[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                         [H.A.S.C. No. 118-24]
                       
                       U.S. MILITARY POSTURE AND
                      
                      NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES
                       
                       IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION
                               __________

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION
                               __________

                              HEARING HELD

                             APRIL 18, 2023


                                     
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                              __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
                    
53-524                    WASHINGTON : 2024                     

                                     
                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                    One Hundred Eighteenth Congress

                     MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman

JOE WILSON, South Carolina           ADAM SMITH, Washington
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio              JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado               JOHN GARAMENDI, California
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia, Vice    DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
    Chair                            RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia                SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
SAM GRAVES, Missouri                 SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California
ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York          RO KHANNA, California
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee          WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
TRENT KELLY, Mississippi             ANDY KIM, New Jersey
MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin            CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania
MATT GAETZ, Florida                  ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan
DON BACON, Nebraska                  MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey
JIM BANKS, Indiana                   VERONICA ESCOBAR, Texas
JACK BERGMAN, Michigan               JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine
MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida               SARA JACOBS, California
MIKE JOHNSON, Louisiana              MARILYN STRICKLAND, Washington
LISA C. McCLAIN, Michigan            PATRICK RYAN, New York
RONNY JACKSON, Texas                 JEFF JACKSON, North Carolina
PAT FALLON, Texas                    GABE VASQUEZ, New Mexico
CARLOS A. GIMENEZ, Florida           CHRISTOPHER R. DELUZIO, 
NANCY MACE, South Carolina               Pennsylvania
BRAD FINSTAD, Minnesota              JILL N. TOKUDA, Hawaii
DALE W. STRONG, Alabama              DONALD G. DAVIS, North Carolina
MORGAN LUTTRELL, Texas               JENNIFER L. McCLELLAN, Virginia
JENNIFER A. KIGGANS, Virginia        TERRI A. SEWELL, Alabama
NICK LaLOTA, New York                STEVEN HORSFORD, Nevada
JAMES C. MOYLAN, Guam                JIMMY PANETTA, California
MARK ALFORD, Missouri                MARC VEASEY, Texas
CORY MILLS, Florida
RICHARD McCORMICK, Georgia

                      Chris Vieson, Staff Director
               Mark Morehouse, Professional Staff Member
                        Spencer Johnson, Counsel
                    Brooke Alred, Research Assistant

                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

              STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman, 
  Committee on Armed Services....................................     1
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking 
  Member, Committee on Armed Services............................     2

                               WITNESSES

Aquilino, ADM John C., USN, Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command.     6
LaCamera, GEN Paul J., USA, Commander, United Nations Command; 
  Commander, United States-Republic of Korea Combined Forces 
  Command; and Commander, U.S. Forces Korea......................     7
Royal, Hon. Jedidiah P., Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
  Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs, Department of 
  Defense........................................................     4

                                APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

    Aquilino, ADM John C.........................................    74
    LaCamera, GEN Paul J.........................................   117
    Royal, Hon. Jedidiah P.......................................    65

Documents Submitted for the Record:

    [There were no Documents submitted.]

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

    Mr. Kim......................................................   135
    Mr. Ryan.....................................................   135
    Mr. Waltz....................................................   135

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

    Mr. Gallagher................................................   141
    Mr. Golden...................................................   142
    Dr. Jackson..................................................   143
    Ms. Mace.....................................................   143
    Mrs. McClain.................................................   143
    Dr. McCormick................................................   146
    Mr. Moylan...................................................   145
    Mr. Scott....................................................   139
    Ms. Stefanik.................................................   141
    Ms. Tokuda...................................................   144


 
           
  U.S. MILITARY POSTURE AND NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES IN THE INDO-
                             PACIFIC REGION

                              ----------                              

                          House of Representatives,
                               Committee on Armed Services,
                           Washington, DC, Tuesday, April 18, 2023.
    The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:36 a.m., in room 
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers (chairman 
of the committee) presiding.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
         ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

    The Chairman. The committee will come to order. Today we 
continue our hearing with INDOPACOM [U.S. Indo-Pacific Command] 
and U.S. Forces Korea.
    I want to thank our witnesses for being here and their 
service to our Nation. I know it takes a lot of time to prepare 
for these hearings, and we really appreciate the fact that you 
do that and you make yourselves available.
    The Indo-Pacific is home to the greatest threat we have 
faced in generations. In North Korea, we have a madman who 
would rather build an illegal nuclear arsenal than feed his 
starving people. The world has sat by while Kim has lobbed 
ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles] over his neighbors, 
rebuilt his nuclear testing facility, and expanded his 
inventory of warheads.
    Last week's announcement that North Korea tested a solid-
fueled ICBM is the latest extremely troubling news. It 
eliminates the time-consuming liquid fueling process, making it 
much harder for us to detect a missile and neutralize it before 
launch.
    That is why it is so imperative for us to invest in missile 
defense and accelerate the next generation interceptor program.
    A strong missile detect and defeat capability is also 
critical to our deterrence of the Chinese Communist Party 
[CCP]. We have talked a lot this year about the growing threats 
we face from the CCP. They have tripled defense spending in a 
decade, and that is what they admit to. Rapidly modernized and 
expanded their conventional forces. Made unprecedented 
advancements in space, hypersonics, AI [artificial 
intelligence], and quantum computing. And increased the number 
of launchers, missiles, and warheads in their nuclear arsenal 
at a dizzying rate.
    The CCP's extraordinary military buildup is certainly 
concerning. But what is most alarming is the increasingly 
provocative actions President Xi has taken in recent years, 
pushing out China's borders with new defense agreements and 
military bases in foreign nations; illegally building 
militarized islands, and trying to limit freedom of navigation 
in the South China Sea; threatening our allies in the region 
when they work with us; and cozying up to Putin and the 
ayatollah and other tyrants. And attempting to coerce Taiwan 
with military exercises simulating a blockade and invasion of 
the island.
    It has gotten to the point where Xi's foreign ministry is 
now seeking to intimidate the Speaker of the House and other 
Members of Congress just for supporting democracy and self-
determination for the people of Taiwan.
    This is not how responsible nations act, especially not 
nations armed with nuclear weapons. We have no choice but to 
take Xi's threats seriously. And we have to be resolute in our 
response.
    We need to accelerate our own military modernization. We 
need to enhance training and readiness in the region. We need 
to better distribute logistics throughout the Pacific. But we 
won't prevail in any conflict with the CCP on our own.
    We need to expand and strengthen our partnerships in the 
region. We need to better arm our allies with agreements like 
AUKUS [Australia, United Kingdom, United States]. And we need 
to expedite the delivery of arms and training to Taiwan so they 
can better defend their own democracy.
    But most importantly, we need to take action now. China is 
not going to give us 10 or 20 years to prepare for conflict. We 
simply cannot procrastinate further.
    I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on their 
assessment of the threats and what they support in the need--
and what they need from this committee to deter China.
    And with that, I yield to my friend and colleague the 
ranking member for any comments he may have.

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON, 
          RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

    Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I think you did an 
excellent job of outlining the threats and the concerns that we 
have in the--in the theater in North Korea and in the Indo-
Pacific theater as well more broadly. It is a very challenging 
part of the world, and one that contains a lot of threats to 
our national security and to global security without question.
    We have our, you know, as the National Defense Strategy 
says, the pacing threat in China, clearly our largest 
competitor both economically and militarily.
    And right next door we have our most unpredictable rogue 
threat in North Korea, as you outlined their development of 
nuclear weapons and the way they are closed off from the rest 
of world that puts us in a position to not exactly know what 
the leverage points are to deter them or work with them makes 
them a significant threat as well.
    I appreciate both of our witnesses being with us today to 
help us walk through that. On North Korea, there is no easy 
answer to the question. But what is our best deterrent 
strategy? How do we contain that threat, given the nuclear 
capabilities that North Korea is developing and the 
unpredictable nature, how does one reach a country like North 
Korea that is so isolated from the rest of the world.
    And China is a much broader threat. We will talk a great 
deal today about Taiwan. And certainly that is the biggest 
flashpoint, China's militant attitude towards Taiwan, their 
increasingly aggressive language about possibly reunifying 
China through military means, something that we must deter.
    A conflict there would be devastating for the entire world. 
We need to figure out how to deter China from taking that 
aggressive action.
    But it is also important to point out Taiwan is but the 
largest flashpoint. As the chairman alluded to, China is 
aggressive and bullying across the world in countless ways. As 
mentioned, they are claiming territory in the sovereign nations 
of at least a half dozen other countries.
    But also the best way to think about the threat that China 
puts to the world is you cannot criticize China without them 
launching an economic war against you. And there are a number 
of examples of this, but Australia is perhaps one of the best.
    Back during the pandemic, I think it was sometime in late 
2020, Australia dared to suggest that China could perhaps be 
ever so slightly more transparent in how they were dealing with 
COVID [coronavirus disease]. In response to that mild 
criticism, China literally launched an economic war against 
Australia.
    Now, one of the positive outcomes of that was Australia, 
you know, woke up and said wow, you know, doing business with 
China is going to be problematic. We better find other allies 
and partners to deal with that.
    But it happens across the world. Lithuania said something 
about Taiwan that China didn't like, same thing. But even in 
industry, if anybody in industry says something that China 
doesn't like, they will use their economic might to pummel that 
country, or entity.
    There was, I think it was the GM [general manager] for the 
Houston Rockets who said something pro Hong Kong, and the NBA 
[National Basketball Association] was instantaneously cut off 
by China. If you are going to make a movie in this world and 
you want to sell it in China, China has to approve the script, 
literally, okay. And if they don't, it doesn't get sold there.
    The level of aggression that China has to restrict the 
freedoms of the entire world is I think far greater than most 
people realize. We need to present an alternative.
    Key to that is our presence, us being actively involved in 
the Indo-Pacific region. I applaud the efforts of the people 
before us today to make clear that we do that.
    President Biden's national security strategy prioritizes 
China, we are present there, we will continue to be. We need to 
have that adequate deterrence. But we also need partners and 
allies.
    We look forward to hearing from our witnesses today about 
those partners and allies. Obviously, you know, Japan, 
Australia, South Korea, India, the Philippines, Thailand, these 
are some of the most important.
    But all the other players, as I was struck by Indonesia as 
a place that is just, they are trying to get along with both. 
How do we work with them to help us in this fight?
    Because ultimately, and the final point is, our goal with 
China has to be peaceful coexistence, which sounds weird given 
everything we have said about the problems and threats that 
China presents.
    But we are not going to defeat China. China and the U.S. 
are going to be major global powers for as far as the eye can 
see. How do we find a way to nudge China back in a more 
positive, less aggressive, and less bullying direction?
    That is ultimately what we have to do. Conflict with China 
is not inevitable, 100 percent not. We need to figure out how 
to peacefully coexist with them and deal with the threats that 
they present in a way that is--keeps the world at peace.
    I look forward to the testimony from our witnesses, and I 
yield back.
    The Chairman. I thank the ranking member. And now I would 
like to introduce our witnesses. We have the Honorable Jed 
Royal is the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs; Admiral John Aquilino, the 
Commander, United States Indo-Pacific Command; and General Paul 
LaCamera is the Commander, United States--United Nations 
Command Korea and the U.S. Combined Forces Command, the U.S. 
Forces Korea.
    I welcome our witnesses. And Mr. Royal, we will start with 
you for 5 minutes to outline your statement.

STATEMENT OF HON. JEDIDIAH P. ROYAL, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT 
    SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INDO-PACIFIC SECURITY AFFAIRS, 
                     DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

    Mr. Royal. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith, and 
members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to 
testify on what the Department of Defense is doing to safeguard 
the interests of the American people, our allies, and our 
partners in the Indo-Pacific region.
    I would first like to acknowledge the tireless work of 
those who serve the U.S. in uniform across the Indo-Pacific, as 
well as those who serve in the civilian workforce across the 
Department [of Defense].
    The very first words of the Biden-Harris administration----
    The Chairman. Mr. Royal, could you pull the microphone a 
little closer?
    Mr. Royal. Yes, sir.
    The Chairman. There you go.
    Mr. Royal. The very first words of the Biden-Harris 
administration's Indo-Pacific strategy state that the U.S. is 
an Indo-Pacific power. And Secretary Austin has been clear 
about our commitment to seeking transparency, openness, and 
accountability; freedom of the seas, skies, and space; and the 
peaceful resolution of disputes in the region.
    That vision and that commitment continue today. The 
Department does not take this vision for granted. We have seen 
the PRC [People's Republic of China] increasingly look to the 
People's Liberation Army [PLA] as a tool for coercion in 
support of its global aims.
    The PLA has continued to conduct inherently risky 
intercepts against U.S., ally, and partner assets in the air 
and at sea, increasing the risk of an accident. And the PLA 
continues to conduct coercive military activities in the Taiwan 
Strait, the South and East China Seas, and beyond.
    The PRC high-altitude balloon that violated our airspace 
earlier this year exemplified the PRC's disregard for the basic 
principle of sovereignty at the heart of peace and stability. 
This is why the National Defense Strategy identifies the PRC as 
our pacing challenge.
    At the same time, North Korea also continues to engage in 
provocative and destabilizing behavior, climate change will 
continue to place downward pressure on peace and prosperity 
across the region, and violent extremism continues to require 
cooperation with our partners on counterterrorism.
    The Department of Defense is doing more than ever to 
strengthen deterrence and to ensure we can prevail in conflict 
if necessary. We are deploying the right capabilities now, 
investing in the capabilities we need in the future, and our 
budget request shows it.
    Efforts like the Rapid Defense Experimentation Reserve show 
how we are quickly delivering promising prototypes to 
warfighters. And the B-21 Raider, which the Secretary unveiled 
last year, is a clear example of a new cutting-edge capability.
    Here is the bottom line: Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific is 
real and strong today because the U.S. military remains the 
world's most capable and credible fighting force. Major 
investments like these will help keep it that way.
    And the U.S. is not alone in upholding peace and stability 
in the region by investing in greater capability and 
connection. We have supported Japan's decision to increase 
substantially its defense budget over the next 5 years and to 
introduce new capabilities, including counterstrike, that will 
strengthen regional deterrence.
    We are taking clear and meaningful steps to modernize and 
strengthen our alliance with the Republic of Korea. We are 
working together with the Philippines to accelerate our allied 
capabilities.
    We are making major investments in our defense ties with 
India and maturing our immensely beneficial security 
relationship. The AUKUS security pact exemplifies our 
collaboration with highly capable allies to expand our combined 
capacity.
    Finally, we continue to fulfill our commitments under the 
Taiwan Relations Act, which has formed the bedrock of peace, 
stability, and deterrence in the Taiwan Strait over the last 
four decades.
    When it comes to modernizing our force posture in the Indo-
Pacific to be even more mobile, distributed, lethal, and 
resilient, the Department of Defense is delivering historic 
achievements. In December, the U.S. and Australia announced a 
series of new force posture initiatives, including increased 
rotations of U.S. bombers and fighters at Australian bases.
    In January, the U.S. and Japan announced a series of force 
posture improvements, including the first forward deployment of 
a Marine littoral regiment in Japan. Weeks later, the Secretary 
visited the Philippines and our governments announced that U.S. 
forces will have access to Philippine military bases in four 
new strategic locations.
    These announcements add up to a historic improvement of our 
regional force posture. We are operating with allies and 
partners like never before, with bilateral and multilateral 
exercises growing in scale, scope, and complexity.
    We have deepened our trilateral security efforts with our 
closest regional allies. We have broadened our initiatives with 
multilateral partners to deliver real results for peace and 
security, especially with ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations] and the Quad.
    States across the Indo-Pacific region are investing in 
their own capabilities, their connections with regional 
partners, and their relationships with us. Over the past 
decade, our five regional treaty allies have increased their 
military expenditures by double digits. That is what delivering 
on our shared vision looks like.
    In closing, I appreciate the work of this committee, both 
members and staff, in continuing to sharpen our edge in the 
face of many challenges. In the past several years we have 
witnessed the growth of a strong bipartisan consensus around 
the scale and scope of the China challenge. We are working 
toward the transformation of that consensus into a coalition 
built around solutions.
    The Department of Defense is deploying the capabilities, 
driving forward the force posture, and deepening the alliances 
and partnerships we need to meet our pacing challenge.
    Thank you for your time and attention today. I look forward 
to answering your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Royal can be found in the 
Appendix on page 65.]
    The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Royal.
    Admiral Aquilino, you're recognized.

 STATEMENT OF ADM JOHN C. AQUILINO, USN, COMMANDER, U.S. INDO-
                        PACIFIC COMMAND

    Admiral Aquilino. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith, 
and distinguished members of the committee, first, thank you 
for the opportunity to be here today to discuss the Indo-
Pacific region.
    First, just let me say that I appreciate and need your 
support and your continuous support for the service members, 
their families, government civilians, and all who operate in 
the Indo-Pacific Command.
    And it is my distinct honor and privilege to serve 
alongside these brave men and women who execute our missions of 
deterrence and for defense every day. I can't thank you enough 
for all of your support. It is instrumental in our ability to 
accomplish these missions. But there is more to do, and we must 
act with a greater sense of urgency.
    Every day, INDOPACOM works tirelessly to prevent conflict, 
not provoke it. War is not inevitable and it is not imminent. 
However, this decade presents a period of increased risk, and I 
say that for the following reasons, and they are real.
    The illegitimate, illegal invasion and the war in Ukraine. 
The military buildup and malign behavior of the PRC, including 
a no-limits relationship articulated as a partnership with 
Russia. Continuous missile provocations and nuclear rhetoric by 
the DPRK [Democratic People's Republic of Korea]. And the 
constant threat of violent extremism in this theater.
    Our National Defense Strategy identifies the PRC as the 
most consequential strategic competitor of the United States. 
And it is the only competitor capable of combining its 
economic, diplomatic, military, and technological capabilities 
to mount a sustained challenge in an attempt to displace the 
United States and the rules-based international order.
    ``Seize the Initiative'' is INDOPACOM's approach to execute 
the National Defense Strategy and accomplish our priorities: 
defend the homeland, deter strategic attacks, deter aggression, 
and build a resilient joint force. By design, this approach 
prevents conflict through integrated deterrence, and it ensures 
we can fight and win should deterrence fails.
    Lastly, it provides the Secretary of Defense and the 
President options for any contingency.
    There are four key elements to Seize the Initiative. First, 
a robust theater posture. Second, a joint operations campaign 
comprised of lethal, persistent forces forward. Third, 
technologically superior capabilities to maintain our 
warfighting advantages in the near, mid, and long term.
    And fourth, an enhanced network of allies, partners, and 
friends with common values and goals.
    We respectfully request your continued support for these 
focus areas, recognizing that any delay in one area directly 
affects the others and puts the overall success of our 
deterrence efforts at risk.
    I say it again, conflict in the Indo-Pacific is not 
inevitable. But we cannot rest on our past accomplishments to 
secure a peaceful future. Security challengers threaten our 
very way of life, as well as the peace and prosperity that the 
rules-based international order has enabled for nearly 80 
years.
    The investments we make today will allow future generations 
to enjoy the same legacy of liberty our ancestors entrusted to 
us. But we don't have the luxury of time. We must act now to 
preserve a free and open Indo-Pacific.
    Thanks, Chairman, I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Admiral Aquilino can be found in 
the Appendix on page 74.]
    The Chairman. Thank you, Admiral.
    General LaCamera, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

   STATEMENT OF GEN PAUL J. LaCAMERA, USA, COMMANDER, UNITED 
 NATIONS COMMAND; COMMANDER, UNITED STATES--REPUBLIC OF KOREA 
   COMBINED FORCES COMMAND; AND COMMANDER, U.S. FORCES KOREA

    General LaCamera. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith, 
the distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the 
opportunity to appear before you as the Commander of United 
Nations Command, Combined Forces Command, and the United States 
Forces Korea to discuss the current situation on the Korean 
peninsula.
    Korea is as important today as it was in 1950 when the 
international rules-based order was first challenged and 
successfully defended on the Korean peninsula. Located on the 
Asian continent, the Republic of Korea is crucial to regional 
and global security.
    When North Korean communist forces invaded South Korea with 
the blessing and assistance of the Soviet Union and China, the 
United States, along with 22 members of the United Nation, 
stood together with the South Korean people to expel the 
aggressors. The Korean War taught us that we must always be 
ready and forward-postured with our allies.
    To ensure continued peace and stability on the peninsula, I 
have five priorities that are nested within the Indo-Pacific 
commander's Seize the Initiative approach to ensure a free and 
open Indo-Pacific.
    My first priority is to defend the homelands, the United 
States and our allies. The Korean War has not ended, we are in 
armistice, and the Kim regime has developed capabilities that 
reach beyond Seoul, Tokyo, Washington, DC, and the capitals of 
the United Nation command sending states.
    By defending forward in this strategic location, we better 
protect our people and the Korean people. Defending forward 
reinforces our ironclad commitment to the Republic of Korea.
    My second priority is to strengthen the United States and 
the Republic of Korea alliance. We must never take the alliance 
for granted. This is our center of gravity in deterring the Kim 
regime.
    The alliance has effectively deterred the Kim regime's 
resumption of large-scale aggression for almost 70 years, 
allowing security and stability to flourish and the Republic of 
Korea to develop into an economically prosperous, vibrant 
democracy.
    In contrast, the Kim regime ignores the needs and rights of 
the great majority of its population and continues to invest 
its resources in developing weapons that it uses as leverage. 
External leverage coerces concessions from the international 
community; internal leverage maintains control of the people 
and ensures Kim regime survival.
    My third priority is to prepare for combat. This is 
decisive. Our alliance alone cannot deter aggression. Our power 
of resistance deters.
    Maintaining the highest state of combat readiness is our 
main effort. Because readiness is perishable, we must continue 
realistic training in order to respond to aggression and defend 
our homelands.
    My fourth priority is to build coalitions to dissuade 
aggression in the region. Our network of allies and partners 
with common interests on the Korean peninsula represents our 
greatest asymmetric advantage.
    My fifth priority is to ensure our personnel are taken care 
of and prepared to execute our mission on the Korean peninsula. 
Mission first, people always. Our people serving on the Asian 
continent have the extraordinary responsibility of providing 
security and stability throughout the Republic of Korea and 
Northeast Asia.
    Our focus remains taking care of the mental, physical, and 
spiritual needs of our service members, civilians, and 
families. Since 1953, the United States and the Republic of 
Korea remain ready to deter and respond to North Korean 
aggression. Our mutual defense treaty expresses our common 
desire to live in peace with all peoples and governments.
    It also expresses our common determination to defend 
ourselves against external armed attack so that no potential 
aggressor could be under the impression that either the United 
States or the Republic of Korea stands alone in the Pacific 
area.
    While the United States and the Republic of Korea alliance 
began out of military necessity, it has evolved to become the 
linchpin of stability and prosperity in Northeast Asia.
    The soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, Guardians, 
civilians, and contractors are proof of our ironclad commitment 
to the alliance and ensures that the authoritarian regimes of 
North Korea, China, and Russia cannot unmake the international 
rules-based order.
    Should the Kim regime resume hostilities, with your 
continued support, we are ready. I am proud to serve with them 
and am honored to represent them before you. Thank you, and I 
look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of General LaCamera can be found in 
the Appendix on page 117.]
    The Chairman. Thank you, General. I thank all the 
witnesses.
    We are now going to move into the question period. And I 
want to emphasize to the members, but also to the witnesses, we 
have a 5-minute time limit.
    You should have a clock in front of your microphone. At 5 
minutes, I will cut off any answer, so you might want to be 
succinct. I don't want to be rude, but I want to treat 
everybody the same when it comes to answers, questions and 
answer period. And that applies to the chairman and the ranking 
member as well.
    So I will recognize myself first.
    Mr. Royal and Admiral Aquilino, what actions do we need to 
take in the near term to improve Taiwan's self-defense 
capability?
    Mr. Royal. Congressman, thanks for that question. The 
interest of the Department is very strongly connected with the 
ability of the United States to meet the Taiwan Relations Act. 
The Taiwan Relations Act has been the foundation of deterrence 
in the Taiwan Strait over the last 40 years.
    We need to make sure that Taiwan is, consistent with the 
Taiwan Relations Act, is able to defend itself. And we are 
looking here, sir, at the opportunity for Taiwan to understand 
what threat is posed against the Taiwan Strait.
    In this regard, ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance] command and control battle management systems 
are absolutely critical. Taiwan also certainly needs to be able 
to make sure that any invading force is caught dead in its 
tracks in the strait as it comes across to be able to defend at 
the beaches and to be able to be resilient in depth on island.
    The Chairman. Admiral Aquilino.
    Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Chairman. Every day we execute 
our responsibilities under the Taiwan Relations Act. The 
training that is required, the capabilities that have been 
identified by the Honorable Nelson are critical in getting them 
to the island as soon and as fast as possible is critical.
    The Chairman. Great. I think the ranking member would agree 
with me that we are very confident that we will get a NDAA 
[National Defense Authorization Act], a bipartisan national 
defense authorization passed not only out of committee in a 
timely fashion, but out of the floor and then the conference 
report.
    There is more dialog in the Congress about the difficulty 
we are going to have in achieving appropriations bills in a 
timely fashion. And the consequence of Congress not achieving a 
timely and fulsome appropriations bill would mean a 2-year CR 
[continuing resolution] possibly.
    And my question is this: Admiral Aquilino, you have said 
repeatedly in the public and talked about your need to go fast 
to help prepare us for conflict in your command, INDOPACOM. If 
you were to have a 2-year CR, would you able to go fast in 
trying to prepare for conflict in your theater?
    Admiral Aquilino. Chairman, a CR of any length is 
devastating to the Department of Defense, specifically for 
Indo-Pacific Command. Maneuvering in the industrial space, 
providing those capabilities we just talked about at pace and 
at speed, any new starts, loss of buying power, there are 
critical disadvantages to a CR.
    Again, my assessment is it would be devastating.
    The Chairman. So I would take that as a no.
    Admiral Aquilino. Yes, sir.
    The Chairman. Great. The ranking member is recognized.
    Mr. Smith. Thank you. Just two questions. One, General 
LaCamera, what role do you see China playing in the North Korea 
challenge, both positive and negative in terms of containing 
that threat?
    General LaCamera. Thanks, Congressman. I don't see anything 
on the Korean peninsula that does not involve Chinese and 
Russian involvement with DPRK, and quite frankly with the ROK 
[Republic of Korea]. They have put economic pressure on the 
Republic of Korea in the past. And but, they also have their 
own people that are stationed in the Republic of Korea.
    So in a NEO [noncombatant evacuations operation] operation, 
getting them off the peninsula I think would be in their best 
interest.
    Mr. Smith. What would they do to put pressure on North 
Korea to not continue, to not do nuclear tests, to not to 
continue them?
    Are they just going to monitor it, or is there something 
that, you know, where if North Korea did this, China would 
leverage North Korea to try to get them at least somewhat under 
control? Or is China just going to go, not our thing?
    General LaCamera. No, they have--they are a treaty--they're 
their only treaty ally.
    Mr. Smith. Right.
    General LaCamera. The borders are back open, so there is 
goods that are coming back and forth across the border. I think 
they can put pressure on DPRK in that respect.
    Mr. Smith. Okay. And Admiral Aquilino, when you look at the 
broader China threat in terms of our allies and partners, can 
you sort of walk us through that world of those partners? I 
believe we have five treaty allies in the Indo-Pacific region.
    But then you also have a lot of other countries that are 
navigating the world between the U.S. and China and Russia. And 
that is the piece that I find most interesting about this, the 
way this plays out.
    If we are going to be successful in both containing the 
threat from China and Russia and hopefully nudging them towards 
a more cooperative rules-based approach to resolving 
differences, we are going to need the Indias, the Indonesias, 
Vietnam.
    So what does that look like and what is your strategy for 
trying to get as much help as possible out of all of the 
countries in the region?
    Admiral Aquilino. Yeah, thanks, Congressman. Certainly 
foundational to our strategic deterrence approach and 
integrated deterrence is the allies and partners, and it is an 
asymmetric advantage.
    Let me just say that the strategy and approach is 
competition, not containment. And the five treaty allies of 
Japan, Korea, Australia, Philippines, and Thailand are 
foundational, right. Those are mutual defense treaties that 
stand through Senate ratification and are truly important.
    But our approach is to pull in as many additional allies 
through a set of layers of mini- and multi-lateral engagements, 
operations, and work we do together for a variety of reasons.
    Number one, we are like-minded nations with common values. 
We have deep people-to-people ties, and that is beyond just the 
treaty allies. Indonesia, Malaysia, Bangladesh, all the nations 
in the region, and we operate and exercise with them 
frequently, 120 exercises a year. Deep engagements in the form 
of key leader and other events.
    So pulling that layer together, Congressman, is really 
important. And it is the asymmetric advantage, because it is 
the one thing China doesn't have, and that is partners.
    Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, I yield back.
    The Chairman. Chair now recognizes the gentleman from 
Colorado, Mr. Lamborn.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having this 
hearing. Thank you all for being here.
    Admiral Aquilino, one of my top priorities is accelerating 
our work on offensive and defensive hypersonic capabilities. 
China's significant investments in their hypersonics, which 
they view as an important element of their regional warfighting 
strategy, are extremely troubling.
    Their progress is undeniable. In 2021, they did an around-
the-world fractional orbital bombardment demonstration. They 
have intermediate-range hypersonic capability that can hit 
targets thousands of miles away and possibly penetrate our 
defenses.
    And by contrast, our progress has been slow and has lacked 
urgency. And I think we need if not quantitative parity, at 
least qualitative parity.
    Can you share the challenges you face in deterring China 
based on their current superiority in hypersonics, and what is 
your best military advice on the need for the U.S. to field 
these hypersonic capabilities?
    Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congressman. So again, in 
alignment with the theme that I have starred here today, we 
need to go faster, right. The concerning part about the PRC is 
both the pace, the speed, and the advanced capabilities that 
they continue to deliver and demonstrate. And to deliver a 
credible deterrent, we certainly need the ability to counter 
and/or exceed.
    Currently, our military far exceeds anything China can 
deliver. In this particular lane, we need to go faster.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. What can you tell us here in open 
session about what you know about their plans for hypersonics 
in this decade?
    Admiral Aquilino. I think we would have to take that in a 
classified hearing, Congressman.
    Mr. Lamborn. Okay, we will follow up on that. Also, 
Admiral, the pace of China's strategic nuclear breakout has 
been, as former STRATCOM [U.S. Strategic Command] Commander 
Admiral Richards said, breathtaking.
    We have learned recently that they have three new 
intercontinental ballistic missile fields. They have more 
mobile and land-based launchers for ICBMs than the U.S. They 
are working with Russia to produce plutonium now.
    So how should we respond to China's nuclear--ongoing 
nuclear breakout?
    Admiral Aquilino. So, sir, the speed at which the Chinese 
are delivering nuclear capability is certainly concerning. And 
Admiral Richards, and now General Cotton and I have had 
multiple conversations.
    One thing we ought to be concerned about, the Chinese 
narrative is that the United States is beginning a nuclear arms 
races in the Indo-Pacific. And the only nation that is 
delivering a nuclear arms race in the Indo-Pacific is China. 
You just articulated the foundation and the speed and 
capabilities they are delivering.
    So for the United States, our best strategy is to ensure 
that our force is modernized, and that we are able to hold a 
superior nuclear deterrent, as required.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thanks, Admiral. I will also point out, as you 
would agree, that the U.S. and Russia have engaged and are 
entering into, have entered into nuclear treaties, but not 
China.
    General LaCamera, can you describe the challenges you face 
to maintain deterrence on the Korean peninsula, giving their--
given the North Korean regime's ongoing missile testing and 
capabilities?
    General LaCamera. Thanks, Congressman. Our focus is on 
building readiness and focusing on all the warfighting 
functions in all the domains. Making sure that we are bringing 
in, you know, joint combined. So the focus is peace through 
strength and focusing on combat readiness.
    But also working with the interagency, because it is not 
just a military solution.
    Mr. Lamborn. Okay, thank you. Now, Assistant Secretary 
Royal, given the discussion we have just had about Chinese and 
North Korean nuclear ambitions, I am amazed that the 
Administration's fiscal year 2024 budget request once again 
attempts to cancel out funding for the Nuclear Sea-Launched 
Cruise Missile. I will call it SLCM-N.
    And I expect and hope that Congress will once again 
overrule that impulse and continue the funding and research on 
this, and do--on this critical capability.
    So, stepping back, how is the Biden administration going to 
address the growing Chinese nuclear threat? I hope it is not by 
canceling out other programs. How are we going to address these 
growing threats, and North Korea as well?
    Mr. Royal. The Nuclear Posture Review is quite clear-eyed 
in its approach to these challenges. We understand them fully. 
In the President's budget submission, we included $38 billion 
to modernize the nuclear triad. And we continue to look hard at 
our overall force posture, nuclear force posture and readiness.
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
    The Chair would like to recognize one of our former 
colleagues, a long-term member of this committee, John Kline, 
Colonel Kline. Good to be with--have you back with us.
    Now we'll go to, recognize Mr. Courtney for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the 
witnesses for being here.
    Just one quick point regarding the sea-launched missiles. 
Last year's budget, we actually included $25 million to have a 
fully thorough investigation by the Navy in terms of just the 
costs as well as the benefits of that program.
    So there is no--whatever sort of is out there, we did not 
kill that program. But we really need to understand with our 
eyes wide open what the operational impact will be for our 
ships and submarines if we start installing nuclear warheads 
on, you know, attack subs or other ships.
    Admiral Aquilino, in your testimony, you inventoried all 
the new cooperation that is going on with allies in the Indo-
Pacific region over the last year. And I am very impressed, 
even within the last few months it is really quite striking in 
terms of how quickly things are moving out there.
    Last month, at Naval Base Point Loma, President Biden, 
Australia Prime Minister Albanese, and U.K. [United Kingdom] 
Prime Minister Sunak released the, what they called the optimal 
pathway to implement AUKUS, which will include transferring to 
Australia conventional armed nuclear-powered submarines.
    Congress has work to do in terms of enabling that execution 
of the agreement in terms of just dealing with export controls 
and other issues there. But from your standpoint, can you state 
what the strategic benefit of this arrangement is in terms of 
sharing these precious assets?
    I mean, we are recapitalizing our own submarine fleet at 
the same time. But again, can you just sort of talk about what 
you see as the value of that arrangement?
    Admiral Aquilino. Yes, Congressman. Well, we articulated 
the concern for the strategic environment, right, as the PRC 
takes more aggressive actions. I think all of our partners are 
seeing that same activity, and it has got them concerned.
    So our work with both Australia and the United Kingdom as 
it applies to sharing some of our most sensitive technology in 
the form of nuclear propulsion and nuclear-powered submarines 
is a really large step.
    So as it applies to deterrence effect, additional nations 
with the capabilities that we have being completely 
interoperable at any point over the globe brings a strong 
deterrent value to the problem.
    Mr. Courtney. Thank you. And I think as you know, I mean, 
the last time we did this was with--and we have only done it 
once, was with one country, and that was in 1958. So I mean, 
obviously this is a huge step.
    And again, can you just talk about Australia's, you know, 
position regarding stewardship of these submarines, which is 
going to require obviously some training up to, you know, for 
their navy. But also just again their commitment to, again, 
complying with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. But and 
also having their own sovereign control over that fleet.
    Admiral Aquilino. Congressman, so as we know, Australia is 
one of our strongest partners and allies. They have shared 
blood and treasure with us for over 100 years in every conflict 
that we have ever been in. Again, when you talk about people-
to-people ties, they are deep. Our values, our interests.
    So, having the Australians as a part of this program, I 
have no worries at all about, you know, losing that technology 
elsewhere. They will treat it at the highest level. We also 
treat other technologies with the Australians as it applies to 
space and cyber in the same kind of vein.
    So I have no concerns about Australia taking this on and 
being able to be successful. And from my position, we are 
taking actions every day to ensure that we can deliver it as 
soon as possible.
    Mr. Courtney. Well, thank you. And again, your comments 
about moving faster, you know, I think also applies to Congress 
in terms of really getting these authorities aligned so this 
thing can really move in the--at the speed it requires.
    Mr. Royal, you also mentioned the AUKUS agreement in your 
testimony. And you know, one other part of the President's 
budget that came over was new funding, additional funding, $640 
million, for submarine industrial base capacity. Last year we 
actually put $750 million. That is again, workforce, supply 
chain, and facility.
    Again, can you talk about really how this is a critical 
piece of making sure that both our Navy and also that the AUKUS 
agreement can be, you know, have the capacity it needs?
    Mr. Royal. Congressman, your point is spot on with respect 
to resilience of the submarine industrial base. We believe that 
the budget submission there represents a sense of urgency with 
respect to maintaining the readiness of that force.
    I am also proud that Australia has now committed to invest 
in the defense industrial base for submarines as well, to the 
tune of $3 billion, and we are very confident that they will 
deliver on that.
    This represents a historic opportunity for us to be able to 
put increasing assets in the undersea domain and strengthen the 
interoperability with our closest allies. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank the gentleman. The chair now recognizes 
the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Wittman, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank 
our witnesses for joining us today.
    Admiral Aquilino, I want to begin with you. First of all, 
thanks so much for your leadership there in the Indo-Pacific 
Command. That is an incredibly challenging time. We want to 
make sure we continue the effort to deter the Chinese Communist 
Party and make sure we can continue to maintain a free and open 
Indo-Pacific.
    We also want to make sure too that the CCP and, for that 
matter Beijing, don't test our determination to make sure the 
Indo-Pacific stays as a free and open place in the world.
    I always think back to your predecessor's testimony here in 
2021, when Admiral Davidson said that he believed that China 
would make their move to reunify with Taiwan forcefully by 
2027.
    So I want to revisit that a little bit, and I want to ask, 
in your best professional military judgment, do you anticipate 
that Beijing will attempt to by force seek reunification with 
Taiwan before 2027?
    Admiral Aquilino. So Congressman, after having worked for 
Admiral Davidson, I know he came up with 2027. It was based on 
what Xi Jinping said, which was the challenge to his military 
to be prepared to execute a task by 2027. That was 
foundationally the approach of his comments.
    Now, for me, it doesn't matter what the timeline is. The 
Secretary could've given me this mission today. So I'm 
responsible to prevent this conflict today, and if deterrence 
were to fail, to be able to fight and win.
    So the timeline, everybody will have an opinion on when it 
is. I think everybody is guessing. The intent and need for 
the--for INDOPACOM, the Department, industry, and everybody to 
go faster will help prevent this conflict.
    Mr. Wittman. Let me ask this, then. In your best 
professional military judgment, based on the buildup of the 
Chinese Communist Party and all their military assets and where 
we are today with what we bring to the table across the joint 
force, do you believe that the threat today is greater than it 
has been in the past?
    Admiral Aquilino. I believe that the trends for the threat 
are in the wrong direction.
    Mr. Wittman. Okay.
    Admiral Aquilino. There is no doubt about that. But I will 
tell you, Congressman, that the United States military is ready 
today for any contingency.
    Mr. Wittman. As you see the future of where China is going 
and where the United States is going, when do you think the 
balance of forces will be such that it could, it could motivate 
China to say here is our opportunity?
    Admiral Aquilino. Yeah, I am not sure that it is a balance 
of forces issue. I think there is a ton of variables on what 
might motivate President Xi Jinping to take that action, 
Congressman. And it is our job to convince him every day that 
it would be a bad choice.
    Mr. Wittman. What is the most effective thing that we as 
the United States can do across the spectrum, strategically, 
economically, you name it, that has the greatest chance of 
deterring the Chinese Communist Party from forcefully 
reunifying Taiwan?
    Admiral Aquilino. As I stated, I think the PRC has taken on 
a whole-of-government approach to achieve their objectives. 
Again, diplomatic, military, informational, economic. And I 
think it is worth--now for me, I own the military piece in 
support of the Secretary.
    I think our approach and what we have laid out delivers a 
deterrent effect. The entire whole-of-government approaching it 
the same way would be good.
    And some of those things have occurred. The CHIPS [Creating 
Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors and Science] Act, 
supported by the Congress, was extremely effective. The ability 
to protect technologies that are sensitive and important to the 
United States is important.
    So we just need to compete across the entire spectrum, 
understanding that our security challenger will.
    Mr. Wittman. Got you. Based on your best professional 
military judgment, do you believe that with everything that we 
are doing, that we will be able to effectively deter China, not 
only now, but also in the future?
    Admiral Aquilino. I do. China is a near-, mid-, and long-
term challenge for us. So we need to deter today, tomorrow, and 
the next day. And I do believe we are doing that, sir.
    Mr. Wittman. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I yield 
back.
    The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. The chair now 
recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Garamendi, for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Gentleman, thank you very much for your testimony, for your 
work, and for your commitment.
    Two lines of questioning. We have discussed the allies in 
the Pacific in some detail, and thank you very much for making 
that clear and the importance of it. But we have not yet 
discussed another set of potential allies in the area, and 
these are the Freely Associated States--Palau, Marshall 
Islands, and Micronesia.
    Mr. Royal, could you please talk to this issue, what we 
need to do in that regard? And then Admiral Aquilino, if you 
could follow up.
    Mr. Royal. Congressman, thank you. We enjoy a substantial 
relationship with the Freely Associated States. I think that we 
have been extended some very favorable military terms. We have 
just completed some memoranda of agreement with these states 
for future access basing with the U.S. military.
    This is an extraordinary relationship that we share with 
them. And in fact, I would just point out, their participation 
per capita in the U.S. military is higher than anywhere--any 
other part of the United States. And so we are very grateful 
for their service involved here.
    We have the funding package that we have put forward onto 
the--to Capitol Hill here to make sure that we can continue 
this arrangement going forward, and would ask for Congress' 
support with that funding package.
    Mr. Garamendi. And that is also Palau, Marshall Islands, 
Micronesia?
    Mr. Royal. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Garamendi. Very good. Admiral.
    Admiral Aquilino. Yes, sir. So I just got back from Yap and 
Pohnpei. As was stated, the amount of people who have served in 
the United States military, I met with about 25 people. I think 
15 of them of them had service. Really impressive.
    That said, we defend the Freely Associated States as if 
they are the U.S. homeland. So that history goes back. They 
were critical to our success in World War II. They are 
critical, and they are strategically located. So it is really 
important we get this agreement done.
    Mr. Garamendi. Very good, thank you. I would like now to 
turn to the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, $11--$11\1/2\ 
billion authorized in 2023.
    Admiral, if you could bring us up to date on the usefulness 
of that. What else you might need, or how you are deploying 
that $11\1/2\ billion.
    Admiral Aquilino. Thank you, sir. So as you know, this body 
has passed a law that requires me to submit an independent 
assessment identifying the capabilities and the needs from 
INDOPACOM to support both the deterrence and defend-the-nation 
mission.
    And as a part of this year's 1254, we identified the 
requirements as needed. That language articulates that 
INDOPACOM should provide that input to inform a PDI [Pacific 
Deterrence Initiative]. And as PDI is calculated inside of the 
Department, my needs were identified and recognized.
    Mr. Garamendi. In the upcoming NDAA, do you have 
recommendations for enhancement, modification, changes in the 
language or authorities?
    Admiral Aquilino. I don't, sir. I think the articulation as 
it applies I think meets both the intent of this body, and I am 
glad to provide my requirements.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you. I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank the gentleman. The chair now recognizes 
the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Scott, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Scott. Thank you, Chairman.
    Gentlemen, thank you for being here. Ranking Member Smith 
started talking about China and partnerships and how they 
conduct themselves. And you know, it is pretty clear to those 
of us on this committee and paying attention that China, 
Communist China, operates in the best interest of Communist 
China without regard for who they hurt or any of the rules.
    And I have every faith in the world that if a situation 
kicked off with Taiwan, that between the United States and our 
partners, we could win that.
    I am concerned, as the PRC has this whole-of-government, 
whole-of-world approach, though, that they are embedding 
themselves into the U.S. economy in such a way that even if we 
win the war, it would destroy our economy inside the United 
States.
    And Admiral Aquilino, are you aware that less than 15 days 
after Communist China flew the spy balloon over the United 
States, that Ford Motor Company announced a multibillion dollar 
deal with Communist China to purchase their battery technology?
    Admiral Aquilino. I did read something about that, 
Congressman.
    Mr. Scott. I think we have to be very careful when we use 
the heavy hand of government. But I will tell you, if corporate 
America is going to, less than 15 days after Communist China 
does that to the United States, announce a multibillion dollar 
partnership with Communist China, I do think that the DOD 
[Department of Defense] needs to reach out to corporate America 
and say you know what, if you buy that technology from China, 
the DOD is not going to buy that technology from you.
    And I just think this is one of those few instances where 
we are going to have to use that heavy hand to press back on 
corporate America and how deep they continue to embed 
themselves with Communist China and the financial ties there.
    Every faith in the world in our ability to beat China in a 
war. I am not sure how we do it if our--if corporate America 
continues to get in bed with them like that.
    But I want to, with that said, Mr. Royal, I'm concerned--
Admiral Aquilino said that the trend was moving in the wrong 
direction. I am concerned it is moving in the wrong direction.
    I was a little taken aback at the President of France 
going, with everything going on between Russia and China right 
now in their alliance in Ukraine, I was a little taken aback 
that the President of France went and sat down with Xi Jinping. 
Is he trying to protect France's investments in Africa? What is 
going on there?
    Mr. Royal. Congressman, we were in touch with the French 
counterparts during the course of that visit and we have been 
in touch with our European allies very closely about the 
challenges that we see the PRC representing in the Indo-Pacific 
region.
    We are very much impressed with the nature and the trend of 
the NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] strategic concept 
and the way that it describes the PRC challenge to Europe. We 
have also seen progress in the EU's [European Union's] new 
white paper and the way that they talk about China as well.
    So we believe that the conversation with Europe is 
advancing with respect to the nature of this challenge. And we 
also appreciate the fact that the French are sending surface 
combatants into the region and sailing where international law 
allows in the Indo-Pacific region.
    Mr. Scott. But he did take, I mean, Europe is one thing. 
France is a part of Europe. But what Macron did, it seemed to 
be selfish and individualistic and not in the best interests of 
what is happening in the world at this stage. Are you defending 
him?
    Mr. Royal. Congressman, I am not defending President Macron 
or any other European leader. I am telling you that our 
relationship with Europe is strong. We continue to advance the 
dialog and the discourse about the nature of the PRC threat. 
And we are seeing positive trend lines there in our engagement 
throughout Europe.
    Mr. Scott. Okay. Well, I just, I want to--I want you to 
know I have every faith in the world in our ability to handle 
China militarily.
    I'm very concerned about what I saw, I think Ford Motor 
Company is the best example, where less than 15 days after the 
Chinese flew a spy balloon across the United States targeting 
U.S. military installations, Ford Motor Company--and for the 
record, I drive an F-350, I am a Ford guy--partners with 
Communist China on their battery technology.
    And I think that we have to bust those alliances between 
corporate America and Communist China. With that, I yield.
    The Chairman. Thank the gentleman. The chair now recognizes 
the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Gallego, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Mr. Royal, in your written testimony you highlighted the 
increasingly provocative conventional military activity that 
the PLA is conducting. I am also concerned about the threat in 
the gray zone and believe that irregular warfare training in 
the region and especially in Taiwan is crucial.
    Do you believe the Department has the authorities it needs 
for special operations forces to collaborate with allies and 
partners in irregular warfare? And where can we further deepen 
or expand irregular warfare programs with allied and partner 
forces in the Indo-Pacific?
    Mr. Royal. Thank you, Congressman. Our special operations 
forces amount to a real strategic advantage for the United 
States. They complement and enable the strategy that we have 
articulated through the National Defense Strategy, and our 
budget reflects the importance and the value that they bring to 
the Indo-Pacific region.
    It is important right now for us to focus on how we 
modernize our special operations forces, making sure that they 
are well-connected to the other components in the Department. 
And that they focus on that enabling capability going forward. 
But we believe that that is well-captured within the budget 
submission.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Mr. Royal. As a follow-up, I also 
want to ask you about Chinese disinformation efforts in the 
region.
    Have you seen a change in the approach to how the CCP 
conducts disinformation campaigns since the start of Russia's 
second invasion of Ukraine? And what lessons do you believe 
China is drawing from Russia's example in the disinformation 
space?
    Mr. Royal. Congressman, I think some of that discussion is 
best left to a classified session. I will say that the PRC has 
demonstrated a significant appetite in its coercion campaign, 
and that is certainly inclusive of a misinformation/
disinformation effort associated with that.
    If we look at the high-altitude balloon, to me that is a 
very good example of the kind of intrusion that you are 
looking--that the PRC is undertaking in a variety of domains 
right now.
    Mr. Gallego. Okay. Admiral Aquilino, thank you for your 
testimony. I want to ask you about the no-limits strategic 
partnership between Russia and China that you referenced in 
your written statement.
    Can you talk about what this enhanced relationship means in 
practice for military forces in the region, and is there a 
tangible effect on the security situation in the Indo-Pacific 
that we have noticed or we will be noticing?
    Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congressman. This kind of ties to 
a couple of your questions here to Jed, because this is a 
different space, right.
    Two large authoritarian nations coming together in an 
attempt to change the world order in ways that are beneficial 
to authoritarian governments vice the rest of the world. That 
is a pretty concerning space to be in.
    Whether it is impact into the U.N. [United Nations] or 
ability to stifle any, you know, agreements that go forward, 
that is the approach. They have no friends. They have 
identified that it is better if they are together in order to 
achieve their strategic objectives. That is a concerning world.
    It ties directly to the misinformation/disinformation 
question. The PRC has been echoing Chinese, or excuse me, 
Russian disinformation in direct support, articulating that the 
war was--their war against Ukraine was derived from an 
expansion of NATO. Just not true.
    So, misinformation, disinformation in today's day and age 
is concerning, weaving through that mess, and the PRC have a 
million-man propaganda arm to generate it.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, and I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank the gentleman. The chair now recognizes 
the gentleman from Tennessee, Dr. DesJarlais, for 5 minutes.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you, Chairman.
    Mr. Royal, on three separate occasions we have seen 
President Biden commit the United States to the defense of 
Taiwan in a potential conflict with China, only to see his 
comments walked back by those in his administration.
    So I would ask who is driving policy in this administration 
on China and Taiwan? Is it the President of the United States, 
or unelected bureaucrats and appointees within the State 
Department, Pentagon, and White House?
    Mr. Royal. Congressman, the Department stands by the Taiwan 
Relations Act, the Three Joint Communiques, and the Six 
Assurances as the foundation of our relationship with Taiwan. 
We continue to believe that our relationship there is aided 
well by the relationship we have.
    We have maintained it on a variety of levels with key 
leader engagements and tight, cohesive understanding of one 
another's defense requirements. And we spend a lot of time 
talking about the PRC pacing challenge as we are observing it 
operate in the region.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay, well, we like to talk about strategic 
ambiguity. Do you think President Xi has been ambiguous at all 
in his intentions on Taiwan?
    Mr. Royal. Congressman, we agree with you that President Xi 
has been very assertive in his approach to conducting a 
coercion campaign against Taiwan. We believe that he does 
intend to build a capable force that could stand to threaten 
Taiwan over time.
    Dr. DesJarlais. And would you agree that our Commander in 
Chief has been pretty clear in his position on the United 
States commitments to the defense of Taiwan?
    Mr. Royal. Congressman, I believe that the President has 
been clear with his intentions. I certainly wouldn't want to 
speak for him.
    I will say again that the Taiwan Relations Act continues to 
guide our engagement with Taiwan, including supporting their 
self-defense and making sure that we are in a position, as the 
United States military, to counter any coercive activity in the 
region.
    Dr. DesJarlais. What I struggle with on this committee when 
I go back home and talk to constituents, and I have heard other 
members say the same thing, is how do we message things like 
China/Taiwan, how do we message Russia and Ukraine. And it 
seems when we don't really know what the endgame is, it is hard 
to do that.
    We have asked specifically what is the endgame in Ukraine, 
and there's not a clear answer. Is there a clear answer for 
what the endgame would be if China invades Taiwan?
    Mr. Royal. Congressman, I won't engage in hypotheticals on 
future invasions. I will say that invasion is neither imminent 
nor inevitable. And the work that we are doing in the 
Department every single day is to focus on deterrence. And we 
do that by increasing our lethality, our posture, and our 
readiness.
    We will continue to operate by the Taiwan Relations Act. 
And we will continue to work on counter-coercion readiness 
within the U.S. military to do that, and to ensure that we are 
supporting Taiwan in their ability to defend themselves.
    Dr. DesJarlais. But we seem to be struggling within the 
military on recruiting and other issues and morale. And I think 
maybe a lot of it is due to strategic ambiguity and nobody 
really knows what's going on within our military.
    We seem unclear about what our strategy in Ukraine is. We 
are getting mixed message from our Commander in Chief and our 
State Department and Pentagon on China/Taiwan.
    In the past, I remember Presidents going on TV and 
addressing the Nation. We can only reach so many people from 
within this committee or Congress, and you guys have the same 
challenges.
    I mean, would it be important for the President to go on TV 
and maybe address the Nation on what is happening in Ukraine, 
what our strategy is there, and what our strategy would be? And 
let President Xi know clearly where the United States stands, 
and maybe some of our allies would come along.
    Mr. Royal. Congressman, I will defer to the White House on 
the President's on-air time. Again, I think that the President 
is asking us to do the daily job of deterrence. And that he has 
submitted a budget that represents a real qualitative 
investment in our ability to maintain deterrence in the region.
    Dr. DesJarlais. The saber-rattling about blockades in the 
Taiwan Strait and certainly China's aggression in the South 
China Sea, we know that, you know, half the world trade goes 
through that area.
    It seems like, as Representative Scott mentioned a minute 
ago, what corporations are doing financially with China may be 
the best way to get their attention. And certainly they can 
have a blockade of things coming it.
    Is it possible we could have a blockade of things going 
out? I know it would impact all of us financially, but if--the 
best way to win this pending war is to not fight it.
    So I guess I would just like to see more unification of our 
allies, more talk from Japan, Australia, and people who are 
committed. And maybe a better strategy economically to help 
deter China. But deterrence did not work with Russia, and I 
hope we can do better moving forward with China/Taiwan.
    And I thank you for you all being here today.
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired. Chair now 
recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Khanna, for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Khanna. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Admiral Aquilino, thank 
you for your leadership. You have spoken about the importance 
of the strategic relationship with India.
    I co-chair with Michael Waltz the U.S.-India Caucus. And on 
April 26, we have a major summit with Secretary Mattis, the 
ambassadors, others. I hope if you are in the country you may 
be able to participate or send someone. But I would like you to 
reflect on the importance of the relationship post-colonialism.
    India and China had a relationship to emerge as the Asian 
voice. But that relationship now has really soured with a 
concern that there should not be a hegemon in Asia and that 
China is treating other countries as junior partners. It seems 
to me that gives us an opportunity to ensure that China doesn't 
emerge as an hegemon, to strengthen the relationship with 
India. And I would like to get your thoughts.
    Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congressman. So we value our 
partnership with India, and we have been increasing it and 
doing a lot more over time. They have the same primary security 
challenger that we do, and it is real on their northern border.
    Two skirmishes now over the past 9 or 10 months on that 
border as they continue to get pressurized by the PRC for 
border gains. So we have the same security challengers. We also 
have the desire to operate together based on they're the 
world's largest democracy.
    We have common values and we also have people-to-people 
ties for a number of years. I met with General Chauhan, my 
counterpart at the Raisina Dialogue not long ago. I have been 
to India five times now in the past 2 years.
    So the importance of that relationship can't be overstated. 
We operate together frequently with the Quad nations. Again, 
the Quad is not a security agreement.
    It is diplomatic and economic. But the Quad nations come 
together often to operate together in multiple exercises. So we 
continue to work to be interoperable and to expand the 
relationship.
    Mr. Khanna. And I appreciate that. And we will follow up 
with your office if you are in the country or have someone for 
the April 26 summit. One question, I was out with 
Representative Mike Gallagher who chairs the China Select 
Committee, and we were out at Stanford.
    And I was struck by Oriana Skylar Mastro who is a professor 
there. And she wrote in the paper, The Taiwan Temptation, and a 
concern that are we deployed enough, do we have the capability 
if there was a blockade or an invasion of Taiwan. And in this 
article, she makes the argument that we don't, that we don't 
have enough long-range missiles to actually shoot down Chinese 
ships and that this makes our deterrence weak. I mean, I am not 
summarizing in all detail, but that was the gist of it. Do you 
have a sense, or anyone on the panel, if that is accurate, do 
we need more capability to make sure we have effective 
deterrence?
    Admiral Aquilino. So today, Congressman, let me just 
articulate that the INDOPACOM command is ready and prepared for 
any contingency. That said, as we talked about before, the 
challenger is moving fast, experimenting and delivering 
additional capabilities. And I think that the Department's 
budget as it applies and again I have given my 1254 report to 
articulate the capabilities that I think I need. So the 
delivery of those and again at speed and as fast as possible I 
believe would continue that deterrence both today and into the 
future.
    Mr. Royal. Mr. Congressman, I would add that we are deeply 
interested in seeing increasing responsiveness from the U.S. 
defense industrial base. This budget puts a lot of money into 
making sure that our defense industrial base is even more 
competitive, including $30 billion towards munitions, Tomahawk, 
LRASM [Long Range Anti-Ship Missile], SM-6, and others and $11 
billion towards hyper- and subsonic weapon systems as well. So 
we are building, including through the multiyear procurement 
authority that Congress has now provided to the Department, a 
deeper stock of munitions within the defense industrial base to 
meet the challenge you described.
    Mr. Khanna. Thank you. I would just say that from my 
perspective, the more we can do to have effective deterrence 
that China understands, the better in terms of avoiding war. 
And so I would be interested in hearing how we can have the 
most effective deterrence possible. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. Chair now recognizes 
the gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Gallagher, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Gallagher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, the fiscal 
year 2023 NDAA directs DOD to conduct war games, tabletop 
exercises, and most importantly, operational exercises with 
Taiwan's armed forces. I sort of view this as the least 
expensive way to build operational expertise and create a force 
capable of deterring an adversary. When can we expect to see 
the first exercises between the U.S. Navy and Air Force and 
their Taiwanese counterparts?
    Admiral Aquilino. So Congressman, thanks. I would like to 
talk to you in a classified hearing about the schedule for our 
operations. I think that would be most beneficial.
    Mr. Gallagher. I guess in an unclassified setting, when you 
wargame these scenarios, put aside the operational exercises, 
are you assuming some level of interoperability with Taiwanese 
forces?
    Admiral Aquilino. Absolutely, both. As you know how war 
games work, right, you can pick the time. We can wargame what 
does today look like, what does 2 years from now, what does 4 
years from now look like. So we look at all those in order to 
ensure that we've got a broad view and we leave no holes in our 
understanding and analysis.
    Mr. Gallagher. While we are on the subject of wargaming, 
tomorrow night, the Subcommittee on the Chinese Communist Party 
is going to be conducting a war game. And I think for a lot of 
our members, it will be an opportunity to participate in a war 
game that haven't done that before. It is going to be Taiwan 
focused, Indo-Pacific focused.
    Usually when we run these war games, one thing quickly 
becomes apparent. We go Winchester on critical weapon systems. 
We run out of long-range fires in particular.
    I would be curious to get your view on that. What worries 
you about the stockpiles of long-range fires that we have west 
of the International Date Line? And what do you think is our 
best way to start replenishing our stockpiles to make sure that 
you have what you need in theater prior to the shooting 
starting?
    Admiral Aquilino. So thanks, Congressman. First, let me 
just make sure--I want to make sure how you know I look at war 
games, right? Wargaming is a learning objective. So when people 
talk about, hey, who one, who lost, wargaming is not about 
that. It is about learning and understanding vulnerabilities, 
strengths, and helps you go forward and figure out how to 
adjust and what you might need.
    So when you go into this event, I hope looking at it in the 
same way. With regard to the munitions piece, again, I would 
like to talk in a classified setting over the specific issues. 
That said, I am not too worried as it applies to our ability to 
deter and then deliver effective contingency operations if 
required.
    Mr. Gallagher. You are not too worried?
    Admiral Aquilino. I am not worried. What I would like is 
the acceleration of those things identified in the budget. And 
in my 1254 report, I have made those requirements be known.
    Mr. Gallagher. Interesting. So even in a scenario that goes 
kinetic, you are not worried about the sufficiency of our 
stockpiles and our magazine capacity right now?
    Admiral Aquilino. I am not worried about the United States 
ability to respond. Again, we can talk about specific munitions 
in a classified setting.
    Mr. Gallagher. Okay. I mean, that surprises me. I guess it 
goes counter to what little I know from playing a few war games 
here or there. But I am not living it in the Indo-Pacific every 
day like you are.
    Quickly, General, I believe this year at the end of July we 
will celebrate the 73rd anniversary of the Korean armistice 
agreement. This is referred to as America's forgotten war. The 
irony is that in China they have not forgotten it.
    In fact, they celebrate it. The highest grossing Chinese 
movie of all time is ``The Battle [at] Lake Changjin,'' which 
is sort of a creative retelling of the Battle of Chosen 
Reservoir. I have sort of an oddball historically focused 
question, but what lessons do you believe that this forgotten 
war offers for contemporary national security strategists and 
planners?
    General LaCamera. Thanks, Congressman. Be ready. I mean, 
that is ``This Kind of War''; we weren't prepared. So what this 
says for us is my main effort of being prepared, combat 
readiness, and evolving as the enemy evolves and looking at it 
through not just a land fight but making sure that we can fight 
in all the domains and we have the capabilities to be able to 
do that. So it would be the 73rd anniversary of the beginning 
of the war and the 70th anniversary of the armistice which we 
are going to celebrate throughout--we have been celebrating 
throughout the year. But it will culminate in the fall time 
with the Koreans.
    Mr. Gallagher. [Inaudible] that you mentioned ``This Kind 
of War.'' Can I assume that is on your reading list such as it 
exists?
    [Simultaneous speaking.]
    General LaCamera. When I was a captain, I read it, yes.
    Mr. Gallagher. Fantastic. All right. I yield.
    The Chairman. Chair now recognizes the gentleman from 
California, Mr. Carbajal, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to all 
the witnesses for being here today. INDOPACOM hosts a broad 
range of challenges, most notably the People's Republic of 
China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, but also 
the increasing effects of climate change and building on 
relationships with several allies and partnerships.
    The PRC is steadily building up their space and anti-space 
capabilities. In 2022, they executed 64 launches alone.
    Admiral Aquilino, can you speak to the importance of 
maintaining space superiority in the INDOPACOM AOR [area of 
responsibility], especially as the PRC, our pacing threat, is 
making advancements in this domain? And can you speak to how 
maintaining fiscal year 2022 funding levels would impact our 
superiority?
    Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congressman. So as it applies to 
deterring and then should deterrence fail being able to fight 
and win in space is critical as we integrate all domains, under 
sea, on the sea, above the sea, in space and cyberspace. The 
synchronization of those effects happens every day in 
INDOPACOM. And the space layer is an enabler for the 
terrestrial force.
    We absolutely need to maintain our superior advantage and 
continue to invest as we expand in space. If we were to reduce 
the investment, I have already identified in my 1254 report 
some shortfalls that we believe are beneficial. But if we were 
to fall back, that would also be impactful.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. Admiral, the second item on your 
unfunded priority list from this year is to operationalize 
near-term space control. Can you expand on what factors 
contributed to this ending up on your UPL?
    Admiral Aquilino. I would rather do that in a classified 
setting, sir.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. Admiral Aquilino, it seems that a 
majority of space programs in development in the INDOPACOM AOR 
are protected at the highest levels of classification. I think 
we all share the goal of wanting to prevent any escalation in 
the region and believe strategic deterrence is key. Strategic 
deterrence is only possible if the deterrent is known to our 
adversaries at some level. Is INDOPACOM thinking through what 
space programs we should declassify as a strategic deterrent to 
the PRC ambitions in the space domain?
    Admiral Aquilino. Yes, sir. We do that all the time. 
Certainly, there is the ability for the security challenger to 
understand what we do. In space, there are capabilities that 
can do that for him.
    We treat all of our capabilities. We look at them in a way 
such that we protect what we need to protect. And for those 
that we don't believe we need to protect, we allow those to be 
seen. We do that with thoughtfulness to ensure we get it right. 
But we have to protect those things that are critical for the 
United States defense.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. We know that the INDOPACOM area 
responsibility is on the front lines of climate change, 
experiencing increasingly frequent disruptive storms and sea 
level rise that is already encroaching on military 
installations and training ranges. While these weather events 
lead to demand for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, 
they also directly impact defense infrastructure in the region. 
The Army commissioned a study in 2018 that show that many 
Pacific islands, including Kwajalein Atoll, home of Ronald 
Reagan's ballistic missile defense test site, are at risk of 
experiencing significant climate impacts by mid-century. 
Secretary Royal, how is the Department planning for and seeking 
to mitigate these risks as we look at force posture in the 
region?
    Mr. Royal. Congressman, thank you for that question. The 
climate change does fold into the National Defense Strategy. It 
is a growing challenge that we understand. It is certainly one 
that we spend a lot of time talking to our partners in the 
Indo-Pacific, particularly Pacific island nations, where we see 
the effects of climate change occurring rapidly.
    Part of our strategy here is to not only recognize it but 
to make sure that we are thinking about areas to mitigate the 
impacts of climate change, including greater energy resilience, 
better infrastructure that protects against the erosion of 
rising sea waters, et cetera. So I believe that we have 
captured that well. And we certainly are funding against that 
in the President's budget submission.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back.
    The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. Chair now recognizes 
the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Gaetz, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Gaetz. Days ago in The Washington Post, ``in 
Washington, military planners are realizing that China has 
surpassed the United States in hypersonic military 
technology.'' Does anyone seated at the table disagree with 
that assessment?
    Mr. Royal. Congressman, I think in terms of assessments, we 
should probably take that to a classified discussion.
    Mr. Gaetz. Well, it has been sort of unclassified without 
our consent. We had this leak that showed that China could 
launch one of these hypersonic glide capabilities 2,100 
kilometers, that it could get there in 12 minutes. And I 
actually don't think it is that--can't be too classified 
because it was a year ago, Admiral, that you were before the 
Senate Armed Services Committee.
    And you seemed to be giving the warning at that time that 
we saw manifest in this leak. You said, quote, ``The Hypersonic 
Glide Vehicle threat poses a serious threat to the U.S. and 
allied forces in the region and we require a near-term initial 
defense capability to meet this challenge.'' I read in between 
the lines of that to say you require the capability in the near 
term because you didn't have the capability when you gave this 
testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, not in a 
classified setting but in open hearing. So I guess my question 
to you, because I sense you are the truth-teller on a lot of 
these things, have you acquired the capability since this 
testimony?
    Admiral Aquilino. The Department is working on the ability 
to do hypersonic defense, Congressman. Again, I stand by what I 
said. I am concerned about it and we----
    Mr. Gaetz. And it is still true today. That statement that 
you made to the Senate Armed Services Committee in 2021, you 
wouldn't revise that or change that? That is true as we sit 
here today?
    Admiral Aquilino. It is.
    Mr. Gaetz. And so what I observe about our posture in 
INDOPACOM is that for the last 30 years the United States has 
been building aircraft carriers that will never get into the 
fight. And we have spent years building littoral combat ships, 
Mr. Smith, that will never get into the fight. And while you 
have been giving us the accurate information, you gave it to us 
now, you gave it to the Senate a year ago, the truth is we have 
not made a sufficient investment in hypersonic defense in order 
to ensure that we have this credible deterrent threat. Isn't 
that right, Admiral?
    Admiral Aquilino. Sir, if you look at the report as it 
applies to our Guam defense system, we have identified the need 
for that capability.
    Mr. Gaetz. Right. And so I guess how do our littoral combat 
ships ever get into the fight in a China/Taiwan scenario?
    Admiral Aquilino. Well, again, I think that would be better 
in a classified setting.
    Mr. Gaetz. I think it is not going to happen. I think 
whether it is classified or not classified, can we hit a moving 
target with our hypersonic offense?
    Admiral Aquilino. Again, sir, I think we ought to take 
those capabilities discussion----
    Mr. Gaetz. Well, okay. So if I----
    Admiral Aquilino [continuing]. To a closed----
    Mr. Gaetz [continuing]. Represent to you that China can hit 
a moving target and we can't hit a moving target, do you have 
any basis in this setting that you can share with me to rebut 
that assertion?
    Admiral Aquilino. I disagree that we can't hit a moving 
target.
    Mr. Gaetz. Oh, you think with our hypersonic capability?
    Admiral Aquilino. I didn't say with a hypersonic 
capability.
    Mr. Gaetz. Okay. But that is what I am talking about 
because of course we can hit moving targets. But with a 
hypersonic capability, it changes the deterrence analysis 
because the time window shortens considerably, as this leak of 
classified information tells us kind of as you told us a year 
ago. And so I know that there will be great bloodlust to go 
after the leaker of this information.
    It is never okay to leak classified information, especially 
when it could potentially put people at risk. What I wonder is, 
who is going to be punished more, the knucklehead who leaked 
this information or the generals and admirals and so-called 
experts who have sat before this committee and the Senate for 
decades saying that these capabilities that we were funding 
with gajillions of dollars were going to sufficiently deter 
China? And what you said last year, what you have confirmed 
now, is that we need a capability in the near term that we do 
not have.
    What this leak shows is that China has it and we don't. And 
yet we continue to build ships that will never get in the 
fight. We continue to support these endeavors that don't 
enhance deterrence. But if the right Senator or Congressman or 
lobbyist is for them, we do them. And I think that is--while it 
is never okay to leak classified information, I think that is 
what animates the concern among some of our even youngest and 
most inexperienced service members that we are not really 
positioning to win this fight.
    And we have got too many grifters who roll in and out of 
the Pentagon, to defense contractors. And some of them even 
become Secretary of Defense thereafter. And I think it is 
disgraceful and is not worthy of a true Pacific power like the 
United States.
    Mr. Smith. Thank you. I am not sure why the gentleman kept 
looking at me throughout that whole thing. I actually had the 
amendment on the floor last year to defund the littoral combat 
ship. I am not sure how the gentleman voted on that amendment.
    Mr. Gaetz. I voted wrong.
    Mr. Smith. Okay. Well, that is good to know. Interesting. I 
will say, and I know we can't talk about it in detail, there 
are massive investments in the President's budget in hypersonic 
missiles. There is no question that we were behind.
    And by the way, we were behind under the last 
administration as well. And in the last couple years, we have 
made massive investments into hypersonics. We don't want to get 
into details what works or not, but we recognize the threat.
    And I would urge this time the gentleman to join me when we 
try to move money away from those platforms that aren't going 
to be as useful and into those platforms that are useful. I 
just wanted to be clear. Thank you. I yield back.
    The Chairman. Chair would advise members not to display 
classified information whether it has been leaked or not in 
open hearings. Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from New 
Jersey, Ms. Sherrill, for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Sherrill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Mr. Royal, 
Admiral Aquilino, did you want to say anything about our 
classified information, how important it is that we protect 
that in our military despite any arguments about where we need 
to move in this committee?
    Mr. Royal. Congresswoman, I will offer that this appears to 
be a disgraceful criminal act that has occurred and it is very 
serious. The Department is taking it with the highest degree of 
seriousness. We, every single day, have the responsibility to 
protect information and make sure that our classified 
information remains ours.
    We are supporting the Department of Justice. We have been 
very clear in offering every bit of support that we possibly 
can to help them in their investigation. We are conducting 
outreach with allies and partners to make sure that they are 
also understanding what the position of the Department is in 
this process.
    I do want to be clear on this point. This will not knock us 
off of our strategy, off of our campaigning approach with 
integrated deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region. It is an 
exceptionally unfortunate situation that does come with 
national security consequence, but it will not knock us off of 
our approach.
    Ms. Sherrill. Thank you. I think the gentleman from Florida 
raised some very good points. But I just wanted to highlight 
that people put themselves, their lives, their family's lives 
in danger to bring us this information.
    And it is really important to me that we understand how 
dangerous it is to people working very hard for the United 
States of America around the world when these things are 
leaked. Thank you very much. I would also like to thank you for 
your service and commitment to keeping our Nation and our 
troops safe, especially as our country and the world grapples 
with a variety of complex and nontraditional threats, including 
the increasing aggressiveness and nuclear posturing of North 
Korea, aggressive and coercive transgressions from China in the 
region, cybersecurity threats and disinformation campaigns, 
climate change, and increases in natural disasters as well as 
supply chain shortages.
    So INDOPACOM, the region is not an easy one. But thank you 
for your service. So Secretary Royal and Admiral Aquilino, we 
are currently conducting our largest ever joint exercise with 
the Philippines. With the new leadership in the Philippines, 
how does our renewed relationship impact our freedom of 
navigation operations for sea lanes in the South China Sea?
    Mr. Royal. Congresswoman, we are enjoying strategic 
convergence with the government of the Philippines and 
operating in a manner that is stronger than ever. Training 
exercises, information sharing, and our ability to respond 
quickly to any kind of contingency that may arise right now. I 
was really proud when we were able to secure access to four new 
strategic locations through the EDCA [Enhanced Defense 
Cooperation Arrangement] sites with the government of the 
Philippines.
    These will offer the opportunity for opening the aperture 
of our ability to respond with the Philippines in a timely 
fashion and responsive fashion to any contingency, particularly 
humanitarian affairs and disaster relief have already been 
identified there. We believe this relationship has a lot of 
wind in its sails. It is definitely moving forward in the right 
direction, and we are seeing the outcomes of that every single 
day.
    Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congresswoman. So again, the 
mutual defense treaty with the Philippines is critical. They 
are a great partner.
    General Santino is my counterpart and a good friend. 
Minister Galvez who just recently took over is a wonderful 
partner. And they are facing some challenges, right?
    The PRC has claims that are inside the Philippine exclusive 
economic zone. Those claims went through an international 
tribunal. They were articulated as they were not legal in the 
international world order as defined.
    Yet the PRC continues to pressurize our Philippine 
counterparts. So it is really important that we continue to 
maintain support. We operate with them. As you said, Balikatan 
is going on right now. We do combined patrols and we support 
our Philippine partners everywhere.
    Ms. Sherrill. And I think traditionally, we have struggled 
a bit to get support from our allies in the region on our 
freedom of navigation [FON] exercises. Can you talk a little 
bit about the support we are receiving from our allies to date?
    Admiral Aquilino. Thanks. Let me start by articulating. So 
the freedom of navigation events that we execute are designed 
to demonstrate what the interpreted international law and order 
looks like. We don't FON countries. We challenge excessive 
claims, and it is supported by our partners in the nation--in 
the region.
    Ms. Sherrill. Thank you, and I yield back.
    The Chairman. Chair now recognizes the gentleman from 
Nebraska, General Bacon, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank all three of 
you for being here today. These are very important discussions, 
and your perspectives are vitally important.
    We have been talking for about 8 years a pivot to Asia. We 
have talked about China being the pacing threat, near-peer 
competitor threat. But I don't know--I have seen the talk. I 
have seen the strategy documents.
    I don't know that we have actually seen as much physical 
movement. So I would ask you, Admiral, if I may. How much has 
the Navy increased its size or presence in the Pacific the last 
couple years?
    Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congressman. So the Navy is 
postured; 60 percent of the maritime forces is in the Pacific. 
Forty percent is on the east coast.
    Mr. Bacon. Has that been an increase over the last 2 years?
    Admiral Aquilino. That has been in place now for at least 3 
years.
    Mr. Bacon. Three years?
    Admiral Aquilino. And a little bit before that.
    Mr. Bacon. How about the Air Force? Because I have seen 
some units being withdrawn from the Pacific.
    Admiral Aquilino. As we align and execute the National 
Defense Strategy, the positioning of those forces certainly 
would be beneficial to be maintained inside of the first island 
chain where they are postured. Our forward stationed Air 
Forces, I have supported those forces to remain in place and/or 
be replaced by equivalent capability and numbers.
    Mr. Bacon. But would it be accurate to say we have seen an 
actual decline in air order of battle in Asia? I see the talk 
but I don't know if I see the actual physical presence.
    Admiral Aquilino. I would have to go back and take a look 
at that, Congressman. Overall, the force has gotten smaller, 
right?
    Mr. Bacon. Yes.
    Admiral Aquilino. There is no doubt about that. So whether 
it is distributed or where it has been pulled from, I'd have to 
go look at.
    Mr. Bacon. One of the concerns that we have is over the 
FYDP [Future Years Defense Program], the Air Force will shrink 
by about 400 fighters. What kind of concerns does this give 
you?
    Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congressman. I am concerned about 
any removal of combat power from the Indo-Pacific theater.
    Mr. Bacon. I would be too. Thank you for that. The B-21s 
and the Navy long-range precision weapons seem to be very 
significant for your theater.
    There is a lot of talk from the Army about long-range 
surface-to-surface missiles and positioning them also in the 
Pacific. But one of the problem areas is where do we station 
those. Do we have good options where to put these weapon 
systems?
    Admiral Aquilino. Yes, Congressman. So I believe we do, 
right? With the service concepts, the Army has delivered the 
multi-domain task force. The Marine Corps has shifted to the 
Marine littoral regiment.
    And when the capabilities deliver for anti-air and anti-
surface, both land and sea, those land forces will be capable 
and directly aligned to what I need in this theater. From the 
air perspective, their agile combat employment approach to be 
able to be survivable and continue to deliver effect, those 
capabilities are needed. And the posture required to do that, 
we are working really hard on.
    Mr. Bacon. Thank you. General, if I may, I know North Korea 
just tested a solid-fuel ballistic missile. How does that 
change the threat in your perspective?
    General LaCamera. Our ability for indications and warning.
    Mr. Bacon. So in other words, it will shorten your 
indications and warning. So you may get more surprise?
    General LaCamera. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Bacon. Okay. One last thing for you if I may, sir. It 
was reported that some of the leaked information involved South 
Korea. Have you seen any pushback from our allies regarding 
this? Or has that impacted your rapport?
    General LaCamera. It has not. No, sir.
    Mr. Bacon. Okay. With that, I thank you for your time. And 
Mr. Chair, I yield back.
    The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. Chair now recognizes 
Ms. Jacobs for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Jacobs. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to 
our witnesses for being here. I wanted to talk about Taiwan. 
Admiral Aquilino, in your testimony, you stated that Beijing 
significantly increased its military pressure against Taiwan in 
2022 in response to, quote, ``a perceived policy shift in the 
U.S.-Taiwan political and military ties,'' end quote. I think 
it is important to recognize what kinds of U.S. actions are 
actually shoring up Taiwan's defenses such as the training and 
weapons the U.S. has provided over the years versus the kinds 
of things that are symbolic but actually don't help the 
Taiwanese in their fight, like calls to rename embassies, high-
profile visits, et cetera. I was hoping you could talk, Admiral 
Aquilino or Mr. Royal, about the ways in which the Department 
is ensuring that we are not unnecessarily escalating tensions 
and how we are maintaining open lines of communication with the 
PRC.
    Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congresswoman. So let me just 
start by articulating the U.S. policy as it applies to Taiwan 
has not changed despite what may be believed in Beijing. 
Second, we do not seek conflict.
    Everything we do is designed to prevent conflict, to 
maintain the peace and stability in the region. So that is 
where we sit. I can't tell you what they believe.
    Now additionally, on your point of ability to have 
conversations and engagements with my counterparts, I have had 
a standing ask to meet with the Eastern Theater Commander and 
the Southern Theater Commander from the PLA for my entire time 
in this job. And they have yet to accept it. Second, we do--the 
chiefs of defense in the region do about a quarterly virtual 
meeting of which the PRC has been invited to. And of the, I 
think, five we have done so far, they have shown up at one. And 
they sent a very low-level individual.
    Additionally, we meet annually in person once a year, and 
they have not shown up for the last 2 years. We will--working 
through the process to invite them again in August. So the 
theme here is we continue to try to engage with our partner but 
there is a different opinion there.
    Ms. Jacobs. Thank you. Mr. Royal, do you want to add?
    Mr. Royal. Sure, Congresswoman. Consistent with the Taiwan 
Relations Act, we continue to support Taiwan's development of 
their own self-defense. We have talked with them consistently 
about their defense requirements. We have $54 billion in 
implemented foreign military sales with the government of 
Taiwan, including $27 billion in new contracts that have been 
put on order since 2017. And so we believe that consistent with 
the law of the United States, that this is important to 
maintain their defensive requirements.
    At the same time, we certainly call on the PRC to maintain 
open lines of communication, particularly at moments of crisis. 
And we have made a handful of requests, including during the 
transit of the high-altitude balloon overflying our sovereign 
airspace. And we have not seen the responsiveness that we would 
like to see from Beijing in terms of answering our phone calls.
    Ms. Jacobs. Thank you. And as we consider our military 
presence in the Indo-Pacific, I think it is incredibly 
important that we prioritize civilian harm mitigation, 
especially in our ability to convene our partners and build 
coalitions that we need to do. And as you guys well know, DOD 
Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan 
[CHMRAP]provided critical guidance on how to minimize harm. I 
think implementing the recommendations outlined in the plan 
such as enhanced training and better communication with local 
communities will be really important. Admiral Aquilino, could 
you talk about how implementing the CHMRAP will change how 
military operations are conducted in the Indo-Pacific region?
    Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congresswoman. So we are 
certainly always operating in accordance with the new guidance 
that is out there. We have taken that on.
    That said, we are currently not in a kinetic theater. But 
even in our peacetime operations, we are always focused on 
ensuring that the rule of law is followed to ensure we protect 
life of all participants in the region, and that we'll always 
operate that way.
    Ms. Jacobs. I appreciate that. I think as you know the 
CHMRAP requires combatant commanders to develop theater-
specific training, especially that addresses cognitive biases 
and especially as we are working with partner forces in the 
Indo-Pacific to make sure that they too are addressing civilian 
harm concerns and human rights. Thank you. I yield back.
    The Chairman. I thank the gentlelady. The chair now 
recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Waltz, for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We have had some 
discussion on this committee, a lot of debate actually, on 
whether this conflict or conflict with the PRC is inevitable. 
And I would just comment to my colleagues that Chairman Xi has 
said that reunification with Taiwan one way or another, 
including the use of military force, just said it to the 20th 
party congress, is inevitable.
    He said that he is not going to pass it on to the next 
generation. Basically said he is going to do it on his watch. 
So I think we got a lot of wishful thinking going on, just like 
we had wishful thinking going on in the run-up to Ukraine that 
force won't be employed.
    And with that context, Admiral Aquilino, thank you so much 
for your hosting of various congressional delegations. It has 
been incredibly informative. Thank you as well, General 
LaCamera.
    And one of the key takeaways I continue to take is the 
ambiguity amongst our allies from these trips, key allies, 
allies that if we don't have use of their airspace, of their 
ports, of their basing, that I don't see how we effectively 
come to the aid of the defense of Taiwan. And so I guess my 
question for you is would greater clarity on our end, on the 
U.S.'s end, and our intentions, help drive clarity with our 
allies? And I will just tell you one quick anecdote.
    In this last trip and in previous trips, we have been 
asking our allies, will you help us in the defense of Taiwan 
should it come to that. And the continual pushback is, well, 
when you tell us what you are going to do, we can make the 
tough political decisions what we are going to do. So again, do 
you think clarity on our end would help allied clarity much 
like it has in Europe?
    Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congressman. Again, I am not the 
policymaker. But what I can tell you is for the past 40 years 
that policy has been successful. That is just historically 
accurate. I think you would have to ask the allies and 
partners. What I hear when I talk to them frequently is that 
war is not desirable for anyone in the region.
    Mr. Waltz. Of course.
    Admiral Aquilino. So as that applies, what I read into it 
is they are supportive of our approach. They recognize that we 
are looking to prevent this conflict. And that is what is 
keeping us together.
    Mr. Waltz. In the event that deterrence fails--of course 
poverty is not desirable, war is not desirable. Got it. But in 
the event that deterrence fails as it has in Europe, you have 
to have those basing and overflight rights, right, whether it 
is Japan, Philippines. We can go down the list. You have to 
have those operationally, correct, as operational commander.
    Admiral Aquilino. The need for access and basing and 
overflight----
    Mr. Waltz. Can you assume today, tomorrow, in the near 
future that you have them?
    Admiral Aquilino. We don't assume. Those are choices of 
sovereign nations whenever the time comes.
    Mr. Waltz. And I think it is reasonable then to say if the 
United States was clear, we are coming to the defense of 
democracy in Taiwan, then it would drive clarity in the region. 
Clarity in Europe, for example, has deterred Putin in many ways 
from going beyond Ukraine. So would clarity in the Pacific help 
you having that basing and access?
    Admiral Aquilino. Yeah, I think we would have to ask the 
allies and partners, Congressman. I don't want to speak for 
them.
    Mr. Waltz. And I will just tell you another concern of mine 
which we have talked quite a bit about is clarity here amongst 
the American people. And one of the lessons that the PRC has 
learned from Ukraine is if they decide to do it, they have to 
do it quickly. We can't decide here in Congress where the 
bathrooms are quickly.
    And so I think we need to have that debate now, not when 
amphibious ships are being loaded.
    Secretary Royal, why does Admiral Aquilino have a $3\1/2\ 
billion unfunded list? Things like the defense of Guam, the 
defense of Hawaii, secure communications. Why if this is the 
number one threat according to multiple administrations does 
the man sitting next to you may be responsible for the greatest 
conflict in American history have $3\1/2\ billion out of an 
$850 billion budget that you can't find to support that 
warfighter?
    Mr. Royal. Congressman, first thing I will say is there is 
no daylight between Indo-Pacific Command and the Department of 
Defense.
    Mr. Waltz. There should be no unfunded priorities for our 
number one threat.
    Mr. Royal. When we think about the prioritization of the 
region, there is absolutely no daylight between us. We 
prioritize----
    Mr. Waltz. Just in the interest of time, why does it take 
2\1/2\ years from congressional notification to contract award 
for Harpoons for Taiwan, 2\1/2\ years? Why?
    Mr. Royal. Congressman, I am happy to follow up with you 
specifically on the Harpoon discussion if that is helpful to 
you. The contracting----
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 135.]
    Mr. Waltz. We have to move more quickly, if the theme of 
today is we are running out of time.
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Chair now recognizes the gentleman, Mr. Kim, 
for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Kim. Yeah, thank you, Mr. Chair. I just want to kind of 
pick up on where we left off. Admiral Aquilino, you just said 
that the policy we have been implementing has been successful 
over the last 40 years or so. What policy were you referencing 
there?
    Admiral Aquilino. Our One China policy and our alignment in 
accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act, Six Assurances, Three 
Communiques.
    Mr. Kim. Is that a policy that is also being implemented 
right now through the strategic ambiguity approach?
    Mr. Royal. Congressman, yes, this is the approach that we 
have taken with the Taiwan Relations Act, the Three Joint 
Commu-
niques, and the Six Assurances.
    Mr. Kim. And so if we are saying that this has been 
successful for the last 40 years, do either of you see a need 
to change that policy at this point?
    Mr. Royal. Congressman, I would say that this policy has 
served us well, continues to serve us well. It allows us to be 
able to conduct all of the deterrence operations that we are 
currently conducting in the region. And it allows us to be able 
to maintain the cohesion with our alliances and partnerships 
throughout the region that serve us very well.
    Mr. Kim. I understand the desire about clarity. And I 
understand sort of how that could very well prompt some 
conversations that we aren't having right now. But I can also 
see how that could be sort of a double-edged sword. So I guess 
I wanted to ask the admiral and then Mr. Royal, would that 
strategic clarity--at this moment, do you think that would help 
or hurt our ability to build coalitions with other partners?
    Mr. Royal. Congressman, I will jump in first on that one. I 
believe that we need to maintain constant contact with allies 
and partners about how they see stability in the region. We 
need to listen to them.
    We are doing that regularly. I would also just add one 
point on clarity. I think what is clarifying here is the 
results that we are seeing in terms of our engagements with 
allies and partners in the region, tremendous amount of 
progress in terms of our posture, our readiness, our ability to 
interoperate with allies and partners.
    To be very clear, that is the clarifying element of our 
strategy in the region right now. And we are investing in all 
of those areas. And our allies and partners are with us.
    Mr. Kim. Admiral, anything you would like to add here?
    Admiral Aquilino. Sir, I am not a policymaker. So again, as 
it applies, I will execute in accordance with.
    Mr. Kim. One thing that I do hear from a lot of allies and 
partners in the area is about their concern regarding 
cybersecurity. This is a place where I feel like we have a lot 
of opportunity potentially to be able to engage and build that 
up as we are thinking about what we have to offer other 
countries. I guess, Admiral, I wanted to just turn to you first 
and then I will turn to the general here. But is there more 
that we can be doing here to be able to help lift up the 
cybersecurity capabilities of different partners in the region 
and use that as a way to be able to further our relationships 
with them? I wonder if there is something here we can press on 
the gas.
    Admiral Aquilino. Yeah, Congressman. It is absolutely a 
field that is needed, we need to expand with our allies and 
partners. That said, that responsibility goes to General 
Nakasone at CYBERCOM [U.S. Cyber Command].
    Now, he and I coordinate all the time. I have identified 
the areas, priorities, and needs. He has taken them on full 
bore. But protecting both the United States networks as well as 
our ally and partner networks is critical and it drives us 
together.
    Mr. Kim. Thank you, Admiral. And that is something that I 
raised with General Nakasone and something that he pointed out 
as important as well. So I hope we can follow up with both you 
and he to try to figure out how we engage in that way.
    General, I wanted to just kind of get your thoughts from 
that from the Korean peninsula side. A lot of concerns about 
cybersecurity there. What else do we need to be thinking about 
on that front? And is there more that we can be doing with our 
partners in the ROK to be able to engage there, especially as 
we have a state visit coming up? I am trying to think about 
what are the priorities we should be trying to push the ROK on 
to be able to strengthen our relationship and partnership on 
cybersecurity and other issues there.
    General LaCamera. Thanks, Congressman. Yeah, the focus is 
on that, protecting our information, not just cyber but the 
other domains. And working with General Nakasone and his folks 
but also working with the Koreans and the commands that they 
are standing up, make sure that we can protect this 
information.
    Mr. Kim. We have seen some promising developments between a 
discussion between South Korea and Japan of recent. Mr. Royal, 
maybe I will just ask you. Is there an area there that we can 
try to again kind of push on the gas and try to see if we can 
help strengthen that kind of relationship there but also see it 
as part of the kind of security architecture that we are trying 
to build?
    Mr. Royal. Congressman, just a couple of days ago, we were 
able to see Japan and Republic of Korea operate just off the 
waters of South Korea together. These are the kinds of 
instances and examples where we are watching a growing 
convergence in the strategic interest and a growing convergence 
in their willingness to----
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 135.]
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired. The chair 
now recognizes the gentleman from the great State of Alabama, 
Mr. Dale Strong, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Strong. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before my questioning, 
I would like to say for the record any leak of classified 
documents related to the national security of America is 
unacceptable under any circumstance.
    Admiral Aquilino, my first question, I want to echo the 
remarks that Chairman Rogers and saying thank you for being so 
candid. Your unfunded priorities list might as well be a 
highlight reel of what North Alabama does best. I know you have 
a close partnership with the Missile Defense Agency, SMDC [U.S. 
Army Space and Missile Defense Command], both call Redstone 
Arsenal home.
    The number one INDOPACOM unfunded priority is for the Guam 
defense system. The fiscal year 2023 NDAA requires the 
Secretary of Defense to designate a senior DOD official to be 
responsible for the development and deployment of a missile 
defense system for Guam. Given your expertise, which DOD 
official do you believe would be best suited for this role to 
reach the objective?
    Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congressman. Again, that current 
debate is going on. I am not sure I know exactly who, but I 
think that might be better for Jed to take as it is working 
through the building.
    Mr. Strong. Okay. Let me rephrase it. What would you want 
to see their expertise be going into this role? What would be 
most beneficial to execute this?
    Admiral Aquilino. Yeah, I think it is somebody who could 
direct budgets, who could direct priorities, and then work 
towards both delivery and sustainment.
    Mr. Strong. Thank you. Your number five unfunded priority, 
all-domain missile warnings and tracking architecture would 
provide upgrades for the THAAD [Terminal High Altitude Area 
Defense] software to assist with integrated air and missile 
defense protections. Can you speak to the importance of this 
provision and the repercussions if Congress does not find a way 
to fund it?
    Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congressman. So foundational--
again, as we built the requirement to defend Guam via 360-
degree threats from all capabilities--cruise missiles, 
ballistic missiles, and other capabilities. The end state is 
this hybrid architecture of integrated capabilities. And the 
shortfall identified in my list would slow down or delay the 
integration of those different sets of capability, whether it 
be the Aegis portion or the Army sets of portions that are 
linked together, THAAD, Patriot, IFPC [Indirect Fire Protection 
Capability], along with the Aegis piece. So it pushes that 
later.
    Mr. Strong. Thank you, Admiral. Both the Navy and INDOPACOM 
both have the SM-6 missile on their unfunded priority list. The 
final assembly and testing of the SM-6 takes place at Redstone 
Arsenal, in my district. I am aware that there have been delays 
with production and the manufacturer is working to get back on 
track within the year. Can you give the committee a perspective 
of why the SM-6 is critical within the Indo-Pacific?
    Admiral Aquilino. Congressman, it is an extremely capable 
weapon, has both an anti-air capability; it has an anti-ship 
capability. So when you deliver it out into the fleet or 
whether it comes in some other form, it has certainly proven 
itself to be critically lethal and capable.
    Mr. Strong. Thank you. As you shared in your testimony, in 
the 2022, China completed 64 successful space launches. This is 
concerning at face value especially considering that we are 
only 87 launches in 2022 from American carriers. I am proud to 
say that the DOD's top launch provider, which manufactures in 
my district, ULA [United Launch Alliance], has 100 percent 
mission success rate. Speaking to your number two unfunded 
priority, which specific resources does your command need to 
ensure a national defense space architecture is reliable and 
resilient?
    Admiral Aquilino. Yeah, Congressman. If we could do that in 
a classified setting, that would be helpful.
    Mr. Strong. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    The Chairman. Chair now recognizes the gentleman, Mr. Ryan, 
for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Ryan. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you all for being 
here. Thank you also for your in-depth written testimony. It 
was appreciated and comprehensive. So thank you.
    In the last few weeks, growing concern certainly from me 
and many to see more and more cozy relationship between Xi and 
Putin. And even more willingness to be overt and blatant about 
what we know what has been obviously happening behind the 
scenes for a while. With that context in mind as we look at the 
lessons over the last near decade looking back to 2014 and 
Ukraine, what we did in terms of some of the actions in 
response there with training and embedding with Ukrainian 
forces.
    Both Mr. Royal and Admiral Aquilino, could you talk about 
those lessons and how we are trying to apply those in Taiwan? 
To be more specific, can you speak to their readiness, both in 
terms of capability and intent and the urgency. Is the urgency 
there, and what can we do to bolster that?
    Mr. Royal. I am happy to share a few initial thoughts with 
you and happy to follow up later on. First is I think it is a 
real lesson for us that the rules-based international order 
cannot be taken for granted, that there is naked ambition that 
continues to exist in the world. And we are watching that play 
out in Ukraine.
    So that is, I think, the first thing we need to be vigilant 
about the fact that our international order is under duress. 
Secondly, we need to make sure that we are understanding what 
the real defense and capability requirements are of those that 
might be put under pressure by revanchist powers. And so we 
maintain strong capability requirements relationship in 
discussion with the government of Taiwan.
    And as I mentioned, we continue to service those defense 
requirements through the foreign military sales program and 
direct commercial sales. And finally, in terms of training, 
proficiency is absolutely necessary here. You pointed to a 
relationship that we had with the government of Ukraine that 
was very productive in terms of its training outcomes since 
2014. I believe that we need to be able to think about how we 
can support Taiwan's proficiencies with the weapon systems that 
they are ordering.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 135.]
    Mr. Ryan. Admiral.
    Admiral Aquilino. Yeah, Congressman, so again, I will just 
leave it as this. We have done a lot of work understanding the 
lessons learned from Ukraine and what has occurred. And we are 
certainly integrating all those into our responsibilities under 
the Taiwan Relations Act.
    Mr. Ryan. Thank you both. Building on that, and ranking 
member addressed this in his opening statement, I have heard 
both from you all and others who have come before us the 
importance of our alliances as one of our, I believe, strategic 
differentiators and strengths vis-a-vis our PRC adversaries.
    Admiral Aquilino, you also touched on this in your 
testimony. Can you speak a little bit more about where we are 
at with India in particular? And I know that is a broad 
question. But are there authorities or requirements that we can 
help you all on to advance and bolster that critical alliance?
    Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congressman. So again, India is a 
critical partner as we talked about. Aside from the cooperation 
that we are doing in the military, right? So the exercises like 
Malabar, Yudh Abhyas, the fact that we are providing assistance 
as it applies to cold weather gear and other capabilities that 
they might need as they defend their border on the northern 
side.
    But additionally, we are expanding our cooperation in the 
form of production as India tries to work to develop its own 
industrial base. So C-130, critical components made in India. 
Helicopter critical frameworks made in India. That is expanding 
the partnership and moving them towards certainly self-
sufficiency and increased partnership with the United States.
    Mr. Ryan. Thank you. Oh, sorry. Did you have say, sir?
    Mr. Royal. Let me just offer as well that recently we 
kicked off what we call an Initiative [on] Critical and 
Emerging Technologies [iCET] that was announced by the two 
national security advisors of the United States and India. We 
are already delivering offers under the context of the iCET 
arrangement. This is a real moment of convergence for the 
United States and India, and we are looking to take full 
advantage of it going forward.
    Mr. Ryan. Thank you. Just very briefly, General LaCamera, 
how do you assess growing bellicosity from the PRC changing Mr. 
Kim's calculus? Is it likely that they sort of feed off each 
other essentially?
    General LaCamera. Yeah, I mean, they are passing 
congratulatory notes back and forth. And I have stated in the 
past that I see nothing on the Korean peninsula that won't 
involve China and Russia both providing lethal and non-lethal 
support.
    Mr. Ryan. Thank you. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chair.
    The Chairman. Chair now recognizes the gentleman from 
Indiana, Mr. Banks, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Banks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, when did you 
first become aware of the spy balloon, before it entered our 
airspace over Alaska or after?
    Admiral Aquilino. Sir, I would like to that in a classified 
setting.
    Mr. Banks. A Washington Post story over the weekend said 
that there have been several Chinese balloons that have 
operated in the INDOPACOM AOR over previous years. What are we 
doing about it?
    Admiral Aquilino. So as we posture in the INDOPACOM AOR, 
sir, I am responsible for defense of Guam, defense of Hawaii. 
We have aircraft on alert. Our systems and our architectures 
are looking to ensure we can identify those, in a position and 
place where we could respond if required.
    Mr. Banks. So the story also notes that the spy balloons in 
your AOR often fly over U.S. carrier strike groups and over the 
South China Sea. So are we concerned about this, or is this 
something that we too easily dismiss as the President seemed to 
have done when the balloon flew over the entire continental 
United States?
    Admiral Aquilino. So sir, I am responsible and always 
concerned about force protection for our assets. So the network 
of sensors that exists, we understand where they are going and 
when and whether or not they are threatening. That said, if 
they fly over the South China Sea in accordance with the rules-
based international order, if that is international airspace, 
then they should be allowed to fly there.
    That is the way we would see it. That is what we do. That 
is what it means to adhere to the rules-based international 
order.
    Mr. Banks. Okay. Can you explain to the public or at least 
members of the committee why you can't answer the question of 
when you became aware of the Chinese spy balloon, before it 
entered our airspace in Alaska or after?
    Admiral Aquilino. That is certainly the----
    Mr. Banks. For the record, why would that have to be 
divulged in a classified setting?
    Admiral Aquilino. Certainly the way we identified it and 
how we knew where it was and when it was is something I would 
rather keep to ourselves.
    Mr. Banks. Okay. Let's see. Admiral, at a March hearing, I 
questioned NORTHCOM [U.S. Northern Command] commander General 
VanHerck who told me that President Biden, quote, ``could ask 
under special authorities for the military to do more to 
prevent fentanyl trafficking at our southern border.'' Could 
President Biden use such special authorities to help INDOPACOM 
block the export of Chinese fentanyl analogues coming into the 
North America from your knowledge?
    Admiral Aquilino. I would have to go back and see, sir. As 
I understand it, those precursor chemicals are actually legal 
to be shipped. So currently, I don't have any authorities to 
interdict or stop or prevent legal chemicals from being----
    Mr. Banks. Mr. Royal, what would those authorities be that 
President Trump--or President Biden could enact that he is not 
enacting that President Trump did use?
    Mr. Royal. Congressman, I can't speak to the specific 
authorities that you are referencing right now. I will say that 
we believe that the fentanyl problem that we are facing is a 
serious one and a serious threat to our society. The 
administration does have a strategic implementation plan that 
is shared by members of the interagency, and DOD has provided 
enabling support to that strategic implementation plan, 
including for the provision of aircraft, radar, and 
intelligence to support arresting this threat as it continues 
to move forward to our country.
    Mr. Banks. So just to clear this up, those special 
authorities do exist?
    Mr. Royal. Sir, I am not entirely sure which specific 
authorities you are referring to. Right now, we have the 
authority to be able to support our interagency partners. And 
we have done that under the rubric of the strategic 
implementation plan.
    Mr. Banks. Admiral, can you talk about the Joint 
Interagency Task Force West that is used to interdict the flow 
of fentanyl into the United States?
    Admiral Aquilino. Yes, Congressman. So that is my 
organization assigned towards counter drug, counter 
transnational crime, and taking on that aspect of what the PRC 
might do. We track any of those shipments in accordance and in 
conjunction with NORTHCOM, SOUTHCOM [U.S. Southern Command], 
and the interagency to provide an understanding of where that 
may be going so that if it does end up turning into an illegal 
chemical, then it can be interdicted. So my organization is 
directly connected. We track those whenever we can.
    Mr. Banks. Okay. Thank you. I yield back.
    The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. Chair now recognizes 
the gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Escobar, for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Escobar. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman and ranking 
member. Gentleman, thank you so much for your testimony and 
your service. I have the privilege of representing Fort Bliss, 
Texas, which is in Texas [District] 16, El Paso.
    And my questions are going to focus on the importance of 
resilient infrastructure, logistics, and mobilization capacity. 
We have to make sure that we are increasing our logistics 
capacity and force adaptability in a theater where China not 
only maintains the advantage of proximity but owns a vast 
arsenal of capabilities unlike that of the insurgent forces the 
U.S. spent the last 20 years fighting. Admiral Aquilino, my 
first question is for you, sir.
    I would like to highlight the critical importance of multi-
domain operational training in a contested environment, 
especially as it pertains to the Army. Can you talk about how 
Pacific Pathways and other initiatives are integrating this 
element to prepare our Army for a potential conflict in the 
theater? What challenges, if any, do you foresee affecting our 
ability to conduct joint training with partners and allies on a 
large scale while emulating a highly contested logistics 
environment?
    Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congresswoman. So from the Indo-
Pacific position, right, this is going to take the whole joint 
force. And synchronizing and integrating that joint force to be 
able to deliver effects is a strength the United States has 
that no other nation can do, to include the sustaining of that 
force across half the globe.
    So Pacific partnership is--or Pacific Pathways is critical 
because it is a mechanism to maneuver the land component to 
places where either we can exercise or operate with our allies 
and partners or to preset the force in places that we need to 
operate. That same capability is needed across all of the 
service components. So what I identified in my report was a 
need for increased campaigning dollars that does exactly that. 
It allows for the transportation, sustainment, and support for 
forces forward to deliver that deterrent effect.
    Ms. Escobar. Thank you so much. Mr. Royal, any large-scale 
operations or increased deployments in the AOR would require 
development of key infrastructure. However, the need for this 
infrastructure to be resilient to climate disasters cannot be 
overstated. What are the biggest challenges impacting your 
ability to take environmental factors into consideration in 
making assessments required for MILCON [military construction] 
needs in the AOR?
    Mr. Royal. Congresswoman, I would just add to what Admiral 
Aquilino has said by reinforcing that deterrence occurs in this 
region based on two things. One, it is having the right 
capabilities at the right level of readiness and in the right 
locations. And secondly, because our allies and partners are 
with us.
    And there this question of posture brings those two 
together, the capabilities and the allies and partners. And we 
are seeing some really terrific progress being made with 
respect to how we are able to posture alongside our allies and 
partners. In terms of climate concerns, we do have an ongoing 
dialogue with partners throughout the region, allies throughout 
the region, on how climate change is affecting their ability to 
be able to withstand and support U.S. military movement through 
the region.
    USARPAC [U.S. Army Pacific] has a terrific wargame series 
called Unified Pacific War Gaming Series. And they are testing 
out their ability to maneuver through a contested environment 
in the region, including with respect to the potential effects 
of climate change moving forward. So we have addressed that in 
the National Defense Strategy and we are addressing that in the 
budget submission as well.
    Ms. Escobar. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    The Chairman. I thank the gentlelady. Chair now recognizes 
the gentlelady from Michigan, Mrs. McClain, for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. McClain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you all 
for being here today. I appreciate it. Admiral Aquilino, I want 
to make it clear that I have some serious concerns with the 
priority of the White House when it comes to our national 
defense.
    I also want to make sure that we understand that I have 
some serious concerns on how our taxpayers' dollars are spent 
as it pertains to the military to make sure that we are ready. 
And I think there are a lot of issues that we need to cover. I 
think prioritization of these issues are extremely important.
    Like you, I am gravely concerned about the CCP and the 
PLA's aggressive modernization timeline while you have almost 
$3.5 billion in unfunded priorities that you have deemed as 
vital to our defense against the PLA; $3.5 billion. The 
President's budget over the past several years has been focused 
on a woke garbage in my opinion agenda that has nothing to do 
with deterring the CCP. So let me just give you some numbers as 
I see them.
    In 2021, Chairman Milley admitted to the Senate Armed 
Services Committee that the DOD spent almost 6 million man-
hours on woke training, 6--it is right here--6 million man-
hours on woke training. May of 2022, the DOD spent $91,000 on 
diversity and inclusion for the Air Force band. Okay. Last 
year, we found out that Kelisa Wing of the former Chief DEI 
[Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion] Officer at the Defense 
Department school was pushing her book on White privilege in 
those schools. Okay.
    Last month, the Air Force launched an effort to hire a 
diversity, equity, and inclusion manager and pay them upwards 
of $180,000 a year. I am curious as to what their outcomes 
would be because when you hire a diversity, equity, and 
inclusion manager, I am curious what their outcome is because 
if they achieve their outcome, they would be put out of a job. 
But that is a different discussion for a different day.
    Fiscal year 2023, the President requested $86.5 million for 
dedicated diversity and inclusion activities; $86.5 million. 
Now remember, you have $3.5 billion of unfunded priorities. 
This year, the President wants $114 million more, right?
    These ridiculous instances of wokeness sends an 
embarrassing message I think to our friends but more 
importantly to our allies on what we prioritize. Now I am not 
here to say that diversity, equity, and inclusion is not 
important. But on the list of priorities, I got to tell you, I 
think we have some other funded projects that we can spend 6 
million more man-hours on.
    So, I know you don't have an exact number. But I would like 
to hear your opinion on how much do you think the CCP spends on 
diversity, equity, and inclusion? Or do you think they might 
prioritize like their hypersonics a little bit ahead of 
diversity, equity, and inclusion?
    Admiral Aquilino. I don't have that number, ma'am. I would 
have to look at it and get back to you.
    Mrs. McClain. What is your gut feel? Think they spend like 
6 million man-hours talking about diversity, equity, and 
inclusion? Or do you think they spend--maybe use those hours to 
develop some hypersonics to use against us?
    Admiral Aquilino. Well, what I would say is, it is 
certainly not a diverse culture by design.
    Mrs. McClain. I would agree with that. But I would like to 
know what you think of our prioritizations. You have billions 
of unfunded mandates, and we are spending taxpayer dollars and 
a lot of those taxpayer dollars, on stuff. Do you think that 
helps our readiness?
    Admiral Aquilino. So, ma'am, what I would say is, as you 
clearly identified and looked at the report I have submitted, 
it is clear what I have identified as priorities. I think I 
would turn that over to Jed to take on.
    Mr. Royal. Congresswoman, I think that the----
    The Chairman. Mr. Royal, you are very soft-spoken. Please 
pull the mic close. We really can't hear you.
    Mr. Royal. Sorry, Congressman. Congresswoman, I would say--
--
    Mrs. McClain. I too am soft-spoken.
    Mr. Royal. The health and the well-being of the 
Department's workforce, both in uniform and civilian, is of the 
upmost importance. It is one of four key priorities of the 
National Defense Strategy. And we are looking comprehensively 
on how we are going to support our workforce going forward.
    Mrs. McClain. I appreciate that. My time is up. I yield 
back. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Chair now recognizes Ms. McClellan for 5 
minutes.
    Ms. McClellan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member 
Smith, for convening the hearing today and to our witnesses for 
being here. I want to focus a little bit on our regional 
alliances. It has been heartening recently that our treaty 
allies, South Korea and Japan, have been working recently to 
resolve their diplomatic tensions and to cooperate more 
effectively. How is INDOPACOM working to encourage similar 
breakthroughs to strengthen ties between U.S. allies in the 
region so that we can present a stronger united front in the 
face of increasing Chinese aggression?
    Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congresswoman. Again, 120 
exercises a year with partners across the region. So through 
the military landscape, we spend a lot of time ensuring that we 
know how to operate together, how we can be interoperable as 
best as possible, how we can protect the rules-based 
international order. And that is on top of all of our 
operations outside of exercises.
    Continuous coordination with my counterparts. My staff 
always directly involved and linked with both country teams as 
well as our partner nations. So that will continue, and we 
spend a lot of money there or we spend a lot of effort there.
    Ms. McClellan. Thank you. And this is for Mr. Royal and 
also you, Admiral. Recently, the United States, the U.K., and 
Australia announced Pillar 1 of the AUKUS agreement that will 
allow Australia to obtain American-manufactured nuclear-power 
submarines and eventually make similar vessels indigenously. Is 
the U.S. military supplier base ready to expand its capacity to 
address increased demand? And if not, what steps can we take to 
ensure that we can meet our stated production goals for AUKUS 
and for the naval forces?
    Mr. Royal. Congresswoman, I would just take one step back 
and offer a complementing comment to what Admiral Aquilino just 
stated. You referenced Japan and Korea in your question. I 
would also note that with Australia in particular, we have 
agreed to increase U.S. rotational presence including with 
bombers and fighters. And defense industrial base integration 
is occurring at this very moment.
    Just looking at the level of exercises that we are 
conducting in the region, Talisman Saber, Balikatan, Cobra 
Gold, Garuda Shield. Each of these are seeing the highest 
levels of engagement in their history. And so in terms of the 
overall picture of how healthy the alliance is and partnerships 
are in the region, we are really seeing some historic steps 
forward.
    On AUKUS, we do believe that the industrial base can 
perform at the level that we have proposed in the agreement 
that we have with the U.K. and Australia. We know that it will 
take a lot of work. It will take a lot of constant conversation 
with industry partners as well. We are encouraged by the 
defense industrial base commitment that Australia has already 
made to our submarine defense industrial base. And so we think 
things are on the right track.
    Admiral Aquilino. And Congresswoman, from my role, it is to 
be able to accelerate this capability. And in order to do that, 
I have sent U.S. submarines to Stirling for familiarization, so 
the Australians can also look at it. We have done that in 
coordination with the United Kingdom. And then ultimately as 
soon as possible, we are going to look to get Australian 
sailors on U.S. submarines. So I get to work diligently to 
bridge the gap as the industrial base delivers what is needed.
    Ms. McClellan. Thank you. And we have touched a little bit 
on how war is not inevitable. And I want to focus a little bit 
on diplomacy. And our military strength can only go as far as 
in maintaining powerful alliance systems that concerted 
diplomacy has to be the cornerstone of those alliances. Are we 
doing enough to maintain a strong and concerted diplomatic 
presence that makes the job of our Armed Forces in the region 
easier?
    Mr. Royal. Congressman, I am very pleased to say that our 
Indo-Pacific strategy for this administration is very much an 
interagency strategy. The role for the U.S. Department of 
Defense and for Indo-Pacific Command and our Armed Forces is 
discrete. It is tailored. It is focused.
    It all fits within a broader context of diplomacy. And 
again, I think that we are seeing the impacts of that 
interagency diplomacy-led effort when we look at the progress 
that is being made in terms of U.S. posture access into the 
region and the multilateral arrangements that have been 
established, in many cases smaller trilateral progress that we 
are seeing right now between Republic of Korea, Japan, United 
States, other minilateral settings.
    Ms. McClellan. Thank you. I yield back.
    The Chairman. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Fallon, is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Fallon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it very 
much. And thanks for all the witnesses for joining us. Admiral, 
is it true that China has doubled their military spending in 
the last 10 years?
    Admiral Aquilino. Congressman, that is true based on the 
reports as articulated and presented by the PLA. My belief is 
that spending that actually goes on in support of their 
military is much higher than that.
    Mr. Fallon. And their spending maybe increased year over 
year about 7\1/2\ percent. Does that sound about accurate, the 
military spending?
    Admiral Aquilino. Excuse me?
    Mr. Fallon. Their military spending has increased 7\1/2\ 
percent roughly over the last year?
    Admiral Aquilino. Again, that is their advertised number. I 
am not sure it is accurate.
    Mr. Fallon. So they are focused on improving clearly their 
hard power. Let's talk about soft power. In your estimation, 
what kind of threats to our interest and influence in the 
region does their Belt and Road Initiative present?
    Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congressman. I am not sure it 
would be considered soft power. I think it is a coercive tool 
as utilized by the PRC to be able to influence and move nations 
in the region in directions that are beneficial for the PLA. 
When the PLA articulates Belt and Road or One Belt, One Road as 
a win-win strategy, that is true. It is a win for the Chinese 
and it is a win for the Chinese.
    Mr. Fallon. Yeah.
    Admiral Aquilino. It is not a win for any nation.
    Mr. Fallon. Secretary Royal, can you touch on India's 
importance in the region and what we can do to wean them off 
their dependence on Russia for weapons and defense assistance 
and bring them more into the fold in the Western world?
    Mr. Royal. Congressman, as Admiral Aquilino already stated, 
India faces the same challenger that we face in the region. And 
so what we are seeing right now is a moment of strategic 
convergence in our relationship with the government of India. 
There is a lot of momentum in that regard. With respect to your 
question on from whom do they buy their weapons, we believe 
that they are through generational process of looking to 
diversify off of traditional suppliers. We want to make sure 
that the U.S. defense industrial base is in the best position 
possible to be India's partner of choice moving forward. I 
noted the Initiative on Critical and Emerging----
    The Chairman. Mr. Royal, please pull the microphone closer. 
Thank you, sir.
    Mr. Royal. I noted earlier the Initiative on Critical and 
Emerging Technologies that has been announced by the two 
national security advisors of the United States and India. And 
so it is in all of these areas where we are able to see the 
kind of progress and the kind of promise for this relationship 
moving forward.
    Mr. Fallon. Okay. Thank you. And I guess for Mr. Royal and 
if the admiral and the general want to weigh in on this. How 
troubling did you find the comments of President Macron of 
France recently?
    Mr. Royal. Congressman, as I mentioned earlier, we are 
having a really in-depth conversation with all of our European 
partners on the challenges that the PRC presents, both in the 
Indo-Pacific region and globally. As we look at the NATO 
strategic document that has been developed, it includes the PRC 
in a way that it hasn't in the past. I would say the same thing 
for the latest European Union white paper.
    So we are taking President Macron's comments within the 
context of all of those trends that we are watching. I would 
certainly point to other voices out there. The Foreign Minister 
of Germany recently delivered a speech in which she talked a 
little bit differently than President Macron. And we have 
certainly Foreign Minister Wong of Australia who delivered a 
speech along those lines I would point to as well as--I would 
say fairly consistent with an understanding and approach the 
United States has to the PRC challenge.
    Mr. Fallon. Admiral, General, do you have any comments?
    Admiral Aquilino. No.
    Mr. Fallon. Go ahead, General. Sorry.
    General LaCamera. No, sir.
    Mr. Fallon. The thing that makes it rather obvious to me is 
the PRC would love nothing more than to separate us from the 
EU. And if they do that, then that is a huge win for them. And 
I just want to make sure that we nip something like that in the 
bud because it was very--just really shocking that he said what 
he said. It didn't really serve, I don't think, Europe's 
interest, France's interest, or certainly ours. So I want to 
thank you all again. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    The Chairman. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania, Mr. Deluzio, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Deluzio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentleman, hello. I 
know it is a long day. Thanks for being with us. Admiral, I 
want to pick up on a question from Mr. Fallon here about PRC 
spending and in particular advertised or otherwise, where is 
their investment in their shipbuilding relative to ours?
    Admiral Aquilino. I don't think I have the comparison, 
Congressman. But they are certain putting out ships at a pace 
that exceeds ours right now.
    Mr. Deluzio. And that is warships, sealift, commercial, all 
of it?
    Admiral Aquilino. All of the above.
    Mr. Deluzio. I ask because one of the pieces I am worried 
about is they are very aggressively making territorial claims, 
asserting the power to regulate ships within what is 
international water that our fleet and otherwise patrols and 
protects to submit to Chinese command and supervision of those 
waters, again, flagrantly violating international law and 
norms. And certainly against the backdrop of raising their 
warships--or building more warships relative to what we are 
doing.
    Our sealift capacity, I worry. I think last month in this 
committee the Maritime Administrator told us, talking about the 
sealift fleet, the average age of some of those ships is 44 
years old, some more than 50 years old.
    We are relying on foreign-built ships for our sealift 
capacity. And so I guess my question, Admiral, would be whether 
you think our sealift capacity is sufficient to meet our needs. 
And certainly if you could weigh in on where our sealift 
capacity is relative to PRC.
    Admiral Aquilino. As it applies to sealift, we certainly 
have a distinct advantage over the PRC, both numbers and 
capabilities. As it applies to what is needed in the future, so 
General Van Ovost, the TRANSCOM [U.S. Transportation Command] 
commander, and I speak often. She is aware of the needs 
required, and she has done some good work.
    And I also thank the Congress for the support to the 
additional 10 tankers that we have been able to utilize. So as 
a combined effort, sealift and airlift is critical, especially 
when you have to do logistics sustainment over half the globe. 
And again, in partner with TRANSCOM commander, we have 
identified that and asked the services to support it.
    Mr. Deluzio. Mr. Royal, anything you want to add to or 
weigh in on that question?
    Mr. Royal. Thanks, Congressman. I would offer that DOD has 
quite a broad range of modeling and analytical capabilities 
that we undertake. We are looking at this theater as an all-
domain competitive space. Shipbuilding is certainly one of 
those domains, and we want to make sure that we remain 
competitive in that regard. But we are also making sure that we 
are thinking about the position and the presence of U.S. ships 
with respect to all of the other domains that are necessary to 
bring to bear the right kind of posture at the right time.
    Mr. Deluzio. Gentleman, thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield 
back.
    The Chairman. And I want to pause for a minute. I was glad 
the way that Mr. Deluzio framed that and that is what are they 
doing compared to us because I have said repeatedly what they 
spend is--what they say they spend is a lie. But what they 
spend compared to what we spend is not apples to apples.
    They don't have an EPA [U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency]. They don't have OSHA [Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration]. They don't have NEPA [National Environmental 
Policy Act]. They don't have a Congress. They don't have any of 
the things that we have to deal with and interfere with or 
drive cost up on their expenditures. So it is always healthy to 
do what Mr. Deluzio did, talk in terms of what is our 
capability, what is their capability, not how much they spend 
versus how much we spend because it really is a silly argument. 
Mr. Moylan from Guam is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Moylan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the panel 
today, the time that you put in, and the answers that you have 
been providing us. It's very helpful. I also want you to know 
in the audience we have also guests from Guam, our Guam Chamber 
of Commerce here. We have six of them that are very supportive 
of our continued military buildup on Guam.
    The Chairman. Where are they? Are they in the [room]?
    Mr. Moylan. Can you kindly stand up, please?
    The Chairman. Welcome. Glad to have you all here with us. 
Hope we didn't disappoint you.
    Mr. Moylan. Thank you. And we continue to support our 
buildup on Guam. Sir, you made in your report regarding the 
Guam cluster. Identifying us as Guam as the most forward 
territory in the Pacific.
    And identifying over 170,000 American citizens. You pointed 
out Guam and CNMI [Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana 
Islands] that no time in history has such a military buildup 
and construction been happening. And specifically, you 
mentioned that Guam is the third highest construction workforce 
per capita nationally.
    And the military construction demands require a workforce 
more than three times as large as what currently exists. So in 
order to do this, we need great relief regarding the H2-B 
workers. And right now, these H2-B workers are going to end in 
2024.
    And in your report, you said we need them until 2029. So I 
am completely behind you. I trust you. I know what you are 
doing. And I believe in what you can do.
    But I need to support you even greater. Congress needs to 
support you even greater. We have introduced the standalone 
bill with the H2-B visas to extend till 2029.
    And we are even attempting to include that in the NDAA 
language. It would be helpful for me if you can further explain 
if we don't get this done. And what is the importance of this 
construction being done in the Guam cluster and how important 
it is for you to complete your mission, sir.
    Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congressman. So the development 
on Guam, I think we have invested between $11 and $13 billion 
to be able to execute the requirements that we believe we need 
for both sustainment as well as offensive and defensive 
warfighting capabilities. It is critical to be able to deliver 
those at speed and with the sense of urgency that I 
articulated.
    So the criticality of extending the H2-B visas through 2029 
would allow us to finalize the investments and the delivery of 
the posture needed on Guam. The people of Guam have been 
amazing partners throughout history, all the way back to World 
War II. So we need to finish our posture initiatives.
    Without the ability to get workers, which are mostly from 
the Philippines--again, I will be clear, there is no Chinese 
workers coming to Guam to do the work that we have asked--it 
would delay the implementation and push us back years if we 
didn't have that authority.
    Mr. Moylan. Thank you, Admiral. Another question, of 
course, is where our budget was significantly short, you are 
talking about the Guam defense system, right? The priority 
mission to defend our homeland with the GDS [Guam defense 
system] 360-degree integrated air and missile defense for Guam 
to include an offensive capability as well.
    So we understand. The President's proposed budget was $147 
million short. You identified that this was the purpose of the 
Guam defense system, the 360-degree integrated air and missile 
defense for the island.
    I want to thank you for making that a top unfunded 
priority. And I am going to do my best to make sure that is a 
funded priority as well. But again, just to reiterate, that we 
are the forward-most deployed, right?
    We keep this as far away as possible. Without this, we are 
putting in danger I believe all the troops we have on island 
and specifically the civilians on Guam. So please reiterate 
what you are explaining to us in your report. Thank you, sir.
    Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congressman. So again, the 
funding shortfall identified as my integration with the Missile 
Defense Agency and the Department is targeted at integrating 
the different sets of capabilities that are identified in the 
architecture. So Aegis capabilities tied with Army capabilities 
in the form of THAAD, Patriot, IFPC, LTAMDS [Lower Tier Air and 
Missile Defense Sensor], and the other required portions to 
deliver a 360-degree integrated defense. That 147 would delay 
the integration of some of those capabilities. And that 
wouldn't be optimum for the delivery of the defense of Guam.
    Mr. Moylan. Thank you, Admiral. We will fight strong to get 
your H2-B extended to 2029 and get you that $147 million in 
order for our Nation and for our island of Guam.
    Admiral Aquilino. Thank you, sir.
    Mr. Moylan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. Chair now recognizes 
the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Davis, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Davis. Thanks so much, Mr. Chair, and to the witnesses 
here today. All the focus of the United States security policy 
of late has been on the People's Republic of China. North Korea 
continues to engage in saber-rattling tactics in the nuclear 
weapons domain. General LaCamera, at this moment in time, how 
do you assess the threat level from the Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea and specifically which leg of the nuclear 
triad, air, land, sea capability, in your opinion poses the 
most immediate threat to the homeland?
    General LaCamera. To answer your last question, his land 
capability is the greatest threat, what he has demonstrated 
with his ICBM testing. Our focus is on combat readiness and 
making sure that we can--we have not deterred him in developing 
this capability; we now need to focus on deterring him from 
employing this capability.
    Mr. Davis. As we saw tragically in Hong Kong, the people at 
the top of the institutions matter as much if not more than the 
institutions of government themselves. In responding to the 
PRC's brazen violation of the ``one country, two systems'' 
regime that govern Hong Kong since its incorporation a 
generation ago, the U.S. offered little in the way of pushback. 
Mr. Royal, as we think about our military's posture in the 
South China Sea, especially as it relates to Taiwan, how can we 
be sure that history does not repeat itself?
    Mr. Royal. Congressman, I agree with your assessment that 
we are watching a PRC increasingly repressive at home and 
increasingly assertive abroad. In the South China Sea, the PRC 
continues to make unlawful claims. And we call on the PRC to 
abide by the 2016 arbitration on the claims in the South China 
Sea.
    We believe that our mutual defense commitments with allies 
and partners in the region represent a demonstrable advancement 
in terms of being able to resist those unlawful claims as we 
watch them unfold. And so we are going to continue to sail, 
fly, and operate wherever international law allows. We talked 
about freedom of navigation operations earlier in this hearing. 
And we will continue to share information transparently with 
allies and partners when we see violations by the PRC in 
illicit way along the lines of those unlawful claims.
    Mr. Davis. And Mr. Royal and to the Admiral, are you 
confident that the South Korean allies and other Quad region 
partners continue to have full trust in our intelligence and 
military capabilities, especially what we have seen over the 
last few weeks with the leak of sensitive classification--
classified information? Any assessment there?
    Mr. Royal. Simply put, Congressman, yes, we believe that we 
continue to have the full faith and confidence in the 
partnership in the alliance with the Republic of Korea.
    Admiral Aquilino. Absolutely, Congressman.
    Mr. Davis. Thank you so much. We appreciate your presence 
today.
    And, Mr. Chair, I will yield back.
    The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. The chair will now 
recognize the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Alford, for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Alford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith, 
and our distinguished witnesses today. Appreciate you all being 
here today.
    I think we are all concerned about what is going on with 
China and Taiwan, and maybe we are not moving fast enough to 
develop the capabilities to deter Communist China.
    Our military has incredible capabilities, but as we 
modernize our forces, particularly our Air Force and Navy, we 
have to ensure that we are putting hard power in place to make 
China think twice before conducting a naval blockade or full-
scale amphibious assault of Taiwan. We also need to do a better 
job of explaining to the American people why Taiwan matters and 
why the Indo-Pacific region is critical to our national 
security efforts.
    More than 50 percent of the world's GDP [gross domestic 
product] flows through this region. Taiwan alone produces more 
than 60 percent of the world's semiconductors, more than 90 
percent of the most advanced ones. We cannot allow China to 
seize control of these critical supply chains which impact 
goods that we use each and every day.
    This leads to our questions today. Mr.--Admiral Aquilino, 
after China's recent military drills around Taiwan, China's 
military declared it is ready to fight. Can you talk more about 
what INDOPACOM is doing to deter the Chinese Communist Party 
from launching military drills and threatening our allies in 
the region?
    Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congressman. So Indo-Pacific 
Command is postured with forces west of the International Date 
Line that are prepared to respond, executing daily operations 
for deterrence, operating with our allies and partners. And 
we're able to respond quickly to any aggressive action.
    Mr. Alford. Do we have the seapower that we need to combat 
China at this point?
    Admiral Aquilino. We do at this point. As we've talked 
about before, China's moving at a very rapid pace. They're 
increasing both capability and capacity. And we certainly have 
to make sure that we always have overmatch against the Chinese.
    Mr. Alford. What do you see as the biggest challenge right 
now [inaudible]?
    Admiral Aquilino. Right now I think it's the speed of 
urgency at which we're working as we've come out of 20 years in 
the Middle East and understanding what this security challenger 
is posing as a threat. We need to understand how fast it's 
coming and we need to go faster.
    Mr. Alford. What are the top priorities for munitions and 
can the American sector meet these demands that we are going to 
be facing?
    Admiral Aquilino. For INDOPACOM, as a part of my 1254 
report I've articulated the numbers and types of weapons that 
we believe we need to invest in and to deliver quickly. As it 
applies to the industrial base, I'll ask Jed to take that.
    Mr. Royal. Congressman, on your last point there were 17 
munition systems identified for multiyear procurement in the 
latest NDAA. Those are the 17 systems that I would say are most 
critical right now in terms of our ability to stockpile, to 
have magazine depth in the Indo-Pacific region.
    Mr. Alford. We have heard you three talk about the 
importance of our allies and the critical role that they will 
play in helping us counter China. Can you talk about some of 
the capabilities that we need to improve on with our allies 
such as cyber and where there might be gaps in that?
    General, let's start with you, please.
    General LaCamera. We're working with the Koreans. They're 
standing up a strategic command that has cyber embedded in it. 
Working with our CYBERCOM and National Security Agency to be 
able to not just look at it from a defensive, but an offensive 
capability going forward. And I'd rather talk about the rest of 
it----
    Mr. Alford. Right.
    General LaCamera [continuing]. In a classified setting.
    Mr. Alford. Admiral.
    Admiral Aquilino. What I would say is that certainly the 
shoring up and defense of all of our networks and our partner 
networks is step one and most critical because as we continue 
to operate with them, the sharing of information and all of 
that. And in INDOPACOM one of my unfunded requirements is 
identified--is referred to as a Mission Partner Environment. So 
right now I got 13 networks to talk to my partners. Maintaining 
13 networks and keeping them all cyber safe is a chore. The 
Mission Partner Environment brings all of our partners into one 
network, think single pane of glass, that has zero trust 
capability for cybersecurity for us to be able to operate 
together.
    Mr. Alford. Thank you again to our witnesses.
    And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
    The chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. 
Jimmy Panetta, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Panetta. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that.
    Gentlemen, thanks to all of you for being here and of 
course your service.
    Obviously, a Ukrainian victory is important. And no matter 
what your definition is of that, America's commitment and 
leadership is absolutely necessary for that, quote/unquote, 
``win.'' In order for there to be peace in the Indo-Pacific 
region obviously when it comes to Korea, when it comes to 
Taiwan, America's commitment is essential, as a deterrent and 
if--as an ally if that deterrence fails, as you said, Admiral.
    Now what we have seen though is obviously build-up on both 
sides. For the past 20 years, as the U.S. has been focused on 
other areas, China has built up the world's largest stockpile 
of precision-guided missiles, which we have heard a lot about 
today. And obviously you are seeing the United States have to 
counter with its own stockpiles and its own long-range of 
precision-guided missiles. In fact, I guess certain war games 
have determined that the U.S. will run out in less than a week 
if there is a military engagement.
    And there is obviously other areas as well. One of those 
is--distributed lethality is where the United States has to 
enter into. And part of that is this strategy called Marines 
2030 where we are basically giving up tanks and getting up on 
littoral forces by putting more on islands, kind of a ship-to-
shore or shore-to-shore, as they say.
    Admiral, if you could expound on Marines 2030 and then also 
go into the fact that as we work to deter China and a China 
attack, how do we not provoke one?
    Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congressman. First, the Marine 
littoral regiment. Again, General Berger, who came out of 
MARFORPAC [U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific], as you know, I 
think was pretty understanding of the threat, the scenario, and 
what was needed. So I appreciate his effort to focus on the 
Indo-Pacific problem set.
    That said, we need to deliver that organization with the 
capabilities to deliver effect. Surface-to-air, air-to--or 
surface-to-surface, surface-to-ship. When that force is armed 
and prepared in that set of capability that's exactly what we 
need in the Indo-Pacific to support the fight.
    To your second question on what do we do to not provoke the 
PRC. Well, number one, we've got to make sure that they 
understand, we're not seeking conflict. Number two, we haven't 
changed our policy. Number three, we don't support independence 
for Taiwan. And then we need to make sure that they can operate 
inside this international world order in a way that all nations 
want to interoperate with them, economically, diplomatically. 
And that's the challenge. So first we need to make sure they 
understand we are not trying to provoke.
    Mr. Panetta. Great. Thank you.
    Mr. Royal, Taiwan's intelligence community faces constant 
infiltrations by the CCP including taking advantage of weak 
espionage laws that can challenge our own ability to coordinate 
with the Taiwanese. What do you make of our ability to work 
with Taiwan's intelligence community and what strategies might 
we consider to create a more reliable intelligence sharing with 
the Taiwanese?
    Mr. Royal. Congressman, this is a topic of our bilateral 
discussions with the government of Taiwan. I will say they're 
making improvements in their ability to hold and maintain 
security over information. We also are able to have some pretty 
discreet conversations about what we're seeing in terms of 
developments in the region. So I would say that this is an area 
for--that we are improving in and needs further improvement 
going forward.
    Mr. Panetta. Great. Thank you.
    Last question. Admiral, can you discuss what USINDOPACOM is 
doing to ensure our current stockpiles and military assets 
remain intact amid a conflict under extreme weather conditions 
such as a hurricane, such as other types of extreme weather 
events that we are dealing with?
    Admiral Aquilino. Yes, thanks, Congressman. So certainly I 
have an organization that's the Center for Disaster--for 
Excellence for Disaster Management. They are doing a lot of 
work for me to make sure I understand where those places are 
that we need that might be at risk based on impacts, whether it 
be drought, sea level rise, severity of storms. And we ensure 
that those are structured correctly and positioned to be able 
to sustain and survive any harsh impact. But the ability to 
predict and then the ability to take action in advance of the 
problem is the approach we've taken.
    Mr. Panetta. Great. Thank you, gentlemen.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    The Chairman. I thank the gentleman from California.
    The chair now recognizes the gentleman from New York, Mr. 
LaLota, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. LaLota. Thank you, Chairman.
    Admiral, General, Mr. Royal, I want to start by thanking 
you for your service and for being here with our committee 
today.
    Admiral, I have to say I am a bit excited to speak with you 
on the record today. It is not every day I get to dialogue with 
a combatant commander who is not only from Long Island, but 
from my congressional district. And in fact I understand that--
as you told me earlier, that you lived five houses away from 
St. Anthony's High School where my wife and I both attended. So 
awesome that you are here, Admiral.
    I was a few classes after you at Annapolis. And after 
commissioning I was deployed to the Western Pacific three times 
and spent 11 months in 2005 attached to a Joint Special 
Operations Task Force in the Southern Philippines. And with 
that experience I have great respect and appreciation for the 
role the Indo-Pacific Command plays to our national security. 
And our Nation's most dangerous adversaries--China, Russia, and 
North Korea--have a significant presence in your area of 
operations and I am honored to have you and your staff here 
today to discuss and work with our committee to address 
national security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region. And a 
significant ally in the region is the Republic of the 
Philippines and the United States and the Philippines have 
maintained a deep multigeneration relationship that includes 
bilateral security alliance, extensive military cooperation, 
close people-to-people ties, and many shared strategic and 
economic interests.
    And as you are all aware, the Philippines, China, and other 
countries have long-standing disputes over waters and land 
features in the South China Sea. And as a result tensions have 
risen sharply over the last decade as China has enlarged and 
placed military assets on several disputed features in the 
South China Sea.
    Just recently our DOD has announced the location of four 
new naval bases in the Philippines to include three on the 
northeastern part of the island chain. And I applaud those 
efforts to keep in check the growing threats of China and I am 
optimistic about our efforts to achieve deterrence through 
strength in the region. And it is crucial that we continue to 
position ourselves and have regional readiness in the region.
    And, Admiral, my first question is for you. In your 
testimony you discussed how important--excuse me, how our 
competitors seek to challenge U.S. dominance in all domains 
including space and cyber.
    Admiral Aquilino. Sure.
    Mr. LaLota. And to maintain our warfighting advantage U.S. 
INDOPACOM requires resilient and flexible space and cyber 
capabilities and we need to continue to integrate these 
capabilities into activities and exercises with our allies and 
partners in the region.
    And so given these new bases and recent joint training 
exercises in the Philippines do you envision any additional 
resources or manpower that will be needed that are currently 
unplanned for? And the question is for everybody.
    Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congressman. I appreciate the 
question. It's good to meet with you as well.
    I just want to--one point of clarification. So the sites 
that we have coordinated with the Philippines will certainly 
not be U.S. bases, right? So those are Philippine sovereign 
territory that we will work with them to be able to invest in 
and build out so that the Philippines and the United States can 
operate together whenever needed to both exercise and rehearse.
    That said, those agreements are just going through. So as a 
part of INDOPACOM's plan for developing those four places, we 
have not even done the assessment, nor have we identified any 
planning and design or ultimately coordination with our 
Philippine partners on what things are best invested in. So we 
have way more work to do. None of those requirements are in my 
1254 report. Those will be for future years. But having the 
ability to work with our critical ally, the Philippines, we 
need to build those out as quick as possible.
    And thanks for your service. The team is still supporting 
the Philippines down south where you operated from.
    Mr. LaLota. Great. Just to follow up on that, Admiral, I am 
familiar--I am sure we are using that through, by, and with 
method still with Philippines and some other neighbors and 
partners in the area. When do you expect to more specifically 
drill down to this committee to what resources you need to help 
advance a presence through, by, and with our Filipino 
counterparts?
    Admiral Aquilino. So in my current report, Congressman, 
there are identified projects that we would like to build out 
in the current sites that they've agreed with that we have 
started work on. For the four additional sites, those will show 
up next year in that report.
    Mr. LaLota. Thanks, Admiral. I appreciate your time and 
your efforts.
    Chairman, I yield back.
    The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
    The chair now recognizes Mr. Horsford for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Horford. Thank you very much, Chairman Rogers and 
Ranking Member Smith, for holding this important hearing.
    As the 2022 U.S. National Security Strategy stated, the 
Indo-Pacific is the epicenter of the 21st century geopolitics. 
The Indo-Pacific theater encompasses over 35 countries, 15 time 
zones, and is home to over half of the world's population. It 
is evident to me that success in the region will be a result of 
multilateral approaches.
    Secretary Austin has stated that we must use every tool at 
the Department of Defense's disposal in close collaboration 
with our counterparts across the U.S. Government and with 
allies and partners to ensure that potential foes understand 
the folly of aggression.
    The work that we do with our allies and partners plays a 
crucial part of our ability to deter conflict. As you know, my 
district includes Nellis Air Force Base who, aligned with the 
National Defense Strategy, have focused their red flag 
exercises on the Indo-Pacific theater and the pacing challenges 
alongside our allied partners.
    So how are we collaborating with our allies and our 
partners to build an advantage and deter any challenges that we 
may face in the region? And how are you working with our 
counterparts and the U.S. Government to address issues in the 
Indo-Pacific? And what can Congress do to further assist in 
those efforts?
    Mr. Royal. Congressman, I'll jump in first here on this 
one. As you alluded to in your comments, deterrence holds in 
this region for two reasons: One is because we have the right 
capabilities postured at the right level of readiness; and 
secondly, because our allies and partners are standing with us. 
And in that regard I would say that we're doing more than ever 
with respect to advancing our relationships with our allies and 
partners.
    In Japan, we're watching their--the Japanese Diet increase 
the defense budget by over 25 percent just in the next year. 
They've supported a counterstrike capability and they are now 
offering to host a U.S. Marine littoral regiment in Japan for 
the very first time.
    The AUKUS arrangement is a historic opportunity for us to 
be able to put increasing capability in the undersea domain and 
to increase interoperability with two of our most capable 
allies.
    This is the sort of story that we're seeing repeated 
throughout the region right now among all of our defense treaty 
allies, but beyond that as well with all of our partners. And 
so when we're talking about having the right capabilities and 
watching defense budgets support that in--postured in the way 
that actually does create the right kind of deterrent effects 
to our adversaries, all of that is underway right now and we 
are breathing oxygen into that work every single day.
    Admiral Aquilino. Yes, Congressman, as it applies from the 
training lens, right, so we do a--like I said, 120 exercises, 
operations. The training aspect of our allies and partners is 
critical. Some of them come to your State and go to the gold 
standard, right, of Nellis for the Air Force, Fallon for the 
Navy. And the intent that we're trying to push in the approach 
is to take that level of training and connect it from Nellis to 
Australia to Alaska to Guam to Japan. And if you were to think 
about a training range that spanned that size and scope, and 
allies and partners from anywhere in the region could jump in 
and get high-end training like you're used to and the Air Force 
is used to at Nellis, that's a pretty good path forward. That's 
our approach.
    Mr. Horsford. Thank you for the recognition of the great 
work that our service members are doing at Nellis and beyond.
    Finally, we know in States like Nevada many of our 
constituents are feeling the effects of the climate crisis 
every day. And the Indo-Pacific theater also experiences some 
of the world's most damaging events. Often they are fast-
occurring and unpredictable. So what are some of the actions 
that are being taken towards work around climate resiliency?
    Mr. Royal. Congressman, the first thing that we're doing 
right now is spending a lot of time with our allies and 
partners in the region talking about what they're seeing in 
terms of impacts of climate change, in particular for defense 
and security requirements where our department is most focused.
    And to that regard we are looking at ways to mitigate those 
impacts, whether it's related to infrastructure or energy 
security. And I do think over time investments that we need to 
be making into green technologies that support our defense 
requirements and those of our allies and partners will be 
absolutely critical in the coming years.
    Mr. Horsford. Okay. Thank you.
    Admiral Aquilino. Congressman, I've provided--my 
organization has done a 30-year prediction on what each of 
those nations might be seeing coming their way and they can use 
that for understanding preparedness. And as we've worked 
projects and other things we make sure we're supporting 
anything through the concerns of climate impacts.
    Mr. Horsford. Thank you very much.
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
    We are going to do--we have been called for votes. We are 
going to do one more witness on each side. It will be Mr. Mills 
and Ms. Tokuda and then we are going to call it a day.
    So, Mr. Mills, you are recognized for 5 minutes at most.
    Mr. Mills. Yes, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will make 
this pretty brief.
    On multiple occasions we have dealt with people from the 
Biden administration within the Department of Defense and the 
Department of State. And as I have tried to offer up many 
times, the recognition of how we view China is very different 
from my perspective of where we are from an economic, resource, 
cyber, and other types of aspects of warfare that is being 
launched against us. And unfortunately for often far too long 
we look at everything from kinetic ability.
    So this question is for you, Mr. Royal. When we are doing 
all this preparedness to try and identify how we can thwart the 
efforts of warfare from China's aggression, do we recognize 
them as anything greater than just a competitor, but as an 
actual adversary?
    Mr. Royal. Congressman, the term that we use in the 
National Defense Strategy is the pacing challenge for the 
Department.
    Mr. Mills. Do we recognize them as anything other than a 
competitor?
    Mr. Royal. Congressman, we can all get into different 
definitions of what is competitor, what is challenger, what is 
adversary. Pacing challenge is a term that we believe sets our 
sights on a trajectory that allows us to do what we need to do 
to be able to make sure that we are defending and deterring 
every single day.
    Mr. Mills. Okay. Why don't we frame it this way? How does 
the CCP view America?
    Mr. Royal. I'd be happy to talk with you in a classified 
session about our assessments of the CCP's----
    Mr. Mills. Well, it is pretty simple. I think that when 
they are actually trying to go after us from an economic and 
resource perspective or trying to eliminate the U.S. dollar 
from being a global currency to ensure they throw us into 
hyperinflation; they are trying to encircle us by utilizing the 
Road and Belt Initiative as well as economic coercion in Panama 
and Honduras to control the tariffs and taxation of the Panama 
Canal; when they are actually releasing out of the Darien Gap 
the fentanyl that is killing tens of thousands of Americans 
every single year in America; when they are utilizing the 
marriage of convenience with Russia to try and advance 
themselves with the SHAWAs [Streamlined Health and WASH 
Activities] of Venezuela, Petro Colombia, and the Cubans, which 
are 90 miles off our--I am fairly confident they don't view us 
as a competitor or to outpace us, but as an adversary that they 
intend to utilize things like even the WHO [World Health 
Organization] and WEF [World Economic Forum] to try and create 
this hegemony, which is what Chairman Xi is actually looking to 
do from the very beginning.
    In saying all that, let's talk about economic resource 
capability and capacity. Admiral, you have been very forthright 
with us even in our closed-door session on where we need to be 
at. In the event of a CCP invasion of Taiwan, what role would 
the Indian Ocean play in shipping critical supplies and 
resources to our partners and allies and could the Indian Ocean 
supply chains constrain the PRC aggression?
    Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congressman. So again no matter 
what would happen in the world, a free flow of product commerce 
to our allies and partners and from the United States, right--
it's not only the allies and partners and friends in the 
region, but it's the EU, it's the U.K. We would come together 
to ensure that free flow of commerce could happen for all those 
nations. And it's also a vulnerability for the other side.
    Mr. Mills. And that is exactly what I was getting to, which 
is that in identifying and trying to prevent, yes, we can 
continue to try and be a porcupine so that China looks at it 
and says that it is not a viable option right now. But also I 
think exposing their vulnerabilities to track them away from 
the invasion, to allow them to try and strengthen up their 
vulnerabilities, which could buy us the precious time that we 
need to get our industrial base where it has to be to support a 
war of this magnitude.
    And so have we looked at how we strengthen the 
quadrilateral agreements, or the Quad as it is referred to, 
with India to ensure that we have that capability to try and 
expose these vulnerabilities?
    Admiral Aquilino. We're certainly working with our Indian 
partners both to advance our warfighting capabilities together, 
to ensure that we're sharing information that's needed. Again, 
we do have the same strategic competitor, or whatever 
definition we want to put on it. And in my time over the--in 
the theater now for 5 years straight it has increased 
exponentially. And again, it's trending in the right direction. 
They're really good partners.
    Mr. Mills. I agree. And I think that our strengthening, as 
we saw under the Trump administration with Modi, it is to their 
economic advantage to weaken China's aggression from an 
economic coercive stance, but also it is to our advantage to 
find reliable resource and economic partners that we can 
conduct not only just trade, but security cooperations in the 
area to ensure that we have stability in operations that are 
sustainable for decades to come.
    Thank you so much, gentlemen. With that I yield back.
    The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
    The chair now recognizes the gentleman from--the gentlelady 
from Hawaii----
    Ms. Tokuda. Thank you so much.
    The Chairman [continuing]. Ms. Tokuda, for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Tokuda. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    For decades our country has enjoyed a close relationship 
with the Freely Associated States under the Compact of Free 
Association, especially in my home State of Hawaii where 
thousands of FAS citizens live and work contributing to our 
diverse communities.
    Ambassador Joseph Yun alongside the Department of State and 
the Department of the Interior has been leading the efforts to 
renegotiate these compacts and send them to Congress for 
approval before they expire. But to me, the Department of 
Defense, especially U.S. INDOPACOM, remains the primary 
beneficiary of these compacts.
    Admiral Aquilino, I think we both agree on the strategic 
importance of these compacts. Briefly, how important is it for 
Congress to act quickly to renew these agreements when they are 
sent to Congress for review and approval?
    Admiral Aquilino. Aloha, Congresswoman. Thank you. It is 
critically important. Ambassador Yun and I have spent time 
together. I've offered my support wherever and whenever needed. 
I've hosted him in the headquarters. Again, when we say it's 
beneficial, it's beneficial to the United States.
    The largest number of military service per capita comes out 
of the Freely Associated States. We defend them as if they were 
the U.S. homeland. And it's critical that we get these 
agreements across the goal line.
    Ms. Tokuda. Thank you. I also want to add that the PRC is 
working aggressively as you know to undermine our relationships 
with our FAS allies. Last month President David Panuelo of the 
Federated States of Micronesia [FSM] wrote a shocking letter 
detailing the extensive influence campaigns and political 
warfare that the PRC is conducting in his country. His letter 
is a bold move to assert that FSM sovereignty through 
transparency. And I hope this committee will join me in 
applauding his courage and his service to his country.
    Now INDOPACOM's independent assessment for fiscal year 2024 
included several military contract--construction projects for 
harbor and port infrastructure in the Federated States of 
Micronesia and the Republic of Palau. These projects are 
possible in part because of the compacts and the access they 
provide.
    Admiral, what is the importance of these types of projects 
in the Freely Associated States? What value are these projects 
delivering for our FAS allies?
    Admiral Aquilino. And, Congresswoman, for the United States 
to have the--we talked a little bit before about access, 
basing, and overflight. You know, those places are critical. 
They're much needed. To have them in the Freely Associated 
States provides a level of defense that's beneficial.
    And I would once--say one thing about the President Panuelo 
letter. I'd sat with him just a couple of weeks ago. His letter 
was far from shocking for me. And it's a good read for 
everybody because it's the model being utilized all across the 
region by the PRC that he shined some light on. It was well 
done.
    Ms. Tokuda. Thank you, Admiral.
    With the remaining time I have, I would like to expound on 
our military presence in Okinawa. As a fourth-generation 
Okinawan-American and Hawaii resident I feel more acutely than 
most the impacts of our presence there and the similarities 
that exist between my homeland and my home.
    Like Hawaii, Okinawa is strategically important to our 
defense posture in the Indo-Pacific and it too is home to a 
significant U.S. military presence with all the benefits and 
the challenges that come with it.
    The planned relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma 
to Henoko Bay has been delayed into the next decade. 
Significant environmental and ecological challenges to this 
plan in addition to local political opposition beg the question 
of when this relocation will ever be completed and if so, at 
what cost?
    In the past 7 years it has been revealed that there is PFAS 
[per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances] contamination of 
waterways, soil, and drinking water around the Kadena and 
Futenma bases. Blood tests conducted by Kyoto University in 
2019 found elevated PFAS concentration in residents' blood, 
strongly suggesting potential exposure to not just Okinawan 
residents, but our own U.S. service members to PFAS compounds.
    There is no denying Okinawa's strategic importance to our 
posture in the Indo-Pacific. My two island homes are destined 
to play a role in the story of this era and I am very proud of 
that. I only ask that our witnesses here today consider a 
whole-of-government approach as we define and strengthen our 
relationship with both Okinawa and Hawaii. More than just a 
location for our fleets and our bases, these islands and her 
people are our allies that should be included in future 
decision making as we work to secure and defend the region.
    Mahalo for your time, and I yield back. Thank you, Mr. 
Chair.
    The Chairman. Thank you. What I would like to do, since 
nobody else has scooted in is--okay. I was going to give them 
time.
    But, listen, I want to thank you all for your patience and 
your service and being here today.
    And, with that, we are adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 1:40 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]


      
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                            A P P E N D I X

                             April 18, 2023

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              PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                             April 18, 2023

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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

      
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              WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING

                              THE HEARING

                             April 18, 2023

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               RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. KIM

    Mr. Royal. The Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan are two of our 
most important allies in the Indo-Pacific region. We continue to 
encourage both countries to seek ways to cooperate further through 
bilateral and multilateral activities on security matters. We are 
encouraged by the summit that was held between Japanese Prime Minister 
Kishida and ROK President Yoon in Seoul on May 7-8 to discuss the 
bolstering of bilateral ties. For U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral 
cooperation, it is critical that we maintain strong and close 
relationships between our three countries to meet the shared challenges 
posed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the 
People's Republic of China (PRC). The Department of Defense is 
currently working to further security cooperation through the 
regularization of trilateral exercises and the implementation of a 
presidential-level commitment to share DPRK missile warning data in 
near-real time between the United States, the ROK, and Japan. These 
efforts are building greater interoperability and preparedness among 
our forces to help maintain peace and security in the region and uphold 
the rules-based international order. As outlined in the National 
Defense Strategy, cooperation with allies such as the ROK and Japan 
provide the United States with an advantage in dealing with regional 
threats and is critical to building enduring advantages for the future 
force.   [See page 36.]
                                 ______
                                 
              RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. WALTZ
    Mr. Royal. The Department supports using all available authorities 
and corresponding appropriations, in coordination with interagency 
partners, to bolster Taiwan's self-defense. I will emphasize that the 
Department is accelerating the provision of both materiel and non-
materiel support to Taiwan to enhance cross-Strait deterrence. 
Department staff are engaged in regular discussions with Members of the 
Committee and their staff members about this specific matter, and I 
would welcome the opportunity to discuss this further in a classified 
setting.   [See page 34.]
                                 ______
                                 
               RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. RYAN
    Mr. Royal. The differences between Ukraine and Taiwan are just as 
important as their similarities. We can draw some important lessons 
from Ukraine that can apply to Taiwan, including the importance of 
building a civilian defense capacity as a critical component of an 
overall self-defense strategy. Ukraine's rapid mobilization orders, 
activation of conscripts and reservists, and efforts to equip citizens 
in supporting the country's defense against Russian aggression were, 
and remain, critical. Taiwan has indeed taken recent steps along these 
lines, including by enhancing the readiness of its Armed Forces through 
increased training and resources, as well as elevating the role of 
reserve forces in crisis and contingency planning. We applaud these 
important steps by Taiwan, and the Department continues to support 
these efforts through our comprehensive security cooperation efforts. 
Our ongoing security cooperation will continue to prioritize efforts 
that build Taiwan's preparedness--including fundamental capability and 
capacity building, modernization, and sustainment to ensure Taiwan is 
organized, trained, and equipped for a range of potential 
contingencies.   [See page 38.]



      
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              QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                             April 18, 2023

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                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT

    Mr. Scott. What message would it send to the PRC if European Navies 
routinely patrolled the Taiwan Strait?
    Admiral Aquilino. Congressman, I would respectfully suggest a 
different characterization--neither we nor our allies ``patrol'' the 
Taiwan Strait. Our air and maritime transits of the Taiwan Strait are 
conducted within a corridor that is beyond the territorial sea of any 
coastal state, where high-seas freedoms of navigation and overflight 
apply. Such transits demonstrate U.S. commitment to uphold a free and 
open Indo-Pacific by flying, sailing, and operating wherever 
international law allows. When our allies and partners fly or sail 
through the Taiwan Strait, they demonstrate their commitment to the 
rules-based international order.
    Mr. Scott. Is there a role for the E-11A BACN in the USINDOPACOM 
area of responsibility?
    Admiral Aquilino. There is a role for Battlefield Airborne 
Communications Node (BACN) capability in the Indo-Pacific to support 
Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2). Peer competition 
necessitates resilient communications and data links for our joint 
forces. USINDOPACOM is agnostic of the platform but requires any 
solution to be persistent and operationally effective in all contested 
domains.
    Mr. Scott. How can the U.S. Coast Guard be better utilized in the 
USINDOPACOM area of responsibility?
    Admiral Aquilino. The U.S. Coast Guard's (USCG) mix of maritime law 
enforcement authorities and capabilities make it ideal to promote a 
free and open Indo-Pacific region. Their presence in this region 
strengthens regional maritime governance, enhances Allied and partner 
nation maritime capabilities, and deepens those maritime relationships. 
The USCG is a vital instrument of national security, humanitarian 
assistance, regulatory authority, and law enforcement that supports 
USINDOPACOM's Theater Campaign Plan and U.S. national interests. The 
USCG provides enormous impact in the region with these unique 
authorities and is fully integrated with USINDOPACOM and JIATF-W. The 
USCG's actions reinforces that the U.S. is a dedicated and present 
partner, which counters the PRC's increased presence in the Indo-
Pacific. We welcome USCG expansion and enduring presence in the region, 
to include recapitalized surface and air fleets, new infrastructure, 
and increased workforce strength.
    Mr. Scott. Does the U.S. Navy's command ships provide greater 
survivability and more flexibility than land-based counterparts?
    Admiral Aquilino. Command ships provide additional survivability 
and flexibility for the joint force commander and complements the 
capability of command nodes ashore. The immense size of the Indo-
Pacific, as well as peer competitors' access to improved targeting 
systems, means that the joint force requires a variety of capable 
options for operational command and control of forces.
    Mr. Scott. How can we expect to engage with merchant mariners from 
Allied/Partner nations if U.S. merchant mariners are not allowed to 
participate in planning exercises and wargames?
    Admiral Aquilino. USINDOPACOM does not plan or execute exercises or 
``wargames'' with merchant marines. The U.S. Merchant Marine (USMM) is 
managed by the Department of Transportation's Maritime Administration 
(MARAD) and consists of privately-owned, U.S.-registered merchant ships 
and vessels that provide waterborne transportation for passengers and 
cargo moving in domestic and international commerce. There are no 
training requirements for merchant mariners outside of what the U.S. 
Coast Guard has designated to maintain their certificates/licenses. Any 
U.S. or allied/partner merchant mariner participation inside of 
USINDOPACOM exercises is as a ``service provider'', specifically they 
are operating a vessel inside of an exercise to facilitate support but 
do not have any training objectives to be satisfied by exercise 
participation.
    Mr. Scott. What additional assistance can the United States Coast 
Guard provide to the Philippine Coast Guard?
    Admiral Aquilino. USINDOPACOM and USCG are synchronized across the 
spectrum of activities, with USCG's unique capabilities and authorities 
supporting the USINDOPACOM Theater Campaign Plan. USCG additional 
efforts with Philippines Coast Guard (PCG) include greater training 
with a new Southeast Asia Training Team coming online, and intentions 
to double USCG operations and footprint in the region over the next few 
years. USCG and USINDOPACOM have a shared effort to advance information 
sharing and cooperation across maritime law enforcement, fisheries, 
Search and Rescue, and other core coast guard missions. Areas of 
potential cooperation include bilateral ``ship rider'' agreements for 
enforcing maritime law within the Philippines EEZ as well as joint 
patrol opportunities with USCG. The USCG's Indo-Pacific Support Cutter, 
the USCGC HARRIET LANE, is purpose-built for bi- and multi-lateral 
engagements. The USCG is looking at ways to further bolster the PCG's 
fleet readiness with additional subject matter expert (SME) exchanges 
and industrial/materiel support alongside existing U.S. facility and 
capability capacity building efforts already underway. The USCG is the 
executive agent for the six-member Southeast Asia Maritime Law 
Enforcement Initiative (SEAMLEI) Commanders' Forum, which seeks to 
enhance multi-lateral cooperation between the PCG and other member 
coast guards, and created a first-ever Standard Operating Procedure 
(SOP) for combined coast guard operations.
    Mr. Scott. How unprepared is the U.S. Transportation Command to 
meet your requirements?
    Admiral Aquilino. USINDOPACOM advocates for the air and sealift 
required to meet our operational and strategic mobility requirements. 
Doing so enables continual improvement in USTRANSCOM's ability to 
satisfy USINDOPACOM's strategic lift and fuel requirements. USINDOPACOM 
and USTRANSCOM will continue to coordinate to achieve operational 
requirements
    Mr. Scott. How unprepared is the Military Sealift Command to meet 
your requirements?
    Admiral Aquilino. USINDOPACOM advocates for the sealift 
capabilities required to meet our requirements in the AOR. The 
implementation of a Jones Act waiver during periods of crisis will 
substantially increase our sealift capabilities. Simultaneously, this 
waiver would increase the flexibility to balance the employment of 
military and civilian strategic lift across the AOR.
    Mr. Scott. How unprepared is the Maritime Administration (MARAD) to 
meet your requirements?
    Admiral Aquilino. USINDOPACOM relies on the combined efforts of 
MARAD, USTRANSCOM, and U.S. commercial industry to meet our sealift 
requirements. Achieving sufficient inventory of tanker and cargo 
sealift to meet our operational requirements is an area that MARAD 
continues to assess and work solutions. USINDOPACOM advocates for the 
air and sealift required to meet operational and strategic needs.
    Mr. Scott. During World War II, many nations operated seaplanes. Is 
there a need for seaplanes today in the USINDOPACOM area of 
responsibility?
    Admiral Aquilino. The Indo-Pacific operational environment has 
evolved significantly since World War II. The employment of seaplanes 
today would not meet the operational demands and current threat 
scenario. However, we support the continuous development of new and 
innovative solutions that may provide solutions to logistical 
challenges. As an example, DARPA's Liberty Lifter X-Plane seeks to 
leverage emerging technologies that may demonstrate seaborne strategic 
and tactical lift capabilities.
    Mr. Scott. Are there any nations in your AOR you would like added 
to the National Guard's State Partnership Program on an accelerated 
basis?
    Admiral Aquilino. For FY24, USINDOPACOM is nominating Palau for 
partnership with the Guam National Guard. For future years (FY25-FY33), 
USINDOPACOM prioritizes developing State partnerships with Brunei, 
Laos, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu. These countries have not formally 
or informally asked for a partnership, but Laos and Vanuatu have been 
introduced to the program and its benefits.
    Mr. Scott. Is there a mission for an expanded number of hospital 
ships in the USINDOPACOM area of responsibility should the U.S. Navy 
expand the size of their hospital ship fleet in the future?
    Admiral Aquilino. Currently, the joint force does not have 
sufficient at-sea capacity to meet the medical and surgical needs of 
the joint force. In particular, USINDOPACOM requires additional 
hospital ship capacity to meet the force's current tertiary care needs. 
In addition to hospital ships, USINDOPACOM needs expeditionary at-sea 
hospital capability. This is because the two hospital ships, due to 
their size and ship draft, only provide partial coverage of the AOR 
while at the same time requiring a large medical staff. In addition to 
hospital ships, options to improve at-sea medical capability and 
capacity in maritime and littoral operations include:
      Expeditionary Fast Transport (T-EPF) Flight II--Increase 
medical capacity by providing high-speed sealift mobility and agility.
      Amphibious assault ships--Provide robust medical and 
surgical capability when augmented by medical teams.
      Platform agnostic expeditionary surgical teams can also 
augment almost any afloat platform and provide medical/surgical 
capability with limited requirement for patient holding.
    Mr. Scott. Is there a role for the E-11A BACN on the Korean 
peninsula?
    General LaCamera. We continue to consider the concept of operation 
for the E-11A Battlefield Airborne Communication Node (BACN) platform 
for the Korea Theater of Operations. The E-11A was a tremendous asset 
to military operations during Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING 
FREEDOM. The platform provided the ability to relay communications 
signals, including air and ground tracks, with high bandwidth 
communication capabilities, fusing the battlefield into one network. 
While Korea's mountainous terrain has similarities to the Afghanistan 
theater, the Korean peninsula is a much smaller landmass with densely 
packed communication infrastructure. Unlike in the Middle East, we are 
not intrinsically challenged by extended distances, lack of ground-
based repeaters, or more geographically distributed fighter/bomber 
caps. The operational requirement for the E-11A could be considered 
later in conflict after air superiority has been established, to help 
address pockets of communication gaps once we have entered stability 
operations. We will work with our US Components to continue exploring 
the concept of operations for the E-11A BACN to enhance operations on 
the Korean peninsula.
    Mr. Scott. How can the U.S. Coast Guard be better integrated with 
United States Forces Korea?
    General LaCamera. The United States is an active participant in 
multiple Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) exercises to include 
the Republic of Korea (RoK)-hosted Eastern Endeavor Exercise 2023, 
which took place on 31 May and included forces from the RoK, Japan, and 
the United States, in addition to other partners. The exercise 
demonstrated interoperability and encouraged follow-on dialogue for 
exercises with other partners. We continue to explore training 
opportunities with the RoK and the U.S. Coast Guard to further develop 
capabilities in Multi Domain Operations.
                                 ______
                                 
                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. STEFANIK
    Ms. Stefanik. Does INDOPACOM and other combatant commands have the 
ability, through commercial means or otherwise, to measure ``Will To 
Resist'' or and other measures of on-the-ground civilian sentiment in 
the Pacific theater, specifically in Taiwan? If your command does not, 
do you have plans to acquire those means?
    Admiral Aquilino. Every day, we execute our responsibilities on the 
Taiwan Relations Act. USINDOPACOM leverages interagency and non 
government organization methodologies, assessments and surveys to 
assist in measuring Taiwan's will to prepare, fight, and resist. The 
current methods and means available are sufficient in informing our 
decision-making and assessments in how to best assist Taiwan and its 
self-defense. Ultimately, USINDOPACOM is primarily focused on enhancing 
Taiwan's ability to fight, an indispensable complement to their will to 
fight.
    Ms. Stefanik. Can you discuss how you utilize HUMINT to augment 
efforts to identify secure basing and personnel and equipment movement? 
Are there other means with which you are able to identify logistical 
challenges, commercial or otherwise? How are you measuring the 
effectiveness of the Pacific Pathways exercises among our partners and 
allies in the region. Can you discuss how you measure that?
    Admiral Aquilino. We utilize all available sources of data to 
assess risk and identify mitigation strategies when seeking to validate 
suitable basing locations and logistics routes that prioritize the 
security of our personnel and resources. Pacific Pathways, now termed 
OPERATION PATHWAYS, is U.S. Army Pacific's number one operational 
shaping activity in the Indo-Pacific. Exercises such as YAMA SAKURA, 
KEEN SWORD, COBRA GOLD, and BALIKATAN support both partnership and 
posture goals within and beyond the First Island Chain. Each PATHWAYS-
supported exercise is deliberately assessed against the Theater Army 
Campaign Plan's lines of effort, with key assessment metrics focused on 
deterring potential adversaries and reassuring our allies and partners.
                                 ______
                                 
                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GALLAGHER
    Mr. Gallagher. Admiral Aquilino, I would like to give you the 
opportunity to clarify the remarks that you made in response to my 
question about current munitions stockpiles within the Indo-Pacific 
theater. At an unclassified level, how do you assess the risk that we 
assume within the Indo-Pacific theater if we fail to prioritize and 
increase the size of missile stockpiles from what we currently possess 
west of the international date line? Please elaborate on the importance 
of the investments in a Joint Fires Network and in Integrated Maritime 
Fires that you lay out in your Section 1254 report.
    Admiral Aquilino. As we learned from the conflict in Ukraine, 
munitions stockpiles are critically important both for deterrence and 
while in conflict. If we fail to prioritize increasing the size of 
missile stockpiles west of the international dateline, we incur severe 
risk to our overall deterrence strategy for peer competitors in the 
Indo-Pacific Theater. In the event of conflict, insufficient missile 
stockpiles present a high level of risk to mission and to our platforms 
and personnel who would lack sufficient standoff munitions needed to 
confront an adversary. The Integrated Maritime Fires requirements 
outlined in the Section 1254 report outline my highest priority 
munitions (Maritime Strike Tomahawk, Long Range Anti-Ship Missile, 
Standard Missile 6 1B, Joint Strike Missile, Precision Strike Missile 
Increment 2, and others listed in my unfunded priority list) which 
would be critical to a conflict in the Western Pacific. I would like to 
accelerate the development and acquisition of these weapons systems 
identified in the budget, and it is essential that we increase the 
inventories of these munitions, or others providing similar capability. 
he Joint Fires Network is equally critical because it will enable 
joint, all-domain fires at the speed and scale necessary for a high-end 
warfighting conflict in the Indo-Pacific theater, through improving the 
pace, synchronization, and efficiency of our munitions and non-kinetic 
effects employment.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GOLDEN
    Mr. Golden. Admiral Aquilino, as you noted in your prepared 
testimony the PLA's rapid military buildup includes the addition of 17 
major warships in 2022, increasing the PLA Navy battle force ships to 
around 350. China currently has the world's largest Navy, and by 2025, 
the PLA Navy is expected to grow to 400 ships, then to 440 ships by 
2030.
    In contrast, our Navy currently has 298 ships and our fleet size is 
expected to decrease in the coming years, contrary to the current 
national policy for a 355 ship fleet and to the reported 373-ship 
force- level goal from the Navy's Battle Force Ship Assessment and 
Requirement Report. Although no one would deny that the U.S. Navy's 
ships are of superior quality to their Chinese counterparts, as the 
saying goes quantity can be a quality of its own. Moreover, I am 
concerned that China, aided by consistently increasing shipbuilding 
industrial base capacity, appears to be fielding increasingly capable 
surface combatants, including the new Type 055 Cruiser/Large Destroyer, 
which reportedly may be able to field directed energy weapon systems.
    Others and I on this committee continue to be concerned with the 
lack of necessary investment in our shipbuilding defense industrial 
base, and given China's consistently expanding naval fleet and 
capability, this is becoming an issue of the utmost urgency.
    Can you please describe how China's expanding naval capability 
impacts the INDOPACOM area of operations? Can you describe what 
concerns you may have regarding how China's ability to grow its fleet 
so consistently may impact our force structure and presence in the 
area?
    Admiral Aquilino. The growth of the PLA Navy allows China to 
conduct more operations and to sustain a higher operational tempo than 
we've seen previously. Even so, the PLA Navy remains a regional force, 
with an overwhelming percentage of their operations and exercises 
conducted within the First or Second Island Chains. The PLAN does 
execute a small number of extra-regional deployments for area 
familiarization, naval diplomacy, occasional humanitarian assistance, 
or in support of counter-piracy efforts. This has at least three 
specific impacts within the Indo-Pacific. First, it allows the PRC to 
project a more engaged and committed image, though I would note the 
PRC's humanitarian efforts, for example, continue to lag other nations 
and organizations both in time and scale. Second, it has allowed the 
CCP to increase pressure against Taiwan and rival South and East China 
Sea claimant states. And third, it has thickened the PLA presence in 
the western Pacific in the event of a crisis. This changing reality in 
the Indo-Pacific demands a U.S. military posture with both the right 
capabilities and capacity that can deter a crisis, and, if required, 
fight and win.
                                 ______
                                 
                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. McCLAIN
    Mrs. McClain. Admiral Aquilino, your unfunded priorities list this 
year again includes funding--almost $100M this year--for the 
Quickstrike-Powered JDAM standoff naval mine system. Can you please 
explain the importance of this capability--and its related Maritime 
Strike Weapons--to your plans? Why are standoff munitions like this so 
important to the defense of Taiwan?
    Admiral Aquilino. Naval mines are a cost-effective means to 
exercise strategic influence over naval and amphibious operations in 
our plans and specifically to the defense of Taiwan. Mines provide 
improved deterrence and defeat options at the onset of an adversary 
military campaign. Additionally, advanced maritime mining significantly 
delays and disrupts adversary operational timelines, which allows 
greater time for the joint force to flow into the theater and provide 
an extended opportunity for joint force fires to attrite adversary 
maritime vessels.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. JACKSON
    Dr. Jackson. For the first time since 1987, the Marine Corps does 
not own any tactical UAS; the RQ-21 Blackjack flew its last flight in 
March 2023 as part of the Force Design 2030 ``divest to invest'' 
strategy. However, the Marine Corps still has a validated requirement 
for a shipboard-capable vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) UAS per the 
Marine Corps Unmanned Expeditionary UAS (MUX) program. This would have 
particular utility in the USINDOPACOM AOR, especially if it has long 
range, endurance, and the ability to operate from austere locations. 
Admiral Aquilino, do you see a capability gap in your AOR for a 
tactical (Group 3 sized) VTOL UAS that is capable for all ship classes 
and of supporting forces ashore? What UAS are currently supporting 
deployed Marine Expeditionary Units in your AOR? Is the Marine Corps or 
the Science and Technology community actively developing a shipboard-
capable UAS? If so, what attributes would you prioritize highest?
    Admiral Aquilino. In 2022, the Department of the Navy awarded a 
$135.8M contract to supply eight MQ-9A Extended Range drones for the 
U.S. Marine Corps. The unmanned aerial systems are scheduled for 
delivery by late 2023 as part of the Marine Air Ground Task Force 
Unmanned Expeditionary (MUC) Program of Record. USINDOPACOM continues 
to prioritize capabilities that increase the Marine Littoral Regiment's 
domain awareness to enable Joint Fires. Marine Corps Unmanned 
Expeditionary UAS (MUX) is a family of systems with MQ-9A providing the 
Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) capability to the MEUs from 
ashore, while Small UAS (Group 1-2) are employed at the battalion and 
below level. V-BAT (Group 3 UAS) is currently supporting VTOL UAS 
requirements for MEUs under a Contractor Owned/Contractor Operated 
contract, the capabilities and flexible employment models being 
executed with MQ-9A provide a more capable product to the supported 
forces. HQMC Marine Corps Warfighting Lab is researching and investing 
in additional MUX-Medium Altitude Long Endurance payloads and the MQ-9B 
as a future replacement to the MQ-9A (although the MQ-9 is not a 
shipboard capability).
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. MACE
    Ms. Mace. Admiral Aquilino and Mr. Royal, you have both stated the 
importance of the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) as one of the 
cornerstones of the US Security architecture in Oceania, along with 
other Freely Associated States (FAS). The Compact of Free Association 
(COFA) agreements with the FAS provide them economic assistance along 
with defense posture opportunities in the Indo-Pacific. I also agree 
these allies are extremely important to maintain geographically. 
However, the outgoing President David Panuelo recently disclosed the 
initiatives he has taken to push ahead with a diplomatic realignment in 
favor of Taiwan, saying the nation ``will be much better off without 
China. Yet the 22nd FSM Congress recently adopted a Congressional 
Resolution states their ``One-China'' policy remains the official 
policy of the islands, and they instruct their outgoing President not 
to make any changes to their diplomatic relations with China. In fact 
it was also quoted in their official press release ``the nation's 
diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China is an example 
of its consistent policy which over time has only strengthened and 
become significantly beneficial to both sides''. Mr. Royal, as the COFA 
agreement is currently under renegotiation before it expires in 2023, 
is this concerning in regard to the nation's defense? Where does the US 
stand on our allies' relations with the PRC?
    Mr. Royal. The Pacific Islands' geography connects the United 
States with the broader Indo-Pacific region; U.S. prosperity and 
security depend on the future of the Indo-Pacific region remaining free 
and open. The Department of Defense continues to enjoy exclusive 
military access to the Freely Associated States under the provisions of 
the Compacts of Free Association (COFA). We strive to be a trusted 
defense partner and welcome the conclusion of the negotiations with the 
Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) for the extension of Compact- 
related economic assistance. We believe that renewed funding for the 
COFA through congressional appropriation is in our national security 
interest. President Panuelo's letter highlighting the political 
interference from the People's Republic of China (PRC) that many Indo-
Pacific countries face serves to underscore the importance of the COFA 
agreement in preserving regional peace and security. Countries around 
the world, including Pacific Island countries, have a vital interest in 
a free and open international system. We do not ask countries to choose 
between the United States and the PRC. Rather, our efforts are aimed at 
preserving an international order where all countries, regardless of 
size or strength, have freedom to choose policies that serve their 
interests. The Department will continue to seek opportunities for 
further engagement and collaboration, including through the COFA 
agreements, with the FSM to strengthen and safeguard security in the 
Indo-Pacific region.
    Ms. Mace. If Congress were to fully fund the JTF-M does INDOPACOM 
currently have the workforce to execute all of the construction 
projects across Guam? Is there anything Congress and the Department of 
Defense can do to increase the available workforce to complete these 
military construction projects? Is there a risk to national security by 
extending the H2-B visas to increase the workforce in Guam?
    Admiral Aquilino. Joint Task Force Micronesia (JTF-M) provides an 
operational headquarters to oversee DoD operations in its area of 
responsibility, which will be the Guam cluster and include Guam and 
U.S. Territories (CNMI, Wake Island, and Midway Island) and also 
include the Freely Associated States (FAS), which consist of the 
Federated States of Micronesia, Republic of Palau, and the Republic of 
the Marshall Island. Fully funding JTF-M will provide the resources 
necessary to meet the FY23 NDAA requirement of establishing a JTF in 
the INDOPACOM Area of Responsibility. This mission is separate from 
execution and oversight of Military Construction (MILCON) which falls 
under the purview of Joint Region Marianas and the military components. 
The Department requires relief from the H-2B visa restrictions through 
at least 2029 to be able to field the workforce required for our 
construction needs. A longer-term extension, beyond the current date of 
December 31, 2024, helps meet the Department's requirements and deliver 
critical military construction projects on time. There is minimal risk 
to national security in extending the H2-B visas for Guam and the CNMI. 
Workers go through a thorough vetting process prior to receiving a 
visa.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. TOKUDA
    Ms. Tokuda. Multiple significant aspects of the environment in the 
Korean theater of operations--like weapons capabilities and force 
employment strategies--have recently changed and continue to evolve at 
a relatively rapid pace. Some of these changes may alter the basic 
assumptions on which operational plans utilized by the U.S. and our 
allies are built. Given that ROK and Japan appear to be more closely 
aligned on security issues than at any previous time, is there a good 
technical solution for agile collaborative planning between the U.S. 
and our allies, and particularly between allies, like the ROK and 
Japan? How can current planning capabilities be improved?
    General LaCamera. Deepening U.S.-Republic of Korea-Japan trilateral 
cooperation, collaboration, and partnership is vital for addressing the 
most pressing challenges of the 21st century. In November 2022, 
President Biden, President Yoon, and Prime Minister Kishida released a 
joint statement reaffirming our trilateral partnership guided by shared 
values, driven by innovation, and committed to shared prosperity and 
security. This statement commits each country to share Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea missile warning data in real time. USFK 
along with US Forces Japan, INDOPACOM, and the Department of Defense, 
are working with the ROK and Japan to implement this commitment. 
Additionally, as noted in the April 2023 U.S.-ROK-Japan Defense 
Trilateral Talks joint statement, each country committed to an annual 
trilateral exercise calendar, resumption of missile defense exercises, 
and anti-submarine exercises. We are also reviewing opportunities to 
undertake exercises in trilateral naval air operations, search and 
rescue, disaster relief, unconventional operations, and multi-domain 
operations. These commitments will be vital to routinizing military-to-
military ties and more importantly, enhancing our extended deterrence 
and commitment to counter and deter the growing DPRK missile and 
nuclear threat. In terms of planning, we must be more integrated and 
interoperable with our allies than ever before. There are both 
technical and pragmatic solutions that can assist in the planning and 
execution of contingency operations within the region. USFK and the 
ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command are addressing this capability with 
our Korean allies this year, using a commercial program that helps 
expedite planning, while increasing collaboration. If successful, 
expanding planning automation to our Japanese allies would be a superb 
next step. Additionally, as we develop new Artificial Intelligence and 
Machine Learning tools, we would ensure that USFK's Digital Operational 
Plan is scalable for allies and partners. We are also working with our 
Korean allies to harness their expertise in coding for innovating our 
planning processes. We will partner with INDOPACOM to maximize 
resources and capabilities to enable the acceleration of our efforts 
moving forward.
    Ms. Tokuda. What is the Command doing to enable rapid updates to 
existing plans and to build new plans that are suited and adaptable to 
the frequently shifting conditions in theater? How is the Command 
harnessing both existing and emerging technologies to ensure that it 
can make decisions better and faster than our adversaries? What 
resources are required for the Command to advance its digital OPLAN 
initiative?
    General LaCamera. USFK worked diligently the past 10 months to 
bring the Joint Planning Process into the 21st Century. USFK's current 
approach is to implement human/machine teaming into the Joint Planning 
Process. We created a digital planning branch to accomplish this 
mission need with four distinct efforts: Data Governance, Artificial 
Intelligence/Machine Learning enhancements, Automation, and Partnering. 
Our overall methodology is to produce quick wins as we march towards 
decision dominance that is made possible when we leverage Artificial 
Intelligence/Machine Learning in our planning. One example of planning 
innovation is being addressed by partnering with a software company 
that enables collaborative planning at the Top-Secret level. 
Additionally, by bringing this software onto the CENTRIXS-K network, we 
will improve the speed and quality of planning with service components 
and alliance partners. Lastly, our team partnered with the Office of 
Secretary Defense's Chief Digital & Artificial Intelligence Office on 
their Global Information Dominance Experiments-6 experimental work 
using the Korean Theater of Operations' Time Phased Force Deployment 
Data to provide the type of conditioned data that Artificial 
Intelligence/Machine Learning tools thrive from.
    We are partnered with the Department of Defense Missile Defense 
Agency as we work together on an Artificial Intelligence/Machine 
Learning enabled ballistic missile shot optimization planning tool. The 
pace of work is rapid, and MDA is helping the warfighter make better 
informed decisions in an ever-increasingly dangerous theater. This 
entails an adversary equipped with missile delivery systems capable of 
holding not just Northeast Asia at risk but pose a persistent threat 
and growing danger to the U.S. homeland. Our team has harnessed the 
technological advances in deep neural networks, combined with 
probabilistic outcome results to help our planners develop courses of 
action faster than the enemy. This provides commanders more decision 
space in which to plan and operate.
    While initiated on a very small budget, the costs for innovative 
changes to planning using next-gen tech are significant. We have been 
able to keep our costs to a minimum. However, as we continue to build 
irreversible momentum, this initiative will require us to procure 
capabilities in the form of trained personnel and hardware/software 
solutions. We are currently investigating the steps behind the creation 
of a Digital Planning and Capabilities Branch, which will require an 
overall net increase of personnel within the command. We will partner 
with INDOPACOM to maximize resources and capabilities to enable the 
acceleration of our efforts moving forward. The combination of threat 
and theater makes USFK's efforts an efficient use of taxpayer dollars.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MOYLAN
    Mr. Moylan. Admiral Aquilino, your Statement notes the importance 
of the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) as one of the cornerstones 
of the US Security architecture in Oceania, along with other Freely 
Associated States (FAS). The Compact of Free Association (COFA) 
agreements with the FAS provide them economic assistance along with 
defense posture opportunities in the Indo-Pacific. The 22nd FSM 
Congress recently adopted a Congressional Resolution that states that 
their ``One-China'' policy remains the official policy of the islands, 
and they instruct their President not to make any changes to their 
diplomatic relations with China. In fact it was also quoted in their 
official press release that ``the nation's diplomatic relations with 
the people's Republic of China is an example of its consistent policy 
which over time has only strengthened and become significantly 
beneficial to both sides''. Is this not concerning in regards to the 
nation's defense.
    Admiral Aquilino. FSM's diplomatic recognition of the PRC does not 
detract from FSM's importance to U.S. defense. The Compacts of Free 
Association with Palau, FSM, and RMI guarantee access for DOD forces in 
a strategically important area of the Pacific. The Compacts also 
provide provisions to designate U.S. defense sites in these countries, 
allowing me to develop important posture initiatives that are crucial 
to deterring PRC aggression and ensuring we are postured to fight and 
win, should conflict arise. The Compacts provide the U.S. with ``veto'' 
power over any foreign military activity in these countries. While 
countries across the Pacific negotiate economic and diplomatic 
relationships keeping with their national interests, we respect their 
sovereignty and welcome competition with PRC in ways that are 
consistent with the rules-based international order.
                                 ______
                                 
                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. McCORMICK
    Dr. McCormick. Mr. Royal, I'm consistently encouraged by the level 
of partnership between the United States and the Kingdom of Thailand, 
and I'm very pleased that our respective militaries were able to 
complete a full-strength Cobra Gold exercise just before the 190th 
anniversary of the establishment of US-Thailand relations. Can you 
briefly summarize the value that the US-Thailand alliance adds to our 
deterrence regime in your AOR and give us your assessment on how the 
recent Cobra Gold exercise went?
    Mr. Royal. The U.S.-Thailand alliance is vital to regional 
security. Thailand provides access to critical air and sea hubs, such 
as Utapao Navy Airfield, which were instrumental to our combat 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and remain available for 
humanitarian response operations in the Indo-Pacific region. This type 
of support, combined with Thailand's consistent defense cooperation 
with DoD--facilitating presence of U.S. servicemembers on the Southeast 
Asian mainland--contributes to regional integrated deterrence. Cobra 
Gold 2023 was very successful; the exercise returned to pre-pandemic 
scale, with participation by more than 6,000 U.S. servicemembers--the 
largest in a decade--and included personnel from 30 countries. Notably, 
this year DoD and the Royal Thai Armed Forces expanded on the scope of 
the Cobra Gold exercise by inclusion of a bilateral U.S.-Thai Strategic 
Airborne Operation into Thailand from Diego Garcia. Additionally, the 
enhanced exercise integrated cyber and space capabilities, marking a 
notable step forward in the interoperability of U.S.-Thai forces.
    Dr. McCormick. I'm very troubled by the PRC's growing military 
footprint and assertiveness across the Indo-Pacific. I'm particularly 
troubled by the recent PRC buildup at Ream Naval Base in Cambodia. This 
base would be the PRC's first overseas installation in the Indo-Pacific 
and would allow them to service their aircraft carriers and project 
power from the South China Sea's western flank. Can you describe the 
strategic value this base would give the PLA Navy and what steps your 
command and the administration have taken regarding these developments?
    Mr. Royal. The People's Republic of China (PRC) is engaged in a 
significant, ongoing construction project at Ream Naval Base. The 
military facility at Ream Naval Base will be the PRC's first overseas 
base in the Indo-Pacific region. PRC use of Ream Naval Base would 
increase the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) operational capability 
and would provide further opportunity for the PLA to coerce its 
neighbors. Use of the base would also enhance the PLA's ability to 
control critical sea lines of communication, including the Malacca 
Strait. The United States and countries in the region have expressed 
concern about the intent, nature, and scope of the project, as well as 
the role the PRC military is playing in its construction and in post-
construction use of the facility. The U.S. Government continues to 
press the Cambodian government to closely examine the agreements its 
defense officials have made with China to ensure the PRC will not be 
allowed exclusive military presence or sensitive technology at the base 
that risks undermining Cambodia's sovereignty and affecting regional 
stability.
    Dr. McCormick. Admiral Aquilino, I'm very excited by the prospect 
of increased security cooperation with what I argue will be the most 
dynamic and consequential friendly nation in the region: India. The UN 
projects that India's population will overtake China's this year, and 
economists project that India could leapfrog Germany and Japan to 
become the world's third largest economy by 2030. Given that, I'm 
profoundly grateful that frameworks like the Quad exist by which our 
two great nations can deepen our security ties. With China looking to 
achieve its major strategic objectives by 2049, how do you foresee US-
India relations evolving over the next quarter century?
    a. [Follow-up] I'm aware that India has displayed real interest in 
purchasing American-made weapons systems, particularly fighter 
aircraft, which will improve their capabilities and our 
interoperability. What are the biggest challenges you see in 
transferring these systems and in improving US-India co-production and 
co-development?
    i. [Follow-up] What authorities or resources could Congress provide 
you with to streamline these processes?
    Admiral Aquilino. The largest hurdle preventing greater defense co-
production and co-development are restrictive U.S. government tech 
transfer policies; for example, our ongoing efforts to clear AUKUS 
Pillar 1 challenges. The second hurdle is the case-by-case nature of 
the export control system. If a defense industry company were to build 
fighters in India under the current ruleset, it would need to request, 
one country at a time, export release authority of those fighters from 
India to a third party. Almost all the co-production and co-development 
ideas that are currently floating around the U.S.-India partnership are 
at least partially aimed at export from India to third parties. In 
addition to tech transfer, a lack of financing is a major impediment to 
the foreign military sales (FMS) system. INDOPACOM would generally 
favor efforts made to offer more favorable foreign military financing 
to allies & partners to purchase weapons systems through FMS.
    Dr. McCormick. Admiral Aquilino, I'm consistently encouraged by the 
level of partnership between the United States and the Kingdom of 
Thailand, and I'm very pleased that our respective militaries were able 
to complete a full-strength Cobra Gold exercise just before the 190th 
anniversary of the establishment of US-Thailand relations. Can you 
briefly summarize the value that the US-Thailand alliance adds to our 
deterrence regime in your AOR and give us your assessment on how the 
recent Cobra Gold exercise went?
    Admiral Aquilino. The U.S.-Thailand alliance enhances a regional 
security architecture to contest growing challenges. It demonstrates 
U.S. commitment to Southeast Asia and increases military capability, 
interoperability, and readiness of both our militaries. The alliance 
fosters regional security promoting a stable, prosperous, and inclusive 
Indo-Pacific. USINDOPACOM supports Thailand's military modernization 
efforts to enhance Thai capacity and U.S.-Thai interoperability. Most 
notably, the United States is currently reviewing Thailand's request to 
purchase our most advanced fighter, the F-35. Thailand is a critical 
partner for regional security and provides logistical nodes essential 
to U.S. military operations throughout the Indo-Pacific region. Efforts 
are underway to expand access to Utapao Air Base and additional new 
sites to support airfield dispersal, including Hat Yai and Nam Phong 
airfields COBRA GOLD 23 was executed 27FEB--10MAR 2023 in Thailand this 
year, and the exercise was back to pre-COVID levels of participation. 
Over 8,000 U.S. service members from across the joint force, operating 
west of the international dateline and side-by-side with 26 other 
nations, demonstrated our mutual commitment to maintain a free and open 
Indo-Pacific. The exercise reinforced the U.S.-Thai alliance and 
relationship with the Royal Thai Armed Forces and participating 
regional militaries, improved U.S. readiness, and enhanced joint and 
combined multinational military interoperability. Additionally, the 
exercise advanced integration of all-domain operations, to include 
space effects and defensive cyber training.
    Dr. McCormick. I'm very troubled by the PRC's growing military 
footprint and assertiveness across the Indo-Pacific. I'm particularly 
troubled by the recent PRC buildup at Ream Naval Base in Cambodia. This 
base would be the PRC's first overseas installation in the Indo-Pacific 
and would allow them to service their aircraft carriers and project 
power from the South China Sea's western flank. Can you describe the 
strategic value this base would give the PLA Navy and what steps your 
command and the administration have taken regarding these developments?
    Admiral Aquilino. Once completed, the PLA's first overseas base in 
the Indo-Pacific will grant them access to the Strait of Malacca where 
they can potentially hold at risk the 3.5 trillion dollars worth of 
goods that pass through the Strait each year. It is an additive 
capability to what the PRC has built on the Spratly Islands in the 
South China Sea. Together, these facilities support the operation of 
ships and aircraft to greater distances from the PRC for longer periods 
of time. But I would also note that unlike us, the PLA has very little 
experience in expeditionary operations and extending themselves could 
make them increasingly vulnerable. USINDOPACOM has supported efforts to 
publicize the PRC's actions, to ensure the Government of Cambodia 
understands the risk they are taking in allowing PLA access to Ream, 
and to share information with the many like-minded nations similarly 
concerned about developments.
    Dr. McCormick. I understand that with Singapore's newly established 
Digital and Intelligence Service, they are seeking partnerships with 
other allied nations' militaries, notable those with dedicated cyber 
services. CYBERCOM is obviously our focal point, however they are 
persistently stretch beyond their resources. Like our Singaporean 
counterparts, do you support a dedicated cyber service which can offer 
bandwidth beyond what you are afforded from CYBERCOM today? If yes, why 
so? If not, why not?
    Admiral Aquilino. Specific to cyber cooperation with Singapore, the 
commanders of USINDOPACOM and USCYBERCOM (USCC), and the Singapore 
Chief of Defense signed a memorandum of understanding in August 2021 to 
focus on greater strategic cooperation in cyberspace. This MOU shows 
good coordination leveraging the current cyber force alignment. 
INDOPACOM and USCC have a good working relationship which aligns Cyber 
forces to the department's strategic priorities. The creation of a U.S. 
cyber service is a policy matter and I defer to the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense.

                                  [all]