[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]




GREAT POWER COMPETITION IMPLICATIONS IN AFRICA: THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 
                            AND ITS PROXIES

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                         SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA

                                 OF THE

                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                             July 18, 2023

                               __________

                           Serial No. 118-39

                               __________

        Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs



[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]




Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov, 
                       or http://www.govinfo.gov  
                       
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                 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
                 
53-291 PDF               WASHINGTON : 2023
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                   MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey     GREGORY MEEKS, New York, Ranking 
JOE WILSON, South Carolina               Member
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
DARRELL ISSA, California
ANN WAGNER, Missouri
BRIAN MAST, Florida
KEN BUCK, Colorado
TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee
ANDY BARR, Kentucky
RONNY JACKSON, Texas
YOUNG KIM, California
MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida
BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan
AUMUA AMATA COLEMAN RADEWAGEN, 
    American Samoa
FRENCH HILL, Arkansas
WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio
JIM BAIRD, Indiana
MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
THOMAS KEAN, JR., New Jersey
MICHAEL LAWLER, New York
CORY MILLS, Florida
RICH McCORMICK, Georgia
NATHANIEL MORAN, Texas
JOHN JAMES, Michigan
KEITH SELF, Texas

                                     BRAD SHERMAN, California
                                     GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
                                     WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
                                     AMI BERA, California
                                     JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
                                     DINA TITUS, Nevada
                                     TED LIEU, California
                                     SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania
                                     DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota
                                     COLIN ALLRED, Texas
                                     ANDY KIM, New Jersey
                                     SARA JACOBS, California
                                     KATHY MANNING, North Carolina
                                     SHEILA CHERFILUS-McCORMICK, 
                                         Florida
                                     GREG STANTON, Arizona
                                     MADELEINE DEAN, Pennsylvania
                                     JARED MOSKOWITZ, Florida
                                     JONATHAN JACKSON, Illinois
                                     SYDNEY KAMLAGER-DOVE, California
                                     JIM COSTA, California
                                     JASON CROW, Colorado
                                     BRAD SCHNEIDER, Illinois

                    Brendan Shields, Staff Director

                    Sophia Lafargue, Staff Director
                                 ------                                

                         Subcommittee on Africa

                           JOHN JAMES, Chair
CHRISTOPHER SMITH, New Jersey,       SARA JACOBS, California, Ranking 
YOUNG KIM, California                    Member
JIM BAIRD, Indiana
THOMAS KEAN JR., New Jersey
CORY MILLS, Florida

                                     SHEILA CHERFILUS-McCORMICK, 
                                         Florida
                                     COLIN ALLRED, Texas
                                     JONATHAN JACKSON, Illinois

                       Joe Foltz, Staff Director   
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                            C O N T E N T S

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                                                                   Page

                               WITNESSES

Sany, Joseph, Vice President, Africa Center at the United States 
  Institute of Peace.............................................     6
Hudson, Cameron, Senior Associate, Africa Program at Center for 
  Strategic & International Studies..............................    16
Bax, Pauline, Deputy Program Director, Africa International 
  Crisis Group...................................................    24

                                APPENDIX

Hearing Notice...................................................    49
Hearing Minutes..................................................    51
Hearing Attendance...............................................    52

            RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Responses to questions submitted for the record..................    53

 
                GREAT POWER COMPETITION IMPLICATIONS IN 
                   AFRICA: THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND 
                              ITS PROXIES 

                         Tuesday, July 18, 2023

                          House of Representatives,
                            Subcommittee on Africa,
                      Committee on Foreign Affairs,
                                                    Washington, DC.

    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:01 p.m., in 
room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John James 
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
    Mr. James [presiding]. The Committee on Foreign Affairs 
Subcommittee on Africa will come to order. The purpose of this 
hearing is to analyze the strategic aims in Africa of the 
Russian Federation and its proxies, and examine how the U.S. 
can provide a positive set of alternative options that advance 
the interests of Africans and Americans alike.
    I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
    Next week Vladimir Putin will host an estimated 50 leaders 
from African nations in St. Petersburg under the banner of the 
Russia and Africa Economic and Humanitarian Forum. This forum 
purports to demonstrate how Russia's experience in maintaining 
domestic security is beneficial and worthy of being copied by 
African countries.
    The fallacy of these claims is clear, it is on display as 
they hold this forum just 1 week after bringing the Black Sea 
Grain Initiative to an end, and 1 month after the Wagner Group 
exposed the Kremlin's multitude of internal problems with its 
march on Moscow. With us today are three distinguished experts 
on the subject to discuss the implications of the Russian 
Federation and its proxies' influence throughout Africa.
    Joseph Sany is the vice president of the Africa Center, and 
the United States Institute for Peace. Cameron Hudson is a 
senior associate in the Africa Program at the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies. Pauline Bax is the Africa 
Program deputy director at the International Crisis Group, I 
thank each of you for being here today.
    Russia primarily pursues four core national interests in 
Africa. First, Moscow seeks to challenge western influence in 
Africa at a relatively low cost. Second, Russia eyes financial 
ties with African economies not tied to the U.S. dollar as a 
part of an attempt to evade sanctions and finance its war on 
Ukraine. Third, Russian military cooperation in Africa through 
arms sales, defense cooperation agreements, and the Wagner 
Group promotes its global footprint, and precious NATO southern 
flank.
    Fourth, its activities drive continued relevance on the 
international stage, and demonstrate its ability to shape 
global events. Russia seeks to rekindle its soviet era 
historical ties with ruling parties such as the African 
National Congress, ANC in South Africa, which Moscow, or more 
appropriately, the USSR, supported during the Apartheid era.
    Similarly, the rise of Putin coincides with renewed 
engagement toward Sudan, which Moscow has courted since the 
1970's, including breaking the arms embargo in Darfur. Moscow's 
disinformation and political influence campaigns have been 
dangerously effective. About thirty thousand students from 
African students were studying in Russian universities as of 
early 2023.
    Russian State owned media outlets, notably Sputnik and RT, 
broadcast widely in Africa, and promote narratives that support 
Russian foreign policy aims and criticize major western powers, 
particularly the United States. Russian backed influence 
operations employ social media, and manipulation including by 
troll farms, pseudo policy efficacy, and think tank proxies.
    Russia is also the top arms dealing entity on the African 
continent. Its security presence is bolstered by a growing 
network of Wagner contracts. In the CAR it serves as a 
Presidential bodyguard detachment for President Touadera, and a 
Wagner employee even serves as national security advisor. In 
Sudan, Wagner has backed General Hemedti's Janjaweed militias 
now rebranded as the rapid support forces.
    Simply put, Russia is a destabilizing force in Africa that 
aspires to create power vacuums and exploit African countries 
in order to weaken U.S. and western influence. I am principally 
concerned that the agreements and commitments in next week's 
summit, including in areas like critical and precious minerals, 
will enable Russia to continue funding its war in Ukraine off 
the backs of Africans, and continue to be a clear and present 
danger to the United States of America.
    I thank the witnesses for appearing today, and I look 
forward to their testimony.
    The chair now recognizes Ranking Members Rep. Jacobs. Ms. 
Jacobs?
    Ms. Jacobs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to our 
witnesses for being here. This hearing is particularly timely. 
We saw yesterday Russia pull out of the landmark Black Sea 
Grain Initiative, which will likely worsen hunger and famine 
around the world, especially in the Sahel, and the Horn of 
Africa.
    Many countries in Africa are already feeling the impact of 
global inflation, the climate crisis, and conflict, and this 
deal was really a lifeline to help bring down food prices, and 
enabled agencies to get food to those who need it most. In 
particular, East Africa has suffered from severe droughts, and 
now extreme flooding, which has scorched, destroyed, or washed 
away crops for millions of people.
    About eighty percent of East Africa's grain is exported 
from Russia and Ukraine, and over 50 million people across East 
Africa face the risk of hunger now that this deal is suspended. 
And just last month the Wagner Group attempted a mutiny on 
Russia Federation that has left questions about the group's 
future on the continent, particularly in Mali and the Central 
African Republic where we have seen Russian mercenaries engage 
in heinous human rights violations, and offered regimes 
security.
    It is not surprising that Russia and its proxies are 
increasing their engagement on the continent. It has the 
youngest population, and it is expected to outpace Asia as the 
fastest growing region in the world with six out of the ten 
fastest growing economies. The United States should continue to 
increase its engagement on the continent as well, but while we 
do so we also need to bear in mind lessons from the cold war.
    The continent has already seen what happens when two powers 
fight for influence and strategic alignment. African 
populations lose, and we risk further instability. Too often in 
the cold war the United States supported authoritarian actors 
for short term alignment or influence, which had harmful 
impacts all over the global south. Whether it was in Chad, 
Angola, or the DRC, U.S. efforts to counter the Soviet Union 
and its proxies often led to democratic back fighting, 
violence, and left populations deeply suspicious of the United 
States.
    A Rand study confirmed this, and found that U.S. security 
assistance in Africa during the cold war increased civil wars 
and insurgencies because of this exact dynamic. The Biden 
Administration has taken some of these lessons to heart. They 
have been clear that they are not going to force African 
countries to choose between the United States and other 
strategic competitors. African leaders do not want to make zero 
sum choices between the west and Russia because of some of 
these lessons, and deep sensitivities over sovereignty and the 
violent legacies of colonization.
    And frankly, we shouldn't force African leaders to make 
these choices because we could be on the wrong end of that 
ultimatum. We also need to be mindful of the ripple effects of 
how our policies, and how engagement on the continent is 
perceived around the world. For example we have recently seen 
calls to designate Wagner a foreign terrorist organization, 
which could not only have unintended humanitarian consequences, 
but likely not even be effective to counter the Wagner Group.
    Additional I, and many of my colleagues, including Chairman 
James, are huge supporters of Ukraine, and have approved 
millions of dollars to support their fight against Russia's 
invasion. But we know that this has caused some resentment 
among some African States who are now severely affected by 
global food insecurity, and are experiencing humanitarian 
crises that have been severely underfunded.
    This does not mean that we need to support Ukraine any 
less, but it does mean that the United States and Congress need 
to step up our commitments and engagement with the African 
continent. In doing so we should ensure our policy tools are 
properly calibrated and not going to exacerbate existing 
grievances. So, I am looking forward to hearing from our expert 
witnesses here today on their perspectives on these few 
questions, and what they recommend for policymakers to address 
these challenges on the continent.
    I yield back.
    Mr. James. Thank you, madam. Other members of the committee 
are reminded that opening statements may be submitted for the 
record. We are pleased to have again as distinguished panel 
witnesses before us here today, Dr. Joseph Sany is vice 
president of the Africa Center at the United States Institute 
for Peace. Again, Cameron Hudson is a senior associate in the 
Africa Program at the Center for Strategic International 
Studies.
    Pauline Bax is the Africa Program deputy director at the 
International Crisis Group. I thank each of you again for being 
here today, and your full statements will be made a part of the 
record.
    Mr. James. And I will ask each of you to keep your spoken 
remarks to about 5 minutes in order to allow time for member 
questions.
    I now recognize Dr. Sany for his opening statement. Dr. 
Sany?

STATEMENT OF DR. JOSEPH SANY, VICE PRESIDENT, AFRICA CENTER AT 
              THE UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

    Dr. Sany. Chairman James, Ranking Member Jacobs, and 
distinguished committee members, I very much appreciate the 
opportunity to discuss great power competition in Africa, 
specifically how the actions of Russia and its proxies harm 
both African and U.S. interests, and how African leaders can 
better work together to counter Moscow's destructive activities 
in Africa.
    As noted, as a vice president at the United States 
Institute of Peace, I direct the work of USIP's Africa Center, 
although the views expressed here are my own. As part of Africa 
work, USIP is engaging with countries in the Sahel, and Central 
Africa to promote political stability, and counter violence, 
extremism, and its threats to the U.S. national security.
    I recently returned from the Sahel where Russia and its 
proxies are quite active. I will discuss four key points from 
my written testimony. The first, Russia and its proxies see 
three main goals in Africa. I will not elaborate more, because 
Chairman, you have clearly articulated those goals. I will not 
repeat for the sake of time.
    But the second point though, Russia's dark rule, often 
through proxies such as the Wagner Group, deepens instability. 
As demonstrated by the humiliating retreat in Cabo Delgado in 
2020 in Mozambique, to human rights abuses and crimes in 
Central African Republic and Mali, Russia's mercenaries mostly 
engage in weapon sales, indiscriminate killing, and rape and 
corruption, which erodes accountability and democracy, which 
African value, and the United States makes considerable 
investment in supporting.
    There is a predictable pattern of engagement by Russia and 
its proxies for their malign activities. By relying on such 
factors as past relationship with Soviet Union, the 
availability of critical natural resources, the backing by 
corrupt political and military elites, and the geopolitical 
opportunities of securing strategic military basis and maritime 
routes, one can predict Russia's future targets for malign 
activities, and U.S. policymakers should anticipate these 
possibilities.
    No. 4, Russia and its proxies hope that by deepening the 
chaos in the Sahel and other places in Africa, they can 
persuade the United States and other democracies to abandon the 
region. The U.S. and its allies should stay engaged. The 
engagement should include exposing Russian destructive 
activities through supporting African media and investigative 
journalism.
    Strengthening Governors, strategic partnerships, and 
economic growth through initiatives like the 2019 Global 
Fragility Act, the African Group and Opportunity Act, and the 
goals of the Prosper Africa Initiatives. Supporting Africa's 
equal rule in multilateral institutions such as the G20, and 
the U.N. Security Council, and promoting regional security 
cooperation wherein African States lead. You do not just take 
another western democracy acting as enablers.
    In conclusion, it is worth asking why Americans should care 
about competing in Africa, or investing in its stability. The 
answer is clear, Africa is posed to shape the 21st century as 
the world's fastest growing demographic and economic power. 
Africa's trajectory will significantly shape the world in which 
our children and grandchildren will live. Therefore, the U.S. 
should not surrender the field to destructive Russian actors.
    The good news is that thanks to your leadership and 
support, we are improving our policy tools, and we have many 
willing and able partners in Africa. Thank you for inviting me 
to testify, I am looking forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Sany follows:]

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    
    Mr. James. Thank you for your statement, Dr. Sany.
    I now recognize Mr. Hudson for his opening statement.

 STATEMENT OF CAMERON HUDSON, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, AFRICA PROGRAM 
        AT CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

    Mr. Hudson. Chairman James, Ranking Member Jacobs, 
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the 
opportunity to speak today regarding the impact of Russian 
Federation activities in Africa and its impact on U.S. national 
security interests there. While I am affiliated with the Center 
for Strategic & International Studies, CSAS does not take 
policy positions, and so the viewpoints I will be presenting 
today are my own.
    Next week, as you said, Mr. Chairman, Russia will convene 
its second Russia Africa Summit in St. Petersburg. The first 
time it convened such a summit in 2019 forty-three African 
heads of State and government arrived, exceeding the attendance 
of similar summits convened by the United Kingdom and France. 
But this summit is merely a rare public measure of an extensive 
set of policies Russia is pursuing in Africa in particular that 
manifests itself as both opportunistic and strategic.
    Like my colleague, I will skim over some of the strategic 
objectives of the Russian Federation, because I think you 
summarized them extremely well. But I do want to underline a 
couple of elements that you raised, Mr. Chairman. These 
strategic objectives are coupled with the set of tactics that 
Russia employs to maximize the impact of this strategy. Here we 
do not see Russia creating fault lines in societies, or 
engineering anti-western sentiment.
    Rather, Russia targets and exploits those countries where 
these fault lines already exist. It then exacerbates and 
weaponizes them through a potent mix of corruption, 
disinformation, and propaganda. Coupled with its messaging, 
Moscow's deployment of security forces like the Wagner Group 
has afforded it the ability to manipulate everything from 
public sentiment, to election outcomes, to the local security 
environment, all under the guise of plausible deniability.
    Specifically Moscow targets weak, unstable, and failing 
States to seek their entry for influence. It has used this 
formula in countries like Mali, the Central African Republic, 
and Sudan, all of which were in the throes of violence, 
instability, and political uncertainty, and possessing a dearth 
of transparency or democratic institutions. This political and 
security involvement often comes with a commercial component.
    Under these arrangements, Russian security assistance, 
political support, and financial interests become entirely 
intertwined with those of host countries, making untangling 
these relationships even more difficult than traditional 
bilateral ties. Finally there is no ideology underpinning 
Russia's inroads as during the cold war, this is transactional.
    Under these terms African leaders get political cover from 
Russia at the United Nations and other international fora. They 
get security for themselves at home, a continued hold on power, 
off book revenue streams, and a counter to western led reform 
processes. In this scenario the costs are borne by Africans 
themselves, who experience an uptick in violence, human rights 
abuses, and social strife, along with a further hollowing out 
of local governance institutions, extensions of illegitimate 
governments, and decreasing levels of economic growth and 
development.
    There is no question that in deepening and expanding these 
ties, U.S. national security interests are being impacted. From 
the threat of spreading jihadist violence that Russia cannot 
effectively contain in places where it is deployed, to 
destabilizing new African States bordering these countries, to 
establishing basing and military agreements along critical 
global choke points, Russia's search for relevance on the 
international stage and new sources of revenue undermine U.S. 
interests and values around democracy, stability, and 
transparency.
    In response to these challenges, there are a number of 
steps that Washington can and should be taking to counter this 
malign influence. First, Washington is positioned to help 
counteract false and misleading Russian narratives in African 
States through their support to local level watch dogs, and 
through online efforts to track and trace online 
disinformation.
    We must empower local partners to understand where the 
propaganda is coming from, and who is spreading it. Second, 
U.S. foreign assistance should be targeted and ramped up in 
those African States where we know Russia is seeking new 
inroads so that U.S. assistance is better aligned to help host 
nations more effectively counter the nature and scope of the 
threat posed to them.
    Third, Washington must approve its own messaging toward 
African nations, which have made clear, as the ranking member 
suggested, that they do not want to be the subjects of a new 
cold war competition. And last, in countries experiencing 
democratic backsliding like Burkina Faso and Guinea, it would 
be consistent with past practice to punish those States through 
sanctions and isolation as an expression of our democratic 
values.
    But we should do so knowing that we risk ceding further 
influence to Russia. Instead we must not concede these 
setbacks, and be able to deepen our engagement out of our own 
national interest without conferring praise, or legitimacy, or 
excusing anti-democratic behavior in our partners. I thank you 
for your attention, and I welcome your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Hudson follows:]

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Mr. James. Thank you, Mr. Hudson, for your testimony.
    I now recognize Ms. Bax for her opening statement.

   STATEMENT OF PAULINE BAX, DEPUTY PROGRAM DIRECTOR, AFRICA 
                   INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

    Ms. Bax. Thank you, Chairman James, thank you Member 
Jacobs, distinguished members, thank you for the opportunity to 
address the subcommittee. I'm the deputy director for Africa 
International Crisis Group, a global nonprofit organization 
that hopes to prevent, mitigate, and help these African 
countries. I have spent the past 3 years researching Russia's 
influence in Africa, and I have presided to its use on the 
continent. I will start by highlighting three attitudes toward 
Russia and the west----
    Mr. James. Madam Bax, one moment please. Turn your 
microphone on please.
    Ms. Bax. Sorry.
    Mr. James. Your words are very important, we want to make 
sure we record them, thank you.
    Ms. Bax. I will start by highlighting three attitudes 
toward Russia and the west that are common in Africa since 
Russia's full scale invasion of Ukraine. First, African leaders 
are resentful of the intense focus of western countries on this 
war, as they feel that the west is diverting its diplomatic, 
financial, and military resources to Ukraine at the expense of 
other places suffering insecurity and violence.
    Second, some African countries have an endearing good will 
toward Russia that is born from the Soviet Union's support for 
African liberation movements during the cold war. More 
generally there is also good will toward other nations that 
advocate non-western governance models. Third, African 
governments are unpersuaded by the west's push for them to 
abandon their longstanding preference for non-alignment, and 
join the campaign against Russia.
    Such views aside, most African leaders remain acutely aware 
that partnering with Russia could harm their relations with the 
United States and other foreign powers that are prepared to 
support democratically elected governments with financial, 
technical, or military assistance. Their dominant focus is on 
managing economic headwinds as ordinary people are struggling 
to make ends meet.
    Most African heads of State are uninterested in 
strengthening political ties with Moscow today, especially if 
doing so will compromise relations with Washington. When it 
comes to the Wagner Group, which until recently was Russia's 
main proxy, it does not have a good reputation on the 
continent, and deservedly so. But it has thrived in a few 
unstable places where leaders harbor grievances about the 
west's perceived track record.
    It has been effective in playing upon existing anti-western 
sentiments, targeting France in particular, and exploiting the 
resentment of Washington's historical inattention to African 
politics. Unfortunately in Africa today there is an increasing 
demand for military solutions. Countries that have hired Wagner 
have been prepared to overlook the company's immoral behavior 
because they value its flexibility, and its willingness to 
engage in ground combat.
    The Central African Republic is one such country. Wagner 
was instrumental in securing the president's hold on power in 
2020 when rebel forces threatened to overrun the capital. In 
Mali, which has long struggled to quell an array of Islamist 
insurgencies, Russia is now the main security partner. Mali's 
military leadership has suspended its relationship with France 
and the U.N. peacekeeping mission, and Wagner troops are now 
patrolling alongside the Malian army.
    Wagner is also active in Sudan, though mainly in gold 
mining. So far it appears to have limited influence on the 
country's spiral into civil war. In Libya, several hundred 
Wagner fighters are reportedly guarding military basis and oil 
facilities, and the group appears to be using the country as a 
logistical hub for its activities elsewhere in Africa. Against 
this backdrop, Washington would be best served by following two 
approaches.
    First, Washington could try to influence the circumstances 
that have enabled Wagner's rise and relevance in Africa. And 
these circumstances will remain at play regardless of how 
Wagner evolves. Programming that seeks to maintain relations 
and lines of communication while supporting good governance and 
business practices align with this approach.
    Second, the U.S. should avoid policies that could rupture 
relations with governments that have hired the group, or are 
considering doing so. We know that there is a conversation in 
Washington about the prospect of designating Wagner a foreign 
terrorist organization, an FTO listing would have this effect.
    While Wagner deserves condemnation, this move would further 
alienate governments who have contracted Wagner, jeopardize 
diplomacy, and crisis response efforts in those countries, and 
likely worsen humanitarian crisis given that aid groups and 
businesses tend to de-risk in jurisdictions where FTO groups 
operate. At the same time it is unlikely to significantly 
restrict the group's operations, or that of its possible 
successors.
    Existing sanctions such as the transnational criminal 
organization designation are bringing attention to Wagner's 
profit driven behavior, while avoiding the specific pitfalls of 
an FTO, and they should be enforced vigorously. Thank you for 
your attention today, I look forward to answering your 
questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Bax follows:]

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    
    Mr. James. Thank you, Ms. Bax.
    I now recognize myself for questioning.
    I want to piggy back on what you just said, enforcement. 
Can you briefly outline maybe a few gaps in enforcement the 
U.S. Government has shown, and some ways we can address those 
gaps in enforcement? Specifics would be welcome.
    Ms. Bax. Enforcement in terms of diplomatic engagement?
    Mr. James. Yes, diplomatic engagement specific with the 
terror organizations. If not designated a terror organization, 
what current policies are we failing to implement that could 
have more impact, more effect?
    Ms. Bax. Well, as I just said in my oral statement, so we 
advocate, or I advocate for a more rigorous application of 
existing sanctions, which could for example restrict the 
financial flows that go to the Wagner organization.
    Mr. James. More rigorous, so more policies, or is somebody 
not doing their job effectively here?
    Ms. Bax. Doing the job effectively.
    Mr. James. OK. So, do you know specifically what 
organization we need to be working with to motivate them to do 
their job more effectively, to use the policies we already have 
on the books to get more peace and stability in the region?
    Ms. Bax. I think this has been outlined in the sanctions as 
they have been listed by the United States. So, those sanctions 
are in place, I think they should be applied vigorously, and 
some of the financial flows that are currently going, for 
example through countries like the UAE, as we can assume, need 
to be applied.
    Mr. James. OK, so we need to do the job better. So, that 
implies that we are not doing the job well now. So, the reason 
we have experts here is so you can inform us where those gaps 
are, and where we can apply that pressure, so that we can get 
folks the resources that they require to execute well. African 
countries have contracted with Wagner recently, and they 
frequently State that in the face of powerful security threats 
and no competitive alternative offer from the west, Wagner 
remains their only security partner of choice.
    If we agree that Russia and their proxies are bad choices, 
I do not believe that we should allow it to be their only 
choice. It defies logic, and invites instability. Do you agree 
that this is the reason why CAR, and Mali turn to Wagner? 
Specifically because Russia, bad choice in security, was their 
only choice? All may answer.
    Dr. Sany. I do not agree that they do not have choices. I 
think what is happening is the transaction cost to start the 
business with alternatives. In my conversation with some of 
those leaders it is just difficult because we have conditions. 
And so, Wagner does not, they do not care, and therefore Wagner 
is willing to engage----
    Mr. James. So, America has some conditions?
    Dr. Sany. Yes, but----
    Mr. James. And what are some of those conditions that may 
preclude----
    Dr. Sany. Human rights.
    Mr. James. What is that?
    Dr. Sany. Human rights, for example. We want to make sure 
that our weapons are not used to massacre villages, and 
communities. We have principles, freedom of expression, civic 
space. So, we have those conditions that are linked to those 
dealings. And for these leaders, it is just a high cost to pay. 
And also----
    Mr. James. Human rights is a high cost to pay.
    Dr. Sany. For some of those corrupt leaders. For some of 
those corrupt leaders, some of them, Wagner is offering them 
the opportunity to pay under the table, corruption. Like I say, 
collusion between some of those leaders and the Wagner 
mercenaries. Remember, Wagner is a mercenary group, they are 
there for business.
    Mr. James. So, piggy backing on that, human rights and 
corruption are never anything the United States will step away 
from. We will never divorce our foreign policy from human 
rights. So, given your statement about reality, help me out. 
Are there any actions that the U.S. can take at this stage to 
lay the groundwork for Wagner's removal from the African 
countries, and for a western solution to be the best solution 
rather than a Russian solution?
    Dr. Sany. Yes. I think as I said in my oral statement, we 
have to stay engaged. And therefore it means that we have to 
enrich continued dialog with those leaders, not isolate them, 
No. 1. And as we engage, we are guided by our principles, we 
will not compromise our principles, but however we have to meet 
them where they are. For example, in Burkina Faso it is a fact, 
9 months ago the State, the government was controlling barely 
forty percent of the territory.
    This is the poorest count during the war, facing two brutal 
and highly sophisticated terrorist groups, Al Qaeda, and the 
Islamic State. So, they have that problem, we cannot just 
sanction our way out of it. So, we have to engage with them. 
Accompanying them in--of course without sacrificing our 
principles, they want more engagement, not isolation. And I 
think just pointing fingers will not help us in this case.
    Mr. James. I totally agree with that statement. As you 
mentioned Burkina Faso, I have said often that the finger 
waving foreign policy is doing no one any good. We need more 
engagement, not isolation. You know what? I am going to play 
nice. I think that my wonderful, intelligence, and kind Ranking 
Member would like to ask some questions.
    Ms. Jacobs?
    Ms. Jacobs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Bax, I wanted to 
followup on what you talked about with the Wagner FTO in your 
opening statements. I wanted you to talk through in a little 
more detail what you view as the potential impact of this 
proposed policy.
    Ms. Bax. To not designate Wagner?
    Ms. Jacobs. To designate.
    Ms. Bax. To designate, the impact that that would have. So, 
we believe generally that it is a risky, it is a policy that 
could have risks, and very limited benefits overall. We think 
it is the wrong policy response in this case. Our main concern 
would be that it can alienate African governments that work 
with Wagner rather than bring them into the U.S. fold.
    Right now these governments, I say Mali and CAR are not in 
a position to just cut ties with Wagner right now, because that 
would make them even more vulnerable to rebel attacks, or 
jihadist violence. Even though we disagree with their choice to 
employ Wagner, it makes sense from a military point of view. 
Wagner has served to some extent as a deterrent to some of 
these forces, mainly jihadist insurgencies.
    And this would endanger already fragile security 
arrangements. Again, as some of my fellow witnesses here have 
said, I think we should also take into account that any U.S. 
efforts to counter Wagner could be viewed by many African 
governments as great power competition. And these governments 
may feel that their preference for non-alignment is being 
ignored, and I think this policy could backfire to some extent.
    More importantly, right now for Mali specifically, we are 
worried that it would create problems for humanitarians, and 
maybe even for peacemakers further down the line as an FTO 
designation would hinder the delivery of humanitarian aid, and 
especially the material support restrictions that flow from 
this designation would have a chilling effect on humanitarian 
organizations, and businesses that work in the country.
    And longer down the line, this is not an issue right now, 
but a designation usually makes any future efforts to bring 
parties together for dialog extremely difficult. So, last I 
would like to emphasize that an FTO designation is very 
unlikely to lead to a quick dismantling of Wagner, especially 
now, after the revolt in Rostov.
    There might be new judicial entities emerging under a 
different name, under the Russian Defense Ministry might morph 
into something else entirely, even if the activities continue. 
Yes, I think those are my main points.
    Ms. Jacobs. Thank you. And, you know, something that you 
all brought up in your opening statements is making sure we are 
taking into account the history of these countries, the 
grievances, and so while the challenges Russia and its proxies 
pose are real, and require a thoughtful and effective response, 
we have to take these grievances into account.
    So, for each of you, starting with Dr. Sany, can you please 
share your views on how the United States can best do this, and 
what lessons we can learn from the cold war, and how we apply 
those to today's world?
    Dr. Sany. Why there are historical ties, Russia, the Soviet 
Union has a long relationship with the continent. The United 
States has a couple of assets. We have a very rich diaspora, 
African diaspora, none of our adversary has that, none, China, 
Russia. And so, we could leverage that diaspora diplomatically, 
economically, and even in our defense or militarily to show the 
best of what we have.
    That is one asset that we have not used optimally, and we 
can do more of it. And as I said, none of our adversaries has 
it, and no propaganda or misinformation can tear down that 
asset. No. 2, I think it is important to continue the kind of 
comprehensive engagement we have with this country. Unlike 
China, or Russia, the United States engages with all--we have a 
more official side approach.
    We engage governments, civil society, youth, the media, 
that is critical. We have to keep doing that comprehensive 
engagement. And I think also it is important this time to flip 
the script from aid to trade, that is what African countries 
are looking for. And for that, they will also have to play 
their part making the business environment attractive.
    Meaning the rule of law, and accountability, and the 
sanctity of contract. In that, the United States has a lot to 
offer, we are known for that. And so, flipping the script from 
aid to trade, and providing the kind of support that will make 
this country more attractive for businesses will be, it is also 
a competitive advantage.
    Mr. Hudson. I guess maybe what I would say is we have to--
in the terms of this conversation, we need to remember we are 
speaking about Africa as if it is monolithic, and we have 54 
countries, all of which are at different levels of political, 
social, and economic development, right? And so, not every 
country that we are talking about is enticed by the Russia 
model, or the Wagner model.
    So, I think we need to be very clear eyed about how we 
calibrate our approach to these countries. And we have been 
spending a lot of time talking about really, the very hardest 
cases. The cases where leaders are dedicated to their own 
personal political survival and economic wellbeing. That is a 
very small minority of the countries that are on this 
continent.
    And I think that one of the challenges is Africans are 
going to be watching this hearing today, and they are going to 
say you are painting with a very broad brush here. So, you have 
for example the president of Ghana not long ago saying we want 
closer security ties because we are fearful of the Wagner 
presence in Burkina Faso, and we are fearful of the spreading, 
the spillover effects of that.
    And so, I think we need to be, as I said in my testimony, 
we need to be very targeted and strategic in how we are 
approaching these countries. So, countries that are bordering 
States where there are high levels of insecurity, and where 
there are already a Wagner presence, or the potential for a 
Wagner presence, we really need to be upping our game in those 
places. We need to be increasing our security assistance, we 
need to be increasing our security dialog.
    I do not know why AFRICOM isn't on the continent all the 
time making the visits that they make, because it really does 
build good will with African militaries. I think the other 
thing that we need to be doing is engaging those African 
militaries so that they are the alternative to Wagner.
    Mr. James. Thank you.
    I now recognize Rep. Kim for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. Kim. Thank you, Chairman, and Ranking Member, for 
holding this hearing. The consequences of Russia's invasion in 
Ukraine has been felt globally, but African countries in 
particular have been affected by the disruptions to global food 
supply chains as a result of the invasion, and there are 23 
million people in the Horn of Africa that face severe hunger 
due to the ongoing drought, and Ukraine is one of Africa's 
largest wheat suppliers.
    Russia just terminated, as the chair mentioned in his 
opening, the Black Sea Grain Deal, and that sends global wheat 
prices up immediately. What message is that sending to African 
countries in the Horn of Africa just days before Putin is 
scheduled to host nearly fifty African leaders at St. 
Petersburg for the Russia African Summit? I want to hear your 
thoughts, your reaction.
    Ms. Bax. I have a brief comment to make on that. So, we 
have just learned recently that Russia has some bilateral deals 
for wheat, for example with Mali, so it has delivered wheat 
below market prices to Mali. It is in talks with Ghana and 
Senegal for delivery of wheat, or fuel below or at market 
prices, which I think is a very clever move. My fellow witness, 
Dr. Sany, also has a theory about the background to this whole 
issue.
    Again, I think most African leaders know the focus is less 
on the Ukraine war, and is more about those fuel and food 
prices that they are struggling with. So, I do not know at this 
moment what their response will be to the deal that has fallen 
through. And I think we will see some of it in the attendance 
of the Russia Africa Summit that will happen in a couple of 
weeks. But it of course will be on the agenda.
    Mrs. Kim. I would like to hear the other two witnesses 
briefly please.
    Mr. Hudson. I would just say that Russia invests a lot more 
time and energy in explaining themselves. Whether we call that 
propaganda or disinformation, they spend a lot more time and 
money trying to control the information environment on the 
continent and globally than we do as a government. And I am not 
suggesting that we get into the business of troll farms and 
things like that.
    But I do not think that we can restrain ourselves in trying 
to shed light on what Russia is doing, and to disabuse the lies 
that they are spreading. Again, I think in my testimony I say 
that sunshine is the best disinfectant. And if we intend to 
roll back the communications strategy that accompanies the 
political and military strategies that Russia is employing, 
then we have to combat it on the airwaves, and online, and in 
places where we aren't.
    We are not on, for example TikTok, this has become a very 
controversial thing because of the Chinese control over TikTok, 
but the fact is that is where a lot of disinformation is 
spreading, and we have ceded that entire battlefield to Russia 
and others on the continent. I will stop there.
    Dr. Sany. I agree that this will have a devastating blow, 
particularly in the Horn of Africa. But I also think that maybe 
it is also a way for Putin to deflate on the Wagner mutiny, 
because the Wagner mutiny has dominated the airwaves in Africa 
for some time. And also a possibility is to hand Africans a 
concrete outcome from the summit. To say they came, and then we 
delivered the grains, because there is nothing to deliver for 
this summit.
    So, the grain could be one of the deals. So, again, who 
knows what Putin wants, but it has real consequences on 
people's lives.
    Mrs. Kim. Thank you. I do like to throw in another question 
there. Russia's proliferation of mercenaries in Africa, notably 
through the Wagner Group, has destabilized a number of 
countries, including Sudan. And we know that the Wagner Group 
is backing the rapid support forces in Sudan, and there is a 
civil war broken out after efforts by civil society in Sudan to 
transition the government to democracy under a civilian rule 
collapsed.
    So, the rapid support forces, that is a parliamentary group 
that traces their lineage to Janjaweed militia accused by the 
United States of genocide in Darfur. So, in this unclassified 
setting that we are in today, can you describe the nature of 
that support, its implication for U.S. interests, and how the 
U.S. can best address the role of Wagner in Sudan? Go ahead, 
please, anyone.
    Mr. Hudson. I was just going to say the Wagner Group 
entered Sudan in 2017, so it is not since the revolution, it is 
preceding the revolution that the Wagner Group has been there 
offering technical assistance and support on security matters. 
We know that in 2019 when the military, when the rapid support 
forces put down civilian protestors, that that was done with 
the assistance, and the planning support of the Wagner Group.
    I think one thing with respect to Sudan that is important 
to keep in mind is that Russia and Wagner have worked really 
hand in hand. So, you have seen the Russian military, the 
Ministry of Defense going into Sudan trying to broker formally 
kind of what I would say through the front door, a military 
basing agreement on the Red Sea. And you have seen the Wagner 
Group kind of engaging through the back door with the rapid 
support forces.
    And so, this is very clearly a very strategic move by 
Russia to employ formal and informal ties with Sudan to try to 
advance its strategic objectives. Right now the Wagner Group 
has very clearly sided with the rapid support forces. The U.S. 
Government announced 2 weeks ago in its sanctioning of Malian 
officials that surface to air missiles were provided by the 
Wagner Group in Central African Republic, and moved across the 
border into Sudan to support the rapid support forces.
    So, I think it is a very destabilizing situation, more so 
than Sudan. Because if Wagner is using Central African Republic 
as a base of operations, then it will be able to kind of have 
its effects felt all across the continent.
    Mrs. Kim. Thank you, thanks for indulging.
    Mr. James. Thank you, and I would remind anybody here, or 
listening abroad that this is a hearing on the Russian 
Federation and its proxies. Anyone concerned that we are 
painting with a broad brush should also be cognizant of the 
efforts we are making on AGOA, the efforts we are making on 
PEPFAR, the efforts we are making on Power Africa, and Prosper 
Africa.
    So, for the topic of today we are staying focused on the 
areas of Russia and their proxies affect the safety of African 
nations, and where they apply, and cause a security threat for 
Americans at home and abroad.
    The chair now recognizes Rep. Cherfilus-McCormick for 5 
minutes.
    Mrs. Cherfilus-McCormick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Earlier 
this year the Administration stated its intent to build on 
commitments made during the U.S. African Leadership Summit last 
December. One of the announcements was that the Agriculture 
Productivity launched with USAID intends to provide 16 million 
to launch an initiative to support Tanzanian farmers with a 
focus on women and youth, and respond to the global food 
security crisis worsened by Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
    Additionally, USAID's Food and Peace program helps mitigate 
the global food insecurity crisis, but we cannot underestimate 
the risk of not doing enough. Mr. Hudson, in your written 
testimony you mention how U.S. foreign assistance should be 
ramped up in States where we know that Russia is making 
inroads. Can you describe how these types of investments can 
help counter Russian influence in Africa?
    Mr. Hudson. Sure. Well, I think that we need to consider 
what the baseline is in the African countries that we are 
talking to, and what the nature of the threat is in some of 
those places. And so in a place like Ghana that I mentioned, 
which is a well-established democratic State on the continent, 
clearly there is a security threat on the northern border. So, 
Ghana will present a kind of different set of needs from 
Washington in terms of support from foreign assistance than say 
a country like Benin just right next door, which has far weaker 
institutions, less of a history of democratic progress, where 
the mission is going to be more important to dial up democracy 
programming around the transition there. As well as, I think 
really contemplating how we approach our security posture with 
them given the anti-democratic behavior that we have seen in 
the country. It is a balance that we have to strike if what we 
are interested in is shoring up these countries.
    But there is no sort of one kind of cookie cutter approach 
to it. I think we kind of have to meet these countries where 
they are.
    Mrs. Cherfilus-McCormick. Thank you. My next question is 
for Dr. Sany. I want to first say that I agree with your 
comments on leveraging the diaspora. Earlier this year I 
traveled with the vice president, and that was one of our 
biggest accomplishments, was to engage the diaspora. We 
traveled with historically Black colleges, such as Howard 
University, some of our most successful actors, and some of our 
most successful businessmen.
    Increasing that engagement, and moving away from just 
looking at Africa as an aid situation, but more of an 
investment, a partner, respectfully, which is a new age. And 
the question I wanted to ask you, Dr. Sany, the Wagner Group's 
attempted mutiny in Russia raised many concerns around the 
world. While Russia's foreign ministry, Lavrov, have asserted 
that global Wagner operations will continue, it is unclear what 
their role will be.
    What are the implications for Russia's ambitions in Africa 
after the Wagner mutiny?
    Dr. Sany. I think what the mutiny did was prove more than 
the cosmetic structure here, because Wagner will not leave 
Africa. They may change the name, it may be piloted owned by 
the Minister of Defense, it may be something else. However, I 
think their biggest impact was twofold. No. 1, it punctured a 
hole in that brand, the Russia brand as a stable partner, a 
provider of security, No. 1, that was a big one.
    No. 2, forcing Lavrov to going around the world and sending 
reassurance, demonstrating something most African Wagner 
clients were hiding, that Wagner is sponsored by the Kremlin, 
and therefore they take full ownership of Wagner's atrocities 
around the world. They pulled themselves up to lead opposition. 
So, those two things are more impactful than any cosmetic 
change the Kremlin will do around Wagner.
    For me, those are the two biggest lessons and implications 
for Wagner moving forward. And I will also take the opportunity 
of this to thank the chairman for mentioning other programs we 
are doing as well. Because I think we have a full--our policy 
mix is rich. And to add to what Cameron said in your previous 
question, I think it may be up to the United States to know how 
to massage all the dosage of those policy tools in every 
country we operate in, and where Wagner is.
    Mrs. Cherfilus-McCormick. Thank you so much.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. James. Thank you, madam.
    The chair now recognizes Rep. Baird for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Baird. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Ranking Member, and 
thank our witnesses for being here. You know, I am very 
interested in this attitude that some of the African countries 
have toward Russia, and toward the United States. And I want to 
start this conversation by saying I had the opportunity not too 
long within the last month or two to go to Purdue, and welcome 
twenty-five fellows they call them, but they were from various 
African countries.
    And they were entrepreneurs, they were young people, and 
they were excited to be there. And they were going to take a 
look at the economics, and financial management if they started 
a business on their own. They were going to look at 
manufacturing and processing techniques, and they were going to 
look at research, and I am a strong advocate for research. One 
example that one couple told me about was they were going to 
make some sort of jerky as a product, like beef jerky, or 
whatever.
    But anyway, so my question to you is that seems to me to be 
a very productive way to have an influence where you are really 
getting together and working out a solution, rather than saying 
this is bad, that is bad, all that. But here you are with young 
people right in the community. So, I guess I want to ask each 
one of you if you care to comment about that kind of process.
    Ms. Bax. Yes, Congressman, I very much agree with you. I 
think the U.S. has a huge soft power potential, it is already 
using some of that, but it could use more of that. Generally I 
think attitudes toward the U.S. are positive for U.S., young 
people see the U.S. as a positive influence around the 
continent. They generally prefer the U.S. style of governance 
to a Russian model or a Chinese model.
    China has good will because of its big infrastructure 
projects, and its cheap consumer groups, but the U.S. has 
enormous good will, also its education system, et cetera, and I 
think that is something that the U.S. can really tap into.
    Mr. Baird. I appreciate you saying that, because in your 
testimony you were talking about during the cold war how Russia 
helped with finances and so on, and that attitude still 
lingered. So, I just wanted to know how far down we were, how 
far down we had to go.
    Dr. Sany. I agree completely with your statement. I think 
to people diplomacy is powerful. And I think that that is an 
asset for the United States. We have our Peace Corps, and my 
first contact with an American was a Peace Corps back in my 
village, a long time ago. But that is the power of this 
country, and Peace Corps, Black, White, Hispanic, that power, 
again, propaganda cannot tear it down.
    And so, that people to people diplomacy is a powerful 
thing, and if you can do more to also expose more frequently to 
our culture and our institutions it will better them.
    Mr. Hudson. I guess I would just offer a word of caution in 
the sense that we have a great deal of soft power, but we 
cannot sit back and expect that that soft power is going to not 
be eroded. The countries that we are talking about today, not 
just Russia and China, but Turkey, Saudi Arabia, European 
partners, in the kind of globalized world that we are living in 
where all Africans have a smart phone just like we do, or most 
of them do, they are exposed to all sorts of new outside 
influences in ways that they weren't 20 years ago.
    And so, I agree that we have enormous soft power potential, 
but when Huawei produces a hundred dollar smart phone, and 
Apple produces a thousand dollar smart phone, then it is hard 
to compete when we are not creating products and outreach 
directly to service the African market. Whether that is in 
consumer goods, or in education and research. And so, I think 
that we have to continue to be a country that is open to 
welcoming Africans here as the story you just presented does.
    But I think increasingly there is a sentiment in Africa 
that it is harder to come to the United States for those kinds 
of educational opportunities. And so we have seen in the last 
few years record numbers of Africans traveling to China, 
traveling to Russia to pursue advanced degrees. And so, unless 
we acknowledge, and do some things to try to stem that flow, I 
think it is going to be difficult to maintain this kind of soft 
power hegemony that we have had for so long I think.
    Mr. Baird. Well, I see we have got 13 seconds left, so we 
do not have much time, but I have got a lot more questions.
    But anyway, I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. James. Thank you, Mr. Baird.
    I now recognize Rep. Allred for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Allred. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate 
our witnesses' testimony, and I appreciate your mentioning of 
our other efforts and discussions around the continent of 
Africa. It cannot be just a backdrop for great power 
competition, it has to be a place where as we see it in the 
global interest, I think to promote, and to use our values to 
allow the continent to thrive. And as you said, Mr. Hudson, 
this is not a monolith.
    We are talking about so many different approaches within 
the continent, so many different nations, and I am interested 
in some of the discussion that Dr. Sany has been mentioning. 
And I am glad you talked about the diaspora, the need for us to 
flip the script from aid to trade, and also the African 
responsibility to be attractive to foreign investment.
    To me, a component of that of course is strengthening the 
institutions that allow their democracies to thrive, that allow 
them to self-govern, that make them resistant to malign actors 
like Wagner. And so, I am interested in the upcoming election 
in the Central African Republic, and they are going to be 
holding a referendum at the end of the month to decide to do 
away with term limits for their president.
    There are reports from as recent as yesterday taking note 
that Wagner forces returning to the Central African Republic 
ahead of the referendum, and in the event that that passes, and 
that Presidential term limits are removed, this is for you, Ms. 
Bax, if you do not mind. What would you see the ramifications 
being of that decision, and how should the U.S. be prepared to 
respond?
    Ms. Bax. Thank you for this question, it is a very 
interesting question, and a very complicated one to answer at 
this point in time, because the referendum is likely to go 
through, and Touadera is likely to stay. And the question here 
is what is the alternative? So, I think generally I advocate 
for continued engagement on a diplomatic level as far as this 
is possible from the U.S. side.
    But there is really not much else the U.S. can do in 
Central African Republic at the moment, except for diplomatic 
engagement.
    Mr. Allred. Well, I think, Dr. Sany, to go back to your 
point on tapping into empowering economic opportunities for 
impacted communities by Russia's actions, as I know you are 
aware, the president plans to invest at least 55 billion 
dollars over the next 3 years on the continent. That sounds 
good, and I think it is the right thing to do. I have concerns 
about some of the things that we are seeing from my colleagues 
in terms of the budget that we are discussing right now in this 
body, and what impact that would have.
    But I am wondering how you have seen us implement those 
funds already, or what pitfalls you think there would be in 
terms of what are we not doing well with that money?
    Dr. Sany. Thank you for your question. It is a deceptively 
simple, but very complicated question, I have to admit.
    Mr. Allred. I have a few ideas, but I will let you.
    Dr. Sany. Yes. I think first we have to commend the 
Administration for hosting the summit, and for having those 
commitments, that is important. It was important for our 
relationships with African countries. I think the investment 
made in terms of the business and the commission of these are 
critical for the continent, the need to see that we are 
flipping the script, and that we are investing in trade.
    There are new programs, I think the existing programs could 
be strengthened, that is a fact, that would be helpful. We have 
to think AGOA is one, the renewal of AGOA, because it has 
lifted thousands, thousands of Africans out of poverty, it 
should continue. The digital transformation element is 
critical, not just from an economic perspective, even from aid.
    It will lower costs for thousands, millions of Africans in 
the continent if you combine the digital transformation with 
PEPFAR, we have a win. So, the digital transformation will be 
critical. Programs such as Adapt to help support transitions, 
we were talking about Wagner being, I call it the vulture of 
diplomacy, following the blood. And so, Adapt will help stem 
that motion.
    So, programs such as Adapt will also be critical, I think, 
in my view. I think I will stop there.
    Mr. Allred. That is great, thank you.
    I yield back.
    Mr. James. That was really good.
    I now recognize Rep. Mills for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Mills. Thank you. I realize that this is really about 
the Russian great power competition, but I think that it is 
naive of any of us to talk about Russia without talking about 
the geopolitical alignment that China has with Russia with 
regards to the ever growing approach to Africa. Africa is a 
very key continent for China, especially as they look at their 
Belt and Road Initiative.
    Especially as they look at fulfilling their rare earth 
mineral mined, and raw material good explorations that are 
going to be necessary for them to take the economic resource, 
and cyber based warfare campaign to its continuation. But in 
knowing what Wagner Group's presence is throughout most of 
African being mostly on the influence of politics, which we 
know is utilized to various mechanisms of economic coercion, we 
see where not only have they grown throughout the continent of 
Africa.
    But China has also grown throughout the continent of Africa 
with regards to its populations. In many cases they come in 
saying that they are going to provide all of these great 
financial instruments, and capabilities, and new 
infrastructure, but we all know that they never actually hire 
from the local populace, or boost the economy in any way. They 
actually just bring in more mainland Chinese to actually work 
there, and try to continue to inhibit its lands.
    But I want to focus on Wagner for a bit. In early 2023 the 
U.S. Treasury Department had designated Wagner as a 
transnational criminal organization, and they levied sanctions 
on the group, and all of its affiliates. Do you think further 
designation of Wagner as a foreign terrorist organization, 
along with its corresponding sanctions would be effective, and 
beneficial to curtail Wagner's operations in Africa, and cutoff 
its extensive international network? We can start with you, Ms. 
Bax.
    Ms. Bax. So, I addressed this in my oral remarks, 
Congressman, so at the Crisis Group, I believe that FTO 
designation would be the wrong policy move, because it is 
unlikely to lead to dismantling of Wagner, it will not prompt 
governments to cut ties with the group, because they cannot 
afford this at the moment in either Central African Republic or 
Mali.
    Whether we agree with it or not, you know. So, we think 
that would be the wrong move, and it would also alienate other 
governments that may be sitting on the fence, or that feel that 
they actually are being pushed into some sort of great power 
competition.
    Mr. Mills. Mr. Sany, you noted in your written testimony 
that Russia's pattern of engagement in Africa, namely 
exploiting the instabilities, taking advantage of undemocratic 
transitions, and profiting off volatile security situations 
suggests that nations like Cameroon, the Republic of Congo, 
Equatorial Guinea, and Uganda may be future targets. What can 
the U.S. do outside of just aid, but perhaps trade to disrupt 
this pattern of engagement, and prevent Russia, and Wagner from 
taking hold of these other nations?
    Dr. Sany. Thank you for the question. Yes, like I said, 
there is a discernable pattern of behavior, and as you 
mentioned, and I have written in the testimony, that they are 
countries, the pipeline. And for that, I think we have to start 
engaging now. We have to prepare, as I said, the institution. 
Working with these leaders and the institutions.
    There are a couple of democratic institutions that we not 
disregard, but we have limited engagement with, like the 
parliaments, for example, in those countries. We may say no, 
they are prudemment as we say in French, but they are just 
robust in parliament. But stepping up our engagement with 
parliament, stepping up our engagement with the business 
sector.
    We talk of the sanctity of contracts, and the rule of law, 
but the business sector, particularly business association 
groups are key actors in promoting the rule of law. Because 
what Wagner does, Wagner carves out, forces out local 
entrepreneurs. And so, they did that in Central African 
Republic, they are doing that. So, engaging with the business 
sector in those countries, the parliament, youth, and media, 
and civil society to buildup that immune system against 
authoritarian regimes.
    Against the instability that may follow the transition in 
those countries. Because it is not a mistake, the four 
countries mentioned have long serving leaders, average thirty-
five years.
    Mr. Mills. Well, I absolutely agree with you. One of the 
things that you have said, and I have noted this many times, I 
have spent more than 12 years of my life working overseas in 
the Middle East, and others, America thinks that one great 
meeting can basically solve the issues. Where our adversaries 
like China and Russia are there every single day and every 
single week.
    If America is going to be involved, we need to be involved. 
If we are not going to, let's not make the mistake of thinking 
one meeting means anything. Thank you so much.
    Mr. James. Mr. Mills, I really appreciate your remarks, 
thank you.
    The chair now recognizes Rep. Kamlager-Dove for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Kamlager-Dove. Thank you, Mr. Chair, for this 
invitation again, and for really shepherding bipartisan dialog 
on this issue, and thank you all for being here today. As you 
all have shared in your opening testimoneys, and in your 
responses, the challenge of the Kremlin's influence in Africa 
reflects two enduring realities.
    Democratic institutions, good governance, development, and 
economic growth are necessary to combat the roots of countries' 
vulnerability to Russia, and Russia thrives on fragility, 
conflict, and elite capture. And then the second is our own 
paternalistic and hypocritical legacy with the countries across 
the continent compromises our attractiveness often times as 
Africa's partner of choice, and how do we re-engage in a way 
that is equal and mutually beneficial.
    I have a few questions, I also want to say I agree on the 
importance of soft power, and I think maybe another simple 
example is just offering more Fulbright Scholarships, getting 
more of our folks over there in dedicated, sustainable ways. 
So, Mr. Hudson mentioned misinformation, and Ms. Bax, you 
highlighted the importance of putting resources into improving 
the quality of independent local media in Africa, and 
recognizing the importance of African voices in speaking out 
against Wagner abuses.
    So, what do U.S. efforts to support local African media 
look like, and what else can we do?
    Ms. Bax. Thank you for your question, Congresswoman. Yes, 
so logically supporting African media would be through 
financial resources, but of course there is the risk to some 
extent, this is also what Russia has been doing. For example 
Kairwood(?) has bought a radio station which it is financing 
where African voices are promoting the Russian narrative.
    However, I think there is plenty of solid media networks in 
Africa that could use technical, financial, maybe material 
support to continue the work that they are doing at the moment. 
Investigative journalism would be quite important, maybe 
investigative journalists that expose the misinformation or 
propaganda networks.
    Support for civil society without telling people what to 
say, I think it might be important to at least lend a hand 
financially, or in terms of expertise in supporting those 
networks, and maybe ensuring their survival, which are under 
threat in some countries. I think those were the most immediate 
things that come to mind.
    Ms. Kamlager-Dove. Thank you. And Mr. Hudson, in Africa, as 
in Latin America, illicit economies like gold mining are a 
lucrative vehicle to finance the operations, and entrench the 
operations of bad actors. So, how effective has the U.S. been 
to cutoff these streams of revenue, and what more can we do to 
neutralize this kind of funding?
    Mr. Hudson. Well, I think we have only been marginally 
successful in recent years, primarily because some of our 
partners and allies are benefiting from this trade. So, when 
you look at illegal gold mining in places like Mali or Sudan, 
virtually all of it is flowing through Dubai right now. And it 
is moving through Dubai to Russia to global commodity markets.
    And so, unless we are serious about cutting off that trade 
through a partner like the United Arab Emirates, then I think 
it is going to be very difficult for us to impact either the 
supply side, or the demand side for those commodities.
    Ms. Kamlager-Dove. Thank you for that, my hair just went 
woo when you said that. And so, Dr. Sany, if the U.S. 
underestimates one thing to our detriment, it is the importance 
of the African public's opinion in determining the influence of 
foreign powers. So, we see Russia as parasitical, but there are 
parts of their engagement that are viewed positively by African 
people.
    So, what is the U.S. doing to offer an alternative counter 
to that perspective?
    Dr. Sany. I think the United States is already offering a 
lot compared to Russia by numbers. Our foreign aid compared to 
Russia is quite high. Russia dwarfed us on security 
cooperation, they sell weapons for Africans to kill each other. 
But I think the United States can do more around what we 
discussed already, the soft power aspect. We can do more 
empowering local media so that they can tell the truth of who 
we are.
    We can also do more in terms of people to people diplomacy. 
We can beef up, or streamline our visa process for example. I 
mean, we want to engage in business with African local 
entrepreneurs, but it is difficult for local entrepreneurs to 
come to a fair, or workshop in Washington to see. It takes two 
hundred days for a Nigerian local entrepreneur to have a visa 
for example. So, those things, we can work around those things 
to enable that exchange of people and influence.
    Ms. Kamlager-Dove. Thank you for those answers.
    And thank you, Mr. Chair, I yield back.
    Mr. James. I think the good doctor has been reading their 
emails, excellent points. You are going to probably find a lot 
of support up here. Seeing there are no further questions, we 
are going to start a second question, are you all ready? 
Burkina Faso remains under coup related aid restrictions.
    Meanwhile the country has experienced one of the largest 
growths of Al Qaeda aligned terrorism in the world, and many 
experts speculate that a Wagner partnership could soon emerge. 
How can the U.S. meet certain nations, particularly Burkina 
Faso, where they are? How can we prevent a Wagner presence in 
Burkina Faso?
    Dr. Sany. Thank you for that question. As I said, I came 
back from Burkina Faso a week ago, literally. I think they 
appreciate the open dialog that exists between the United 
States and their government. Staying engaged and discussing 
issues of real concern with them, that is No. 1. Recognizing 
their challenges, and finding ways together to support them.
    But concretely it means help work reviewing how we can 
support their security. Not providing lethal weapons, but we 
can provide logistics, we can help encourage neighboring 
countries to build with Burkina Faso a security architecture 
that can help them address their security priorities.
    Mr. James. What sort of cooperation can we have with the 
military junta?
    Dr. Sany. Yes. I think we are already investing a lot on 
humanitarian assistance already, that eases the burden on the 
government. We can also engage on the security cooperation in 
terms of training some of their additional forces. However, 
that engagement, because we will be in a dialog, can allow us 
to influence what matters for us, the civic space and the 
political process.
    In my meeting with them, one of the things that came 
constantly was yes, security is a priority, but it is not 
exclusivity. Security gains should guarantee the openness of 
the civic space and your human rights. We can only have that 
conversation if we engage in a serious dialog with them. That 
is the starting point. We cannot just isolate them, because 
that will throw them in the hands of Wagner and the rest, not 
just Wagner, but other malign actors.
    Mr. James. Do you expect that certain conditions as those 
might be repellent to those in Burkina Faso? As you mentioned 
earlier, human rights and corruption are standards that many 
rulers over there struggle with, and may not necessarily--and 
align with Wagner and others specifically because they are not 
held to those types of standards.
    Dr. Sany. Burkina Faso is a specific case in this, they 
have not signed with Wagner yet, and traditionally for many 
years now, the Burkina Faso have hardly accepted any foreign 
fighters in their country, so they have not. And based on 
public discussions, they do not intend to.
    Mr. James. Good. Any further comment?
    Mr. Hudson. I would just add that a lot of these countries, 
when they invite Wagner in, or more specifically when they kick 
out the French or the United Nations, what they are saying to 
their people is that we are taking back control over our own 
security. Even though we see them as being dependent upon 
Wagner forces that are coming in, they see it, and they are 
selling it to their people as an act of sovereignty.
    As a re-declaration of their own independence from foreign 
interventionist forces, which have a very long history from 
Europe, from the west, of occupying parts of Africa. And so, I 
think we have to be sensitive to the fact that African 
governments are not only benefiting from this, but they are 
benefiting internally in their internal politics.
    We have seen this in Mali already, and I think that is one 
of the reasons why we haven't seen Wagner sign a formal 
agreement yet. Because the Burkina, they are saying we can do 
this on our own. These are governments that are having a 
difficult time proving to their people that they can govern. 
That there has been a breakdown of State institution and State 
authority in many of these countries in the Sahel.
    And so, they are trying to prove to their people that they 
can in fact govern these countries. When they bring in, I was 
in Mali not too long ago, and one of the security actors that I 
met with said the Wagner Group, when they are here, they are 
here to support us. When the French were here, the Malian 
National Army was in support of the French. They decided 
everything, and we were told what to do in our own country.
    But now that Wagner is do, we tell them what to do. And so, 
this is a reassertion of their sovereignty. Whether that is 
true, that is how they are selling it to their people. And so, 
I think when we talk about our security partnerships with these 
countries, it has to be in a way that is not perceived by these 
governments as simply us coming in and directing military 
operations, but is acting in support of local government 
efforts to govern the situation, and respond to the situation.
    I think the challenge is, of course, that they haven't been 
sufficiently trained around things like civilian protection, 
human rights, and the like. And so, it creates a rupture in 
whatever the partnership is that we are trying to create, 
because they are not meeting our standards.
    Mr. James. Do you see a role for western trained police 
forces?
    Mr. Hudson. Absolutely. But I see more of a role for other 
African forces coming in. I do not understand for example, why 
we are not working through ECOWAS in West Africa, or the 
African Union more broadly. We have seen just in the last year, 
for example Rwanda go in, and replace Wagner forces in 
Mozambique. We have seen them be invited in to Benin as an 
alternative to Wagner forces.
    And so, I do think there is a possibility, and an 
opportunity even for us to work with allied partner militaries 
on the continent that we have trust and faith in to be able to 
present an alternative to their African counterparts so it is 
not western interventionism as it has been framed by Russia and 
Wagner. But that it is African security for African problems.
    Mr. James. Thank you.
    The chair now recognizes Ms. Jacobs.
    Ms. Jacobs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I actually want to 
keep going on this same stream. I think all of you talked about 
in your testimony sort of the relationship between Wagner, and 
instability, erosion of democracy, poor governance. And I think 
one of the challenges U.S. policy in Africa faces is how do we 
balance the need to engage with the need to remain consistent? 
And we also know that Russia has capitalized on this 
inconsistency, Mr. Hudson, as you said.
    So, Mr. Hudson, if you could start, and then I will ask the 
rest of you to discuss this dynamic more. How should the United 
States remain consistent in our values? And how do you think 
supporting, whether that is through security assistance, or 
appraising, or just showing up, or otherwise legitimizing 
authoritarian governments in the name of competition or 
countering Wagner impacts our long term strategic goals, and 
how should we think about that balance?
    Mr. Hudson. Sure. Well, I think that you have seen the 
Biden Administration struggle to come up with a policy in the 
Sahel that is both sensitive to the individual countries' 
conditions, but also create some kind of consistent policy 
across kind of governments that have seen undemocratic changes 
in power. And so, it is not something that is particular easy, 
or that I think we have done particularly well.
    Obviously we have congressional requirements, that when you 
have unconstitutional changes of government, there is a certain 
automaticity of response that comes in. And I think in many 
respects when you talk to colleagues at DOD, or when you talk 
to others at State, as much as that is a reflection of our 
values, and our prioritization of democratic principles, it can 
also be a constraining factor in our diplomacy, and in our 
engagement, right?
    And we have seen that time and again across this region. 
And so, I do think that how we strike a balance between--and 
even I see talking to Africans recently, I mean I think the 
Biden Administration has said publicly time and again that 
democracy and human rights are sort of bedrocks of our foreign 
policy, and I know that we all believe that. But Africans are 
the ones who point to us to say well it is inconsistent how you 
apply these values of yours.
    Because you are in fact pursuing your security interests in 
a lot of these countries, right? And so, I think one thing that 
we can be is quite honest about how we view that balance 
between our values and our interests. I think that one thing 
that we can all agree on, and that we need to be reinforcing 
time and again is our values and our interests overlap when it 
comes to avoiding the erosion of rule of law, and democratic 
principles across the continent and beyond.
    And so, I think we have to kind of go back, and continue 
going back to these first principles of ours. Again, I think I 
said before, we have ceded a lot of the kind of public 
diplomacy space, and communication space to Russia, and to 
others on the continent. I do not think it is enough for us, 
for example, through our Global Engagement Center that the 
State Department has to kind of issue statements from on high 
about what Russia is doing.
    Russia is active in local languages, controlling the media 
environment in local languages. We operate in French, and we 
operate in English, we operate through Reuters, and Associated 
Press, and we issue press statements. We are playing a 
different communications game than Russia is online, and we are 
losing because of it.
    Ms. Bax. I think if we, specifically at the Sahel today, 
and the coastal countries, the Gulf of Guinea countries, most 
of these countries are now looking for military solutions. They 
have economic crises, not all countries, but most, it is a 
massive humanitarian crisis in the Sahel region. So, there are 
several problems that overlap, and sometimes they do not.
    I think the U.S. would be well served to ask some of those 
countries how can we help, what do you need? And there are 
different levels of assistance that the U.S. can give, or can 
step up. And I think it is very important to listen to the 
States that you are talking with, and to ask them what they 
think is a good idea.
    And again, I would like to stress that the coastal 
countries are looking at what is happening Mali and Burkina 
with great concern, and they are looking for solutions, and 
they are looking for help, and they will be very much open to 
increased engagement.
    Dr. Sany. I think there are two categories here. We have 
countries in transitions after a coup d'etat, frankly we do not 
have clear formula to engage, to be honest, I think because of 
all the constraints we have. But there are also countries 
where, like coastal West Africa, where a prevention strategy is 
needed. And, I mean I commend this body for the Global 
Fragility Act, that will find we have a formula, and we hope to 
see it implemented.
    So, there are two differences here. I mean, the country in 
transition, frankly we are building that plane as we fly it. On 
prevention, yes, we may have mechanisms and tools.
    Mr. James. Thank you.
    I now recognize Rep. Baird for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Baird. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I am going to 
continue on, I want to find out about this attitude so I can 
see what it might be. Anyway, in recent months South Africa has 
abstained from U.N. votes condemning Russia's aggression 
against Ukraine, they have held joint exercises with Russia and 
China in the Cape, and allowed U.S. sanctioned Russian ships to 
stop at the port.
    And then most recently our Ambassador accused South Africa 
of loading arms onto the ship Lady R for use against Ukraine. 
So, what do these actions suggest about South Africa's broader 
foreign policy, and what actions might be appropriate to 
address Pretoria's drift toward Russia and China?
    Ms. Bax. Yes, Congressman, as you know, there will also be 
a BRICS summit in South Africa, and we do not know what is 
going to happen. I reside in South Africa, so thank you for 
this question. The ruling party is divided on its support for 
Russia, and its sympathies for the U.S. I think the older 
generation of leaders still has a lingering affinity with 
Russia based on outdated ideology.
    This is actually not supported by, I would say, the younger 
generation of South Africans who are very confused by all of 
this. At the same time, the African National Congress knows 
where its bread is buttered, the U.S. is a very important 
investment partner, so they are trying to play both sides. It 
has been very awkward, and very confusing.
    I do think that is again, maybe a more--the statement by 
the U.S. Ambassador, I think it was timely, and it was 
important, but the way it was done created some diplomatic 
hiccups, and I think it could have been done in a more quiet 
manner. And I would really advocate for continued U.S. 
engagement with South Africa.
    Because the context is also that there will be elections 
next year, the ruling party is very likely to be forced into a 
coalition government, and the dynamics may change.
    Mr. Hudson. I would just add that one topic, which I think 
is relevant to your question, but has sort of been underpinning 
a lot of the discussion today is the idea, and I think you hear 
South Africa espouse this idea more than most African 
countries, is the value of a multi polar world. And I think 
that we see that through South Africa's foreign policy, it is a 
stated aspect of their foreign policy, the creation of a multi 
polar world.
    Not a unipolar, not a bipolar world. And so, I think I at 
least put in, I look through that prism when I see them 
engaging with Russia, obviously for all the reasons that Ms. 
Bax has already laid out. But I also think that one aspect of 
what they are doing, and this goes back to their kind of non-
aligned position throughout the cold war, is this notion that 
South Africa, and Africa in general, the African Union has this 
as part of its Agenda 2063 kind of vision document.
    Is kind of re-balancing the global world order, and that is 
going to be beneficial to African countries. That if we can 
increase our partnerships around the world, we are able to tap 
into benefits. Whether they are trade, whether they are 
political benefits. And so, I do look at some of South Africa's 
engagement with Russia as part of this effort of its own 
foreign policy to kind of re-balance the world order in a way 
that it thinks is beneficial to its interests.
    Dr. Sany. I have nothing to add to those reports. Northing 
to add, sir.
    Mr. Baird. Thank you for that. And you know, my background 
is agriculture, and we have already talked about Russia pulling 
out of the Black Sea Grain Initiative, so I have only got 
thirty-six seconds left now, so I would like to have just a yea 
or nay, what has your experience been, if you know, with 
American grains, and products, and American grain?
    Dr. Sany. No experience, sir.
    Mr. Hudson. No, not in this context.
    Ms. Bax. In the context of South Africa, or overall?
    Mr. Baird. Of any of the African countries. And I guess we 
only got 4 seconds, so I will just put a summary here. We 
produce a lot of high quality commodities, and grains, and so 
on, so keep that in mind. We can get it anywhere in the world, 
so thank you.
    Mr. James. Thank you. African nations have choices, as we 
were just discussing South Africa, South Africans have choices, 
and we will always respect the sovereignty. But the American 
people have choice as well, and if communities around the world 
expect the American taxpayer to help, then there should be some 
sort of mutual benefit to include respect for the rule of law, 
respect for democracy, and of course respect for the safety and 
security of America and our interests abroad.
    Specifically with South Africa, the Putin visit with the 
Lady R situation, and also military exercises on the 
anniversary of the Ukraine invasion are very problematic. And 
in a recent meeting we expressed American concerns with the 
situation of moving away from those stated values and 
interests. I am confident that by increasing engagement and 
communication, we can be the first choice of our allies and 
potential friends around the world.
    So, with that, I thank the witnesses for their valuable 
testimony, and members for their questions. The members of the 
committee may have some additional questions for the witnesses, 
and we ask that you respond to these in writing. And pursuant 
to committee rules, all members may have 5 days to submit these 
statements, questions, and extraneous materials for the record, 
subject to the length of limitations.
    Without objection the committee stands adjourned. Thank you 
for your time.
    [Whereupon, at 3:33 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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