[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                     

                         [H.A.S.C. No. 118-25]

                                HEARING

                                   ON

                   NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

                          FOR FISCAL YEAR 2024

                                  AND

              OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS

                               BEFORE THE

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING

                                   ON

                    FISCAL YEAR 2024 BUDGET REQUEST

                        FOR MISSILE DEFENSE AND

                        MISSILE DEFEAT PROGRAMS

                               __________

                              HEARING HELD

                             APRIL 18, 2023


                                     


                [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]





                               ______
                                 

                 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

53-417                    WASHINGTON : 2024




                                     
  




                    SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

                    DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado, Chairman

JOE WILSON, South Carolina           SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio              JOHN GARAMENDI, California
ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York          DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee          SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California,
DON BACON, Nebraska                  RO KHANNA, California
JIM BANKS, Indiana                   CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania
MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida               GABE VASQUEZ, New Mexico
DALE W. STRONG, Alabama              MARC VEASEY, Texas

                 Ryan Tully, Professional Staff Member
                Maria Vastola, Professional Staff Member
                  Zachary Calderon, Research Assistant









                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

              STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Lamborn, Hon. Doug, a Representative from Colorado, Chairman, 
  Subcommittee on Strategic Forces...............................     1
Moulton, Hon. Seth, a Representative from Massachusetts, Ranking 
  Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces.......................     3

                               WITNESSES

Hill, John D., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space 
  and Missile Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense........     6
Hill, VADM Jon A., USN, Director, Missile Defense Agency.........     7
Karbler, LTG Daniel L., USA, Commanding General, U.S. Army Space 
  and Missile Defense Command, and Commander, Joint Functional 
  Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense...............     9
Miller, Maj Gen David N., Jr., USSF, Director of Operations, 
  Training and Force Development, U.S. Space Command.............    10

                                APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

    Hill, John D.................................................    35
    Hill, VADM Jon A.............................................    46
    Karbler, LTG Daniel L........................................    60
    Miller, Maj Gen David N., Jr.................................    84

Documents Submitted for the Record:

    [There were no Documents submitted.]

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

    Mr. Moulton..................................................    97
    Mr. Strong...................................................    97

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

    Ms. Houlahan.................................................   101








 
                 FISCAL YEAR 2024 BUDGET REQUEST FOR
              MISSILE DEFENSE AND MISSILE DEFEAT PROGRAMS

                              ----------                              

                  House of Representatives,
                       Committee on Armed Services,
                          Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                           Washington, DC, Tuesday, April 18, 2023.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:01 p.m., in 
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Doug Lamborn 
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DOUG LAMBORN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
      COLORADO, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

    Mr. Lamborn. We will come to order. I ask unanimous consent 
that the Chair be authorized to declare a recess at any time. 
Without objection, so ordered.
    I'd like to begin by welcoming our witnesses who are here 
today. We have Mr. John Hill, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Space and Missile Defense policy. We have another 
Jon Hill, Vice Admiral Hill, the Director of the Missile 
Defense Agency. We have Lieutenant General Karbler from U.S. 
Army Space and Missile Defense Command. General Karbler, it was 
great visiting with you last week in Huntsville and seeing all 
the work you and your team are doing. And finally, we have 
Major General David Miller, Director of Operations for Space 
Command.
    This will likely be the last time that we have Vice Admiral 
Hill and Lieutenant General Karbler before our subcommittee. 
Thank you both for your decades of service and for the 
sacrifices that your families have made as well. Our country is 
stronger and safer because of your tireless dedication and 
sacrifices that accompany your service. I offer a heartfelt 
thanks from myself and the members of this committee for it.
    And now onto the topic of the day, missile defense. Missile 
defense policy has shifted from a partisan issue years ago to 
one where there is much more consensus today. One of the 
driving factors behind this shift is the aggressive actions and 
advancing military capabilities of China and Russia.
    It is challenging to argue, as some have, that U.S. missile 
defenses are destabilizing when Russia's Moscow missile defense 
system alone has 68 interceptors, more than the total number of 
U.S. ground-based interceptors, and they are armed with nuclear 
warheads. And just last week, China claims to have conducted a 
successful midcourse intercept test.
    In addition to China and Russia's actions, North Korea and 
Iran are growing rogue threats. North Korea just last week 
conducted a flight test of a solid-fueled ICBM 
[intercontinental ballistic missile], a new capability for its 
military that is the result of its unprecedented pace of 
missile tests over the past year.
    And Iran has multiple space launch vehicle programs that in 
my opinion are nothing more than flimsy cover for an ICBM 
program.
    Missile defense policy has evolved in places like Ukraine 
and Israel, as we have seen how it is executed in real-world 
operations. This is especially true given what Israel has been 
able to do with Iron Dome to protect its citizens and recent 
advancements it has made with the Iron Beam directed-energy 
program.
    In Ukraine, Vladimir Putin's unprovoked and unsuccessful 
invasion attempt has been stifled by missile defenses of 
critical military assets and population centers. Through both 
conflicts, it has proven that missile defenses save lives and 
buys time for senior leaders to make decisions regarding how to 
respond.
    Missile defense of the American homeland provides similar 
benefits. If for some misguided reason an adversary would 
attack our territory, we need to be able to take out as many 
incoming missiles as possible, saving lives and providing 
senior leaders additional time to calibrate an appropriate 
response.
    Furthermore, knowing that we can defend our country and our 
people deters an adversary from even considering an attack on 
our homeland in the first place. This is inherently 
stabilizing.
    There are some other issues I hope our witnesses will 
address today. I hope we will hear how vital that spectrum is 
to our homeland missile defenses. If we get the current 
spectrum debate wrong, there will be unfathomable consequences 
on our missile defense capabilities.
    These consequences include an overwhelming financial cost 
that we would shoulder to replace our current systems and the 
unimaginable capability gap that would occur in the interim.
    With this in mind, I hope we get an update on the Next 
Generation, NGI, Interceptor program and hear how DOD 
[Department of Defense] and Congress can work together to 
accelerate it. Buying only 20 NGIs doesn't make sense to me. 
Instead, we need to look at a full replacement of the current 
fleet for a total of 64.
    I am also interested in having a discussion about 
reenergizing plans to field additional interceptors in upstate 
New York, which General Milley gave his support to earlier this 
month. We can't wait for Iran to test an ICBM before we begin 
construction on an east coast site. We know from site 
construction in Alaska that this will be a multiyear project so 
it is best to get started now.
    On Monday, I was able to attend the Space Symposium in my 
home district of Colorado Springs. I guess that was just 
yesterday. Time flies. Based on current trajectories in 
military technology and the innovation of the private sector, 
it is clear that the future of missile defense is increasingly 
becoming space-based. I hope we can address this issue sometime 
during our classified session later this afternoon.
    One example of this that we can discuss here and now is a 
high-priority program for me, and that is the HBTSS [Hypersonic 
and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor Satellites] constellation. 
This will provide the sensing, tracking, and fire control 
needed for hypersonic and other missile defense. Two of these 
payloads will launch this year while the rest of the 
constellation will follow in a few years.
    I also hope to hear from our policy witnesses as to why we 
are settling for President Biden's limited budget request for 
the Glide Phase Interceptor, or GPI, that doesn't get us a 
capability until the mid-2030s.
    Given the rapid pace with which our adversaries are 
pursuing and fielding hypersonic systems, I am eager to hear 
ideas from DOD on how to pull both HBTSS and GPI to the left. 
On this issue, many of us in Congress feel a sense of urgency 
that does not seem to be shared by the executive branch. And 
that is a problem for our national security.
    With that, I turn to the ranking member for his opening 
remarks.

     STATEMENT OF HON. SETH MOULTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
MASSACHUSETTS, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

    Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Vice Admiral Hill, 
during your 38 years of service, you have been committed to the 
development and deployment of at-sea and land-based missile 
defense capabilities for not only the United States, but for 
our allies and partners around the world.
    Lieutenant General Karbler, you have played a critical role 
across the Army's artillery and air and missile defense 
communities to address the growing threat to our forces and 
have had a unique purview across both the space and missile 
defense missions.
    Your collective achievements for our security, for the 
safety of every one of us in this room, have entailed 
sacrifices for your families not to mention the professional 
burdens and responsibilities that you have so often carried 
heavily on your shoulders. So gentlemen, thank you. You have my 
sincerest appreciation as you culminate extraordinary military 
careers.
    It is appropriate and important to begin our discussion 
this afternoon by acknowledging that unlike your impeccable 
military careers, missile defense and defeat has a mixed legacy 
and continues to pose difficult questions about what its 
purpose is and should be, under what conditions it actually 
makes us safer, and therefore how much and what kind of it we 
need.
    As a committee, it is important for us to evaluate these 
budget requests with a clear understanding of the strategic 
logic behind them. And so I think it is helpful to frame the 
conversation with a discussion of the scenarios or levels in 
which we use or don't use missile defense. I'm aided by this 
chart behind me.
    The highest possible level of missile defense is the 
strategic level, which means deterring or defeating a nuclear 
attack on the United States by a near-peer adversary, as 
President Reagan's fanciful and infamous Star Wars program 
envisioned.
    As both the chairman and I discussed during a recent CSIS 
[Center for Strategic and International Studies] panel, and as 
affirmed by both the Trump and Biden administrations in the 
2019 and 2022 Missile Defense Reviews, this is not an area 
where the U.S. is pursuing nor should pursue missile defense. 
Going down this road would not only be prohibitively expensive 
but fundamentally destabilizing.
    Of course, the crazy logic of atomic peace is achieved 
through mutual vulnerability where no major nuclear power would 
launch a nuclear attack because they know--we all know--that 
the result would be nuclear holocaust.
    Until we can safely rid the world of nuclear weapons, which 
I believe is ultimately necessary for the survival of humanity 
itself, we can neither unilaterally disarm nor unilaterally 
render useless our adversaries' arsenals. If we were to try to 
render our adversaries' missiles incapable, they would simply 
develop new ones to defeat our defenses as we have seen with 
our adversaries deploying increasingly sophisticated 
maneuvering weapons to evade current U.S. missile defense 
radars.
    We should always remember that the U.S. decision to leave 
the Anti-Ballistic Missile [ABM] Treaty in 2002 to develop a 
homeland missile defense system in response to advancements by 
the DPRK [Democratic People's Republic of Korea] can almost 
directly be tied to both the Chinese Communist Party and Russia 
pursuing more advanced ballistic cruise and hypersonic 
missiles.
    And the result has been to make the balance of power 
between nuclear superpowers fundamentally less stable. As 
multiple general officers have restated before this committee 
in the past month, we deter our near-peer nuclear adversaries 
with our own safe, secure, and reliable nuclear forces.
    Now the next level down, the fourth level, is the area 
where there is the most debate and that is the limited 
capability to address rogue nations.
    This is where our current ground-based missile defense 
system and the Next Generation Interceptor fit in. And this is 
where we can argue that our advancements in missile defense 
over the past two decades since pulling out of the ABM Treaty 
have provided a security blanket against aspiring nuclear 
powers like North Korea and Iran.
    However, it should not be lost on this subcommittee that 
during the latest parade, North Korea showcased 11 KN-22 ICBMs. 
The publicly stated shot doctrine for the GMD [Ground-based 
Midcourse Defense] system is four to five interceptors per one 
incoming ICBM. Given the fact that we currently have 44 
emplaced interceptors--so, 11 times 4 for anyone rusty on 
elementary school arithmetic--if North Korea gets just one more 
ICBM capable of reaching the United States, we won't have 
enough interceptors.
    We therefore are in an arms race today with North Korea, 
exactly the arms race the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty was 
designed to stop. And at some point if we continue to expand 
our current arsenal of interceptors, we must ask not just how 
North Korea will respond but how Russia and the CCP [Chinese 
Communist Party] will respond as well, as they see a pathway 
for our missile shield to impact their deterrent.
    I hope that in today's discussion, Mr. Hill can help us 
understand how the Department of Defense is weighing that 
important question. At what point will this arms race provoke a 
response from Russia and the CCP? And therefore, at what point 
do we move North Korea's nuclear arsenal from category four 
into category five, which we deter with our own nuclear 
response?
    We must all recognize that decisions like that, indeed 
decisions that we make on this subcommittee this year, have 
implications not just for meeting today's tactical threats, but 
for ensuring the strategic stability of America and the world 
for decades to come.
    Now the third level of missile defense, the nuance that I 
think is important to distinguish from a rogue nation because 
the size of a homeland system required to deal with it is very 
different. And that is the instance of anyone, including a 
near-peer adversary, from having an accidental launch. The 
chairman referenced this in his testimony--his statement as 
well. Any student of history understands how close to this 
possibility we have come in the past and having some ability to 
defend against a small even single accidental launch should be 
maintained.
    Level two, which we are seeing play out on the battlefield 
today, is what we call regional missile defense. There is a big 
difference between level three and level two from taking out a 
strategic intercontinental nuclear weapon to stopping theater-
level missiles in current conflicts. Systems such as the 
Patriot, THAAD [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense], and the 
Aegis BMD [Ballistic Missile Defense] system are the 
cornerstone of regional missile defense. And the investments 
being made in this budget request to improve these systems are 
needed to meet increasingly complex short to intermediate 
weapons that have been proliferated around the world.
    We've seen these at work in action. The incredible support 
Ukraine has received from allies and partners in the [area of] 
air and missile defense has enabled them to fight back against 
near non-stop Russian missile attacks.
    Missiles are an integral part of the modern way of war. So 
this, too, is important for missile defense. Ukraine has also 
reaffirmed the power of the higher level strategic nuclear 
stability between nations, even in the presence of regional 
missile defense because it has not resulted in any strategic 
nuclear exchange. But we must be cognizant of the danger of 
crossing this line when developing theater-level defense could 
it be interpreted to impact strategic stability.
    The final piece of missile defense is the foundation of all 
levels, level one. And that is the ability to detect and track 
threats from the moment they are launched, throughout their 
flight, and up until they reach their target. Our ability to 
see an incoming threat is what gives us decision space to react 
and respond either offensively or defensively. And this is an 
area where the subcommittee has consistently pushed the 
Department to address.
    It is a place where more investment in better capabilities 
unquestionably make us more safe and the world more stable. And 
I am encouraged that the administration has requested over $6 
billion across several programs to develop, improve, and expand 
the capabilities of both land- and space-based missile centers 
to address more complex threats that our adversaries are 
developing.
    When we look at this complicated multilevel and multilayer 
picture, it is easy to be overwhelmed. This is esoteric stuff. 
But it is vitally important that we get it right, not just for 
our own national security but for the security of humanity 
itself.
    Taking the narrow view, it is an easy vote to buy a few 
more interceptors., But it is up to us in this room to 
recognize the much longer term strategic implications for the 
narrow authorization and budgeting decisions we make today.
    As an American citizen, having a robust, layered missile 
defense system makes me feel more safe and secure this 
afternoon. And buying a few more interceptors would probably 
make me feel a little bit more comfortable tomorrow. But when I 
think about the world we will leave to my 2- and 4-year-old 
daughters, I am less sure. How will expanding U.S. missile 
defense today impact strategic stability tomorrow?
    We are already in an arms race. Will it make our world more 
safe? That is the discussion that we have too often glossed 
over or left for another day on this subcommittee and in 
Congress. And it is a discussion and a debate that we must have 
the political and intellectual courage to resolve. Thank you, 
Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    Mr. Lamborn. Our first witness will be Mr. John Hill, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space and Missile 
Defense. The floor is yours.

   STATEMENT OF JOHN D. HILL, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF 
DEFENSE FOR SPACE AND MISSILE DEFENSE, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY 
                           OF DEFENSE

    Mr. Hill. Thank you, Chairman Lamborn, Ranking Member 
Moulton, and distinguished members of the committee. Thank you 
for the opportunity to testify on behalf of the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense. I am honored to be alongside my 
distinguished colleagues here on the panel.
    Today I am going to review recent missile threat 
developments, provide a policy update, and explain how the 
Department's fiscal year 2024 budget request implements our 
policy.
    Secretary Austin and the National Defense Strategy have 
made clear that People's Republic of China [PRC] is the 
Department's pacing challenge while Russia remains an acute 
threat.
    Over the past year, the PRC continued to develop, test, and 
field advanced missile systems of all classes and ranges. It 
also launched ballistic missiles in unsuccessful attempts to 
intimidate and demonstrate a capability to forcefully unify 
with Taiwan.
    Russia conducted thousands of missile strikes in Ukraine to 
terrorize the Ukrainian people and degrade Ukraine's 
warfighting capability. Iran launched missile attacks into 
neighboring states and provided rockets and uncrewed aerial 
systems to non-state actors who in turn used them to target 
U.S. forces and partners. And North Korea showcased an array of 
missile systems, including 11 ICBMs, and it conducted yet 
another ICBM test just last week.
    As outlined in the 2022 National Defense Strategy, 
integrated deterrence incorporates the Department's efforts to 
deter and defeat air and missile threats. Our top two NDS 
priorities are to defend the U.S. homeland, pacing to the PRC, 
and to deter strategic attacks against the United States allies 
and partners. This includes staying ahead of the threat from 
North Korea through improvements to the Ground-based Midcourse 
Defense system as part of a comprehensive missile defeat 
approach complemented by the credible threat of direct cost 
imposition.
    Our third priority is to deter regional aggression and 
prepare to prevail if necessary, prioritizing the PRC in the 
Indo-Pacific and Russia in Europe. The defense of Guam 
intersects all three of these priorities.
    To defend our homeland, we requested $3.3 billion to 
improve our Ground-based Midcourse Defense, including $2.2 
billion for the Next Generation Interceptor.
    Our homeland defense priorities include $1.5 billion for 
the defense of Guam, an increase of over $600 million compared 
to the FY23 request; $64 million to improve the defense of 
Hawaii through investments in air surveillance and other 
capabilities; $423 million to continue fielding over-the-
horizon radars; and nearly $5 billion for modernizing our space 
capabilities with new missile warning, missile tracking, and 
next-generation overhead persistent infrareds architectures.
    For regional defense, our key priorities include $259 
million for hypersonic missile defense sensors and development 
of the Glide Phase Interceptor; $2.2 billion for the Standard 
Missile-3, THAAD, and PAC-3 interceptors; $1.5 billion to 
counter lower tier missile threats; and $308 million for 
directed-energy development.
    Missile defense is a notable element of our $35 billion of 
support to Ukraine since Russia's further invasion last year. 
Ukraine endures today as a sovereign and free nation in large 
part because it made air and missile defense top priorities as 
it leveraged extensive assistance from the United States, our 
NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] allies, and many 
others.
    Our international missile defense cooperation also includes 
developing testing and training together with allies and 
partners around the world and supporting them through sales of 
equipment.
    So in conclusion, missiles have become foundational to our 
adversaries' way of war. And missile defense has become 
foundational to integrated deterrence and defense of the 
Nation. To that end, the best thing Congress can do to support 
the warfighter is pass on time the Defense and Military 
Construction Appropriations Acts. Thank you for your attention. 
I am prepared to take questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Hill can be found in the 
Appendix on page 35.]
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. We will next hear from Vice Admiral 
Jon Hill, Director of the Missile Defense Agency.

 STATEMENT OF VADM JON A. HILL, USN, DIRECTOR, MISSILE DEFENSE 
                             AGENCY

    Admiral Hill. Chairman Lamborn, Ranking Member Moulton, 
distinguished subcommittee members, thank you for the 
opportunity to talk to you about missile defense today. I would 
like to take a quick moment to thank the women and men of the 
Missile Defense Agency [MDA] who focus on developing, 
delivering, and supporting the services to meet the joint 
requirements of our combatant commands with credible 
capabilities to counter ballistic, maneuvering, and hypersonic 
missile threats.
    To summarize the threat, I would call it large numbers, 
high speeds, and heavy maneuver. Those are the challenges today 
and for tomorrow.
    We are requesting $10.9 billion to continue our mission to 
meet these threats. And I'm going to talk to you about three 
priorities. The first is homeland defense, level four, and then 
I will talk about the priority for Guam and then the priority 
for hypersonic missile defense, which are at the level two of 
missile defense.
    So the first priority of homeland defense, which includes 
Alaska and Hawaii, the Ground-based Midcourse Defense as 
mentioned earlier, has protected the homeland from rogue nation 
ballistic missile attacks since 2004. Our current focus is on 
new capabilities to counter the limited but advancing North 
Korean long-range ballistic missile threat. The GMD system is 
undergoing a service life extension program to improve 
reliability and extend the GBIs [Ground-based Interceptors] 
beyond 2030.
    These upgrades mitigate the risk until the Nation fields 
the Next Generation Interceptor, which is on track for first 
emplacement no later than the end of 2028. NGI development is 
executing to deliver advanced interceptors featuring multiple 
kill vehicle technology which we will add to the current fleet 
of interceptors at Fort Greeley, Alaska, and Vandenberg Space 
Force Base in California.
    On to priority two, which is the defense of Guam. The 
Department is developing an integrated air and missile defense 
system to defend against diverse missile threats. Working with 
the services and the agencies, we are driving to meet 
INDOPACOM's requirement for a persistent 360-degrees layered 
defense. That capability on Guam against simultaneous raids of 
cruise, ballistic, maneuvering, and hypersonic threats. We are 
driving operational capability in phases to meet the clear 
warfighting needs.
    As I go to the third priority, which is also level two, the 
priority of hypersonic missile defense, this to counter the 
hypersonic threat. We have integrated tracking capabilities 
into existing radars, both ground and sea-based. That 
capability is here today. Today's sensor architecture and 
command and control can track hypersonic threats to support 
warning and domain awareness.
    Level one. Aegis ships equipped with the Sea-Based Terminal 
capability can engage some hypersonic threats in the terminal 
phase today. Now due to the global maneuver capabilities of 
hypersonic missiles, space-based tracking and targeting 
capability is a clear need. Later this year, the MDA developed 
Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor, as mentioned by 
the chairman, HBTSS, will start on-orbit operations to 
demonstrate unique tracking and targeting designed to support 
hypersonic engagements.
    HBTSS will participate in flight tests and real-world 
threat collections through FY24. The capability will be 
proliferated and operated by the Space Force.
    We continue to work closely with the Navy to upgrade Sea-
Based Terminal defenses to counter more advanced maneuvering 
and hypersonic threats. Based on threat evolution, we will 
deliver the next incremental upgrade in 2025. Sea-Based 
Terminal is the only active defense available today to counter 
hypersonic threats.
    In order to expand the battlespace against hypersonic 
threats, we have initiated the Glide Phase Interceptor to 
counter regional hypersonic threats. GPI leverages proven Aegis 
weapon system engage-on network sensors to provide the depth of 
fire needed to thin the raid for terminal defenses.
    Homeland defense BMD against rogue nations, defense of Guam 
against large raids of high-speed maneuvering threat, and 
building out the defense-in-depth against hypersonic threats, 
those are our priorities. Thank you, and I look forward to 
answering your questions. And it has been an honor to serve. 
Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Admiral Hill can be found in the 
Appendix on page 46.]
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. We'll next hear from Lieutenant 
General Daniel Karbler, U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense 
Command.

 STATEMENT OF LTG DANIEL L. KARBLER, USA, COMMANDING GENERAL, 
  U.S. ARMY SPACE AND MISSILE DEFENSE COMMAND, AND COMMANDER, 
   JOINT FUNCTIONAL COMPONENT COMMAND FOR INTEGRATED MISSILE 
                            DEFENSE

    General Karbler. Chairman Lamborn, Ranking Member Moulton, 
and distinguished members of the subcommittee, I am honored to 
again testify before you and to represent an incredible people-
first organization of 2,600 soldiers and civilians across 13 
time zones and 19 disbursed locations, 20 if you count Army 
Astronaut Frank Rubio aboard the International Space Station 
and multiple time zones throughout this hearing.
    Every day, these amazing professionals provide space, high-
altitude, and missile defense forces and capabilities to Army 
and joint warfighters.
    First, let me express my sincere appreciation for your 
steadfast support of our people and their families. My role 
remains unchanged from previous testimonies. I serve as the 
commanding general for the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense 
Command; the commander of the Joint Functional Component 
Command for Integrated Missile Defense; and as the Army's 
proponent for air and missile defense, or AMD.
    I provide U.S. Northern Command the soldiers who stand 
ready to defend our Nation from intercontinental ballistic 
missile attack; serve as the Army's service component commander 
to both U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Space Command; and I am 
the chief of staff of the Army's air and missile defense 
enterprise integrator.
    In Europe, we see a continuation of the largest employment 
of offensive missiles since World War II and the unprecedented 
use of attack UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles] in Russia's 14-
month war against Ukraine. In the Pacific, against the backdrop 
of multiple missile tests by the DPRK and China, threats of 
regional and transregional complex missile attacks still loom. 
And in the CENTCOM AOR [U.S. Central Command area of 
responsibility], our adversaries continue to attack partner 
nations and U.S. forces using missiles, UAVs, rockets, 
artilleries, and mortars.
    In short, in my 36 years as an air defender, I have never 
seen adversary threat activity, whether that be test or 
operational use, as great as I see it today. Adversary actions 
in the space domain are equally as aggressive as they continue 
to challenge us across multiple space-enabled mission areas. To 
address these threats, we must strengthen our capabilities to 
deny our adversaries the benefit of their aggression.
    We must continue investment and sustainment of combat 
ready, capable and lethal AMD capabilities. And fortunately, we 
do not face these threats alone. We have allies and partners 
who contribute significantly to the AMD and space missions. 
Please allow me to briefly outline a few milestones 
accomplished by our space and missile defense soldiers and 
civilians.
    This past year we have partnered with the U.S. Army Special 
Operations Command and Army Cyber Command to create a space/
cyber/SOF [special operations forces] triad to provide 
deterrence and response options to the integrated use of our 
unique capabilities. We have continued to mature the triad 
through multiple exercises to include the Army's Project 
Convergence 2022.
    In the air defense enterprise, we recently reached a 
historic milestone with a full-rate production decision for the 
Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System, IBCS. 
This any sensor, best shooter, optimal command and control 
construct allows us to integrate the right quantity and mix of 
AMD capabilities across all echelons, building an effective 
tiered and layered defense. This is the linchpin of the Army's 
broader AMD modernization effort, critical to transforming air 
and missile defense capabilities well into the future.
    In closing and on a personal note, this will be my last 
opportunity to address the distinguished members of the 
subcommittee as I will retire later this year. I am confident 
in the direction and momentum of the Army's air and missile 
defense and space enterprises. I look forward to addressing 
your questions. Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of General Karbler can be found in 
the Appendix on page 60.]
    Mr. Lamborn. And thank you. And lastly, we will hear from 
Major General David Miller, Director of Operations, U.S. Space 
Command.

 STATEMENT OF MAJ GEN DAVID N. MILLER, JR., USSF, DIRECTOR OF 
 OPERATIONS, TRAINING AND FORCE DEVELOPMENT, U.S. SPACE COMMAND

    General Miller. Thank you, Chairman Lamborn, Ranking Member 
Moulton, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. I 
appreciate the opportunity to join Deputy Assistant Secretary 
Hill and Admiral Hill and Lieutenant General Karbler, and I am 
honored to speak today on behalf of our commander, General Jim 
Dickinson, as well as the men and women of the United States 
Space Command.
    Our strategic competitors are expanding and evolving their 
inventories of advanced weapons capable of threatening both the 
U.S. homeland and our interests around the globe, as my 
panelists have also stated.
    Our challenge and my focus here today will be mainly in 
level one, discussion of the domain awareness, warning, 
targeting, and tracking capabilities needed to quickly 
identify, characterize, and defeat these threats.
    To accomplish this task requires a joint combined, and 
partner solution involving an array of traditional and non-
traditional sensors capable of delivering space domain 
awareness, missile warning, and missile defense. U.S. Space 
Command has made tremendous strides in optimizing our legacy 
space architectures as the global sensor manager and 
integrating non-traditional sensors capable of contributing to 
this mission set.
    While we are excited about the future space-based sensors 
and architectures being delivered by the Space Force as well as 
by our Missile Defense Agency teammates, we are focusing now on 
maintaining our advantage in the space and cyber domain and 
providing the space-enabled combat edge that the joint and 
combined force enjoys today.
    The complexity and scale of the threat environment demands 
that we integrate these sensors and enable timely decision-
making and response. Additionally, our missions are not 
confined to one region. They are inherently global. This only 
increases the need for close coordination across all combatant 
commands, supporting agencies, as well as our allies and our 
commercial partners.
    This environment demands integrated missile warning, space 
domain awareness, and missile defense solutions to enable 
globally persistent space and missile threat tracking along 
with many other responsibilities the unified command plan 
assigned to General Dickinson as the United States Space 
Command commander. As the Nation's global sensor manager, he is 
required to plan, manage, and execute the DOD's space domain 
awareness, missile defense, and missile warning sensors.
    Recent successes in the integration of these operations, 
activities, and investments is a direct result of assigning 
U.S. Space Command as the global sensor manager.
    We have developed the synergies among disparate missions, 
functions, and systems, significantly enhancing the joint 
force's effectiveness in protecting the United States and our 
allies.
    Since all missile defense travel in, through, and from the 
space domain, it made sense to assign U.S. Space Command as the 
global sensor manager. We have the tools, tactics, training, 
and expertise to accomplish this mission.
    Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you 
today. I submit my written testimony for the record. And I 
welcome the subcommittee's questions on this critical topic as 
well as the collaboration with these agencies' representatives.
    [The prepared statement of General Miller can be found in 
the Appendix on page 84.]
    Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you. And thank all of you for 
being here today and for your opening statements. We will now 
have a series of questions. I am going to ask a specific one of 
you, General Karbler, and then a couple on hypersonic defense 
and a couple on NGIs and then I'm going to turn it over to my 
ranking member.
    General Karbler, when we were here last year, you told me 
that our soldiers working the missile defense mission, 
particularly Patriot and THAAD, were going through a meat 
grinder. In other words, the dwell times were 9 months at home 
for every year deployed, you know, less than the time deployed. 
What is the current dwell time for Army missile defenders and 
has the Army made any progress reducing dwell times for these 
soldiers?
    General Karbler. Chairman, yes, the Army recognizes as a 
challenge the high OPTEMPO [operations tempo] for our Army air 
defense soldiers was such a priority for the chief of staff and 
the under secretary, they commissioned a health of the force 
study specific to address the OPTEMPO challenges for our air 
defense soldiers.
    That study encompassed multiple surveys--families, 
soldiers, officers, NCOs [noncommissioned officers] across the 
entire air defense force. Got back great feedback and then the 
Army made recommendations and now has implemented those 
recommendations really over the past year, recommendations that 
stem from everything from pay incentives to professional 
military education opportunities for our NCOs because they were 
deployed, didn't have a chance to go to different schooling, 
our officers as well; mid-tour leave, for example, just all 
those different opportunities.
    And we also decreased the demand across our force, 
specifically in the CENTOM AOR. So when we went from 1 to .9, 
dwell to deploy, we've gone now from 1 to 1.9; so it's almost 1 
to 2. So the current battalions that are over there, one 
battalion's deploy to dwell is 1 to 1.9 and the other battalion 
is 1 to 2.2.
    So you can see that in that year we have really made a 
significant change. And the SECDEF's [Secretary of Defense's] 
red lines for deploy to dwell is 1 to 2. So we are getting 
right within the Secretary of Defense's red lines.
    And quantitatively, we also have proven that this is making 
a difference. The 32nd Army Air and Missile Defense Command, 
the command that is responsible for providing those soldiers to 
CENTCOM, last year led the Army for division-sized retention 
with 109.7 percent exceeding the retention rate.
    And this year, they have met 70 percent of their annual 
retention goal already. And they also have a 39 percent 
stabilization request of the soldiers within that formation. So 
those soldiers are voting with their feet and they are voting 
with their feet to stay where they are at right now. Thank you.
    Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you for your great progress in 
that area. So on the first issue, I wanted to ask about 
hypersonic defense. My top priority this year is accelerating 
our Nation's hypersonic capabilities.
    There are two capabilities for hypersonic defense that I 
want to dwell on here for a moment. The HBTSS for sensing, 
tracking, and fire control, and the Glide Phase Interceptor. 
The first two HBTSS payloads are set to launch later this year, 
but the rest of the constellation to get us to full coverage is 
not expected to launch until the end of this decade.
    Additionally, the administration's proposed budget does not 
get us even an initial capability for the Glide Phase 
Interceptor against hypersonics until around 2035. Only in 
Washington, DC, does a missile development program take 13 
years. And I don't think it takes that long in Beijing, Moscow, 
or Pyongyang.
    So Vice Admiral Hill, given sufficient funding, what's the 
earliest that MDA believes it could get a Glide Phase 
Interceptor program to initial operational capability?
    Admiral Hill. Thanks, Chairman Lamborn. The Glide Phase 
Interceptor, as I mentioned earlier, is based on Aegis fire 
control so we are going to leverage the existing engage-on-
remote, which today we can do from a forward-based ship. We can 
leverage existing space-based sensors. We can fuse that through 
command and control battle management communications. Today 
that drives Sea-Based Terminal.
    The Glide Phase Interceptor really is providing that area-
level defense. It really thins the raid before we deal with it 
down in terminal, which is the worst place to do this sort of 
intercepts, particularly in the sea-base when the debris just 
comes forward onto the ship.
    We laid out the plan, and we worked within the Department. 
We are very early in the program, Chairman. So just so you kind 
of level set where we are. We are not at milestone A yet. We 
should be kicking into that next phase, which is all about the 
risk reduction. And that is where we would really build our 
confidence to be able to accelerate the program.
    I believe that we can pull it earlier. It is certainly a 
funding challenge. But we will continue to work closely within 
the Department to pull it as left as possible because I agree 
with you that out in the mid-30s is, you know, almost 
irrelevant. We are not meeting the threat.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. I really appreciate that. And I 
know it is based on years of great service. So I appreciate 
that answer.
    For you and for General Miller, what is the importance to 
both of you to field the full HBTSS constellation as quickly as 
possible?
    Admiral Hill. I will go ahead and just kind of go back to 
why we should do that. It really is about the maneuvering 
threat. We no longer have predictable trajectories that go down 
a threat access where your land-based sensors would typically 
be located to look in that one direction with limited field of 
view. By being in space, we have the ability to catch these 
maneuvering threats and then provide the fire control quality 
data and the latency that is required.
    The first two that go up later this year, the launch time 
is roughly September depending on the manifest. And we will be 
collecting data throughout 2024 to prove out in space what we 
have already proven on the ground. We are working very closely 
with the Space Force to integrate into the overall architecture 
to proliferate HBTSS. So I will hand it over to ``Rock'' 
Miller.
    General Miller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just echo 
Admiral Hill's points. A couple key things, I think. The first 
is the HBTSS capability provides two things in particular, 
certainly the maneuvering threat and the custody therein, but 
it also provides a level of discrimination that is essential if 
you are going to provide quality missile defense across the 
regime of threat areas that we see.
    So I think within both the COCOM [combatant command] as 
well as--you know, we would have to talk to the service for 
their specific integration requirements, I think it is 
absolutely essential to complement what we already have in the 
budget in terms of the missile warning, missile tracking 
architecture.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. And lastly on this subject, 
Secretary Hill, don't you think that providing the GPI or the 
HBTSS faster in both cases should be a higher priority?
    Mr. Hill. I think we are going to have a lot of learning 
this year as Admiral Hill spoke to in terms of the GPI program 
as we're moving into this risk reduction and that is going to 
give us information that would help make a more confident 
decision. If you want to move it to the left, we still have the 
space to move it to the left, so coming forward in that program 
and that is an option you want to keep open to do that as you 
look at the threat.
    Likewise, with the HBTSS, with these launches that are 
going to be happening this year, now you get that space-based 
data to inform your decision as you move to the actual fielding 
timeframe. And I think you are still maintaining that 
flexibility to do to make the kind of decision you are 
suggesting, Chairman.
    Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Well, let's work on making this the 
highest priority so that we can move it to the left as we have 
all just talked about.
    On Next Generation Interceptor, NGI, the current plan is to 
buy 20, and these will come online around 2028. I have heard 
2027 a little bit, which is even better. But in any case, this 
will give us a mix of approximately 44 older GBIs and 20 newer 
NGIs at the end of this decade. Vice Admiral Hill, what is your 
best military advice? Wouldn't it make sense to eventually 
start replacing aging GBIs with NGIs if the funding was there?
    Admiral Hill. Chairman Lamborn, great question. And when we 
laid out the acquisition plan, we thought through all of that. 
We wanted to leave ourselves enough flexibility to give the 
Nation options. So we have two companies that are competing now 
and that's why you hear different timelines.
    The government reference architecture for first emplacement 
is 2028. Both companies are running towards a 2027 timeframe, 
which is great. The power of competition does work. And then 
along the way we will make decisions on inventory.
    Right now the acquisition plan was, basically what it was, 
you know, 4 years ago which was to add 20. And so that was the 
starting point for the acquisition plan. But what is great 
about carrying two, the Nation has the ability to go beyond the 
critical design review.
    You could have two production lines if you want to really 
build out capacity. You can neck down to one supplier at that 
point and have a single production line. You can build the 20. 
You can add to the 44 or you can replace some numbers of those 
and then increase more as you go.
    So it's a very flexible acquisition strategy. And I think 
those decisions do not have to be made today.
    Mr. Lamborn. And Vice Admiral Hill, could the flexibility 
also encompass not just having two contractors through critical 
design review but into production.
    Admiral Hill. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Lamborn. So that we have two perhaps varying 
capability, maybe one for a particular threat, and one for 
another threat that is better suited over here. And we can mix 
and match.
    Admiral Hill. Yes, sir. And in fact, whenever we talk about 
just interceptors, I always like to go back to the total 
system. The ground-based weapons system itself is designed to 
handle basically the three variants that are in the ground 
today plus two new variants.
    And so, again, we built in the flexibility so that we could 
make decisions at the right time. I would say we have got to 
come through preliminary design review later this year. I have 
high confidence that we can in fact close the design and then 
move to critical design review where we can either down-select 
or not. Those decisions are open to the Nation.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
    Admiral Hill. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Lamborn. Ranking Member Moulton.
    Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to start 
by just really hammering home one of the points that you were 
addressing here if I can attempt to quote Major General Miller. 
The HBTSS not only detects a maneuvering threat and maintains 
custody therein but also provides discrimination so you can 
accurately prosecute that threat. That's a very difficult 
statement for anyone watching C-SPAN right now to understand. 
It is probably a difficult statement for many of us on the 
committee to decipher and pull apart.
    But what we are talking about is fundamentally important. 
And it is something that every American should actually 
understand, which is that if Russia or China were to launch a 
hypersonic missile on Washington, DC, where we are all sitting 
this afternoon, how much advance warning would we have of that 
attack? Vice Admiral Hill.
    Admiral Hill. Ranking Member Moulton, thanks. Great 
question. And so what I will do is I will go back to your 
levels chart, right? Right now when it comes to hypersonic 
threats from an engagement perspective, we are pursuing a 
regional capability. But you are exactly right. From a sensing 
capability, we are at that level one piece, which is, you know, 
you want to cover everything, right? So you want to see a 
strategic attacks on the States for sure.
    Just to kind of add on to what General Miller mentioned, 
when I say latency and fire control quality data, if I was 
explaining that to my daughter, I would say latency means 
timely, right? We want timely information going to any 
defensive system or to a warning system. So that is what I mean 
by latency.
    When we say fire control, what we mean is position and 
velocity accuracy at a level that can support a missile on 
target. So that is what we mean when we say fire control 
quality against a hypersonic threat.
    The other piece of the B in HBTSS, right, so--and I didn't 
mention that in my opening statement, but the B really means 
the dim targets of ballistic missiles. So what we are seeing in 
the North Korean shots, and you see it with other countries 
too, is they shift their propulsion types. And they are much 
dimmer up in the upper stages.
    And so when they go there we lose them with radars. They 
are very hard to see with other infrared systems. And so you 
need a sensor that can see that as well. So it is not just the 
hypersonic maneuvering threat that has gone global, but it is 
these different propulsion types that are very, very hard to 
see. And it is what HBTSS was designed to actually detect and 
provide either warning or weapons control.
    Mr. Moulton. That is very helpful. But to just get back to 
my question, how much advance warning would we have?
    Admiral Hill. I am probably not the right guy to do that. I 
don't know, Dan, do you want to talk about it or?
    General Miller. Sir, for the current threats that we are 
looking at boosted on the vehicles that you are talking about, 
you will get warning within seconds to minutes of that threat 
activity. And depending on where a threat is located will 
dictate how much advance warning that you have.
    Obviously, a threat immediately off the coast has always 
been talked about over years as a challenge in a submarine-
launched environment. But given the launch timelines that you 
have talked about from the PRC or your example you provided, we 
will certainly have adequate warning for decision-making.
    Mr. Moulton. Well, I think, you know, my understanding is 
that part of the need to really develop our level one sensing 
capabilities is that, you know, this is not like dealing with 
the traditional ICBMs and that we could essentially have an 
attack on a place like Washington, DC, without getting much 
advance warning at all.
    I understand you might be able to detect the launch, but 
you wouldn't necessarily know where that missile is headed. 
That is why investing in these capabilities is so important. 
And I also think that you are going to hear from, well, he may 
have just disappeared, but Mr. Bacon, about the need to 
maintain command and control until we have those capabilities, 
which is another, I think, really important question for us to 
address and something that I hope that you will be considering 
as we go forward.
    ASD [Assistant Secretary of Defense] Hill, you know, back 
to my opening statement, I want to ask how the Department 
thinks about missile defense requirements for North Korea and 
specifically how you can weigh the trade-off between continuing 
to try to keep pace with the North Korea missile threat and the 
reality that at some point it becomes not only an arms race 
with North Korea but also might influence Russia and China's 
behavior in ways that are counterproductive to nuclear 
stability.
    So under what conditions would North Korea become a nuclear 
power that we deter with our own nuclear response instead of 
with missile defense, essentially moving North Korea from level 
four to level five?
    Mr. Hill. Thank you, Ranking Member Moulton. We described 
in the Missile Defense Review that the North Korea challenge, 
what we deal with, we have the missile defense that we have 
talked about already today. Missile defeat, which is about the 
things you can do to reduce their confidence in how their 
system is going to work. And then we have always had, and this 
has been consistent in dealing with the North Korea threat, the 
ability of U.S. to cost impositions that can be nuclear 
response as well. That has always been part of our posture with 
respect to North Korea and deterrence there.
    I think with your question, though, of if North Korea 
continues to just deploy more and more missiles, more advanced 
missiles, how far do you go in your question how that relates 
to Russians? At some point you decide, the missile defense we 
have is enough interceptors, and the interceptors are improved, 
the warning that you are talking about is improved, we will 
deal with the missile defense problem there. If North Korea 
were to take that shot, that will be the time when the nuclear 
retaliation, the strategic deterrence portion also has to play 
its part.
    It is real. That is the foundation of all deterrence for 
the United States. And it's part of the North Korea challenge, 
too.
    Mr. Moulton. Well, I think it would be helpful for the 
Department to understand where we make this transition, because 
if we're just sort of blindly, you know, producing more 
interceptors to try to keep up when that is actually not the 
main deterrence strategy that we have for this particular 
threat, then we risk other consequences as we have just 
discussed.
    Can you just--the last question is, look, if we were to get 
into the realm of level five missile defense, deterring a near-
peer adversary in theory by saying we are going to shoot down 
all your missiles, I mean, how GMD interceptors would you 
estimate we would need if we were to--trying to deter or defeat 
an all-out Chinese or Russian nuclear attack on the United 
States?
    Mr. Hill. I think in any realm of warfare from the lowest 
conventional levels to the highest nuclear levels, defense has 
a role. But the key role of defense is you are denying people 
the advantage of the attack that would launch in the first 
place and you are assuring your ability to impose costs that 
would make them regret having started it in the first place. So 
whether that is at the conventional level or at the nuclear 
level, your defense is there to assure your command and 
control.
    You mentioned Washington, DC. One of the things that we 
have been investing in starting with last year's budget and 
continuing in this is over-the-horizon radar. That is to 
improve warning against cruise missile type threats that are a 
concern as well. The space-based sensors we have talked about, 
dealing with some of the hypersonic, the dimmer targets, the 
dimmer threats we are seeing.
    So it is that combination of saying, I can sense and see 
what you are doing. I will have means to intercept, to defend 
myself, to assure critical capabilities like command and 
control and response and power projection. And I will have my 
nuclear deterrent if I need to use that as well.
    Mr. Moulton. At some point this is just math. ASD Hill, 
what is the answer? How many do we need?
    Mr. Hill. I don't think we have--what we have said is right 
now we have the 44 that you mentioned. There are 20 more that 
are part of the NGI program. That is for 64. That is what we 
covered in the Missile Defense Review. And in the Missile 
Defense Review, to come back to Chairman Lamborn's question, we 
also left open the possibility, looking at, as the NGI program 
develops, do we replace the existing [inaudible] or do we go 
beyond that.
    Mr. Moulton. If you could just take this question for the 
record, I would appreciate it.
    Mr. Hill. Oh, sure.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 97.]
    Mr. Moulton. Thank you. Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Lamborn. Representative Wilson.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank each of you 
for being here today. Admiral Hill, General Karbler, thank you 
for your service. You have been instrumental with your 
colleagues in promoting peace through strength. And as a 
retiree myself from military service, I know you will be 
looking back on the successes that you have had, and they are 
so meaningful for our country. Thank you.
    Secretary Hill, facing the threats of the Chinese Communist 
Party, the murderous threat of war criminal Putin, the unstable 
North Korean government, and the irrational threat of the 
regime in Iran, as they continue to develop capacity to conduct 
long-range missile threats with greater capability, capacity, 
and intent to challenge America, our allies, and our partners 
by being part of authoritarians promoting the rule of gun, how 
concerned are you that their continued missile development and 
production--what steps is the Missile Defense Agency taking to 
adequately detect, deter, deny, and protect the homeland and 
regional partners from these threats?
    Mr. Hill. I think we covered Russia and China and a whole 
range of the threats, I believe, in there. And so the budget 
that we have put forward this year, focusing on significant 
investments in the Missile Defense Agency alone, about $10.9 
billion in their programs covering the Next Generation 
Interceptor, covering the space-based centers we talked about, 
the HBTSS, and a discriminating space sensor as well as well as 
the regional programs.
    And we are covering it from both the homeland missile 
defense perspective as well as all of the regional defense for 
our forces forward deployed in those conflicts.
    There are also investments going in through the services. 
So, for example, the Space Force budget deploying the missile 
warning and missile tracking layers. Another nearly $5 billion 
there. Total expenditures of about $29.8 billion in the total 
budget that we are looking at for the ranges of defenses 
against the threats you described.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much. And Admiral Hill, the 
defense of Guam. It is such a strategic location for the 
defense of our country, such an appreciated American territory, 
such patriotic people living there who we so cherish as to 
their importance in our national security strategy.
    The Missile Defense Agency is responsible for efforts of 
integrating the Army integrated air and missile defense and 
Navy Aegis ballistic missile defense in support of the defense 
of Guam through the command and control battle management and 
communications.
    The current plan would demonstrate an initial capability in 
Guam in 2024 followed by the delivery of an enhanced capability 
by 2029. Are there any additional requirements or resources 
that the Missile Defense Agency may need to ensure this 
function is established on the vitally located and patriotic 
territory of Guam? Can you highlight the challenges and 
limitations on this current plan?
    Admiral Hill. Yes, sir. Thank you. This is really our first 
year in 2023 starting the program. Our total focus right now is 
on establishing the sites. We know what they are. We have done 
the early environmental work there. And as you mentioned, at 
the end of 2024, our intent is to have the first radar, an 
engineering version of the command and control suite, and a 
launcher system so that we can test in the environment just 
beyond signals and checkouts and those sorts of things.
    So we will be on island with capability at the end of 2024. 
And then as you mentioned, there is an enhanced capability as 
we move forward.
    If you ask me what I know we need, it is really the 
infrastructure on the island. So as, you know, General Karbler 
mentioned, the Army's IBCS system is a core part that will 
integrate with the Aegis capabilities on the island is really 
about quality of life for those soldiers and for the other 
operators that will be on the island.
    There are some other capabilities that are meant for a 
different environment that Admiral Aquilino has challenged us 
to ensure that we have the ability to integrate those in as 
well. And so that is what the program really encompasses, 
primarily Aegis and IBCS along with some additional 
capabilities that we will save for another session.
    Mr. Wilson. And very briefly, General Karbler, the people 
of Ukraine have been so courageous resisting war criminal Putin 
in his invasion, what have we learned from missile defense in 
the war in the Ukraine?
    General Karbler. I had the opportunity to go to Fort Sill, 
Oklahoma, and watch the Ukrainian soldiers train in our U.S. 
Patriot system. And I would like to talk about that in a closed 
session, if I could, of my assessment and observations of their 
training and their abilities.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you. I yield back.
    Mr. Lamborn. Representative Houlahan.
    Ms. Houlahan. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you all for 
your testimony today. My first question is for General Miller. 
General, you have written in your written testimony that 
USSPACECOM's [U.S. Space Command's] commercial integration 
strategy and American commercial innovation is an asymmetrical 
advantage that our competitors don't possess. And I certainly 
agree with you on that. And I have led efforts in the past NDAA 
[National Defense Authorization Act] years to ensure that 
programs like SBIR [Small Business Innovation Research] and 
STTR [Small Business Technology Transfer] operate unimpeded. 
And I am again leading a similar effort to bridge the so-called 
valley of death this year between small businesses and the 
Department of Defense.
    So my question to you is could you talk a little bit more 
about the commercial integration strategy at SPACECOM and do 
you think that we are doing enough both here on this committee 
and also at the DOD to leverage our asymmetrical advantage of 
commercial innovation and what more should we be doing if we 
aren't doing enough?
    General Miller. Yes, ma'am. And thank you for your support 
on those programs in particular.
    So I think that I would start with that the relationship 
particularly with U.S. Space Command and even the predecessor 
STRATCOM [U.S. Strategic Command] with commercial industry has 
gone on for quite some time. It has typically started in the 
commercial SATCOM [satellite communications] arena. What you 
have seen in recent years is expand into other mission sets as 
well.
    One area in particular that it has expanded into is in the 
space domain awareness area. We have leveraged commercial 
sensors at a scale that we had not really anticipated just 
years ago to fill in potential gaps in locations for coverage, 
provide new technology developments, and also provide 
synchronization and integration and more accuracy in some of 
the capability that we see for space domain awareness.
    What the commander did in the commercial integration 
strategy was a focus to try to get a couple of things in 
particular. One he wanted a single point of entry, and that is 
our Combined Joint Integrated Commercial Office within our J-8 
staff to provide a single face to all of our commercial 
partners on what our requirements are.
    The second piece was to lay out some key priority mission 
sets and devolve down into some specific capabilities that we 
are looking at so that our commercial partners are not guessing 
what they are looking for. In fact, they have specific asks and 
requirements that we definitized to the extent that we can.
    There are some examples of goodness, though, that have 
already shown up. In the last few years, you probably have 
heard about Joint Task Force Space Defense's Joint Commercial 
Office. And they have leveraged the space domain awareness 
capabilities of a number of sensors and provided us an 
independent, verifiable, publicly available catalog that we use 
to provide warning on a range of threats.
    They also augment and allow us to inform our missile 
warning capabilities in the future is what we are looking at, 
particularly from a data transport layer, less so from a 
warning perspective.
    So I think the future is bright. You will see that within 
the unfunded priorities list that the commander has submitted 
there are some specific things that he is looking for to try to 
expand and hasten some of the delivery of those capabilities. I 
think your continued support there would be most appreciated.
    Ms. Houlahan. I will definitely take a look at that and so 
in terms of what more we can do, that would be something to 
take a look at.
    Also a question is, you have outlined sort of defining what 
the priorities are. Is there any sort of inverse of that where 
you don't know what you don't know, but that civilian industry 
is innovating on, and you might be able to take advantage of or 
benefit from? How are you interacting with civilian industry to 
understand the innovations that are happening that may be 
useful to you?
    General Miller. Absolutely. There is a commercial 
integration cell that is at Vandenberg Air Force Base has been 
a main place for our commercial industry partners to go to 
partner with us. So in the realm of what we are learning all 
the time.
    In the SDA, or space domain awareness enterprise, a number 
of the capabilities they provide are varied. There are some 
really exquisite capabilities some have, but also increased 
capacities that others have. So we are learning more about what 
they have to offer and are interfaced with that as the 
commercial integration cell.
    We have also learned that they have specific relationships 
they want to have with us on safety of flight and awareness of 
what the threats are that are on orbit and how are we sharing 
that information. That that is a mission set that you will see 
transition to the Department of Commerce ultimately is their 
space traffic management, it's largely a civil function, stands 
up and begin to repurpose those guardians that are at 
Vandenberg to do some of the more operationally driven threat 
warning and assessment mission sets that we see them having.
    So there is a benefit on both ends here, both in what we 
can get out of the commercial enterprise but also exploring new 
technologies they are providing us in order to execute our 
mission sets even more efficiently.
    Ms. Houlahan. Thank you. I have several other questions, 
but very little time. So I think if it is all right, I will 
submit them for the record for you all. And thank you very much 
for your service and for your time.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. Representative Turner.
    Mr. Turner. Thank you. Gentlemen, I think the last several 
years have shown us that deterrence by nuclear weapons arsenals 
alone is dead. Russia has threatened both NATO allies, even 
nuclear weapons nations, with nuclear weapon attack. China is 
tripling its nuclear weapons and is vastly expanding its ICBM 
capability and, of course, not in response at all to any 
missile defense that may, in fact, thwart in any way their 
ability to hold us at risk for a target.
    Our missile defense system, as it is currently configured, 
and our Aegis Ashore that sits in Europe, are publicly by 
policy stated as targeting North Korea and Iran. We by policy 
state that we are not deploying missile defense systems for the 
purposes of defending ourselves against the threat of Russia 
and China.
    Clearly, Russia and China are not being deterred by our 
nuclear weapons arsenals alone because of their continuing vast 
expanse, and the fact that both of them are pursuing what many 
people call exotic weapons, which are completely new 
capabilities. They are not modernization of existing 
capabilities, completely new capabilities that can easily be 
classified as first-strike weapons, weapons that are intended 
to initiate a nuclear weapons strike, not one that is merely to 
deter as our posture has been.
    We are clearly going to have to move to a more blended 
architecture where we understand that if there is an attack 
that we have a responsibility to protect the American public, 
because right now most Americans believe that if a nuclear 
weapon is headed at this very moment to Washington, DC, whether 
it be hypersonic or an ICBM, that we have systems in place to 
protect them, and we do not. It is time that we do.
    Let's start with Europe first. In Ukraine, Russia has 
claimed that they may use tactical nuclear weapons. And even 
all of the analysts looking at the situation have been 
concerned that they might. If they did, with the placement of 
our Aegis Ashore in Poland and in Romania, we restricted those 
systems so that they, again, are intended to target Iran and 
not Russia, meaning that the United States would basically be a 
casual observer to watch a nuclear exchange instead of having a 
role to be able to intervene.
    Admiral Hill, could you please describe to us the issue 
that we are facing with the Aegis Ashore in Poland and Romania. 
They are not fully functioning Aegis systems, correct? So if 
you had a ship that was sitting there, as opposed to Aegis 
Ashore, which Congress funded and authorized, it would have 
greater capabilities than what sits there today. Is that right, 
Admiral?
    Admiral Hill. That's correct, sir. We carved out the 
ballistic missile defense capability for Europe as part of the 
European Phased Adaptive Approach. We do have the computer 
base, the computer program base, that would include cruise 
missile defense and strike capabilities, but those are not 
included at those sites.
    Mr. Turner. Would we have to scrape off the Aegis Ashore 
that is there or can those be modified so that they could be 
fully functioning Aegis Ashore like our Aegis at sea?
    Admiral Hill. So very early on, we wanted to make sure that 
we maintain the flexibility on that site should policy change 
or we require additional capabilities. We could bring it back 
in through the computer programs, which it is only certified 
for use for ballistic missile defense only. But, you know, it 
is an inherent capability. There would likely be some 
additional consoles required depending on what the missions 
are, and potentially additional launching systems.
    Mr. Turner. So existing capabilities that we have could be 
appended to the systems giving them the full functioning 
capabilities that an Aegis at sea has?
    Admiral Hill. Yes, sir. And I wouldn't refer to it really 
as appended. It would just be enabled.
    Mr. Turner. Okay. Excellent, excellent. Do you think the 
situation has arisen that we seriously need to consider our 
European footprint? We have voluntarily restrained ourselves so 
that these Aegis capabilities are missing. Don't you think we 
have gotten to the point where we need to from a policy 
perspective begin the debate as to why have we done this and 
shouldn't we look at modifying them?
    Admiral Hill. We have had questions in the past about 
whether or not we should enable the cruise missile defense 
capability just to defend the site itself. But it really is a 
policy question if you are going to add----
    Mr. Turner. And I'm going right there.
    Admiral Hill. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Turner [continuing]. To our other John Hill. So, Mr. 
Hill, don't you think it is time that we take a look at this 
issue, that deterrence is dead? What blend do we need and what 
do we need to do in Europe?
    Mr. Hill. I think it is time. And I think NATO thinks it is 
time. And I think NATO is looking at whether NATO needs to 
change its policy structure.
    NATO has what is called NATO ballistic missile defense 
policy, and they have NATO integrated air and missile defense 
policy. We won't go into all of the deep dark art of NATO, but 
ballistic missile defense focused on Iran. Integrated air and 
missile defense focused on all threats, all directions, and so 
forth.
    The real question is should we be able to use the Aegis 
Ashore sites for both? As Admiral Hill explained, technically 
you could do it. Now the policy question, given what everybody 
has seen in Ukraine over the past year, people are asking 
themselves exactly that question of, what is the balance of 
deterrence and defense going forward that we need to have?
    Mr. Turner. And that is what our committee I am certain 
will be doing. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. Representative Carbajal.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair. First I would like to 
take a second to congratulate the Space Force on their recent 
successful launch from the Vandenberg Space Force Base in my 
district. Congratulations.
    The rocket carried the initial tranche of Space Development 
Agency satellites that are a key part of the missile warning, 
missile tracking architecture that we are discussing here 
today.
    Vice Admiral Hill, GAO [U.S. Government Accountability 
Office] published a report in May 2022 that highlighted 
opportunities to reduce the risk of Missile Defense Agency 
programs from experiencing cost overruns and schedule delays.
    One recommendation is for increased collaboration between 
program offices and warfighters. What steps has the agency 
taken to enhance the partnership between MDA and other missile 
defense organizations?
    Admiral Hill. Great. Thank you for the question, 
Congressman. We have a series of hybrid programs within the 
agency. And I will just start from the bottom and work my way 
up. When we have the THAAD program, it is there on Redstone 
Arsenal. We have an Army colonel running that program. He is 
right next door to his partners who are running Patriot and the 
IBCS system. So that partnership is alive and well from an 
acquisition perspective and as we field and deploy those 
systems.
    Our Navy program for Aegis is in Dahlgren, Virginia, right 
at the center of excellence for the Aegis program, tied closely 
in to all capabilities there. The Aegis Training and Readiness 
Center there. Naval officers are in charge of the efforts there 
at Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense in Dahlgren.
    When you look at the work that we are doing for GMD, there 
is not a day that we are not talking either directly to 
Northern Command and the different servicemen that are serving 
on that staff to ensure that we are providing them all the 
support they need.
    The same thing with Fort Greely, the maintenance is done 
hand in hand with the soldiers up there in terms of the launch 
site and all the command and control. So I think we have a very 
good, strong hybrid system. And our partnership with the 
services is as strong as I have ever seen it.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. Lieutenant General Karbler, the 
need for missile defense assets is at an all-time high due to 
the operational tempo of NATO and our allies. How are we 
balancing the global demand for Patriot and THAAD missile 
defense batteries while maintaining our readiness requirements?
    General Karbler. Thanks, Congressman. As I talked about a 
little bit earlier, we identified--we had to reduce the demand 
signal for our air and missile defense forces, specifically in 
the CENTCOM AOR, so that we could get that balance so we 
weren't putting the air defense soldiers through the grinder 
and affecting readiness through a very high OPTEMPO. So we have 
done that.
    The soldiers have elected to reenlist and stay with their 
current units, which increases readiness. So instead of a big 
turnover, now soldiers, particularly this year, 39 percent of 
the soldiers have stabilized within their current units as they 
reenlist. That helps readiness because those crews now that 
have been training together for months and months now stay 
together for 2 or 3 years. And then they get promoted through 
the ranks, and then they can share those lessons learned with 
their subordinate soldiers and so that helps improve readiness 
as well.
    Our air defense readiness, we are there 24/7, always stays 
well within the combatant commanders' requirements. And, again, 
that is a testament to the soldiers who have stayed on with 
their organizations.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. Vice Admiral Hill, what are the 
challenges of defending against hypersonic missiles from a 
technological standpoint? And, as it relates to hypersonic 
missiles, are your efforts focused on homeland defense or are 
you looking at regional applications as well or both?
    Admiral Hill. Yes, sir. We are focused in on regional 
capability. If you look at it through the framework of detect, 
control, engage, detection, tracking of hypersonic is 
incredibly challenging because of their maneuver capability.
    So they don't launch in a singular azimuth. They don't come 
directly at you. They go in and around you. So field of view of 
radar has become very limited, which is why we advocate for 
space in order to track hypersonic missiles.
    When it comes to the command and control, because of the 
speeds they fly, that means reaction time is very short and so 
that challenges command and control and the ability to get the 
information to the operator to make decisions.
    And finally when you get to engagement, typically, if you 
engage them in the terminal, that is a very dirty environment. 
It is electromagnetic down there. There are jammers on the 
front ends of these things. They maneuver quickly. Our most 
recent test from 2 weeks ago demonstrated our capability to 
take that threat on in terminal.
    And then Glide Phase Interceptor that we talked about 
earlier, a regional capability is to be an area defense that is 
in the glide phase. So if you look at a boosting hypersonic 
threat it goes into a glide phase before it dives down, we want 
to engage it there in glide before it comes back into the 
atmosphere, which is one of the hardest places to engage, but 
we do have capability there today.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back.
    Admiral Hill. Thank you.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. Representative Stefanik.
    Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, Chairman, for your statements 
regarding the east coast missile defense as you opened this 
hearing. I wanted to address Vice Admiral Hill.
    As you know, both the NDAA and the Department of Defense 
have publicly designated Fort Drum as the site selected for a 
potential east coast missile defense location. And recently in 
this hearing room, Chairman Milley responded to my question, 
stating his support for a third missile defense site, 
specifically focused on the east coast at Fort Drum.
    What is your best military assessment regarding the 
national security and missile defense need to face 21st century 
threats and specifically, how is Fort Drum well positioned to 
meet those?
    Admiral Hill. Yes, ma'am. When it comes to defense, 
geography is very meaningful. And our ability to expand the 
battlespace for something like a Next Generation Interceptor, 
that is exactly what the location does and what it does 
provide.
    We will often talk about a shoot/assess/shoot. That means 
getting a shot in early. So if you are geogra/phically 
dispersed and you have a third site, you have the ability to 
engage early and then engage again after you have assessed 
whether or not you've hit the first time. So there is a 
compelling need there that we continue to watch as the threat 
increases.
    Chairman Lamborn talked about space launch vehicles as a 
ruse. It really is. It is ICBM technology being demonstrated 
and being matured. So I think the threat is real. And I think 
where the chairman was going, the more defenses you have, the 
better. It is a key part of deterrence.
    Ms. Stefanik. So you would support Chairman Milley's 
assessment?
    Admiral Hill. Yes, ma'am.
    Ms. Stefanik. My next question is, in terms of the 
timeline, there are many steps that need to be taken to prepare 
for that threat of the future. Can you walk us through that 
timeline and the steps that are needed to be taken in the next 
few years?
    Admiral Hill. Yes, ma'am. The comment you made earlier 
about the site selection is really step one. You assess some 
number of sites, generally to meet the NEPA [National 
Environmental Policy Act] rules. You have to assess at least 
three sites so you have a comparative on nature there. And that 
is usually at a very top level view, you know, what would make 
sense? All the analysis goes into play in terms of, you know, 
timelines and whether or not you can get that shoot/assess/
shoot capability and so those locations do matter.
    And you get a general scrub of what that area would be and 
what the challenges would be just from a geography perspective.
    The next steps generally involve going in and doing more 
invasive work on the areas that we might be considering. So if 
it is Fort Drum, we would want to go in and determine how hard 
would it be to build there?
    And then you have the other discussions about, well, how 
many silos would you require? What are the timelines? What 
would we do with the NGI production line, because to me that 
would be--the best military advice on what to plan for would be 
the Next Generation Interceptor since we will have at least one 
production line, maybe more depending on the decisions that are 
made.
    Ms. Stefanik. And then lastly, the FY23 NDAA required an 
MDA to report to Congress on an updated assessment for an 
additional defense missile interceptor site specifically at 
Fort Drum as well as a funding profile for that site.
    You recently wrote a letter to Chairman Rogers dated March 
24 indicating that the report is now late, but you are going to 
meet a deadline of June 30. Can I get your commitment that you 
will meet that deadline of submission before June 30?
    Admiral Hill. Absolutely, ma'am. We have heat and light on 
that report. We know what you are asking for and those are 
reasonable requests, and we will get those to you on time.
    Ms. Stefanik. Well, thank you, Admiral Hill. I also want to 
take this opportunity to thank my colleagues. I have led this 
effort as the Representative for Fort Drum for many, many 
years. And because of the bipartisan work on this committee as 
well as our work with MDA and DOD broadly, we are continuing to 
move this project forward. We know how important it is for our 
national security, our military, and our missile defense. So 
thank you very much, and I yield back.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. Representative Garamendi.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. A couple of things. 
In a recent hearing on defending Guam, there wass a long list 
of unfunded priorities. Can any of the programs that you three 
gentleman have be delayed so that the defense of Guam can go 
forward, in other words shifting money from your programs to 
the defense of Guam?
    Admiral Hill. As the acquisition guy at the table, I will 
tell you that I have limited capability to move money from 
program to program. There would have to be----
    Mr. Garamendi. How much money do you have?
    Admiral Hill. We are at $10 billion--10.9 in 2024.
    Mr. Garamendi. $10 billion.
    Admiral Hill. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Garamendi. I think the number may have been classified 
so I won't give it here. It is significantly less than $10 
billion.
    Admiral Hill. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Garamendi. One of the things that we ought to be paying 
attention to here on this committee and in the full committee 
is we make choices. Some people say the defense of Guam is 
rather important.
    What is the role of directed energy, not in the 
exoatmosphere, but in the other defense mechanisms that you 
intend to employ?
    Admiral Hill. Is that a question for me, sir?
    Mr. Garamendi. It seems to me all three of you are in this 
business----
    Admiral Hill. I am happy to give you----
    Mr. Garamendi. So why don't we start with you, and we will 
go down the line.
    Admiral Hill. Yes, sir. We are investing in directed energy 
specific in lethality. So what we do is we are actively running 
tests to determine the right places to place energy in order to 
get an effect. And there is a range of those effects from just 
absolute destruction to just disturbing something to take it 
off track.
    Mr. Garamendi. Against what threat are you looking at?
    Admiral Hill. Multiple different types, the whole range of 
missile threats.
    Mr. Garamendi. And how far off is your culmination of this 
effort?
    Admiral Hill. I would say that directed energy is 
promising. It is not something you are going to see in the near 
term, at least for missile defense. If you just look at the 
threat, ballistic hardened nuclear threat, you have to have 
energy on that target for a long period of time.
    Hypersonic threats are designed to fly in a very high-heat 
environment. So you have to overcome that baseline heat 
environment to inflict damage. So it is a big challenge for 
missile defense to leverage direct energy in the near term.
    Mr. Garamendi. I see. Are you familiar with the Israeli 
application of----
    Admiral Hill. I am.
    Mr. Garamendi [continuing]. Directed energy coupled with 
the Iron Dome and David's Sling where they have a software 
system that will determine whether to use a missile or a 
directed-energy solution?
    Admiral Hill. Yes, sir. And we also have investments in 
weapons selection logic that would determine best use of 
whatever weapon it is, directed energy or hard-kill weapon.
    Mr. Garamendi. Does their system work?
    Admiral Hill. Their system is in trials. It has not been 
deployed. It is not certified for operational use yet.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you. Could you give us an update--I 
don't know which one of you would handle this one. Maybe it is 
Mr. Karbler. What is the Aegis Ashore situation in Poland?
    Admiral Hill. I will take that. Aegis Ashore in Poland has 
reached its technical capability declaration. It is going 
through the Board of Inspection and Survey, a Navy process for 
acceptance. The Chief of Naval Operations is on track to accept 
the site for the Navy at the end of this fiscal year. And then 
it will go through EUCOM [U.S. European Command] and then NATO 
acceptance to be fully operational next year.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you. How many Aegis Ashore missiles 
would be necessary to deal with Russia's intermediate-range 
nuclear weapons?
    Admiral Hill. Sir, I would like to take that to the closed 
session.
    Mr. Garamendi. I see. Well, probably the number, if you go 
1 to 1, which we probably ought not assume, we may need 2 to 1 
because we sometimes miss or there may be some problem. It's 
been calculated it is over a trillion dollars just to defend 
Europe.
    Admiral Hill. Yes, sir. And I am not sure what assumptions 
you are making on which threats and----
    Mr. Garamendi. I would be happy to share them with you.
    Admiral Hill. I would love to see it. But, yes, sir, it 
would be expensive.
    Mr. Garamendi. I yield back.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. Representative DesJarlais.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Admiral Hill, I just had a quick question 
for you. Fiscal year 2024 budget request include $800 million 
to support the defense of Guam. The current plan outlined is 
for an initial capability to be ready on Guam in 2024 followed 
by delivery of the enhanced capability by 2029.
    I met with the Guam Chamber of Commerce earlier today. And 
they echoed Admiral Aquilino's concerns this morning about 
whether the present workforce is capable of meeting these 
goals.
    To what extent are you hindered by labor and workforce 
issues in meeting these timeline goals and what can we do to 
support the workforce in Guam to ensure we stay on track?
    Admiral Hill. Yes, sir. It is a great question, and it is a 
real concern. I would say anyone that is doing military 
construction on the island of Guam will be impacted. We have 
not realized that yet. We are just doing site selection and the 
initial environmentals.
    Once we get to military construction in the 2025 timeframe, 
there will be an impact if we don't come through the visa 
issue.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. Apparently, they had mentioned that 
there was some misconception that workforce was coming in from 
China. They said that is not true. And they were wanting to 
know about H2-B visas. Would that be helpful?
    Admiral Hill. That would be very helpful, not the Chinese 
piece, but----
    Dr. DesJarlais. Exactly. Okay. Thank you. I have some 
questions for the closed session, but I will yield back.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. Representative Strong.
    Mr. Strong. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Karbler, thank 
you for stopping by my office yesterday. And it has been a true 
honor to work with you over the years. I thank you for your 
service to our country. I would be remiss if I didn't note how 
proud Alabama's Fifth Congressional District is to host the 
Missile Defense Agency and the Army's Space and Missile Defense 
Command at Redstone Arsenal.
    General Miller, Admiral Hill, Mr. Hill, it's good to see 
each of you again.
    Last year's NDAA mandated the Department to provide a 
report to Congress, a comprehensive and layered strategy of how 
the U.S. military will use asymmetric capabilities to defend 
hypersonic missile threats. That was due on March the 1st. Do 
you know how the current status--what is the current status of 
this report?
    Mr. Hill. Let me take that one for the record if I may.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 97.]
    Mr. Strong. That would be fine. Thank you, sir. General 
Karbler, yesterday in my office you shared that capacity is a 
top concern of yours. Like you said, the CCP isn't conducting 
science projects. The threats posed are real. Can you share 
with us what your top capacity concerns are when it comes to 
our missile defense system and how potential problems can be 
avoided?
    General Karbler. Yes, sir. As we look at the adversaries as 
we talked about throughout the hearing thus far, every 
combatant commander wants more Patriot. They need more THAAD. 
And the Army has been very good. We are getting a 16th Patriot 
battalion and an 8th THAAD battery through the work with the 
Missile Defense Agency. We are standing up four Maneuver-SHORAD 
[Short Range Air Defense] battalions to get after the counter-
UAS drone challenges that our soldiers face. Continued 
invigoration of the organic industrial base through FMS 
[foreign military sales] purchases of Patriot and THAAD 
batteries are very helpful for us.
    But the additional capacity requirements we have to meet 
the adversaries that are out there, I just am--I am never 
comfortable with the current capacity that we have. And I know 
it is challenging in a budget environment to have additional 
air and missile defense units. That's why I am very happy with 
where the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Army are at in 
terms of helping increase our air and missile defense 
capabilities, again on the Patriot, THAAD side, and with the 
Maneuver-SHORAD.
    Mr. Strong. Thank you. Right now the U.S. is facing 
extremely high operational tempos for our air and missile 
defense assets. Can you discuss how the global requirements are 
impacting the readiness of our Patriot and THAAD batteries?
    General Karbler. Yes, sir. We have gotten after this. We 
recognized it again in the health of the force study that the 
Chief of Staff of the Army commissioned; identified the stress 
on the force, laid out recommendations that we are 
implementing. And again, as we see soldiers reenlisting at the 
highest rates within the Army for a division-sized element, 
that is a quantitative measure to show that we are making a 
difference.
    We have also been able to provide a level of predictability 
to our soldiers. One of the challenges that was very 
frustrating was they would go for a 6-month rotation. It would 
get extended to 9 months, or a 9-month rotation to a year, or a 
year rotation and then get extended beyond a year. And what we 
have been able to do here in the past year and a half is really 
get that predictability back to the soldiers and their 
families.
    Mr. Strong. Thank you. And again, thank you for service to 
our country.
    General Miller, I know space domain awareness is a top 
priority for both SPACECOM and the DOD at large. How is Space 
Command integrating with commercial companies to strengthen 
space domain awareness and sensor management?
    General Miller. Thank you for the question, Congressman. I 
think a few areas I mentioned previously, I will foot-stomp on 
a couple if I can.
    The main effort we focused on up until now is to ensure 
that--we call those non-traditional sensors, in other words not 
purpose-built necessarily for a missile warning or missile 
defense mission. So we have taken sensors and capabilities that 
the commercial sector has offered to provide on the one hand 
unique places and locations for us to leverage for collection, 
detection, tracking.
    We have also looked to that commercial sector to provide us 
advanced algorithms and tools to allow us to provide better 
analytic data on any potential risk threats or even just 
safety-of-flight concerns that we see while simultaneously 
disseminating a warning to our partners and using unclassified 
means in order to be able to do that.
    So all the way from detection all the way through 
reporting, the thread of commercial integration has been put at 
every step along that way.
    The commercial integration strategy was designed to enhance 
that, and we see a lot of productivity coming out of that 
relationship just so far and it has only been months since 
initiated, Congressman.
    Mr. Strong. Thank you. I thank each of you for being here 
today. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. We will now go into a brief recess. 
We will go up to the SCIF [sensitive compartmented information 
facility] in room 2337 and votes will be called at about 5 
o'clock. So with the indulgence of the witnesses, we will go 
until approximately 5 o'clock and then we will be done for the 
day. And we will now be in recess.
    [Whereupon, at 4:26 p.m., the subcommittee proceeded in 
closed session.]



      
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                            A P P E N D I X

                             April 18, 2023

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              PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                             April 18, 2023

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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    

      
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              WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING

                              THE HEARING

                             April 18, 2023

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             RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. MOULTON

    Mr. Hill. As stated in the 2022 Missile Defense Review and 
consistent with U.S. defense policy for nearly two decades, the United 
States continues to rely on strategic deterrence--underwritten by safe, 
secure, and effective nuclear forces--to address intercontinental-range 
nuclear threats from Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC).
    Though the United States reserves the right to defend itself 
against attacks from any source, the Ground-based Midcourse Defense 
(GMD) system is neither intended for, nor capable of defeating the 
large and sophisticated ICBM, air-, or sea-launched ballistic missile 
threats from Russia and the PRC.   [See page 17.]
                                 ______
                                 
              RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. STRONG
    Mr. Hill. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is drafting this report 
on behalf of the Secretary of Defense and received an extension to June 
1. The Agency is on track to deliver the report on time.   [See page 
28.]



      
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              QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                             April 18, 2023

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                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. HOULAHAN

    Ms. Houlahan. What steps is MDA taking to ensure that the threat 
models and targets it uses during testing are up-to-date and based on 
relevant threats, as identified by the intelligence community?
    Admiral Hill. [The information provided includes controlled 
unclassified information and is retained in the committee files.]
    Ms. Houlahan. Can you please describe MDA's efforts to address 
cyber vulnerabilities overall and in response to DOD IG findings? 
Please also describe how MDA is addressing cyber security within the 
defense industrial base, and the work you have done with Prime 
contractors to improve cyber security throughout the supply chain.
    Admiral Hill. [The information provided includes controlled 
unclassified information and is retained in the committee files.]

                              [all]