[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                     

                          [H.A.S.C. No. 118-4]

    THE ROLE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES IN GREAT POWER COMPETITION

                               __________

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

          SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS

                                 OF THE

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                              HEARING HELD

                            FEBRUARY 8, 2023


                                     


                 [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]






                               ______
                                 

                 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

53-350                    WASHINGTON : 2024






----------------------------------------------------------------------



                                     


          SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS

                  JACK BERGMAN, Michigan, Chairman

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia                RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona
ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York          WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
TRENT KELLY, Mississippi             JASON CROW, Colorado
RONNY JACKSON, Texas                 ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan
NANCY MACE, South Carolina           SARA JACOBS, California
MORGAN LUTTRELL, Texas               JEFF JACKSON, North Carolina
CORY MILLS, Florida                  JIMMY PANETTA, California

                Joe Bartlett, Professional Staff Member
                Will Johnson, Professional Staff Member
                  Zachary Calderon, Research Assistant










                            C O N T E N T S

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                                                                   Page

              STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Bergman, Hon. Jack, a Representative from Michigan, Chairman, 
  Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations............     1
Gallego. Hon. Ruben, a Representative from Arizona, Ranking 
  Member, Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations....     2

                               WITNESSES

Jones, Seth G., Senior Vice President, Center for Strategic and 
  International Studies..........................................     3
Ucko, David H., Professor and Department Chair, College of 
  International Security Affairs, National Defense University....     5

                                APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

    Jones, Seth G................................................    25
    Ucko, David H................................................    39

Documents Submitted for the Record:

    [There were no Documents submitted.]

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

    [There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

    [There were no Questions submitted post hearing.]











 
    THE ROLE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES IN GREAT POWER COMPETITION

                              ----------                              

                  House of Representatives,
                       Committee on Armed Services,
       Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations,
                       Washington, DC, Wednesday, February 8, 2023.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:03 p.m., in 
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jack Bergman 
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JACK BERGMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
 MICHIGAN, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL 
                           OPERATIONS

    Mr. Bergman. Good afternoon. I call to order this hearing 
of the Intelligence and Special Operations Subcommittee on 
``The Role of Special Operations Forces in Great Power 
Competition.''
    The United States is facing a dramatically different 
geopolitical environment than any other time in recent decades. 
While this century has been dominated by our efforts in the 
global war on terrorism, the new era of great power competition 
presents strategic challenges from revisionist states in China 
and Russia and their rogue state allies in Iran and North 
Korea. All the while, the threat from violent extremist 
organizations persist, as nodes from ISIS [Islamic State of 
Iraq and Syria], al-Qaida, and their affiliates continue to 
seek out unstable regions from which they can plot and plan 
against Western targets.
    As the United States faces an inflection point in 
geostrategic competition, so too does our special operations 
community. Thankfully, the SOF [special operations forces] 
enterprise is well-suited to address the challenges posed by 
great power competition, where core SOCOM [U.S. Special 
Operations Command] activities such as irregular warfare and 
the train, advise, and assist mission offer the ability to 
present strategic and operational challenges to our adversaries 
and enable our allies and partners to resist outside 
aggression.
    Great power competition, in which conventional force 
capabilities may play a larger role in deterring hostile 
actions from our state adversaries, similarly means that 
special operations forces will play more of a supporting and 
enabling role for the wider joint force. The core functions of 
the SOF enterprise, when taken together, provide options and 
capabilities across the entire operational spectrum--from gray 
zone competition to direct military engagement if the need 
arises.
    During this transition, it will be critical for our special 
operators to continue to hone new skills and expertise in a 
variety of areas, from critical cultural knowledge and language 
capabilities, to being tactically proficient in the cyber and 
information space.
    Today's hearing is focused on the role of special 
operations forces as the United States enters an era of great 
power competition. This subcommittee will seek to examine the 
unique capabilities of SOCOM and how special operations forces' 
core activities may complement and enable the joint force to 
operate against strategic adversaries. We hope to further 
understand which skill sets of the SOF community must be 
relearned after 20-plus years of counterterrorism, and what new 
skills our special operators must learn to operate in the 21st 
century gray zone, below the threshold of direct military 
intervention.
    Our witnesses today have a breadth of experience with the 
special operations community and the study of gray zone 
conflict and irregular warfare.
    Dr. Seth Jones is a senior vice president at the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies. Dr. Jones has also served 
as a director at the RAND Corporation and has served as a plans 
officer and adviser to the commanding general of U.S. Special 
Operations Forces in Afghanistan.
    Dr. David Ucko is a professor and department chair at the 
College of International Security Affairs at the National 
Defense University, where he oversees the college's irregular 
warfare area of concentration.
    In the interest of time, I ask the witnesses to keep their 
opening remarks to 5 minutes or less so that we will have 
sufficient time for questions and answers.
    With that, please let me thank our witnesses for appearing 
before us today.
    And I now recognize Ranking Member Gallego for any opening 
remarks.
    And, oh, by the way, just know the subcommittee chairman 
and the ranking member both probably look at life from a 
slightly Marine Corps perspective. So, having said that, just 
keep your words, you know, to simple syllables. We want to be 
able to understand.
    Congressman Gallego, over to you.

STATEMENT OF HON. RUBEN GALLEGO, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ARIZONA, 
   RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL 
                           OPERATIONS

    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to 
working with you in a bipartisan manner to continue the great 
work that we started last year.
    And it is hard to think of a more appropriate topic as we 
continue our oversight responsibilities at the beginning of 
this Congress. As I said during last year's SOCOM posture 
hearing, special operations forces are at an inflection point. 
The 2022 National Defense Strategy focuses on strategic 
competition to counter China's growing multi-domain challenges 
and Russia's persistent aggression, including its ongoing war 
in Ukraine.
    SOF has a significant role to play and, in this volatile 
security environment, should be prioritized.
    But I want to return to the inflection point I mentioned 
earlier at the hearing. How are SOF postured to support a 
whole-of-government approach to great power competition?
    What is the role in concert with other departments and 
agencies so you are using the right instrument of national 
power for its best purposes?
    The summary of the Irregular Warfare Annex to the National 
Defense Strategy published in 2020 tells us that irregular 
warfare is the struggle among state and non-state actors to 
influence populations and affect legitimacy. This needs to be 
prioritized as a competency within the joint force and the 
special operations community.
    Some of the core activities that are important to irregular 
warfare are ones like foreign international defense and 
military information support operations, which are essential if 
we are to be successful in confronting our competitors in the 
gray zone or below the threshold of armed conflict.
    My question stands: Where does the special forces community 
stand in the core activities needed for irregular warfare?
    Has the focus on counterterrorism and counter violent 
extremist organizations, which has been needed for the last 20 
years, caused other aspects of SOCOM's core activities to 
atrophy?
    I would argue that the lessons over the last 20 years, as 
is, don't directly translate to the needs of today or tomorrow. 
We need to ensure that SOCOM has the right training, 
institutional education, and authorities to continue to be the 
best at what this nation asks them to do.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this hearing. And I also want 
to thank our witnesses for their time today. And I look forward 
to hearing your views.
    Mr. Bergman. Thank you, Representative Gallego.
    We will now hear from our witnesses, then move into 
question and answer session.
    So, Dr. Jones, we will begin with you.

 STATEMENT OF SETH G. JONES, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, CENTER FOR 
              STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

    Dr. Jones. Thank you very much, Chairman Bergman, Ranking 
Member Gallego, and distinguished members of the committee. 
This is an important hearing, and look forward to the 
discussion afterwards.
    As I will outline in my testimony, U.S. Special Operations 
Forces need to play an important role in competition, 
particularly with such countries as China, Russia, and Iran, 
including in the area of irregular warfare.
    My brief remarks are going to cover three areas.
    The first is irregular warfare.
    The second is the role of SOF in irregular warfare.
    And the third are some implications on the congressional 
side.
    So, let me just say that I think, as has been well 
documented in the recent National Defense Strategy and the 
National Security Strategy, we are in an era of competition 
with a range of countries, particularly with the Chinese at the 
top. I would argue, as we have seen historically, we have not 
had nuclear powers ever go to war directly with each other, in 
part because states get quite cautious in conventional warfare 
against other nuclear powers.
    So, the Soviets, even the Chinese and the Indians, or the 
Indians and Pakistanis, have generally acted with restraint. We 
have not seen any of those states go to direct conventional war 
with each other.
    However, we have still seen intense competition below the 
threshold of conventional war. So, I would argue here today 
that I consider this area below the threshold of conventional 
war as probably being the primary area of competition on an 
hourly and a daily category.
    As we look at a range of U.S. competitors, the Chinese are 
very active below this threshold with elements of the People's 
Liberation Army, the Ministry of State Security, the Ministry 
of Public Security. The Russians with elements of the GRU, the 
Main Directorate; the SVR, Foreign Intelligence Service; the 
FSB [Federal Security Service]; several of Russia's special 
operations forces, including its Spetsnaz; as well as non-state 
entities including, as we have seen in the Ukraine in the 
Bakhmut area, the Wagner Group, and some of the private 
military companies.
    And I don't need to say a lot about the Iranians because 
they are among the quintessential irregular actors with the 
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Quds Force, and its relationship 
with the Lebanese Hezbollah, Popular Mobilization Forces, and 
others around the Middle East.
    So, I think when we look at, at the role of SOF in this 
arena, I think there is a particular role for activities 
outside of direct action. That has been the mantra over the 20 
years after 9/11 of SOF and many of its units. But I think what 
we are talking about primarily, because of the risk of 
escalation, is a heavy focus on things like foreign internal 
defense, providing assistance to a range of countries. So, 
think for a moment about aiding the Baltic States or Finland in 
providing assistance in case of an invasion, Russian invasion, 
not imminent at this point, but certainly potentially down the 
road.
    Taiwan in case of an invasion there is an important 
component of the Taiwanese would need to resist both 
conventionally but also an irregular element of that as well.
    Unconventional warfare, which is the support to non-state 
entities, non-state partners, a role historically of 
organizations like the Green Berets.
    And then a range of other activities, including information 
operations.
    My general view is, again, is that I think there has been a 
slight misunderstanding of the non-kinetic side of special 
operations forces. And they, they have a range of capabilities.
    When it comes to the role of Congress, I think Congress has 
a very important role moving forward for SOF, particularly in 
this area of irregular warfare. My own view is that funding 
should be considered expanding in the section 1202 area, 
potentially also in triple-three, section 333. And happy to 
discuss that.
    I do think there needs to be a broad review, posture review 
of the Department of Defense's and the interagency role in 
irregular warfare.
    And happy to take more specific questions. But as I have 
argued so far, I think this will be a major form of 
competition. The Chinese, the Russians, and the Iranians are 
heavily involved in this, and we need to responsibly as well.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Jones can be found in the 
Appendix on page 25.]
    Mr. Bergman. Thank you, Dr. Jones.
    Dr. Ucko.

  STATEMENT OF DAVID H. UCKO, PROFESSOR AND DEPARTMENT CHAIR, 
  COLLEGE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, NATIONAL DEFENSE 
                           UNIVERSITY

    Dr. Ucko. Chairman Bergman, Ranking Member Gallego, and 
members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me here 
today.
    As we have heard, the United States finds itself in an era 
of strategic competition. How to respond is now the focus of 
the U.S. Government, but it is a question compounded by the 
variegated and global method of attack.
    Indeed, America's rivals are deliberately avoiding U.S. 
strengths, particularly in the military domain. And, instead, 
they privilege ambiguity and subterfuge, blending statecraft 
with subversion and war with peace.
    SOF have and can contribute to this competition through its 
specialization in irregular warfare. In recent years, SOF has 
broadened its application of foreign internal defense and 
unconventional warfare to IW [irregular warfare] missions and 
SOF core activities to fit this new strategic environment. FID 
[foreign internal defense] traditionally meant aiding a 
friendly government against an insurgency. But SOF now looks 
upon it to boost a country's resilience against foreign-
sponsored proxies.
    UW [unconventional warfare] traditionally implied 
sponsoring an insurgency against an illicit or occupying 
government. But SOF now looks upon its work as supporting 
resistance capabilities for states either facing foreign 
invasion or seeking to deter such a threat.
    Building resilience and resistance will be key lines of 
effort in America's overall approach. Yet, they are also highly 
demanding tasks requiring institutional readiness and 
protracted partnerships abroad. There is today a need to 
rebalance SOF in favor of FID and UW, and to harness the skills 
they call for within this new strategic era.
    This will mean an emphasis on language skills, cultural 
know-how, political awareness, and strategic acumen, all at 
scale, with major implications for SOF recruitment and career 
tracks.
    Yet, FID and UW are more than military tasks. In FID the 
assets trained by SOF must be supported by a capable security 
sector, undergirded by sustainable institutions, and operating 
alongside instruments of state that can take the lead in 
political, societal, and economic matters.
    In UW, fostering potential for armed resistance must be 
complemented by a whole-of-society effort to provide a legal 
framework, engage with allies and partners, build a narrative 
for mobilization, and win the struggle for legitimacy that is 
so essential to irregular warfare.
    This calls for greater interagency coordination, and 
integration even, in conducting what many see exclusively as a 
SOF task.
    This brings us to the primary non-military nature of 
strategic competition. Indeed, as our competitors seek to avoid 
our military strengths, there are clear limits to how much we 
can and should expect from SOF, still a military force. 
Responding to weaponized corruption, election interference, 
media penetration, political infiltration, dodgy trade deals, 
and infrastructural development will require a far broader 
portfolio. Even where SOF has relevant capability, for example 
its PSYOPS [psychological operations] assets, so do other 
instruments of power. And they must be made to count.
    This is not only a matter of managing SOF's operational 
tempo, which has been too high for too long, forcing standards 
to slip, it is also about allowing SOF to master the tasks we 
expect of them, FID and UW in particular. Thus, where SOF 
engages in non-military tasks, it should be to increase the 
reach and effectiveness of civilian agencies.
    My written testimony sets out useful precedents for such 
integration at the operational level, which could be scaled up 
for truly strategic effect. This also means integrating better 
with general purpose forces for a more calibrated division of 
labor, particularly as concerns security force assistance and 
persistent partnerships.
    Now, such partnerships do rely on an interagency and 
conventional military being able to play their parts within 
irregular warfare. Thus, I recommend interagency strategic 
education, training, and sensitization as to the nature of this 
competition and the roles of different components of state in 
generating a tailored response.
    My college, the College of International Security Affairs 
at the National Defense University, provides a model for such 
education that could be scaled up for greater effect. At our 
campus at Fort McNair here in DC, under the Regional Defense 
Fellowship Program we combine senior officials from across the 
armed services, the intelligence community, the interagency, 
and partner nations for an education in irregular warfare and 
associated strategies. The program is partner oriented, with 
more than 50 percent of students coming from abroad.
    At our MA [master of arts] program at Fort Bragg, civilian 
academics teach an irregular warfare curriculum to SOF officers 
and NCOs [noncommissioned officers], alongside international 
SOF students and State Department personnel.
    On integration, there's also a key role here for cross-
functional teams, liaison officers, and other structural ways 
of cutting across agencies, thereby enabling awareness and 
synchronization of respective strengths. The newly formed 
Irregular Warfare Center could play a leading role in this 
initiative, as it provides a focal point for irregular warfare 
and taps into existing networks devoted to this topic.
    As of the FY 2023 defense budget, it has been granted 
authorities to engage and coordination across the interagency 
to enhance America's capability for irregular and political 
warfare.
    The final need is for greater strategic clarity and long-
term planning for strategic competition, to understand what we 
are both competing for and against. I think this means 
developing a strategy that proceeds according to a clearly 
elaborated theory of success rather than just the means and 
capabilities at our disposal.
    I look forward to discussing these issues with you, and to 
your questions.
    Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Ucko can be found in the 
Appendix on page 39.]
    Mr. Bergman. Thank you, Doctor.
    And I will defer my questions until--till last.
    I would like to recognize Ranking Member Gallego for his 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Chairman. I just have two 
questions. And this is to both of our witnesses.
    While we are discussing the role of SOF in great power 
competition, are there some areas that should be left to other 
departments and agencies?
    And are there any tasks that SOF should not necessarily do 
when it comes to great power competition?
    And that is not necessarily that they can't do it well, but 
that someone else could probably be doing it better and we have 
the opportunity cost issue here.
    Want to start, Dr. Jones?
    Dr. Jones. Sure.
    Yes, so I think a range of the skill sets that SOF do get 
involved in, including information operations, there is a role 
in MISO [military information support operations] that SOF can 
play. But I think in general, as we look across the U.S. 
Government more broadly, there is a critical role and a leading 
role for the State Department to play there, including with the 
Global Engagement Center.
    When it comes to covert activity there is certainly a role 
for the U.S. intelligence community to play.
    So, I would say on some of these areas SOF and the 
Department of Defense are not even the leading agency for this 
but need to be nested. This does raise questions about to what 
degree on the information side we are nested more broadly into 
a broader strategy. And I don't--I think we are still a long 
way away from where we were in the last, say, decade of the 
Cold War.
    So, that is one.
    When it comes to providing foreign internal defense, there 
are key elements, I think, of training foreign forces that are 
probably better left to Army or Marine Corps forces as well. I 
think when you're talking about specialized units, your special 
operations forces, commando units, some civil defense side that 
would be engaged in responding to a foreign invasion, that is 
probably where SOF has some comparative advantage.
    But general, there are SFABs [security force assistance 
brigades] within the Army, for example, that can do broader 
training.
    So, I think it depends on what kind of foreign military, 
for example, is training and whether that is better left to SOF 
or conventional forces.
    Mr. Gallego. And we have seen some of, for example, State 
National Guards going and training other countries, and with a 
lot of that, a lot of that relationship that normally would 
have been taken up by special forces and they're doing it, and 
doing it well, and freeing up our SOF elements for something 
else.
    Dr. Ucko.
    Dr. Ucko. Thank you, Representative Gallego.
    I concur with my colleague here. I would say that on the 
military or security side it is absolutely worth mentioning the 
State Partnership Program that the National Guard leads up. And 
the way that that has produced an enduring security cooperation 
bond with strategically relevant countries.
    The SFAB initiative I think is also a very positive step 
for the Army, finally recognizing that it, too, has a role in 
security force systems and need to actually devote specialized 
assets to that end.
    But it is also worth recalling, again, that great power 
competition is primarily non-military, and that China, and 
Russia, and other actors we're competing with have found a way 
of carrying out the so-called war of interlocking, that is to 
say synchronizing different efforts across different agencies. 
And we need to be as versatile and as nimble.
    And on that front, I think that it would be foolish to look 
to the special operations community as the go-to option in 
responding to this type of aggression. I'm thinking in 
particular in terms of countering threat finance. Admittedly, 
SOF has a burgeoning expertise in this area, but I think it 
would be unwise to neglect the fact that Department of Commerce 
and the OFAC [Office of Foreign Assets Control] also should 
have a role to play. And that we need to make sure that our 
portfolio is as diverse and as specialized, particularly at the 
strategic level, as that of our adversaries.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Gallego. And, Dr. Ucko, you recently proposed a 
modified definition of irregular warfare. Can you share that 
with the group and why you believe that is important?
    Dr. Ucko. Absolutely.
    Irregular warfare, ironically, has become more of a talking 
point since we said goodby to the so-called war on terror. And 
yet, of course, that was 20 years of very protracted and very 
intense involvement in this term.
    My concern is that in trying to close that chapter we will 
now try to redefine irregular warfare as something very 
different from the experience we had there.
    To my mind, the definition that was come up in 2007, the 
joint operating concept, is still absolutely relevant. 
Irregular warfare, then, is a violent struggle for legitimacy. 
It is violent because it is, ultimately, something that the 
military is involved in. If you take that away, then irregular 
warfare becomes pretty much anything China does.
    And it is a struggle for legitimacy because in the struggle 
a need for partnerships and for mobilizing potential and united 
fronts is key. This is an area where China and Russia are 
competing extremely heavily.
    So, I wrote this piece on redefining irregular warfare to 
make sure that we don't lose the lessons, both positive and 
negative, from the last two decades, and turn irregular warfare 
into something that is in fact very alien to its nature. This 
is still something that we have to deal with now versed 
against--waged against states, rather, non-state actors. But it 
is an area of more continuity than change.
    Mr. Gallego. I yield back, Mr. Chair.
    Mr. Bergman. Representative Scott, you are recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Dr. Ucko, I want to stay on that train of thought. And 
could you identify briefly, in about 2 minutes so that I can 
move to Dr. Jones, the key differences in the way Russia and 
China carry out irregular warfare and their competition?
    Dr. Ucko. Yes, absolutely.
    I would say that--do you mean the difference between the 
two respective nations or between us and them?
    Mr. Scott. Between the two respective nations.
    Dr. Ucko. Right. Thank you, Representative.
    Yes. I think Russia has emphasized to a greater degree the 
use of violence, seen most egregiously, of course, in Ukraine, 
but also previously in Georgia, also in its engagement on the 
African continent. Its main contribution to those states have 
been in the security realm with the deployment of the so-called 
Wagner Group to provide, effectively, the role of mercenaries.
    China, in contrast, has adopted a slightly different role. 
And I think it is more invested in infrastructural development, 
economic, financial, and informational lines of effort. That, 
in a sense, and perhaps paradoxically, I think, is a bigger 
threat. Because whereas Russia has played the role of spoiler, 
China actually threatens to contribute something and to create 
a new order.
    That order I think is deleterious both to the countries 
that it is targeting and to the international system that the 
United States upholds. But it is, nonetheless, attractive, 
particularly to elites looking for quick solutions to urgent 
problems of debt and poverty.
    So, therein lies one difference.
    And I think going back to the issue of irregular warfare, 
then, what we have to make sure is that we also bring into the 
fore the notion of political warfare which, of course, George 
Kennan described as the application of Clausewitzian logic in 
times of peace. But Russia and China, then, bridge the spectrum 
from conflict to peace. And we need to ensure that while the 
DOD [Department of Defense] and the special operations forces 
have a role in particular to play along that spectrum, we don't 
use sight of the other instruments of state that must also be 
integrated and synchronized to meet a threat where it is 
active.
    Mr. Scott. So, just in summary, China is using debt and 
infrastructure projects, whereas Russia is using mercenaries 
and the Wagner Group?
    Dr. Ucko. Yes, absolutely. I think that is a fair 
characterization.
    Mr. Scott. The end result is the same in that the people 
lose the country.
    Dr. Ucko. Yes.
    I would add one point which is, of course, that the target 
is never static. And what Russia did in February of last year 
will very much inform the way it acts in the future. It would 
be foolish, and I think unrealistic, to assume that it won't 
learn from this strategic error.
    Mr. Scott. Dr. Jones, I want to stay on the issue of 
African Wagner Group. My friend Jimmy Panetta and I traveled 
there; I've traveled there several times. But the most recent 
time we had seen a marked change towards the French on the 
continent of Africa in the Lake Chad Basin area and Mali.
    And it seems that Wagner Group has been extremely 
successful in the use of social media to drive the general 
public against the French. There is one, and it is publicly 
reported, instant where French ISR [intelligence, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance] picked up a mass grave and mass killing 
that had been carried out presumably by the Wagner Group. And 
when the French reported that, before it was ever disseminated 
to the general public, Wagner had picked up on it and put it 
out that the French had done that.
    The end result of that is the public believed what they 
heard first. And the French were asked, have been asked in some 
cases to leave the countries.
    How fast do we have to operate when it comes to the social 
media aspect of information and our special forces groups?
    Where should the authorities lie? Should it be at the 
lieutenant colonel level where the commander on the ground in-
country has the authority to just unleash his keyboard warrior?
    Dr. Jones. Well, two things. On the role of organizations 
like the Wagner Group, I mean, it is certainly important to put 
this in the context of the Wagner Group. If you look at its 
location where it operates out of in Russia, it is collocated 
with Russian Spetsnaz. So, there is a close connection deployed 
overseas between the Wagner Group and Russian government 
agencies, whether it is Spetsnaz, GRU, SVR, or even the Kremlin 
itself with Yevgeny Prigozhin.
    And they are heavily involved, as you know, in information 
operations against the French, against us, against local 
governments in some cases. So, I think there is an important 
need to combat those kinds of information campaigns.
    Now, how much of that gets pushed down, I think it depends. 
I do think there is a need to have initiatives at the lower 
level. It may depend on the concept of operations. There may be 
some CONOPS that need to be approved, because of their 
sensitivity, at higher levels.
    Mr. Scott. I am out of time.
    It just seems to me that with regard to the information 
war, if you don't move first, it doesn't matter if it is an 
hour or a week behind, you are out.
    I yield.
    Mr. Bergman. Thank you.
    Now, since we have two members of the subcommittee with the 
last name of Jackson, this will be Representative Jeff Jackson. 
You are recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Jackson of North Carolina. I would defer to the doctor. 
Only one of these Jacksons is a doctor.
    Mr. Bergman. I don't know. Would you like to be a doctor?
    Mr. Jackson of North Carolina. I will go and I will defer 
afterwards.
    I just want to ground this conversation real quick. I 
understand we are having a very high-level conversation which I 
gather is basically about reorienting SOF in the great power 
conflict era into which we appear to be entering.
    When I think about reorienting a military group, I think in 
terms of mission, training, and equipment, and that we have to 
make changes along those three axes.
    And I would like you both, if you would, give me a quick 
glance at mission, training, equipment. Are there major changes 
that need to be made in each one of those categories?
    Is it major in one and minor in two others?
    Do you think we are okay in one area?
    How big of a pivot are we really talking about on the 
ground?
    Dr. Ucko. I will attempt to answer your question, 
Representative. It is a very good one.
    I think in terms of mission there is a contrast to be drawn 
between aiding El Salvador against the FMLN [Farabundo Marti 
National Liberation Front] in a FID environment of the 1980s, 
and helping a country that is threatened by China. Not only is 
the adversary a state actor, and a very potent one at that, but 
the threat of military action is also both more remote and more 
existential.
    And so, in the mission we have to probably spend some time 
redefining what it is that we are fighting for, and what 
victory will look like.
    How do you know that you are resilient? It is one thing 
when you are facing an ongoing insurgency. It is another thing 
when you are facing proxies, auxiliaries, and subversion within 
your state borders.
    So, again, this is perhaps a less military problem set than 
a political and societal one. We have to, in a sense, 
effectively figure out where would we draw the line.
    And I am sorry, that is not a very definitive answer, but I 
think it speaks to the messiness of the strategy that is being 
waged against us.
    In terms of training, then, certainly after two decades of 
heavy use of SOF in direct action, it is heartening to see that 
after the withdrawal from Afghanistan we have seen initial 
steps of rebalancing and returning to the regional alignment of 
the Special Forces in particular, but SOF in general. And that 
is, I think, a step that we need to continue and sustain so 
that you have the, again, cultural knowhow, the linguistic 
skill set, and political awareness necessary to engage in 
partner countries and to understand the environment in which 
you are operating, both human and otherwise.
    And then equipment, this is when things get more techy. I 
think there's been some interesting news in the last few 
months, which I applaud, talking about the deployment of drones 
as a particular MOS [military occupational specialty], the 
possibility of adding cyber MOSes within special operations 
forces, and taking the lessons from Ukraine and trying to 
institutionalize that within emerging force structure.
    So, that would be my initial attack at that question.
    Thank you.
    Dr. Jones. Great, great question.
    Let me just start off by saying that, that this problem set 
is obviously not new to the SOF community. They--organizations 
like the U.S. Army Green Berets have a long history of doing 
irregular activity. So I think this is--the shifts are not 
major in most cases. But I will give you some examples of I 
think where.
    So, if we go to mission, probably more of a rebalancing 
than a big mission shift. The rebalancing is when you are 
dealing with countering major powers instead of terrorist 
groups, probably shift away from how much you are putting into 
direct action and how much you are putting into foreign 
internal defense and unconventional warfare, I would argue.
    The number of direct action missions you are going to want 
to do when it involves the Chinese government or the Russians 
is going to be limited because of the risks of escalation.
    So, I think it is a rebalancing on the missions.
    On the training, I think that is a bit of a challenge 
because I think you are talking about shifting from special 
operations forces that have had to work through Dari, and 
Pashto, and Arabic in some areas, and now you are dealing with 
Mandarin and Russian. Or, if you are dealing with, you know, 
the Finns or the Baltic States, you are dealing with Eastern 
European languages in order to.
    So, I think there are some cultural-linguistic challenges 
that SOF have to get through in understanding the partners that 
they are working with, certainly the case in the Indo-Pacific.
    And then on the equipment, I would wholly agree. I think 
the issue is the French have withdrawn from key parts of 
Africa; so have we. So have we from the Middle East. So, I 
think there you are talking about ISR assets, where we are 
probably going to need more of to cover a bigger terrain. And 
the same thing on drones, and also underwater activity.
    Mr. Jackson of North Carolina. Thank you.
    I yield to the doctor.
    Mr. Bergman. Thank you. And Dr. Jackson of Texas, you are 
recognized for 5 minutes.
    Dr. Jackson of Texas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate 
the time. Unfortunately, I came in with three great questions 
and they have almost been completely addressed at this 
particular point.
    So, I will yield my time back. I thank you.
    Mr. Bergman. Okay. Congressman Panetta of California, you 
are recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Panetta. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Appreciate this 
opportunity.
    Gentlemen, good afternoon. Thanks for being here.
    I think it was Dr. Jones, you talked about 1202 and title 
333 authority. So, let's focus on there.
    Obviously, 1202 authority enables DOD to support foreign 
forces engaged in IW, irregular warfare. However, once a 
conflict is determined to turn conventional, that authority is 
removed, as happened in Ukraine where 1202 authority is no 
longer applied.
    Are there other funding authorities that could be used to 
supplant 1202 in that situation?
    Dr. Jones. Possibly. I mean, I think there are elements of 
triple-three, of section 333, that could be used for building 
partner capacity. If there's a counterterrorism component of 
it, 127 Echo. So, there may be other authorities that could be 
used, depending on the circumstances.
    Mr. Panetta. But isn't title 33, that can't be used for 
irregular, it can only be used for asymmetric warfare; correct?
    Dr. Jones. Well, it's a--I am operating in the gray zone 
here. It kind of depends on how one interprets it. So, if a 
country is--if you want to build the capacity for future 
irregular activities, I mean there may be some, some ways you 
can, you can define that.
    Mr. Panetta. Okay. So, I mean, going forward, once you 
either--once you have conventional or asymmetrical warfare, 
those two authorities are no longer applied?
    Dr. Jones. That is my understanding.
    Mr. Panetta. Okay. And is there any other type of authority 
that could allow us any other type of funding stream?
    Dr. Jones. There may be. I'm not aware off the top of my 
head.
    Mr. Panetta. Okay. Would you happen to know, sir?
    Dr. Ucko. No. I would [inaudible] the same answer.
    But I would add, if I may----
    Mr. Panetta. Please.
    Mr. Ucko [continuing]. That part of the confusion here is 
this delineation between irregular and major combat operations. 
It just doesn't really make sense in reality. And I think that 
is when we come up to these legislative hurdles with 
authorities.
    I would probably prefer just to speak of war as war in all 
its complexity, but we are where we are. But that might be one 
of the issues confronting us at this point.
    Mr. Panetta. Understood. And one I am sure we will talk 
more about in this committee, I would imagine.
    Moving on to Africa. Obviously, as you heard from my travel 
partner over there, Representative Scott of Georgia, we have 
taken a couple trips to Africa actually, three total, two to 
the Sahel. Obviously seeing some unfortunate developments that 
have gone on there, not just with the spread of VEOs [violent 
extremist organizations] and, obviously, the influx of Wagner, 
be it in Central African Republic, Mali, and possibly Burkina 
Faso based on some of the flags we saw at the coup, creating a 
lot of instability, pushing out France and, obviously, having 
military governments filling that vacuum that are openly 
sympathetic to Moscow, unfortunately.
    I know I think, Mr. Scott, Mr. Jones, you talked about 
there has been a withdrawal from Africa. Well, I wouldn't 
necessarily says a withdrawal from Africa, because if you look 
at Chad, and you look at Niger, I believe Niger is kind of the 
Alamo. That is what I call it, in the sense that, you know, you 
saw the French forces go there after leaving Mali. We have our 
forces there, either in Diffa or Ouallam or right there in the 
capital city.
    I mean, do you believe that we can hold the Alamo based on 
the situation that we are facing right now?
    Dr. Jones. It is a very good question. By withdrawal my, my 
only comment there is when it comes to U.S. Special Operations 
Forces in Africa, the number has decreased over the last couple 
of years. So, we have----
    Mr. Panetta. Fair.
    Mr. Jones [continuing]. Withdrawn some numbers.
    And the challenge when you look at the Sahel, with groups 
like JNIM [Jama'at Nasr al-Slam wal Muslimin], some of the 
areas of North Africa, including in Libya, or even in the Horn 
with Somalia, is we are seeing pretty significant activity of 
violent extremist organizations.
    I think the situation in the Sahel is extremely dangerous 
right now with the spread of both al-Qaida and Islamic State-
linked groups operating. On the one hand it is a spreading 
right now. And we have got now Russian Wagner Group and Russian 
intelligence agencies linked up.
    On the other hand, I am not aware of much external plotting 
going on against the United States from these areas. So, you 
know, it is different--it is a different situation from Syria 
where we have seen external plotting in the west from areas.
    So, I think it is an area of monitoring closely. We need to 
be involved to some degree. How much? That is an area of debate 
and discussion.
    Mr. Panetta. Understood. Look forward to having that 
debate.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Bergman. Thank you.
    Mr. Mills of Florida, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Mills. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both for 
coming.
    And understanding this is about the great power resurgence, 
if you will, and knowing the geopolitical alignments now of 
Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, I feel that the United 
States for many decades now has been very good in the kinetic 
elements of things. But we have failed to address a lot of the 
economic resource and cyber warfare capabilities that we are 
against.
    In many cases while we are seeing where there is an 
increase in the capability of messaging strategies of 
propaganda and information warfare against the West whereby we 
don't have an effective countermessaging strategy to be able to 
prevent this. From your perspective, would you see fit more 
allocations of funding that would address the geopolitical 
alignments as opposed to just the kinetic elements of things?
    Dr. Jones. Absolutely. And I think this goes back to our 
discussion both on amounts of funding, but also the speed with 
which we respond.
    I mean, I think the Chinese also--we talked about Africa 
and the Russians--the Chinese are a very good example. Their 
entire three warfares campaign involve--all of them are non-
kinetic. All of them involved information. And all of them are 
aggressive. That is in part, along with bribery and corruption, 
how they got into the Solomon Islands.
    Which is for anybody that has read our World War II 
history, including our Marine Corps history, we fought tooth 
and nail against the Japanese there. So, now the Chinese have 
moved in. We lost that information fight in the Solomon 
Islands.
    So, I think the funding side, as well as the speed with 
which we respond, are important.
    Mr. Mills. And just kind of following up on that same tone, 
and obviously this is information I am aware of, but I just 
want it for the chamber.
    Knowing that it is an economic resource warfare that's been 
launched against, and it is one of Chairman Xi's primary 
focuses to try and expand out the Eurasian border, which is 
what I believe Ukraine was truly about, take Africa, Oceania, 
with an attempt to try to create a maritime silk route to choke 
off Western Hemisphere supply chain while dominating resources 
and attacking things like the petrodollar for the ultimate goal 
of U.S. dollar elimination, do you feel that the State 
Department, the DOD, and other elements work well together in 
addressing all of these complex issues when they are so diverse 
and just outside of the SOF kinetic capabilities?
    Dr. Ucko. Thank you for that question, Representative.
    I would offer that we don't have a strategic framework or 
guidance at this point with which to synchronize and integrate 
those respective agencies and departments.
    Mr. Mills. And do you feel that is something that is 
needed?
    Dr. Ucko. I would very much say so. I think a looming 
question in this era is who actually sets a strategy?
    Where are the structures where you have that level of 
interagency integration?
    Certainly at the country team, great things are done, but 
that's within specific countries rather than as a nation. So 
this, I think, is an area of urgent concern, and one that I 
think we should certainly keep moving.
    Mr. Mills. And, Dr. Jones, in your testimony you mention 
that the Department of Defense does not use all the funds 
appropriated to it by Congress for IW activities.
    In what ways would you recommend Congress play a more 
active role in ensuring that DOD maximizes its capabilities in 
this area to counter the very real and very heavily invested 
war being waged against our country by our adversaries?
    Dr. Jones. So, my comment was, was not that it is 
necessarily being used inappropriately. It is more that there 
is a focus predominantly, and there needs to be a focus to some 
degree, on the conventional side of warfare.
    So, we need to build our, we need to build our F-35s. We 
need to build our Virginia-class and Columbia-class submarines. 
We need to build our B-21.
    But the problem is, I think, at least in my view, are some 
of our funding for irregular warfare activities--we are not 
asking for a lot of money. I mean, they are not, they are not 
very costly. But they are pretty low right now. And there is, 
as you are noting, the challenge with the Chinese, I think the 
problem is bigger than what our National Defense Strategy 
highlights, which is a focus on China and the Indo-Pacific.
    And the reality is when you look at the Belt and Road 
Initiative, and you look at China's Digital Silk Road, it is 
global in nature. And it touches key parts of Africa where they 
are building infrastructure and there are information campaigns 
that go along with that; same thing on the Digital Silk Road. 
Which means that, I think, we have got to also be heavily 
invested in countering that activity and funding it.
    So, when I talk about funding, I am talking about some of 
these sections, 1202, triple-three, that I think are pretty low 
right now.
    Mr. Mills. And just really quickly, knowing that it is also 
a geopolitical alliance that has the Chavez in Venezuela, Petro 
in Colombia, and they are developing that kind of Iron Curtain, 
if you will, do you feel counternarco operations would be a 
very effective thing with combating the fentanyl overdoses 
coming across the borders?
    Dr. Jones. Yes. Although I am not an expert on 
counternarcotics. But it certainly is a problem.
    Mr. Mills. Thank you so much for that. I appreciate it.
    With that, I yield back.
    Mr. Bergman. Mr. Luttrell of Texas, you are recognized for 
5 minutes.
    Mr. Luttrell. Am I the clean-up shot?
    Thank you, gentlemen.
    I always get very uneasy when the words ``rebalance,'' and 
``restructure,'' and ``reorganize'' SOF communities come about. 
It seems that that happens as the war starts to progress. We 
saw it in early 2000s as we came in, hard direct action 
missions. And we were at learning curves completely vertical. 
And as we reached out up to the ten and the early, and the 
early teens, we went from--we went into more of a FID where 
organizations were fighting for work, but still forward 
deployed.
    And then ISIS hit and then we went right back to direct 
action missions where it seems like we, we essentially focused 
on FID and certain things when we lost the capability that we 
should have been hyper aggressive on but patiently focused.
    And I hope that is just not the case right now because SOF 
fills out a portfolio of all the experiences that we have had 
over the past two decades. And that is something that we need 
to hold near and dear in case China or Russia clacks off and we 
are actively involved in that.
    But my question to you both is regarding the Tier 1 
organizations in Russia and China, how does the American Tier 1 
organizations compare and compete?
    Dr. Jones. So, I can start there.
    Look, I think our special operations forces in my view are 
the best in the world, whether it's Joint Special Operations 
Command or any of the other special operations forces that are 
within the Department of Defense and, frankly, their partners 
in the U.S. intelligence community.
    I think where we do not have--we are not as well organized 
and not as well structured is what I will call the broader 
interagency. So, that is we see a fair amount of Chinese 
activity across the Chinese intelligence, MSS [Ministry of 
State Security], Chinese PLA [People's Liberation Army], the 
United Front Workers Department. Same thing on the Russian side 
as well.
    That, I think we are being outcompeted in the interagency 
national scope, not on the capabilities of our SOF.
    Mr. Luttrell. And to your point earlier, it seems to me 
that we are trying to spread SOF too thin when it comes to 
these extracurricular activities that the other countries seem 
to be performing in, where we can bring in civil affairs or the 
Army units or the Marine units to help us.
    Does that, does that hold water?
    Dr. Ucko. Yeah. That is exactly the point that I tried to 
make in my testimony.
    There is simply no appetite for irregular warfare really 
outside of SOF. Even the general purpose forces, although I did 
comment on the SFABs as a very positive step. Of course, they 
are oriented predominantly towards conventional warfare. And 
irregular warfare doesn't really translate outside of the 
Pentagon. And so we don't have a strategic construct, which I 
think the Communist--Chinese Communist Party does have and I 
think the Kremlin has for this type of competition.
    Irregular warfare spend does not have to be very high, as 
Dr. Jones put it. But there is also no proponent for it. And I 
think that is allowing us to complete at a more suboptimal 
level than we should be.
    Mr. Luttrell. Okay. I am fairly familiar with the Russian 
Spetsnaz capabilities. Not so much on China. How does that, how 
does that look?
    Dr. Jones. Chinese capabilities of their special operations 
forces I would call mediocre. Where they are high, high profile 
is in areas outside of PLA special operations forces so, for 
example, offensive cyber operations and espionage, along those 
lines, reasonably competent. You know, those are probably the 
areas where, in my view, the Chinese are reasonably competent, 
but not in the special operations.
    Mr. Luttrell. They don't define their SOF like we define 
our SOF with direct action, aggressive warfare?
    Dr. Jones. And they don't use them in the same way. Our 
special operations forces have had several decades of 
experience conducting direct action, unconventional warfare, 
foreign internal defense. So, we have got--we know how to do a 
lot of activity. Chinese are not.
    Again, what the--on the irregular warfare side, the Chinese 
are able to use a range of different agencies in conducting 
action.
    Mr. Luttrell. I yield back. Thank you.
    Mr. Bergman. Ranking Member Gallego, you are recognized.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Mr. Chair, for giving me one more 
bite at the apple. And it is kind of following up on 
Congressman Luttrell's question a little.
    How much and what did we learn from the last 20 years of 
special forces operations, which were largely dominated by CT 
[counterterrorism]-like missions? And did it prepare us for 
irregular warfare?
    I mean, there is the downside but there also should be some 
of the lessons that we can carry over.
    And it is for both witnesses.
    Dr. Ucko. I think what we have learned in the last 20 
years, and it really comes on the back of the information 
technology revolution that started in the 1990s, perhaps even 
1980s, is that SOF equipped with that technology, and having 
the training and education that they do have, can achieve 
amazing things through direct action, but also very sensitive 
clandestine operations.
    The broader strategic lesson, however, I think comes from 
places like Colombia, places like the Philippines, where we see 
FID missions being conducted on a protracted basis through 
partnerships with the host nation government. And, in 
comparison with Afghanistan and Iraq, albeit in a very 
different strategic context, Philippines and Colombia I think 
points to a way forward for FID and for the special operations 
community.
    What does that mean? It requires then a political 
engagement. It requires an enduring partnership, trust. And 
those things, of course, cannot be instantly manufactured. But 
it also requires different instruments of state power to make 
sure that the operational gains can have a strategic meaning.
    So, I think 20 years of war on terror, those are some of 
the key lessons that I would take away from SOF activity.
    Dr. Jones. And I would say what we can do well is if we 
need to hit a target in a specific location, we can do that 
quickly, and we can do it probably better than--not probably--
better than anybody else in the world. So, we can do direct 
action extremely well.
    I think we can generally train foreign forces relatively 
well. We did it in Colombia. We have done it with the Iraqi 
counterterrorism services. But there are limitations to what 
that means. You can't rebuild a government that way. You can't 
nation build.
    So, by training key partner forces it doesn't mean you win 
in that case. We struggled in Afghanistan, despite the fact 
that the commandos were a phenomenal organization as part of a 
broader government that was collapsing.
    So, there are limits to what I think you can do with these 
activities if you don't have it.
    The other thing that I would just add is I think we, 
hopefully, have learned that the answer to dealing with 
challenges is not to flood a foreign country with large numbers 
of American forces. That as I think we finally got to a point 
by 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020 where a small number of both special 
operations and conventional forces, working with an indigenous 
force, the Syrian opposition, could retake territory on the 
Syrian side and on the Iraqi side.
    And I think that was a much better way to end those 20 
years than the way we started by 100,000-plus in both 
countries. We ended up, I think, largely getting it right at 
the end.
    Mr. Gallego. I yield back.
    Mr. Bergman. Thank you. And I know we are going to call 
votes here in a couple minutes.
    But, you know, Dr. Jones, just how would you ideally 
delineate SOCOM's core activities between the component 
commands, TSOCs [Theater Special Operations Commands], JSOCs 
[Joint Special Operations Commands], to compete in irregular 
warfare and continue the CT mission?
    Dr. Jones. Well, I think U.S. Special Operations Command 
generally does not own its forces when they go to the combatant 
commanders. So, it has got a coordinating function with the 
combatant commanders.
    But I think it does have a responsibility. It has got to 
help equip those forces. It has got the responsibility to help 
and work and train with U.S. Army Special Operations Command, 
with the Navy SEALs, with WARCOM [Warfare Command] to help 
train.
    And then with the TSOCs, to help manage the role of special 
operations globally in the combatant commands.
    So, it has got a very important role in preparing for and 
then supporting combatant commanders in the use of special 
operations forces. But, really, without SOCOM and without a 
major role, the special operations community breaks down into 
Army SF [Special Forces], into Navy SEALs. So, it provides 
really the overarching umbrella for the training.
    And then it also has an important role, I think, on the 
personnel side in pushing for the, you know, the--how well the 
forces are dealing with PTSD [post-traumatic stress disorder], 
with suicide, with a range of those issues. SOCOM's got a very 
important component of that as well.
    Mr. Bergman. Thank you.
    Dr. Ucko, in your written statement you equate FID and UW 
to resilience and resistance respectively. How have resilience 
and resistance evolved in the 21st century, especially with the 
expansion of cyber and information space?
    Dr. Ucko. Thank you.
    So, the main change, I think, from what we saw during the 
Cold War is that the threat is no longer primarily military. 
And, of course, it was the military nature of the threat that 
brought SOF into the scene. Defending, again, El Salvador, or 
supporting mujahedeen in Afghanistan is a very different 
enterprise when you are looking at the strategy that China and 
Russia are now using.
    So, that brings in new capabilities that have to be 
sharpened, whether it is countering threat finance, countering 
disinformation. And the question for me is to what degree SOF 
really ought to be taking the lead in those particular areas. 
So, while we speak of FID and UW, really have to bring in other 
agencies and expertise to that portfolio.
    Doctrinally, that is anyway recognized. I think it is also 
recognized within SOF's emphasis on partnerships and working 
with and through their interagency. But it does, perhaps, run 
up against a tendency to press what one former Secretary--one 
former Assistant Secretary of Defense called the SOF easy 
button, that is to say, to delegate things to the special 
operations community because of problems being unorthodox and 
no one else is around to solve them.
    I think that is fighting this competition with one arm tied 
behind our back. And so, we have to probably instead broaden 
what we mean by resilience and resistance to bring in the 
relevant civilian capabilities that can give us strategic 
purpose.
    Mr. Bergman. Okay. Thank you.
    You know, I wanted to thank--I want to thank everybody, our 
members and our witnesses for, I believe, getting our 118th 
Congress subcommittee off to a great start with a presentation 
of ideas, thoughts based on experience, both your experience, 
with all of the members' here experience, to bring us into the 
reality of where we are here in 2023 and going forward.
    And I think since where the first two wolves, Romulus and 
Remus, life has been a competition for resources. You find that 
carcass on the road, you are going to tear it apart and you are 
going to fight for what you want.
    And when we look at what we do as Members of Congress in 
allocating funds, understanding which authorities exist and 
don't exist, and how it relates to the future resources that we 
are going to need, and then understand how we as a 
congressional committee do the right thing then to enable the 
Department of Defense to do what it needs to do, it is--we have 
to be very careful in life that we don't fight yesterday's war 
or use yesterday's--in the case, my case, I would love to be 
able to use just yesterday's phone and make it work, but we 
know it is going to change.
    The point is, as a committee we are going to work through 
this, and we are going to--we are going to test areas where we 
are not comfortable. And we would hope that all of the 
services, all of our subject matter experts who come from the 
different communities will run with us. And we will run 
together and figure out ways in the next 2 years to do the 
right thing for the defense of our Nation through our special 
operations, through our irregular warfare, through the 
recruiting, training, and sustaining of the MOSes that we are 
going to need to win the next fight.
    So, I just with that, unless there is anything else, this 
hearing is adjourned.
    Thank you, everybody.
    [Whereupon, at 4:01 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]


      
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