS. Allowing the public access to this information would
significantly increase awareness regarding where integrity management
is being implemented and allow them to weigh risks when making
decisions such as where to live.
Congress should amend 49 U.S.C. Sec. 60116 to require operators to
disclose pipeline safety and attribute information to those who
inquire.
Improve Reporting Data Metrics
PHMSA can improve public engagement around pipelines by making the
data available on its website easier for the public to digest and draw
conclusions. Multi-stakeholder groups including the public, regulators,
and industry met in 2015 and 2017 to develop performance measures for
natural gas and hazardous liquid pipelines. The group working on
hazardous liquid measures created the helpful metric of Accidents
Impacting People or the Environment (IPEs). Performance measures for
Highly Volatile Liquids (HVLs) or Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) have not
been developed, and the performance measures developed for hazardous
liquid pipelines do not align with those created for natural gas
pipelines. Over the past few years, the pipeline industry has been
developing new standards for pipeline safety performance measures that
do not align with those of PHMSA, potentially creating more confusion
than clarity regarding performance.
Congress should mandate PHMSA to convene multiple stakeholder
groups to revisit the measures previously developed to assess their
usefulness and effectiveness as well as develop new measures for HVLs
and LNG. Stakeholders should include, at a minimum, Tribal governments,
Tribal members, safety advocates, environmental advocates, state and
federal regulators, and industry.
Create Office of Public Engagement
Public understanding and engagement are critical aspects in
ensuring pipeline safety throughout the country. Currently, PHMSA, and
more specifically the Office of Pipeline Safety, has no independent
division to ensure effective public engagement and education in the
pipeline safety process. PHMSA does have ``Community Liaison Services''
which are intended to help members of the public when contacted with
questions related to pipeline safety, however, due to lack of
independence, training, and support from PHMSA, these services are
significantly lacking in their ability to provide meaningful assistance
to the public.
For members of the public to better understand and engage in the
regulatory and safety aspects of pipeline awareness, Congress should
direct PHMSA to create and fund an Office of Public Engagement. This
independently run office would build on and enhance the effort of the
already established PHMSA Community Liaison Services program by
providing much needed support and two-way engagement directive for the
administration.
The Office of Public Engagement could dispatch to communities after
a pipeline failure to offer information and listen to residents'
concerns. For a timely example, such an office could hold workshops
across the Midwest and Gulf States to help educate members of the
public on carbon dioxide pipelines and listen to the communities.
Effective public engagement is vital to pipeline safety and an
independent office dedicated to its values would help tremendously.
Other Needed Safety Improvements
Increase Penalties
PHMSA's penalty authority, and the agency's implementation of that
authority, results in civil penalties that are economically
insignificant to operators, are significantly smaller than those
imposed by some states, and are disproportionate to the harm inflicted
by pipeline failures. PHMSA's criminal penalty authority sets too high
of a bar for criminal behavior and fails to hold companies accountable
for criminal acts.
From 2002 to 2021, PHMSA's resolved civil penalty cases amounted to
a mere $79,622,174--less than $4 million per year.\16\ By comparison,
in the same period, 12,793 incidents have occurred killing 276 people,
injuring 1,145, and causing over $10.1 billion dollars in property
damage.\17\ Despite PHMSA's 2017 maximum civil penalty adjustment to
$209,002 for each day or $2,090,022 for a related series of violations,
there has not been a significant increase in penalties proposed or
collected, suggesting that PHMSA still remains reluctant to impose
penalties In fact, some dramatic incidents have resulted in no civil
penalties whatsoever. For example, just last year PHMSA imposed no
penalties on operators responsible for a 165,000 gallon spill into an
Illinois creek \18\ and a methane release of approximately 1 billion
cubic feet.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ PHMSA, Summary of Cases Involving Civil Penalties: Civil
Penalties Resolved (2002-2021) https://tinyurl.com/dvw837tc.
\17\ PHMSA, Pipeline Incident 20 Year Trend (Jan. 23, 2023) https:/
/tinyurl.com/5n6njd93.
\18\ NTSB, Marathon Pipe Line LLC Hazardous Liquids Pipeline
Release, https://tinyurl.com/2d69wchm; PHMSA, Federal Enforcement Data,
Marathon Pipe Line LLC (2006-2023) https://tinyurl.com/4dansv3m
(showing no penalties for 2022 pipeline incidents).
\19\ Letter from Robert Burrough, Director, Eastern Region Office
of Pipeline Safety, PHMSA, to Clifford Baker, Senior Vice President,
Equitrans Midstream Corporation (Dec. 29, 2022) https://tinyurl.com/
2p9ekfck (proposing no fine).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Some states, notably California, have dramatically increased their
use of civil penalties in the last decade, levying large fines like the
one levied against PG&E following the San Bruno tragedy. The state
regulator fined the utility $1.6 billion dollars for violations related
to the 2010 failure in San Bruno and has since fined the utility
additional millions relating to subsequent recordkeeping, reporting and
other violations. These large fines are possible because the California
and other state statutes do not have a limit on penalties for a related
series of violations. Each day in violation is subject to another
penalty.
Fortunately, it is very rare that a pipeline operator violates the
regulations in a way that would be considered criminal. The Pipeline
Safety Trust was born from one of those rare incidents where an
operator's actions were proven to be so reckless as to kill members of
the public and do uncounted environmental harm. The U.S. Department of
Justice under President Bush did an outstanding job prosecuting that
case, fining the company, and getting jail time for company employees.
There have only been a handful of other incidents caused by such
reckless behavior from pipeline companies since that case nearly 20
years ago, but it is important to not create barriers that make it
difficult to hold companies accountable when they knowingly or
recklessly ignore the laws meant to keep people safe. The criminal
statute applying to pipeline safety, 49 U.S.C. Sec. 60123 requires
that an operator ``knowingly and willfully'' violate the law--an
unusually high bar for holding companies accountable for criminal
behavior.
Congress should eliminate the cap on civil penalties for related
series of violations and impose a mandatory minimum penalty for each
violation. Congress should direct the Secretary to amend the agency's
regulations accordingly within 180 days and align PHMSA's pipeline
safety rules with its transportation of hazardous materials rules with
respect to criminal penalties by amending section 60123 to adopt the
``willfully or recklessly'' language from 49 U.S.C. Sec. 5124.
Eliminate Natural Gas Operator's Choice in Determining High Consequence
Areas
Current federal regulations (49 C.F.R. Sec. 192.905 and 192.903)
allow for natural gas operators to choose between two methods in the
identification of High Consequence Areas along the route of their
pipeline.
High Consequence Areas are generally areas with higher populations
in proximity to the pipeline. The chosen HCA method may be applied to
the entire system, or different methods may be applied to different
individual portions of the system. This discretion given operators not
only creates inconsistency and uncertainty when PHMSA evaluates
operator Integrity Management programs, but it also allows operators to
choose whichever method requires the least effort and/or safety
measures in their IM program.
The determination of a High Consequence Area should be limited to a
singular definition. Specifically, by clarifying the definition of High
Consequence Area in Sec. 192.903.
Close Class Location Loophole on Building Occupancy
Under current regulations, gas transmission pipeline operators are
required to classify their systems into Class Locations 1 through 4.
These class locations generally signify how many buildings intended for
human occupancy are located within the potential impact radius (PIR) of
the pipeline and thus determine the level of safety requirements
imposed on the operator for that section of pipeline. The regulation
for determining class 3 areas creates a loophole which has the
potential to exclude pipelines close to churches, theaters, and other
public areas that may hold hundreds of people only a few days per week.
The class location of a gas transmission pipeline impacts the
pressure at which the pipeline can operate and has other impacts on how
an operator must comply with the PHMSA regulations. 49 C.F.R. Sec.
192.5(b)(3)(ii) creates speculative criteria which limits the safety
requirements associated with class 3 location areas. This section of
the regulation partially defines a class 3 area as ``An area where the
pipeline lies within 100 yards (91 meters) of either a building or a
small, well-defined outside area (such as a playground, recreation
area, outdoor theater, or other place of public assembly) that is
occupied by 20 or more persons on at least 5 days a week for 10 weeks
in any 12-month period. (The days and weeks need not be consecutive.)''
This regulation is not strict enough to ensure that pipelines that
could endanger large numbers of people are held to higher safety
standards.
Congress should require PHMSA to clarify and tighten this
definition and regulation to close this loophole allowing operators to
avoid stricter safety standards in areas with churches, playgrounds,
and similar areas and buildings.
Eliminate Safety Related Condition Report Exemptions
Existing regulations requiring operators to disclose safety related
conditions are ambiguous, lenient, and do not encompass all situations
that warrant reporting.
49 U.S.C. Sec. 60101(h) requires the Secretary to make rules
requiring each operator of a pipeline facility to submit a written
report to the Secretary on any (a) condition that is a hazard to life,
property, or the environment; and (b) any safety related condition that
causes or has caused a significant change or restriction in the
operation of a pipeline facility. That written report must go to PHMSA
and the state regulators within five days of the operator first
establishing that the condition exists. However, the rules (49 C.F.R.
Sec. 191.23 and 195.55) enacted to implement that statute list only 8
specific kinds of safety related conditions, most with a large amount
of operator discretion built into their definitions, and then provide a
set of three reasons that even if the condition meets one of those
eight requirements, a report isn't required.
Congress should require operators to submit reports to PHMSA on all
safety-related conditions as originally mandated and make them easily
available to the public.
Require Mandatory Reporting of Liquid Over-Pressurization Events
Over-pressure events are a serious threat to pipeline safety that
can adversely impact pipeline integrity and cause incidents that harm
people and the environment.
On June 10, 1999, an over-pressurization event occurred that
changed the lives of many occurred in Bellingham, WA when the Olympic
Pipe Line ruptured. The rupture leaked 277,200 gallons of gasoline into
Hanna and Whatcom Creek, which flow through downtown Bellingham and
directly into Bellingham Bay. The gasoline vapor subsequently ignited
and exploded, killing three young men: Liam Wood, Wade King, and
Stephen Tsiorvas. The cause of the incident was a failed pressure
relief valve that caused the massive pressure surge and rupture.
To this day, despite the potential for disaster, operators of
liquid pipelines are not required to report over-pressurization events
to PHMSA's Office of Pipeline Safety so long as they are corrected
within five days. Over-pressure events are almost always corrected
within this period, but that fact does not reduce the potential harm to
the public and the environment that these events can cause by possibly
weakening a pipeline. This five-day exemption also precludes PHMSA from
getting important safety data that can help identify operators who are
having problems properly controlling their pipelines, and that may
point to pipeline segments in need of certain inspections. This
exemption was removed for natural gas pipelines in the PIPES Act of
2011. Congress should remove the exemption for liquid pipelines as
well.
Congress should direct PHMSA to amend its safety-related conditions
reporting regulations to require operators of liquid lines to report
over-pressurization events.
Require Improvements to State 811 Damage Prevention Programs
It has been widely recognized among industry and federal regulators
that third party excavation is one of the greatest threats to
underground pipelines. Pipeline incidents caused by excavation damage
can result in fatalities and injuries, as well as significant costs,
property damage, environmental damage, and unintentional fire or
explosions. While there are regulations which are intended to prevent
such damage, such as state ``Call Before You Dig'' 811 programs, there
are still many gaps in these regulations which leave room for the
increasing number of excavation related damages caused to pipelines
every year.
Under the authority of 49 C.F.R. Sec. 198.35, PHMSA requires that
states have a one-call damage prevention system to be eligible for
grants from PHMSA to reimburse the costs of its pipeline safety
programs. States can receive up to 80% of their costs in grants from
PHMSA, but only if they've adopted a one-call system. PHMSA reviews not
only the enforcement part of state systems, but the adequacy of the
underlying systems as well. Improved enforcement efforts, and PHMSA
intervention to provide enforcement when a state won't, may help reduce
the number of excavation incidents even further.
While PHMSA has been encouraging states to improve their damage
prevention programs, the following concerns continue to come up:
1. Exemptions: There are requests for exemptions from
participating in the one call system from both the call and response
sides of the program. Cities and municipal utilities, state departments
of Transportation, and agriculture seek exemptions, or to retain
existing exemptions from having to participate in the one call system.
Production and gathering pipelines will often seek exemptions from
having to participate in responding to one call locate requests or
mapping requirements.
PHMSA maintains that there are no federal exemptions within
the Excavation Damage Rule of 2015 and that any exemptions from
participating in the one-call system are to be determined at the State
level. However, a State must provide to PHMSA a written justification
for any exemptions for excavators from State damage prevention
requirements. PHMSA will make the written justifications available to
the public (Sec. 198.55(a)(7)).
Whether an exemption is written as an exception to a
definition of what an underground facility is, what excavation is, or
whether it's written as an exemption to who must participate, every
exemption provides another opportunity for a completely preventable
serious pipeline incident to occur.

2. Positive response: Not all states require the excavator to be
contacted by a utility or the one-call center when all the utilities
are done locating and marking. This leads to 2 problems: 1) The
excavator is never positive that they've all been marked, even if the
48 hours has passed; and 2) accidents can occur to unmarked utilities
even if the excavator did everything right. These issues would be
easily resolved by a requirement that the utility either respond
directly to the contractor once location is complete, or that the one-
call center do so.

3. Enforcement authority/equal enforcement: Most state attorneys
general have more than enough cases to deal with without adding to
their burden by requiring them to enforce violations of state damage
prevention laws. Some states have tried to resolve this by creating an
independent commission to hear complaints, made up of members from all
the various stakeholder groups. This group can hear complaints and make
recommendations to an attorney general or a county prosecuting
attorney.
Another common concern is that a high percentage of the
incidents that cause damage to underground utilities are caused by the
utilities being marked incorrectly after one-call has been used.
Excavators want to ensure that if they are going to be held accountable
for their failures to use the one call system properly, the utilities
are also held equally accountable for failures to mark utilities
correctly.
Mandate Offshore Pipeline Safety Improvements
Offshore pipeline safety remains an important area for regulatory
improvements. These pipelines have unique safety risks and should not
be exempt from important safety regulations.
Recent incidents such as the 2020 Enterprise Products propane
pipeline explosion in Corpus Christi, TX (4 fatalities, 6 serious
injuries) and the 2021 Amplify Energy/Beta Offshore oil spill near
Huntington Beach, CA (25,000 gallons of crude oil in San Pedro Bay)
demonstrate some of the safety issues with offshore pipelines.
One glaring regulatory shortfall is Offshore pipelines are
specifically exempted from having a damage prevention program. Another
shortfall is gas pipelines in navigable waterways are not required to
have five-year crossing inspections like hazardous liquid pipelines.
Congress should address both shortfalls.
Clarify ``Confirmed Discovery'' Definition
The definition of ``confirmed discovery'' of an incident is very
vague, allowing an operator to potentially delay this notification with
little risk of enforcement action by PHMSA.
Pursuant to PHMSA's regulations, operators of gas and hazardous
liquid pipelines are required to report incidents to the National
Response Center (NRC) and to the Secretary within one hour of
``confirmed discovery.'' 49 C.F.R. Sec. Sec. 191.3; 191.5; 195.2;
195.52. Unfortunately, this definition of ``confirmed discovery''
allows an operator to delay notification with little risk of
enforcement action by PHMSA. This is delay in reporting an incident can
be extremely consequential: Incidents affecting humans or the
environment could continue for some time before proper notification and
subsequent remedial action begins.
Congress should direct PHMSA to modify its regulations to amend its
definition of ``confirmed discovery'' to ensure that operators notify
the NRC and the Secretary as soon as possible after an incident occurs.
Appendix
Statutory and Regulatory Language Where Appropriate
[The appendix to Mr. Caram's written testimony is retained in
committee files and is available online at https://docs.house.gov/
meetings/PW/PW14/20230308/115415/HHRG-118-PW14-Wstate-CaramB-
20230308.pdf pages 20-33.]

Mr. Nehls. Thank you, Mr. Caram.
And I want to thank you all, all the witnesses here, for
your testimony. We will now turn to questions from the panel,
and I will recognize myself for 5 minutes.
Administrator Brown, the PIPES Act 2020 was signed on
December 27th of 2020. Included in the legislation was a
requirement that PHMSA modernize its regulations to accommodate
the growing LNG export industry. The proposed rule has not yet
been published. What is PHMSA's path for the promulgation of
these regulations?
Mr. Brown. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. That rule is a
priority rulemaking, one of the many in the 2020 PIPES Act, as
far as our monthly updated web chart showing what our priority
rulemakings are. And we hope to get a proposal out this year on
that.
I was just down in Freeport, Texas, where we had a really
terrible incident last year in June. We hope to incorporate
lessons learned from that incident in that rulemaking.
I will just note, too, that in the first year of this
administration, we had the most productive series of pipeline
safety rulemakings in the last 12 years, and maybe beyond that.
So, we are making tremendous progress, but I agree, and I
think a theme for the whole day today and the last hearing held
regarding PHMSA is that our pace of rulemakings is not what
anybody in the room would like it to be. And so, we are excited
to work with any and all of you to help improve that ability to
get rulemakings done.
Mr. Nehls. And Mr. Brown, we understand PHMSA has long
dealt with staffing challenges, which is why the PIPES Act of
2020 mandated--mandated--that enforcement and inspection
personnel not fall below a certain number. Yet as of January
21st, PHMSA has only 207--207--inspection and enforcement
personnel, despite the PIPES Act requiring 247 such employees.
I think Mr. Grubb was talking a little bit about this, hiring
people, safety personnel for 2023.
Instead of filling these essential positions, PHMSA has
hired environmental specialists, including an environmental
economist, that do not appear directly tied to its pipeline
safety mission.
You have also referred to PHMSA as a climate change agency.
Considering the agency's current challenges in meeting its
pipeline safety mission, do you think rebranding PHMSA as a
climate change agency is helpful in recruiting safety and
inspection personnel?
Mr. Brown. Well, so, yes. In fact, when I asked new hires
why they came to the agency, a lot of them actually referenced
that. Actually CEOs of companies would be interested to hear
the representatives here, but the CEOs of oil and gas pipeline
companies also cite their focus on climate change over recent
years to attract engineers and Ph.D.'s to their agency to be a
part of the transition, and to mitigate one of the big
challenges.
I will be glad to get you updated numbers on where we are.
My understanding is we have actually met PIPES Act mandates in
hiring new inspectors and engineers over the last few years.
Mr. Nehls. OK.
Mr. Brown. It has been our top focus. We can't do the work
without the incredibly dedicated people we have.
Certainly, during the pandemic and over the last few years,
the challenges of competing with the private sector, with other
States, it is a challenge. I just heard from one of our State
agents that they had four people they were interviewing, nobody
showed up for the interview. That is real challenging, and any
tools you can give us to help us get to that----
Mr. Nehls [interrupting]. Yes, I appreciate that, Mr.
Brown. It has been over 2 years without a nominee for PHMSA
Administrator. How has the absence of permanent leadership
affected the agency's regulatory efficiency?
Mr. Brown. Honestly, I don't think one bit, but I don't
have too much to add----
Mr. Nehls [interrupting]. Has there been any discussion
when a nominee is coming forward? I mean, when are we going
to----
Mr. Brown [interrupting]. I don't have any estimates or
information.
Mr. Nehls. All right. Last question. And again, in the
PIPES Act of 2020, signed on December 27, 2020, included in the
legislation was a requirement that PHMSA modernize its
regulations to accommodate the growing LNG export industry. The
proposed rule has not yet been established.
Again, what is PHMSA's path forward for the promulgation of
these regulations?
Mr. Brown. This door shut when you started. Is this the LNG
facilities update rule, the one I think you first asked about?
Our plan is to get it out this year, and we provide monthly
updates on progress there.
Mr. Nehls. Well, I am looking forward to--we had a meeting
a few weeks ago. I look forward to continuing on with this
relationship so we can do the right thing and make sure that
our pipelines are as safe as can be. Thank you.
I will now recognize Ranking Member Payne for 5 minutes.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, Chairman.
Deputy Administrator Brown, in February of 2020, Denbury's
24-inch carbon dioxide pipe ruptured in Mississippi, with 200
people needing to be evacuated, as was just stated.
Fortunately, there were no fatalities, but local first
responders were caught completely unaware.
Can you please share with us how PHMSA is using lessons
learned from this incident to inform your ongoing carbon
dioxide rule development?
Mr. Brown. Really important question, and I just want to
relate it back to the chairman's comments about the LNG
facilities rule and discussions we have frequently with
industry.
But in that incident that you referenced--and I visited a
community of about 70 people in rural Mississippi about an hour
northwest of Jackson. The first responders were unaware of the
incident and what was at issue with the rupture of that carbon
dioxide pipeline. Notification and getting information out--
same thing in East Palestine, Ohio.
We live in modern society, where I can get notification of
my food order, that it has been retained by the restaurant,
they are cooking my food, it is ready to go. That is all within
minutes. And in that incident, it was over 1\1/2\ hours before
folks were aware that there was a cloud of CO2 gas
that was engulfing a community. We can do much better than
that.
I really look forward to working with everybody. And I
think there is consensus on the need to improve that
communication.
Mr. Payne. Thank you. As we look forward to a pipeline
safety reauthorization, do you feel that PHMSA has the
resources needed to investigate all pipeline incidents?
And what additional tools do you need to recruit and retain
an inspection workforce?
Mr. Brown. We triage our needs. I think we have requisite
resources to investigate pipeline incidents. But the amount of
time it can take, we actually have reduced the amount of time
to open, certainly for an enforcement and compliance issue
related to an incident, to a record low amount of 323 days.
So, the amount of resources we have--and that seems to be a
common theme for the day--is directly proportional to the work
that we can do. And everybody seems to think we should be doing
more. We are grateful that this committee has continued to
support our work. But it is an important question you ask.
Mr. Payne. Yes, that is the unfortunate position you are
in, irrespective of what you do, people are always going to
want more. So, thank you.
Now, Mr. Caram, your testimony says that we are not making
real progress on pipeline safety, and that integrity management
programs have not lived up to their promise. What are the
shortcomings of the integrity management plans?
Mr. Caram. Thank you for the question. Yes, the theory
behind integrity management really makes perfect sense. You
identify those pipelines that can have the most devastating
effects on communities or on the environment in the case of a
failure, and you focus your safety efforts on those sections of
pipelines with more inspections, more safety requirements, and
we identify those areas. We call them high-consequence areas.
But when we look at the data, and we look at incident rates
within high-consequence areas and compare them to the incidents
outside of high-consequence areas, they are not doing any
better. In a lot of cases, they are actually doing worse. And
so, we see this as a performance-based metric, a performance-
based regulation that leaves a lot up to the operator's
discretion. It makes it hard for PHMSA to inspect, hard for
them to enforce. And it is not producing the results that we
would hope to see, as safety advocates.
Mr. Payne. And with the time I have remaining, quickly,
what is the single biggest driver of the lack of progress on
pipeline safety?
Mr. Caram. Thank you for the question. It is a good one. I
would have to say PHMSA's statutory handcuffs on ability to
make strong rules.
Mr. Payne. OK. Thank you very much.
And Mr. Chair, I yield back.
Mr. Nehls. Thank you, Mr. Payne.
And Mr. Brown, in your testimony it says PHMSA has kept up
with the PIPES Act of 2020 hiring mandates, both for inspectors
as well as regulatory personnel. And in your office, January
31st, it says 207 of the 248 inspection enforcement personnel
were filled. So, obviously, in the last 5 weeks, 6 weeks you
have hired 41 personnel. I find that incredible, with the
bureaucracy and the stuff that we have today.
But I will now yield to Mr. Rouzer.
Mr. Rouzer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Brown, this is not a gotcha question by any means. I am
just curious how you will answer it. Generally speaking, are
pipelines safe?
Mr. Brown. Are pipelines safe, generally speaking? Sure.
Mr. Rouzer. Let me ask this. Are investigations common when
there is no safety incident?
Mr. Brown. Can you repeat the question? I didn't hear.
Mr. Rouzer. I am sorry. Are investigations common when
there is no safety incident?
Mr. Brown. Are investigations common when there is no
safety incident? Not common, no.
Mr. Rouzer. OK. A followup to that: What circumstances
would prompt PHMSA to launch an investigation on a wireline or
slickline operator that has never had a recorded safety
incident?
Mr. Brown. Perhaps a notification through anonymous sources
or through a hotline. There are many circumstances where you
might investigate an allegation of a company or an operator,
sure.
Mr. Rouzer. So, let me ask it this way. Is there any kind
of testing available for a regulated wireline or slickline
operator, where they can be exempt from, quite frankly,
unapplicable regulations imposed upon them?
Mr. Brown. I am sorry, I am having trouble hearing.
Mr. Rouzer. Is there any kind of testing or process
available for a regulated wireline or slickline operator to be
exempt from unapplicable regulations that might be imposed upon
them?
In other words, is there a process where you check all the
boxes, you are clear to go, without having to go through an
investigation when in fact there is no safety incident?
Mr. Brown. You would never be totally exempt from--just if
you check boxes and you say you are meeting our requirements.
We are always going to make sure what you say is accurate, and
the operator is held accountable if it is not.
Mr. Rouzer. One other question here. So, what kind of
research, if there is any, is PHMSA conducting related to
pipelines and the products that support pipelines?
Mr. Brown. A tremendous amount of research, actually, and
it actually gets to Mr. Black's testimony about our commitment
to innovation. We spend millions of dollars a year working with
the academic community, the regulated community on the needs to
improve pipeline safety and technologies. There were actually a
bunch of patents come out of the research that Congress
appropriates and that we dole out to those communities.
Mr. Rouzer. Is that research available to the public?
Mr. Brown. It is, yes.
Mr. Rouzer. Where can that be found?
Mr. Brown. Oh, we can send it to you, but it is on our
website.
Mr. Rouzer. OK.
Mr. Brown. Yes.
Mr. Rouzer. So, how many different research projects are
there out there?
Mr. Brown. I want to say at least a dozen. We have got
about $8 million currently on some of the new emerging areas of
energy--hydrogen, carbon dioxide--both to mitigate safety
risks, to improve leak detection, and to keep the product in
the pipe, which I think everybody here is focused on. So, that
is an area that I think we have a really broad stakeholder
support for and engagement with.
Mr. Rouzer. Yes. With regard to my earlier questions, later
on I would like for my team to get with your team to talk about
some specific incidents, just make sure that you are aware, and
that all things are being handled properly.
Mr. Brown. Happy to. I really appreciate your flagging
that. Thanks.
Mr. Rouzer. Thank you, Mr. Brown.
I yield back.
Mr. Nehls. Mr. Rouzer yields. I now recognize Mr. Larsen
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Strengthening pipeline safety protects our communities. We know
that in Washington State. It also holds operators accountable.
In the future, it can help us fight climate change, with the
role of moving CO2 around. I think we need to focus
on better identifying our vulnerabilities, addressing safety
gaps, and giving PHMSA the tools it needs to strengthen the
safety standards.
To that end, Mr. Caram, your testimony outlines a variety
of things, but one point you make is that integrity management
isn't working. Well, I have been at this 23 years. Many have
been at this longer. But it was always about integrity
management when we did the Pipeline Safety Act in 2002 and
continuing on.
In your view, why isn't integrity management working, and
what is the biggest contributor to the pipeline safety
challenges that you have identified?
Mr. Caram. Thank you for the question. I wish I could list
off a number of reasons of why it is not working.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. You get to pick one.
Mr. Caram. I believe it is the performance-based nature of
them, and the lack of prescriptions.
For a lot of the--there are a lot of wonderful operators
out there that really are leading the way on safety. They take
it very seriously. It is a part of their culture. And I would
imagine that those operators have pretty good integrity
management programs.
Unfortunately, those are not all the operators out there.
And for those I think we do need some more prescriptive level
of minimum safety standards which would allow the other
operators to continue to do their integrity management
programs, their safety management systems, and these continuous
improvement processes.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. Yes. You have identified a lot
of--about--like, 22 recommendations or so in your testimony. I
appreciate that.
Are there any new approaches you think would best move the
needle to improve safety?
Mr. Caram. Overall, I think the best thing we can do for
safety is give PHMSA the full resources it needs to be the
regulator it needs to be. I think they have been historically--
it is a theme today among all of us, they have been
historically underfunded, they have these statutory handcuffs.
And if Congress could give them the tools, the resources, and
the ability to become a more robust regulatory agency, I think
that is where we will see a real change in pipeline safety, and
start to move towards our goals.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. Yes. Mr. Brown, I have been
around long enough to not ask you specifically what is going to
be in the President's budget tomorrow, because I know what your
answer will be. You won't be able to give it.
Should we expect to see something in the President's budget
tomorrow with regards to PHMSA and the resources you have
outlined that are needed?
Mr. Brown. Yes, thank you for the question and how you
asked it. There are a couple of things that I can highlight
without specificity, and one is support for States.
We oversee 3.4 million miles of pipeline, but the vast
majority of those are gas distribution, and 80 percent of those
are overseen by our State agents. They have gotten about 55
percent of their budgets covered through appropriations that
you all provide us to give to them. That is--with all the new
demands on us and on them, that is hefty. And so, we are trying
to address that in the budget.
And then, in addition to that, hydrogen, CO2,
the fuels of the future that have greatly been incentivized in
the last 2 years through the Inflation Reduction Act, the
Bipartisan Infrastructure Law. The one thing that sort of was
missing from those tremendous investments was additional
oversight by our agency.
So, the President's budget should reflect those items I can
preview for you.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. All right, and so, we will look
for those, especially.
Mr. Black, we talked a little bit yesterday about the
technology demonstration. Can you talk a little bit more about
that?
I mean, it certainly sounds interesting. I want to move
forward. Certainly, in the last 25 years, technology has
changed. I understand the technology of a smart pig hasn't
changed. It is a matter of thinking of that as a platform, and
then the stuff you stick on it, if you will, the technology has
changed to better do integrity management.
Can you talk a little bit more about the program itself,
and how it can benefit?
Mr. Black. Sure. Thank you, Ranking Member.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. Yes.
Mr. Black. Yes, the smart pig technology or in-line
inspection is the same as maybe 20 years ago, but the
sophistication of the devices that can travel inside the
pipeline looking for issues has improved. So have the analytics
of what can be done with that information. We can see more. We
have a better idea of what issues might become a problem. So,
we know now, through greater advancements, what the proper
schedule should be on, which features a pipeline operator
should address.
But the PHMSA regulations have not changed that. So,
Congress, in recognition, created this section in the PIPES Act
2020, right? That sounded great. But what PHMSA did is they
went beyond the mandate and the limitations imposed by
Congress.
First, they required that an application to use it follow
the NEPA process, and an environmental assessment was done.
That is the first time PHMSA has ever done that for an R&D
project.
They said the standard of review needed to be higher even
than the special permit process, and the special permit is for
a permanent waiver of regulations. This is for a temporary
project.
And then PHMSA said that anybody asking for a demonstration
project needed to use the special permit process itself, which
is has taken 10 years, in some instances.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. Thank you. To follow up--and I
appreciate the chair's indulgence, and I have nothing to yield
back except nothing.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Larsen of Washington. Thank you.
Mr. Nehls. Mr. Larsen yields, and I will recognize Mr.
Stauber for 5 minutes.
Mr. Stauber. Thank you very much.
Mr. Larsen, thanks for yielding your time to me. I
appreciate it. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
In recent years, I am sure everyone has seen the illegal
protesters that have set fires, cut hydraulic lines, attacked
equipment and operators during the Enbridge Line 3 replacement
construction. And they did millions of dollars of damage and
put union workers in danger.
Deputy Administrator Brown, are our pipelines, the critical
infrastructure used to deliver affordable and reliable energy
to my constituents in Minnesota, are they safe from radical
protesters?
Mr. Brown. Congressman, as you and others may know, we
don't oversee security of pipelines. So, when you say ``safe,''
our jurisdiction does include the safe operations, but the line
is sort of drawn as far as security to the Transportation
Security Administration. We do work closely with them. And when
we see issues of security, we let them know. And vice versa, if
they have issues of security, they flag those issues as they
may affect operations.
Mr. Stauber. When these protesters are protesting for
climate reasons, obviously, do they put the workers in
jeopardy?
Mr. Brown. Again, because we focus on the safe operations
of the pipelines and not on the security, I am certainly
concerned always about the workers doing work----
Mr. Stauber [interrupting]. But do they put the workers in
jeopardy when they jump into pipes as the 49ers are lifting
that pipe up into place, does that put them in jeopardy?
Mr. Brown. I mean, that sounds very concerning to me, sure.
Mr. Stauber. Does it put the community in jeopardy?
Mr. Brown. All of that, what you are describing, sounds
very concerning----
Mr. Stauber [interrupting]. Does it put law enforcement in
jeopardy?
Mr. Brown. The way you are describing things, that does
sound like it puts everybody in jeopardy if you are threatening
violence to anybody or anything.
Mr. Stauber. Thank you. Mr. Brown, in your testimony you
had stated that PHMSA is a climate agency. Do you still stand
by that?
Mr. Brown. Yes. Thanks for giving me the opportunity to
explain that.
Mr. Stauber. Do you sympathize with the radical protesters?
Mr. Brown. I don't know to what you are referring.
Mr. Stauber. Protesters, for instance, on Enbridge Line 3
that are climate protesters. Do you sympathize with them?
Mr. Brown. That is a large group of people who I don't know
exactly what you are referring to. Sort of what--I really just
don't know what you are referring to. So, I----
Mr. Stauber [interrupting]. Do you support their radical
protests that put the workers, community, and law enforcement
in danger?
Mr. Brown. I do not support anybody putting anybody in
danger, especially law enforcement. My dad was a police
officer, I come from a law enforcement family.
Mr. Stauber. That should have been easier for you to
answer, then.
Mr. Brown. Well, I think I answered the easy ones.
Mr. Stauber. Are the Biden administration's climate
priorities driving decisions at PHMSA, yes or no?
Mr. Brown. We have a whole-of-Government approach to
mitigating the threat of climate change, which I think
everybody up here is aligned with.
And I appreciate the bipartisan PIPES Act focusing on
minimizing methane emissions, which has 80 times the global
warming potential as carbon dioxide.
Mr. Stauber. Ultimately, I am concerned that this
administration is steering PHMSA away from its mission, and
using yet another agency to push its activist agenda. PHMSA's
mission is to protect people and the environment by advancing
the safe transportation of energy and other materials that are
essential to our daily lives.
Reliable, affordable, clean energy is good. Would you agree
with that?
Mr. Brown. I would agree that reliable, affordable, clean
energy is good.
I think our mission statement also includes protecting the
environment, and we also focus on that, as well, and I
appreciate the committee supporting that, as well.
Mr. Stauber. All the American people want is safe, reliable
access to affordable energy. We need to protect our pipeline
infrastructure to accomplish that goal.
Mr. Chair, I yield back.
Mr. Brown. Yes, I agree. Thank you, Congressman.
Mr. Nehls. Mr. Stauber yields. I now recognize Mrs. Foushee
for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Foushee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the
witnesses for being here this morning.
I would also like to thank Ranking Member Larsen and
Ranking Member Payne for their work, and I am honored to join
both of you and my colleagues on this subcommittee.
First I would like to discuss the Colonial Pipeline spill
that happened in Huntersville, North Carolina. In August of
2020, gasoline was found bubbling from the ground on the Oehler
Nature Preserve in Huntersville. At first, Colonial Pipeline
estimated that only 63,000 gallons had leaked. But ultimately,
it was reported that nearly 2 million gallons of fuel was
released in the nature preserve, resulting in my State's
largest gasoline spill ever.
Last summer, the North Carolina Department of Environmental
Quality filed a consent order holding Colonial Pipeline
accountable after they failed to provide the State with
essential information required for remediation after the spill.
It took 2 years and a consent order.
Mr. Brown, in May 2022, your agency proposed nearly $1
million in civil penalties on Colonial Pipeline for multiple
probable violations of Federal pipeline safety regulations for
failing to adequately plan and prepare for a manual restart and
shutdown operation, which contributed to the national impacts
of the May 2021 cyber attack.
So, my question is whether PHMSA's civil penalty authority
is substantial enough to encourage better behavior by pipeline
operators.
Mr. Brown. That is a really good question. I don't know if
I have a great answer. I would welcome other panelists' answer
of whether a civil penalty of $1 million is going to dissuade a
company that is valued in the billions. Intuitively, I would
think not.
But I will say, we specifically highlighted that proposed
civil penalty because it was something where we had actually
given the company a heads up--hey, you have got to fix this--
and they chose not to after we even told them to adhere to our
regulation. For us, that is a particularly egregious violation,
and that is why we issued a proposed civil penalty.
Mrs. Foushee. Thank you for that response.
Mr. Grubb and Mr. Black, I am interested in learning more
about how you detect and prevent leaks in your industry. Is
this a priority for Kinder Morgan, Mr. Grubb?
And for your member organizations, Mr. Black, do you have a
means of detecting leakage on your pipelines, and are your
systems for doing so more stringent in high-population areas,
also known as high-consequence areas?
Mr. Grubb, you may go first.
Mr. Grubb. Thank you for the question. So, in terms of
detecting methane leaks, we routinely patrol our pipelines for
leak detection purposes. We also implement leak detection at
compressor stations along our pipeline routes.
Detecting leaks is important. It is something that does not
happen often, in terms of natural gas pipeline leaks. But when
it does happen, we quickly identify it, and we quickly repair
those.
Methane emissions, in general, are something that is of the
utmost importance to us, as well as our industry. And certainly
PHMSA acting upon the rulemaking to address class location will
also minimize or reduce methane emissions associated with
activities that are required to meet the current regulations,
that being pipe replacement. And it will minimize the
unnecessary release of natural gas associated with those
projects, and that will go a long way in reducing methane
emissions, as well.
Mr. Black. Thank you, Congresswoman. Detecting leaks is
very important. A pipeline operator's goal is to detect the
leak available in the control room, where you can shut down the
pipe at the sign. So, they maintain sensors along the pipeline,
looking for signs of a leak.
Industry, in the last several years, has developed through
experts a recommended practice at the American Petroleum
Institute on leak detection. We are also conducting R&D to
continue to improve leak detection. We want to be able to see,
smell, or hear maybe the signs of released product, also
maintain those aerial patrols, just like Mr. Grubb was saying,
and have community awareness programs so that, if the public
knows--if they find an incident of a leak, they know who to
call. Detecting a leak is very important.
Mrs. Foushee. Thank you.
With that, Mr. Chair, I yield back.
Mr. Nehls. Mrs. Foushee yields. I will now recognize Mr.
Johnson for 5 minutes.
Mr. Johnson of South Dakota. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was
grateful to see that Ranking Member Larsen had focused a little
bit on the technology pilot program.
And so, Mr. Brown and Mr. Black, I want to dive a little
deeper. I mean, talk to me about what improvements we could
make to the program so that it would be more valuable for
operators, and more people would take advantage of it.
Mr. Brown. You want to go? You want me to--go ahead.
Mr. Black. OK, thank you. Nobody has used the program right
now. It has been untenable. We need to make some changes.
One, we need to change the standard of review. It is
complicated in the law. It is complicated in what PHMSA has
done. Generally, we want something simple, where it is a
reasonable level of safety, compared to what the existing
regulations have.
Second, we don't----
Mr. Johnson of South Dakota [interrupting]. So--hold on.
Before going to second, let's drill in just a little bit. So,
when you say we need to change the standard of review, what is
it, and where do we need to head to?
Mr. Black. The problem is that PHMSA is using a standard of
review even higher than its special permit process, which is
for permanent waivers of regulations. It doesn't need to be
that way.
Shall I move to another one?
Mr. Johnson of South Dakota. What standards should they
move to? Should they just move to their standard level of
review?
Mr. Black. We want PHMSA to exercise judgment on if this
application is going to improve pipeline safety.
Mr. Johnson of South Dakota. I see.
Mr. Black. This is PHMSA's decision to make. They have made
it more complicated than they need to.
Mr. Johnson of South Dakota. OK, very good, sorry. Number
one. Now number two.
Mr. Black. Great. Next, we need to not use the NEPA
process. There is no reason for an environmental assessment to
be completed for an R&D project.
Next, we need to not use the special permit process itself.
It is broken. Everybody recognizes that. It has taken 10 years
for some special permits.
Next, we need to extend this program. Congress gave it a
few years. We have lost 2 years already. Do a 10-year
reauthorization so we have the full cycle of PHMSA to finish
developing the updates, operators to apply. Let's conduct the
research. PHMSA can get the data. The goal is for them to
update their regulations with the know-how of 20 years of
developments.
Mr. Johnson of South Dakota. That is excellent, because
those are specific changes that we can make that are within our
power, they are easy to understand, and they would have the
desired impact.
Sir, what did he get wrong?
Mr. Brown. So, we actually opened for public comment, ``How
can we implement this directive from Congress?'' We didn't get
the specifics of exactly your question, Congressman. What
standard do we judge a new technology--it is just an R&D
project. That is different than deploying a technology that has
safety implications for the public. I rely on the subject
matter experts, whose focus is safety, to make that
determination.
Now, the question of how to apply the National
Environmental Policy Act, that is a directive that Congress
established 50-plus years ago. You can consider environmental
impacts in different ways, but there was no proposal to provide
those environmental impacts at all in the public comment period
that we offered.
We want innovative technologies. We are happy to work with
folks on this. That is why we opened it up for public comment.
Happy to work with LEPA and any of the committee members here.
But we don't want to sacrifice two things, right? Safety,
environmental impacts. So, how to do it is absolutely the
question. You asked the right question. We are asking the same
question. And if we can come to agreement on an efficient way
to do it, great. It is definitely a common goal that we have.
Mr. Johnson of South Dakota. Mr. Black, what else?
Mr. Black. PHMSA has recognized that a decision on a
pipeline safety demonstration program application is not a
major Federal action. It has the discretion to not put it
through the NEPA process. This can be simple. Congress can tell
PHMSA, ``Don't go beyond the limitations that we tell you to
use in this program.''
Mr. Johnson of South Dakota. Certainly----
Mr. Brown [interrupting]. Well----
Mr. Johnson of South Dakota [interrupting]. No, go ahead,
sir.
Mr. Brown. So, we certainly, potentially, could face a
lawsuit, and then have to litigate that. If Congress were to
provide us the directives, or if we could get a proposal that
says we are not going to ignore the environmental impacts, here
is how you know we are not going to ignore the environmental
impacts, then that would get us closer to what I think we all
want to get to.
Mr. Johnson of South Dakota. So, Mr. Chairman, I would just
close by saying this. I mean, we have specific recommendations.
We have an opportunity to make this program work better, to get
additional research and development, to make the system run
better and more safely. It is not being used properly. This is
something we can work on together. This is something that we
might be able to get the overwhelming majority of the people on
both sides of this dais to understand that the reforms that
have been described will work, and they will make the system
better long term. Let's get it done together. I yield back.
Mr. Nehls. Mr. Johnson yields. I now recognize Mr. Cohen
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Cohen. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and I thank you and the
ranking member for holding this hearing.
The safe operation of the 3.4 million miles of pipeline
regulated by PHMSA is vital to the health and safety of the
American people. I want to focus on a pipeline issue that is
particularly important to our country's ability to combat the
climate crisis, which is methane leaks.
According to a recent report in a Guardian article, methane
causes about one-quarter of global heating from the greenhouse
gas effect, and human-caused emissions over the last century
have contributed about one-third of the total global
temperature rise. Emissions have surged in recent decades, and
if we continue on this path, methane alone could push us past a
number of catastrophic climate tipping points.
Around 40 percent of those methane emissions come from
leaks from fossil fuel exploration, production, and
transportation, and that percentage has increased by half in
the last two decades. For the sake of the planet and future
generations, we must do all we can to prevent methane leaks
from the millions of miles of natural gas pipelines under
PHMSA's authority.
In my State, the Tennessee Valley Authority is pushing
forward with a plan to construct new natural gas powerplants
and pipelines as a ``bridge'' to renewables, a bridge to
renewables. I have argued that it is a bridge to more pollution
and disasters, and have strongly encouraged them to rethink
this approach.
Deputy Administrator Brown, in your written testimony, you
stated that PHMSA has been integral to the whole-of-Government
approach to mitigating unnecessary greenhouse gas emissions.
Could you expand on what this approach entails, and what
resources or support PHMSA might still need to properly carry
out this vital mission?
Mr. Brown. Yes. Well, thank you so much, Congressman. And
really, we have been really energized by this committee's work
with the 2020 PIPES Act, which said regulated facilities have
to minimize methane emissions--as noted, 80 times the global
warming potential as carbon dioxide.
Also, we have to include in our cost-benefit analysis, as
we move forward with rulemakings, environmental impacts, which
just gets to some of the questions from Members today why we
might hire people with environmental knowledge and skills. We
have been directed to do that by the committee in carrying out
these directives. And we are doing it, actually, by hiring
engineers with environmental knowledge and experience.
But we have got six rulemakings in the White House Methane
Emissions Reduction Action Plan, three of them we finalized.
And those overlap to the chairman's questions about how we are
prioritizing. We are prioritizing the directives we have from
Congress to do a host of rulemakings, the ones that have the
biggest safety impact, that--also, I think it is inextricably
linked. You reduce methane emissions, you are actually
improving and mitigating climate change. You are mitigating
methane emissions when you keep the product in the pipe, which
is something you hear from industry all the time.
We are all, I think, focused on that, and how we talk about
it. And I suggest we talk about it. I suggest we talk about
keeping the product in the pipe is helping reduce methane
emissions and global warming. The agency that I lead now wasn't
allowed to talk about that for 4 years. And a lot of companies
are talking about it now to recruit folks, and also because
their investors want that information.
So, really, over the last few years, the marketplace, the
free market has said, yes, actually we would like to have
improved clean energy, but we also want to mitigate the impacts
to the environment.
Mr. Cohen. Our time is running out. If I can--I thank you
for that--very quickly, could operators decide for themselves
which high-consequence area definitions to use?
Why do we have two different definitions, and do we allow
operators to pick and choose even different ones along the same
route?
Mr. Brown. I am sorry. I didn't hear that.
Mr. Cohen. Well, I got 1 minute left. I am going to pass.
Mr. Caram, in your written testimony, you state that
natural gas regulations drafted before the collective consensus
that methane emissions are a major contributor to climate
change are extremely permissible with regard to leak reporting
requirements.
You and Deputy Administrator Brown, methane, a potent
greenhouse gas, we want to avoid it leaking from pipelines.
PHMSA has just finished a year-long study to put together a
proposed rule on the use of advanced leak detection. Where are
we tackling methane emissions from natural gas pipelines, and
what still needs to be done?
Mr. Caram. Thank you for that question. As Mr. Brown
stated, Congress made extraordinary progress in this area with
the PIPES Act of 2020, but we still do have a lot of work to
do. We now have satellites detecting huge methane plumes from
planned and routine maintenance from pipelines. We don't
tolerate these kind of planned intentional releases from liquid
pipelines, and we need to continue this culture change on the
gas side, and no longer tolerate those, as well.
These blowdowns, the intentional releases for routine
maintenance, they are not required to be reported to PHMSA. And
besides the general language in the PIPES Act about minimizing
emissions, there is no limitation on them.
Mr. Cohen. Mr. Brown, do you have something to add?
Mr. Brown. Yes, we have a rulemaking that is at the Office
of Management and Budget that addresses leak detection, repair,
blowdowns, basically what the gentleman just addressed,
Congressman, and that is a mandate from the 2020 PIPES Act.
Mr. Cohen. Thank you, sir, and I yield back the balance of
my time.
Mr. Nehls. Thank you, Mr. Cohen. I now recognize Mr. Yakym
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Yakym. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to our
witnesses for taking the time to be here today and share with
us your expertise.
I am glad that our Transportation and Infrastructure
Committee kicked off our first hearing on the FAA
reauthorization with a hearing concerned and centered around
safety. And I am glad that we are doing the same thing with
PHMSA today, with the reauthorization, a hearing on safety.
Pipelines are the lifeblood of our economy. They help put
gas in our vehicles, they heat our homes, they power our
factories and our businesses, and they drive exports that lift
our economy and create jobs right here at home. They are an
integral part of the conversations as we discuss emerging
technologies like hydrogen and carbon capture, as well.
At the heart of all these applications is safety. Without
pipeline safety, Americans won't have gas, heat, power, or
exports that we depend on to drive our economy on a daily
basis. That is why we have agencies like PHMSA, the Pipeline
and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, which is
entrusted with this critical mission of safety.
But I am concerned--concerned because it seems like there
is a potential movement to deviate from that mission of safety.
We heard earlier today about a number of pipeline issues that
have happened, safety issues across our country, and it seems
like we may have a deviation from that mission of safety.
Mr. Brown, you recently said, and I quote, ``One thing we
are trying to brand is as a climate agency.'' I would like you
to clarify that comment, because Congress created PHMSA to be a
safety agency, not a climate agency. Full stop. So, if you
could for the record, Mr. Brown, please clarify. Is PHMSA's top
and sole priority safety?
Mr. Brown. Yes, it is. It is the top priority, but it is
inextricably linked to environmental impacts. And that is in
our mission statement, and it is in the 2020 PIPES Act for us
to minimize methane emissions, methane being 80 times the
impact of carbon dioxide in global warming. When you minimize
methane emissions, you are mitigating climate change.
Now, you can talk about it, or you can not talk about it. I
choose to talk about it. But when you minimize methane
emissions--and by the way, most of the companies that Mr. Black
represents, Mr. Grubb, his company, they talk about what they
are doing to mitigate climate change. It is inextricably linked
to safety. And so, to just not talk about it, I mean, it is up
to folks if we want to talk about it. I choose to talk about
it. I think it is good for recruiting. It happens to be
accurate. And we are acknowledging the reality that climate
change exists, and we have to consider ways to mitigate it.
Mr. Yakym. Do you think that some of the pipeline safety
issues we have had have happened because maybe we have taken
our eye off the ball of safety, and we are focused more on
climate change, it seems, than we are on----
Mr. Brown [interrupting]. Absolutely not.
Mr. Yakym [continuing]. Safety, which is the responsibility
of your agency?
Mr. Brown. There are 600 people completely dedicated to
safety. You couldn't convince them not to be focused on safety.
The first thing I did was what are the rulemakings that will
have the biggest safety impact at the agency, and that is what
we are focused on.
Mr. Yakym. Talk to me about how your agency speaks to
recruits. I mean, do you tell your recruits that you are a
climate agency that is concerned about safety?
Mr. Brown. I mean, as far as what we recruit, we post our
jobs. I don't think most of them mention climate change. But
through our social media, through hearings like this, we are
trying to note, hey, if you want to make a difference--and when
you talk to people under the age of 30, 35, they really care
about making a difference in the world and leaving something
better for the next generation. It is different than what
people in the 35 to 45 care about, or the 55 to 65.
We want to recruit from the biggest pool of people that we
possibly can to get the best engineers, best safety experts.
And if that can provide a little bit of difference, and get us
a little bit more folks to address the chairman's comments from
earlier of how to recruit people, great.
Mr. Yakym. How would you rate the considerations in hiring
when you are considering between safety considerations in
hiring versus climate considerations in hiring?
Mr. Brown. Well, for the vast majority of our positions,
safety is integral. We have a few positions--we started off
with less than 1 position--at an agency of 600 people who has
in its mission statement environmental impacts, we had less
than 1 focused on National Environmental Policy Act
implementation with respect to our agency. We now have three
and change, one person who is straight out of college, right?
I mean, we have not revamped our agency of 600 people with
3 people. We just now are able to carry out the laws that you
have given us to carry out, which include environmental
impacts.
Mr. Yakym. All right, thank you.
And Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Johnson of South Dakota [presiding]. Thank you.
With that, Mr. Garcia, your 5 minutes.
Mr. Garcia of Illinois. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking
Member, for holding this hearing. This committee, of course,
has a responsibility to ensure the safety of our transit and
infrastructure systems, and this hearing is critical to
ensuring that we provide that safety.
There is currently a proposal to build a 1,300-mile
pipeline to transport liquefied CO2 across four
Midwestern States, with Illinois serving as the endpoint and
storage facility. The building of this pipeline will cause
significant safety concerns. And to date, there are no plans
from PHMSA to update CO2 safety regs until 2024.
Mr. Brown, regulators are behind on all these issues. And
given past mismanagement, why would we trust corporations to
come up with their own appropriate safety standards?
Mr. Brown. I don't think we should trust anyone. I think we
should put rules in place, and standards in place, regulations
in place that are foolproof, that don't involve trusting, but
involve meeting standards.
And we are planning to promulgate a draft rule in the
coming months. I think that will set the standard and bar for
the projects you referenced.
Mr. Garcia of Illinois. And as the pipeline goes, shouldn't
we hold off on construction?
Mr. Brown. That is not a question that Congress has given
to my agency to make any sort of determination.
I can just tell you we are racing to get these rules out,
to make them as strong as possible. We have got input from, I
think, folks across the panel here to acknowledge and the
consensus that there need to be updates to the rules.
Mr. Garcia of Illinois. Fair enough. And my next question,
Mr. Brown, is this: If we don't have definitive standards for
how far plumes go, or how far back setbacks should be, how can
we accurately regulate for the health and safety of those
nearby?
Mr. Brown. That is something we hope to address in our
rulemaking.
Mr. Garcia of Illinois. Why would we put this technology in
place, risking lives without adequate research or protections
in place?
Mr. Brown. Well, so, just for clarification, we have had
carbon dioxide pipelines around for decades. And it was
incentivized in the bipartisan infrastructure act as well as
the Inflation Reduction Act, because of the climate change
challenge that we face, and this being one of the potential
solutions to the challenge that I think--I hope everybody in
the room can help us focus on, which is how to make sure it
works, how to make sure it works safely because of its
potential to reduce climate change impacts.
Mr. Garcia of Illinois. Thank you.
Mr. Chair, I yield the balance of my time.
Mr. Johnson of South Dakota. Thank you very much, Mr.
Garcia. With that, the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Babin.
You have 5 minutes.
Dr. Babin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it. Thank
you, all of you witnesses, for being here.
Pipelines are the backbone of our energy infrastructure.
The United States has the largest network of energy pipelines
in the world. My home State of Texas has the highest total
pipeline mileage by far. And while there is certainly room for
improvement, studies prove that pipelines are also the
cheapest, the most environmentally friendly, and the safest way
to transport oil and gas and other products.
However, given the Biden administration's actions to shut
down pipeline projects like the Keystone XL pipeline that they
killed back in 2021, you would think that it was just the
opposite. Why would President Biden shoot down a cheaper,
cleaner, safer way to move our petroleum products, a project
that supports our national security and energy goals? It is a
great question, and one we ought to be asking ourselves every
single day.
But moving forward, we have got to be sure that the
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration is fully
equipped and prepared to oversee current and future pipelines.
And they also need to be laser-focused on safety, not
environmental advocacy or anti-corporate litigation efforts.
So, Deputy Administrator Brown, due to the growing size of
the liquefied natural gas, or LNG, market and its importance
for both domestic and international relations, PHMSA will need
to step up its important safety role to oversee this industry.
One proposal is that PHMSA institute an LNG separate Center
of Excellence at a new location, as discussed in its report to
Congress under model 3. Model 3 appears to provide
comprehensive benefits to directly align industry,
stakeholders, and industry in the continued growth of the
domestic LNG export facilities. If PHMSA does not intend to
pursue model 3, how will it make up for the shortfalls and gaps
in knowledge that would occur?
Mr. Brown. This is with regards to the creation of the LNG
Center of Excellence?
Dr. Babin. That is model 3, that is what--I think you
mentioned that in your opening statement, did you not?
Mr. Brown. Yes, I don't think model 3 was in my opening
statement, but----
Dr. Babin [interrupting]. OK, well----
Mr. Brown [continuing]. But we did get appropriated $8.4
million just a few months ago to create the LNG Center of
Excellence, and so, we are well on our way in developing that
model, but don't have anything to report yet as far as where,
and some of the specifications of what that will look like. But
it is something that--we are grateful that Congress has
appropriated this funding to help improve the safety and
environmental performance of LNG facilities.
Dr. Babin. OK, well, I have got another question, time
permitting. The Federal permitting process for energy
infrastructure projects is complex, often triggering the
jurisdiction of multiple Federal agencies and reviews. This is
especially true for large-scale LNG projects, where PHMSA
provides the regulatory expertise on safe design and
operations. Yet FERC holds the authority to authorize the
construction of these projects.
I understand that often, because of a lack of coordination
between the agencies, project developers, despite going through
a multiyear design process, are then questioned and then forced
to redesign existing facilities to satisfy the evolving demands
of Federal inspectors and regulators.
What is your agency doing to improve this coordination and
to help shorten the permitting process, so that some of these
projects can move forward, especially in an era of shortfalls
of energy?
Mr. Brown. Yes, and thank you, an important question. While
we don't have, as you recognized, permitting authority, we do
work closely with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. I
was actually just down in Freeport, Texas, the site of an
incident last year, a 450-foot-high fireball and explosion at
that facility. We want to learn from those mistakes, and make
sure we don't have that type of incident ever again.
And so, we had, for the last 9 months, met on a weekly
basis with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, as well as
the U.S. Coast Guard, to basically not, sort of, stay in our
lanes, but instead work more closely, as you describe, to
identify any potential areas of risk, whether it is in our lane
or their lane typically, and work more robustly to identify
those items upfront in that process.
Dr. Babin. OK, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you.
Mr. Johnson of South Dakota. Thank you, Mr. Babin. We now
turn to the new Member from New Jersey, Mr. Menendez.
Sir, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank my
friend, Ranking Member Payne.
Deputy Administrator Brown, as you know, we have seen
increasingly sophisticated cyber attacks on our transportation
infrastructure, including our pipeline systems. Keeping our
pipelines secure is critical to the safety and well-being of
the communities we represent. Can you speak to some of the
cyber threats PHMSA grapples with, and what the interagency
process for dealing with these attacks looks like?
Mr. Brown. I can speak a little bit, but just for
everybody's benefit, Congress has not given us authority to
oversee cybersecurity of pipelines. The Transportation Security
Administration does do that. But we do work very closely with
them.
Prior to the Colonial Pipeline cyber attack, we would
engage voluntarily, invite our regulated entities, pipeline
operators to discuss their cyber plans because, as we
experienced when that incident occurred, there are operational
impacts, potentially, when you have a cyber attack, and we are
responsible for safe operations. Ultimately, the companies are
always responsible for safe operations, but we are responsible
for overseeing that. And so, prior to that incident, we had
about 50 percent of our regulated entities engage in those
discussions. Post that incident, we had about 100 percent of
entities engaged in that.
So, we have provided our input to the Transportation
Security Administration on their proposed security directives
on cybersecurity. We have engaged with leadership of pipeline
companies, including the CEOs of companies that Mr. Black and
Mr. Grubb represent, to make sure we are all on the same page.
And more coordination between the Government and the private
sector and between the Government agencies like the ones I
referenced is integral to mitigating this increasing threat.
Mr. Menendez. And a quick followup to that. Do you believe
you have the statutory authority and tools you need to keep our
pipeline infrastructure secure?
Mr. Brown. We don't have the security responsibility, but
we are actually hiring a cyber expert, even though we don't
have a jurisdiction in that space, it does affect the areas
that we do have jurisdiction.
The nexus between operations and cybersecurity, just the
same as Congressman Stauber noted for physical security. When
we find issues, we want to flag them for Transportation
Security Administration. And when they find them, we want to
know about that. We train their inspectors on pipeline safety
issues. So, we will continue to keep up that close
collaboration.
Mr. Menendez. That is great, and I appreciate that. And
speaking of collaboration, this next question is open for all
the witnesses.
Where do you see the gaps in our pipeline cybersecurity
infrastructure?
And what do you need from Congress to address these
threats?
Mr. Brown. I will answer last because I have talked a lot
here.
Mr. Black. TSA has primary jurisdiction, as the Deputy
Administrator has said, and they have identified critical
facilities and required security directives of pipeline
operators. That engagement with TSA and DOE is pretty good.
Pipeline operators participate in a public-private partnership,
Oil and Natural Gas Sector Coordinating Council, where we can
do classified briefings and talk threats.
TSA has seen that they need to evolve their requirements on
pipeline operators to make sure that we are keeping up with the
latest threats. There are a lot of bad guys out there who are
trying to stop pipelines, but the public-private partnerships
and the actions by pipeline operators are heading in the right
direction.
I don't have a recommendation for you.
Mr. Menendez. For sure. Especially, you see more
sophisticated technology, in terms of the pipeline management.
I can imagine the increase in technology also increases the
exposure and the risk. And so, I appreciate you continuing to
monitor with our different agencies, TSA being the primary
lead.
Mr. Black. Yes.
Mr. Grubb. So I, as well, don't have a recommendation, but
I appreciate the question.
But I will tell you that Kinder Morgan is definitely
engaged with TSA and CEPA regarding cybersecurity of our
pipelines. And in fact, our CEO was in Washington late last
week, meeting with those agencies and talking through, and
collaborating on the importance of cybersecurity and plans and
programs going forward.
Mr. Brown. I will just add one thing we have floated is
having a detailed firm, a regulated entity with cyber
expertise. Again, while we don't have that jurisdiction, we
would still benefit, I think, from the sort of internal
knowledge of how an operator navigates some of these challenges
and vice versa that I think they can appreciate what we need to
know in an incident like the Colonial cyber incident.
Mr. Menendez. Thank you. I appreciate all of you, and I
apologize for not having any time to yield back.
Mr. Nehls [presiding]. Thank you. The gentleman's time is
expired. I now yield 5 minutes to Mr. Duarte.
Mr. Duarte. Hello. Thank you, Mr. Chair, Ranking Member. I
appreciate the hearing today.
Mr. Brown, good day. The fiscal year 2023 Appropriations
Act provided more than $319 million in new funding for the
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration. And as
you know, the PIPES Act required PHMSA to maintain a minimum of
247 pipeline inspection personnel for fiscal year 2023. Your
current count is 207, and now we learn that this funding
includes a total of 33 positions, including 6 positions for
pipeline safety climate change experts.
Given the clear direction of Congress that PHMSA hire a
minimum of 247 pipeline inspection and enforcement personnel,
how can you justify 6 positions related to climate change in an
agency that is supposed to be focused on safety?
And what are these six climate change experts doing that is
not covered by the regular pipeline inspection personnel?
Mr. Brown. Yes, I want to make sure we get a very robust
answer as a followup to this hearing, because over the first 2
years, we were meeting the year-on-year increases of 20 percent
each year. At the end of the year, we often lose folks to
retirement. I want to make sure we get you up-to-date numbers
and factor in those changes.
We also initiated new recruitment and retention proposals
that are currently pending with the Office of Personnel
Management. For example, the Bureau of Safety and Environmental
Enforcement pays their engineering inspectors about 30 percent
more than we are able to pay ours.
Additionally, there is at least one State that pays about
30 percent more. We just want to be able to be on that same
level playing field.
We can't compete with the private sector in terms of
compensation, but we welcome any incentives.
Mr. Duarte. Great.
Mr. Brown. It is not for a lack of trying. We certainly
want----
Mr. Duarte [interrupting]. Well, thank you. My followup
question is, what are the climate change experts----
Mr. Brown [interposing]. Yes, great.
Mr. Duarte [continuing]. Doing that your regular safety
personnel are not doing?
Mr. Brown. Yes. So, this committee directed us to consider
environmental impacts in our rulemakings. That has been a
directive from this committee. We have to implement that.
The last administration promulgated a rule in which 15
State attorneys general sued us because we did not consider
environmental impacts. When a rule is litigated and basically
held in abeyance, we can't do our work on those rules until we
consider the environmental impacts.
As I noted before, we had less than one full-time employee
considering environmental impacts when it is in our mission
statement. So, we need a few folks. That also includes lithium-
ion batteries. So, half of our agency oversees 1 in 10 goods
that move in the United States: nuclear waste, lithium-ion
batteries----
Mr. Duarte [interrupting]. OK, I got it. It has been said
that if everything is a priority, then nothing gets priority.
PHMSA requests more resources from Congress to complete this
core mission. Now you are spending these resources on
activities that have no correlation with pipeline safety.
We can all talk about climate change until the cows come
home. We can all talk about: Are we facilitating the use of
natural gas, and does natural gas contribute to climate change?
Your core mission is keeping the natural gas and the natural
gas pipeline--because as you said, it is a very powerful--when
released, a very powerful climate driver.
And so, in this change in mission--is this change in
mission being directed by the White House? And what
communications have you had with them regarding this new
direction for PHMSA?
Mr. Brown. So, I agree with what you said. So, I think
maybe there is just a disconnect on, sort of, our common
understanding. When we are keeping product in the pipe, that is
mitigating climate change, right? So, that is what we are
trying to do, is keep the product in the pipe. That is
improving safety, mitigating----
Mr. Duarte [interrupting]. I guess I have to ask. You used
to have quarterly meetings with the industry, the PHMSA group
and your group used to have quarterly meetings. And yet, the
best way to keep gas in the pipe and to keep environmental
catastrophes from happening is working closely with the people
who are most engaged in keeping them from happening, as the
industry folks here are very incentivized to deliver safety and
delivery within their pipelines. You haven't been having the
meetings since 2021. How can you achieve your stated purpose
without better engagement with the industry?
Mr. Brown. I believe we have had five advisory committee
meetings in the last few years. Those are primarily focused
on--and their role as Congress set out--to consider
rulemakings. We had the most productive year in our agency's
history in 2021 in rulemakings. Many of those had already had
the advisory committee meeting for those rulemakings.
So, you can expect a bunch more, either a bunch more
meetings or longer meetings to just get more done at one
meeting, instead of having a bunch of separate meetings,
because it takes a ton of staff time to actually set up for
those meetings. And it also takes a lot of time--and I know
people are very generous, we have got members here represented
in actually going to those meetings, but we are trying to make
it as efficient as possible, instead of just having meetings,
which in this town often don't always produce results.
Mr. Duarte. I can see that.
I will yield back.
Mr. Nehls. Thank you. I now yield 5 minutes to Mr. Carter.
Mr. Carter of Louisiana. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and
Ranking Member--273 crossing fatalities, 1,475 per year between
2005 to 2021. GPAC meetings, making sure these communities are
safe, becomes very, very important.
Mr. Grubb, can you explain the benefits of the Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration issuing a final class
rule?
Mr. Grubb. So, it has three main benefits. I thank you for
the question, by the way. There are three main benefits
associated with finalizing the class location rule.
The first is updating the outdated regulation that has been
in place for over 50 years. It was put in place prior to in-
line inspection being developed, and those technologies being
further advanced.
The second benefit is, we will eliminate over 800 million
cubic feet that is emitted annually by virtue of having
alternative methods of compliance with the current regulation.
The third benefit is the hundreds of millions of dollars
that industry is spending on replacing perfectly safe pipe that
is in accordance with the current regulation, can be
reallocated to other safety measures, other safety benefits on
these pipeline systems.
We hope that PHMSA will finalize this rule as soon as
possible, based on those three benefits.
Mr. Carter of Louisiana. Can you share with me what your
company does to ensure pipeline safety?
Mr. Grubb. So, the main things are, we respond to incidents
with the priorities of lives and property, first. We
investigate incidents to determine the causes and the facts of
those incidents. And then we use those findings to improve our
processes and procedures.
Mr. Carter of Louisiana. So, we know how important it is to
involve the community. And I just heard Mr. Brown suggest that
there have been five meetings over the last several years. Do
you think that is ample?
I mean, we are talking about keeping the community
involved, making sure that they understand the most up-to-date
safety measures, that they know the early warnings, that they
know their area is to be protected. I suggest that these
meetings should be much more frequently held.
Mr. Brown. These are largely to consider the text of
regulations that we promulgate, and come to a consensus on that
text. And so, we are trying to time them where we can get--
given the interest in our finishing our rulemakings quickly--as
many rulemakings on one of those meetings as possible.
Otherwise, it extends the amount of work everyone has to do.
Mr. Carter of Louisiana. But you would agree that having
community involvement is essential?
Mr. Brown. I am sorry?
Mr. Carter of Louisiana. You would agree that having
community involvement is essential?
Mr. Brown. Yes. Community is welcome to attend those
meetings, but it is largely only attended by the statutory
members of that committee, which is 15 individuals, and they
represent 5 people from industry, 5 from governmental entities,
and then 5 public members.
Mr. Carter of Louisiana. What individuals are mandated that
must be in attendance for these meetings?
Mr. Brown. Just the--well, actually, no one is mandated to
attend, but there are 15 members of the committee that are
statutorily required to be appointed.
Mr. Carter of Louisiana. Fifteen members from where?
Mr. Brown. Five from industry, five from the public, five
from governmental entities, State and local.
Mr. Carter of Louisiana. OK, so, tell me about the five
from the public.
Mr. Brown. So, we, for the first time, appointed a labor
representative, the people that actually do the work that we
are talking about on the ground. Mr. Caram is a member, and his
organization is represented as a member of the public. We have
an environmental organization, Environmental Defense Fund,
represented, a law professor, and then, for the first time, we
are trying to focus on, can we get some engineer professors, or
people with sort of the greatest amount of expertise in this
space committed to our mission of safety and environmental----
Mr. Carter of Louisiana [interrupting]. Well, why not
individuals? Why not people from the community, the people that
are most impacted? You say those five are community, but I
didn't hear you say anybody from a neighborhood. I didn't hear
anybody from a school, anyone from a church, anyone from the
affected community. May I----
Mr. Brown [interrupting]. Yes, we do.
Mr. Carter of Louisiana [continuing]. I----
Mr. Brown [interposing]. Yes.
Mr. Carter of Louisiana. Let me ask first.
Mr. Brown. I am sorry.
Mr. Carter of Louisiana. It is important that, when we talk
about these things, that we involve community.
Mr. Brown. Absolutely.
Mr. Carter of Louisiana. And if you call it a community
five, then that community should truly be representative of the
people in the community.
Mr. Brown. My understanding of what Congress----
Mr. Nehls [interrupting]. The gentleman's time is expired.
I now yield 5 minutes to Mr. Molinaro.
Mr. Molinaro. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate
that.
Mr. Brown, I want to get to you in a moment, but I strongly
suggest that long meetings don't produce better outcomes.
Effective meetings produce better outcomes. Congress is a
living example of some of that, and I trust that you can
appreciate that.
I do want to, Mr. Grubb, though, I want to follow up on the
classification rule. I appreciated my colleagues' questions.
Could you remind us, however, how long the industry has been
waiting for the rule to be finalized?
Mr. Grubb. Thank you for the question. Over 20 years.
Mr. Molinaro. So, Mr. Brown, what exactly is the reason why
over 20 years is the time in which the industry has been
waiting?
Mr. Brown. The question the chairman asked me first about
the LNG facilities rule, that is about 30 years. That one, big
safety impacts. This one, more efficiency, potential impacts
for reducing environmental emissions. We focus on safety first.
We had three rules that we finished last year that were
over 10 years in the making that this committee said, ``You
must get done in 30 days'' in 1 year. So, we are focusing on
the ones that Congress has given us deadlines for, and
prioritizing safety first.
Mr. Molinaro. Dear God, I can only imagine that, if 10
years is priority, I can't imagine what 30 is. It is a bit of
an embarrassment, wouldn't you think? I mean----
Mr. Brown [interrupting]. In the last administration--I
just went to revisit that exact same hearing, and you got the
exact same questions from both sides of the aisle: Why does it
take so long?
And the amount of things that we oversee--natural gas, for
example--triple what it was 5 years ago that we oversee. Carbon
dioxide, hydrogen, $100 billion in incentives. We have zero
people, zero full-time employees focused on that. Our ability
to get things done is directly proportional to the resources
that Congress gives us.
Mr. Molinaro. Yes, I tend to question that, as a former
government official, local government official. I tend to think
that it is just--it is a lack of focus and focus on efficient
outcomes. I have never been involved in government where
somebody didn't say, ``What I need is more people to accomplish
more,'' and when we do, they don't accomplish it any quicker,
we just have more people doing the same thing. That is my
observation. I will be glad to engage in that a little bit
further as we get further down the--sorry for the pun--
pipeline.
But I want to return, Mr. Grubb. So, the PIPES Act of 2016
convenes this voluntary information-sharing system, a working
group. It was recommended that Congress authorize such a
program to share pipeline safety information, while providing
confidentiality for disclosures.
Could you speak briefly to the benefits of that? And then
how might Congress or PHMSA address the concerns about sharing
proprietary information?
Mr. Grubb. Thank you for the question. So, INGAA and its
member companies strongly support sharing of information across
the sector. It is something that we have done for many years.
It is something we will continue to do. We learn from those. We
modify our procedures associated with the learnings from other
companies, as well as our own. We highly value it. It is
something that we share not only with industry sectors, but
across the regulatory groups, the governmental groups, the
public safety organizations. It is very beneficial. It is
something we champion.
With respect to this particular program, I don't have a lot
of details on the inner workings of it, and how it would work.
I would certainly be willing to look at that and take that back
and respond in writing. But I don't have any particular
information relative to the inner workings of that information-
sharing that you referenced.
Mr. Molinaro. OK. And, of course, protecting proprietary
information, obviously, a priority for the industry. And as we
address that, obviously, some guidance and input would be
useful.
Mr. Brown, I know that you have already addressed this for
my sake, and I am just getting used to the concept of asking
questions that have already been answered as a new Member of
Congress, but I am happy to continue in that fine tradition.
I wanted to talk, if you could, in my last 30 seconds, the
technology pilot program allows operators to deploy that
technology that we know will both spur innovation, has
environmental benefit, and, of course, increased safety. Can
you just reiterate why we have had no participants?
Mr. Brown. I think Mr. Black has reiterated it a few times,
from the perspective of those who are looking to participate.
The burden is too high for them to meet. And so, we are happy
to work with folks, because we do want to get to the same
place, which is using innovative technologies. We don't want to
sacrifice safety, and we don't want to sacrifice environmental
impacts. But if we can come up with rules of the road there, I
mean, that is what we publicly asked for, and we just haven't
gotten the suggestion of how to do that.
We have gotten the suggestion that we shouldn't consider
the environmental impacts, but the Congress said we have to, is
our legal interpretation of that. So, I don't know if I can add
too much more, but I do think it is an important point, and I
am glad to work with you.
Mr. Molinaro. We would like that.
And Mr. Chairman, with the degree of priority--without
being snide--perhaps we could achieve that in less than 20
years.
Mr. Nehls. Thank you. The gentleman's time is expired. I
now recognize Mr. Huffman for 5 minutes.
Mr. Huffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for the
witnesses.
If I have learned anything in my 10 years in Congress, it
is that my colleagues across the aisle pretty much look at any
situation, almost every hearing, every bill, as an opportunity
to push the fossil fuel agenda. And so, I guess it is no
surprise that this week, apparently, the GOP messaging memo was
to use the toxic rail tragedy in East Palestine as a pivot to
make the case for more fossil fuel pipeline infrastructure.
Never mind that that was vinyl chloride, and the pipelines that
they want are oil and gas.
I understand why they want to pivot to fossil fuel
pipelines, but let's not pretend that that is safe. The truth,
if we are honest about it, is that fossil fuel pipelines are
disasters waiting to happen, plain and simple.
A great example of that is the Keystone XL, or the Keystone
Pipeline. Over the last 12 years, it has had 22 oilspills,
including 2 large spills between 2017 and 2019. The GAO issued
a report in 2021 regarding this pipeline's safety record,
showing that it had been deteriorating, identifying
construction issues as the primary contributor. But maybe the
more shocking part of that report was that the Keystone
Pipeline's terrible safety record was about the same, on
average, as other fossil fuel pipelines all over this country.
So, when you put that together with Mr. Caram's testimony
showing the number of significant incidents has slightly
increased since 2010, I think we have just got to be very
clear-eyed about pipeline safety and fossil fuel pipeline
safety, specifically, in this country.
On December 22, 2022, Keystone sprang another big leak.
This time, 14,000 barrels spilled in Nebraska. It was the
pipeline's largest spill since it began operating in 2010, the
largest onshore oilspill in the U.S. since 2013. And PHMSA
officials had actually told the GAO way back in 2001 that they
had learned lessons, and that they were applying those lessons
to inspecting pipelines that were under construction. But here
we are.
And so, Mr. Brown, I have been impressed by your knowledge
and your competency. You have given great answers to all the
questions. If we have to have this spaghetti web of pipelines
moving dangerous, toxic, volatile fossil fuel all over this
country every day, I want a competent person like you
overseeing it, I really do. And I respect the work that you do.
But you also said--you gave us this lessons learned line
that we have heard many times before. And I just want to ask if
you can appreciate the fact that we have heard this many, many
times before. So, as you undertake your rulemaking under the
PIPES Act, can you give us something more specific about
specific lessons that you are going to put into practice to
make these pipelines more safe?
Mr. Brown. Yes, absolutely. But I just want to get to that
really important point that people find it very disconcerting
that we focus on lessons learned. That is, like, by design.
That is Congress telling us, and the statutes----
Mr. Huffman [interrupting]. You should do it. I am not
saying you shouldn't do it.
Mr. Brown. Yes. No, no, of course. And I just want
everybody in the room to understand.
We just had a hearing in the DC Circuit on a rule, and a
little bit of the commentary was that unless you can point to a
failure specifically, then you can't do a rulemaking. You are
not going to survive the legal standard that has been set up by
Congress.
Mr. Huffman. Understood. And reclaiming my time, because I
want you to learn those lessons and to apply them to your
rulemakings, I do want to ask Mr. Caram about hydrogen.
One of the latest things that we are hearing is that all of
these new fossil fuel pipelines will soon be carrying hydrogen.
We can start blending it right away, and eventually it will be
all hydrogen. But it is not that simple, is it, Mr. Caram? We
know that the California PUC has just done a study suggesting
that there are serious risks and gaps in research and
regulations regarding blending hydrogen into fossil fuel
pipelines, and that we could very well face leaks from
fittings, gaskets, valves, stems.
What are some of the things we should be concerned about
before we get too far down the path of hydrogen pipelines?
Mr. Caram. Yes, thank you for the question. And the
Pipeline Safety Trust commissioned a report on the safety of
hydrogen pipelines that I encourage everyone to review.
We found that hydrogen has some unique physical
characteristics that are very different from methane that make
it more dangerous from methane, primarily a much larger
flammability range, meaning it more likely to ignite at
different concentrations, and it also poses known integrity
issues to pipes and components, embrittlement and things like
that, which would lead to more failures.
There are some really large knowledge gaps that both PHMSA
and the industry, through research organizations, are
attempting to fill, but we are years away from answering those
questions.
Mr. Huffman. Thank you. And Mr. Chair, I see that I am out
of time. I don't have enough time to get into CO2
pipelines, which are not a climate solution. They are for
enhanced oil recovery. But we will do that another day. I
appreciate your indulgence.
Mr. Nehls. Thank you, Mr. Huffman. I now yield 5 minutes to
Mr. Kean.
Mr. Kean of New Jersey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want
to thank all the witnesses for being here today.
As we begin our work to reauthorize pipeline safety
legislation, I look forward to working with every single member
of the subcommittee to improve pipeline safety through a
balanced regulatory approach.
As we have heard, the United States has the largest network
of energy pipelines in the world. Oversight of the Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration safety programs
should be a top priority for this subcommittee in achieving our
common goal and our shared goal of zero pipeline incidents.
Mr. Black, the PIPES Act of 2020 creates a technology pilot
program that allows operators to test innovative technologies
and practices that improve safety in the field. How do
operators use innovative technology and practices to improve
the pipeline safety of their systems?
And what benefits would a technology pilot program give to
operators?
Mr. Black. We are excited about the benefits of innovation
in inspection and analytic technologies, and we want them to be
rolled into how PHMSA regulates pipelines. And I know
innovation is very important to you in your part of New Jersey.
Pipeline inspections occur through in-line inspections, so-
called smart pig, that travel inside of the pipe. And through
the decades, the sensors that have been put on the pipe have
gotten more and more sophisticated. We can see more things.
Similarly, back in the office, we are using newer
techniques to harness the data from that. But the regulations
that PHMSA uses for the schedule that pipelines must address
incidents on are more than 20 years old, but yet we have had
all these innovations.
So, we are grateful to Congress for creating a pipeline
safety demonstration program. Sadly, it hasn't worked. Nobody
has applied, because it was made too hard, it went beyond what
Congress was suggesting. With some reforms that I am happy to
go into, we can road test. PHMSA can see the benefits of new
inspection technologies, and how reorienting the schedule that
operators need to address risks on improves pipeline safety.
That is our goal.
Let's use innovation, new technology, even machine learning
to improve. We are doing it, but we need the PHMSA schedules to
improve.
Mr. Kean of New Jersey. OK. Thank you.
Deputy Administrator Brown, PHMSA has only held one GPAC
meeting since January of 2021, and that was on October 20th and
21st of 2021. In the past, you have had many GPAC meetings,
while also issuing complicated notice of rulemakings and final
rules. Why have you had so few meetings?
Mr. Brown. So, in the past, we have also had years where we
didn't get any rulemakings done. So, we might have had meetings
but not done rulemakings.
These meetings are exclusively--at least from my
perspective, and all the demands on getting rulemakings done--
to advance rulemakings. We have to have a meeting in order for
a rulemaking to advance. So--and we want--we had the busiest
year in our history in producing pipeline safety rulemakings in
2021, nearly the busiest in 2022.
We have no aversion to having these meetings. We just want
to make them as efficient as possible, given the demands we
have for all the rulemakings we have to complete.
Mr. Kean of New Jersey. OK. Thank you. And Mr. Grubb, can
you explain, please explain to this subcommittee, what your
committee does to ensure the safety of its pipeline system?
Mr. Grubb. So, thank you for the question.
So, over time, pipeline operators have invested highly in
advancements in pipeline in-line inspection technology. That
has improved immensely over time.
The other things are implementation of pipeline safety
management systems. We have one at Kinder Morgan. We call it
our operations management system. It is really a system that
defines our culture.
And there are three main tenets of our operations
management system: the first is, every employee has a role in
the OMS; the second is instilling a culture of continuous
improvement and operational excellence; and the last, and
certainly not least, is risk reduction: risk reduction to our
assets, to the people that live near our pipelines, to our
employees, to our contractors that work in our pipelines. That
is a main part of what we do to reduce risk and manage the
safety of our pipelines.
The third and last thing is joint industry collaboration,
over which GPAC meetings are also crucial and key, interacting
with other industries or other industry subject matter experts,
Government experts, as well as public safety organization
experts.
Mr. Kean of New Jersey. Thank you to the entire panel for
your testimony.
I will yield back the remainder of my time.
Mr. Nehls. Thank you. I now yield 5 minutes to Mr. LaMalfa.
Mr. LaMalfa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am glad I was able
to slide into the newer, larger second base just in time.
Apologies. Overlapping committees make it tough around here,
but I appreciate your folks' work with this committee and
extremely important topics here on pipelines, which we rely
heavily upon in this country, and we need more of. So, let me
launch into it here real quickly.
Now, safety is a cornerstone. And that is what much of the
work of Congress is seeking to do in increasing safety in all
aspects of our lives, including pipelines.
What I note is that the average U.S. company pays
approximately $10,000 per employee per year to comply with
Federal regulations. So, laws passed with good intent can be
completely changed by the time the implementation is completed,
or years and decades go by. We see that a lot with the creep of
responsibility and jurisdiction.
So, the more input that is received, the rules that the
companies have to comply with become less flexible and more
burdensome--input by Federal Government and agencies. And the
estimate of the National Association of Manufacturers puts the
total economic cost of regulations every year at $2 trillion.
In the 2020 PIPES Act, Congress recognized this and sought
partially to address it by telling PHMSA to immediately carry
out a pilot program to let pipeline operators evaluate new
technology and operational changes to improve pipeline safety.
But in a way, it is inefficient and also uneconomical.
Again, apologies if some of this is redundant from earlier
work today, but since it took too long to send the guidance to
operators, the report that they were required to send to
Congress a year later was completely void of recommendations,
is my understanding.
So, tossing this to Mr. Grubb here, do you know of any
recent innovations with technology or operational changes that
could have improved pipeline safety under this pilot program?
Mr. Grubb. I am sorry. Could you repeat the last part of
the question?
Mr. LaMalfa. Some of the innovations with technology or
operational changes that could have improved the pipeline
safety under the pilot program that was to be done under PHMSA.
Mr. Grubb. Yes, so, to my knowledge, there hasn't been any
takers on the technology pilot program because of the
complications that Mr. Black talked about.
But I can tell you that pipeline operators are advancing
technology on their own.
Mr. LaMalfa. On their own, yes.
Mr. Grubb. And I can tell you that Kinder Morgan, one of
our pipelines was the first pipeline to implement a tool that
detects cracks, environmental cracking, in its pipelines. And
that was done many, many years ago. It received PHMSA approval.
It was the first pipeline to have received that approval. And
it has become the industry standard today for detecting cracks.
Mr. LaMalfa. So, the PIPES Act did not really aid in
expediting in this in a pilot program?
Mr. Grubb. No, because of the issues that Mr. Black
referenced earlier.
Mr. Black. The PIPES Act helped. PHMSA implementation meant
nobody took it up. PIPES Act was good. We would like you to
continue. Maybe give more direction to PHMSA, have a longer
program. Congress was in the right place.
Mr. LaMalfa. OK. What do we need to do to then speed up or
do additional work to make PIPES Act effective and something
you would want to access?
Mr. Black. Say that decisions on pilot program applications
don't need to follow NEPA, have an environmental assessment;
have a reasonable standard review that is less than something
for a permanent waiver, and not use the permanent waiver
process; and give this enough time to work. We believe that it
can. The technology is an ultrasound, an MRI, and pipelines can
improve safety.
Mr. LaMalfa. So, even though it is a pilot program designed
to speed things up, it is still under the guidelines of a long-
term permitting process. It hasn't really changed.
Mr. Black. It is suffering many of the same problems, yes,
sir. Two years later, we haven't made notable progress.
Mr. LaMalfa. OK. What do we need to do in order to modify
or streamline, massage that act in order to make it so it would
be accessible and actually a helpful tool?
Mr. Black. Thank you. That would be great, and we would
like to work with you. Reauthorize it for a long time. Tell
PHMSA to stick with the mandates that you have given. Tell them
we don't need to do environmental assessments on R&D projects.
We don't need to use the special permit process. Let's make
this work.
Mr. LaMalfa. R&D shouldn't need environmental review.
Mr. Black. Yes, sir.
Mr. LaMalfa. OK. Makes sense.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. I appreciate the
time.
Mr. Nehls. The gentleman yields. Are there any further
questions from any members of the subcommittee who have not
been recognized?
Seeing none, that concludes our hearing for today.
I would like to thank each one of the witnesses for your
testimony. I would like to thank Ranking Member Payne for being
here.
I look forward to working with you for the next several
months.
I ask unanimous consent that the record of today's hearing
remain open until such time as our witnesses have provided
answers to any questions that may be submitted to them in
writing.
Without objection, so ordered.
I also ask unanimous consent that the record remain open
for 15 days for any additional comments or information
submitted by Members or witnesses to be included in the record
of today's hearing.
Without objection, so ordered.
The subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

Submissions for the Record

----------

Letter of March 22, 2023, to Hon. Sam Graves, Chairman, and Hon. Rick
Larsen, Ranking Member, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
from Geoff Moody, Senior Vice President, Government Relations and
Policy, American Fuel and Petrochemical Manufacturers, Submitted for
the Record by Hon. Troy E. Nehls
March 22, 2023.
The Honorable Sam Graves,
Chairman,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, 2165 Rayburn House
Office Building, Washington, DC 20515.
The Honorable Rick Larsen,
Ranking Member,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, 2164 Rayburn House
Office Building, Washington, DC 20515.
RE: Statement for the Record--Pipeline Safety: Reviewing
Implementation of the PIPES Act of 2020 and Examining Future Safety
Needs

Dear Chairman Graves and Ranking Member Larsen:
The American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers (AFPM) is the
leading trade association representing the makers of the fuels that
keep us moving, the petrochemicals that are the essential building
blocks for the American manufacturing economy, and the midstream
companies that get our feedstocks and products where they need to go.
AFPM members make modern life possible and keep America moving and
growing as they meet the needs of our nation and local communities,
strengthen economic and national security, and support over three
million American jobs. AFPM appreciates the opportunity to provide its
perspectives on priorities for pipeline safety reauthorization.
As Congress crafts the pipeline safety reauthorization, it should
ensure PHMSA focuses on risk-based and cost-effective regulations,
promote technology development, and ensure existing programs are
working as intended. AFPM recommends Congress consider the following
concepts for inclusion in any reauthorization.
Enhance Pipeline Safety Through Data-driven and Risk Based Initiatives
Congress can help improve safety by encouraging sensible data- and
risk-based regulations in the following areas.
Voluntary information sharing (VIS) can benefit PHMSA's
safety mission and AFPM supports a VIS regime provided appropriate
protections are in place to ensure such information is used solely as a
mechanism to improve pipeline safety. Protecting voluntarily shared
information, as well as security sensitive information, must remain a
commitment for PHMSA.
PHMSA standards regulate the inspection of petroleum
storage tanks on fixed structures; however, these inspection
requirements are rigid and not risk-based, which can lead to unneeded
inspections, environmental impacts, and increased risk for workers.
Congress should instruct PHMSA to review current storage tank
inspection procedures and implement a risk-based approach that
prioritizes worker and environmental safety.
The National Response Center reporting process currently
requires tedious telephonic reporting and PHMSA's update to the
incident reporting threshold for liquid pipelines has been delayed.
Congress should simplify the National Response Center reporting process
and instruct PHMSA to periodically adjust the incident reporting
threshold for inflation.
Enable Technology Advancements Through Modernized Pipeline Safety
Standards
The regulatory process often lags behind the pace of technological
advancements. Congress can foster innovative technologies and support
programs that will improve safety standards in the following areas.
In the PIPES Act of 2021, Congress instructed PHMSA to
implement a pilot program to enable operators to use new advanced
technologies without major regulations. Unfortunately, the program has
not been utilized effectively, as many of the parameters are overly
restrictive and have discouraged pipeline operators from the program.
Congress should update the Pipeline Safety Technology Demonstration
program to encourage operators to utilize this option and deploy
advanced technologies under controlled conditions.
While current federal pipeline safety standards already
regulate the design, construction, operation, maintenance, and
emergency response for CO2 and Hydrogen pipelines, the regulations
could be updated to ensure they are consistent and current. PHMSA
should ensure the regulations address any specific safety concerns for
this material, but at the same time not be so burdensome that they
stifle development. Congress should instruct PHMSA to review and update
where necessary specific CO2 and Hydrogen pipeline safety standards.
Improve PHMSA Safety and Enforcement Programs
Congress can provide clarity around PHMSA's safety and enforcement
programs in the following areas.
The rise of interference directed at both pipeline
construction and operations creates unsafe conditions and places lives
at risk. Pipelines must be protected, and deterrents must be in place
to dissuade such actions. PHMSA's safety mission should include
authority that ensures pipeline construction and operations remain safe
at all times and protected from unsafe conditions and damage.
In 2021 Congress authorized PHMSA to create a program
that would monitor and mitigate methane emissions from natural gas
systems. PHMSA expanded the scope of the program beyond natural gas
pipelines to include liquid pipelines. AFPM members believe that the
inclusion of liquid pipelines has not resulted in any meaningful
reductions in hazardous leaks and being overly burdensome on liquid
pipeline operators. Congress should clarify that this program does NOT
apply to liquid pipelines and refocus the program on natural gas
pipelines.
PHMSA regulations include criteria and procedures for
determining the effectiveness of State pipeline excavation damage
prevention programs. While there has been significant improvement over
the years in avoiding these unintentional hits to pipeline systems, the
need to make continuous improvements in avoiding such accidents
remains. Congress should continue to encourage maximum participation in
these State damage prevention programs by discouraging exemptions from
such programs via grant funding to the States.

PHMSA is a small agency with a hugely important mission. While
previous reauthorizations authorized PHMSA with resources, many safety
priorities have been delayed. AFPM supports Congress reauthorizing
PHMSA with the resources to achieve their safety mission. Thank you
again for your attention and work on Pipeline Safety reauthorization.
We appreciate your leadership on this important issue and look forward
to working with lawmakers as the reauthorization process moves forward.
Sincerely,
Geoff Moody,
Senior Vice President, Government Relations and Policy,
American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers.

Appendix

----------

Questions from Hon. Troy E. Nehls to Tristan Brown, Deputy
Administrator, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
(PHMSA)

Question 1. Is it true the PHMSA has a new Environmental Policy and
Justice Division?
Answer. There is no formally established Environmental Policy and
Justice Division. PHMSA currently has two full time employees with
engineering and environmental backgrounds within PHMSA's Office of
Planning and Analytics who work on environmental policy. This work has
been performed in PHMSA for decades, on an ad hoc basis. PHMSA is
considering ways to increase efficiency and reduce costs, and
centralize efforts--aimed at tackling environmental issues proactively
to help increase the speed of delivery and avoid costly litigation.

Regarding this office:

Question 1.a. Where in the organization is this office located and
what are the responsibilities of the personnel in this office?
Answer. The effort to create more capacity for proactive analysis,
as previously mentioned, is ongoing.

Question 1.b. What is its annual budget?
Answer. There is no formally established Environmental Policy and
Justice Division so it does not have a budget.

Question 1.c. Is this office involved in the development of
rulemakings?
Answer. PHMSA currently has two full time employees focused on
ensuring the agency meets the requirements established by Congress for
NEPA reviews, including for rulemakings.

Question 1.d. Can you please list the number of personnel and
corresponding title and GS-level for each personnel located in this
office?
Answer. There are currently three personnel who work on
environmental policy, all with engineering (and environmental)
backgrounds:
GS-0028-15 Supervisory Environmental Protection
Specialist
GS-0028-14 Lead Environmental Protection Specialist
GS-0028-09/11/12 Environmental Protection Specialist

Question 1.e. Are there additional positions to be filled in this
Division and if so, can you please list those vacant positions?
Answer. The Office of Planning and Analytics is in the process of
hiring a GS-0028-13/14 Lead Environmental Protection Specialist to
conduct state, local, tribal, and territorial reviews to ensure that
PHMSA is meeting its statutory requirements under Section 106 of the
National Historic Preservation Act. The office does not have any plans
to hire any additional environmental protection specialists other than
the ones previously mentioned.

Question 2. We've learned that PHMSA has six pipeline safety
climate change expert positions that are open. Can you please detail
the job titles, GS-level, position duties, and where they are located
in PHMSA's organizational structure? How many of these positions have
been filled?
Answer. The FY 2023 appropriations provided funding for six (6)
positions to support the requirements in Executive Order 14008
(Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad), among several other
duties consistent with their respective job series. Four positions have
been filled.
The positions are as follows:
Office of Planning and Analytics (4 positions)
+ GS-0028-15 Supervisory Environmental Protection Specialist
(Filled)
+ GS-0028-9/11/12/13/14 Environmental Protection Specialist
(Vacant)
+ GS-0028-9/11/12/13/14 Environmental Protection Specialist
(Vacant)
+ GS-0028-9/11/12 Environmental Protection Specialist (Filled)
Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS, 2 positions)
+ GS-2101-14 Transportation Specialist, Standards and Rulemaking
Division (Filled). This position will help lead the development of
rulemaking efforts related to methane emissions reduction for gas
transmission, gas gathering, gas distribution, liquefied natural gas
(LNG) and hazardous liquid pipeline facilities. This individual will
also be involved in the implementation, including stakeholder outreach
and engagement, of these efforts to reduce the safety and climate
impact of pipeline infrastructure.
+ GS-2101-13 Transportation Specialist, Standards and Rulemaking
Division (Filled). This position will support the development of
rulemaking efforts related to methane emissions reduction for gas
transmission, gas gathering, gas distribution, LNG, and hazardous
liquid pipeline facilities. This individual will also be involved in
the implementation, including stakeholder outreach and engagement, of
these efforts to reduce the safety and climate impact of pipeline
infrastructure.

Question 3. Section 102(b)(1) of the Protecting Our Infrastructure
of Pipelines and Enhancing Safety Act of 2020 (PIPES 2020) mandated
PHMSA hire eight full time employees with subject matter in pipeline
safety, pipeline facilities, and pipeline systems to finalize
outstanding rulemakings and fulfill congressional mandates. PHMSA's FY
2024 budget request states, ``In furtherance of its rulemaking efforts
and in accordance with the PIPES Act of 2020, PHMSA is in the process
of completing its hiring of eight full-time employees to help finalize
outstanding rulemakings and fulfill congressional mandates.''
Question 3.a. Can you please list the number of positions that have
been filled related to this mandate along with their associated titles
and GS-level?
Answer. PHMSA has filled all eight (8) positions:
GS-0801-14 General Engineer
GS-0801-14 General Engineer
GS-0801-13 General Engineer
GS-0905-14 Attorney Advisor
GS-1515-13 Operations Research Analyst
GS-0110-13 Economist
GS-1083-13 Technical Writer
GS-2101-9 Transportation Specialist

Question 3.b. Can you please also share what subject matter
expertise in pipeline safety, pipeline facilities, and pipeline systems
each person hired has?
Answer. Almost all of the individuals hired to fill the above
positions had experience in pipeline safety or the pipeline industry.
The attorney and economist had transferable experience to PHMSA's
regulatory program, and they have been instrumental to the progress
that PHMSA has made in the last two years in one of the busiest
rulemaking periods in the agency's history.

Question 3.c. Can you describe the important contributions to
pipeline safety that each person has made since onboarding?
Answer. Over the last two years, PHMSA has achieved significant
milestones in rulemaking, supported by personnel with pipeline safety
rulemaking responsibility, including the eight (8) hired thus far under
this mandate. Significant contributions include development of Notices
of Proposed Rulemakings (NPRMs) for Gas Pipeline Leak Detection, Safety
of Gas Distribution Pipelines, safety of Carbon Dioxide Pipelines,
Hazardous Liquid Repair Criteria, LNG Safety, and Pipeline Operational
Status; information collection requests from OMB for the recently
published Valve Rule; development of congressionally mandated studies
and reports; and performance of regulatory impact analysis and
regulatory flexibility analysis for rulemakings.
The eight (8) personnel hired under this mandate have the following
responsibilities:
GS-0801-14 General Engineer, GS-0801-14 General Engineer,
and GS-0801-13 General Engineer: provide technical expertise and
engineering and science-based analysis in support of rulemaking,
improvement of reliability and serviceability of the pipeline
transportation network, and development of studies and reports mandated
in the PIPES Act of 2020.
GS-2101-9 Transportation Specialist: responsible for
specializing in rulemaking, perform research and analysis related to
the development of regulatory changes and interpretation of
regulations, participate in the development of proposed and final
rulemaking documents, including environmental and economic impact
statements, evaluation of public comments, and incorporation of legal
input on proposed regulatory changes.
GS-0905-14 Attorney Advisor: responsible for providing
legal advice in support of the policy development efforts, development
of rulemakings and implementing guidance, and defense of the same from
administrative and appellate litigation. The incumbent ensures
rulemakings developed are evidence-based, legally sound, and otherwise
satisfy the myriad of procedural and substantive requirements under
Federal administrative law and PHMSA's safety statutes.
GS-1515-13 Operations Research Analyst: responsible for
providing data analysis and visualization and reports to various PHMSA
offices to address inquiries, respond to mandate and audit activities,
and support Federal regulation compliance.
GS-0110-13 Economist: responsible for conducting economic
research to understand economic and industry trends that influence
risks to pipelines, the transportation of hazardous materials, and/or
related industries. The incumbent performs regulatory impact analysis
and regulatory flexibility analysis, assessing the costs, benefits,
efficiency, and impacts of PHMSA's regulatory and safety programs.
GS-1083-13 Technical Writer: responsible for providing
writing and editorial support for rulemaking and to respond to
Congressional reports, mandates, and other requirements.

Question 3.d. Can you please list the number of vacant positions,
along with their associated titles and GS-level?
Answer. All eight (8) positions have been filled.

Question 4. Section 102(b)(2) of PIPES 2020 mandated that PHMSA
ensure the number of full-time positions for the pipeline inspection
and enforcement personnel in the Office of Pipeline Safety does not
fall below 224 for fiscal year 2021, 235 for fiscal year 2022, and 247
for fiscal year 2023.
Question 4.a. Can you please let us know the current number of
full-time pipeline inspection and enforcement personnel employed by
PHMSA?
Answer. In compliance with this requirement, as of May 18, 2023,
PHMSA has 247 full-time pipeline safety inspection and enforcement
positions. We have continued to accept applications and recruit for
these positions, and recently we received approval and applied
additional retention and recruitment incentives. As of September 30,
2023, 214 of these positions have been filled.

Question 4.b. According to your testimony, ``PHMSA has kept up with
the PIPES Act of 2020 hiring mandates--both for inspectors as well as
for regulatory personnel . . .'' However, according to information
provided by PHMSA to staff, PHMSA currently only has 207 pipeline
inspection and enforcement personnel. If this number is accurate, do
you believe it is compliant with the number set out in Section 102?
Answer. The 2020 PIPES Act requires PHMSA to ensure that the number
of full-time positions for pipeline inspection and enforcement (I&E)
personnel in the Office of Pipeline Safety of the Administration does
not fall below 224 for fiscal year 2021, 235 for fiscal year 2022 and
247 for fiscal year 2023. PHMSA has established the openings and
continued to receive applications consistent with the requirement, and
as noted above has filled the regulatory personnel positions; further:
With receipt of appropriations in the FY22 cycle, which
included funding for additional I&E positions in December of FY22,
PHMSA has put a robust and aggressive recruitment and retention
strategy in place, focusing on soon-to-be college graduates and recent
graduates for entry level opportunities, and internships that will
create a pipeline of future engineers. PHMSA is also working on
providing student loan repayment to support its recruitment and
retention efforts.

PHMSA successfully onboarded 13 full-time I&E employees
in FY 2021, 24 I&E employees in FY 2022, and 24 I&E employees to date
in FY 2023. However, more staff separated from PHMSA's Office of
Pipeline Safety between fiscal years 2021 and 2022; in FY 2023, 14 I&E
personnel separated from PHMSA. As Congress has recognized, these are
also hard to fill positions--PHMSA competes with the private sector to
attract and retain qualified pipeline inspectors and engineering
analysts. The commercial energy industry and at least one other federal
agency offer candidates higher salaries and provide incentives. That is
why PHMSA requested and received approval for a special rate table from
OPM to provide a 35 percent premium to grade 5-12 engineer inspectors
in its five regional offices, in line with other Federal agencies (on
account of Congress' directive and the fierce competition from industry
salaries), which was instituted as of May of 2023. PHMSA also continues
to implement other hiring solutions, such as recruitment and retention
incentives, tuition assistance, and student loan repayment.

The job pool is small because the work is technically
challenging--requiring engineering and other technical degrees--and
requires individuals who are willing to travel frequently and work in
harsh outdoor and sometimes hazardous conditions.

Like any organization, public or private sector, large or
small, PHMSA will have vacancies due to departures and retirements. In
the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, some employees are choosing to
pursue work that does not involve frequent travel across the country.
While PHMSA has been successful in bringing many new inspectors and
investigators onboard, it has also lost a similar number to retirement
and resignation. That is the reason that the number of positions does
not equal the number of current staff onboard. We have noticed similar
challenges for state pipeline inspector openings as well.

Question 5. Section 102 (c) of PIPES 2020 provided PHMSA with the
authority to use incentives to retain a qualified workforce, including
inspection and enforcement personnel, attorneys, and subject matter
experts at the Office of Pipeline Safety at PHMSA. Can you please
provide a status update on the implementation of the following
incentives and if they have been utilized, including the number of the
times they have been used:
Question 5.a. Special pay rates permitted under section 5305 of
title 5, United States Code;
Answer. In 2021, PHMSA engaged an outside contractor to determine
the parameters for increasing its special pay rates--including for
example the geographic areas and pay grades--necessary for OPM approval
of the special pay rates. In FY22, PHMSA received additional funding to
provide financial incentives such as increasing the pay rates. In
August of 2022, PHMSA/DOT submitted to the Office of Personnel
Management (OPM) for approval an increase in the special pay rates for
engineer/inspectors. PHMSA received final approval from OPM on April
17, 2023, and promptly implemented the new pay rates.

Question 5.b. Repayment of student loans permitted under section
5379 of title 5, United States Code;
Answer. PHMSA has developed a plan to use the repayment of student
loans as a retention incentive for its 0800 engineering series
employees. PHMSA is working to develop an internal process for
applications of the repayment and expects to implement this retention
incentive in FY23.

Question 5.c. Tuition assistance permitted under chapter 41 of
title 5, United States Code;
Answer. PHMSA is in the process of creating a new tuition
assistance program.

Question 5.d. Recruitment incentives permitted under section 5753
of title 5, United States Code; and
Answer. PHMSA actively utilizes recruitment incentives for highly
qualified applicants for mission-critical occupations.

Question 5.e. Retention incentives permitted under section 5754 of
title 5, United States Code.
Answer. PHMSA is examining ways to offer group retention incentives
to combat increased turnover experienced last year. The group retention
incentives could be offered to eligible inspectors and engineers in
positions that are hard to fill or have high turnover. The incentives
would not exceed 10% of the proposed salary per recipient and would
help PHMSA compete with industry salaries. The incentive could be
coupled with a continuation of service agreement as called for in the
PIPES Act.
PHMSA has strongly emphasized recruitment efforts and has
successfully implemented strategies to attract and retain qualified
talent. However, based on recent data, PHMSA recognizes that retention
has become a growing concern across the sector, and as such, we are
dedicating additional resources to retention efforts moving forward. We
believe that these incentives will be effective in our efforts to
retain our talented workforce. Once implemented, we will track and
measure their effectiveness to ensure they have the desired impact.

Question 6. Are there any recruitment and retention incentives not
currently held by PHMSA or included in PIPES 2020 that you believe
would increase PHMSA's ability to recruit a qualified workforce?If so,
can you please detail them as well as any needed congressional
authority to be able to utilize them?
Answer. PHMSA has recently onboarded a new director for human
resources who is currently reviewing every available incentive possible
and proceeding with implementation for those most feasible for PHMSA
and our incumbents. There is an approval process by which agencies like
PHMSA may utilize existing recruitment and retention incentives--i.e.
the authorities PHMSA has are not self-executing. Additionally, PHMSA
invests in employee leadership development--including three tiers of
leadership development internal programming as well as external
coaching services that have been shown to both improve employee morale
as well as increase employee productivity. These areas show additional
promise for attracting and retaining talent. While PHMSA is not
requesting any additional authorities at this time, the agency is
continuing to explore opportunities to ensure we are able to recruit
and retain a robust pipeline safety workforce.

Question 7. Can you please explain why PHMSA has not held a Gas
Pipeline Advisory Committee (GPAC) meeting on the class location rule
when Congress required in the 2020 PIPES Act to do so by the end of
calendar year 2021? When does PHMSA plan to hold this meeting?
Answer. PHMSA has attempted to successfully balance its existing
statutory directives with new directives from Congress, many of which
have included aggressive deadlines, including this one. PHMSA
recognizes that obtaining input from the Gas Pipeline Advisory
Committee and Liquid Pipeline Advisory Committee is a crucial part of
its rulemaking process, including for the Class Location Change
Requirements proposed rule. In 2021, after the passage of the 2020
PIPES Act, the Government Accountability Office completed a report on
the Keystone pipeline, noting the unique circumstances under which
PHMSA issued and maintained a special permit for that line. In
response, PHMSA initiated an independent third-party assessment of its
special permit process and the safety conditions required of operators
for class location special permits--across the board. To optimize use
of the GPAC and ensure that all relevant information related to the
proposed rule is available to the GPAC, and to make efficient use of
the agency resources and the Committee's time, PHMSA planned to hold a
GPAC meeting on the class location rulemaking after the conclusion of
the special permit process review. PHMSA recently announced the GPAC
meeting will occur the week of November 27, 2023. The meeting will
consider both the Class Location Rule as well as the Leak Detection and
Repair proposed Rule. Holding a PAC meeting before the independent
report would deprive the PAC of that information and could further
delay the finalization of the rule. PHMSA has already reached out to
GPAC members and scheduled a meeting to review this NPRM, as well as
PHMSA's NPRM for Gas Pipeline Leak Detection and Repair.

Question 8. When does PHMSA anticipate issuing a final class
location rule?
Answer. As stated above, PHMSA has made public an expected date for
this meeting, to consider both the Class Location Rule as well as the
Leak Detection and Repair Proposed Rule. PHMSA currently anticipates
the rule to be published by the end of 2024.

Question 9. Deputy Administrator Brown, in your response to a
question from Representative Marc Molinaro (R-NY) about the class
location rule, you stated that PHMSA is, `` . . . focusing on the
[rules] that Congress has given us deadlines for and prioritizing
safety first.'' You also characterized the class location rule as being
focused on, `` . . . efficiency, potential impacts for reducing
environmental emissions. We focus on safety first.'' The Interstate
Natural Gas Association of America (INGAA) believes that finalizing
this rule will significantly benefit safety by allowing its members to
reallocate between $200-$300 million per year that could be invested in
running advanced inspection tools on 25,000 miles of pipe. In addition,
INGAA believes that finalizing this rule would stop up to 800 million
cubic feet of natural gas from being released to the atmosphere each
year. Completing the class location rule would clearly fulfil the
broader safety and environmental objectives of PHMSA. Furthermore, the
class location rule had a mandate from Congress in the PIPES Act of
2020 to hold a Gas Pipeline Advisory Committee (GPAC) meeting on it by
the end of 2021. We have several inquiries on this topic:
Question 9.a. Can you please explain why your agency has yet to
prioritize, and possibly ignored, this mandate thus far?
Answer. Please see response to question 7 above.
Further, with respect to the characterization of the rule, I would
also refer you to the August 1, 2022 letter to me from then Ranking
Members Graves and Crawford as well as Senators Wicker and Fischer who
noted ``Class location change regulations mandate that pipeline
operators undertake certain actions when population density changes,
such as replacing pipeline segments that result in large releases of
gas into the atmosphere. Modernizing these requirements has the
potential to create efficiencies for operators and further protect the
environment by minimizing these releases.''

Question 9.b. Can you please explain why your agency has yet to
prioritize the implementation of the class location rule when there are
both safety and environmental benefits?
Answer. In addition to the context provided in response to subpart
a of your question, since the beginning of the Administration, PHMSA
has prioritized Congressional mandates (and associated) deadlines with
ensuring PHMSA advances the rules that can have the greatest impact on
safety. PHMSA in turn prioritized finalizing three rules that were
twelve years in the making--spanning four Presidential
administrations--which stemmed from tragic incidents involving
pipeline-related fatalities such as the 2010 PG&E San Bruno, CA
incident.

Question 9.c. When specifically does PHMSA plan to hold a GPAC
meeting on the class location Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM)?
Answer. PHMSA has already reached out to GPAC members to schedule a
meeting to review this NPRM, as well as PHMSA's NPRM for Gas Pipeline
Leak Detection and Repair in the Fall of 2023.

Question 9.d. Why did PHMSA hold its only GPAC meeting since the
start of 2021 on the Periodic Updates of Regulatory References to
Technical Standards and Miscellaneous Amendments NPRM, which was not
Congressionally mandated?
Answer. Please see response to question 7 above.
Additionally, periodic Updates of Regulatory References to
Technical Standards and Miscellaneous Amendments proposed rule fulfills
a Congressional mandate. 49 U.S.C. Sec. 60102(l), Updating Standards,
states that the Secretary shall update incorporated industry standards
that have been adopted as part of the Federal pipeline safety
regulatory program. The ``Periodic Updates of Regulatory References to
Technical Standards and Miscellaneous Amendments'' NPRM is a rulemaking
that addresses 26 such standards--more than 30 percent of the standards
that are incorporated by reference in the pipeline safety regulations.
As required by 49 U.S.C. Sec. 60115, PHMSA convened a GPAC meeting on
this rule.
On March 8, I testified ``As required by Congress, PHMSA continues
to update the Federal pipeline safety regulations (PSRs) to reflect new
and revised voluntary consensus standards developed and adopted by
standards-setting bodies (see e.g., PHMSA's periodic standards update
rulemakings). We understand how important updating and aligning
standards can be to ensure the PSR include up-to-date standards that
reflect current best practices and technologies--and to serve as a
higher bar, from which the regulated community can continue to
improve.''

Question 9.e. Can you explain what process your agency has for
processing Congressional rulemaking mandates?
Answer. Generally, when PHMSA receives a congressional mandate to
complete a rulemaking, PHMSA works with personnel in both the program
office and the Chief Counsel's office to initiate the rulemaking by
requesting a Regulatory Identification Number (RIN)--which is then
submitted to the Office of the Secretary's Office of General Counsel
for approval and inclusion in the Unified Agenda. PHMSA staff then
reviews the statutory language in the mandate and begins drafting
proposed regulations and a Notice of Proposed Regulations (NPRM). Once
drafted, PHMSA will then issue the NPRM in the Federal Register for
public comment. If required, PHMSA will hold a meeting of the relevant
Pipeline Advisory Committee to review and discuss the statutory
language and any proposed regulatory text, as well as any comments
received. PHMSA will then issue a final rule adopting new or updated
regulations. Occasionally, in response to public comments on the NPRM,
PHMSA may elect to issue a Supplemental NPRM if we need to adjust the
proposed regulations or ask additional questions before finalizing the
regulations.
As part of this process, PHMSA continuously works to balance
completion of outstanding congressional mandates for rulemaking, as
well as other rulemakings initiated as a result of NTSB
recommendations, concerns arising from incidents, and other sources. As
noted at the hearing, the agency--through Republican and Democratic
administrations, since its inception--has typically had more
congressional mandates than it has resources to complete under the
timeframes provided. PHMSA in turn, attempts to triage mandates based
on the overlapping congressional mandates and with safety being the top
priority.

Question 10. Can you please detail the number and dates of meetings
PHMSA has held of the GPAC and Liquid Pipeline Advisory Committee
(LPAC) since January 1, 2021? What is the agency's target for annual
frequency of meetings for both of these respective committees?
Answer. Since January 1, 2021, PHMSA has held three (3) pipeline
advisory committee meetings:
a) October 20, 2021: The LPAC and GPAC both met jointly to discuss
the notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) titled: ``Periodic Updates of
Regulatory References to Technical Standards and Miscellaneous
Amendments.'' The NPRM is relevant to both gas and liquid pipeline
safety.
b) October 21, 2021: The LPAC and GPAC met jointly to discuss the
Standards Update notice of proposed rulemaking.
c) August 17, 2022: The LPAC met to discuss the interim final
rulemaking (IFR) titled: ``Unusually Sensitive Areas for the Great
Lakes, Coastal Beaches, and Certain Coastal Waters.''

Given the statutory role of the LPAC and GPAC, PHMSA schedules
meetings of those committees to review and discuss specific
rulemakings. Accordingly, the schedule is based on the progression of
PHMSA's regulatory agenda--with the goal of maximizing efficiency of
the meetings. PHMSA also meets with most of the organizations
represented on the advisory committees on an individual basis--again,
for efficiency.

Question 11. What do you believe is the appropriate role for the
GPAC and LPAC? What value does the GPAC and LPAC provide to PHMSA in
the rulemaking process?
Answer. Under 49 U.S.C. Sec. 60115, the Gas Pipeline Advisory
Committee (GPAC) and the Liquid Pipeline Advisory Committee (LPAC) are
peer-review committees regarding carrying out 49 U.S.C. Ch. 601. As
required by law, the GPAC and LPAC, respectively, are composed of a
broad spectrum of stakeholders with equities in PHMSA proceedings, with
equal representation from government, industry, and the public. These
committees offer input that is a statutorily mandated part of PHMSA's
rulemaking process. The committees review PHMSA's regulatory
initiatives to determine technical feasibility, reasonableness, cost-
effectiveness, and practicability.
PHMSA values the feedback from its advisory committees for Office
of Pipeline Safety rulemakings. They play a key role in the federal
pipeline safety rulemaking process. The input they provide helps PHMSA
ensure a constructive, in-depth look at our rules, helps inform
potential changes to them, and allows PHMSA to make more effective
rules to govern pipeline safety.

Question 12. PHMSA has stated that litigation is impacting its
ability to finalize rules. Do entities like the Pipeline Advisory
Committees reduce litigation risk?
Answer. PHMSA welcomes stakeholder feedback during all stages of
its rulemaking process. As required by law, PHMSA's Gas Pipeline
Advisory Committee and the Liquid Pipeline Advisory Committee advisory
committees review PHMSA's regulatory initiatives to determine technical
feasibility, reasonableness, cost-effectiveness, and practicability.
PHMSA values the feedback from its advisory committees for Office of
Pipeline Safety rulemakings and that feedback can help ensure PHMSA's
rulemakings are more legally defensible.

Question 13. Congress mandated a 2-year deadline for PHMSA to
complete the idled pipeline rulemaking as part of the PIPES 2020;
however, PHMSA missed the congressionally established deadline to
complete this rulemaking this past December. This rulemaking is
important to the regulated community as pipeline operators need
regulatory certainty from PHMSA for situations when pipeline operators
suspend normal service on pipeline systems due to changes in market
conditions in which the status of these pipelines is neither ``active''
nor ``abandoned''.
Question 13.a. Why hasn't PHMSA issued a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPRM) addressing idled pipelines when Congress specifically
required a rule to be promulgated by the end of December 2022?
Answer. It is important to note that rulemaking is designed to be
an iterative process that encourages maximum participation by all
stakeholders and rigorous analysis in support of decision making. PHMSA
uses its limited resources to promulgate comprehensive rules that
protect the public and the environment and meet our statutory
requirement for rules. The PIPES Act 2020 included an aggressive
timeline for the agency to advance rulemakings (as well as other
congressional directives), and PHMSA has completed several of these
rulemakings and other legacy rulemakings with important safety impacts
related to remote-control valves, gas gathering pipelines, and
increased protections for unusually sensitive areas. At the same time,
as mandated by the PIPES Act of 2020, PHMSA has recently issued
proposed rules related to Gas Pipeline Leak Detection, and the Safety
of Gas Distribution pipelines. PHMSA anticipates publishing an NPRM on
idled pipelines by the first quarter of 2024. After the NPRM is
published, PHMSA will schedule and facilitate the necessary GPAC/LPAC
meeting and work to complete a final rule.

Question 13.b. When will PHMSA finalize the idled pipe rulemaking?
Answer. PHMSA currently anticipates publishing an NPRM on idled
pipelines by the first quarter of 2024. After the NPRM is published,
PHMSA will schedule and facilitate the necessary GPAC/LPAC meeting and
work to complete a final rule.

Question 14. Section 104 of PIPES 2020 authorized PHMSA to
establish a Pipeline Safety Enhancement Program (program) as a means
for operators to demonstrate new technologies and procedures that
advance pipeline safety. A number of pipeline operator stakeholders are
encouraging Congress to reauthorize the program as it has not been
utilized to date. PHMSA says operators have not applied for the
program. Operators tell us they want to apply, but PHMSA has added
additional requirements that make participation infeasible.
Question 14.a. Do you believe a program that allows operators to
test safety procedures and technology more swiftly is beneficial to
improving pipeline safety as a whole?
Answer. PHMSA believes that testing new safety procedures and
technologies can be beneficial to improving pipeline safety. Because of
the potential serious consequences to people and the environment, as
well as existing congressional mandates, testing under the current
program requires an evaluation process and stakeholder notice and
comment prior to in-situ testing. PHMSA has sought comment on ways to
improve the program and would like to work with Congress to find ways
to improve the program.

Question 14.b. If an operator would like to test a new safety
practice or technology in the field, would it take less time to utilize
the technology pilot program or acquire a special permit?
Answer. The timing would be based upon the specific application.
While both follow similar paths and require, in accordance with Federal
law, the completion of an environmental assessment, the Section 104
process includes more specific criteria that need to be met in order to
apply, such as the location being outside prohibited areas (a high
population area (HPA), high consequence area (HCAs) or an unusually
sensitive area (USA)).

Question 14.c. Do you have any suggestions for how Congress could
improve the program so operators will be more inclined to utilize it?
Answer. PHMSA sought public comment on ways to improve the program
and would like to work with the Congress to find ways to improve the
program.

Question 14.d. If the program were to be extended for a longer
period, for example, 10 years or more, how might that impact PHMSA's
ability to implement the program and how might it affect its use by
operators?
Answer. An extension of time would allow for a more thorough
evaluation of the potential benefit of the new safety procedures and
technologies by the operators and PHMSA that could be applied
throughout the industry.

Question 15. The PHMSA program implementation guidance for the
Pipeline Safety Enhancement Program (program) requires applicants to
meet conditions and follow processes beyond those enacted by Congress.
To date, no pipeline operator has applied to PHMSA under these
conditions.
Question 15.a. During the March 8, 2023, hearing, Deputy
Administrator Brown testified PHMSA believes Federal law requires
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) analysis before approving a
program. What is the statutory or legal basis for this opinion?
Answer. PHMSA's consideration and approval of applications for
pipeline safety enhancement programs established in Section 104 of the
PIPES Act of 2020--is a discretionary Federal agency action or
decision, which is presumptively subject to the National Environmental
Policy Act (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., NEPA), as well as any applicable
implementing regulations and policies issued by the agency or CEQ (40
CFR parts 1500-1508). Those legal authorities require consideration of
the impacts of those Federal actions or decisions on the human
environment.

Question 15.b. In a February 9, 2022, meeting between industry
stakeholders and PHMSA career staff, representatives of the PHMSA
Office of Chief Counsel agreed the program does not trigger a statutory
obligation to perform NEPA analysis. However, Deputy Administrator
Brown testified to Congress on March 8, 2023, that PHMSA is obligated
by law to conduct NEPA analysis. Why did Deputy Administrator Brown
testify to Congress contrary to the legal opinion of the PHMSA Chief
Counsel's Office?
Answer. Like any discretionary Federal agency action or decision,
PHMSA's consideration and approval of applications for pipeline safety
enhancement programs established in Section 104 of the PIPES Act of
2020 are presumptively subject to the National Environmental Policy Act
(42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., NEPA), and to applicable implementing
regulations and policies issued by the agency or CEQ (40 CFR parts
1500-1508). Accordingly, during the March 8, 2023, hearing, I testified
PHMSA believes Federal law requires National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) analysis before approving a program. PHMSA's Office of Chief
Counsel staff is unaware of any statements inconsistent with the March
8, 2023, testimony, including in any meetings between industry
stakeholders and PHMSA staff.

Question 15.c. Does PHMSA consider establishing a testing program
as authorized by Sec.104 a major Federal action significantly affecting
the quality of the human environment?
Answer. PHMSA's consideration and approval of applications for
pipeline safety enhancement programs established in Section 104 of the
PIPES Act of 2020 is a discretionary Federal agency action or decision,
which is presumptively subject to the National Environmental Policy Act
(42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., NEPA), as well as any applicable implementing
regulations and policies issued by the agency or CEQ (40 CFR parts
1500-1508). Those legal authorities require consideration of the
impacts of those Federal actions or decisions on the human environment.

Question 15.d. If so, representatives of PHMSA's Chief Counsel's
Office agreed during a February 9, 2022, meeting with industry
stakeholders that the program did not represent a major Federal action
that would trigger NEPA analysis. If PHMSA has changed its opinion on
this, what is the statutory or legal basis for this change?
Answer. PHMSA understands its consideration and approval of
applications for pipeline safety enhancement programs established in
Section 104 of the PIPES Act of 2020--like any discretionary Federal
agency action or decision--are presumptively subject to the National
Environmental Policy Act (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., NEPA), as well as any
applicable implementing regulations and policies issued by the agency
or CEQ (40 CFR parts 1500-1508). Those legal authorities require
consideration of the impacts of those Federal actions or decisions on
the human environment.
Section 104 of the PIPES Act of 2020 contains no exception to
NEPA's procedural requirements. Rather, Section 104 explicitly
contemplates that PHMSA may, in reviewing applications for pipeline
safety enhancement programs, employ its longstanding special permit
procedures issued pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 60118(c)(1)(A). See 49 U.S.C.
60142(d)(2)(A). NEPA review is a critical component of those special
permit procedures. See 49 CFR 190.341(c).
PHMSA's Office of Chief Counsel staff are unaware of any statements
by PHMSA staff that are contrary to the above position or inconsistent
with the March 8, 2023, testimony.

Question 15.e. Has PHMSA ever previously required a research and
development project, including those demonstrating promising
technologies or analytic methods, to conduct a NEPA analysis?
Answer. Unlike traditional pipeline safety-related research and
development activated, directed, or funded by PHMSA (which are
typically performed using some combination of software modeling or lab
or institution-based testing under controlled conditions), pipeline
safety enhancement programs are expected to be conducted on operational
gas and hazardous liquid pipelines. Those programs are also expected to
require a waiver of existing PHMSA safety regulations that would
otherwise prevent the use of the innovative technologies and
operational practices being tested. Therefore, novel technologies and
operational practices employed in pipeline safety enhancement programs
could involve markedly different potential impacts on the human
environment than PHMSA's own traditional pipeline safety-related
research and development activity--including positive impacts, which
would of course be welcome. In addition, Congress included within that
provision limitations on pipeline safety enhancement programs evincing
concern with the potential safety and environmental consequences of the
novel technologies and operational practices in those programs, such as
program duration, mileage limitations, location limitations and safety
thresholds.

Question 15.f. What is the statutory or legal basis for PHMSA
requiring program applicants to submit applications in accordance with
PHMSA's special permit process?
Answer. Section 104 explicitly contemplates that PHMSA may, in
reviewing applications for pipeline safety enhancement programs, employ
its longstanding special permit procedures issued pursuant to 49 U.S.C.
60118(c)(1)(A). See 49 U.S.C. 60142(d)(2)(A). NEPA review is a
component of those special permit procedures. See 49 CFR 190.341(c).

Question 16. Section 111 of the PIPES 2020 sets out that PHMSA,
subject to the availability of funds appropriated by Congress, may
establish a National Center of Excellence for LNG Safety. Per the
requirements of Section 111, PHMSA submitted a report to Congress
titled National Center of Excellence for Liquefied Natural Gas Safety.
One proposal included in the report to Congress is that PHMSA institute
an LNG Separate Center of Excellence at a new location, as discussed in
the report under ``Model 3,'' with an estimated annual cost of $8.4
million. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 provided PHSMA $8.4
million for PHMSA to establish a Center of Excellence.
Question 16.a. When will PHMSA issue a decision on if it will
utilize its authority in Section 111 of the PIPES 2020 and FY 2023
appropriated funds to create a National Center of Excellence of LNG
Safety?
Answer. As stated during my testimony in response to Rep. Brian
Babin of Texas, PHMSA has already initiated planning for the
establishment of the Center. Since then, PHMSA has also hosted a public
meeting on the subject (in May 2023), made visits to potential
locations for the center, and assigned a senior leader, with
considerable LNG experience, to oversee the planning, creation and
management of the Center.

Question 16.b. If PHMSA does not intend to pursue Model 3, how will
it make up for the shortfalls and gaps in knowledge that would occur?
Answer. PHMSA plans to pursue Model 3 to establish the LNG Center
of Excellence.

Question 17. How is PHMSA working to improve the Federal permitting
process for energy infrastructure projects in instances where PHMSA
provides the regulatory expertise on the safe design and operations and
FERC holds construction authorization authority, especially for large-
scale LNG projects?
Answer. On August 31, 2018, PHMSA and FERC entered into a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that describes each agency's
respective roles and responsibilities concerning the siting,
construction, and operation of LNG facilities, and established a new
coordination framework to streamline the permitting approval process
for those facilities. Specifically, under the terms of the MOU, PHMSA
is responsible for reviewing whether an application meets the siting
criteria and safety requirements contained in Part 193, Subpart B.
In accordance with the MOU, upon receiving an application from
FERC, PHMSA will issue a Letter of Determination (LOD) to FERC with its
analysis and conclusions 30 days prior to FERC's final NEPA document
issuance. The agencies' coordination has helped improve the
environmental reviews on several LNG export terminal applications. To
date, PHMSA has issued LODs for 25 projects.
Currently, PHMSA is reviewing five (5) applications and will issue
LODs once PHMSA has completed its Part 193, Subpart B review for the
following proposed projects:
1. Golden Pass Uprate Project (CP20-459-000)
2. Calcasieu Pass Uprate Amendment Project (CP22-25-000)
3. Venture Global CP2 (CP22-21-000)
4. Driftwood LNG (CP17-117-000)
5. Plaquemines Uprate (CP17-66-000)

Question 18. Have there been instances where project developers are
made to redesign existing facilities to comply with requirements from
different Federal inspectors and regulators? If so, does PHMSA have any
recommendations or plans to improve this process to avoid such
instances?
Answer. PHMSA is unaware of project developers being required to
redesign existing facilities to comply with other Federal standards.
PHMSA performs comprehensive safety inspections of LNG facilities and
monitors and enforces an LNG operator's compliance with the DOT's
Pipeline Safety regulations. In accordance with Sec. 191.22
(c)(1)(iii), LNG operators are required to notify PHMSA 60 days prior
to construction of a new LNG facility. Currently, PHMSA reviews the
final design records for compliance with Part 193, Subpart C--Design,
while construction activities are in progress.

Question 19. United States LNG exports have grown rapidly and
safely and it is important that regulations that govern these
facilities are modernized without delay. PIPES 2020 included two
provisions that impacted LNG--the creation of risk-based regulations
for LNG facilities, and the creation of a National Center of Excellence
for LNG safety. Can you give us an update on where PHMSA stands, and if
PHMSA will meet the timeline set forth by the PIPES 2020?
Answer. With respect to regulations for LNG facilities, PHMSA
anticipates issuing an NPRM to update the LNG regulations by the end of
2023.
As stated during my testimony in response to Rep. Brian Babin of
Texas, PHMSA has already initiated planning for the establishment of
the Center. Since then, PHMSA has also hosted a public meeting on the
subject (in May), made visits to potential locations for the center,
and reassigned a senior leader, with considerable LNG experience, to
oversee the planning, creation and management of the Center.

Question 20. Do you support efforts to streamline environmental
reviews at PHMSA in a way that advances projects without impacting
environmental protections, including through applying One Federal
Decision, which is bipartisan-supported and applies to other
transportation modes?
Answer. Congress enacted NEPA (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.) and the
Pipeline Safety Laws (49 U.S.C. 60101 et seq.) to mitigate
environmental and safety impacts. PHMSA is charged by Congress with
carrying out these laws in an efficient manner. To do that, we have
employed mechanisms like concurrent reviews and close coordination with
other federal agencies. When environmental reviews have not been
fulsome, the agency's work has actually been slowed down by litigation,
which is why the agency has increased its environmental review
capacity. The agency is also implementing recent changes to NEPA
pursuant to the Fiscal Responsibility Act, see e.g. https://
ceq.doe.gov/laws-regulations/fra.html.

Question 21. There are roughly 5,500 hundred miles of CO2 pipeline
in this country. These pipelines have safely transported carbon dioxide
in a dense or supercritical liquid state for decades mostly without
incident and are regulated by PHMSA under 49 CFR Part 195. There is a
potential need to build out additional pipeline infrastructure to
support carbon capture and sequestration efforts that would potentially
move CO2 in less-dense, gaseous phases. This has raised the question of
whether current regulations are adequate when it comes to the safe
construction, operation, and maintenance of carbon dioxide pipelines.
PHMSA has also stated publicly that it will be issuing new regulations
on the safety of carbon dioxide pipelines.
Question 21.a. How does PHMSA intend to proceed with this
rulemaking? Does it propose to publish an Advanced Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (ANPRM) to gather additional data, information and analysis
or does it have enough to proceed with a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(NPRM)?
Answer. PHMSA is developing a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM),
strengthening its regulations in response to the anticipated
significant expansion of carbon dioxide pipelines and to implement
lessons learned from the February 22, 2020, rupture of a supercritical-
phase carbon dioxide pipeline in Satartia, MS.
PHMSA also announced in 2022, new research topics to better
determine impact areas for the safer operations of carbon dioxide
pipelines. The results of this may help inform the current rulemaking
related to carbon dioxide pipelines but congressional attention and
collaboration in strengthening oversight related to these issues is
also welcome.
PHMSA hosted a public meeting focused on carbon dioxide pipeline
safety on May 31-June 1, 2023, in Des Moines, IA, where PHMSA received
information from a diverse array of stakeholders and other members of
the public that will inform PHMSA's NPRM.

Question 21.b. When does PHMSA anticipate publishing an ANPRM or
NPRM?
Answer. PHMSA is working on drafting the NPRM and hopes to publish
that NPRM in January 2024.

Question 21.c. Has PHMSA identified particular priority issues the
agency believes need to be addressed through a potential future
rulemaking?
Answer. PHMSA is developing proposed amendments to its regulations
in response to the anticipated significant expansion of carbon dioxide
pipelines and to implement lessons learned from the February 22, 2020,
rupture of a supercritical-phase carbon dioxide pipeline in Satartia,
MS. Although PHMSA is still determining what specific issues will be
covered in the rule, PHMSA discussed several topics related to carbon
dioxide in its public meeting on carbon dioxide pipeline safety on May
31-June 1, 2023, in Des Moines, Iowa. Information gathered at the
public meeting will help inform the rulemaking.

Question 21.d. Is PHMSA considering modifications to existing
regulations under 49 CFR Part 192 regarding the transportation of
gaseous CO2 in pipelines or would it create a new section?
Answer. Consistent with 49 U.S.C. 60102(i), PHMSA is considering
whether applying the minimum safety standards in 49 CFR part 195 to
gaseous carbon dioxide would help improve safety.

Question 22. How does PHMSA intend to work with CO2 pipeline
operators, other Federal agencies and public stakeholders to develop
and design dispersion models in the case of a pipeline rupture or
substantial leak? Will it incorporate dispersion modelling in CO2
pipeline safety regulations?
Answer. PHMSA has observed through the published research on the
topic that all models have different advantages and disadvantages. As
part of its rulemaking process, PHMSA will seek stakeholder input on
the best approach to CO2 dispersion modelling. Stakeholder input will
include both public input as well as collaboration with other Federal
agencies. For example, PHMSA and DOE's Office of Fossil Energy and
Carbon Management are discussing these technical issues at agency
sponsored research events and have agreed to co-chair an Interagency
Carbon Transport Topic Team. This topic team will include several other
interested Federal agencies, share information on dispersion modeling
among many other technical topics, resolve issues and track projects to
their completion.
PHMSA requires operators to have a process for identifying which
pipeline segments could affect a high consequence area, including the
use of dispersion modeling (see Sec. 195.452(f)(1)). This modeling is
required prior to the occurrence of an emergency and can also be used
to inform emergency responders in the event of an actual emergency (see
Sec. 195.402(e)(8)).

Question 23. Liquid CO2 pipelines are critical platforms for the
biofuel industry in the Midwest. Currently, a number of liquid CO2
projects are in development, working with PHMSA, states, local
governments, and biofuels producers to develop platforms for the
capture and storage of millions of metric tons of CO2. Development of
these platforms not only sustains the biofuel industry, critical to
farmers and the Midwest economy, but also reduces carbon emissions.
Liquid CO2 pipelines are definitionally hazardous liquid pipelines and
currently must adhere to safety regulations put forward by PHMSA.
Question 23.a. Is PHMSA currently working to ensure the safety of
CO2 pipeline projects that would utilize carbon capture from biofuel
plants in the Midwest?
Answer. Yes. PHMSA is also reviewing the three proposed projects
for compliance with the federal regulations in 49 CFR Part 195, PHMSA
is working to issue a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking updating current
CO2 regulations, and will continue to oversee the safe design,
operations, and maintenance of such lines going forward. PHMSA also
recently issued new requirements for automatic and remote shut off
valves for CO2 (and other hazardous liquid and gas) pipelines (See 87
Fed. Reg 20940), which PHMSA will be implementing with respect to new
CO2 pipelines being built.

Question 23.b. Notwithstanding any potential future regulations,
would current PHMSA safety regulations for hazardous liquid pipelines
apply to any liquid CO2 pipeline currently built in the United States?
Answer. The current regulations apply to any pipeline transporting
CO2 in a supercritical state as defined by Sec. 195.2.

Question 24. The Federal Government is spending a substantial
amount of funding on hydrogen energy as a residential, modal and
industrial fuel. However, building out a network fully dedicated to
hydrogen fuel pipelines present a host of challenges.
Question 24.a. Given the fact that blending of natural gas with
hydrogen in concentrations up to 20 is occurring on a limited basis,
does PHMSA have an opinion on the safety of this approach?
Answer. PHMSA is evaluating existing requirements for hydrogen and
hydrogen-blended pipelines in 49 CFR Part 192 to identify what changes,
if any, are needed in its regulations. In addition, PHMSA is supporting
research to determine how transporting hydrogen can affect the
integrity of pipelines that today carry natural gas.

Question 24.b. What research is being done on hydrogen blends and
pipelines?
Answer. In FY 2022, PHMSA awarded approximately $6 million in
research investments on hydrogen R&D projects. Specifically, under the
Competitive Academic Agreement Program, PHMSA awarded two projects on
pipeline infrastructure and modernization for hydrogen networks to two
universities. These projects will research the safe transportation and
storage of hydrogen via repurposing existing infrastructure used for
natural gas transport and underground storage, improving hydrogen leak
detection, and characterizing hydrogen-specific pipeline integrity
threats.

Question 24.c. Does PHMSA intend to study the safety impacts of
blending at concentrations above 20 percent?
Answer. Yes. All PHMSA hydrogen R&D projects, as part of their
research scope, involve the safety impacts of blending at
concentrations over 20 percent. PHMSA is also closely coordinating with
the Department of Energy HyBlend initiative which is also studying the
impacts of blending at concentrations over 20 percent. Data resulting
from both initiatives will inform national standards and support the
safe transportation by pipeline and underground storage of hydrogen.

Question 25. How does PHMSA work with standards-establishing bodies
like the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) and the
American National Standards Institute to develop pipeline and
operational safety standards? How often does PHMSA review and
incorporate new industry safety standards by reference? What is its
typical timeline for doing so?
Answer. PHMSA employees participate in meetings held by national
standards developing organizations (SDO) that address the design,
construction, operation, maintenance, inspection, and repair of
pipeline facilities. PHMSA's subject matter experts represent the
agency, participate in discussions and technical debates, register
opinions, and vote in accordance with the procedures of the SDOs at
each stage of the standards development process (unless prohibited from
doing so by law). PHMSA participates in this process to ensure that the
agency's safety priorities are considered and to avoid the need to
develop separate, government-unique standards. PHMSA also regularly
reviews updated editions of currently referenced consensus standards
and amends the regulations to partially or fully incorporate updated
standards that will enhance or maintain pipeline and environmental
safety. Previous rules that incorporated updated consensus standards by
reference were published on May 24, 1996, (61 FR 26121); February 17,
1998, (63 FR 7721); June 14, 2004, (69 FR 32886); June 9, 2006, (71 FR
33402); February 1, 2007, (72 FR 4655 (correction)); August 11, 2010,
(75 FR 48593); January 5, 2015, (80 FR 168); and August 6, 2015, (80 FR
46847 (correction)). As of late, PHMSA has issued two NPRMs (January
15, 2021 (86 FR 3938) and August 29, 2022 (87 FR 52713)) that will
update or otherwise address 60 percent of PHMSA's standards that are
currently incorporated by reference.

Question 26. PHMSA has undertaken a number of previous rulemakings
regarding improvements to state One Call systems.
How would PHMSA rate the effectiveness of these rulemakings in
reducing excavation-related damages?
Answer. PHMSA's Excavation Enforcement Final Rule issued July 13,
2015, established standards for State damage prevention enforcement
programs creating accountability at the State level for effective
enforcement of State excavation damage prevention laws. Prior to this
rule, the enforcement of one-call laws was strictly a stakeholder-
driven, state-by-state approach, and many states were unable to show
any consistent or demonstrative enforcement of their laws, even when
there were violations of existing State laws. Accordingly, in 2016,
when the first round of State evaluations was conducted to determine
the adequacy of State damage prevention enforcement programs, 25 of the
States failed to meet the requirements of 49 CFR 198.55 and were deemed
``inadequate.'' Currently, the number of States that are inadequate is
three.
This rule has helped improve States' enforcement of damage
prevention laws. The number of excavation damages per thousand
notifications of excavation (One-Call Tickets) has generally trended
downward, from 3.0 in 2015 to 2.55 in 2022 indicating improvement in
reducing damages when a notification to excavate was made. However, the
actual number of excavation damages continues to increase from 81,974
in 2015 to 92,006 for 2022 a 12% increase indicating more work to drive
improvement is necessary to address this threat to pipeline and public
safety.

Question 27. PHMSA recently accepted applications for the Natural
Gas Distribution Infrastructure Safety and Modernization (NGDISM) grant
program authorized in the Infrastructure Investment and Job Act of
2021. This program provides $200 million annually to municipal
utilities to repair, rehabilitate or replace high-risk distribution
pipelines.
Question 27.a. How will PHMSA prioritize applications?
Answer. For the FY 2022 funding round, PHMSA considered each of the
statutory criteria, and prioritized high-risk, actively leaking legacy
natural gas distribution infrastructure with a specific emphasis on
benefiting underserved rural and urban communities (among other
considerations).

Question 27.b. How will it weigh statutory criteria in terms of
what weight will be given to environmental justice criteria?
Answer. Please see PHMSA's response to Question 29.

Question 27.c. Can you please list the number of positions that
have been filled along with their associated titles and GS-level that
have been onboarded to implement this program, as well as any vacant
positions?
Answer. All 9 positions are currently filled.
1. Program Director, GS-15
2. Grants Attorney, GS-14
3. Senior Grants Management Specialist, GS-14 (Team Lead)
4. Grants Management and Acquisitions Specialist, GS-14
5. Grants Management Specialist, GS-13 (3 positions)
6. Program Specialist, GS-13
7. Environmental Protection Specialist, GS-14

Question 27.d. When will PHMSA issue its first awards under this
program?
Answer. PHMSA announced its first awards on April 5, 2023.

Question 27.e. When will it issue its notice of funding opportunity
for the second cycle of funding?
Answer. PHMSA issued its combined FY23 and FY 24 Notice of Funding
Opportunity on May 23, 2023.

Question 28. The President's FY 2024 budget for PHMSA references
``equity'' roughly thirty times, including funding related to
``equity.'' Please provide a specific definition of ``equity'' and
explain how it relates to pipeline safety and PHMSA's core mission of
pipeline safety.
Answer. For clarity, PHMSA also has a safety mandate pertaining to
the regulation of transporting hazardous materials. Executive Orders
13985 and 14901, issued by President Biden, define equity as ``the
consistent and systematic fair, just, and impartial treatment of all
individuals, including individuals who belong to underserved
communities that have been denied such treatment, including persons who
live in rural areas, and persons otherwise adversely affected by
persistent poverty or inequality.'' Equity considerations directly
relate to PHMSA's core mission as data analyses comparing pipeline
incident rates in socially vulnerable areas indicate a
disproportionately higher incident rate in some overburdened and
underserved communities. PHMSA will use data to focus inspection
efforts on increasing safety in areas with higher incident rates,
ensure rulemakings and agency decisions affect the safety of
communities regardless of geography or income level, and increase
community outreach efforts to raise awareness and education in areas
with higher rates of incidents. As an example, aging and higher risk
infrastructure are found disproportionately in rural communities and
older parts of cities and towns, which often coincide with lower income
neighborhoods.

Question 29. The President's FY 2024 budget for PHMSA references
``environmental justice'' multiple times. Can you please specifically
define ``environmental justice'' and describe how it applies to PHMSA's
mission of providing pipeline safety?
Answer. Presidential Executive Order 14096 of April 21, 2023,
directs Federal agencies to develop an agency-wide environmental
justice strategic plan that sets forth the agency's vision, goals,
priority actions, and metrics to address and advance environmental
justice and to fulfill the directives of this order. EO 14096 defines
environmental justice as follows: ``Environmental justice'' means the
just treatment and meaningful involvement of all people, regardless of
income, race, color, national origin, Tribal affiliation, or
disability, in agency decision-making and other Federal activities that
affect human health and the environment so that people: (i) are fully
protected from disproportionate and adverse human health and
environmental effects (including risks) and hazards, including those
related to climate change, the cumulative impacts of environmental and
other burdens, and the legacy of racism or other structural or systemic
barriers; and (ii) have equitable access to a healthy, sustainable, and
resilient environment in which to live, play, work, learn, grow,
worship, and engage in cultural and subsistence practices.
PHMSA looks to this order, which builds on and complements
Executive Order 12898, and policy objectives of Federal regulation to
ensure its regulatory oversight activities advance environmental
justice for all, including in evaluating and addressing, as
appropriate, disproportionate and adverse benefits and burdens and
advancing the goal of meaningful involvement. Following statutory
requirements, environmental justice has, therefore, long been an
important consideration in PHMSA regulatory oversight of ensuring
pipeline safety, addressed explicitly in historical PHMSA pipeline
safety rulemakings, special permit reviews, and other activities. Often
the procedural vehicle for consideration of environmental justice has
been PHMSA's consideration of environmental and public safety impacts
pursuant to NEPA.

Question 30. We understand there was great interest in the NGDISM
Program, but PHMSA has not announced its awards for FY 2022 as of March
14, 2023. Further, the grant agreements will not be executed until the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) Tier 2 Environmental review
process is completed in 2023. Smaller utilities often do not have the
resources dedicated to devote staff to grant writing and therefore may
seek to learn from the first round of grant funding awarded in order to
use their resources more efficiently. However, if applications for the
second cycle of funding are due before the first cycle funding is
awarded, they may miss out on this learning opportunity.
Question 30.a. How is PHMSA working to address potential lost
opportunity and working to ensure smaller utilities are able to use the
first cycle of awards to use their resources effectively in applying
for the program?
Answer. The first round of awards was announced on April 5, 2023.
PHMSA issued the second NGDISM Notice of Funding Opportunity on
Grants.gov on May 23, 2023, with an August 4, 2023 deadline. PHMSA
believes that applicants who were not successful in the first round had
sufficient opportunity to review their application status letters to
determine whether to apply for the second round of funding. PHMSA
received 184 applications for its FY 2023 NOFO with funding requests
that totaled $1.8 billion. Many applicants from the first round elected
to re-apply.
To assist smaller utilities with applying for this grant, PHMSA
made updated its FY 2023 NOFO to make it more user friendly and
provided examples in certain areas to assist applicants. PHMSA has also
provided extensive technical assistance via FAQs, webinars, debriefs,
and outreach. Going forward, PHMSA will promote DOT's Thriving
Communities Program as a resource on its website and inform
stakeholders that this program is available for grant application
assistance.

Question 30.b. What feedback will be provided after the 2022 grant
awards have been provisionally announced so as to allow smaller
municipal gas systems to learn how to improve their applications?
Answer. PHMSA informed unsuccessful applicants by letter about
their application rating and any key factors that impacted their
application. Additionally, PHMSA offered applicants the opportunity to
discuss questions about their application, including steps they can
take to improve their application. In total, 56 of the 161 unique
applicants requested and received debriefs. PHMSA concluded these
debriefs in June 2023. Finally, PHMSA offered three public webinars to
discuss lessons learned and provided examples of best practices and
common application pitfalls. PHMSA accepted questions during all three
FY 2023 webinars and provided a FY 2023 FAQ document with responses to
those questions. PHMSA also continues to accept questions from
applicants by email (PHMSAPipelineBILGrant@dot.gov) and phone 202-366-
7652. All resource documents are available online at https://
www.phmsa.dot.gov/about-phmsa/working-phmsa/grants/pipeline/natural-
gas-distribution-infrastructure-safety-and-modernization-grants.

Question 31. In your testimony, you discuss the importance of
cybersecurity for pipelines and that PHMSA is working to hire
cybersecurity specialists. We understand the Transportation Security
Agency (TSA) has the lead on pipeline security and is working on
cybersecurity regulations for pipelines.
Question 31.a. Given that TSA has the lead on cybersecurity
enforcement and PHMSA faces staffing shortages for pipeline safety
personnel, how will hiring new cyber specialists benefit PHMSA's
pipeline safety mission?
Answer. As stated during my testimony on March 8, 2023, PHMSA's
safety oversight of pipeline control rooms forms a nexus with TSA's
cybersecurity oversight, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security
Agency's (CISA's) role as the national coordinator for critical
infrastructure security and as a cybersecurity agency, and DOE's
national energy management. The 2021 cyber-attack on Colonial Pipeline
demonstrated how critical it is for a whole-of-government approach to
safeguard our Nation's critical infrastructure. PHMSA regulates,
inspects, and enforces operational technology (OT) used in the
communications and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA)
systems for pipeline, liquefied natural gas and underground natural gas
storage facilities. PHMSA's two new cyber specialists will join a small
team of PHMSA SCADA and control room experts that routinely inspect the
240-270 control rooms spread across the U.S. and Canada. The
specialists will be able to leverage their cyber expertise during the
OT portion of CRM inspections, identifying violations and potential
cyber-related concerns. In addition, the specialists will provide
onsite accident and special investigation assistance. Cyber specialists
will look at specific incidents to identify a potential cyber component
when reviewing control room details, controller responses, and data
associated with a pipeline spill or release into the environment.
Pipeline control rooms are where a cyber-attack could create
significant safety hazards to the public and threaten energy
reliability, as demonstrated by the Colonial Pipeline hacking incident.
PHMSA has oversight of the operator's emergency response to any cyber-
attack that impacts the safe operation of the pipeline. Further, PHMSA
has safety oversight of a pipeline start-up and return to normal
operations, including manual operations should commodity movement be
required. The PHMSA inspection team, including those with combined
cyber and pipeline operation expertise, are the federal government's
regular ``in-the-field'' presence and will be a critical component of
safely restoring pipeline operations should U.S. pipeline
infrastructure experience another cyber-attack. It is important to note
that PHMSA routinely collaborates with TSA and CISA and will refer any
identified cyber risks to TSA for their review and action.

Question 31.b. Can you please list the number of these
cybersecurity positions that have been filled along with their
associated titles and GS-level? Can you please list the number of
vacant positions PHMSA is planning to hire, along with their associated
titles and GS-level?
Answer. PHMSA will soon advertise two GS-14 General Engineer
positions with a program title of ``Program Manager.'' The best
qualified candidates for these two positions will have pipeline
engineering and control room management expertise combined with a sound
cyber skill set. These individuals will be CRM inspectors and provide a
unique skill set with understanding of pipeline safety standards,
pipeline OT and the potential impact that cyber may have on pipeline
OT.

Question 31.c. How will you ensure PHMSA does not duplicate the
efforts of the TSA?
Answer. PHMSA's safety oversight forms a nexus with TSA's cyber
authority and the two agencies have adjacent but different foci. PHMSA
regulates, inspects, and enforces operational technology (OT) used in
the communications and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA)
systems for all pipeline, liquefied natural gas (LNG) and underground
natural gas storage (UNGS) facilities. PHMSA performs routine, onsite
inspections of all pipeline control rooms and connects pipeline
operators with TSA when potential cyber risks are identified. PHMSA
also routinely investigates both major and minor pipeline, LNG, and
UNGS incidents, as well as abnormal events. PHMSA field inspections
include onsite observation of OT components such as PLCs (program logic
controllers) in-situ, such as in remote, rural settings.
PHMSA evaluates SCADA controller training and human factors such as
fatigue. These issues have a cyber nexus as a fatigued, or inadequately
trained, controller can make risky OT decisions, potentially missing
pressure and flow indications of a leak or abnormal operations.
PHMSA exerts is safety and regulatory authority on all pipeline,
LNG and UNGS facilities; Currently, TSA efforts are limited and
constrained to certain operators. PHMSA and TSA collaborate under the
guidance of Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that promotes
communication, efficiency, and nonduplication of effort.

Question 32. Deputy Administrator Brown, on November 4, 2020, PHMSA
published a set of draft frequently asked questions (FAQs) in the
Federal Register under docket number PHMSA-2019-0199 attempting to
delineate where PHMSA and the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) assert jurisdiction to perform inspection and
enforcement for midstream processing facilities in which there is
overlapping authority by the two respective regulatory bodies. While
PHMSA extended the comment period on that proposal to February 2022, to
date, PHMSA has not finalized this guidance or taken any other
regulatory action to address this issue. I am aware of confusion and
other challenges facing the regulated community as a result of the lack
of clarity around this issue.
Question 32.a. Will PHMSA take action this year to finalize this
guidance or perhaps propose some other remedy to this important issue?
If so, when? If not, why?
Answer. PHMSA anticipates finalizing the guidance relative to the
jurisdiction of midstream processing facilities later this year.

Question 32.b. In the absence of regulatory action, how will PHMSA
provide clarity to the regulated community around this issue?
Answer. PHMSA believes that the jurisdictional clarity provided by
the finalized midstream FAQ's will negate the need for any further
regulatory action.

Question 33. The PIPES Act of 2016 convened a Voluntary Information
Sharing System working group that recommended Congress authorize such a
program to share pipeline safety information while providing
confidentiality for disclosures.
Question 33.a. Does PHMSA believe there are benefits to such a
program and how might it use such a system to improve pipeline safety
across the United States pipeline network?
Answer. PHMSA acknowledges potential benefits to the Voluntary
Information Sharing System (VIS), if thoughtfully crafted, including
the potential for:
Serving as a trusted repository of high-volume, high-
quality data and information that would advance pipeline safety and
lead to opportunities for reducing pipeline accidents and incidents to
achieve the goal of ``zero.''
Enhancing Safety Management Systems.
Providing technical support for service providers'
technology investments to improve technology performance.
Determining gaps in pipeline information to drive
continuous improvement.

Question 33.b. How might Congress or PHMSA address concerns about
the sharing of proprietary information by companies who actively
participate in a voluntary information sharing program?
Answer. Industry may be more incentivized to participate in the
program if their concerns about protecting proprietary and confidential
information could be better addressed within a VIS program. PHMSA
welcomes the opportunity to working with Congress on ways to address
these concerns.

Question 34. PHMSA recently started asking pipeline operators
during inspections to fill out the ``Racial Equity and Support for
Underserved Communities--New Racial Equity and Support for Underserved
Communities Form 1.'' PHMSA stated the justification for asking these
questions is Executive Order 13985, Advancing Racial Equity and Support
for Underserved Communities Through the Federal Government. To aid in
the response of questions, PHMSA inspectors pointed to a Climate and
Economic Justice Screening Tool map that was put together by the
Council on Environmental Quality. We have several questions on this
topic:
Question 34.a. What was the process that PHMSA used to draft this
form and send it out to pipeline operators? Were other Federal
agencies, including the Office of Management and Budget (OMB),
consulted? Did PHMSA obtain approval from OMB to conduct this
information collection exercise based on Paperwork Reduction Act
requirements?
Answer. In 2022, PHMSA performed a data analysis comparing incident
occurrence locations relative to the Centers for Disease Control (CDC)
Social Vulnerability Index (SVI) and found that some SVI areas may be
disproportionately impacted by natural gas distribution incidents.
Discussions with a variety of stakeholder groups--including state
regulators and industry groups--revealed a value in raising awareness
and improving transparency about the location of incidents, including
for historically underserved communities. PHMSA data shows that a good
amount of underserved communities are at significantly greater risk of
pipeline failures due to aging infrastructure and other factors. To
help with this, PHMSA initially formulated seven questions to ask
operators to raise awareness and thoughtful consideration among the
industry and regulators regarding EO 13985. PHMSA has since converted
the questions into informational points for its inspectors to
facilitate discussions with operators during inspections regarding
equity or impacts on underserved communities. The points not only help
us communicate that we are seeking to advance protection for all,
including in these areas, but also helps us understand what efforts
operators are taking to address safety risks for local communities.
Similar to PHMSA's other inspection resource materials, the original
questions were not submitted for OMB approval, as each inspection,
including questions, are uniquely designed for each pipeline system.

Question 34.b. Did PHMSA submit this form to the Federal Register
and institute a formal comment process? If not, why?
Answer. PHMSA did not submit the questions to the Federal Register
for comment. PHMSA has converted the questions into informational
points in a brochure.

Question 34.c. To which pipeline operators did PHMSA submit this
form and how were they selected?
Answer. PHMSA had discussed the questions with companies that it
interacts with, including during safety inspections. PHMSA has
converted the questions into informational points in a brochure.

Question 34.d. The form references ``Disadvantaged Community (DAC)
datasets.'' How would you explain what a DAC is and what criteria is
used to establish it? Additionally, are DACs used in any part of
existing PHMSA regulation?
Answer. PHMSA initially applied the acronym DAC to refer to various
datasets that include data components that PHMSA deemed relevant to
social disadvantage such as components of the Center for Disease
Control's (CDC) Social Vulnerability Index (CDC/ATSDR Social
Vulnerability Index (SVI) and many others referenced on the Department
of Transportation's public facing website at: https://
www.transportation.gov/grants/dot-navigator/federal-tools-determine-
disadvantaged-community-status. These tools are publicly available and
can assist stakeholders in their own data analysis. The Pipeline Social
Equity Tool was published on August 8,2023 and does not use the SVI. It
uses the DOT Equitable Transportation Community (ETC) Explorer Tool
data. DAC PHMSA--Pipeline Social Equity Tool (arcgis.com).

Question 34.e. Has PHMSA incorporated any aspects of Executive
Order 13985 into its regulations?
Answer. PHMSA has not amended its regulations to incorporate the
text of Executive Order 13985. However, PHMSA has addressed, at a high
level, the application of Executive Order 13985 within several of its
recent rulemakings. See, e.g., 86 FR 63266, 63291 (Nov. 15, 2021).
PHMSA also has, consistent with the Federal policy objective announced
in Executive Order 13985 and where appropriate, identified equity
benefits expected from recent safety-enhancing rulemakings just as it
recognizes safety, economic, and environmental benefits from its
rulemakings as appropriate.

Question 34.f. Does PHMSA have any plans to change its regulations
to address disadvantaged communities? If so, can you please specify
which Regulation Identifier Numbers (RIN) you plan on using?
Answer. PHMSA is still analyzing the safety data and currently has
no new specific RINs on the matter.

Question 34.g. Does PHMSA believe safety and environmental
expectations should be different in DAC areas as opposed to non-DAC
areas? If so, can you please stipulate how and why?
Answer. PHMSA believes safety and environmental expectations and
performance should be commensurate in both DAC and non-DAC areas. This
is why potentially disparate safety performance is concerning and why
PHMSA seeks to raise awareness of the potential issue.

Question 34.h. If PHMSA believes there should be different
expectations as stipulated in the above question, can you please
specify which regulations govern this process?
Answer. As stated above, PHMSA believes expectations should be the
same.

Question 34.i. What does PHMSA intend to do with the information
gleaned from the answers to the form mentioned above?
Answer. PHMSA's intention is to raise awareness through discussion,
and any information gathered will be used only to document staff effort
to reach stakeholders.

Question 34.j. The Executive order defines ``equity'' as the
``consistent and systematic fair, just and impartial treatment of all
individuals.'' Do you believe that the current set of pipeline
regulations included in 49 CFR Parts 190-199 are adequate regarding
equity as defined above? If not, why?
Answer. While the intent of PHMSA regulations is designed to
accomplish equity as defined in the EO, PHMSA believes empirical data
is more valuable than interpreting regulatory intent.

Question 34.k. The Department of Transportation recently sent to
the Federal Register a notice regarding its updated Transportation
Disadvantaged Census Tracts Tool asking for input from stakeholders.
How does PHMSA plan on using this tool?
Answer. On August 8, 2023, PHMSA published an interactive map
called the Pipeline Social Equity Tool. This public tool allows
stakeholders to evaluate safety performance compared to the Department
of Transportation's Equitable Transportation Community (ETC) Explorer
Tool. PHMSA has not yet identified other specific uses for the Tool.

Questions from Hon. Donald M. Payne, Jr. to Tristan Brown, Deputy
Administrator, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
(PHMSA)

Question 1. In 2022, there were more than 280 significant or
serious incidents and this year we have already had two fatalities as a
result of pipeline incidents. Meanwhile, your testimony states that
certain operators are negotiating for reduced civil penalties and other
operators are delaying paying the civil penalties they owe. Which
pipeline operators are negotiating for lesser civil penalty payments
and which ones have not paid what they owe? For the operators who have
not paid, how long have you been awaiting their payment?
Answer. Sec. 108 of the 2020 PIPES Act directs PHMSA to allow the
respondent in an enforcement proceeding to request the use of a consent
agreement. It further directs PHMSA to allow the respondent and the
agency to convene at least one meeting to explore the possibility of
settlement or simplification of the issues. On average over the last
two years, PHMSA issued 47 proposed penalties and consistent with Sec.
108, every operator was eligible to request the use of a consent
agreement and to meet with PHMSA for settlement discussions. Since the
beginning of 2018, PHMSA, as part of settlement negotiations, issued
penalties lower than proposed in 24 pipeline enforcement cases, as
noted below:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CONSENT
CPF NUM OPERATOR PROPOSED ASSESSED OPENED ORDER
PENALTIES PENALTIES DATE DATE
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
42022017NOPV.......................... DENBURY GULF COAST $3,866,734 $2,868,100 5/26/22 3/24/23
PIPELINES, LLC (32545).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
12022038NOPV.......................... KINDER MORGAN LIQUID $455,200 $165,700 7/1/22 2/3/23
TERMINALS, LLC (26041).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
32022019NOPV.......................... TEXAS GAS TRANSMISSION, $474,300 $237,800 1/21/22 7/1/22
LLC (19270).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
32022018NOPV.......................... TALLGRASS PONY EXPRESS $55,200 $44,800 1/19/22 5/16/22
PIPELINE, LLC (39043).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
32021046NOPV.......................... TALLGRASS PONY EXPRESS $437,300 $385,500 11/23/21 5/10/22
PIPELINE, LLC (39043).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
32021043NOPV.......................... TALLGRASS INTERSTATE GAS $359,900 $325,382 12/7/21 4/13/22
TRANSMISSION, LLC
(1007).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
32021045NOPV.......................... TALLGRASS POWDER RIVER $58,400 $25,920 11/5/21 3/29/22
GATEWAY, LLC (39963).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
32021049NOPV.......................... DAPL-ETCO OPERATIONS $93,200 $20,000 7/22/21 1/11/22
MANAGEMENT, LLC (39205).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
320215008............................. HESS ND (39065)......... $127,600 $82,000 3/1/21 12/1/21
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
32021022NOPV.......................... EXXONMOBIL PIPELINE CO $58,200 $38,900 5/18/21 10/28/21
(4906).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
52021022NOPV.......................... SFPP, LP (18092)........ $2,231,779 $1,493,200 5/12/21 10/22/21
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
32021027NOPV.......................... NORTHERN NATURAL GAS CO $56,900 $46,700 4/28/21 9/10/21
(13750).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
320205024............................. SPIRE MISSOURI INC. EAST $139,800 $62,600 11/30/20 4/9/21
(11032).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
42020018NOPV.......................... TEXAS EASTERN $36,200 $18,100 12/9/20 4/8/21
TRANSMISSION, LP
(SPECTRA ENERGY
PARTNERS, LP) (19235).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
320205004............................. PEMBINA COCHIN LLC $187,200 $172,800 3/19/20 3/18/21
(32258).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
320205020............................. SINCLAIR TRANSPORTATION $97,100 $67,700 10/13/20 2/5/21
COMPANY (15156).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
520192001............................. HILCORP ALASKA, LLC $198,700 $0 1/24/19 5/18/20
(32645).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
320196006............................. CRESTWOOD MIDSTREAM $236,100 $200,000 11/22/19 5/13/20
PARTNERS LP (39368).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
120190004............................. RICHMOND, CITY OF $80,500 $0 4/22/19 4/22/20
(17360).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
420145025............................. CENTURION PIPELINE L.P. $165,600 $92,000 9/30/14 1/31/19
(31888).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
120160005............................. RICHMOND, CITY OF $51,800 $0 10/13/16 11/30/18
(17360).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
320135014............................. ONEOK NGL PIPELINE, LLC $559,100 $550,400 5/13/13 10/23/18
(32109).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
320135015............................. ONEOK NGL PIPELINE, LLC $230,800 $0 5/13/13 10/23/18
(32109).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
320135020............................. ONEOK NGL PIPELINE, LLC $45,700 $22,500 7/3/13 10/23/18
(32109).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The following two enforcement cases are in an extended non-payment
status:
Idaho Pipeline Corp has not paid $49,000 penalty that
PHMSA assessed in an August 9, 2019, Final Order (CPF 5-2018-6015).
Bohrenworks LLC has not paid $209,002 penalty that PHMSA
assessed in a December 2, 2019, Final Order (CPF 5-2019-0018E).
Bohrenworks is an excavator.

Question 2. The 2020 PIPES Act allowed PHMSA a number of
recruitment and retention incentives, including special pay rates
permitted under section 5305 of title 5, United States Code. How has
having this authority assisted PHMSA to recruit and retain inspection
and enforcement personnel? Are there additional barriers to ensuring
PHMSA has the resources it needs?
Answer. In recognition of the critical nature of these positions,
the PIPES Act of 2020 authorized PHMSA to provide recruitment and
retention incentives such as tuition assistance, student loan
repayment, and special pay rates to improve efforts to attract and
retain pipeline engineers and inspectors. In 2021, PHMSA engaged an
outside contractor to determine the parameters for increasing its
special pay rates--including for example the geographic areas and pay
grades. In FY22, PHMSA received additional funding to provide financial
incentives such as increasing the pay rates. In August of 2022, PHMSA/
DOT submitted to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) for approval
an increase in the special pay rates for engineer/inspectors. PHMSA
received OPM approval to increase special pay rates for some engineer
inspectors on April 17, 2023, and promptly applied this to increase to
existing employees and openings. While awaiting approval, PHMSA
increased the number of open/available positions for which it is
hiring. In 2023, PHMSA also proposed establishing additional incentives
to retain pipeline engineers/inspectors. Upon approval of these new
incentives, the agency hopes it will experience a significant boost in
its rate of onboarding and retention of inspectors.

Question 3. California state law (2022 SB-905) prohibits
construction of any new pipelines for carbon dioxide, including for new
carbon capture and storage projects, until PHMSA promulgates a final
rulemaking regarding minimum federal safety standards for
transportation of carbon dioxide by pipeline. Can you confirm that
PHMSA is working to finalize this rulemaking, and provide a publication
date for the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking?
Answer. PHMSA is developing a proposed rule updating its
regulations in response to the anticipated significant expansion of
carbon dioxide pipelines and to implement lessons learned from the
February 22, 2020, rupture of a supercritical-phase carbon dioxide
pipeline in Satartia, MS. PHMSA anticipates publishing an NPRM by
January 2024.

Questions from Hon. Mike Bost to Tristan Brown, Deputy Administrator,
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA)

Question 1. Does PHMSA oppose acts to damage or destroy an
interstate natural gas or hazardous liquids pipeline facility?
Answer. Yes, as noted in my response to Congressman Stauber, and
PHMSA personnel work closely with the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) to advance pipeline security, which is under the
jurisdiction of the TSA.

Question 2. Does PHMSA consider acts to damage or destroy an
interstate natural gas or hazardous liquids pipeline facility a legal
expression of 1st Amendment free speech rights?
Answer. PHMSA does not condone any act to damage or destroy a
pipeline facility. Knowingly and willfully damaging or destroying a
pipeline facility is a criminal violation of 49 U.S.C. 60123.

Question 3. Does PHMSA consider acts to damage or destroy an
interstate natural gas or hazardous liquids pipeline facility an
appropriate form of protest against climate change?
Answer. PHMSA does not condone any act to damage or destroy a
pipeline facility. Knowingly and willfully damaging or destroying a
pipeline facility is a criminal violation of 49 U.S.C. 60123.

Question 4. Does PHMSA oppose publications or other forms of media,
such as movies, which encourage the damage or destruction of an
interstate natural gas or hazardous liquids pipeline facility?
Answer. PHMSA does not condone any act to damage or destroy a
pipeline facility. Knowingly and willfully damaging or destroying a
pipeline facility is a criminal violation of 49 U.S.C. 60123.

Question 5. Does PHMSA consider dangerous certain acts to tamper
with or disrupt the operation of an interstate natural gas or hazardous
liquids pipeline facility, such as valve-turning?
Answer. Only trained personnel with explicit direction and
authority of the pipeline operator should ever perform activities on a
pipeline facility.

Question 6. Does PHMSA agree with the statement expressed by former
Pipeline Safety Trust (PST) Executive Director Carl Weimer that,
``[c]losing valves on major pipelines can have unexpected consequences
endangering people and the environment''?
Answer. Only trained personnel with explicit direction and
authority of the pipeline operator should ever perform activities on a
pipeline facility.

Question 7. Does PHMSA agree with former PST Executive Director
Weimer that actions by activists to close valves on major pipelines
were a ``dangerous stunt''?
Answer. Only trained personnel with explicit direction and
authority of the pipeline operator should ever perform activities on a
pipeline facility.

Question 8. Does PHMSA support a Federal prohibition on activities,
such as closing valves on major pipelines, that are dangerous but do
not result in damage or destruction?
Answer. Only trained personnel with explicit direction and
authority of the pipeline operator should ever perform activities on a
pipeline facility.

Questions from Hon. Donald M. Payne, Jr. to Andrew J. Black, President
and Chief Executive Officer, Liquid Energy Pipeline Association (LEPA)

Question 1. How much in annual revenue did LEPA members earn in
2022?
Answer. LEPA does not collect or hold information on the revenue of
its member companies. LEPA focuses on policies and programs that
improve pipeline safety and the public's perception of the benefits of
pipelines. LEPA also advocates for the liquids pipeline industry at
FERC, where the focus is on just and reasonable tariff rates and terms
of service. Public sources of information on pipeline operator revenue
would provide some information, although this data would be incomplete.
Several major members of LEPA are privately owned and do not report
their financial information publicly. Several other major members are
subsidiaries of larger organizations with multiple business units and
generally do not publicly break out liquids pipeline revenues
separately.

Question 2. How much of your members' product was exported to other
countries?
Answer. For the most part, LEPA member companies do not own the
product they transport. Similar to FedEx or UPS, pipeline companies
deliver liquid energy products owned by other parties from one
destination to another on behalf of shippers. The ultimate destination
of products delivered by LEPA members, to the extent they are beyond
the U.S. pipeline network, are usually unknown to LEPA and its members.
This model is similar to the rail and trucking industries, where trains
and trucks deliver packages and goods owned by other parties from
contracted pickup to destination points. The ultimate end point of
those shipments is not necessarily known to the rail and trucking
companies.

Question 3. Could you please explain what statutory prohibitions
there are on the industry creating its own voluntary information
sharing system?
Answer. There are no statutes which directly prohibit the sharing
of pipeline safety information. However, legal considerations and other
risks deter or limit free disclosure of information by infrastructure
owners to a voluntary information sharing system. For example,
companies will not share safety information which has a security
component if it would pose a threat to public safety if publicly
released. Companies will also not disclose to the public information
which might be used against them in pending or threatened litigation.
This is separate and apart from information subject to inspection and
enforcement action by a regulator. Congress recognized that legal
liabilities discourage safety sharing when it authorized a VIS-like
program for air carriers administered by the FAA. Indeed, the success
of the FAA safety sharing program resulting from the Congressional and
regulator safe harbor granted to air carriers was the inspiration for
Congress suggesting application of the program to the pipeline sector.
If Congress wants pipeline safety to benefit from voluntary information
sharing, it must create the legal safe harbors necessary for such
sharing.

Questions from Hon. Donald M. Payne, Jr. to Kenneth W. Grubb, Chief
Operating Officer, Natural Gas Pipelines, Kinder Morgan, Inc., on
behalf of the Interstate Natural Gas Association of America (INGAA)

Question 1. How much in annual revenue did INGAA members earn in
2022?
Answer. Many of INGAA's member companies have multiple revenue
streams in addition to interstate natural gas transmission pipelines.
To find the annual revenue stream for each Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (``FERC'')-regulated interstate natural gas transmission
pipeline, please see each pipeline's FERC Form No. 2 and 2-A, which are
publicly available here [https://www.ferc.gov/industries-data/natural-
gas/industry-forms/form-2-2a-3-q-gas-historical-vfp-data]. To find the
total annual revenue for each INGAA member company for all of its
business segments, here is a link to each INGAA member company or their
owner's public disclosures and/or press releases:
BHE GT&S: https://www.brkenergy.com/assets/upload/
financial-filing/2022
1231_BHE%20Form%2010K.pdf
Boardwalk Pipelines: https://loews.com/FileStore/2022-Q4-
--Earnings-Remarks.pdf
Cheniere Energy, Inc.: https://www.sec.gov/ix?doc=/
Archives/edgar/data/3570/
000000357023000042/lng-20221231.htm#ic1131b9e5c5b41368c2dbfdabf3591
5e_19
DT Midstream: https://s28.q4cdn.com/581450200/files/
doc_presentation/2023/01/DTM-Q4-2022-Earnings-Call-vF.pdf
DTE Energy: https://ir.dteenergy.com/news/press-release-
details/2023/DTE-Energy-closes-year-with-strong-financial-results-well-
positioned-for-2023/default.aspx
Eastern Shore Natural Gas: https://investor.chpk.com/
static-files/aff97881-7a86-4f51-a5ab-0768337b06d5
Enbridge Energy: https://www.enbridge.com/-/media/Enb/
Documents/Investor-
Relations/2022/2022_Q4_Financials_MDA.pdf?rev=c574188313454a11
8924d6eb033edfcb&hash=8B9FDDC80A7994E26138F731C077F4EC
Equitrans Midstream: https://s22.q4cdn.com/743133753/
files/doc_news/
Equitrans-Midstream-Announces-Full-Year-and-Fourth-Quarter-2022-
Results-2023.pdf
Iroquois Pipeline Operating Company--reported through TC
Energy and BHE GT&S
Kinder Morgan, Inc.: https://s24.q4cdn.com/126708163/
files/doc_financials/2022/q4/KMI-2022-10K-Final-as-Filed-wo-
Exhibits.pdf
Millennium Pipeline Company, LLC--reported through TC
Energy and DT Midstream
Mountain West Pipeline--acquired by Williams in Feb. 2023
National Grid: https://www.nationalgrid.com/document/
148586/download
National Fuel Gas Supply Corporation: https://
www.nationalfuel.com/wp-content/uploads/documents/NFG-9.30.2022-
Earnings-Release-11032022-PDF.pdf
NextEra Energy: https://www.investor.nexteraenergy.com//
media/Files/N/NEE-
IR/reports-and-fillings/quarterly-earnings/2022/Q4/2023-0125_NEEQ42022
News%20Release%20Final.pdf
ONEOK, Inc: https://otp.tools.investis.com/clients/us/
oneok_inc2/SEC/sec-show.
aspx?FilingId=16441050&Cik=0001039684&Type=PDF&hasPdf=1
Pacific Gas & Electric: https://s1.q4cdn.com/880135780/
files/doc_financials/2022/q4/PGE-02.23.23-Press-release.pdf
Sempra LNG: https://www.sempra.com/sempra-reports-fourth-
quarter-2022-business-results
Southern Company Gas: https://s27.q4cdn.com/273397814/
files/doc_financials/2022/q4/Earnings-Release-Q4-2022-IR.pdf
Southern Star Central Gas Pipeline, Inc.--privately owned
company that does not report publicly in U.S.
Spire, Inc.: https://ir.spire.com/sec-filings/all-sec-
filings/content/0000950170-23-008177/0000950170-23-008177.pdf
TC Energy: https://www.tcenergy.com/siteassets/pdfs/
investors/reports-and-filings/annual-and-quarterly-reports/2022/tc-
2022-annual-report.pdf
Tellurian, Inc.: https://ir.tellurianinc.com/financials-
filings-and-presentations/annual-reports/content/0000061398-23-000011/
0000061398-23-000011.pdf
UGI Energy Services, LLC: https://www.ugicorp.com/news-
releases/news-release-details/ugi-reports-fiscal-2022-results
WBI Energy Transmission, Inc.: https://
d18rn0p25nwr6d.cloudfront.net/CIK-0000067716/c0870b54-f2c5-4d64-88aa-
6000c3abd644.pdf
The Williams Companies: https://
d18rn0p25nwr6d.cloudfront.net/CIK-0000107263/828947a0-eef8-45b8-93a2-
c623e08108d5.pdf

Question 2. How much of INGAA members' product was exported to
other countries?
Answer. As you may know, INGAA member companies do not own the
natural gas that they transport. Interstate natural gas transmission
companies merely transport the natural gas owned and controlled by the
pipeline customer (shipper). In an integrated pipeline network (both
inter and intrastate), pipeline customers can transport their natural
gas over multiple pipelines from various production fields. The
interstate natural gas transmission pipeline typically does not know
the final end use of the gas that it transports.
INGAA does have member companies which own and operate LNG import
and export terminals, including BHE GT&S (Cove Point, MD), Cheniere
(Sabine, LA and under construction in Corpus Christi, TX), Kinder
Morgan (Elba Island, GA), Sempra (Hackberry, LA), and Tellurian (under
construction in Calcasieu Parish, LA). Please see a list of FERC-
certificated LNG terminals (both INGAA and non-INGAA members) here
[https://cms.ferc.gov/media/north-american-lng-export-terminals-
existing-approved-not-yet-built-and-proposed-8]. INGAA does not track
the volume of members' exports. Please refer to their websites for
further information.
We note that the U.S. Energy Information Administration (``EIA'')
reports [https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/n9133us2m.htm] monthly LNG
export volumes and reports [https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/
n9050us2a.htm] yearly marketed production volumes.

Question 3. What is the starting and average salary, benefits and
bonus, and any additional employment incentives for a Kinder Morgan
engineer?
Answer. Kinder Morgan utilizes a market-based approach whereby pay
ranges are established around a market reference point (MRP) to
compensate employees within its organization. For pipeline engineering
positions, there are 6 job titles that make up the job family currently
used by the company with different experience levels and job functions.
The average starting compensation for a pipeline engineer at Kinder
Morgan can range from $121,521 to $172,129, depending on the employee's
level of experience and qualifications. This dollar figure includes
salary, bonus, and benefits amounting to roughly one third of the total
compensation (i.e., health care, payroll taxes, retirement plans,
educational reimbursement, and service awards). The average total
compensation across the range of all pipeline engineering positions at
Kinder Morgan is $208,444 (including the same categories listed
earlier).

Question 4. Kinder Morgan has received 39 special permits from
PHMSA in the last 10 years and experienced more than 500 accidents or
incidents. Have any of those accidents or incidents occurred on
pipelines that received a special permit to waive PHMSA's safety
regulations?
Answer. Kinder Morgan currently has 17 active natural gas
transmission class location special permits. No incidents have ever
occurred in a class location special permit segment. In the last 10
years, companies operated by Kinder Morgan have experienced 188 natural
gas incidents (the remainder of the incidents cited in your question
were on our liquids systems). Almost exactly two-thirds of those
natural gas incidents, while reportable, were minor and contained
within company facilities (e.g., within a compressor or meter station).
Additionally, many of Kinder Morgan's pipelines are hundreds of miles
long. When there were incidents on pipelines where class location
special permit segments exist, there was no impact to the class
location special permit segment.

Questions from Hon. Troy E. Nehls to Bill Caram, Executive Director,
Pipeline Safety Trust

Question 1. Information sharing is a critical part of the pipeline
industry's efforts to advance safety. Since 2016, industry has
supported the idea of establishing a formal voluntary information
sharing framework, similar to what is utilized by the airline industry.
The PIPES Act of 2016 convened a Voluntary Information Sharing System
working group that recommended Congress authorize such a program to
share pipeline safety information while providing confidentiality for
disclosures, but such a provision has been excluded from two previous
reauthorization bills.
As the committee considers future safety needs, could you please
share your thoughts on whether such a framework would be valuable and
should be included in the next pipeline safety reauthorization bill?
Answer. The Pipeline Safety Trust believes there is nothing that
prevents the pipeline industry from creating an information sharing
system if desired, so we question the need for Congressional
authorization of such a program. However, we would not oppose a
provision provided protections from disclosure, FOIA requests, and
other legal processes are reasonable and do not restrict information
from the public that is currently available; funding does not pull from
existing PHMSA resources; and the governing board is fairly balanced
among stakeholders.

Questions from Hon. Donald M. Payne, Jr. to Bill Caram, Executive
Director, Pipeline Safety Trust

Question 1. Would you recommend that the committee extend the
Technology Pilot Program as mandated by Sec. 104 of the PIPES Act of
2020? If so, do you have specific safety concerns or concerns with the
application process? What recommendations do you have to ensure
applicants provide a sufficient level of safety during their pilot
program?
Answer. Given that the Technology Pilot Program would allow
companies to operate outside of existing Federal minimum safety
standards, we believe the program requires robust safeguards, including
an extensive application and approval process, to operate pipelines in
our nation's communities without meeting those standards. Regulations
around maximum pressure, repair criteria, risk assessments, and many
other standards are important to the safety of people and the
environment and PHMSA needs to rigorously assess the consequences of
any potential regulatory leniency.
The Pipeline Safety Trust would need to assess any proposed changes
to the existing program that might accompany a proposed extension to
the Technology Pilot Program before deciding to support its adoption.

Question 2. Does the Pipeline Safety Trust support H.R.4261, the
``Pipeline Seismic Safety Study Act'' raised in the last Congress?
Answer. Yes, we support the ``Pipeline Seismic Safety Study Act''.

Questions from Hon. Mike Bost to Bill Caram, Executive Director,
Pipeline Safety Trust

Question 1. Does the PST oppose acts to damage or destroy an
interstate natural gas or hazardous liquids pipeline facility?
Answer. Yes, The Pipeline Safety Trust opposes activities that
create unsafe conditions for people and the environment on pipeline
facilities.

Question 2. Does PST consider acts to damage or destroy an
interstate natural gas or hazardous liquids pipeline facility a
protected expression of 1st Amendment free speech rights?
Answer. Acts to damage or destroy a pipeline can create unsafe
conditions, and The Pipeline Safety Trust opposes activities that
create unsafe conditions for people and the environment on pipeline
facilities.

Question 3. Does PST consider acts to damage or destroy an
interstate natural gas or hazardous liquids pipeline facility an
appropriate form of protest against climate change?
Answer. Acts to damage or destroy a pipeline can create unsafe
conditions, and The Pipeline Safety Trust opposes activities that
create unsafe conditions for people and the environment on pipeline
facilities.

Question 4. Does PST oppose publications or other forms of media,
such as movies, which encourage the damage or destruction of an
interstate natural gas or hazardous liquids pipeline facility?
Answer. Unfortunately, this hypothetical question goes beyond our
mission and our tiny staff's capacity, but I will reiterate that we
oppose activities that create unsafe conditions for people and the
environment on pipeline facilities. However, I am unable to comment on
the potential constitutional implications of your question.

Question 5. Does PST consider dangerous certain acts to tamper with
or disrupt the operation of an interstate natural gas or hazardous
liquids pipeline facility, such as valve-turning?
Answer. Acts such as valve-turning by untrained individuals can
create unsafe conditions on pipeline facilities and the Pipeline Safety
Trust opposes activities that create unsafe conditions for people and
the environment on pipeline facilities.

Question 6. Do you agree with the statement expressed by former PST
Executive Director Carl Weimer that, ``[c]losing valves on major
pipelines can have unexpected consequences endangering people and the
environment''?
Answer. Yes, I agree with that statement.

Question 7. Do you agree with former PST Executive Director Weimer
that actions by activists to close valves on major pipelines were a
``dangerous stunt''?
Answer. I am not familiar with the particular circumstances that
would contextualize Mr. Weimer's comment but given the level of respect
I have for his integrity and judgment, I think it's safe to say I would
agree with his assessment at the time.

Question 8. Does PST support a Federal prohibition on activities,
such as closing valves on major pipelines, that are dangerous but do
not result in damage or destruction?
Answer. I believe such activities are already prohibited.

Question 9. Does PST support actions to blow up a natural gas or
hazardous liquids pipeline encouraged by the upcoming movie ``How to
Blow Up a Pipeline'' set for release April 7 in theaters across
America?
Answer. We have not seen the movie nor read the book and do not
know if either encourages blowing up pipelines. I will reiterate that
the Pipeline Safety Trust opposes activities that create unsafe
conditions for people and the environment on pipeline facilities.

Question 10. Does PST consider actions to blow up a natural gas or
hazardous liquids pipeline as encouraged by the upcoming movie ``How to
Blow Up a Pipeline'' a danger to people or the environment?
Answer. We have not seen the movie nor read the book and do not
know if either encourages blowing up pipelines. I will reiterate that
the Pipeline Safety Trust opposes activities that create unsafe
conditions for people and the environment on pipeline facilities.

Question 11. Does PST condemn the upcoming movie ``How to Blow Up a
Pipeline''?
Answer. We have not seen the movie and have enough real pipeline
issues to keep our tiny staff more than busy without spending time
dealing with fictional drama meant to entertain. It is always our hope
that pipeline companies, lawmakers, and regulators, who have the
ability to change things safely and rapidly, will deal with the
existential threat of climate change in a proactive manner.

[all]