[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]




                      STRENGTHENING BIOSAFETY AND
                         BIOSECURITY STANDARDS:
                       PROTECTING AGAINST FUTURE
                               PANDEMICS

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

            SELECT SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CORONAVIRUS PANDEMIC

                                 OF THE

               COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                            OCTOBER 18, 2023

                               __________

                           Serial No. 118-70

                               __________

  Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Accountability





                [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
               



                       Available on: govinfo.gov,
                         oversight.house.gov or
                             docs.house.gov

                               ______
                                 

                 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

54-067 PDF                WASHINGTON : 2023













               COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY

                    JAMES COMER, Kentucky, Chairman

Jim Jordan, Ohio                     Jamie Raskin, Maryland, Ranking 
Mike Turner, Ohio                        Minority Member
Paul Gosar, Arizona                  Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of 
Virginia Foxx, North Carolina            Columbia
Glenn Grothman, Wisconsin            Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts
Gary Palmer, Alabama                 Gerald E. Connolly, Virginia
Clay Higgins, Louisiana              Raja Krishnamoorthi, Illinois
Pete Sessions, Texas                 Ro Khanna, California
Andy Biggs, Arizona                  Kweisi Mfume, Maryland
Nancy Mace, South Carolina           Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, New York
Jake LaTurner, Kansas                Katie Porter, California
Pat Fallon, Texas                    Cori Bush, Missouri
Byron Donalds, Florida               Jimmy Gomez, California
Kelly Armstrong, North Dakota        Shontel Brown, Ohio
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania            Melanie Stansbury, New Mexico
William Timmons, South Carolina      Robert Garcia, California
Tim Burchett, Tennessee              Maxwell Frost, Florida
Marjorie Taylor Greene, Georgia      Summer Lee, Pennsylvania
Lisa McClain, Michigan               Greg Casar, Texas
Lauren Boebert, Colorado             Jasmine Crockett, Texas
Russell Fry, South Carolina          Dan Goldman, New York
Anna Paulina Luna, Florida           Jared Moskowitz, Florida
Chuck Edwards, North Carolina        Rashida Tlaib
Nick Langworthy, New York
Eric Burlison, Missouri

                                 ------                                

                       Mark Marin, Staff Director
             Mitchell Benzine, Subcommittee Staff Director
                        Marie Policastro, Clerk

                      Contact Number: 202-225-5074

                Miles Lichtman, Minority Staff Director

                      Contact Number: 202-225-5051
                                 ------                                

            Select Subcommittee On The Coronavirus Pandemic

                     Brad Wenstrup, Ohio, Chairman

Nicole Malliotakis, New York         Raul Ruiz, California, Ranking 
Mariannette Miller-Meeks, Iowa           Minority Member
Debbie Lesko, Arizona                Debbie Dingell, Michigan
Michael Cloud, Texas                 Kweisi Mfume, Maryland
John Joyce, Pennsylvania             Deborah Ross, North Carolina
Marjorie Taylor Greene, Georgia      Robert Garcia, California
Ronny Jackson, Texas                 Ami Bera, California
Rich Mccormick, Georgia              Jill Tokuda, Hawaii









                         C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

                              ----------                              

                                                                   Page

Hearing held on October 18, 2023.................................     1

                               Witnesses

                              ----------                              

Gerald W. Parker, Jr., DVM, PhD, Associate Dean for Global One 
  Health, College of Veterinary Medicine & Biomedical Sciences, 
  Texas A&M University
Oral Statement...................................................     5

Jaime Yassif, PhD, Vice President, Global Biological Policy and 
  Programs, Nuclear Threat Initiative
Oral Statement...................................................     7

Written opening statements and the written statements of the 
  witnesses are available on the U.S. House of Representatives 
  Document Repository at: docs.house.gov.

                           Index of Documents

                              ----------                              

Questions for the record to: Dr. Parker; submitted by Rep. 
  Wenstrup.

Questions for the record to: Dr. Parker; submitted by Rep. 
  Miller-Meeks.

Documents are available at: docs.house.gov.









 
                      STRENGTHENING BIOSAFETY AND
                         BIOSECURITY STANDARDS:
                       PROTECTING AGAINST FUTURE
                               PANDEMICS

                              ----------                              


                      Wednesday, October 18, 2023

                        House of Representatives

               Committee on Oversight and Accountability

            Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic

                                           Washington, D.C.

    The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:05 a.m., in 
room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Brad Wenstrup 
(Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
    Present: Representatives Wenstrup, Comer, Malliotakis, 
Miller-Meeks, Lesko, Cloud, Joyce, Jackson, Ruiz, Dingell, 
Ross, and Tokuda.
    Dr. Wenstrup. Good morning. The Select Subcommittee on the 
Coronavirus Pandemic will come to order.
    I want to welcome everyone.
    I now recognize myself for the purpose of making an opening 
statement.
    And without objection, the Chair may declare a recess at 
any time.
    Today, the Select Subcommittee is holding a hearing to 
examine our country's biosafety and biosecurity standards. We 
are not just examining whether they are effective, but whether 
they are sufficient and whether they can protect us from 
biological threats, both domestically and abroad, and what 
actions should be taken if these standards are insufficient or 
outdated and need to be modernized. The hearing is timely and 
forward looking. On Monday, the public comment period ended on 
proposed changes to oversight policies of federally funded, 
dual-use research of concern and gain-of-function research of 
concern. I have been told no one knows these proposed changes 
better than our witness, Dr. Gerry Parker, and we are also 
honored to have Dr. Yassif here today for her input.
    As we move forward, we want to make sure that our standards 
and capabilities can effectively respond and assess risks 
related to new research and biotechnologies, including those 
capable of unleashing new pandemics. In addition to pandemics, 
we must be prepared for a future public health attack, 
including the release of a biological weapon. This is necessary 
to protect American lives, and because infectious diseases 
don't recognize borders, lives of those around the world are in 
jeopardy.
    In the earliest stages of the pandemic, scientists and 
public health authorities raced to understand the novel 
coronavirus, to understand how it is spread, who is at risk, 
and, most importantly, its origins. Did it come from a natural 
spillover transferred from a bad to an intermediate source to 
human, or was it the result of a laboratory or research related 
accident? In other words, did it come from a lab, and while 
there is mounting evidence supporting lab leak theory, 
especially within certain agencies, we may never know with a 
100-percent certainty the origins of COVID-19, especially when 
transparency is being denied.
    However, we do know some things for certain. In early 2018, 
before COVID-19 emerged, the U.S. State Department had serious 
biosafety concerns about the Wuhan Institute of Virology. 
Specifically, they warned that there was a serious shortage of 
appropriately trained technicians and investigators needed to 
safely operate the high-contaminant laboratory, concerns that 
continued through 2019 and into 2020. They also warned that the 
WIV, Wuhan Institute of Virology, was conducting coronavirus 
research under inadequate biosafety levels, using reverse 
genetic engineering techniques to hide their work and creating 
chimeric coronaviruses to test infectivity to humans. Worse 
yet, we now know, the American taxpayer was likely paying for 
it, some of it, and we know, based on emails uncovered by this 
Subcommittee, that Dr. Fauci himself knew there was gain-of-
function research happening in Wuhan, before the pandemic broke 
out.
    We know this wouldn't be the first time that a lab leak 
occurred. We know that smallpox escaped a laboratory in the 
U.K. in 1978. We know that the former Soviet Union accidentally 
released anthrax from the military research facility. We know 
that two separate lab-related incidents led to the release of 
SARS from the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention 
in 2004. Finally, we know that the United States isn't immune 
to leaks. There have been lab-related accidents involving H1N1, 
H5N1, smallpox, tuberculosis, and Zika, some as recently as 
2016.
    These lab leaks can occur for a multitude of reasons. They 
can occur because of mishandled biological materials, escaped 
aerosols, laboratory design flaws, or human error, which can be 
as simple as failing to correctly wear protective equipment or 
accidentally puncturing a glove. Such an accident could easily 
have occurred in Fresno County, California, where we know now a 
Chinese company operated an illegal laboratory where it 
conducted dangerous experiments involving COVID-19 and other 
viruses. Inside this lab, authorities found hundreds of mice 
that had been genetically modified to catch and carry the 
COVID-19 virus.
    Troubling, as we already know, these lab-related incidents, 
if not contained, can cause predictable, but disastrous 
consequences. Desiring more laboratory safety and more 
oversight isn't to chill the scientific community from engaging 
in research, but to ensure we are taking every precaution 
necessary to protect the public from escaped pathogens of which 
we cannot control nor fully understand the consequences until 
it is too late. It is critically important that these issues be 
addressed proactively. Scientists that are conducting their 
work safely and with the proper precautions should not have any 
concerns about more oversight on bad labs. This oversight 
should be welcomed. One bad lab gives a good lab a bad name.
    In recent years, there have been significant advancements 
in biotechnology or dual-use technology that makes it far 
easier to develop and genetically engineer dangerous viruses, 
advancements that could make a genetically altered virus 
indistinguishable from a naturally occurring virus. This is one 
reason increased oversight into the experiments being conducted 
and the viral holding of labs is vital to preventing another 
pandemic. There has also been a proliferation of high 
contaminant labs throughout the world. Left unchecked, this 
makes it conceivable, if not probable, that another pandemic 
could occur in the future because of a lab related incident. 
This is a matter of public health and a matter of national 
security that requires interagency coordination and 
international cooperation.
    We are holding this hearing today to look at our current 
standards and circumstances to help prepare for a future 
pandemic or maybe prevent one, to determine what went wrong and 
to recommend how to do it better in the future. That is our 
goal. I look forward to a strong on topic discussion today, and 
I would now like to recognize Ranking Member Ruiz for the 
purpose of making an opening statement.
    Dr. Ruiz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Today's hearing is on a 
topic of critical importance to our national security and our 
public health. The fact is we don't know when the next pandemic 
will strike, and in order for us to truly be prepared, we must 
devote the time and resources now to strengthening our 
biosafety and biosecurity so that we can ensure the health 
security of Americans all across the country. While the path to 
a bio secure future lies ahead, I hope that during today's 
hearing, we can identify workable, forward-looking solutions 
that the minority has long called for to not only bolster 
pandemic preparedness, but also foster innovation and ensure 
our country's global competitiveness. At the center of these 
solutions must be a whole-of-government approach that 
prioritizes the American people's health and safety.
    In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, our Nation has taken 
important steps forward in advancing this approach with 
targeted investments in pandemic prevention, refined policies 
to promote biological risk management, and informed 
recommendations to improve overall biosafety and biosecurity. 
In fact, last year's Consolidated Appropriations Act included 
robust funding for the Biomedical Advanced Research and 
Development Authority to develop countermeasures in response to 
public health emergencies and biological threats. At the behest 
of congressional Democrats, the Consolidated Appropriations Act 
also worked to address public health threats in biomedical 
research and improve oversight of research involving select 
agents.
    Compounding this work are the National Science Advisory 
Board for Biosecurity's recommendations to strengthen existing 
oversight of research that raises biosafety and biosecurity 
concerns. Released this March after Secretary Becerra tasked 
the NSABB to evaluate our Nation's biosecurity and biosafety 
frameworks, these recommendations demonstrate a sound start for 
enhanced biosafety and biosecurity standards here in the United 
States. These are all promising steps forward, and I look 
forward to discussing them in more detail here today.
    However, it is important to note that our work to enhance 
biosafety and biosecurity cannot and should not end here. Risks 
to our national security do not end within our borders, and 
with every step we take to bolster lab safety and security at 
home, we must do so with an eye toward strengthening biosafety 
and biosecurity on a global scale as well. That is why I was 
glad to see President Biden's executive order focused on 
growing our own, take action to promote biosafety best 
practices abroad as well. Right now, a patchwork of lab safety 
standards and guidance may guide nations in their pursuit to 
bolster their own biosafety and biosecurity. However, we as an 
international community are without a consistent set of 
standards that we can all work together toward to reduce the 
threat of biological incidents.
    There is no simple solution to how we can achieve this 
goal, and every day, emerging technologies further complicate 
our work. However, if we remain united around our common goal 
of protecting the health and safety of our communities, 
fortifying our bio-defense, and enhancing pandemic 
preparedness, I know that we can get there. We have the 
distinct opportunity right now to make a positive change with 
constructive policy that improves people's lives and prevents a 
future disaster. I hope that today's discussion moves us closer 
to that vision that bolsters biosafety, enhances biosecurity, 
and, in turn, fortifies our national health security for 
generations to come. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you. Our witnesses today are Dr. Gerry 
Parker. Dr. Parker is the associate dean for Global One Health 
at the School of Veterinary Medicine & Biomedical Sciences, and 
director of Pandemic Preparedness and Biosecurity Policy 
Program at the Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs 
within the Bush School of Government and Public Service at 
Texas A&M University. It is quite a business card you have got.
    Dr. Parker's service includes more than 26 years on active 
duty leading military medical research and development programs 
and organizations. He is a former commander and deputy 
commander, United States Army Medical Research Institute of 
Infectious Diseases. After his military career, Dr. Parker held 
senior executive-level positions at the Department of Homeland 
Security, Department of Health and Human Services, and the 
Department of Defense. This includes serving as the Principal 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response at 
HHS, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Chemical and 
Biological Defense at DOD.
    Dr. Parker is a member of several advisory boards, 
including the Bipartisan Commission for Biodefense. Dr. Parker 
also temporarily served as senior advisor to the Assistant 
Secretary for Preparedness and Response at the Department of 
Health and Human Services from August 2020 to February 2021, 
during the COVID-19 response.
    Dr. Jaime Yassif: Dr. Yassif currently serves as NTI Vice 
President for Global Biological Policy and Programs, where she 
oversees the organization's work to reduce catastrophic 
biological risks, strengthen biosecurity and pandemic 
preparedness, and drive progress in advancing global health 
security. Dr. Yassif previously served as a program officer at 
Open Philanthropy where she led the biosecurity and pandemic 
preparedness initiative. Dr. Yassif has also served as a 
science and technology policy adviser at the U.S. Department of 
Defense and worked on the global health security agenda at the 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Dr. Yassif holds 
a biophysics Ph.D. from UC Berkeley, an M.A. in science and 
security from the King's College London War Studies Department, 
and a B.A. in Biology from Swarthmore College.
    I want to thank you both for being here today. Obviously, a 
lot of great expertise with us.
    Pursuant to Committee on Oversight and Accountability Rule 
9(g), the witnesses will please stand and raise their right 
hands.
    Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony that you 
are about to give is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but 
the truth, so help you God?
    [A chorus of ayes.]
    Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you. Let the record show that the 
witnesses answered in the affirmative. The Select Subcommittee 
certainly appreciates you being here today, and we look forward 
to your testimony.
    Let me remind the witnesses that we have read your written 
statement, and it will appear in full in the hearing record. 
Please limit your oral statement to 5 minutes. As a reminder, 
please press the button on the microphone in front of you so 
that it is on and Members can hear you. When you begin to 
speak, the light in front of you will turn green. After 4 
minutes the light will turn yellow. When the red light comes 
on, your 5 minutes has expired, and we would ask you to please 
wrap up.
    And I now recognize Dr. Parker to give an opening 
statement.

              STATEMENT OF GERALD W. PARKER, JR., DVM, PHD

                  ASSOCIATE DEAN FOR GLOBAL ONE HEALTH

                    COLLEGE OF VETERINARY MEDICINE &

                          BIOMEDICAL SCIENCES

                          TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY

    Dr. Parker. Chair Wenstrup, Ranking Member Ruiz, and 
Members of the Select Subcommittee, thank you for the 
opportunity to testify as you consider biosafety and 
biosecurity threats to our Nation and the world. My career has 
spanned from the bench to executive leadership positions in 
biodefense, health security, and pandemic preparedness, 
including as a commander of a high-containment lab at Fort 
Detrick. The views I offer today are my own and not 
representative of past or current organizational affiliations, 
employers, or advisory boards.
    A high-containment lab consisting of Biosafety Levels 3 and 
4 requires the highest level of containment to protect workers 
and public safety. Within these labs, highly trained workers 
and scientists are conducting infectious disease research and 
working with hazardous pathogens that are essential for 
biodefense, national security, and public health preparedness. 
These labs require a highly skilled work force and detailed 
attention to operations and sustainment. Still, lab accidents 
happen, and they happen more often than you think. Most are 
quickly mitigated and contained, but some are more serious.
    I am more concerned about the readily available, dual-use 
technologies and the global expansion of high-containment labs. 
Lab accidents and misuse are more likely to occur where there 
is a lack of institutional norms. This is why it is imperative 
for a modernized, harmonized domestic and international 
framework to ensure a skilled work force and institutional 
norms needed to operate these facilities. Because the United 
States is viewed as a model for biosafety and biosecurity, it 
will be necessary to make reforms at home to make the biggest 
difference worldwide. Congress is an essential partner in this 
mission, which will require funding oversight and, in some 
cases, legislative authorities.
    In my written testimony, I outline the history of U.S. 
biosafety and biosecurity, which describes how our fragmented 
oversight framework came to be. Today, my intent is to help the 
Committee as you look for a path forward. I will discuss five 
recommendations for your consideration.
    First, the single most important thing Congress and the 
Federal agencies can do is to harmonize biosafety and 
biosecurity standards and norms domestically and 
internationally. Congress should direct the Administration to 
commission a top-to-bottom holistic review of the entire 
biorisk management framework. The goal will be to harmonize 
oversight while minimizing unnecessary and unproductive burdens 
on the research institutions. This is long overdue and is 
needed to address growing and unproductive compliance 
challenges caused simply by the fragmentation of the current 
system. For example, there is no single authority for biosafety 
or biosecurity oversight at the Federal level, and this 
actually is increasing risk.
    Second, the vast majority of infectious disease research is 
safe when done in compliance with the existing guidelines, but 
the exceedingly small subset of especially dangerous research 
has the potential to trigger an unnatural epidemic or a 
pandemic. We need to incentivize safer alternatives to reduce 
or eliminate the need to generate especially dangerous 
pathogens by the few scientists and institutions engaged in 
this kind of basic research. Congress should act to ensure that 
the Administration adopts, implements, and they revise policy 
to responsibly govern especially dangerous enhanced pathogen 
research. Third, Congress should authorize and fund an 
independent biosafety and biosecurity oversight authority, 
analogous to the FAA's oversight over air transportation. It is 
imperative that this oversight authority be nimble and able to 
keep up with the rapidly evolving life science advances.
    Fourth, due to the potential for unnatural epidemics or 
pandemics resulting from accidents or misuse, particularly in 
countries that lacks strong institutional values and norms, we 
all should be concerned about the expansion of high-containment 
labs and readily available to use technologies worldwide. This 
requires a recommitment to international diplomacy. Congress 
should direct the State Department to elevate international 
biosafety and biosecurity harmonization as a diplomatic 
priority. All member-states must assume their responsibility 
and accountability for effective oversight. Fifth, as the GAO 
has repeatedly pointed out, there is a need for the 
Administration to develop a national strategy for high-
containment labs so we can optimize use, establish a better 
system for sharing lessons learned, best practices, and 
increase collaboration.
    In conclusion, the U.S. Government must recommit to working 
with international partners. The goal is to harmonize 
international standards and norms. This is essential for worker 
safety and public safety. The public deserves transparency to 
have confidence that these important systems work. I look 
forward to answering your questions. Thank you.
    Dr. Wenstrup. I now recognize Dr. Yassif to give an opening 
statement, please.

                     STATEMENT OF JAIME YASSIF, PHD

                             VICE PRESIDENT

                 GLOBAL BIOLOGICAL POLICY AND PROGRAMS

                        NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE

    Dr. Yassif. Chairman Wenstrup, Ranking Member Ruiz, and 
other Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the 
opportunity to join today's hearing to share my perspective on 
strengthening biosafety and biosecurity standards. I serve as 
Vice President for Global Biological Policy and Programs at 
NTI, which is a nonprofit, nonpartisan global security 
organization focused on reducing nuclear and biological threats 
imperiling humanity.
    We are in the midst of a 21st century bioscience and 
biotechnology revolution. New technologies create tremendous 
opportunities to benefit society, but these same advances also 
pose significant risks, namely that the tools of modern 
bioscience and biotechnology could be deliberately exploited by 
malicious actors or accidentally misused, which could lead to 
the next global biological catastrophe.
    The world has seen the devastating effects of the COVID 
pandemic, and the next pandemic could be as damaging or 
potentially much worse. As discussions continue to swirl about 
COVID origins, the evidence as to whether it emerged naturally 
or resulted from an accident is still inconclusive. We cannot 
say with confidence what the origins of COVID are, but the fact 
that it is even plausible that so much disruption could have 
been caused by a possible lab accident is a big blinking red 
light. It signals the urgent need to strengthen biosafety and 
biosecurity. To protect the U.S. population here at home and 
save lives globally, it is in our interest to take an 
international approach to bolstering biosafety and biosecurity. 
That is because infectious diseases, no matter their origin, do 
not respect borders.
    Unfortunately, biosafety and biosecurity are very weak 
globally. For example, according to the Global Health Security 
Index, only 6 percent of countries have national-level 
oversight measures for dual-use bioscience research. 
Furthermore, there is currently no international entity that 
has its primary mission dedicated to reducing emerging 
biological risks associated with rapid technology advances.
    To address these gaps, I am very pleased that the Biden 
Administration has taken a number of steps to bolster biosafety 
and biosecurity, both domestically and internationally. Just 
last week, the Administration released updated guidance for DNA 
synthesis screening, which provides helpful improvements over 
the original 2010 guidance. Another promising development is a 
2023 report from the National Science Advisory Board for 
Biosecurity. Huge congratulations are due to my colleague, Dr. 
Gerry Parker, and his colleagues for producing such a forward-
leaning set of recommendations for bolstering U.S. Government 
oversight of dual-use bioscience research. Now, it will fall to 
the Administration and Congress to find practical, effective 
ways to implement these recommendations.
    Additionally, the White House's 2022 National Biodefense 
Strategy notes the importance of raising the global bar for 
biosafety and biosecurity norms and practices. The plan is 
focused on preventing global biological catastrophe through 
such efforts and is crucial. The executive order on the 
American bioeconomy sets up a requirement to launch a biosafety 
and biosecurity innovation initiative, and it calls for 
investments in applied biosafety research and biosecurity 
innovation to reduce biological risks throughout the biotech 
R&D and biomanufacturing lifecycles.
    And yet, even with all the efforts that I have described, 
most of the work lies ahead. The U.S. Government can take 
several concrete actions to advance critical biosafety and 
biosecurity goals going forward: One, make dedicated financial 
investments to bolstering biosafety and biosecurity, 
specifically by dedicating 2 to 4 percent of investments in 
pandemic preparedness research and development to support 
innovation in biosafety and biosecurity; two, establish an 
office within the U.S. Government to lead and serve as an 
innovation hub to build biosecurity and biosafety into life 
science research, biotechnology, biomanufacturing, and awards; 
three, establish a legal requirement to screen DNA synthesis 
orders coupled with incentives to make implementation 
achievable. The recent guidance from the Biden Administration 
on DNA synthesis screening is a good first step, but 
establishing this as a legal requirement will also be 
important; four, implement key elements of U.S. biosecurity 
strategy documents. The U.S. Government has set a number of 
ambitious goals for itself, now is the time to implement these 
plans; five, and finally, provide political and diplomatic 
support for the International Biosecurity and Biosafety 
Initiative for Science or IBBIS. NTI has been working to 
establish this new independent international organization, 
which we are planning to launch soon. IBBIS' mission will be to 
work collaboratively with global partners to strengthen 
biosecurity norms and develop practical innovative tools to 
uphold them.
    Bolstering biosafety and biosecurity is extremely important 
work, and it is urgent. If the U.S. Government can achieve the 
biosafety and biosecurity goals it has set for itself and work 
with partners in industry and civil society to further advance 
these goals, it will be a big win for reducing biological risks 
domestically and around the world. If not, the risk of facing 
another pandemic on the scale of COVID-19 or larger will grow 
with even higher stakes as biological threats increase over 
time.
    Chairman Wenstrup, Ranking Member Ruiz, and other Members 
of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify 
today. I look forward to answering your questions.
    Dr. Wenstrup. Well, thank you both very much. I now 
recognize myself for questions, and I agree with both of you. 
To start off, it is important that our focus be forward 
looking, and as you know, many of our current biosafety and 
biosecurity policies and regulations, may have been enacted in 
response to specific events. For instance, the Federal Select 
Agent Program was effectively created in response to improper 
orders of plague strains by an unauthorized individual and was 
subsequently bolstered in response to the 2001 anthrax letter 
attacks.
    I heard both of you saying some of the things Congress can 
do, and it is appreciated. You talked about investments and 
investments into what--you have got specifics; I appreciate 
that as well--and the role of oversight, and role of State 
Department internationally should be well defined. I think that 
is something that we can try to do and recommend.
    Internationally, I do take concern when I look at an 
organization like the World Health Organization, which I would 
like to see it be more independent, aside from the United 
Nations, which is full of political realm, but may be separate 
from that and not be under the influence of its members that 
have a political agenda, and I don't think I need to go into 
much detail on that. The question is, if we can establish an 
international organization, what do you recommend as far as how 
we enforce biosafety and biosecurity? And I am going to ask 
both of you that question, your opinions on that, as you both 
have dealt internationally many times.
    Dr. Parker. Yes, I think the question of enforcement is 
really the hard one, and I guess that is why my recommendation, 
first and foremost, is focused on recommitment to diplomacy. 
And there are some actually good efforts already underway and 
the State Department working with the G7 countries and USDA is 
part of that, but it is a small effort to try to just encourage 
collaboration on harmonization of high-containment standards 
and norms and work with infectious agents, but it just needs to 
be elevated as a secretarial priority and resourced 
appropriately.
    But I think for those diplomatic negotiations and 
collaborations, I think some additional ideas will come out of 
those conversations and through diplomacy about how to better 
strengthen the World Health Organization so it can be less 
dependent upon regional offices than member-states within the 
regional office because the director general does need some 
support. But there are other ideas, too, that could be 
considered that I think would come out of those diplomatic 
conversations.
    But first and foremost, member-states, all of us, United 
States, all member-states of the WHO or the United Nations, we 
all have a responsibility to make sure that we have the 
appropriate guidelines, laws, regulations in our own countries. 
And so how do we encourage all member-states to make sure that 
they do what they need to do and assume their responsibility 
and accountability to make sure their institutions have the 
right norms, ethical values, they are operating high-
containment labs, they have to have the appropriate skilled 
work force, funding, and so forth to do so, so the 
international community can have better confidence in these 
labs.
    Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you. Dr. Yassif?
    Dr. Yassif. Thank you. I think the question of how to 
strengthen global approaches to biosafety and biosecurity 
through stronger international institutions is really 
important, and I agree with Gerry that the enforcement part is 
going to be really challenging. And before we can even envision 
that possible future, we need to do a lot of groundwork to lay 
a foundation, have a shared understanding globally of what the 
rules of the road are, and what are the best practices for 
biosafety and biosecurity that we would like to see that can 
meaningfully reduce risks. And I think that is going to take a 
lot of work. One of the efforts that we are really focused on 
through IBBIS is to help to build that foundation. We envision 
that IBBIS will serve as a resource to help countries as well 
as members in the private sector, in industry and academia and 
civil society to sort of share and develop best practices, so 
we can raise the bar both domestically and internationally.
    I would say that nations have an enlightened self-interest 
in advancing biosecurity and biosafety. No one wants to see a 
lab leak or some sort of catastrophic event from within their 
borders, and I think that we can enhance that through 
transparency and accountability of implementing best practices 
in biosafety and biosecurity. That is why we track those kinds 
of provisions through our global health security index that I 
mentioned during my testimony. And I think nations should be 
accountable to each other for upholding biosafety and 
biosecurity standards, and by tracking, that we can support 
that.
    And the last thing I will say is, WHO is one place that can 
carry out this work, the BWC is another piece of it. And they 
both are international institutions that have credibility 
internationally, and it will be important to have them at the 
table to continue to advance this work. But I do think that 
other complementary institutions, like IBBIS, can support that 
work, and take on some of the tasks of innovation, and taking 
risk and developing best practices that may be harder for some 
of the U.N.-based institutions to do. And I think together, we 
can really drive progress.
    Dr. Wenstrup. Yes. I mean, I am hoping that maybe here in 
the United States, we can set the gold standard with high level 
of expectations and be the example for others. And it just 
seems to me that if a certain nation is not cooperating, then 
we point that out to the world, and they no longer are part of 
the international organization. Just a thought going forward.
    I do have a question because we talked a lot about dual-use 
research and into dual-use, and I am just curious. What 
positives have come out of dual-use research in the last decade 
or so, and maybe more specifically, to gain-of-function or 
creation of chimeras, what positives have come out of that type 
of research?
    Dr. Parker. Well, by definition, let me just take the dual-
use part of that question first. So dual-use, I would say by 
far that most dual-use is good and bad. And so most of our life 
science, scientific advances in biotechnology and biomedicine, 
by far the vast majority of those advancing technologies are 
improving our way of life, our health, our well-being, our 
economy, our agriculture. So these are important technologies 
that we need to continue to innovate and foster. But there is 
another side to that dual use and that is the bad, and so how 
do we mitigate the misuse of the potential of these advancing 
technologies and somebody who wants to do harm?
    Dr. Wenstrup. But, again, I guess what I am asking 
specifically, if you look at what has taken place is, one, 
obviously potential for bioweapon, right? And let's not kid 
ourselves on that. So what are the positives? If you are 
advancing research that can lead to a bioweapon, are we 
advancing research that also can lead to something good? What 
is that good?
    Dr. Parker. Well, I don't think the intent of most of the 
life sciences are to develop and advancing technology that is 
going to be misused. I think our issue is how do we control and 
mitigate the misuse of it. And almost anything that we have 
throughout humankind, somebody has figured out how to misuse 
technology that we develop. And I think you really kind of get 
into the enhanced dual use, especially dangerous gain-of-
function research is what you are really getting at, and what 
benefits have come out of that research.
    And I think we have to be realistic about those benefits, 
and I think we have to be realistic about what those benefits 
are. And I can see where there is possibly a need for basic 
science, knowledge advancement with some of this research. I am 
not going to negate that that could be useful, but I think we 
have to be very careful and not exaggerating the benefits of 
that type of research. And so I am not going to prejudge that 
somebody may come with a good idea that there may be a need to 
engage in a dual use, especially dangerous, enhanced pathogen 
research that might advance our basic science knowledge if it 
is good for public health too, but that is why we need to have 
additional oversight of that. And actually, we need to be 
incentivizing safer alternatives because many believe that 
safer alternatives can be used for answering the basic science 
questions for most of these proposed research proposals.
    So we need to really incentivize safer alternatives. And if 
one is justified, I mean, really justified, and the risks are 
mitigated, and there is verification that there is no safer 
alternatives, and there is public transparency, then it just 
needs to be reviewed, and there is nothing wrong with having a 
review. And so I think a lot of folks don't like the extra 
review.
    Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you. Dr. Yassif, do you have anything 
to add to that?
    Dr. Yassif. Yes, I largely agree with my colleague. I think 
our colleagues in the molecular biology and virology community 
would share that, for example, gain-of-function research and 
their view is important for advancing public health and 
development of medical countermeasures. But I agree that we do 
have to, on the balance, consider that with downside risks of 
accidental or deliberate misuse. That is a really serious set 
of considerations we need to balance in figuring out how to do 
that as we improve our oversight practices to figure out what 
kind of research should go forward and what kind of research 
perhaps should not because the cost-benefit calculation doesn't 
make sense.
    I think that there is more work to be done to figure out 
how to thread the needle there, and it is a really hard 
question. So some of the work that the Administration is doing 
to revise oversight and to revise review processes for funding 
decisions is going to have to figure out how to do this well, 
and I think that is where we really need to focus our efforts 
at the moment.
    Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you. I appreciate the feedback from 
both of you. Dr. Ruiz?
    Dr. Ruiz. Thank you. Bolstering international biosafety is 
at the heart of our efforts to prevent future pandemics. And 
currently, the existing framework for ensuring that research 
across the globe occurs safely relies on a patchwork of non-
enforceable standards and guidance, including the World Health 
Organization's laboratory biosafety manual. Beyond these 
international guidance documents, it is incumbent upon each 
nation to enact its own policies and standards to promote 
biosafety. Dr. Yassif, what shortcomings exist within this 
current international biosafety framework?
    Dr. Yassif. Thank you. Yes, the international biosafety 
framework is primarily, as you have noted, in the form of 
guidelines and not regulations, and so it is not enforceable. 
Another challenge is that it is very high level and not 
necessarily as specific as some of the U.S. biosafety 
guidelines in particular. I think that there is more work that 
can be done both in the United States to improve our own 
biosafety guidelines as well as to improve biosafety guidelines 
and practices and regulations internationally so that we can 
really more effectively safeguard this research.
    Dr. Ruiz. OK. In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, renewed 
attention has been paid to ensuring that research to advance 
our understanding of dangerous pathogens is done safely across 
the globe, including by tightening standards for lab 
operations. Dr. Yassif, what measures have the United States 
and other nations taken to bolster lab safety standards, and 
how can these policies serve as a blueprint for the types of 
biosafety reforms we would like to see implemented at the 
international level?
    Dr. Yassif. Sure. So we have a patchwork of biosafety 
guidelines and regulations here in the United States, includes 
the recombinant DNA guidelines for recombinant molecular 
genetics work in labs that work with NIH funding. We have got 
the Federal Select Agent Program, and then we have got the 
biosafety in microbiological and biomedical laboratories 
guidelines, and so this is a patchwork. It is not 
comprehensive, but it is a lot better than some of the other 
systems that we see overseas that are considerably weaker.
    Some of these features are not perfect, but they could be 
emulated internationally. So, for example, our system here in 
United States of biosafety oversight committee review within 
universities is a really valuable tool that we could replicate 
overseas. Some of the regulations we have in the United States, 
like the Federal Select Agent Program, are not perfect and 
could be made more comprehensive, but it could be the beginning 
of a blueprint for efforts overseas.
    I think one of the challenges, though, is that the sort of 
personnel training and the resources and the lab infrastructure 
internationally is not necessarily to the same standard that we 
have in the U.S. So we would have to make an investment in 
terms of capacity building, and partnership to really help 
raise the bar internationally, the level we would like to see. 
And so we really need to put our money where our mouth is if we 
really want to drive progress there, and I think we are also 
hoping that IBBIS can help with some of this work.
    Dr. Ruiz. OK. And so what precautions can be taken to 
ensure that bolstering lab safety is appropriately balanced 
with continued scientific advancement, including in the realm 
of pandemic preparedness? And I will ask you that question too, 
Dr. Parker. Dr. Yassif?
    Dr. Yassif. Sure. I think we can certainly continue with 
our work domestically and internationally to invest in pandemic 
preparedness research and development. That is critical. But as 
we see the global spread of research into these areas and the 
global spread of high-containment labs, we have to ensure that 
it is done in a safe and secure environment. We have to make 
investments to make sure that the labs, the high-containment 
labs where this work is being conducted, have appropriate 
biosafety provisions in place and biosecurity provisions in 
place. As I have noted in my written and oral testimony, 
biosafety and biosecurity are very weak globally, so we have a 
lot of work to do if we are really going to safeguard this work 
and make sure it is done safely and responsibly.
    Dr. Ruiz. Yes. Dr. Parker?
    Dr. Parker. Sure. I think the most important thing to do, I 
think, internationally is how do we make sure and support 
institutional norms, even a broader institution, that may host 
a high-containment lab within their university. It is the 
institutional norms. I think the guidance and regulations will 
come. We got to do that, but if we don't have strong 
institutional norms that understand the need for having a 
skilled work force that need the funding and resources for 
operations and maintenance, and sustaining these laboratories 
are extremely complex. And I am a former commander of a high-
containment lab, and I know how complex they are and the 
detailed attention that you have to do there. And so not all 
countries share our view of what that means to have strong 
institutional norms, and that would extend and the need for 
resources----
    Dr. Ruiz. Would a international school of lab safety and 
biosecurity practices in the United States help with that?
    Dr. Parker. I am sorry. I didn't----
    Dr. Ruiz. An international school of biosafety in the U.S. 
with certain institutions that brings in personnel from other 
labs to come and get trained here on biosafety, would that be 
helpful?
    Dr. Parker. That would be helpful, but I also think about 
it as trainings is necessary, but not sufficient. So 
educational is important, too, and it is, like, ongoing.
    Dr. Ruiz. You also need the equipment.
    Dr. Parker. There is an organization called ABSA 
International. That is the Professional Society for Biosafety, 
Scientists and Professionals. And ABSA actually had a great 
idea several years ago, third-party accreditation for high-
containment labs. And that would be analogous----
    Dr. Ruiz. What role does gain-of-function research play in 
pandemic preparedness research, if anything?
    Dr. Parker. Yes. First let's make sure that we are using 
the right terminology because ``gain of function'' is a very, 
very confusing term.
    Dr. Ruiz. Yes. Let's clarify.
    Dr. Parker. And, well, it is not codified.
    Dr. Ruiz. I said let's clarify.
    Dr. Parker. Oh, clarify it. OK. Clarify it. OK. So gain of 
function is a common experimental procedure used in biomedical 
research and biotechnology, so it is fairly common, but there 
are guidelines. The NIH guidelines are appropriate, but there 
is then in the vast majority of it, as long as it is done under 
the appropriate guidelines, can be done safely with appropriate 
institutional oversight, too, at the laboratory level. But 
there is this exceedingly small--I think it is exceedingly 
small--area of gain-of-function research of concern. I actually 
call it especially dangerous enhanced pathogen research that we 
have to have more oversight of.
    But the first, I would say, the normal research procedures 
using the relatively safe gain of function, that is just part 
of our biomedical research enterprise, and it has been 
important for our biodefense and pandemic preparedness. I don't 
believe, my opinion, that the especially dangerous enhanced 
pathogen research has contributed significantly to pandemic 
preparedness. And remember, I was a previous executive leader 
at ASPR, and some of those studies came out did not affect any 
of our vaccine development decisions.
    Dr. Ruiz. Got it. Thank you. So beyond building on the 
guidance and standards promulgated by the WHO and other 
international institutions, we must also dedicate time and 
energy to cultivating a shared culture of collaboration on best 
practices for safe research. As a leader in the global health 
community, the United States has a key role to play here. So 
Dr. Yassif, what steps can be taken to promote a culture of 
shared norms that prioritizes research and lab safety? And 
also, what role does Congress have in paving the way for 
stronger international biosafety cultures?
    Dr. Yassif. Thank you. So, I mean, I think we are all in 
agreement that having stronger norms and best practices for 
biosafety and biosecurity is critical, and we have to figure 
out how to do it well. And we see a gap in the international 
system in terms of the structures in place that aren't really 
prioritizing this as their top mission, and that is why we are 
working with international partners to establish IBBIS. We 
really believe that IBBIS can help contribute to this. We think 
that IBBIS will play a role in serving as a resource to 
institutions and countries around the world that are looking to 
get assistance with having more effective biosecurity 
provisions and biosafety as well in places where, working 
alongside organizations like ABSA, so I think that that is 
critical.
    What the U.S. Government can do to support that work is to 
diplomatically and politically support IBBIS so that we can 
build more political support in countries around the world to 
really have IBBIS have a prominent position. I do think that 
IBBIS, even though it is going to be a non-governmental 
organization, can help advance U.S. goals on biosafety and 
biosecurity and raise the bar globally. And so for that reason, 
I think it is important.
    The role of Congress, in particular, I think is funding. 
There are a lot of initiatives that have been set forth in the 
various strategy documents that I outlined in my testimony 
that, I think, are really promising initiatives for supporting 
research and innovation in biosecurity and biosafety. There are 
certain things that we know that we need to do, but with rapid 
advances in science and technology, we have to continue to 
innovate and stay ahead of the curve. The emerging risks are 
constantly moving the goalposts, so we need to invest in 
innovation in biosecurity and biosafety. This will help 
domestically but also internationally.
    Dr. Ruiz. Thank you. And so now that we have turned the 
page on the darkest days of the pandemic, we have an obligation 
to enact forward-looking policy solutions to reduce the 
likelihood of future deadly novel airborne viruses. And I look 
forward to building on the progress that the Biden 
Administration and congressional Democrats have made, and do so 
in a strong bipartisan way to bolster biosafety and prevent 
future pandemics. And I yield back.
    Dr. Wenstrup. I now recognize Ms. Malliotakis from New York 
for 5 minutes of question.
    Ms. Malliotakis. Thank you very much, and I appreciate this 
discussion. I think it is really important to safeguard our 
future.
    The U.S. biosecurity rules don't apply overseas, as has 
been mentioned here, yet Federal money went to the Wuhan 
Institute of Virology. And we know now that they had inadequate 
training. They had subpar conditions. The FBI and Department of 
Energy testimony here in this Committee as well point to the 
fact that COVID came from the lab. So my question is really 
regarding we have no centralized oversight or standards. There 
is not enough risk assessment. There needs to be a set of 
standards that are meant to receive U.S. tax dollars, in my 
opinion. We saw what happened with money going either directly 
to WIV or through EcoHealth Alliance. So should we stop Federal 
grants from being sent to foreign subrecipients like it did 
through EcoHealth, particularly if they don't have biosecurity 
rules that are comparable to ours?
    Dr. Parker. Is that for me?
    Ms. Malliotakis. Whoever would like to answer.
    Dr. Parker. First, I would just point out, the National 
Science Advisory Board report of March 2023 actually has a 
recommendation regarding international funding and the need--
essentially, I will summarize it--if international-funded 
research should comply with the same standards that we have in 
the United States. That essentially summarizes one of the 
recommendations in that report.
    Ms. Malliotakis. What is the best way to determine that if 
they are, if they aren't?
    Dr. Parker. Well, you need to have oversight. I can just 
give an example. I don't know if this is an example, but what I 
used to do when I was the commander of a high-containment lab. 
This is 20 years ago, and we did not fund international 
research, but we funded domestic research. Most of our research 
was done intramurally, but we had some extramural contracts. 
But we would always have a site visit from one of our own 
biosafety officers, government biosafety officer, to provide a 
detailed inspection and then further onsite visits later on, 
but that is just what I did 20 years ago when I was commander 
at USAMRIID.
    Ms. Malliotakis. And, Doctor, I would like to give you an 
opportunity to also respond.
    Dr. Yassif. Thank you. I mean, I think the main thing I 
will say is I do think we should be conducting more effective 
biosafety and biosecurity pre-funding review to make sure that 
any grantee, domestically or internationally, is in compliance 
with our standards. I think that makes sense.
    Ms. Malliotakis. Should we just not allow foreign grant 
subrecipients? If one entity here in the United States gets a 
grant, is it appropriate for them to then move that money over 
to a facility overseas?
    Dr. Parker. Well, subcontracting is pretty normal in 
Federal acquisitions, whether it be life science research or 
other lines of research. So subcontracting is fairly common and 
often needed to get the right expertise to the right location 
you need to do whatever work may be done. But we need to make 
sure that whatever Federal acquisition regulation requirements 
flow down to the subcontractor and the subcontractor is 
complying with those requirements.
    Ms. Malliotakis. OK. Alright. Thank you very much for your 
time.
    Chairman Comer [presiding]. The Chair now recognizes Mrs. 
Dingell from Michigan for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. Dingell. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you to the 
witnesses for what I believe is excellent testimony and 
balanced, and gives us guidance on how to work together in a 
very bipartisan way or nonpartisan way, a way that protects 
research globally to help people. I am going to build on the 
discussion we are just having that we continually hear, have 
heard over this hearing, but in other places, is the importance 
of enhanced biosafety and biosecurity and what they are to the 
future of pandemic preparedness.
    Now, I do want to say to my colleague, it has never been 
where the original COVID came from. It has not been established 
that it leaked from the Wuhan laboratory. I think everybody's 
got their own theories, but I don't want the facts that aren't 
true to be on the record either, but it is very clear that 
international labs are not meeting the kind of standards that 
they should be meeting. And as our witness said, that there is 
a scientific report out in March that recommends that 
international standards be the same as our standards.
    But it is a fact that bears repeating, we will not be 
prepared to face the next pandemic if we don't start doing the 
work now to fortify our biodefense with meaningful biosafety 
and biosecurity reforms. And to do so effectively, we must take 
a lessons-learned approach to pandemic preparedness and 
prevention. So I would like to urge my colleagues on all sides 
that we must meet the urgency of this moment in the policy 
issues we are attacking. I will give you an example of 
something we should be doing. Attempts to reauthorize critical 
legislation, such as the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness 
Act, in other words known as PAHPA, currently is falling short 
of applying the lessons we have learned from the COVID-19 
pandemic to improve national health security and biodefense 
capabilities.
    On top of that, we are letting the legislation expire at 
the end of September, and I wish Republicans unfortunately, no, 
I don't mean that. That didn't come out right. Republicans have 
control right now, so we got to work together. I didn't mean 
that, Ronny, to come out that way, but we are not making the 
investments needed to actually advance biosafety and 
biosecurity, two causes that we talked about today and I know 
that my colleagues care about. In fact, the current Republican 
PAHPA proposal would reduce funding for state and local public 
health emergency preparedness grants down to pre-pandemic 
levels. That is a $50 million cut from current appropriation 
levels, which would ultimately hamstring the ability of state, 
local, and territorial public health departments to respond to 
public health threats, including biological, chemical, nuclear, 
and radiological events.
    So, Dr. Yassif, let me ask you this. What role do state and 
local public health responses to public health threats, like 
the ones I just mentioned, play in biosafety and biosecurity at 
a national level?
    Dr. Yassif. Thank you. If we are really going to have an 
effective layer defense against pandemic risks to the American 
public and to the global population, we need to both have 
stronger biosafety and biosecurity to prevent those events from 
happening in the first place, but we also have to have 
effective capabilities to detect and respond quickly. And in 
addition to Federal capabilities, state and local public health 
capabilities are critical, and we do have to resource them at 
the level that is necessary, so they can perform their role.
    The COVID pandemic showed that we were woefully 
underprepared and unprepared to respond, and I am hoping that 
we can, as you say, learn the lesson from that and build the 
capacity that we need because when the next pandemic inevitably 
arises, we need to be ready.
    Mrs. Dingell. I am going to submit questions for the 
record, too, but yes or no, would you say we are prepared for 
the next one?
    Dr. Yassif. No.
    Mrs. Dingell. Thank you. Dr. Parker, what policies should 
Congress consider to fortify our biodefense capabilities from 
the local all the way to the Federal level?
    Dr. Parker. I think the more that we can emphasize the need 
to provide the right tools to our local and state colleagues, 
whether that is public health, emergency management, the 
private sector, NGO's, all disasters, including pandemics hit 
multifocal areas around the country at different times and 
different severity, so the more that we can do to encourage and 
have our policies emphasize the support, that will support our 
state and local.
    Just as an example, PAHPA, and I am really glad you brought 
up PAHPA reauthorization. To my view, that is essential, and 
you might see in my testimony of last June, for that hearing 
last June, I did talk about the need for supporting. The tools 
that ASPR needs are really the tools that our state and local 
community needs. The tools you may be thinking about for CDC 
are really the tools that need to be at the state and local 
communities, again, whether that is public health or emergency 
management. So just that philosophy on supporting the local and 
state authorities and citizens is really would be very helpful 
as we think about policies emanating from Washington, DC.
    Mrs. Dingell. Thank you. I have more questions for the 
record. I am assuming you would say we are not prepared now, 
too.
    Dr. Parker. We are not prepared.
    Mrs. Dingell. And I really do want to work with my 
Republican colleagues because I think this is something we 
really can agree on, and if we came out of this Committee with 
just that, it would really be good for our country. Thank you. 
I yield back, Mr. Chair.
    Chairman Comer.[Presiding.] The Chair now recognizes Dr. 
Miller-Meeks from Iowa for 5 minutes.
    Dr. Miller-Meeks. Thank you, Chair Comer. And I also thank 
Chair of this Select Subcommittee, Brad Wenstrup, for holding 
this hearing, and our witnesses for appearing here. I also want 
to say thank you very much for your support for local public 
health and your comments on local public health.
    As the former director of the Iowa Department of Public 
Health, I was one of the very few people in my first year in 
Congress during the pandemic in 2021 that talked about the 
COVID funding that was being put across. Only one-half of 1 
percent of all of that $1.9 trillion went to noncompetitive 
grants to local public health. And as we know, the CDC went 
from the CDC to the CDC&P, the Centers for Disease Control to 
the Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, and more and more 
of the funding has gone into other health entities rather than 
to infectious diseases. And so as this relates to both 
biodefense and our preparation for the next pandemic, I think 
it is important.
    One of the things I have also talked about repetitively and 
why I was pleased that this Select Subcommittee was continued 
into this Congress was one of the rationale in my mind for 
knowing the origins of COVID-19, and continuing to investigate 
that and determine that. And I think it is unlikely now, with 
evidence having been destroyed, we will. But the reason for 
that is, internationally, all communities, all countries have 
vested interest in bio lab safety. We know that there was bio 
lab 4 research being done in a biosafety lab, too, so we have a 
vested interest in putting out those standards for biosafety 
labs. No. 2, disclosure. We have requirements for disclosure. 
They were not followed, and so there is an immediate 
disclosure, 24 hours, if you think that there is a virus or 
bacteria that could lead to a pandemic. So we have a vested 
interest in making sure that that is followed by all countries, 
and our international community needs to be part of that.
    And then three, the ethics of what research is being done, 
whether or not gain-of-function research should be done. We had 
a temporary prohibition on funding that in the United States, 
and then that was waived. But too often I found in medicine 
that the research goes forward, and then after it is unleashed 
and there is a problem, then we start looking at the ethics of 
that. So the ethics of that research should be done 
concurrently and in parallel, in tandem. So thank you very much 
for being here and thank you for your testimony.
    I am going to skip over some of the things that I was going 
to talk about because of the research component of this and 
just going to say Allison Young, author of Pandora's Gamble, 
highlights many lab biosafety failures that have largely gone 
unnoticed, including one in my home state of Iowa. She 
describes the threat to suspend a USDA National Animal Disease 
Center's permit to work with dangerous pathogens in Ames, Iowa. 
And I visited these facilities and they are truly great 
facilities, but it had a failure to abide by regulations that 
are meant to prevent releases from wastewater systems.
    According to information from a FOIA request, the USDA 
National Animal Disease Center had three releases of wastewater 
that were potentially contaminated with select agent pathogens. 
The Select Agent Pathogen Program by mistake released an 
unredacted report of the three lab incidents which occurred on 
June 5, 2019, to April 16, 2020 and May 3, 2020. None of these 
incidents were reported to the Iowa Department of Natural 
Resources, even though the incidents were considered as posing 
a risk to agriculture and public health.
    So, Dr. Parker, the former CDC director, Tom Frieden, 
expressed concerns that the Select Agent Program did not 
complete any unannounced inspections to see how labs truly 
operated. Furthermore, the U.S. doesn't have comprehensive 
regulations, as you both have indicated, on biosafety at 
laboratories experimenting with infectious organisms, to ensure 
a safe operation in the United States. You state in your 
written testimony that you support an independent biorisk 
management Federal authority and claim that such authority 
could consolidate the patchwork of current biosafety and 
biosecurity policies and regulations. I am just going to ask 
you to further clarify that and whether ASPR would be a good 
place for that location, given the CDC's failure in this 
pandemic to take research and then translate that into action 
or policies or messaging.
    Dr. Parker. Sure. Thank you for the question, and I do 
believe that it is time to consider an independent biosafety 
oversight someplace in the Federal Government to consolidate 
the current patchwork of fragmented guidance and policies. And 
I am not saying that each one is a bad policy or hasn't been 
effective, but it is the overall kind of patchwork. It is 
confusing for research institutions about who is their 
oversight authority, and for what pathogen, for what funding 
stream and so forth. So we need some kind of consolidation and 
also to look for how we can get efficiencies, close any gaps, 
and really make it easier for the research institutions because 
it is pretty confusing, and that confusion increases our 
biosecurity risks.
    As far as the organizational home for something like that, 
I am not sure if ASPR is the right home. You know, remember, I 
was a Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary at ASPR. You know, 
actually when the Federal Select Agent Program was first 
established, I think that that decision had a lot of debate, 
and it was understood there is really no good place. At least 
in USDA, it is in APHIS, and APHIS is a regulatory agency, and 
I think that is something to think about is what is the right 
regulatory agency that has that culture. But you have to do it 
in a way that is going to still not stifle scientific 
innovation, and that is the challenge. How do you improve 
efficiencies in our current fragmented system and put it in the 
right regulatory structure without stifling innovation? And 
that is hard.
    Dr. Miller-Meeks. Thank you very much. I am sorry, I went 
over. I yield back.
    Chairman Comer. The Chair now recognizes Ms. Ross from 
North Carolina for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Ross. Thank you very much, and I am pleased that my 
Republican colleagues are heeding our calls to consider 
forward-looking policy solutions with today's hearing, and I am 
also very pleased that there is some consensus about what we 
should be doing going forward.
    In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, Democrats have been 
at the forefront of Congress' work to fortify our Nation's 
biosafety, biosecurity, and biodefense. Last year, 
congressional Democrats passed the Consolidated Appropriations 
Act of 2023, which includes $950 million in funding for the 
Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority. BARDA 
leads our Nation's development of medical countermeasures in 
response to public health emergencies, including chemical, 
biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents and attacks, as 
well as outbreaks of emerging infectious diseases. Dr. Yassif, 
how do comprehensive investments in BARDA safeguard America's 
public health and security?
    Ms. Yassif. Thank you. Comprehensive investments in BARDA 
and other parts of the U.S. Government that are investing in 
medical countermeasure development are critical for protecting 
the American public and our friends and allies overseas. I said 
in my testimony that we are experiencing a 21st century 
biotechnology and bioscience revolution, and it is hard to 
imagine a place where that could be more important and useful 
than in development of vaccines.
    We have seen with the response to COVID. Fortunately, we 
were able to develop a medical countermeasure much faster than 
at least I expected us to be able to, but I think in the 
future, to be prepared for future pandemics and to be prepared 
for the unexpected, we need to be much faster. We need to be 
able to prepare novel medical countermeasures in response to 
novel unanticipated pathogens. For example, we are looking at 
the 100-day mission. We want to go from zero to 60 in 100 days. 
That would make us here in the United States and 
internationally much safer. Those kinds of investments are 
critical.
    Ms. Ross. Wonderful. And BARDA also plays a key role in the 
United States global bio preparedness, as you alluded to, and 
our partnerships, including on international initiatives to 
reduce the risk of pandemic influenza through vaccine 
development, as we discussed, and to advance our arsenal of 
medical countermeasures against Ebola and other known diseases. 
What role does BARDA play in fortifying our leadership on 
pandemic preparedness within the international community? And 
that is for both of you, but Dr. Yassif first.
    Dr. Yassif. Sure. I will be really quick. I think, in 
addition to all the benefits that I just described, I think us 
making investments in our domestic capabilities and talent pool 
ensures that we have a seat at the table internationally as we 
are working with our allies and partners to develop a stronger 
medical countermeasure infrastructure and better capacity 
generally to detect and respond to pandemics.
    Ms. Ross. Dr. Parker, do you have anything to add to that?
    Dr. Parker. Sure. Yes, BARDA is absolutely essential for 
our biodefense pandemic preparedness, and, in fact, the 
Operation Warp Speed and the ability to develop vaccines in 11 
months was predicated on the investments in infectious disease 
research and advanced development from vaccines and 
technologies and also a commitment to regulatory science, and 
so we have to continue that, absolutely. But BARDA also plays 
an international role of actually with a broader ASPR 
organization and the Office of Global Affairs within HHS. There 
has been longstanding international collaboration in pandemic 
preparedness, biodefense, health security, and BARDA is a big 
player in that within the HHS family and in the interagency 
family, and it has got to continue.
    Ms. Ross. Thank you so much. Just as a reminder because the 
last session of Congress seems so long ago, alongside the 
investments in BARDA and increased protection for BioShield, 
Democrats in the Consolidated Appropriations Act also directed 
the Secretary of Health and Human Services to develop 
strategies to prevent, mitigate, and address threats in 
biomedical research, including those stemming from undue 
foreign influence. It strengthened training for personnel 
handling biological agents and toxins, and it bolstered Federal 
reporting requirements for the release, loss, or theft of 
biological agents and toxins. We have much more to do. It 
appears we will be able to do that in a bipartisan way, but it 
is nice to remember that some action has been taken. And thank 
you, Mr. Chair, I yield back.
    Chairman Comer. The gentlelady yields back. The Chair now 
recognizes Mr. Cloud from Texas for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Cloud. Thank you, Chairman. The Federal Government 
isn't hesitant to insert itself into the daily lives of 
Americans, whether it is banning gas stoves, restricting their 
ability to choose their own doctor, pressuring social media 
companies to censor their constitutionally protected speech. 
All have been backed by the full force of law. OSHA can slap a 
small business with thousands of dollars in fines for a 
misplaced extension cord or for failing to have their first aid 
kit approved by a physician. We have seen intelligence agencies 
ban physicians from and medical experts from social media 
companies. The Department of Labor can impose civil and 
criminal penalties on mine operators for such transgressions as 
failing to ensure that miners ride hoist buckets in an orderly 
manner.
    But somehow the government zeal to protect us from the 
smallest threats to our health and safety standards seems to 
stop at the doors of these agencies responsible for preventing 
the hazardous biological research from ongoing, and it is 
terribly wrong and potentially resulting in global catastrophe. 
Agencies like the NIH don't have a problem imposing burdensome 
regulations on everyday Americans, but they fail to monitor the 
high-containment laboratories that could potentially produce 
another pandemic.
    It is a Federal crime to ride a bicycle, believe it or not, 
without a horn on NIH grounds, but funneling NIH money to shady 
foreign labs lacks even the requirements of basic effective 
reporting. So it is clearly not a lack of conviction from their 
own authority or the righteousness in their safety standards 
that the Federal Government has refrained from imposing 
enforceable standards on dangerous biological research. We have 
seen far too often in the past few years the current system is 
designed to allow unelected bureaucrats and self-proclaimed 
experts shield their conduct from accountability and the 
taxpayers who fund them.
    The world has already suffered large-scale consequences of 
one biosecurity failure fueled by government corruption. We 
should be careful to ensure there isn't a second one. We work 
on funding. Our main job here in Congress is funding, and so 
the grant process is tremendously opaque, and you couple that 
with the investigations that happen. And for example, OSHA can 
show up at a workplace any point, anytime and go through, but 
our inspections generally will be scheduled way far in advance. 
The labs cancel them, and so there is not the kind of oversight 
that we would expect to see from that kind of thing. We can 
continue, as Congress, to ask the executive branch to continue 
to put a heavy regulatory burden on it. The other thing that we 
can do, since our job is the purse string, is to be careful on 
how we are spending the money.
    And so I would ask you, what role we should play in the 
funding aspect of it? What restrictions? What ideas you would 
have for us placing restrictions on the government funding 
going out to make sure that it is not being misused? And one 
other thought that has been presented, because this happens 
quite often up here, is that the taxpayers will fund the 
government that creates a problem, and then the solution is 
more money toward that problem. I have real concerns when it 
comes to these international labs getting taxpayer funded money 
when it comes to that, but if you could help us out with what 
kind of restrictions we could be looking at, and also how do we 
provide transparency to the grant writing process?
    Dr. Parker. Well, I think everything that I included in my 
written testimony about, first, just the need to reexamine top 
to bottom our biosafety/biosecurity framework and look for 
efficiencies and then close gaps is absolutely essential and to 
improving our biosafety and biosecurity. And I would point you 
again to a comment I made earlier about one of the NSABB 
recommendations when it came to funding work internationally 
and any international funded research should comply with the 
same standards, laws, guidelines that we have in the United 
States, and that can be done.
    We have to be careful. We talk about restricting funding 
for biomedical research. We are in a global competition for the 
bioeconomy. Now is not the time to restrict funding for 
biomedical research when we are in a global competition, and 
that we need advancements in our healthcare system. And our 
investments in our healthcare system are underpinned by 
advancing technology, so we have to be very careful there.
    Mr. Cloud. To that point, that is kind of one of my major 
concerns that you are touching on is we have U.S. taxpayer 
dollars funding the research in other countries who are 
competing against us for preeminence in this, and why we would 
put that on the American taxpayer is kind of beyond me. It 
seems like that should be extremely limited, what we are doing 
with international. I mean, again, we don't have a smoking gun 
when it comes to the labs, but it is not a stretch to say that 
U.S. taxpayer dollars helped fund the pandemic with what we do 
know. We do know that evidence was destroyed. We don't have the 
smoking gun, but we know that they potentially destroyed the 
smoking gun.
    So why would we put the burden on taxpayer dollars? I am 
not saying cancel all funding. I am saying we should put 
restrictions on the funding that is going out. What should 
those restrictions be? And then when it comes to international, 
I mean, that seems to me to be very limited. Certainly we 
shouldn't be investing in labs that are competing against us.
    Dr. Parker. Well, I think the vast majority of our 
biomedical research dollars go domestically, but international 
collaboration is also important. And that is also how we are 
going to be able to enhance norms and enhance behaviors 
internationally, but how we fund that research is important. I 
agree with you there. Those are the how and the what research 
we fund internationally will be an important thing to consider. 
And I think when we do do international research, especially 
with hazardous pathogens, we have to make sure that the 
oversight complies with the same U.S. standards we have here 
and probably needs onsite inspections and evaluation of that to 
just improve that oversight. I will end with that.
    Mr. Cloud. Thank you.
    Chairman Comer. The gentleman's time has expired. We now 
recognize Dr. Joyce from Pennsylvania for 5 minutes.
    Dr. Joyce. Thank you Chairman Comer and Ranking Member 
Ruiz, and thank you for the witnesses for being with us today. 
We appreciate both your time and your testimony.
    This Select Subcommittee has the responsibility of 
investigating the origins of the coronavirus, and analyzing and 
scrutinizing the failed policies that arose. And further, we 
have been charged with holding those public health officials 
accountable for enforcing those harmful COVID-era policies. 
More important, what the American people want and what the 
American people deserve is to know what this body intends to do 
and how this body intends to safeguard our Nation and protect 
our citizens from the next public health emergency.
    Clearly, the coronavirus pandemic is a direct result of 
failed biosecurity and failed biosafety regulations. In fact, 
this Committee held a hearing in July that examined the 
controversy of proximal origins piece that confused the picture 
by not allowing the necessary information to come forth by 
pointing to a lab leak. Even the ODNI report that was released 
said, ``The Department of Energy and the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation assess that a laboratory associated incident was 
the most likely cause of the first human infection with SARS-
CoV-2.'' Now more than ever, it is crucial that we strengthen 
and we secure our regulatory framework as it relates to both 
biosafety and biosecurity. Only then can we ensure better 
preparedness and execute a more effective response ahead of 
that next public health emergency.
    Dr. Parker, how important is oversight biosafety and 
security in foreign countries? Let's carve out because we have 
been talking about subcontractors. Let's carve out and look at 
those subcontractors where the initial funding comes from here, 
comes from United States. Do you feel that U.S. funds should 
continue to labs that are subcontracted that don't have the 
same safety standards that we have in the United States?
    Dr. Parker. Well, I think, as I said, any of our work with 
infectious diseases internationally ought to be compliant with 
the same guidelines standards that we have in the United 
States.
    Dr. Joyce. Thank you. I think that is an important message 
for all of us to take home. Dr. Parker, your extensive 
background in this area, are you aware that some countries have 
that inherent lack of biosafety and bioethics that are so 
important? Should certain countries be excluded?
    Dr. Parker. I think really the issue, and I think I have 
said it already before, is any country that lacks the 
institutional norms, the ethical foundation, and the commitment 
to making sure that these laboratories can operate safely and 
securely and they are sustained, they have the skilled work 
force, those are all essential, no matter what country.
    Dr. Joyce. Are there any countries that have come to top of 
mind that you think should be excluded that currently might 
function as subcontractors?
    Dr. Parker. Well, I think any country that lacks those 
institutional norms, and that would be up to the funding agency 
to verify that they have the right institutional norms.
    Dr. Joyce. So before that funding comes from an NIH grant, 
which this body approves, those countries should be thoroughly 
evaluated before any subcontractors are used. Is that your 
point?
    Dr. Parker. Yes.
    Dr. Joyce. Thank you. Dr. Yassif, you made an incredibly 
interesting point. In your testimony, you said that the 
question of a lab leak in China allows a big blinking red light 
to be present. A big blinking red light to me means stop. How 
do we stop?
    Dr. Yassif. Thank you for the question. My choice of the 
big blinking red light is a warning light, not a stoplight, and 
I think it is----
    Dr. Joyce. Well, I think then we need that clarification 
because I think most of us as drivers see a big blinking red 
light to mean stop, and we have seen those concerns. I think 
that those concerns from this Select Subcommittee continue to 
exist, and I think in that preparedness, which we are trying to 
formulate how to protect and be prepared for that next public 
health emergency, I actually think you were spot on with that 
assessment. I think a big blinking red light, we have to stop, 
we have to pause, and we have to make sure that the biosecurity 
is in place. It is an important role for our charge to make 
sure that we protect, and each of us representing 750,000 
constituents, each of us take that responsibility, incredibly 
important. I thank both of you for being here today, and, Mr. 
Chairman, I yield.
    Chairman Comer. The gentleman yields back. I will now 
recognize myself for 5 minutes.
    In March 2020, five scientists published Proximal Origin of 
SARS-CoV-2, which effectively shut down the lab leak theory. 
However, the authors relied more on political implication than 
actual science. In uncovered emails, Dr. Rambaut, one of the 
authors of Proximal Origin, stated that their conclusion 
downplaying the lab leak theory would limit the chances of new 
biosafety discussions. Dr. Parker, in your expert opinion, is 
opposition to increased biosafety or biosecurity regulations 
common amongst the scientific community?
    Dr. Parker. I don't think it is common. I think 
virologists, scientists, everybody working in the infectious 
disease research community and including hazardous pathogens, 
they want to do this work safely and securely, those that I 
know in the United States. I don't think they are trying to 
avoid oversight, but in their defense, the oversight system is 
becoming very fragmented, it is confusing.
    Chairman Comer. Are you aware of the Proximal Origin paper?
    Dr. Parker. I am.
    Chairman Comer. Do you think it is problematic that the 
author's conclusion may have been, in part, based on the fact 
that they wanted to avoid more strict biosafety guidelines?
    Dr. Parker. Those emails are black and white, and I will 
let the Committee interpret those emails.
    Chairman Comer. Dr. Yassif, do you agree that constructing 
scientific conclusions to avoid increased biosafety regulations 
is inappropriate?
    Dr. Yassif. Conceptually, hypothetically, yes, such an 
action would be inappropriate, but I am not making a judgment 
about whether that happened in this instance.
    Chairman Comer. The authors were aware that the Wuhan 
Institute of Virology was conducting risky gain-of-function 
research with coronaviruses under questionable biosafety 
conditions, including in BSL-2 laboratories. They were also 
aware that this research could be done without leaving a trace. 
Troublingly, the U.S. Government also knew about these 
concerns. In January 2018, the State Department warned that the 
Wuhan Lab had serious biosafety issues, specifically that there 
were serious shortages of appropriately trained technicians and 
investigators necessary to operate its laboratory. They also 
noted the research of coronavirus is aiming to make them more 
transmissible. So, Dr. Parker, to safely conduct this kind of 
research, is it important to have trained technicians and 
investigators?
    Dr. Parker. It is important to have a skilled work force, 
have high-containment labs that are supported by appropriate 
operations and maintenance, and they have the right biosafety 
officers, they have the right building engineers for any work 
with hazardous pathogens.
    Chairman Comer. I agree. Would you fund a lab that has a 
shortage of properly trained technicians and investigators and 
was operating at a low biosafety level?
    Dr. Parker. No.
    Chairman Comer. Dr. Yassif, what about you? Is it important 
to have properly trained staff while operating a high-
containment laboratory?
    Dr. Yassif. Yes.
    Chairman Comer. Dr. Parker, do you know if the State 
Department told the rest of the government about these 
warnings?
    Dr. Parker. I am sorry. I didn't quite hear.
    Chairman Comer. Do you know if the State Department told 
the rest of the government about these warnings?
    Dr. Parker. I am not aware. The only thing I am aware of is 
what has been in the media.
    Chairman Comer. Do you think that there is a lack of 
coordination between government agencies regarding biosafety 
and biosecurity threats?
    Dr. Parker. I think there is a lack of coordination overall 
in a lot of our pandemic preparedness and biodefense efforts 
just at large, and that is why leadership is so important. And 
that is why actually in my written testimony, I do talk about 
the need for a single focal point somewhere in the Federal 
Government that can be the focal point for biosafety and 
biosecurity.
    Chairman Comer. So it is clear that China has actively 
sought to conceal and suppress information related to COVID-19. 
Dr. Parker, how can we hold foreign laboratories accountable 
and ensure they are complying with international biosafety 
standards?
    Dr. Parker. That is one of the challenges we talked about 
earlier that enforcement is extremely difficult. At the moment, 
our best tool is to recommit to international diplomacy, work 
with our strategic international countries, and begin a dialog 
to make sure that all member-states and the WHO, United Nations 
family are taking on their responsibilities and accountability 
for managing and overseeing this important research. Every 
country has got to assume that responsibility and 
accountability for that.
    Chairman Comer. OK. Thank very much. Dr. Yassif, would you 
like to answer that in my remaining few seconds?
    Dr. Yassif. No, I have nothing to add. Thank you, sir.
    Chairman Comer. Do you all have any other questions? OK. 
The Chair recognizes the Ranking Member.
    Mr. Garcia. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am 
grateful to have a chance to have a substantive discussion 
today about how we can help the American public and certainly 
keep us safe from future pandemics.
    Earlier, the Chairman was able to clarify at the start of 
the hearing that we don't know for sure how the COVID-19 
pandemic started, and I think it is really important to re-
emphasize that point. None of our intelligence agencies have 
been able to make a determination with complete certainty about 
the lab leak theory or the theory that COVID was a natural 
spillover from animals, and so that was good to hear from the 
Chairman earlier. We should be clear about that and stay within 
the boundaries of what the evidence tells us.
    We know this has not always been the case. In the past, on 
this Subcommittee or within the Congress, we have had Members 
in the past publicly stating their beliefs of how the pandemic 
started without actually any conclusive evidence, which I think 
is a huge mistake. Now, Dr. Yassif, can you clarify for us just 
once again, just to end this part of the debate, can any Member 
of Congress say with absolute certainty that they know how the 
pandemic was caused, whether a lab leak versus natural 
transmission, given the available evidence?
    Dr. Yassif. No.
    Mr. Garcia. Thank you. So if any of my colleagues were to 
say that they know for certain without question that COVID 
started as a lab leak or as a bioweapon, that is not consistent 
with the assessment of our intelligence agencies. Is that 
correct?
    Dr. Yassif. Yes.
    Mr. Garcia. And that would be speculation on their part?
    Dr. Yassif. I think that there are different people in the 
community that have looked at this set of evidence and have 
come to different conclusions with varying degrees of 
confidence, and so it is a very challenging topic. And 
different people can look at the same set of evidence and come 
to different conclusions.
    Mr. Garcia. Thank you. So to say that there is just one 
certain known or outcome would be incorrect? I mean, obviously, 
folks----
    Dr. Yassif. That is my view.
    Mr. Garcia. Yes. No, I appreciate that. Thank you. That is 
my view as well, so I want to thank you for clarifying again.
    Now, and this was just also referenced by the Chair, so I 
want to just be clear. I know that in July, we had an entire 
hearing where my colleagues had accused Dr. Fauci, that Dr. 
Fauci persuaded the authors of a key research paper to change 
their conclusions and cover up evidence that the pandemic had 
emerged from a lab. They were obviously very serious 
accusations, and we called several of the paper's authors to 
Washington to answer questions about Dr. Fauci's involvement. 
And both in this room under oath and in the documents and 
written testimony provided to the Committee, the people 
directly involved all told us that the allegation was simply 
incorrect. So I just want to repeat that because hopefully now 
we can put to rest any allegations that we know for certain how 
the pandemic started at this point.
    Just also a quick question for both of our witnesses. Why 
is it important to strengthen biosafety and biosecurity 
standards universally, irrespective of where potential 
pandemic-causing pathogen may emerge?
    Dr. Yassif. I will start. So I think, as I noted in my 
testimony, we are really only as strong as our weakest link. So 
a pandemic that is caused, either through a deliberate 
bioweapons attack or through an accidental release, could 
emerge anywhere in the world, and infectious diseases, no 
matter what their origin, don't respect borders. And as we saw 
with the COVID pandemic, an outbreak can happen in one part of 
the world, if it is not quickly, rapidly contained, can quickly 
spread globally, causing vast human casualties, political 
disruption, and extensive economic damage. And so if we really 
want to prevent those kinds of events in the future, it is 
critical to invest in biosafety and biosecurity as a 
preventative measure, as part of a broader layer defense that 
is complementary to broader biodefense efforts to detect and 
rapidly respond, those are all critical.
    Mr. Gracia. Thank you.
    Dr. Parker. And I agree with my colleague a hundred 
percent. And really, we know enough already that we must take 
action at the animal-human-environmental interface nexus, 
whether that is in nature, whether that is in a laboratory. 
Inaction really is not an option. Thank you.
    Mr. Garcia. Thank you. I just want to add I am also just 
grateful that the Biden Administration has taken important 
steps to prioritize biosafety and biosecurity, promote strong 
biosafety standards, and make sound investments in biorisk 
management, disease surveillance, and safe and responsible 
research. As you both mentioned, there is still a lot of work 
to be done, which you have mentioned throughout this hearing 
today. Both of you also specifically mentioned the need for 
additional funding and investment in these efforts. Democrats 
in Congress and President Biden agree with you.
    Now, earlier this year, the President requested Congress 
appropriate $6.1 billion for the CDC to enhance domestic and 
global disease surveillance, biosafety and biosecurity efforts. 
I know that if we had a Speaker of the House, we could actually 
vote to advance some of that funding, and hopefully we will get 
there soon. Democrats in Congress are ready to get to work, but 
we are, of course, here listening to this important work, not 
able to move forward because the House is still in a 
standstill. So hopefully that will end very shortly, and with 
that Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Chairman Comer. The gentleman yields back. That concludes 
our questions. We will now move to closing statement, if the 
Ranking Member wants to do one. The Ranking Member declines.
    I will have a brief closing statement if that is all right. 
I want to thank the witnesses for being here today.
    The purpose of today's hearing was to examine the 
effectiveness of our current biosecurity and biosafety 
policies, and discuss ways that we can improve them going 
forward. Again, the witness testimony today is very appreciated 
by this Committee. As we move forward, it is vital to properly 
investigate the gaps in oversight that currently exist for 
biosafety and biosecurity standards and draw attention to the 
lack of transparency surrounding lab incidents and safety 
inspections due to inadequate reporting requirements. Through 
this investigation, we will determine what policies currently 
exist, whether those policies are sufficient, how those 
policies are applied internationally and how to move forward.
    The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the need to better 
understand what safeguards are needed to protect ourselves and 
prevent a future pandemic. While the U.S. has one of the 
strongest regulatory oversight mechanisms to enforce 
biosecurity, it only applies to research in this country or 
research funded by U.S. taxpayer money. As we heard today, if 
research is conducted outside the U.S., including in China, 
there is not only limited oversight, but an increased chance 
that lab leaks and accidents could occur. This current posture 
is not only wildly unsafe, but it significantly impairs our 
ability to respond to emerging threats. And as we discussed 
today, we must be able to effectively respond to and assess 
risk so that we can be prepared for a future pandemic, 
including the potential deliberate release of a biological 
weapon.
    As we learned during COVID-19, infectious diseases don't 
recognize borders, and once there is a containment issue, it 
may only be a matter of time before it gets to United States. 
We know that there were sufficient concerns regarding 
biosecurity and biosafety at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, 
but nothing was done, and we know that the American taxpayer 
was likely paying for some of this dangerous research. We 
cannot afford to have another COVID-19 pandemic. We cannot 
allow dangerous research to continue without proper safeguards 
in place because the next time might be worse.
    The Select Subcommittee has been focused on gathering 
evidence in order to conduct fact-based investigations because 
Americans deserve answers, and we have been gathering data, 
recommendations, and information so that we can predict, 
prepare, protect, and prevent a future public health disaster. 
This hearing was an essential step in this process because 
safeguards are lacking. Biosecurity and biosafety standards 
must be strengthened. We have a chance right now to prepare 
better to ensure that high risk laboratories are safe as 
possible, and we need to take advantage of this opportunity. So 
thank you for being here today, and we look forward to 
continuing to work with the witnesses on this issue as this 
Select Subcommittee continues its work.
    With that and without objection, all Members will have 5 
legislative days within which to submit materials and to submit 
additional written questions for the witnesses, which will be 
forwarded to the witnesses for their response.
    Chairman Comer. If there is no further business, without 
objection, the Select Subcommittee stands adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 10:38 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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