[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                  THE VILNIUS SUMMIT AND WAR IN UKRAINE: 
                    ASSESSING U.S. POLICY TOWARDS EUROPE 
                    AND NATO

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                         SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE

                                 OF THE

                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                             June 22, 2023

                               __________

                           Serial No. 118-37

                               __________

        Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
        
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                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
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                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                   MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey     	GREGORY MEEKS, New Yok, Ranking 
JOE WILSON, South Carolina               	Member
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania	 	BRAD SHERMAN, California
DARRELL ISSA, California		GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
ANN WAGNER, Missouri			WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
BRIAN MAST, Florida			DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
KEN BUCK, Colorado			AMI BERA, California
TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee			JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee		DINA TITUS, Nevada
ANDY BARR, Kentucky			TED LIEU, California
RONNY JACKSON, Texas			SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania
YOUNG KIM, California			DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota
MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida		COLIN ALLRED, Texas
BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan			ANDY KIM, New Jersey
AMATA COLEMAN-RADEWAGEN, American	SARA JACOBS, California
    Samoa				KATHY MANNING, North Carolina
FRENCH HILL, Arkansas			SHEILA CHERFILUS-MCCORMICK, 
WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio			 	Florida	
JIM BAIRD, Indiana			GREG STANTON, Arizona
MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida			MADELEINE DEAN, Pennsylvania
TOM KEAN, JR., New Jersey		JARED MOSKOWITZ, Florida
MIKE LAWLER, New York			JONATHAN JACOBS, Illinois
CORY MILLS, Florida			SYDNEY KAMLAGER-DOVE, California
RICH MCCORMICK, Georgia			JIM COSTA, California
NATHANIEL MORAN, Texas			JASON CROW, Colorado
JOHN JAMES, Michigan			BRAD SCHNEIDER. Illinois
KEITH SELF, Texas      
                                    
                    Brenden Shields, Staff Director
                    Sophia Lafargue, Staff Director		      
			      

                         Subcommittee on Europe

                 THOMAS KEAN, Jr., New Jersey, Chairman

JOE WILSON, North Carolina           WILLIAM KEATING, 
DARRELL ISSA, California                 Massachusetts,Ranking Member
ANN WAGNER, Missouri		     DINA TITUS, Nevada
BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan		     MADELEINE DEAN, Pennsylvania
MICHAEL LAWLER, New York	     JIM COSTA, California
NATHANIEL MORAN, Texas	             SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania
KEITH SELF, Texas

                    Sophia Lafargue, Staff Director
                           
                           
                           C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

                               WITNESSES

Jones, Douglas D., Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European 
  and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State.................     7
Cooper, Laura K., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
  Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia, U.S. Department of Defense.......    11

                                APPENDIX

Hearing Notice...................................................    37
Hearing Attendance...............................................    39
Hearing Minutes..................................................    40

            RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Responses to questions submitted for the record..................    41

 
                 THE VILNIUS SUMMIT AND WAR IN UKRAINE:
             ASSESSING U.S. POLICY TOWARDS EUROPE AND NATO

                        Thursday, June 22, 2023

                          House of Representatives,
                             Subcommittee on Europe
                      Committee on Foreign Affairs,
                                                    Washington, DC.

    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:06 p.m., in 
room 210, House Visitor Center, Hon. Thomas Kean, Jr. (chairman 
of the subcommittee) presiding.
    Mr. Kean. The Subcommittee on Europe of the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee will come to order.
    The purpose of this hearing is to discuss U.S. policy 
toward Europe and NATO, as well as U.S. and allied support to 
Ukraine, in advance of the July NATO Vilnius leaders summit.
    I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
    Next month, in Vilnius, NATO member States will meet to 
discuss the greatest and most pressing challenges facing the 
alliance. With the largest land war in Europe since World War 
II ongoing, a rising and increasingly aggressive China, and 
Finland and hopefully Sweden joining the alliance, there will 
be no shortage of issues to discuss.
    There is strong bipartisan support in Congress for NATO. 
For decades NATO has served as a cornerstone of American 
national security and underpinned our relationship with our 
closest friends and trade partners in Europe. All of us in this 
room remember when NATO allies came together in America's 
defense in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, which was the 
first and only time that NATO's Article 5 was ever invoked.
    On Ukraine, I firmly believe that NATO allies must leave 
the summit in Vilnius with a clear path charted for Ukraine to 
join the alliance once conditions allow. I am concerned by 
reporting that the U.S. and Germany are resistant to the 
alliance making a stronger political commitment to Ukraine, one 
that is 15 years overdue. At the 2008 NATO leaders summit in 
Bucharest, all NATO allies agreed that Ukraine would become a 
member of NATO.
    Since then, NATO has only repeated that vague promise again 
and again. In that time, we have learned that NATO's waiting 
game--waiting room is not a safe place to be. Ukraine has 
repeatedly suffered overt and covert aggression from Russia, 
now including a full-scale war of national survival.
    Eventual NATO membership is the most solid guarantee 
against future Russian aggression. Providing a clear path to 
that membership will signal to Vladimir Putin that he will not 
be able to achieve his goals in Ukraine on the battlefield. 
This is critical to prove to him that Russia cannot outlast 
Ukraine's backers nor determine sovereign foreign policy 
decisions of his neighbors through war.
    Until Ukraine is a full-fledged member of NATO, it will 
require concrete security guarantees to help win the current 
war and deter any future Russian aggression. I believe the 
United States must be actively involved in these discussions, 
but implementing such guarantees would require Congress to 
appropriate the necessary funds.
    As such, the Administration must engage with this committee 
and this chamber on a strategy to allow us to conduct our 
constitutionally mandated oversight responsibilities. 
Importantly, like with Israel, the guarantees under the 
consideration will include continued and reliable security 
assistance for years to come, to ensure that Ukraine can deter 
future Russian aggression.
    Therefore, I am glad to have DASD Cooper here to discuss 
the weapons Ukraine needs, not only to defeat Putin's invading 
forces but also to ensure that we do not have a repeat of 2014 
and 2022 once Putin's regime rebuilds its forces.
    In addition, I hope to hear from both of our witnesses why 
the Administration is refusing to provide Ukraine with the 
critical weapons systems that could make a real difference on 
the battlefield, like ATACMS and PDICMs.
    In fact, just yesterday this committee passed my bipartisan 
resolution calling for the immediate transfer of ATACMS to 
Ukraine. I was honored to be joined in that effort by Ranking 
Member Keating, a true ally in this fight.
    Beyond Ukraine, there is great hope that NATO allies will 
agree at next month's summit to make a firm commitment on 
burden-sharing; namely, by clarifying that NATO's defense 
spending target of 2 percent of GDP should be considered a 
floor and not a ceiling. This 2 percent target was first agreed 
to by all NATO allies in the summit of 2014 nearly a decade 
ago.
    Yet even as the threats from Russia and China grow every 
day, there are still far too many NATO allies that fail to meet 
this target. I expect to hear from Mr. Jones about the U.S.'s 
plans to press our allies at next month's summit to live up to 
their commitments and to share the burden of collective 
security.
    Speaking of China, the strategic concept that NATO released 
last year said, ``The People's Republic of China's stated 
ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interest, 
security, and values.''
    It is vitally important that our NATO allies recognize and 
address the threat posed to all of us by the CCP. Our security 
will be at serious risk if we allow China to own our critical 
infrastructure, infiltrate our sensitive industries, and to 
expand and to influence, to pursue, the malign agenda.
    Last, I hope Mr. Jones today can provide an update on 
Sweden's efforts to join the alliance. I was pleased that NATO 
welcomed Finland as its 31st member in April, but Sweden's 
application has remained stalled for far too long. Turkey and 
Hungary's stonewalling is deeply concerning, and I hope that 
they will ratify this very capable partner to join this 
alliance by the summit next month.
    I want to once again thank our witnesses for being with us 
today. And with that, I will now turn to Ranking Member Keating 
for his opening remarks.
    Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this 
important hearing. As has been proven by the bipartisan 
interest in this hearing, congressional support for NATO and 
Ukraine remains steadfast. I look forward to continuing to work 
with you on these issues as we have with the recent resolution 
we introduced calling--subject to our own readiness needs, 
calling for the President to provide ATACMS to Ukraine, which I 
hope will see the floor soon.
    I also want to thank the witnesses for your tireless 
efforts to support Ukraine in their fight for freedom against 
Russian aggression. Together, along with our colleagues across 
the U.S. Government, you work to provide Ukraine with the 
military, economic, and humanitarian support they need to win 
the war and to secure their future.
    In response to Vladimir Putin's criminal war and illegal 
occupation of Ukraine, the Biden Administration has coordinated 
more than 50-country response with transatlantic alliances as 
well, and our own global partners, to this effort. Through 
these efforts, like-minded partners have worked to support 
Ukraine on the battlefield, providing safe haven for those 
fleeing violence at home and also to ensure that vital 
governmental and community services, from schools to hospitals 
to their own utilities, can literally keep the lights on.
    As part of these ongoing efforts, leaders from across the 
NATO alliance will meet in Vilnius next month to discuss 
current and future challenges as well as the steps we must take 
together to ensure our collective security. One such step, 
which I believe is vital, is the swift approval of Sweden's 
ascension into the alliance.
    Last Congress I introduced legislation that welcomed the 
ascension of Sweden and Finland into NATO, two countries that 
have incredible military might and that are interoperable 
already with our alliance. This legislation passed with 
bipartisan support, and I am glad that Finland is now squarely 
in line for NATO.
    And today, while I am encouraged by the Hungarian 
Parliament and the fact that they have scheduled a vote on the 
matter, I continue to call on Hungarian and Turkish allies to 
approve their application expeditiously. Hope Sweden's 
membership will be approved soon to ensure we remain united in 
our response to Russia's aggression in Ukraine.
    In addition, I believe that NATO members must recommit to 
increased defense spending in response to Vladimir Putin's 
increasingly aggressive posturing. Vladimir Putin has already 
made his imperialistic fantasies known when, in a series of 
letters and memos exchanged between the U.S. and Russia prior 
to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia requested that 
the U.S. prevent further eastward expansion of NATO and the 
disarming of 50 percent of the current NATO countries' 
capabilities, and also making direct threats to members of the 
alliance.
    We must take these threats seriously to deter Russian 
aggression. While many NATO countries have succeeded in 
reaching 2 percent, we must now view this goal as a floor 
rather than a ceiling.
    I also look forward to discussions at the Vilnius summit 
regarding Ukraine's continued progress toward NATO ascension. 
Much has already been said and discussed on the topic, and 
Ukraine has clearly surpassed the security relationship that 
would traditionally warrant a membership action plan.
    While discussions are ongoing, I have been clear that after 
this war is over, Ukraine will emerge as one of--if not one of 
the strongest, the second strongest, most well-equipped 
military in Europe. We must show unity at the Vilnius summit, 
and I remain confident that NATO allies will continue to use 
the vast resources of our historic alliance to ensure Ukraine's 
self-defense.
    The European Union has also stepped up as of May 23, 
providing over $70 billion in financial, military, 
humanitarian, and refugee assistance. This includes over $41 
billion in financial and budgetary support, $18 billion in 
support of Ukrainian refugees, and over $18 billion in military 
assistance such as ammunition and air defenses, Leopard tanks, 
and fighter jets.
    The EU is also currently the largest military training 
provider to the Ukrainian Armed Forces and will have trained 
more than 30,000 Ukrainian military personnel by the end of the 
year.
    To conclude, I want to briefly address China and the Indo-
Pacific. Having served on the subcommittee for many years now, 
I have always believed that while Russia poses the greatest 
risk to our collective security today, in the long term China 
represents the great threat to our alliance. We must consider 
our relationship with China, de-risk wherever possible, and 
bring critical supply chains back home.
    We must also invest in our partnership in the Indo-Pacific, 
providing an alternative democratic way forward with like-
minded partners.
    Unfortunately, as the war in Ukraine is at a pivotal stage, 
and China prioritizes their foreign assistance budget and 
increases their diplomatic expenditures by 12 percent in the 
coming year, Republican House leadership have proposed a 22 
percent budget cut of U.S. foreign assistance. While I know my 
Republican colleagues recognize Russia and China as a threat, 
their budget says otherwise.
    With that, I want to thank our witnesses for joining us 
here today in this timely discussion, and I yield back.
    Mr. Kean. Thank you, Ranking Member Keating.
    Two quick procedural motions. First is I ask unanimous 
consent that the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Fitzpatrick, 
and the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Turner, be allowed to sit on 
the dais and participate, following all other members, in 
today's hearing. Without objection, so ordered.
    Second, I would like to welcome the gentleman from 
Virginia, Mr. Connolly, and the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. 
Schneider, who are joining us today. They will participate, 
following all other members, in today's hearing.
    Other members of the subcommittee are reminded that opening 
statements may be submitted for the record.
    We are pleased to have a distinguished panel of witnesses 
before us today on this important topic. Mr. Douglas Jones is 
Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of European and 
Eurasian Affairs at the Department of State, and he is joined 
by Ms. Laura Cooper, who is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia at the Department of 
Defense.
    Thank you both for being here. Your full statements will be 
made part of the record, and I will ask each of you to keep 
your verbal remarks to 5 minutes in order to allow time for 
member questions.
    I now recognize Mr. Jones for his opening statement.

  STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS D. JONES, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, 
  BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
                             STATE

    Mr. Jones. Chairman Kean, Ranking Member Keating, thank you 
for the invitation to testify and for the committee's support 
for NATO. Your bipartisan leadership and engagement, including 
in the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, reminds our allies that the 
United States' commitment to NATO remains robust, durable, and 
unwavering.
    Russia's brutal full-scale invasion of Ukraine following 
its previous 9-year campaign of aggression and illegal 
occupation of Crimea, has reaffirmed the critical importance of 
the transatlantic alliance. It has galvanized allied unity, 
driven allies to enhance the defense of allied territory, and 
strengthened allied commitment to the democratic values on 
which the alliance is built.
    At the NATO summit in Vilnius in July, allies will take 
decisions to strengthen NATO across three broad areas, and I 
would like to speak to each briefly.
    First, we will see in Vilnius a strong, united NATO. Allies 
will reinforce our unity and resolve to support Ukraine in the 
fight to defend its sovereignty, territorial integrity, 
democracy, and the right to choose its own path. At Vilnius, 
NATO will commit to a package of political and practical 
support for Ukraine that will build on our bilateral support 
over the past 16 months.
    Since February 2022, the United States has provided more 
than $40 billion in bilateral security assistance to Ukraine. 
More than 50 other nations, including our NATO allies, acting 
bilaterally through the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, have 
provided Ukraine with approximately $32 billion in lethal aid.
    NATO itself has complemented this bilateral lethal 
assistance to Ukraine's military with non-lethal support 
totaling $82 million, with another $110 million in the pipeline 
to NATO's comprehensive assistance package for Ukraine, and 
more support is on the way.
    Second, NATO will strengthen its deterrence and defense in 
support of our ironclad Article 5 obligations. Allies are 
completing the full implementation of NATO's new fit-for-
purpose force model to fortify the alliance's readiness, 
working to deepen defense production and updating defense plans 
for all allied territory that will address the heightened 
threat on NATO's eastern flank and the new land, sea, air, 
cyber, and space security challenges.
    The alliance is also working to strengthen the Wales 
Defense Investment Pledge, which States that allies aim to 
spend 2 percent of GDP on defense by 2024. As of today, eight 
allies are meeting or exceeding the 2 percent target. Another 
nine are on track to do so by next year. 2023 will mark the 
ninth consecutive year of defense spending growth in real terms 
for non-U.S. allies, with more than $350 billion in additional 
defense spending by non-U.S. allies since 2014.
    But this is not enough. Allies need to do more, and allies 
will commit to a new, enhanced Defense Investment Pledge in 
Vilnius.
    Finally, even as NATO sees Russia as the most significant 
and direct threat to security, peace, and stability in the 
Euro-Atlantic area, NATO faces other challenges, the PRC first 
among them.
    This brings me to my third point. At Vilnius, NATO intends 
to strengthen its global partnerships in the Indo-Pacific and 
the Global South. For the second time, heads of State from 
Australia, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea have been invited to 
a NATO summit to coordinate on shared security challenges, 
including the PRC.
    At NATO's 1949 inception here in Washington, President 
Truman called the alliance a shield against aggression. For 74 
years, it has proven to be the world's most successful 
defensive alliance, extending that shield of collective 
security from 12 to now 31 allies and soon 32. Having Finland, 
and hopefully soon Sweden, in the alliance makes it stronger, 
more capable, and more secure.
    As we look to the Vilnius summit, and beyond to the 2024 
NATO summit here in Washington, the power of that shield 
providing security to nearly 1 billion citizens of NATO 
countries, remains as strong as ever.
    Thank you for inviting me today, and I look forward to your 
questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Jones follows:]

    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Mr. Kean. Thank you, Mr. Jones.
    I now recognize Ms. Cooper for her opening statement.

  STATEMENT OF LAURA K. COOPER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF 
 DEFENSE FOR RUSSIA, UKRAINE, AND EURASIA, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
                            DEFENSE

    Ms. Cooper. Chairman Kean, Ranking Member Keating, members 
of the committee, thank you very much for this opportunity.
    At the Department of Defense, I am responsible for policy 
regarding Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, Moldova, the South 
Caucasus, and Central Asia. Today I want to focus my remarks on 
the U.S. policy response to Russia's aggression in Ukraine, and 
in particular our work alongside allies and partners to provide 
Ukrainian forces with the capabilities and the training they 
need to defend the Ukrainian people and repel Russia's 
invasion.
    Our objective in Ukraine is to ensure the existence of a 
free, prosperous, and democratic Ukraine that can defend itself 
and deter further Russian aggression. Ukraine is attempting to 
liberate its territory from Russian occupation or control, 
including in the latest counter-offensive. Ukraine is well 
prepared and equipped.
    Although the course of war is dynamic and unpredictable, we 
do have great confidence in the training, capabilities, and 
preparedness of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
    The security assistance that the United States and our 
allies and partners have provided is substantial, and those 
resources reflect the shared interests and values that are at 
stake.
    Russia's war of aggression is a clear and present danger 
not only to Ukraine but to the security of Europe and to the 
basic principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity that 
uphold global stability. Russia's atrocities in Ukraine are an 
assault on our common values and our common humanity.
    In a crisis of this magnitude, one that implicates our 
national interests and values, and those of the larger free 
world, the United States must lead. When we lead with 
determination and purpose, our friends also respond.
    For evidence, consider the collective contributions of the 
group of 50-plus nations Secretary Austin has assembled in the 
Ukraine Defense Contact Group. Last week I joined Secretary 
Austin in Brussels to participate in the 13th meeting of the 
Contact Group, where we discussed how we can collectively 
address Ukraine's priority requirements, both for the immediate 
fight but also increasingly for the longer term.
    All told, we have marshaled over $28 billion in security 
assistance commitments from allies and partners, including in 
top priority areas of air defense, armor, and artillery. Nine 
European countries have contributed more than $1 billion each. 
You can put these figures in perspective if you consider 
security assistance to Ukraine as a percentage of GDP. By that 
measure, the United States actually currently ranks 12th 
globally.
    It is also helpful to break down the contributions into 
categories of capabilities. For example, over half of all the 
tanks, armored personnel carriers, and infantry fighting 
vehicles provided to Ukraine are from allies and partners, not 
from the United States. Over half of the 155 millimeter 
artillery systems are from allies and partners. Over half of 
the counter-unmanned aerial system capabilities and about half 
of the Stingers and Javelin missiles are from allies and 
partners.
    Moreover, our allies and partners are having a major impact 
in training Ukrainian forces. In fact, allies have trained more 
than three times the number of Ukrainian soldiers that the 
United States has trained.
    Coalitions of allies are starting to emerge to focus on 
certain capabilities. For example, Germany and Poland are 
collaborating to provide Ukraine with Leopard tanks as well as 
the training and maintenance and sustainment for those tanks. 
The Netherlands and Denmark are collaborating to set up 
training for Ukrainian pilots to fly fourth generation 
aircraft.
    And we are also seeing allies starting to make longer term 
commitments. Germany has authorized about $13 billion in 
support to Ukraine over the next 9 to 10 years. Norway has 
committed over $7 billion, and Denmark recently announced $3.2 
billion. You will see many of these figures in the handbook 
that my team has prepared for you today.
    Finally, it is important to note the growing collaboration 
between the United States and partners on industrial 
production, both to support Ukraine and to replenish our own 
stocks.
    But in addition to providing the steady flow of security 
assistance and boosting industrial capacity, we recognize the 
importance of prioritizing the accountability of that 
assistance. To date, we have not seen credible evidence of the 
illicit diversion of U.S.-provided advanced conventional 
weapons, although Russia continues to spread disinformation to 
the contrary.
    That said, DOD continues to implement adapted end-use 
monitoring measures in Ukraine to track sensitive U.S. weapons 
systems and to proactively prevent arms proliferation. And I 
would be happy to address additional questions on this matter 
in the discussion.
    Finally, our ability to provide Ukraine's forces with the 
capabilities they need, now and over the longer term, rests on 
continued bipartisan support from Congress. I am committed to 
working closely with you to maintain enduring support for this 
national security imperative.
    Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Cooper follows:]

    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Mr. Kean. Thank you, Ms. Cooper. I now recognize myself for 
5 minutes of questions.
    Mr. Jones, reportedly, the majority of NATO allies are 
coalescing around the need to provide Ukraine a clear path 
toward membership once conditions allow. Does the 
Administration support NATO emerging from Vilnius with a 
stronger political commitment to Ukraine's NATO membership bid 
than what was expressed in 2008?
    Specifically, as I mentioned in my opening statement, I am 
concerned by reports that the U.S., Germany, and Hungary are 
the most resistant to moving beyond the 2008 wording.
    Mr. Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think it is the top 
goal of the United States, and I think of all allies for the 
Vilnius summit, that we come out with a strong, unified message 
of support for Ukraine. And I think we are on track to achieve 
that.
    Allies will of course, as you mentioned, reaffirm Bucharest 
summit language that Ukraine will become a member of NATO, but 
we are preparing to go beyond that in several important ways. I 
think, first of all, is by backing that up with increased 
levels of non-lethal support through NATO's comprehensive 
assistance package that Ukraine needs now to help it prevail in 
its war with Russia.
    Second, we are developing what is an unprecedented package 
of long-term support that signals that the alliance's 
commitment to Ukraine is for the long run. This long-term 
support is focused specifically on preparing Ukraine for future 
NATO membership by advancing Ukraine's reform agenda and 
helping it to meet NATO's membership standards.
    NATO is also preparing to upgrade its partnership with 
Ukraine, to include a new consultative body, the NATO Ukraine 
Council, where Ukraine will sit on an equal basis with allies 
to advance the political dialog and also Ukraine's Euro-
Atlantic aspirations.
    The Ukraine and all allies agree that NATO cannot join--
sorry, Ukraine cannot join the alliance during an active 
conflict. But NATO can provide Ukraine with the long-term 
support it needs to advance its reform agenda, so that it can 
be ready to join the alliance when conditions permit.
    Mr. Kean. Does the Administration have a plan to engage 
Congress on this issue, particularly given it will likely 
require additional funding?
    Mr. Jones. Yes, sir. We are always available to consult on 
this issue, and I think that is part of what we are looking 
forward to hearing today.
    Mr. Kean. Ms. Cooper, yesterday this committee passed mine 
and Ranking Member Keating's bipartisan resolution supporting 
the immediate transfer of ATACMS to Ukraine. Unfortunately, 
this Administration continues to deny these critical systems to 
Ukraine.
    Do you agree that ATACMS could--would be useful to 
Ukraine's counter-offensive?
    Ms. Cooper. Mr. Chairman, I think there are many 
capabilities that are useful. And when we have looked at 
ATACMS, we have also taken into account other practical 
considerations, like availability, and also whether there are 
substitute systems. And right now, Mr. Chairman, we are seeing 
the effectiveness of the Storm Shadow system provided by the 
U.K., and are finding it to be quite effective.
    Mr. Kean. You had opposed--or, excuse me, this 
Administration had opposed ATACMS because they saw it as they 
had many weapons systems and--before as escalatory in nature. 
But as you just mentioned, the British have sent the Storm 
Shadow missiles to no reaction by Putin.
    Is one of your concerns still the ability to escalate the 
conflict?
    Ms. Cooper. Mr. Chairman, my concerns relate to the 
practical aspects of availability and also whether there are 
other systems like Storm Shadow, like the ground-launched 
small-diameter bomb that will come online this fall, other 
systems, including UAVs, that can range the same targets.
    And I would be more than happy to discuss greater details 
on these issues in a classified setting.
    Mr. Kean. I would appreciate that. Thank you.
    Ms. Cooper, the Russian military has been using cluster 
munitions with impunity in Ukraine, yet the Administration has 
refused to provide similar weapons known as DPICMs to Ukraine. 
I am aware of the dangers of unexploded ordnance. However, the 
Ukrainians believe that the battlefield benefits outweigh the 
costs. And since these would be used on Ukraine's own 
territory, Kyiv would be incentivized to judicially limit the 
post-war threat to civilians.
    Do you think that the DPICMs would be helpful to Ukraine's 
counter-offensive, particularly in offsetting Russia's 
quantitative advantage in manpower or armor and artillery?
    Ms. Cooper. Mr. Chairman, our military analysts have 
confirmed that DPICMs would be useful, especially against dug-
in Russian positions on the battlefield. The reason why you 
have not seen a move forward in providing this capability 
relates both to the existing congressional restrictions on the 
provision of DPICMs and concerns about allied unity. But from a 
battlefield effectiveness perspective, we do believe it would 
be useful.
    Mr. Kean. OK. Thank you.
    I now recognize Ranking Member Keating for any questions 
that he may have.
    Mr. Keating. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    On the ATACMS issue, too, you will notice there is language 
in that that said that subject to our own readiness. Is there 
an issue, without getting into classified session, generally 
that that would have to be considered in any kind of 
dispersion, whether it is Ukraine or otherwise?
    Ms. Cooper. Yes, Ranking Member Keating. We would look at 
readiness considerations, and they would be a clear factor in 
our decisionmaking. Thank you.
    Mr. Keating. OK. Thank you.
    I notice, Mr. Jones, in your testimony you highlighted 
again for the second time that heads of State from Australia, 
Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea will be joining NATO at the 
Vilnius summit. And that is significant.
    As we look to China, and you look at the threat that China, 
you know, currently exerts with a building military and its 
other types of coercive activities, that is quite a statement, 
to see these countries join together again as partners in this 
summit.
    Two things. How significant is that in sending a message to 
China? And also, again, can you underscore the importance of 
our victory and Ukraine's victory against Russia in terms of 
posturing toward China and their threats?
    Mr. Jones. I think the presence of NATO's four Indo-Pacific 
partners is significant, and it signifies the evolution that 
NATO has gone through as it increasingly recognizes the 
challenges that the PRC poses to Euro-Atlantic security, and it 
has become increasingly important agenda on--for NATO. This has 
followed years of effort by the United States, and we are 
seeing an increasing convergence of views between our European 
allies and the United States on the way we recognize the 
challenges posed by the PRC.
    And NATO has responded in a couple of ways. One, by really 
focusing on what NATO can do to reinforce resilience of NATO 
allies to resist the coercive policies and pressures from the 
PRC, and also by expanding its partnerships in the Indo-
Pacific. And that is what we are seeing at this summit for the 
second time.
    I think there is also increasing realization that what 
happens in the Indo-Pacific also impacts security in the Euro-
Atlantic space, and the reverse as well. So the outcome of the 
war in Ukraine is extremely important to show that countries 
who engage in aggression, who violate the principles of 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, and use force to try to 
redraw borders, will not succeed.
    And that is a message that will be particularly important, 
that the PRC take the right lessons from the outcome of this 
conflict.
    Mr. Keating. Ms. Cooper, do you want to comment in terms of 
our defense posture and how important it is to send a message--
not just a message but the reality that these countries--like-
minded countries in terms of values are coming together on 
issues as a deterrent to China?
    Ms. Cooper. Yes, Ranking Member Keating. I would say that 
one sign of the importance of this and the shared unity is not 
just the participation at NATO but also participation by 
countries around the world in the Ukraine Defense Contract 
Group that I had referenced earlier.
    And I will tell you that, you know, from my consultations 
with our Indo-Pacific allies, they are watching this very 
closely, and they want to ensure that there is an unequivocal 
message of support for Ukraine and unequivocal condemnation of 
Russia's actions, lest we send a signal to other dictators 
around the world who think----
    Mr. Keating. I also think--I am sorry.
    Ms. Cooper. Please. Please, sir.
    Mr. Keating. I am approaching my time here. But so it is 
not lost in the overall picture, but still important I think, 
what can NATO do to incentivize Georgia to halt some of its 
democratic backsliding and continue to make the reforms 
necessary for eventual NATO membership?
    I think this is important to underscore the need for these 
kind of reforms as we go forward, too, with other countries as 
we approach the summit.
    Ms. Cooper. So I can answer this from not just the NATO 
perspective but the bilateral perspective. I know that we, with 
our NATO allies, are very concerned about what we see in 
political developments in Georgia. But at the same time, we 
have to make sure that we are continuing to send that message 
to Russia that they must not press forward and continue their 
aggression in Georgia.
    So it means that we have to maintain our military-to-
military relationships. We have to maintain our capacity-
building efforts, but at the same time send very strong 
political signals to the leadership.
    Mr. Keating. Thank you very much.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Kean. Thank you, Mr. Keating.
    I now recognize Mr. Lawler from New York for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Last week some of my 
colleagues and I sent a letter to President Biden urging that 
the Administration prioritize discussion on Ukraine's ascension 
to NATO at the Vilnius summit. At the very least, we must 
establish a clear and achievable pathway to membership 
accompanied by concrete security commitments, of course.
    Is the Administration planning to put forward this 
discussion at the summit?
    Mr. Jones. So I can speak to certainly your comment about a 
clear path. That is a major focus of the summit, and we are 
working diligently to send that clear message of support for 
Ukraine at Vilnius.
    Mr. Lawler. Well, yet just this weekend the President said 
that his Administration wouldn't ``make it easy'' for Ukraine 
to join NATO. So is it going to be a clear path or is it going 
to be difficult?
    Mr. Jones. I do not think there is any contradiction there. 
The NATO membership process is a rigorous process. It is a 
standards-based process. And to get through it successfully----
    Mr. Lawler. Right. So if it----
    Mr. Jones [continuing]. Will have to----
    Mr. Lawler [continuing]. If it is standard, why do--why 
even have the comment that we are not going to make it easy? 
What is it that we are concerned about?
    Mr. Jones. Because every applicant, including Ukraine, has 
to make reforms to meet the criteria for membership. And so 
what we are focused on in this summit is really providing 
Ukraine the support that it needs to make those reforms, so it 
can be successful in the membership process.
    Mr. Lawler. Is the goal of the Administration ultimately to 
have them part of NATO?
    Mr. Jones. So we have said that we stand by what was said 
in Bucharest, that Ukraine will become a member of the 
alliance.
    Mr. Lawler. OK. With respect to Moldova, Moldova obviously 
is in the process of reforming its government. President Sandu 
has taken on corruption in concert with the United States and 
the EU, putting sanctions in place. They are obviously seeking 
EU membership, and in that process. Is there any talk with 
respect to Moldova being part of NATO and, obviously, rigorous 
process understood, but is there any talk with respect to 
Moldova and what NATO can and should do to help with security?
    Ms. Cooper. Perhaps, Congressman, I can first address it 
from a bilateral perspective, because right now the government 
of Moldova is really focusing on EU membership, and they aren't 
emphasizing NATO membership. So we actually have ramped up 
significantly our engagement with Moldova to support them in 
this critical time.
    And from a Defense Department perspective, we have 
significantly expanded security assistance and training and 
other forms of engagement and support, and it really is 
intended to strengthen their ability to defend themselves and 
have a deterrent effect and build toward what they see as an 
immediate EU goal.
    But if you wanted to comment on NATO?
    Mr. Jones. I just wanted to add that Moldova follows a 
policy of constitutional neutrality. And so it is not 
requesting or seeking NATO membership. It is not a NATO 
aspirant, but it is a strong partner to NATO. And NATO has 
tailored its support for Moldova to be fully in respect of its 
policy of constitutional neutrality, and NATO does recognize 
Moldova as one of its partners particularly at risk and has 
targeted its support of----
    Mr. Lawler. Understood. It is common knowledge that the 
majority of NATO members still fail to meet the alliance's 2 
percent of GDP threshold for defense spending. But this past 
February, Secretary Austin met with NATO Secretary General 
Stoltenberg and then announced that NATO countries would agree 
to a ``new Defense Investment Pledge'' at the Vilnius summit.
    Ms. Cooper, do you know what this new pledge would look 
like and what it--would it be an increased threshold?
    Ms. Cooper. Congressman, I am going to defer to DAS Jones, 
since my primary responsibility is not specific to NATO.
    Mr. Jones. So allies are intensively negotiating what the 
new updated Defense Investment Pledge will be, and our position 
is that the new Defense Investment Pledge needs to affirm an 
enduring commitment to send--to spend 2 percent of GDP as a 
floor for all allies.
    But, in addition to that, there needs to be strong language 
to spend--to aim to spend even beyond that, because in our 
assessment 2 percent spending by each ally would actually not 
be sufficient.
    Mr. Lawler. Is there going to be accountability measures as 
a part of this?
    Mr. Jones. So the Secretary General does release a report 
annually that details defense spending by all allies, and all 
allies are asked to produce a plan--a credible plan--for how 
they will get to the 2 percent mark.
    Mr. Lawler. Thank you.
    Mr. Kean. Thank you, Mr. Lawler.
    I now recognize Ms. Titus from Nevada for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I am glad to hear that Turkey has kind of softened its 
opposition to Sweden joining NATO, but I am--at the same time, 
I am concerned about the Administration and some lawmakers 
softening their stance on the possibility of selling F-16s to 
Turkey.
    We know Turkey is nothing if not practical or 
transactional. So I just believe that Turkey has proven it is 
not a reliable NATO ally, and its actions are contrary to the 
spirit of NATO.
    So I would ask both of you, are you aware of any other of 
our NATO allies that we have imposed sanctions on under CAATSA 
besides Turkey? And are you aware of any other NATO allies that 
antagonize other NATO allies, like flying into the airspace of 
Greece and Cyprus, besides Turkey?
    Mr. Jones. So I am not aware of other NATO allies that we 
have applied CAATSA sanctions to. I do want to say it is no 
secret that we have differences with Turkey. But also, from a 
NATO perspective, Turkey is also a longstanding and committed 
NATO ally. It does contribute strongly to NATO operations, 
including through the entire time of our NATO mission in 
Afghanistan. I think the most recent example, in the flare-up 
of violence in Kosovo recently, Turkey----
    Ms. Titus. That is all right. I do not need----
    Mr. Jones [continuing]. Quickly sent 500 additional 
soldiers----
    Ms. Titus. I will ask your colleague there the same two 
questions.
    Ms. Cooper. I also am not aware of any instance of imposing 
CAATSA sanctions on another NATO member.
    Ms. Titus. Any other NATO members flying in the airspace or 
taking aggressive action against other NATO fellow allies?
    Ms. Cooper. At the current time, no examples come 
specifically to mind.
    Ms. Titus. Thank you. I think that makes Turkey the 
outlier, so whatever they may have done in the past, let's look 
at what they are doing in the present.
    I also want to ask about the situation with Kosovo and 
Serbia. That seems to be boiling over again. We have seen 
divisive mayoral appointments in Kosovo. Northern Kosovo, 
ethnic Serbs are attacking the U.N. peacekeepers. Kosovar 
police officers are being detained in Serbia.
    Any instability in the western Balkans, whether they are 
NATO members or not, is really a threat to NATO itself, and not 
to mention the security of the U.N. peacekeepers or to Kosovo's 
own NATO aspirations.
    I would ask you, Mr. Jones, how is the U.S. working with 
NATO to help lower the temperature between Kosovo and Serbia?
    Mr. Jones. Well, we have called on all parties to take 
immediate action to de-escalate tensions. We have condemned the 
violence which has been directed both at NATO troops, but also 
law enforcement and journalists.
    We have been deeply engaged with Kosovo and with Serbia to 
de-escalate and to urge both to quickly return to the EU-
facilitated dialog. And I would--and from the NATO perspective, 
you know, NATO continues to be responsible for the safety and 
security through the--and freedom of movement through the KFOR 
mission, recently reinforced that mission, to be able to 
execute that mission.
    Ms. Titus. I know there are high hurdles for Kosovo to join 
as a full member of NATO. But can you tell us where things 
stand on its bid to join the Partnership for Peace Program? Is 
the U.S. supporting that? Are the tensions causing that to be 
delayed or affected in any way negatively?
    Mr. Jones. Well, there are hurdles to NATO--to Kosovo 
moving forward. We have been clear that both Kosovo and Serbia 
need to immediately fulfill commitments to the Normalization 
Agreement and also its Implementation Annex.
    And we have continued to support Kosovo's 10-year 
transition plan to transform the Kosovo security force into a 
multi-ethnic NATO interoperable territorial defense force, and 
that would help move Kosovo forward on this path.
    Ms. Titus. Ms. Cooper, do you want to add to any of this?
    Ms. Cooper. Congresswoman, since the Balkans is not part of 
my portfolio, I will refrain. Thank you.
    Ms. Titus. OK. Thank you.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Kean. Thank you. This committee will recess until 2:15 
when we will reconvene after votes. 2:15. Thank you.
    [Recess.]
    Mr. Kean. The committee will come to order.
    Ms. Wagner, for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. Wagner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I thank you for 
organizing this hearing.
    The NATO summit in Vilnius is fast approaching. And I 
appreciate the opportunity to examine allied priorities ahead 
of this great, critically important meeting. I am privileged to 
serve as a U.S. delegate to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 
the Alliance's legislative, I guess, advisory body.
    At our spring meeting in Luxembourg I was moved and 
gratified to hear firsthand from our transatlantic partners 
that the Alliance commitment to an independent, sovereign, and 
victorious Ukraine remains absolutely ironclad.
    Equally important, our NATO partners made it clear to us 
that they understand the need to put real skin in the game. And 
I know that this has been addressed previously. But as we 
discussed in Luxembourg at the NATO Parliament, you know, 
spending 2 percent of GDP on defense should be a floor, not a 
ceiling, for each member of the Alliance. And I hope that the 
United States makes that case to our partners during the 
Vilnius Summit.
    The world is a safer, safer place when NATO is strong, 
capable, and ready.
    In addition to the shortcomings that many NATO members face 
on their kind of overall defense spending, several also lag in 
their bilateral support for Ukraine.
    Deputy Assistant Secretary Cooper, which countries could 
and should provide more assistance to Ukraine? And how does the 
Biden Administration engage with them to ensure that they are 
pulling their weight?
    Ms. Cooper. Thank you, Congresswoman Wagner. I would say 
that, first of all, it is important to note that our NATO 
allies are, are pulling their own weight and their fair share 
in terms of supporting Ukraine. And we see tremendous support 
in terms of near-term provision of support on the immediate 
battlefield, but also we are seeing more and more allies 
actually investing in long-term support, with billions of 
dollars in multi-year commitment packages, which are really 
important.
    The areas where we see less support and where we have a lot 
of private, quiet conversations because of the countries' 
policies tend to be outside of Europe in regions where 
countries are not willing to be vocally in support of Ukraine, 
but sometimes quietly will agree to provide donations without 
publicity.
    But those are much more challenging conversations. But they 
are conversations that we are having at the highest levels of 
the U.S. Government.
    Mrs. Wagner. Thank you. Deputy Assistant Secretary Cooper, 
keeping with you, a little earlier you mentioned Ground 
Launched Small Diameter Bombs as an alternative to ATACMS that 
the U.S. has agreed to provide. However, I do not believe these 
will be delivered to Ukraine's armed forces before October, is 
my understanding.
    With Ukraine's counteroffensive underway, the critical time 
is now, not in 4 months. Why would we wait until October to 
provide critical, longer-range systems rather than provide 
ATACMS now?
    Ms. Cooper. Thank you for that. In terms of the 
capabilities that we are providing to Ukraine for their 
immediate needs, we are always looking at every possible 
opportunity. And we always have to weigh the question of 
effectiveness: you know, will it work on the battlefield, and 
are there alternative capabilities?
    In this case, you are absolutely right, ma'am, that the 
Ground Launched Small Diameter Bombs will not arrive until 
later this fall. But what we are seeing on the ground today is 
the employment of various long-range UAV systems, as well as 
the Storm Shadow system that the U.K. has provided, which both 
have that, that range. And in the case of Storm Shadow, also 
significant, significant payroll.
    Mrs. Wagner. There is nothing we could do to move that, 
that timeframe up at all?
    Ms. Cooper. My colleagues in the acquisition and 
sustainment organization have been working to try to move up 
the Ground Launched Small Diameter Bomb timeframe. We 
absolutely agree that we would like to do that. But, so far 
that the earlier is this fall that we, that we have heard.
    And in the meantime we will keep, we will keep looking for 
other capabilities within our own stocks. There are 
availability challenges with, with certain capabilities.
    Mrs. Wagner. I just want to reiterate in my 2 seconds left 
here that, you know, the counteroffensive is now. Now is our 
moment. And we have to do whatever we possibly can to provide 
the Ukrainians with the necessary armament, weaponry to try and 
finish this.
    So, I thank you for your work. And I thank you for the 
chair's indulgence. And I shall yield back and submit the rest 
of my questions, Mr. Chairman, for this in writing.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Kean. Thank you, Ms. Wagner.
    I now recognize Ms. Dean for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Dean. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member 
Keating.
    And I thank you, both of the assistant secretaries, for 
your testimony today and, more importantly, for your work and 
your service to our country, especially around this incredibly 
important global issue of Ukraine.
    I wanted to let you know I serve suburban Philadelphia in 
Pennsylvania's 4th congressional District, which is Montgomery 
and Berks County, home to a tremendous number of Ukrainian 
Americans, just a wonderful community that I have known and 
loved since before this horrific invasion and set of war 
crimes.
    And I share the sentiment of some folks on the other side 
of the aisle. I am very proud of this Administration and the 
President for what he has done, how he has led, and how we, the 
United States of America, has brought 53 countries, if not 
more, together, seeing clearly the grotesque invasion by 
Russia.
    But my question, I am posing it to both of you, either of 
you, Mr. Jones, Ms. Cooper, what additional steps is NATO 
considering in order to end Russia's war in Ukraine as soon as 
possible, as well as to deter any future aggression?
    Obviously, if we end it sooner than later, I think that 
will be a powerful deterrent.
    What else is NATO doing? What else is the Administration 
summoning up to end this sooner?
    Mr. Jones. I will talk briefly about what NATO is doing.
    NATO is also committed to supporting Ukraine in this 
conflict. But NATO's role has been primarily to provide non-
lethal support to complement the lethal assistance that is 
being given bilaterally to the Ukraine defense coordination 
group that Laura described.
    The Alliance has been going through a historic 
transformation of its own deterrence and defense in order to, 
to ensure that there is no aggression against NATO territory. 
NATO has expanded its forward-deployed forces, doubling the 
number of battle groups that it has on its eastern front, 
almost doubling the number of troops it has forward deployed.
    And NATO is also in the process of completing and is on 
track to complete at the Vilnius Summit a complete rework of 
its defense plans to take in a comprehensive plan for the 
defense of Europe, which will both strengthen its deterrence 
and, I think, send a clear message about our ironclad 
commitment to defend every inch of NATO territory.
    Ms. Cooper. And if I may add, so, from a perspective of 
your point, you know, to support the Ukrainians in winning this 
war, I would say that right now we are very focused on ensuring 
that the Ukrainians have what they need in the 
counteroffensive. We have helped support them to build nine new 
brigades. This is an amazing achievement and a tribute to the 
work of U.S. European Command and our allies and partners.
    So, these nine brigades have been outfitted with the best 
kit possible: with tanks, with infantry fighting vehicles, 
artillery, and with plenty of ammunition. And we are watching 
to see what else they need. As things break we are getting them 
spare parts or replacement capabilities.
    So, that is a very tangible, very practical thing that we 
are doing.
    But I want to also emphasize that, you know, this is not 
just about today, it is also about showing Russia that they 
cannot wait us out, and showing Russia that we are there to 
support Ukraine for the long haul. And that is something that 
you see reflected in the NATO discussions, but you also see it 
reflected in our bilateral discussions, both in private and in 
public. And I think that will be increasingly important.
    Thank you.
    Ms. Dean. Thank you. And with the little time I have left, 
I thank you both for those answers. And the nine brigades is 
impressive and important. I know we must continue to do more 
and more of that.
    I am thinking, also, what additional security assurances 
for Ukraine will the Biden Administration support at the 
upcoming summit?
    I am thinking along the lines of the kind of Israel-style 
support, the security agreement, the memorandum of 
understanding that we have, multi-year commitments to Ukraine.
    I know you spoke to it a little bit in your testimony, but 
if you wouldn't mind detailing that?
    Ms. Cooper. Thank you. And I'll just touch on, again, the 
bilateral dimension of this. And, of course, there is the 
multilateral NATO dimension of this.
    So, you know, we are engaged in discussions on how we can 
support Ukraine and give that sense of confidence that they 
will have what they need, not just today but in the long term, 
so that after there is an end to this war we will also be 
deterring future Russian aggression.
    And so, these are conversations that are occurring in 
diplomatic and in military-to-military channels and will 
continue to unfold.
    Ms. Dean. Terrific. I see my time has expired. I yield 
back.
    Mr. Kean. Thank you, Ms. Dean.
    I now recognize Mr. Self from Texas for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Self. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I think my colleagues are going to cover Ukraine and the 
major issues quite well. In the lead up to Vilnius I want to go 
to former Yugoslavia.
    You have a potential flashpoint, Assistant, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary Jones, in the Serbia-Kosovo, area. And I 
think people need to realize it.
    From my time in NATO and the European Command in the 1990's 
during the multiple civil wars, there are some issues that have 
not been solved between Serbia and Kosovo. As you know, the 
Serbs basically boycotted the recent election. The Kosovars 
took their rightfully elected positions. And now we have a 
potential flashpoint between Serbia and Kosovo.
    Can you give me your opinion before I ask my questions?
    Mr. Jones. So, I agree with your assessment on the 
potential flashpoint. And certainly NATO has a long history in 
the Balkans.
    Regarding Serbia and Kosovo, we are engaged in intense 
diplomacy currently to urge both sides to de-escalate and 
return to the EU-facilitated dialog. And we are supporting, as 
a way ahead, the EU's three point plan which is calling for de-
escalation by both parties, new elections, this time with 
Kosovo-Serb participation, and also the normalization agreement 
implementation.
    Mr. Self. And you have, you have mentioned Bosnia-
Herzegovina. In your written testimony you did not mentioned 
this at all.
    And let's go to this election, because the Serbs boycotted 
it. And I thought you had mentioned you wanted new elections.
    Why do you want new elections? Because when someone 
boycotts an election, when a side boycotts the election the 
election is held, duly held, and the people who win the 
election take office. Why would you ask for new elections?
    Mr. Jones. So, the plan, including new elections, was 
referring to elections in Kosovo and which were boycotted by 
the----
    Mr. Self. Correct.
    Mr. Jones [continuing]. Serbs, Kosovo Serbs.
    So, we have recognized that the mayors that were elected 
were elected through a proper election. However, they have not 
been able to fully execute their duties. And, in fact, their 
attempt to move into their municipal office buildings is what 
has led to the, to the violence.
    And so----
    Mr. Self. But that is my question. Duly elected mayors are 
trying to do their duty to move into the office buildings, and 
we are supporting a re-do as opposed to supporting these duly 
elected mayors.
    Why is that?
    Mr. Jones. So, these mayors, due to the, to the boycott 
they were elected with an extremely low percentage of 
electorate.
    Mr. Self. That happens every day in America. We have local 
elections where we have 10 percent turnout. And we do not fight 
it because we have a low turnout.
    Mr. Jones. But it has led to large portions of the 
electorate feeling disenfranchised. They are--at their own 
choice.
    Mr. Self. Correct.
    Mr. Jones. They are willing to come back and vote, as we 
are urging them to. I think that would result in a more stable 
process and a more representative government that would help 
end the current conflict that we are seeing now.
    Mr. Self. The real problem I see is the State Department is 
trying to pull Serbia away from the Russian orbit. You are 
intervening in elections that were properly held. You are 
interfering with people who were properly elected to try to 
insert yourself into a millennia-old issue here. And you are 
upsetting a duly executed election.
    You are not going to pull Serbia out of the Russian orbit. 
You might as well let Kosovo--we have recognized Kosovo. I know 
a lot of people have not, a lot of countries have not. But we 
have recognized Kosovo. You need to, I encourage you to re-
think your position on this Serbian-Kosovar conflict here 
because you need to be standing for the rule of law, which is 
duly elected officials trying to do their duty.
    With that, I yield back.
    Mr. Kean. Thank you.
    The chair now recognizes Mr. Costa from California for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Costa. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And thank 
you, Ranking Member Keating. I have got a number of questions.
    First of all, let me begin with weapons to Ukraine. Clearly 
we have done an incredible job. But, obviously, more work needs 
to be done for, I think for ourselves and NATO to ensure that 
this counteroffensive is successful.
    Ukraine has repeatedly requested cluster munitions, 
including dual purpose improvised conventional munitions. And I 
am not going to go through the acronym. But, a host of other 
factors.
    Where are we on that? I know we have struggled with the F-
16s, and I know that is in progress. But right now they need 
these, these dual purposes improved conventional munitions. 
Where are we?
    Ms. Cooper. Congressman, on, I refer to it as DPICMs for 
short, on----
    Mr. Costa. That is fine.
    Ms. Cooper. On this issue the military advice that we have 
received is that they would make a difference on the 
battlefield, that they would be effective against dug-in 
Russian positions.
    There are two factors that weigh heavily in the 
decisionmaking. The one is that, you know, Congress has 
actually legislated a restriction on transfer of these 
munitions with a dud rate above 1 percent. So, the 
congressional----
    Mr. Costa. Well, if it is our responsibility, we can deal 
with that. I am not looking for excuses. We know they would be 
effective.
    So, you are saying that we have to act?
    Ms. Cooper. Well, right now there is, there is legislation 
that restricts the transfer.
    Mr. Costa. I heard you.
    Ms. Cooper. And then the second piece is the question of 
allies' reactions and alliance----
    Mr. Costa. Well, then what you are saying is we are at a 
standstill until we make changes on the legislation, and until 
we get support with our allies. Is that the answer?
    I have got other questions I want to ask. That is the 
answer?
    Ms. Cooper. I think it would be important for us to 
understand where Members of Congress are on this issue.
    Mr. Costa. Well, OK. Let's move on. We will take that and 
followup.
    Germany's National Security Strategy. Last week Germany 
published its first National Security Strategy. That document 
takes kind of a broad view at major threats facing Germany, 
strategically broad goals to increase defense spending and 
deploy more capable, robust armed forces.
    What is your impression of the strategy? Have you looked at 
it, the goals? Is this aspirational or is it realistic?
    Mr. Jones. So, I think in general the strategy, we are 
reviewing the strategy. And but we have been quite like-minded 
with Germany in a lot of the issues----
    Mr. Costa. OK, but the bottom line, is this aspirational or 
is this, can they achieve this? Is it realistic?
    Mr. Jones. Are you talking about the defense spending?
    Mr. Costa. Yes. That has been a problem as well with 
Germany.
    Mr. Jones. So, so far, you know, they laid out a very 
impression plan for increased defense spending, but we have yet 
to see it materialize.
    Mr. Costa. So, the proof is in the pudding. OK.
    Let me move to Armenia.
    Clearly, you know, Azerbaijan has no intention of following 
through with the Minsk Accord. And Russia is not going to, they 
cannot abide by any international rules that they have 
previously committed to.
    The Lachin corridor continues to be closed to Nagorno-
Karabakh. And the blockade exists.
    Simply put, you know, Armenians are suffering.
    What is our effort to try to deal with this?
    Ms. Cooper. I can share my perspective as the Defense 
Department official who handles this part of the world.
    First of all, I have to credit Secretary Blinken and 
National Security Council leadership for the work that they are 
doing to try to actually achieve a successful peace process.
    Mr. Costa. So, I know, that is fine. But what are we doing 
to deal with the blockade on the Lachin corridor?
    Ms. Cooper. And so that, you know, those peace negotiations 
are the path to stability and peace in the region.
    Mr. Costa. So, where are we on this? I mean, Azerbaijan has 
no intention of following through. They haven't followed 
through on their previous agreements.
    And we sure as hell cannot expect Russia.
    Ms. Cooper. So, in terms of the peace negotiations, we 
actually are cautiously optimistic that we are making progress.
    Mr. Costa. I would like find out what your optimism is and 
why?
    Ms. Cooper. Absolutely. If the----
    Mr. Costa. Yes, all right. I have got 49 seconds now, 
please.
    I want to talk about burden sharing and defense spending.
    The Vilnius Summit that is coming up includes making 2 
percent of the GDP a targeted spending floor rather than a 
ceiling. However, we know some of the European countries are 
struggling to reach the 2 percent historically. And this goes 
back three Administrations, back to the Bush Administration.
    The pace of the military procurements has led to delays in 
spending appropriated funds. And, finally, NATO countries close 
to reaching 2 percent increased funding I think is coming as a 
one-off thing, in other words, one-off supplemental funding 
packages instead of an increased annual funding.
    Where do you think we can make some progress in the summit 
coming up?
    Mr. Jones. So, we are seeing progress, slow progress, too 
slow progress in increased allied defense spending. I think for 
the summit specifically, it is with a stronger defense 
investment pledge.
    And we agree that we should set 2 percent as the floor for 
allied defense spending. And in addition to that, we are 
working to ensure there is also language in there that aims to 
go higher than 2 percent because we will need more than 2 
percent, in our estimation, for allies to be able to have the 
money to provide----
    Mr. Costa. Oh, absolutely. Absolutely.
    Mr. Jones [continuing]. Military simple needs.
    Mr. Costa. Mr. Chairman, my time has expired. But I do want 
to followup.
    Chairman Moran and I were in Vilnius--I mean Stockholm this 
weekend meeting with the Swedish officials about their ability 
to become a part of NATO. And I want to find out what we are 
prepared to do in the upcoming summit to assist Sweden in its 
ability to become a part of NATO. It is critical.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Kean. Thank you, Mr. Costa.
    I now recognize Mr. Moran from Texas for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Moran. That was a perfect segue to the first question I 
have. So, let's go with Mr. Costa's question, because we did 
have a good time discussing the NATO accession for Sweden this 
weekend, both bilaterally with Swedish government officials, 
and then multilaterally with EU Parliament members. And there 
is strong support all the way around from everybody to make 
sure that Sweden gets into NATO, and to do it in a very timely 
fashion.
    So, what pressures are we applying from the U.S. Government 
to ensure that the blockade or the objection by Turkey goes 
away and that Hungary follows suit, and that we get Sweden into 
NATO as quickly as possible?
    Mr. Jones. This is a top priority of the United States that 
Sweden become a NATO ally by Vilnius. And we are actively and 
persistently raising this with Turkey and with Hungary at all 
levels.
    Most recently, yesterday, Secretary Blinken in his meeting 
with Turkish Foreign Minister Fidan focused intensely on this.
    So, our belief is that allies have taken--or Sweden has 
taken Turkey's counterterrorism concerns into account and has 
implemented largely the memorandum of agreement that they, that 
they reached with Turkey and Finland. And Sweden is ready to 
become a member of the Alliance now.
    Mr. Moran. Let me just take issue just briefly with the 
word you said, ``largely.`` You said that Sweden largely 
complied with the MOU. But I haven't found an instance where 
they did not comply.
    And, in fact, it looks like to me that Sweden has complied 
beyond what the MOU required, has gone above and beyond, and 
has done everything that Turkey has required in order to remove 
those objections.
    Is there something specifically that the U.S. Government 
would say that Sweden still needs to do?
    Mr. Jones. No. I would agree they have, they have 
implemented the MOA.
    Mr. Moran. All right. And they have done a great job 
getting to that 2 percent mark for defense spending of the GDP. 
And that is getting there quickly.
    And so, it looks like to me that we need to continue to put 
pressure on Turkey.
    Does Turkey understand that if this does not happen, if the 
objection does not go away and Sweden does not accede into NATO 
that their request for military equipment could be in peril?
    Mr. Jones. So, yes. I mean, I think Turkey realizes, and 
because they are hearing it not only from us, but from all 
allies, the strong support for Sweden to join by Vilnius.
    They also realize that confirm--ratifying Sweden by the 
Vilnius Summit would help in many of these, the weapons 
transfers that you are talking about.
    Mr. Moran. Yes, I think it is critical that we continue. 
And we are, as a bipartisan group, at least this last weekend 
and I think consistently, have projected that message from 
Congress to Turkish officials that we need them to cooperate in 
this manner because Sweden's decision to come out of neutrality 
after 200 years, frankly, of being neutral, I mean, most folks 
do not know that, that Sweden, it is a big step for them. They 
have been a neutral country for 200 years, and they decided to 
come out and apply for NATO membership.
    They, in the first time in about 80 years, provided weapons 
systems to another country. They hadn't done that since the 
World War II time period.
    Those are big steps for them to take to say we are on the 
side of what is good in this world. And we need to meet that 
with appropriate force, in my opinion, and appropriate leverage 
to make sure that their, that their steps are successful in 
getting into NATO.
    Would you agree with that?
    Mr. Jones. I agree with that. It is a historic shift that 
we have seen in both Finland and Sweden.
    These were centuries old policies of neutrality. And so, a 
point that we frequently make to Turkey is not only is it about 
Turkey demands on counterterrorism, but this is also an issue 
that affects Alliance security, and it affects the security of 
other allies as well.
    Mr. Moran. OK. All right, so when we are talking about the 
NATO Alliance, just with my last minute let's talk a little bit 
about Ukraine. And I know they want to get into NATO one of 
these days. There is some hesitation to do that before peace, 
after the Ukraine-Russia war, once that ends.
    And there is talk about maybe a pathway.
    But at the Vilnius Summit do you think it might be better 
just to set some benchmarks out there to say, hey, we need to 
get to these benchmarks before we even establish a pathway 
potentially for Ukraine to becoming part of NATO? Do you think 
that is an appropriate and wise step?
    Mr. Jones. Well, I think what we are trying to accomplish, 
and I think we will accomplish is a really strong message of 
support for Ukraine, including not only, you know, going beyond 
what we said before about our commitment that Ukraine will 
become an ally, but also to provide increased support from NATO 
for its current, in its current conflict with Russia. And also, 
a really package that we are building, really an unprecedented 
package to help Ukraine implement the reforms it needs so that 
it is ready to join NATO once the conflict ends.
    Mr. Moran. All right. Thanks.
    I would continue to urge you to do whatever we can for 
Sweden to get them into NATO. As you know, they are going to be 
a great, long-term economic, diplomatic, and military partner. 
And them being part of NATO is a critical step in that process.
    So, thank you. I yield back.
    Mr. Kean. Thank you, Mr. Moran.
    I recognize Mr. Wilson of South Carolina for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Chairman Kean. And thank you and 
Representative Bill Keating.
    Both secretaries, you are going to see something really 
remarkable with the leadership of Chairman Kean. Republicans 
and Democrats want you to succeed. And that is why so many of 
the questions that you see are meant to be positive. And they 
are. But we want you to succeed because war criminal Putin has 
inadvertently unified NATO, as we see with Congressman Moran 
pointing out about Sweden joining NATO, giving up its 
neutralism after 20--200 years.
    We see the incredible people of Finland who were successful 
in the Winter War of 1939 to resist invasion.
    We see the European Union coming together, providing over 
$75 billion of aid to the people of Ukraine.
    And then, again, possibly even more remarkable, something 
that Putin didn't mean to do, and that is get Republicans and 
Democrats to work together.
    And that is why we want you to succeed.
    And you could see by the questions from Congressman Costa, 
Congressman Moran with the Parliamentary Assembly, we want you 
to do well.
    And then I was really very pleased with the passion by 
Congresswoman and Ambassador Ann Wagner. We want the right 
weaponry delivered as quickly as possible.
    And in line with that, Ms. Cooper, you mentioned the 
legislative restrictions on the provision of the DPICMs. And 
that's the Dual Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions. 
However, there is a waiver available for the President that was 
not mentioned, that he can exercise this waiver at any time. 
And given the assessment that these would be effective for the 
people of Ukraine for the counteroffensive, why isn't this 
issue addressed with a waiver immediately?
    Ms. Cooper. Congressman, so, on the issue of DPICMs there 
is the question of congressional support. And certainly there 
is a provision for a waiver. That is absolutely accurate. But 
certainly the Administration would want to understand, you 
know, congressional sentiment on this issue before taking such 
a step.
    And then the other piece of it that I had mentioned earlier 
is the Alliance unity piece. Since we do have a considerable 
number of NATO members that have signed up to the convention 
prohibiting cluster munitions, there are some concerns about 
whether this would lead to divisions.
    Mr. Wilson. OK. I want you to be aware, when you have good 
people, amazingly enough, like former NATO President of the 
NATO Parliamentary Assembly Gerry Connolly here, he can verify 
to you that there is a majority in Congress that wants DPICMs 
to be provided. That even though there may be members of NATO 
that will not be supportive, it needs to be done.
    And for the benefit of success, we want President Biden to 
be successful in this initiative. And to be successful means 
that the people of Ukraine have the most advanced weaponry with 
the longest range, the most effectiveness to face a war 
criminal who the mining of Ukraine, I mean just over and over 
again the war crimes are being committed.
    With that in mind, also, Secretary Jones, following the 
2008 Bucharest Summit Ukraine's NATO aspirations were welcomed 
and a path to membership was confirmed. The people of Ukraine 
have certainly indicated by giving blood to every effort that 
they want a clear path to NATO membership.
    And Americans also want victory. And that is why myself, as 
chairman of the U.S. Helsinki Commission, we introduced House 
Resolution 332 which defines victory and a path forward for 
NATO membership. And also, it is bipartisan with 12 other 
members to provide for President Biden to call for a concrete 
pathway for Ukraine at the Vilnius Summit to provide for NATO 
membership.
    With that, why is the Administration hesitant on moving 
ahead with Ukraine?
    Mr. Jones. So, I think, as I have said, one of our top 
goals for this summit is a strong message of support for 
Ukraine. And to not only reaffirm what the allies said at 
Bucharest, that Ukraine will become a member of the Alliance, 
but also to back that up with an increased package of non-
lethal support, larger than before, and also to unveil this 
package of support to signal the Alliance's long-term 
commitment, that the Alliance is there to support Ukraine over 
the long term.
    And to focus this assistance on helping Ukraine meet its 
reform agenda so that they can meet NATO's membership 
standards. Because Ukraine and allies agree that Ukraine cannot 
join NATO while there is an active conflict, but we can, 
through this assistance, help Ukraine to advance its reforms so 
that it can be ready to join NATO when conditions permit.
    Mr. Wilson. Well, there will be bipartisan support for 
this.
    And I yield back. Thank you.
    Mr. Kean. Thank you, Mr. Wilson.
    I now recognize Mr. Connolly from Virginia for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for 
allowing me to participate.
    Welcome to our two witnesses. And let me just say I think, 
hopefully, you have heard on a bipartisan basis. And I hope it 
helps you diplomatically and in counterpart discussions.
    I do think the sentiment here in Congress is no F-16s or 
major weapon sales to Turkey until they have decided to release 
Sweden and allow Sweden's accession immediately into NATO. 
Turkey doesn't get to do that without, you know, to block it 
without consequences.
    I also believe that in Congress is probably broad, broad 
support for going ahead with F-16s for Ukraine, and going ahead 
at Vilnius and giving a green light to an invitation, a direct 
invitation to Ukraine for membership.
    Ms. Cooper, I would say to you I appreciate, and I think a 
lot of my colleagues appreciate your concern and deference to 
Congress about certain things like cluster bombs. That is not a 
non-controversial item. And it is not necessarily on the 
approved list on a bipartisan basis going to Ukraine.
    And we need to have that debate and that discussion. And it 
is you are absolutely right to express the caution you did, 
from my point of view.
    Mr. Assistant Secretary, I am going to ask you two 
questions. One is maybe easier than the other. The other one is 
not going to be particularly an invitation to a diplomatic 
answer, but it is going to be direct.
    So, the first one is where are we, as you know, the NATO 
Parliamentary Assembly has virtually unanimously, hundreds of 
parliamentarians representing 31 parliaments, have recommended 
the creation of the Center for Democratic Resilience at NATO 
itself. So, we are in fact operationalizing the avowed 
commitment we have to democratic shared values, creating an 
architecture to propound, advocate for, and be a resource about 
democracy and democratic institutions.
    Real briefly, where are we on that? Because last time I 
checked, we had 29 out of 30 Ambassadors to the North Atlantic 
Council supporting the idea.
    Mr. Jones. So, we support the idea. We think it would be an 
important forum for NATO to protect shared values that are the 
basis for the Alliance. And we have advocated for this at NATO.
    We made a strong push for this before the Madrid Summit. 
But, unfortunately, there was not NATO consensus or unanimity 
as is required for all NATO decisions. And so, we elected, 
rather than take on amendments to that proposal that would have 
in our mind gutted it, we elected to play a long game and 
continue to push for this.
    And we are regularly raising this at NATO, including at 
recent North Atlantic Council meetings. And we do not think 
this will be delivered by Madrid--I mean by Vilnius. But we 
think we can keep advocating for this and, in the long term.
    Mr. Connolly. Well, taking a page out of Ms. Cooper's book, 
I think it is important to take cognizance of the fact that the 
House of Representatives passed a resolution endorsing this, on 
a big bipartisan vote.
    So, you know, it is not like some stray idea that might be 
good to pursue. Not that you are saying that. But it has 
standing in Congress. We actually acted on it.
    Mr. Jones. And I think that the support from the NATO 
Parliamentary Assembly has actually been a critical----
    Mr. Connolly. Good.
    Mr. Jones [continuing]. Effort, and it makes a big impact 
with those allies who have----
    Mr. Connolly. Now, you are being----
    Mr. Jones [continuing]. Not yet agreed.
    Mr. Connolly. You are being diplomatic, Mr. Jones. You said 
we operate unanimously. And pointed out 29 of 30 Ambassadors 
support us.
    So, who, pray tell, is not supporting it and blocking it?
    Mr. Jones. Well----
    Mr. Connolly. You can say it.
    Mr. Jones [continuing]. I prefer not to talk about what 
happened----
    Mr. Connolly. I know. But we, we prefer to talk about it.
    Mr. Jones. All right. Well, I think you know. So, the----
    Mr. Connolly. Did I hear you say Hungary?
    Yes. That is what I got.
    Mr. Jones. You said that.
    Mr. Connolly. So, real quickly I will make a statement so I 
do not put you in it.
    I think the time has come to reassess the relationship with 
Hungary across the board. The EU is doing it and has suspended 
aid. It is, it is absolutely going down a road that compromises 
democratic institutions. It has publicly criticized the United 
States for undermining its own legitimacy as a government 
rather than Russia.
    It has strengthened its relationships with Russia in the 
middle of a war.
    It has threatened to block further sanctions.
    And it is blocking, certainly, the membership of Sweden, 
the accession of Sweden to NATO.
    It raises serious questions about a viper at our breast, in 
NATO. And I think the time has come for a serious reassessment 
about the relationship with Hungary.
    With that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Kean. Thank you, Mr. Connolly.
    I now recognize Mr. Huizenga for 5 minutes.
    Yes, then you yield back?
    Mr. Huizenga. I yield back.
    Mr. Kean. OK.
    Mr. Schneider, I yield to you for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Schneider. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for 
allowing me to waive onto the committee and join the 
conversation.
    I want to thank the witnesses.
    And to my friend, Mr. Huizenga, I am happy to go long. I 
have been there before.
    Anyway, thank you guys very much.
    We have talked a lot about NATO. And the NATO Alliance is 
absolutely one of the remarkable accomplishments of the last 80 
years, and is unprecedented in global history.
    At this moment, with so many countries coming together, 
united to defend each other, but also to defend democracy in 
the Free World, and as we discuss here today, we need to make 
sure that not only Finland but Sweden is able to join NATO.
    When the cold war ended the need for the Alliance was 
questioned. Few could even conceive of the possibility of a 
land war in Europe. But Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine 
has made it clear that the Free World needs to work together as 
much as ever, and that America must lead, as we have over the 
past year-and-a-half.
    Ukraine's fight has been an inspiration from the day it was 
invaded. And President Zelensky's refusal to leave Kyiv and to 
lead his nation has been an inspiration to the world.
    It has been our privilege to support the brave Ukrainians, 
warfighters who sacrificed and continue to sacrifice each and 
every day. This war will end when the guns stop firing. But the 
peace can only begin once Ukraine has ironclad guarantees of 
its independence and security.
    What I would like to ask both of you is can you touch on 
what is significant and what potential guarantees would help 
Ukraine? And what are the advantages and disadvantages of 
providing those guarantees?
    Mr. Jones. I think I will talk briefly about NATO and then 
pass it to Deputy Secretary Cooper.
    NATO, of course, provides security guarantees only to NATO 
allies, of which Ukraine is not a member. But what NATO is 
looking to do is to send rather, through this longer-term 
package of support at NATO, indication of its commitment to 
support Ukraine in its struggle in the way that it can, 
primarily through its non-lethal assistance to complement the 
bilateral lethal assistance. And to make that commitment not 
only sort of year to year, as it has been done so far in the 
past, but to talk about a much longer-term commitment to 
indicate the long-term NATO support for Ukraine.
    Ms. Cooper. And then, Congressman, I will just fill in from 
the bilateral perspective which complements this NATO 
perspective on how to assure Ukraine in the long term, the 
United States, but also other allies, are considering how we 
can convey that long-term support.
    And it is a security issue, so it is an issue for my 
department when you think about ensuring the viability of the 
Ukrainian armed forces in the long term, but it is also 
important to note that this is an economic, and recovery, and 
reconstruction issue as well. And that is where you see, you 
know, allies and partners coming together in London to talk 
about reconstruction.
    So, we are engaging in these, in these conversations, you 
know, privately. And we are working on how we might be able to 
provide this kind of support.
    Mr. Schneider. Great. Thank you.
    And expanding the view or expanding the focus for a second, 
the other gray zones, independent from Russia but within 
striking distance is, for example, Georgia and Moldova. What 
should we do in those circumstances?
    Ms. Cooper. Congressman, I spend, when I am not thinking 
about Ukraine or Russia, I tend to be thinking about Moldova 
and Georgia a good deal. And what we have seen is very 
different in both countries. But in both cases we have, during 
this period of crisis, have redoubled our effort to have strong 
military-to-military ties, and to maintain our support for 
these countries to be able to defend themselves, recognizing 
that the threat is quite real.
    I will leave it at that.
    Mr. Schneider. OK.
    Mr. Jones. And I would just like to add that following 
Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, NATO realized that 
some of its partners were at risk to Russian malign influence. 
And that includes Georgia, Moldova, but also Bosnia-
Herzegovina. And it has initiated tailored packages for each 
one to help them resist malign influence.
    And, also, the Alliance will be inviting the foreign 
ministers of these three countries to come to the summit to 
meet with NATO foreign ministers as a sign of support for them, 
and a special focus on them as at-risk NATO partners.
    Mr. Schneider. Great. Thanks.
    And my red light is on, so I am out of time. But I would be 
negligent if I didn't mention I am the co-chair, with my friend 
Joe Wilson, of the Bulgaria Caucus. And if we had more time we 
would talk about the Balkans as well.
    Thank you. I yield back.
    Mr. Kean. Thank you. The chair now recognizes Mr. Huizinga 
for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Huizinga. Thank you, Mr. Kean. I appreciate your 
indulgence in giving me a moment.
    I had a chance this past weekend to be in Stockholm, in 
Sweden, with the Transatlantic Legislative Dialogue. That, as 
you can imagine, a fascinating time right now with what has 
been going on. There was members of the EU Parliament from 
Finland that were there, and a number of other, a number of 
other countries. Quite a lot of conversation about Sweden's 
ascension into NATO.
    And I just want to publicly, again, State my support of 
that. And we hope that those that appear to be holding us back, 
Hungary and Turkey, that they come to their senses on this, and 
that they see that this would be a positive, positive thing to 
have for NATO.
    One of the issues that I discussed at length while we were 
there with a number of our European colleagues was the Arctic 
and what was going on. Certainly with Finland and Sweden or--
hopefully, soon Sweden now being a part of NATO, they are part 
of the Arctic Council. Russia is also a part of that Arctic 
Council.
    Incredibly, China is trying to claim near Arctic status, 
and soon to have a cooperation with Russia about that. In fact, 
these are published public facts that Canada earlier this year 
discovered Chinese listening buoys in Canadian waters up in the 
Arctic.
    So, I have been seeing that this is not just a strategic 
area, valuable and ripe with valuable commodities, and energy, 
and minerals, but it also has commercial, geopolitical 
implications and, frankly, security implications.
    And it is no doubt that China has its eyes and designs on 
that. And, in fact, it even has something called the Polar Silk 
Road Initiative. So, it cannot be ignored that that area is 
rising in its importance.
    So, recently I sent a letter, with the support of Chairman 
Kean and fellow members of this committee, to Secretary Blinken 
seeking State's plan to bolster our Arctic allies and partners 
to thwart Russia and Chinese influence in the reason.
    Within the letter I pointed to Finland's ascension to NATO, 
in addition to Sweden's pending ascension, as a marker of a 
fundamental shift in the Arctic.
    So, first and foremost, and I guess this should be to you, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary Jones, what can NATO do to expand 
and strengthen our partnership in the Arctic?
    And is there a common understanding of a path ahead from 
NATO on further engagement in the Arctic region? Or are there 
some other member nations that might take some more convincing?
    Mr. Jones. So, I agree that the Arctic is a area of 
increased attention, growing geostrategic challenges, and it is 
also rising on NATO's agenda. As you mentioned, when Sweden and 
Finland join the Alliance, then seven of the eight Arctic 
nations will be in NATO.
    Mr. Huizenga. Yes.
    Mr. Jones. So, that is a lot more of the Arctic in NATO. 
And NATO also sees rising importance there, primarily as a 
result of Russia's increased military presence in what it calls 
the High North, and also China.
    Mr. Huizenga. OK. We have got just a little over a minute 
now. I want to hit on a couple of other quick things.
    There is a 2022 report titled the ``National Strategy for 
the Arctic Region.'' One of the areas was sustainable 
development capacity. However, the security capacity was not, 
was not mentioned in that.
    And I am trying to push on this, does the Biden 
Administration support the idea of an escalated involvement in 
the Arctic region, not just for development reasons and for 
sustainable development reasons, but for security reasons?
    You understand my distinction here, right? I mean, the 
security was not, and military importance and security 
importance wasn't discussed, but there was a lot of emphasis 
more on sustainability.
    And I want to make sure that we are not just focused on 
sustainability and green initiatives in the Arctic. I want to 
make sure that we are also seeing the strategic military as 
well as security elements in the Arctic.
    Ms. Cooper. Congressman, you know, aside from that 
particular document I can just emphasize that, yes, we 
recognize the strategic and security dimensions of the Arctic. 
And we have long recognized the malevolent role that Russia 
plays in the region. And now are very mindful of watching 
China's moves.
    So, this is an occupation for the Department of Defense. 
And it is something that we are focused on.
    Mr. Huizenga. And I know, Mr. Chairman, my time is up. And 
I would like to followup with some written questions through 
the chair to you about an Arctic, unified Arctic NATO Command, 
as well as how NATO can address the challenges from the PRC in 
that Arctic security, regarding Arctic security in that region.
    So, with that, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your indulgence 
and yield back. Thank you.
    Mr. Kean. Without objection.
    There are no further questions from members. I want to 
thank our witnesses for their valuable testimony and the 
members for their questions. In closing, I would like to make 
some brief remarks.
    Mr. Jones, I appreciate the steps you laid out in 
reaffirming NATO allies' strong support for Ukraine. However, 
none of the steps you outlined provide Ukraine a clear path to 
NATO membership when conditions allow.
    Only by providing a clear path can we signal to Putin that 
he cannot achieve his objectives on the battlefield and he will 
lose this war.
    Our allies from Poland to the Baltic States to even, now, 
France are pushing for a clearer path. The U.S. leadership is 
required to get this over the finish line. And I fear from what 
I have heard today that the U.S. may in fact be impeding this 
critical effort. The U.S. needs to do more than simply put 
window dressing on the 2008 Bucharest pledge.
    The members of the subcommittee may have some additional 
written questions for the witnesses. And we would ask you to 
respond to these promptly in writing.
    Pursuant to the committee rules, all members may have 5 
days to submit statements, questions, extraneous materials for 
the record, subject to the length limitations.
    Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 3:09 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

                                APPENDIX
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