[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


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                         [H.A.S.C. No. 118-10]

                     FY24 STRATEGIC FORCES POSTURE

                               __________

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                    SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

                                 OF THE

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                              HEARING HELD

                             MARCH 8, 2023

                                   
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                               ________

                   U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
53-351                    WASHINGTON : 2024                    
          
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                    SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

                    DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado, Chairman

JOE WILSON, South Carolina           SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio              JOHN GARAMENDI, California
ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York          DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee          SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California,
DON BACON, Nebraska                  RO KHANNA, California
JIM BANKS, Indiana                   CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania
MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida               GABE VASQUEZ, New Mexico
DALE W. STRONG, Alabama              MARC VEASEY, Texas

                 Ryan Tully, Professional Staff Member
                Maria Vastola, Professional Staff Member
                  Zachary Calderon, Research Assistant
                            
                            
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

              STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Lamborn, Hon. Doug, a Representative from Colorado, Chairman, 
  Subcommittee on Strategic Forces...............................     1
Moulton, Hon. Seth, a Representative from Massachusetts, Ranking 
  Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces.......................     3

                               WITNESSES

Cotton, Gen Anthony J., USAF, Commander, United States Strategic 
  Command........................................................     8
Dickinson, GEN James H., USA, Commander, U.S. Space Command......     7
Plumb, Dr. John F., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space 
  Policy.........................................................     4
VanHerck, Gen Glen D., USAF, Commander, United States Northern 
  Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command...........     6

                                APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

    Cotton, Gen Anthony J........................................   106
    Dickinson, GEN James H.......................................    82
    Plumb, Dr. John F............................................    35
    VanHerck, Gen Glen D.........................................    56

Documents Submitted for the Record:

    [There were no Documents submitted.]

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

    [There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

    Mr. Lamborn..................................................   139
    Mr. Waltz....................................................   140
    Mr. Turner...................................................   140
    Dr. DesJarlais...............................................   141
                     
                     
                     FY24 STRATEGIC FORCES POSTURE

                              ----------                              

                  House of Representatives,
                       Committee on Armed Services,
                          Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                          Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 8, 2023.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:01 p.m., in 
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Doug Lamborn 
[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DOUG LAMBORN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
      COLORADO, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

    Mr. Lamborn. We look forward to your testimony.
    As this is the first Strategic Forces Subcommittee hearing 
of the 118th Congress, I am going to take a chairman's 
prerogative and lay out some agenda and priorities for me.
    I would like to start by acknowledging the new ranking 
member of the subcommittee, Mr. Seth Moulton of Massachusetts.
    Weren't you on the screen just a moment ago for CSPAN? You 
must have hurried back over here.
    Mr. Moulton. I hustled. I am a Marine, I can hustle.
    Mr. Lamborn. And just from our short time working together 
in our new capacities, I am already confident that we will 
continue a strong bipartisan tradition of this subcommittee. 
So, I am pleased for us to officially start our work together 
today.
    And I would like to welcome the new members of the 
subcommittee as well, who might be in and out as we are going 
through this hearing: Mr. Bacon of Nebraska, Mr. Banks of 
Indiana, Mr. Strong of Alabama, Mr. Norcross of New Jersey, Ms. 
Houlahan of Pennsylvania, and Mr. Vasquez of New Mexico.
    I am honored to be the chairman of this subcommittee, and 
privileged to be the first person from Colorado to hold this 
position. I have been working on these issues for many years, 
as they are integral to the fabric of my district as well as to 
our national defense.
    I have big shoes to fill. Recently retired Jim Cooper, Mike 
Turner, Mike Rogers, Ellen Tauscher are among those who have 
served so capably in this position while I have been in 
Congress.
    Thank you to our witnesses for appearing today. And I wish 
we had the President's budget to inform our discussion. The 
budget was due last month, but it seems like we are still one 
day early.
    Regardless, there are a lot of strategic issues that we can 
dig into today. Russia's unjustified invasion of Ukraine, which 
just passed its year mark, has been punctuated by attempts at 
nuclear coercion. Now Putin has suspended Russia's 
participation in the New START Treaty.
    I understand that Russia has ceased providing the U.S. with 
treaty notifications, yet we continue to provide them for 
Russia. It is curious that we provide Russia with this benefit 
under our treaty when Russia is no longer reciprocating.
    Given Russia's suspension and their false declaration that 
the U.S. is in material breach, the Joint Staff, with the help 
of STRATCOM [United States Strategic Command], needs to 
accelerate contingency planning should Russia begin uploading 
warheads on its strategic delivery systems beyond the numbers 
called for.
    China is also building up its nuclear arsenal at an 
unanticipated and rapid pace, and is pursuing aggressive 
activities in all domains. Most notably, there is public 
reporting that Russia's state-owned Nuclear Energy Corporation 
ROSATOM [State Nuclear Energy Corporation] is helping China 
acquire enough weapons grade plutonium to fuel its strategic 
nuclear breakout. I am hopeful that we will see a comprehensive 
strategy from the Administration to break this relationship 
and, ideally, shutter ROSATOM.
    Now that India--Excuse me. Now that China has surpassed the 
United States in the number of intercontinental ballistic 
missile launchers, STRATCOM has additional targets to hold at 
risk. I am sure we will hear from General Cotton about how that 
complicates his targeting efforts and challenges his ability to 
deter two near-peer nuclear adversaries simultaneously.
    We can't also forget that North Korea has an ICBM 
[Intercontinental Ballistic Missile] program that is proceeding 
apace. And Iran has multiple space launch vehicle programs 
giving cover for the development of an Iranian ICBM.
    Given all these threats, my priorities for the subcommittee 
include the following. We must accelerate and timely field 
hypersonic weapons systems for all three services, adjust our 
nuclear modernization program to deter both Russia and China 
simultaneously, and ensure our missile defenses can outpace the 
North Korean and forthcoming Iranian ICBM threats. This 
includes ensuring that the Department of Defense maintains the 
necessary spectrum to discriminate targets at range in the 
atmosphere at all times.
    I will also continue to push the Department to develop a 
space policy we can debate in public. So, we will take a hard 
look at classification, and continue to push for changes in how 
we do space acquisitions as well.
    Finally, I want to highlight that last year, on a 
bipartisan basis, Congress authorized and appropriated funds to 
the Navy and the National Nuclear Security Administration for 
research and development of the Nuclear Sea-Launched Cruise 
Missile, or SLCM-N [Nuclear Sea-Launched Cruise Missile]. The 
restriction in the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] 
only applies to production work and was not meant to constrain 
research and development in any way.
    And I also hope to hear how the Department is progressing 
on the hard and deeply-buried target study.
    With that, I will turn it over to Ranking Member Moulton 
for any remarks he would like to make.

     STATEMENT OF HON. SETH MOULTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
MASSACHUSETTS, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

    Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And congratulations 
on your appointment as chairman of this subcommittee.
    I know that you believe, as I do, that the issues this 
committee tackles are at the very core of our national security 
as a nation. Therefore, it is important that we work together 
in a bipartisan fashion to address the critical issues before 
us.
    I already know that there is much that we agree on. And I 
hope that through open and transparent dialog and debate we can 
expand that area of agreement as we both learn more about these 
important and fascinating issues.
    I would also like to welcome General Cotton, as this is 
your first Strategic Forces hearing. I am encouraged by our 
discussion last week. And your leadership is critical, given 
the growing global strategic threat to the United States.
    I appreciate your view that strategic deterrence is much 
broader than nuclear weapons, as the world and the threats we 
face as a nation have evolved significantly since our nuclear 
triad was first established. I look forward to learning more 
about how you understand and apply integrated deterrence across 
multiple demands as you take command of STRATCOM.
    And as we welcome you, I also want to acknowledge that this 
will be General VanHerck's final or last strategic forces 
posture hearing. Thank you, sir, for your 36 years of 
distinguished service to our nation and the past 3 years as 
head of Northern Command. During that time you have shown great 
leadership across a range of critical issues, from welcoming 
our Afghan refugees, responding to COVID-19, and highlighting 
the need for better situational awareness over the continental 
United States which, as we saw very clearly last month, is not 
just a hypothetical or a future need.
    So, thank you to all our witnesses for being here and for 
helping us begin the important work of writing the fiscal year 
2024 National Defense Authorization Act.
    As we sit in this hearing, Russia continues to wage an 
unconscionable war against Ukraine using veiled threats of 
nuclear weapons, not to keep the peace between superpowers, but 
offensively to try and turn around its losing war.
    Meanwhile, China is launching satellites that have dual use 
capability, putting U.S. systems at risk.
    North Korea has been consistently launching ballistic 
missiles that can reach the United States.
    And just last week, the U.N. [United Nations] International 
Atomic Energy Agency reported that they have found uranium 
enriched to near bomb grade purity at an Iranian nuclear 
facility.
    The mission of this subcommittee is growing in scope, 
importance, and urgency.
    Our witnesses do not oversee development of weapons systems 
per se, but they are responsible for current operations, and 
are given the challenging task of predicting what the 
Department of Defense will need in the future to maintain 
strategic deterrence across all demands--air, land, sea, space, 
and cyber.
    While we are clear-eyed about the advancements our 
competitors are making in various weapons systems, we must also 
reflect on how our decisions, actions, and statements are 
understood by those competitors and adversaries to avoid 
starting or escalating an arms race, or worse, a miscalculation 
that could have catastrophic effects.
    Ultimately, we should have two shared goals: ensuring our 
credible deterrence and strategic advantage over our 
adversaries; and reducing the number of weapons and chances of 
warfare on all sides.
    I am encouraged that the Biden administration is taking a 
more balanced approach to strategic deterrence while 
maintaining and modernizing the triad and focusing on the 
greatest strength of the United States--our partners and 
allies.
    Dr. Plum, I am heartened to hear you say clearly that the 
Department--you are nervous now about what you just said--``the 
Department will protect and defend U.S. space capabilities 
along with those of our allies, partners, and the commercial 
sector when directed to do so.''
    And I welcome this Administration's real investments in 
domain awareness for what NORAD [North American Aerospace 
Defense Command], with the modernization of the over-the-
horizon radars along the existing Northern Warning System 
architecture.
    But there remains much work to be done in the jurisdiction 
of this subcommittee. And the strategic posture of the United 
States must remain a top priority across both the 
Administration and Congress.
    I look forward to working, to conducting that work together 
over the next two years.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you.
    Now we will move from opening statements, from our opening 
statements to those of the witnesses. I would note that your 
prepared statements will be made part of the record but you 
will each have 5 minutes to make some opening remarks.
    And, Dr. Plum, we will begin with you.

STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN F. PLUMB, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
                        FOR SPACE POLICY

    Secretary Plumb. Thank you very much.
    Chairman Lamborn and Ranking Member Moulton, thanks for 
inviting me to testify on strategic forces posture. I 
appreciated sitting down with both of you last week. And I look 
forward to working with you in the new roles, as well as with 
the rest of the distinguished members of this committee.
    Today the United States finds itself in a highly dynamic 
and challenging security environment as characterized by 
intensifying strategic competition, assertive behavior by 
multiple competitors, rapidly evolving domains of conflict, and 
a growing risk of military confrontation.
    China and Russia have placed nuclear weapons, space 
warfare, and long-range strike at the center of their 
strategies to counter the United States and our allies and 
partners.
    As Secretary Austin has said since his first days in 
office, China is the Department's facing challenge. China is 
engaged in a significant and fast-paced expansion and 
diversification of its nuclear forces. Like Russia, China views 
space as a war fighting domain, and China is developing, 
testing, and fielding sophisticated counter-space capabilities 
intended to deny the United States our space enabling 
advantage.
    And China has an ever-growing inventory of sophisticated 
long-range strike systems to hold U.S. forces at risk at 
greater and greater distances.
    In Ukraine, Russia's illegal and unprovoked full-scale 
invasion has showcased the critical role of strategic forces in 
conflict.
    Space systems inform U.S. national security decisions every 
single day. President Biden has declassified intelligence 
gained from U.S. space assets to counter Russian 
misinformation.
    The Ukrainian military has been leveraging proliferated 
satellite broadband constellations in innovate ways to support 
their own operations.
    Russia has repeated, has conducted repeated missile attacks 
against civilian infrastructure, which highlights the need for 
air and missile defenses. And as some of the members have 
already said, Putin's irresponsible nuclear saber rattling has 
further underscored the importance of U.S. nuclear deterrence, 
which is the bedrock of our own national security.
    Just this last October, the Department released 
unclassified versions of the national defense strategy, the 
nuclear posture review, and the missile defense review. 
Together, these documents recognize that the United States is 
entering a period of heightened risk, and they articulate an 
urgent imperative to strengthen deterrence.
    The national defense strategy identified four priorities 
for the Department:
    One, defend the homeland;
    Two, deter strategic attacks;
    Three, deter aggression while preparing to prevail in 
conflicts, and we are prioritizing China first and then Russia;
    And, four, build a resilient Joint Force.
    All four of these priorities rely heavily on our space 
systems, our missile defenses, and our nuclear forces.
    Cooperation with allies and partners is also a core element 
of the national defense strategy, and it is central to our 
national security and deterrence goals. The Department is 
actively pursuing deeper cooperation to enhance our extended 
deterrence commitments, to achieve combined space operations, 
and to share data in real time to support air and missile 
defenses. Our allies and partners are an asymmetric advantage 
that neither China nor Russia can ever hope to match.
    Now, for the Department, we are clear-eyed about the 
threats we face and the importance of our nuclear, space, and 
missile defense forces in defending the nation. The Department 
is committed to making critical investments in our nuclear 
triad modernization, in a more resilient space architecture, 
and in homeland and regional missile defenses.
    These investments will be detailed in the upcoming, 
forthcoming fiscal year 2024 budget request, but these 
investments are necessary to deter conflict and to fight and 
win if deterrence fails.
    So, thank you to the committee for its tireless dedication 
to the Department and our servicemembers. And I look forward to 
your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Secretary Plumb can be found in 
the Appendix on page 35.]
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. And I didn't say it, but Dr. Plumb 
is the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy with the 
U.S. Department of Defense.
    Now we will hear from General Glen VanHerck, Commander of 
the United States Northern Command, and North American 
Aerospace Defense Command.

  STATEMENT OF GEN GLEN D. VANHERCK, USAF, COMMANDER, UNITED 
 STATES NORTHERN COMMAND AND NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE 
                            COMMAND

    General VanHerck. Thank you.
    Chairman Lamborn, Ranking Member Moulton, and members of 
the committee, the subcommittee, thank you for your opportunity 
to appear this afternoon before the Strategic Forces 
Subcommittee along with General Dickinson, General Cotton, and 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy, Dr. John 
Plumb.
    As you know, I testified this morning before the full 
committee. Therefore, I will be brief in my remarks here in the 
open session. I look forward to the classified discussion 
later.
    The United States military remains the most powerful and 
professional force in history. However, I would like to 
reiterate our competitive advantage is eroding, but I believe 
our greatest risk for the United States stems from the 
inability to adapt at the pace required by the changing 
strategic environment.
    Our commands and the Department of Defense need your 
continued support to outpace the rapid gains made by our 
competitors. On behalf of all the soldiers, sailors, airmen, 
Marines, Guardians, Coasties, and the civilians at NORAD and 
NORTHCOM [Northern Command], I would like to thank the 
subcommittee for your steadfast support for all those who 
defend our nation.
    I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of General VanHerck can be found in 
the Appendix on page 56.]
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
    And our next witness is General James Dickinson.
    And I want to say, as was said for General VanHerck, this 
is probably your last testimony before this subcommittee. And 
you will be missed. And we want to thank you for your decades 
of service, including most recently the standing up and the 
shepherding of Space Command.
    So, the Commander of the U.S. Space Command, General James 
Dickinson.

  STATEMENT OF GEN JAMES H. DICKINSON, USA, COMMANDER, UNITED 
                      STATES SPACE COMMAND

    General Dickinson. Thank you, Chairman Lamborn and Ranking 
Member Moulton. Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen of the 
committee.
    It remains my distinct honor to represent the 18,000 
military servicemen and women, civilians, and families of U.S. 
Space Command who are serving our great nation today around the 
world. Thank you for this opportunity to testify before this 
committee. I look forward to both this session as well as the 
closed session.
    I am proud to lead such a talented and patriotic group of 
joint space professionals. Their expertise, diversity, and 
creativity underpin our strength and effectiveness. Of all the 
elements of space power, our most valued asset is and always 
will be our great people.
    My provisional headquarters achieved initial operational 
capability in just two years. And we will reach full 
operational capability through the disciplined initiative of 
our people. Space power enables our way of life and is a 
critical component of our national security.
    I want to thank Congress for its support to advance 
America's primacy in space. We must maintain our position of 
advantage in the space domain and ensure it remains 
sustainable, safe, stable, and secure.
    The Joint Force relies on space-based capabilities to 
project and employ power. China and Russia consider this 
dependency a soft underbelly and seek to exploit it. They 
intend to limit our access to space during crisis and conflict, 
and they are building capabilities to that effect today.
    Our strategic competitors' irresponsible actions have 
transformed space into a contested domain. We must prevent 
today's strategic competition from growing into a conflict in 
space. We achieve this by deterring aggression, defending 
national interests and, if necessary, prevailing in any domain.
    U.S. Space Command contributes to integrated deterrence by 
preserving freedom of action in space and by providing critical 
support to the rest of the Joint Force. Our mission spans the 
spectrum of conflict and in every domain.
    For example, we are creating concepts to further integrate 
space, cyber, and special operations to generate asymmetrical 
advantages around the globe.
    Additionally, our protect and defend mission involves all 
three segments of the space architecture--the ground, link, and 
space--an approach that requires all-domain solutions. My 
Command's planning horizon is short. It is near-term. We must 
be ready to fight today because the threat will not wait.
    To this end, we are leveraging the Joint Force, our allies 
and partners, to integrate and maximize the capabilities that 
we have today. At the same time, we look forward to the 
capabilities the services are developing for the future fight.
    As we observe in Ukraine, commercial space assets are a 
significant force multiplier. For years our commercial mission 
partners have augmented our satellite communications and 
provided enhancements to our space domain awareness sensor 
networks. Commercial integration is critical to mission 
success.
    So, today's hearing reasserts the United States' resolve to 
maintain our leadership and position of advantage in the space 
domain.
    But before I address the committee's questions, I just want 
to emphasize to the American people my pledge that U.S. Space 
Command will ensure that there is never a day without space.
    Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of General Dickinson can be found 
in the Appendix on page 82.]
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
    And the last of our four witnesses will be General Anthony 
Cotton, the Commander of United States Strategic Command.

  STATEMENT OF GEN ANTHONY J. COTTON, USAF, COMMANDER, UNITED 
                    STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND

    General Cotton. Good afternoon, Chairman Lamborn, Ranking 
Member Moulton, and distinguished members of the committee. I 
appreciate this opportunity to testify next to ASD [Assistant 
Secretary of Defense] Plumb, General VanHerck, and General 
Dickinson. And I thank the committee and Congress for its 
support for our national defense.
    First, I, along with my command senior enlisted leader, 
Sergeant Major Howard Kreamer, want to ensure you and the 
American people that the United States Strategic Command is 
ready today, ready to defend our nation, defend our allies, and 
respond decisively if our adversaries miscalculate.
    As we speak, there are command watch standers at their 
stations: missileers, maintainers, security forces on alert, 
submariners on patrol, air crew on duty, standing guard. The 
men and women of the United States Strategic Command are the 
foundation for the capabilities that underpin our nation's 
strategic deterrence. They do this in an environment that 
continues to grow more complex and challenging.
    Russia's invasion of a sovereign Ukraine is an attempt to 
undermine the rules-based international order with conventional 
force backed by nuclear saber rattling. As this conflict 
continues and Russia's conventional forces fail to achieve 
President Putin's strategic objectives, Strategic Command is 
monitoring for any indications of escalation.
    How this conflict unfolds and eventually ends will shape 
the strategic environment for decades to come.
    We see the People's Republic of China continuing to rapidly 
expand its nuclear capabilities. The PRC's [People's Republic 
of China's] actions are wholly inconsistent with its long-
professed policies of minimum deterrence.
    I reported to Congress in May that the number of land-based 
intercontinental ballistic missile launchers in the PRC now 
exceeds that of the United States. Along with its significant 
modernization and expansion of conventional capabilities, the 
PRC is also investing heavily in lower yield precision weapons 
with theater ranges, a new generation of mobile missiles, and a 
hypersonic glide vehicle with fractional orbital bombardment 
systems.
    The PRC's nuclear modernization provides it with an 
alarming number of offensive options that can negatively shape 
the environment before and during a crisis or conflict.
    North Korea continues to be a rogue actor and poses a 
threat to the United States and our allies. North Korea 
conducted a unprecedented number of missile launches in 2022. 
And its new intercontinental ballistic missile, referred to as 
the KN-28, highlights that the strategic challenge and security 
challenge will continue to grow.
    We are meeting today's challenges, though, through 
integrated deterrence, the cornerstone of the NDS. Our 
unmatched network of allies is a key component of integrated 
deterrence, and these relationships are underpinned by our 
extended deterrence commitments. These commitments are enabled 
by a safe, secure, effective, and credible nuclear deterrent. 
The credibility of our extended deterrence commitments is not 
only part of the nation's ironclad commitment to our allies, 
but has also been essential in limiting the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons.
    The nation's nuclear forces underpin integrated deterrence 
and enable the U.S., our allies, and our partners to confront 
aggressive and coercive behavior.
    To ensure our continued ability to serve as the bedrock of 
integrated deterrence, we are recapitalizing every leg of the 
nuclear triad and the nuclear command, control, and 
communications spectrum, as well as addressing the 
electromagnetic spectrum. These long-term investments are going 
to be absolutely required for us to make sure that we have a 
predictable, stable, and efficient nuclear force.
    Finally, I want to start as I ended. Our people are the 
foundation of every capability that enables strategic 
deterrence. I am proud to serve alongside the Soldiers, 
Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Guardians, and our civilians at 
STRATCOM. I am very appreciative of everything the committee 
and Congress is doing for us along those goals. And it's an 
honor to be here. And I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of General Cotton can be found in 
the Appendix on page 106.]
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, General. And you did mention 
hypersonic vehicles. This subcommittee will be having a hearing 
on that subject Friday morning at 9:00 o'clock. And like the 
one here today, it will be a public hearing followed by a 
classified hearing afterwards.
    So, we will start with questions. And with the first round 
of questions we will see if we have time for a second round or 
not. We do have votes at 5:30, which means we should be able to 
have our classified session at 4:30--and the SCIF [Sensitive 
Compartmented Information Facility] is occupied until then--
well before we have to go for votes. And should be able to wrap 
up everything by that time.
    Thank you all again for being here.
    Dr. Plumb, various open source outlets, along with a very 
detailed Bloomberg story from last week, reported how Russia, 
specifically ROSATOM, is providing highly enriched uranium for 
Chinese fast breeder reactors. These reactors will almost 
certainly help accelerate the pace of the Chinese nuclear 
weapons program by producing weapons grade plutonium.
    How concerned is the Department that ROSATOM is helping 
China accelerate the pace of its nuclear weapons program?
    Secretary Plumb. Thank you, Congressman. It is very 
troubling to see Russia and China cooperating on this. And they 
have talking points around it, but there is no getting around 
the fact that breeder reactors are plutonium, and plutonium is 
for weapons.
    So, I think the Department is concerned. And, of course, it 
matches our concerns about China's increased expansion of its 
nuclear forces as well, because you need more plutonium for 
more weapons.
    Mr. Lamborn. General Cotton, this highlights the concern 
that we all share about China's seeming nuclear breakout. It 
was mentioned that they have now more launchers than the U.S., 
and they are working on warheads as well.
    So, the number of targets we have to hold at risk is 
rapidly growing because of China's nuclear breakout. But the 
forces available to you remain unchanged.
    How does the Department reconcile this?
    General Cotton. Chairman, thank you for the question.
    I think as we discussed last week, one of the things ----
    Mr. Lamborn. And if you could hold the microphone just a 
little closer. Thank you.
    General Cotton. Does that work, sir? There we go.
    One of the things that actually the NPR [Nuclear Posture 
Review] gives us an opportunity to do is have a conversation on 
strategy and have a conversation on force posture. And as the 
conversation we had last week, I think that conversation is 
going to have to be had.
    When we talk about the forces that we currently have today, 
that force that we have today was based on a adversary of which 
for the first time in the history of the United States of 
America we now have two that are nuclear peer adversaries.
    Now we are going to have this conversation in regards to 
what does it look like now as far as force posture moving 
forward.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. And that is a critical conversation 
we will all be having here in the subcommittee, and the full 
committee as well.
    On the issue of electromagnetic spectrum operations, 
General, can you describe--or let me back up.
    As I emphasized in my opening statement, I think DoD 
[Department of Defense] needs to commit to fixing 
electromagnetic spectrum operations and plugging the holes 
identified in the Northern Edge Exercise. I understand that 
this has the attention of Secretary Hicks and Admiral Grady. 
And I hope that we will have good progress on this.
    Can you describe some of the ways that STRATCOM relies on 
spectrum to support your missions? And what are some of the 
future spectrum that--spectrum warfighter needs that will be 
essential to competing with Russia and China on a future 
battlefield, if necessary?
    General Cotton. Chairman, thank you for that question.
    You know, I don't think it is any different than the 
requirements that are with my fellow commanders that are here. 
STRATCOM depends on EMS [Electromagnetic Spectrum Superiority 
Strategy] to successfully provide deterrence and deliver 
decisive response when called upon.
    The things that I worry about is we need to ensure that we 
have spectrum for employment of forces; to maintain situational 
awareness; to assure communications via all domains, space, 
maritime, air, and land; and to assure positioning with PNT 
[Position, Navigation, and Timing] with position navigation 
systems.
    What we are doing within STRATCOM is my top priority is to 
execute the DoD EMS superiority strategy implementation plan.
    What we are going to do is we are actually in the midst of 
standing up a two-star joint EMS operations center known as the 
JEC [Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations Center]. Direct 
reports to me that raises and aggregates force readiness across 
the Department.
    We will continue to ensure that the Joint Force 
appropriately is organized and equipped to handle EMS. I am 
responsibility for advocating the proper training when it comes 
to EMS. And as we said when I had my conversation with you last 
week, what makes this particularly helpful to me is the fact 
that my direct report will be the Deputy Secretary of Defense, 
who can direct services to take action.
    Mr. Lamborn. Okay, thank you.
    I have a little follow-up on that issue and then I will 
turn it over to others.
    The 3.1 to 3.45 gigahertz band of radio frequency spectrum 
is being studied by DoD and the Department of Commerce for 
consideration for auction by the FCC [Federal Communications 
Commission]. Can you speak to the value of this specific band 
for target discrimination at range in the atmosphere for from 
everything from missile defense to tracking Chinese spy 
balloons, which has been in the news?
    And, Dr. Plumb, you and General Cotton, please.
    General Cotton. Well, from my perspective it is what I have 
just mentioned as far as the things that are required for me to 
be able to execute and exercise and employ the forces.
    I think if we lose that spectrum, all of those things that 
I had articulated to you that is required for me for force 
employment, for maintaining situational awareness, for having 
assured navigation and timing, and assured cons, that could 
potentially be lost.
    And I would, I would yield to Dr. Plumb for further 
questions.
    Secretary Plumb. Thanks, Congressman.
    That particular portion of the band, the S band there from 
3.1 to 3.45 is absolutely essential for DoD operations. The 
Department of Defense is conducting a study with the Department 
of Commerce on whether we can share that spectrum.
    For DoD, we need to be able to maintain our operational 
capability and readiness in any result. And I will just say we 
have looked at what it might take to vacate, by which we mean 
leave that band and go somewhere else. We don't know where else 
we would go. And it would easily $120 billion, probably more, 
just to create the pieces. But that isn't the same as getting 
the studies and the physics done, or the recapitalization. It 
could take easily 20 years. It is a really difficult problem 
for us.
    And so we think that the only viable forward would be is 
there some way to share so DoD can operate there, and so other, 
you know, commercial companies might be able to use that as 
well without impeding on us.
    Mr. Lamborn. Did you say 120 million or billion?
    Secretary Plumb. That is billion with a B. And that is kind 
of our low estimate. And I don't want that to be confused with 
what it would actually cost because that is really just if you 
look what would it cost to make a new AEGIS radar. But that is 
not the same as figuring out the physics and all the testing 
that would go into figuring out what band we would have to use 
it in, let alone the decades of experience we have with the 
equipment now to understand how they work.
    Mr. Lamborn. Okay, thank you both.
    I turn it over to Representative Moulton.
    Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Let me begin with an apology to General Dickinson. I did 
not know this is your last hearing before us as well. I 
understand you have been serving for 38 years, so you have, you 
have outdone your seatmate by two. Thank you for your 
incredible service.
    You are the senior air defense artillery officer in the 
United States Army today. And that is a job that for a long 
time we didn't think was terribly important because of our air 
superiority. And now we realize how unbelievably critical it 
is.
    So, we have been very lucky to have you. We are grateful 
for your service. And I think I can confidently say that we 
will probably miss you more than you will miss us. But good 
luck.
    Let me start with this, this is for, General Dickinson, for 
you and for Dr. Plumb.
    Over 10 years ago the joint operational access concept 
predicted that ``a logical opening operation to any anti-access 
campaign from China against the United States is to neutralize 
U.S. space assets because space such a critical role in 
enabling operations on the Earth's surface.''
    Dr. Plumb, General Dickinson, do you believe this is a 
reasonable assessment?
    General Dickinson. First of all, thank you for those kind 
remarks as you get ready to ask the question. It has been an 
honor to serve in the U.S. military for 38 years.
    To your question, I think we just have to look, quite 
frankly, at some of the PLA [People's Liberation Army] writings 
on doctrine and strategy that do suggest what you just 
mentioned, which is that the reconnaissance, communications, 
navigation, and even early warning satellites could--I am not 
saying will--could be among the possible first targets to be 
attacked.
    And so just in accordance with their own strategy, their 
own doctrine, we have reason to believe that that might be the 
case.
    Mr. Moulton. And Dr. Plumb is nodding his head. So, I will 
take that as agreement.
    So, if war with China could start in space, then deterring 
war with China seems to require having an effective space 
deterrent. Do you agree?
    General Dickinson. I do agree with that.
    Mr. Moulton. One of the challenges with deterrence is it is 
not just enough to have capabilities that exceed your 
adversary's capabilities, they have to believe that. Right?
    I mean, we can look back and say, you know, we knew we 
would be able to get together the most remarkable coalition of 
NATO allies since World War II to push back Russia out of 
Ukraine. The problem is that Vladimir Putin did not believe 
that before he started this war. And so, we did not effectively 
deter, prevent this war from happening.
    So, Dr. Plumb, perhaps we could start with you. We are 
developing some exquisite space capabilities that you are 
overseeing. But how do we effectively communicate this to our 
adversaries so that they believe it?
    Secretary Plumb. Thanks, Congressman.
    I would say just to start with I think they, they know 
that, well, we have space superiority right now. And they know 
that this is not an opportunity for them to move forward.
    And our goal at the Department of Defense is to make sure 
that really every day that President Xi wakes up is not the day 
that he thinks this is worth the attempt to go after Taiwan. 
And we use as Taiwan as our pacing scenario. I think it is a 
good frame of reference, regardless of the actual scenario we 
put out.
    I will just say I think you are getting to the reveal/
conceal question. And I actually think we should not overlook 
statecraft as well. Right? So, we do communicate back and forth 
between nations, and they use their statecraft to see or to try 
to discern what we are doing.
    I personally believe there is great value in some 
ambiguity. But your point is well taken.
    General Dickinson, do you have, I know you have worked in 
particular on declassifying some of the work that we are doing, 
to better communicate this to our adversaries. Do you have 
anything to add?
    General Dickinson. That is one of the areas within the 
Command that we are looking very closely at is how do we get to 
a--you mentioned the allies and partners, and how critical they 
are, not only in the space domain and what we do there, but in 
the other domains as well.
    And so, when we look to integrate and operate with the 
allies and partners, it is critical that we take a very close 
look at, you know, overclassification and classification 
period, so that we can share necessary information with our 
allies and partners. And we are working on that every day in 
U.S. Space Command.
    We have had a couple of areas where we have had some 
success in that. Like, for example, we have run operational Big 
Defender every day, which is really the operations that does 
our space enabling responsibilities to the Joint Force each and 
every day. That has been traditionally held at a NOFORN [Not 
Releasable to Foreign Nationals] level. And just within the 
last year we have been able to start sharing that with the Five 
Eyes.
    There are many other examples, but that is, that is one in 
particular that I think worth noting.
    Mr. Moulton. Thank you.
    General Dickinson, another question for you. As everyone on 
this committee well knows, the DoD has not invested 
sufficiently in space until quite recently. My question is will 
the budget that we receive tomorrow have enough in it to 
protect, defend, and reconstitute our space assets?
    And where should we invest more?
    General Dickinson. Well, first-off I would say since we 
have stood up in 2019 as a combatant command, Congress' support 
to what we are doing--and I even mentioned it in my opening 
statement where I said helping us sustain primacy in the space 
domain--has been very good.
    And I thank the Congress for the monies and the resources 
that are going towards us in that effect.
    The Command has had a good opportunity over the last 4 
years as well to start developing the requirements that we need 
in support of our operations. And we have done a lot of that. 
We have been able to codify that through the normal processes 
within the Department in terms of identifying requirements, 
ICDs [Intelligence Community Directives] for example, JUONs 
[Joint Urgent Operational Needs], IPLs [Integrated Priority 
List], those kinds of normal functions within the Command to 
put a demand signal, if you will, on the Department and what we 
will need in the space domain.
    So, I am pleased with that. And, again, I think if you look 
at what one of my, my number one priority is in terms of what 
more do I need, is the ability to increase my space domain 
awareness. So, as we look to today and into the future, and 
with the growing congestion, if you will, in the space domain 
with regards to current satellites, operating satellites, 
defunct satellites, debris itself, it is becoming a bigger 
challenge to be able to do that. We have to have the 
capabilities to be able to see and characterize what is going 
on in the space domain.
    So, top priority for the Command right now is to make sure 
that we increase that.
    And I can go into details, if you would like, on how we are 
approaching that.
    Mr. Moulton. No, it is very helpful. And a message that we 
have heard loud and clear from General VanHerck is that domain 
awareness is absolutely critical and something that we need to 
improve. So, he may be 2 years your junior but he is very much 
following in your footsteps on that count.
    General Cotton, final question. Mr. Banks, I guess he has 
parted for a time, but he and I co-chair the Future Defense 
Task Force. And we looked at a lot of things across the 
spectrum of war fighting and, you know, trying to determine 
where we need to be in the future.
    And, of course, we focused a lot on technology and the 
technology that we need to invest in to keep pace with our 
adversaries across the globe.
    But another point that we made is it is not enough just to 
invest in technology. You have to know how you are going to use 
that technology. And sometimes in the past we have made the 
mistake of pursuing a technology because it seems like the hot 
new thing, without having a clear understanding of how we might 
actually employ that technology. And, therefore, sometimes that 
money goes to waste.
    So, we are putting a lot of money into hypersonics. But I 
asked this question recently, last year, of some of your 
colleagues and people at the Department: how do you actually 
plan to employ hypersonic weapons?
    We are going to invest a lot in them because China has 
them, too, but how do you actually plan to employ them? What 
are the operational concepts for the use of hypersonic weapons?
    And I can tell you we got a very dissatisfying answer. A 
lot of stares, a lot of blank stares saying we are not quite 
sure yet. Well, that is not a good enough reason to invest in 
them.
    So, tell us how your thinking has involved on the 
employment of hypersonics, and why--see, explain to the 
American people why it is critical that we put such an enormous 
amount of money into these new weapons systems?
    General Cotton. Thank you, Ranking Member.
    I think the answer to that is simple. Our adversaries 
already have them as a baseline, so they are using them as, 
they are using them as a deterrent already.
    When it comes to us, within STRATCOM one of the things that 
we are already doing is we are prepared to accept utilizing 
hypersonic weapons as a strategic deterrent weapon because it 
has strategic effects.
    Mr. Moulton. Uh-huh.
    General Cotton. So, one of the things that we are thinking 
through on my staff and that I am having my team do is to 
understand knowing that we are going to have low density, high 
demand assets at the beginning, that we can help in the 
planning and understanding of how we want to execute those 
weapons, just like we do any other strategic weapon.
    That is not to say that when the cash gets a lot larger 
that it has to stay that way. But from my vantage point as a 
strategic deterrent lead, if you will, from STRATCOM, I see 
that as the entering argument on what I want to be able to do 
and utilize.
    And, oh, by the way, the complementary factors of what it 
can do with a nuclear force as well as just strategic 
deterrence writ large. So, there is a nuclear deterrent aspect 
to this where hypersonics can be complementary to some of the 
effects that we would do in our planning, as well as what you 
would see from conventional long-range strike.
    Mr. Moulton. Let me ask one quick corollary to that.
    A lot of theorists about nuclear weapons would argue that 
the weapons that we have had for some time, the triad, 
including ICBMs, which are sort of horrific in concept, are 
actually stabilizing weapons. I mean, they have prevented, they 
have helped prevent war between our super--the superpowers for 
decades.
    Do you believe that hypersonics are a stabilizing or 
destabilizing strategic weapon?
    General Cotton. I see hypersonic weapons just like I see 
the ICBMS as stabilizing weapons.
    Mr. Moulton. Okay. Well, I will tell you a lot of people 
disagree. And I think this is something we need to get to the 
bottom of.
    Thank you very much. And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Lamborn. Representative Turner.
    Mr. Turner. Well, I certainly think that hypersonic weapons 
in the hands of our adversaries are destabilizing.
    General Cotton, you and I had the opportunity to talk about 
the concerns of Russia stepping out of New START. The United 
States took several steps to comply with New START.
    I, for one, believe that if they step out of New START we 
should not give them a pass. We shouldn't say we are going to 
continue to comply and stay within New START, and you can do 
whatever you want.
    That means, of course, that we are going to have to up our 
game for deterrence. Because if they are going to expand their 
nuclear inventory but also continue to expand their nuclear 
offense capabilities, which I personally believe are many first 
strike weapon capabilities, we are going to have to look at 
reMIRV. We are going to have to be looking at the B-1, the B-
52, how do we ensure the dual capability and the prevalence of 
the F-35 and, certainly, the expeditious completion and 
deployment of the B-21.
    My question to you is, as we look out at all the things 
that we need to do, let's say there we wake up tomorrow and 
there is no New START, are there things the United States could 
and should do in response to that that could ensure our 
deterrence of our adversary that is self-declared, which is 
Russia?
    General Cotton. Thank you for that question, sir.
    First of all, nuclear, responsible nuclear parties stick to 
the treaties that they sign up for. Suspending NST [New START 
Treaty] from the Russian's perspective, from my perspective is 
irresponsible.
    That being said, my responsibility is to be able to offer 
flexible deterrent options to the President. And we have 
already, we have already worked and have always worked in 
STRATCOM to be able to offer flexible deterrent options when 
required.
    So, to answer your question, flexible deterrent options are 
always available to the President the United States.
    Mr. Turner. Excellent.
    General VanHerck, we have obviously had a relatively robust 
conversation nationwide about our capabilities to see and 
understand threats and warnings to the United States and North 
America. We are also in the process of reinvesting because some 
of these systems are very old.
    And, of course, some of these systems now with China's 
having, China having chosen to test a hypersonic weapons that 
orbits the Earth that looks like it is something that could 
be--remain in orbit and be a space-to-ground weapon, and for 
which all indications are their intentions to perhaps make this 
a nuclear weapon, we are going to have to look at how do we see 
better, how do we get greater fidelity, how do we look at areas 
where we might have blind spots?
    But the next step we are going to have to look at is as 
China increases its nuclear weapons capabilities in China, and 
Russia increases its nuclear weapons capabilities, that we are 
going to be sort of beyond a world that is just mutually 
assured destruction and deterrence of we have nuclear weapons 
and you have nuclear weapons.
    China is building them at such a pace that it is clearly 
not just their territorial integrity that they are concerned 
about, they are building them at a pace where we can even see 
in non-classified areas their new ICBMs areas.
    If we are going to go beyond deterrence, we are going to 
have to add missile defense. We are going to have to add 
missile defense and we are going to have to add it in a robust 
fashion where we look at China and Russia as perhaps 
perpetrators. To do so we are going to have to upgrade what we 
look at for radars and sensing for North America.
    Could you speak for a minute about what our current system 
is? What we are currently planning on doing for upgrade? And 
what would that leap look like that we would have to do in 
order to do integrated missile defense for the United States?
    General VanHerck. Yes, thank you for the question.
    First, to be clear, our missile defense today does not, 
from a policy perspective, defend against Chinese ----
    Mr. Turner. Right. This is a radar question.
    General VanHerck. Okay. Chinese or Russia, radar question. 
So, first, I am concerned and very challenged for domain 
awareness. I will start with hypersonics.
    If you can't see hypersonics it is hard to continuity of 
government, and it is certainly hard to protect your nuclear 
posture. So, therefore, I would say that would be destabilizing 
or erode our strategic stability from a standpoint of not being 
able to see them.
    From the way forward I would ask two things:
    For radars, over-the-horizon radars. We need those soon as 
possible. Ten years to field over-the-horizon radars does not 
make sense.
    Then the question becomes what do you do with the data and 
information from those over-the-horizon radars? That needs to 
feed an integrated air and missile defense system that 
ultimately feeds some type of an in-game factor. That could be 
non-kinetic or kinetic, either one.
    This problem is much larger than radars, by the way. It is 
also the P-LEO, U.S. Space Forces dealing to give us domain 
awareness for hypersonics and other missile systems.
    Mr. Turner. Thank you.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
    Mr. Garamendi.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the 
meeting. And congratulations on your chairmanship, and Mr. 
Moulton the same on the ranking.
    Fascinating discussion thus far. I am going to ask the big 
question, a question that has been on my mind since I came to 
this committee, and that is, gentlemen, are we now, the United 
States, engaged in a new nuclear arms race?
    Mr. Plumb and then on down the line, yes, no, and qualify 
if you want.
    Secretary Plumb. Thanks, Congressman. I, I don't think I 
would characterize it as a new nuclear arms race based on 
current numbers and based on what the historical arms race 
looked like when the numbers were multiples of this.
    Mr. Garamendi. A different?
    Secretary Plumb. A different kind. Maybe a capabilities 
race perhaps. I don't know if that is quite the same as a 
nuclear inventory race.
    Mr. Garamendi. Does that include General Cotton's new 
strategic weapon, similar to a nation--similar to a nuclear 
weapon, otherwise known as a hypersonic? I think that is what 
he just said.
    Am I correct, General Cotton, didn't you just say that?
    General Cotton. I said that if you were to ask what we 
could use as far as can a hypersonic be seen as a strategic 
weapon.
    Mr. Garamendi. And then you went on to say part of the 
nuclear ----
    General Cotton. I said it could ----
    Mr. Garamendi.--strategic weapons.
    General Cotton.--it could be complementary to our nuclear 
forces.
    Mr. Garamendi. In other words, part thereof; correct?
    General Cotton. No. Because, sir, we still use conventional 
forces to complement our nuclear forces today.
    Mr. Garamendi. So it is not a strategic weapon?
    General Cotton. You can have conventional strategic weapons 
----
    Mr. Garamendi. Or I suppose a ----
    General Cotton.--as opposed to nuclear strategic weapons is 
what I was alluding to.
    Mr. Garamendi. Similar to a HIMAR [High Mobility Artillery 
Rocket System] being a strategic weapon?
    I guess I want to know where you are going here. Are we 
going to consider the hypersonic weapon being part of our 
strategic defense systems, as we consider the nuclear triad to 
be part of our strategic?
    Secretary Plumb. So, Congressman, I would say the word 
``strategic'' ----
    Mr. Garamendi. That was addressed to General Cotton.
    General Cotton, you raised this issue. What is the answer?
    General Cotton. What I am saying is strategic deterrence is 
not just nuclear. Strategic deterrence can also be through 
conventional means. We do it every day today.
    Mr. Garamendi. Then why did you raise the question of the 
hypersonic being specifically in that arena?
    General Cotton. I did not. I said it could actually 
complement in the nuclear ----
    Mr. Garamendi. I will check the record. Enough of that.
    We have got this issue of the SLCM [Submarine-Launched 
Cruise Missile], which is a strange name. The United States 
already deploys a low yield warhead, 76-2 on submarine-based 
missiles. And we have the B61-12 low yield. And we have the, 
will soon I suppose, or someday have an LSRO [Long Range 
Standoff Weapon] that is nuclear capable.
    Why do we need a SLCM? Which one of you want to answer 
that? I guess Mr. Plumb.
    Secretary Plumb. Congressman, the Administration position 
is that we do not.
    Mr. Garamendi. Well, the Congress thinks differently, 
unfortunately.
    So, what does that mean for our nuclear submarines that are 
presently not necessarily stationed at ports where nuclear 
weapons are allowed? It changes everything, doesn't it, if we 
put this on our attack submarines?
    Secretary Plumb. Congressman, to be fair, I was a fast 
attack submariner. Fast attack submarines used to have nuclear 
cruise missiles on them. They were removed by presidential 
nuclear initiatives years ago just as I was entering the force.
    So, I don't know if it would change everything. I guess I 
would argue that it would not. But it would certainly change 
some things.
    Mr. Garamendi. What things?
    Secretary Plumb. Some nations are not keen on having 
nuclear weapons in their ports. So kind of from a port 
standpoint that is a problem from us.
    Mr. Garamendi. And they wouldn't be able to use those, the 
submarines couldn't use Gordon and Norfolk, they would have to 
go to a different?
    Secretary Plumb. I wouldn't, I wouldn't be willing to say 
that, sir. But additional investments would be required if they 
were going to use the naval ports.
    Mr. Garamendi. My time is expired. Thank you. I yield back.
    Mr. Lamborn. Mr. Wilson.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Chairman Doug Lamborn and 
Ranking Member Seth Moulton. Look forward to working with you 
and your leadership. And we have got a great team. And, truly, 
it is significantly bipartisan.
    So, I am just grateful to be here. Now, it is really 
humbling, okay, to look out there. I have never seen this many 
stars, 24. And so, you have done a good job at the first 
meeting.
    And but thank you for your service. And I truly appreciate 
your service. My dad served in the 14th Air Force Flying Tigers 
to liberate China, in Kunming, Jengdu, Xi'an, China. So, I 
appreciate that.
    And then I am really grateful, General Dickinson, you beat 
me by 7 years in terms of the number of years' service. And so 
I appreciate that. Although I am grateful, my oldest son Allen 
is field artillery, received the CAB in his service in Iraq. 
So, I appreciate that branch.
    And then I am all service behind you. My second son's a 
doctor in the Navy, and the third son is signal, and youngest 
an engineer, having served in Iraq, Egypt, and Afghanistan.
    So, thank you for your service.
    With that, General Cotton, the communities in South 
Carolina's 2nd District, and our adjacent communities in 
Georgia, are extremely supportive of the plutonium pit 
production mission at the Savannah River Site. The Savannah 
River Site, with its workforce and expertise is ideally suited 
to complete this important mission that is so vital to national 
security.
    Maintaining active levels of funding for the Savannah River 
plutonium processing facility is necessary to ensure that our 
nation can reach our nuclear modernization needs and maintain 
an effective nuclear deterrent. In fact, Congressman Moulton 
was absolutely correct, we have got to have a real deterrent 
that the enemy understands that they are very effective.
    As of February 2023, the National Nuclear Security 
Administration notified Congress that it would be unable to 
meet the congressionally mandated timelines to achieve a rate 
of 30 plutonium pits by 2026, or achieve the 80 pits per year 
Congress mandated by 2030.
    The question, as the NNSA [National Nuclear Security 
Administration] will not be able to meet the requirements of 
producing 80 pits per year by 2030, how critical is it that we 
do everything we can to minimize the delay and reach the 
requirement as soon as we can?
    General Cotton. Congressman Wilson, it is nice seeing you 
again, sir.
    Bottom line, it is critically important. Eighty pits per 
year, the 2030 statutory requirement has not changed when it 
comes to delivery for us. We are working hand-in-hand with our 
partners in NNSA to understand how they will be able to achieve 
that. But it is, it is actually crucial and critical for us to 
make sure that they can get as close to meeting that 
requirement as they can.
    Mr. Wilson. Well, I would like to assure you that the 
citizens of central South Carolina and CSRA into Georgia are 
ready to back this up in every way.
    And, General VanHerck, a rising threat of China, acute 
threat of Russia, the unabated threat of Iran building 
intercontinental ballistic missiles, and an unstable North 
Korea with the capacity to deliver long-range missile threats, 
continue a great--to develop a greater capability and capacity, 
with the intent to strike the United States and our allies.
    How concerned are you about the continued missile 
development and production?
    Is NORAD preparing adequately to deter, detect, deny, and 
protect the homeland from threats?
    General VanHerck. Congressman, I am encouraged with recent 
funding for NORAD modernization. Specific to the ballistic 
missile threat, the basic ballistic missile threat from DPRK 
[Democratic People's Republic of Korea], I am confident today 
in my threat warning and attack assessment capabilities. And 
also to defend in my NORTHCOM hat against a limited attack.
    I am very concerned by the numbers I see and the capacity 
out of DPRK today as far as the total numbers that they 
actually have produced and are capable of potentially launching 
at our homeland.
    Mr. Wilson. Well, please keep us advised what we can do to 
reach and match the threat.
    And, General Dickinson, with China continuing to strengthen 
its military space capabilities, if China were to conduct an 
illegal invasion of Taiwan, what would be the implications of 
these satellites? And would they be a threat to the United 
States?
    General Dickinson. Congressman, first of all, thank you for 
those kind remarks as you began your question period.
    I would just tell you that space is global in nature, and 
so, in particular for us, the U.S. Space Command for the 
Department of Defense. So, any regional conflict, if you will, 
will depend upon space, and utilize space assets, both blue as 
well as China.
    So, I think what we would see would be a use because we 
know China is leveraging space capabilities now. They have 
watched us for many, many years, more than 20 years, and how, 
how space-based capabilities facilitate our global reach and 
our global ability to employ forces. So, I think we could see a 
similar thing with China.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank each of you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Lamborn. Representative Carbajal.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And thank you to all 
the witnesses for being here.
    General VanHerck, General Dickinson, thank you for your 
service to our country. Reminds me of that movie ``A Few Good 
Men.'' We wanted you on that wall, and now you are leaving. But 
if General Cotton is any indication of the bench we have and 
the people that are ascending to the capacities that you will 
leave behind, I think we are in good hands.
    Secretary Plumb, we just wrote Mr. Plumb instead of Dr. 
Plumb or Assistant Secretary. I think we need to correct that 
because we need to give you your due.
    Again, thank you for being here.
    General Dickinson, the space activity from the Department 
of Defense, the United States commercial sector as well as 
partners, allies, and competitors, is growing. And in the next 
few years a significant number of satellites are planned to be 
launched into orbit, particularly P-LEO.
    As the launch industry continues to grow and other 
countries develop their own launch capabilities, it is 
reasonable to believe that there will be more traffic in space, 
not to mention debris. Will this increased traffic pose 
challenges to space domain awareness?
    And is SPACECOM [United States Space Command] prepared for 
this?
    General Dickinson. Congressman, thanks for those words, 
kind words as we have started out.
    I could tell you that, frankly, yes, that presents a 
challenge to us as we watch. And I think we might all agree 
that watching the commercial market around the world starts 
showing a lot of interesting space and wanting to be part of 
the space community, space-faring nations. We are watching it 
grow. We see it every day.
    I will give you a statistic just to think about. In terms 
of when this Command stood up in 2019, we tracked about 25,000 
pieces of debris, old satellites, new satellites in the space 
domain. Today we are up over 48,000.
    So, you can see that, the growth that you mentioned 
earlier, and how that is creating a more congested domain. So, 
as we look at that there are two things I want to point out 
that we are working on right now.
    One, as I mentioned earlier, my top priority is to increase 
space domain awareness. And how I do that is through commercial 
integration as well as bringing on non-traditional type assets 
that we haven't used before to look into the space domain 
specifically; air defense radars, missile defense radars around 
the world, both maritime as well as ground-based; leveraging 
the commercial market.
    The other thing we are looking at very carefully is, you 
know, how we will do that transition with the Department of 
Commerce for them to start doing the space traffic management 
functions that are required to do space domain awareness.
    I think when you look at the size, as I described, of how 
much it is populated, how much it has grown in numbers, we are 
going to need the Department of Commerce to do that type of 
civil type of operations to account for the debris and things 
that are in orbit. So, that will allow me to use the assets 
that I have to do characterization of things that I need to 
look at that aren't necessarily just civil or pieces of debris.
    So, in other words, I will have a better opportunity with 
the resources I have to do better characterization of the space 
domain.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
    General Dickinson, as the number of launches continues to 
grow, can you speak to how you envision the Space Force range 
of the future?
    And do trained access-to-launch ranges meet your needs as 
the combat combatant--combatant commander responsible for 
space, particularly when it comes to responsive space 
capability?
    And how can the Department further help ensure access to 
ranges?
    General Dickinson. Congressman, I think a robust launch 
infrastructure and responsive launch capabilities are 
absolutely essential to our assured use of space, which remains 
a top national security priority.
    The launch stations themselves, launch facilities is 
critical to the tactical response of space. But I will tell you 
it is not just the only piece to it. It is ``a'' piece to it.
    The other pieces are, you know, having more assets on orbit 
that can be looked at to provide capabilities. It is also what 
is on each of the satellites that go up and how quickly those 
can be actually deployed upon a rapid response launch type 
capability.
    So, it is really kind of those three together. But the 
launch structure is absolutely critical to what we are going to 
do today and in the future.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
    Dr. Plumb and General Cotton, I have limited time now, but 
I am concerned by Russia's decision to suspend implementation 
of the New START Treaty. In your statement you note the 
``continued degradation of Russian conventional capabilities in 
Ukraine will likely increase Russia's reliance on its nuclear 
arsenal.''
    Can you speak to the role Russia's failures in Ukraine 
played in their decision to suspend New START?
    And how important is it for us to maintain our commitment 
to the New START Treaty?
    Secretary Plumb. Thanks. Thanks, Congressman.
    I will say I do think that the more Russia shows that its 
conventional forces are being degraded or not up to par, then 
they do rely more and more on nuclear weapons. I do think that 
is a hallmark of a conventionally weak state that has to, that 
you rely more on nuclear weapons as their conventional forces 
fail in the field or continue to be degraded, against Ukraine 
in this case.
    I am not convinced, sir, that the problems Russia is facing 
in the field are directly related to the New START piece. There 
is a lot of political and narrative pieces inside the Russian 
Government, inside Putin's mind that may be more related to 
this. It is troubling nonetheless.
    I will just say at the top of the meeting, if you--I forget 
who, but someone noted, maybe it was Congressman Lamborn--but 
they have stopped their, suspended their notifications. This is 
new. This has just happened in the last couple, really the last 
week. And so we can see what they are doing there. We are 
looking at this closely to understand what that means for us.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. I am out of time.
    General Cotton, you are saved by the bell.
    Mr. Chair, I yield back.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
    Dr. DesJarlais.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you, Chairman.
    I would like to join my colleagues in thanking General 
VanHerck and General Dickinson for your commitment and your 
contribution and service to our country. And don't worry, 
General Cotton, we appreciate you, too. You will get your day.
    But it seems like we have too many hearings--and Mr. 
Plumb--we have too many hearings now where it seems like we are 
talking about how our adversaries are looking in the rearview 
mirror at us when it comes to hypersonic weapons or expansion 
and modernization of nuclear forces. And that is very 
concerning.
    So, General Cotton, I wanted to let you for a minute, if 
you would, describe how delays in modernization programs impact 
your ability to field sufficient forces in the future?
    And are there steps STRATCOM can take now to better hedge 
against the possibility that some programs do not deliver on 
time?
    General Cotton. Congressman, thank you for the question.
    First of all, what it shows us, and the ability of us 
being, having a triad shows that that strategic theory works. 
Because what a triad does, it allows me to be able to balance 
amongst the three legs.
    Those three legs have to work together. Some folks try to 
talk about the triad and stovepipes. They are not stovepipes. 
So, the balancing of being able to understand. And what we are 
facing today is the legacy systems across the triad are all 
being modernized. That is a good thing.
    But to your point, how do we balance as we make that 
transition, the other good news is the legacy systems are safe. 
They are secure. They are effective, and they are credible 
today.
    So, we constantly look at all three legs to ensure that we 
can balance, to ensure that we can, you know, cover to your 
point and make sure we have an effective deterrent.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Would you say if we stay on our current 
modernization trajectory will the President and the STRATCOM 
Commander, if it is not you, have the capabilities that we will 
need to deter both Russia and China if our intel on their 
modernization continues at the current pace, say, in 2030?
    General Cotton. Sir, I think, I said it in an earlier 
statement, I think we probably need to have a conversation in 
regards to strategy as well as force posture to ensure that we 
can, that we can make sure we have what we need in regards to I 
would say probably the mid-2030s and beyond.
    Now, the transition to our newer weapons systems are 
happening in the time frame that you just mention. And I think 
I can deliver, as long as we stay in alignment and produce and 
deliver the weapons systems, the new modernization systems as 
close to on time as we can.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. Shifting gears just a little bit, we 
had a conversation regarding non-strategic nuclear weapons. And 
how many non-strategic nuclear weapons does Russia have? And in 
what ways is their arsenal expanding and expected to expand?
    General Cotton. Sir, I have to take that for the record to 
get you the exact number. But by definition, non-strategic 
nuclear weapons are anything that is not counted in New START.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. What is your assessment of Russia's 
motivation for investing so heavily in these non-strategic, 
low-yield nuclear weapons?
    And do they detect a gap in our deterrence that they 
believe they can derive a military advantage from exploiting?
    General Cotton. I think it is based on their strategic 
theories on the utilization that it is below threshold where 
they can actually utilize non-strategic nuclear weapons or 
tactical nuclear weapons.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. General VanHerck, I had a question 
for this morning on North Korea's missile capabilities. But we 
will address that in the next closed session.
    So, with that, I will yield back.
    Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Now to one of our new members of the 
subcommittee, Representative Houlahan.
    Ms. Houlahan. I am new to the subcommittee but not new to 
this. I served in the Air Force myself, and this is what I did 
when I was in the Air Force 30-something years ago. So, I am 
grateful to be here with you guys today.
    My questions are for General Cotton, and for General 
Dickinson, and Dr. Plumb.
    General VanHerck, we asked questions at the last meeting, 
so maybe we will skip that today, and maybe something in the 
classified session.
    First for General Cotton, three days ago reports emerged 
that the PRC is increasing their defense budget by 7.2 percent 
next year. And we already know, as you said in your written 
testimony, that the PRC has rapidly increased their supply of 
both warheads and missiles, with the expectation that they will 
control about 1,000 warheads over the next decade.
    So, as Commander of the Strategic Command, I guess having, 
you know, spent the next 30 years working in industry with KPIs 
[Key Performance Indicators] and learning to measure what 
matters, what matters to you?
    How do you measure success with strategic deterrence? Is it 
the number of warheads? Is it the size, or is it the range, or 
is it comparison against our pacing threat? Or is it something 
else, as you mentioned, that is a balance of non-nuclear and 
other assets as well?
    Do you believe that we have to outspend or have a larger 
missile supply than the PRC to maintain our effective levels of 
deterrence?
    General Cotton. Congresswoman, thank you so much. And hooah 
at you. You are an Air Force veteran.
    I think it is a little bit of all the above. And what I 
mean by that is the definition of strategic--no, excuse me--of 
deterrence from my perspective. For me, deterrence is about, 
first, understanding what the adversary values. And when you 
understand what the adversary values, ensuring the adversary 
understands that the action you impose, that imposition is so 
great that they will not risk what they value.
    I think an incredible start for that in what we are doing 
right now with the modernization of our nuclear forces is a 
start to that.
    I agree with you, I think adding different capabilities 
that we are talking about today from a strategic deterrence 
perspective is also something that needs to be added in that 
calculus.
    Ms. Houlahan. Thank you. I appreciate your brevity in your 
answer so it allows me time to ask Dr. Plumb a question.
    As we are rightfully focusing more of our time on space and 
improving our security and collaboration in space, we are 
running into some issues working with our allies due to the 
tendency that many of us have to overclassify space-related 
information. And Representative Moulton asked about this, too.
    The fiscal year 2022 NDAA required that the Secretary would 
conduct a review of the classified programs under Space Force 
to determine whether any level of classification of the program 
could be changed to a lower level, or if the program could be 
declassified and reported back to us.
    Dr. Plumb, my understanding is that report was due last 
April. Do you have any expectation of when we might be able to 
get that report?
    Secretary Plumb. Thanks, Congresswoman.
    First, let me just say I have got three C's from my ASD 
space hat that I wear, all related to space. I am interested in 
space control. I am interested in space cooperation with 
allies, which you raised. And both of those are also contingent 
on kind of our tendency to over classify space.
    It really does make it hard to share information with our 
allies. General Dickinson and I have been to New Zealand to 
talk about this with some of our closest allies, as a matter of 
fact.
    I will say I am aware that the report was due then. It is 
actually a pretty Herculean task. The Deputy Secretary of 
Defense has started last year a SAP [Special Access Program] 
reform effort--it might have been even before that--which is 
coming to a, at least a new stage.
    I don't think any of those things, I don't expect any of 
those things are going to become unclassified. But we are 
hoping to find ways to better share information with industry, 
just as an example, another partner we don't talk about as 
much.
    Ms. Houlahan. Do we have an estimation on when that report 
would be due?
    Secretary Plumb. I don't have a great one for you. But I am 
hoping for later this year.
    Ms. Houlahan. Well, I look forward to following up on that, 
with that.
    And with my last half a minute, General Dickinson, you 
talked a little bit about sort of the implications about 
working with our allies. And, Dr. Plumb, you talked a little 
bit about industry. But I am also thinking about the American 
people.
    A lot of what has effectively been effective about Ukraine 
has been that release of information by the Administration and 
others that has been sanitized and is allowed to be advanced, 
you know, to the American public to help them understand space, 
and Space Force, and Space Command as one of those problems 
where people just don't understand its impact.
    I know I have run out of town. But I would be interested, 
perhaps afterwards, in learning more from you about whether you 
think there is an appetite or an ability to have that 
information available to the American public in a more abundant 
way and a more sanitized way.
    And I am sorry, and I yield back.
    Mr. Lamborn. Okay. And now we have another new member, 
although not new to this issue, just like Representative 
Houlahan is not new to this issue, and that is Representative 
Bacon.
    Mr. Bacon. I am glad to be on this committee. Thank you.
    I want to welcome all four of you here today. We appreciate 
your leadership and what you do.
    I want to welcome General VanHerck. General Dickinson, 
Omaha where you are retiring, you can join General Cotton who 
has been well-received and welcome there.
    So, but congratulations to both. And we thank you.
    I volunteered to be on the Strategic Forces Committee to 
focus on NC3 [nuclear command, control, and communication], as 
General Cotton knows. We are investing in the triad. I think we 
are on a great glidepath for success to modernize all three of 
those legs of the triad.
    I am concerned about the survivability of our NC3. I know 
STRATCOM and our DoD has been working on the comm systems and 
the architectures. But the area that I am focused on is, or 
worried about is the survivability of command. With 
hypersonics, and cruise missiles, perhaps submarines off our 
coasts at some point again, it is harder to ensure that command 
authorities can survive a first strike and conduct a second 
counterstrike.
    I want to have 100 percent confidence that the Russians and 
Chinese have 100 percent confidence that we can do a second 
strike, because that ensures deterrence. And that is ultimately 
what we are about. Job number one is strategic deterrence.
    So, with that, General Cotton, can you share your thoughts 
on what parts of our deterrence, our alert, and our readiness 
posture that you are watching most closely, and what elements 
you believe may warrant more attention from us and more 
funding?
    General Cotton. Congressman Bacon, thank you so much for 
the question. It is all of it.
    You know, I look at our E6B fleet. I look at our E4B fleet. 
I look at the mission readiness of those fleets. I look at our 
submarine fleet as well as the ICBM leg and our bomber fleet, 
to include all of the bomber forces, not just those that are 
directly assigned, which is the B-52 and the B-2.
    We carefully manage that, Congressman, to make sure that we 
are, that we are confident that we can do exactly what you are 
saying in regards to being able to disperse when we need to 
disperse, and get to locations of safety when we need to get to 
locations of safety.
    Mr. Bacon. A lot of this is predicated on strategic 
warning. But I am an intel officer by trade, and historian. I 
love reading history. And more often than not, adversaries are 
caught flatfooted.
    So I just, I want to ensure that we have a debate done 
every day that we have that survivability there.
    A follow-up question with you, General Cotton, is how is 
our hosting Nuclear Enterprise Center at Offutt working to 
design the next generation NC3 architecture?
    And how is that work informing DoD NC3 modernization?
    General Cotton. Thank you for that question.
    You know, as I took command on the 9th of December, one of 
the things that we did on the 12th of December was we created a 
cross-functional team within the Command to really get after 
how do we describe the incredible things that are going on 
within the NC3 portfolio, and describe it, to be frank, to the 
members of Congress and to my own bosses within the Department?
    So, one of the things that we are doing is we are changing 
what we would call our OV1 strategy to describe what we are 
doing within the architecture. And I have directed our team to 
come out with what we would call a roadmap construct to better 
describe the dollars, and the investments, and everything that 
is happening within the enterprise.
    It is still nascent, but we will be ready to present that 
to my bosses in the Pentagon, as well as to the members here 
shortly.
    But there is a lot of work that is going on with the next 
gen NC3 implementation plan. And I look forward to being able 
to describe that to you.
    Mr. Bacon. I have a question for General Dickinson. But 
before I do, before my focus on NC3, I have been working on 
electronic warfare. I really appreciate the great work STRATCOM 
and the whole DoD is doing on it. It is an area that we have 
fallen behind on. So, I appreciate your focus on that as well 
as STRATCOM.
    General Dickinson, while I have about 30 seconds left, can 
you explain a little more about the dynamic space operations 
and your requirements?
    General Dickinson. Thank you, Congressman.
    So, dynamic space operations is the concept where we get to 
the point where we are not having to worry about consumables 
that might be on spacecraft. In other words, we need to be able 
to have dynamic space capabilities that don't--an operator or a 
warfighter can actually use that in the actual context or the 
tactics they want to employ, without having to worry about 
replenishment. Whether it is a battery drain, whether it is a 
fuel consumption, something along the lines where you can 
refuel, be able to have a replenishment of that capability so 
you can use it not only today but in the future. And then when 
you are actually doing operations, that you are not limited in 
what you can do because of that.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. And for everyone's situational 
awareness, I have asked Joint Staff, OSD, and STRATCOM to put 
together a classified NC3 brief for members. So, be looking for 
a notice coming soon.
    I was going to ask Representative Norcross. He wants to 
defer. So, Representative Strong, you are next.
    Mr. Strong. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    It is an honor when I get to see a panel of generals who 
spend a lot of time in my hometown of Huntsville, Alabama, at 
Redstone Arsenal, where I served 26 years on the Madison County 
Commission, the last 10 as the chairman.
    General Dickinson, Redstone Arsenal and the surrounding 
community was sorry to see you leave SMDC [Space and Missile 
Defense Command] in 2019. We are proud of everything you have 
done for the U.S. Space Command.
    Your successor, General Dan Karbler, has done a fantastic 
job as well. And I know General Cotton will agree.
    General Cotton, thank you for taking time from your 
schedule to come by my office last week and give me a brief. In 
our discussion you stressed the importance of guaranteeing the 
U.S. strategic forces are safe, secure, effective, and 
credible. This applies to the three legs of the nuclear triad 
and nuclear command, control, and communications.
    Can you briefly summarize what Strategic Command is doing 
to ensure that all ongoing modernization efforts and our 
strategic forces and capabilities are safe, secure, effective, 
and credible?
    General Cotton. Congressman Strong, thank you so much. And 
I had a great opportunity, it was a great time talking with you 
last week.
    You know, there is nothing more sacred than ensuring that 
we have a safe, secure, and effective, and credible nuclear 
deterrent, just because of the weapons systems effort described 
in themselves. When we talk about the men and women that are 
working those systems each and every day, and the training and 
readiness that goes in ensuring that they are ready to do their 
job, that is paramount for us.
    So, I oversee the service components that have that mission 
set every day to ensure that they are properly trained, they 
are properly equipped, and have the means to be able to deliver 
effects when they are required to do so.
    Mr. Strong. Thank you, General.
    Dr. Plumb, as you know, my hometown of Rocket City, USA, 
Huntsville, Alabama, is a haven for traditional defense 
contractors and commercial industry alike. As the Department of 
Defense continues to increase its reliance on commercial 
partners in space I have two questions:
    One, what is the DoD doing to ensure there is no foreign 
adversary influence on commercial partners and their dual-use 
service or technology?
    Two, what authorities does the DoD have to safely integrate 
commercial partners into current architectures and information 
sharing?
    Secretary Plumb. Thank you, Congressman.
    So, a two-part question. So, first, I think if I have you 
right you are asking about supply chain.
    Mr. Strong. That is right.
    Secretary Plumb. So, obviously, or if not obviously, let me 
just stress how important supply chain integrity is to the 
Department of Defense for any, really any capability, but 
certainly any high-end capability, and that is a thing that the 
Department takes seriously and works on every day.
    Your second question is authorities that I think I am 
integrating commercial into. So, it is a good question. I think 
I am not aware of any authority limitations. I think it is very 
clear to those of us at the table, and anyone working on space 
at the industry, right, commercial providers are moving at a 
pace that is probably rapid and the Department of Defense said 
that they can move at. So, we are trying to harness that and 
see how we can use that to our advantage.
    We are looking at different ways we can use commercial 
space. There are some missions that are probably almost 
completely could be filled by commercial, and there are some 
that are very unique to DoD. I will just say I think the 
general approach going forward, and I am not the acquisition 
authority here, sir, is that we should buy what we can and 
build what we have to.
    Mr. Strong. Thank you, Dr. Plumb.
    General Dickinson, I have heard a lot of talk about dynamic 
space operations and maneuvering satellites without regret. Can 
you explain on what your requirements are for this and how it 
intersects with ensuring robust and redundant situational 
awareness capabilities?
    General Dickinson. Thank you, Congressman. And good to see 
you. Thanks for those kind words.
    I would say for dynamic space operations we are still 
looking at crafting our requirements, drafting our 
requirements, what that really means, and being able to 
describe that. But in essence, as I mentioned earlier, it is 
being able to maneuver on orbit in any manner that we need to 
given the situation, and not be constrained by fuel, 
electricity, batteries, whatever the consumables might be on 
that particular spacecraft or that particular capability.
    So, like in other domains where you are able to refuel 
trucks, and tanks, and aircraft, we need to be able to do the 
same thing in space.
    Mr. Strong. Thank you.
    I thank each of you for being here. I yield my time.
    Mr. Lamborn. Representative Norcross.
    Mr. Norcross. I'll ask in the classified.
    Mr. Lamborn. In a moment we are about to recess and go up 
to 2337 for the conclusion of this hearing in a classified 
setting
    I have one quick follow-up on something you said, General 
Dickinson, earlier.
    You talked about achieving initial operating capability at 
your provisional headquarters at Peterson Space Force Base. I 
know that reaching full operational capability is a high 
priority, but there have been complications regarding Space 
Command's permanent headquarters and where it will be located.
    Can you talk about the readiness challenges you face should 
those headquarters be moved from Colorado Springs, and the 
additional time that would be involved?
    General Dickinson. Chairman, I did say I reached IOC, 
initial operational capability, a couple years ago. And we are 
on the glidepath right now, moving aggressively towards full 
operational capability in the provisional headquarters and the 
infrastructure that I have in Colorado Springs right now.
    To me it is all about readiness. It is all about being able 
to do the mission sets that I have been given by the President 
of the United States. And so, as we move with resourcing the 
both infrastructure as well as people, which are the most 
important part of the command, we are moving in that direction.
    Mr. Lamborn. All right, thank you.
    We will now go into recess and reconvene in a few moments 
in 2337.
    [Whereupon, at 4:29 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
     
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                            A P P E N D I X

                             March 8, 2023
      
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                             March 8, 2023

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              QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                             March 8, 2023

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                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN

    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you for your frank comments on Russia's 
provision of highly enriched uranium for Chinese CFR-600 Fast Breeder 
reactors. In February 2023, the administration sanctioned three Rosatom 
entities, but this is a far cry from enough. Can you please describe 
what policy proposals the Department of Defense is pursuing to knee-cap 
Rosatom?
    Secretary Plumb. The Department of Defense (DoD) has expressed its 
concern regarding Russia's provision of highly enriched uranium to the 
PRC for use in its CFR-600 fast breeder reactors now under 
construction, which will likely be used by the PRC to produce fissile 
material that could be used in its expanding nuclear weapons program. 
As the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review states, the PRC should adopt a 
moratorium on fissile material production or, at a minimum, provide 
increased transparency to assure the international community that 
fissile material produced for civilian purposes is fully accounted for 
and not diverted to military uses. Russia's cooperation with the PRC 
does not reflect the behavior of responsible nuclear weapons states. On 
April 12, the State Department announced further sanctions on five 
entities and one individual that are part of Rosatom. The DoD will 
continue to work closely with other U.S. government agencies to address 
and constrain Rosatom's activities, including with the PRC.
    Mr. Lamborn. Can you please provide an update as to when the 
Committee can expect the reports on the nuclear sea launched cruise 
missile (SLCM-N) and Hard and Deeply Buried Targets directed in the 
FY2023 NDAA.
    Secretary Plumb. The FY 2023 NDAA tasked reports related to a 
nuclear sea-launched cruise missile to several components within the 
Defense Department as well as to the National Nuclear Security 
Administration (NNSA). These reporting requirements include a letter 
from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), a report from the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense, a report from the Joint Staff, a 
report from the Navy, and spend plans from the Navy and the NNSA. 
Efforts to complete the DOD required reports are proceeding. The Navy 
is finalizing the process to submit a spend plan to the Congressional 
defense committees. In compliance with Congressional requirements, the 
Navy has obligated FY22 funds appropriated and authorized for SLCM-N. 
These funds went to support relevant research conducted by Navy 
Strategic Systems Programs (SSP).
    The Navy intends to obligate authorized and appropriated FY23 
funds. This process is ongoing with the intent to submit the report in 
the near future. OSD is drafting the required report on deterring 
theater nuclear use and is coordinating completion of the remaining 
reports by the Joint Staff and the Department of the Navy. The 
Department is working towards completing these reports by their 
required NDAA due dates. OSD is also drafting the required letter from 
the Secretary of Defense identifying ``one or more preferred courses of 
action from among the actions identified in the analysis of 
alternatives for a nuclear-capable sea-launched cruise missile.'' The 
Department is aware that this letter was due to the committee in 
January 2023. We are working to provide a satisfactory answer to this 
requirement that is consistent with the legal requirement as well as 
current administration policy.
    A study on enduring approaches to HDBT defeat, one that takes an 
all-domain approach, is underway. OSD Policy is monitoring this work as 
part of the Department's efforts to develop an enduring capability for 
improved HDBT defeat as an outcome of 2022 Nuclear Posture Review. The 
study team is examining a range of nuclear and non-nuclear options to 
hold at risk adversary HDBTs. We anticipate timely submission of the 
report to Congress in the third quarter of Fiscal Year 2023. The 
Department is complying with Congressional requirements to retain a 
portion of the B83s in the active stockpile until the HDBT study is 
complete.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you for your comments on the importance of Joint 
Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (JEMSO) in the open hearing. I was 
hoping that you could provide a more fulsome answer for the record. To 
the best of your ability in an unclassified format, can you describe 
the ways that United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) relies on 
spectrum to support its missions and what are some of the future 
spectrum warfighter needs that will be essential to competing with 
Russia and China on a future battlefield?
    General Cotton. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
    Mr. Lamborn. What did the Chinese balloon observe while over 
STRATCOM and U.S. nuclear facilities? What countermeasures did you take 
to limit or prevent it from collecting intelligence?
    General Cotton. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
    Mr. Lamborn. Your opening statement described Chinese warhead 
production capacity and the total number you estimate China will have 
in 2030 and 2035. Please provide an unclassified estimates for Russia.
    General Cotton. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
    Mr. Lamborn. Recent press reported that the Russia's tested a 
Sarmat ICBM while President Biden was in Kyiv. Can you describe the 
recent failed test launch of the Russian Sarmat ICBM that has been in 
the opensource? Do we know what caused the failure, and whether it will 
impact the system's deployment? Do you believe the timing of the test 
was adjust to occur during President Biden's visit?
    General Cotton. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
    Mr. Lamborn. In our open session, Secretary Plumb spoke to reports 
that Russia, specifically Rosatom, is providing highly enriched uranium 
for Chinese Fast Breeder reactors. These reactors, the CFR-600 that 
will almost certainly help accelerate the pace of the Chinese nuclear 
weapons program by producing weapons grade-plutonium. These reports 
highlight the importance of simultaneously deterring both Russia and 
China at the same time. How concerned are you about increasing evidence 
of Russian material support for China's nuclear program and what does 
this tell you about their strategic defense relationship?
    General Cotton. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WALTZ
    Mr. Waltz. There's been discussion recently about satellite 
tactical surveillance and reconnaissance and whether Space Force should 
be responsible for requirements, budget, and acquiring government 
systems or commercial solutions to satisfy warfighter needs. What is 
your perspective on this? Should Space Force have its own budget for 
and be able to either acquire or commercially procure tactical 
satellite surveillance and reconnaissance?
    General Dickinson. I disagree with this claim. USSTRATCOM began 
advocating for hypersonic weapon capabilities in 2003, and the 
Department of Defense formally recognized the need for a prompt global 
strike capability in 2006, well before potential adversaries began 
maturing and fielding hypersonic weapons.
    The challenge of holding adversary targets at risk continues to 
grow as advanced offensive and defensive systems hinder our ability to 
employ fires in highly contested environments. Today, the only prompt 
long-range strike capabilities are ballistic missile systems armed with 
nuclear warheads. Hypersonic strike weapons will provide a highly 
responsive, long-range, conventional capability for distant, defended, 
and/or time-critical threats when other forces are unavailable, denied 
access, or not preferred. Hypersonic weapon systems will provide senior 
leaders additional credible strike options to influence all stages of 
conflict without crossing the nuclear threshold.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER
    Mr. Turner. We are just past the three-year anniversary for the 
Space Force. Can you please explain in detail how the establishment of 
the Space Force as a separate service has benefitted the country and 
national security, particularly when compared to how Space was managed 
prior to the Force's establishment?''
    Secretary Plumb. The decision to pursue the establishment of the 
U.S. Space Force (USSF) reflected recommendations and advice of 
multiple independent commissions and studies regarding how to adapt our 
defense space enterprise to the growing security challenges in space. 
These reviews considered many potential models including making changes 
within the U.S. Air Force, establishing a structure like Special 
Operations Command, and the establishment of a separate Military 
Service.
    Ultimately, these efforts led to the legislation establishing the 
USSF as the sixth Armed Force. This outcome reflected the importance of 
strengthening advocacy for space in budgeting decisions, strengthening 
development of doctrine for space, and the need to bring coherency to 
the complex research, development, and acquisition challenges of 
developing hardware and software for space architectures of the future.
    Access to and freedom to operate in space is critical to our 
national security and economic prosperity. However, space is a 
contested domain. Potential adversaries are fielding and developing 
increasingly complex capabilities in order to have the means to deny 
the United States access to the space capabilities that are fundamental 
to our way of war and modern way of life. The Space Force's organize, 
train, and equip role enables our Guardians to protect national 
security interests, together with the rest of the Joint Force, in space 
and across all domains.
    In the Fiscal Year 2024 Presidential budget, we saw the largest 
increase to the space budget to date--reflecting the increased 
importance of space to our national security and the need to address 
the challenges we face from adversary threats.
    In addition to equipping and budgeting, USSF fills the statutory 
role to organize and train our Guardians and has established a mission 
and vision to prepare for conflict that may begin or extend into space. 
The USSF has established warfighter training and doctrine that had not 
previously existed, and has organized itself into a force capable of 
providing space capabilities to the joint warfighter, and moreover, 
fully capable of reacting to hostile activities during conflict, and 
denying the adversary use of space-based capabilities that would 
provide them an advantage terrestrially.
    Mr. Turner. I have heard some claim that the only reason we are 
investing in hypersonic weapons is because our adversaries already have 
them. Do you agree with this claim or are there other reasons the US 
might want to invest in hypersonic weapon capabilities?
    General Cotton. I disagree with this claim. USSTRATCOM began 
advocating for hypersonic weapon capabilities in 2003, and the 
Department of Defense formally recognized the need for a prompt global 
strike capability in 2006, well before potential adversaries began 
maturing and fielding hypersonic weapons. (U) The challenge of holding 
adversary targets at risk continues to grow as advanced offensive and 
defensive systems hinder our ability to employ fires in highly 
contested environments. Today, the only prompt long-range strike 
capabilities are ballistic missile systems armed with nuclear warheads. 
Hypersonic strike weapons will provide a highly responsive, long-range, 
conventional capability for distant, defended, and/or time-critical 
threats when other forces are unavailable, denied access, or not 
preferred. Hypersonic weapon systems will provide senior leaders 
additional credible strike options to influence all stages of conflict 
without crossing the nuclear threshold.
                                 ______
                                 
                 QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. DESJARLAIS
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. Shifting gears just a little bit, we had a 
conversation regarding non-strategic nuclear weapons. And how many non-
strategic nuclear weapons does Russia have? And in what ways is their 
arsenal expanding and expected to expand?
    General Cotton. Please see classified response.

                                  [all]