[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


.                                    

                         [H.A.S.C. No. 118-14]

                 U.S. AND ADVERSARY HYPERSONIC PROGRAMS

                               __________

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                    SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

                                 OF THE

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                              HEARING HELD

                             MARCH 10, 2023

                                     
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                ________

                   U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
53-352                    WASHINGTON : 2024                    
          
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                    SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

                    DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado, Chairman

JOE WILSON, South Carolina           SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio              JOHN GARAMENDI, California
ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York          DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee          SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California,
DON BACON, Nebraska                  RO KHANNA, California
JIM BANKS, Indiana                   CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania
MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida               GABE VASQUEZ, New Mexico
DALE W. STRONG, Alabama              MARC VEASEY, Texas

                 Ryan Tully, Professional Staff Member
                Maria Vastola, Professional Staff Member
                  Zachary Calderon, Research Assistant
                           
                           
                           C O N T E N T S

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                                                                   Page

              STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Lamborn, Hon. Doug, a Representative from Colorado, Chairman, 
  Subcommittee on Strategic Forces...............................     1
Moulton, Hon. Seth, a Representative from Massachusetts, Ranking 
  Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces.......................     2

                               WITNESSES

Freisthler, Paul F., Chief Scientist, Directorate for Analysis, 
  Defense Intelligence Agency....................................    11
Horowitz, Michael C., Director, Emerging Capabilities Policy 
  Office, U.S. Department of Defense.............................     4
Rasch, LTG Robert A., Jr., USA, Director of Hypersonics, Directed 
  Energy, Space and Rapid Acquisition, U.S. Army.................     7
Shipton, Lt Gen Donna D., USAF, Military Deputy, Office of the 
  Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, 
  Technology and Logistics, U.S. Air Force.......................    10
White, Michael E., Principal Director for Hypersonics, Office of 
  the Director of Defense Research and Engineering 
  (Modernization), U.S. Department of Defense....................     5
Wolfe, VADM Johnny R., Jr., USN, Director, Strategic Systems 
  Programs, U.S. Navy............................................     8

                                APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

    Freisthler, Paul F...........................................    70
    Horowitz, Michael C..........................................    33
    Rasch, LTG Robert A., Jr.....................................    49
    Shipton, Lt Gen Donna D......................................    64
    White, Michael E.............................................    38
    Wolfe, VADM Johnny R., Jr....................................    56

Documents Submitted for the Record:

    [There were no Documents submitted.]

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

    [The information was not available at the time of printing.]

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

    Mr. Banks....................................................    77
    Mr. Norcross.................................................    78
                
                
                U.S. AND ADVERSARY HYPERSONIC PROGRAMS

                              ----------                              

                  House of Representatives,
                       Committee on Armed Services,
                          Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                            Washington, DC, Friday, March 10, 2023.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:02 a.m., in 
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Doug Lamborn 
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DOUG LAMBORN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
      COLORADO, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

    Mr. Lamborn. Today's hearing will come to order. The 
Strategic Forces Subcommittee meets today to review U.S. and 
adversary hypersonic capabilities. Good morning to our 
witnesses, Mr. White, Mr. Horowitz, Lieutenant General Rasch, 
Vice Admiral Wolfe, Lieutenant General Shipton, and Mr. 
Freisthler.
    And Mr. White, we understand you will be leaving this role 
soon and this will be your last appearance before Congress. We 
want to thank you for your years of service and express our 
appreciation for all that you have done.
    Mr. White. Thank you very much. It's been a pleasure and an 
honor.
    Mr. Lamborn. This is the first time this subcommittee has 
conducted a hearing on hypersonic capabilities. Given the 
magnitude of the threats posed by China and Russia and our 
relatively slow pace of development, I think this is far 
overdue. With that in mind, we appreciate all of you being with 
us here today to share your expertise to address these 
challenges.
    Before we begin, I believe it is useful to revisit the 
history of hypersonic weapons development. Despite leading the 
development of this technology in the 1970s and 1980s, the U.S. 
foolishly decided not to pursue hypersonic weapons. Russia and 
China made the opposite decision.
    Instead of mimicking our restraint as we hoped, they 
developed and deployed increasingly sophisticated and numerous 
hypersonic capabilities of various types, including nuclear-
capable and orbital hypersonic weapons. As a result, our 
adversaries have the advantage. Their hypersonic capabilities 
provide them novel ways to hold our homeland and our deployed 
forces at risk.
    This is not just about them having a capability that we do 
not. There are inherent and compelling advantages that 
hypersonic systems have that could bolster our military plans 
and capabilities. Retired General John Hyten said once that 
hypersonic weapons enable, quote, ``responsive, long-range 
strike options against distant, defended, and/or time critical 
threats when other forces are unavailable, denied access, or 
not preferred,'' unquote.
    We are behind, and I am concerned we are not doing enough 
to close the gap as our adversaries continue to test and 
develop new capabilities at a much faster rate. This is an 
instructive lesson, and it reminds all of us about the risks 
that come with giving up the advantage as well as the 
difficulty that comes with trying to recover it. So we have our 
work cut out for it.
    But we have taken steps in the right direction. 
Particularly over the last 2 years, Congress has provided 
additional resources to accelerate the development of 
hypersonic capabilities and upgrade the necessary test 
infrastructure. We have worked with the Department of Defense 
to formalize initiatives that we included in the NDAA [National 
Defense Authorization Act] such as the National Hypersonics 
Initiative and Hypersonic Asymmetric Defeat Strategy. We look 
forward to receiving these documents from the Department.
    The President's decision last week to authorize the Defense 
Production Act to invest in our hypersonics industrial base was 
a welcome step. I do have questions as to how it will be used 
and on what specific technologies and components. Hopefully, 
our witnesses will provide some clarity. Perhaps some of this 
will come in the closed session that we will have after our 
votes which will be after our open session this morning.
    Despite this positive development, there is a lot more that 
must be done. And I intend for this subcommittee to play a key 
role in this effort starting with today's hearing. Welcome 
again to our witnesses. We look forward to hearing from you 
about your efforts to develop these capabilities and how this 
subcommittee can be helpful. I now recognize Ranking Member 
Moulton for his opening comments.

     STATEMENT OF HON. SETH MOULTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
MASSACHUSETTS, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

    Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Chairman Lamborn. I also want to 
extend a welcome to our distinguished panel of witnesses here 
with us this morning. I am thankful we are holding this hearing 
on hypersonics, not only to understand our adversaries' 
capabilities and intentions when it comes to these weapons but 
also to gain a better understanding of how the Department 
envisions the employment of our own hypersonics in a future 
conflict.
    In 2020, I chaired the House Armed Services Committee 
Future of Defense Task Force. In our many discussions with 
Department officials, academia, industry, and various think 
tanks, we learned that hypersonics were a capability both 
Russia and the People's Republic of China had prioritized in 
their modernization efforts, mainly due to their asymmetric 
capability to avoid detection by existing U.S. air and missile 
defense systems. As Dr. Freisthler's testimony starkly lays 
out, those investments have resulted in at least four different 
types of hypersonic weapon systems being fielded today that can 
reach targets anywhere on the globe.
    While our adversaries have been developing these weapon 
systems for years, ever since we built an anti-ballistic 
missile system, the Department has watched and done little to 
negate their asymmetric advantages over our systems and 
capabilities, especially our domain awareness. Congress has had 
to come in repeatedly to address this problem, authorizing in 
the fiscal year 2019 NDAA and then appropriating the Hypersonic 
Ballistic Missile Tracking Space Center. Launches of the 
operational satellites are still 2 years away.
    Despite General VanHerck's consistent warnings of his 
inability to detect and track these types of threats, it took a 
high-altitude balloon from the PRC [People's Republic of China] 
for many to fully understanding the severity of our gaps in 
domain awareness. One of the top conclusions of our Future of 
Defense Task Force was that it is not enough for the Department 
to pursue technology for technology's sake. We need to develop 
the operational concepts for how that technology will actually 
be employed.
    Indeed, the operational concepts should come first and then 
we should develop whatever technology is needed to best address 
the need. Otherwise, you can waste a lot of money and time 
developing technology you don't need or technology that is not 
best suited to what we need to do. Seen through this lens, U.S. 
hypersonic weapons development is troubling.
    We restarted hypersonic weapons development because our 
adversaries were developing them without having a clear 
operational concept ourselves for how they will be employed. 
Last year, I asked this simple question of Department 
officials: How will you use these weapons that are costing 
taxpayers hundreds of billions of dollars? I was met with blank 
stares.
    This week I asked the question again. Why are we developing 
them and how will they be employed? The answer I received was 
that we are developing them because our adversaries have them.
    Again, exactly the wrong answer. There are plenty of 
weapons our adversaries are developing that we are not such as 
the Russian nuclear-powered missile that blew up and killed its 
own test crew not long ago. What matters is how we will use 
them, not chasing after what our adversaries have just because 
they have it.
    But there is an even deeper level at which our development 
of hypersonics is troubling, and that is that they may well be 
fundamentally destabilizing weapons. Since after years of 
development, the Department can't even make a clear case to our 
committee for how these weapons will be employed, we also have 
not seriously examined the results of whatever that employment 
might be. Many theorists believe hypersonics will be 
fundamentally destabilizing to our national security and indeed 
perhaps to humanity.
    This is in stark contrast to the other legs of our triad 
that have helped keep the peace between superpowers for 
decades. If a nation cannot tell whether an inbound hypersonic 
missile is a strategic nuclear weapon or not, or simply where 
it is aimed, that nation could feel compelled to launch a full 
nuclear response and nuclear holocaust could be the result. 
During a hearing this week, there was a clear disagreement 
among the four-stars on that panel about whether these weapons 
are stabilizing or destabilizing. That is troubling not just 
for the American taxpayer but for humanity itself.
    The bottom line is that we have a lot of work to do. And I 
have not even mentioned the successive technical failures in 
our programs to date as we chase our adversaries' more advanced 
programs. I hope that the hearing this morning will for the 
first time help answer some of these fundamental questions. 
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    Mr. Lamborn. We now turn to our witnesses. Your prepared 
remarks will be made part of the record. Since we have a full 
panel today, I would ask that you each limit your opening 
comments to 5 minutes. And Dr. Horowitz, you are recognized.

     STATEMENT OF MICHAEL C. HOROWITZ, DIRECTOR, EMERGING 
     CAPABILITIES POLICY OFFICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

    Dr. Horowitz. Thank you, Chairman Lamborn, Ranking Member 
Moulton, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the 
opportunity to speak with you today. I'm honored to be here.
    Today I want to lay out the Department's view of hypersonic 
weapons, both offensive and defensive, and how they contribute 
to Department of Defense objectives in the context of the 2022 
National Defense Strategy. The central premise of the National 
Defense Strategy is the urgent need for the Department to 
sustain and strengthen integrated deterrence. The NDS is clear-
eyed in its assessment of the range of threats posed to the 
United States by a number of adversaries.
    In particular, it notes that the People's Republic of China 
is the only competitor with both the intent and increasingly 
with the capability to systematically challenge the United 
States across the board, militarily, economically, 
technologically, and diplomatically. The Department of 
Defense's efforts to mature, develop, and field hypersonic 
technologies contribute to our objectives in the context of 
implementing the National Defense Strategy. They're key to 
support vital U.S. national interests, to contribute to a 
stable and open international system, and to maintain and 
strengthen our defense commitments to U.S. allies and 
international partners.
    We see offensive hypersonics as a logical and necessary 
addition to the mix of capabilities that the joint force 
employs to deter, if necessary prevail, in future conflicts. To 
help meet the broad challenges outlined by the NDS and to 
transform the foundation of the force, Secretary Austin and 
Deputy Secretary Hicks have pushed the Department to invest in 
innovation to ensure that U.S. military capabilities go beyond 
the cutting edge. And with the support of Congress, which we're 
grateful for, the Department's fiscal year 2023 budget 
contained our largest ever commitment to developing and 
deploying the breakthrough technologies required to deter 
future conflict.
    DOD [Department of Defense] investments in hypersonics are 
growing and accelerating, but it's not enough to simply spend 
and produce more. Deterrence today and tomorrow requires 
integrating capabilities into new operational concepts through 
a dedicated campaign of learning. And the Department is 
exploring creative concepts that expand U.S. options and 
constrain those of potential adversaries.
    Put another way, it is not just about building hypersonics. 
Rather, the Department is focused on building and deploying 
these systems and defending against them in a way that 
maximizes the effective implementation of the National Defense 
Strategy. In concert with select allies, DOD is pursuing 
multiple hypersonic-based capability solutions as complements 
to the existing suite of diverse warfighting capabilities. 
You'll hear today about specific hypersonic programmatic 
efforts from the military services and from my research and 
engineering colleagues.
    For offensive strike weapons, the Department will take 
advantage of the opportunities presented by employment of 
regional hypersonic systems in its global planning 
considerations. And across these capabilities, DOD is 
purposefully generating a diverse array of options to launch 
hypersonics from different platforms, across different 
distances, and based in different technological approaches. 
Delivering these capabilities will ensure that the Department 
of Defense maintains the ability to deter potential adversaries 
and to defeat aggression if necessary. Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Horowitz can be found in the 
Appendix on page 33.]
    Mr. Lamborn. Mr. White.

     STATEMENT OF MICHAEL E. WHITE, PRINCIPAL DIRECTOR FOR 
  HYPERSONICS, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND 
    ENGINEERING (MODERNIZATION), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

    Mr. White. Thank you, Chairman Lamborn, Ranking Member 
Moulton, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. I 
appreciate the opportunity to testify on the state of 
hypersonics, and I'm honored to be here with key Department 
leadership to discuss the progress that we made and still 
what's left to be done. Hypersonic systems travel for a 
significant portion of their trajectory in the upper reaches of 
the atmosphere at sustained speeds at or above Mach 5, or five 
times the speed of sound, which is approximately 3,700 mph.
    Their combination of speed, maneuverability, long range, 
and high altitude provide clear and distinct operational 
advantages, enabling highly survivable and responsive defeat of 
time critical, heavily defended, and high-value threats from 
outside an adversary's defensive perimeter. Offensive 
hypersonic systems will be especially critical on a battlefield 
where the adversary has deployed high-end defensive and anti-
access systems designed to limit the effectiveness of 
traditional U.S. weapons in time scales needed to avoid a 
military, diplomatic, or political fait accompli.
    Like any military technology, hypersonic systems are not a 
be all and end all. However, as the battlefield environment 
becomes increasingly more contested, hypersonic systems will be 
a critical tool to deliver highly responsive, survivable, and 
long-range effects to supplement and sometimes enable our more 
traditional capabilities. We are moving with urgency to put 
advanced technologies and new concepts--new operating concepts, 
including hypersonic strike and defensive capabilities, in the 
hands of the joint force to ensure we have the right mix of 
capabilities to deter potential adversaries and if necessary 
defeat aggression.
    The accelerated delivery of transformational warfighting 
capability based on hypersonic systems is a key contributor to 
the overall superiority as it directly contributes to the three 
pillars of the Department's National Defense Strategy: 
integrated deterrence, campaigning, and building enduring 
advantages. Our peer adversaries are developing high-end 
systems designed to create a highly contested environment and 
challenge U.S. battlefield dominance in space, in the air, on 
land, and at sea. The primary mission driver for the 
development of U.S. strike--hypersonic strike capability is to 
hold at risk these systems by leveraging the unique combination 
of speed, range, lethality, and survivability.
    It is important to note that the United States is not 
engaged in an arms race, but instead hypersonic strike systems 
are needed to preserve deterrence because they offer a critical 
regional advanced strike capability that will complement 
existing joint force strike options such as cruise missiles, 
tactical aircraft, and bombers. In addition to developing 
offensive hypersonic weapons, we are developing a comprehensive 
layered defeat capability to defend against adversary 
hypersonic systems. And we are evaluating the military utility 
and technology requirements for reusable hypersonic aircraft.
    These systems are essential to ensure that we maintain the 
ability to deter potential adversaries and if necessary, defeat 
aggression in a time scale of relevance on the future 
battlefield. Over the past year or so, we have made significant 
progress building partly on the knowledge gained in overcoming 
challenges faced in our early flight tests. We have 
significantly increased the pace of flight testing across the 
hypersonics portfolio from once every 2 years just a couple of 
years ago to over a dozen flights per year last year and this 
year.
    The Air Force Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon, or ARRW 
program, completed two successful booster test flights last 
year, followed in December by the first test of the--their full 
prototype operational missile launched from a B-52 aircraft. 
The ARRW hypersonic glide body was developed under the DARPA 
[Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency]/Air Force Tactical 
Boost Glide program and is the most sophisticated air-launched 
hypersonic glide body in the world. The DARPA Air Force 
Hypersonic Air-breathing Weapon Concept or HAWC program 
demonstrated in flight two distinct hypersonic cruise missile 
concepts, one of which has been chosen as the basis for the Air 
Force Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile program, HACM.
    The Air Force and Navy demonstrated on the ground and then 
in flight the common tactical rocket motor that will launch the 
already demonstrated common hypersonic glide body for the Army 
Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon and Navy Conventional Strike--
Conventional Prompt Strike weapon systems. The Navy and Army 
and MDA [Missile Defense Agency] worked together to conduct two 
High Operational Tempo for Hypersonics H4H flight test 
campaigns to enhance future hypersonic systems with a total of 
five flights and over 50 technology experiments. Despite this 
progress, there remains much to do to deliver hypersonic 
systems with the capabilities and at the capacity necessary to 
meet warfighting needs and to continue on a path of accelerated 
development of next-generation and leap-ahead systems.
    Under the next phase of the Department's strategic 
approach, we must first leverage commercial production 
practices and design for production approaches to achieve 
affordable capacity in our industrial base and enable the 
fielding of capability in quantities necessary to defeat an 
increasingly capable adversary. Second, we must identify and 
develop next-generation and leap-ahead hypersonic capabilities 
and technologies to maintain battlefield dominance well into 
the future. And third, we must significantly improve the 
throughput of our testing infrastructure and improve our 
modeling and simulation capability to further accelerate 
learning and development.
    On behalf of the Department, I appreciate the continued 
interest and support we receive from Congress for accelerating 
the delivery of transformational warfighting capability based 
on hypersonic systems. And I look forward to your continued 
support as we begin to field hypersonic offensive and defensive 
capabilities.
    Thank you for this opportunity. I look forward to your 
questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. White can be found in the 
Appendix on page 38.]
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. Lieutenant General Rasch.

    STATEMENT OF LTG ROBERT A. RASCH, JR., USA, DIRECTOR OF 
HYPERSONICS, DIRECTED ENERGY, SPACE AND RAPID ACQUISITION, U.S. 
                              ARMY

    General Rasch. Hey, good morning, Chairman Lamborn, Ranking 
Member Moulton, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. 
Thank you for allowing me to be here today to represent the 
Army for this hearing on hypersonics alongside my colleagues in 
the other services as well as the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense. As part of the Army's modernization strategy, we have 
prioritized the development of the long-range precision 
portfolio in order to provide an array of complementary 
capabilities to the combatant commanders at a multitude of 
ranges.
    Within that portfolio, the Army's Long-Range Hypersonic 
Weapons, or LRHW program, is designed to be the longest range 
asset to hold heavily defended high-value targets at bay, 
especially targets in anti-access/[area] denial environments. 
The LRHW is designed to be a road-mobile and C-17 transportable 
ground-based hypersonic weapon system with a first prototype 
battery being delivered in fiscal year 2023. The development of 
a ground-based hypersonic capability is crucial to support the 
Army's role in multi-domain operations and as part of the joint 
fight.
    I am here today to discuss the Army's LRHW effort. But the 
success of this system is also reliant upon the great 
relationship we share with Vice Admiral Wolfe's team in the 
United States Navy. The Army and the Navy are partnered in 
hypersonic development and resourcing as the Army's LRHW and 
the Navy's Conventional Prompt Strike programs share key 
components such as a common missile booster stack also known as 
the All-Up Round and Canister and the use of a common 
hypersonic boost glide vehicle known as the common hypersonic 
glide body.
    We also share joint testing opportunities at the 
subcomponent and component level, all the way up to full system 
flight test and have received significant support from Mr. 
White and OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] in the 
execution of this testing. The commonalities between the 
services helps incentivize the emerging industrial base. It 
creates economies of scale and maintains aggressive development 
and fielding schedules for our hypersonic weapons.
    We are also reliant on the relationships amongst our 
industry partners as no single entity can build a hypersonic 
weapon capability alone, especially since so much of this 
valuable technology was initially solely developed within the 
government labs. In September of 2021, the Army fielded its 
ground support equipment to the first hypersonic unit, the 
battery unit, located at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, a battery 
unit that is also part of the Army's first multi-domain task 
force. Since the initial fielding, the soldiers have 
successfully completed their new equipment training and have 
participated in multiple joint test events in which they have 
displayed and demonstrated full employment of the system in a 
combat-like environment.
    As many of you are likely aware, we recently prepared to 
conduct a hypersonic test on 5 March from Cape Canaveral Space 
Force Station. And as a result of the preflight checks during 
that event, the test did not occur. We are still in the process 
of processing and analyzing the data we received at that event.
    But Vice Admiral Wolfe and I will field as many of your 
questions as possible this morning, especially in the closed 
session. Above all, I am confident, however, in our team and we 
will persevere together to get this system capable and safe for 
fielding to our soldiers. I sincerely appreciate Congress' 
steadfast and consistent support of our efforts to develop 
hypersonic weapons as we would not be here today without the 
relationship that we share with you all.
    And I'm so incredibly proud to be a part of this team, this 
joint team. And am especially grateful for all the countless 
hours the Army, the Navy, and the industry teams puts in day in 
and day out to support this mission. Thank you again for having 
me today as the Army's witness, and I look forward to answering 
your questions.
    [The prepared statement of General Rasch can be found in 
the Appendix on page 49.]
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. Vice Admiral Wolfe.

    STATEMENT OF VADM JOHNNY R. WOLFE, JR., USN, DIRECTOR, 
             STRATEGIC SYSTEMS PROGRAMS, U.S. NAVY

    Admiral Wolfe. Chairman Lamborn, Ranking Member Moulton, 
and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for 
the opportunity to discuss the Navy Strategic Systems Programs' 
Conventional Prompt Strike hypersonic weapon known as CPS. I'm 
proud to be here alongside this panel of witnesses who are 
working tirelessly to deliver a portfolio of hypersonic 
capabilities to the warfighter. In particular, I'm pleased to 
be here with Lieutenant General Rasch who I am partnered with 
to deliver the common hypersonic missile to the Army as the 
Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon, LRHW, before then delivering CPS 
as a sea-based capability to the Navy.
    The support we receive from Mr. White and the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense has been essential as we continue on the 
path to rapidly field these capabilities. The Navy and the Army 
are partnered to execute the CPS and LRHW programs through the 
use of a common hypersonic missile, which consists of a two-
stage missile booster designed, developed, and produced by the 
Navy as well as a common hypersonic glide body designed and 
developed by the Navy and produced by the Army. By leveraging 
joint developmental test opportunities, the programs have 
marked significant testing milestones at a consistent pace.
    Our March 2020 flight test demonstrated that the common 
hypersonic glide body technology is mature. Multiple static 
fire tests and a 2022 flight test provided vital data on the 
performance of our newly developed missile booster. In 
partnership with the Missile Defense Agency, the Navy and Army 
have completed two sounding rocket campaigns to inform the 
future development of the common hypersonic capability.
    During a recently planned flight test, automated preflight 
checks identified that a battery did not activate, which 
resulted in not conducting the test. We are aggressively 
investigating the cause of the no test and will continue to 
move forward with our development and additional testing in 
support of Army fielding as soon as the cause is identified and 
corrected. The services are making great progress transitioning 
hypersonic capabilities out of government laboratories and into 
commercial production.
    And in the spring of 2022, we celebrated the delivery of 
the first industry-produced common hypersonic glide body. 
Hypersonic industry partners are working diligently with the 
government national team to facilitate a rapid transition to 
production, platform integration, and delivery to the 
warfighter. In order to deliver this capability at the speed of 
relevance, the Army and Navy teams will continue to work 
closely with industry partners, OSD, and Congress to identify 
supply chain issues and put mitigation plans in place.
    The Navy is diligently preparing for the fielding of CPS on 
both the Zumwalt-class destroyers and the Block V Virginia 
Payload Module equipped submarines. Making a critical 
development milestone, testing at our In-Air Launch test 
facility has validated the cold-gas launch approach the Navy 
will use to launch the common hypersonic missile from both of 
our sea-based platforms. The CPS fielding on Zumwalt-class 
destroyers will mark the first use of this cold-gas launch 
approach on a service ship platform. The program is continuing 
construction and outfitting of the underwater test facility 
that will allow the program to test how the CPS missile 
transits through the water using the newly developed CPS 
launcher.
    We have begun a series of exercises that allow sailors to 
execute scenarios in an operationally representative 
environment and will soon be deploying a weapon system 
prototype and a missile simulator on a Zumwalt-class destroyer. 
The ship will take the equipment to sea and demonstrate 
employment concepts and command and control with USSTRATCOM 
[U.S. Strategic Command] and INDOPACOM [U.S. Indo-Pacific 
Command]. I remain confident that the CPS program will be ready 
to fill the hypersonic weapon system upon the availability of 
the Navy platforms.
    I'd like to thank Congress for the support you have shown 
our program and the important focus that you have placed on 
this essential capability. As the 14th director, it is my honor 
to represent the men and women of SSP's [Strategic Systems 
Programs'] CPS program. One of my top priorities is to ensure 
that these dedicated Americans are poised to execute the 
Conventional Prompt Strike mission with the same level of 
success, passion, and rigor as we have since SSP was founded.
    Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on behalf of 
the team that will provide our Nation with a credible and 
reliable intermediate-range hypersonic strike capability. I 
look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Admiral Wolfe can be found in 
the Appendix on page 56.]
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. Lieutenant General Shipton.

 STATEMENT OF LT GEN DONNA D. SHIPTON, USAF, MILITARY DEPUTY, 
    OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE FOR 
     ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS, U.S. AIR FORCE

    General Shipton. Good morning, Chairman Lamborn, Ranking 
Member Moulton, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. 
Thank you very much for the opportunity today to provide 
testimony on the Department of the Air Force's hypersonic 
programs. Our continued efforts to develop and field an 
operational hypersonic air-launched weapon will enable us to 
hold high-value time-sensitive targets at risk in contested 
environments from standoff distances.
    A hypersonic weapon in concert with a wider weapons force 
mix is key to providing a war-winning Air Force. The Air 
Force's hypersonic portfolio consists of three major thrusts: 
the air-launched boost-glide missiles, air-launched air-
breathing cruise missiles, and the foundational science and 
technology hypersonics portfolio. Our boost-glide missile is 
the Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon, also known as ARRW.
    In fiscal year 2023, the Air Force will continue the 
development of ARRW. To this date, we have successfully 
completed the booster test flight series in July of 2022 and 
the first All-Up Round test flight, ATF 1, in December on the 
B-52. ATF 1 represents the Air Force's first successful test of 
an end-to-end operationally representative air-launched 
hypersonic weapon. ATF 2 is scheduled to take place by the end 
of this month, and we are planning for two additional All-Up 
Round test flights prior to program completion.
    Our air-breathing cruise missile is the Hypersonic Attack 
Cruise Missile, also known as HACM. It is an air-launched, air-
breathing weapon that can be integrated on current and future 
fighters as well as provide expanded capacity on bombers. The 
Air Force awarded the HACM contract in September of 2022 and is 
developing the weapon using middle tier of acquisition rapid 
prototyping authority. We are working to mature HACM to 
critical design along with other development activities in 
order to enable the flight test program to begin in fiscal year 
2025.
    For our S&T [science and technology] efforts, in 
collaboration with the wider hypersonics community you see 
seated here today, our foundational science and technology 
hypersonics portfolio is executed by the Air Force's Research 
Laboratory, AFRL. AFRL has made many enduring contributions to 
the field of hypersonics.
    They have achieved recent successes with their completed 
High Speed Strike Weapon Technology Maturation, or TechMat, 
program. This program transitioned over 30 technologies to 
various DOD hypersonic programs ranging from advanced materials 
to propulsion technologies to air vehicle designs. Based on 
these successes, we look forward to the launch of TechMat 2 
this year to further develop and transition technologies for 
next-generation hypersonic capabilities.
    Lastly, AFRL will continue technology development efforts 
this year towards expendable hypersonic, multi-mission, 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, or ISR, and 
strike capabilities for larger, long-range, multi-mission 
hypersonic platforms. Thank you again for the opportunity to 
testify and to provide additional details in the closed 
session. I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of General Shipton can be found in 
the Appendix on page 64.]
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. Mr. Freisthler.

 STATEMENT OF PAUL F. FREISTHLER, CHIEF SCIENTIST, DIRECTORATE 
           FOR ANALYSIS, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

    Mr. Freisthler. Chairman Lamborn, Ranking Member Moulton, 
and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for 
the invitation to provide the Defense Intelligence Agency's 
assessment of China and Russia's hypersonic weapon systems. 
Amid the backdrop of strategic competition, the events of the 
past several years demonstrate in no uncertain terms that our 
competitors are developing capabilities aimed to hold the U.S. 
homeland at risk. Hypersonic weapons designed to evade U.S. 
sensors and defensive systems pose an increasing and complex 
threat due to the availability of both nuclear and conventional 
capabilities, challenging flight profiles and maneuverability. 
These weapons include air, ground, and naval launched variants 
as hypersonic glide vehicles, hypersonic cruise missiles, and 
aero-ballistic missiles.
    Unlike ballistic missiles, these hypersonic weapons, which 
fly at speeds at least Mach 5 for a significant portion of 
their flight, do not follow a ballistic trajectory and can 
maneuver en route to their destination. While both China and 
Russia have conducted numerous successful tests of hypersonic 
weapons and have likely fielded operational systems, China is 
leading Russia in both supporting infrastructure and numbers of 
systems.
    Over the past two decades, China has dramatically advanced 
its development of conventional and nuclear armed hypersonic 
missile technologies and capabilities through intense and 
focused investment, development, testing, and deployments. 
China has a robust research and development infrastructure 
devoted to the development of hypersonic weapons. For example, 
the China Aerodynamic Research and Development Center claims to 
have 18 wind tunnels and the China Academy of Aerospace 
Aerodynamics claims to operate at least 3 hypersonic wind 
tunnels capable of operating at speeds of Mach 8, Mach 10, and 
Mach 12.
    China has conducted a number of successful tests of 
hypersonic weapon systems, including the DF-17, which is a 
medium-range ballistic missile with a hypersonic glide vehicle 
payload. It is estimated to have a range of at least 1,000 
miles enabling it to reach U.S. military forces in Western 
Pacific and may have been fielded in 2020. China is also 
pursuing an intercontinental-range ballistic missile with 
hypersonic glide vehicle payload and has conducted several 
flight tests since 2014, including a test in July of 2021 that 
circumnavigated the globe.
    China also is actively pursuing high-speed engine or 
``scramjet'' technologies which have applications in hypersonic 
cruise missiles and has used their Mach 6+ scramjet testbed to 
research thermal resistant components and hypersonic cruise 
missile technologies which would further expand its hypersonic 
weapons capabilities.
    Russia has performed research on hypersonic weapons 
technologies since at least the 1980s. Russia reportedly 
conducts hypersonic wind tests--wind tunnel testing at the 
Central Aero-Hydrodynamic Institute and the Khristianovich 
Institute of Theoretical and Applied Mechanics and has 
performed hypersonic weapons testing at several locations 
across the country.
    Russia currently has three deployed hypersonic weapon 
systems. In 2018, President Vladimir Putin mentioned the first, 
the Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile, claiming it has a 
top speed of Mach 10 with a range of over 1,200 miles. The 
second system, the SS-19 Mod 4, achieved initial operational 
capability in 2019 and is the world's only deployed strategic-
range hypersonic glide vehicle.
    Russian government officials claim the hypersonic glide 
vehicle is capable of flying at speeds over Mach 20 with a 
range of approximately 6,500 miles. The third system, the 
Tsirkon, is a ship-launched hypersonic missile that travels at 
speeds up to Mach 8 with a maximum range of approximately 600 
miles. Russia has also declared its intentions to expand its 
strategic hypersonic weapons inventory in the coming years by 
eventually placing multiple hypersonic glide vehicles on the 
developmental intercontinental ballistic missile, known as the 
Sarmat, and developing another air-launched hypersonic long-
range missile called the Kh-95.
    My goal in this hearing is to help Congress and the Nation 
better understand the threats we face as a nation. DIA aims to 
support this committee in identifying opportunities to respond 
to these challenges. Thank you for your continued confidence, 
and I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Freisthler can be found in 
the Appendix on page 70.]
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you all for your statements and for 
being here. We have one vote that will occur at 10:00 to 10:15. 
My hope is that we can get the opening hearing done before the 
vote. Then we will go vote and all of us reconvene up in room 
2337 in the SCIF [Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility] 
for the classified session. I would ask members and witnesses 
to keep our questions and answers as succinct as possible so we 
can get to more members.
    President Biden's decision last week to authorize the 
Defense Production Act to invest in hypersonic--hypersonics was 
welcome. This move demonstrates a recent and serious 
realization more and more of us are having of the need for 
hypersonics. So General Rasch and Vice Admiral Wolfe, do 
hypersonics meet a need not otherwise met by our existing 
weapons and forces? In other words, are we developing this just 
to be copying potential adversaries? Or do hypersonics meet a 
need that if not met, puts us at an unacceptable risk? General 
Rasch, start with you.
    General Rasch. Thank you, Chairman, for the question. So, 
as a materiel developer, I'm not necessarily involved in the 
policy decisions regarding the implementation and usage of 
those. But from an Army perspective, as part of the joint 
fight, when we did the long-range fire study across the Army 
portfolio looking at the capabilities we had and the ranges we 
had and the allocation or apportionment of targets that we as 
part of the joint fight were supposed to address, it was 
determined at that point in time that hypersonics--the Long-
Range Hypersonic Weapon system was needed. If you need more 
information, I can absolutely get that report that lays out 
that additional information.
    Mr. Lamborn. Vice Admiral Wolfe or Mr. White, can you--or 
Dr. Horowitz, can you add to that?
    Admiral Wolfe. So, from a Navy perspective, I too--like 
General Rasch, I'm a materiel provider. But I would tell you 
the Navy's view is this does fill a need for the United States 
Navy. It's not just because of parity with what the adversary 
or our strategic competitors are doing. But again, like General 
Rasch, if you'd want more detail on that, it would have to go 
to the classified session.
    Dr. Horowitz. Thanks so much. I think we believe in the 
Department that hypersonics are a critical part of the mix of 
capabilities that we need. They expand the range of options 
available to senior decision makers. And as Mr. White said, 
their speed, maneuverability, and range give them novel 
capabilities that will be helpful from the perspective of the 
joint force.
    That's why the National Defense Strategy calls them out as 
priority capabilities from the perspective of--from the 
perspective of development. And so I think there are--there are 
reasons why the Department needs to develop hypersonics clearly 
laid out in the National Defense Strategy that are aside from 
whatever Russia and China are doing.
    Mr. Lamborn. Mr. White, do you have anything to add?
    Mr. White. I think that pretty much covers it.
    Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Very good. Very good. And Mr. White 
continuing with you. Last year, I worked with the Department to 
formalize the National Hypersonics Initiative and had it 
included in the fiscal year 2023 NDAA. This provision directed 
the Department to provide a report on options to enhance 
hypersonic development efforts through the establishment of a 
National Hypersonics Initiative. Can you give us an update on 
that and preview what will be in the report? And will we need 
any more legislation in the 2024 bill?
    Mr. White. Thank you for the question. The National 
Hypersonics Initiative really is a descriptive term for the 
next phase of our hypersonic strategy that moves us from the 
initial prototyping phase of development to operational 
fielding with affordable capacity. So the key elements of that 
next phase of our strategy have to do with affordable capacity 
and getting industry and the industrial base designs capable 
for--of being built affordably and at high rate to meet the 
needs of the warfighter as well as continuing to evolve our 
technology.
    So the two key pillars of that next-generation strategy is 
affordable capacity and next-generation leap-ahead 
technologies. In addition, we want to make sure we enhance the 
technology base and the workforce providing the capabilities 
and currently and for the future in hypersonics as well as the 
T&E, test and evaluation, infrastructure necessary. So those 
are the key elements of the strategy. The report has been 
completed and is in review and it should be out in about a 
month.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
    Mr. White. Thank you.
    Mr. Lamborn. And hurrying right along. Mr. Freisthler, your 
opening statement mentioned the Chinese hypersonic fractional 
orbital bombardment system, or FOB, that circumnavigated the 
globe. Some people call this a Sputnik moment. Can you explain 
why China is pursuing this technology and when can we expect it 
to reach initial operational capability if it hasn't already?
    Mr. Freisthler. Thank you for the question. In order to 
provide you a full and robust response, I would like to defer 
that to the closed session if I may.
    Mr. Lamborn. Okay. We will address that in closed session. 
And let's see, at this point, I am going to hand it off to 
Representative Moulton and we will try to do as much as 
possible. But when votes are called, we will adjourn here and 
reconvene after votes in the SCIF.
    Mr. Moulton. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. So in my 
opening remarks, I commented on how we need to have operational 
concepts before we just pursue technology for technology's sake 
or just because our adversaries have it. And the chairman 
addressed this in his first question, but I have to say I was 
struck by how vague your answers were.
    I mean, two of you essentially said, hey, I am just 
developing this, but the policy people are figuring out how to 
use it. Others talked about vague things like options that it 
provides our warfighters. There is not a weapon system on Earth 
that doesn't provide our warfighters new options. But we have 
to be smart about what we invest in. We cancel weapon systems 
all the time that provide options to our warfighters, but we 
decide are not a top priority.
    Now in your testimony, Mr. White, you said mission planning 
work is well underway for Air Force, Army, and Navy 
capabilities and the United States Strategic Command has been 
developing a concept of operations for support of the Army's 
first fully operational weapons. Has been developing, is 
working on, doesn't sound like we have an operational concept 
first for which we are developing a technology. You also said 
earlier in your testimony, we are moving with urgency to put 
advanced technologies and new operating concepts, including 
hypersonic strike and defensive capabilities, into the hands of 
the joint force. Again, this doesn't sound like we have this 
figured out. It sounds like we are trying to just catch up with 
our adversaries.
    Now I asked this question in the earlier hearing this week 
of General Cotton and his answer was essentially we need them 
because China and Russia have them. I then asked if he thinks 
they are stabilizing or destabilizing weapons and he said that 
they will be stabilizing if we reach parity. That sounds like 
we are just trying to get to parity with our adversaries.
    He didn't give us an operational concept for how they are 
going to be used. Just a few minutes later, General VanHerck 
described an operational concept in which Russia or China 
attacks us with a hypersonic weapon and we can't tell where it 
is going. And he said very explicitly that is destabilizing.
    But let's just take General Cotton's line of reasoning for 
a minute and argue that we need them because the other guys 
have them. And once we get to parity, they will be stabilizing. 
But, Dr. Freisthler, in your testimony, you made it very clear 
that Russia and China are developing hypersonic capabilities 
that we have no intention of developing. Do we have intention 
of developing nuclear hypersonics? Does anyone on the panel 
think that we are?
    No. So we are not even going to reach parity in that sense. 
It is not like we have ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic 
missiles] and they have ICBMs. So we know that we don't want 
anybody to fire an ICBM because that is what they are going to 
get back. So on the one hand, people come before us all the 
time arguing as you have that we need these capabilities 
because our adversaries have them.
    And you have the commander of STRATCOM [U.S. Strategic 
Command] saying that once we reach parity with our adversaries, 
then these will be stabilizing weapons, good for our national 
security across the board. And yet you don't even have a plan 
to reach parity because we are not developing the same type of 
hypersonic weapons as they are.
    So it seems to me that there is a fundamental disconnect 
here. Not only that, it does seem like we are quite far behind. 
Mr. White, you said that we are not in an arms race. How would 
you define an arms race?
    Mr. White. I define an arms race in the traditional sense 
of numerical parity. They have 47 widgets, so we need 50.
    Mr. Moulton. Which is exactly what General Cotton said is 
our path.
    Mr. White. I would disagree with that. I don't believe I 
interpreted what he said in that--in that vein. But that is not 
what we're doing. Our development of our hypersonic 
capabilities for offensive strike is dictated by the target set 
and the mission capabilities needed to complement our existing 
and other types of weapons so that we can perform our 
operational missions successfully and deter preferably.
    Mr. Moulton. Well, I would highly encourage you as I have 
in years past to accelerate the development of these 
operational concepts so you can come before us and before the 
American people who are footing the billions and billions of 
dollars to develop these weapons just so that your STRATCOM 
commander can tell us we can reach parity with our adversaries 
even though we don't even really have a plan to do so. Now, let 
me ask one other question. Oh, I am sorry. Lieutenant General 
Rasch.
    General Rasch. Sir, I was just going to add from an 
operational employment perspective separating that from how we 
execute. We do exercise from General Cotton's team at STRATCOM 
through the combatant command and did actually this last week 
that full chain of events. Obviously, decision authority is not 
something that the materiel developer is necessarily focused 
on. But the ability to employ that--deploy and/or employ that 
when we conduct that first unit of issue later this year is 
something that we are exercising from the top all the way--all 
the way to the bottom. So when it is capable and ready and the 
leaders decide that we need to--to execute it, we have a system 
that can execute that mission.
    Mr. Moulton. I appreciate that very much. Do you think that 
these are strategic weapons, Lieutenant General Rasch?
    General Rasch. I would actually rather defer that to policy 
if I could please.
    Dr. Horowitz. These are conventional weapons that can have 
strategic effects. And we think that because of their speed, 
maneuverability, and range that they offer something 
potentially unique to the joint force.
    Mr. Moulton. Well, as I said from the very beginning, I 
don't doubt that they offer something unique, but let's figure 
out how that is actually going to be used. And fundamentally 
whether at the end of the day it contributes to our national 
security or makes the world a more dangerous place, not only 
for us but for everybody else.
    Dr. Freisthler, what is your assessment on Chinese and 
Russian capability to track U.S. hypersonic weapons? Do they 
have the same limitations that we obviously do when it comes to 
tracking them in flight?
    Mr. Freisthler. Thank you very much for the question. So 
the physics is the same across the universe. So I would say 
they definitely have similar struggles that the U.S. may have 
to attack. I'm not saying we have a struggle with the 
capability. But looking at it from a physics perspective, as 
you travel through the air at that velocity, there becomes 
challenges with onboard sensors, but also then with 
capabilities from ground and space to detect and track 
vehicles.
    Mr. Moulton. Dr. Horowitz, when the strategic deterrence 
that we have and have had for decades between the U.S., Soviet 
Union, U.S. and Russia relies not only on the fact that we have 
a lot of ICBMs on the ground, but that we have detection 
capabilities so we can tell when they launch. What is our 
policy if Russia were to take out our detection capabilities? 
How would we treat that?
    Dr. Horowitz. I think we view the--we view our capabilities 
in this area as robust. And we'd be happy to talk about it more 
in a closed----
    Mr. Moulton. No, no, that is not my question. My question 
is what is our policy if Russia takes out our capability to 
detect nuclear launches from Russia?
    Dr. Horowitz. I don't think we--I think the--I think we'd 
need to talk about that in a closed session.
    Mr. Moulton. I think that is intimately related to the 
question that I just asked. So I look forward to that 
discussion. And I hope you can resolve the pretty obvious 
logical discrepancy here. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Lamborn. Representative Wilson.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Chairman Doug Lamborn, and thank you 
also Ranking Member Seth Moulton. It is so refreshing as you 
see the bipartisan working together, concern for the American 
people. And then thank goodness we have such capable people as 
you are here today.
    And a gruesome reminder of how important and what you are 
doing was the hypersonic attack last night yesterday across 
Ukraine. The people of Ukraine were given no warning. There is 
no tracking.
    There is not a capability of providing air siren 
capabilities so people to go to shelters. There is the whole 
situation of evading. The courageous people of Ukraine have 
been so successful in blocking, by their missile defense 
systems, the war criminal Putin's attacks on the people of 
Ukraine.
    But this yesterday was just horrific, again, to see 
civilian targets intentionally to create the mass slaughter of 
civilians. And it is just so critical that we have a capability 
hopefully to deter war criminal Putin. But yesterday was such a 
reminder of how critical what is today and I am concerned too.
    It may have been a response by war criminal Putin to the 
actions by President Biden last week that his message is that, 
hey, we shall proceed and the global conflict that we have 
between democracies rule of law with authoritarians rule of 
gun. And so I believe that we are sadly obviously in an arms 
race. We are in a competition.
    And the good news is we have been through competition like 
this before called the Cold War where we had no chance of 
victory, but we did. So what you are doing is so critical. I 
want to point out to General Shipton. First of all, we are so 
thrilled to have a distinguished graduate of Clemson University 
School of Engineering.
    And so since I have a grandson there and I have had a son 
follow you. So, hey, we appreciate what you have done. General, 
the senior Air Force leaders have discussed the need to 
determine the optimal weapons mix for hypersonic capabilities 
conventional munitions to make production decisions. How is the 
Air Force resolving these concerns?
    General Shipton. Thank you for the question, sir. And go 
Tigers.
    Mr. Wilson. Hear, hear.
    General Shipton. So, sir, yes, the Air Force is proceeding 
with understanding what our operational weapons mix will look 
like incorporating hypersonics into that discussion. We do see 
that it is a probably high-value but low-volume addition to our 
wider weapons mix. We do believe that we will be adding this 
capability to our--especially with our future fighter force 
that our wargaming and analysis has shown, especially with 
HACM, that it will provide a superior capability to our current 
inventory. And we are looking forward to bringing that in the 
inventory as I mentioned in 2027.
    Mr. Wilson. Well, thank you very much. And indeed, go 
Tigers. And I am so grateful to be with you. And Dr. 
Freisthler, again Russia--Putin developing his capabilities, 
the Chinese Communist Party developing their capabilities, the 
collusion with Tehran, with the intent of Tehran to vaporize 
the people of Israel, to vaporize the people of America.
    We know of their capabilities. With those capabilities, is 
there evidence of cooperation between Russia, China, and any 
other, here we go with DPRK too, North Korea--does this ever 
end--in weapons development. And what is their industrial 
production capability?
    Mr. Freisthler. Thank you very much for the question. If I 
may tackle that slightly in reverse order. So production, the 
costs remain a barrier for everyone that is pursuing 
development of hypersonic weapons. You know, China, Russia, as 
well as France, India, Austria, North Korea, Japan, and others, 
as you mentioned, they are all looking at the technologies that 
are in this and working to overcome them. So from an industrial 
base perspective, we do see some collaboration. Beyond that, I 
would have to defer to the closed session, sir.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you. And I hope we collaborate with other 
countries, i.e., India and Japan. Thank you.
    Mr. Lamborn. Representative Norcross.
    Mr. Norcross. Thank you, Chairman. I would like to thank 
the panel for being here today. And I don't want to go point 
for point on the line of questioning that my colleague had. I 
want to take it one step down, the assumptions that technically 
we are getting to where we need to be, although nowhere near 
the timeframe, but operationally still a huge question.
    The Defense Production Act typically is there for when 
there is not an industrial base to support it. There is no 
doubt in anybody's mind up here is we have been throwing 
billions of dollars at this. Why at this time the Defense 
Production Act being deployed by the President, what need is it 
because you usually do that when, A, it is not there, B, 
industry is unwilling to do this.
    I am not sure which one of you are in a position to answer 
this question. But why now is that being invoked? Where is 
industry not answering the call? I know you are all dying to 
answer this question.
    Dr. Horowitz. Thank you for the question. The--I think 
the--I think that we're pleased and excited that the President 
is allowing us the opportunity to act on behalf of the Nation 
to accelerate the advancement of hypersonics capabilities in 
the U.S. These investments we think will lead to new training 
and job opportunities for American citizens.
    Mr. Norcross. No, I got that. Why? What is the defense--why 
does that need to be employed instead of industry just 
answering the call? Because this is to force industry's hand. 
Where is that not being addressed?
    Dr. Horowitz. The administration has made a determination 
that invoking it is necessary given where industry is now. But 
I would also have to take this for the record given that our 
colleagues from acquisition and sustainment are not represented 
on this panel and could bring more to bear on the specific 
question of the decision on the timing.
    Mr. Norcross. I hear you. Let me shift gears here a little 
bit. The CBO [Congressional Budget Office] recently released 
the U.S. Hypersonic Weapons and Alternatives Report--I assume 
everybody has seen this--and came to some takeaways that are 
extremely concerning to many of us up here that the ballistic 
missiles in many ways be well suited to address these.
    Second of all, that probably hypersonics would not be more 
survivable than ballistic missiles. Third, the cost, 
considerably less. So my question is, given those challenges, 
what are we getting with a hypersonic missile that we are not 
getting with the ballistic that is going to address it in light 
of this report? Dr. Horowitz, if you could start.
    Dr. Horowitz. Thanks for the question. The Department 
believes that the intersection of the speed, maneuverability, 
and range of hypersonics provides capabilities that are not 
simply provided by ballistic missiles. But we also believe 
hypersonics are not a one-size-fits-all solution. That's why 
they're important as part of the mix of capabilities that the 
joint force is--that the joint force is planning to operate in 
the future, and why my colleagues in uniform have talked about 
some of the plans we have concerning different quantities of 
hypersonics that we think might be useful in different 
scenarios.
    Mr. Norcross. So let me interject. What are we getting from 
a hypersonic that we are not getting? Speed is obvious. 
Maneuverability is questionable that we are getting that 
additionally. What is it? That timeframe cuts down from 6 
minutes to 3 minutes that makes an operational difference?
    Admiral Wolfe. Rep. Norcross, if I could just weigh in 
here. So I'd be happy to answer that question, but we really 
need to be in the classified discussion for me to give you an 
example of exactly where this is useful.
    Mr. Norcross. I yield back and we will address it in the 
closed session.
    Dr. DesJarlais [presiding]. I thank the gentleman. I will 
now recognize myself for 5 minutes. Mr. White, I would like to 
start by thanking you for the work that you have done in the 
Department through your briefings on the Hill to raise 
awareness of the state of our hypersonic test infrastructure. 
It is not a flashy topic, but it is critical.
    Because of your persistent work shedding light on the dire 
state of our T&E infrastructure, we have seen tremendous 
support built on this committee for necessary investments. So I 
really appreciate your efforts. But I would like to ask you 
where we are now. As you know, my district is home to Arnold 
Engineering Development Complex, and we have seen significant 
funds dedicated to Arnold over the past few years.
    I am curious to know how you would assess the state of our 
ground test infrastructure presently. Are we dedicating 
sufficient resources? Are there additional construction or 
hiring authorities that we could provide you all to help with 
these modernization efforts? So in short, what do you need from 
this committee to continue the progress we have made in our 
modernization of our ground test infrastructure?
    Mr. White. Thank you for that question. And let me first 
start off by saying that we greatly appreciate the support 
we've gotten from this committee and Congress in general for 
our T&E infrastructure improvements and the tremendous amount 
of funding that's been added by Congress for T&E 
infrastructure. The Arnold Engineering Development Center 
really is the crown jewel in our hypersonics T&E capability, 
and our facilities in Tennessee provide critical capabilities 
for testing of high-temperature materials for thermal 
protection systems and air-breathing propulsion systems for 
hypersonic cruise missiles.
    Right now, we have worked to increase the capability of the 
current facility infrastructure to improve the throughput by a 
factor of two over the last couple of years. But the 
investments that we're being able to make with the additional 
funding is allowing us to dramatically improve that throughput 
and capability by building new facilities, both for air-
breathing propulsion and for high-temperature materials testing 
in Tennessee.
    So we look forward to bringing those systems online over 
the next couple of years to dramatically improve our ground 
test capability. In addition to those investments, the 
additional funding and support we've gotten from Congress has 
allowed us to make investments across the board with our 
industry partners as well as our government laboratories 
elsewhere to enhance our facility needs for ground testing, and 
so we really appreciate that. And the investments are going to 
universities, industry elements in Minnesota and New York in 
particular, and government facilities outside of Tennessee, for 
example, the Holloman sled track in New Mexico. So quite a lot 
of investment and it will dramatically improve the robustness 
of our ground test facility.
    Beyond that, the investments are allowing us to improve the 
capability and throughput of our flight test infrastructure. As 
I mentioned in my opening remarks, we've gone from testing 
about once every 2 years to over a dozen times per year. And 
that's put a demand signal on our flight test infrastructure.
    That's being enabled by advanced capabilities being pursued 
for moving our range instrumentation to airborne platforms from 
maritime platforms, a dramatic improvement in flexibility and 
agility for our range assets. So there's a lot of investment 
going on across the T&E infrastructure enabled by robust 
funding approved in the recent Congress in particular.
    Dr. DesJarlais. One other thing, something General Thurgood 
raised on a trip to Huntsville last August was utilizing some 
of these small-scale facilities of our academic institutions to 
help alleviate some of the testing shortfalls. To what extent 
is the Department utilizing these facilities and are there 
additional opportunities? And I think you kind of answered 
that, but specifically like the UT [University of Tennessee] 
Space center in Tennessee.
    Mr. White. Yeah, the university ecosystem is an important 
part of our strategy moving forward. The University Consortium 
in Applied Hypersonics [UCAH] is allowing not only investments 
in the students, but in the infrastructure in the universities. 
We've made numerous investments in universities like Purdue and 
Notre Dame for quiet hypersonic wind tunnels.
    We're making additional investments in the University of 
Illinois for their hypersonic facility. And then in Texas, 
we're making a number of investments. So we are through the 
UCAH and additional investments through the Test Resources 
Management Center energizing our university ecosystem for 
testing and evaluation.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you. And again appreciate your 
efforts and thanks for all you have done.
    Mr. White. Thank you.
    Dr. DesJarlais. And I will now recognize Mr. Carbajal from 
California.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Welcome to all the 
witnesses. Hypersonics are an innovative technology. They have 
a lot of potential. They have the potential to be the next 
generation of weapon system that increases our capabilities and 
they also have the potential to cost taxpayers a whole lot of 
money.
    We need more clarity on where supersonics will fit in with 
our National Defense Strategy and what the plan and metrics are 
for future research, development, testing, and evaluation. I 
must say I associate myself with the comments and statement of 
Ranking Member Moulton and Mr. Norcross. In my district Cal 
Poly San Luis Obispo in partnership with the Air Force Research 
Laboratory is in the process of building a Ludwig tube wind 
tunnel capable of Mach 6 to conduct hypersonic research and 
workforce development opportunities for students. Mr. White and 
General Shipton, can you speak to the benefits of partnerships 
between the university and the Department like we have with Cal 
Poly and the Air Force Research Laboratory in advancing the 
research of technologies like hypersonics?
    Mr. White. Thank you for the question. I'll start. As I 
just mentioned, the University Consortium in Applied 
Hypersonics is a major initiative that we established with the 
Joint Hypersonic Transition Office.
    Started largely due to congressional support and funding in 
earlier bills. And we've really energized that community. We 
have over 100 universities involved in that university 
consortium to not only develop future technologies and build 
facilities that allow that research, but really to train that 
next-generation workforce so that we can make sure the 
country's capability and future is robust in delivering this 
capability to our warfighter.
    I just want to re--or emphasize that I don't view my job as 
being hypersonic technology development. I view my job as 
developing transformational capability and delivering that 
transformational capability to the warfighter based on 
hypersonic systems. So our emphasis really is getting the 
capabilities and the weapon systems in the hands of the 
warfighter so they can make sure that we can perform what we 
need to do on the battlefield and accomplish our mission 
objectives should deterrence fail.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
    General Shipton. Thank you for the question, sir. And I 
would just add that I agree completely with Mr. White's 
comments earlier. I would just say that I think adding any 
additional capability is going to allow us to do increased 
testing at a faster rate. Just very basic simple math. And so I 
think these efforts with the university are certainly going to 
be helpful in allowing us to do more tests more quickly and 
bring that capability sooner. So that's all I have, sir.
    Mr. Carbajal. Great. Thank you. Dr. Horowitz, I think it is 
clear that the PRC and Russia are ahead of us in hypersonic 
weapon deployment. Can you walk me through current discussions 
taking place or strategies that will allow us to keep pace 
while keeping in mind the cost of this technology? And can you 
give specific examples of how President Biden's announcement 
last week regarding DPA [Defense Production Act] Title III will 
allow the Department to field technology sooner?
    Obviously, within this setting.
    Dr. Horowitz. Thanks so much for your question. The--I 
think the question of the intersection between our hypersonic 
development and what China and Russia are doing is interesting. 
But the most important question is, is the--is the joint force 
developing the capabilities it needs to fight and win the 
Nation's wars?
    And we think hypersonics are a critical part of that for 
some of the reasons that I've stated before, for their speed, 
for their maneuverability, the intersection of their speed, 
maneuverability, and range, which is why we think they 
complement subsonic missiles and supersonic non-hypersonic 
missiles as part of the package of capabilities that the joint 
force--that the joint force needs. And that's our overall 
development of capabilities is paced to the challenge posed by 
the PRC. But as my colleague Mr. White said, we're not seeking 
to one to one develop hypersonics just because China's 
developing them.
    We seek to develop them, and my colleagues have given you 
several examples of capabilities, you know, HACM, LRHW, CPS, 
that we think are necessary for the joint force to implement 
the National Defense Strategy. The DPA we believe will be 
helpful in accelerating the development of these capabilities 
in that they--they'll help the market fill the demand that we 
have for development of--for fielding of hypersonic 
technologies in the timeframes that we need given the 
production challenges. But, again, as I said before, I think 
our colleagues from acquisition and sustainment would be much 
better poised to answer specific details of those--of how it 
will make a difference.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Gentleman yields back. Chair now recognizes 
Representative Khanna from California.
    Mr. Khanna. Thank you, Mr. Chair. My understanding, Dr. 
Horowitz, and correct me if I am mistaken, is that once we 
developed the precision strike capability to possibly strike 
the nuclear capability that China has prior to their launch 
that this in part incentivized them to develop hypersonics to 
be able to do that to us. Of course, we have the second strike 
capability through our submarines and so that would deter them 
from doing that. I guess my question is what additional 
deterrent value would the hypersonics provide that we don't 
already have with the triad?
    Dr. Horowitz. That's a really great question. Obviously 
strategic deterrence is fundamentally based in the--in the 
triad. And my colleague, Assistant Secretary Plum, spoke about 
this a few--a few days ago. And I would defer to him actually 
on all things. But the--I think in this specific case, we see 
offensive hypersonics as providing another rung of conventional 
capabilities that can help deter conflict and deter--and 
potentially deter escalation.
    And that hypersonics because they have the potential to 
have strategic effects because of the intersection of that 
speed, maneuverability, and range give not just capabilities 
for their own sake, but capabilities that potentially can make 
a difference for the joint force and in potentially avoiding 
escalation. They give senior decision makers more options.
    Mr. Khanna. Are they needed to do the precision strike 
force that President Bush started? I forget the exact name of 
that which can allow us to have a preemptive strike on nuclear 
facilities. Or do we have that capability without it?
    Dr. Horowitz. I think we'd want to talk about that question 
in a closed session.
    Mr. Khanna. Okay. Thank you.
    Mr. Lamborn [presiding]. Representative Vasquez.
    Mr. Vasquez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to all the 
witnesses here today taking the time to be here with us this 
morning. Over the last several years, hypersonics have become 
an increasingly important strategic tool for the world's 
largest militaries to project power.
    While we have made progress in testing and development of 
hypersonics, we should continue to do more to make sure we are 
outpacing and outcompeting our adversaries. It is imperative 
that the United States military has the necessary capabilities 
to defend ourselves and our allies. Built and designed 
correctly, hypersonic weapons can be valuable non-nuclear 
deterrent that will allow the United States to keep our 
adversaries at bay without threatening the outbreak of a 
nuclear conflict.
    In my district, the Second District of New Mexico, White 
Sands Missile Range and Holloman Air Force Base are leaders in 
testing and developing hypersonic weapons. Congress should 
ensure that our brave service members, researchers, support 
workers, and others have the resources they need to accomplish 
their mission, including the bases in my district.
    So I thank you for today's discussion. My first question is 
to Lieutenant General Rasch, Lieutenant General Shipton. Could 
you explain the role that White Sands Missile Range and 
Holloman Air Force Base play in the testing and development of 
the future of hypersonic weapons?
    General Rasch. First, Congressman, thank you for the 
question. And I've spent a lot of time at White Sands Missile 
Range in my previous job testing many munitions for the United 
States Army. And today still we use White Sands Missile Range 
and have used it for our program activities to date in 
sensitive munitions testing on several fronts as well as 
utilizing the processes that have been established by the great 
professionals out of that workforce for several decades.
    With regards to larger scale hypersonic weapons testing, I 
think that actually would go to OSD R&E [Research and 
Engineering] for discussion as it gets to the bigger discussion 
of test range development over a longer period of time. But we 
certainly use White Sands at every opportunity we can, given 
the great workforce in that area. Over.
    General Shipton. Sir, thank you for the question, but I'll 
have to take it for the record. My apologies.
    [The information referred to was not available at the time 
of printing.]
    Mr. Vasquez. No problem. Thank you.
    General Shipton. Thank you.
    Mr. Vasquez. My next question here is since White Sands, 
Holloman Air Force Base, and other military installations in 
New Mexico are so necessary for the continued development 
research of hypersonics. My question is what additional 
resources does the military need to utilize a place like White 
Sands Missile Range and Holloman Air Force to achieve this next 
level of competitiveness and to make sure that the development 
is adequate for the future of these weapons? And I will give 
that question to anybody on the panel.
    Admiral Wolfe. Yes, sir. So, here I would say, first of 
all, thank you for the support that you've given us in this 
area. In the fiscal year 2023 plus-up that we were given, we've 
started a program called Multi-Service Advanced Capabilities 
for Hypersonics Test Bed. As we've talked about test 
infrastructures, we've talked about, you know, our need to get 
these technologies developed quicker.
    That money is being used for just what you're asking about. 
We're looking at a whole portion of industry where historically 
we would not have engaged to help us understand. And certainly 
some of those capabilities, what we're looking at that we'll 
leverage, they actually use White Sands as kind of their home 
base. There's others across other ranges. So we are opening up 
our aperture and with the support of Congress and the plus-up 
that you've given us, that's exactly what we're doing to make 
sure we grow the base to be able to get after this problem.
    Mr. Vasquez. Thank you, Mr.----
    Mr. White. I would just add that one of the key investments 
being made by the Test Resources Management Center is in the 
Holloman sled track to look at high-speed testing at the 
Holloman sled track to enhance our ability to learn more about 
endgame performance of hypersonic weapons and the way they 
perform against various threats. So it's a very critical part 
of understanding the capability actually delivered by these 
weapons when they're fielded.
    Mr. Vasquez. Thank you both. I look forward to working with 
you all to bring those investments home to those two bases into 
our district. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. Representative Houlahan.
    Ms. Houlahan. Thank you so much for the chance to talk to 
you all. I served in advanced plans and programs in the Air 
Force as a young person decades ago and have the background as 
an engineer and wondering if I might be able to use my open 
time to talk a little bit about the things that we have been 
focusing on in my office, which are specifically supply chain 
related and critical minerals and rare earth elements, 
composites, chips, alloys, those kinds of things which are very 
essential, not just in domestic products, but also in what we 
are talking about here today, hypersonic missiles.
    And so Mr. White, if you wouldn't mind speaking a little 
bit about if you have any concerns about our access to or 
supply of critical minerals that we might need to produce these 
sorts of weapons or any other materials that you are worried 
about in terms of composites or chips or alloys. I notice, of 
course, that the President has implemented the Defense 
Production Act. Are you concerned about our access domestically 
to any of these particular products?
    Mr. White. Thank you for the question. I think it's really 
important as we field all of our future capabilities that we've 
described today that we ensure we've got domestic supplies for 
that capability. And we're not sourcing our supply chain from 
foreign sources, especially those who are potential 
adversaries.
    The Defense Production Act that--and the Presidential 
determination recently really enables us to incentivize and 
invest in industry to accelerate their ability to deliver these 
capabilities. General Rasch mentioned that we have technologies 
that really are coming out of the laboratories, largely 
government laboratories, that we're transitioning to industry. 
And so the real purpose for that there's--that Presidential 
determination for hypersonics is to really accelerate the pace 
at which industry can respond to our supply chain needs. And 
there also was a Defense Production Act that was supply chain 
focused for kinetic weapons, and that also is applicable to 
hypersonics.
    So when we look at high-temperature materials, when we look 
at advanced microprocessors, we look at air-breathing 
propulsion, all those technologies and capabilities are 
enablers. And we have to make sure we have a robust supply 
chain, and even beyond that, a supply chain that can deliver 
capacity affordably. So as we move out of the laboratory 
environment and into a production environment, we have to make 
sure we're pulling in even nontraditional and commercial-based 
industry practices and procedures to deliver affordable 
capacity moving forward.
    Ms. Houlahan. And would anyone else like to contribute to 
that first question? My second question is can you speak to any 
advantage that China or Russia might have in this area given 
they do in fact control mines in Africa, South America and even 
in their own countries? Mr. White.
    Mr. White. Can we save that for the closed session?
    Ms. Houlahan. Of course. Of course. And my other question--
--
    Dr. Horowitz. I defer to my DIA colleague on that in a 
closed session.
    Ms. Houlahan. Okay. My other question is for the closed 
environment. And so thank you. I yield back my time.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. Representative Strong, did you want 
to ask any questions or do you want to wait till closed 
session? Okay. And we are going into closed session almost 
immediately. I will just clarify one thing. I said this in my 
opening statement. I quoted former Vice Chairman of the Chiefs 
of Staff, General John Hyten, who said that hypersonic weapons 
enable, quote, ``responsive, long-range strike options against 
distant defended and or time critical threats when other forces 
are unavailable, denied access, or not preferred,'' showing 
that this fills a serious gap in our capabilities.
    Does anyone disagree with what General Hyten said? If so 
please raise your hand and I will give you a moment. I am 
taking it that you agree with General Hyten on this quote. 
Okay. Thank you so much. We will now be----
    Mr. Bacon. Too late?
    Mr. Lamborn. Oh, no, just in time. Representative--
Representative Bacon, you didn't have enough stars to--
Representative Bacon.
    Mr. Bacon. First question for Dr. Horowitz or Mr. White. Is 
there a need for a hypersonic weapon that can be fired from the 
United States that could have the range to hit Russia or China?
    Dr. Horowitz. The Department is currently planning to 
develop conventionally armed, regionally based hypersonic 
weapons. We think the state of our nuclear deterrent is strong. 
And from a policy perspective, I'd defer to Assistant Secretary 
Plum's comments a few days ago to this committee.
    Mr. Bacon. Yeah, I think I might also say for the record, I 
think it is more destabilizing to have Russia and China have 
these weapons and us not have them. I don't think that helps us 
out at all by not fielding them. So I just wanted to point that 
out. I have a question here for Mr. White too. This relates to 
the current limitations in hypersonic flight test capacity.
    Last week, the President announced the Defense Production 
Act authority for the hypersonic industrial base, but it is not 
clear to many of us how these individual hypersonic components 
technologies can be tested in flight at sufficient tempo to 
catch up with the pace China has right now given our 
limitations.
    So is our national industrial base capable of performing 
flight tests for hypersonic components and technologies? And do 
you believe these new Defense Production Act authorities can or 
should be applied to help create a robust and healthy 
industrial base for hypersonic flight test?
    Mr. White. I think the answer to that question is yes and 
yes. I think industry can step up, but I think it's really 
critical that we as a government incentivize and accelerate 
their ability to do that. And we're doing that not only through 
Defense Production Act investments, but as well as ManTech 
[Manufacturing Technology program] investments, IBAS 
[Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment program] investments. 
And our Test Resources Management Center is making considerable 
investments in the T&E infrastructure to enable all of that.
    I mentioned earlier the next phase of our strategy and the 
importance of T&E in that next phase of our strategy. And I've 
given the team the charge of being able to do flight test once 
a week. And that's quite a quite a stretch from just a couple 
of years ago when we were testing once every 2 years.
    We're at about once a month now, a little bit better than 
once a month. So we're on a good trajectory. And Admiral Wolfe 
mentioned the MACH-TB [Multi-Service Advanced Capability 
Hypersonic Test Bed] program where we're pulling in 
nontraditional methods and means and partners really in 
industry and government to try to develop the tools and 
techniques to achieve that rapid flight test pace to accelerate 
our learning moving forward.
    Mr. Bacon. Well, we look forward to that. That is great. 
General Rasch, I can see the need for ground-based hypersonics 
in Europe and Middle East. I don't understand how we are going 
to do it in the Far East or in the Pacific theater given there 
is very little basing options that make sense.
    I understand the sea-launched or the air-launched, but can 
you explain a little more? Do you think we will have the 
ability to field these weapons that are within range? How do we 
do this?
    General Rasch. Congressman, thank you for your question. 
And unfortunately, as the materiel developer, I don't 
necessarily get to make the stationing decisions for that. But 
given the quantities that the Army is currently prepared to 
procure for a total of three batteries supporting our multi-
domain task force, those stationing decisions are ahead of us 
in the Army. But we can take a question for record and get back 
a more formal Army position on that.
    [The information referred to was not available at the time 
of printing.]
    Mr. Bacon. Appreciate it. Thank you. Mr. Freisthler, am I 
saying your name right? What is the best way to say that?
    Mr. Freisthler. Freisthler.
    Mr. Bacon. Okay. Freisthler. I apologize. Are there plans 
to use hypersonic weapons to identify gaps and develop tactics, 
techniques, and procedures to keep the United States safe 
against hypersonic weapons?
    Mr. Freisthler. I would defer to my esteemed colleagues to 
my right to look at U.S. systems, capabilities, tactics, et 
cetera.
    Mr. Bacon. I will just close with a comment. I see a need 
for hypersonic weapons, but I'm really concerned that China and 
Russia has them because they are destabilizing and we can't 
detect them. They are going to put--it appears they are going 
to put nuclear warheads on there. And from my vantage point, we 
could be targeted with weapons with like 15-minute warning 
times or less.
    And this all comes back to nuclear command and control 
survivability for me. How do we ensure that we have a 
survivable command and control capability? And that is not a 
question for you all here, but that's--I think that is the 
number one thing we need to work on, on the Armed Services 
Committee, is ensuring that we have nuclear survivable C3 
[command, control, and communications]. But thank you very 
much.
    Mr. Lamborn. We will now reconvene in 5 minutes up in room 
2337 for our closed session. Thank you all for being here.
    [Whereupon, at 10:26 a.m., the subcommittee proceeded in 
closed session.]
     
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                            A P P E N D I X

                             March 10, 2023

      
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              PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                             March 10, 2023

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              QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                             March 10, 2023

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                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BANKS

    Mr. Banks. In recent years, the DOD hypersonics strategy to rapidly 
develop and field hypersonic weapons has been fast-paced and 
challenging. Mr. White: Is there any concern that the demands of 
getting baseline weapon systems deployed on rapid schedules might 
result in crowding out potential advancements in these capabilities? 
Mr. White: Will our hypersonics arsenal have enough capacity and 
capability to prevail in a conflict with China? Mr. White: Last year 
Congress called for the Department to leverage more affordable and 
reliable booster systems from commercial systems. I was glad to see the 
rapid establishment of the Multi Service Advance Capabilities for 
Hypersonics Test managed by Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane in 
Indiana. Mr. White: Can you expand on the importance of Multi Service 
Advance Capability Hypersonics Test Bed (MACH TB) and how it will help 
acceleration technology development and transition to our weapons 
systems?
    Mr. White. Thank you for your insightful questions, and I 
appreciate your support for the development of the nation's hypersonics 
capabilities. If I may address your questions in the order they are 
posed:
      Baseline vis-a-vis Advanced Hypersonic Capabilities. As 
you know, the United States has been the world leader in advanced 
hypersonics technologies for decades. With our decisions in recent 
years to operationalize and produce hypersonic capabilities in 
meaningful quantities, our first and foremost priority is meeting 
urgent warfighting needs, including in response to high-end defensive 
and anti-access systems our competitors are developing and deploying. 
The Department is utilizing Middle Tier of Acquisition (MTA) pathways 
to develop and soon field operational prototype hypersonic capabilities 
on timescales of relevance. We have done so deliberately and with plans 
to upgrade those capabilities over time as well as develop new concepts 
to maintain battlefield dominance into the future.
      Planned Capacity and Capability. We are in active 
discussions with the Joint Staff, Combatant Commands, and Services to 
align the numbers and types of hypersonic weapons the nation is 
developing and producing with warfighting and deterrence needs--both in 
the near term and well into the future. To be clear, no conflict will 
be fought only with a hypersonic arsenal. Our deterrence of aggression, 
and our ability to prevail if deterrence fails, relies on hypersonics, 
the capabilities that hypersonics enable the United States to bring to 
bear, and the totality of all other U.S. capabilities.
      MACH-TB. The Multi-Service Advanced Capability 
Hypersonics Test Bed (MACH-TB) program is a critical component of our 
strategy to increase the operational tempo for hypersonic system and 
technology test and evaluation. MACH-TB manages a portfolio of DoD, 
commercial, and innovative launch vehicle options to execute high-
cadence flight testing of hypersonic technologies in relevant flight 
environments. MACH-TB is managed and resourced by the OUSD(R&E) Test 
Resource Management Center and executed by the Naval Surface Warfare 
Center in Crane, Indiana. It provides affordable--and importantly, 
frequent--flight test research opportunities for DoD programs, national 
labs, academia, industry, and other government agencies.
    Mr. Banks. How does the Department plan to leverage hypersonic 
systems in a near term conflict? What role and benefit would a reusable 
system play? How is the Department prioritizing development or reusable 
hypersonic multi-mission systems in the hypersonic portfolio? What role 
does the Department assume DARPA will play in the development of 
hypersonic systems, especially reusable systems? What is the 
Departments approach to expanding hypersonic testing capabilities? What 
steps is the Department taking to enable flight test of hypersonic 
system, especially with reusable systems? Does the Department envision 
transitioning or leveraging reusable hypersonic test assets for other 
use cases?
    Mr. White. [The information provided is classified and retained in 
the committee files.]
    Mr. Banks. How important is it that we continue to invest the 
Conventional Prompt Strike program?
    Admiral Wolfe. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. NORCROSS
    Mr. Norcross. The Defense Production Act typically is there for 
when there is not an industrial base to support it. There is no doubt 
in anybody's mind up here is we have been throwing billions of dollars 
at this. Why at this time the Defense Production Act being deployed by 
the President, what need is it because you usually do that when, A, it 
is not there, B, industry is unwilling to do this.
    I am not sure which one you are in a position to answer this 
question. But why now is that being invoked? Where is the industry not 
answering the call?
    Mr. White. [The information provided is classified and retained in 
the committee files.]

                                  [all]