[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                   LASERS AND WATER CANNONS: EXPOSING THE 
                    CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY'S HARASSMENT 
                    IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                       SUBCOMMITTEE INDO-PACIFIC

                                 OF THE

                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                           September 28, 2023

                               __________

                           Serial No. 118-52

                               __________

        Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
        
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       Available:  http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://
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                              __________

                                
                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
53-646PDF                   WASHINGTON : 2023                    
          
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------     

                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                   MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey     	GREGORY MEEKS, New Yok, Ranking 
JOE WILSON, South Carolina               	Member
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania	 	BRAD SHERMAN, California
DARRELL ISSA, California		GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
ANN WAGNER, Missouri			WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
BRIAN MAST, Florida			DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
KEN BUCK, Colorado			AMI BERA, California
TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee			JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee		DINA TITUS, Nevada
ANDY BARR, Kentucky			TED LIEU, California
RONNY JACKSON, Texas			SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania
YOUNG KIM, California			DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota
MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida		COLIN ALLRED, Texas
BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan			ANDY KIM, New Jersey
AMATA COLEMAN-RADEWAGEN, American	SARA JACOBS, California
    Samoa				KATHY MANNING, North Carolina
FRENCH HILL, Arkansas			SHEILA CHERFILUS-MCCORMICK, 
WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio			 	Florida	
JIM BAIRD, Indiana			GREG STANTON, Arizona
MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida			MADELEINE DEAN, Pennsylvania
TOM KEAN, JR., New Jersey		JARED MOSKOWITZ, Florida
MIKE LAWLER, New York			JONATHAN JACOBS, Illinois
CORY MILLS, Florida			SYDNEY KAMLAGER-DOVE, California
RICH MCCORMICK, Georgia			JIM COSTA, California
NATHANIEL MORAN, Texas			JASON CROW, Colorado
JOHN JAMES, Michigan			BRAD SCHNEIDER. Illinois
KEITH SELF, Texas      
                    Brendan Shields, Staff Director
                    Sophia Lafargue, Staff Director
                                 ------                                

                      Subcommittee on INDO-PACIFIC

YOUNG KIM, California, Chair		ANDY KIM, New Jersey
ANN WAGNER, Missouri			BRAD SHERMAN, California
KEN BUCK, Colorado			GERALD CONNOLLY, Virginia
MARK GREEN, Tennessee			WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
ANDY BARR, Kentucky			JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas					
AMATA RADAWAGEN, American Samoa
WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio
MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
AMI BERA, California, Ranking 
	 Member
                     Daniel Markus , Staff Director
                            
                            
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

                               WITNESSES

Ford, Lindsey, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for South 
  and Southeast Asia, Department of Defense......................     7
Pak, Dr. Jung, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Multilateral 
  Affairs, Department of State...................................    15
Tiongson, Vice Admiral Andrew, Commander, Pacific Area, U.S. 
  Coast Guard....................................................    20

                                APPENDIX

Hearing Notice...................................................    41
Hearing Minutes..................................................    43
Hearing Attendance...............................................    44

         STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD FROM REPRESENTATIVE CONNOLLY

Statement for the record from Representative Connolly............    45

             ADDITIONAL MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Additional materials submitted for the record....................    47

 
                 LASERS AND WATER CANNONS: EXPOSING THE.
              CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY'S HARASSMENT IN THE.
                            SOUTH CHINA SEA

                      Thursday, September 28, 2023

                          House of Representatives,
                  Subcommittee on the Indo-Pacific,
                      Committee on Foreign Affairs,
                                                    Washington, DC.

    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:02 p.m., in 
room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Young Kim (chair 
of the subcommittee) presiding.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Hello, everyone. Thanks for being 
here. I ask unanimous consent that the following members be 
allowed to sit on the dais and participate in today's hearing: 
Representative James Moylan of Guam. Welcome. Thanks for 
joining us. Without objection, so ordered.
    The subcommittee on the Indo-Pacific of the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee will come to order. The purpose of this 
hearing is to examine the Chinese Communist Party's increasing 
aggression in the South China Sea. I now recognize myself for 
an opening statement.
    Again, welcome to the Indo-Pacific Subcommittee hearing 
entitled Lasers and Water Cannons: Exposing the CCP's 
Harassment in the South China Sea. The South China Sea is an 
area of critical strategic importance for the United States and 
its allies and partners. It is one of the busiest shipping 
lanes in the world with an estimated 5.3 trillion dollars in 
annual trade flowing through its waters.
    The Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, 
China, and Taiwan all have territorial claims. The waters are 
rich with natural resources including seafood and large 
reserves of natural gas and oil. The Chinese Communist Party 
has long maintained illegal claims in the South China Sea, 
spreading propaganda about its notorious nine-dash line which 
is now ten dashes because they added a dash around Taiwan.
    Across the South China Sea, China has illegally dredged 
nearly 3,200 acres of new land, some of which Service military 
outposts that have runways for military aircraft and isolated 
research platforms that can port military-grade vessels. These 
artificial islands allow the CCP's Coast Guard to maintain a 
permanent presence in the exclusive economic zones of our 
allies and partners. Further, illegal and unregulated fishing 
activities destroying the environment and depleting fishing 
stocks.
    I led a bipartisan CODEL with Representatives Andy Barr, 
Jonathan Jackson, Jasmine Crockett last month to Thailand, 
Philippines, and Indonesia so that we can assess the CCP's 
buildup in the South China Sea. Just a week before our trip, 
the CCP's Coast Guard used lasers to temporarily blind 
Philippine sailors and water cannons to stop Philippine Coast 
Guard ships from re-supplying the Sierra Madre, a Philippine's 
ship permanently stationed in the South China Sea to protect 
the Philippine's claims to Spratly Islands. My delegation also 
flew on a mission with the U.S. Navy over the South China Sea 
and we saw as congestion.
    Instead of open water, we saw civilian fishing fleets from 
South Asian countries, patrols from the Philippine Coast Guard, 
and vessels from the People's Liberation Army, Navy, and CCP 
Coast Guard. By far, the largest and the most common vessels in 
the seas all vying for the same water between rifts and islets. 
When flying near the Sierra Madre post, the CCP Navy radioed 
into our aircraft asking who we were and demanding that our 
plane turn around, claiming that we were flying over the 
Chinese territorial waters.
    This was clearly a bullying tactic, intimidation tactic. 
Our partners in the region need our help, and our allies are 
questioning if the U.S. will be there to help if the CCP 
escalates aggression in the South China Sea. We have willing 
partners and allies ready to hold firm against the CCP's 
aggression.
    But they need reassurances about the U.S.' commitment to 
peace and security in the region. Just this month for the first 
time ever, ASEAN countries held joint maritime patrols. The 
U.S. must encourage and support these activities in the South 
China Sea.
    Congress must take the CCP's aggression in the South China 
Sea seriously and ensure that our allied nations are getting 
the assurances from the Administration that they need. This 
starts with ensuring our military supporting these countries' 
maritime domain awareness missions. The U.S. must also 
strengthen its economic relationships with countries in the 
region as the CCP seeks to use its economic influence as a 
means to achieve political goals.
    The Administration's rhetoric about trade in the region has 
been positive but has not been met with deliverables. Finally, 
the Administration must stop sidelining Congress on its 
fruitless engagements with the CCP. A number of senior 
officials have met with the CCP in recent months while the CCP 
continues to double down on militarizing the South China Sea 
and acting aggressively toward the U.S. allies and partners.
    For the U.S. to be taken seriously in the South China Sea, 
discussions with the CCP on this matter must be held from a 
position of strength. So I look forward to hearing the 
witnesses' testimoneys, and I yield the balance of my time. And 
now the chair recognizes the ranking member, the gentleman from 
California, Mr. Bera, for your opening statements.
    Mr. Bera. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. And I want to thank 
the witnesses for being here and appreciate the importance of 
the recent delegation that you led and unfortunately was not 
able to make it. But over the last several years, I've been 
able to visit each of those countries and assure that the 
concern about what we're seeing in the South China Sea and also 
share some of the issues that you raised in terms of what our 
strategy is, how we stand with our allies in the region.
    I want to applaud the Biden Administration actually for 
early engagement, early two-by-two high-level meetings, not 
just in Vietnam, Indonesia, the Philippines, but also within 
all the ASEAN countries. The President's recent visit to the 
G20 followed by a stop in Vietnam and the announcement of what 
really is a historic agreement, the comprehensive strategic 
partnership with Vietnam is exactly what we should be doing. 
And again, I think that's incredibly important.
    When I was in the Philippines just before the pandemic, it 
was a very different environment in terms of what the 
relationship was like with the United States under the prior 
Administration. But I applaud the Biden Administration's 
engagement with the Marcos Administration, Secretary Austin's 
engagement and visits there, and the fact that we are going to 
be back in the Philippines. And with the harassment that the 
chairwoman has outlined in terms of Filipino fishing vessels, 
Coast Guard, et cetera, the reiteration that we do an alliance 
with the Philippines.
    And if there is aggression against Filipino vessels that 
the U.S. will uphold our mutual defense commitments to the 
Philippines in the face of an armed attack by the PRC. I think 
the present was very strong in his announcement. And I think 
our friends an allies in the Philippines understand that this 
an important strategic relationship.
    I also agree with--as much as I wish we had gotten TPP 
across the finish line, yet that's not where we are today. But 
the importance of economic engagement with the countries there, 
you see a lot of U.S. investment and support from the 
Administration in terms of supply chain resiliency, redundancy, 
and the opportunities there. Indonesia is a hugely important 
country. It's one of the largest democracies in the world.
    And I think this is also a place where having visited 
Indonesia, understanding what's happening around the chain of 
islands and so forth is another place where I think we can work 
in a bipartisan manner to support our friends there as well 
support the Administration. Again, I do not think this should 
be a partisan issue. It should be a long-term strategy that we 
execute on because the Chinese are playing a long game.
    So it shouldn't matter whether there's a Democratic or 
Republican Administration or Democratic or Republican majority 
in the House. I think this is an area where I look forward to 
working with the chairwoman and hopefully 1 day being chairman 
again.
    Mrs. Kim of California. I'm not going to let----
    Mr. Bera. But again, I think this is a place where my 
friends and colleagues on the subcommittee but also across the 
full committee, there's great agreement on. And just one or two 
last comments. I'm really happy that the Coast Guard is here.
    And I think the Coast Guard will be critical in helping 
work with and buildup the infrastructure. When I was in 
Vietnam, we had those conversations certainly in the 
Philippines because the Coast Guard mission is not a military 
mission. But it's a law enforcement mission.
    And in that capacity as a law enforcement mission, it is 
about protecting the territorial integrity, the territorial 
sovereignty, the exclusive economic zones. The Chinese operate 
in the gray zones. And working to help build that Coast Guard 
capacity, having our Coast Guard make additional rotations 
through there, and then helping the countries in that region 
buildup their own ability and providing maritime domain 
awareness, et cetera.
    I think those are all incredibly important strategies. And 
I see the Biden Administration executing them. I certainly 
think Congress should be very supportive in providing assets 
and others as necessary.
    And again, I know in the comprehensive strategic 
partnership with Vietnam, hopefully some of those will be 
forthcoming. So again, thank you for holding this incredibly 
important topic. Appreciate the prior hearing on the Indian 
Ocean region which is also an area that we do not pay enough 
attention to and we ought to pay attention to so we do not find 
ourselves 4 years from now having these same issues there. So 
with that, I'll yield back. And again, thank you.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you, Ranking Member. Other 
members of the committee are reminded that opening statements 
may be submitted for the record. We are pleased to have a 
distinguished panel of witnesses before us today on this very 
important topic. Let me introduce our witnesses.
    First, Ms. Lindsey Ford is the Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of Defense for South and Southeast Asia at the Department of 
Defense. Thank you for joining us. Dr. Jung Pak is the Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for Multilateral Affairs at the Department 
of State. Thank you for being with us. Vice Admiral Andrew 
Tiongson is the Commander, Pacific area of the U.S. Coast 
Guard. Thank you for being with us.
    Thank you for being here, and your full statements will be 
made part of the record. And I'll ask each of your to keep your 
spoken remarks to 5 minutes in order to allow time for member 
questions. So let me now recognize our first witness, Ms. Ford, 
for your opening statement.

   STATEMENT OF LINDSEY FORD, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF 
  DEFENSE FOR SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST ASIA, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

    Ms. Ford. Well, Chairwoman Kim, Ranker Member Bera, and 
distinguished members of the committee, thank you very much for 
the opportunity to come today and discuss how the Department of 
Defense is working with allies and partners to strengthen our 
common vision for peace and stability in the South China Sea. 
And I should say at the top, thank you all as well for the time 
that you have taken to go visit the region, to understand the 
challenges that our allies and partners are facing there. I 
will say in my engagements with them, I consistently hear that 
they not only want to see members of the executive branch.
    But knowing that they also have support from the 
legislative branch in the United States makes a huge 
difference. So thank you. You have heard from leaders across 
the Department of Defense that our network of allies and 
partners is one of America's greatest strategic advantages and 
the center of gravity for the Department's 2022 National 
Defense Strategy.
    As the NDS clearly States, close collaboration with our 
allies and partners is foundational to sustaining and 
strengthening deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region including 
in the South China Sea. We cannot confront complex and 
interconnected challenges alone, and the South China Sea is not 
exception. Over the last decade as you mentioned, the People's 
Republic of China has increased the scope, the scale, and the 
pace of its approach to assert control over the entirety of the 
South China Sea.
    They've constructed multiple military outposts on occupied 
and reclaimed features in the Spratly Islands and steadily 
equipped these outposts with an increasing array of advanced 
military capabilities. The PLA has sharply increased coercive 
and risky operational behavior in the air and at sea, 
threatening lawfully operating American, allied, and partner 
forces. This includes sinking Vietnamese fishing vessels using 
military aircraft to harass Malaysian offshore energy 
exploration, flying within 20 feet of U.S. military aircraft, 
and deploying water cannons and military grade lasers to block 
and target Philippine resupply boats headed toward Second 
Thomas Shoal.
    Despite these attempts to assert further control of the 
South China Sea, there is another better vision, one that is 
shared by both the United States and the region. And over the 
past year, we've seen an unprecedented number of States enhance 
efforts to support rule of law in the South China Sea which is 
a very encouraging development. As you saw earlier, this week, 
the Philippine Coast Guard took a bold step in defending their 
own sovereignty by removing a floating barrier installed by the 
PRC Coast Guard near Scarborough Shoal.
    And in the face of PRC threats and intimidation, we've seen 
Indonesian, Malaysia, and Vietnam continue to expand their 
offshore energy exploration efforts and challenge PRC 
encroachment. We've seen partners across Southeast Asia and 
beyond the region come together to condemn PRC behavior in the 
South China Sea, including in August Australia, Japan, Canada, 
the United Kingdom, and the EU all protested to the aggressive 
PRC maneuvers that we saw against the Philippine at Second 
Thomas Shoal. In the recent Camp David summit that President 
Biden convened with Japan and South Korea, all three nations 
strongly condemned the PRC's aggressive behavior in the South 
China Sea.
    And just days ago, members of the G7 opposed the PRC's 
militarization of the South China Sea and called on them to 
uphold the principles of the law of the sea. While our allies 
and partners have taken great steps to stand up for our shared 
vision, DOD is also taking an increasingly proactive approach 
to counter PRC coercion. A key element of this approach is 
building asymmetric advantages for our allies and partners.
    Since 2016, the Department has allocated over 475 million 
dollars in capabilities that enables Southeast Asian partners 
to sense, share, and contribute to regional maritime security. 
And we are laser focused on identifying new and cost effective 
emerging technologies that will bring greater capability to our 
allies and partners more quickly. Beyond the investments we're 
making in ally and partner capabilities, we have enhanced the 
complexity of our military operations in and around the South 
China Sea to ensure deterrence is strong.
    Earlier this year, the Nimitz Carrier Strike Group and the 
USS Ronald Reagan conducted multi-carrier, multi-domain 
operations in the South China Sea. And in June, Canada, France, 
and Japan all joined us for a large multi-national exercise in 
the South China Sea. Just this past month, we are very proud to 
have conducted our first joint bilateral sail since 2016 with 
the Philippines, an important step in our alliance.
    We've expanded the scope, the scale of our annual exercises 
with partners, including Garuda Shield which is one of the 
largest multi-national exercises in the region and Exercise 
Balikatan with the Philippines which this year for the first 
time included high end coastal defense, cyber defense elements, 
again, showing how we are strengthening and modernizing our 
relationship. We are diversifying U.S. force posture to remain 
prepared for any crisis or contingency. That includes regular 
rotational deployments of U.S. P-8s and littoral combat ships 
with Singapore and in the Philippines recently agreeing to four 
new enhanced defense cooperationsites that U.S. forces will 
have access to.
    Finally, we are making a concerted effort to support to 
support multi-and mini-lateral coalitions of allies and 
partners, supporting network security architecture of like-
minded nations. In May, India and Singapore hosted their 
inaugural India-ASEAN maritime----
    Mrs. Kim of California. Ms. Ford, can you wrap up, please?
    Ms. Ford. Yes, maritime exercise in the South China Sea and 
Australia and the Philippines also conducted their first 
exercise in the South China Sea as well. So let me thank you 
very much, say we remain clear eyed about the challenges that 
we face, and we look forward to working with you on this 
problem.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Ford follows:]

    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you, Ms. Ford. I now 
recognize Dr. Pak for your opening 5 minute statement.

   STATEMENT OF DR. JUNG PAK, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR 
           MULTILATERAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

    Dr. Pak. Chair Kim, Ranking Member Bera, and distinguished 
members of the subcommittee, thank you for the honor and the 
privilege of speaking with you today on the South China Sea. We 
have seen a clear and upward trend of PRC provocations in the 
South China Sea, including efforts to exercise its expansive 
and unlawful maritime claims. The PRC routinely harasses 
vessels lawfully operating in their respective EEZs and on 
their continental shelves. Further, the PRC uses intimidation, 
harassment, and unprofessional maneuvers at sea in areas where 
it has failed to put forth lawful maritime claims.
    For example, PRC aircraft have increasingly engaged in 
unsafe intercepts of U.S. and other military aircraft in 
international airspace over the South China Sea. The PRC 
likewise has interfered with our ally the Philippines' exercise 
of high seas freedoms in conducting routine resupply missions 
of the Philippine marines stationed aboard the BRP Sierra Madre 
at Second Thomas Shoal, a low tide elevation located on the 
Philippines' continental shelf, and well within it's exclusive 
economic zone. The world witnessed the PRC's dangerous and 
provocative conduct on August 5 when the China Coast Guard used 
water cannons and--along with PRC maritime militia vessels--
employed unsafe blocking maneuvers against Philippine vessels.
    We saw similar behavior during later resupply missions on 
August 22 and September 8 and again most recently when the PRC 
reportedly installed a barrier to prevent Philippines fishing 
vessels from entering Scarborough Reef. We have made clear that 
we stand with our Philippine allies and have reaffirmed that an 
armed attack on the Philippines public vessel, aircraft, and 
armed forces--including those of its Coast Guard in the South 
China Sea--would invoke the U.S. mutual defense commitment 
sunder Article IV of the 1951 U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense 
Treaty. We have seen similarly dangerous PRC conduct against a 
Vietnamese fishing board on August 28 that resulted in injuries 
to Vietnamese fishermen.
    And open and accessible South China Sea is vital not only 
to global peace and stability, but also to the global economy. 
Nearly one third of global trade runs through the South China 
Sea, worth about three trillion U.S. dollars. We therefore have 
a strategic interest in upholding the rights of all countries 
to exercise freedom of navigation and overflight.
    Indeed, all nations have a vital interest in preserving the 
international law of the sea from maritime claims that do not 
comply with international law. In keeping with our longstanding 
policy on this vitally important waterway, we take a strong and 
principled position that all States, including those with 
competing claims to parts of the South China Sea, should 
comport their maritime claims with international law, as 
reflected in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. The 
Administration's approach to protecting this critical maritime 
domain falls into three key lines of effort: one, diplomatic 
outreach to promote respect for international law and the 
rules-based order, emphasizing the need for peaceful settlement 
of disputes; two, maritime capacity building programs for the 
region's maritime law enforcement agencies and militaries; and 
three, finally, our own operations, including Freedom of 
Navigation Operations and routine presence operations, to 
demonstrate that all countries have the right to fly, sail, and 
operate anywhere that international law allows.
    First, on diplomacy, we have consistently prioritized 
multilateral engagement through ASEAN and other dialog 
mechanisms. And we have called on our ASEAN and other like-
minded partners to call out the PRC's egregious behavior. 
Second, on capacity building, the U.S. Government has provided 
over 1.6 billion dollars in military and law enforcement 
assistance to Southeast Asian countries over the past 5 years, 
with a focus on building maritime capabilities and enhancing 
maritime domain awareness.
    Through the Quad-supported Indo-Pacific Partnership for 
Maritime Domain Awareness, we are also enabling Southeast Asian 
nations to monitor their maritime areas and international sea 
lanes via low-Earth-orbit satellites that identify ships by 
their radio traffic and automated tracking systems. Last, we 
maintain a longstanding program to uphold freedom of the seas 
for all nations under international law. The United States 
conducts regular FONOPs in the South China Sea to demonstrate 
our commitment to these rights and our firm opposition to the 
PRC's and other claimants' unlawful maritime claims.
    In summary, maintaining peace and stability, and freedom of 
navigation and overflight in the South China Sea, is part of 
our larger vision for a free and open Pacific. We will continue 
to work with you and we will continue to work with our allies 
and partners on this critical issues. Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Pak follows:]

    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you, Dr. Pak. I now recognize 
Vice Admiral Tiongson for your opening statement. Thank you.

 STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL ANDREW TIONGSON, COMMANDER, PACIFIC 
                     AREA, U.S. COAST GUARD

    Vice Admiral Tiongson. Good afternoon, Chairwoman Kim, 
Ranking Member Bera, and distinguished members of the 
subcommittee. I am honored to appear before you today to 
discuss how the United States Coast Guard words, to be a 
trusted partner throughout the Indo-Pacific. Chairwoman and 
members of the subcommittee, every day the Coast Guard, a key 
component of the Department of Homeland Security, provides a 
distinct value proposition, maritime governance.
    We protect, defense, and save those who live and work on 
the sea. We protect the sea itself, and we support the rule of 
law. At all times, a branch of the Armed Forces, a law 
enforcement agency, the Coast Guard protects, defends, and 
regulates more than 100,000 miles of U.S. coastline and inland 
waterways and 4.5 million square miles of exclusive economic 
zone.
    Our white ships with orange racing stripes demonstrate 
maritime governance wherever we sail. The Coast Guard's 
specific area encompasses 74 million square miles of ocean, 
more than half of the world's population in 77 countries. 
Throughout the region, the Coast Guard serves as a vital link 
between our Nation's diplomatic and military options with 
unique expertise and authorities to support partner objectives.
    The Indo-Pacific is experiencing increasing challenges 
across the maritime domain. Malign actors exploit gaps and 
seams in maritime governance that generate destabilizing 
effects. For example, illegal, unreported, and unregulated 
fishing threatens global fish stocks, an existential issue for 
some Pacific Island nations as well as the world's protein 
security.
    Impacts to the global marine transportation system pose 
risk to trillions of dollars and economic activity. Also, the 
increasing frequency and magnitude of natural disasters 
combined with sea level rise endangers fragile economies and 
ecosystems. Chairwoman, I understand you recently returned from 
a trip to the Indo-Pacific region where you learned how 
maligned actors exert influence, leveraging approaches to shift 
conditions to their advantage.
    Aggressive fishing practices and natural resource 
exploitation undermine territorial sovereignty and economic 
prosperity of Indo-Pacific countries. As a counter to these 
malign activities, the United States Coast Guard has been and 
is now operating and engaging throughout the region to promote 
maritime governance. We are trusted to support partners as they 
deter, disrupt, and defeat threats and challenges.
    In doing so, together we strengthen the rules-based 
international order. A robust network of partnerships is the 
cornerstone of a free, open, connected, prosperous, secure, and 
resilient maritime domain. Together we bolster maritime 
governance through combined operations, sharing of best 
practices, and leveraging collective expertise.
    The key aspect of our approach in the region is to always 
meet partners where they are with what they need, always seeing 
threats and challenges through their eyes. These engagements 
may look like a small team deploying in support of a major oil 
spill or embedding members with partners in Asia to improve 
maritime demand awareness or even conducting operations with a 
partner in Asia's maritime forces. In coordination with the 
U.S. interagency, the Coast Guard has deployed maritime law 
enforcement training teams and National Security Cutters to 
support partners, building regional interoperability in 
cooperation to uphold maritime governance.
    So the Coast Guard is well positioned to continue to work 
in the region, to promote maritime governance, to contribute to 
efforts so that a rules-based international order is upheld 
throughout the Indo-Pacific. Thank you for the opportunity to 
testify before you today and for Congress' continued support 
for the Coast Guard. I look forward to answering your 
questions.
    [The prepared statement of Vice Admiral Tiongson follows:]

    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you, all of our witnesses. 
Now we'll go into the Q&A session from the members. And let me 
recognize myself first for 5 minutes.
    The CCP continues to ignore the 2016 permanent court of 
arbitration ruling that its nine-dash line has no legal basis 
and these artificial islands do not create its own exclusive 
economic zones, yet they continue to deploy the vessels to 
patrol the sea, intimidate our allies and partners. Dr. Pak, 
right? Will the CCP ever resolve their disputes in the South 
China Sea through a rule of law approach which I think we know 
what the answer may be? But will they always resort to might 
makes right?
    Dr. Pak. Thank you, Chair Kim. And that's exactly what 
we're trying to push back against and to make sure that our 
allies and partners are 100 percent resilient to those 
challenges. We continue to say out loud and to all who will 
hear and to grow that chorus of condemnation against the PRC's 
unlawful and expansive maritime claims that have no basis in 
international law.
    And so we will continue to support our allies and partners. 
I will leave it up to the PRC to speak for themselves. But I 
think what our assessment is that the PRC sees this as a long 
game, and they're using a variety of tactics across multiple 
domains.
    And that includes economic. It includes security. It 
includes just outright harassment and coercion through might. 
And we're looking to tackle those issues in a multidimensional 
way.
    Mrs. Kim of California. So considering the CCP isn't 
abiding by the 2016 ruling or Xi Jinping's 2015 commitment to 
President Obama not to militarize the South China Sea, what 
prospects does that raise for peaceful, orderly resolution of 
the disputed claims?
    Dr. Pak. Thank you. One of the things that we're working 
with our allies and partners on is globalizing the South China 
Sea issue. As you have mentioned here today and in other venues 
that so much of the global economy runs through the South China 
Sea, and it's a vital economic throughway.
    And so this is not just about China. This is not just about 
the countries in the region. It's vital for Europe. It's vital 
for us, the United States and Indo-Pacific nation. And it's 
vital for all that are dependent on their economic--the economy 
that runs through this.
    So one, we're looking to globalize. And so we were very 
happy to have ginned up support among 11 countries across the 
globe that rejected and condemned the PRC's unlawful 
reclamation activities. And so we're trying to globalize and 
making sure that we have a common understanding of the threats.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Got it. Thank you. As was 
mentioned, the U.S. and Philippines has our mutual defense 
treaty. And we are pursuing more cooperation through the 
multilateral or additional sites under the enhanced defense 
cooperation arrangement. So I want to ask you, Ms. Ford, is the 
U.S. prepared to back up its mutual defense treaty with 
military force? And what message would it send to other 
questions in the region if the U.S. does not respond forcefully 
enough to an event that triggers that treaty?
    Ms. Ford. Thank you so much. I think the credibility of our 
alliances is the bedrock part of U.S. security in the Indo-
Pacific region and globally. And that's one reason that the 
Department has been incredibly clear that when it comes to our 
treaty commitments to the Philippines, we believe an armed 
attacks against Philippine armed forces, public vessels, 
aircraft apply to the South China Sea. That includes the 
Philippine Coast Guard. And we have said repeatedly and will 
continue to say that we stand by those commitments absolutely.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you. Our delegation also 
visited the Subic Bay. And I just wanted to ask you, what 
lessons did we learn from Subic Bay to ensure that we do not 
lose the critical infrastructure to the CCP and that region? 
Would you be able to answer that?
    Ms. Ford. I'd be happy to chime in here. I actually had the 
opportunity to visit Subic earlier this year. I think we're 
very pleased to see that an American company is now helping 
with the Administration of the Hanjin shipyard.
    I walked that shipyard. It's one of the largest shipyards 
in the world. It is critical strategic infrastructure. And the 
fact that U.S. companies are cooperating and helping to build 
jobs and make sure that strategic area stays in friendly hands 
I think is incredibly important.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you very, very much. At the 
time we visited, we weren't allowed to name the company name. 
But I guess it's becoming very clear that it is becoming final, 
Hanjin.
    Ms. Ford. The Hanjin shipyard is currently being 
administered by an American company.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Great, thank you. All right. Let me 
now recognize Ranking Member Bera for 5 minutes of questioning.
    Mr. Bera. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I'm going to yield 5 
minutes to Representative Jackson who I know accompanied you on 
the CODEL. And unfortunately, it has a time commitment. So I'd 
love to yield him that time.
    Mr. Jackson. Thank you. Very kind of you, Congressman Bera. 
Congresswomen Kim, Congressman Bera, thank you for inviting me 
on the trip. It was fascinating to see the front lines of 
what's going on there. Specifically, I want to talk about the 
looming, impending shutdown opportunities or challenges that 
we're going to face. First, to the vice admiral, could you 
please share with us what was the effect of the 2019 shutdown 
on the 35-day shutdown in the military in 2019?
    Vice Admiral Tiongson. In 2019, the United States Coast 
Guard was not funded. It was the first time ever that one of 
the armed services was not funded as a result of a lapse in 
appropriation. What we saw is that you had people--Coast Guard 
people that were deployed in different parts of the world, 
maybe side by side with their DOD counterparts who were getting 
paid but they were not getting paid. And devastating effects 
back home to families as well as future recruiting and 
retention still loom.
    Mr. Jackson. Thank you very much. To our Deputy Secretary 
Pak, the question I would have is what's the impact of the 
diplomatic initiatives that will be impacted by a shutdown?
    Dr. Pak. Thank you for that question, Representative 
Jackson. It would have a huge impact on how we do business in 
Southeast Asia. As many of you know from visiting the region, 
showing up matters.
    And I want to foot stomp what DASD Ford said about your 
engagement in the region. And we also in the State Department 
hear great things about the level of engagement that they have 
from Congress and that it's in a bipartisan way. So they see 
it, our partners and like-minded see it and they send us kudos 
for it.
    So I wanted to really foot stomp what DASD Ford had said 
about your engagement. I'll note that 91 representatives or 
Members of Congress visited the region in the past year alone. 
And I know that we've seen each other in various ASEAN 
committee Washington events together. So showing up matters, 
and a government shutdown would affect that showing up those 
personal relationships, especially in matters like the South 
China Sea which are pretty sensitive conversations.
    Mr. Jackson. Will this give a greater opening or 
opportunity for the Chinese government to strengthen its 
relations?
    Dr. Pak. I would argue that it would fuel the PRC's false 
narrative that we are not committed, that we are inward 
looking, that this engagement with the Southeast Asian 
countries are just a blip, and that ultimately our default 
position is looking inward and looking at domestic issues. So I 
think that would fuel that false narrative and feed Chinese 
disinformation on U.S. commitment to the region.
    Mr. Jackson. Thank you very much. Deputy Secretary Ford, I 
cannot call you assistant and all that. You're what I've got to 
work with, and I'm honored to be here. How will this deal with 
our readiness, the looming shutdown, and preparedness in the 
region?
    Ms. Ford. Thanks very much. I think the impact of a 
shutdown would be significant for the Department of Defense. 
For one thing, there is a tremendous amount of momentum 
underway that I've already spoken about regarding to what we 
are doing to strengthen deterrence with our allies and 
partners.
    So certainly from a budgetary perspective and how we 
implement our strategy, there's an enormous impact. We're 
seeking 40 percent increase in Pacific deterrence initiative 
funding. If we have a shutdown, if we have a CR, we cannot 
actually have that funding to implement that strategy.
    For U.S. forces, for civilians, the work that we undertake 
in the Department of Defense on a daily basis to oversee the 
planning of our exercises and everything else, we will not be 
able to implement anymore. And you will have personnel across 
the Department of Defense who do not know when they're getting 
their next paycheck. They're focused on that rather than 
focusing on all the things that we ought to be doing to 
maintain deterrence on a daily basis.
    Mr. Jackson. I thank you all for your Service. Thank you, 
Chairwoman Kim, for inviting me and letting me have this 
opportunity. Thank you again, Congressman Bera and Mr. Barr. I 
yield back my time.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you, Rep. Jackson. It was 
really good to have you. I'll now recognize Representative Barr 
for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Barr. Thank you, Chair Kim and thank you for your 
leadership and leading us on the CODEL. It was great to be with 
Congressman Jackson and Congresswoman Crockett. And I do think, 
Dr. Pak, to your point and hopefully our State Department 
diplomats who are deployed over there saw the bipartisan unity 
that we expressed to our partners and allies and counterparts 
over there.
    Let me start with Admiral Tiongson because we met when we 
were in Manila with our Filipino Coast Guard leaders there. And 
it was apparent in our conversation with the Filipino Coast 
Guard that they do not currently have enough assets to 
adequately confront the well funded Chinese Coast Guard and 
grey-zone operations. And they asked for help, and they 
specifically asked for more assets and ships.
    How is the United States Coast Guard working with the 
Filipinos to expand the capabilities of their Coast Guard? Do 
we have enough assets, Cutters and whatnot, that could be 
deployed to the South China Sea to assist in those law 
enforcement operations?
    Vice Admiral Tiongson. We have a very strong relationship 
as you observed with the Philippine Coast Guard. In fact, the 
Philippine Coast Guard, we have our largest security sector 
assistance program with them. In fact, when you talk assets, we 
through the interagency partnerships built an entire training 
center to help them with operations as well as maintenance of 
the vessels that they do have that they are in a ribbon 
cutting. It was just in the last couple of weeks for that.
    We have helped them grow their Coast Guard from 5,000 to 
their goal of about 35,000. They're still working on that, but 
they're well into that right now. And we have assigned a 
maritime advisor to them to help along that growth projection. 
In addition to that, we do work with them with our ships. In 
fact, just recently, we had our first trilateral underway 
exercise between Japan Coast Guard, Philippine Coast Guard, and 
U.S. Coast Guard.
    Mr. Barr. No, you all are doing a great job. To Deputy 
Assistant Secretary Pak, you did note in your testimony about 
how we are doing. And one of the main objectives is maritime 
capacity building programs for the region's maritime law 
enforcement agencies and military. But the Filipino Coast Guard 
is specifically asking for more ships. Is that included in your 
plans as assistance to the Filipino Coast Guard, Navy and Coast 
Guard?
    Dr. Pak. And thank you----
    Mr. Barr. They cannot confront the PLN with what they've 
got is what they're telling us.
    Dr. Pak. Right. The admiral has mentioned the Japan 
relationship. And that's part of our efforts to knit together 
groupings of like-minded countries together. And so I just 
hosted in July a maritime dialog with the Philippines, and they 
brought a sizable contingent to talk about these and other 
issues. And part of the State Department's goals there is to 
make sure that we're consulting frequently and in depth to talk 
about exactly what the Philippines need, Coast Guard 
capabilities, and otherwise----
    Mr. Barr. That's great. And I'm running out of time. So my 
last two questions are to Deputy Assistant Secretary Ford. The 
Sierra Madre is falling apart. It's not a permanent solution to 
the Second Thomas Shoal issue.
    As Chair Kim pointed out, we flew over and PA over the 
Chinese Coast Guard vessel there that's right off of the shore. 
They clearly want to--they want to militarize that just like 
they've done with Fiery Reef and Mischief Reef and all these 
others. What is the long-term plan to help the Filipinos defend 
their exclusive economic zone beyond a temporary Sierra Madre 
situation there?
    And then last question, the EDCA sites in the Philippines, 
this is a big, important development. What are we going to do 
at those EDCA sites? What does INDOPACOM want?
    And why not make--and I know we met with Ambassador 
Carlson, I know there's some internal diplomatic changes. But 
why not make Subic an EDCA site? And can we not work with the 
Filipino government to reestablish a U.S. naval presence beyond 
just the ship building activity? There, it's Subic.
    Ms. Ford. Thanks very much, Representative. We are in 
regular conversations with our Philippine allies about how we 
help them modernize their capabilities. And so we're doing a 
number of things.
    We are in the process of negotiating a multi-year security 
sector assistance road map that will enable us to bring more 
maritime capability more quickly to them. We have committed to 
negotiate just only by the end of this year that will enhance 
our information and intelligence sharing that enables them to 
have a better understanding of what's going on. And we recently 
concluded defense guidelines that talk about how we will 
actually enhance our operational planning to enable them to be 
more effective in what they do on the water and in the air in 
the South China Sea.
    When it comes to EDCA, we are really thrilled how EDCA is 
moving forward. The Department has already allocated over 100 
million dollars for infrastructure investments that you'll 
continue to see over the next few years coming online. In 
response to your question about Subic, what I would say is 
anything that is designated that is designated as an EDCA site 
is done in partnership and in coordination with the Philippines 
and only when the Philippines is looking for that EDCA 
designation. Thank you.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you. I now recognize--your 
time is up. Sorry.
    Mr. Barr. Yes, I know.
    Mrs. Kim of California. I'm going to recognize Ranking 
Member Bera for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Bera. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. DAS Ford, in your 
opening comments, you referenced UNCLOS, the Law of the Sea, 
which on our side of Congress, we do not get a chance to ratify 
it. But obviously, it has not been ratified by the Senate. And 
the PRC uses that sometimes against us when we try to say, 
there's a ruling. From your perspective, how important is it 
that we--I've talked to other colleagues like Congressman 
Courtney and others that we really ought to make a push to 
ratify that and it would strengthen our hands in upholding the 
rule of law particularly in the South China Sea?
    Ms. Ford. Thanks very much. And I'm sure the admiral has 
thoughts here as well. I would say it's incredibly important. 
You will hear no one speak more loudly than the Department of 
Defense and the U.S. Navy about how much upholding UNCLOS 
matters and that we think ratification is important.
    The reality is the U.S. Navy continues to operate in 
accordance with UNCLOS everywhere we go. But operationally 
maintaining the freedoms that we are allowed under UNCLOS is 
incredibly important. It is only one leg of the stool, though. 
And seeing that legal recognition as well, we think it matters 
a lot.
    Mr. Bera. So we already held ourselves to that standard. So 
if my colleagues over on the other side of Congress are 
watching, I would hope the Senate would take that up and it 
would be important. Vice Admiral, if you want to add anything 
to that.
    But I'd also--Congressman Barr touched on--as I've traveled 
around the region, obviously Vietnam, Philippines, others would 
love additional Coast Guard assets. Mexico would love 
additional help as well. Knowing we've got limitations, knowing 
that we have transferred some assets there, and knowing that 
we're doing some joint training and maritime domain awareness, 
and that the Coast Guard will really be vitally important in 
protecting territorial sovereignty and the maritime governance 
mission in that region. What are some things that we should be 
thinking about from the congressional side?
    Vice Admiral Tiongson. Just to add to that piece, I 
mentioned earlier our value proposition is maritime governance. 
And exactly as DASD Ford was saying, we live by the rule of law 
all the time. We agreed to the internationally accepted norms 
and standards.
    We follow professional maritime behaviors everywhere we go 
without a doubt. That is part of maritime governance. To your 
points about--I'm going to say excess defense articles in many 
ways.
    So as you were tracking, I believe, in Vietnam, we've 
provided two high endurance Cutters or 378-foot ships. There's 
a third one that could be there through help with the 
interagency partners. We've provided 25 response boats also to 
the Vietnam Coast Guard, and we have a maritime advisor there 
as well.
    So we have a footprint in the Philippines I described 
earlier as well as in Vietnam. The key for us is right now we 
are episodic in our presence. What we need to be is a little 
bit more persistent in our presence.
    We thank the Administration and Congress for this Indo-
Pacific support Cutter that I hope to receive here very soon in 
the winter timeframe and then get it operational in the early 
spring, probably in the Oceania region first. A second one of 
those would do great wonders in different parts of the Indo-
Pacific as well as on our unfunded priorities list that has 
been forwarded up to Congress. We have four fast response 
Cutters that allow us to provide more presence in the Indo-
Pacific.
    Mr. Bera. DAS Pak or Vice Admiral, you also talk about 
stretching our resources by working with our partners and 
allies, whether that's Australia, New Zealand, Japan. Others, 
could you just, in the brief time I have left, touch on the 
importance and what our strategy is in terms of kind of that 
coalition building?
    Dr. Pak. Sure, we work through ASEAN as you know to make 
sure that ASEAN itself as an organization also calls out PRC's 
activities in the South China Sea. You'll note in the U.S.-
ASEAN summit statement in which the Vice President 
participated, there was a strong statement about the South 
China Sea. We also work through AUKUS.
    We work through dialogs with the EU. We work through the 
Japan-Philippines-U.S. relationship. In the Camp David--the 
unprecedented Camp David summit with Korea and Japan, South 
China Sea was a key part of that and the three countries, 
prioritization of Southeast Asia and to make that part of the 
world more resilient. And so there are a variety of groupings 
and ways and dialog mechanism. And that's not to mention the 
bilateral mechanisms as well.
    Mr. Bera. I'll yield back.
    Mrs. Kim of California. The gentleman's time is up. Now I 
recognize Representative Sherman for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Sherman. Thank you. I think the meetings with high 
Chinese officials make a lot of sense. Ronald Reagan who's 
memory and Administration was commemorated yesterday at the 
Republican debate of course met with Kruschev--Gorbachev rather 
at a time when the Soviet Union had many thousands of nuclear 
weapons aimed at the United States far more than China has.
    We are not approaching this from a position of strength. 
The trade deficit is enormous. Every dollar we ship to China 
empowers then and weakens us. In addition, we provide a capital 
gains allowance, an incentive at the cost of the U.S. Treasury 
for those who invest in Chinese stocks.
    The purpose of the capital gains allowance is to encourage 
investment to build an economy. You can argue that it's a good 
investment in the American economy when we invest in American 
stocks. Why do we provide that? And I look forward to perhaps 
having some co-sponsors for a bill to say no capital gains 
allowance for investment in Chinese stocks.
    And finally, I think our military is strong. But this 
shutdown is making us weaker, both militarily and in terms of 
diplomacy as well. We look like the Keystone Cops. Those Asian 
leaders who have studied history will note that empires fall 
and great nations fall when they're unable to pay their troops 
on time.
    We're doing that to ourselves. Now we have up until this 
Administration had a deliberately ambiguous position as to how 
would we react militarily if Taiwan were blockaded or invaded. 
Dr. Pak, is it now clear that the Biden Administration would 
respond militarily in the case of such a military attack on 
Taiwan?
    Dr. Pak. Thank you, Representative Sherman. I just wanted 
to just touch on the----
    Mr. Sherman. I'm sorry. I have limited time.
    Dr. Pak. Sure.
    Mr. Sherman. Can you say yes or no?
    Dr. Pak. Yes. For over four decades, we have abided by the 
One China policy that's been guided by the----
    Mr. Sherman. Is it our policy----
    Dr. Pak [continuing]. Taiwan's Relations Act.
    Mr. Sherman [continuing]. To respond military if Taiwan is 
invaded?
    Dr. Pak. Well, we will make--the United States will make 
available Taiwan defense articles and services necessary to 
enable----
    Mr. Sherman. So our response----
    Dr. Pak [continuing]. It to maintain sufficient self-
defense capability.
    Mr. Sherman. Our response may not include putting American 
lives at risk?
    Dr. Pak. I do not really want to go into hypotheticals.
    Mr. Sherman. I thought Biden said, we will defend Taiwan. 
Are you saying that's just his----
    Dr. Pak. And we do so in multiple----
    Mr. Sherman [continuing]. Policy and not the policy----
    Dr. Pak [continuing]. Ways in terms of increasing 
Taiwan's----
    Mr. Sherman. Defending Taiwan usually means--OK.
    Dr. Pak [continuing]. International space. Taiwan has a lot 
to offer, its democratic----
    Mr. Sherman. So we----
    Dr. Pak [continuing]. Governance, its economy.
    Mr. Sherman [continuing]. Continue to be ambiguous as to 
whether that would involve deployment of American troops?
    Dr. Pak. We continue to assert and make sure that we have a 
peaceful resolution of the cross-strait.
    Mr. Sherman. Well, obviously, everybody wants peace. I'm 
asking the more difficult question. How do we respond if China 
wages war? And You're not willing to answer or even tell me 
that you want to be ambiguous. There's nothing more ambiguous 
than refusing to tell me whether You're going to be ambiguous.
    Dr. Pak. I think our policy speaks for itself. And I won't 
put words into the President's----
    Mr. Sherman. What You're saying is that I'm stupid for 
asking the question because the answer is obvious.
    Dr. Pak. I won't put words into the President's mouth. But 
for four decades, we believe that our One China policy has----
    Mr. Sherman. OK. I'm going to go----
    Dr. Pak [continuing]. Been successful in maintaining cross-
strait stability.
    Mr. Sherman. Well, what's been successful is that the 
Chinese military hasn't been powerful enough to invade Taiwan. 
They're getting closer every day. Forty years ago, China 
couldn't have invaded Taiwan.
    I would point out that we continue--we were in an area 
where we should not be ambiguous is we should make it clear 
that if Taiwan is invaded or blockaded, that ends most favored 
nation status for China. Not because I want to see that happen, 
but because that's the way to put China on notice with 
something other than ambiguity.
    Now I know at the State Department, a large percentage of 
your people will be furloughed if we have a government 
shutdown. Admiral, do your people get paid September 30th? And 
I assume they have to keep working. When is their first 
interrupted paycheck?
    Vice Admiral Tiongson. The first interrupted paycheck would 
come at the fiscal--at the change of the fiscal year. That's 
about 38,000 active duty members.
    Mr. Sherman. So they get paid September--do they get a 
check September 30th and have to wait for the next one? When's 
the next one?
    Vice Admiral Tiongson. It would be on the 15th, halfway 
through the month.
    Mr. Sherman. Fifteenth. So if we shut down the government, 
your people have to work. They do not get paid. That may apply 
to the military or maybe we would pass a military defense bill. 
What would that do to the morale in the Coast Guard if they 
have to work and they do not get paid?
    Vice Admiral Tiongson. Well will continue to focus on----
    Mr. Sherman. What would it do to the morale?
    Vice Admiral Tiongson. Morale-wise, as experienced in 2019, 
it is hard.
    Mrs. Kim of California. The gentleman's time is up.
    Mr. Sherman. It impairs American security. I yield back.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you. Let me now recognize 
Representative Moylan for your questioning.
    Mr. Moylan. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you to all 
the panel members here today for allowing me to weigh in for 
this hearing. I appreciate the chance to hear from the 
witnesses, panels, and a chance to speak about the importance 
of working to counter China's continued illegal actions in the 
South China Sea and the Pacific at large. It is essential that 
we in Washington show our allies in the Pacific that we do not 
accept rogue nations flaunting their disrespect for 
international borders and instead work with our regional allies 
to ensure a safe and secure Pacific.
    Over 3.4 trillion dollars in trade pass through the South 
China Sea every year. If we continue to appease China and allow 
them to build artificial rates throughout the region, it is 
only going to be a matter of time before they seek to disrupt 
this crucial trade corridor. Last month, I wrote an op-ed that 
was published on the Hill speaking on this very issue. Madam 
Chair, I ask unanimous consent that the op-ed titled the U.S. 
must send a strong message in the face of China's harassment of 
the Philippines to be entered into the record.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Without objection.
    Mr. Moylan. This op-ed, I call for the increase of joint 
patrols with our regional allies, an inclusion of the 
Philippines and future Quad-plus as well. My first question for 
Assistant Secretaries Pak and Ford, do you think we should seek 
to include the Philippines in future Quad-plus discussions? And 
when will we begin to seek more bi-and multilateral 
arrangements in the Indo-Pacific involving one of our closest 
regional allies?
    Ms. Ford. Thank you very much, Representative. Those are 
great questions. I'm really thrilled to hear you advocating for 
joint patrols which as I mentioned is something that we just 
engaged in with the Philippines.
    I know in the recent engagement between the Philippines and 
Australia, this is conversations that they're having as well. 
So from our perspective, we are strongly supportive of not just 
bilateral patrols but exploring opportunities for multilateral 
patrols with the Philippines and with other partners as well. 
When it comes to the Quad or other kinds of minilateral 
settings, what I would say is over the last year, we 
inaugurated a new U.S.-Japan-Philippines defense dialog.
    So we are looking trilaterally along with other interagency 
partners on what more we can do to network the Philippines with 
our partners. The Secretary also convened the first ever 
meeting of U.S., Japan, Australia, and Philippine defense 
ministers. So we have been networking the Philippines into many 
of our other alliances much more proactively. It's the central 
part of our strategy.
    Dr. Pak. And from State Department's perspective, in 
addition to working with DOD on all of those--on those 
groupings, we've worked very hard to rally support for the 
Philippines and the Philippines' ability to lawfully exercise, 
operate, fly in their region. And so we've been very focused on 
making sure that the Philippines have the support, not just of 
the United States but on a global scale.
    Mr. Moylan. I appreciate all that, working together and the 
networking. But I think the Quad would also be an addition to 
that. That would be very helpful. But thank you for your 
statements.
    Vice Admiral, last week, the Chinese Coast Guard laid a 
1,000-foot long barrier to block Scarborough Shoal which is 
well within the Philippines' exclusive economic zone. 
Nonetheless, China claims that the shoal belongs to them thanks 
in part to their ten-dash line map which is an increase of 
maritime area from the previous nine-dash line. That included 
contested areas that extends well beyond international agreed 
upon borders, both on land and sea.
    This follows other prerogative actions by the Chinese Coast 
Guard in August when they attempted to interrupt routine 
resupply of Philippine base in Second Thomas Shoal. These 
actions are totally illegal in the current international law 
and fly in the face of the 2016 discussion by the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration in Hague. My question is, what more can 
our Coast Guard do to help support our allies as they attempt 
to deal with these constant assaults on their sovereignty? If 
asked by the Philippine Coast Guard, would the U.S. Coast Guard 
be inclined in joining our allies to deter bad faith action by 
the CCP?
    Vice Admiral Tiongson. We will continue to help build their 
capacity and capability to deter and defend their sovereign 
rights. We will continue to share with them our tactics, 
techniques, and procedures to make sure that they are ready for 
those types of events.
    Mr. Moylan. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you. We have a consensus that 
we're going to go for a second round of questioning. So let me 
ask a couple questions very quickly.
    When we were out in the region, we spoke to our allies and 
we talked a lot about dangerous PRC behavior in South China 
Sea. And we did the flyover as was mentioned. And we were 
actually witnessing the Chinese military conducting in an 
unprofessional and unsafe ways, radioing in and asking 
questions, like, how many of us are there, why are we there, 
that type of thing.
    So we want to know what is the contingency plan if there is 
an accident. And could an incident spark a conflict there? And 
when we were talking to the Philippine Coast Guard and our 
counterparts with the Philippine officials, they were talking 
about, yes, there is the hotline.
    The problem is they do not even pick up the hotline. So how 
confident are we that they are going to pick up since they have 
shown not to be responsive to other flashpoints in our 
relationship such as when we had the spy balloon incident 
flying over our continent. So what is our plan?
    Ms. Ford. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. We share your 
concern about the unsafe PRC operational behavior that we've 
seen not just in the South China Sea to be honest with you, 
through the Taiwan Strait across the Indo-Pacific region. The 
Department, the Secretary have spoken out on this repeatedly.
    And you are exactly right. Unplanned incidents have real 
escalatory potential. And that's something that deeply concerns 
us. It is why we have continued to say that we believe that 
communication channels between the United States and the PRC, 
defense and military channels is incredibly important. And we 
are trying to keep that channel of communication open so that 
we can avoid those kinds of unplanned incidents.
    Mrs. Kim of California. The probably is they do not pick up 
those lines.
    Ms. Ford. It certainly is a problem. We certainly can 
continue to say as much as possible that that needs to be in 
place. And other than that, we do everything possible to 
closely coordinate with our allies like the Philippines to make 
sure that we're prepared for any potential crises.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you. What will we need to 
establish that with PRC? And what actions will we need to see 
from PRC to actually avoid miscalculation and accidental 
escalation?
    Ms. Ford. I think the admiral can chime in here as well. 
But what I would say is they are well known, especially for 
naval vessels. We have a code for unplanned encounters at sea.
    There are clear rules that define what safe operational 
behavior looks like in the maritime domain. China has said in 
the past that it is willing and had signed up to abide by 
those. It has not. So how to behave safely is not actually that 
complicated. It's simply that you actually need to stand by 
what you said you'll do.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you. I'm going to turn it 
over to Ranking Member Bera for your questions.
    Mr. Bera. Great, thank you. This has been a great hearing 
and certainly a super important topic. We've talked a lot about 
the Philippines and Vietnam. I'd love to give any of the 
witnesses an opportunity to talk about what we might be seeing 
around Indonesia and so forth and get their perspective on 
that, maybe starting with DAS Ford.
    Ms. Ford. Sure. Thank you so much. Indonesia is a 
critically important partner for us. The Secretary has seen 
Minister Prabowo whose counterpart twice this past year 
already. I expect we will again.
    Certainly in every conversation that we have with our 
Indonesian partners, maritime security is an important part of 
what we talk about. It's one reason why as a department we have 
been working with Indonesia to provide them with ISR, Air, 
Maritime Capabilities. And as I mention in my opening 
statement, we have been actively working with them to identify 
new and emerging capabilities that also may help them police 
their EEZs more effectively. Over 17,000 islands, a tremendous 
amount of water that they have to police. So this is something 
we're very focused on with them.
    Mr. Bera. Vice Admiral, if you'd like to add anything from 
the Coast Guard perspective.
    Vice Admiral Tiongson. I just would totally agree with DAS 
Ford in that piece. Maritime domain awareness is huge there, 
particularly because of all of those islands that were just 
discussed.
    Mr. Bera. Great, thank you. Madam Chairwoman, I'm going to 
have to leave. But again, my deep appreciation to the witnesses 
here, to you for holding this hearings. And again, I think the 
scenario where we can work in a bipartisan, bicameral way with 
the Administration. Again, applaud----
    Mr. Sherman. Will the gentleman----
    Mr. Bera [continuing]. The strong work of the 
Administration.
    Mr. Sherman [continuing]. Yield his time?
    Mr. Bera. Of course.
    Mr. Sherman. I want to resume with Dr. Pak. Back in last 
year, the President appeared on 60 Minutes. And I realize you 
work with the President--for the President you have, not the 
President you might wish we had.
    And he made it--he said--and they wanted to clarify. He 
clarified that--and this is a Reuters story, and I'll ask 
unanimous consent to put this Reuters article of September 19, 
2022 on the record. In that story, the President was asked 
whether we would commit American men and women to fight if 
Taiwan were invaded and he said yes. Are you saying that the 
President's words are not the words of Administration policy?
    Dr. Pak. Thank you, Representative Sherman. I will--I'm not 
going to interpret the President's statements. What we do----
    Mr. Sherman. Well, what is our policy?
    Dr. Pak [continuing]. From our--what we do from----
    Mr. Sherman. Is our policy an unambiguous commitment of 
American forces to fight against an invasion of Taiwan? Is our 
policy the policy we had under prior Administrations where we 
were intentionally ambiguous? Or you simply do not know the 
policy?
    Dr. Pak. From State Department's perspective--and I'm not 
going to interpret--I think the President speaks for--I'll let 
his words stand.
    Mr. Sherman. I know the President speaks for----
    Dr. Pak. But I--but I just----
    Mr. Sherman [continuing]. Himself. Does he speak for the 
Administration?
    Dr. Pak. I want to say that what we're doing very intensely 
is to make sure that there is no conflict----
    Mr. Sherman. OK. We both want peace.
    Dr. Pak [continuing]. In the Taiwan Strait given that----
    Mr. Sherman. I'm asking you a question. How do we react if 
there's an invasion? And your response is, we do not want an 
invasion.
    Dr. Pak. Well, I think I do not want to go into the 
hypotheticals of how that might happen.
    Mr. Sherman. That's not a response. That's a refusal to 
answer. If you want to refuse to answer, just say you refuse to 
answer. Don't pretend to answer.
    Dr. Pak. I cannot answer that right now.
    Mr. Sherman. OK. So----
    Dr. Pak. But we can certainly get back to you on that.
    Mr. Sherman [continuing]. The President makes statements. 
The State Department may or may not decide that is our policy. 
Ms. Ford, we have a situation where it appears to be our policy 
that the Defense Department's men and women would be deployed 
to defend Taiwan. But we do not have an explicit policy to end 
MFN for China if we're fighting.
    What would the effect on morale be if American marines and 
troops and sailors are dying fighting the Chinese on the one 
hand but Walmart is importing things from China and making big 
profits on the same day? Would that have a good effect on 
American morale? Should we ask our troops to die while our 
corporations make money and our consumers by Chinese goods? 
Would that make sense?
    Ms. Ford. I cannot tell you what the effect specifically a 
most favored nation status or not would be. I would say----
    Mr. Sherman. I'm not asking for most favored nation status. 
I'm asking if----
    Ms. Ford [continuing]. The Department of Defense takes very 
seriously the morale of our troops, the well being of our 
troops. We never want to see them in harms way.
    Mr. Sherman. I asked you what effect it would have on our 
troops----
    Ms. Ford. And I think that's why we're very----
    Mr. Sherman [continuing]. If corporations are making 
billions importing goods from China on the same day when 
marines and sailors are dying in the Taiwan Strait. Would that 
have an effect on morale, yes or no, you do not know?
    Ms. Ford. Sir, my job is to make sure they're never in 
harms way. And that's why we're focused on deterrence.
    Mr. Sherman. So we do not need to have a hearing about how 
to react if Taiwan is invaded because we just hope that it 
won't happen.
    Ms. Ford. I do not think we hope. I think--we're laser 
focused on deterrence. And there are a number of things we're 
doing to enhance our posturing capabilities to make sure the 
deterrence remains strong.
    Mr. Sherman. And are you 100 percent sure that those 
efforts will be successful?
    Ms. Ford. I am very confident the deterrence is strong 
today, and we're doing what we----
    Mr. Sherman. But You're confident--You're not 100 percent 
sure----
    Ms. Ford [continuing]. Need to do to make sure it remains 
strong.
    Mr. Sherman [continuing]. That the deterrence will be 
successful. And you refuse to respond how we will react if the 
deterrence is unsuccessful. The most important part of 
deterrence is to identify for the Chinese what our response 
would be.
    And you won't even tell me that it's illogical and harmful 
to morale to make billions in trade on the same day when our 
troops are dying in the Taiwan Straits. It sounds like other 
than telling me that you do not want Taiwan invaded, you do not 
want to answer any questions. And that's fine if you would just 
be honest enough to say you do not want to answer any 
questions.
    Although why you would come here and testify is up in the 
air. Admiral, I do have one question for you and this is on the 
dovish side. We have the right to sail our military ships right 
up to the 12 miles off the coast of China and we do it from 
time to time. Does China operate with significant naval force 
12, 13 miles off the U.S. coast on a regular basis?
    Vice Admiral Tiongson. I have not come across any 
incursions of that to our territorial seas.
    Mr. Sherman. But we do it to them. I yield back.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you. The gentleman's time is 
up. Let me now recognize Representative Barr for your 
questions.
    Mr. Barr. I think my colleague, Mr. Sherman, does make a 
good point that Congress needs to maybe make a policy decision 
here with respect to the economic ramifications of cross-strait 
invasion. And we could clarify what the policy of the United 
States would be in that case. And I'd offer to work with the 
gentleman on that, including the most favored nation suggestion 
and certainly powerful sanctions in that case.
    And to telegraph that frankly to Beijing that there will be 
repercussions and it will be very painful. Let me go back to 
Dr. Pak on the nine-dash line, ten-dash line issue. I know that 
and I applaud the Administration's policy of trying to bring 
more international consensus on this question that really is--
it should not be a subject to debate given the U.N. tribunal 
2016 unanimous determination that this is a violation of 
international law.
    But what can we do with the United Nations and these allies 
and partners to delegitimize China's claims on the nine-dash 
line? How can we amplify the international court ruling from 
the U.N.? I'll give you one suggestion from our Filipino 
partners which was to have a resolution in Congress referring 
to this body of water as the West Philippine Sea as opposed to 
the South China Sea. Now I know Vietnam has some claims there 
which could complicate matters. But what is the State 
Department's position on a renaming of that as the West 
Philippine Sea?
    Dr. Pak. I do not have a technical answer to that, 
Representative Barr. But over and over again, we foot stomp 
this on the legally binding nature of the 2016 award. We do 
that bilaterally with the PRC and we do it in multilateral fora 
when the PRC is also in that room. And that's echoed by all of 
our like-minded allies and partners.
    Mr. Barr. Xi Jinping lied to President Obama. He lied to 
President Obama. I can say it. Maybe you cannot. But that's 
what he did.
    Dr. Pak. And you will hear us say that loud and clear from 
the hilltops and the mountaintops about the 2016 award being 
legally binding on all parties. As you know from your trips and 
your conversations, the PRC has been trying to erode that and 
trying to delegitimize that 2016 ruling. But we will continue 
to keep yelling it from the mountaintops----
    Mr. Barr. Keep it up. Thank you. Keep it up. And to DAS 
Ford, what are the solutions to pushing back and preventing 
further PRC buildup and militarization of the reefs in the 
South China Sea or West Philippine Sea? And the reason I say 
that is the militarized island outposts are a threat to U.S. 
forces in the Taiwan scenario.
    So preventing further militarization or artificial island 
building is important for the Taiwan scenario for U.S. forces 
moving in that 440 nautical miles north but to have China on 
the south end of that. But what do we need to do to eject the 
Chinese or at least limit further militarization? I think 
that's really important for the Defense Department.
    Ms. Ford. Thank you. I agree with you very much, 
Representative. So what I would say is the first thing that we 
need to do and are doing is to bring more awareness and 
transparency about what the PLA is actually doing in the South 
China Sea, including on its outposts. So that's one reason for 
us. We are very focused on information sharing and we are 
working with allies and partners to make sure that it is more 
publicly known what is taking place in the South China Sea.
    Mr. Barr. And let's emphasize your testimony: advanced 
anti-ship cruise missiles, long range surface to air missile 
systems, J-20 stealth fighter jets, laser and jamming 
equipment, military radar and signals intelligence 
capabilities. Not just in the South China Sea, in the exclusive 
economic zone of the Philippines. This is preparing for war.
    They do not do this other than that purpose. And that's 
what the American people need to understand there. I'm running 
out of time, but let me just ask one final question to Dr. Pak.
    And I promised the foreign minister of Indonesia Marsudi 
that I would communicate back to Secretary Blinken on this and 
to the State Department. The Indonesian government was very 
disappointed that Vice President Kamala Harris was dispatched 
as opposed to the President when he was right there at the G-20 
and went to Vietnam. Yes a partner but a communist country. 
They are the fourth largest population country in the world in 
a democracy. If we want to send a signal that Indonesia is our 
friend, we need the President there.
    Dr. Pak. Thank you. The Vice President attended and she was 
hugely successful. She had great meetings with YSEALI. She had 
great meetings with Indonesian officials. As you might be 
tracking the President Jokowi will be in Washington sometime in 
November. And so we look forward to welcoming the Indonesian 
government.
    Mr. Barr. Thank you. My time has expired.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you. I want to thank all the 
witnesses for your valuable testimony and engaging with our 
members and answering tough questions too, at times pretty 
feisty engagement. Thank you so much.
    The members of the committee may have some additional 
questions for the witnesses. And in that case, we ask you to 
submit those answers in writing. And let me now recognize 
myself some closing remarks.
    As the witnesses noted, as you noted, the PRC is ramping up 
their aggression and military footprint in the South China Sea. 
And since those waters are of critical importance to global 
shipping, the U.S. national security and our commitment to 
Indo-Pacific, the U.S. must respond to that aggression. And 
from each of the countries that we visited in August, I heard 
the same thing, that the PRC is doing this because they can.
    And they have received little or no pushback. And every 
single one of the people that we met, they said that. And it is 
thus critical that the U.S. respond to every single act of 
aggression by the PRC in the South China Sea.
    In Indonesia, I was glad to give remark at Ambassador Sung 
Kim. He hosted a reception for Super Garuda Shield. The day 
after we had that reception, they were doing the multilateral 
exercises.
    And spoke with servicemen and women from our allies and 
partners around the world that were gathered. I believe there 
were 19 nations present. And I saw the energy and the 
commitment to protecting our shared interest in the region.
    And so I hope we can work together to get these folks the 
capabilities, the training, and the support they need to 
protect those shared interests. And I echo Dr. Pak's comments 
about the U.S.' need to show up in the region. As Congressman 
Barr mentioned, when we were Indonesia, we met with the foreign 
minister.
    And she clearly told us. I mean, she did not mince her 
words. She told us how disappointed she was that President 
Biden was not able to attend the ASEAN summit where we tried to 
explain that there was some scheduling conflict and Vice 
President was coming. But it was very, very apparent that the 
disappointment was not lost on them.
    And while I support the engagement with Vietnam, it's 
important. But it is more important that we show up and court 
democracies in the region too and obviously the largest 
democracy in Indonesia that it is. That's why it was important 
for me to ensure that my first CODEL as chairwoman of this 
Indo-Pacific Subcommittee was to visit with our two key allies, 
Thailand, Philippines, and of course the largest democracy in 
Southeast Asia, Indonesia.
    So our trip was a show of commitment and reassurance. And 
we demonstrated bipartisan congressional support for those 
important relationships. And last, many Americans may be 
wondering why we're talking about South China Sea today.
    Yet we rely on the South China Sea for much of our 
shipping, including to and from the four of our top ten trading 
partners. And it is a bellwether for our U.S. commitment to the 
region. So I say if we let China aggressively bully its way 
through the South China Sea, we could see large scale supply 
chain disruptions and a complete breakdown of the rules based 
international order.
    And that will affect every American who enjoys the level of 
commerce and the freedom that we enjoy today. So let me once 
again repeat how grateful we are for your time, spending your 
afternoon with us, answering our questions. And I look forward 
to continuing our work together with each and every one of you 
on this very, very important issue.
    So pursuant to committee rules, all members may have five 
additional days to submit statements, questions, and extraneous 
materials for the record subject to the length limitations. So 
without objection, the committee now stands adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 3:22 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

                                APPENDIX
                                
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         STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD FROM REPRESENTATIVE CONNOLLY
         
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             ADDITIONAL MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
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