[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                                                        
                         [H.A.S.C. No. 118-18] 
                         
                         
                         

                                HEARING

                                   ON

                   NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

                          FOR FISCAL YEAR 2024

                                  AND

                   OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED  
                                PROGRAMS 

                               BEFORE THE

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION
                               __________

                SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING

                                   ON

                    FY24 REQUEST FOR NUCLEAR FORCES  
                  AND ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITY
                                __________

                              HEARING HELD
                             MARCH 28, 2023




                                     
              [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 

                                     
  


                                ------ 
                                
                   U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 

53-391                    WASHINGTON : 2024 















                    SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

                    DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado, Chairman

JOE WILSON, South Carolina           SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio              JOHN GARAMENDI, California
ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York          DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee          SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California,
DON BACON, Nebraska                  RO KHANNA, California
JIM BANKS, Indiana                   CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania
MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida               GABE VASQUEZ, New Mexico
DALE W. STRONG, Alabama              MARC VEASEY, Texas

             Peter Schirtzinger, Professional Staff Member
                Maria Vastola, Professional Staff Member
                  Zachary Calderon, Research Assistant 
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  






                  
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

              STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Lamborn, Hon. Doug, a Representative from Colorado, Chairman, 
  Subcommittee on Strategic Forces...............................     1
Moulton, Hon. Seth, a Representative from Massachusetts, Ranking 
  Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces.......................     2

                               WITNESSES

Bussiere, Gen Thomas A., Commander, Air Force Global Strike 
  Command, USAF..................................................     9
Hruby, Jill, Under Secretary for Nuclear Security and 
  Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, 
  DOE............................................................     7
Plumb, Dr. John F., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space 
  Policy, DOD....................................................     4
Rosenblum, Deborah G., Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
  Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs, DOD........     6
Wolfe, Jr., VADM Johnny R., Director, Strategic Systems Programs, 
  USN............................................................    10

                                APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

    Gen Bussiere.................................................    80
    Ms. Hruby....................................................    55
    Mr. Plumb....................................................    35
    Ms. Rosenblum................................................    45
    VADM Wolfe...................................................    95

Documents Submitted for the Record:

    [There were no Documents submitted.]

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

    [There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

    Mr. Lamborn..................................................   111

 
               FY24 REQUEST FOR NUCLEAR FORCES AND ATOMIC  
                       ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES 

                              ----------                              

                  House of Representatives,
                       Committee on Armed Services,
                          Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                           Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 28, 2023.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:02 a.m., in 
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Doug Lamborn 
[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DOUG LAMBORN, A REPRESENTATIVE  
  FROM COLORADO, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

    The Chairman. Today's hearing will come to order.
    I ask unanimous consent that the chair be authorized to 
declare a recess at any time. Without objection, so ordered.
    The Strategic Forces Subcommittee meets today to review the 
fiscal year 2024 budget request for U.S. nuclear forces.
    Good morning to our witnesses--Secretary Plumb, Secretary 
Rosenblum, Administrator Hruby, General Bussiere, and Vice 
Admiral Wolfe.
    I'm glad that we can have this hearing as informed by 
President Biden's budget request. My priorities as we put 
together the fiscal year 2024 budget are that we keep the 
current nuclear modernization program of record on track.
    Where there are delays or bottlenecks we should identify 
ways to fix or circumvent them, and we will begin to examine 
new capabilities outside the current program of record.
    We need to be thinking about the key infrastructure 
investments and capabilities we'll need in a decade and start 
planning and budgeting for them now.
    We are in a precarious time during our nuclear 
modernization program. Simultaneously modernizing the ground, 
air, and sea legs of our triad was never going to be easy and 
we are past the point of no return to ensure new capabilities 
come online as old capabilities age out.
    I intend to be deeply involved in the schedules for the 
Columbia, Sentinel, and B-21 Raider programs, as well as those 
for the associated warhead and missile systems.
    And this isn't even to mention the Russian--excuse me, the 
Chinese nuclear breakout that we see taking place, which was 
never contemplated when New START [Strategic Arms Reduction 
Treaty] treaty was negotiated.
    There are three specific concerns that I would like to 
highlight today.
    On the Sentinel ICBM [Intercontinental Ballistic Missile] 
program there have been some press statements that global 
macroeconomic issues like supply chain are causing delays to 
the program. I would like to thank Under Secretary Bill 
LaPlante for quickly reaching out to schedule a briefing on 
these challenges and happy that he will be here tomorrow to 
brief Ranking Member Moulton and myself.
    Once we get that briefing tomorrow we'll be sure to get an 
update in the works for members of the subcommittee as well.
    Secretary Rosenblum and General Bussiere, to the degree you 
can say anything about these delays today it would be 
appreciated, and I'll let everyone know we will have a 
classified portion of this hearing immediately upon recessing 
from this open hearing.
    I'm also incredibly worried about the National Nuclear 
Security Administration's ability to recruit and retain people 
and how this is leading to delays in key projects. 
Administrative Hruby, we are obviously very concerned about the 
delays in plutonium pit production but we're also tracking 
delays to the Tritium finishing facility in South Carolina and 
the Pantex high explosive facility in Texas.
    My understanding is that these programs are delayed so I'm 
hoping you will explain why the Tritium and high explosive 
projects didn't receive any funding in the budget request.
    Finally, I have some questions about AUKUS [Australia, 
United Kingdom, United States]. There is broad bipartisan 
support across the aisle for this framework. I would like to 
understand how AUKUS is going to impact U.S. highly-enriched 
uranium requirements.
    Specifically, I would like to know if we need to begin 
thinking about and budgeting for a DOD [Department of Defense]-
specific program to sustain our requirements.
    With that, I'd like to, again, welcome our witnesses. We 
look forward to hearing from you and about your efforts to 
develop these critical nuclear capabilities and how this 
subcommittee can be helpful.
    I would now like to recognize Ranking Member Moulton for 
his opening comments.

STATEMENT OF HON. SETH MOULTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
 MASSACHUSETTS, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC 
 FORCES 

    Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Chairman Lamborn. It's an honor to 
work with you on such important issues and I want to welcome 
our panel of distinguished witnesses.
    As we sit in this hearing room this morning Putin continues 
to threaten the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine and is 
talking about moving nuclear weapons into Belarus.
    North Korea is undoubtedly readying for their next 
ballistic missile launch. IAEA [International Atomic Energy 
Agency] inspectors are raising flags regarding Iran's ability 
to enrich uranium to the point of producing a nuclear weapon, 
and the Chinese Communist Party is conducting a nuclear 
expansion at a rate that aims to reach parity with the United 
States within a decade.
    The jurisdiction of this subcommittee remains one of the 
most consequential of any in Congress and our nuclear forces 
are at the core of our national security--the bedrock, the 
foundation.
    I believe that humanity would be safer if we eliminated 
nuclear weapons. The sheer number of close calls with 
accidental launches we have had in the past 7 decades should 
concern anyone who understands nuclear holocaust and a few 
shreds of statistical theory.
    I hope we never lose sight of what should be a shared goal 
of all nations. But until we get there we know only two 
fundamental ways to prevent nuclear weapons from ever being 
used.
    The first is reducing the number we all have through arms 
control and the second is instilling confidence in our 
adversaries that the weapons we have are safe, secure, 
reliable, and can be employed to devastating effect.
    There's broad bipartisan support for the nuclear triad and 
ensuring that our systems remain safe, secure, and reliable. In 
fact, it was Secretary Mattis, who, after publicly expressing 
concern regarding the land leg of the triad, ordered a review 
as to whether all three legs are still necessary and the 
conclusion was yes.
    Our systems must check those three boxes safe, secure, and 
reliable to provide a credible deterrent as we face a dynamic 
this country has never previously confronted, two nuclear peer 
adversaries.
    This is an area in which the chairman and I very much see 
eye to eye. This means making the significant investments 
across the Department of Defense and the National Nuclear 
Security Administration--the NNSA to produce new platforms such 
as the B-21 and Columbia class SSBNs [Ballistic Missile 
Submarines], modernize delivery systems such as the Sentinel 
ICBM, long-range standoff weapon and the next Trident D-5 life 
extension variant, as well as updating aging NNSA 
infrastructure across the national labs and production 
facilities so that they can deliver nuclear warheads on time 
and on schedule to the services.
    The chairman and I also firmly agree that a strong U.S. 
nuclear deterrent is at the core of strategic stability in 
today's world. This is true not just with our adversaries but 
because of the umbrella it provides to our allies and partners 
as well.
    Amidst Putin's nuclear saber rattling over Ukraine, U.S. 
contributions to the NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] 
alliance have proven to be a stabilizing force.
    With regards to the INDOPACOM [U.S. Indo-Pacific Command] 
region, President Biden has been crystal clear, the U.S. has 
an, quote, ``ironclad and unwavering commitment'' to draw on 
the full range of its military capabilities, including nuclear, 
to provide extended deterrence for the Republic of Korea in the 
face of an increasingly antagonistic Pyongyang.
    Without a reliable U.S. nuclear deterrent to counterbalance 
our adversaries the potential of proliferation to our allies is 
a real concern that we should take just as seriously as what 
Russia and the CCP [Chinese Communist Party] are doing.
    While our adversaries are making significant qualitative 
and quantitative improvements to their nuclear forces, U.S. 
programs, whether at NNSA or across the DOD, continue to face 
schedule delays and cost overruns.
    Just last week, I read that Sentinel, which is planned to 
deliver just in time to replace the aging Minuteman III ICBMs, 
could be up to 2 years delayed. I am certain any schedule shift 
will also be met with a corresponding price tag increase to the 
already staggering $96 billion program.
    Meanwhile, at NNSA the uranium processing facility is $2 
billion over cost and is similarly delayed up to 2 years, and 
NNSA's plans to produce plutonium pits at the rate DOD requires 
have been delayed, again, by years until the mid to late 2030s 
and we won't know how much it will realistically cost until 
2025.
    We also made public a few weeks ago that the CCP has 
surpassed the U.S. in their quantity of ICBM launchers and is 
exceeding its own nuclear modernization plans with a path to 
get to 1,500 warheads by 2035.
    In the 2018 Chinese military power report DIA [Defense 
Intelligence Agency] assessed that the purpose of their nuclear 
forces was to maintain a limited but survivable second strike 
capability consistent with their purported ``no first use'' 
policy.
    There was no mention by the intelligence community just 5 
years ago about the potential expansion of their nuclear 
arsenal. But, yet, in 2021 they released that they would more 
than double their stockpile by 2027.
    In other words, while U.S. programs are several years 
behind, the Chinese are now several years ahead. This is 
unacceptable.
    And we don't know yet what a Moscow-Beijing alliance might 
portend for all of this. While Russia is sabotaging the last 
real example of verifiable arms control, we have yet to see a 
clear strategy for engaging the CCP in arms control 
discussions.
    I hope today's witnesses can help this committee better 
understand what is being done on both policy and acquisition to 
ensure that U.S. nuclear forces continue to keep us safe.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you for your remarks. We now turn to 
our witnesses.
    Your prepared statements will be made part of the record. 
Since we have a full house today I would ask each of you to 
please limit your opening comments to 5 minutes.
    Because you don't have a clock in front of you, with 1 
minute to go I'll give a light tap on the gavel as a helpful 
reminder, hopefully.
    And, Assistant Secretary Plumb, you're recognized first.

     STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN F. PLUMB, ASSISTANT SECRETARY   
      OF DEFENSE FOR SPACE POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  

    Mr. Plumb. Thank you. Thanks, Chairman Lamborn. Thanks, 
Ranking Member Moulton, distinguished members of the committee.
    Good morning, and thanks for inviting me to testify on the 
fiscal year 2024 defense budget request for nuclear forces 
alongside my colleagues, Assistant Secretary Rosenblum, Under 
Secretary Hruby, General Bussiere, and Admiral Wolfe.
    As Secretary Austin has observed, the U.S. is on the verge 
of a challenging and dangerous moment in which we will face two 
major nuclear powers and strategic competitors for the first 
time, Russia and China.
    Both are investing heavily in nuclear weapons and forces to 
hold the U.S. and our allies and partners at risk. But neither 
is demonstrating the behaviors associated with responsible 
nuclear weapon states.
    China is engaged in a significant fast-paced expansion and 
modernization of its nuclear forces. But China has not shown 
interest in establishing dialogue related to nuclear weapons. A 
lack of dialogue breeds mistrust in peacetime and can lead to 
miscalculation and crisis.
    Russia has engaged in nuclear saber-rattling throughout its 
unjustified and unprovoked war of aggression in Ukraine. Russia 
continues to emphasize nuclear weapons in their strategy and we 
expect they will do so even more due to their conventional 
force losses in the Ukraine conflict.
    Russia's recent declared suspension of its participation in 
New START is the latest example of a pattern of irresponsible 
behavior and, in addition, of course, there are two near peer 
competitors, North Korea and Iran. Both continue to act as 
destabilizing forces in their own regions and present 
challenges for the global community.
    To meet these threats, the 2022 National Defense Strategy 
and Nuclear Posture Review are both clear about the urgent need 
to strengthen and sustain deterrence.
    Now, going back for decades, the United States has under 
invested in nuclear modernization but no more, and I thank this 
committee for their help on that.
    As a tangible sign of the administration's clear commitment 
to modernize the triad, the President's 2024 budget request 
includes $37.7 billion to recapitalize, sustain, and operate 
DOD's nuclear enterprise.
    This is $3.3 billion more than the fiscal year 2023 request 
and it includes $4.3 billion for the continued development of 
the Sentinel ICBM weapon system, $6.2 billion for the Columbia 
class SSBN program, $5.3 billion for the B-21 Raider bomber, 
almost a billion dollars for the long-range standoff cruise 
missile, and $456 million for the life extension of the Trident 
II D5 sea-launched ballistic missile.
    These investments will ensure that each leg of the triad is 
modernized and has the needed adaptability and flexibility to 
address a changing threat environment for the coming decades.
    The President's budget request also includes more than $7 
billion to sustain and recapitalize our Nuclear Command, 
Control and Communications architecture, NC3, and in addition 
the President's budget requests full funding for our nuclear 
security infrastructure to reestablish, repair, and modernize 
our production capabilities and infrastructure.
    The President's budget will ensure that our strategic 
deterrent remains safe, secure, and effective and that our 
extended deterrence commitments remain strong and credible. 
Sustained and consistent congressional support for this 
modernization effort is absolutely essential to ensure the 
security of the United States for the coming decades.
    So I would like to thank the members of the committee for 
your support to this monumental effort and for your tireless 
dedication to the department.
    Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Plumb can be found in the 
Appendix on page 35.]
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Assistant Secretary Rosenblum, you're recognized.

STATEMENT OF DEBORAH G. ROSENBLUM, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF  
 DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE  
 PROGRAMS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

    Ms. Rosenblum. Great.
    Good morning. Thank you, Chairman Lamborn as well as 
Ranking Member Moulton and the distinguished members of the 
subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity today to be able to 
testify regarding the fiscal year 2024 request for U.S. nuclear 
forces.
    It's a pleasure to join all my colleagues here to discuss 
all of the matters that undergird our U.S. nuclear deterrent.
    The President's budget request as just outlined by Dr. 
Plumb reinforces the importance of these efforts by fully 
funding the nuclear sustainment as well as modernization 
efforts.
    It is no secret that we are navigating a decisive decade. 
The decisions that we make as a nation today will have profound 
effects on our nuclear deterrent for decades to come.
    As the Assistant Secretary for Nuclear, Chemical, 
Biological, and Defense Programs, I serve as a senior adviser 
and technical expert to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of 
Defense on DOD's efforts to sustain and modernize our nuclear 
deterrent. I also serve as a staff director for the Nuclear 
Weapons Council.
    As just well articulated by Dr. Plumb, the global security 
environment has continued to deteriorate and we are facing the 
prospects of two major nuclear-armed adversaries, both of 
whom--Russia and China--are growing and diversifying their 
arsenals.
    Our adversaries, however, do not represent our only 
challenge. Today, we are faced with an unprecedented set of 
cross-cutting risks that affect multiple organizations tasked 
with sustaining the current nuclear stockpile and 
simultaneously modernizing the future nuclear triad.
    These risks reside in our nuclear industrial base with our 
future warfighter--workforce, excuse me--in supply chain 
security and in cybersecurity threats that require action in 
the near term in order to make lasting impacts over--for the 
deterrent across the next 15 years.
    Despite these challenges, we have made significant progress 
in our weapons modernization programs, and in my written 
statement, which I would ask be submitted for the record, 
contains further details. But I'm happy to answer any of them 
today for you.
    As staff director of the Nuclear Weapons Council, I am also 
pleased to report that the NWC is actively making decisions to 
modernize a modern, flexible, and balanced stockpile 
underpinned by a resilient and responsive production 
enterprise.
    In addition to executing our statutory responsibilities, 
the NWC embarked on an endeavor this past year to think broadly 
about the necessary capabilities and capacities potentially 
needed for the future and to understand how future requirements 
may impact on current plans and schedules and the program of 
record.
    The council recognizes that it can no longer make 
individual decisions related to specific warhead programs but, 
rather, the council, with all of the efforts of my colleagues 
here at this table, are focused on understanding a suite of 
decisions that reflect the priorities of the department and 
enable the council to trade and balance risk across the 
deterrent and between DOD and the Department of Energy.
    Our adversaries' technological advances also pose direct 
risks to both our legacy and future nuclear forces. To that 
end, I want to thank and acknowledge this subcommittee's 
support for the Department of Defense's ongoing 2022 failsafe 
risk reduction review.
    This represents an historic opportunity to conduct an 
enterprise wide review to rebaseline nuclear surety.
    Finally, as vice chairman of the NATO High Level Group we 
are very focused on and helping to lead NATO's modernization of 
the nuclear deterrent and we are working very closely with our 
allies on the B61-12 and in close coordination with the U.S. 
Air Force and allies to ensure the F-35 is operationally 
certified later this year for their dual capable aircraft role.
    So with this, I'd like to thank the subcommittee for all of 
your support and I look forward to taking your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Rosenblum can be found in 
the Appendix on page 45.]
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Administrator Hruby, you're recognized.

STATEMENT OF JILL HRUBY, UNDER SECRETARY FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY  
 AND ADMINISTRATOR OF THE NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY   
 ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

    Ms. Hruby. Thank you, Chairman Lamborn, Ranking Member 
Moulton, and members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the 
opportunity to present the President's fiscal year 2024 budget 
request for the Department of Energy's National Nuclear 
Security Administration.
    Chairman Lamborn, a written statement has been provided and 
I respectfully request that it be submitted for the record.
    The deteriorating international security environment 
reminds us daily of the importance and urgency of the NNSA 
missions. This security atmosphere and the ramifications of 
Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine are expanding the scope 
of our responsibilities.
    As a result, we are laser focused on the need to accelerate 
delivery in all of our missions while simultaneously advancing 
the foundational science and technology that provides the 
United States with comprehensive deterrence.
    I am proud of NNSA's progress. The B61-12 and the W88 Alt 
370 are in full-scale production and are achieving planned 
deployment schedules. The other three weapon modernization 
programs--the W80-4, the W87-1, and the W93--are making 
significant progress.
    Our investments in pit production have advanced the ability 
to produce 80 pits per year as close to 2030 as possible. At 
Los Alamos we have produced 40 developmental pit builds with 
the first production unit expected late in calendar year 2024.
    The investments made at the Savannah River pit production 
facility has accelerated progress by conducting early site 
preparation, removal of unneeded equipment, and procuring long 
lead items.
    The uranium processing facility is over 50 percent complete 
with the first four nonnuclear sub projects concluded. 
Nonproliferation efforts also continue to succeed with three 
disposals of surplus plutonium, removal of weapons usable 
materials from countries around the world, and replacement of 
almost 100 Cesium irradiators from U.S. facilities. We have 
partnered with Ukraine and neighboring countries to train 
emergency responders and we have provided equipment to the 
Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant.
    Additionally, the Office of Naval Reactors has completed 
the refueling and overhaul of the prototype land-based reactor 
in New York, progressed development of the Columbia class and 
SSN(X) [Next-Generation Attack Submarine] submarine propulsion 
systems and supported AUKUS.
    I'm especially pleased to say the entire enterprise is 
energized because of the importance of our mission, our 
emphasis on accelerated delivery, and our investments in 
science, technology, infrastructure, and workforce.
    NNSA's fiscal year 2024 budget request of $23.8 billion, an 
increase of $1.7 billion over fiscal year 2023 enacted levels, 
reflects current national security priorities and remains 
consistent with the Nuclear Posture Review and other 
administration policies and strategies.
    The budget request supports the five ongoing weapon 
modernization programs, two Phase One exploratory efforts, and 
enhanced cybersecurity for our networks and digital assurance 
of our weapons and enterprise.
    The request responds to inflationary pressures, supply 
chain and labor shortages in the construction sector by 
prioritizing funding for ongoing large-scale nuclear production 
modernization efforts and expansion of nonnuclear production 
capabilities while delaying some planned construction 
activities to maximize success.
    The budget request in defense nuclear nonproliferation 
continues nuclear risk reduction work and supports our robust 
nonproliferation regime and international partnerships and 
advances associated research.
    Expanding nonproliferation portfolio priorities include the 
support for Ukraine and preparing for a growing and evolving 
civil nuclear power fleet.
    The naval reactors' budget request continues to support 
reactor designs for new systems, provides a qualitative edge 
for our naval fleet, and funds the recently rebaselined spent 
fuel handling facility.
    Before closing, I want to express my appreciation for my 
colleagues from the Department of Defense for their strong 
collaboration. We continue to focus both--on both short- and 
long-range planning to align our respective mission 
deliverables to maintain a safe, secure, reliable, and 
effective nuclear deterrent at all times.
    The priorities and challenges for NNSA are clear and 
progress is being made. With your continued support I'm 
confident we will succeed.
    Thank you. I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Hruby can be found in the 
Appendix on page 55.]
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    General Bussiere, you're recognized.

STATEMENT OF GENERAL THOMAS A. BUSSIERE, COMMANDER, AIR FORCE  
 GLOBAL STRIKE COMMAND, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE 

    General Bussiere. Good morning, Chairman Lamborn and 
Ranking Member Moulton, and distinguished committee members. 
I'm absolutely honored to be here today to represent the men 
and women of Air Force Global Strike Command and provide you an 
update on our mission, our airmen, our modernization efforts, 
and the challenges we face in sustaining our legacy weapon 
systems.
    As you know, the world is a very different place than it 
was in 2019 when this command was activated. The Air Force 
Global Strike Command was created to ensure the Air Force 
dedicated the appropriate leadership and oversight over our 
nation's nuclear mission.
    As the commander of Air Force Global Strike Command I 
intend to ensure no one forgets why our command exists. For the 
first time in history the U.S. faces two major nuclear powers 
as strategic competitors.
    China continues to expand, modernize, diversify their 
nuclear forces and is the foremost country positioned to 
reshape its region and the international order to comply with 
its authoritarian purposes.
    Meanwhile, President Putin has engaged in reckless rhetoric 
about the use of nuclear weapons as Russia persists in their 
unprovoked attacks on Ukraine in an attempt to expand their 
power and influence.
    Air Force Global Strike Command remains the bedrock of our 
nation's defense and the international assurance against these 
threats. We are postured to respond to the strategic 
competition our nation currently faces.
    We are responsible for the air- and land-based legs of the 
nuclear triad and, fundamentally, we are the long-range strike 
force for the free world. The entire inventory of U.S. bombers 
and intercontinental ballistic missiles rests within our 
command.
    I'd like to thank the members of this committee for your 
steadfast support for our continued efforts to modernize our 
weapon systems. I will briefly highlight some of our ongoing 
initiatives.
    We continue to maintain and sustain our current Minuteman 
III ICBMs and we already are preparing our wings and their 
surrounding communities to receive our future ICBM, the 
Sentinel.
    Additionally, our bomber fleet including our B-1s and our 
dual capable B-2s and B-52s are being sustained with innovative 
solutions as we prepare for the future bomber fleet, including 
the B-21 Raider and the modernized B-52J.
    In addition to the ICBM and bomber fleets, we continue our 
efforts to modernize our Nuclear Command, Control and 
Communications, or NC3. As you know, NC3 is integral to the 
national military command system used to exercise and conduct 
continuous, survivable, and secure nuclear command and control.
    We are at a critical time for the United States. The 
threats we face are more complicated and more dangerous than 
any time in my career. The evolving global environment demands 
a credible strategic deterrence and to achieve this Air Force 
Global Strike Command must continue to modernize at the speed 
of relevance.
    Unique to our command is our requirement to maintain full 
operational capability with our legacy nuclear weapons systems 
to answer the President's call until the new weapon systems are 
fully operational.
    The nation's nuclear enterprise is the foundation of our 
nation's defense and integrated deterrence will not operate as 
designed without the stability it provides.
    To maintain the security of our nation and of our allies 
and partners the U.S. must ensure our weapons are capable and 
ready, our airmen are empowered and equipped. The airmen of Air 
Force Global Strike Command continue to fulfill our mission 
with discipline, excellence, and pride.
    However, a number of our airmen also face personal 
challenges including health concerns, housing and childcare 
availability, and we are working to develop prompt and 
comprehensive solutions to ensure our airmen are getting the 
care they need and deserve.
    Last December I was honored to be confirmed to be the 
commander of Air Force Global Strike Command. There is no other 
job I would rather have. Strategic deterrence and long-range 
strike are foundational to our nation's defense and Air Force 
Global Strike Command is the backbone of these mission sets.
    With our legacy platforms and our modernized forces and our 
devoted people we safeguard our nation now and the decades to 
come.
    Thank you for your time, and I look forward to your 
questions.
    [The prepared statement of General Bussiere can be found in 
the Appendix on page 80.]
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Vice Admiral Wolfe, you're recognized.

       STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL JOHNNY WOLFE, DIRECTOR,   
        STRATEGIC SYSTEMS PROGRAMS, UNITED STATES NAVY 

    Admiral Wolfe. Good morning, Chairman Lamborn, Ranking 
Member Moulton, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. 
Thank you for the opportunity to testify on the Department of 
the Navy's budget priorities for nuclear forces.
    I'd like to thank this subcommittee for its continued 
support of the Navy's nuclear deterrence mission. The mission 
of my command, Strategic Systems Programs, is to provide 
credible and affordable strategic solutions to the warfighter.
    To quote from the administration's 2022 Nuclear Posture 
Review and as said many times already this morning, in a 
dynamic security environment a safe effective nuclear deterrent 
is foundational to broader U.S. defense strategy and the 
extended deterrence commitments we have made to allies and 
partners.
    For nearly 7 decades the Navy has provided unwavering 
support to the sea-based leg of the nuclear triad. The coming 
year will build on this remarkable history.
    Later this year, the Navy will conduct the final 
demonstration and shakedown operation for an Ohio class 
ballistic missile submarine, demonstrating the unmatched 
reliability of our sea-based nuclear deterrent.
    Alongside our partners in the U.K. we will celebrate the 
60th anniversary of the Polaris Sales Agreement. In 
coordination with our colleagues at NNSA the W93/Mk7 program 
continues on schedule, further demonstrating our commitment to 
responsible stewardship of the nuclear stockpile.
    As this work shows, we must continue to sustain today's 
deterrent while modernizing for the future. The Navy continues 
to manage the nuclear strategic weapon system across three main 
mission priorities: sustaining the current weapon system D5LE 
through Ohio end-of-life, developing the strategic weapon 
system of the future, D5LE2 for the Columbia class, and 
safeguarding our special relationship with the United Kingdom 
embodied in the Polaris Sales Agreement.
    First and foremost, we must maintain the current D5LE 
missile inventory and provide the necessary operational support 
to sustain Ohio class submarines through the end of their life 
in the early 2040s.
    All of our life extension efforts remain on track and our 
current program will support the deployment of all existing 
warheads. We must also recapitalize our supporting Navy nuclear 
deterrent mission infrastructure to support and sustain nuclear 
weapons and SSBN operations that enable sea-based strategic 
deterrence.
    Secondly, we must continue to ensure the transition between 
Ohio class and Columbia class submarine stays on schedule. For 
my command, SSP [Strategic Systems Programs], this requires a 
seamless transition of the current Trident II D5LE weapon 
system and missile inventory onto the new Columbia class 
ballistic missile submarine.
    We have already started the work on the next variant of 
Trident and its corresponding weapon system. This next 
generation of D5LE missile, D5LE2, will continue to meet 
required missile performance while providing flexibility in the 
system to adapt to meet future warfighter requirements.
    D5LE2 will be necessary to outload the Columbia class SSBNs 
starting with Hull 9, ensuring that Trident remains credible 
until at least 2084.
    In order to achieve this requirement we must design, 
develop, produce, and test this next-generation Trident over 
the coming decade with the first flight test scheduled for 
2033.
    Finally, one of the greatest advantage the United States 
has is its alliances and partnerships. As the U.S. project 
officer for the Polaris Sales Agreement I will continue to 
support the U.K.'s sovereign deterrent for today's Vanguard 
class submarines and their successor, the Dreadnought class.
    For decades U.S. policy had recognized that the independent 
British nuclear deterrent adds to NATO and, indeed, global 
stability. Execution of these three mission priorities is only 
possible through investments in our people, our infrastructure, 
and our industrial base.
    Our government and contractor teams are working hard to 
deliver a safe, secure, and effective strategic weapon system 
that will ensure sea-based strategic deterrence. Nuclear 
modernization will take time to complete so sustained 
resourcing and enterprise effort is absolutely essential.
    Chairman, as you said, we can no longer put off 
recapitalizing the nuclear triad. Our strategic competitors are 
not idle.
    Ranking Member, as you said, Russia and China's nuclear 
arsenal is our nation's biggest existential threat. It is only 
through your continued support that the department's top 
modernization program priorities can be achieved and the Navy 
can deliver a reliable sea-based strategic deterrent 
capability.
    As the fourteenth director it is my highest honor to 
represent the men and women of SSP. I echo General Cotton's 
comments before this committee recently where he said, I quote, 
``Our people are the foundation of every capability that 
enables strategic deterrence,'' end quote.
    My number-one priority is to ensure that they are poised to 
execute the mission with the same level of success, passion, 
and rigor that has characterized our workforce since our 
program was founded in 1955.
    Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on behalf of 
the dedicated Americans that make deterrence of major power 
conflict their life's work.
    I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Vice Admiral Wolfe can be found 
in the Appendix on page 95.]
    The Chairman. All right. Thank you, and thanks to all of 
you for being here this morning and we'll now start with our 
questions.
    Administrator Hruby, on the topic of NNSA workforce in our 
office call you and I discussed earlier the trouble we're 
having recruiting and retaining enough specialized craft and 
trade workers across the country at locations like New Mexico, 
South Carolina, and Texas.
    The NNSA facilities in these States are critical for 
reconstituting plutonium, pit production, assemble Tritium 
packages, and modernizing our high explosive science 
capabilities.
    If recruiting is so hard why can't we just pay potential 
workers more? Wouldn't that save money in the long run?
    Ms. Hruby. Yeah. Thank you for that question. You're 
absolutely right. Of all of the issues that we have with 
construction labor shortages are our biggest concern and the 
biggest cost driver, and craft workers are a large part of 
that.
    We will look at all options for attracting more craft 
workers. For example, we're actively recruiting people who are 
coming off the Civil Nuclear Power Plant Vogtle to work at 
Savannah River, which is relatively nearby.
    We're working with all the union shops. We have 
apprenticeship programs that we're funding and we will look at 
paying higher wages. So we'll look at all of those options. We 
have--now that we are tracking very closely our craft worker 
shortage, I think we can tailor those solutions in a more 
effective way.
    Thank you.
    The Chairman. Okay, thank you.
    On the Sentinel delay I want to ask several questions here. 
Secretary Plumb, I'll start with you.
    From a policy point of view, recapitalizing the land-based 
leg of the triad with the Sentinel program is something this 
administration is completely committed to. Isn't that correct?
    Mr. Plumb. Absolutely, sir.
    The Chairman. Thank you. And, Secretary Rosenblum, as the 
witness from the Acquisition and Sustainment Office is it 
correct to say the changes in the Sentinel schedule are the 
result of macroeconomic factors and that the need for the 
program remains unchanged?
    Ms. Rosenblum. Yes, that is true.
    The Chairman. Okay. Thank you.
    And, General Bussiere, let's drill down into this just a 
little more. You're responsible for sustaining the current 
Minuteman III system. Do you agree that the need for the 
Sentinel program has not changed?
    General Bussiere. Chairman Lamborn, absolutely not. It 
hasn't changed. We struggle with our current maintenance and 
sustainment of the Minuteman III. I mean, it's a very old 
weapon system.
    In the last 5 years, we have had 2.5 million maintenance 
man hours, which was a 30 percent increase over the previous 5 
years, and we're anticipating a 25 percent increase in the next 
5 years. So the solution to that aging weapon system is the 
Sentinel.
    The Chairman. And with some delays in the Sentinel will 
these life extension programs that you've just articulated be 
enough to say that we have a reliable and credible nuclear 
deterrent in the meantime?
    General Bussiere. Yes, Chairman Lamborn, I would agree with 
that statement. So I know you're going to get a lot more 
information from Honorable LaPlante tomorrow, but this--the 
size, scope, and scale of the Sentinel deployment over, as you 
know, a 10 year period and the unique aspects of having to 
maintain full operational capability of the Minuteman III 
system until replaced by the Sentinel.
    So we'll have both systems as we transition over, 
essentially, a decade and the unique aspects of that is as we 
field Sentinel we're going to harvest the parts that we can 
from Minuteman to maintain the Minuteman until completely 
replaced.
    The Chairman. Okay. Thank you.
    Admiral Wolfe, can you describe the need for a second life 
extension for the D5 missile and why production of additional 
DSLE missiles is not practical?
    Admiral Wolfe. Yes, sir. Thank you for the question.
    Yeah. So if you look at where we're at with our industrial 
base, we have gone out of production on, essentially, every 
major component of the Trident D5 life-extended missile. So 
that's the first issue. We have got to address obsolescence and 
life issues of the current system.
    Additionally, as we start to field Columbias, and if you 
remember in my opening statement I talked about the 9th Hull of 
the Columbia class, the reason that is so important is because 
at that point the current inventory of Trident D5 life-
extension missiles that we have got will not be sufficient to 
outfit from Columbia Hull 9 and into the future for the 
remaining platforms and then back fit where we need to get on 
the first date.
    So both of those are driving the need for us to have 
additional assets to both life extend and provide those to 
Colombia for the future.
    The Chairman. Okay, thank you.
    General Bussiere, back to you. How are you preparing to 
field the Sentinel missile and what investments in equipment 
and personnel will be necessary to meet the planned deployment 
schedule?
    General Bussiere. Chairman Lamborn, there's a lot of facets 
for fielding this weapon system. The first point I'd like to 
make is the full operational capability is a unique part of any 
weapon system in the Air Force, or in the department for that 
matter, where you have to maintain full operational capability 
versus off ramp and on ramp, typical of other weapons systems. 
So that's a unique aspect of it.
    It'll require increased manpower for that transitionary 
period. It'll require our operators, our maintainers, our 
defenders, to have to maintain those two weapon systems as we 
transition.
    It will take a great partnership between Air Force Global 
Strike Command or Force Materiel Command, the Army Corps of 
Engineers, our communities and partners, members of this 
committee, as we take on what's been reported as one of the 
largest work projects in the last 50 years for our nation.
    The Chairman. All right. Thank you. And while I've got you 
can you update us on something that's come out in the news 
recently and that is the possibility of higher cancer findings 
with people that have been involved in these programs? Where do 
we stand on researching and getting to the bottom of that?
    General Bussiere. Thank you for asking that question, 
Chairman Lamborn.
    It was illuminated in January from a member of Space Force 
that used to be serving in the Air Force as an ICBM operator at 
Malmstrom Air Force Base and this member had been diagnosed 
with non-Hodgkins lymphoma and several of his colleagues that 
had served at Malstrom about 15 to 18 years ago had also been 
diagnosed with non-Hodgkins lymphoma.
    So although there had been previous studies specific to 
Malstrom, I asked the Air Force Surgeon General and the Chief 
and the Secretary if I could do a more comprehensive study that 
looked across all of our AFSCs--Air Force Specialty Codes--that 
serve in the missile field operations at all three of our bases 
to make sure we have a deep understanding if we're putting our 
airmen at risk, and if we are we're going to mitigate it.
    So about 2 weeks ago we started our efforts. The first 
phase is to look at all the cancer registries in the Department 
of Defense as well as those that are available from the State 
level and see if we have higher incident rates within the areas 
that we do missile field operations, and if we do then we're 
going to go down into the next level of the study to assess 
what is causal and then, hopefully, be able to mitigate it.
    The Chairman. Do you have a time line on how that long--how 
long that's going to take?
    General Bussiere. We're anticipating getting the data. The 
database is going to take anywhere from 6 to 10 months. But 
we're not going to wait until that's done. If we find something 
then we're going to drill down into that causal area.
    The Chairman. Okay. And please keep the subcommittee and 
full committee informed on that.
    General Bussiere. Absolutely, Chairman.
    The Chairman. And, lastly, my last question will be who can 
update us on--we have talked about the other programs in more 
detail, but the LRSO [Long Range Standoff Weapon]--who'd like 
to give us a breakdown on where that stands right now?
    Ms. Rosenblum. Yes, I can, Representative.
    The LRSO achieved milestone B in 2021. It remains on track. 
It's currently in the EMD [Engineering and Manufacturing 
Development] phase. And I'll ask Administrator Hruby to provide 
detail with regards to the warhead for the LRSO. But the big 
takeaway is it remains on track.
    The Chairman. Okay. Thank you.
    Representative Moulton.
    Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General Bussiere, you have detailed how tricky this 
transition is from Minuteman III to Sentinel and how Minuteman 
III is aging quickly. So how are we going to deal with this 2 
year delay?
    General Bussiere. Ranking Member Moulton, I wouldn't 
necessarily characterize what was in the press as equating to a 
2 year delay. So what I think the program office is doing very 
innovatively is they bundled the weapon system into kind of 
three different areas.
    So there's the missile itself. Then there's the command and 
control architecture or the launch facility or the 
construction--the MILCON [Military Construction]. And then 
there's the support equipment, and they've kind of bundled all 
that.
    What I think the article kind of illuminated was 
potentially the macroeconomic impacts to the missile itself as 
well as some workforce challenges the contractor is having.
    But what it doesn't illuminate is the success not only in 
organizing this large project the way this--the project office 
has done it but also the fact that they've moved certain things 
left of schedule and had great successes, for example, recently 
with a stage one rocket.
    So there's a very discrete challenge in the missile based 
on workforce and technology. But other facets of this program 
are actually moving left of schedule.
    Right now, I am not--you know, 3 years into a 7 year 
developmental process of this program I have confidence that 
the program office--and, again, I believe Dr. LaPlante will 
provide more illumination of this tomorrow--is able to take 
that program where it needs to go.
    Mr. Moulton. Do you think there's anything more important 
for our national security as a nation that we are doing than 
this kind of program?
    General Bussiere. No, sir. I think--in my opinion, this is 
our nation's most important mission.
    Mr. Moulton. Okay. So if it's our most important mission I 
hope there is a plan to not just limit further delays but to 
actually get us back on track, because I would point out that 
the macroeconomic challenges that you described--the troubles 
because of COVID, the supply chain issues because of COVID, 
worldwide COVID economic recession--those are all challenges 
that our adversaries have faced as well. And, yet, China is 
exceeding their schedule. They're getting ahead while we're 
getting behind.
    I mean, I like to think that we can outcompete China at 
everything and, yet, here we are just trying to build a 
technology that fundamentally has existed for 60 years and 
we're way behind. That's just--at the macro level it is 
fundamentally unacceptable.
    So I appreciate all the hard work you're doing. It's 
encouraging to hear that some things are left of schedule. But 
I think the goal has to be to 100 percent get this back on 
track.
    General Bussiere. Ranking Member, I couldn't agree with you 
more and I believe the department and the Air Force has made 
this a priority, and I would absolutely love to see the nation 
make it a priority also, not just department priority.
    Mr. Moulton. Well, I think the nation has made it a 
priority because taxpayers are funding this to a 100 percent.
    General Bussiere. Yeah. Ranking Member, I wasn't 
referencing the funding stream. I was referencing, you know, 
great innovative minds wanting to come and work in this 
business----
    Mr. Moulton. Got it.
    General Bussiere. ----et cetera, where the nation our 
talented youth go, I want to go serve in that capacity to 
defend our nation.
    Mr. Moulton. Well, that's a very good point. We should--we 
should continue that discussion.
    ASD Rosenblum, do you have anything to add to this?
    Ms. Rosenblum. Yeah. No, thank you very much, and I know 
you'll hear tomorrow from Dr. LaPlante along with Chairman 
Lamborn.
    Just a few highlights with regards to this. This remains 
absolutely one of the department's top priority so that we have 
a sustainable ICBM leg. There have been a number of 
constructive recommendations that the Air Force has made to Dr. 
LaPlante by way of buying things in lead--long lead items and a 
variety of different acquisition mechanisms that he has 
approved last night. He'll be able to detail those for you 
tomorrow.
    The department has also used to full effect the Defense 
Production Act in giving the Sentinel program the DX rating, 
which means with suppliers it will be preferenced and we are 
also working hard along with the Air Force with regards to some 
of the workforce challenges. So it is really a combined OSD 
[Office of the Secretary of Defense] and Air Force effort to 
make sure that this program remains on track.
    As of now, we believe we're still aiming for the threshold 
objective date of 2030. But it would be premature to let you 
know the degree to which these particular actions will move the 
schedule further to the left.
    Mr. Moulton. Okay. Thank you very much.
    Dr. Plumb, what specific options is the administration 
considering to respond to Russia's suspension of New START?
    Mr. Plumb. Thanks for that question, Ranking Member 
Moulton.
    So just to lay the base work, on February 28th, as I 
testified last time, Russia passed its law and suspended--
declared they were suspending participation in New START and we 
have not received any daily notifications from them since that 
time.
    Just this week--which, yes, that's yesterday--we had a 
further interaction with Russia pressing them on the upcoming 
end of the month there is due a semiannual data exchange. Every 
6 months under the treaty we exchange data on kind of high 
level numbers.
    Russia responded that they will not be providing that 
information, and so as a diplomatic countermeasure the United 
States will not be providing that information back.
    We are going to continue to examine what are the diplomatic 
countermeasures that are appropriate and what we're trying to 
do, sir, is balance both responding to Russia's irresponsible 
behavior but to continue to demonstrate what we believe a 
responsible nuclear power's action should be.
    Mr. Moulton. Okay. With respect to China there are a lot of 
analysts, observers, who think that China is not going to be 
willing to enter arms control discussions until they, 
essentially, reach parity with the United States.
    Is there any daylight there? Is there any places where we 
might be able to convince them to come to the negotiating table 
before that point?
    Mr. Plumb. I mean, I think we should all hold out hope and 
we should continue to pursue. I do believe there are a track 
two, which is, you know, nongovernmental conversations that go 
on. But as far as track one, I'm not aware of any progress on 
that front.
    Mr. Moulton. Okay. This is something that the Chairman and 
I have discussed as we would like to see a real strategy here 
for how we're going to and even just imagine an arms control 
framework that encompasses dealing with two peer adversaries.
    Now, I'm just asking how do we even start the discussion 
with China. But to think behind the scenes about how we get to 
this point where we have some trilateral arms control agreement 
is something that we should be thinking about today even before 
they're willing to come to the table.
    One final question for Administrator Hruby. Your fiscal 
year 2024 budget request shows increasing costs, schedule slips 
for many of the programs and projects that are key, as you've 
detailed.
    Will NNSA's enhanced mission delivery initiative outlined 
in the September 2022 report allow the agency to recover 
schedule and cost overruns? And can you provide specific 
examples of how NNSA will hold contractors accountable for 
their performance, including cost control?
    Ms. Hruby. Yeah. Thank you, Congressman Moulton.
    The EMDI initiative stands for Enhanced Mission Delivery 
Initiative. It was aimed at making our enterprise more 
efficient across the board in many ways.
    With respect to construction projects and the delays 
associated with that there's one specific recommendation that 
has to do with the inefficiencies involved in acquisition that 
we're working very hard on. That should save us weeks or months 
every year in the approvals between the people doing the work, 
the contractors doing the work, and the government.
    So it is specifically aimed at improving the schedules for 
the construction projects and all the efficiencies across the 
enterprise.
    Mr. Moulton. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you. And by way of reminder, upon every 
member here asking their questions in this open hearing we'll 
immediately go into recess for a brief time and reconvene up in 
2337 in the SCIF [sensitive compartmented information facility] 
for everyone who has the appropriate clearance.
    Representative Wilson.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank each of you 
for your service, and I am really grateful.
    Chairman Doug Lamborn was correctly concerned, Secretary 
Hruby, about tritium production. I'll be getting to a question 
on that.
    And then it's really bipartisan, as you see, our hopes for 
all of you to succeed for the American people, and in 
particular I agree with Ranking Member Seth Moulton that we 
have got a situation, obviously, with war criminal Putin where 
he just this week has--aside from murdering people in Ukraine 
he's now threatening the security of the people of Belarus by 
placing nuclear capabilities there, and that should be a 
sovereign country, which has been virtually annexed by Putin.
    And then we have the Chinese Communist Party, obviously, 
making threats to Taiwan, to America, and then it was 
disconcerting to me that the Chinese spy balloon could easily 
have been monitoring the Savannah River site as it traversed 
across North and South Carolina.
    And then with the regime in Tehran, the threats that they 
make, their capabilities of developing ICBMs in the midst of 
anything else, and then they have a goal and it's the 
vaporization of Israel, the vaporization of the United States.
    And so as we have democracies the rule of gun facing the 
authoritarians' rule of law--by rule of gun and democracies 
rule of law, again, I just want to thank you for what you're 
doing.
    And, Secretary Hruby, I'm really grateful that the 
communities of South Carolina and adjacent Georgia are 
extremely supportive of the plutonium pit production mission at 
the Savannah River site, and maintaining the enacted levels for 
this is necessary for nuclear deterrence.
    With that, sadly, the NNSA will not be able to meet the 
requirement of producing 80 pits per year by 2030. How critical 
is it that we do everything we can to minimize the delay and 
reach the requirements as close to 2030 as possible?
    Ms. Hruby. Well, thank you, and I appreciate the question 
and I definitely appreciate the support from the local 
communities in South Carolina. The pit production--recreating 
the ability to make pits in the United States at the rate of 
about 80 per year starting in 2030 remains important.
    We also have known for a couple years now that this--the 
2030 date was going to be complicated for us, that 80 pits 
are--we're going to make 80 pits per year. In fact, we're 
likely to make more than 80 pits per year because of the demand 
once we get up and running.
    But the time requirement is very difficult for us. While we 
continue to try to do everything we can and we have made some 
important decisions thanks to the support last year--the 
funding last year, we're doing some acceleration activities 
with prebuying equipment, with doing demolition in the existing 
building that needs to be done before we can start new 
construction, and some other site preparation work and 
training--in a high-fidelity training facility.
    So we're doing lots of things to try to accelerate progress 
and, most importantly is we're working with my colleagues here 
in the Nuclear Weapons Council to make sure that we have a 
credible plan to keep our--and then this case it's associated 
with the ground-based ICBMs--to keep those systems, you know, 
reliable at all times.
    And so we have--we're accelerating pit production and we're 
working closely to make sure schedules stay aligned and that 
our nuclear deterrent is effective.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you.
    And, again, Chairman Lamborn is correct again on his 
concern about the tritium production, and this is so important 
because it makes nuclear weapons--a thermo nuclear weapons--it 
boosts the chain reaction inside the weapon and increases 
magnitude dramatically.
    The tritium finishing facility is being--is replacing a 
part of the overall Savannah River site tritium enterprise, 
which was built in the 1950s and now it's been zeroed out, and 
there's been $120 million already spent on this and it's--
unlike most radioactive elements tritium decays very fast and 
therefore the stockpile must be replenished frequently.
    And so what's being done because of the tritium finishing 
facility for funding in the future?
    Ms. Hruby. Yeah, thanks for that question. We did--we 
have--we did zero out, so to speak, but we haven't cancelled. 
We're delaying the tritium finishing facility for one reason 
and one reason only is so that we can concentrate on getting 
the Savannah River pit production facility as close to be 
finished as close to 2030 as possible.
    We have a significant craft labor shortage. If we have two 
big projects going on at once we're going to have a bigger 
craft labor shortage. So we're delaying the tritium finishing 
facility. We'll restart it.
    If you look at the FYNSP [Future-Years Nuclear Security 
Program] we'll restart it in 2027 with construction expected to 
start again in 2029 as it fits into the overall construction 
plan with SRPPF [Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility]. 
So we know the--we know we can maintain the current tritium 
facility. We will not--we will have tritium for our gas 
bottles. We're just trying to update that facility, make it 
more modern. Thank you.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much.
    Mr. Garamendi. I'm just trying to get my head around all 
the happy talk that I've heard. The fact of the matter is every 
single one of these systems are behind schedule and over 
budget. Every single one of them, and the happy talk from each 
and every one of you doesn't get down to the detail. I'm going 
to delay my questions until we can get into a classified 
session when we can get past the happy talk and get down to 
details.
    For example, not one word about the cost of the 
infrastructure for the Sentinel. No information at all about 
what it's going to cost to build the infrastructure or when it 
would be completed.
    On pit production, good luck on South Carolina--on Savannah 
River. If there's ever a place that's delayed, and Joe--well, 
now that he's not here I'll just unload. It has never been on 
schedule for anything and here you go again with another delay. 
With regard to the Sentinel, delay, delay, delay. Command and 
control, which is probably the most important, we just get 
happy talk. We don't get any detail.
    The Columbia, oh, now we're going to have to--we're going 
to have to refit the Ohio because the Columbia is delayed.
    Pit production--at Los Alamos, where is it? What is it? 
When will it be and at what cost? No information from any of 
you, but then this is public.
    I yield back my time. I'm going to go--I look forward to 
the classified.
    The Chairman. Representative Turner.
    Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    First of all, I'd like to defend South Carolina for Joe 
Wilson. The second thing is is I want to say this is the first 
time I think I've been in a Strategic Forces Subcommittee 
hearing where I can actually say I completely agree with 
everything Mr. Garamendi has just said because there's a lot of 
things that we disagree on but I completely agree with him on 
our being behind and over budget and how critical this is.
    Mr. Garamendi. You're going to ruin your reputation and 
mine.
    Mr. Turner. Yeah, that's right. But we're good friends so 
that helps that we can agree on this.
    So in the Intel Committee just yesterday we had a hotspot--
so Ms. Houlahan serves with me on the Intelligence Committee--
on focusing on Russia and China and their nuclear weapons, both 
deployed stockpiles and their research projects. Of course, 
it's classified. I don't want to talk about classified things.
    We're going to--you'll have the opportunity later to talk 
about classified things. But there's a number of things that 
are not classified that, General, Admiral, I want to discuss 
with you.
    And, General, you said for the first time we're going to be 
facing--and it's not in your written testimony but I want to 
highlight in your--in your testimony that you read to us you 
highlighted the fact that, you know, China is in the midst of, 
you know, strategic breakthroughs, rapid nuclear expansion, and 
that Russia is doing the same--that our environment has 
changed.
    So I want to focus on that with the two of you. Would you 
both agree that in the aggregate that China and Russia are 
increasing their number of deployed nuclear weapons, their 
stockpiles--that both are increasing?
    General.
    General Bussiere. So, Congressman, as it relates to Russia, 
if you believe what they stated they're going to comply with 
the New START treaty deployed operational----
    Mr. Turner. That's just strategic. I'm talking about 
aggregate.
    General Bussiere. For nontreaty accountable weapons they've 
expanded and diversified that portfolio. It's not accountable 
under any treaty program. The unclassified numbers are around 
2,000 and we can discuss other things in the closed hearing.
    Mr. Turner. So back to my question, do you agree that China 
and Russia are increasing their aggregate deployed nuclear 
weapons and their stockpiles?
    General Bussiere. So that was Russia. As it relates to 
China, absolutely. They're rapidly diversifying and modernizing 
and deploying.
    Mr. Turner. General, I really would like a yes here.
    General Bussiere. Yes.
    Mr. Turner. Thank you.
    Admiral, do you agree that China and Russia are increasing 
their aggregate deployed nuclear weapons and stockpiles?
    Admiral Wolfe. Yes.
    Mr. Turner. Excellent. General Admiral, we signed the New 
START treaty in 2010. Russia, since that time period, has 
announced Skyfall, which they tested in 2019 post New START; 
Poseidon, their underwater, unmanned or torpedo, however you 
want to refer to it, 2023; Avanguard, their hypersonic weapon; 
and what we call Satan, their larger MIRV [Multiple 
Independently-targetable Reentry Vehicles] that could have up 
to 15 nuclear warheads.
    All of those are since New START. China is also developing 
a hypersonic nuclear weapon that would orbit the Earth. They've 
tested it most recently.
    General, Admiral, in our plans for modernization are we--
are we planning new nuclear weapons, new nuclear capabilities 
or are we modernizing the capabilities we have? Because these 
are new. Many people call these novel nuclear weapons. These 
are new capabilities. Do we have on the board any new 
capabilities?
    General Bussiere. Congressman, no.
    Admiral Wolfe. Congressman, I agree with the general. I 
would say no except for the fact that for the Navy, the W93/Mk7 
will be a third variant of warhead that the Navy will deploy as 
we work within NNSA. Our focus then is on just modernizing what 
we have in Trident today.
    Mr. Turner. Sure. So Ms. Hruby, Dr. Plumb, we have, I 
believe, as a fallacy pursued the view in policy that if we 
constrict, if we go down in our numbers, that others will 
follow. Clearly, China and Russia are not following. They're 
reaching new capabilities. They're increasing their overall 
numbers.
    Why then when we get our Nuclear Posture Review there's no 
change other than the fact that you're recommending that we get 
rid of SLCM [Submarine-launched Cruise Missile]? Why is it that 
in a period of expansion and as we look--in the future we're 
going to have expansion--that there's no recommendation from 
this administration of a change in our nuclear posture?
    Mr. Plumb. So, Congressman, first of all, thank you for the 
question.
    Second, I'll just say that under the current security 
environment we see no need to change our nuclear force posture.
    But the Nuclear Posture Review makes clear that we're going 
to continually review the security environment and make changes 
if required, and so I don't want the concept that we're not 
changing right now to indicate that we aren't looking towards 
the future and constantly reevaluating to see what might need 
to be done.
    Mr. Turner. Do you have an answer also?
    Ms. Rosenblum. Yes. I would just concur with what Dr. Plumb 
has just articulated.
    Mr. Turner. Thank you, Chairman.
    The Chairman. Okay. Representative Norcross.
    Mr. Norcross. Thank you, Chairman. I thank the witnesses 
for being here today.
    From the opening comments of both the chair and the ranking 
member along with many statements by our witnesses, we continue 
to talk about the challenges of the workforce, the craft worker 
in particular, and what we have heard is there are issues, 
delays, narrowing of the projects, when projects are going to 
be started because of the workforce, and the statement of risk 
of our industrial base, our workforce, our cyber.
    But what I'm not hearing is--we know it's a problem. I'm 
not hearing any specifics on how we are addressing this. For 
the chairman to bring out why can't we pay them more is a 
rather simple question but it goes right to the heart of it.
    What are we doing? Knowing that these projects are going to 
continue through the course of the next decade, how are we 
addressing other than saying it's a problem?
    And let's go right down the line. Would you please address 
what specifically are we doing to make sure we have the 
workforce? We can take care of the hardware. We can make sure 
that all of the items that we need will be on the table.
    But if nobody's there to install it that has the expertise, 
help me understand this.
    Ms. Rosenblum. Yeah, let me kick off.
    Representative, you've done a very nice job of articulating 
the challenge that's facing this country across the board where 
we no longer have a robust manufacturing workforce and it's 
something that our country needs to be recreating.
    Specifically at the Department of Defense we are investing 
in the current workforce as well as developing under the 
Defense Production Act a number of programs and projects that 
are designed to develop the workforce that we will need over 
the next 10 to 15 years investing ----
    Mr. Norcross. Okay. Hold on--just one moment so we get a 
better understanding. We have the manufacturing and then we 
have the construction--two completely different worlds.
    But when you talk about the Defense Act that was recently 
put on for hypersonics what programs do we have that that has 
been applied to and what does that do to increase?
    Ms. Rosenblum. So under the industrial base analysis 
program we have monies that are used in order to build programs 
to train welders, to train mechanics, to train construction 
workers, everything that we are going to need across the 
nuclear modernization program, whether it be on the East Coast 
in terms of our submarine force, working closely with the Navy 
with regards to that as well as some of the other areas.
    I'll leave it to Administrator Hruby to speak specifically 
to the NNSA complex. It's something that the department is 
investing in over the long term, recognizing that we will 
continue these modernization programs over the next 10 to 15 
years and it is an area of focus for both Secretary Austin as 
well as our deputy secretary in terms of having both the 
commercial and the organic workforce that we need.
    Mr. Norcross. Thank you.
    Administrator.
    Ms. Hruby. Yeah, thanks for this question. It's a very 
important question and I appreciate your interest in it. I want 
to start by saying we have taken a lot of actions in our 
science and technology workforce.
    In fiscal year 2022 we instituted a--and distributed a 
midyear pay increase to stop attrition, which was the highest 
we'd seen in the history of the complex. We leaned into 
flexible benefits and pay adjustments for 2023 as well and 
we're seeing our attrition come back to closer to normal rates.
    We all have to continue to watch that because without that 
workforce there is nothing to construct or--right. So we're 
looking at that. We have taken lots of action now. We have also 
started apprenticeship programs for our craft workers.
    We're working with the communities near the--in the areas 
near our plant. But we haven't--I mean, I'll say we need to be 
broader about pay increases. I mean, we do try to be good 
stewards of taxpayers' dollars so we have to make sure that's 
going to work before we just willy nilly do it.
    But we will look at everything. This is an issue. We 
recognize it is an issue. We thought we would recover but we 
have a shortage of workers and, honestly, the productivity of 
workers is not where it has been historically where it's been a 
new space that we're tracking as closely as possible, and we 
appreciate your support and interest and where we're equally 
interested.
    Mr. Norcross. Chairman, again, thank you for bringing this 
up, and as I leave--I'm going to over to Education and Labor to 
have the hearing on unleashing our hiring, which will be rather 
short but----
    The Chairman. I see a connection there.
    Mr. Norcross. Could be. I yield back.
    The Chairman. Very good.
    Representative Bacon.
    Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you, everybody, for 
being here today. I appreciate your leadership and your 
dedication to our country.
    One of the main of two objectives I have in the Armed 
Services this Congress is to ensure that we can have a 100 
percent reliable nuclear command and control survivability. We 
used--I think we used to have it but I'm not so sure we have it 
today.
    You know, we had a 24/7 airborne command and control 
operations for 3 decades that ended in 1990. After the 
communist government fell in Moscow, after the Berlin Wall 
fell, we rightfully thought, hey, the world is a safer place. 
We stopped those 24/7 airborne operations with a general 
onboard to take control if need be.
    Then in 1998 we deactivated the EC-135 that had the Looking 
Glass mission. We transitioned it to the E-6s in the Navy. But 
today there's not enough E-6 aircraft to fly extended 24/7 
airborne operations.
    We used to have a 35 minute warning time when it comes to 
ICBMs, perhaps loss of subs if they were closer to our coast. 
But today with hypersonic weapons with nuclear weapons on them 
we're talking 15 minutes or less. If certain flight profiles 
are used maybe no warning. If space weapons are used no 
warning.
    I think we are back to the future and I think we need to 
seriously consider do we need to go back to 24/7 command and 
control airborne or ground away from the Pentagon, away from 
the White House, so we could have 100 percent assuredness that 
we can respond to a first strike.
    And it's not really about us having that strike. It's about 
the Russians and Chinese having that assurance that we have 
deterrence.
    So my question is really to Ms. Rosenblum and to General 
Bussiere. If we funded a big enough fleet for 24/7 operations 
with a new platform would that not improve our command and 
control survivability and should that not be a requirement 
coming from DOD?
    Ms. Rosenblum. Thank you. Let me make a few remarks and 
then turn to General Bussiere.
    As Dr. Plumb, my colleague, articulated this was something 
that was looked at in terms of NC3 as part of the Nuclear 
Posture Review and the decision was taken that there was not a 
need to make a change to the posture nor to the alert status.
    That said, we are very actively engaged in an upgrade and a 
modernization on the NC3 systems that we have and STRATCOM 
[U.S. Strategic Command], which is the enterprise owner, as 
you're well aware, of that is working very actively with both 
the Air Force and the Navy on that modernization upgrade.
    Mr. Bacon. If I may interject, and I'll turn to General 
Bussiere. I used to be the general on board of the Looking 
Glass mission. I'm not convinced we can respond within a 15 
minute warning time and that scares me. I think it's 
unacceptable, in my view. I'm going to do everything we can to 
get those fixed.
    General Bussiere, thank you.
    General Bussiere. Congressman, thank you for the question. 
The only thing I'll add to what Honorable Rosenblum said was I 
know General Cotton and STRATCOM are evaluating all the 
different facets of command and control.
    As you know, there are different avenues by which we can 
perform that mission. One of them is in the air domain and, as 
you know probably better than most, that mission was aggregated 
into the E-6B years ago.
    If the decision is made to field another capability in the 
area layer the only analysis we'll have to do in addition to 
just the command and control procedures is the analysis on the 
increased manpower required and the training to be able to do 
that mission.
    Mr. Bacon. I think this is something Congress would fund to 
ensure that we get this 100 percent assurance. And I do hear a 
lot about, hey, we're studying--we're looking at it. I don't--I 
think time is of the essence.
    We have Russia invading Ukraine, talking about moving 
nuclear weapons into Belarus. They've already shown a 
propensity that they will attack if they think they can get 
away with it. Right makes might, or might makes right in their 
mind.
    So I think we need to communicate to them that there is no 
way that they can catch us off guard and I think it's 
imperative for the safety of our country.
    One last question for you, General, if I may. The Navy is 
transitioning the E-6 for its TACAMO [Take Charge and Move Out] 
mission to the 130s. What does that portend for the Looking 
Glass mission? Or maybe I should ask the admiral. I don't know. 
Whoever is the best on this one.
    General Bussiere. Congressman, again, as the Navy 
transitions to their new platform for the TACAMO mission the 
Looking Glass mission will be performed based on what General 
Cotton decides is the best platform for that. That may or may 
not be in the air later.
    Mr. Bacon. Just to let you know, we'll be pushing this. I 
think time is of the essence. We can't have years of 
discussions and analysis and treading water. I think we got to 
push forward.
    Thank you. I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Representative. Thank you for 
articulating that important issue. And for your information and 
for everyone on the subcommittee, we are going to have a 
briefing on NC3 to bring us up to speed, hopefully, on April 
19th at 4:00 p.m. Thank you.
    Representative Carbajal.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Ms. Hruby, in September 2022 the GAO [Government 
Accountability Office] assessed the NNSA's nuclear weapons 
cybersecurity practices and found, quote, ``The NNSA and its 
contractors have not fully implemented six foundational 
cybersecurity risk practices.''
    Based on the findings, the GAO recommended nine actions 
that the NNSA could implement to protect cybersecurity threats. 
In November 2022 the NNSA agreed with each of the nine 
recommendations.
    Can you provide a status on the implementation of these 
recommendations and how the fiscal year 2024 budget addresses 
these shortfalls? The thought of our nuclear weapons systems 
being vulnerable to a cyber threat is pretty terrifying.
    Ms. Hruby. Yeah, thanks for that question. What you'll see 
in the fiscal year 2024 budget for our IT [Information 
Technology] and cyber infrastructure programs is a 30 percent 
increase over the 2023 enacted--I mean, it's the 2023--for our 
2024 budget.
    In addition, there's a almost 40 percent increase in a 
program we call Nuclear Enterprise Assurance, which is the 
cyber and other sabotage associated with the weapons program. 
So we have increased both of those programs substantially in 
fiscal year 2024.
    This is a threat that we take very seriously how we deal 
with cyber in the enterprise, our IT systems, and, frankly, it 
was ignored.
    I also just want to say with respect to that GAO report it 
did mention a number of good things that NNSA has done and 
progress. But we--like you said, we agree with all the 
recommendations and we're working hard on it. Thanks.
    Mr. Carbajal. It sounds like it was a bandwidth issue 
because you don't have enough resources.
    Ms. Hruby. Yeah, and we appreciate the--actually the 
government has authorized a pay increase for people in these 
fields, in the cyber fields, which will help us attract and 
retain Federal employees in the cyber area, which we really 
need to do.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
    General Bussiere and Admiral Wolfe, what are you doing to 
ensure your programs are protected from a cyber threat?
    General Bussiere. So from an Air Force perspective, 
Congressman, 16th Air Force kind of runs our cybersecurity 
really as a supportive component to both STRATCOM and, 
obviously, as the Air Force Global Strike Commands, the air 
component to STRATCOM.
    So we have a dedicated number at the Air Force that does 
that for us as well as individual airmen that maintain our 
networks.
    Mr. Carbajal. Admiral Wolfe.
    Admiral Wolfe. Yes, sir. So, for our program, everything 
that we do cyber is an integral part of the design development. 
It's an integral part of how we--how we test things.
    We also do other types of testing and I'll just leave it at 
that. As a matter of fact, we just took Secretary Rosenblum--
over the past year she actually went and looked at our program 
and how we do a lot of the cybersecurity aspects of what we do 
in Trident.
    So it's not just what we do internal but it's what the 
department does as well to oversee to make sure that we're 
doing all of the right things, not just now but as we look into 
the future.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
    General Bussiere, I received notification recently that the 
Air Force canceled the Sentinel reentry vehicle facility that 
was intended to be built at Vandenberg Space Force Base, which 
is in my district, due to requirement uncertainty.
    We were told the cancellation and delay won't impact the 
first test flight--flight test for the Sentinel program. What 
can you tell me? Will it have an impact on the overall 
readiness of the Sentinel program? If so, what are you doing to 
minimize the impact of this delayed construction?
    General Bussiere. Congressman, I might have to take that 
one for the record. My understanding we just slipped it, didn't 
cancel it, because of the need date. But I will--I will take 
that for the record and get back to you.
    Mr. Carbajal. I understood it was canceled. So then I was 
going to ask you what can we do with $48 million at Vandenberg 
Space Force Base to prepare for the construction of this 
facility. But I'll let you answer that later.
    Ms. Hruby, it is my understanding that the NNSA has great 
success with the Minority-Serving Institution Partnership 
Program. Can you please give us more information on this 
effort, how successful it's been to recruit, hire, and retain a 
talented workforce? How is this program executing compared to 
other initiatives across the agency?
    Ms. Hruby. Yeah. We're very excited about that Minority-
Serving Institution Partnerships Program. It has two elements 
to it. It has grants to minority--serving institutions and 
we're working--we have a lot of programs across the full 
spectrum of the kind of workforce we need through that program 
and we also have----
    Mr. Carbajal. How successful is it?
    Ms. Hruby. Well, we have hired a lot of those people so I 
consider that one marker of success. I've met a lot of these--
the students working in this program and they're amazing. So we 
have expanded that program year over year. We have an intention 
to expand it again, and it's it's getting us a workforce of the 
future.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you very much. I yield back.
    The Chairman. Representative Houlahan.
    Ms. Houlahan. Salud, you took one of my questions and then 
you're leaving. No fair.
    It's really nice to be here with you guys. I want to talk a 
little bit about what a lot of other folks have also brought 
up, which is workforce issues.
    I know that we focused a little bit on welders and other 
sort of manufacturing and craft jobs. I want to talk more, 
though, about things like cyber or engineering or any of those 
other kinds of billets that may or may not be filled now.
    I would like to start with you, Ms. Hruby--Administrator 
Hruby, to talk about what kind of--these 90 FTEs [Full-time 
Equivalents] that are in your fiscal year 2024 budget, what 
kind of people are they--equivalents are they?
    Ms. Hruby. I think you're referring to the Federal 
workforce?
    Ms. Houlahan. Mmm-hmm.
    Ms. Hruby. Okay. Thanks. And we--I really appreciate the 
question because we haven't had a chance to talk about the 
Federal workforce yet in NNSA.
    We have experienced a greater than average attrition--quite 
a lot, actually--in the 0 to 5 year experience range. So we're 
trying to explore ways to address that----
    Ms. Houlahan. But are they people with four-year degrees? 
Like, what kind of requirements are they?
    Ms. Hruby. They are. Well, they're at least four-year 
degrees. Yeah, this is a professional workforce, this workforce 
that we're talking about, and our workforce has--our Federal 
workforce has expanded far less than our programs.
    Ms. Houlahan. And when we're talking about the, you know, 
people with professional experience for your workforce are, 
what, 0 to 5 years, and then you also listed at the beginning 
of your testimony the places where you're looking for them to 
work. Could you list them again? Geographic places.
    Ms. Hruby. Oh, the geographic places. Yeah.
    Well, we have labs in New Mexico and California and we have 
production plants in Kansas City, South Carolina, Tennessee, 
and Texas, and we have the nuclear test site in Nevada.
    Ms. Houlahan. So I guess what I'm trying to understand is 
we're in an environment now post-COVID where a lot of people 
with these kinds of skills and backgrounds are given 
opportunities for much, much more flexible working capabilities 
than what you're describing is.
    We're also talking about people who are increasingly with 
spouses or partners who also have careers of their own who want 
to make sure that they can find places to land and to work.
    Is there a world where we can be not just paying more 
potentially but also more flexible in what it is that we're 
allowing people to do and where we're allowing it to--where we 
are allowing them to do it physically from?
    Ms. Hruby. Yeah, thanks for this question. I love this 
question. We do have a large remote workforce now and we're 
trying to do that at all levels--managers, you know, to make it 
easier also for staff to see how it's done.
    I would say this has greatly--has greatly helped us. But we 
do have a lot of jobs that are classified and we do have a lot 
of jobs that are production that you have to be, you know, in 
the right facility on the floor.
    But we are leaning in as hard as we can to the flexibility 
in the workforce for the parts of the workforce that we can do 
that in.
    Ms. Houlahan. Are there any authorizations or authorities 
or anything else that you all collectively need from us to be 
able to allow for a more flexible working environment when 
you're talking about classified environments?
    As an example, is there a way for people to--I know when I 
go home to my community I can access the SCIF in my community 
if I need to. Is there a way to be more adaptive in that area 
that we can be helpful with?
    Ms. Hruby. That's a great question. I will look at that. I 
use SCIFs all over the world and certainly all over the United 
States, and so do many others in our workforce.
    But I would like to get back with you as to whether or not 
there's anything else we can do there. I appreciate the 
question.
    Ms. Houlahan. Anybody else with my remaining 40 seconds 
that has anything that I--that our collective body can be doing 
to be helpful in stimulating the working workforce?
    Admiral Wolfe. Ma'am, I'd just like to chime in, and I 
think many of the members have said it today. I think it's 
getting today's workforce to understand how critical it is what 
these missions that we're doing right here are for our national 
defense and for the protection of allies and partners.
    This is hard work and it takes a lot of dedicated folks to 
do that. It's not always glamorous but it does underpin 
everything that this nation and our allies count on. So helping 
us get that word out----
    Ms. Houlahan. Yeah, a hundred percent agree. The reason why 
I am asking this question--indulge me for a couple of seconds--
is I served in the early--the late '80s and early '90s. I was 
in the Hanscom Air Force Base, Boston area. I was married to a 
gentleman, and still am, who couldn't necessarily find a job in 
the middle of, you know, somewhere else.
    And so I want to make sure that we're being thoughtful. I'm 
a patriot. I'm sure many people are patriots as well who want 
to work on these really important programs. We just have to 
find them where they are and they're not always in the places 
we're looking.
    Thank you. I yield back.
    The Chairman. All right. Thank you. We will now go into an 
immediate recess and reconvene in 2337 upstairs in 5 minutes.
    [Whereupon, at 10:31 a.m., the subcommittee proceeded in 
closed session.] 


      
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                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN

    Mr. Lamborn. The 2022 Nuclear Posture Review eliminated ``hedge 
against an uncertain future'' as a formal role of nuclear weapons. Can 
you explain the rationale behind this decision?
    Mr. Plumb. The 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) determined that 
``hedge against an uncertain future'' does not constitute a valid role 
for nuclear weapons, and that retaining it as a role could lead to 
confusion and misunderstanding of our nuclear strategy. Elimination of 
the formal hedge role, however, has not changed our overall approach to 
risk management. Mitigating risk is an integral function of the nuclear 
enterprise that enables our ability to fulfill the three roles of 
nuclear weapons: deter adversaries, assure allies and partners, and 
achieve objectives if deterrence fails. We must be able to effectively 
reduce, and where necessary manage, emerging geopolitical, 
technological, operational, and technical risk across the Joint Force 
and within the nuclear production enterprise. A resilient and adaptive 
nuclear enterprise is critical to managing such risks, and the 2022 NPR 
commits both DOD and the Department of Energy to continue revitalizing 
the enterprise through a strong and diverse workforce and timely, 
consistent investments in science and production capabilities.
    Mr. Lamborn. The 3M Company has announced it will discontinue use 
of a category of substances known as ``PFAS'' by the end of 2025. Has 
DOD assessed the impact this will have on operations, and what 
continency plans is DOD developing to mitigate this?
    Ms. Rosenblum. Preliminary assessments indicate expected impacts to 
operations for multiple weapons platforms and in key enabling 
industries if PFAS manufacturing and supply are disrupted. The scope of 
potential impacts to these programs and the defense industrial base and 
potential mitigation strategies are still being assessed. We estimate 
that it will take months to identify and understand the extent of this 
expanding issue and the potential impact on DOD and its supply chain 
and years to develop and qualify alternative materials in many 
applications. DOD is currently conducting a data call with the Services 
and other DOD components to identify known uses of PFAS materials and 
products purchased directly from 3M that may be impacted by 3M's 
departure from the PFAS market. In addition to these potential impacts 
to weapons platform and key enabling industries, during the assessment 
process we may identify potential broader impacts to DOD operations and 
mission-critical material. The DOD is working alongside the U.S. 
Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration and other 
U.S. Government mission partners on assessments and potential 
resolutions. To date, DOD had engaged closely with 3M senior managers 
and have focused on identifying which materials 3M sells directly to 
DOD and what alternatives to these products may be available as well as 
working to identify materials 3M sells to a third party that then 
incorporates them into products for DOD. The DOD is also working 
alongside its Federal partners to prioritize substitutes for products 
that contain PFAS, consistent with Executive Order 14057 and Office of 
Management and Budget Memorandum M-22-06. DOD issued a new Military 
Specification (MILSPEC24) for fluorine- free foam in January 2023, thus 
taking an important step toward eliminating PFAS exposures from 
firefighting foam. DOD also issued a Defense Federal Acquisition 
Regulation Supplement (DFARS) class deviation 25 in 2022 to prohibit 
procurement of certain items that contain PFOS or PFOA. Each military 
department established a transition plan covering its facilities and 
mobile assets to ensure a methodical conversion over the next few 
years.
    Mr. Lamborn. The FY24 budget request proposes to reduce B83-1 
sustainment funding by more than 50%. Is this based on the assumption 
that the NNSA will begin retiring B83 bombs next year? If so, what 
percent of the inventory is planned to retire? Can you provide the 
committee with a schedule of retirement activities planned for FY24?
    Ms. Hruby. The FY 2024 B83-1 budget request is lower than the FY 
2023 enacted because NNSA will apply prior year carryover funding, 
originally requested for two alteration activities that are no longer 
required, to FY 2024 activities. The FY 2024 budget request is 
consistent with requirements to ensure the safety and security of the 
B83-1 until all weapons are retired and fully dismantled. Details of 
the B83-1 retirement and dismantlement plan remain classified.
    Mr. Lamborn. The 3M Company has announced it will discontinue use 
of a category of substances known as ``PFAS'' by the end of 2025. Has 
NNSA assessed the impact this will have on operations, and what 
contingency plans is NNSA developing to mitigate this?
    Ms. Hruby. Preliminary assessments indicate negative impacts on 
warhead programs across the complex if PFAS manufacturing and supply 
are disrupted. Impacts to existing and future weapon programs and 
potential mitigation strategies are still being assessed. It will take 
months to quantify this expanding issue and the impact on NNSA's supply 
chain and safety systems. NNSA continues to explore mitigation and 
solution options across industry groups, to include finding alternate 
suppliers and materials. Once NNSA selects these alternate suppliers 
and vendors, material and/or vendor qualification will occur and will 
take years to complete. NNSA is working alongside the U.S. Department 
of Defense and other U.S. Government organizations on assessments and 
potential resolutions. In specific cases, such as FK-800, NNSA is also 
collaborating with 3M to explore the possibility of additional 
procurements ahead of production discontinuation. In addition to 
impacts to NNSA's weapons program, there are also potential broader 
impacts to DOE programs and activities, given the many uses of PFAS and 
PFAS-based systems. DOE is also working alongside its Federal partners 
to prioritize substitutes for products that contain PFAS, consistent 
with Executive Order 14057 and Office of Management and Budget 
Memorandum M-22-06.
    Mr. Lamborn. Can you describe the process for uploading Minuteman 
III ICBMs? What would this look like in practice? Is this a slow and 
labor-intensive process, or can you execute it quickly? a. Are there 
steps you could take now to decrease the time it would take you to 
execute this?
    General Bussiere. CUI) The process for transporting and installing 
and removing missiles is a deliberate and labor-intensive. It requires 
coordination across multiple organizations (Wing Leadership, Security 
Forces, Helicopters, Vehicle Section, Missile and Munitions 
Maintenance, Operations, Civil Engineering and local law enforcement). 
Unconstrained, operating under normal scheduling operations today, from 
empty silo to a missile on alert takes approximately 3-5 days, 
depending on re-entry system type, minimum.--(CUI) Missile roll/
transfer (1 day): Moves missile from shipping trailer to an operational 
transporter-erector for installation. Requires 4-person Missile 
Handling Team a full shift to perform (8 hours)--(CUI) Route survey (1 
day): Required to ensure routes of travel are safe for transport. 
Requires 3-person team (Civil Engineering and Maintenance) to evaluate 
road hazards and certify travel routes prior to missile movement. 
Consumes one duty day (8 hours), can be completed in parallel with 
roll/transfer operations.--(CUI) Missile transport and installation (1-
2 days): Moves the missile from support base to launch facility for 
installation. Requires certified Convoy Commander, 4-person Missile 
Handling Team, 5-person Missile Maintenance Team, 2-person vehicle 
support team, 2-person Security Forces team. Requires 1-2 12-hour 
shifts depending on distance travelled from support base to launch 
facility. Transporter-Erectors, used to install boosters, are at end-
of-life and experience a 45% on-site failure rate.--(CUI) Re-entry 
system build (2-4 days): Builds a re-entry system from multiple DOE and 
AF supply chain components. Requires 3-person Munitions Maintenance 
Team 2 days for a single re-entry vehicle configuration and 4 days for 
a 2 or 3 re-entry vehicle configuration. Can be performed in parallel 
with missile prep and installation.--(CUI) Re-entry system transport 
and install (1 day): Transports configured re-entry system from support 
base to launch facility for installation. Requires 5-person Missile 
Maintenance Team, 53-person Security Forces team, helicopter overflight 
and 2-person vehicle support team. Security Forces teams are providing 
transport security using an armored vehicle fleet ranging from 1998-
2012 year models, with a 72% in-commission rate. (CUI) Timelines above 
assume ready access to components required for build-up and do not 
account for component failures during the maintenance process or delays 
caused by weather or personnel issues. A 5-day timeline should not be 
construed to indicate each unit can complete an upload every 5 days. 
Each system must be incorporated into the scheduled maintenance 
required to sustain an alert force. (CUI) Storage and infrastructure 
limitations at our operational units prevent us from posturing 
sufficient resources to significantly decrease the time required to 
execute missile installation or re-entry system builds.
    Mr. Lamborn. The Air Force's position has been that it should 
purchase at least 100 B-21 bombers--how many do you think we'll need?
    General Bussiere. Air Force Global Strike Command is assessing how 
to achieve a modernized force of 220 total bombers as we transition 
from a three-bomber fleet of B-1s, B-2s, and B-52s to a two-bomber 
fleet of B-21s and heavily modified B-52s. We plan to maintain 75 B-
52s, so 145 B-21s would get us to the desired 220 total. However, the 
current B-21 program of record is for a minimum buy of 100 aircraft.
    Mr. Lamborn. The Air Force's position has been that it should 
purchase at least 100 B-21 bombers. Are there scenarios in which you 
could foresee a greater B-21 buy? If so, what are those scenarios and 
to what degree could you see the numbers required?
    General Bussiere. The U.S. faces renewed great power competition 
from Russia and the PRC. As these and other potential threats evolve, 
AFGSC foresees the need to remain agile and responsive in our nation's 
acquisition of capabilities, including long range strike platforms. Air 
Force Global Strike Command is assessing how to achieve a modernized 
force of 220 total bombers. We plan to maintain 75 B-52s, so 145 B-21s 
would get us to the desired 220 total. However, the current B-21 
program of record is for a minimum buy of 100 aircraft.
    Mr. Lamborn. In the 2030s, both the ICBM and submarine-leg of the 
triad will be recapitalizing at the same time; do you think it would be 
prudent to invest and improve the readiness of the bomber force so that 
it is able to act as a hedge against the possibility of a disruption in 
the Sentinel or Columbia programs?
    General Bussiere. AFGSC intends to maintain full operational 
capability with the Minuteman III ICBM until it can smoothly transition 
to the Sentinel, ensuring no gaps in operational coverage. AFGSC firmly 
believes that the bomber force can provide an increased capability and 
capacity to alleviate disruptions to the Sentinel and/or Columbia 
programs. Depending on the level of disruption, AFGSC has identified 
scalable options for augmenting the joint force in the global strike 
mission area. With modest investment in its aircraft and weapons 
portfolio, AFGSC has identified multiple opportunities to leverage new 
research and emerging technologies to enhance the capability and 
capacity of the bomber force for strategic competition and the high-end 
fight. With an additional commitment to resourcing, the bomber force 
could further enhance capability and capacity with investment in 
additional personnel, equipment, and facilities.
    Mr. Lamborn. Airmen in nuclear-coded billets are reporting elevated 
rates of non-Hodgkins Lymphoma. Will you investigate to see if this 
community is susceptible to other forms of cancer? Given the difficulty 
in advanced screening for NHL, will you investigate with NIH the 
possibility of conducting a pilot study that offers liquid biopsies to 
at-risk Airmen? The purpose would be to both test and refine liquid 
biopsy technology while offering Airmen an additional layer of 
developmental screening?
    General Bussiere. The missile community cancer study currently 
underway will assess whether there is an increased incidence of Non-
Hodgkin Lymphoma (NHL) as well as other cancers throughout the missile 
community. If the incidence of NHL or another cancer is found to be 
increased, the evaluation would progress to identify causative agents 
with the intent of eliminating or reducing any increased risk. If a 
high risk population is identified we would of course explore all 
possible ways to ensure we reduce their risk, put appropriate programs 
in place to ensure timely diagnosis, and support them with appropriate 
treatment. Your suggestion to investigate the role of liquid biopsy 
technology to support these efforts has been communicated to our AF 
hematology and oncology experts and researchers as we await the results 
of the initial phases of the study.

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