[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

EXAMINING THE METHODOLOGY
AND STRUCTURE OF THE
U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY'S
CRITICAL MINERALS LIST

=======================================================================

OVERSIGHT HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND
MINERAL RESOURCES

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

__________

Wednesday, September 13, 2023

__________

Serial No. 118-58

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Printed for the use of the Committee on Natural Resources

[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
or
Committee address: http://naturalresources.house.gov

________

U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
53-407 PDF WASHINGTON : 2024

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COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES

BRUCE WESTERMAN, AR, Chairman
DOUG LAMBORN, CO, Vice Chairman
RAUL M. GRIJALVA, AZ, Ranking Member

Doug Lamborn, CO Grace F. Napolitano, CA
Robert J. Wittman, VA Gregorio Kilili Camacho Sablan,
Tom McClintock, CA CNMI
Paul Gosar, AZ Jared Huffman, CA
Garret Graves, LA Ruben Gallego, AZ
Aumua Amata C. Radewagen, AS Joe Neguse, CO
Doug LaMalfa, CA Mike Levin, CA
Daniel Webster, FL Katie Porter, CA
Jenniffer Gonzalez-Colon, PR Teresa Leger Fernandez, NM
Russ Fulcher, ID Melanie A. Stansbury, NM
Pete Stauber, MN Mary Sattler Peltola, AK
John R. Curtis, UT Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, NY
Tom Tiffany, WI Kevin Mullin, CA
Jerry Carl, AL Val T. Hoyle, OR
Matt Rosendale, MT Sydney Kamlager-Dove, CA
Lauren Boebert, CO Seth Magaziner, RI
Cliff Bentz, OR Nydia M. Velazquez, NY
Jen Kiggans, VA Ed Case, HI
Jim Moylan, GU Debbie Dingell, MI
Wesley P. Hunt, TX Susie Lee, NV
Mike Collins, GA
Anna Paulina Luna, FL
John Duarte, CA
Harriet M. Hageman, WY

Vivian Moeglein, Staff Director
Tom Connally, Chief Counsel
Lora Snyder, Democratic Staff Director
http://naturalresources.house.gov
------

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND MINERAL RESOURCES

PETE STAUBER, MN, Chairman
WESLEY P. HUNT, TX, Vice Chair
ALEXANDRIA OCASIO-CORTEZ, NY, Ranking Member

Doug Lamborn, CO Jared Huffman, CA
Robert J. Wittman, VA Kevin Mullin, CA
Paul Gosar, AZ Sydney Kamlager-Dove, CA
Garret Graves, LA Seth Magaziner, RI
Daniel Webster, FL Nydia M. Velazquez, NY
Russ Fulcher, ID Debbie Dingell, MI
John R. Curtis, UT Raul M. Grijalva, AZ
Tom Tiffany, WI Grace F. Napolitano, CA
Matt Rosendale, MT Susie Lee, NV
Lauren Boebert, CO Vacancy
Wesley P. Hunt, TX Vacancy
Mike Collins, GA
John Duarte, CA
Bruce Westerman, AR, ex officio

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CONTENTS

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Page

Hearing held on Wednesday, September 13, 2023.................... 1

Statement of Members:

Stauber, Hon. Pete, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Minnesota......................................... 1
Ocasio-Cortez, Hon. Alexandria, a Representative in Congress
from the State of New York................................. 3
Grijalva, Hon. Raul M., a Representative in Congress from the
State of Arizona........................................... 4
Westerman, Hon. Bruce, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Arkansas.......................................... 6

Statement of Witnesses:

Nassar, Nedal, Chief of Minerals Intelligence Research, U.S.
Geological Survey, Reston, Virginia........................ 7
Prepared statement of.................................... 9
Questions submitted for the record....................... 14
Blakemore, Reed, Director of Research and Programs, Global
Energy Center, Atlantic Council, Washington, DC............ 15
Prepared statement of.................................... 17
Eggert, Roderick, Research Professor of Economics and
Business and Coulter Foundation Chair in Mineral Economics,
Colorado School of Mines, Golden, Colorado................. 23
Prepared statement of.................................... 24
Mulvaney, Dustin, Professor, Environmental Studies, San Jose
State University, San Jose, California..................... 31
Prepared statement of.................................... 32
Questions submitted for the record....................... 39

Somers, Brian, President, Utah Mining Association, Salt Lake
City, Utah................................................. 41
Prepared statement of.................................... 43

Additional Materials Submitted for the Record:

Submissions for the Record by Representative Westerman

Letter from the Committee to Hon. Deb Haaland, Secretary
of the Interior, dated February 3, 2022................ 59

OVERSIGHT HEARING ON EXAMINING THE METHODOLOGY AND STRUCTURE OF
THE U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY'S CRITICAL MINERALS LIST

----------

Wednesday, September 13, 2023

U.S. House of Representatives

Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral Resources

Committee on Natural Resources

Washington, DC

----------

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:18 a.m., in
Room 1324, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Pete Stauber
[Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.

Present: Representatives Stauber, Lamborn, Wittman, Gosar,
Fulcher, Curtis, Tiffany, Boebert, Collins, Westerman; Ocasio-
Cortez, Mullin, Magaziner, Dingell, Grijalva, and Lee.
Mr. Stauber. The Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral
Resources will come to order.
Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare a
recess of the Subcommittee at any time.
Under Committee Rule 4(f), any oral opening statements at
hearings are limited to the Chairman and the Ranking Minority
Member.
I now recognize myself for an opening statement.

STATEMENT OF THE HON. PETE STAUBER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MINNESOTA

Mr. Stauber. Today, the Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral
Resources will host an oversight hearing to examine the U.S.
Geological Survey's critical minerals list.
I would like to begin by thanking all of the witnesses for
being here today for this important hearing.
By now we have all seen the numbers: demand for hardrock
minerals like nickel, cobalt, zinc, silver, lithium, and many
other commodities is expected to climb rapidly in the coming
years. Our modern way of life relies on these resources for
satellites, cell phones, defense systems, and virtually all
other high-tech devices.
Luckily, here in the United States, we are blessed to have
some of the most prolific deposits of hardrock minerals,
including the district that I represent in northeastern
Minnesota, which will power our 21st century economy forward. I
use the term ``hardrock minerals,'' which includes nearly all
mineral commodities except hydrocarbons and aggregates.
However, since the Trump administration's 2017 Executive Order,
the term ``critical minerals'' has been used for a subset of
these minerals.
We now have the critical minerals list, which is created
and overseen by the U.S. Geological Survey at the Department of
the Interior, also known as USGS.
We discuss the importance of mining and minerals in this
Committee often, as we should. But what exactly is a critical
mineral compared to other hardrock minerals?
Are there tangible benefits to being listed as critical,
such as increased access to funding, higher prioritization by
Federal permitting agencies, or protection from frivolous
lawsuits brought by activists and interest groups?
If so, what happens to those mineral commodities that are
not listed?
I am also interested to hear about the similarities and
distinctions between the USGS Critical Minerals list and the
recently released critical materials list published by the
Department of Energy. It is important to fully understand how
these lists differ. If minerals benefit in different ways from
being on one list or the other, and if there are any
considerations given to the DOE list that the USGS might
incorporate into its own analysis.
Finally, we need to understand the impact of these
decisions on domestic mining projects. We will hear testimony
today about how investments in a mineral rich state like my
home state of Minnesota can be affected by Federal decisions
about which minerals are considered critical and how changes to
the list can bring uncertainty to economic development.
One would reasonably assume that if a particular mineral is
listed on the critical minerals list, the Administration would
prioritize domestic access to and development of it. As we
begin the hearing today, I am once again struck by the
hypocrisy of this Administration's policy on domestic mineral
production.
On the one hand, the Administration advocates for increased
renewables and EV mandates, policies that will certainly speed
up demand for the minerals needed to build them. The White
House has even provided billions of dollars in taxpayer funds
for midstream and downstream mineral production.
But on the other hand, we have seen this Administration
repeatedly choose to lock up lands with high mineral potential
across our nation, such as the 225,504 acres withdrawn from
development in Minnesota this past January in the Duluth
complex, the biggest copper nickel find in the world.
Just last month, the Administration created a new national
monument outside the Grand Canyon, blocking access to some of
the richest uranium deposits in the United States.
For that matter, I am very curious why uranium was listed
as a critical mineral in the 2018 version of the list, but for
some reason it no longer qualified just a few years later for
the 2022 list under this current Administration. I hope this
policy change was not political, but given this
Administration's anti-mining agenda, I am skeptical.
For the sake of our country, I strongly urge the
Administration to accept that shutting down domestic mining
while increasing demand at the same time will lead the United
States to disaster. This Administration must drop its anywhere-
but-America, any-worker-but-American anti-mining agenda. I hope
my colleagues on both sides of the aisle will join me today in
a robust and meaningful discussion of the critical minerals
list and any potential changes that will help put the United
States into the greatest position possible to meet future
challenges to our supply chain and our national security.
Thank you again to the witnesses for their willingness to
join us today and share their testimony.
I now yield to the Ranking Member for her opening
statement.

STATEMENT OF THE HON. ALEXANDRIA OCASIO-CORTEZ, A
REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Ms. Ocasio-Cortez. Thank you so much, Chairman Stauber, and
thank you to our witnesses for joining us this morning to
discuss the U.S. Geological Survey's critical minerals list.
Thank you for joining us, gentlemen.
Recognizing the foundational role many minerals play in our
economy, Congress has recently tasked USGS with creating and
regularly updating a list of critical minerals. These are
minerals that are deemed essential to U.S. economic or national
security, and are vulnerable to supply chain disruption. These
critical minerals will play a crucial role in our clean energy
transition.
For example, we use lithium, cobalt, and nickel among many
other minerals in batteries for electric vehicles, in wind
turbines, and solar panels, all renewable energy technologies
that will help us end our reliance on polluting fossil fuels
and stave off the worst effects of the climate crisis. Critical
minerals will be especially important for the transition of our
transportation sector.
Transportation is currently the No. 1 source of carbon
emissions in the United States, which makes this sector crucial
to decarbonizing quickly. An important aspect of electrified
transportation is demand for minerals, and the most non-
replaceable critical mineral for electric vehicle batteries is
lithium.
I would like to use lithium as a prescient example here.
Lithium is already a bottleneck in the global and domestic
supply chains for electric vehicles, or EVs. Today, there is
only one operational lithium mine in the entire United States.
Most of our lithium is currently imported from countries like
Chile and Argentina, and our demand for lithium is only
expected to skyrocket in the coming decades. Studies show that
if today's demand for electric vehicles is projected outward,
the global demand for lithium will increase 42 times by 2040.
The vast majority of this new demand will be driven by the
United States.
If demand for EVs continues at our current pace, the
lithium requirements for the U.S. EV market alone in 2050 would
require triple the amount of lithium currently produced on the
entire planet today. Corporate interests and their allies in
Congress see this as potential for astronomical demand, and
point to it as a reason for cutting our bedrock environmental
protections, ignoring community input, and abusing vulnerable
communities among our international trade partners.
These private interests and their allies will say that we
need to spark a rush to the bottom in order to compete with
China; that we can't afford our 200-year-old mining law because
China's mining regulations are weaker; that we can't afford to
pay union wages to U.S. auto workers because Chinese auto
workers already make less; and essentially, major corporations
are asking us to engage in a global race to the bottom because
when they drive costs down they profit. But they use those
profits to then surge and skyrocket their own CEO pay and not
drive costs down, but drive them up.
These race-to-the-bottom arguments prey on a fear of
scarcity that is emotionally appealing. But like so many
arguments based in fear, this is a false choice.
For one, these arguments fail to acknowledge the work the
United States can do in other sectors to reduce our reliance on
these minerals in the first place. A recent study by UC Davis
and the Climate Community Project shows that by increasing mass
transit options, bringing EV batteries in line with other
nations, and creating a robust battery recycling system, we can
reduce our dependence on lithium by as much as 92 percent.
In a world where lithium is hard to come by, these reforms
would have huge advantages for our energy and economic
security. Race-to-the-bottom arguments also ignore a painful
legacy when it comes to mining. Namely, we must recognize that
to this day mining disproportionately harms Indigenous
communities in the United States and across the globe.
In the United States, 97 percent of known nickel deposits,
89 percent of copper, 79 percent of lithium, and 68 percent of
cobalt, all critical energy transition minerals, are within 39
miles of tribal lands. And, unfortunately, mining on public
lands in the United States is still governed by the long-
outdated Mining Law of 1872, which lacks provisions for tribal
consultation, environmental safeguards, permitting
requirements, or even royalties so American citizens can see
even a return on these publicly-owned resources.
But the clean energy transition is an opportunity to
reimagine our supply chain from mineral extraction all the way
to end use. And we do not need to choose between sacrifice
zones and creating jobs. Using non-partisan data from the USGS,
we can improve mineral efficiency, increase recycling, and
build economic security. We can require meaningful consultation
with tribes. We can work in partnership with organized labor to
build family-sustaining union jobs in mineral processing and
manufacturing. And lastly, we can develop trade policy that
holds our global partners accountable to the same environmental
and labor standards established here so that businesses have no
incentive to leave the United States for cheaper labor or
resources.
It won't be easy, and I firmly believe that with a
coordinated, whole-of-supply-chain approach, we can reduce
demand, prevent environmental and cultural harms, and uphold
Indigenous sovereignty while enforcing strong labor standards.
Thank you.

Mr. Stauber. Thank you very much. The Chair will now
recognize the Ranking Member of the Full Committee, Ranking
Member Grijalva.

STATEMENT OF THE HON. RAUL M. GRIJALVA, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ARIZONA

Mr. Grijalva. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Ranking
Member, for the hearing. And let me join in thanking the
witnesses for being here today.
The USGS critical minerals list determines which minerals
are important for our national and economic security. But what
is often left out of that determination is the damage that
mining for these critical minerals causes, especially for
tribes and other vulnerable communities.
As we have seen over and over, our outdated Mining Law of
1872 doesn't have the appropriate or necessary safeguards in
place to protect these communities and the public engagement
that is necessary. Mining has repeatedly destroyed public lands
and nearby communities, our environment as well, our public
health, and our sacred and special places.
With that in mind, we need to think very carefully about
how we use the critical minerals list. Some of my colleagues
think this list is a free pass to open new mines and rush
through or ignore environmental reviews and public input. But
doubling down on the mining industry's free-for-all is simply
not a viable solution. Advancing environmental justice,
strengthening tribal and community engagement, and ensuring a
fair return for taxpayers is imperative.
There are no royalties collected from mining at all. And
that alone is reason enough to deal with the Mining Law of
1872. We are premising all discussions on the law that is 150
years old, outdated, not part of this century, and the
conflicts that come from that law. It is time to modernize it,
reform it, bring it up to date, and put in the guarantees and
safeguards that is going to make the public believe that truly
they are part of the decision-making. As it stands now, they
are not.
In fact, just yesterday the Interior Department-led
Interagency Working Group on Mining Reform released a report
informed by more than 26,000 public comments that include 65
recommendations to do exactly that, to advance environmental
justice, to strengthen tribal and community engagement, and
assure a fair return for taxpayers.
When it comes to critical minerals, we also need to
recognize that, yes, we will need certain minerals for our
clean energy transition. Which minerals, in what amounts, and
from what sources are far from set in stone. What is critical
today may not be critical tomorrow. Demand and a critical
status can change quickly, but the mines cannot. Mines take
years to start producing, and they cannot simply change the
type of minerals they produce when the critical minerals list
changes.
The legacy of environmental and cultural harms created by
mines last long past the actual life of the mine. That is why
we must be more careful with where and how we mine, and not
less careful.
We must also take a holistic approach to addressing the
risks identified by the critical minerals list. That means
using our powers as Congress to promote efficient use and
recycling of minerals for the benefit of the environment and
communities.
What we should not do is consider every single change to
the critical minerals list as an excuse to impulsively open a
bunch of new mines whenever and however the industry wants.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.

Mr. Stauber. Thank you very much. The Chair now recognizes
the Chairman of the Full Committee, Chairman Westerman, for 5
minutes.

STATEMENT OF THE HON. BRUCE WESTERMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ARKANSAS

Mr. Westerman. Thank you, Chairman Stauber, and thank you
to the witnesses for being here today.
The people in this room know that we will need to mine six
times more in the future than what we mine today to meet our
mineral demands. This demand is increasing at a greater and
greater rate the more this Administration and international
bodies prioritize renewable energy technologies.
I think where we are blessed is the fact that the United
States has many of these commodities in our geology. But our
national strategy to develop them seems to be all over the
place. Over the past 30 years, we have allowed refineries and
processing facilities to close and let Federal bureaucracy sink
our mineral production into a quagmire of red tape and
predatory litigation. Instead, we have become increasingly
reliant on imports from other countries to meet our mineral
needs, many of whom are not allies of the United States.
Our mineral dependency is now threatening our future. Over
the August break, like many Members of Congress, I spent a lot
of time in my district. I have a couple of nuclear power plants
in my district that I visited, and as we were wrapping up I
asked them, ``Where do you get your uranium pellets?''
They immediately said, ``One hundred percent from Russia.''
One hundred percent of 40 percent of the energy in my state
is dependent on uranium pellets from Russia. To me, that is
unacceptable. And we can do better than that. We have deposits
of uranium. Unfortunately, the next day the Biden
administration put our most valuable uranium deposits in an
off-limits zone where we can't mine them. That makes absolutely
no sense to me.
The problems are clear, but the solutions seem to, for some
reason, be complicated. In an attempt to identify the most
vulnerable supply chains, the U.S. Geological Survey has put
together a list of minerals they deem critical. This was a
helpful way to focus our nation's attention on the issue, and I
appreciate the effort to quantify such a complex issue.
However, many questions remain about how effective this list
has been in actually reducing our national dependency.
Further, I would like to consider ideas to improve the list
methodology so that we can best capture changing demand trends
with the highest accuracy possible. The critical minerals list
is binary, and what I mean by that is a mineral either makes
the list or it doesn't. Looking at minerals in this way as
either critical or not critical has its limitations, obviously.
I would like to consider the value of different approaches,
such as incorporating forecasting into the list-making process
or looking at supply chain vulnerability on a sliding scale.
Some of the supply chains we are looking at can change
radically with one global event, and the critical minerals list
needs to be nimble enough to respond to account for such
changes.
Finally, we have to remember that the critical minerals
list exists in the context of domestic mining policy overall.
Just yesterday, we finally received the Interagency Working
Group's report on mining reform. I regret that many of the
Administration's policy recommendations will take us even
farther from mineral independence. The Biden administration can
talk about the importance of mineral development all they want,
but when they recommend an ill-advised conversion to a leasing
system, high royalties, and putting mineral-rich areas off
limits to development, their actions are speaking louder than
their words.
For both sides of the aisle and for all Americans, ensuring
a stable supply of mineral resources is essential for our
national security and future economic well-being. A thorough
examination of the USGS critical minerals list, why some
minerals are on it and others are not, and how it might be
improved is a necessary piece of that puzzle.
I look forward to a robust discussion on this extremely
important topic.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.

Mr. Stauber. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We will now move to introduce our witnesses. Each witness
will have 5 minutes to make their opening statements.
Our first witness is Dr. Nedal Nassar, who serves as Chief
of Minerals Intelligence Research, U.S. Geological Survey, in
Reston, Virginia.
Dr. Nassar, you are now recognized for 5 minutes.

STATEMENT OF NEDAL NASSAR, CHIEF OF MINERALS INTELLIGENCE
RESEARCH, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, RESTON, VIRGINIA

Dr. Nassar. Good morning, Chairman Stauber, Ranking Member
Ocasio-Cortez, and members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for
the opportunity to discuss the U.S. Geological Survey's
critical minerals work. My name is Nedal Nassar, and I am the
Chief of Minerals Intelligence Research at the U.S. Geological
Survey.
The USGS provides the nation's data on domestic and global
mineral commodity supply chains. Under the Energy Act of 2020,
the USGS analyzes those data in coordination with other Federal
agencies to develop a whole-of-government list of critical
minerals. The analysis identifies commodities for which supply
risk is elevated, including how the supply risk has changed
over time. It also identifies bottlenecks in supply chains,
quantifies import dependencies, and highlights industries that
may be most vulnerable to supply disruptions.
The 2022 list of critical minerals identified gallium as
having the greatest U.S. supply risk, a risk that has become a
reality as a result of recent export controls imposed by the
People's Republic of China on gallium and germanium products.
Gallium is, of course, important to semiconductors that are
used in telecommunications, including 5G cellular networks,
consumer electronics, solar photovoltaics, electric vehicles,
and defense applications. Our data indicate that in 2022, the
People's Republic of China produced 98 percent of the world's
primary gallium, 98 percent.
Over time, we expect the list to evolve. The Energy Act of
2020 requires that the list be updated once every 3 years. As
supply chains are diversified and strengthened, commodities may
come off the list. Similarly, commodities may be added to
future lists if their supply becomes less secure, or the U.S.
economy becomes more dependent on them.
The methodology for developing the list will also continue
to evolve as we gather additional data and develop better tools
to anticipate and quantify supply and demand disruptions and
their impacts.
Since the release of the most recent list of critical
minerals, the list and its underlying analysis have informed
some of the nation's largest investments in mineral commodity
supply chains. These include recent Defense Production Act
investments and Bipartisan Infrastructure Law critical mineral
provisions focused on multiple supply chain stages. USGS data
and analyses are informing partner agencies' decision-making
for a number of these investments.
Within the USGS, we are accelerating the Earth Mapping
Resource Initiative's assessment of areas with potential to
contain critical minerals both still in the ground and in waste
streams. Under the Energy Act of 2020, the USGS also uses the
list of critical minerals to help prioritize mineral resource
assessments.
The USGS analyzes supply chains across sectors, which
allows us to understand cumulative supply risks. For example,
we examine cross sectoral demand for mineral materials needed
for energy, transportation, and construction, and quantify the
economic impact the supply disruption may have on mineral-
consuming industries, the ripple effects on the downstream
industries that rely on them, and the economy as a whole. We
provide these analyses and data to a variety of Federal
decision-makers, including the Defense Logistics Agency
stockpile managers, the National Security Council, the State
Department, the Department of Commerce, the U.S. Trade
Representative, and the intelligence community.
Over the past several years, our data have provided
evidence of supply chain disruptions in mineral commodity
production and shipping attributable to the COVID-19 pandemic,
natural disasters, regional conflicts, as well as export
restrictions imposed by trading partners. We continuously
monitor the effects of such disruptions across the suite of
mineral commodities that we track.
The Energy Act of 2020 also calls for the USGS to further
develop its forecasting capability. Accordingly, the USGS has
expanded the range of official statistics reported annually in
the mineral commodity summaries, and are developing new series
of mineral outlooks. The President's 2024 budget request
proposes to further increase the speed and responsiveness of
USGS scenario modeling capabilities.
In summary, the USGS provides cross-sectoral, demand-driven
analyses that inform whole-of-government efforts to strengthen
supply chains. The list of critical minerals is one tool to
identify concerns and inform actions. The list and the
underlying analysis provide a rich set of data and tools that
can be used to better understand the specific risks affecting
individual technologies, industries, and commodities
originating from a particular geographic region or trading
partner. The information can help policymakers target
interventions that will increase the security of our nation's
mineral commodity supplies.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I look
forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Nassar follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Nedal T. Nassar, Chief of Minerals
Intelligence Research, National Minerals Information Center, U.S.
Geological Survey

Good morning, Chairman Stauber, Ranking Member Ocasio-Cortez, and
Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss
the U.S. Geological Survey's critical minerals work. My name is Nedal
T. Nassar and I am the Chief of Minerals Intelligence Research at the
U.S. Geological Survey (USGS).
Background

The USGS is the science arm of the Department of the Interior and
brings impartial, actionable science to an array of stakeholders and
partners, including decision-makers like yourselves, resource managers,
and the public.
Congress passed the USGS's Organic Act in 1879, in part to gain
greater understanding of our Nation's mineral resources. That remains
central to our mission 144 years later, although our tools have
changed, and today our science serves a wider range of objectives. For
example, through the Earth Mapping Resources Initiative (Earth MRI) and
our growing national mine-waste inventory, we are mapping the potential
for mineral occurrence with advanced instruments that are deployed in
space, in the air, in the laboratory, and on the ground, all leading to
a better understanding of our country's mineral resources both in the
ground and in waste streams. And through our mineral supply chain
analyses, we advise other federal agencies on supply chain risks and
investments in their sectors of expertise.
The United States remains a major mineral producer, and in 2022,
the domestic mineral industry mined $98.2 billion worth of mineral
commodities.\1\ However, over the past half-century, mineral supply
chains have become more complex as both new and established
technologies rely on an increasing volume and variety of minerals. Most
future energy-sector technologies are mineral-intensive, and therefore
also potentially land-intensive and water-intensive; neither domestic
production nor trade eliminates these challenges. Other economic
sectors' mineral demands are also increasing. The U.S. economy is
demanding traditional mining products like iron, aluminum, copper,
sand, gravel, and cement. We also see rising demand for nontraditional
mineral commodities that are required for new technologies essential to
our national and economic security. While the USGS addresses all of
these mineral commodities, a set of essential mineral commodities for
which there are significant supply chain risks are designated as
critical minerals, and they are at the center of the USGS' minerals-
related research.
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\1\ U.S. Geological Survey, 2023, Mineral commodity summaries 2023:
U.S. Geological Survey, 210 p., https://doi.org/10.3133/mcs2023.
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List of Critical Minerals and Changes to the List

The USGS provides the Nation's data and statistics on domestic and
global production and consumption of minerals. Under the Energy Act of
2020, the USGS regularly analyzes those data to develop a whole-of-
government list of critical minerals based on global mineral supply
chains across all economic sectors. This cross-sectoral approach is
coordinated across the Federal Government through the National Science
and Technology Council's Critical Minerals Subcommittee (NSTC CMS),
which is co-chaired by the White House Office of Science and Technology
Policy, the U.S. Department of Energy, and the USGS. The initial
methodology and list, published in 2018 \2\ under the direction of
Executive Order 13817, was updated in 2021 in response to the Energy
Act of 2020,\3\ reviewed by other Federal agencies through the NSTC CMS
and by the public, and a final list of 50 critical mineral commodities
was published in the Federal Register on February 24, 2022.\4\
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\2\ Fortier, S.M., et al., 2018, Draft critical mineral list--
Summary of methodology and background information--U.S. Geological
Survey technical input document in response to Secretarial Order No.
3359: U.S. Geological Survey Open-File Report 2018-1021, 15 p., https:/
/doi.org/10.3133/ofr20181021.
\3\ Nassar, N.T., and Fortier, S.M., 2021, Methodology and
technical input for the 2021 review and revision of the U.S. Critical
Minerals List: U.S. Geological Survey Open-File Report 2021-1045, 31
p., https://doi.org/10.3133/ofr20211045.
\4\ 2022 Final List of Critical Minerals https://
www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/02/24/2022-04027/2022-final-
list-of-critical-minerals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In developing the list of critical minerals, we apply data on the
Nation's production and consumption of mineral commodities, all
provided voluntarily by industry, to evaluate supply risk. When
sufficient data to support quantitative analysis are not available, we
analyze supply risk qualitatively, for example by identifying supply
chains that include a single point of failure. Table 1 shows the 2022
list of critical minerals and their rationale for inclusion. Table 1
also highlights that many mineral commodities on the list are recovered
as byproducts from mining and processing of other, non-critical mineral
commodities.
Figure 1 lists the commodities for which supply risk was evaluated
using quantitative tools, including how the supply risk for each has
changed over time; it also shows the countries that are the major
producers of each of those commodities. The 2022 list of critical
minerals identifies gallium as having the greatest U.S. supply risk, a
risk that has become a reality as a result of the recent export
controls imposed by the People's Republic of China on gallium and
germanium.
Over time, we expect the list of critical minerals to evolve. The
Energy Act of 2020 requires that the list be updated at least once
every three years. As supply chains are strengthened for minerals
currently on the list, or if specific minerals become less important to
the U.S. economy or national security, those minerals may come off the
list. Similarly, minerals may be added to future lists if their supply
becomes less secure or the U.S. economy becomes more dependent on
applications for which those minerals are primary inputs.
The methodology for developing the list will evolve as we and our
interagency partners gather additional data and develop better tools to
anticipate and quantify supply and demand disruptions.
Recent Federal Investments Guided by USGS Analysis

Since we released the most recent list of critical minerals, the
list and its underlying analysis have informed some of the Nation's
largest investments in mineral supply chains. These investments include
recent Defense Production Act investments and Bipartisan Infrastructure
Law (BIL) critical minerals provisions focused on multiple supply chain
stages. USGS data and analyses are informing partner agencies'
decision-making for a number of these investments. Within the USGS, we
are accelerating Earth MRI mapping of areas with potential to contain
critical minerals and investing in the preservation of historical data
and samples related to critical minerals. Under the Energy Act of 2020,
the USGS also uses the list of critical minerals to help prioritize
mineral resource assessments. The USGS is focusing its next series of
resource assessments on critical minerals needed for high-capacity
batteries and grid-energy storage applications before assessing other
critical minerals (Figure 2).
Scenario Analysis and Forecasting

The USGS monitors supply chains across sectors, which allows us to
understand cumulative supply risks. For example, we examine cross-
sectoral competition for materials needed for energy, consumer
electronics, and construction. We provide mineral supply chain data and
analyses to a variety of Federal decision-makers, including the Defense
Logistics Agency's stockpile managers, the National Security Council,
the State Department, the Department of Commerce, the U.S. Trade
Representative, and the Intelligence Community.
Over the past several years, our data have provided evidence of
supply chain disruptions in mineral production and shipping
attributable to the COVID-19 pandemic as well as evidence of recovery.
Mineral supply chains have also seen disruptions associated with
natural disasters and with export restrictions imposed by trading
partners. We continuously monitor the effects of such disruptions
across the suite of minerals we track.
The Energy Act of 2020 calls for the USGS to further develop its
forecasting capability. Accordingly, the USGS has expanded the range of
official statistics reported annually in the Mineral Commodity
Summaries and is developing a new series of five-year global mineral
outlooks. The President's 2024 budget request proposes to further
increase the speed of USGS critical mineral supply chain forecasting
and its responsiveness to current events.

This focus on supply chain analysis and forecasting supports whole-
of-government efforts to strengthen supply chains. The USGS works to
provide strong scientific evidence on the feasibility and impacts of
domestic primary and secondary (recycling and reprocessing of waste)
production and on the potential to secure supplies through trade with
reliable partners. Under the BIL, the NSTC CMS is authorized to
coordinate investments in science and technology to support these
strategies. In support of these efforts, the USGS identifies potential
future critical minerals and evaluates whether these investments are in
fact strengthening supply chains.

Summary

In summary, the USGS provides cross-sectoral, data-driven supply
chain analyses that inform whole-of-government efforts to strengthen
supply chains. The list of critical minerals is one tool to inform
investments in supply chains. The list and its underlying analyses also
provide a rich set of data and tools that can be used to better
understand the specific risks potentially affecting individual
technologies, industries, or commodities originating from a particular
geographic area or trading partner; to identify key trade relationships
that may need strengthening; and to target investments in alternative
sources of supplies for economically vital products. The USGS has deep
expertise in near- and long-term mineral supplies, supply risk, and the
potential for supply shocks. By partnering with other agencies that
specialize in sector-specific demand forecasting and the potential for
demand shocks associated with the emergence and growth of specific
technologies, we can provide an even richer picture of the future risks
to mineral supply chains. This information can help policymakers target
interventions that will increase the security of our Nation's minerals
supply.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I look forward to
your questions.

*****

Table 1. Results of quantitative and qualitative evaluation of supply
risk and the 2022 list of critical minerals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Ranked in order from highest to lowest risk based on a recency-
weighted mean of the commodities' overall supply risk scores. See the
published methodology (https://doi.org/10.3133/ ofr20211045) for
further details.
\6\ Most mineral commodities are recovered as byproducts to some
degree, but the share of primary production as a byproduct for the
mineral commodities that are not identified as byproducts in the table
is typically small. Rare earth elements (REEs) are mined both as
byproducts of other mineral commodities (for example, iron ore or
heavy-mineral sands) and as the main product. Where REEs are mined as
the main product, the individual REEs are either byproducts or
coproducts of each other. For simplicity, all REEs are labeled in the
table as having been produced mostly as byproducts. Byproduct status
can and does change, although notable changes over short periods of
time are rare.
\7\ Commodities that were not evaluated using the quantitative
evaluation are not given a rank and are ordered alphabetically.

[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

.eps(Source: adapted from https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-
2021-11-09/pdf/2021-24488.pdf)
Figure 1. Supply risk for 54 commodities with sufficient data for
quantitative evaluation, for the years 2007-2018. Warmer (i.e.,
orange to red) shades indicate a greater degree of supply risk.
As indicated by the dashed horizonal line, 36 commodities with
a recency-weighted mean supply risk greater than or equal to
0.40 are included on the list of critical minerals. Leading
producing countries for each commodity are listed.

[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

.eps(Source: Nassar, N.T., and Fortier, S.M., 2021, Methodology and
technical input for the 2021 review and revision of the U.S. Critical
Minerals List: U.S. Geological Survey Open-File Report 2021-1045, 31
p., https://doi.org/10.3133/ofr20211045.)

Figure 2. Areas with potential subsurface mineral resources required
for high-capacity batteries (cobalt, graphite, lithium,
manganese, and rare earth elements) across the conterminous
United States.

[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

.eps(Source: Dicken, C.L., and Hammarstrom, J.M., 2020, GIS for
focus areas of potential domestic resources of 11 critical minerals--
aluminum, cobalt, graphite, lithium, niobium, platinum group elements,
rare earth elements, tantalum, tin, titanium, and tungsten: U.S.
Geological Survey data release, https://doi.org/10.5066/P95CO8LR)

______

Questions Submitted for the Record to Dr. Nedal Nassar, Chief of
Minerals Intelligence Research, U.S. Geological Survey

Dr. Nassar did not submit responses to the Committee by the appropriate
deadline for inclusion in the printed record.

Questions Submitted by Representative Stauber

Question 1. In response to a question from Congressman Collins
regarding the possibility of incorporating subcategories of critical
minerals by sector or end use into the critical minerals list, you
replied this was an interesting idea to consider. How might USGS go
about creating such categorizations?

Question 2. When can Congress expect the publication of the Annual
Critical Mineral Outlook as required by the Energy Act of 2020?

Question 3. Given the requirements for forward-looking data
gathering in the Energy Act of 2020, does USGS have all the statutory
authority it needs to utilize forecasting analysis in the formation of
future iterations of the critical minerals list should it be directed
to do so by Congress?

Question 4. How was the Fraser Institute's policy perception index,
an opinion survey of mining executives, decided on for the sole source
of data on a country's ability to supply resources (ASI)?

Question 5. Were non-subjective sources of data on the socio and
geopolitical stability of source countries (for example, Uppsala
University's Uppsala Conflict Data Program) considered as measures of a
country's ability to supply (ASI)? If so, why were they not utilized?

Question 6. The methodology for trade exposure (TE) reviews trade
activity for a mineral at a single point in time. How does this
methodology address minerals with no immediate critical need, but which
are predicted to become critical under common scenario analyses?

Question 7. The methodology relies heavily on the accurate and
fulsome identification of source countries. How were the source
countries identified, and what criteria was used in determining whether
a single or multiple countries would be examined as a source for a
mineral?

Question 8. If USGS had not interpreted the Energy Act of 2020 as
barring uranium from consideration as a critical mineral, would the
known vulnerabilities in the uranium supply chain have otherwise
qualified it for inclusion in the updated 2022 Critical Minerals List?

Questions Submitted by Representative Wittman

Question 1. How frequently is the Critical Mineral List updated,
and what factors trigger updates or revisions to the list? Are there
any plans to make this process more regular or responsive to changing
market conditions?

Question 2. Are there fixed or universally defined thresholds fo
criteria to determine if a mineral is classified as critical? ff not,
why not?

Question 3. How transparent is the decision-making process for what
minerals are classified as critical?

______

Mr. Stauber. Thank you very much for your testimony. Our
next witness is Mr. Reed Blakemore. He is the Director of
Research and Programs for the Global Energy Center with the
Atlantic Council, based right here in Washington, DC.
Mr. Blakemore, you are now recognized for 5 minutes.

STATEMENT OF REED BLAKEMORE, DIRECTOR OF RESEARCH AND PROGRAMS,
GLOBAL ENERGY CENTER, ATLANTIC COUNCIL, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. Blakemore. Thank you, Chairman Stauber and Ranking
Member Ocasio-Cortez, and thank you to the distinguished
members of the Subcommittee for the invitation to appear before
you today. My name is Reed Blakemore, and I am the Director of
Research and Programs at the Atlantic Council's Global Energy
Center, a non-partisan, non-profit think tank headquartered
here in Washington, DC.
Before I begin, I would like to note that my remarks and
written testimony represent my observations as an expert, and
do not necessarily represent the views of my colleagues or
institution.
To summarize my more detailed testimony, I would like to
provide a broad overview of our understanding of what makes a
mineral critical, and how we should approach a global economy
increasingly dependent on an ever-diverse set of minerals and
materials.
As many of my colleagues today will reiterate and as has
been reiterated by the Chairman and Ranking Member, many
minerals, many of which are supply constrained, are fundamental
to strategically important industries of the United States,
such as defense, energy, pharmaceuticals, and semiconductors.
Access to these minerals is essential to limiting inflation,
our global economic leadership, and our national security. The
security of supply for such minerals has been strategically
relevant to the United States for some time, and will continue
to be so.
Nonetheless, as has already been noted, the rapidly
expanding mineral requirements of the energy sector are
reshaping how much attention is needed to secure these supply
chains. These demands are not only reframing how we think about
energy security, but new energy technologies, opportunities for
exports, and additional economic leadership. Resource security
is critical to enabling this leadership in emerging sectors
such as electric vehicles and renewable power.
Importantly, the United States is not alone in observing
this shift. Allies, partners, peers, and rivals are moving
quickly to seize the strategic value of influence in mineral
supply chains, exacerbating geopolitical risk and supply
concentration, which have long been features of minerals
markets. For instance, in just one example here, through
tariffs and export bans many mineral-rich countries are
enacting policies to push investment toward value-added
economic activities, so they can capture the economic windfall
opportunities beyond simply extracting raw materials for
export. This shapes how we need to think about supply chain
intervention and securing our resources moving forward for the
next 30 years.
The risks of inaction here abound. This is why a priority
of the U.S. Government across consecutive administrations has
been to identify specific minerals that it deems critical, and
focus policy attention on improving access to or the security
of these supply chains.
Deciding which minerals are critical, of course, is based
on dependency, our demand, and the ability to access them
reliably, the available supply. However, with 50 minerals now
on at least one of the three critical minerals lists being
produced across the U.S. Government, we would do well to think
through the relative criticality of minerals that are
designated to this list to mature our strategic planning and
act effectively.
Though there are a number of mineral-specific factors that
apply to this notion, several stand out as useful first steps
for consideration. On the demand side, these include the growth
rate of specific mineral demands over time, the demand
elasticity and substitutability of certain minerals, and
differing technology deployment scenarios.
On the supply side, I applaud the critical efforts of the
USGS to improve our knowledge of the resource base.
Nonetheless, the supply picture is also increasingly shaped by
several additional features, including difficult project
economics and ore quality declines, lengthy project life cycles
and permitting challenges, and new sourcing methods such as
recycling or waste conversion.
Contextualizing these features is an appreciation for the
vulnerability of supply to disruption, namely trade exposure
and supply chain concentration. Provided that the United States
cannot supply all of its mineral needs domestically, mitigating
these supply risks requires work to build trusted supply chain
partnerships that limit the possibility of physical
interruptions, market imbalances, and government interventions.
This balance defines the space for how we should resolve a
particular criticality, which is equally if not more important
than listing a particular mineral in the first place.
To conclude, there are certain minerals that are
structurally important to our national and economic security,
and our needs for them are diverse, dynamic, and growing.
Identifying these minerals signals a need for action and forms
the basis for interagency coordination. But while lists are
important, we shouldn't rely on lists alone. We need to ensure
that our minerals policy does not become overly clerkish,
prescribing problems rather than solving them. Capturing the
supply and demand dynamism between each critical mineral will
illuminate the pathways to build a cohesive mineral strategy.
To be clear, many of the foremost issues in our minerals
policy stem from a need for broader reform, be it through
permitting or deeper international engagement. Nonetheless, a
properly curated list helps inform decisions on those fronts. I
therefore commend this Committee for attention to this issue,
and look forward to continuing to support its efforts in this
area. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Blakemore follows:]
Prepared Statement of Reed Blakemore, Director of Research and
Programs, Global Energy Center, Atlantic Council

I. Introduction

Chairman Stauber, Ranking Member Ocasio Cortez, and distinguished
members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the invitation to appear
before you today.

My name is Reed Blakemore, and I am the Director of Research and
Programs at the Atlantic Council's Global Energy Center.

The Atlantic Council is a non-partisan, non-profit policy
organization headquartered in Washington, DC. Our work at the Global
Energy Center develops and promotes pragmatic and nonpartisan policy
solutions designed to advance global energy security, enhance economic
opportunity, and accelerate pathways to net-zero emissions. Critical
minerals and materials is one of the core pillars of our work.
Before I begin, I should note that my remarks and written testimony
represent my observations, and do not necessarily represent the views
of my colleagues or institution.
This hearing focuses on the methodology and structure of the USGS
Critical Minerals List. However, I would like to provide a broad
overview on our understanding of what makes a mineral ``critical'' and
how the United States can best prepare to act on the vulnerabilities
inherent in a world of diverse mineral demands.
The distinction of a mineral or material as `critical' ascribes
that a mineral should be treated with additional concern, intended to
inform the strategic thinking of policymakers with respect to domestic
mining legislation, public investments, trade policy, development
policy, and more. It can also signify a need for action from
policymakers and government officials, whether that is an addition of a
material to the National Defense Stockpile, the DOE Loan Programs
Office making an investment in a processing plant at home, or
Development Finance Corporation investing in a project abroad.
Yet what determines criticality is ultimately in the eye of the
beholder. Minerals that are critical to one industry or policy
objective may not be essential for another, and the minerals that are
critical for the United States may not be so for another nation. As
such, continued reflection on what is `critical' and how one plans to
address that criticality is essential in a minerals and materials-
intense world, and I commend this committee for their efforts in this
regard. My esteemed co-panelists will explain in detail the methodology
of critical minerals list-making and the implications for minerals that
are placed on that list. However, I would like to begin with a top-
level overview of what factors, generally-speaking, influence the
determination of what makes certain minerals or materials fall into
this category.
II. Why are certain minerals and materials `critical'

A suite of core minerals and materials are fundamental pieces of
the structure of our economy and national security. While the
importance of certain metal commodities to the United States' national
economic health is well-understood, a small number of niche, supply-
constrained minerals are equally-as important to industries such as
pharmaceuticals and semiconductors. Access to these minerals is key/
essential to limiting inflation and maximizing economies of scale,
making them central to prosperity at home and economic leadership
abroad.
Defense needs also entail demand for certain materials that have
been deemed critical, such as gallium, ferromanganese, antimony,
lithium, nickel, and many others. Every SSN-774 Virginia-class
submarine requires about 9,200 pounds (half the weight of a school bus)
of rare earth elements, while F-35 Lightning II aircraft require
roughly 920 pounds.\1\ Cobalt is an important component of permanent
magnets which are used in energy technologies, but also military
technologies such as smart bombs, aircraft, and guided missiles.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Runde, Daniel F., and Austin Hardman. ``Elevating the Role of
Critical Minerals for Development and Security.'' CSIS, September 1,
2023. https://www.csis.org/analysis/elevating-role-critical-minerals-
development-and-security#::text=Critical%20minerals%20are%20also%20
characterized,the%20economy%20or%20national%20security.%E2%80%9D.
\2\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The security of supply of these minerals, therefore, has been
strategically relevant to the United States for some time and will
continue to be so.
Now, the mineral and material requirements of the energy sector
demands equal attention, especially as the energy transition changes
the structural makeup of the global economy.
Much of this demand is policy driven. Electrifying large swaths of
the economy necessarily implies the use of a significant number of
materials that can carry that electricity. Furthermore, renewable
energy generation technologies require a large quantity of durable
materials, as opposed to our present energy system, which relies on
consumable fossil fuels.
Over time, our energy generation, storage, and transmission
technologies will become increasingly dependent on materials such as
copper, nickel, manganese, graphite, lithium, cobalt, and many others.
Since the passage of the Inflation Reduction Act, forecasts of demand
in 2035 for lithium have increased by 15 percent, and nickel by 13
percent.\3\ The United States' total combined energy technolgy-related
demand for lithium, nickel and cobalt will be 23 times higher in 2035
than it was in 2021.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ ``United States Faces New Challenges Meeting Increased Demand
for Critical Minerals One Year after Historic Inflation Reduction Act,
S&P Global Study Finds.'' News Release Archive. Accessed September 11,
2023. https://press.spglobal.com/2023-08-15-United-States-Faces-New-
Challenges-Meeting-Increased-Demand-for-Critical-Minerals-One-Year-
After-Historic-Inflation-Reduction-Act,-S-P-Global-Study-
Finds#::text=Adding%20the%20post%2DIRA%20demand,than
%20it%20was%20in%202021.
\4\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Similar trends around the world amplify the importance of these
minerals to the global economy. Globally, policies to decrease
greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 are accelerating. A higher reliance on
critical minerals is already being observed as a result--since 2010,
the average amount of minerals needed for a new unit of power
generation capacity has increased by 50 percent as the share of
renewables in new investment has risen.\5\ Some minerals such as
lithium, copper, graphite and nickel may see a 40-fold increase in
demand globally due to their importance in batteries, electric
vehicles, semiconductors, transmission lines, and clean electricity
generation technologies.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ International Energy Association. ``Executive Summary--the Role
of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions--Analysis.'' IEA.
Accessed September 11, 2023. https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-
critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-transitions/executive-summary.
\6\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Meanwhile, the steady transformation of a new energy system is
opening market opportunities for new clean energy technology exports,
with resource security a critical component of the supply chains that
will enable leadership in industries new and old.
We have seen this manifest in industrial ambitions for several
nations associated with building out mining and processing
infrastructure which can meet future demand. For instance, Indonesia is
developing polysilicon plants to feed solar panel manufacturing, while
also banning unrefined nickel exports, which is necessary for the
manufacturing of materials for lithium-ion.\7\ Many mineral-rich
countries are enacting policies to push investment towards downstream
`value-added' economic activities so they can more effectively control
their supply chains during the global transition and capture the
windfall that will be associated with producing those materials for
export. The latter is particularly true for those countries that view
critical mineral industries as a development opportunity, such as
Zimbabwe and Namibia, which have banned exports of unprocessed lithium
ore, to keep more economic activity in their nations.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Listiyorini, Eko. ``Tropical Indonesia Wants t Start Making a
Key Solar Panel Part.'' Bloomberg.com, January 24, 2022. https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-01-25/tropical-indonesia-wants-to-
start-making-a-key-solar-panel-part?sref=a9fBmPFG; International Energy
Association. ``Prohibition of the Export of Nickel Ore--Policies.''
IEA, October 31, 2022. https://www.iea.org/policies/16084-prohibition-
of-the-export-of-nickel-ore.
\8\ Dempsey, Harry, and Joseph Cotterill. ``How China Is Winning
the Race for Africa's Lithium.'' Financial Times, April 3, 2023.
https://www.ft.com/content/02d6f35d-e646-40f7-894c-ffcc6acd9b25.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This drive to capture value from the economic opportunity of the
new energy technologies extends down the energy technology value
chain.\9\ Global EV sales increased from 716,000 vehicles in 2015 to
10.6 million vehicles in 2022.\10\ Solar power saw global growth of
nearly 200 Gigawatts--equivalent to the grid of Brazil--the most of any
form of electricity generation.\11\ Growth in areas such as these form
the impetus to capture the value stemming from such a dramatic economic
transformation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Blakemore, R., & Ryan, P. (2023, August 16). One year after the
IRA, the hard work to build resilient mineral supply chains is only
beginning. Atlantic Council Global Energy Center. September 11, 2023,
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/energysource/one-year-after-the-
ira-the-hard-work-to-build-resilient-mineral-supply-chains-is-only-
beginning/
\10\ Department of Energy. ``2023 Critical Materials Assessment--
Department of Energy.'' 2023 U.S. Department of Energy Critical
Materials Assessment, July 2023. https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/
files/2023-05/2023-critical-materials-assessment.pdf.
\11\ International Renewable Energy Agency. ``Record Growth in
Renewables Achieved despite Energy Crisis.'' IRENA, March 21, 2023.
https://www.irena.org/News/pressreleases/2023/Mar/Record-9-point-6-
Percentage-Growth-in-Renewables-Achieved-Despite-Energy-Crisis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Clearly, there is an emerging dynamic wherein influence and access
across critical mineral supply chains is viewed as a strategic lever.
By a similar vein, concentration and geopolitical risk abound in
critical mineral supply chains. One country, the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, accounts for 70 percent of global cobalt production.\12\
Indonesia holds about 22 percent of the world's total nickel reserves,
and about 40 percent of global nickel output.\13\ Roughly 50-60 percent
of lithium resources are found in three countries in Latin America
(Argentina, Chile, and Bolivia).\14\ Many of the countries that produce
and process critical minerals are not our preferred trade partners by
means of a free trade agreement. By 2035, it is forecast that as much
as 90 percent of all nickel products, for instance, will be processed
by countries that do not hold a free trade agreement with the United
States.\15\ China, meanwhile, enjoys significant control across the
minerals supply chain through near-monopolistic control of processing
for key minerals, and a dominant position in the financing or ownership
of upstream mineral resource development.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Kelly, Lauren. ``Top 10 Cobalt Producers by Country (Updated
2023).'' INN, August 19, 2023. https://investingnews.com/where-is-
cobalt-mined/.
\13\ Falak Medina, Ayman. ``Unleashing Nickel's Potential:
Indonesia's Journey to Global Prominence.'' ASEAN Business News, June
20, 2023. https://www.aseanbriefing.com/news/unleashing-nickels-
potential-indonesias-journey-to-global-prominence/
#::text=Indonesia's%20
nickel%20reserves,22%20percent%20of%20global%20reserves.
\14\ Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean.
``Lithium Extraction and Industrialization: Opportunities and
Challenges for Latin America and the Caribbean.'' CEPAL, July 2023.
https://www.cepal.org/en/publications/48965-lithium-extraction-and-
industrialization-opportunities-and-challenges-latin.
\15\ Goodman, Peter S, and Ulet Ifansasti. ``How Geopolitics Is
Complicating the Move to Clean Energy.'' The New York Times, August 18,
2023. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/18/business/indonesia-nickel-
china-us.html.
\16\ Wilson Center. ``Critical Mineral Maps.'' Wilson Center, March
17, 2022. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/critical-mineral-maps;
Wells, Katherine. ``China's Monopoly over Critical Minerals.''
Georgetown Security Studies Review, May 31, 2023. https://
georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/2023/06/01/chinas-monopoly-over-
critical-minerals/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Taken together, though minerals have long had a significant role in
ensuring the prosperity and security of the United States, the makeup
of this role is changing dramatically as the mineral requirements
underpinning US energy and geo-economic priorities become more diverse
and competitive in response to projected changes in energy markets

III. The Characteristics of `Listmaking' and Increasing Importance of
Relative Criticality

As the `minerals intensity' of the global economy increases,
assessing and acting upon possible vulnerabilities or opportunities
will be a feature of the strategic landscape. This is why a priority of
the US Government across consecutive administrations has been to
identify specific minerals that it deems ``critical'' and therefore
focus policy attention on improving access to or the security of those
supply chains.

Though `listing' has been a feature of US policymaking for over a
century, these efforts intensified in 2008 with a National Academy of
Sciences study, which informed the creation of the first contemporary
critical materials list, the DOE's 2010 Critical Materials Strategy.
With Executive Order 13818 under the Trump Administration came the
direction for the Department of the Interior to publish a critical
minerals list--which has now been published in 2018, and updated in
2022. Other countries have been developing Critical Mineral lists
modeled after the US lists, including the EU, UK, South Korea, Japan
and Australia, but their definitions of ``critical'' are different and
reflect independent strategic priorities.

Yet as policymakers' attention to the possible vulnerabilities of a
minerals-intensive world has grown, the scope of these lists has also
evolved considerably. The first mineral list, titled War Minerals, was
created in 1917 to aid the US WWI effort. It was comprised of only 5
minerals: tin, nickel, platinum, nitrates, and potash. Now, almost
every element on the periodic table is used in global manufacturing,
and 50 minerals are now on at least one of the three formal lists being
produced across the USG.

This suggests that the United States would do well to think through
the features of what makes a particular mineral critical, with
particular attention to the relative criticality of minerals that are
designated to these lists. Doing so will allow the United States to
better understand its mineral and material vulnerabilities, communicate
those priorities to partners in the marketplace, and more effectively
act to secure key supply chains.

Fundamentally, a determination of which minerals are critical is
broadly based on dependency on those minerals (demand--or the impact of
supply risk) and the ability to access them reliably (supply--or the
risk of supply disruption). Though the relationship between the two is
at the core of whether a mineral should be deemed `critical' or not,
there are some independent features of each that provide some necessary
color to a mineral's relative criticality.

The risk of not meeting future demand for minerals is not just a
function of global geopolitical risks. It is also affected by the
economic forces that impact the ability of mineral supply chains to
meet future demand, and thus adequately supply the market.

IV. Demand

Assessing mineral demand is mostly an exercise in forecasting. As
mentioned above, the accelerating momentum of renewable energy
technology deployment has led to a general consensus of demand growth
for key minerals for the next several decades. However, particularly
for transition minerals and metals, several additional characteristics
of demand warrant consideration. These include:

1. The trendline of demand over time. The growth in demand for
certain materials will be larger at the outset of the
energy transition than it will be over a prolonged period
of time. Demand for certain minerals required for the
buildout of transition infrastructure will grow rapidly in
response to the energy transition but may become steadier
over time given the long life cycle of those projects.
Certain minerals may offer opportunities for recycling, as
technology matures, suggesting that while a large demand
signal for mined material will present itself initially,
recycling can alleviate demand stress. Either example
offers a framing to better understand vulnerability to
certain mineral demands now vs. those over time.

2. Demand elasticity. The relative sensitivity of a particular
mineral to being replaced by an alternative in response to
disruption also helps contextualize how severe certain
mineral vulnerabilities are relative to each other. While
the unique properties of most minerals limit elasticity on
a 1-1 basis, marginal input elasticity for technologies is
emerging--for example in battery chemistries where concerns
around cobalt resourcing have enabled the development of
zero-cobalt or lithium-phosphate chemistries. Additionally,
minerals used for EV batteries will not be necessary for
batteries used for stationary grid storage, enabling
substitution within that end-use.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ Blakemore, Reed, Paddy Ryan, and William Tobin. ``Alternative
Battery Chemistries and Diversifying Clean Energy Supply Chains.''
Atlantic Council, September 13, 2022. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/
in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/alternative-battery-chemistries-
and-diversifying-clean-energy-supply-chains/.

3. Transition Technology Criticality (and corresponding elasticity).
Related is the notion that some technologies (and their
underlying minerals) will be more or less replaceable in
the energy system of the future. For example, while there
are few options to replace transmission infrastructure
required for expanding the grid, there are a wide range of
possibilities as to the scale of the hydrogen economy.
Similar principles apply to highly innovation-exposed
sectors of the economy and national defense. The potential
variation in deployment of certain technologies implies a
range in corresponding materials needed for manufacturing--
this is observed in the stark variation observed in
modelling of future demand for key minerals.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ ``IEF Critical Minerals Outlooks Comparison.'' International
Energy Forum. Accessed September 11, 2023. https://www.ief.org/focus/
ief-reports/critical-minerals-outlooks-comparison.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
V. Supply

Assessment of available supply to fulfill mineral demand is
twofold: an understanding of the resource base both now and in the
future, and the vulnerability of the resource base to disruption.

Our understanding of the resource base continues to mature, and I
applaud the efforts of the USGS to continue to improve our knowledge of
where certain minerals are available and in what quantities.
Nonetheless, the supply picture is increasingly shaped by a number of
additional features that bear strongly on relative criticality.

1. Project Economics & Ore Quality. Mining project economics are
typically defined by the concentration of the desired
material that is found in the ore at the mine site--ore
being the naturally occurring sediment or brine. However,
ore grades for certain materials are declining globally,
precisely as we are in need of more. Mines for those metals
are being dug deeper at greater expense and environmental
impact (due to higher tailings--wastewater and waste rock).
This increases prices to obtain the same quantity of the
desired material. In Chile, for instance, which has borne
the brunt of this problem due to its degrading copper
mines, the capital intensity of new mines has ballooned
from 4-5,000 dollars per ton of copper, to as much as
44,000 dollars per ton.\19\ Many materials also require
specialized technologies and processes to adjust extraction
to certain ore profiles. This is the case for lithium,
where ore bodies can differ drastically, and for nickel,
where new technology has been necessary to adjust to the
predominating variety of nickel ore.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ ``Copper mines becoming more capital intensive and costly to
run'' Ahead of the Herd. Accessed September 11, 2023. https://
aheadoftheherd.com/copper-mines-becoming-more-capital-intensive-and-
costly-to-run/
\20\ Tang, J. (2023, April 25). Infographic: Indonesian projects to
boost Nickel Supply. S&P Global Commodity Insights. https://
www.spglobal.com/commodityinsights/en/market-insights/latest-news/
metals/042423-infographic-indonesian-projects-to-boost-nickel-supply

2. Project Lifecycle. Certain mining projects require much more time
to bring supply to market than others. This not only varies
between minerals, but in some cases from project to
project, with a new lithium brine project requiring much
less time to come to production than a lithium hard rock
project. Challenging lead times induced by regulatory
processes such as permitting also make it difficult for new
entrants and projects to break into the market.\21\ For
instance, critical materials projects in the United States
such as Pebble copper mine in Alaska, the Twin Metals
copper mine in Minnesota, and a titanium mine in Georgia
have failed to progress due to this process.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ Blakemore, R., Ryan, P., & Bell, R. (2022, March 27). The
United States, Canada, and the minerals challenge. Atlantic Council
Global Energy Center. September 11, 2023, https://
www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/the-united-
states-canada-and-the-minerals-challenge/
\22\ Northey, H., & Holzman, J. (2022, August 15). Biden wants
minerals, but mine permitting lags. E&E News by POLITICO. https://
www.eenews.net/articles/biden-wants-minerals-but-mine-permitting-lags/

3. Non-traditional Sourcing. New sources of supply are increasingly
being developed in response to tightening markets. Full-
value mining, which uses tailings from existing material
processing to retrieve other critical minerals, is emerging
as a useful corollary to circular economies of recycling
minerals. These non-traditional sources of supply can offer
both additional as well as marginal sources of supply,
depending on the mineral. Materials R&D also remains
vitally important to developing new processes or materials
that can reduce supply chain constraints--whether in
recycling, or producing critical materials from other forms
of waste, such as captured carbon.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ Tobin, W. (2022, April 28). The US should leverage 45Q for the
graphite supply crunch. Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.
September 11, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/energysource/
the-us-should-leverage-45q-for-the-graphite-supply-crunch/

Each of these features add necessary color to our understanding of
how big the gap between supply and demand for certain minerals may be
and what obstacles may shape the manner in which that gap can be
filled.
Supply risk, meanwhile, can manifest in several ways.\24\ Though it
primarily comes in the form of trade exposure, wherein there is a high
degree of import reliance, these risks are complicated by
overconcentration of supply in a certain country, which can create a
risk of disruption of supply in certain cases. Provided that the United
States cannot supply the entirety of its mineral needs domestically,
mitigating supply risk is more art than science--requiring an
assessment of which minerals have relatively clearer pathways to build
trusted supply chain partnerships that hedge against or limit the
possibility of physical interruptions in the supply chain, market
imbalances, and government interventions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ Neumann Strengthened Federal Approach Needed to Help Identify
and Mitigate Supply Risks for Critical Raw Materials, J., Strengthened
Federal Approach Needed to Help Identify and Mitigate Supply Risks for
Critical Raw Materials.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Taken together, these elements of what shapes the relative risk of
a critical mineral or material offers some additional nuance to an
increasingly diverse suite of minerals that underpin national security
and economic prosperity. It helps us understand when risks to certain
minerals will be more or less severe (an exercise I commend the
Department of Energy for beginning to undertake in its most recent
Critical Minerals Assessment), and how policymakers should consider
intervening in a world where nearly every mineral and metal is of
strategic importance.
VI. Conclusion

To conclude, there are certain minerals that are structurally
important to our national and economic security. As energy transition
proceeds, those mineral requirements are increasingly diverse and
dynamic.
As a result, the practice of designating minerals as critical is
necessary as a strategic review of national vulnerabilities in a
minerals-intensive world, and the work of USGS and their interagency
peers to this end is deeply important.
However, I will end with some final thoughts.
Lists signify a need for action and form the basis for interagency
coordination, where it is invariably the case that we need to show our
receipts and provide justification for actions that leverage the US
taxpayer dollar in an environment of increasing demand for public
money.
But while lists are important, we shouldn't rely on lists alone. We
need to ensure that our minerals policy does not become overly
clerkish, prescribing problems rather than solving them. Maturing those
lists to capture the supply/demand dynamism between each critical
mineral will illuminate the pathways to address the relative
criticality inherent in these lists.
Many of the foremost issues in our minerals policy stem from a need
for broader reform, whether in permitting, benefit-sharing, or
international engagement.
Nonetheless, a properly curated list helps inform decisions on
those fronts.
Thank you and I look forward to your questions.

______

Mr. Stauber. Thank you very much for your testimony. I am
going to yield to Representative Lamborn to introduce our next
witness.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to
introduce Dr. Roderick Eggert, Deputy Director of the Critical
Minerals Institute at the DOE Energy Innovation Hub and
Research Professor at the Colorado School of Mines in Golden,
Colorado.
Colorado School of Mines is a leading center of education
for geology and mining engineering, and represents the foremost
level of academia in this industry. They are on the cutting
edge of mineral and mining innovation, and are training the
next generation of leaders in the mining industry, which we
know is sorely needed.
Dr. Eggert, we are pleased to have you here representing
the mining industry, the Colorado School of Mines, and the
great state of Colorado.

STATEMENT OF RODERICK EGGERT, RESEARCH PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS
AND BUSINESS AND COULTER FOUNDATION CHAIR IN MINERAL ECONOMICS,
COLORADO SCHOOL OF MINES, GOLDEN, COLORADO

Dr. Eggert. Well, thank you very much for that kind
introduction.
Chairman Stauber, Ranking Member Ocasio-Cortez, other
members of the Committee, thank you very much for the
opportunity to testify today. Let me use my oral remarks to
summarize two of the issues from my written testimony.
First, let's think about and compare the 2022 USGS
assessment with the 2023 Department of Energy assessment and
list.
So, what is the USGS assessment? It is broad in scope, a
screening of something like 70 non-fuel minerals and their
supply chains in the context of their importance for national
security and, really, overall economic affairs in the country.
It is U.S.-centric and asks the question for what minerals
is the United States at risk. It is based on data from the
present and recent past, so it is only forward-looking to the
extent that the indicators themselves provide insight into the
future, which, to be fair, some sense of which can be gained
from looking at the 10-year trends which are part of the
assessment.
Finally, it is a single list with 50 of the 70 elements
scored designated as critical.
The DOE lists an assessment of critical materials for
energy. It is narrower in scope. Not surprisingly, it focuses
on energy technologies. It is also global in scope in the sense
that the question that this assessment asks is what are the
material risks that threaten the development and deployment of
energy technologies.
It is explicitly forward-looking by incorporating demand
scenarios into its analysis, demand scenarios that have two
time frames: out to 2025, and then a longer look out to 2035.
It presents a more nuanced list. In some sense, it is
actually four lists of materials. There are critical materials
and then, separately, near-critical materials for both time
frames, near term or short term out to 2025, and the medium
term out to 2035.
So, the USGS list is U.S.-centric, broad, and based largely
on the present and recent past. The DOE assessment is energy-
centric, narrower, and more forward-looking. So, that is my
first topic.
The second topic, more broadly and philosophically: why
have a list? The simple answer, perhaps a statement of the
obvious, is to inform public policy, to prioritize things like
research and development activities, geologic mapping, market
analysis, aspects of commercial policy such as tax credits and
other issues.
A more complicated answer, in my view, a list is most
useful when it is viewed as an intermediate product rather than
the final word. It is really an initial screening and
identification of minerals and materials deemed important for
further, more detailed assessment in more specific contexts.
The danger of a simple list of minerals and materials as either
critical or not critical is that it obscures the complexity of
criticality, suggesting that criticality is yes or no, rather
than a continuum of risk and importance. The longer a list is,
the less it represents a prioritization and the less useful the
designation ``critical'' is. As many have said, if everything
is critical, then is anything really critical?
Finally, a couple of comments more specifically about the
USGS list. The list is long, 50 elements or minerals. The scope
is broad, encompassing both national security and economic
affairs. Thus, in my view, the primary uses of the list should
be two: first, to signal in a very broad way the importance of
minerals, their essentiality, and the degree to which they are
subject to supply chain risks; and second, to identify specific
supply chains for further analysis.
Designation as critical should by itself not qualify a
mineral or material for special treatment, which should require
more in-depth analysis of particular supply chains. In other
words, and this is finally-finally, the USGS list should
inform, but not determine public policy.
Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Eggert follows:]
Prepared Statement of Roderick G. Eggert, Research Professor and
Coulter Foundation Chair in Mineral Economics, Colorado School of Mines
Chairman Stauber, Ranking Member Ocasio-Cortez, and other Members
of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to provide testimony
on the U.S. Geological Survey's Critical Minerals List. I am a research
professor in the Department of Economics and Business at Colorado
School of Mines and hold the Coulter Foundation Chair in Mineral
Economics. As part of my university responsibilities, I am deputy
director of the Critical Materials Institute, an Energy Innovation Hub
established by the U.S. Department of Energy in 2013, to accelerate
innovation in energy materials and led by the Ames National Laboratory.
Of relevance for this hearing, I have been involved in the topic of
critical minerals and materials for more than 15 years. In 2007-2008, I
chaired the committee of the National Research Council that developed a
conceptual framework for criticality assessment that is reflected in
many of the criticality assessments since the committee's report was
published (National Research Council, 2008).
My testimony represents my personal views, although these views
reflect work I have done and opportunities I have had at Colorado
School of Mines and with the Critical Materials Institute.
I organize my testimony around four topics: the concept of a
critical mineral or material; a review of selected other (non-U.S.
Geological Survey) assessments of mineral and material criticality; a
comparison of the U.S. Geological Survey's 2022 assessment with the
2023 assessment by the U.S. Department of Energy; and consideration of
the question, why have a list?
Concepts
A critical mineral or material provides essential functionality to
a modern engineered material, component or system; has few if any easy
substitutes; and is subject to supply-chain risks or longer-term
concerns about availability. It is the combination all three of these
characteristics that makes a mineral or material `critical' in the
specialized sense of the concept--not simply that a mineral or material
is indispensable or essential, the common meaning of the word.

Five key aspects of critical minerals and materials are:

First, risks come in two basic forms: physical unavailability and
price. Physical-unavailability risk reflects the probability and
consequences of not being able to obtain a needed mineral or material.
Price risk reflects the probability and consequences of unexpected
fluctuations in price.

Second, the consequences of lack of physical availability or
unexpected price changes differ from circumstance to circumstance. In
other words, something important is at risk but exactly what is at risk
depends on the circumstance. For a company, profits and growth are at
risk if a supply disruption leads to physical unavailability of a
material or to unexpected increases in input costs. For a nation's
manufacturing sector, at risk are the viability of the sector and jobs
in the sector. For national security, at risk is the ability of a
nation's military and associated civilian infrastructure to respond
during and immediately following a national emergency. For the energy
transition, at risk is the transition itself if input minerals and
materials are not available in sufficient quantities and at affordable
costs from sources that are secure, environmentally sustainable and
socially responsible.

Third, the sources of risk vary from one mineral and material to
another and differ between the short term and long term. In the short
term (one or a few years, up to about a decade), the principal sources
of risk relate to the fragility of the geography of existing
production, processing and use of minerals and the materials. More
specifically, these risks include:

-- Geographically concentrated production in a small number of
mines, companies or countries;

-- Geopolitical risks in important producing countries;

-- The small, opaque markets that exist for many of the minor
metals included in most assessments of critical minerals
and materials, which leaves market participants vulnerable
to unexpected disruptions and, moreover, discourages
investment in the sector because investors do not
sufficient knowledge about a sector to make them
comfortable investing in the sector; and

-- Reliance on byproduct production of a mineral or metal, in
which case the availability of the byproduct is a function
not just of market conditions for the byproduct but also
conditions facing the main product.

In the long term (a decade or more into the future), the principal
sources of risk relate to more fundamental determinants of mineral
availability:

-- How abundant is a mineral in the earth's crust?

-- Is there a technology proven at scale that can recover the
mineral at prices customers are willing to pay, with
environmental impacts that are acceptable to society?

-- Can companies and local communities work together to
effectively manage the environmental and social impacts
that often accompany mining and processing?

-- Given the long lead times in developing new mines, will there
be sufficient investment today to ensure that a decade or
two from now we have sufficient and affordable quantities
of minerals to meet the growing demands of society?

Fourth, criticality is dynamic. Which specific minerals and
materials are `critical' changes over time. As technologies evolve and
change, so too do material requirements. As we transition from lead-
acid batteries in internal-combustion engines to lithium-ion batteries
in electric vehicles, lead becomes less critical, while lithium and
other associated battery materials (such as nickel and cobalt) become
more critical. Another example comes from lighting. As society moved
from compact-fluorescent bulbs to light-emitting diode (LED) bulbs, the
demand and prices for the rare-earth element europium fell considerably
as did europium's criticality.

Fifth, it's about processing, not just mining. While mining is the
essential starting point for mineral-derived materials, in many cases
what is missing in the United States or represents a choke point
elsewhere in the world is processing and the production of intermediate
products that occur after mining.
Selected Assessments of Critical Minerals and Materials

Many entities have conducted formal assessments. For a recent paper
that reviews criticality studies and methods, see Schrijvers and others
(2020). For an earlier and detailed discussion of methodology from the
perspective of corporations, nations and the world, see Graedel and
others (2012).
One of the early studies in the modern era of concern about
critical minerals and materials (beginning in about 2005) was National
Research Council (2008), which I referred to earlier in my testimony.
The major contribution of this study was a conceptual framework for
assessing material criticality emphasizing two criticality dimensions:
likelihood of a supply disruption, and the consequence of the
disruption should it occur. Indicators of a supply disruption include
those listed in the previous section of this testimony, which differ
depending on whether one is concerned about the short term or long
term. Many subsequent studies use modified versions of this conceptual
framework, customizing the assessment around those factors that are
important in a particular circumstance.

Corporate assessments: A number of companies evaluate their raw
material risks through assessments of materials criticality. For
example, Ku and Hung (2014) describe General Electric's approach that,
at the time, evaluated the materials used in its manufacturing and
commercial operations, scoring each material in two dimensions: supply
and price risk, and impact on General Electric operations.

National or regional assessments: A number of countries or regions,
other than the United States, have assessed the raw material risks
faced by their economies or that threaten national security. Notably,
the European Union assessed critical raw materials and published lists
in 2011, 2014, 2017, 2020 and 2023 (European Commission, 2023). All
these assessments are organized around two determinants of criticality:
supply risk, and economic importance. Hatayama and Tahari (2015)
evaluated critical minerals and materials from the perspective of
Japan. Lusty and others (2021) assessed minerals and materials critical
for technology applications in the United Kingdom (UK), based on two
considerations: global supply risk, and UK economic vulnerability. The
Indian Ministry of Mines (2023) identifies 30 minerals critical to
India's economy.
Nearly all assessments of critical minerals and materials,
including the national assessments listed above, reflect the
perspective of mineral and material consumers. However, two nations,
Australia and Canada, have assessed critical minerals and established
lists of critical minerals that reflect opportunities for these nations
to produce and export minerals to customers in countries facing supply-
chain risks (Australian Government Department of Industry, Science and
Resources 2023, Natural Resources Canada 2023).

Energy-transitions assessments: The International Energy Agency
(2021) and the International Renewable Energy Agency (Gielen 2021)
published assessments of minerals essential for low-carbon energy
technologies subject to supply-chain risks and uncertainties about
long-term availability.

World: For an evaluation of material criticality for the world as a
whole, see Graedel and others (2015), which assesses criticality in
three dimensions: supply risk, vulnerability to a supply restriction,
and environmental implications of mineral and material production.
Comparing U.S. Assessments

We in the United States have three current, public and published
assessments and lists of critical minerals and materials: the U.S.
Geological Survey 2022 list that is the focus of this hearing, the U.S.
Department of Energy's 2023 assessment and list of critical materials
for energy (U.S. Department of Energy 2023), and the Defense Logistics
Agency's evaluation and list of strategic materials for military and
essential civilian uses (see https://www.dla.mil/Strategic-Materials/).
Table 1 presents a basic comparison of the U.S. Geological Survey and
U.S. Department of Energy assessments and lists. Table 2 summarizes the
lists emerging from these two assessments. I have not included the
assessment of the Defense Logistics Agency because I am less familiar
with this assessment than the other two assessments.

Table 1. Comparing Two U.S. Assessments and Lists of Critical Minerals
and Materials

------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. Geological Survey 2022 U.S. Geological Survey 2023
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Narrow To comply with the Energy To inform DOE strategy on
purpose Act of 2020, and more critical minerals &
broadly inform government materials research,
and the public about development,
critical minerals demonstration, and
commercialization
------------------------------------------------------------------------
What or who U.S. national security and The global development and
is at risk economic development deployment of low-carbon
energy technologies
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Material 70 nonfuel mineral Screening analysis of 37
scope commodities (usually listed materials, detailed
as chemical elements) evaluation of 23 materials
with important uses in
energy technologies
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Time frame Not explicitly forward Explicitly forward looking
looking, except to the (short term = 2020-2025,
extent that data on the medium term = 2025-2035)
present and recent past
provide insight into the
future
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Key Disruption potential Importance to energy
criticality (essentially lack of applications, supply risk
indicators diversity in supply),
international trade
exposure (net import
dependence), and economic
vulnerability aggregated
into a single supply-risk
score. A single point of
failure.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Role of data, Draft list relies to the Relies on both (a)
expert extent possible on objective data on the
judgment, objective data on the present and recent past
forecasts present and recent past. and (b) future demand
and future Final list also includes scenarios compared to
scenarios consideration of current production
interagency feedback and capacity. Preliminary list
public comment. of critical and near
critical materials
released for public
comment prior to issuance
of the final report.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of 50 critical minerals, 36 on A number of critical
minerals in the basis of quantitative materials for energy. For
the list assessment, 3 based on a the short term (to 2025):
single point of failure, 7 critical, 9 near
and 11 based on qualitative critical. For the medium
assessment when term (2025-2035): 13
insufficient data were critical, 6 near critical.
available to allow for
quantitative assessment.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sources: Nassar, N.T., and Fortier, S.M., 2021. Methodology and
technical input for the 2021 review and revision of the U.S. Critical
Minerals List: U.S. Geological Survey Open-File Report 2021-1045, 31
p., https://doi.org/10.3133/ofr20211045; U.S. Department of Energy,
Critical Materials Assessment, July 2023, available at: https://
www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2023-07/doe-critical-material-
assessment_07312023.pdf.

Table 2. The Priorities Identified by the U.S. Geological Survey and
the U.S. Department of Energy

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. Department of Energy, 2023, Critical
U.S. Geological Survey, Materials for Energy, Near Critical or Critical
Element or Material 2022, Critical Minerals ---------------------------------------------------
Short Term (2020-2025) Medium Term (2025-2035)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aluminum X X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Antimony X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Arsenic X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Barite X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Beryllium X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bismuth X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cerium X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cesium X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chromium X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cobalt X X X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Copper X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dysprosium X X X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Electrical steel X X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Erbium X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Europium X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fluorspar X X (fluorine) X (fluorine)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Gadolinium X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Gallium X X X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Germanium X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Graphite X X (natural) X (natural)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hafnium X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Holmium X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Indium X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Iridium X X X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lanthanum X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lithium X X X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lutetium X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Magnesium X X X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Manganese X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Neodymium X X X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nickel X X X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Niobium X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Palladium X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Platinum X X X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Praseodymium X X X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rhodium X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rubidium X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ruthenium X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Samarium X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Scandium X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Silicon X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Silicon carbide X X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tantalum X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tellurium X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Terbium X X X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thulium X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tin X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Titanium X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tungsten X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Uranium X X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vanadium X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ytterbium X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Yttrium X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Zinc X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sources: U.S. Geological Survey, Department of the Interior, 2022,
``2022 Final List of Critical Minerals,'' Federal Register, 87 FR
10381, pp.10381-10382. February 24; U.S. Department of Energy, Critical
Materials Assessment, July 2023, available at: https://www.energy.gov/
sites/default/files/2023-07/doe-critical-material-
assessment_07312023.pdf.

The U.S. Geological Survey list consists of 50 minerals that meet
the threshold for designation as critical minerals. But this assessment
presents much more detail than implied by the single list. Fifty-four
minerals are ranked from most to least risky when sufficient data were
available to allow for quantitative assessment. Eleven additional
minerals were evaluated qualitatively. Three minerals were designated
critical on the basis of a single point of failure in the domestic
(U.S.) supply chain even though they did not qualify as critical on the
basis of the quantitative assessment.

The U.S. Department of Energy designates materials as critical,
near critical and not critical and makes these determinations over two
time periods--the short term (2020-2025) and the medium term (2025-
2035). A larger number of materials are critical or near critical for
the medium term compared to the short term--19 for the medium term, 16
for the short term. Aluminum, copper and silicon are critical or near
critical in the medium term but not in the short term.

Overall, the U.S. Geological Survey assessment is broad and U.S.-
centric, focusing on minerals important for U.S. national security and
economic activity; and is based on data from the present and recent
past, and thus is forward-looking only to the extent that these data
provide insight into the future. The U.S. Department of Energy
assessment is energy-centric and takes a global perspective, focusing
on materials important for energy technologies, and is explicitly
forward looking with perspectives on the short term (2020-2025) and
medium term (2025-2035). Both assessments are described in sufficient
detail that others can easily see the basis for a material's
designation as critical. Others also could replicate the analysis or
modify the approach if they wish.
Why Have a List?

Broad considerations: An evaluation of mineral and material
criticality can be indispensable in setting priorities and informing
private-sector decisions and government policies. A list is simply the
most basic of the outputs of an evaluation.
A list is most useful when it is viewed as an intermediate product
rather than the final word--the result of an initial screening and
identification of minerals and materials deemed important for further,
more-detailed evaluation.
The danger of a simple list of minerals and materials as either
critical or not critical is that it obscures the complexity of
criticality, suggesting that criticality is ``yes/no'' rather than a
continuum of risk and importance.
The longer a list is, the less it represents a prioritization and
the less useful the designation `critical' is. If everything is
critical, then is anything really critical?
The broader the scope of analysis is, the less useful it is for
specific decisions and policies. A narrow focus, for example, on
military preparedness or energy technologies is potentially more useful
for policy making than an assessment and list based on all economic
sectors of an economy, especially for a large economy such as the
United States.

The U.S. Geological Survey list: The list is long (50 minerals),
and the scope is broad (national security, national economic activity).
Thus, the primary uses of the list should be (1) to signal to
government officials and the broader public that minerals are essential
and subject to supply-chain risks and (2) to identify specific supply
chains for further analysis. Designation as `critical' should not by
itself qualify a mineral for special treatment, which should require
this more in-depth analysis of particular supply chains.
In other words, the U.S. Geological Survey list should inform but
not determine public policy. A list should simply be one of several
inputs to the formulation of public policy.

References

Australian Government Department of Industry, Science and Resources,
2023. Critical Minerals Strategy 2023-2030. Available at: https://
www.industry.gov.au/sites/default/files/2023-06/critical-minerals-
strategy-2023-2030.pdf.

European Commission, 2023. Study on the critical raw materials for the
EU 2023--Final report. Directorate-General for Internal Market,
Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs. M. Grohol and C. Veeh.
Publications Office of the European Union. Available at: https://
data.europa.eu/doi/10.2873/725585.

Gielen, D., 2021. Critical materials for the energy transition,
International Renewable Energy Agency. Available here: https://
www.irena.org/Technical-Papers/Critical-Materials-For-The-Energy-
Transition.

Graedel, T.E. and others, 2012. ``Methodology of Metal Criticality
Determination,'' Environmental Science and Technology. DOI: https://
dx.doi.org/10.1021/es203534z.

Graedel, T.E. and others, 2015. ``Criticality of metals and
metalloids,'' PNAS, vol. 112, no. 14, 4257-4262. DOI: www.pnas.org/cgi/
doi/10.1073/pnas.1500415112.

Hatayama, H. and K. Tahara, 2015. ``Criticality assessment of metals
for Japan's resource strategy,'' Mater. Trans. 56, 229-235. DOI:
https://doi.org/10.2320/matertrans.M2014380.

International Energy Agency, 2021 (revised corrected version, March
2022). The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions.
Available at: https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/ffd2a83b-8c30-
4e9d-980a-52b6d9a86fdc/TheRoleof
CriticalMineralsinCleanEnergyTransitions.pdf.

Ku, A. and S. Hung, 2014. ``Manage Raw Material Supply Risks,'' Chem.
Eng, Prog. 110, 28-35.

Lusty, P.A.J. and others, 2021. UK criticality assessment of technology
critical minerals and metals. British Geological Survey Commissioned
Report CR/21/120. Available at: https://www.bgs.ac.uk/download/uk-
criticality-assessment-of-technology-critical-minerals-and-metals/.

Ministry of Mines (India), 2023. Critical Minerals for India, Report of
the Committee on Identification of Critical Minerals. Available at:
https://mines.gov.in/admin/storage/app/uploads/
649d4212cceb01688027666.pdf.

Nassar, N.T., and Fortier, S.M., 2021. Methodology and technical input
for the 2021 review and revision of the U.S. Critical Minerals List:
U.S. Geological Survey Open-File Report 2021-1045, 31 p., https://
doi.org/10.3133/ofr20211045.

National Research Council. 2008. Minerals, Critical Minerals, and the
U.S. Economy. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. https://
doi.org/10.17226/12034.

Natural Resources Canada, 2023. The Canadian Critical Minerals
Strategy. Available at: https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/nrcan-rncan/
site/critical-minerals/Critical-minerals-strategyDec09.pdf.

Schrijvers, D., and others, 2020. ``A review of methods and data to
determine raw material criticality,'' Resources, Conservation and
Recycling. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resconrec.2019.104617.

U.S. Department of Energy, Critical Materials Assessment, July 2023,
available at: https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2023-07/doe-
critical-material-assessment_ 07312023.pdf.

U.S. Geological Survey, Department of the Interior, 2022. ``2022 Final
List of Critical Minerals,'' Federal Register, 87 FR 10381, pp.10381-
10382. February 24.

______

Mr. Stauber. Thank you, Dr. Eggert. I will now introduce
our next witness, Dr. Dustin Mulvaney. Dr. Mulvaney is a
professor at the Environmental Studies Department at San Jose
State University in San Jose, California.
Dr. Mulvaney, you are now recognized for 5 minutes.

STATEMENT OF DUSTIN MULVANEY, PROFESSOR, ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES,
SAN JOSE STATE UNIVERSITY, SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA

Dr. Mulvaney. Greetings, Chairman Stauber, Ranking Member
Ocasio-Cortez, and other members of the Subcommittee on Energy
and Minerals. It is a great honor to be with you today. Thank
you for the invitation, and special thanks to the Committee
staff for all their work putting together this hearing.
My name is Dustin Mulvaney. I am a Professor of
Environmental Studies at San Jose State University and a fellow
at the Payne Institute for Public Policy at the Colorado School
of Mines. This testimony reflects my views and expertise on the
topics herein, and I am not speaking on behalf of my affiliated
organizations or anyone but myself.
The development and strengthening of supply chains to
support metals, minerals, and materials that we will need for
decarbonization, green infrastructures, transportation, health
care, defense is of serious national importance. Supply chain
disruptions from bottlenecks, geographic concentration, and
trade restrictions in recent years have shown vulnerabilities
to the economy and decarbonization efforts.
The dependence on critical minerals of many key
technologies to the U.S. economy makes securing adequate
supplies crucial to the success of other important public
policies, including the 2021 Inflation Reduction Act and the
Energy Act of 2020, as well as efforts by states and local
governments.
The development of a critical minerals list is an excellent
starting point for a conversation about how to develop clean
energy supply chains responsibly, and to the highest possible
labor and environmental standards. We need a framework also
that brings together both new, responsible critical minerals
development, but also one that emphasizes circular economy
approaches that can augment supply significantly.
To date, much of the conversation and public policy effort
has focused on domestic mining. But recycling, alternative
extraction techniques, resource efficiency, harvesting
materials from waste streams offer significant promise for
enhancing the nation's supply of critical minerals and
lessening the risks and exposures to supply chain disruptions.
These latter activities are more recently gaining attention and
policy support, including from this Congress, which is welcome
news to those of us who have been working on waste and
recycling issues.
While we cannot recycle or mine our way out of these
challenges, we should be collecting as much of these critical
materials from the waste stream as feasible. It seems
profoundly wasteful that we would allow critical materials to
be landfilled at the same time we talk about the dire economic
and national security consequences of a lack of supply and
promote greenfield mine development elsewhere. Today in the
United States, less than 40 percent of copper is recycled, only
5 percent of lithium is recycled. No gallium is recycled, and
only small amounts of germanium are recovered and exported for
recycling. These are lost resources that we should not be
throwing away.
I have several suggestions for areas in my experience and
understanding that would result in helping make critical
minerals supplies less vulnerable, while at the same time
safeguarding environmental protection, cultural resources, and
respecting Native American self-determination and sovereignty,
and at the same time creating high-quality, high-road domestic
jobs, and I detail these more in my written testimony.
But to summarize, building a circular economy on critical
minerals should: (1) promote more cradle-to-cradle approaches
to the critical minerals challenge; (2) develop robust takeback
and collection systems to enhance the prospects of recycling;
(3) recover more critical materials from waste streams and
increase resource efficiency; (4) advance materials science,
input substitution, and alternatives to hardrock mining; (5)
strengthen tribal consultation; (6) reform the 1872 Mining Law;
(7) avoid unnecessary groundwater and ecological impacts; (8)
strengthen environmental review; and (9) provide community
benefits.
Emphasizing these aspects will result in more secure
critical mineral supplies, as well as more community acceptance
of and consent to mining and extractive industry activities.
Taken together, these suggestions will help get more public
support for responsible natural resource development, product
stewardship policies, public investments and innovations in
materials science, increased resource efficiency, and better
processing to augment supplies of critical minerals for the
U.S. economy.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today
on these important matters.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Mulvaney follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dustin Mulvaney, Professor, Environmental
Studies, San Jose State University

Introduction

My name is Dustin Mulvaney and I am a Professor of Environmental
Studies at San Jose State University, and a Fellow at the Payne
Institute for Public Policy at the Colorado School of Mines. This
testimony reflects my views and expertise on the topics herein, and I
am not speaking on behalf of my affiliated organizations or anyone but
myself.
My areas of expertise and research are on land use change, life
cycle analysis, recycling & waste, and the environmental justice
impacts of energy technologies, supply chains, and infrastructures. I
have published research on numerous energy technologies with extensive
emphasis on the life cycle impacts of solar photovoltaics and lithium-
ion batteries. I have a Ph.D. in Environmental Studies from the
University of California, Santa Cruz, a Master's of Science degree in
Environmental Policy Studies, and a Bachelor's of Science degree in
Chemical Engineering, the latter two from the New Jersey Institute of
Technology. My professional private sector experience includes work in
chemical manufacturing, environmental remediation, and environmental
consulting. I have been an expert witness at the California Public
Utilities Commission for 13 years, and have participated in the
development of waste, land use, and energy policy with California
legislators, and state and county agencies over the past decade. I
serve on the Technical Advisory Committee to the Recycling and Waste
Reduction Commission of Santa Clara County, the Technical Committee for
an Ultra-Low Carbon Solar Standard for photovoltaics recently developed
by the Green Electronics Council, and am part of the Lithium Valley
Equity Technical Advisory Group advising Comite Civico del Valle on
issues related to the development of geothermal and lithium near the
Salton Sea in Imperial County, California.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before this committee.
Special thanks to the committee staff, and thank you for your attention
to these important matters.
The development and strengthening of supply chains to support
metals, minerals, and materials that we will need for decarbonization,
green infrastructures, transportation, healthcare, and defense is of
serious national importance.
Supply chain disruptions from bottlenecks, geographic
concentration, and trade restrictions in recent years have shown
vulnerabilities to the domestic economy and decarbonization efforts.
The dependence on critical minerals of many key technologies to the
U.S. economy make securing adequate supplies crucial to the success of
other important public policies including the 2021 Inflation Reduction
Act and the Energy Act of 2020, and well as efforts by states and local
government. The development of a critical minerals list is an excellent
starting point for a conversation about how to develop clean energy
supply chains responsibly and to the highest possible labor and
environmental standards. We need a framework that brings together both
the need for new responsible critical minerals development, but also
that emphasizes circular economy approaches that can augment critical
mineral supplies significantly in the short term.
To date, much of the conversation and public policy effort has
focused solely on mining. But recycling, alternative extraction
techniques, resource efficiency, and harvesting materials from waste
streams offer significant promise for enhancing the nation's supply of
critical minerals, and lessening the risks of and exposures to supply
chain disruptions. These latter activities are more recently gaining
attention and policy support, including from this Congress, which is
welcome news to those of us that have long been working on waste and
recycling issues.
While we cannot recycle or mine our way out of these challenges, we
should be collecting as much of these critical minerals in the waste
stream as feasible. It seems profoundly wasteful that we would allow
critical materials be landfilled at the same time we talk about the
dire national security consequences of a lack of supply and promote
greenfield mine development elsewhere.
In the testimony that follows, I have several suggestions for areas
that in my experience and understanding would result in helping make
critical minerals supplies less vulnerable, while at the same time
safeguarding environmental protection, cultural resources, respecting
Native American self-determination and sovereignty, and creating
quality high-road domestic jobs.
Building a circular economy on critical minerals should (1) Promote
more circular economy approaches to the critical minerals challenge,
(2) Develop robust take back and collection systems and recycling, (3)
Recover more critical minerals from waste and increase resource
efficiency, (4) Advance materials science, input substitution, and
alternatives to hard rock mining, (5) Strengthen Tribal consultation,
and (6) Reform the 1872 mining law, (7) Avoid unnecessary groundwater
and ecological impacts, (8) Strengthen environmental review, (9)
Provide community benefits.
Emphasizing these aspects will result in more secure critical
minerals supplies as well more community acceptance of mining
activities. Taken together these suggestions will help get more public
support for responsible natural resource development, product
stewardship policies, increased resource efficiency, and innovations in
materials science and processing to augment supplies of critical
minerals for the U.S. economy.
1. Promote more circular economy approaches to the critical minerals
challenge

The National Academy of Sciences 2008 report recognized the need to
analyze the risks posed by critical mineral supply chains for national
security and domestic industries. The U.S. in 1973 was the top producer
of non-fuel minerals, and that position 50 years later has been ceded
largely overseas. The United States has recognized this in a series of
public policies intended to strengthen the resilience of supply chains,
which will have the added benefits of geographic diversification and
reduced environmental impact.
The idea of criticality as the United States Geologic Survey uses
it involves understanding supply risks across three domains (1) how
likely a disruption is to occur, (2) how exposed a supply chain is to
disruption, and (3) whether the disruption can be overcome. Copper for
example is sourced from a wide variety of places. This geographic
diversity means that disruption due to anything from geopolitics to
natural disaster, does not rise to the level of risk of say gallium or
germanium, where over 90% of production is concentrated in one regional
geography.
2. Develop robust take back and collection systems and recycling

Despite concerns about the availability of copper and other metals,
minerals, and materials, the federal government has no comprehensive
electronics and electronical equipment waste take back and recovery
law. This is missing opportunities to recover important inputs the
United States economy will need from waste flows, and to avoid
unnecessary mining. Recycling can significantly augment critical
minerals supplies. Some estimates put these values at 25% for lithium,
35% for cobalt and nickel and 55% for copper, based on projected demand
and technology adoption scenarios. According to the Copper Alliance,
less than 40% of global copper is currently recycled. According to
research from Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation, two-
thirds of end-of-life copper are sent to landfills annually.
Waste flows from end-of-life electronic products often have
significantly more critical minerals by percent than the ores they are
obtained from in mining. Rare earth elements in end-of-life electronics
are mostly lost through waste flows in the United States. Less than 5%
of rare earth elements globally are recycled according to the trade
press Recycling International. Recycling consumer electronic products
and utilizing byproducts of other materials processing could yield
double to ten times the rare earth elements that could be extracted
through processing the raw materials. Three to four times more
dysprosium can be obtained from recycling headphones than from rare
earth element ores. An iPhone touch screen has more lanthanum to make
those bright colors, than is typically found in rare earth element
ores. Similarly, there is a higher percent of neodymium obtained from
recycling wind turbine magnets, than are found in those rare earth
element ores. In an era of declining ore grades, these waste flows
should be seen as resources to boost critical mineral supplies.
Lithium-ion battery recycling rates are slowly ticking up, but
still most collected at end-of-life are only recovered for copper,
cobalt, nickel, graphite, and aluminum. We have not developed a lithium
battery recycling ecosystem in the United States and as a result most
lithium-ion batteries are sent to China, South Korea, and Europe for
reprocessing into new feedstocks. This means not only are these places
securing new supplies, they are developing the technologies to do so.
Developing recycling infrastructure in the United States would allow
battery recyclers to be suppliers of metal and minerals to materials
refiners producing battery input precursors.
Developing recycling programs for electronic waste will hasten
United States innovation in this space and allow it to catch up with
the rest of the world on recycling technology.
Germanium and gallium were in the news last month (August 2023) as
critical minerals that would be restricted from export by China. Yet we
do very little recycling of LEDs, scrap materials, and everyday devices
and appliances containing germanium- and gallium-based semiconductors
including microwaves, blue ray players, and other electronic products
that are often landfilled today. No gallium is recycled in the United
States. Small amounts of germanium are recovered and exported for
recycling.
Tellurium is used in cadmium telluride photovoltaics and night
vision goggles, and is 1000 times more rare than rare earths. Over 40%
of the global tellurium supply goes to one photovoltaic supply chain.
But tellurium also goes into steel dissipatively, meaning that the
amount in the product is lower than that found in typical copper and
gold ores where tellurium is obtained. Dissipative uses of critical
metals typically means losing them to future products forever. More
research into substitutes for materials used this way will free up
existing supplies and encourage more recovery.
Indium is a critical mineral used to make indium tin oxide,
essential to the functioning flat-panel displays, mobile phones,
photovoltaics, aerospace and other telecommunications applications
because of its conductivity and transparency. The production of indium
is mostly in China, and countries like Japan have secured supplies of
indium from indium tin oxide scrap at electronic waste recovery
facilities.
Comprehensive electronic waste recycling rules can foster these
emerging industries and technologies. Singapore created an extended
producer responsibility law, and in 2021 opened its first battery
recycling facility. Rules for end-of-life products can help ensure that
emerging recyclers are recovering as much of the waste stream as
possible. For these nascent recycling industries, getting waste volumes
is critically important to economic viability and scale.
A recent Wall Street Journal article about Redwood Materials noted
that the company is now valued at $5 billion. Redwood Materials claims
a 90% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions using recycled cathode
product as feedstock for new battery cathodes. These investments show
that the battery recycling industry is ripe for growth and passing laws
to encourage the take back and collection of batteries for recycling
will only help these industries grow. American Battery Technology
Company, Li-Cycle, and Ascend Elements are a few more companies in this
space employing thousands of people and attracting private sector
investment to recycling lithium ion batteries.
The European Union's Battery Directive and battery passport system
requires supply chain due diligence, has strong environmental
protections, from sourcing through end-of-life. A similar policy in the
United States could go a long way to utilizing recycling to augment
supplies of critical minerals. Battery manufacturers in the United
States currently fund a non-profit to do some collection, but it still
only about 5% of lithium-ion batteries that are collected; in Europe
this number is closer to 40%.
PV Cycle has developed take back and recycling infrastructure for
photovoltaics since 2007 and in Europe over 95% of photovoltaics are
recycled, compared to less the 5% in the United States. This is because
of the Waste Electronics and Electrical Equipment (WEEE) Directive
promotes cradle-to-cradle materials handling and added photovoltaics to
mandatory take back and recycling policy in 2014. The United States on
the other hand, uses only a cradle-to-grave approach to materials
management, only managing the most hazardous of electronics products.
With the few photovoltaics collected in the United States today, very
little silver, an element considered by not listed currently as a
critical mineral, is recovered as the modules are mainly used as
smelter flux and those smelters are not designed to recover silver. The
solar industry uses over 10% of the global silver supply for
metallization pastes.
The Green Electronics Council has developed an Electronic Product
Environmental Assessment Tool (EPEAT) to leverage procurement in
raising the environmental standards of photovoltaics, which supports
companies with comprehensive take back and recycling programs. Federal
government procurement could further help develop these programs as
described by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency: ``EPA recommends
the following private sector standards/ecolabels be used when
purchasing photovoltaic modules and inverters or energy savings
performance contracts or power purchase agreements.'' \1\
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\1\ https://www.epa.gov/greenerproducts/photovoltaic-modules-and-
inverters
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It seems imprudent to be letting critical minerals go to landfill
or dissipative uses. We need to build the infrastructures for a
circular economy in--not just critical minerals--but all metals and
mineral flows that are practicable. One way to bring value to waste is
to not let it be landfilled or disposed of for free. Extended producer
responsibility and other product stewardship laws and programs can
ensure that materials are diverted from landfill where it will never
return to products.
3. Recover more critical minerals from waste and increase resource
efficiency

Waste is an important resource for critical metals. With over
400,000 to 500,000 abandoned mines in the United States, according the
several estimates, policies and practices that encourage waste and
``tailings valorization'' is another strategy to augment critical
mineral supplies. There are also opportunities to recover these
materials from coal ash, red mud, slag piles, mine tailings, and other
wastes. Recovery of critical minerals from mine waste particularly
looks promising in environmental remediation, where work to process
materials may be underway anyways for cleanup.
Environmental remediation can be expensive, which is why it is
important to modernize our mining laws, payments, and royalty programs.
Effective reforms could raise revenues to clean up legacy mine waste
and further augment needed supplies of critical minerals. Some
materials recovery may require novel processing that needs more
research and development support. Abandoned mine lands sites in
particular provide an opportunity to augment critical mineral supplies,
while cleaning up and remediating legacy pollution from past mining
activities. Unfortunately there has been a historic lack of interest
for among other reasons, there is little information about the
composition and potential value of most of these legacy wastes.
Materials recovery in mining and downstream processing is optimized
for profitability not maximizing materials or biproducts. More
incentives to develop biproducts, recover materials at smelters, or
increase recovery rates could help drive up recycling of materials.
Smelters in the United States are not designed to recover many critical
minerals. For example, there are no smelters that can recover cobalt in
the United States.
There are also excellent examples of resource efficiency avoiding
significant amounts of materials. A photovoltaic module today, thanks
to increased resource efficiencies, uses about five times less silver
than a photovoltaic module today. Similar, semiconductor wafers in the
same technology are two to three times thinner than just a decade ago.
This has translated to lower energy inputs and silicon feedstocks
needed for the solar industry.
There are other ways to increase resource efficiency across society
as well. In a recent report from the Climate and Community Project they
found up to 90% of lithium demand can be reduced by encouraging public
transportation and more lightweight electric vehicles and other modes
of transportation.
4. Advance materials science, input substitution, and alternatives to
hard rock mining

It is fundamentally important to emphasize incentives and policy
that develops substitutes and alternatives to critical minerals as
sustainable ways to secure domestic supplies. This would help mitigate
extensive impacts from extractive industries, which can be poorly
regulated and environmentally-damaging.
The critical mineral of concern a few years ago for lithium-ion
batteries was cobalt. In a few short years, projections for use of
cobalt--75% of which according to Benchmark Minerals currently goes to
making lithium-ion batteries--has fallen dramatically with lowering of
cobalt content and advances non-cobalt batteries. Companies concerned
about bottlenecks and reputational risks have begun to eschew cobalt
supply chains. We are already seeing companies move away from nickel
and manganese as well in next generation in lithium iron phosphate
batteries.
These shifts in technology are sometimes beyond the horizon. We do
not necessarily know the battery chemistries and composition of
tomorrow's lithium-ion batteries, how do we know which materials to
prioritize for development today?
The next generation batteries may have no lithium at all. We are
also seeing the development of non-lithium batteries. One of the
largest battery makers in the world BYD announced in August 2023 a
partnership to build sodium-ion batteries and has plans to put in their
popular and inexpensive Seagull electric vehicle. It is not clear how
widespread this technology will eventually be, but it is a perfect of
example of how materials demand can change in a short time.
Not far off in the future, we are likely to see batteries that
altogether avoid graphite, currently used as the anode in 95% of
lithium-ion batteries today, as well.
We are also using many of these critical minerals in ways that make
it difficult or expensive to recover germanium and gallium for example
often are alloyed in a way that complicates recovery. Use of critical
minerals in low concentrations in alloys like this is another area
where research into substitutes could allow more minerals to be
available for green infrastructures.
Supply chain diversification also means supporting alternative
mining methods. While might be too early to characterize environmental
impacts, the prospects of direct lithium extraction seems to offer
significant benefits over hard rock mining for lithium.
5. Strengthen Tribal consultation

The energy transition is likely to be significantly impactful to
Native American tribes. Most mining activity in the United States is in
the American West, and within close proximity to Native American
communities. 79% of lithium mining claims, 89% of copper, and 97% of
nickel deposits are within 35 miles of a Native American reservation.
Furthermore, the Bureau of Land Management has an obligation to conduct
prior consultation on projects proposed across public lands because of
important sacred sites off-reservation on their ancestral territories.
Mining activities puts both drinking water, cultural resources at
risk, making it of the utmost importance to ensure community acceptance
and respect for tribal sovereignty and cultural resources. I have read
many public comments and spoken with representatives from Tribes over
the years in my research and it is not uncommon to hear that the
federal consultation process for National Historic Preservation Act to
take one example is ``failing tribes'' on adequate and meaningful
consultation.
Instead of looking for ways to short circuit environmental and
cultural resource review--by undermining nation-to-nation consultation
or expediting review--the United States should strengthen Tribal
consultation in the National Environmental Policy Act around the ideas
of self-determination and ``Free, Prior and Informed Consent'' as
described by International Labour Organization's Convention number 169,
the United Nation Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
There is often emphasis on how the United States' mining practices are
the best in the world because they have the strongest global
regulations. But the issue of Tribal consultation needs significant
improvement to catch up with international norms and standards on
relations between mining activities and Indigenous peoples.
6. Reform the 1872 mining law

The 1872 mining law makes mining the highest and best use of public
lands and reflects a time long since passed. The exploratory claims-
based system is outdated, with most other parts of the world having
lease-based systems that are more competitive and result in better
decision-making on land uses.
Reform to the royalty system would benefit taxpayers, given there
are no royalties for hard rock mining under the law today. Reform of
the royalty program could raise substantial revenues to help finance
the clean up and remediation of legacy mine pollution.
Mining law needs a better plan to pay for remediation of old mines.
The 1872 mining law set the bar too low for bonding mine sites for
reclamation and cleanup. The Government Accountability Office (GAO)
estimates that federal agencies spent $2.9 billion in the decade from
2008 to 2017 on cleanup activities, and this could cost taxpayers up to
$54 billion to clean up the nation's 400,000 to 500,000 abandoned mine
sites that pose hazardous threats to communities.
The Initiative for Responsible Mining Assurance (IRMA) could be a
model for reforming the 1872 law. IRMA allows for independent audits of
mines to ensure environmental and social performance. Even the White
House refereed to IMRA as a ``method for U.S. companies and the Federal
Government to ensure that minerals are being sourced from mines with
robust environmental, social, and financial responsibility policies.''
\2\
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\2\ The White House, Building Resilient Supply Chains, Revitalizing
American Manufacturing, and Fostering Broad-Based Growth: 100-Day
Reviews Under Executive Order 14017, June 2021, https://
www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/100-day-supply-chain-
review-report.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The 1872 law was intended for settler colonialism on the western
frontier not for mining in a modern high-tech economy. Federal and
public lands should not be new sacrifice zones for decarbonization.
Without key reforms, the antiquated mining law will continue to cause
unnecessary environmental degradation and environmental inequality.
7. Avoid unnecessary groundwater and ecological impacts

The impacts of mining to water resources and riparian habitat
across the United States cannot be understated. According to an
analysis from Trout Unlimited, ``half of the known critical mineral
deposits in the U.S. are within trout and salmon habitat, and one in
ten deposits are in protected public land areas like wilderness.'' \3\
The same report notes that many critical minerals overlap with sage
grouse habitat and major big game wildlife corridors. Rhyolite Ridge is
a lithium mining project proposed by an Australian mining company that
will impact Tiehm's buckwheat (Eriogonum tiehmii), a species that only
exists on that particular site.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ https://www.tu.org/cmr-a-path-forward/
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Across the American West, impacts to groundwater are of particular
concern. Groundwater depletion can easily occur from over-pumping. The
recently permitted Thacker Pass mine will use 2,500 acre feet per year
for 41 years, which is about 104,000 acre-feet of water total, posing
threat to the Kings River aquifer. There are several new gold mines
under development and proposed in Nevada not far from Death Valley
National Park, that are using substantial amounts of water, including
one mining operation that will use water from a spring in the park,
which receives about two inches of rain per year.
In Amargosa Valley near the Ash Meadows reserve, an exploratory
lithium development project was almost allowed under that 1872 law to
drill 30 boreholes without any environmental review, within 2,000 feet
of springs that are critical habitat for the endangered Ash Meadows
Amargosa pupfish. If not for the community and an environmental group
recognizing the BLM mistake, this critical habitat could have been
comprised by a speculative venture.
As far as alternative extraction techniques go, we also at this
point do not have the full picture of the groundwater impacts from
Direct Lithium Extraction for example in the Salton Sea area, where
several pilot projects are underway.
Public policy efforts to develop critical minerals should do so
responsibly and should not undermine bedrock environmental laws.
Predictability to developers is often the emphasis when describing
environmental oversight, but predictability is also important to
environmental groups and tribes to know what land is protected, and
that there are community safeguards like strong environmental rules and
opportunities for public participation.
8. Strengthen environmental review

The need to prioritize development of domestic minerals supplies
should not undermine meaningful environmental review. In my experience,
conservation groups, Indigenous peoples, and local communities feel
that environmental review, even where an environmental impact statement
might be required, is a foregone conclusion. Many communities view the
NEPA process as a ``decide-announce-defend'' development strategy where
developers and investors decide where they want to propose a project,
announce it to the public, and then spend the review process defending
the project.
Instead, more collaborative approaches are shown to be effective at
gaining community support and trust. Transparent and meaningful public
participation processes should result in responsible mine development
and reduced community opposition to new mines.
It is often claimed that it takes 7 to 10 years or more to permit a
new mine. The reality is the time to permit a hard rock mine is two
years according to the GAO. The GAO did find variation with some mines
taking up to eleven years, but their interviews with agencies and mine
operators found delays were overwhelming caused by the applicant. More
broadly, another GAO report found only 1% of NEPA covered projects need
an Environmental Impact Statement. Only 5% of covered projects require
an Environmental Assessment, a shorter environmental disclosure
document that typically is completed in nine months or so.
There have been recent changes that promise to address any
lingering NEPA issues. The IRA made the FAST-41 Act permanent, extended
the provisions of the law to mining, and provided significant funding
for agencies to process permits.
Thacker pass for example initiated the NEPA process in 2020 shortly
after they submitted an operating plan to the BLM and is under
construction today, despite being incredibly controversial.
To build infrastructure projects getting community support in a
collaborative way is important. Finding a way to get communities, NGOs,
and Tribes involved from the start can help ensure the community
accepts and gives consent to the project, an makes it more likely
benefits from the project recirculate in the community.
Some are concerned that the funding available through the IRA will
be undermined by environmental review and make it difficult to spend
all of the money. Lessons from the American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act projects are a great example of how projects can be built on time.
None of the $90 billion in clean energy projects missed deadlines
because of environmental review. This includes large scale solar and
wind facilities, a nuclear power plant, and photovoltaic, electric
vehicle, and battery manufacturing plants. Concerns that IRA projects
will be stopped by environmental review are overblown.
9. Provide community benefits

Where mines will be developed, bringing community benefits to the
table will be important tools for public support, buy-in, and trust.
Furthermore, to reap more community benefits, more value added
industries to support the development of critical minerals supplies can
ensure more jobs and local revenues are generated. Mining tends to have
a very low value added without these downstream manufacturing
activities.
Community benefits should be broadly construed to benefit as many
as possible. The widely celebrated community benefits agreement between
Lithium Americas and Thacker Pass and the Fort McDermitt Paiute and
Shoshone Tribe is a one example worth looking at closely. While
benefits accrue to some communities from this project, other tribes
with ancestral claims to the landscape such as the People of Red
Mountain feel their voices were not acknowledged and will receive no
benefits.

Other examples that could be a model for how to build in community
benefits is the approach used in the Salton Sea and suggested by the
Blue Ribbon Commission on Lithium Extraction in California. That
process is early on, but will be worth watching closely.

Community benefits will help gain local acceptance and
collaboration with project development.
Conclusion

To conclude, securing supplies of critical minerals is essential to
national security, domestic industries, and decarbonization efforts.
More emphasis on diverting waste flows that contain critical minerals
from landfills to supply chains will encourage a circular economy in
materials that results in less waste, fewer greenhouse gas emissions,
the development of domestic industries, and the reduction of risks and
exposures to vulnerabilities in global supply chains.
We need to move beyond the ``take-make-waste'' cradle-to-grave
management approach to critical minerals and create a circular economy
based on practices and policies to encourage us to ``make-use-recycle''
in a cradle-to-cradle framework.
I appreciate this opportunity to offer these remarks and I look
forward to the oversight hearing.

______

Questions Submitted for the Record to Dustin Mulvaney, Professor,
Environmental Studies, San Jose State University

Questions Submitted by Representative Grijalva

Question 1. Is recycling critical minerals a net energy winner or
loser? In other words, does it take more energy to mine a critical
material and turn it into a product, or to recycle a critical material
for the same product? What are the environmental benefits of using
recycled materials, and can you share any examples?

Answer. Recycling metals to recover critical minerals is nearly
always a net energy winner. It takes far less energy to recover metals
from recycled electronic and electrical equipment waste than the energy
required to liberate metals from ores and brines. Some metals that have
very high rates of recycling because it is not only energy saving, but
it is highly economic. This is because some waste materials have very
high concentrations of metals, much higher than one can find in ores,
brines, or other natural resources.

The exception to this rule is when metals are used dissipatively,
in lower concentrations than found in ores. Steel for example uses very
low quantities of tellurium and aluminum and recovering such low
concentrations requires correspondingly more energy. This is what I
emphasized in my original testimony innovations in materials science to
replace materials used dissipatively which if substituted can be found
can augment critical minerals supplies. Some screenings of critical
metals have found that most have dissipative use rates over 50%, which
is consistently much higher than other metals. But to the main
question, there is extensive research documenting the high energy
savings associated with recovering and recycling metals. Recycling and
other waste recovery efforts help bring a life cycle approach to the
critical minerals challenge.

Many end-of-life items that are recycled at high rates include
automobiles, where steel where over 90% of steel is recovered and made
into new steel. A report from McKinsey suggests that a battery made of
recycled metals has four times fewer energy requirements than a battery
made from virgin natural resources (McKinsey 2023). Another example is
aluminum, which is also recycled at high rates because of relatively
low energy requirements than recovery of bauxite. Recycling these
metals can result in the avoidance of up to 90% of the energy used to
produce these material from natural resources. The reason these
materials go uncollected is the lack of rules and regulations that
require their recovery and collection. According to a 2022 GAO report,
``DOE officials stated that most critical minerals, such as rare earth
elements (REE), are not collected for recycling on a large scale, in
part because of variations in recycling programs'' (p 16, GAO 2022).
``Moreover, according to an EPA report, U.S. recyclable collection
infrastructure is outdated.'' (p. 17, GAO, 2022).

Question 2. Could you expand upon the social and economic benefits
of developing circular economy approaches to mitigating critical
minerals supply chain risks?

Answer. The social and economic benefits of developing a circular
economy for critical minerals supplies are manyfold. Critical area that
would benefit from expanded recycling and collection systems for
materials include job creation, infrastructure investments, and
workforce development. Developing a value chain for various critical
metals here in the United States can help buffer supplies that might be
vulnerable to disruption. Developing leadership in this space could
result in valuable industry as the value of battery recycling alone is
poised to be over $95 billion per year by 2040 (McKinsey 2023).

Question 3. Please expand on the community and environmental
benefits of reforming the Mining Law of 1872, and why these reforms are
needed to build a sustainable domestic supply chain for critical
minerals and materials.

Answer. The interagency working group report on Responsible Mining
on Public Lands identified over sixty actions that can help create
better predictability for environmental groups, Tribes, and mining
companies. Reforming the 1872 mining law according the report and other
experts suggest that community benefits from these reforms come in a
variety of forms including more certainty, accountability, and
stakeholder perspectives that result in better project outcomes.

Question 4. How should Tribal consultation, cultural heritage,
water supplies, and endangered species factor into mine permitting?

Answer. Water supplies particularly across the American West's
public lands system are critical to thriving communities and
ecosystems. Given the extensive legacy contamination of water it is
critical that new mine permitting processes take water concerns
seriously and ensure that there are revenues set aside to clean up
potential groundwater contamination during operations through mine
closure and reclamation. Ongoing regional droughts across the west mean
that its important to ensure that groundwater and surface waters are
not over drafted for mining activities.

Tribal consultation is often described as failing Tribes. It is
important that Tribes are consider more than merely stakeholders or
members of the public but as sovereign nations with important expertise
on cultural resources. We need to collectively do more to center Tribal
voices in mining permitting decisions because often these perspectives
are in strong alignment with sustainable land use stewardship and
protecting cultural heritage and endangered species.

References

Damgaard, A., Larsen, A.W., & Christensen, T.H. (2009). Recycling of
metals: accounting of greenhouse gases and global warming
contributions. Waste Management & Research, 27(8), 773-780. https://
doi.org/10.1177/0734242X09346838

Government Accountability Office, 2022. Critical Minerals Building on
Federal Efforts to Advance Recovery and Substitution Could Help Address
Supply Risks. 2022-06-01. https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-22-104824

Interagency Working Group. 2023. Recommendations to Improve Mining on
Public Lands. https://www.doi.gov/pressreleases/biden-harris-
administration-report-outlines-reforms-needed-promote-responsible-
mining

McKinsey, 2023. Battery recycling takes the driver's seat. March 13,
2023. https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/automotive-and-assembly/our-
insights/battery-recycling-takes-the-drivers-seat

______

Mr. Stauber. Thank you for your testimony. I will now yield
to Representative Curtis to introduce our final witness.

Mr. Curtis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is my honor to
introduce Mr. Brian Somers. I am grateful that we had the
opportunity to invite him here. Brian has been the President of
the Utah Mining Association, or UMA, since 2019.
UMA works tirelessly to ensure that the country has a
stable supply of minerals for the United States to lead
globally in energy and other industries.
Brian, it is a delight to have you with us. Thanks for
traveling to Washington, DC.

STATEMENT OF BRIAN SOMERS, PRESIDENT, UTAH MINING ASSOCIATION,
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH

Mr. Somers. Thank you for that kind introduction,
Congressman, and good morning to Chairman Stauber, and Ranking
Member Ocasio-Cortez, and other members of the Committee. I
appreciate the invitation to testify in today's hearing. My
name is Brian Somers, and I am the President of the Utah Mining
Association, or UMA.
UMA was founded in 1915 and represents Utah's hardrock,
coal, and industrial mineral mine operators and related support
industries. UMA also works closely with the National Mining
Association and other state and regional industry groups. UMA's
mission is to advocate on behalf of Utah's mining industry, its
workers, and the communities they support.
Mining is a critical industry in Utah, contributing $7.7
billion to the state's GDP, supporting nearly 57,000 direct and
indirect jobs, and powering Utah's broader economy by producing
the coal which provides 62 percent of Utah's low-priced
electricity. Mining jobs in Utah are family and community-
sustaining jobs, with mining salaries averaging 46 percent more
than the average Utah wage.
Since Utah's first commercial mining district was
established in 1863, 33 years before Utah became a state,
Utah's mining industry has labored diligently to develop Utah's
vast mineral wealth and provide the mined commodities markets
demand. I believe the fundamental reason a hearing like this, a
discussion about how and why particular minerals have been
deemed critical is even necessary, is due to interference by
bad actors like China who seek to distort and control commodity
markets, and by misguided regulatory burdens, policy decisions,
and investment signals by the Federal Government.
A recent report entitled, ``Critical Minerals of Utah''
released by the Utah Geological Survey states, ``The concept of
critical minerals is not new. And in the United States, various
lists of commodities and definitions of what qualifies as
critical have been developed since the early 1900s.''
Again, the fact that a hearing like today's is still
necessary more than 100 years on is prima facie evidence that
making lists, however methodologically sound, is not as useful
as letting the diverse demands of free markets, environmental
responsibility, operational efficiency, technological
innovation, economic security, and national security determine
which minerals are critical at any given time.
More simply, perhaps we could adopt the definition of
criticality put forth by our friends at the National Mining
Association, which is that minerals that are unavailable when
we need them should be considered critical.
Utah provides an example of how, as NMA presciently
observed in a comment letter on the original critical minerals
list, ``World events can redefine criticality in an amazingly
short period of time.''
A 2020 report from the Utah Geological Survey stated that
Utah hosts 28 of the 35 minerals on the original critical
minerals list, and had active production of 8 of them. When the
U.S. Geological Survey released the revised critical minerals
list in 2022, 4 of those 8 critical minerals Utah was producing
were removed from the list: uranium, potash, helium, and
rhenium.
Just 2 days before the revised critical minerals list was
published in the Federal Register, Russia invaded Ukraine. In
the aftermath of the invasion, global prices for uranium spiked
and remained at near-record highs as alternatives to uranium
supplied by Russia and Russian-aligned countries are explored,
especially in light of the greatly diminished capacity of the
United States' once thriving uranium mining, milling, and
enrichment industries. Prices for potash also spiked after the
invasion and have remained high, given that Russia and Belarus
account for 41 percent of global trade in potash, with
resulting negative effects on food supply and prices.
Ongoing shortages and high prices for helium also continue,
putting further strains on the global semiconductor shortage
which began during the COVID pandemic, as semiconductor
manufacturing constitutes the second largest use of helium
worldwide.
Almost in real time, world events was highlighting the
criticality of uranium and potash and helium as the USGS was
downgrading their critical status.
I should also note that Utah is home to the nation's last
functioning conventional uranium mill in Mr. Curtis' district
and is also the only state in the Union which produces the
higher-value sulfate of potash, or SOP, which made the
exclusion of uranium and potash in the revised critical
minerals list especially puzzling to Utahns.
There are many other concerns and inconsistencies related
to the Federal Government's designation of critical minerals
and its management of the nation's mineral estate, which I hope
we can discuss today. These include competing Federal mineral
and material criticality assessments, such as the Department of
Energy's critical materials list and the Defense Logistics
Agency's National Defense Stockpile; the accelerated withdrawal
of public lands from mineral production during the Biden
administration; implications of the fact that many minerals
designated as critical are collocated and produced with other
minerals which may not share a criticality designation; the
severe diminishment of domestic mineral processing, smelting,
refining, and other beneficiation capacity over the last few
decades; and the Federal Government's Byzantine and burdensome
permitting processes which are far outside the norm of other
allied countries with similar labor and environmental
protections, and which discouraged capital investment.
Again, I urge the Committee to consider the idea that any
minerals that are unavailable when we need them should be
considered critical. There are far too many minerals which are
unnecessarily unavailable and constrained because we have
neglected our nation's vast mineral resources, our highly
trained mining workforce, and our unrivaled capacity for
innovation. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Somers follows:]
Prepared Statement of Brian Somers, President, Utah Mining Association

Good morning, Chairman Stauber and members of the Committee. I
appreciate the invitation to testify in today's hearing. My name is
Brian Somers and I am the president of the Utah Mining Association
(UMA). UMA was founded in 1915 and represents Utah's hardrock, coal,
and industrial mineral mine operators and related support industries.
UMA also works closely with the National Mining Association and other
state and regional industry groups.
UMA's mission is to advocate on behalf of Utah's mining industry,
its workers, and the communities they support. Mining is a critical
industry in Utah, contributing $7.7 billion to the state's GDP,
supporting nearly 57,000 direct and indirect jobs,\1\ and powering
Utah's broader economy by producing the coal which provides 62% of
Utah's low-priced electricity.\2\ Mining jobs in Utah are family- and
community-sustaining jobs with mining salaries averaging 46% more than
the average Utah wage.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ McCarty, T.J., Wang, Z., Kim, M., and Evans, J., 2022, The
economic contribution of Utah's energy and mining industries: Utah
Geological Survey Miscellaneous Publication 176, 12 p., 4 appendices,
https://doi.org/10.34191/MP-176
\2\ https://www.nei.org/resources/statistics/state-electricity-
generation-fuel-shares
\3\ https://jobs.utah.gov/jsp/utalmis/#/industry/list
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Since Utah's first commercial mining district was established in
1863--33 years before Utah became a state--Utah's mining industry has
labored diligently to develop Utah's vast mineral wealth and provide
the mined commodities markets demand. I believe the fundamental reason
a hearing like this--a discussion about how and why particular minerals
have been deemed ``critical''--is even necessary is due to interference
by bad actors like China who seek to distort and control commodity
markets, and by misguided regulatory burdens, policy decisions, and
investment signals by the federal government.
A recent report entitled ``Critical Minerals of Utah'' released by
the Utah Geological Survey states, ``The concept of critical minerals
is not new, and in the United States various lists of commodities and
definitions of what qualifies as critical have been developed since the
early 1900s.'' \4\ Again, the fact that a hearing like today's is still
necessary more than 100 years on is prima facie evidence that making
lists--however methodologically sound--is not as useful as letting the
diverse demands of free markets, environmental responsibility,
operational efficiency, technological innovation, economic security,
and national security determine which minerals are ``critical'' at any
given time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Mills, S.E., and Rupke, A., 2023, Critical minerals of Utah,
second edition: Utah Geological Survey Circular 135, 47 p., https://
doi.org/10.34191/C-135.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
More simply, perhaps we could adopt the definition of criticality
put forth by our friends at the National Mining Association (NMA),
which is that, ``. . . minerals that unavailable when we need them
should be considered critical.'' \5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Sweeney, Katie. National Mining Association letter to Secretary
of the Interior Ryan Zinke. 19 March 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Utah provides an example of how, as NMA presciently observed in a
comment letter on the original critical minerals list, ``World events
can redefine criticality in an amazingly short period of time.'' \6\ A
2020 report from the Utah Geological Survey stated that Utah hosts 28
of the 35 minerals on the original critical minerals list and had
active production of eight of them.\7\ When the U.S. Geological Survey
(USGS) released the revised critical minerals list in 2022, four of the
eight critical minerals Utah was producing were removed from the list:
uranium, potash, helium, and rhenium.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ ibid.
\7\ Mills, S.E. and Rupke, A., 2020, Critical minerals of Utah:
Utah Geological Survey Circular 129, 49 p., https://doi.org/10.34191/C-
129. The report notes that uranium was not produced from ores mined
directly in Utah--despite proven reserves and significant historical
production--but from the extraction of uranium from alternate feeds
from out-of-state sources which were processed at the White Mesa
uranium mill in Blanding, Utah.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Just two days before the revised critical minerals list was
published in the Federal Register, Russia invaded Ukraine. In the
aftermath of the invasion, global prices for uranium spiked and remain
at near-record highs \8\ as alternatives to uranium supplied by Russia
and Russian-aligned countries are explored, especially in light of the
greatly diminished capacity of the U.S.' once thriving uranium mining,
milling, and enrichment industries. Prices for potash also spiked after
the invasion and have remained high given that Russia and Belarus
account for 41% of global trade in potash,\9\ with resulting negative
effects on food supply and prices. Ongoing shortages and high prices
for helium also continue, putting further strains on the global
semiconductor shortage which began during the Covid pandemic as
semiconductor manufacturing constitutes the second-largest use of
helium worldwide.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ https://tradingeconomics.com/commodity/uraniumhttps://
tradingeconomics.com/commodity/uranium
\9\ https://www.ifpri.org/blog/russia-ukraine-war-after-year-
impacts-fertilizer-production-prices-and-trade-flows
\10\ https://pubs.aip.org/physicstoday/article/76/9/18/2908156/
Helium-prices-surge-to-record-levels-as-shortage
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Almost in real-time, world events were highlighting the criticality
of uranium, potash, and helium as the USGS was downgrading their
critical status. I should also note that Utah is home to the nation's
last functioning conventional uranium mill and is the only state in the
union which produces the higher-value sulphate of potash or SOP,\11\
which made the exclusion of uranium and potash from the revised
critical minerals list especially puzzling to Utahns.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Rupke, A., Mills, S.E., Vanden Berg, M.D., and Boden, T.,
2023, Utah mining 2022--metals, industrial minerals, uranium, coal, and
unconventional fuels: Utah Geological Survey Circular 136, 32 p.,
https://doi.org/10.34191/C-136.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There are many other concerns and inconsistencies related to
federal government's designation of critical minerals and its
management of the nation's mineral estate which I hope we can discuss
during committee questions. These include: Competing federal mineral
and material criticality assessments such as the Department of Energy's
Critical Materials List and the Defense Logistics Agency's National
Defense Stockpile; the accelerated withdrawal of public lands from
mineral production during the Biden administration; implications of the
fact that many minerals designated as critical are co-located and
produced with other minerals which may not share a criticality
designation; the severe diminishment of domestic mineral processing,
smelting, refining, and other beneficiation capacity over the last few
decades; and the federal government's byzantine and burdensome
permitting processes which are far outside the norm of other allied
countries with similar environmental and labor standards and which
discourage capital investment.
Again, I urge the committee to consider the idea that any minerals
that are unavailable when we need them should be considered critical.
There are far too many minerals which are unnecessarily unavailable or
constrained because we have neglected our nation's vast mineral
resources, our highly trained mining workforce, and our unrivaled
capacity for innovation.
Thank you, again, for the opportunity to testify, and I look
forward to answering any questions.

______

Mr. Stauber. Thank you, Mr. Somers, and it is great to see
you again. Visiting Kennecott Mine was very, very impressive
and very informational for us. Thank you.
I am now going to recognize Members for 5 minutes of
questions, and I am going to recognize myself first.
Dr. Nassar, I would like to ask you about the forecasting
abilities of USGS. I understand that today you analyze risks
for a given mineral using current supply and demand data only,
but do not use forecasting to analyze how risks may change in
the next few years. How does your current structure address
mineral commodities that are predicted by multiple reports and
models to have extremely high demand in the future?
Dr. Nassar. Chairman, thank you for that question. You are
correct. Our analysis looks at contemporary data regarding
current production and demand. But as we have seen recently,
our analysis has predictive power, as in the case of gallium.
And, indeed, our analysis that we started with the National
Science Technology Subcommittee on Critical Minerals in a
report that we did back in 2016 highlighted that we could have,
using the same indicators, identified that rare earths would
have been a problem as early as 2001 and cobalt as early as
2010. So, these analyses, while using contemporary data, do
have predictive power.
We are looking at developing our forecasting capabilities,
but currently complete data sets in terms of reliable forecasts
that are internally consistent regarding future supply and
demand across all commodities and all industries that we cover,
currently don't exist.
Mr. Stauber. Well, let's take copper as an example.
Dr. Nassar. Sure.
Mr. Stauber. I am sure you are aware of the multiple
requests to add copper to the critical minerals list, given its
increasing demand. The Director of the USGS, David Applegate,
sent a letter to Senator Sinema, declining her request to re-
evaluate copper as a critical mineral this past April.
However, just in July, the Department of Energy published
its list of materials, and copper was included in that list.
Can you explain why copper is considered at-risk enough to be
considered critical material by the DOE but not sufficiently at
risk to be a critical mineral at your agency?
Dr. Nassar. Thank you, Chairman, for that question. I am
happy to answer it.
Copper is an important mineral commodity not only for the
United States, but for the world, and has been since antiquity.
While copper is clearly essential, its supply chain risks are
mitigated by a large and diverse global supply chain that spans
over 50 countries, reliable trade partners, dependable domestic
production, and significant recycling capacity that supplies
over a third of U.S. copper supply.
USGS has and will continue to analyze copper supply and
demand. It is a commodity that we study and will continue to
invest research and assessments in. And I am happy to lean on
some of the testimony that Professor Eggert mentioned in terms
of the differences between the DOE analysis, which is global
and specific----
Mr. Stauber. And that is going to be a great segue, so
thank you.
Dr. Eggert, what do you consider to be the most significant
difference between the USGS critical minerals list and the DOE
critical minerals list, and what do you think the impact of
these differences may be?
Dr. Eggert. The key differences are those that I identified
in my statement: narrower in focus, energy technology-specific,
and forward-looking over different time frames.
Obviously, it makes a difference in terms of what
qualifies, although it is noteworthy that both lists, the DOE
and the USGS lists, have significant overlap.
Mr. Stauber. OK. Mr. Somers, do you think the USGS critical
mineral list and the methodology for creating such a list is
nimble enough to react to changing market conditions and
geopolitical events?
Mr. Somers. Thank you for the question. No, I don't. And I
highlighted some of the issues with the critical minerals that
were removed from the list in this last go-round, and the world
events that perhaps made the removal of those minerals unwise.
And I think that a list that is updated every 3 years, again,
no matter what the methodology is, is simply not nimble enough
to respond to very quickly changing world and economic events.
Mr. Stauber. What is the value or implication of a mineral
being on the critical minerals list for the mining companies
that are operating in Utah?
Mr. Somers. I think that, to be honest, we haven't seen
investment decisions being driven thus far by inclusion or non-
inclusion under the critical minerals list.
I think that one of the things that we need to highlight
here, though, is that, again, most of these minerals,
especially the ones where we have major foreign reliance, they
are not primary targets of mining. They tend to be collocated
with other minerals. And in many cases, these are not minerals
that are on the list.
As you were visiting Kennecott, the Bingham Canyon Mine a
few months ago, that is a copper porphyry deposit. So, yes,
copper is the primary target, but it also provides gold,
silver, molybdenum, and also critical minerals like rhenium and
platinum, palladium, and tellurium.
So, I think that in many cases you have to make sure that
there is a base for a target mineral which can support a very
large and complex and capital-intensive mining operation. And
also in many cases that is going to provide some of these
minerals that are a little bit harder to extract and maybe not
economical to extract on their own.
Mr. Stauber. And then one quick question for Mr. Blakemore.
Mr. Blakemore, what is the biggest factor in mineral supply
chain vulnerability that is not addressed by the USGS critical
minerals list today?
Mr. Blakemore. I would suggest it is the assessment of what
does that criticality look like by the time we reach 2050? As
it relates to the technologies we are dependent on in the
energy space and beyond. These are all high innovation sectors
where the technology is changing, the underlying minerals are
changing for many of these technologies, but also the
innovations around substitutability and supply chain
circularity for certain minerals and materials are also
changing.
So, those features are critical to develop a holistic plan
of action in terms of how we both modernize, adapt, and act on
any sort of critical minerals list that is being produced, not
just by the USGS, but by other parts of the U.S. Government,
writ large.
Mr. Stauber. Thank you very much, and my time has expired.
I am now going to recognize Representative Ocasio-Cortez for 5
minutes of questioning.
Ms. Ocasio-Cortez. Thank you so much, Chairman. And thank
you again to our witnesses. It is important for us, I think, as
policymakers, to understand how the USGS critical minerals list
works and, frankly, to communicate this to the public. I think
part of our hearings is also an effort in public education on a
lot of these different issues. So, I want us to zoom out a
little bit and ask Dr. Nassar.
In explaining to a layperson, what does it mean for a
mineral or a critical mineral to be added to the USGS critical
minerals list? What are the implications of that, and what does
that mean to the average person?
Dr. Nassar. Thank you, Congresswoman. The simplest way I
can put it is that these are commodities for which there is a
heightened degree of supply risk, meaning that they are
commodities that are not only important, but for which supply
may be disrupted in the near future.
The benefits of the list is the ease of communication. But
as my colleagues on the panel have mentioned, it is definitely
a nuanced issue. There are a lot of concerns with just having a
simple binary. We agree with that, which is why we provide a
ranking methodology that prioritizes things.
In one sense, it is a way to prioritize both government
action and to highlight issues and concerns.
Ms. Ocasio-Cortez. And there are also policy implications
for a mineral being added to the critical minerals list,
correct? There are tax credits, as have been mentioned, and
other sorts of policy incentives for investment, for example,
through the Infrastructure and Jobs Act.
Dr. Nassar. Correct. As I mentioned in my opening
testimony, other Federal agencies have used the critical
minerals list as a way to prioritize. Within USGS, we use it
also to prioritize our research, which commodities we should
focus on.
That doesn't mean that we don't look at commodities and do
research on commodities that are not on the critical minerals
list.
Ms. Ocasio-Cortez. Yes, and I think from a policy
perspective this creates a little bit of a tension, where we
want to make sure that this list is accurate, that it contains
all of the minerals that truly are a priority, but also, I
think for us, we deal with a profound incentive because it
creates a large pressure for people who want to add minerals to
this list and have access to some of those perks and benefits.
So, we have to make sure that we are having the appropriate
amount of minerals on this list while also dealing with,
frankly, very real political incentives to pile on things to
this list that perhaps may not be necessary.
But in addition to that, I also want us to explore further
the implications of that. As was mentioned earlier, there are
very real needs, of course, for minerals in our economy,
everything from EVs to a wide range of different uses. But I do
want us to explore a little bit on how we can reduce the need
for the intensity of these minerals overall.
Dr. Mulvaney, what are some of the ways that we can
actually reduce some of these supply chain risks for critical
minerals that don't necessarily involve mining?
And what are some of the economic and social benefits of
developing a circular economy here?
Dr. Mulvaney. Recycling and recovery programs in Europe are
creating new stockpiles of end-of-life materials that can then
be brought back into feedstocks for new materials. So, that is
one area that is kind of closing the loop on these materials
and not letting them get away.
We could also substitute for materials. We have seen even
recently cobalt and nickel falling, a few years ago people were
saying 20-fold increase in cobalt needed by X date, and we have
seen those numbers come down quite significantly because of
advances in materials substitution. So, there is less cobalt in
the batteries that have cobalt. And then we have seen a lot of
companies just go away from cobalt and nickel altogether to the
lithium iron phosphate batteries, which created a supply chain
crunch, by the way, in the manufacturing sector, and caused
those battery prices to go up. That was independent of the
minerals extraction and all of that.
And furthermore, just resource efficiency in general. We
make solar panels with less silicon, with less silver, with
less glass, less energy, so we can be more efficient with the
materials that we use.
Ms. Ocasio-Cortez. Fabulous. And I was wondering, as well,
if you could dig into the current state of battery recycling
and other forms of recycling that could potentially reduce our
reliance on minerals. How does that comparatively look in the
United States, compared to some of our European counterparts?
And what are some of the largest opportunities that you see for
investment there?
Dr. Mulvaney. Europe has had a comprehensive electrical
equipment and electronics legislation, as well as battery
recycling policy across the board for 15, 20 years now. And now
the European Battery Directive has just been released that
requires, for example, certain amounts of recycled content to
be in the battery. That is, I think, very promising for
jumpstarting those industries.
One thing I have noticed having served on various recycling
and waste management boards and things like that, is recycling
is pretty volatile also. We recyclers, sometimes paper is worth
stuff, sometimes aluminum is worth stuff, sometimes it is not
worth anything. And that bounces around, too. So, rules like
that, where you have content requirements, how much recycled
content is in a battery, for example, can help drive recycling.
Batteries, because of the value of some of those materials,
we are starting to see investment in those. We see state laws,
for example, that require the recycling of batteries. So, that
has jumpstarted many recycling industries, for example, that
are getting located in Nevada, partly because of California's
requirements for battery recovery.
So, we are getting there. We need more Federal policy. We
have had a lot of Federal inaction. The only waste electronical
equipment we collect is, we actually don't collect. The only
waste electrical equipment that we require be handled in
certain ways is just hazardous stuff. So, we are landfilling
way too much copper, too much lithium.
And the benefits of having recycling programs, we have had
quite a few fires, for example, at material recovery facilities
because of a little battery in a card, like a Hallmark card,
might have a battery in it and that goes through a shredder and
it causes a fire, it causes $5 million worth of damage at a
MRF. And that costs taxpayer money and causes public health
challenges for people exposed to those fires.
Ms. Ocasio-Cortez. Thank you so much. I appreciate it.
Mr. Stauber. Thank you very much. The Chair now recognizes
Mr. Lamborn for 5 minutes.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to have
the Climax and Henderson molybdenum mines in my state of
Colorado. I used to represent one of these two mines in my
former district lines. They are the only pure molybdenum mines
outside of China, and together produce 33 percent of our entire
domestic production. And it is critical for energy and
infrastructure projects.
The Henderson mine alone is able to recycle 75 percent of
its water, or roughly 2 billion gallons in 2022. And much of
this water is even sent to the city of Denver and reclaimed as
drinking water.
So, Dr. Eggert, while our Colorado mines specifically
target molybdenum, it is more often the case that critical
minerals are produced as a byproduct of a host mineral. Can you
explain the relationship between critical minerals and host
minerals, and how important is it to have a robust mining
industry for all minerals if we want to harvest critical
minerals?
Dr. Eggert. As several people have said, many of the
minerals listed as critical are produced as minor byproducts of
other things, some of which are not major or listed as critical
minerals. It is both a risk, but it is also an opportunity
because in places like the Kennecott Bingham Canyon Mine in
Utah, for example, there are unrecovered minor amounts of
critical minerals that are waiting to be recovered. There are
emerging efforts in this regard, and I think they are worthy of
greater attention.
Mr. Lamborn. OK, thank you. China recently announced that
it will curb the export of gallium for which they produce the
bulk of the world's supply, and germanium upon which the United
States is 54 percent reliant on Chinese exports. These two
minerals are critical for semiconductors, solar cells,
integrated circuits, fiber optics, and more. The United States
is more than capable of producing these items domestically, and
it is unacceptable not to do so, considering the amount of
money and attention we have placed upon microchip production in
the last few years.
In 1943, U.S. bauxite production, for example, which is the
host mineral for gallium, peaked at 6.3 million tons. By 2013,
that had dropped to 128,000 tons, which is less than 1 percent
of global supply.
Now, China, by the way, is not as environmentally
responsible as we are. In my opinion, if we are less dependent
on China, this creates a race to the top, bringing production
to our shores where we do such a better job. By offshoring
production to China, we are poisoning the world as well as
endangering our national security.
So, Dr. Nassar, if we allow the development of critical
minerals in general, would the United States be less dependent
on China?
Dr. Nassar. Congressman, thank you for that question. I
agree that the United States is not a major bauxite producer.
In fact, we import quite a bit of our bauxite to produce
alumina. So, when we did a quick analysis in terms of the
gallium content of the imported bauxite, there was quite a bit
in there that potentially could be produced in the United
States. And in the latest list, our analysis specifically
examines country metrics that evaluate how reliable those
supplies may be.
Mr. Lamborn. On another topic, demand for minerals and
metals is expected to drastically increase to meet
manufacturing, infrastructure, energy, and national defense
needs. The DOD's Logistics Energy Agency provides economic
analysis and forecasts for strategic and critical minerals.
That is one of the three lists that we talked about in your
testimony.
How does the Defense Logistics Agency's analysis compare to
that of DOE or USGS?
And are the components of that methodology that USGS could
pick up?
And I will start with you, Dr. Eggert.
Dr. Eggert. The Defense Logistics Agency analysis has a
much shorter time frame. It evaluates emergent national
emergencies of months to several years. It focuses on both
military preparedness and essential civilian infrastructure in
times of national emergency. It is very detailed. I don't have
a lot of insight into it, but it is an example of a narrower
focus and a specific type of emergency that is being evaluated.
Mr. Lamborn. Dr. Nassar, do you have anything to add to
that real quickly?
Dr. Nassar. No, I think that is accurate.
I would add just quickly that the USGS provides data for
both the Defense Logistics Agency and the Department of Energy
to analyze their issues and provide their reports.
Mr. Lamborn. OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Dr. Gosar [presiding]. The gentlelady from Nevada, Ms. Lee,
is recognized for her 5 minutes.
Ms. Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And I really appreciate us
having this hearing. I come from Nevada. As we transition to a
clean energy economy, as well as the focus on hardrock mining,
we are no strangers to these issues and stand to economically,
of course, benefit tremendously from this transition. So, I
appreciate us taking the time to really delve into this area in
terms of critical minerals.
I thank you all for being here, and I hope that your
testimony will help inform us as we navigate this important
transition.
Companies like MP Materials are playing an absolutely
essential role in securing our clean energy future and shoring
up our strategic positioning in the critical minerals sectors.
And this is particularly true and concerning in light of the
reality that countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo
and China are currently responsible for up to 70 percent of the
global production of key rare earth elements. As vital as this
is, and I agree with Chair Stauber that we have to onshore
production of this, but it is only half of the story.
Professor Mulvaney, I wanted to ask you, is there any
reality in which the United States would simply be able to just
mine our way out of the need for critical minerals?
I think it is fair to say. Would you agree that a whole-of-
supply-chain approach is the most effective, efficient, and
most realistic way to help us achieve this goal?
Dr. Mulvaney. Yes, a whole supply chain approach would
certainly shore up more minerals because we are literally
letting stuff fall through our fingers a lot. So, yes.
Ms. Lee. And back in my state of Nevada, Nevada-born and
Nevada-based Redwood Materials is building a battery recycling
facility near Reno that is creating 5,000 jobs and will be able
to process enough recycled materials to supply a million EVs a
year. To me, that sounds like a win-win. Would you agree that
this not only stands to benefit our environment, but also our
economy, this type of approach?
Dr. Mulvaney. Yes, especially since a lot of those
batteries come from California. And I have looked at data, and
that stuff goes all over the country. So, having it closer to
California is, I think, and plus in Nevada, I know Nevada has
batteries, too.
I had read that the cathode material that they are
processing has a 90 percent reduction in greenhouse gas
emissions, as well.
So, as we recover more materials, often it is the case that
they actually are less greenhouse gas intensive and less energy
intensive. So, it benefits in multiple ways, as well as creates
jobs, too.
Ms. Lee. Thank you.
Dr. Nassar, I wanted to turn to Earth MRI, decreasing the
nation's reliance on foreign sources of critical minerals by
shining a spotlight on relevant resources in states like my
home state of Nevada and assisting in locating and mapping
abandoned hardrock mine sites. As you know, this is a
bipartisan health and safety concern in the Western United
States, and particularly in a state like mine where there are
at least 900 known abandoned hardrock mines within 100 square
miles of the Spring Mountains.
Can you just talk about how this will assist us in dealing
with abandoned mines?
Dr. Nassar. I will do my best. Earth MRI is not my area of
expertise, but I do know from my colleagues that mineral
exploration is hampered due to lack of adequate geological,
geophysical, and topographic data. These data can be used for
not only identifying areas of potential for critical minerals,
but also identifying and characterizing legacy hardrock sites.
Ms. Lee. Is there any other expert who wants to comment on
this?
No? OK. Well, thank you. I yield back.
Dr. Gosar. I thank the gentlelady. The gentleman from Utah,
Mr. Curtis, is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Curtis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Nassar, I am going to continue on this theme that you
have heard from a number of us this morning. And I want to talk
about helium, specifically. As you know, the Biden
administration removed helium from the critical minerals list.
Helium is vital to our economy, including in defense,
semiconductors, health care, and more.
And there is also a well-documented shortage of helium. In
fact, Gary Stanley, the Director of the Office of Materials
Industries at the Commerce Department, in 2021 stated, ``You
can see helium is at the center when you look at the medical
side, climate change, health care, the whole area of the U.S.
economic growth and recovery from COVID-19. We see that helium
is one of the most critical minerals that can be seen at the
center of that conversation.''
Shortly after that, in February 2022, the Biden
administration removed helium from the critical minerals list.
Given the Commerce Department's comments, can you please
explain why helium was removed?
Dr. Nassar. Thank you, Congressman, for that question. One
of the key factors that we look at is import dependence, net
import dependence. And the United States is the world's largest
producer of helium, and has been for a long time, and a net
exporter of helium. That is the main reason it was taken off
the critical minerals list.
Mr. Curtis. There is a well-documented shortage of helium.
Can you explain why helium was taken off the list?
Dr. Nassar. Yes, sir. I believe those are commercial
issues. The fact of the matter remains that the United States
is a net exporter of helium, producing significantly larger
quantities of helium than it consumes domestically.
Mr. Curtis. So, I think you are sensing a brain freeze from
a lot of us up here that your definition of a critical mineral
has a lot to do with supply chain. And I would disagree with
you on the availability. All of those things can be disrupted
and changed in moments. So, how is it that things can be
critical and not be critical?
Dr. Nassar. I think the issue is definitional. I think
critical is a word that I often try not to use because it gets
conflated for that reason. It gets conflated with a word of
importance. I think there is no doubt that helium and basically
every mineral commodity is important to somebody, right?
What we are looking at is trying to understand what is the
supply risk to the entire U.S. economy. And that is how we do
the analysis. And for commodities for which we are a net
exporter, we are dependent on domestic sources for those
commodities.
Mr. Curtis. OK. But yes, we are a net exporter, but we have
a shortage. We don't have enough.
Dr. Nassar. My understanding is that, based on the USGS
estimates of reserves, there are 8.5 billion cubic meters of
helium reserves. That is not all there is, that is just the
reserves that are known. So, there is significant supply for
decades, if not centuries, of helium.
Mr. Curtis. All right. We are going to agree to disagree on
that.
Mr. Somers, you and I understand Utah well, and the mining
industry. I would like to kind of have you opine for a minute
on this concept that we talk about a lot, that somehow it is OK
to seek these minerals in other countries, where we don't see
and hear some of the human rights, some of the standards, some
of the emission standards that are in play.
Is it fair to say that is viewed hypocritically sometimes
in the state? And can you kind of explain how that feels to our
U.S. miners in the United States and in Utah?
Mr. Somers. Absolutely. And with your indulgence, Mr.
Curtis, I would actually like to talk about the helium for a
second.
Mr. Curtis. Please, yes. Actually, I should have started
with that, but please jump in.
Mr. Somers. Again, with your indulgence, most of the helium
targets in Utah are in your district, as you know.
Mr. Curtis. Right.
Mr. Somers. We actually had been seeing quite a bit of
exploration activity around potential helium development. And
most of that is frozen up. And my understanding is that a large
reason for that is because of the re-establishment or the
expansion of the Bears Ears National Monument, which is very
close to many of those helium targets. And then also because of
litigation. Many of the helium targets that have been looked at
in your district have been the subject of litigation almost
pre-emptively.
So, to your other point, I do think that it is very
hypocritical when we can mine these commodities much better in
a more environmentally friendly way with regard to labor
protections, with regard to technological innovation here in
the United States better than they can do it in foreign places.
And it is always baffling to me that many people will drive
across town for a fair trade coffee bean, but their car is full
of cobalt that has come from child miners in the Congo, and it
is just not acceptable.
Mr. Curtis. Another way to say that, and unfortunately, we
are almost out of time, is this body literally controls every
aspect of the way that is mined in Utah and in the United
States, and we have zero control on how that is mined overseas.
Mr. Somers. Absolutely.
Mr. Curtis. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I am regrettably out of time. I yield back.
Dr. Gosar. And to the gentleman, don't forget Helium-4, and
these new ideas about fission.
Mr. Curtis. Thank you.
Dr. Gosar. The gentlewoman from Michigan, Mrs. Dingell, is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Dingell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Today's hearing is focused on critical minerals, which we
all know is critical and essential for our transition to the
clean energy economy and electric vehicle manufacturing, which
I know my colleagues on the other side love. But my home state
of Michigan is home to a major hub for electric vehicle
manufacturing, which is why I am entirely focused on ensuring
the United States has the capacity to reach our full potential
when it comes to the buildout of electric vehicles for both
jobs and the climate.
The Inflation Reduction Act changed the requirements for
electric vehicle tax credits for consumers, requiring either
assembly in North America or at least 40 percent of the value
of critical minerals used for the vehicle to be extracted,
processed, and/or recycled domestically or in a country that
the United States has a fair trade agreement with.
So, I have a question for you, Dr. Mulvaney. We know that
current laws for domestic mining have not been meaningfully
updated in over 150 years, and that has tipped the scales
toward mining companies and away from the communities who want
to have a fair say in the decision-making if we are going to
build a strong, enduring mining industry in the United States,
especially one that is going to fit the needs to meet the
vehicles of the future.
So, Dr. Mulvaney, can you expand on why it is essential
that we reform the Mining Law of 1872 as we build a sustainable
domestic supply chain for electric vehicles?
Dr. Mulvaney. Thank you for the question. I noted in
reading some of the testimony that the mining law is older than
the USGS, which I think is worth pointing out.
Native Americans in particular, I think, have borne the
brunt of the negative impacts of mining across the United
States, and that is partly due to the proximity of mining
developments. And I think it is something like 600,000 Native
Americans live within 6 miles of an abandoned mine, and that
usually has implications for groundwater and other things.
If we were to try to think about a new reform around
mining, cleaning up some of these legacy wastes, I think, would
be one area to focus on. Raising revenues to do that, I think
we don't raise enough money for those kinds of things, and the
taxpayer ends up paying for a lot of the mine waste cleanup at
the end of the day.
And then, as the Ranking Member pointed out in the opening
remarks, a lot of these clean tech minerals are also very close
to Native American communities. So, ensuring that they get the
benefits and don't have the burdens from this transition, I
think, are also really critically important there.
And then I guess----
Mrs. Dingell. I am going to ask you to cut off there, but I
would like to have you maybe expand on this because I think we
need to have a sustainable supply. That is something we all
want to work on.
But Dr. Nassar, we also know that mining is not always the
risk factor for minerals on the critical minerals list.
Sometimes we do have sustainable supplies from allied
countries, but things like processing are the issue. Dr.
Nassar, can you expand on how often mining is the bottleneck of
our critical minerals versus other stops along the supply
chain?
Dr. Nassar. Thank you for that question.
Mineral commodities supply chains, of course, begin with
mining. Actually, one could argue that they begin with
exploration and having good geological data. However, what we
have seen in our data and analysis is that, more often than
not, the middle of the supply chain is where production becomes
extremely concentrated. For example, China does not dominate
lithium or cobalt mining, but it does refining. And we assess
supply chain risk at multiple supply chain stages and identify
the bottlenecks for that purpose.
Mrs. Dingell. Thank you.
Dr. Mulvaney, in the short period left, can you give us, in
your perspective, what are some more of the sustainable ways to
address these issues?
And what are the economic and social benefits of these
approaches, including job creation?
And maybe you can do more for the record later.
Dr. Mulvaney. Yes, I will just highlight a life cycle
approach, I think, is key because there are lots of
opportunities to recover from waste. And I think community
benefits and early engagement with communities will help make
projects be more socially acceptable and better and more
sustainable in the long run.
So, more collaborative approaches to mine development
instead of the approach that we use today, which is what we
call decide, announce, defend.
Mrs. Dingell. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Gosar. I thank the gentlewoman. The gentleman from
Wisconsin, Mr. Tiffany, is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Tiffany. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In reading your testimony, Dr. Mulvaney, I take it that you
view the permitting process as not burdensome at all here in
the United States of America for mineral and natural resources
projects that use natural resources.
Dr. Mulvaney. If you are specifically talking about the
National Environmental Policy Act review process, then yes.
That is the part of the permitting process that I am most
familiar with.
Mr. Tiffany. Yes. And you don't view that as burdensome?
Dr. Mulvaney. I do not.
Mr. Tiffany. Yes. It says in here the reality is the time
to permit a hardrock mine is 2 years, according to the GAO.
What do you tell Congressman Stauber about the mine that has
taken 17 years in his district?
Dr. Mulvaney. I am not familiar with that mine, and I would
love to learn more about that because that sounds like it is
out of the bounds that I typically hear from----
Mr. Tiffany. Yes, you said in regards to the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act, that is a great example of how
our projects can be built on time. Are you familiar with the
Cardinal Hickory line that is supposed to be bringing so-called
renewable energy from Iowa into Wisconsin, and how it is
delayed?
Dr. Mulvaney. I am not familiar with that one, no.
Mr. Tiffany. Yes, you should take a look at that, because I
don't think your testimony is accurate in regards to, that is
one project that is supposedly going to bring renewable energy
in.
Isn't it correct recycling is a net energy loser? Haven't
there been detailed studies that have been done that have shown
that, really, recycling is a net energy loser between all the
trucks that we run on roads and stuff like that, that we
actually end up using more hydrocarbons as a result of
recycling?
Dr. Mulvaney. I can see certain circumstances where there
might be net energy losses in certain systems. But in general,
I do not think that that is true. Recycling is a net energy
winner in most cases.
Mr. Tiffany. I would urge you to review some of the
documentation out there. In particular, I would point you to a
fellow Californian who is in academia, Steven Hayward, and see
some of the work that he has done.
I see you are in the College of Social Sciences. Are all
the hard sciences at San Jose State University housed in the
Social Sciences Department?
Dr. Mulvaney. No, our department has gone back and forth
between natural sciences and social sciences because we are an
interdisciplinary department.
Mr. Tiffany. Dr. Nassar, a very good chart here in regards
to supply risk. What is the one consistent thing above the line
there that we all see in regards to all these minerals,
especially trace minerals? What is the one consistent thing
that we see there on the right side of the chart in terms of
supply risk?
Dr. Nassar. I am not exactly sure what you are referring
to, but I would imagine that you are referring to the largest
producer being China.
Mr. Tiffany. Yes, the largest producer and refiner is
China. Does that bring you any pause?
Dr. Nassar. That is definitely of concern, and the reason
why we do the analysis that we do in terms of understanding
which countries may be not reliable trade partners going
forward.
Mr. Tiffany. Mr. Chairman, as we debate the Department of
Defense budget here this week, it is very clear that this is as
big a national security concern as you can possibly have. For
those of you that have not studied the chart, take a look at it
really closely. Leading producing countries, both production
and refinery.
Dr. Eggert, has the United States of America done a better
job of mitigating risk in regards to mining over the last 100
years?
Dr. Eggert. I would say it is a mixed bag. I think we are
more aware of the issues and the problems now, but there is
always room for improvement.
Mr. Tiffany. Yes, but do you believe that we have gotten
better about mitigating that risk?
Dr. Eggert. Well, I think a lot of risk mitigation occurs
in the private entities that are directly focused on supply
chain risks, the companies that use the materials for the
products that they manufacture and use----
Mr. Tiffany. Well, specifically in regards to mining,
because there are no environmental protections put in place
when I think about the mining district that is north of me in
the community of Hurley and then Ironwood, Michigan. And now
you could never build a mine like that.
Dr. Eggert. It is correct, obviously, that there is a lot
more to mining law than the mining law itself. Certainly,
environmental rules have grown up around the mining law, and
there is room for improvement in the permitting processes and
related activities.
Mr. Tiffany. One quick question to Mr. Somers. Did I hear
you say that the USGS has downgraded potash? I came in right
when you were giving your testimony. Could you give us some
detail on what is going on there?
Mr. Somers. Yes, correct. In the 2022 list, potash was
removed as a critical mineral. And then, as I mentioned in my
testimony, this was 2 days after Ukraine was invaded by Russia,
and Russia and Belarus supply about 41 percent of the global
potash commodity that we have. So, that has a resulting
increase in fertilizer prices and availability around the
world.
Mr. Tiffany. Yes, isn't potash a critical element for
farmers to be able to grow crops?
Mr. Somers. Correct.
Mr. Tiffany. I yield back.
Dr. Gosar. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from Rhode
Island, Mr. Magaziner, is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Magaziner. Thank you, Chairman.
In order for the United States to remain competitive in
this century, we must have access to a reliable supply of
critical minerals that are vital to our national security, our
energy independence, and our economy. These minerals are used
in consumer electronics, in our phones, in our cars, and also
found in Rhode Island in some of our most important economic
sectors.
General Dynamics Electric Boat at Quonset Point in my
district builds Virginia-class submarines which need large
quantities of rare earth minerals. Offshore wind turbines like
we have in Block Island and like we are rolling out as part of
the Revolution offshore wind project also require mineral
inputs, just to use some examples.
The Energy Act of 2020 requires the Department of the
Interior to review and update the list of critical minerals,
update the methodology used to identify potential critical
minerals, and accept feedback from the public every 3 years.
This legislation, along with the Infrastructure Investment and
Jobs Act, the Inflation Reduction Act helps strengthen the U.S.
supply chain for critical minerals.
The U.S. Geological Survey is at the center of this work,
and is entrusted with developing a framework for understanding
which of these resources is most vulnerable to disruption, and
forecasting short-term and long-term trends based on the data.
Dr. Nassar, since the passage of the Energy Act of 2020,
can you explain how USGS's methodology has evolved and changed?
Dr. Nassar. Yes, I would be happy to, Congressman.
The initial methodology examined two factors
quantitatively. We looked at net import reliance and production
concentration, regardless of where the production was taking
place.
In the updated methodology, after the passage of the Energy
Act of 2020, we modified that indicator by taking into account
country factors. So, production concentrated in Canada and
Australia don't get the same rating as production concentrated
in Russia or China.
Going forward, we are moving toward having a more economic
impacts model, where we are able to understand and quantify the
impact that a certain supply disruption scenario may have not
only consuming industries, but downstream industries and the
economy overall.
Mr. Magaziner. Thank you. And it was alluded to in one of
the prior Member's remarks that there is a lot of political
pressure around which minerals are on this list or not, and a
lot of stakeholders that approach your organization to lobby
for inclusion versus not.
So, how are you able to insulate the process from political
pressure so that this is truly based on empirical data, based
on sort of a rational analysis of the facts, and not political
pressure or lobbying?
Dr. Nassar. Thank you again for that question, Congressman.
The USGS is a Federal science agency. And as part of our
fundamental science practices, USGS analyses and reports go
through multiple layers of review and approval, including peer
review. The critical minerals list methodology, in addition to
the internal review process, went through an external review
process in a peer-reviewed journal.
In addition to that, we performed, as required by the
Energy Act, an interagency working group that reviewed the
analysis and the methodology, and had a chance to review the
results before its release.
Mr. Magaziner. Thank you. I have heard some of my
colleagues from the other side intimate that because there are
critical minerals found in clean energy development, that that
means that we should pump the brakes on rolling out clean
energy to reverse climate change and protect our environment,
that we should stop building windmills, stop building solar
panels. Interestingly, I don't hear them saying the same thing
about cell phones, cars, and other products that use critical
minerals.
But I was wondering, Mr. Mulvaney, if you could just, at a
high level, say is scarcity of critical minerals a reason that
we should pump the brakes and not move forward on transitioning
to clean energy and fighting climate change?
Dr. Mulvaney. No, it is a good reason to take a life cycle
approach to thinking in a circular economy approach to
recovering these materials.
Mr. Magaziner. Yes, and on that, and I know you spoke to
this earlier, but I think this is an important point, in
addition to sourcing these critical minerals, we need to be
focused on recycling them and using them efficiently because
they are scarce.
So, with the time we have left, could you just reiterate
what are some of the things that we, as Congress, should be
doing to promote the recycling of critical minerals?
Dr. Mulvaney. What makes recycling typically work is the
reverse logistics. You need comprehensive takeback and
collection systems to recover all of the electrical equipment,
because every bit of electrical equipment has some copper in it
somewhere, or aluminum. So, we really need to be focused on
making sure that those materials don't end up in the landfill,
and end up in new products.
Mr. Magaziner. Thank you. I yield back.
Dr. Gosar. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman that is the
Chairman for the Full Committee, Mr. Westerman from Arkansas,
is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Westerman. Thank you, Mr. Gosar, and thank you again to
the witnesses.
Dr. Nassar, in the 2018 critical minerals list, USGS
included uranium, despite it having both fuel and non-fuel
uses, saying that input from other agencies emphasized
uranium's important non-fuel uses.
Then Director Fortier defended the decision to include
uranium when he testified before this Committee in 2019,
listing the important non-fuel uses of uranium, including
radiation shields, counterweights, and armor-piercing kinetic
energy penetrators, as well as medical applications such as
medical isotope production.
However, uranium was noticeably absent from the updated
list under this Administration. The explanation for this cited
uranium fuel's uses as the disqualifying factor.
I have sent Secretary Haaland a letter on this issue in
February 2022, before the new critical minerals list was
finalized, asking DOI to consider its decision to list uranium
as military tensions in Eastern Europe came to a head.
Unfortunately, that request was denied.
I would like to submit that letter to the record.
Dr. Gosar. So ordered, without objection.

[The information follows:]

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Committee on Natural Resources

Washington, DC 20515

February 3, 2022

Hon. Debra Haaland, Secretary
U.S. Department of the Interior
1849 C Street, N.W.
Washington, DC. 20240

Dear Secretary Haaland:

The military tensions in and around Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan
could have serious impacts on the United States' critical mineral
supply chains.

At the beginning of January, anti-government protests in Kazakhstan
turned violent, resulting in hundreds of deaths \1\ and leading
Kazakhstani authorities to call in the Russian military.\2\ Backlash
against the protestors has been fierce, with around 10,000 people
detained and some allegedly facing death threats from government-backed
forces.\3\ The Biden administration's response has been referred to as
``toothless,'' illustrating that the President's ``idealistic words
alone are insufficient'' to lead on the world stage.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Abdujalil Abdurasulov, ``Kazakhstan unrest: `If you protest
again, we'll kill you','' BBC News, January 21, 2022, https://
www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-60058972.
\2\ ``Kazakhstan: Why are there riots and why are Russian troops
there?'' BBC News, January 10, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/
explainers-59894266.
\3\ Abdujalil Abdurasulov, ``Kazakhstan unrest: `If you protest
again, we'll kill you','' BBC News, January 21, 2022, https://
www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-60058972.
\4\ Ingrid Burke Friedman, ``Kazakhstan Exposes the Central Flaw of
Biden's Foreign-Policy Doctrine,'' Foreign Policy, January 13, 2022,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/01/13/kazakhstan-csto-tOKev-biden-
foreign-policy-democracy-autocracy/

Almost simultaneously, Russia increased its military pressure on
Ukraine, amassing more than 100,000 troops along the Ukrainian border,
prompting the U.S. Department of Defense to place 8,500 troops on high
alert and ready to deploy in response to a crisis in the region.\5\
While the Biden administration continues to fall short of its
responsibility to lead a coordinated response to this growing
international crisis,\6\ conditions in the region have deteriorated
such that the White House confirmed that Russia could invade Ukraine
``at any point.'' \7\ These escalations, and the Biden administration's
failure to lead a global response, present an unknown number of risks
to Europe and the rest of the world.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Robyn Dixon, David L. Stern, Isabelle Khurshudyan and John
Hudson, ``Russia moves troops and U.S. sends weapons as fear of war
mounts in Ukraine,'' The Washington Post, January 25, 2022, https://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/01/25/ukraine-russia-nato-biden.
\6\ Michael Crowley and Steven Erlanger, ``Biden Strengthens Words
on Ukraine After Flustering European Partners,'' The New York Times,
January 20, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/20/world/europe/
ukraine-biden-eu.html.
\7\ Shannon Pettypiece, ``White House warns Russian invasion of
Ukraine may be imminent,'' NBC News, January 18, 2022, https://
www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/white-house-warns-russia-invasion-
ukraine-may-be-imminent-n1287649.

One of many concerns is the effect these continued international
crises will likely have on global supply chains, including for minerals
sourced from these countries and the surrounding area. As you work to
finalize the Department of the Interior's (DOI's) Final Critical
Minerals List of 2022, we strongly encourage you to consider the
prolonged unrest in the region and its potential impacts on mineral
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
supply chains in your determination of which resources to include.

As you know, the Energy Act of 2020 (later included in Public Law
No: 116-260) defines a ``critical mineral'' as a resource ``the supply
chain of which is vulnerable to disruption (including restrictions
associated with foreign political risk, abrupt demand growth, military
conflict, violent unrest, anti-competitive or protectionist behaviors,
and other risks through-out the supply chain),'' in addition to other
qualifications.\8\ This makes the risk of supply chain disruptions a
required consideration when evaluating minerals to include on DOI's
List of Critical Minerals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Energy Act of 2020, Section 7002(c)(4)(A).

The 2021 Draft List of Critical Minerals was released on November
9, 2021, months before the period of elevated unrest involving Russia,
Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. Unfortunately, the growing instability in the
region and the Biden administration's confused response to these crises
have increased uncertainty for a number of mineral supply chains.
Resources listed as ``critical'' on the draft list are known to have
insecure supply chains, by definition, but this recent unrest has also
greatly affected resources that were not listed, such as helium and
uranium.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ 86 FR 62199.

For example, Russia is a major producer of helium, and, as markets
are already stressed by the upcoming closure of the Federal Helium
Reserve in the U.S.,\10\ Gazprom's helium plants were expected to help
ease global supply concerns in 2022.\11\ However, recent fires and an
explosion at Gazprom's Amur facility demonstrates how irresponsible it
is to rely on Russia to meet the world's need for an element essential
to medical imaging, high tech computing, semiconductor manufacturing,
telecommunications and metal fabrication worldwide.\12\ Similarly
concerning, Kazakhstan is the world's largest producer of uranium, and
any supply disruptions due to the humanitarian and diplomatic crisis
unfolding there could have vast effects on global markets.\13\ As it
stands, about 97 percent of U.S. demand for uranium is met by foreign
imports, despite a large domestic supply and repeated calls by Members
of Congress for the Biden Administration to develop our own natural
resources at home.14,15,16
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Bureau of Land Management, ``BLM ANNOUNCES DISPOSAL PROCESS
FOR FEDERAL HELIUM SYSTEM,'' Press Release, April 16, 2020, https://
www.blm.gov/press-release/blm-announces-disposal-process-federal-
helium-system#::text=In%20accordance%20with%20that%
20law,follow%20its%20statutory%20disposal%20process.
\11\ Phil Kornbluth, ``Kornbluth: Latest Amur fire tightens helium
supply for 2022,'' Gas World, January 17, 2022, https://
www.gasworld.com/kornbluth-latest-amur-fire-tightens-helium-supply-for-
2022/2022514.article.
\12\ Vladimir Soldatkin, ``Russia's Amur gas plant says a unit
caught fire,'' Reuters, January 5, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/
business/energy/russias-amur-gas-plant-says-unit-caught-fire-2022-01-
05/.
\13\ ``Uranium sector monitors evolving Kazakh situation,'' World
Nuclear News, January 7, 2022, https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/
Articles/Uranium-sector-monitors-evolving-Kazakh-situation.
\14\ U.S. Energy Information Administration, Uranium Marketing
Annual Report, https://www.eia.gov/uranium/marketing/table3.php.
\15\ Letter to Secretary Granholm from Rep. Henry Cuellar and Rep.
Vincente Gonzalez. April 15, 2021.
\16\ Volcovici, Valerie. U.S. House votes to protect 3 million
acres of land from development. Reuters. February 26, 2021.

The lukewarm response from this administration regarding Russia's
menacing behavior has been too slow and insufficient to mount a strong
deterrent. Secretary Blinken may have threatened ``a swift, a severe
and a united response'' should Russia invade Ukraine, but without an
administration-wide willingness to address this challenge on every
front, these strong words will remain hollow.\17\ By not using every
tool at its disposal to bolster domestic mineral production, this
administration is passively enabling our continued reliance on Russia
and other adversaries for helium, uranium, and other mineral resources.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ Jessica Bursztynsky, ``Secretary of State Blinken warns of
severe response if a single Russian force enters Ukraine in an
aggressive way,'' CNBC, January 23, 2022, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/01/
23/secretary-of-state-blinken-warns-of-severe-response-if-a-single-
russian-force-enters-ukraine-in-an-aggressive-way.html.

The relationship between national security and stable mineral
supply chains is clearer now than ever as the world watches Eastern
Europe continue to destabilize and the administration's response
remains tepid. Careful selection of the mineral commodities included on
DOI's Final List of Critical Minerals is an important aspect of
ensuring a reliable supply of these necessary resources. As you
continue your required consultations with the Secretaries of Defense,
Commerce, Agriculture, and Energy and the U.S. Trade Representative, we
urge you to bear in mind the troubling developments in Europe and the
impacts of this administration's anemic foreign policy in your
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
finalization of the 2022 List of Critical Minerals.

We appreciate your attention to this vital matter.

Sincerely,

Bruce Westerman, Ranking
Member Pete Stauber, Ranking Member
House Committee on Natural
Resources Subcommittee on Energy and
Mineral Resources

Don Young, Ranking Member Russ Fulcher, Ranking Member
Subcommittee for Indigenous
Peoples of the United
States Subcommittee on National Parks,
Forests, and Public Lands

Cliff Bentz, Ranking Member Louie Gohmert
Subcommittee on Water,
Oceans, and Wildlife Member of Congress

Doug Lamborn Robert J. Wittman
Member of Congress Member of Congress

Garrett Graves Jody Hice
Member of Congress Member of Congress

Aumua Amata Coleman
Radewagen Daniel Webster
Member of Congress Member of Congress

Jenniffer Gonzalez-Colon Tom Tiffany
Member of Congress Member of Congress

Blake Moore Yvette Herrell
Member of Congress Member of Congress

Jay Obernolte
Member of Congress

______

Mr. Westerman. So, what led USGS and its consulting
agencies to change its mind about the importance of uranium's
non-fuel uses, and choose to not evaluate it as a critical
mineral for the recent list?
Dr. Nassar. Thank you for that question. I think what has
changed is that the Energy Act was passed, and the Energy Act
defines critical minerals as non-fuel, and specifically
excludes fuel minerals. Thus, USGS did not evaluate uranium.
Mr. Westerman. That seems to have changed since 2019,
because it has always had fuel and non-fuel uses. So, were
there other factors involved?
Dr. Nassar. No, sir. The uses maybe have not changed, but
the definition of what uranium is labeled as, is it a fuel
mineral or not, not its uses.
Mr. Westerman. That just doesn't seem to make a lot of
sense to me, why it would be taken off the list after such a
strong argument for it being on the list. That is why it is
important for us to have these hearings and to come up with
better policy moving forward.
Mr. Somers, just yesterday the Department of the Interior
released the report from the Interagency Working Group on
Mining Reforms. I will say I was obviously very disappointed,
but not surprised to hear of several extremely harmful
recommendations to change our domestic mining system, despite
lip service about increasing mining for the Administration's
renewable goals.
How harmful would these changes be to investment in a
mining state with large amounts of Federal land such as yours?
Mr. Somers. It would be incredibly damaging, especially the
idea of changing into a leasing system. And the idea of
royalties, which, according to the proposal, would be among the
highest in the world, would be absolutely devastating to the
hardrock mining industry.
Mr. Westerman. Yes, and we have seen what appears to be an
attack on mining all around this country. At the same time, we
see China dominating mining and mineral resources, and we also
see policies that are making us more dependent on those
minerals and elements that China produces.
As we talk about being more energy independent, as we talk
about having more national security, it seems that reports like
this one that came out yesterday fly right in the face of that.
It is one thing to talk the talk, but we are not walking the
walk in this Administration.
Mr. Somers. Yes, and I think you have seen that on a number
of fronts. I mean, the latest report is one piece of evidence
there. Mineral withdrawals that we have seen all around the
country, these are things that are very problematic to enable
us to develop the mineral resources that we have that can
lessen our dependence on places like China.
Mr. Westerman. Right. It just seems like it should be
common sense.
Dr. Eggert, could you explain to your knowledge the real-
world benefits, if any, of a commodity being designated as a
critical mineral?
And how does this compare to being designated as a critical
material by DOE?
Dr. Eggert. In my view, designation as a critical mineral
or material shines a spotlight on the material or mineral
overall. In terms of policy implications, I think one needs to
then ask the question more narrowly, what is the narrower
context of that particular supply chain, the technologies and
products it is used in, and what the various policy mechanisms
are.
In terms of mineral versus material, I think it reflects,
well, many people use the term synonymously. For those who
focus on one or the other, I think it relates to the portion of
the supply chain that is most prominent in a person's
perspective. ``Critical mineral'' tends to be used by people
who have an upstream focus more than downstream, relatively
speaking, and vice versa.
So, to me, it is not surprising that the USGS activity is
``critical mineral,'' whereas the Department of Energy activity
is labeled ``critical material.'' But to me, they are all part
of the same thing, and they really mean the same thing to me.
Mr. Westerman. Thank you.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Gosar. I thank the Chairman. I now recognize the
gentleman from California, Mr. Mullin, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Mullin. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you to all of the
witnesses for your time today.
My district in California, the San Francisco Bay Area, is
home to many companies working on emerging technologies to
advance the clean energy transition. The mineral supply chain
will become increasingly important as they continue to work
toward that transition. So, my question is for Dr. Mulvaney.
In your testimony, you discuss how advances in technology
can help us create innovative sources of critical minerals. And
apologies if you have touched on this already, maybe multiple
times, but could you elaborate on some of the latest
innovations and advancements in things like developing a
circular economy, improving recycling and materials
substitutions?
And then specifically, what can Congress do to help
encourage these innovative approaches?
Dr. Mulvaney. Well, I will start with the second part to
that, which piggybacks on my previous comment about setting up
a takeback and collection system, because that really sends a
signal to the recyclers and the innovators who are working with
these materials that there is going to be a market for them to
recover that material and sell it back to a new product. For
example, having content requirements, having a certain
percentage of recycled content as a law or policy can help
drive innovation in those new, emerging sectors.
We are seeing, because of the European Union's Waste and
Electronics and Electrical Equipment Directive, a takeback and
collection system is leading to 95 percent of solar panels
being recovered in Europe. They are getting silver out of them,
they are innovating to get the silicon, which is very, very
high energy intensity and the most carbon intensive part of the
solar panel. They are recovering that. And in the United
States, it is less than 10 percent. It is on the order of 5
percent because we don't have that takeback and collection
system.
We are also innovating around battery materials. We are
starting to see sodium batteries entering into cars in China. A
very small car, a burgeoning industry. We don't know if sodium
batteries will be the future, but that is part of, I think,
what we have to be aware of is that sometimes these materials
that we demand will change in the future.
Mr. Mullin. Thank you, sir.
I yield back.
Dr. Gosar. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from Idaho,
Mr. Russ Fulcher, is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Fulcher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And to the panel, thank you for being here and your
participation. And you are probably aware of this, but in the
wisdom of Congress we have multiple committees going on at the
same time. So, if you see us coming and going, please, please
forgive the scheduling on that. But thank you for being here.
A question for Mr. Nassar. This has to do with uranium. And
I know that in your written testimony you touched on this, but
I would like to just clarify and get your thoughts. Uranium is
used, of course, for nuclear power plants. And that is a
specific interest to me in my state. Idaho National Lab is
instrumental in research for nuclear power. And our
availability for that, our resources for that, are primarily
outside of the United States.
So, I want to just have you talk for a minute about what
are your concerns when it comes to domestic production, what
are the issues there, and is there a reason why, from a policy
standpoint, we don't have more of that domestic sourcing?
Dr. Nassar. Thank you, Congressman, for that question.
As a science agency, I obviously wouldn't be able to
comment on policy issues. But what we are concerned with and
what our analysis draws upon are supply risks due to three
factors that we look at: we look at the likelihood of a
disruption; our exposure, meaning the United States' exposure
to foreign supply disruptions; and our ability to weather the
storm through our economic vulnerability to those disruptions.
So, those are the factors that we look at.
And in terms of disruption potential, we are looking at
whether or not the suppliers to the United States are reliable
suppliers, whether there will be potential for disruption due
to the simple fact that the production is concentrated either
in one trading partner or in a geographic region. So, those are
the things that concern us most.
Mr. Fulcher. Right now, how much of our current supply
comes from domestic sources, can you tell me that?
Dr. Nassar. It really depends by commodity. For some
commodities like molybdenum, we are net exporters. For other
commodities like gallium, we are importing 100 percent----
Mr. Fulcher. I am talking specifically about uranium in
this case.
Dr. Nassar. Uranium. Our center doesn't necessarily cover
uranium production and consumption. But my understanding is
that we are highly net import reliant. Most of our imports are
coming in currently from Australia and a smaller degree from
Canada.
Mr. Fulcher. That brings up another question. Why is
uranium not of interest to you? When you say that is not
covered by your jurisdiction, why not?
Dr. Nassar. Sorry, I believe that is due to a statute that
requires the Energy Information Administration to cover uranium
and not the National Minerals Information Center at the U.S.
Geological Survey.
Mr. Fulcher. OK. But your understanding is that we are
highly reliant outside of the United States.
Dr. Nassar. That is my understanding, yes.
Mr. Fulcher. OK. Mr. Eggert, I would like to talk to you
for just a second, please. Idaho provides a significant amount
of phosphate that is used for fertilizer and other products,
and that is important for domestic food production and other
uses. There are two phosphate mines in my state, in Idaho, and
both of those are put at risk currently due to some lawsuits
and other issues.
The Department of the Interior did not include phosphate on
its list of critical minerals in 2022. It has been previously,
but it wasn't as of 2022. So, if we lost domestic production of
phosphate, do you think that would trigger that being put on a
critical mineral list?
Dr. Eggert. I would expect so. The phosphate clearly is
essential for fertilizer and, in turn, agricultural production.
The United States is currently a major producer of phosphate
rock and phosphorus for fertilizers. And if we lost domestic
production capabilities, that would certainly elevate its
ranking in any list or evaluation of material criticality.
Mr. Fulcher. So, we have about 35 percent of our dependence
on that from a combination of China and Russia.
And then just the local stock is in danger of being shut
down with current litigation standards. Have you tracked that?
Do you see a danger of supply shock, given our susceptibility
to those circumstances?
Dr. Eggert. I don't have detailed knowledge of that
particular circumstance. But it sounds worthy of evaluation.
Mr. Fulcher. Mr. Chairman, I would like to follow up with
Mr. Eggert on that at a later point. I have used my time, so I
yield back. Thank you.
Dr. Gosar. Sounds good. The gentleman from Arizona, the
Ranking Member for the Full Committee, is now recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Grijalva. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Before I forget, Mr. Somers, if I may, on the issue of
royalties, and you commented on it, the Interagency Working
Group recommended, I think, proposed a 4 to 8 percent royalty
on net revenue from a mining operation. Do you still believe
that that is an excessive amount?
Mr. Somers. Again, that would put us among the highest
royalties in the world if that were to be implemented.
Mr. Grijalva. Interesting, because the state of Utah on
their state land charges 4 to 10 percent on gross revenue, not
the net revenue part of it, which I would suggest makes Utah
the highest royalty charging government entity in the world
other than the Federal Government. So, how do you reconcile
that?
Is that fair for taxpayers from public lands, Federal lands
cannot draw royalties from mining operations, regardless, and
yet a state, Utah, Wyoming does the same thing, Arizona does
the same thing, can charge royalties on state land. Do you
think that that is fair?
Mr. Somers. Again, I am not sure exactly which royalty rate
you are referring to, Mr. Grijalva. But in some cases----
Mr. Grijalva. Since there is none on Federal land, any
royalty rate you want. Anyway, finish your response. I
apologize.
Mr. Somers. Again, I am not sure exactly which royalty rate
you are referring to. It does differ by commodity in Utah. And
those are set by the State and Institutional Trust Lands
Administration, which administers a trust on behalf of Utah's
school children.
And I think that the issue here is not necessarily that the
mining industry is opposed to any type of royalty rate. It is
just a matter of how that royalty rate is applied and the
overall rate, as well.
Mr. Grijalva. The fact we have none does open that
conversation on many levels, from cleanup of abandoned mines to
reclamation, to assurance for communities, and for tribes in
the area in terms of the impact and effects of a particular
mining operation after they leave, after 25 or 30 years. So, I
think it is a legitimate point, which is part of the problem
with the 150-year-old mining law.
The critical minerals list informs decisions across the
Federal Government. In my district, the Permitting Council
recently announced the first-ever mining project approved for
FAST-41, a process where these covered projects receive
expedited permitting and review. The mine was chosen because
the minerals are on the critical minerals list.
But my constituents have concerns. The critical mineral
list may tell us all about the mineral's importance to the
economy, but it doesn't capture the impacts of mining on our
local communities, local economies, the environment, or
cultural heritage.
And compound that with the constituents being concerned
about the already extremely scarce water supplies that this
mine would draw upon, and the huge water users would dry up. In
fact, some parts of the state residential construction is being
paused, stopped because there isn't enough groundwater to
support the new developments.
My point being while there are critical minerals in this
location, how do you balance and weigh water supplies,
endangered species, cultural heritage, tribal consultation, and
executing our trust responsibility to tribes?
Dr. Nassar, are any of these factors considered when you
are looking at the critical minerals?
Dr. Nassar. Thank you, Congressman. Those are not factors
that we look at.
However, in our earth mapping resource initiatives, USGS
follows Department of the Interior guidelines regarding tribal
engagement, and only collects data over tribal lands with
express written consent.
Mr. Grijalva. My point being, I mean, we are talking about
the sovereignty part of it. But the consultation is any project
that impacts, and I think that the answer is no.
And Dr. Mulvaney, going into the future of mine permitting,
these factors need to be taken into account, from my
perspective. Your response to that?
And there are other factors. I just mentioned those three.
Dr. Mulvaney. Could you repeat that one more time?
Mr. Grijalva. Yes. How do you think the future mine
permitting should take these factors into account, going
forward?
Dr. Mulvaney. First, that life cycle approach that I
started with, it needs to be more holistic, there needs to be
alternatives considered. And that could be even through the
National Environmental Policy Act, sometimes there are
alternatives considered there. And there also needs to be more
cumulative impacts looked at because we are often permitting
projects one by one, and we don't see the big picture. And that
is what I meant when I said a holistic approach by
understanding the cumulative impacts.
A mine might be proposed, it might say it is not going to
impact groundwater, but we don't know what else is coming down
the line, and we think it is important.
Mr. Grijalva. Mr. Chairman, thank you for allowing the
witness to answer.
Dr. Gosar. I thank the gentleman. I am going to recognize
myself now for the next one.
Dr. Mulvaney, you made a comment to Mr. Tiffany in regards
to power, in regards to recycling. I think you really need to
check your information. It takes much more power to recycle
something than it does new. That is whether it be paper wood,
whether it be minerals, all the way across the board.
And then second, can you name me a mine that you actually
endorse and support?
Dr. Mulvaney. I will answer the second question first. I
live next to a sand mine in Ben Lomond, California, and I
support that----
Dr. Gosar. How about a hardrock mine?
Dr. Mulvaney. I actually don't know of any hardrock mines
where I have lived near, so I don't know.
Dr. Gosar. It seems to me like you should be looking at
that hardrock mine and getting familiar with it, if you are
going to be an expert along these critical minerals because it
is so very, very important.
Dr. Eggert, I have to tell you, thanks for Colorado School
of Mines. My dad and my sister went there, so thank you very
much for that excellent education we got.
I want to come back to uranium. I find it offensive that it
was taken off the critical mineral list because now we are
seeing, I was in Germany a couple of years back with Rob
Bishop, and our military is supposed to have 24/7 baseload
power. And they were going to use Nord Stream 2. So, my comment
was, ``Well, we are going to use this 24-hour baseload power
coming from Russia. How does that work?'' And here we are doing
the same thing again, where almost everybody that talks about
green energy says you can't do it without nuclear right now.
Take a quantum leap in battery storage to get this taken care
of.
So, we are going down this rat hole again about energy, and
being dictated by adversaries. Would you consider Russia a
friend, Dr. Eggert?
Dr. Eggert. Under the current circumstances? No, I would
not consider Russia an ally.
Dr. Gosar. And how did that switch flip? Was it very quick,
that geopolitical switch? Didn't it flip very quickly?
Dr. Eggert. Oh, absolutely. I think for the last several
decades we, generally speaking, have viewed engagement with
Russia as a means of, over the longer term, fostering greater
security through more interactions. And what has happened came
as a surprise.
Dr. Gosar. I just want to go back to Mr. Fulcher. He talked
about helium. I thought I saw this, that it was Helium-4 that
was used in a fusion experiment. Was that true, Dr. Eggert?
Dr. Eggert. I believe so. I am not an expert on helium.
Dr. Gosar. I guess, coming along those same lines as Mr.
Fulcher to Dr. Nassar, this ought to be on the critical list
because my understanding is Helium-4 just isn't everywhere.
Now, Dr. Eggert, when we are doing science discoveries and
experiments, a critical element could be just anything that we
need to have to place in there. But if you don't have it, you
can't use it. Is that true? If you don't have that element, you
can't use it.
Dr. Eggert. If you don't have it, you cannot use it,
correct.
Dr. Gosar. Wow, it seems like all this technology is going
down these roads with helium, nuclear, critical, and hardrock.
It is just amazing how much things we have not taken into
consideration here, very, very sad.
Mr. Somers, here is your answer to the gentleman from
Arizona. In the multiple use doctrine, Congress gave the state
the hardrock royalty as part of that aspect. Like in Arizona,
the state is the last of jurisdiction because we were rejected
the first time. The second time we were coming, they came back
with Taft. Taft was the only President to go to the Supreme
Court. He understood contracts. So, we were forced to take the
multiple use or take the Federal doctrine of the Federal lands.
But in lieu of that, we were given the multiple use doctrine
that the Feds said they would get the maximum out of it to
appease both sides. So, hardrock mining went to the state.
I find it very offensive that I look at my district, we
just had the Ranking Member and the Interior Secretary come
into my state and withdraw over a million acres, not for
maintaining the landscape. It was to stop uranium production.
And if you look at this, it is an unhealthy situation when you
do not mine it. A collapsed breccia pipe is a low point in the
geology.
I used to hate rocks, Dr. Eggert. Now I love rocks. They
set you free.
So, water pools there and the air. And you are going to get
contamination all the way across. It seems to me like what you
would want to do is take out that uranium, clean it up, have
sand and gravel put in there. It helps you through the caliche
clays so you get sub-permeation of water. That was a mouthful.
Sorry.
The gentlewoman from Colorado, Mrs. Boebert, is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Boebert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all
for being here today and testifying before our Committee.
Mr. Blakemore, clearly China is dominating the entire world
when it comes to mineral supply chains. But why is that? Why
are we so desperately far behind the curve when it comes to
China and these rare earth minerals?
Mr. Blakemore. It is a combination of multiple factors.
First and foremost, China embarked on an aggressive strategy of
investing in upstream resources abroad. And those investments
drew a lot of those resources domestically to China, where it
was able to construct a pretty strong market share on the
processing part of key supply chains, facilitated also by high
subsidization and, in some cases, rather lax environmental
regulation.
That has gotten us to the point now where China's market
incumbency both puts it ahead of the United States in terms of
certain supply chain resiliency efforts, but also makes
reducing that market incumbency a little bit sticky, given the
economics associated with those respective supply chains.
Mrs. Boebert. Do you think that the Trump administration,
his Executive Orders in 2017 that were proposed steps to form a
national strategy to strengthen our domestic supply chains, do
you think that that would have helped in this, so we wouldn't
be so far behind the curve?
Mr. Blakemore. I think the efforts more broadly over the
course of several administrations actually have advanced a more
holistic approach to thinking about our supply chain
resiliency.
The Trump administration, to its credit, did a lot of work
to think specifically about upstream resiliency. However,
upstream resiliency alone is not a solution to supply chain
resiliency. And I think as our thinking and strategic planning
around supply chain resiliency matures, moving down the supply
chain as well, and thinking about the ontake and offtake of
various components of the supply chain to build that strategy
is also necessary. So, I look at the Trump administration
decision as one piece, a critical piece, but one piece of what
I would call a healthy supply chain resiliency strategy.
Mrs. Boebert. Thank you. It sounds like we would agree that
the way the United States determines what is considered a
critical mineral and how we manage these supply chains and what
production advantages, if any, listed critical minerals we
receive over unlisted mineral commodities is of national
importance.
Dr. Eggert, you have been involved in critical mineral and
material assessments for decades, and it seems that these
assessments have helped highlight some of the challenges that
we are facing. But are we, as a nation, making headway in
improving our situation with respect to critical minerals?
Dr. Eggert. I think we are making improvements, but there
is always room for more improvement. I think in terms of three
specific areas where we should focus attention: first, research
and development throughout the entire supply chain; second,
workforce development, it takes workers to mine the minerals
and do the various downstream processing activities, and we
have lost much of that capability; and third, there is
significant room for improvement in permitting and associated
pre-production activities, not to minimize or reduce the
importance of environmental protection or interaction with
local communities, but in a way that gets us to yes or no and
how, in terms of project development, sooner.
Mrs. Boebert. Thank you. Mr. Somers, to me it seems that
this Administration says one thing about mining in America, but
does something completely different. Has the critical materials
list yielded any results in terms of creating jobs or economic
development in your state?
We just heard that one improvement to the supply chain and
this energy security would be to improve the workforce.
Mr. Somers. Yes, I do think that there is utility in
highlighting the supply chain vulnerabilities that we have. But
in terms of bringing specific investment or jobs to the state
because a mineral is on the list or not on the list, we haven't
seen that in Utah. And I think that the bigger issues are some
of the other things that we have talked about.
I mean, it is what is the Federal Government's policy,
especially in a public land state like Utah, what are the
Federal Government's policies with regard to how you can open
up, and permit, and develop a mine?
And then also, is the Federal Government going to come in
and make the economics of a mining project more difficult
because of royalty rates or other things that they might be
contemplating?
So, I think that those are the more important issues as
opposed to whether a mineral is on a list or not.
Mrs. Boebert. Thank you.
And Mr. Chairman, may I ask one yes-or-no question to Mr.
Somers?
Mr. Stauber [presiding]. Yes, go ahead.
Mrs. Boebert. Thank you.
Has the Biden administration's decision to leave out
critical minerals like uranium and helium on the list had any
adverse impacts on job creation or economic development?
And you can expand later, but maybe just for now yes or no.
Mr. Somers. I think that it has, yes.
Mrs. Boebert. OK, great. Thank you so much for all of you
and your time here today.
I yield back.
Mr. Stauber. Thank you very much. Next to question is
Representative Collins.
You are up for 5 minutes.
Mr. Collins. I think that was pretty obvious there, Mr.
Chairman. No, I am just joking.
I kind of want to point my questions in one direction, and
listening for most of the questions and testimony, except for
the time, obviously, you have been seeing us run in and out
like Fulcher was talking about, but I have noticed that people
have been asking about certain minerals and being on the list,
off the list, on the list of critical minerals.
And then having gone all over the country with field
hearings that we have been involved with to talk to people
about how it is impacting their lives, their family's lives,
and generational lives of people that mine, and I kind of want
to, you may have answered it, I don't know. And maybe I just
didn't get it. I have tried to take some notes. But Dr. Nassar,
I just want to kind of go over a few things real quick to just
get an idea in my simple little brain of process and
methodology maybe.
How does the USGS determine a country's ability to supply
mineral resources, and how did you decide on that methodology
that you are using?
Dr. Nassar. Thank you, Congressman, for that question. I
think you are specifically asking regarding the country
metrics.
Mr. Collins. Yes.
Dr. Nassar. We look at two factors: a country's ability to
continue to supply to the United States, and a country's
willingness to continue to supply to the United States.
For the ability metric, we use the Fraser Institute's
Policy Perception Index, which is a survey to mining executives
around the world to rank countries and jurisdictions regarding
how favorable are policies, how is the political situation,
political stability of the country, access to labor, access to
infrastructure, access to electricity, for example. So, that is
the basis for the ability metric.
For the willingness metric, we look at three factors. How
close a country is ideologically to the United States, do they
have democratic practices or not? We look also at trade ties.
How closely are the two countries, the country in question and
the United States in terms of trade? And we also look at
military cooperation. Is there a specific defense agreement for
supplying the United States? So, those are the factors that we
look at in terms of country metrics.
Mr. Collins. OK, and maybe that will help with this next
question that I have for you then, because I understand you do
consult with other agencies, including the Department of
Defense and the Department of State when you draft your
critical minerals list.
How much weight do you give those consulting departments
when you make your final decision?
Dr. Nassar. Sorry. If I can get a clarification, are you
asking how much weight do we give the----
Mr. Collins. Those departments, when you are making your
final decision, when they have their input.
Dr. Nassar. Right, so through the interagency process,
through the National Science Technology Council's Critical
Subcommittee, we formed a working group. They weighed in on the
methodology throughout the process. They weighed in on the
results at the end of it.
We also did an internal peer review within USGS and an
external peer review with experts at a scientific journal.
Mr. Collins. So, how do you even put a value on the
importance of their opinion when they have totally different
priorities?
Dr. Nassar. Well, I think we take in all the comments. This
is an iterative process where we hear each other, we understand
the issues of importance to them, and we weigh the factors
together.
Mr. Collins. OK. The last----
Mr. Stauber. Mr. Collins, can I follow up real quick? I
will give you the time back.
Mr. Collins. Yes, sir.
Mr. Stauber. Mr. Nassar, so you weigh other departments,
their needs, and wants, and desires. So, does politics then
enter it?
Dr. Nassar. I apologize. Let me clarify. What I was saying
is that we take input from people within the departments in
terms of the methodology. Do they feel like this specific
methodological input makes sense or not? They are part of the
Interagency Working Group to help us define the methodology.
Mr. Stauber. I yield back to the gentleman from Georgia,
and I will give you your time back, as well. Thank you.
Mr. Collins. No, that is OK. I only have one other question
I wanted to run by him.
Have you ever considered making subcategories of minerals
on the list by sector or end use, such as defense or
aeronautics? Similar to the way the critical minerals list at
the DOE focuses on alternative energy.
Dr. Nassar. Thank you for that question. I think it is an
interesting proposal.
The way we see it is that it is important to look at the
economy as a whole, because if you look at one individual
industry sector or technology, then you might be missing
compounding or second order effects that might impact each
other. So, it is important for us to look at the economy as a
whole.
And in our future development of the methodology, we are
planning to use an economic model that is able to measure and
quantify those impacts, not only on those directly consuming
industries, but downstream industries again, and the economy as
a whole.
Mr. Collins. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That is
all I have.
Mr. Stauber. Thank you, Mr. Collins. I want to thank the
witnesses for their valuable testimony and the Members for
their questions.
The members of the Subcommittee may have some additional
questions for the witnesses, and we will ask you to respond to
these in writing. Under Committee Rule 3, members of the
Committee must submit questions to the Committee Clerk by 5
p.m. on Monday, September 18. The hearing record will be held
open for 10 business days for these responses.
If there is no further business, without objection, the
Committee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:29 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

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