[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                      DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 
                          APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2024
    _______________________________________________________________________

                                 HEARINGS

                                 BEFORE A

                           SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE

                       COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

                         HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                     ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                              FIRST SESSION                                 
                                 
                                __________ 
                                 
                     
                    SUBCOMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

                      DAVID P. JOYCE, Ohio, Chairman

  JOHN H. RUTHERFORD, Florida		HENRY CUELLAR, Texas		
  ANDY HARRIS, Maryland			LAUREN UNDERWOOD, Illinois
  DAN NEWHOUSE, Washington		ED CASE, Hawaii
  ASHLEY HINSON, Iowa			DAVID J. TRONE, Maryland
  MICHAEL CLOUD, Texas
  MICHAEL GUEST, Mississippi

   NOTE: Under committee rules, Ms. Granger, as chairwoman of the full 
committee, and Ms. DeLauro, as ranking minority member of the full 
committee, are authorized to sit as members of all subcommittees.

   Paul Anstine, Laura Cylke, Anna Lanier Fischer, Fern Tolley Gibbons,
                     Emily Trapani and Brooklyn Tucker
                            Subcommittee Staff
                            
                                __________


                                  PART 1
                     DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

                                                                   Page
  Cybersecurity and Infrastructure 
Fiscal Year 2024 Budget Request.........
                                                                      1
  Transporation Security Administration 
Fiscal Year 2024 Budget Request.........
                                                                     47
  Department of Homeland Security Fiscal 
Year 2024 Budget Request................
                                                                     91

                                
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]  

                                    __________                                
                                

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations
             
                        U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
53-030                           WASHINGTON : 2023                        
          
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------          

                       COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

                                ----------  
                                
                     KAY GRANGER, Texas, Chairwoman

  HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky			ROSA L. DeLAURO, Connecticut	
  ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama			STENY H. HOYER, Maryland			
  MICHAEL K. SIMPSON, Idaho			MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio		
  JOHN R. CARTER, Texas				SANFORD D. BISHOP, Jr., Georgia			
  KEN CALVERT, California			BARBARA LEE, California		
  TOM COLE, Oklahoma				BETTY McCOLLUM, Minnesota			
  MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida			C. A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland		
  STEVE WOMACK, Arkansas			DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida
  CHARLES J. ``CHUCK'' FLEISCHMANN, Tennessee	HENRY CUELLAR, Texas
  DAVID P. JOYCE, Ohio			        CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine
  ANDY HARRIS, Maryland				MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois
  MARK E. AMODEI, Nevada			DEREK KILMER, Washington
  CHRIS STEWART, Utah				MATT CARTWRIGHT, Pennsylvania
  DAVID G. VALADAO, California			GRACE MENG, New York
  DAN NEWHOUSE, Washington			MARK POCAN, Wisconsin
  JOHN R. MOOLENAAR, Michigan	         	PETE AGUILAR, California
  JOHN H. RUTHERFORD, Florida			LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
  BEN CLINE, Virginia				BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey
  GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania		NORMA J. TORRES, California
  MIKE GARCIA, California			ED CASE, Hawaii
  ASHLEY HINSON, Iowa				ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York
  TONY GONZALES, Texas				JOSH HARDER, California
  JULIA LETLOW, Louisiana			JENNIFER WEXTON, Virginia
  MICHAEL CLOUD, Texas				DAVID J. TRONE, Maryland
  MICHAEL GUEST, Mississippi			LAUREN UNDERWOOD, Illinois
  RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana			SUSIE LEE, Nevada
  ANDREW S. CLYDE, Georgia			JOSEPH D. MORELLE, New York
  JAKE LaTURNER, Kansas
  JERRY L. CARL, Alabama
  STEPHANIE I. BICE, Oklahoma
  C. SCOTT FRANKLIN, Florida
  JAKE ELLZEY, Texas
  JUAN CISCOMANI, Arizona

              Anne Marie Chotvacs, Clerk and Staff Director

                                   (ii)

 
        DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2024

                              ----------                              

                                           Tuesday, March 28, 2023.

            CYBERSECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AGENCY

                                WITNESS

HON. JEN EASTERLY, DIRECTOR, CYBERSECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY 
    AGENCY
    Mr. Joyce. The Subcommittee on Homeland Security will come 
to order.
    I want to welcome everybody here today for the first 
subcommittee hearing of the 118th Congress.
    Jen Easterly, welcome.
    Ms. Easterly. Thank you, sir.
    Mr. Joyce. Ranking Member Mr. Cuellar.
    Mr. Cuellar. Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Joyce. And I also want to welcome back Mr. Rutherford 
and Mrs. Hinson, who were here on the subcommittee last year. 
Dr. Harris and Mr. Newhouse have been on the Appropriations 
Committee for some time. We have two members in Mr. Guest and 
Mr. Cloud.
    I look forward to working with everyone as we begin the 
fiscal 2024 appropriations cycle.
    Thank you, Director, for joining us today. And I welcome to 
allow you to give your opening statement at this time.

                 STATEMENT OF HON. JEN EASTERLY

    Ms. Easterly. Wonderful. Thank you so much.
    Thanks to Chairman Joyce, Ranking Member Cuellar, and 
members of the subcommittee for the opportunity to testify 
regarding the fiscal year 2024 President's budget for CISA.
    As the Nation's cyber defense agency and the national 
coordinator for critical infrastructure security and 
resilience, CISA leads the national effort to understand, 
manage, and reduce risk to the cyber and physical 
infrastructure that Americans rely on every hour of every day.
    And this mission has never been more urgent, as our Nation 
faces a wide array of threats that could undermine our national 
security, our economic prosperity, and our public health and 
safety, including the preeminent cyber threat we face from 
China.
    I joined CISA nearly 2 years ago as the agency was still 
leading the national recovery from the widespread Russian cyber 
espionage campaign known as SolarWinds. In those dark days in 
the aftermath of intrusion into many of our government's most 
critical systems, we came to several realizations.
    We realized our visibility into cyber threats and 
vulnerabilities was wildly incomplete. We realized our 
capability to ingest, analyze, and act upon cyber risk data was 
inadequate. And we realized that the breadth of the cyber 
threat facing our country required a new model of public-
private partnership characterized by persistent operational 
collaboration.
    Since that time, I am proud that Congress, the 
administration, CISA, and our partners have all stepped up to 
the challenge. And we have received sustained, generous, 
bipartisan investment from Congress and invaluable new 
authorities. And we have worked to be good stewards of this 
investment, executing 99.87 percent of our 1-year fiscal year 
2022 funds.
    This year's budget builds upon this progress, requesting 
$3.1 billion for CISA, $149 million more than what Congress 
appropriated to us in fiscal year 2023, reflecting the 
administration's commitment to our important mission in 
matching the strong and steady investment Congress has made in 
CISA, including in areas that we identified as essential in the 
aftermath of SolarWinds.
    Specifically, we have made significant progress in 
expanding our visibility into cyber threats and vulnerabilities 
across the government and the private sector. Visibility is 
critical. If we can identify threats and vulnerabilities with 
speed and breadth, we can provide more support to victims, 
share more actionable info, and deliver more tailored guidance 
to reduce risk.
    The resources requested will meaningfully advance this 
capability, first, by providing investments in the Continuous 
Diagnostics and Mitigation program, enabling greater real-time 
visibility into threats and vulnerabilities for every Federal 
civilian agency; second, by enabling us to modernize the array 
of cyber sensors to protect Federal agencies; third, by 
supporting the expansion of the CyberSentry program; and, 
finally, by allowing us to implement CIRCIA, the Cyber Incident 
Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act, which Congress 
passed a year ago with broad, bipartisan support.
    The budget provides $97 million to ensure the staffing, 
processes, and technical capabilities to successfully implement 
CIRCIA and use incident reportings to limit the impact of cyber 
incidents targeting Americans.
    As our visibility increases, our access to data increases, 
and our need to conduct big data analysis becomes increasingly 
acute. That is why we requested $425 million for the Cyber 
Analysis and Data System, or CADS, to provide a modern, 
scalable, analytic infrastructure for our cyber operators. And 
CADS is a foundational step to building the joint collaborative 
environment that will enable collaborative analysis of cyber 
risk data across the government and private sector.
    Now, at the same time, we can't do this alone. This is 
about collective cyber defense. We have to continue to bring 
together partners from government, the private sector, and the 
international community to address shared risks.
    The budget sustains $97 million for the JCDC, the Joint 
Cyber Defense Collaborative, the Nation's focal point for cyber 
defense collaboration and planning. As we did in the lead-up to 
Russia's invasion of Ukraine, this will allow us to increase 
the number of cyber defense plans, expand persistent 
collaboration efforts, and improve our ability to conduct 
timely notifications of cyber threats before damaging incidents 
occur.
    Of equal importance, we have to continue to grow and mature 
as a new agency in order to fully execute our essential 
mission. The budget consolidates mission support funding for 
dedicated efforts to secure our networks, to report with 
transparency, to acquire new technology, and to enable the 
continued growth of our workforce.
    Over just the past 2 years, we have expanded our team by 
more than 560 people, hiring more than double the people in the 
last 2 years than we hired in the previous 2. And we project 
fiscal year 2023 will be our best hiring year yet. Our funding 
request is essential to sustaining this progress.
    Before I close, I want to thank this committee. Because of 
your continued support and generosity, we have had a remarkable 
year, working in every State and territory to provide cyber and 
physical and chemical security assistance to our partners and 
dedicated support to public safety and emergency communications 
communities.
    As one team unified behind our shared mission, we will 
continue to operate in an efficient and cost-effective manner. 
There is no shortage of work ahead of us, and I look forward to 
working with you during the appropriations cycle to continue 
strengthening CISA and, by extension, the security and 
resilience of our Nation's infrastructure.
    Thank you. I look forward to your questions.
    [The information follows:]
    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 
    
    Mr. Joyce. Thank you very much, Director Easterly.
    And I wanted to get that out there ahead of time because 
some of us--this is the kickoff of the season for us in 
Appropriations, and so members may come and go, but I know they 
all wanted to hear your opening statement. And so, if they come 
and go, it is not meant to be disrespectful; they are just 
trying to attend other hearings at the same time.
    And I truly thank you for your military service as well as 
your leadership here today.
    In 2018, Congress authorized CISA to protect the Nation's 
cyber and physical critical infrastructure. We invested heavily 
in the operational agency and its mission over the last 3 
years, increasing the budget by 44 percent, from $2 billion to 
$2.9 billion.
    The President's latest request will put you over $3 
billion. That is a fair amount of dollars. Today, I would like 
to drill down and quantify the return on that investment for 
the American people, as CISA's mission has never been more 
important.
    Nation-state actors backed by China, Russia, North Korea, 
Iran, and others are targeting government and private-sector 
networks to steal intellectual property, probe our defense, 
disrupt operations, cause panic, and inflict financial 
consequences on the homeland.
    Simultaneously, cyber criminals are using ransomware to 
prey on vulnerable groups, including schools, local 
governments, and hospitals, for financial gain. These attacks 
can cost millions of dollars when a ransom is paid and also 
create additional costs from lost productivity and disrupted 
operations.
    CISA is charged with coordinating the defense of 16 
critical infrastructure sectors, including energy, healthcare, 
manufacturing, transportation, communications, and the defense 
industrial base, among with others.
    We all remember the Colonial Pipeline, as you brought up, 
the ransomware attack that disrupted the flow of fuel to a 
large portion of our country, resulting in nearly $5 million in 
damages. Imagine the impact of a coordinated, larger-scale 
attack, akin to the Nord Stream pipeline attack in the Baltic 
Sea last fall.
    Increased vigilance on both the cyber and physical 
infrastructure front is critical to ensuring both our national 
and economic security and public trust. I look forward to 
hearing how CISA is leveraging its resources to harden our 
defenses against adversarial nation-state-sponsored threat 
actors, cyber criminals, and other nefarious actors.
    But not all challenges CISA face are external. The rapid 
growth of the agency over the past 3 years brought hiring 
challenges, management and communication difficulties, and 
organizational growing pains. Without the right people, CISA 
cannot fully carry out its mission, regardless of its 
investment.
    With the private sector also competing for cyber talent, I 
am interested to hear how you are attracting, hiring, 
developing, and retaining employees. As the country faces 
continually evolving threats, our workforce, too, must evolve. 
Rapid technological developments will continue to dramatically 
change network security, and CISA will need personnel with the 
right tools, training, and tenacity to meet those critical 
networks.
    I look forward to a robust discussion today and working 
together to make sure we see the results from our significant 
investment in CISA.
    I will turn to my colleague, Mr. Cuellar, for any opening 
remarks he may have.
    Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, again, I 
congratulate you on your new role as chairman.
    And I certainly welcome the new members both on--on the 
committee itself, so I want to say, first of all, 
congratulations.
    And, again, as you know, we do have a few members that are 
coming back. I know Ms. Lauren Underwood, Illinois, welcome 
back, because she has been on the committee, and appreciate all 
the good work.
    And we got two new Democratic members, Congressman David 
Trone of Maryland--again, we welcome you and all the work that 
you are doing on fentanyl and other work like that--and then 
Mr. Ed Case will be joining us also.
    So, again, good morning, Director Easterly. It is good to 
see you again. I am still very impressed--there is a story of 
why I have this--very impressed not only by your talents but by 
the work that you are doing.
    As we all know, cyber threats pose a significant risk to 
our national security, our economy, and our way of life. These 
threats are posed by individual bad actors, transnational 
criminal organizations, foreign adversaries like state-
sponsored groups and nations.
    CISA plays a vital role in partnering with other Federal 
agencies, State and local governments, critical infrastructure 
owners and operators who protect against emerging and evolving 
threats.
    Again, we appreciate your leadership. And at this, I will 
go ahead, because I do want to start into questions, but I do 
appreciate, Director Easterly, all the work that you are doing.
    Mr. Joyce. Thank you.
    And your statement will be entered into the record.
    I want to start on the return on investment that we 
discussed. As I mentioned in my remarks, Congress provided CISA 
with substantial increases in funding over the last 3 fiscal 
years due to the importance of the mission. I would like to 
drill down on the specific return on that investment for the 
American people. This in addition to the more than $780 million 
provided through the American Rescue Plan and infrastructure 
law last Congress.
    Director, can you quantify for the subcommittee how much 
safer the homeland is today than it was before these funding 
enhancements for CISA? And specifically in both the 
cybersecurity and infrastructure security buckets, how do you 
measure success?
    Ms. Easterly. Thanks very much for asking that question.
    You know, when I came to CISA, our mission was to lead the 
national effort to understand and manage risk. And we actually 
changed the mission statement to say that we were leading and 
managing and reducing risk, recognizing that we have to be able 
to measure and quantify those investments.
    That said, Chairman, that is a very difficult thing to do, 
so we are starting on this journey about how we actually 
measure not only things, activities, or performance, but 
actually how we measure effectiveness.
    So, for example, one of the things that we are very focused 
on, given the incredible investments that we have gotten from 
Congress after the SolarWinds incident, as I mentioned, through 
the Rescue Plan Act as well as our budget later this year, were 
investments designed to increase our visibility on the Federal 
civilian executive branch network, so the dot-gov, because, 
effectively, we saw that we were blind.
    So many of the new authorities and the money that we were 
given allowed us to instantiate technology that we call EDR, 
endpoint detection and response capabilities, across the dot-
gov that allows us now to do persistent hunting based on new 
authorities that we have been given so that we have much more 
visibility to be able to say, we are seeing malicious activity 
on those networks. And we do this, obviously, in concert with 
Federal agencies.
    It enables us to say, there is risky technology, like, for 
example, TikTok, on Federal Government devices, or risky 
technology from foreign adversaries on some of our technology. 
It also allows us to understand if there are vulnerabilities 
that need to be remediated.
    But actually measuring that is a challenge. But I want to 
read you some of the things that we are specifically focused on 
here.
    Percentage of Federal agencies that are sharing current and 
accurate data through our CDM Dashboard. So now we have a way 
to actually look across the dot-gov to see what agencies have 
what risk teed up to us.
    Percentage that have developed internal vulnerability 
management and patching of vulnerability disclosure policy, 
end-of-life service and end-of-service policy; voluntary 
adoptions of our shared services, like protective domain name 
systems that allows us to see malicious traffic transiting the 
internet; and then, finally, that percentage that is covered by 
that EDR technology.
    So we are, again, looking to measure aspects of 
instantiation of capabilities. What we hope to be able to get 
at the end of the full maturation--and much of our budget is 
focused on maturation--is actually showing the number of 
incidents that will be reduced.
    And then the last thing I would say here, sir: As a measure 
of reducing risk, we don't have a lot of visibility into the 
overall ecosystem, but you all gave us CIRCIA last year, the 
Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act. That 
will be game-changing in allowing us to actually understand the 
ecosystem so we can say, here are the number of critical 
incidents that occurred across our critical infrastructure this 
year. And then we can measure the reduction given all of these 
improvements that we have put in place.
    So we are on our journey to be able to give you very 
quantifiable metrics to allow us to articulate that return on 
investment.
    Mr. Joyce. Thank you, Director.
    I am going to ask you to think about the funds CISA 
receives. Which are the most critical for deterring and 
preventing attacks on the homeland?
    Ms. Easterly. Well, as we had to make hard choices in our 
budget this year, sir, you saw that we are putting new moneys--
we are requesting new moneys in the budget to focus on these 
cyber threats.
    We have built out capabilities over the past 20 years for 
integrated security across physical security, but where we are 
seeing threats from nation-states--China, as I mentioned, the 
preeminent; Russia, very focused on that with our Shields Up 
campaign; Iran; North Korea--and cyber criminals, we have seen 
ransomware as a scourge on schools, on municipalities, on 
hospitals, and we really want to drive down that risk there.
    So some of the investments that we are making are focused 
on our field forces, which are working with State and local and 
with smaller infrastructure to be able to drive down risk on 
those entities. But the big-ticket items are really around 
CIRCIA so that we have the staff, the processes, and technical 
infrastructure to be able to receive reports, to triage them, 
and to respond to them so we can drive down risk to the Nation.
    The other big investments have to do with the Federal 
civilian enterprise, where we play the role as operational lead 
for Federal cyber security. So the CADS system, the Cyber 
Analytic and Data System. Essentially we have been bringing in 
a lot more data, but we have to have a system to provide us 
cyber analytics to integrate, to enrich, to correlate it, so we 
can make use and make sense of that data to drive down risk.
    And then, finally, some of the maturation around our 
Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation team, which is really the 
foundational system for cybersecurity. And part of that is the 
maturation of the National Cyber Protection System, some of the 
things that we are doing with EINSTEIN.
    So these investments are critical to actually take 
advantage of the investments that you have given us, because it 
really is an evolution of maturity. To get there, we have to be 
able to evolve with these new systems--in particular, the 
analytics.
    Mr. Joyce. Thank you very much, Director.
    I now recognize our ranking member, Mr. Cuellar.
    Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I also want to follow the line of questioning that the 
chairman brought up.
    Back in 2010, I changed legislation that modernized the 
performance, results-oriented government legislation that got 
passed in the 1990s. And in there, in the 2010 legislation, we 
are asking agencies to make sure they have their mission 
statement, their objectives, key performance measures, which 
are some of the ones I have here. And I will be asking every 
agency before our committee about their performance measures.
    And I have looked at some of the key performance measures, 
which are the big ones. And, again, I am not blaming you, but 
I--this has probably been in place for a while.
    But one of the things, Members, that we need to realize, 
that in the State--and I was asking who has been in the State 
legislature, because in the State legislatures we use a lot of 
the performance measures, and it is a different process. And I 
was trying to do this in 2010. It is a little different in 
D.C., trying to change things. But, here, we leave agencies to 
develop their own performance measures. In State legislatures, 
I think in most State legislatures, the Congress or the 
legislature and the agencies actually sit down and agree on 
certain measures.
    Because, for example, one of the key measures that you have 
here, or that the agency has, that is supposed to be a key 
measure is--``Key Measure: Landline priority call successfully 
connected.'' So is that important? Is that a key measure that 
we ought to be looking at? Or should we come up with--instead 
of measuring activity, we ought to measure results? If we put 
in $1, what is the bang for that $1?
    And I am hoping that somewhere down the line we all can get 
involved, where we can have certain measures that we can 
negotiate, if I can use that term, or work out with you, and 
hopefully be part of the report language where we can actually 
look at the measures.
    Because, right now, all of this are on websites. And I 
don't know if you look at every website out there. And I think 
this is what the chairman was saying--and I am in agreement 
with him--that if we put in money, what are we getting for that 
$1?
    For example, as the chairman mentioned, back in December 
2020, we added $650 million in supplemental funding to CISA 
through the American Rescue Plan Act to increase and enhance, 
you know, the work that you are doing. And the question is, as 
the chairman asked: So, given all that investment, plus other 
moneys that the chairman mentioned, describe how CISA is better 
positioned than it was in 2020 to protect against a response to 
cybersecurity attacks.
    And one of the ways we could look at is the performance 
measures. But if we are looking at--and I don't want to go 
through all of them--but if we are looking at how many landline 
calls did you connect, I don't think that is the best measure 
to look at.
    So we are hoping, one is, if you can answer the question, 
with all that investment, specifically, how are you in a better 
position now to protect the public? But I am hoping that we can 
look at and ask Members to start looking at every agency, we 
put in $1, what is the bang? Not measure activity. I don't want 
to count how many pencils we have out there. I want to see 
results on that.
    Ms. Easterly. Yeah. Hundred percent. And I think you have 
seen our strategic plan as well----
    Mr. Cuellar. Yes.
    Ms. Easterly [continuing]. Where we have representative 
outcomes that are about outcomes, not activities, right? 
Measures of effectiveness, not measures of performance.
    This is the agency's strategic plan, but every one of my 
divisions and mission-enabling offices has annual operating 
plans that then spreads out in more detail what we are looking 
to achieve. And I would love for us to come back to this 
committee to be able to talk to you, to get your guidance and 
counsel about what you would like to see.
    I think we are moving in the right direction on this.
    I had this same challenge when I was in the private sector, 
at Morgan Stanley, where we were putting hundreds of millions 
of dollars into the cybersecurity program and return of 
investment was things not happening. So, you know, at a broad 
level, bad things not happening is hard to measure.
    So what we want to do is get more granular with the 
visibility that we have gotten out of that $650 million to say, 
this is how we have reduced the instance of bad things 
happening; and better metrics for things like, how have we 
recovered most effectively? How have we reduced our time to 
actually detect something and then to respond to it and recover 
from it? And that is the direction we are going in with 
metrics.
    So I would love to spend more time on a deep dive with you 
on that.
    Mr. Cuellar. Thank you so much.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Joyce. Thank you, Mr. Cuellar.
    I recognize Sheriff Rutherford for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Rutherford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Director, it is really great to see you again.
    And I would be remiss if I didn't thank you all, first and 
foremost, for the visit to the district that we had. I think 
building those local relationships is huge, and I know you are 
working hard on that. It was very well received by my 
community, so thank you.
    Ms. Easterly. Thank you, sir.
    Mr. Rutherford. And I want to kind of follow up on the line 
of questioning so far in talking about CIRCIA.
    So we are requiring the critical infrastructure to report. 
First of all, I know it has only been a year, but how has that 
been received? Are we getting the reporting that you think we 
should? Can you just give me an idea of how that is rolling 
out?
    Ms. Easterly. Yeah, absolutely. Thank you for asking, 
because I think this is one of the most important things that 
has been happening--that happened legislatively since probably 
the establishment of CISA in 2018.
    So, as you know, we are largely a voluntary agency. So I do 
want to thank you for hosting that meeting with my team. They 
loved it. And they love to spend time with constituents in the 
field. So I would ask any of you who wants to meet with our 
CISA team, please do so. Because that is where the rubber meets 
the road, right?
    Mr. Rutherford. Uh-huh.
    Ms. Easterly. So, with CIRCIA, we are in a rulemaking 
process, sir. So we have been working over the past year to 
essentially put the infrastructure in place so that we can 
start defining what we need to receive from the private sector 
within 72 hours, how we define a covered entity, how we define 
a covered incident. And we are moving forward to actually 
create the notice of rulemaking, which should come out in March 
of next year, and then look for the final rule, which will be 
implemented in September of 2025.
    We have worked really hard to make this a consultative 
process. Having come from a highly regulated industry in 
finance, I am very, very sensitive to not creating chaos when 
there are all kinds of regulations that are out there. We want 
to do this in a way that allows us to render assistance to the 
victim and then drive down risk to the Nation.
    So we had 27 sessions--10 in person, 17 virtual--where we 
talked to the private sector to get their feedback. We did a 
request for information where we got over 100 comments back. So 
we are putting together that rule based on everything we have 
heard from the private sector. That is hugely important to make 
sure that we do this right.
    The other important thing is to ensure that this is 
harmonized. What we can't have is a bunch of different agencies 
asking slightly different questions to the private sector, 
because all we are going to create is chaos.
    Mr. Rutherford. Right.
    Ms. Easterly. Then it becomes a box-checking compliance 
exercise, not about reducing risk to the Nation. So we are very 
mindful of leveraging the Cyber Incident Reporting Council that 
was in CIRCIA.
    The other things with CIRCIA which we are already getting 
after are the Joint Ransomware Task Force to help reduce risk 
to the Nation through our Ransomware Vulnerability Warning 
Pilot that was mandated in the legislation, as well as our pre-
notification of ransomware incidents that is driving down 
impact across the country.
    So legislation moving forward, sir. We are being 
consultative about it.
    But the additional moneys we asked for was really about 
putting the technical infrastructure in place to allow us to be 
able to receive this massive amount of new reporting, to 
analyze it, to correlate it, to enrich it, and then to use it 
to respond, but really to reduce risk to other sectors in the 
rest of the Nation.
    Mr. Rutherford. Good.
    And you have subpoena power if they do not report. My 
question, though, is, is there any teeth behind that?
    Because, you know, from experience, I think we see that 
there is quite a lot of reluctance for some of these 
organizations, maybe not in the critical infrastructure when it 
is governmental, but others--there is a lack of openness, I 
think, in wanting to lay out their problems.
    Ms. Easterly. Yeah.
    Mr. Rutherford. Do we need to put more teeth into the 
reporting piece? Because I really don't see any teeth in that.
    Ms. Easterly. Yeah. You are right. I think this was a hard-
fought set of legislation, and a lot of views came in from the 
private sector. So there are not a lot of sticks, in terms of 
enforcement and compliance. If, in fact, we hear of an incident 
and it is not reported to us, we can use admin subpoena power.
    You know, what I would say, though, is, we need a cultural 
transformation, frankly, in order for us to have a sustainable 
approach to cybersecurity. This has to be about collaboration 
over self-preservation.
    I know that companies--because I was in one of them--worry 
about their reputation, they worry about their stock price. 
But, at the end of the day, the reporting came to CISA because 
we have the most robust authorities for information-sharing and 
protection of data.
    We are not here to name, to shame, to stab the wounded.
    Mr. Rutherford. Right.
    Ms. Easterly. We are here to render assistance and then to 
use that data, very importantly, to protect the rest of the 
ecosystem.
    If you are in a neighborhood and your neighbor gets robbed, 
you are going to want to know that, so you can actually lock 
your doors and put your guard dog out. It is important for our 
collective defense.
    We are facing some very, very serious threats to our 
Nation, to our critical infrastructure. If we don't work 
together to put collaboration over self-preservation and make 
sure that we are connected in this highly connected ecosystem, 
that we are not looking out to protect the Nation, we will 
fail.
    So I am very much hoping that we are going to get the 
reports that we have asked for. And, quite frankly, sir, as 
part of our Shields Up campaign, we actually asked entities to 
reduce their threshold and voluntarily report to us. And we got 
in a ton of reports about potential scanning and activities.
    So I am optimistic, as I always am, about the successful 
implementation of the legislation.
    Mr. Rutherford. Thank you very much.
    And I see my time has expired. I yield back, but I will 
say, Mr. Chairman, we may need to look at some teeth. We will 
see how it goes.
    Thank you.
    Ms. Easterly. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Joyce. Thank you, Sheriff.
    Ms. Underwood
    Ms. Underwood. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Director Easterly, thanks for being with us. It is good to 
see you again.
    Ms. Easterly. You too, ma'am.
    Ms. Underwood. First, I want to talk about election 
security, which is a critical pillar of our national security.
    Over the past several elections, we have seen foreign 
adversaries, like Russia and Iran, deploy more sophisticated 
and brazen campaigns in attempts to influence and interfere 
with our elections.
    And, most recently, in our 2022 midterm elections, we saw 
China using fake social media accounts with the goal of sowing 
distrust into our elections, something analysts noticed was a 
shift in strategy for China.
    Director Easterly, can you tell us more about emerging 
threats and trends you are seeing recently when it comes to 
foreign attempts at election interference and from China in 
particular?
    Ms. Easterly. Yeah, absolutely. Thank you for the question.
    Just to level-set, as you know, we were designated in 2017 
as the sector risk management agency. So we don't, obviously, 
run elections. We make sure that State and local election 
officials have the resources----
    Ms. Underwood. Correct.
    Ms. Easterly [continuing]. The capability, and the 
intelligence that they need.
    And 2022 was my first election with these local officials. 
I will tell you, when we were first designated, there was 
massive pushback. They didn't want anything to do with the 
Federal Government. But through years and years of building 
partnerships, that is very solid now.
    And what I hear from State and local election officials is 
that they are increasingly asking for more of our resources. In 
fact, we----
    Ms. Underwood. Director----
    Ms. Easterly [continuing]. Just met with----
    Ms. Underwood. I am sorry, Director. I asked about the----
    Ms. Easterly. Yes, ma'am.
    Ms. Underwood [continuing]. Threats from China.
    Ms. Easterly. So what they are telling us and what we are 
seeing, very complicated threat environment. Cyber threats from 
nation-state actors; physical threats to polling places, to 
election officials; insider threats; and then the threats of 
foreign influence and disinformation. As you mentioned, we saw 
it from Russia. We saw it from Iran in 2020. We saw it in 
China.
    I have serious concerns, particularly given some of the 
capabilities that China has, like TikTok, to be able to use 
their data, the data that they have collected from us, 
capabilities, to be able to influence the American public.
    So we are working very hard to make sure that we are 
amplifying the trusted voices of local officials, putting out 
election literacy information, and then providing them all the 
resources that they need, so that American people can have 
confidence in the integrity of their elections.
    Ms. Underwood. Great.
    Next, I want to talk about who the burden of cybersecurity 
generally falls on, because, frankly, I think our approach is 
backwards.
    You and I have compared cybersecurity to auto safety. If a 
car today didn't have seatbelts or if an airbag didn't deploy, 
we wouldn't blame the driver; we would hold the auto 
manufacturer accountable. Cars undergo rigorous safety and 
crash tests before they can be sold to consumers. And roadways, 
themselves, have speed limits and traffic lights, all to ensure 
the end user is as safe as possible while driving.
    Cybersecurity products should be treated the same way. But, 
in our current system, we leave individuals with no choice but 
to shoulder cyber risks and consequences, instead of the 
technology providers, who have more of the resources, capacity, 
and visibility to protect consumers from those risks in the 
first place. This model is not safe, sensible, or sustainable.
    So, Director Easterly, how can we, as policymakers, help 
shift the burden away from the end user? And what does a more 
sustainable cyber model look like? And how is CISA helping 
getting us there?
    Ms. Easterly. Thank you, thank you for asking that 
question, because I 100 percent agree with you. We are not in a 
sustainable place.
    So, as you said, what we need to make sure is that we 
change the incentives. We have normalized a world where 
technology comes to us inherently unsafe, and then we developed 
a multibillion-dollar cyber security industry to basically deal 
with the fact that we are all walking around with unsafe 
technology.
    So we have to change the incentives. Right now, the 
incentives are all about speed to market and competing on 
features and cost reduction. We have to make safety baked in, 
and we have to make products safe by design.
    We have asked for radical transparency so that we 
understand that consumers--so the burden isn't placed on them, 
so they know what they are buying. We have asked for technology 
providers to bake in security and to design in security. And, 
as the National Cybersecurity Strategy suggested, ma'am, we may 
need to look at certain liability for whether manufacturers 
have duty of care to be able to protect those consumers.
    I realize this may be a long time coming. It was 1965 when 
Ralph Nader wrote ``Unsafe At Any Speed'' and 1983 when we had 
seatbelt legislation. But we absolutely have to get there. Take 
the burden off small businesses, take the burden off consumers, 
and push it on those most capable of bearing it.
    Ms. Underwood. And I think that CISA is well-equipped to 
help lead that charge forward, as we work to make sure that we 
have robust protections for everybody, including the end user.
    Director Easterly, thanks so much for appearing before our 
committee today.
    I yield back.
    Ms. Easterly. Thank you, ma'am.
    Mr. Joyce. Thank you very much, Ms. Underwood.
    I recognize Mr. Newhouse for any comments he may have or 
questions.
    Mr. Newhouse. Thank you, Chairman Joyce.
    Ranking Member, also, thank you very much.
    Director, thanks for being with us today.
    Ms. Easterly. Sir.
    Mr. Newhouse. So I come from the State of Washington, and 
we have had, it seems like, more than our fair share of issues 
on some of our local and, I believe, locally owned State and 
Federal power to substations.
    Ms. Easterly. Yes.
    Mr. Newhouse. It has gotten a lot of press recently.
    I had served on this committee prior to my term now, and I 
asked people, your predecessors, about the security of our grid 
and are we keeping up security protocols at the national, 
Federal level. So let me ask you about some of these 16 
critical areas that you are responsible for.
    Could you talk to me about CISA's Energy Sector-Specific 
Plan, the SSP?
    And don't get me wrong here; I know cyber is vitally 
important. And, in fact, some of the briefings I have had keep 
me up at night, worrying about some of these things. But have 
we focused on cyber at the expense of some of our physical 
security? I know it is a balance.
    In the coming budget year, do you think there is a need to 
update the sector-specific plans? The energy plan, for 
instance, hasn't been updated, I believe, since 2015. And you 
can update me on that if that isn't correct.
    Should we revisit the National Infrastructure Protection 
Plan as well? I do have some concerns because the President's 
budget looks, to me, to be proposing a decrease in the overall 
infrastructure security account.
    So just a rhetorical question: If we can't secure our 
physical assets here at home, how do we tackle cybersecurity 
and safeguard those new technologies that are coming, like 
fusion, the hydrogen, the small modular reactors? It seems to 
me we have to be able to do both.
    So, your response?
    Ms. Easterly. I 100 percent agree with you, which is why 
our mission is to reduce risk to cyber and physical 
infrastructure.
    So, you know, in addition to being America's cyber defense 
agency, we serve as the national coordinator for critical 
infrastructure resilience and security. And that was what was 
in the statute.
    So the SRMAs for the 16 sectors, we actually serve as 8, 
for 8 sectors, but there are other departments and agencies 
that serve--say, for energy, electricity, it is the Department 
of Energy.
    And so our role is to work hand-in-hand with the sector 
risk management agencies who are responsible for updating those 
sector-specific plans to ensure that we are taking a cross-
sector, coordinated approach to driving down both physical and 
cyber risk to the most systemically important entities.
    So that is why Congress had the insight to have a 
coordinator role. Because it used to just be various sectors 
operating in silos. And so now bringing that together, knowing 
the dependencies are so important.
    So, with respect to sector plans, the plan was to do the 
National Infrastructure Plan update. We are responsible for 
that. But we have been asked to first get done PPD-21. The 
White House is working on an update to the critical 
infrastructure Presidential Policy Directive. We will then do 
the national plan. And then the sector-specific plans will 
follow, to include the ones, the eight, that we are responsible 
for, as well as the elections subsector.
    To your point on physical, the President's request in 2024 
was actually the same as the request in 2023. The Congress 
generously gave us plus-ups on the physical security side in 
2023. We didn't annualize them, sir, because we had to make 
tough decisions and we wanted to double-down on our investments 
in cyber given that threat.
    All that said, we are continuing to do our work around 
school safety--more important than ever given the tragic events 
yesterday in Nashville--our work around the Office of Bombing 
Prevention, and all of the work we do on the physical security 
side.
    But one of the things that we have recognized is, we can't 
look at these as separate things. There is the convergence of 
cyber and physical threats, so the convergence of cyber threats 
to physical buildings. We have to look at these in a converged 
way, which is why we are building out an integrated security 
model in the field, where our physical security advisors and 
our cybersecurity advisors look at these things together so we 
can maximally reduce risk to our national infrastructure.
    Mr. Newhouse. So you brought that up. Let me just ask you 
to delve into that just a little bit deeper in the seconds I 
have left.
    It looks to me like there is a reduction in the security 
programs that would primarily benefit the K-12 school system.
    Ms. Easterly. The $3 million that was plussed up in 2023 by 
the Congress, sir?
    Mr. Newhouse. Well, the request is $11.8 million less than 
the prior fiscal year, so just looking at the chart that you 
provided.
    Ms. Easterly. Yes, sir. Let me follow up with you. That 
program is not hugely funded, so I think it was just $3 million 
that was decremented. That is what I have in my notes. But 
happy to follow up.
    And, again, we can always do more with more. So, if the 
Congress wants to put back that specific money that is all 
about creating safety for schools, we would certainly take 
advantage of it.
    Mr. Newhouse. OK. All right. Thank you very much.
    Ms. Easterly. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Newhouse. Again, thanks for being here.
    Ms. Easterly. My pleasure.
    Mr. Newhouse. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Joyce. Thank you, Mr. Newhouse.
    Mr. Trone, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Trone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member 
Cuellar. I just want to say it is a pleasure to be here on this 
subcommittee, and you folks always work well together. You are 
totally bipartisan, and I just love the atmosphere that that 
generates. So thank you for having us here.
    Director Easterly, we had a wonderful meeting, and you were 
most helpful and answered a bucketload of questions. And I 
can't thank you enough for going back to public service and 
leaving the corporate world. And you left all the money behind 
to be here for this. God bless you.
    Ms. Easterly. Thank you, sir.
    Mr. Trone. The cyber area. As a businessperson, you know, 
all my life, I just checked with my CIO and asked him, how many 
hits do we get on our small company literally every day? And he 
said, over 150 from nation-states and actors mostly over in 
western Europe. So a company that doesn't even trade in 
anything of national security, we are getting hits all the 
time.
    I look at Maryland and all these mom-and-pop businesses 
that can't afford the cyber infrastructure that I put in my 
company--which is basically, whatever those guys need, we get 
them. Because if we don't get it right in cyber, we are done. 
And it is just that simple.
    But in Maryland there were 340 breaches last year. So 
Maryland was the fifth worst in the country on breaches. So 
business really needs the help.
    And what Ms. Underwood talked about was, the products 
themselves don't come out safe. So we are certainly supportive 
of that point. I think that is a great point. But things not 
happening is the key, and it is hard to measure.
    But tell me, for businesses looking to take their 
cybersecurity program up to the next level, how is there a best 
way to connect with CISA and stay up to date on the latest 
threats? Because the problem is, they don't stay up to date; 
then they are vulnerable.
    Ms. Easterly. Yeah, 100 percent. Thank you for the question 
on that.
    And thank you, also, for your leadership, because one of 
the things, to get to the point we were talking about on 
sustainable cybersecurity, is corporate cyber responsibility. 
We need CEOs and leaders to actually put the resources that 
they need into their cybersecurity and to really empower and 
resource their CIOs and CISOs. That is what everybody needs to 
be doing, just as you are, sir. So thank you.
    On small businesses in particular, right--33 million, 99.9 
percent, median size is between 10 and 20 people, I think--they 
just don't have those resources. So we have provided, actually, 
a--we did last year--the Cybersecurity Action Plan. And we 
provided a kit for, what are those easy things that can be 
done?
    And you can reach out and look--you can actually sign up 
for all of our products, our advisories and our alerts. You can 
take advantage of the kit, if you are a small business, on 
those basic steps that you can do. We have put out 
cybersecurity performance goals that are on our website that 
are basically breaking it down to, what are the top things you 
need to do, by cost complexity and impact, to drive down risk?
    And then we have a field force, a growing field force of 
cybersecurity advisors, cybersecurity State coordinators, who 
are there to help, advise, provide assistance, and provide a 
massive amount of free services, government and industry, to 
help drive down risk.
    So we recognize how important that is for some of the 
smaller businesses, particularly because some of these small 
and medium enterprises are in our supply chain in critical 
infrastructure. So we have to work together collectively to 
take responsibility as a Nation to drive down risk.
    Mr. Trone. That is a great idea. We are certainly going to 
get back to you and figure how to get that stuff out to our 
chambers of commerce, our rotaries. Because these folks are 
just--they are helpless. And they get hit, they get 
ransomwared, they get shut down, and they can't absorb it. They 
have no resiliency.
    Ms. Easterly. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Trone. So thank you for that, and I want to follow up.
    Next quick question was: To run a business or run any 
organization, you have to have enough people and the right 
people. And that is where we get back to, you know, your 
situation on personnel, because it is so hard to find the 
talent in this area across the country.
    So you set up--Homeland Security launched the Cyber Talent 
Management System back in November of 2021 to recruit, retain 
personnel. And the process has been tedious and difficult, and 
I understand that.
    So how does the fiscal year 2024 request support the 
agency's recruitment and workforce goals, including the 
continued implementation of the Cyber Talent Management 
Program?
    Ms. Easterly. Yeah. Thanks so much for asking.
    Since I got here, day one, in July of 2021, we have made 
hiring a top priority here, to include using some of those new 
authorities for the Cyber Talent Management System. By the end 
of 2021, we had hired 200 more people than we hired the year 
before. 2022, more than 2021. 2023, we are on track to hire 600 
people using those new authorities, but using a full range of 
other authorities to enable us to be able to more quickly 
recruit people and then to bring them into a culture where they 
feel like they can make impact.
    As you well know, as somebody who has run a business for a 
long time, sir, we are not paying a big salary, right? People 
come here because of mission. We are looking for people who 
want a purposeful mission, who want a culture of collaboration 
and innovation, who want an environment that combines the 
entrepreneurialism of a start-up with the stability of a 
Federal job. And so those are the kinds of people that we have 
been able to tap into across the country.
    As I said, 516 people last year. 600 people. We are going 
be down to--at the end of 2024, we are going to be down to less 
than 8 percent vacancies.
    And so we are maximizing everything we can do to be more 
agile, to be more effective, and to drive down those vacancies 
in our workforce, and to keep attrition low, which is about 8 
percent. But, you know, not all attrition is regretted. And so 
there is a natural flow, as you know from a business world, 
that people should go out and do other things if they are not 
the right fit for defending the Nation.
    Mr. Trone. Well, thank you very much for those answers. And 
I think this committee unanimously supports the importance of 
cyber. And it would be a fool's errand to cut that, just 
inviting China, inviting Russia and the other nation-states to 
devastate our small businesses around the country.
    So thank you.
    And I yield back.
    Ms. Easterly. Thank you, sir.
    Mr. Joyce. Thank you, Mr. Trone.
    Dr. Harris.
    Mr. Harris. Thank you very much.
    And thank you very much for being here with us today.
    Let me just ask, one thing that we have seen kind of 
pervasive through the administration is spending money outside 
for purposes that, I will say, don't directly support your 
mission or the mission of any agency. Your mission is 
cybersecurity.
    So I want to know how much you spend on DEI, because I 
think that distracts from your mission. I think that the SVB 
bank collapse shows in spades how distractions on things like 
DEI distract from what a regulator or a watchdog should be 
doing. So what part of your budget is spent on DEI?
    Ms. Easterly. We don't break it down by diversity, equity, 
and inclusion----
    Mr. Harris. Can you do that for me and get that figure to 
me? I mean, you have a DEI officer in your----
    Ms. Easterly. We do. We do have an Office of DEIA----
    Mr. Harris. So they have a salary, they have an office, 
they have employees. You can do that for me, can't you?
    Ms. Easterly. I will, and I will get back to you.
    Mr. Harris. Because you have asked for an extraordinary 
increase in personnel costs. So I am assuming some of that 
might be to maintain or actually amp up the DEI office. Is that 
true? Are there plans to actually expand it?
    Ms. Easterly. I don't believe there are plans to expand 
that office, but I will certainly get back to you on that. 
Absolutely.
    Mr. Harris. And just out of curiosity--because in your 
testimony you say you want to ensure we can hire a diverse and 
talented workforce. Now, what I want is the person looking 
after cyber to be the best.
    So what do you do? Do you have a quota system for 
diversity? What do you do? Because you want to hire a diverse 
workforce. How does that work?
    Ms. Easterly. No, we don't have quotas or targets. And when 
I say ``diverse'' I mean diversity of thought.
    Mr. Harris. Let me tell you something, Madam Director: Wow. 
OK? Because we, on our side of the aisle, we have been kind of 
calling for diversity of thought as the real diversity that 
doesn't exist in academic institutions, for instance, that 
doesn't exist in many different things that we fund.
    So I am going to leave that line of questioning alone. Let 
me just ask one other thing. And one of my colleagues may go 
further on that.
    Part of your mission is election security. Is that right?
    Ms. Easterly. That is right.
    Mr. Harris. And disinformation or misinformation with 
election security.
    Ms. Easterly. Foreign influence operations and 
disinformation.
    Mr. Harris. OK. It has to be foreign--oh, OK. Well, foreign 
influence.
    So, for instance, the Hunter Biden laptop was claimed to be 
a foreign disinfor--I mean, look, they said, look, this is 
Russian--we had numerous people in the security--I am sorry, 
former intelligence officials who said, oh, no, this has all 
the earmarks of Russian disinformation.
    So CISA could have been involved. I mean, theoretically, 
that would fall, therefore, under what your agency could do. Is 
that right? Because it was claimed to be foreign disinformation 
affecting our election.
    Ms. Easterly. No. I don't think we had any involvement. But 
that was before my time.
    Mr. Harris. I am not saying it had your involvement. But 
according to what you said--you said you are disinformation and 
misinformation on election security.
    The Hunter Biden laptop was, again, falsely blamed on 
Russian misinformation or disinformation.
    So, therefore, theoretically, your agency could have been 
involved in interacting with social media companies to suppress 
any information on that.
    Ms. Easterly. I don't want----
    Mr. Harris. Theoretically.
    Ms. Easterly. I don't want to talk about theory. What I 
want to talk about is what our actual mission is, what we are 
doing for State and local election officials, who have asked 
for our help in dealing with foreign influence and 
disinformation operations, and that is to support them in 
amplifying their trusted voices and providing them what they 
need to be able to ensure that the American people have 
confidence in the integrity of their elections.
    And this is not a partisan issue, sir, as you know. This is 
entirely about supporting election officials of all parties, of 
all affiliation. And as somebody who has served--beat Navy, by 
the way--as somebody who has served in the Army, I am very, 
very focused on just making sure we are defending and 
protecting every constitutional right that exists.
    Mr. Harris. Thank you very much.
    And, look, I am two for two, because I think both your 
answers are right. This shouldn't be a political issue. But it 
was pol--the Hunter Biden laptop was politicized. And we are 
trying to figure out at what level of the government's 
involvement in that politicization.
    And I am very glad to hear that you want thought diversity. 
I am very glad about--I mean, I would rather have your 
employees understand a diverse group of threats as the meaning 
of ``diversity.''
    Thank you very much.
    I yield back.
    Ms. Easterly. Thank you, sir.
    Mr. Joyce. Thank you, Dr. Harris.
    Mrs. Hinson.
    Mrs. Hinson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, 
Ranking Member Cuellar, as well, for holding this hearing 
today.
    Director Easterly, it is great to see you again. Thank you 
so much for meeting with me and answering some of my questions 
before the hearing today about what you are doing to help 
reduce cyber threats, also ensure that our critical cyber 
installations and infrastructure are resilient. So I appreciate 
that.
    I know CISA is obviously working to secure cybersecurity 
and infrastructure but also to analyze and create tools to help 
build up that security across various sectors in the country. 
You mentioned collaborative analysis there.
    And while that work is, of course, essential to protecting 
our national security now, what I am most concerned about is 
the agency's long-term stability and consistency toward that 
mission and that goal, if it is pulled into many different 
directions, with a focus on maintaining that unified mission. 
That is really what I want to see you do going forward.
    So what do you see as CISA's primary function and driving 
focus? And what steps are you taking to rein in, to make sure 
you are focused on that mission?
    Ms. Easterly. Yeah. Thank you very much. It was great to 
meet with you. And I appreciate your leadership.
    We went through an exercise to ensure that we could create 
a strategic plan that lays out our goals in a unified way.
    Mrs. Hinson. Uh-huh.
    Ms. Easterly. So what we wanted to do was not to do a whole 
bunch of different things, just as you said. We wanted to focus 
on four key things: one, on cyber defense; two, on 
infrastructure risk and resilience; three, on operational 
collaboration; and, four, on unification.
    All of that is spelled out in our strategic plan, along 
with our mission, which is to lead the national effort to 
understand, manage, and reduce risk to the cyber and physical 
infrastructure that Americans rely on every hour of every day, 
with the vision of secure and resilient infrastructure for the 
American people.
    Every single person in my agency is focused on that very 
specific mission, and everybody sees themselves in that 
mission. So focus, focus, focus, continue to invest in those 
capabilities that will most effectively drive down risk to the 
Nation.
    Mrs. Hinson. All right.
    And I look forward to working with our ranking member on 
his initiatives to hopefully get some ROI and some firm 
requirements there and some teeth on what we are getting for 
our dollars.
    With the ongoing cyber threats, of course, from foreign 
adversaries--you called them foreign influence operations--like 
the CCP, which is blatantly targeting Americans' data. 
Obviously, you mentioned TikTok, as well, as a huge threat. 
These are truly attacks on our critical physical infrastructure 
and on our Nation's security, so it is more essential than ever 
that our cyber platforms are secure.
    I think we need to be forward-thinking and planning for 
that next threat. These attacks are happening every single day 
en masse, and we need to be confident we have guardrails in 
place to detect.
    So, again, getting back to what you mentioned about 
collaborative analysis here, without going into too much detail 
timing-wise, what preventative measures is CISA utilizing to 
counter that increased aggression from foreign adversaries, 
like the CCP and Russia? As you mentioned, SolarWinds. We know 
they are not giving up. So can you just briefly dive into that 
for me?
    Ms. Easterly. Yeah. And we have made significant 
investments even just the past 2 years, given the lessons 
learned out of SolarWinds.
    The thing that I would highlight--because I think to get to 
that sustainable cybersecurity, we really do need a posture of 
persistent operational collaboration, a recognition that the 
government can't do it alone, industry can't do it alone. So 
that is why the Congress gave us these authorities to build the 
Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative. And we have been working 
with our partners since August of 2021 to operationalize that.
    We did it to help drive down risk around a very serious 
software vulnerability called Log4j. We did it around the 
Russian invasion of Ukraine, working with our industry partners 
to come up with a four-phase plan where we could actually 
measurably do things if the Russians actually retaliated 
against our infrastructure. We were bringing in data, we were 
analyzing it, we were enriching it, and we were creating a 
picture that allowed us much more ability to actually drive 
down risk to the Nation.
    And we have been expanding it. If you happened to see--if 
not, I will get it to you--our JCDC planning agenda, where 
there is a focus on working with energy companies, a focus on 
further collaboration on things like high-risk communities, 
further collaboration with cross-sector entities--so all kinds 
of things to continue to drive down risk. But collaboration and 
collective defense is the key to that.
    Mrs. Hinson. You mentioned it was, I think, 560 new people 
is what I wrote down. How many of those people, would you say, 
are devoted to these types of priorities?
    Ms. Easterly. So 516----
    Mrs. Hinson. Sixteen. OK.
    Ms. Easterly [continuing]. Actually.
    And we have in our--so, in those priorities, frankly, I 
mean, I would say collaboration is one of our core values at 
CISA, so I would like to say everyone in collaboration. 
Because, as you know, we don't do law enforcement, we don't do 
intel, we don't do military, we are not a traditional 
regulator; we are a partnership agency. So I think everybody 
would say they are part of these collaboration efforts.
    Specifically on the cyber side, that falls within our cyber 
team, which is about 1,000 people.
    Mrs. Hinson. OK. Great. Thank you, Director.
    Ms. Easterly. Thank you, ma'am.
    Mrs. Hinson. And I yield back.
    Mr. Joyce. Thank you, Mrs. Hinson.
    Mr. Guest, please.
    Mr. Guest. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Director Easterly, thank you again for being here.
    I want to talk a little bit about the private sector and 
the hardening of cybersecurity. Would you agree that cost is a 
major disincentive for private companies to harden their 
cybersecurity as needed?
    I am thinking, as we look at today's environment, we have 
inflationary costs which are extremely high. We know that 
energy costs are up, labor costs are up, input costs are up. 
And for many in the private sector, it is an allocation of 
where those dollars are spent.
    And one of the things that I have heard talked about is the 
possibility of tax credits for private businesses, particularly 
those in the 16 critical infrastructure sectors, that if they 
are using those dollars to harden their cybersecurity, that 
they be given some sort of tax credit for that.
    Would you be supportive of that as a way to encourage 
private companies to continue to invest in their cybersecurity?
    Because we know it is not a one-time expense, you know. It 
is a continual upgrade, a continual cost that these companies 
are bearing. And should there not be some sort of tax credits, 
where these companies that are investing to the level approved 
by CISA would be able then to use some of that as a credit 
toward taxes to the Federal Government? Is that something that 
you would be supportive of?
    Ms. Easterly. I haven't studied it, but generally I am 
supportive of anything that incentivizes our businesses to make 
their networks and systems more secure.
    Mr. Guest. And would you agree that cost is a disincentive 
for some companies as the reason that they don't properly 
invest in cybersecurity?
    Ms. Easterly. Yeah, cost and, you know, frankly, some 
people look at tech as magic, and so it is hard to get the 
talent and the skills to be able to secure networks.
    But I would say, sir, we should stop putting the burden on 
these small businesses and forcing them to make a decision 
between mission and security. I go back to: Technology 
providers should be baking in security so that we don't have to 
worry about bolting it on at the back end.
    Mr. Guest. Well, and at some point, if the providers are 
going to have to continue to do that, I mean, ultimately that 
is going to be a cost borne out by someone. And so it seems to 
me that tax credits would be a logical step to encourage 
businesses to do that.
    I know TikTok has been brought up once or twice in this 
hearing, and I know that last week you probably saw there were 
lots of conversations about TikTok. As the Director of CISA, 
can you talk a little bit about the threat that TikTok poses?
    Ms. Easterly. Yeah. I think anything that is in the control 
of a foreign adversary, to include our preeminent threat from 
China, where troves of data, to include data from kids, goes 
back to a foreign adversary for them to be able to use that 
data potentially for influence operations, for profiling, I 
think is a huge, huge risk, which is one of the reasons why 
TikTok is off Federal Government devices.
    And I think we need to be really, really mindful, not just 
TikTok--that is an important and a prominent issue, but, in 
some ways, sir, it is a tactical issue. It is all sorts of 
Chinese technology that is in our critical infrastructure 
supply chain. We need to be very concerned about that.
    And then, frankly, from a strategic level we need to be 
very concerned. We know that China for years has been doing 
espionage and stealing intellectual property, but every 
foothold for espionage can be a foothold for disruption and 
destruction. And so we need to be prepared to be able to 
respond to any type of incursions that might exist on our 
networks.
    Mr. Guest. And would you be supportive of a ban of TikTok?
    Ms. Easterly. Across the country?
    Mr. Guest. Yes.
    Ms. Easterly. I would be. I don't know if that is 
implementable though.
    Mr. Guest. And then, recently, we have seen reports of a 
data breach at the DC health insurance exchange, which many 
Members of Congress and our staff use that health exchange.
    Can you talk a little bit about that breach, information 
that you may be able to share in a non-secure setting with 
myself and the other members of the committee?
    Ms. Easterly. I don't want to talk specifically about that. 
I would be happy to do it in a closed session to give more 
information on that, sir.
    Mr. Guest. Are you able to say whether or not that breach 
occurred from a foreign adversary, someone--was it--because we 
know you have nation-states which are conducting cybersecurity 
threats, there are criminal organizations, and then we have the 
lone-wolf or the individual actors.
    Of those three, could you classify which of those three was 
responsible for the data breach at the D.C. health exchange?
    Ms. Easterly. I don't have the attribution at hand. I am 
happy to get back to you on that, sir. I don't know if final 
attribution has been made.
    You know, when you talk about those categories, though, of 
course you have nation-states, but, you know, many of those 
cyber criminals are given safe haven and sponsorship by those 
nation-states. So we don't see a lot of these lone-actor ones; 
there is usually some connection there.
    But I am happy to get back to you with more specifics.
    Mr. Guest. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am out of time, so I 
yield back.
    Mr. Joyce. Thank you, Mr. Guest.
    We will recognize Mr. Cloud upon his return, but we will go 
to a second round. And we will start with the distinguished 
ranking member, Mr. Cuellar.
    Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And let me just add the same thought, thinking, on the 
private sector, trying to find that balance between the carrots 
and the sticks. And without going into details, I would ask 
you, if you have any suggestions, let us know.
    Because, you know, one of the things I worry about is, I 
don't want the private sector just to depend on the Federal 
Government, and, at the same time, we want the private sector 
to do its fair share. So that balance is always hard.
    So I just want to ask, if you have any thoughts, provide it 
to the committee, and we would appreciate that.
    Ms. Easterly. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Cuellar. Then, second of all, I am now looking at your 
strategic plan, the vision, the mission, goals, and, of course, 
the objectives under each of the goals. And I am looking at 
this just right now.
    I don't think I have a problem with your mission, your 
goals. I still go back, you know, to the performance measures. 
And I think anybody that has worked with performance measures 
or strategic plans, it is always hard trying to measure. So I 
would ask you, if you can, work with us, give us some 
suggestions.
    And I would encourage all the members of the committee, 
like we do anybody that is over at the State, we get involved 
with the agency. Because if you let--again, not you, but I have 
seen some other ones where, if you let the agencies, they will 
come up with the measures where they basically are patting 
themselves on the back, and the difficult ones it is always 
hard to do. It is a lot easier to measure activity, and it is a 
lot harder to measure results.
    So I just want to say, I want to work with you all--
hopefully the committee will be willing in a bipartisan way--
and ask that we all look at the performance measures not only 
for your agency but the other agencies under Homeland.
    That is it. I want to work with you, and if you have any 
thoughts, let us know.
    Ms. Easterly. Yes, sir. Absolutely. And we are not looking 
for a certificate of participation. We are looking to actually 
reduce risk to the Nation. So I would love to work with you to 
make sure that we are wisely investing what you have given us.
    Mr. Cuellar. Yes. Because I think taxpayers always want to 
see that.
    Ms. Easterly. A hundred percent.
    Mr. Cuellar. You know, if we put in $1, they want to know, 
what is the bang for that $1? It is like, you know, in 2020, we 
invested $650 million; people want to know, what did we get for 
the $650 million? How is our country safer now?
    Ms. Easterly. Yes, sir.
    Just one thing on this that I would like to talk about is, 
you know, there have been ransomware incidents across the 
country for the last few years now on some of the target-rich, 
cyber-poor entities, like K-12 schools, like hospitals, like 
public utilities.
    And so we made a very deliberate effort, starting in fiscal 
year 2023, to actually do outreach to those sectors very 
purposefully and use some of our Cybersecurity Performance 
Goals and our free services, both government and industry, to 
measurably and materially drive down risk by actually 
implementing the things we put in the CPG.
    So what we are looking to do is actually look at the 
numbers, that we know of anyway, on incidents for those 
sectors, and then at the end of the year both measure the 
activities but, more importantly, see where we have been able 
to materially reduce risk.
    So that may be a way to actually, at an outcome level, 
start to measure some of the investments that we are making, 
particularly for some of those cyber-poor entities.
    Mr. Cuellar. Right.
    And one of the reasons we want to look at the measures is, 
for example, in your fiscal year 2024 request, it looks like 
CISA is shifting resources away from physical security programs 
in order to be more focused on cybersecurity missions. In other 
words, I think there are cuts to programs dealing with critical 
infrastructure, bombing prevention, school safety, and other 
programs that ensure the security of public gathering spaces. 
That is why those measures are going to be important.
    Any reason why you are requesting reduction on some of 
those physical infrastructure that I mentioned, school safety 
and----
    Ms. Easterly. Yeah.
    Mr. Cuellar [continuing]. Other programs like that?
    Ms. Easterly. Sir, in a very tight budget year, we had to 
make some really tough choices. We just didn't annualize. It is 
the same request from the President's budget in 2023. You all 
were very generous with plussing us up in those areas. We just 
didn't annualize it, because we had to make really tough 
choices.
    If the committee looks to put back money in school safety, 
which I think is $3 million, and in the Office of Bombing 
Prevention, which was $9 million, we could certainly do stuff 
with it.
    Mr. Cuellar. Yeah.
    Mr. Chairman, thank you so much.
    Mr. Joyce. You are more than welcome, Ranking Member 
Cuellar.
    Mrs. Hinson.
    Mrs. Hinson. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    A quick followup. We have talked a lot about TikTok 
already, so I don't need to beat a dead horse here. But are 
there other platforms that you are very concerned about that 
maybe we are not paying as much attention to? Because, 
obviously, we are having a lot of hearings about TikTok, we are 
having a lot of discussions about it. What is the next thing 
that we are worried about?
    Ms. Easterly. Yeah. So, in terms of those types of 
capabilities and platforms, I wouldn't, you know, name a 
specific one. But what I will say I am very concerned about is 
some of the emerging capabilities specifically in artificial 
intelligence, which can be used by threat actors like China for 
weaponization--weaponization of cyber, weaponization of genetic 
engineering, weaponization of bioweapons.
    And, you know, I am a techno optimist generally. I have 
seen technology save lives and do amazing things for our 
national security. But I have concerns, in my role, to see the 
rapid acceleration, almost the frantic pace of the 
implementation of some of this technology into actual things 
that we are using on a daily basis. And I do not think that 
there are the right guardrails in place to be able to assure us 
that this is not going to have cascading massive impacts on our 
safety.
    Mrs. Hinson. Uh-huh.
    Ms. Easterly. So those are the things that we are starting 
to work on as part of our overall technology safety efforts, is 
the safety of artificial intelligence. Because I think we are 
going too fast, and we don't know what is at the other end. And 
I think our adversaries can use this technology in very, very 
damaging ways, and we need to more fully understand that.
    Mrs. Hinson. Right. They are weaponizing that information, 
as you said, to influence as well.
    But you did mention something that is very important there: 
technology used to save lives, which is a critical part of our 
mission, I think, as Members of Congress but also in what you 
do.
    And in my district in Iowa, we obviously know how important 
it is to make sure that those safety tools and emergency 
communications systems are up and running well and that they 
can deliver that lifesaving information, those alerts to 
people. We saw a failure in Iowa recently. We had some tornados 
about a year ago, and some people died.
    So I would just be encouraged to hear a little bit more 
from you about what steps CISA is doing to ensure that our 
emergency comms networks are resilient, strong, and operating 
correctly, so we can avoid having a repeat of what happened in 
Iowa.
    Ms. Easterly. Yeah. Thanks so much for that question.
    So our Emergency Communications Division is so important. 
It really grew out of the entities that came out of 9/11--
SAFECOM and now the National Council of Statewide 
Interoperability Coordinators.
    So what we work on, along with all of our--we have ECCs, 
emergency comms coordinators, in every region. We are focused 
on working with the public safety community and the emergency 
responders to ensure that their comms are secure, resilient, 
and interoperable.
    So, of course, it is Emergency Communications Month coming 
up in April, and we have a full-court press to make sure that 
we are bringing on more of these entities into our Government 
Emergency Telecommunications System and our Wireless Priority 
System, so when there are significant hazards or incidents, we 
can switch over to those capabilities and can be able to 
provide that same emergency comms.
    So, day-in, day-out, working on collaborative planning, 
working on creating resilience. We are providing tools and 
assistance to the public safety community. And just incredibly 
important.
    And, you know, I would love to follow up with you on this, 
because I think our work in this space is--you know, it is only 
really noticed when you have incidents like you had in Iowa 
when you can't use your 911, but critical to the security of 
the Nation.
    Mrs. Hinson. Yeah.
    And, obviously, the derecho came through, and people had no 
way to communicate even with the Governor's office. In my 
community, they were trying to get a hold of her, and they 
couldn't, right? I mean, so that is a huge challenge.
    So I think what is important is redundancies there, to make 
sure that we are--you mentioned resilience, but, obviously, our 
threat actors that we are competing with and trying to counter, 
they are obviously looking for any vulnerability there. So that 
is a huge concern.
    And I want to wrap up with just a question about supply-
chain vulnerabilities, as far as hard infrastructure is 
concerned. Because, obviously, we are coming out of a major 
pandemic. We learned a lot of lessons about the supply chain in 
general. But what do you see as the biggest challenges there in 
terms of threats or vulnerabilities?
    Ms. Easterly. Yeah. I think the biggest issue--and we run, 
as you probably know, the Information and Communication 
Technology Supply Chain Risk Management Task Force with many of 
our partners.
    But, you know, I would just say that the biggest issues are 
that some of these supply chains are run by small businesses. 
And so these entities are part of this target-rich, cyber-poor 
group of people that, you know, the person doing HR is the 
person doing IT, is the person doing finance. And some of these 
entities are within our critical infrastructure.
    Mrs. Hinson. Uh-huh.
    Ms. Easterly. And so one of the things I was most excited 
about is we created these Cybersecurity Performance Goals.
    Now, the gold standard for risk management is the NIST 
Cybersecurity Framework, and that is what we used at Morgan 
Stanley, for example. But if you are a small business, you look 
at that and it is just intimidating. So what we wanted to do 
was really take that document and distill it down to less than 
40 things that can be done, characterized by cost, complexity, 
and impact, to drive down risk.
    And we are most excited about being able to use that into 
some of these small companies that sit within the supply chain 
to really materially drive down risk. Because that will make us 
all safer just given how interconnected, how digitized, and how 
vulnerable we are because of some of those supply-chain 
components.
    The last thing I would say is, we need to also look at some 
of the Chinese technology that is within our supply chains. FCC 
has a list of some of this technology that they are looking to 
come out of communications. But we are actually--because we 
have vulnerability scanning of the public internet, we can see 
some of these technologies in critical infrastructure. We have 
actually done outreach now to, I think, 120 entities to let 
them know, hey, you have Huawei, you have Hikvision, you have 
ZTE; you know, you should think to pull that out, because it is 
creating risk in your network. So we need to do that as well.
    Mrs. Hinson. Well, thank you, Director Easterly.
    And I look forward to working with you, Mr. Chairman, to 
maybe act on some of those challenges that she just mentioned. 
Thank you.
    Mr. Joyce. Absolutely. Thank you, Mrs. Hinson.
    Recognizing Mr. Cloud for his initial round of questions.
    Mr. Cloud. Thank you so much for being here and sharing 
your insight with us.
    I wanted to tackle--you know, we all certainly want to 
guard our cyber infrastructure. And, you know, that is a 
bipartisan goal. A lot of Americans are now concerned about 
maybe some of the mission creep that has happened recently.
    You started, I guess it was in July 2021. And then, shortly 
after that, not that you did this, but in September there was 
an effort to start a Disinformation Governance Board, and there 
was a lot of pushback from that. But part of that memo said 
that CISA would be involved in flagging content for censorship 
on social media platforms leading up to the 2020 election.
    And then we know that CISA played a key role in working 
with outside organizations, such as the Election Integrity 
Partnership, to censor information about the Hunter Biden 
laptop story.
    What are you doing to make sure that that kind of thing 
doesn't happen again?
    Ms. Easterly. Yeah. Thank you for the question, 
Congressman.
    Just to be totally crystal-clear, as I think you would want 
me to be, we don't censor anything. And as someone who served, 
as a combat veteran that----
    Mr. Cloud. No, but you recommend to Twitter and social 
media organizations or flag things for them that could be 
considered----
    Ms. Easterly. We don't flag anything to social media 
organizations at all. We are focused on building resilience to 
foreign influence and disinformation.
    So we do not do any censorship. And I just want to make 
that incredibly clear.
    Mr. Cloud. OK.
    On March 7, Biden issued an executive order, 14019, 
directing all Federal agencies to develop voter registration 
and voter education plans, to be submitted to the White House 
and OMB by September 2021.
    My understanding is that CISA has submitted a plan to the 
White House. Is that correct?
    Ms. Easterly. I need to go back on that. If there is--
September 2021? I don't know, sir. I will go back and check on 
that.
    Mr. Cloud. OK. There has been a number of FOIA requests to 
get copies of these plans.
    Ms. Easterly. Yeah.
    Mr. Cloud. And I would like to see if you could----
    Ms. Easterly. Voter registration--sir, can you help me 
understand the question?
    Mr. Cloud. Biden issued an executive order directing all 
Federal agencies to develop a voter registration and voter 
education plan, to be submitted to the White House.
    And my understanding is that CISA did submit one but there 
have been some FOIA requests, and, government-wide, there has 
been a lot of non-transparency in delivering on those plans 
when it comes to FOIA requests.
    Ms. Easterly. Yeah.
    Mr. Cloud. And would you be able to get us a copy of that 
plan?
    Ms. Easterly. Yeah, 100 percent. And, you know, at the end 
of the day, happy to be completely transparent. Transparency 
builds trust.
    Mr. Cloud. Yeah.
    Ms. Easterly. That is our job. Elections and voting is not 
a partisan issue.
    Mr. Cloud. Sure.
    Ms. Easterly. We work with all parties, all affiliations. 
We are just trying to make sure that, whether you are 
Republican, whether you are Democrat, election officials have 
what they need to be able to run safe and secure----
    Mr. Cloud. Or neither.
    Ms. Easterly [continuing]. Elections, as you would want us 
to.
    Mr. Cloud. Sure.
    One of the issues we have when we are looking at budgets 
is, a lot of the line items we send or we will fund, the line 
item is great, a lot of bipartisan support for it, but a lot of 
the action that would be questionable is in the grant-writing 
process.
    But it is hard to have transparency on that, because there 
is very little transparency on where the grants are going, who 
the grants are going to, what particular NGOs, what 
particular--even how the contracting is happening.
    Can you work with us on getting us a copy of everyone that 
has received any sort of grant or contract over the last 2 
years through CISA?
    Ms. Easterly. Yeah. Absolutely. Are you talking about--the 
grants, the one that we are most directly involved in managing 
is the State and Local Cybersecurity Grant Program that is 
really dedicated to State and local.
    So, you know, as you can imagine, a lot of those 
capabilities at the State and local level don't have a lot of 
resources, and so we want to make sure that the State of Texas 
or the jurisdictions have what they need to keep their networks 
and systems secure.
    But happy to get you whatever you would like.
    Mr. Cloud. Well, thank you very much.
    And I yield back.
    Ms. Easterly. Thank you.
    Mr. Joyce. Thank you, Mr. Cloud.
    I recognize Ms. Underwood for the second round of 
questions.
    Ms. Underwood. Thanks so much, Mr. Chairman.
    Director Easterly, I know you have placed a lot of emphasis 
on these target-rich, resource-poor critical infrastructure 
sectors.
    In northern Illinois, we have a lot of rural and suburban 
communities with schools, small businesses, public works 
facilities, and hospitals that lack the resources to combat the 
evolving 21st-century landscape of cyber threats. Yet these are 
vital services for our communities, and we rely on them every 
day, and they are responsible for a lot of data.
    What are some of the most target-rich, resource-poor 
critical infrastructure sectors and subsectors? And what is 
CISA doing to help those owners and operators mitigate the 
specific risks they face?
    Ms. Easterly. Yeah. Thanks very much for that question.
    What we wanted to do was look at those entities that were 
most targeted by ransomware over the past year and then really 
focus in a way where we could measurably drive down risk, 
leveraging the Cybersecurity Performance Goals and then the no-
cost vulnerability assessments and some of the tools that we 
had.
    So we chose K-12 school districts, and we wrote--if you 
haven't seen it, we actually did this great report with the 
school entities about what are the tools that can most help 
schools that don't have a lot of resources there. So we are 
focused on that.
    We are focused on public utilities, like water facilities 
because I am very concerned about that.
    And we are focused on hospitals, you know, particularly 
some of the smaller hospitals. I know you have an appreciation 
for that. Because making a decision between a surgeon and 
whether you upgrade your software, you shouldn't have to make 
those decisions.
    Ms. Underwood. That is right.
    Ms. Easterly. So we have brought the CEO for Atlantic 
Healthcare on our board, we have brought somebody that does 
public utilities in New Hampshire, we have brought somebody who 
heads a K-12 nonprofit to help advise us and connect us with 
those communities to drive down that risk using some of these 
new tools that we have.
    By the way, we actually followed up on Waubonsee. Thank you 
for raising that to make sure that they have what they need to 
drive down risk.
    Ms. Underwood. Excellent. Thank you.
    I see small local governments as another example of a 
target-rich, resource-poor entity. My Resilience Act would 
target CISA's resources through outreach and pilot programs to 
rural and suburban communities that don't have the resources to 
defend against every cyber and physical threat.
    Can you provide an update on CISA's current work to help 
local governments protect themselves from emerging threats?
    Ms. Easterly. Yeah, absolutely.
    The thing I think we are most excited about here is the 
grant program, the State and Local Cyber Grant Program. Two 
States opted out of it. We have 54 States and territories that 
are going to do it. We just received 12 of the first proposals 
for the first year.
    Ms. Underwood. Yeah.
    Ms. Easterly. We just approved 10 of them. Info went out to 
those 10. FEMA is in the process of just validating that. And 
the money should be out the door within the next couple weeks. 
And so we look forward to seeing those other 44 by September. 
And, as you know, that goes for several years.
    And there is also a matching component. So we don't want to 
have this sort of--you know, we understand cyber-poor, but we 
don't want to have a moral hazard. We want to teach a person to 
fish, so at the end of the day there is some matching that 
occurs at the State level.
    Ms. Underwood. Yep.
    Ms. Easterly. And then we are going to provide assistance 
to ensure that they are continuing to raise their baseline so 
that they can drive down risk.
    Ms. Underwood. Excellent.
    Now, I understand there has been a larger national 
conversation and Republican leadership has put forward a plan 
to involve some cuts.
    We received a letter from the Secretary outlining the 
impact of some cuts, including a note about State and local 
impacts, which says that budget cuts would lead to a 13-percent 
reduction in CISA's regional field forces, and the regional 
workforce is a critical component of CISA's service delivery 
model.
    I am about putting people over politics. And I think that 
CISA's value and impact for our local communities is unmatched, 
and would certainly not support this type of devastating cut.
    Wondering if you might want to expand on the impact of such 
a reduction.
    Ms. Easterly. Thank you. I completely agree. If we have any 
of the cuts, if we get pushed back to 2022, it will severely 
negatively impact what we have been able to do with State and 
local partners and with those smaller critical infrastructure 
owners and operators around the country.
    Over the past 2 years, we have added significant forces--
cybersecurity advisors, cybersecurity State coordinators, 
protective security advisors--that are on the ground, the tip 
of the spear, providing our no-cost resources, capabilities, 
and tools to drive down risk to this Nation, in an environment 
where there are very serious nation-state threats and cyber 
criminals that are sponsored by those nation-states.
    So I would be very concerned about any cuts to those 
capabilities as well as any capabilities of the things that we 
asked for. Because that will put us back in a pre-SolarWinds 
world where we will lose that visibility that we have 
developed, and that is harmful to our security as a Nation.
    Ms. Underwood. Harmful to our security as a Nation. Limits 
our ability to meet the demand from our State and local 
partners, who, as I understand it, are asking for support. And 
these PSAs and CSAs are oversubscribed as is. And so we can't 
let a 13-percent reduction move forward.
    Thank you so much, Director, for being here.
    Ms. Easterly. Thank you.
    Ms. Underwood. I yield back.
    Mr. Joyce. Sheriff Rutherford.
    Mr. Rutherford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And I want to follow up on that. In my absence, I know Mrs. 
Hinson talked about our foreign adversaries and Mr. Guest 
talked about TikTok, so a lot of my questions have already been 
asked in my absence. And I know Mr. Trone spoke of staffing, as 
did Ms. Underwood just now, and I want to follow up on that.
    Because I will tell you, that is, I think, one of the most 
important issues we have going forward, is, what are the 
national staffing needs for cyber-trained individuals, and what 
are we doing about it? And what are your needs from a staffing 
standpoint, and what are we doing about it?
    And so can you talk a little--and I guess my question, too, 
is, is that in your mission, to help develop human capability 
out there?
    Ms. Easterly. Yeah. Absolutely.
    So, just to talk about CISA specifically, as I mentioned, 
we have a full-court press on hiring. We are projected to hire 
up to 600 people this year. That will drive down our vacancies. 
And, you know, we have grown, I think, 13 percent over the past 
couple years, given some of the new budgets, so now we are at a 
place where we are going to be able to drive down vacancies. 
Because we even asked for, I think, 11 new positions with this 
budget.
    So I am very confident that we will have the capacity and 
capability to defend the Nation as America's cyber defense 
agency.
    With respect to the rest of the country, so the stats are 
something like: 3.5 million unfilled cybersecurity jobs 
globally, 700,000 in the U.S., and about 35,000 in the Federal 
Government.
    So, from a Federal Government perspective, we are working 
on things like, we run re-skilling programs for people who want 
to----
    Mr. Rutherford. I am sorry, say that again?
    Ms. Easterly. Like, re-skilling programs. So a 3-month 
course for people who want to move from what they are doing 
into cyber and get re-skilling training. So we do that.
    We do the Federal Virtual Training Environment, where you 
can go on and learn about cyber through webinars.
    And then we also--importantly, we work across the Nation. 
Because I think this has to be, frankly, from K--what I call 
``K through gray.''
    Mr. Rutherford. Right.
    Ms. Easterly. And K-12 is really important. I just saw 
North Dakota actually mandated cybersecurity in their K-12 
education. I think every State should do that, frankly. Because 
our kids are digital natives, while we are all digital 
immigrants. They are very facile on their devices. But, quite 
frankly, they don't know how to protect themselves. So they 
need to learn at a very young age how to protect themselves.
    So we actually have a grantee in Louisiana, Cyber 
Innovation Center, and we work with them to provide curriculum 
to train the trainer, for teachers all across the Nation in 
every State. And I think more of that program is really, really 
important as we dig in and help our younger folks get more 
facile on cyber.
    It has to be a national thing. It can't just be the Federal 
Government.
    Mr. Rutherford. Uh-huh. Alrighty.
    And can you--I want to ask you personally, because I trust 
you a lot.
    Ms. Easterly. Thank you, sir.
    Mr. Rutherford. This whole TikTok thing, I have to tell 
you, I am a little torn. I don't like censorship, but I don't 
know enough about what our full reasons are about going after 
TikTok.
    Can you talk about that a little bit and where you come 
down on that issue?
    Ms. Easterly. Yeah. Thank you, Sheriff.
    So the data right now from TikTok that a lot of kids use--I 
think 130 million Americans; that is a lot--basically goes back 
to China. And, you know, frankly, for those who talked about, 
you know, we can be more--we can compete economically and this 
can be a partner, I don't see us turning in that way.
    I very much worry about the threat from China to our 
Nation, and I very much worry about what they are going to do 
with all of that data to weaponize it--to weaponize it for 
influence operations. Particularly, I am worried about that, as 
I have said throughout the hearing, foreign influence 
operations during our elections.
    Mr. Rutherford. Yeah.
    Ms. Easterly. The Chinese have a well-known doctrine of 
cognitive domain operations. They are focused on influence 
operations against the American people to sow discord, to sow 
distrust, to undermine our confidence in the core foundations 
of our democracy. This is why I am concerned about so much data 
that is going right back to an adversary nation.
    And I agree with you, we don't censor. You know, I spent 21 
years in the Army and three times in combat zones serving the 
Nation, sworn to protect and defend the Constitution of the 
United States. We don't censor anything.
    What we want to do is to ensure that we are building 
resilience and securing our Nation from the type of threats 
that we are going to be dealing with in a really serious way. 
And China is where we need to be focused.
    Mr. Rutherford. Thank you.
    I yield back.
    Ms. Easterly. Thank you, sir.
    Mr. Joyce. Thank you, Sheriff.
    Mr. Trone.
    Mr. Trone. I would just like to comment that I think where 
the sheriff is going there is really right on point. And it is 
so good to hear, you know, you talk about that and explain that 
to us. And, you know, I really appreciate that. It really helps 
me.
    And I couldn't agree with the sheriff more on the 
importance of building that pipeline of workers to get into 
cyber. And if we see we are falling behind, like we have fallen 
behind on addiction specialists, therapists, psychologists, a 
lot of folks in the medical fields--we are doing things to help 
fill those needs, but if we see the problem here, you have to 
come to us. And we can think about ways we can put tax credits, 
tuition refunds, get our kids in this area that are going to be 
such great jobs in the future that really pay well.
    And the other comment would be, I really thought Mr. Guest 
had some great comments about, you know, maybe some tax credit 
ideas on our small business. You know, a bigger business, like 
myself, we get it; we are all in. But these small businesses, 
you know, I was there one time, and you always think short-
term. You are just working on getting payroll Friday. And you 
have to think long-term, you know, when you look at cyber, 
because it is going to devastate you. You won't be able to 
recover.
    So, if we give them some sort of credit, that kind of gets 
them in the swimming pool, so to speak, and gets their feet 
wet, and then all of a sudden they realize, wow, this could be 
bad. Then they are going to figure out how to get some of their 
own resources, go to places like the chamber, we talked about 
earlier and be successful. And we can support those small 
businesses, which are--the future of our country is small 
businesses in America.
    So we should continue to think about that, Mr. Chairman, 
and ideas. I think this should be very bipartisan and we would 
all support that.
    The last thing I want to mention was on TikTok. You had 
talked to me a little bit about how TikTok looks differently in 
China and how it works in China versus how TikTok works here 
and how the, I think you said, dumbing-down of 130 million 
Americans, so they are just dumbed down, looking at dogs and 
cats and animal tricks, versus thinking about reading a book, 
you know, about philosophy or English literature, you know, 
some things that really could help us.
    So talk about that, how it is different in China.
    Ms. Easterly. Yeah. And my friend Tristan Harris, who was 
one of the founders for the Center for Humane Technology, 
actually talked about this, I think it was on ``60 Minutes,'' 
several months ago.
    It is this idea of ``spinach TikTok,'' so the controls that 
are placed by the Chinese on how TikTok is used within their 
nation. Restricted time. There is not the--you know, I am not 
ideologically opposed to cat videos, but, at the end of the 
day, cat videos versus videos about museums and Nobel Prize 
winners.
    So this is really different from what our kids here are 
seeing, versus what kids in China are seeing.
    Mr. Trone. The kids in China are seeing what?
    Ms. Easterly. Seeing much more educational videos. And they 
are restricted in terms of timing.
    And so, you know, when you think about what our kids are 
seeing here versus there, it is, I think, part of an overall 
strategy to impact how our kids are being educated. And I worry 
a lot about it, both as the Director of CISA but also as a mom.
    And I think we all, as parents, as citizens of this Nation, 
we all need to be focused on, really, how to be a good 
ancestor, frankly. What are my great-grandkids going to think 
about, you know, these, what I call, ``weapons of mass 
distraction'' and all of the, sort of, tools--which, frankly, 
we should, you know, read a damn book, right, at the end of the 
day.
    And so I am with you. And, again, there is some cool stuff 
going on in this technology, but I think we need to be very 
mindful about how it is impacting the next generation.
    Mr. Trone. You nailed it. Thanks for your insights.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Joyce. Thank you, Mr. Trone. And I agree that reading 
books allow one's imagination to flourish.
    Ms. Easterly. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Joyce. And taking my second question of this round: 
Hypothetically, what would a full-fledged nation-state-actor 
attack on our critical infrastructure look like? And what are 
we doing to prepare for that worst-case scenario?
    Ms. Easterly. Yeah. Thank you for asking. You know, I often 
get asked what keeps me up at night.
    Mr. Joyce. Yeah.
    Ms. Easterly. This is part of it. A lot of things, is the 
answer.
    So, you know, you saw, I am sure, the intel community 
assessment that came out a couple weeks ago. And it is very 
clear in there, you know, we are still focused on the threat 
from Russia. We are still vigilant, we are still keeping our 
shields up, knowing that we are not out of the woods in terms 
of retaliation on our infrastructure.
    But, to me, the focus needs to be on China. China is the 
preeminent threat. And so what I worry about is a scenario 
where, in the next 3 to 6 years, China decides to reunify with 
Taiwan, whether that is an invasion or a blockade of the 
straits. But, at the same time, I think we are very likely to 
see attacks here in the homeland.
    Remember, China is looking at Russia and Ukraine, and they 
are learning lessons just as we are learning lessons, and I 
think they are costing in the impact of what an escalatory 
attack would look like. And so I think we would see attacks 
against pipelines, because the big lesson of Colonial Pipeline 
is, what a great way to create panic, to incite societal panic, 
to, you know, essentially upend how Americans are thinking 
about their safety and security.
    So I would see attacks on pipelines, attacks on 
transportation, attacks on water facilities, all of which, 
again, induce societal panic, delay mobilization of our 
military forces, and really get the American people to say, 
``Look, I don't want to worry about that place out there. I 
really just want to worry about getting to work and getting my 
gas and getting my healthcare and being able to communicate.''
    And so I think that is the kind of thing that we can see. I 
think that is a more-than-likely scenario and certainly if you 
read in the intel.
    So what are we doing? We are aggressively doing everything 
we can, working with our partners, our industry partners, our 
partners in every sector, to ensure they understand the threat 
and that they are taking aggressive measures to drive down 
risk.
    If they are some of the smaller entities, it is using some 
of the no-cost tools and the capabilities like our Cyber 
Performance Goals to drive down that risk. If it is some of the 
bigger companies, we are working with them to ensure that we 
are sharing information to allow us to have a consolidated 
threat picture so that we can actually drive down risk to the 
Nation.
    But this, to me, sir, it is not about prevention, at the 
end of the day. It is about resilience. Because in this highly 
connected, highly vulnerable world, it is very hard to prevent 
bad things from happening. We need to expect disruption. We 
need to ensure that we have redundant communications, that we 
are prepared to recover, that we have manual overrides, that we 
can actually withstand an attack and then get back up and have 
the country running in a very short period of time.
    That is the mentality and the culture that we all need to 
be focused on across the Nation to be able to deal with these 
threats.
    Mr. Joyce. Thank you. And Godspeed in getting to that.
    Ms. Easterly. Thanks, Chairman.
    Mr. Joyce. Without any further ado, members of the 
subcommittee may have some additional questions. I know both 
Mr. Harris and Mr. Cloud have asked for some responses from 
you. Would 15 business days from today give you enough time to 
respond?
    Ms. Easterly. Yes, sir, Chairman.
    Mr. Joyce. OK. Thank you.
    And anybody else who would like to send a written question 
in a timely manner, get their responses during that time.
    But I also want to thank you again for being here today.
    And this subcommittee stands adjourned.
    Ms. Easterly. Thanks, Chairman.
    Thanks, everyone.
    [Answers to submitted questions follow:]
    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 
    

                                         Tuesday, March 28, 2023.  

FISCAL YEAR 2024 REQUEST FOR THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

                                WITNESS

HON. DAVID PEKOSKE, ADMINISTRATOR, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY 
    ADMINISTRATION
    Mr. Joyce [presiding]. Today's hearing will come to order.
    This afternoon we welcome the Administrator of the 
Transportation Security Administration, David Pekoske, to 
testify on TSA's fiscal year 2024 budget request.
    Administrator Pekoske, thank you for joining us today. I 
would also like to take a moment to congratulate you on being 
confirmed for a second term as TSA Administrator. In today's 
political environment, it is quite an achievement to work for 
multiple administrations.
    I have a friend who has been in the U.S. Marshal in 
Cleveland, and he first got appointed under Bush in 2001, and 
so he managed--it is always quite an achievement. You must be 
really doing your job if you can survive administration after 
administration. Thank you for your leadership and service.
    TSA's mission is vast and imbedded in the principle that 
transportation security is national security. Establishing the 
immediate aftermath of September 11, 2001, TSA works to combat 
dynamic threats across the Nation's transportation systems and 
protect the traveling public.
    In order to carry out that mission in a robust and 
effective manner, the resources this committee provides to TSA 
must prioritize innovative and transformative solutions to 
security challenge we face today.
    Of course, Administrator, I am not sure the President's 
2024 budget request meets that mark. The budget request for TSA 
is nearly $1.6 billion above the fiscal year 2023 enacted 
level. The single largest line item increase in the budget 
request is $1.1 billion for pay increases for the TSA 
workforce.
    I appreciate the dedication and service to our Nation that 
these officers show each and every day and believe they should 
be paid fairly, but I also recognize the significant budgetary 
challenges that this poses, especially in the current fiscal 
environment.
    The budget request also woefully underfunds investment in 
new, more capable technology in airport checkpoints. For 
example, computed tomography technology is able to render 3D 
images of carry-on baggage, provide TSOs with a greater ability 
to identify potential threats at checkpoints while increasing 
the speed and efficiency of passenger screening.
    However, the budget request includes only $70 million for 
this technology, which is $35 million less than the amount that 
was provided in fiscal year 2023. At the current rate, in this 
budget, TSA will not be able to fully deploy these systems 
across the United States until 2042.
    Compounding these budgetary challenges is the 
administration has, yet again, resorted to budget gimmicks, 
assuming unauthorized fees that are offset for TSA's 
appropriation. Coupled with the $1.1 billion in pay increases, 
this administration has created a huge hole in TSA's budget to 
the tune of $2.8 billion.
    The committee will need to take a hard look at the entirety 
of TSA's and the Department's budget and balance the proposals 
against other funding requirements.
    Administrator Pekoske, today I look forward to your 
testimony and working with you throughout the fiscal 2024 
appropriations process.
    Before I turn to the witness for his statement, I would 
like to recognize our ranking member, my friend, Mr. Cuellar, 
for his opening remarks.
    Mr. Cuellar. Mr. Chairman, again, thank you so much. And, 
again, congratulations on your chairmanship.
    Mr. Administrator, again, good talking to you again and 
welcome back. You are no stranger to this committee, and we 
appreciate the good work that you and your folks have done.
    We are here looking forward to hearing about the 
President's budget request for TSA for fiscal year 2024, and I 
think we understand the very important work that you all do.
    We rely, the public relies on making sure that flights take 
off on time, and it is a lot of work. And certainly, with the 
growth that now post-pandemic, we certainly know that those 
numbers are going to go up on that.
    We also understand and we want to talk to you a little bit 
more about the fiscal year 2023 funding bill that is part of 
TSA's effort to provide parity to the TSA workforce, and an 
effort to bring TSA employees on par with their peers on the 
rest of the Federal Government. We do know that there is some 
work to be done legislatively and appropriations.
    And again, we appreciate the work that you have done.
    One of the things that also we want to talk to you a little 
bit about in some of the questions is the procurement process, 
the hiring process itself also, and also customer service. I am 
a big believer in customer service. Certainly, I appreciate the 
work that your folks do. Very important work. But again, 
customer service, how we treat, how we talk to people is very 
important.
    So, again, we look forward to working with you. And, again, 
welcome back to the committee again.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Joyce. Thank you, Mr. Cuellar.
    Administrator, without objection, your written testimony 
will be entered into the record. With that in mind, we would 
ask for you to please summarize your opening statement in 5 
minutes.

               STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID P. PEKOSKE

    Mr. Pekoske. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Chairman Joyce, 
Ranking Member Cuellar, and distinguished members of this 
subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before 
you this afternoon on the President's fiscal year 2024 request 
for TSA.
    Let me begin by recognizing that our operations are 
conducted by an incredible team of TSA employees and 
contractors and with the enormous security contributions of all 
the stakeholders in the aviation's surface transportation 
industries.
    To put the scale of our operations in context, in calendar 
year 2022, 736 million travelers were screened in our 
checkpoints at over 430 airports across the country. This is an 
average of over 2 million travelers and their 5 million carry-
on bags per day.
    Last calendar year, we stopped 6,542 firearms, an all-time 
record, at our checkpoints. 88 percent of those firearms were 
loaded.
    We expect that passenger volumes will continue to grow. 
Therefore, we need the additional staff requested in the fiscal 
year 2024 budget to continue to meet our passenger wait time 
standards of 30 minutes or less in our standard lanes and 10 
minutes or less in our PreCheck lanes. We met these standards 
for over 99 percent of passengers last year.
    And with this subcommittee's support, we continue to 
upgrade all of our primary screening technologies for identity 
verification, carry-on bag screening, and on-person screening. 
These critical technology investments accomplish all three of 
these key goals to improve security effectiveness, to improve 
security efficiency and to enhance the passenger experience.
    I am very grateful for the funding we received in the 
fiscal year 2023 Omnibus Appropriations Act that places TSA 
employees on an equal-pay footing with every other employee in 
the Federal Government. This action is absolutely fundamental 
to our long-term success.
    As I travel to airports and offices around the country, I 
find that our recruiting is stronger already, and our attrition 
rates are coming down as a result of Congress including fair 
pay in our fiscal year 2023 appropriation. It is having an 
enormous positive effect on our workforce, and it is coming 
just in time to ensure we are ready to face the changing 
threats to our transportation system and the increasing demand 
for air travel that all of us see evidence of every time we 
fly.
    The TSA workforce performs a critical national and Homeland 
Security function. Here are some examples of outstanding 
performance: At Cleveland Hopkins International Airport, TSA's 
Alan Borocz and Joshua Guysinger found a knife hidden in a 
passenger's cast during screening.
    At the Lehigh Valley Airport in the Allentown, Pennsylvania 
area, Transportation Security Officer Vance Hamilton and Nick 
Apostolou detected an explosive in a checked bag.
    At Austin-Bergstrom International Airport, TSO Angel Ayala 
and STSO, Supervisor Transportation Security Officer Emmett 
Street detected a stuffed animal with over 50 rounds of 9 
millimeter ammunition sewed inside of it.
    And just this month, while assigned to a Visible Intermodal 
Prevention and Response deployment in the Charlotte Douglas 
International Airport, two Federal air marshals were called to 
assist the Charlotte-Mecklenburg police in approaching and 
apprehending a known felon in possession of a handgun in the 
airport's parking garage.
    These and many more examples prove that TSA cannot be 
successful without a professional, vigilant, engaged, and 
properly staffed workforce.
    I thank you in advance for your continued support of our 
workforce. That, in addition to fair pay, includes assuring 
that they have the tools and technology needed to do their 
jobs.
    The cybersecurity of our critical transportation 
infrastructure is much stronger today than it was just two 
years ago, and that is urgently needed because the cyber 
threats we face are significant.
    We have worked very closely with pipeline, rail, and 
aviation critical infrastructure owners and operators. 
Together, we have begun to build cybersecurity protections and 
improve the resiliency in these sectors that are so critical to 
our national well-being. The private sector and non-Federal 
Government entities that own and operate the majority of the 
transportation infrastructure have been terrific partners and 
have made significant and necessary investments in 
cybersecurity.
    Similarly, the President's fiscal year 2024 request will 
provide the resources TSA needs to continue to fight this 
threat and support our stakeholders' efforts.
    I appreciate the challenge of identifying the resources 
needed to fund TSA's operations. TSA's gross discretionary 
budget request is offset every year by revenues generated by a 
fee paid by all passengers when they purchase an airline 
ticket. This fee is called the September 11th Security Fee, and 
its only original purpose was to fund aviation security.
    But since the 2013 Bipartisan Budget Act, a significant 
portion of these fee revenues, nearly $1.6 billion or 38 
percent of the total fees collected in fiscal year 2024 will be 
directed towards deficit reduction, not aviation security. The 
President has submitted a legislative proposal again this year 
to end this fee diversion and provide that $1.6 billion in 
additional offsetting collections to TSA's budget.
    I will do all I can to provide information to you and our 
authorizing committees to enact this legislative proposal and 
the fee diversion, and put the funds to their intended purpose, 
as the President has requested.
    Thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I look 
forward to your questions this afternoon and to working with 
all of you over the coming years to ensure that TSA has the 
funding needed to continue to provide for our transportation 
security.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    [The information follows:]
    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Mr. Joyce. Thank you, sir.
    I will start with questions, and I will start with myself.
    I mentioned in my opening statement my concern with the 
requested level for technology procurements, including computed 
tomography machines. CT machines apply sophisticated algorithms 
to detect weapons, explosives, and other prohibited items.
    Can you describe how this technology impacts the aviation's 
security system and what benefits they provide to TSOs and the 
traveling public and how this is critical to the technology--
how this is important technology to the aviation security?
    Mr. Pekoske. Mr. Chairman, thanks for the question.
    The computed tomography, or CT scan x-rays that we are 
installing in our checkpoints are medical grade x-ray systems. 
What they provide more than anything else, is they provide the 
ability to detect a very small amount of explosive, which we 
know we need to detect and prevent a catastrophic event with an 
aircraft in flight at 35,000 feet.
    So the detectability is very consistent with our 
requirements for detection in our checkpoints, and it has other 
benefits of providing additional speed and also providing 
additional convenience for passengers.
    For example, with the computed tomography x-ray technology, 
passengers don't need to take out laptops or liquids, aerosols, 
and gels out of their carry-on bags if they are a PreCheck 
passenger because the technology can actually see around those 
items with the way it works from a detection standpoint.
    So this project has been critically important to us. We 
have got CT x-rays deployed at about 40 percent of our 
checkpoints nationwide. So we are not quite halfway there, but 
with the funding levels to the points that both you and the 
ranking member made in your opening statements, this program 
will not be completed until 2042. That is a further delay from 
where it was just last year.
    Last year, at last year's funding levels, we thought we 
could get this completed in 2036. Now, with the funding levels 
that are reduced to the top-line constraints, this is going to 
be moved out to 2042.
    Mr. Joyce. Fair to say in those 40 airports where it has 
been deployed, that it has sped up the process of passenger 
handling?
    Mr. Pekoske. Where it has been deployed, Mr. Chairman, at 
40 percent of the airports already, or 40 percent of the lanes, 
more properly, in our system, yes. In fact, the large systems, 
which have a technology called an Automatic Screening Lane 
imbedded within the x-ray system, five passengers at the same 
time can take things out of their carry-on bags and put them 
into bins if they need to be taken out.
    That is much better than doing it one passenger after the 
other. In other words, you don't have to wait for the passenger 
or two or three passengers in front of you.
    We found significant improvements in the ability of that 
technology, combined with those automatic lanes, to process 
passengers compared to what we currently can do.
    Mr. Joyce. It is fair to say that under the current funding 
plan, it would take two decades to roll this out. If, in fact, 
we, the committee, were to fund the technology to the requested 
level, does TSA have a strategy in place to accelerate this 
plan in future years?
    Mr. Pekoske. Mr. Chairman, this is one of the rather unique 
situations in the Federal Government where the agency 
requesting the funding not only knows exactly what it wants to 
buy and has tested it both from a, ``Hey, does the technology 
work perspective,'' but also does the technology work in our 
environment perspective.
    So we tested it. We know what we want to buy, and we have 
contract vehicles already in place. And so, you know, we could 
spend, with our current contract vehicles, and successfully 
install. So it is one thing to be able to buy a lot and store 
them. That is not what I am saying. We could buy about $350 to 
$380 million worth of CT technology. That would accelerate this 
project by many, many years.
    So, you know, we are in a position where we know what we 
want. We have tested it. We have had operational experience 
with it. We have contract vehicles in place, and we have an 
implementation plan.
    Mr. Joyce. Has TSA performed an analysis on impacts to 
TSO's staffing requirements as more capable screening equipment 
is deployed to the airports? And do you anticipate this will 
reduce the number of TSOs needed to staff a checkpoint and 
maintain the same passenger throughput?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. We have started that. We started 
extensively. It would reduce the rate of growth for screening 
officers because, you know, what we expect to see over the next 
many years, we are already seeing it from fiscal year 2022 into 
2023. We will certainly see it from 2023 into 2024 is a return 
to increases in passenger volumes.
    Pre-pandemic, it was about 4 percent year over year. We 
expect to see that beginning in fiscal year 2024. So, you know, 
from our perspective, we won't need to grow the workforce 
nearly as much as we would have had we not had this technology 
in place.
    Mr. Joyce. Thank you.
    I will notice my dear friend, Ranking Member Henry Cuellar, 
for any questions he may have.
    Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Administrator, under the 2010 law, there was a 2010 law 
that called for every agency to make sure they set up their 
strategic plans, their performance measures, their mission, 
their vision, their goals, their objectives. And I have looked 
at your strategic plan and the performance measures, and one of 
the things we said earlier today is at the State level, State 
legislature, there is this working collaboration with the 
agency and the legislatures.
    And one of the things I would ask you is if you would be 
willing to work with us on reviewing some of this because the 
way the Federal Government does it is that you all set up your 
own performance measures.
    And with all due respect, not you all but there are some 
agencies that just put performance measures so they can pat 
themselves in the back. They look good.
    But measuring activity is one thing. Measuring results, 
which is what I think you are looking at, is a little harder.
    So I would ask you later on, once we get past this 
appropriation process, sit down with us to go over some of the 
work that you all have done on that.
    The other thing is what the chairman was asking. On the 
procurement acquisition part, it is going to take a long time, 
and I think this is a problem that we have with almost every 
agency. It is, you know, we buy things and it costs the 
taxpayers dollars. You don't have enough competition at times, 
and we have got to find a better way.
    So one of the things that, you know, we would ask you is, 
you know--and I am sure, you know, to improve it, some of the 
steps are you have to have some clear goals, a metrics as to 
what you want to do, look at the--streamline the acquisition 
process. If you can do it in 1 year, instead of 5 years, let's 
do it because I think waiting until 19--what is it, 2042 or 
whatever, that is a long time.
    You know, making sure that we are working with the 
stakeholders, which means, you know, the private sector also. 
And, of course, making sure that you have the right procurement 
or acquisition professionals because if the people that you 
hire--and I am not saying that, but if an agency hires some 
people that don't know and the other side knows more, you know 
what is going to happen there.
    So, we certainly want to work with you on the procurement 
process, and any ideas that you have, any authorities that you 
think you might have besides money, because it is money and 
authorities, we want to go over that.
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. And thank you for your comments, and 
I agree with everything that you said.
    And let me go back to the strategy piece for a second, if I 
could. When we developed our strategy, which we published in 
2018, we intentionally made it a longer-term strategy, because 
I wanted to bring some stability to the agency in terms of an 
strategic direction. But it was especially important that we 
included the inputs of all of our stakeholders, members and 
staff up on Capitol Hill, members of the industry, other 
Federal partners, our international partners.
    So we got a lot of very robust input, and what you see is 
that strategy document that goes out into our 25th anniversary 
in 2026.
    To go with it, there are documents that I publish every 2 
or 3 years called Administrator's Intent documents, and these 
documents are basically looking at the strategy. What do we 
need to accomplish in a 2-year window? Because things are going 
to change every couple of years. What do we need to accomplish 
in a 2-year window to be able to achieve the strategy, which 
should be relatively stable?
    So we are now developing the third version of that 
Administrator's Intent. We have already shared it with your 
staff.
    So we have done a robust industry engagement, because I 
agree with you. I mean, getting as much input as we possibly 
can is going to get a better product, and it is going to make 
sure that we have more people buying into what we collectively 
need to do, because we are not a single actor in this 
environment.
    The other thing I would offer, in addition to the great 
things that you mentioned with respect to acquisition, is 
having a steady level of funding. If I am a vendor and I am 
looking at an agency as a customer, knowing that that agency is 
going to have a relatively steady level of investment or a 
predictable level of investment means that I am willing to 
spend a little bit more money up front on our research and 
development, for example.
    Or it means that, hey, if I might be sitting at the 
sidelines saying, ``Hey, this is a short-term acquisition or it 
is only going to go to a couple of vendors,'' I might sit on 
the sidelines. But if I see a pot of money out there that is an 
addressable market for me, I might come into that market.
    And, for us, what we want is more competition. More 
competition develops a better product, and it generally reduces 
price.
    The other thing I would add to your list, and we are doing 
this with our CT investments, is making sure that we buy things 
based on widely-accepted standards, that we aren't developing 
proprietary systems. Because if you develop standard-based 
systems, and our standards are based on standards that are 
established internationally and domestically, not established 
necessarily by the agency, you are going to get more vendors 
that are going to participate in what you are doing as well. 
And plus, you are going to have more flexibility in the long-
term.
    Mr. Cuellar. And the cost will go down.
    Mr. Pekoske. Cost will do gown.
    Mr. Cuellar. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Joyce. The chair recognizes Mr. Cloud.
    Mr. Cloud. Thank you, Administrator, for being here.
    I wanted to see if you can help us clear up something kind 
of on another issue that TSA has been dealing with.
    At some point, were migrants flowing through our traffic 
system, through airports, going through TSA?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. Migrants, on any given day, do 
travel domestically in the United States.
    Mr. Cloud. Still?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Cloud. A lot of that is transferred to private carriers 
now, or charter flights?
    Mr. Pekoske. There are so charter flights, but they also do 
some commercial flights.
    Mr. Cloud. Okay. Could you speak to the identification that 
is required for those?
    Mr. Pekoske. What we do is we have an application on the 
smartphones of the airports that we know that migrants will 
typically fly from. It is called CBP One, and it is an 
application developed by Customs and Border Protection.
    Mr. Cloud. That is really new, though.
    Mr. Pekoske. It is new, right, and we have been using it 
robustly. In fact, you know, 99.7 percent or so of all the 
migrant travelers use the CBP One app for identification.
    Mr. Cloud. Okay.
    Mr. Pekoske. So it is a biometric match.
    Mr. Cloud. Yes. And how do they--well, up until now you 
have used arrest warrants, right? Warrants for removal and 
deportation, order of release and recognizance, or supervision 
notice to appear in arrival departure forms as well?
    Mr. Pekoske. Not exactly. And to explain that, a migrant 
that might not be able to use the CBP One app, which are very, 
very small numbers--so to give you a sense of scale, on 
average, we verify the identity that CBP has established when 
these immigrants cross our border.
    Mr. Cloud. How do they establish the identity? That was 
going to be my next question.
    Mr. Pekoske. Sure.
    They have their own process where they capture biometrics. 
They take the identity information that the individual has on 
his or her person and go through a process of----
    Mr. Cloud. Which usually isn't anything?
    Mr. Pekoske. That is CBP's process.
    Mr. Cloud. Right.
    Mr. Pekoske. And they are in the best position to speak to 
that.
    Mr. Cloud. Yes, I realize that is not your doing. You are 
going with what they are giving you, the information they are 
giving you.
    Mr. Pekoske. Right. But what they have decided, though, is 
they have decided to admit legally this person into the 
country, and they have established their identity upon 
admission coming into the country.
    What we check is, is this the same person that CBP 
encountered, and that biometrics match does that.
    Mr. Cloud. Right.
    Mr. Pekoske. To your question on the civil arrest----
    Mr. Cloud. But there is still a loophole as to whether that 
person is actually who they are saying they are when they come, 
but that is not your purview.
    But the point is that there are people potentially flying 
on our flights that might not be who they say they are. Not 
because of TSA. I want to clarify.
    Mr. Pekoske. We trust the identity that CBP has provided to 
us.
    But to go back to the civil arrest warrant question you had 
for just a second, on any given month, there are--in the month 
of March, there were nine individuals to date that have come in 
with one of those forms. And what we do is you can't just 
present that form and say, ``Hey, this is my identity,'' and 
then you are processed through our screening process.
    What that does is it has on it a file number, and what we 
do is we take that file number, and we call CBP and get the 
information from that file number, including identifying 
characteristics of that person to satisfy ourselves. The same 
idea, that this is the same person that CBP encountered at the 
border.
    The other really important thing to keep in mind, sir, is 
that every single person, whether it is a U.S. traveler or a 
non-U.S. traveler who doesn't have the identity credentials 
that we established, goes through enhanced screening.
    So, you know, we do full-bag searches. We do on-person 
searches of all of these individuals, irregardless of where 
they are coming from.
    Mr. Cloud. Now, during COVID, thankfully we are past that, 
but there were COVID restrictions on U.S. citizens coming into 
the country but not on migrants coming into the country, I 
guess, through CBP.
    Mr. Pekoske. Well, title 42 was established. That limited 
the number of migrants coming into the country. And again----
    Mr. Cloud. Well, yes, but that is--anyway.
    Mr. Pekoske. Right. But folks coming into the country----
    Mr. Cloud. Moving on, I wanted to ask you about--just to 
get your take on data collection. What data does TSA collect? 
What do they do with the data? How long do they store it? Do 
they share it with other agencies? What is your general 
policies on----
    Mr. Pekoske. The data we collect on any passenger, sir?
    Mr. Cloud. Yes.
    Mr. Pekoske. Sure.
    So for any passenger, we collect their name, their date of 
birth to verify their identity. And we also verify that they 
have a flight that day from that airport. So those are the two 
things we look at is, ``Hey, is this the person that we vetted 
through our systems that we are going to permit to travel 
today?'' And, you know, have they changed their flight 
reservation that might be different than a paper boarding pass?
    It also prevents any boarding pass fraud that we might have 
seen in past years.
    Mr. Cloud. Right.
    There was some talk of--I guess I saw a headline that you 
are working to implement facial recognition. Could you speak to 
that and how that will be used?
    Mr. Pekoske. We are in an operational assessment phase for 
facial recognition, and basically, this is, at this stage, 
primarily one-to-one facial recognition.
    So if you go up to our screening checkpoints, there is a 
technology that we are investing in. We have had great support 
from this subcommittee for this investment. That allows the 
passenger, rather than the officer, to insert their driver's 
license or their passport into the technology.
    What that technology does is it takes from the driver's 
license, let's say in this case, the name, the date of birth, 
and the digital photo, and then takes that digital photo and 
displays it on a larger screen for the officer. And so the 
officer looks at the passenger, sees if what is on the screen 
matches the enlarged photo that is there. If so, then that 
passenger's identity is verified.
    There is a further enhancement to technology where we have 
a camera system now that we are prototyping in the second 
version of this identity technology that the camera takes 
another photo. And then there is a one-to-one comparison of the 
photo the camera takes digitized and the photo on the driver's 
license or passport that is digitized.
    What we have found in our testing is that that is much more 
accurate than a human. And of course, you know, I think most 
people would assume that would be the case. It is very hard to 
look at, you know, a photo and do a quick match.
    Mr. Cloud. It is usually the worst picture of all.
    Mr. Pekoske. Right, right. Yes. Yes. Yes.
    And then we are, for PreCheck passengers, testing out a one 
to small number comparison where we would pre-load--for 
PreCheck passengers, when you enroll in PreCheck or Global 
Entry, you voluntarily provide your passport information, and 
we have your passport photo, or your driver's license photo. 
And what we do is we pre-load those photos onto our technology 
for the people that we know have a reservation for a flight 
that day.
    And when they walk up to the technology, there could be 
just a no exchange of a credential, but a match of the photo 
that is stored in the gallery with the photo that the camera 
takes.
    Mr. Cloud. Okay. And that information would stay within 
TSA, I guess?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes. In fact--thank you. All the information 
that we do on processing people operationally for biometrics, 
as soon as that passenger walks away from our technology and 
the next passenger comes up, we erase that data completely. We 
don't retain it.
    Mr. Joyce. Thank you.
    Ms. Underwood.
    Ms. Underwood. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Pekoske, thank you for being with us today. It is nice 
to see you again.
    Mr. Pekoske. Thank you.
    Ms. Underwood. So I fly in and out of O'Hare a lot, and I 
can tell you on my trips following the fiscal 2023 omnibus bill 
being signed into law, the TSOs were very excited, and they 
told me how relieved they felt knowing their pay raise was 
included in the bill, the new law.
    And I am excited, too. It has been a long time coming, and 
it is thanks to these officers who have been unionizing and 
advocating for the past 20 years that Congress is able to get 
this across the finish line.
    As you have explained already, pay equity will have an 
immense impact on employee morale, workforce retention, and job 
satisfaction, and it will allow the TSOs to develop their 
careers at TSA instead of leaving for other jobs that can offer 
higher pay.
    Now, this is no small feat, and it needs to be celebrated. 
I believe in putting people over politics. I know that House 
Republicans have put forward a plan that would involve some 
cuts, and we cannot be rolling back these well-fought, 
important pay increases as part of this larger debate.
    I know that TSA personnel still do not have full collective 
bargaining rights, and we know that collective bargaining is 
good for workers. It raises wages, increases benefits, and 
makes workplaces safer.
    Can you tell us more about why collective bargaining would 
be beneficial for the TSA workforce specifically? And, from 
your perspective, why is it a necessary next step following pay 
equity?
    Mr. Pekoske. Thank you very much for your comments.
    And, yes, collective bargaining is an absolute critical 
part of our effort to improve the workplace environment, and to 
improve our ability to attract and retain talent in the 
Transportation Security Administration.
    Full collective bargaining was approved. The resources were 
approved in last year's budget. And once those resources were 
approved, I approved full collective bargaining for the 
screening workforce in TSA. We have been very diligent about 
working and getting a collective bargaining agreement 
negotiated and in place. That work is going on very, very well.
    But to the points that you made, this is making an enormous 
difference in our workforce. You know, one of the things that I 
looked at very carefully when I was going through my 
confirmation hearing for TSA were the Federal employee 
viewpoint survey results for the TSA workforce. I mean, this is 
a survey that Federal workers take every single year, and it 
gives you a year-to-year comparison as to how we are doing in 
workplace environment, how people feel about their promotion 
potential within the agency, how they feel about the way they 
are treated within the agency.
    TSA's results were--well, let me put it this way, had room 
for improvement.
    Ms. Underwood. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Pekoske. And I tried everything in my first 3 or 4 
years as the Administrator, to put programs in place to, first, 
address the pay issue, but I could only do a very small part 
because I was on a very limited budget.
    As I looked at it, it became really clear to me that, one, 
we need to fix the pay. To have a portion of the Federal 
workforce that has critical national security responsibilities 
not getting the same pay as their Customs counterparts that are 
literally in the same airport is unconscionable, right? And no 
surprise we were losing a lot of people as a result of that.
    Secondly, we need to make sure that we do everything we can 
to have people view TSA as a career of choice.
    Ms. Underwood. Right, but I asked about collective 
bargaining, sir.
    Mr. Pekoske. Sure. And collective bargaining will give all 
of our screening workforce more of a voice in what is going 
on----
    Ms. Underwood. Right.
    Mr. Pekoske [continuing]. And much better communications.
    Ms. Underwood. Thank you.
    Mr. Pekoske. And we can make improvements there.
    Ms. Underwood. Okay. Thank you so much. I look forward to 
working with you to fully implement the collective bargaining 
rights.
    Mr. Pekoske. Thank you.
    Ms. Underwood. Now, you and I share the priority of keeping 
the TSA workforce safe, as well as passengers and airport 
employees. Our Nation's gun violence epidemic has a direct 
effect on the security of our skies.
    Can you tell me how many guns were discovered in airports 
by TSA last year and how many were loaded?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, ma'am. 6,542, and 88 percent were loaded.
    Ms. Underwood. 88 percent were loaded.
    How does that number compare to previous years?
    Mr. Pekoske. It is higher than every previous year, and the 
next highest year was the year before.
    Ms. Underwood. What other trends or novel threats are you 
seeing related to firearms?
    Mr. Pekoske. We are seeing firearms just being carried much 
more commonly across the entire system, and we have done a lot 
of things to deter that behavior. It is not having a big effect 
to date.
    Ms. Underwood. What are you seeing in terms of long guns?
    Mr. Pekoske. We rarely see long guns. Although, we see them 
on occasion. Recently, we have seen two, which is unusual.
    Ms. Underwood. Two? In this fiscal year?
    Mr. Pekoske. So far in this calendar year.
    Ms. Underwood. In this calendar year. Yes, sir.
    No one should have fear of mass shooting at work. Hard 
stop. No one should fear a loaded gun being on a plane with 
them either. And thanks to screeners, like our TSOs, 5,642 guns 
have been prevented from making their way onto planes full of 
passengers, but we need to do more as policymakers to see this 
trend go down.
    Thank you, Mr. Pekoske.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Pekoske. I appreciate it.
    Mr. Joyce. Thank you.
    Mrs. Hinson.
    Mrs. Hinson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Administrator, it is great to see you again. Thank you so 
much for coming before our committee again and for all you do 
to help keep Iowans and Americans safe while they fly.
    I wanted to just share a quick story with you. And this man 
was actually my State of the Union guest this year, but his 
name is Sergeant Trent Dirks. And he brought a challenge to my 
attention that he faces when he travels, because he flew out 
here to Washington, D.C., and he flies with his service dog, 
Tracer.
    Sergeant Dirks, obviously, served our country valiantly. He 
came back from that service with PTSD. And, unfortunately, that 
is an affliction facing many of our servicemen and women when 
they come back.
    But Sergeant Dirks founded an organization in Waverly, 
Iowa. It is called Retrieving Freedom. It paired him with his 
service dog, Tracer, and he has been able to improve his 
quality of life and get out and travel and share the good word.
    So, unfortunately, what he flagged for me was that they are 
facing some challenges when they travel with their service 
dogs, a lack of consistency. Sometimes the collars have to come 
off. Sometimes they don't.
    It can place our veterans in a position where they are, 
again, retraumatized, and it is confusing for the service 
animal as well. So it provides additional barriers and 
complications when they are trying to go through TSA security.
    So I think that when you look at that added stress and 
anxiety-inducing situation, I think that there may be room for 
improvement there. So I would ask today would you commit to 
working with me to improve that process so there is consistency 
across all airports for our veterans flying with service 
animals?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, ma'am. I appreciate your advocacy, and I 
am absolutely willing to work with you.
    We do have a passenger support specialist program that you 
can call and ask for assistance prior to arrival at the 
checkpoint, and that is something that we are trying to expand 
and make more available throughout our system.
    But absolutely willing to work with you and look forward to 
it.
    Mrs. Hinson. Yes, I think consistency is the biggest 
challenge here, right. We want to make sure that every veteran 
can count on the same process, no matter what airport they are 
flying through.
    Another area, and it is kind of a pivot here, but to drugs 
and looking at and trying to counterdict those drugs. When we 
look at the fentanyl crisis facing our country, I think we need 
to be looking at true, meaningful solutions, and I think you 
are on the front end of fighting a lot of that.
    We have to control this mass flow of illicit drugs through 
our systems, and I think some of it is on increasing penalties 
for traffickers in our homeland. And it is our, obviously, 
responsibility as members to enact legislation to do that.
    But can you maybe speak to some of the increases you may 
have been seeing in terms of illicit drugs, fentanyl, 
synthetics, counterfeit drugs? What are the latest tactics that 
you are employing at TSA to help counter the traffickers and 
the drug cartels?
    Mr. Pekoske. Thank you for the question.
    You know, we see drugs transported through our system in 
checked baggage sometimes, on persons sometimes, and certainly 
in carry-on bags. One of the things that we do, and this is 
where we find a lot of drugs, is on a person. And sometimes we 
get criticized for the pat-down process we have, but the pat-
down process, we know from our own testing, is absolutely 
critical to detect where people might be able to secrete 
something on their person. So, you know, a lot of progress 
there.
    But also, in the carry-on bags, we see good quantities of 
fentanyl coming through our screening checkpoints. Our process 
is to identify it, call the local law enforcement officials 
over, and then they take care of the situation from there.
    Mrs. Hinson. How frequently are you encountering folks 
traveling with fentanyl?
    Mr. Pekoske. We see fentanyl every single day. So it is not 
an uncommon occurrence.
    Mrs. Hinson. Is it mostly the pills? Is that the----
    Mr. Pekoske. Mostly the pills, yes, ma'am.
    Mrs. Hinson. Okay.
    Mr. Pekoske. And sometimes in pretty large quantities.
    Mrs. Hinson. So I know I was in Chicago a few months back, 
and there was a drug-sniffing dog, obviously, going around our 
gate. Is that a situation where they might be able to get 
something on the second sniff, so to speak, if it doesn't get 
caught in the initial screening process?
    Mr. Pekoske. Our dogs are explosive detection screening 
canines. So they are not trained to screen for any drugs 
whatsoever. But local law enforcement dogs can be trained in 
that regard.
    Mrs. Hinson. And do you partner with them inside the 
airport, or is inside the airport----
    Mr. Pekoske. We do. Inside any airport, I mean, there is 
just not enough capacity to go around between local law 
enforcement and the Federal law enforcement agency, CBP and 
TSA, generally.
    Mrs. Hinson. All right. Thank you, Administrator. I 
appreciate you. Thank you.
    Mr. Pekoske. I appreciate it. Thank you.
    Mr. Joyce. Thank you, Mrs. Hinson.
    I recognize Mr. Trone.
    Mr. Trone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and ranking member.
    Mr. Administrator, thank you for being here today. We 
appreciate your help.
    As someone who grew a business from employee one to 12,000 
employees, I get it that you have got to recruit the best 
folks, the best talent for your team. You need pay equity, and, 
hopefully, better benefits and better pay than your competitors 
to get the best folks.
    So, Mr. Administrator, as you are preparing to implement 
these new salaries July 1 of this year, which is fantastic, to 
get equivalency, the President's budget includes sufficient 
funds to continue that new pay plan in 2024.
    If this committee does not provide that level of funding, 
what would be the consequence?
    Mr. Pekoske. Thank you for the question.
    The consequences would be pretty dire for passengers in 
particular because it will force us to, arguably, furlough a 
good number of people. And I can see a situation where if we 
don't get the pay, the funding we need to continue the pay into 
fiscal year 2024, that we will have wait times in major 
airports of 2 hours or longer.
    And that creates, obviously, the inconvenience of 
passengers, all of us here included, but also a security 
problem, because you have got a lot of people in a public area 
of an airport that are easy targets for somebody that might 
want to do some harm. So I hope it doesn't come to that.
    But, you know, to your point, I think paying people fairly 
and paying people for--that recognizes the importance of the 
position that they hold, and how hard a job it is--I mean, 
people don't realize that is a hard job to do. I get tired 
sometimes just watching 15, 20 minutes of video that I review 
on occasion for our operations, and I am in our checkpoint 
operations all the time personally.
    So I appreciate the comments, and it will have very, very 
significant impacts on travel.
    Mr. Trone. Tough job on your feet the whole time, dealing 
sometimes with difficult folks.
    Mr. Pekoske. And you know you can't make a mistake, right.
    Mr. Trone. I think that is part of the problem because when 
you have got a line there for 2 hours, versus a normal line, 
all of a sudden, sometimes shortcuts get taken, and you can't 
afford, or your team, to take a shortcut because it puts major 
risk out for the population.
    Mr. Pekoske. Well, and the other thing that happens, too, 
is as an officer, you might not be able to work just a 40-hour 
week. You know, you might be working 60-hour weeks, week after 
week after week. That induces a lot of fatigue as well.
    And, plus, that is a big detractor for somebody wanting to 
stay with the agency. Because as you know from your own 
business experience, keeping your great employees with you is a 
key objective of any organization.
    Mr. Trone. Would you be forced to return to the old pay 
scale?
    Mr. Pekoske. No. I would not return to the old pay scale. I 
don't think that is right. I fundamentally believe that people 
ought to be paid a fair wage for the work that they do, 
especially when they have a national security position in 
place.
    Mr. Trone. I absolutely agree with you 100 percent.
    As you stated, the transportation sector certainly is a 
high value target for international, domestic threats due to 
the number of easy public access, not much protection. How 
would the proposed budget cuts affect the technology that you 
deployed to significantly improve safety and security while 
minimizing the negative impacts on travelers and commerce?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir, a great question. And you already 
see the impacts of it to a degree in the fiscal 2024 request. I 
mean, our technology request the chairman mentioned in his 
opening statement is less in fiscal 2024 than it was in 2023. 
That is a top-line constraint issue. It is not the ability to 
contract. It is not the ability to identify what we want to 
buy.
    What it also does is it allows us to continue known 
security vulnerabilities. I mean, our technology is designed to 
close vulnerabilities. That is the number one reason why we buy 
it.
    Thirdly, you have got a lot of people waiting in line, 
arguably, and you have old technology, which means it is going 
to be slower, and they are going to have to go through more 
motions to get through our screening process, where the new 
technology eliminates some of those steps.
    Mr. Trone. What is the exact fee that you charge a 
passenger for passage?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir.
    The 9/11 security fee is $5.60 in each direction, $11.20 
round trip.
    Mr. Trone. $5.60, 11.20.
    So what is the thinking of that number times the number of 
passengers should be the budget? I am not quite sure I am on 
the same page on that one because it seems like that is a 
capricious number that you leverage up as you drive more 
throughput with more efficiency. And probably that number ought 
to be thoughtfully reduced and charge the passengers less long-
term. Or we are just simply charging people to pay down the 
budget.
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir.
    You know, arguably, you could get the same amount of 
revenue just with the natural growth in the traveler 
population, which, as I mentioned earlier, we are starting to 
see already. So 4 percent growth year over year would increase 
the fee by 4 percent. That is sort of baked into the budget as 
it exists today.
    But the increase in the budget that was made in 2013, was 
quite significant. It went from $2 and something up to $5.60, 
but all of that money went to deficit reduction, not to 
aviation security.
    Mr. Trone. I yield back. Thank you.
    Mr. Joyce. Thank you, Mr. Trone.
    I recognize Mr. Newhouse.
    Mr. Newhouse. Thank you, Chairman Joyce, Ranking Member 
Cuellar.
    Administrator Pekoske, it is a pleasure to have you with 
us. Thank you for being here.
    And let me just say that, you know, all of us come in 
contact with your folks on a regular basis, and I have got to 
tell you, the patience, an example of patience, I should say, 
by most of the members of your agency, I could never do that 
job. It would be hard.
    But with the increase in air travel that we are seeing, 
growth over the next several years projected, it is going to 
tax an already-taxed system.
    Just a couple of questions about security improvements. I 
noticed the exiting--I don't know if I can call this correctly, 
but the exit lane doors that we walk through now, those were 
required a couple years ago, 10 years ago, I guess, but now in 
place most everywhere I think. And so that displaces some 
individuals.
    I am just curious about the funds for the FTEs at those 
displays. Were those being directed to help facilitate the 
entrance of passengers coming through the system? Tell me a 
little bit about that change that you are making in your 
budgets?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. And thank you and thank you for your 
comments as well. I greatly appreciate it. And all the officers 
are listening to this hearing. So they appreciate all of your 
comments as well on their performance.
    For exit lane staffing, I mean, we all would like to get to 
the point where we don't staff exit lanes. To your point, there 
is technology in place. It is in place in most airports 
already. It is more efficient in the long-term, easier for a 
lot of people, and it doesn't generally make any--it can't get 
overwhelmed by large numbers of people.
    We have in the budget a proposal to reduce exit lane 
staffing for about the 25 percent of airports that we currently 
staff the exit lanes. So there are some TSOs staffing exit 
lanes at 25 percent of the airports, about 109 airports 
nationwide.
    Basically, that number was the number that existed in 2013 
when the bipartisan budget agreement was passed. And part of 
the agreement was that it would require TSA to continue 
staffing those exit lanes for the foreseeable future.
    As we all look at this, I mean, it doesn't make any sense 
because it costs more money in the long run to do it that way, 
and really it is not the best application----
    Mr. Newhouse. Put those resources to better use somewhere 
else.
    Mr. Pekoske. Correct.
    Mr. Newhouse. And you want to do that?
    Mr. Pekoske. We do.
    Mr. Newhouse. So maybe you can--in the couple minutes I 
have left, two things I wanted to ask you about. Some of the 
technology and modernization that you are looking at, you 
talked a little bit about the face-to-face recognition thing. 
So some of those things that you are anticipating.
    Then, also a question about the collective bargaining 
agreements. And help us feel better that the original mission 
of TSA when it was set up to be responsive to emergent 
situations, to be able to be flexible and be able to change in 
a moment's notice, is that impacted by bargaining agreements?
    Or how can you make sure that there is flexibility in those 
agreements so that we can be--you know, do as good a job as 
possible keeping travel flowing smoothly and safely?
    Mr. Pekoske. A vision of TSA is to be an agile security 
agency. In the cornerstone that established our agency, it 
lists innovation as one of the key attributes of TSA.
    You know, we have limited collective bargaining now with 
our screening workforce. We are about to go to full collective 
bargaining. In limited collective bargaining, we have been able 
to maintain that agility. In our efforts, as we negotiate a 
collective bargaining agreement, we will be able to ensure that 
because the agility is in the best interest of our workforce as 
well.
    Mr. Newhouse. Agility. I like that word. You have got to be 
agile.
    Mr. Pekoske. You do because your threat actors are agile, 
right. You have got to be more agile than they are.
    Mr. Newhouse. So that will be a primary goal?
    Mr. Pekoske. Absolutely.
    Mr. Newhouse. Okay.
    Mr. Pekoske. And officers are going to want to see that 
agility. They want a technology solution to a problem we have 
to be put in place as quickly as it can, because that way they 
don't have to do a manual process on something, you know, 150 
times over on a given day.
    Mr. Newhouse. So then any other technology modernization 
you are looking at?
    Mr. Pekoske. There are several. One of them is on the on-
person screening technology that we use. That is the technology 
where you walk into a machine and put your hands above your 
shoulders. We are just now deploying a new software upgrade to 
that technology that will improve its ability to detect 
anomalies on a person's body. So security gets better.
    It also reduces by about 50 percent, so a big, big 
reduction in the false alarm rate. Because that technology was 
very new when we put it out. We knew it had a false alarm rate. 
We knew we needed to get a software solution to fix that. Well, 
that solution is being installed right now.
    So a 50 percent reduction in false alarms for officers. 
That is a 50 percent reduction in pat-downs. And for 
passengers, same thing. So that is going to be a fairly 
significant improvement.
    The other thing that we are working on with respect to 
identity verification are digital identities. Right now, we 
have worked with Apple. We have also worked with Google and 
Samsung to have State DMVs have the ability, if they choose to, 
to allow one of their license holders to download their 
driver's license into their wallets on their smartphones.
    And then while you do--you know, I use an Apple iPhone, and 
I am a Maryland resident. So Maryland participates in this 
program. All I do when I go to the screening checkpoint is I 
literally tap my iPhone on a reader. It comes up and asks me if 
I want to transmit the following fields in my driver's license 
to TSA. I double click it. It gets transmitted electronically. 
And then there is no exchange of credentials whatsoever.
    It is much more secure. A lot more convenient. People will 
leave home with--will leave some things at home, but they will 
not leave their smartphone home.
    So it also helps us in the process. But we are trying to, 
you know, get to less friction. So that is a lot less friction 
in the checkpoint.
    From a health perspective, much better from, you know, just 
a seasonal flu perspective, to say nothing of the pandemic.
    And then digital identity is very, very hard to 
counterfeit.
    Mr. Newhouse. Very good.
    Again, thank you for being here and for the work you do.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Joyce. You are welcome, Mr. Newhouse.
    I am glad to hear we are making some upgrades on that 
technology. From a guy like me with a replaced titanium knee, I 
am in there every week.
    The budget request includes an increase of $1.1 billion to 
pay for the increase of the TSA workforce that we have been 
talking about. As I said in my opening statement, I support 
paying TSA employees fairly and taking care of our front-line 
officers. But the total cost of across-the-board pay increase 
presents a significant funding challenge.
    In 2019, the TSA blue ribbon panel noted that low pay and 
difficult nature screening jobs were key challenges in the 
transportation security office retention. However, the 
panelists specifically recommended against implementing across-
the-board pay increases. It also noted that increasing pay 
alone will not resolve the other leadership, human capital, and 
IT issues that were identified by the panel.
    TSA has long struggled with TSO officer retention. Did TSA 
consult with any other DHS components or any outside 
organizations on strategies to improve morale and increase 
retention that did not involve across-the-board pay increases?
    Mr. Pekoske. Sir, we looked into all kinds of things. I, as 
the administrator, had a lot of flexibility under the law that 
governs TSA to adjust pay as I saw fit. I just needed the funds 
to be able to do that.
    We put a number of programs in place that we thought were 
going to have an impact, but whenever we did that--and it 
really goes to the premise of your question--we had a very 
limited amount of money to do this with. And so, you know, I 
could provide maybe a $2- or $300-a-month bonus for a certain 
level of activity, but it was fairly limited. And what we saw 
was it really didn't move the needle at all on recruiting or 
retention.
    When we came out of the pandemic, one of the things that is 
very fortunate about the United States system is that we have a 
Federal system, and we were able to maintain our workforce 
throughout the pandemic. Our workforce was not furloughed. And 
so when we came out, we already had a good number of people in 
the workforce.
    But we had a really tough time recruiting people to come 
into TSA because literally they could work for Chick-fil-A for 
the same amount of money we were willing to pay them, and they 
weren't showing up at 4 a.m. In the morning and weren't working 
60 hours a week without any discretion.
    So, you know, I think there is a whole menu of things you 
need to look at, and I absolutely agree that pay is not the 
cure-all for everything.
    But one of the things that the Fed survey says 
unambiguously about TSA, and it says it uniquely about TSA, and 
basically what the Partnership for Public Service said is pay 
is always something that any employee is going to say, ``Hey, I 
wish I got more pay.'' And so we sort of factored that into 
some of the Fed's evaluations that we do.
    But when we analyzed TSA's Fed results over many, many 
years, pay was a driving factor in dissatisfaction within the 
agency. And until you fix that, you aren't really going to fix 
any of the underlying issues either. So, you know, I think that 
is a fundamental starting point, but it is not the only thing 
that we are doing.
    Mr. Joyce. The panel also recommended against switching TSA 
employees to the GS system, but TSA is adopting a system that 
pretty much exactly mirrors GS scale. Why did you adopt this 
approach?
    Mr. Pekoske. We adopted the approach, sir, because we 
weren't asking for any more or any less than any other Federal 
employee. And the General Schedule pay system was that 
template.
    What we did was we looked at our counterpart agency in DHS, 
the Customs and Border Protection Agency, and we said, ``Hey, 
how do they pay their folks?'' And we basically used the model 
that they had for our own workforce.
    And really, in marketing that effort and convincing people 
that it was the right thing to do, it was very important for us 
to say, ``Hey, we are not trying to be any different than 
anybody else from a pay perspective. We just want to be able to 
be on equal footing for the work that we do.''
    Mr. Joyce. Aside from increasing pay, what other steps did 
you take to address the low morale and high attrition, 
particularly within the TSO workforce?
    Mr. Pekoske. A number of things. You know, we put all kinds 
of leadership programs in place. They are starting to have an 
effect. We are trying to make sure that we have the right 
staffing at our checkpoints because if you can't take vacation 
time or you can't count on being done with your shift on time, 
that is a big dissatisfier for our people.
    The other thing, sir, that is really important is pay is 
critical, and when you throw a bunch of incentives onto a 
person's compensation, those incentives don't count towards 
your retirement calculation. They don't count towards your 
Thrift Savings Plan and your 401(k) equivalent contributions 
with respect to agency or government matches.
    So we just really felt we were significantly disadvantaging 
our workforce by not having the pay the same.
    Mr. Joyce. Thank you.
    Excuse me. Mr. Cuellar.
    Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And I understand this thing about the pay reform and we 
certainly--I know we might have some questions, but we want to 
work with you to make it work somehow on that and address any 
concerns that some of the members have.
    Let me talk to you about some of the trends impacting TSA, 
and that affects your budget and that affects the way you do 
it. And, again, I am looking at your strategic plan.
    Continuous threat. You know, bad guys always trying to find 
a way. Emerging technology. How you can have interconnected 
technology that will enable a security model to work better. 
Passenger experience. People want to have the best experience, 
and it is always difficult. The changing workforce, which is 
tied into pay. You know, how do you recruit and retain talent 
with some of the skills that you need nowadays. And, of course, 
the transportation system and economy.
    So, talk to us about how those trends are impacting your 
work and your budget?
    Mr. Pekoske. Sir, I will start with the threat. I mean, the 
threat is changing. We didn't have anywhere near the cyber 
threat today that--or 5 years ago that we have today. So that 
is a significant change in the threat factor. We put a 
considerable amount of effort into cyber protections for 
transportation sector owners and operators. So that is a big 
threat change.
    With respect to the foreign base, foreign-inspired threat, 
that still is very much a concern of ours. And, you know, what 
I think about all the time is on 9/11, it took 19 people to 
kill thousands of people in this country. And so even though 
ISIS and al-Qaeda might be smaller, they still exist, and they 
still want to attack the American system.
    We also are concerned with the domestic terror threat, and 
we see manifestations of domestic violence in this country, in 
our aviation system in particular and our surface systems every 
single day at levels that we never saw before.
    We look, too, at emerging threats. We have an incredible 
system of national laboratories in the United States that 
really look at, ``Hey, what can an adversary develop that you 
just need to be aware of so you can start putting mitigations 
in place to be able to arrive with a prevention before the 
adversary is able to use it.''
    And then the incredible growth in transportation overall, 
particularly in aviation, I mean, you know, aviation, as we all 
know, and I said it in my opening statement, when you jump on a 
plane today, it is full, and all the flights are booked. There 
is an incredible demand for aviation. There has been a 
tremendous investment and there will be more with airport 
improvements, new terminals, new checkpoints. You see it at 
Reagan Airport, a brand new checkpoint here, for example, that 
many members travel out of. So there is just a lot of work in 
the transportation sector.
    And the other thing that we are paying very close attention 
to is how do we strengthen our partnerships internationally? 
Because we have hundreds of flights that come in every single 
day from international locations, and one of the things that 
Congress gave us the authority to test is this concept called 
One-Stop Security, which means if you are coming from a trusted 
last point of departure airport internationally that we have an 
agreement with, that when you land in the United States, unless 
they have a follow-on domestic flight somewhere else in the 
United States, you don't need to get rescreened in this 
country.
    You know, the screening that you receive at your departure 
airport internationally is equivalent to U.S. standards. That 
has made inbound flights and will make, as we continue the 
prototyping of this, more secure inbound to the U.S.
    So there is just a whole menu of things going on.
    Mr. Cuellar. Let me ask you, before my time is over, on the 
back end of the procurement, how we improve the procurement 
process. What happens to the technology? I know some years ago 
TSA had some technology, and they said we are not using it 
anymore. So I suggested, Well, maybe give it to some of the 
local jails that they can use. And they contacted the local 
jails, but there was an agreement where they had to pay. And 
the sheriffs were saying, well, we don't want to pay whatever 
the large amount is.
    So TSA was keeping that technology, paying rent, paying on 
that contract, paying on the equipment they were not using.
    So on the procurement part of it, I certainly want to ask 
you that you all look at working out better deals for the 
taxpayers' dollars. Because I remember that particular 
situation. I said, I have got a solution for the local jails 
that they can use that, and it didn't work out because they had 
to pick up this contract on that.
    I even tried to work it with some other countries, you 
know, work with the State Department. They didn't want to pick 
up the cost.
    So I would ask you to look at those.
    Mr. Pekoske. Okay. Sure.
    Mr. Cuellar. Mr. Chairman, thank you so much.
    Mr. Pekoske. Okay. Sure.
    Mr. Cuellar. Yeah. Mr. Chairman, thank you so much.
    The Chairman. You are welcome, Mr. Cuellar.
    Dr. Harris.
    Mr. Harris. Thank you very much.
    And thank you for being here in front of us. I have a few 
things I want to touch on.
    One thing--and I am sorry, I apologize, I came from another 
hearing--there is a diversity inclusion chief at TSA. Now, I am 
kind of puzzled because I think minorities actually are 
overrepresented in the TSA.
    So, first of all, how much is this costing in your budget? 
And what are they going to do? Are they going to hire 
different--I mean, you already have 55 percent, I understand, 
of the workforce minority. So what are you going--are you going 
to hire Asian-Pacific Islanders because they are 
underrepresented? Are you going to go out and hire more 
Caucasians because they are underrep--I don't understand. Why 
would you be spending security dollars on a diversity inclusion 
chief that doesn't seem to be necessary?
    Mr. Pekoske. We would spend security dollars because it is 
better security, pure and simple. And we do have a Diversity, 
Equity, Inclusion, and Accessibility Officer that reports 
directly to me. That is how important I think this program is.
    For me, you know, my goal is to make sure that all the 
different perspectives that we need to have to make good 
decisions in TSA are represented around the table, both at the 
front line in redesigning things that we do and in our policy 
decisions in our headquarters. So diversity of thought, 
diversity of perspective, diversity of culture. And really, you 
know, when I think of TSA, I can't think of another Federal 
agency that has more interaction with the public than TSA.
    Mr. Harris. Sure. So are you going to hire more Asian-
Pacific Islanders? Because when I go to the airport, I don't 
see them in the T--I mean, they are very rarely seen among the 
TSA staffing. Is that what this diversity inclusion chief is 
going to do?
    Mr. Pekoske. What we are trying to do is to create the 
environment where we have wide range of choice on who we hire 
coming into TSA, that we have equal opportunity in who we can 
bring into the agency. And very, very importantly is that--you 
know, you mentioned that we have a very diverse workforce, and 
really that is at the front line of our workforce.
    Mr. Harris. Sure. No, no. And good for you.
    And so let me move on from that, because I guess--I don't 
know. Like I say, I can see where it is important that those--
but at the front line it would appear to me that maybe you 
should be just hiring people who aren't there. Like I said, you 
are already overrepresented with minorities. That is all I can 
say. I get it. That is what this administration wants to do, 
but this administration, we are $1 trillion in the hole. Your 
mission is to keep the skies safe.
    Mr. Pekoske. Right.
    Mr. Harris. And that is it.
    Mr. Pekoske. And, you know, sir, that I served----
    Mr. Harris. So I appreciate that.
    Mr. Pekoske. I served in both administrations. I have the 
very same perspective.
    Mr. Harris. Okay. Thank you very much.
    Now, in terms of the budgets, you know, there is a $1.1 
billion increase in pay reform, but your budget depends upon us 
terminating the diversion of passenger security fees to the 
Treasury General Fund, and instead you assign them to TSA.
    Now, if we don't statutorily do that, how do you fill that 
hole?
    Mr. Pekoske. You appropriate the funds, so that is the hole 
that we are asking you to fill.
    Mr. Harris. Us to fill?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, clearly. And, really, let's think about 
this for a second.
    Mr. Harris. Sure.
    Mr. Pekoske. Passengers are paying money every single trip 
they make for aviation security. It is not going for that 
purpose. That seems wrong to me.
    Mr. Harris. But you have taken that money and you have 
added it to your budget. I mean, it is not like you have said, 
Okay, give us, you know, $1.56 billion less because we are 
going to divert these funds. You have just inflated the budget 
by that. Your budget counts on $1.56 billion transferred. Is 
that right?
    Mr. Pekoske. I disagree----
    Mr. Harris. Okay. Thank you.
    Mr. Pekoske [continuing]. With the characterization that we 
inflated the budget. The budget is what we need to operate the 
agency, and it is a bare-bones budget.
    Mr. Harris. Sir, believe me, every hearing I am in, that is 
what everyone says: This is what we need. The President's 
budget is what we need.
    We are $1 trillion in deficit, so just pardon me if I am 
going to dissect whether you really need a thing like a 
diversity inclusion chief and things like that.
    Finally, and hopefully on a high point, the Federal Flight 
Deck Officer and Crew Training Program--and I think it is an 
important program--what is the number of flight crew who have 
been trained in the program already?
    Mr. Pekoske. We have about 7,200 Federal Flight Deck 
Officers. It is a really great program. I agree with you.
    Mr. Harris. And they are--because it says flight crew. Now, 
I am assuming it is flight--it is basically flight deck. Is 
that where you are starting?
    Mr. Pekoske. It is the FFDO Program, Federal Flight Deck 
Officer Program.
    Mr. Harris. So when you say flight crew members, you mean 
in the cockpit?
    Mr. Pekoske. Pilots and first officers.
    Mr. Harris. And you have 7,200. So that is not a very high 
percentage, though, is it? Is it enough to be a deterrence?
    Mr. Pekoske. No. We would like it to be higher.
    Mr. Harris. Correct. And what is your goal? What percent of 
the flight crew do you--the flight deck officers do you think 
would be amenable to this kind of training?
    Mr. Pekoske. Candidly, I would like to have as many as we 
possibly can. I mean, if we had 100 percent, that would be 
great, because we would know every single cockpit was secure.
    Mr. Harris. Oh, look, I couldn't agree more.
    And that 7,200, that is only a very small percent of the 
flight deck officers right now?
    Mr. Pekoske. It is. These are all volunteers. There are 
about 2,000 people in the queue that----
    Mr. Harris. Okay.
    Mr. Pekoske [continuing]. Have raised their hand that want 
to join, and we are processing them.
    Mr. Harris. And your increased funding request would train 
how many of that waiting list?
    Mr. Pekoske. It would probably train about 500, so it is 
chipping away at it. It is not as fast as I would like. But, 
you know, I am really heartened by the fact that we have pilots 
and first officers that volunteer their time to do this 
program, so I want to bring them in as quickly as we can.
    Mr. Harris. I am heartened by the fact too. I think it 
makes for a much safer airliner. Thank you very much.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Cuellar. Chairman----
    Mr. Joyce. Mr. Cuellar.
    Mr. Cuellar [continuing]. I don't mean to interrupt, but I 
don't know if this is the right time to ask Mr. Harris what he 
meant twice by they are overrepresented by minorities. And I 
don't know if you want to do this privately or I can ask him 
now, but----
    Mr. Harris. No. If the gentleman would yield, I would be 
more than happy. I mean----
    Mr. Cuellar. Yeah, I would be happy to.
    Mr. Harris. The statistic I saw is that 55 percent of the 
workforce is minority, which actually, if you go through a TSA 
screening point, you----
    Mr. Cuellar. But you almost made--your tone made it sound 
like it was not good.
    Mr. Harris. No. That is great. But, again, if the gentleman 
would yield, my question is, what is your diversity and 
minority officer going to do? I mean, we are spending 
administration dollars when minorities are already represented 
in the workforce.
    Mr. Cuellar. Uh-huh, uh-huh. Well----
    Mr. Harris. That was my point.
    Mr. Cuellar. Yeah. Okay. Well----
    Mr. Harris. In some workforces in the Federal Government, 
they are not. This one they are.
    Mr. Cuellar. This one they are.
    Mr. Harris. Thank you. Thank you for yielding.
    Mr. Cuellar. But you did ask the same question of CISA this 
morning, so I assume you are going to be asking every agency--
by the way, Border Patrol is 51 percent Hispanic, so I want to 
lay that out before we go any further.
    But I don't want to disrupt, Mr. Chairman, but I just would 
like to keep a certain level of--work together with the 
members. And if we have any other particular questions, I will 
be happy to talk to you in private if we have to.
    But sorry to interrupt, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Joyce. That would be a much better place for those 
discussions, Mr. Cuellar.
    Mr. Cuellar. I agree. I agree.
    Mr. Joyce. Thank you very much.
    Mrs. Hinson.
    Mrs. Hinson. Thank you for your patience with a second 
round of questions.
    I just wanted to follow up actually on something that we 
talked about a little bit last year with the CT scanning 
technology, computed tomography technology. I think we can all 
agree it is essential. We talked about all the fentanyl that 
you are able to catch and things like that.
    So I just wanted to flag, obviously your budget proposal 
cuts this account by 33 percent over last year. So what is your 
rationale for this reduction specifically? And what are you 
doing to accelerate the implementation of these systems?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, ma'am. Thank you very much. The rationale 
is the top line. I just don't have the top line room to--as I 
said earlier, I have contract vehicles in place I know I want 
to buy. With more money, I would buy more, and I could install 
more so they wouldn't be put in storage. So we would put them 
into use right away.
    My goal is to get this acquisition done as quickly as we 
can. The good news with the acquisition is that we have more 
and more competition in it as well. We have multiple vendors in 
each one of the sizes of CT technologies that we are buying in. 
We buy a base size, a mid size, and a large size. So now we 
have robust competition within there, and we will see more 
competition over the coming years.
    Mrs. Hinson. I certainly hope that drives prices down so 
you can buy more and get them in sooner.
    I think a major concern that I have is, when you look at 
the time that it is taking to implement these systems, 
technologies advancing quickly, we are already talking about, 
with the machines that you have to put your hands over, the 
fixes that have happened there.
    So, I guess, what are you doing to ensure that taxpayer-
funded new technology is deployed in a timely manner? And are 
you concerned about it being outdated by the time we get all of 
this in place?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yeah. One of our hedges against that being 
outdated is that open architecture piece that I mentioned, is 
that, hey, when we buy the technology, it produces data that is 
in a very standardized format so that we can rapidly change the 
software packages that have all the detection algorithms in 
them.
    And, for example, if we have a new threat that manifests 
itself, rather than rewrite the entire package, we would just 
place a layer on the existing package. So that is a way to 
future proof.
    Mrs. Hinson. Okay. Real quick followup on the digital 
driver's license. We are working on it in Iowa, I know that, 
and I can't wait to have it on my phone as a frequent flyer.
    How many States currently are participating in that 
program? And what kind of enrollment have you seen?
    Mr. Pekoske. Thank you. We have seen pretty good 
enrollment. We are still in the testing phase. We are still 
testing to make sure that it works as planned. So far, the 
tests have gone really well. Arizona, Maryland, Colorado, and 
now Utah are participating. And Utah has their own digital 
identity.
    So, you know, we have allowed a lot of variation how States 
do this, all tagged to a standard. It kind of goes back to that 
open architecture piece is, here's the standard you need to 
achieve, and that means that you can go at it from a different 
perspective, but as long as you meet that security standard 
that is there.
    Mrs. Hinson. Do you see any efficiencies in time getting 
passengers through using a digital ID?
    Mr. Pekoske. Huge, huge. It takes----
    Mrs. Hinson. Can you quantify that?
    Mr. Pekoske. Well, every second counts in a checkpoint. So 
if you shave 2 seconds off, it counts. Because if you multiply 
that times, you know, 2.5 million people every day going 
through a checkpoint, that is a lot of time.
    Mrs. Hinson. Absolutely. Thank you.
    Mr. Pekoske. Thank you.
    Mr. Joyce. Thank you, Mrs. Hinson.
    Recognizing Sheriff Rutherford for basically his first 
round here.
    Mr. Rutherford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will try and be 
quick.
    Thank you for being here this afternoon. Is there somewhere 
that I can go to get results from VIPR operations and BOD 
deployments?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. You have done it. We will get those 
to you.
    Mr. Rutherford. Okay. And can you tell me how many States 
we are running VIPR operations in?
    Mr. Pekoske. So we have 31 VIPR teams for the entire 
country, and so we move them around as we need to. For example, 
when we have a national special security event, we move more 
VIPR teams to that event. But we also--you know, part of the 
reason that VIPR teams were put in place was to provide that 
visible presence of police and working very closely with State 
and local police in that effort.
    Mr. Rutherford. Okay. And so there are 31 teams. And how 
many individuals on each of those teams?
    Mr. Pekoske. There are seven or eight people on each team.
    Mr. Rutherford. Okay. All right. And if you can get me that 
information on their results, what they have done.
    Mr. Pekoske. Sure.
    Mr. Rutherford. How do you measure results on that 
operation?
    Mr. Pekoske. We measure results in one way that I think is 
particularly powerful--and as a sheriff, you would appreciate 
this--is how many operations do we do jointly with our law 
enforcement partners? I mean, how much of a force multiplier, 
how much coordination occurs between the law enforcement 
agencies so we have the best coverage of a transportation hub 
that we possibly can.
    We also look at the interactions that VIPR teams have had 
to ensure compliance with regulations or with law in different 
jurisdictions. And we have that data. We would be happy to 
share it with you.
    Mr. Rutherford. Okay. And are they still doing the BOD 
deployments also, the behavioral observation performance?
    Mr. Pekoske. So we don't have a dedicated behavioral 
detection program any longer. That was ended by the Congress, 
actually, many years ago.
    Mr. Rutherford. Okay.
    Mr. Pekoske. But what we do is we train every person on the 
front line with behavioral detection techniques. So we 
accomplish a similar thing, but it is across the entire 
workforce. I think it is actually more powerful that way.
    Mr. Rutherford. But there is no special deployments for 
that purpose any longer?
    Mr. Pekoske. No, sir. Right.
    Mr. Rutherford. Okay. Thank you.
    If you will just get me those numbers, I would greatly 
appreciate that.
    Mr. Pekoske. Sure.
    Mr. Rutherford. And if we can do that fairly quickly, 
because we are trying to move through this process fast.
    Mr. Pekoske. No. We will get them to you very soon. Thank 
you.
    Mr. Rutherford. Thank you very much.
    I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Joyce. Thank you very much.
    For those get-back questions of the members from the 
subcommittee today and any other ones that they may come up 
with, we ask that you try to respond in 15 business days so 
that we have an opportunity to do this in a timely fashion. 
There may be additional questions----
    Oh. Welcome. Let me back up.
    Mr. Guest, I recognize you for your--I apologize for having 
put you right on the spot. I can't give you any breathing room 
because we were just about to close. So this will be 
technically your first round of questions, any questions you 
have.
    Mr. Guest. Thank you. And, Mr. Chairman, I apologize. I was 
just coming back from an Ethics Committee meeting, so I 
apologize for my tardiness.
    Mr. Joyce. The one that I missed that both you----
    Mr. Guest. That is right.
    Mr. Joyce [continuing]. And Mr. Rutherford were covering 
for me on.
    Mr. Guest. That is right.
    Mr. Joyce. Thank you very much.
    Mr. Guest. Yes, sir.
    First of all, I want to thank you. I know you came by, 
visited with us earlier. I had a couple of questions on a 
couple of things.
    First, I want to talk to you about REAL ID. I know REAL ID 
originally was implemented in 2017, I think July of 2017. REAL 
ID was implemented with the intended rollout to be 2020, giving 
roughly a 2.5 year period for individuals to comply with that. 
I know that REAL ID has since been moved--the implementation 
date has been moved. I think now it has been pushed back until 
sometime in 2025, if I am not mistaken.
    Mr. Pekoske. Right.
    Mr. Guest. And so I guess my question and concern is--and I 
am assuming that REAL ID is a very important part of us being 
able to verify and screen those individuals who are getting on 
planes to make sure that they are using a State identification 
that you can rely upon.
    Outside of COVID, why has it taken now or will take some 7-
plus years to implement REAL ID?
    Mr. Pekoske. So the Secretary just extended the deadline 
for REAL ID enforcement to the 7th of May 2025, as you 
mentioned. The reason he made that decision was because when 
you look at REAL ID compliance across the States--in other 
words, how many of the driver's license holders hold a REAL ID 
compliant driver's license--that number is about 53 percent. 
Operationally, we can't implement a program when just 53 
percent of the license holders have the credential they need.
    I agree with you 100 percent. I mean, it does create a much 
stronger credential. That is the reason for the effort.
    Mr. Guest. And so is this a State issue, the fact that 
States are not complying and issuing the driver's license 
quickly enough? I am just trying to see if there is a way that 
maybe, as Congress, that we can push back on some of the States 
to make sure they implement this quicker.
    Again, I think it is an important screening method and 
important screening tool, but I do have some concerns at the 
continual delay in getting REAL ID implemented. And so is the 
delay on the State level? Is that what I understand?
    Mr. Pekoske. The States issue the driver's licenses. And 
so, you know, we see great variability across the States in 
terms of the amount of compliance.
    There is also, you know, a role that we play in terms of 
enabling individuals that are going to go get a REAL ID 
driver's license to electronically transmit some of the 
documents that are needed. That rulemaking is in process right 
now. So it is not all on the States, but the States have a 
significant responsibility here.
    We do have a very good working relationship with what is 
called AAMVA, the American Association of Department of Motor 
Vehicle Administrators. They have been very cooperative with 
us. I think we all want to get to the same point, but continued 
emphasis on the part of Congress would be helpful.
    Mr. Guest. Okay. And then the other question I have is, at 
one time, there were some reports about illegal immigrants who 
were being able to fly without photo ID, I think actually using 
paperwork that DHS had issued those individuals.
    I know that you testified before the Senate in July of last 
year, said that roughly--I think you said somewhere under a 
thousand illegal immigrants had been allowed to board planes 
using those warrants as identification.
    One, is that process still in existence? Are immigrants 
able to use that as an identification? And then, two, do you 
have an approximate updated number? Again, it was under a 
thousand 9 months ago. Do you know what that number would be 
today?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. With respect to the civil arrest 
warrants, that document is not the identification document. 
What that document has is it has a file number. And what we do 
in all those cases when a passenger presents that civil arrest 
warrant is we take that file number and then call Customs and 
Border Protection and use the information we get from them to 
verify the identity of that individual.
    Mr. Guest. So do they present that paperwork and a photo ID 
at the same time?
    Mr. Pekoske. Well, that paperwork, and then, you know, we 
can--Customs and Border Protection, if they have a photo of the 
person, can send it to us. We can look at it, or we can 
describe the individual and be more sure than not that this is 
the person.
    To give you a number, so far in the month of March, nine 
people have presented that document as not an identification 
again but as a reference to a file that will allow us to 
further verify their identity.
    The other thing, sir, just very quickly, is they all go 
through enhanced screening, any passenger that doesn't have the 
proper form of identification, whether it is somebody that is a 
migrant in the country or a U.S. citizen.
    Mr. Guest. And last question. I am running out of time. I 
know that there has been legislation introduced in the Senate 
that would ban these documents from being able to be used as 
travel documents.
    Would you support the ban of those documents and require 
these individuals, just like everyone else, to present some 
sort of photograph ID, State-issued ID, again, driver's 
license, passport, something of that nature?
    And I will let you answer. And then I yield back.
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. I haven't seen the legislative text. 
I would like to see that legislative text to see what it 
requires.
    From our perspective, you know, we want to be sure that the 
person that we are encountering is the person that we vetted, 
so that that person gets the right level of screening and is 
not a person that is on a no-fly list, for example. And so I 
would look at it from that regard is to make sure that our 
security protections are in place. We don't make decisions as 
to who is allowed to enter the country.
    Mr. Guest. Thank you.
    Mr. Pekoske. Thank you.
    Mr. Guest. I am sorry. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Joyce. No problem. I mean, you also missed a second 
round. If there is one burning question that you would like to 
get off, I mean, feel free.
    Mr. Guest. All right. One last question--and we talked 
about this in the office as well--is the rollout of the CT 
scanners, the importance of that to protect the traveling 
public. I know that, I think in our conversation, that there 
was going to be, under this budget, some delay in maybe those 
scanners being rolled out as quickly as they could be. I know 
that there is a limit in how quickly that those scanners can be 
installed in airports.
    But can you talk about the importance of the CT scanners, 
what they do for your agents as being able to be able to better 
identify what they are seeing, move passengers through more 
quickly, and then the importance of us being able to outfit 
airports as quickly as possible with those scanners?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. Those scanners are critically 
important to allow us to detect the level of explosive weight 
that we need to detect to make sure that if an IED, an 
improvised explosive device, went off in an aircraft at 
altitude, that it would not be catastrophic for that flight. So 
there is a driving security concern to get the CT technology in 
place, and it is critical for our overall security.
    Additionally, the CT X-ray allows the officer a much better 
view of what is in a carry-on bag. And so what that generally 
means is that things that normally we ask people to take out of 
their carry-on bags we don't need to with the CT technology, 
like liquids, aerosols, and gels, like laptops and iPads, and 
things of that nature.
    So what that does is it is more convenient for the 
passenger. It is actually better for us because we can resolve 
any discrepancies that we see in the bag on the screen rather 
than having to do a bag search. So we are not going into 
somebody's property nearly as often as we were before.
    To your point about speed, originally, this program--if we 
looked at last year's budget, you know, the fiscal 2023 budget, 
the budget that we are executing now, that project would be 
completed in 2036. So that is already a long time. With the 
reduced funding, which is basically reflective of our top line 
constraints, we don't have enough room in our budget to fit 
more of this in, it is now out to 2042. So that is a very long 
way into the future for a security vulnerability that we need 
to close as quickly as we can.
    The last point, sir, is that we have contracts in place. We 
have robust competition amongst all sizes of this technology 
that we are buying. So we are ready to buy and we are ready to 
install.
    Mr. Guest. Thank you. That is all I have.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Joyce. As a former prosecutor, Mr. Guest, you will 
appreciate the fact that I opened my questioning with those 
questions, and I really wanted to give you the asked and 
answered, but that is okay.
    Mr. Guest. Great minds think alike.
    Mr. Joyce. And reminding you, for the members of the 
committee--or questions that the committee members will submit 
to you, 15 business days if you could respond to us, so we 
could.
    Again, I would like to thank you for being here today, 
Administrator.
    And, with that, this subcommittee is adjourned.

                                         Wednesday, March 29, 2023.

    FISCAL YEAR 2024 REQUEST FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

                                WITNESS

HON. ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
    Mr. Joyce. The Subcommittee on Homeland Security will come 
to order.
    Welcome, Secretary Mayorkas. I sincerely thank you for 
joining us today as we discuss the Department's fiscal year 
2024 budget submission.
    First, I want to recognize DHS' 20-year anniversary. The 
Department was forged in the wake of the horrific attacks on 
September 11, 2001, and it was tasked with the critical mission 
of protecting our Nation against those who would do us harm.
    On behalf of the committee, I would like to convey my 
sincere appreciation for the tireless, and often thankless, 
work done by the men and women of DHS on a day-to-day basis.
    Turning our attention to the fiscal year 2024 budget 
request, this proposal is, unfortunately, more disappointing 
than it is promising. The budget is full of gimmicks that mask 
the true cost of protecting the homeland and make our job as 
appropriators that much more difficult.
    The administration's fiscal year 2024 budget request for 
the Department is $60.3 billion, which is nearly equal to the 
current fiscal year. However, after accounting for the $1.6 
billion in unauthorized TSA fees and the $4.7 billion in 
emergency funds for border management activities, the real 
request is nearly $6 billion above the fiscal year 2023.
    Now is not the time for budget gimmicks. For over 2 years, 
we have seen skyrocketing illegal migration at the border. The 
policy-driven crisis continues for one reason and one reason 
alone: This administration is unwilling to publicly dissuade 
migrants from coming to the border and to back that up with the 
action and authority it already has on the books.
    Bad policy drives bad outcomes, and the Biden 
administration's policies are undoubtedly driving our border 
security crisis. It is our job as appropriators to be good 
stewards of the taxpayer dollars, ensure we are not wasting 
money by supporting bad policies that don't result in desired 
outcomes.
    Despite your public statements to the contrary, the border 
is not secure. If it was, we wouldn't have 2.7 million 
encounters, a record level, last fiscal year; we wouldn't have 
an estimated 600,000 illegal migrants who got away from agents 
and made it into our country; and we wouldn't have our law 
enforcement professionals stuck administratively processing 
migrants when they should be patrolling the border.
    On top of all this, the title 42 public health authority 
that the Department has relied on to turn back migrants at the 
border will likely expire on May 11. When that tool goes away, 
the border security operations will be profoundly impacted. As 
we consider resources, it seems clear that the combination of 
losing title 42 will easily cause a surge and overwhelm our 
dedicated officers and agents at the border.
    The Biden administration has responded to the situation 
with a proposed rule entitled the ``Circumvention of Lawful 
Pathways,'' which is being touted as an effective border 
security measure. However, this does not solve the problem at 
hand, and instead, it abuses the parole system by allowing tens 
of thousands of migrants with no permanent lawful path to 
citizenship into the country.
    The administration's response also includes taking out 
crucial founding for addressing the border crisis out of its 
own base, and instead, funneling it into a slush fund that will 
have little impact on mitigating the border chaos.
    The proposed emergency $4.7 billion Southwest Border 
Contingency Fund will only ensure that we will spend more hard-
earned tax dollars to achieve the same results and less 
oversight from Congress. Conditioning additional funds to 
worsening conditions incentivizes this administration to not 
solve problems and do their job in the first place.
    Building more soft-sided facilities for processing and then 
releasing migrants into the interior hasn't worked. Decreasing 
detention capacity hasn't worked. Border security operators 
have been clear. Without consequences, the illegal flow will 
continue unabated. We cannot manage our way out of this crisis 
with a blank check for processing capacity and nongovernmental 
organizations. These actions will only facilitate lawlessness 
and encourage more migrants to make this dangerous journey 
north.
    A lack of transparency in this budget proposal is 
frustrating. Today, I would like you to be more specific on 
funding and outcomes, what has worked, what hasn't, and how we 
can sufficiently resource the Department to carry out its 
important missions.
    I look forward to working with you and the Department to 
seek solutions to address the border security crisis at hand 
and combat the many threats facing our Homeland.
    I now turn to my distinguished colleague, Mr. Cuellar, for 
his opening remarks.
    Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Madam Chair, it is a 
pleasure, members of the committee.
    Mr. Secretary, thank you so much for being here with us. I 
do have a prepared statement, but I am just going to summarize 
it, because I want to give you the opportunity to provide your 
statement on this.
    But Homeland is very important to me. Like I always tell my 
friends, I don't go visit the border, I actually live there. My 
family lives there, and we work there and we live there, go to 
church and everything.
    So the border is very important. And trying to find that 
balance between security, that is, providing security there at 
the border is very important, but at the same time, allowing 
trade and tourism, which are so important to our area. You 
know, Laredo, the largest inland port, we get 17,000 traders a 
day.
    So it is not only the men and women in green that are 
important, but also the men and women in blue. And so, not only 
hiring new officers are important, but now the support staff, 
the border processing coordinators are very important.
    So one of the things that I want to focus on and I hope 
that we all focus on are what are the facts. For example, if we 
talk about drugs coming into the U.S., there are times where 
people will say, Oh, migrants are bringing in the drugs.
    But when you look at the numbers from the Office of Field 
Operations at a port of entry, as of January of fiscal year 
2023, 98 percent of the meth came through ports of entry; 97 
percent of the fentanyl, port of entry; 87 percent of the 
cocaine, port of entry; 94 percent of the heroin, port of 
entry; 58 percent of the marijuana, ports of entry.
    And yes, Border Patrol does catch what comes in. But I want 
to make sure that we put resources, that technology at the 
ports of entry, whether it is canine officers, support staff, 
working with our counterparts.
    And one of the good things when we went with Senator Cornyn 
a delegation to Mexico, Mexico is now, for the first time, 
buying some of the same technology, same companies that we use 
at the ports of entry. So that way they can talk to each other, 
the technology can talk to each other. So that is very 
important.
    Now, one of my concerns is procurement, how long it takes. 
We will put in the money, but it takes a long time to get the 
technology. So we have got to find a way to streamline the 
procurement process.
    And on top of that, it is not only adding money for the 
technology, but the footprints of the bridges are very 
important. And a lot of times, we don't appropriate money to 
make sure that we can put the machines where they have to be. 
So that is one of the things that we have to focus on.
    And talking about who brings in the drugs. According to the 
Sentencing Commission, the latest numbers we have, fiscal year 
2021, 86.2 percent were U.S. citizens that are used by the 
criminal organizations.
    So I just want to make sure that we put the focus and the 
moneys where we need to look at, and look at, you know, not 
14th-century solutions, but 21st-century solutions. We know the 
drones that the bad guys are using and we need to counter the 
drones that they are using, the tunnels and other ways.
    But I am also concerned about what happens on May 11. You 
and I have had conversations. I am one of the ones that 
supports the new rule that will be coming out. I do support 
Title 42, but I do understand that it is coming to an end.
    And I am one of those that I feel that Title 8, if we do 
expedited work process and deportations when the case calls 
actually works better than title 42, because title 42, you 
expel people, you don't deport people. There are no bars for 
somebody that is expelled under title 42. But title 8, you have 
5 years, 10 years, 15 years, 20 years or lifetime bars, 
depending on the facts. So that is actually more I think 
provides teeth than title 42.
    So we look forward to working with you on this new rule 
coming in, again, provide the law and order, the border 
security, but at the same time, respect the rights of the 
asylum folks.
    Finally, to conclude, let me just say this: One of the 
things that Mexico, we spent 4\1/2\ hours with the President 
and his Cabinet. There are some ideas that I want to follow up. 
For example, the fentanyl, you know, what is the agreement, you 
know, what are we doing. They are basically saying, we will 
work with you on fentanyl, but stop the guns from going back 
over there. So those are things that I am hoping that we can 
explore.
    And, with that, I say thank you so much to your men and 
women that work for you across the agency.
    And, Mr. Chairman, thank you so much.
    Mr. Joyce. Thank you, Mr. Cuellar.
    I would now like to recognize the chairwoman of the full 
committee, Ms. Granger, for her opening statement.
    The Chairwoman. Thank you very much. Thank you, Chairman 
Joyce.
    Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for being here. Since the last 
time you testified before us, the situation at the border has 
not improved. And living in Texas, I have been there many, many 
times.
    Last year, a record 2.7 million migrants attempted to cross 
the border, 2.7 million. This year, they are telling me it is 
even worse. We have already had more than 1 million migrant 
encounters.
    In May, title 42, you talked about, the Congressman talked 
about that. We want the thing that works best, and Title 8 will 
work better than that.
    The cartels or the traffickers, they have no fear. They are 
not afraid of what we are going to do or where we are going to 
send them or fined. They are not doing that. They are coming 
across our border and drugs are coming across our border in 
huge numbers. Drugs are affecting all the communities, not just 
the Southwest, but all over.
    You said you have operational control on the border. I 
would say this, I don't agree. The administration must reverse 
course on the situation, or it is going to get worse. We can't 
imagine it getting worse than it is now, worse than it is now. 
And now, some that have been able to go into the area can't 
even come close to it now because of the danger.
    You have to have a strong voice in this. The border isn't 
open. And if you try to cross illegally, you will be quickly 
sent home. We have to be clear and we have to work together on 
this. It is not going to work any other way.
    But when we are seeing what has happened, what has happened 
to our border, what has happened to our schools, what has 
happened to our freedom, it is just a tragedy. And I have done 
this many, many times over many, many years, and have friends 
that have on both sides of that border. And now no one goes 
there.
    Mr. Secretary, the administration has to acknowledge what 
we all know, and that is the wall does work. And I have 
explained that to so many people. And it wasn't the wall, that 
we will have a wall that will stop it. It is what is inside 
that wall. It is inside the wall so that we will know when 
people are trying to come across that. And so that technology 
was so important. I think it was a step--and as soon as it was 
built, I went down there and visited whatever. And now, it is 
just sitting there.
    To close, I want to extend my appreciation to the men and 
women of the Department when they are trying to fix this. I 
will do everything in my power, everything in my power to be 
helpful, but we can't just live with what is here now. Thank 
you.
    Mr. Joyce. Thank you, Chairwoman Granger.
    Secretary Mayorkas, without objection, your full testimony 
will be entered into the record. With that in mind, I would ask 
you to please summarize your opening statement in 5 minutes.

            OPENING STATEMENT OF SECRETARY MAYORKAS

    Secretary Mayorkas. Thank you very much, Chairman Joyce, 
Ranking Member Cuellar, Chairwoman Granger.
    On Sunday, I traveled to Rolling Fork, Mississippi, to 
assure the residents there and others in Mississippi devastated 
by the tornadoes that had just struck that the Department of 
Homeland Security will support their recovery in the days, 
weeks, and months ahead. More than 20 people lost their lives, 
and many more lost their homes and all that they possessed.
    On Monday, I spoke with Senators Blackburn and Hagerty and 
with Governor Lee and Mayor Cooper and offered our Department's 
response to the too tragic and senseless murder of children and 
adults at St. Paul Christian School in Nashville, Tennessee. 
Our thoughts, prayers, and support are with all who are 
suffering today.
    Over the past 20 years, the Department has evolved and 
responded capably to an increasingly dynamic threat landscape. 
We have done this through the unflinching dedication of the 
Department's 260,000 public servants, the third largest 
workforce in the Federal Government.
    Every day these heroes work to: ensure the safety of 
Americans in the skies and on the seas, secure our borders; 
promote lawful trade and travel; provide relief when disaster 
strikes; advance the security of cyberspace and critical 
infrastructure; stop cartels from trafficking illegal drugs 
into our communities; combat human trafficking and online child 
sexual exploitation; protect our interests in the Arctic and 
the Indo-Pacific, and much more. The threats and challenges 
facing the homeland never have been more complex or dynamic.
    The President's fiscal year 2024 budget for DHS was crafted 
to meet these threats and challenges strategically and 
responsibly, ensuring that our Department has the tools that it 
needs to keep our communities safe.
    The displacement of people across the region is greater 
than at any time since World War II. I have visited the 
Southwest border approximately 16 times as Secretary, to meet 
with our personnel and to see firsthand the challenges that 
they face and the tools that they need to do their jobs.
    The fiscal year 2024 budget proposes the hiring of more 
than 1,400 additional personnel to secure the Southwest border, 
including 350 additional U.S. Border Patrol agents and 310 
additional U.S. Border Patrol processing coordinators, to get 
more agents back into the field performing their critical law 
enforcement mission.
    The budget proposes $535 million in new funds for border 
technology, $305 million of which is to deploy new technologies 
and capabilities in our fight against the trafficking of 
fentanyl through our ports of entry.
    The threat environment that we face along the southwest 
border is dynamic, and the annual appropriations process does 
not provide the flexibility to address challenges that often 
change, from sector to sector, and from month to month.
    We propose that Congress create a fund that can be spent 
for specific purposes when certain migrant encounter thresholds 
are met. This would equip our personnel with the tools that 
they need to meet migration surges if and as they occur, like 
transportation resources, soft-sided facilities for processing, 
and grants to support State and local community reception.
    The budget also will enable the Department to process the 
increasing number of asylum cases, to address the backlog of 
applications for immigration benefits, to support the 
Citizenship and Integration Grant Program, and to improve 
refugee processing to meet the goal of admitting up to 125,000 
refugees.
    Our schools, hospitals, businesses, local governments and 
critical infrastructure are increasingly the targets of cyber 
attacks launched by transnational criminal organizations and 
hostile nation-states, including China, Russia, Iran, and North 
Korea. This budget invests in personnel, infrastructure, and 
enhanced tools and services to increase the cybersecurity 
preparedness and resilience of our networks and critical 
infrastructure.
    We also must continue to build a culture of preparedness so 
that communities on the front lines of climate change and 
increasing extreme weather events are informed, ready, and 
resilient. This budget provides $20.1 billion for FEMA to 
assist individuals and State, local, Tribal, and territorial 
partners affected by major disasters, and funds whole-of-
community efforts to build climate resilience.
    The U.S. Coast Guard provides critical capabilities and 
broad authorities to defend our national interests in the 
Western Hemisphere, the Arctic, and the Indo-Pacific. This 
budget makes strategic investments in the U.S. Coast Guard's 
fleet of Offshore Patrol Cutters and Polar Security Cutters 
that will advance our safety, security, and economic 
prosperity.
    Finally, the men and women of DHS who serve our Nation are 
our most important and vital resource. We cannot expect to 
recruit and retain a world-class diverse workforce if they are 
not compensated fairly. We are asking for $1.4 billion to honor 
the promise of pay fairness for our TSA workforce.
    This budget will enable the Department to respond to the 
threats of today and to prepare for the threats of tomorrow. 
Thank you very much, and I look forward to answering your 
questions.
    [The information follows:]
    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
                       BORDER WALL: CONSTRUCTION

    Mr. Joyce. Thank you, Secretary.
    I now recognize myself for questions.
    Congress provided more than $5.8 billion in appropriated 
funding for the border wall, and during the last administration 
many miles of new and replacement barriers were built. The 
Chief of the Border Patrol recently told this subcommittee that 
walls work.
    However, this President not only refuses to build 
additional barriers, but his administration, and specifically 
your Department, is taking every possible action not to expend 
the funds Congress explicitly provided for wall construction. 
There is rusting wall sitting in the dirt in the El Paso sector 
that taxpayers have paid for that you refuse to put up, and 
there is no rational reason for that.
    So I ask you, do you agree with Chief Ortiz that walls 
work, and do you believe that additional barriers are necessary 
to secure the border? And if so, why aren't you building more?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Mr. Chairman, I have approved, I 
believe it is approximately 129, wall projects to close gaps in 
the existing wall, to bring technology to the gates to complete 
those projects.
    What we are seeking to invest in is our personnel, our 
greatest resource, as well as in technology that is an 
extraordinary force multiplier to help to secure the border.
    We believe that technology, and really harnessing the 
advances of innovation, is the most effective way to secure the 
border and to add to the tremendous resource and talent that 
our personnel deliver.
    Mr. Joyce. Thank you. How much money did it cost the 
Department to cancel the contracts midstream when taking into 
account the additional work that needs to be done, such as 
stabilizing roads, drainage, and other mitigation efforts?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Mr. Chairman, if there was a cost in 
the cancellation of contracts, I certainly would be pleased to 
provide that to you. I don't have that number at my fingertips.
    Mr. Joyce. Thank you. Fifteen business days after today, I 
would love to have that.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Most certainly, Mr. Chairman.

                        FY 2024 BUDGET: TSA PAY

    Mr. Joyce. While the disaster at our borders is top of my 
mind for many of us here today, we cannot lose sight of the 
budget request as a whole. It is over $60 billion across the 
Department. I am very concerned with the request of funds being 
for border management and not for border security. I look 
forward to having my colleagues dive into this more.
    What I am disappointed in seeing in this budget request is 
a lack of prioritization for another frontline workforce, those 
working the front line at TSA, including the Transportation 
Security Officers. For far too long, TSOs' pay lagged behind 
similarly situated counterparts across the government.
    Before someone makes the argument that this is why TSA 
needs to be moved under title 5, nothing has stopped the 
Department from prioritizing these workers to get them a pay 
raise now. Instead, what has been submitted is a budget request 
to fund an increase for the entire TSA workforce, including 
those at headquarters.
    I would like to see pay increases just for the front line 
as well as increases in tech investment. Deploying more 
advanced technology to airports would greatly enhance security. 
Giving high-paid headquarters execs a raise will not.
    Sometimes I think we forget the Federal Government does not 
have unlimited resources, and we need to be precise and 
thoughtful on where we spend these limited funds. I tend to 
think investing in the frontline workers is money well spent.
    Secretary Mayorkas, could you explain why this request does 
not prioritize funding pay raises for only the frontline 
workforce at TSA who most desperately need it?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Mr. Chairman, I very much appreciate 
your question. First and foremost, we are prioritizing the 
much-needed and long overdue pay increases for our 
Transportation Security Officers at the airports all over the 
country. They are our front lines, and I am incredibly proud to 
support them. We also do believe that pay increases for other 
personnel are warranted.
    To address a concern that you articulated, we are, in fact, 
in this fiscal year 2024 budget, investing in our technology 
and other innovations. We are harnessing those innovations, 
including exploring how we can use artificial intelligence to 
be a force multiplier for our brave and heroic personnel.
    We are, indeed, addressing the prioritization that you 
communicate. We are investing in technology, as you indicate is 
necessary. We also are providing for pay increases for other 
personnel who so richly deserve it. They are, in headquarters, 
but we cannot support the achievements of one without 
recognizing and rewarding the contributions of all. This is a 
team effort, and all 260,000 people at DHS contribute to the 
Homeland Security mission.

            CYBERSECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AGENCY

    Mr. Joyce. I want to hit on one other priority, and that is 
CISA. Over the past few years, CISA's budget has been doubled. 
They have gained several new authorities. And I look forward to 
seeing how CISA incorporates industry feedback in finalizing 
the rulemaking for CIRCIA. It was great to have Director 
Easterly here just yesterday to testify but, Secretary 
Mayorkas, as the Cabinet-level official overseeing CISA, could 
you explain where the significant resources CISA has been given 
are going and how your opinion if CISA is making good use of 
taxpayer funds?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Mr. Chairman, the threat of 
cybersecurity is not diminishing. We are seeing cybercriminals 
only enhance their efforts, predominantly in the world of 
ransomware, but also in other cyber attacks against our 
critical infrastructure: schools, hospitals, local law 
enforcement offices, and so much more.
    We also see adverse nation-states--China, North Korea, 
Iran, Russia--engage in cyber attacks against our country. CISA 
is on the front line. Its incredibly talented and dedicated 
personnel work every day to enhance the cybersecurity of our 
country and to ensure the cybersecurity of our critical 
infrastructure, the majority of which rests in the hands of the 
private sector.
    We are investing in people. We are investing in technology. 
We are investing in grant funds to ensure that communities 
enhance their respective cybersecurity. There are many target-
rich and resource-poor elements of this country that have to 
enhance their cybersecurity. We are doing so much in that 
regard.
    Mr. Joyce. Thank you. I have exceeded my time limit.
    I now recognize my distinguished ranking member, Mr. 
Cuellar, for any questions.

                  FENTANYL: PROCUREMENT OF TECHNOLOGY

    Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Mr. Joyce, Mr. Chairman.
    Let me concentrate on fentanyl. When you look at the 
precursors that come in from China to Mexico, you will see that 
they usually go to two ports, go through the Pacific, end up in 
Manzanillo and Lazaro Cardenas. And then, of course, then the 
drug organizations will send them off to different locations in 
Mexico, store them, change them into fentanyl. And then from 
there, they will go--and if you look at what makes sense, what 
is closest, they will go through the areas of California, San 
Diego, and Arizona, a percentage. And there is a percentage, 
but----
    So if we know that most drugs are coming in through ports 
of entry, one of the things that concerns me is the major 
acquisition programs, how long it takes. It moves too slowly. 
It avoids competition. It avoids opportunities for innovation.
    And one of the things that we want to work with you is how 
do we speed up that acquisition while we still protect 
taxpayers' dollars? If we know what the problem is and how they 
are going in, I would ask you to work with us on that part, and 
then what you all are doing with the Mexican Government, 
because for the first time the President said, he said, I will 
officially ask China to stop sending precursors to Mexico.
    And then after that, I also read that you all are working 
with him on--I don't know which Department, working on an 
agreement. And what they want is, we will help you with 
precursors, but we want you to stop sending guns, because Texas 
is the number one source of guns for them.
    So I want to see what are we doing to address the issue on 
procurement to get the technology. And keep in mind, Mr. 
Secretary, for the first time they are buying--they bought 
almost $800 million, and it is the same technology that U.S. 
Customs is using over here. So that is encouraging for us. So 
if you can address those issues.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Thank you very much, Ranking Member 
Cuellar. We are taking a multi-pronged approach to our attack 
against the cartels that traffic in fentanyl.
    I must say, as Congressman Guest knows, we share a past as 
prosecutors. I served for 12 years as a Federal prosecutor. I 
have prosecuted cocaine trafficking cases, methamphetamine 
trafficking cases, and black tar heroin trafficking cases, and 
we have seen nothing like the toxicity of fentanyl that is 
killing so many Americans. This is a problem that has been 
around for too many years. We are taking it to the cartels in 
unprecedented ways, and we are working with the Government of 
Mexico in that regard.
    I have visited with our Mexican counterparts as well. We 
are assisting them in securing their ports, because indeed, 
many of the precursor chemicals and the equipment used to 
manufacture fentanyl is coming from China, reaching the Mexican 
ports, and the traffickers, the cartels try to bring it through 
the ports of entry.
    Mr. Cuellar. And if I can interrupt, and members, if we 
look at the Chinese investment that we have in Mexico, and we 
got to be aware that is a different issue, but especially they 
are very smart. They will do it in the port. So they are there 
at the ports. They get the legal and the illegal drugs--I mean, 
products going through there. Sorry.
    Secretary Mayorkas. We are very focused on that element as 
well.
    So with respect to your question about procurement, we have 
a procurement innovation lab to address precisely the concern 
that you articulate, which is to be able to harness technology, 
to harness innovation quickly. We need to be able to move 
quickly. The procurement process is far too slow.
    With respect to the POES, we are surging our personnel to 
the POES to increase our interdiction and investigative 
capabilities. The remarkable special agents of Homeland 
Security Investigations already have begun that effort. I 
announced Operation Blue Lotus last week, and in its first week 
of operation, it already is making a significant difference.
    Mr. Cuellar. And that technology, Mr. Secretary, is very 
important, because if you want to bring marijuana, you can see 
big old piles. And I have seen some of the technology you have 
in Laredo and other places. But now you are talking about 
pills, and it is smaller, and if you don't have the trained 
officers you won't see those--you can't see them unless if you 
have the trained eyes. So it takes personnel, it takes canines, 
and it takes the latest technology and the Mexicans doing that.
    So, Mr. Secretary, thank you so much.
    Mr. Joyce. Thank you, Mr. Cuellar.
    I now recognize Chairwoman Granger for any questions she 
may have.

                    BORDER WALL: EXPIRATION OF FUNDS

    The Chairwoman. Mr. Secretary, right now I would say that 
protecting our border has been a complete failure. And I have 
been there many times, and it is tragic. It is a tragedy.
    Right now, Customs and Border has $2.8 billion remaining 
for the funds to complete the wall, $2.8 billion. A little more 
than $200 million of it will expire in the next few months. Are 
we just going to let that happen? All I hear is words. And see 
that border, it is a crime. It is terrible what has happened 
there. So what is going to be real about this?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Madam Chairwoman, as I mentioned to 
Chairman Joyce, I have approved, I think it is approximately 
129 projects, to close gaps and to complete the gates in the 
border wall. We believe that investing in personnel, investing 
in technology is the best way to secure the border.
    We are focused intensely on securing the southwest border, 
securing all of the borders of the United States. We are 
working day in and day out. I must commend the heroic work of 
the U.S. Border Patrol agents as well as the Office of Field 
Operations officers of Customs and Border Protection and the 
support from throughout our Department. I do not understate the 
seriousness of the challenge that we face.
    The Chairwoman. What is going to happen to the $200 million 
that is going to expire? Are you going to let it expire?
    Secretary Mayorkas. If I may, Madam Chairwoman, the 
challenge that we face at our southern border, is not exclusive 
to the United States. We are seeing an increase in migration 
around and across the entire hemisphere. Let me give, if I may, 
one example. Venezuela is a country with a population of 
approximately 28 million people.
    The Chairwoman. My questions were on our southern Texas 
border.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Yes, but this speaks to the issue. It 
speaks to the seriousness of the challenge that is gripping the 
entire hemisphere.
    Of those 28 million people, approximately 8 million have 
fled Venezuela, because of the authoritarian repressive regime 
there. 2.5 million of those individuals are in Colombia. 
Hundreds of thousands are moving to Chile.
    What we have done, and what we announced on January 5, to 
address the challenge at the border is we announced an 
innovative program that provides safe, orderly, and lawful 
pathways to come to the United States for Cubans, Haitians, 
Nicaraguans and Venezuelans, and delivers a consequence to 
individuals from those countries if they don't take advantage 
of those pathways, and instead come to our southern border.
    We have seen a 95 percent, approximately 95 percent----
    The Chairwoman. Sir, that is not the question I asked. That 
is not the question I have. And I have asked this question over 
and over and over. We know what is happening, what is happening 
to our southern border? Texas changed dramatically. Other 
countries have come there.
    But it is pretty simple, and I said there is $2 million 
that is going to expire having to do with the wall in a few 
months. That is a pretty straightforward question. What is 
going to happen to it? It is going to go away?
    Secretary Mayorkas. As I mentioned, Chairwoman Granger, I 
have, indeed, approved a number of projects. We will comply 
with our legal obligations with respect to the funds provided 
for the wall.
    The Chairwoman. I pass.
    Mr. Joyce. Thank you, Chairwoman Granger.
    I believe in a request, though, you said that you had 129 
projects that you are going to expend the $200 million on. We 
would like a copy of how that is going within 15 business days 
as well.
    At this time, I recognize Mr. Newhouse.

                      MIGRANT ENCOUNTERS: REMOVALS

    Mr. Newhouse. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Secretary Mayorkas, thank you for being here today.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Good morning.
    Mr. Newhouse. We all appreciate the huge challenge at our 
country's borders.
    A couple of questions: Last year, the administration 
removed--the numbers I have in front of me--72,177 migrants 
under the Title 8 authority. That does not include the Title 42 
expulsions. This past December, over 250,000 people were 
encountered by the CBP. Well over half of those encountered 
were single adults. You know all these things.
    So in 1 year, the administration removed less than a third 
of the number of encounters that we see in a single month. And 
the backdrop of that is in 1 year, 2.76 million people were 
encountered by the CBP.
    So my questions have to do with some of those numbers. I am 
curious. Of those 72,177 individuals, can you tell me were 
those people that were arrested in fiscal year 2022 or were 
they prior arrestees that were being deported? Give me an idea 
of how quickly people are being removed.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, you ask a very important 
question. Title 42 is a public health authority. Title 8 is our 
immigration enforcement authority. We sought to expand our use 
of Title 8, because it delivers a consequence, as Ranking 
Member Cuellar noted, and we were enjoined from doing so.
    Last year, we removed and expelled approximately 1.4 
million people, the most ever. That is because we were under 
compulsion to use the Title 42 authority, which allows us to 
expel people very quickly, and we were prevented from using our 
Title 8 authority, as we had sought to do so. It is very 
important to note that 1.4 million people either were expelled 
or removed from the United States last year.
    Mr. Newhouse. So Title 42 is going away. Title 8 you are 
telling me then will be utilized to a fuller extent moving 
forward, and so we should see a greater number.
    My question has to do with those people that I referred to 
under the Title 8 removals. Were they arrested in this past 
year, or how long are people here before they are removed?
    Secretary Mayorkas. I see. Congressman Newhouse, you 
identify a significant infirmity with our immigration system, 
strong evidence of why it is so fundamentally broken, and 
everyone agrees on that.
    It historically has taken 4- to 6-plus years in between the 
time that an individual is encountered at our southern border, 
and the time that their immigration case is adjudicated with 
finality for removal.
    That is not specific to this Administration, nor the prior 
administration, nor the administration before that. I learned 
that when I first entered DHS in August of 2009.

                          ICE: DETENTION BEDS

    Mr. Newhouse. So if we could also request that information 
related to those Title 8 individuals and how long they have 
been in the country, I would appreciate that.
    Throughout your administration, thousands of available ICE 
detention beds have sat empty. So a simple question: Apart from 
the mandate with no discretion that the law provides, do you 
believe detention is an important part of overall border 
security?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Yes, I do, Congressman. We seek to 
prioritize individuals who present a public safety threat or a 
national security threat.
    If I may explain why all the detention beds have not been 
used. There has been litigation throughout the country with 
respect to the capacity that we are allowed to fill our 
detention space.
    That has been especially acute in a time of COVID-19, when 
we have court orders requiring that we not fill a particular 
facility to its maximum capacity in light of social distancing 
and the like.
    There is a patchwork of litigation across the country that 
inhibits our ability to use our maximum bed space.
    Mr. Newhouse. Well, I do have some further things I would 
like to learn about, but my time is expired.
    Mr. Chairman, thank you for indulging me, and I will yield 
back.
    Mr. Joyce. It certainly has, Mr. Newhouse.
    I apologize, Ms. Underwood. In the spirit of going back and 
forth, I got ahead of myself. Please.

                  MIGRANT ENCOUNTERS: FAMILY DETENTION

    Ms. Underwood. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Secretary, nice to see you, sir. Thanks for being here 
with us today. Congress has charged the Department of Homeland 
Security with an incredibly broad mission, countering terrorism 
and domestic violent extremism, responding to mass shootings 
like the tragedy this week in Nashville, protecting our 
infrastructure at institutions from cyber attacks, leading 
disaster response and climate resiliency, overseeing our 
borders with a broken immigration system at a time of historic 
migration and much more.
    And by failing to pass broad immigration reform, like the 
U.S. Citizenship Act, Congress has not given the Department all 
the tools it needs to address these challenges.
    But leading a Federal agency means being clear-eyed about 
the political environment and making determined, data-driven 
choices that uphold our country's values anyway.
    So I was horrified to learn that the Biden administration 
is considering reinstating family detention of migrants. It is 
not just immoral. It is expensive. It is a bad policy that 
makes our country less safe. I am a nurse, and I have reviewed 
the literature myself. The data are clear. Family separation 
causes long-term damage to kids' mental and physical health, 
and their parents too. Family detention shouldn't even be an 
option on the table right now, given the mountain of evidence 
against it, but reportedly it is.
    And so I would like to hear from you what specific data the 
administration is using that would suggest any justification 
for going backwards like this?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, you mentioned two 
things: family separation and family detention. With respect to 
family separation, the heinous policy of the prior 
administration, President Biden created the Family 
Reunification Task Force.
    Ms. Underwood. Right. I am asking about family detention. 
Family detention, what evidence do you have to reinstate this 
policy?
    Secretary Mayorkas. No decision has been made, 
Congresswoman. I try to encourage people to present ideas. I 
tried to create an open environment where people feel free to 
do so. No decision has been made.
    Ms. Underwood. So are you aware of any data that would 
support that option that you are weighing as you are making 
your decision?
    Secretary Mayorkas. I am aware of data on both sides of the 
argument, Congresswoman. I can assure you that no decision has 
been made. We review the data and we review all factors that 
inform our decision, not just with respect to detention, but 
with respect to every aspect of our work across the breadth of 
our mission.
    Ms. Underwood. The evidence against family detention is 
overwhelming, even within the limits of our current immigration 
system. The American Academy of Pediatrics finds that there is 
no evidence that any amount of detention is safe for children. 
Even the shortest periods of detention can cause trauma and 
long-term health consequences. There is also no evidence that 
it meaningfully deters families from coming to the U.S.
    Meanwhile, study after study after study has shown that 
Alternative to Detention programs, or ATD, are generally more 
humane and more cost-effective than detention. According to 
ICE, the daily cost to the U.S. Government per participant is 
$8 for ATD compared to $150 for detention. It is also 
effective. Ninety-five percent of those on ATD appear for their 
final hearings.
    Family detentionis immoral, it is un-American, and it is 
just plain wrong and we have better alternatives available. 
Reinstating this policy would be unacceptable, full stop. This 
administration must do better. We have to do better.
    And we are here to be partners with you to get that done, 
sir, and to help build an immigration system that supports our 
economy, that protects our communities, and that upholds our 
values.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Joyce. Thank you, Ms. Underwood.
    Mrs. Hinson.

                       U.S. BORDER PATROL: HIRING

    Mrs. Hinson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Good morning, Mr. Secretary.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Good morning.
    Mrs. Hinson. Thank you for appearing before our committee 
and answering our questions.
    Your budget request, I believe you have $77.4 million for 
border management staffing. Is that correct on my number?
    Secretary Mayorkas. I believe that is correct.
    Mrs. Hinson. How many additional Border Patrol agents does 
that number and that funding level support hiring?
    Secretary Mayorkas. I want to make sure that I speak 
accurately here, Congresswoman. I don't want to make a mistake, 
because there are two elements of the budget that go to 
personnel of our U.S. Border Patrol agents and Customs and 
Border Protection writ large.
    Mrs. Hinson. Who have specifically asked for the agents 
that are out on the border.
    Secretary Mayorkas. There is a drawdown from Department of 
Defense, which we calculate separately. Our Department, since 
2006, every single year has depended upon that Department----
    Mrs. Hinson. I am not asking about 2006, Mr. Secretary.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Oh, I am sorry.
    Mrs. Hinson. I am asking about how many agents you are 
planning to add to your list. I believe the number is 350 
Border Patrol agents, if I am correct.
    Secretary Mayorkas. 350 Border Patrol agents in fiscal year 
2024. This fiscal year, we added 300, the first time since 
2011.
    Mrs. Hinson. Is this what CBP is telling you they need to 
be able to secure the border and provide that operational 
security? Is that the number, or is it more?
    Secretary Mayorkas. It is 300--remember something, if I 
may, Congresswoman. There is a limit to how many we actually, 
functionally can hire in a particular year. We need more Border 
Patrol agents than 350----
    Mrs. Hinson. Which is my biggest concern, because there is 
800 or so of those positions that are open right now. So I 
guess my biggest question is, when you look at 19,000 staff 
Border Patrol agents, which is what we have right now, funded 
for 19,800, 800 of those positions are currently open.
    So when you are coming to us and saying you need more 
Border Patrol agents, the policies of this administration have 
truly affected retention for CBP.
    So when we are down 800 currently, how can you tell me 
realistically that when you are coming to us to ask for these 
many new positions, you are going to be able to feasibly 
actually hire this many new people?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Oh, Congresswoman, we are focused 
intensely on recruiting and retention. As a matter of fact, I 
spoke with the International Association of Chiefs of Police 
just last week about the challenges of recruiting and 
retention, not specific to the Federal Government, but with 
respect to law enforcement across this country.
    We are very focused on filling the positions of the U.S. 
Border Patrol, of filling the positions of Office of Field 
Operations, of filling the positions of the United States 
Secret Service.

                        BORDER SECURITY: CARTELS

    Mrs. Hinson. Well, I think it would certainly help if we 
didn't have defund-the-police rhetoric around the country as 
well, because law enforcement is struggling. You are right. I 
hear that from my local law enforcement back in my district. It 
is why I am so concerned about the security of the border.
    When the CBP Chief is saying that you need 22,000 agents 
total to counter the crisis, that is a total of 3,000 more 
agents. This request only provides for 350 more, plus I 
mentioned those 800 positions open.
    So I see it as a lack of meaningful work to address the 
retention challenges. They don't match what CBP is actually 
asking for. Throwing out increased numbers looks nice, I think, 
but it does not actually address the reality of the situation 
at our southern border.
    Mr. Secretary, are you aware of how many times in your 
budget request you mention the word ``cartel''?
    Secretary Mayorkas. No, I am not, but I must say that I 
respectfully disagree.
    Mrs. Hinson. It is zero. It is zero, Mr. Secretary.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Oh, Congresswoman, we are----
    Mrs. Hinson. In the 100-page document that submitted, you 
mentioned the word ``cartel'' zero. You mentioned transnational 
gangs once, if that is your preferred way of addressing the 
term, what you call cartels.
    I am very concerned when you say you are addressing the 
cartels in unprecedented ways, the cartel activity along the 
southern border and in the homeland has escalated. And I can 
say both times that I have visited the southern border, I have 
seen that countering the cartel activity was a number one 
concern for our CBP agents. But it is a clear indication that 
you are not listening to the men and women on the front lines.
    Would you agree that the cartels are a cause of the uptick 
of the deadly fentanyl surge in our country and the violence at 
our southern border?
    Secretary Mayorkas. I agree 100 percent with that. I 
disagree with 100 percent of your mischaracterizations of our 
commitment to border security, to tackling the cartels, to 
battling fentanyl. The fact is that we are supporting fully the 
men and women, the personnel of the Department of Homeland 
Security.
    Mrs. Hinson. Well, the fact is that, Mr. Secretary, with 
all due respect, we were here a year ago, and it feels a little 
bit like deja vu when I was asking you if you were hearing 
about the morale within the Department at CBP.
    When the Chief of the Border Patrol is telling us that the 
border is not secure and that men and women at the border feel 
disrespected by the policies of this administration, it is very 
clear to me, sir, that there is a lot more work to be done and 
that you need to listen better to the men and women who are 
putting their lives on the line every single day.
    Mr. Chair, I yield back.
    Mr. Joyce. Thank you, Mrs. Hinson.
    Mr. Case.

                          FY 2024 BUDGET: FEMA

    Mr. Case. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Let me just start by agreeing with all of my colleagues on 
the panel that I believe the situation at the border is a very 
critical issue, and I think anybody that walks away from that 
basic statement is not facing the realities.
    And I believe that this committee and this subcommittee can 
be and should be part of the solution as opposed to part of the 
problem. We have too many in our body and beyond our body who 
view this in a very binary, polarized approach. And I think 
that there are eminent solutions that combine the best of all 
worlds. So I think we should try to focus on how can we come up 
with a bill that actually solves this problem as opposed to 
worsens it.
    I don't want to focus there. That is what I want to say 
about the border. It is critical. We need to fix it. But your 
Department handles a lot more than just the southern border. In 
fact, Customs and Border Protection is 19 percent of your total 
budget, as I believe is the case. That leaves 81 percent in an 
area that you fill critical responsibilities throughout our 
government.
    You are responsible for the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency. You are responsible for the U.S. Coast Guard. You are 
responsible for the Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the 
Citizenship and Immigration Services, the Cybersecurity and 
Infrastructure Security, the Transportation Security 
Administration, the U.S. Secret Service, which is not just 
about protecting our President. It is about financial crimes 
around the world. You are responsible for Federal Law 
Enforcement Training Centers that assist our State and local 
law enforcement. That is 81 percent of your budget.
    And so, if all we are going to do is talk about the border, 
which is critical, then we are doing a disservice to the 
remaining areas that you are responsible for. So I want to give 
you a little bit of love in terms of those areas, because we 
cannot neglect them.
    Let me ask you two or three kind of quick questions along 
these lines. First of all, FEMA, is it sustainable under your 
budget? Certainly, it has been strained. It is 29 percent of 
your total budget. We certainly have seen an uptick in 
emergencies, and we have seen an uptick in the need for FEMA, 
including just the last few weeks. FEMA is in high demand.
    Does your budget provide a realistic, sustainable funding 
level for anticipated emergencies throughout our country?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, it does. The President's 
fiscal year 2024 budget does, indeed, support funding for FEMA. 
The criticality of funding FEMA has never been more important 
than it is now.
    You speak of the increasing number of natural disasters. It 
is not only the increasing number of them, but the increasing 
gravity of them.
    I visited, as I mention in my opening statement, 
Mississippi, on Sunday. The town that I visited, Rolling Fork, 
Mississippi, where the tornado ripped through that small town, 
that poor town in about 20 seconds, and the winds moved between 
160 and 200 miles per hour, just devastated the community.
    We are, in fact, investing in FEMA for fiscal year 2024, 
and I appreciate the support.

                          FY 2024 BUDGET: TSA

    Mr. Case. Okay, thank you.
    The Transportation Security Administration, Americans are 
traveling much more. Other people from other countries want to 
travel here. Does the budget address the incredible upsurge in 
travel post COVID, pent-up demand, and what I think is going to 
be a sustained level of demand on the TSA?
    Frankly, I am not sure it does adequately take care of that 
load, but I would like to hear your comments on whether this 
budget addresses what you reasonably anticipate to be demands 
on TSA.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, if you have concerns with 
respect to the funding of TSA in the fiscal year 2024 budget, I 
would welcome the opportunity to sit down and discuss those 
concerns with you, because we are very focused on TSA for 
precisely the reasons that you express. Not just the 
opportunity, the economic opportunity of lawful trade, but 
also, of course, lawful travel, and the security of that 
travel.
    The Fiscal Year 2024 budget invests in our people, our 
greatest resource, not just in additional personnel, but in pay 
fairness for them, and critically in technology and other 
assets. We are harnessing technology in the air environment to 
facilitate lawful travel and to maintain its security at all 
times.

                       INDO-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIPS

    Mr. Case. Okay. Thank you. And finally, in the time I have 
remaining, it is probably going to be a rhetorical question in 
the time I have remaining, when we talk about Homeland 
Security, I think we all know that we are not talking about 
Fortress America. We are talking about Homeland Security in a 
global context, that we need to be working with our 
international partners and allies in terms of joint Homeland 
Security efforts.
    I think in terms of my own Indo-Pacific, where you have 
wide partnerships with others throughout the Indo-Pacific in 
areas such as human trafficking, financial crimes, 
cybersecurity, et cetera.
    I am just going to make a comment that I hope and believe 
that this budget enhances those partnerships, because they are 
going to be critical, given the malign influence out there in 
the rest of the world.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Joyce. Thank you, Mr. Case.
    I recognize Dr. Harris.

                       U.S. BORDER PATROL: HIRING

    Mr. Harris. Thank you very much.
    And thank you, Mr. Secretary, for being here.
    I am just going to add to the concern that the gentlelady 
from Iowa had. It is strange the administration wants to hire 
350 Border Patrol agents and 87,000 armed IRS agents. Perhaps 
you should go over to the IRS and see if they will share some 
of that wealth with you or support our efforts, perhaps, to 
transfer some of that funding. And that was a rhetorical 
comment.
    I yield the balance of my time to Mr. Guest.
    Mr. Joyce. Thank you, Dr. Harris.
    Mr. Guest is recognized.

                      BORDER SECURITY: STATISTICS

    Mr. Guest. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Mayorkas, today's Washington Times headline: ``Border 
crisis questions baffle Mayorkas, Republicans fume.'' I am sure 
you would probably disagree with that headline. I know you 
didn't write that.
    But I just want to talk about some statistical data about 
why Republicans are so concerned about what is happening on our 
border, specifically the southwest border, but also as we are 
seeing increased activity on the northern border.
    For the last 12 months, we have seen more than 200,000 
immigrant encounters along our northern and southern border. 
For the last 24 months, expanded out 12 months beyond that, we 
have seen at least 185,000 immigrant encounters along our 
northern and southern border. We know that in the month of 
December of last year, we saw over 300,000 encounters along the 
northern and southern border.
    In addition to that, we see the growing chaos that fentanyl 
and drug cartels have caused in every community. We know now 
that the leading cause of death for individuals 18 to 45 is, in 
fact, drug overdose, the large majority of those associated 
with fentanyl.
    I had the opportunity just 2 weeks ago to be back on the 
border, my second time this year, but just 2 weeks ago in 
McAllen, where, as a member of the Homeland Security 
Authorizing Committee, we had an opportunity to speak with 
Border Patrol Chief Ortiz. And he also addressed, in an 
informal briefing, members of this subcommittee, the week 
prior.
    In that hearing, there were some things that I thought came 
out that were very enlightening, one particularly when I had 
the opportunity to talk to the Chief about some prior 
statements made by the administration, not only by you, but by 
the President, the Vice President and others, about the border 
being secure.
    And, again, looking at statistical data, trying to 
understand how, with the large increase in immigrant 
encounters, with the increase of drugs, with the violence that 
we are seeing on the border, again, much of that on the Mexican 
side of the border, but we saw four Americans who were 
kidnapped, two killed, a third shot as they crossed across the 
border there in the RGV sector, seeking a medical procedure.
    We saw the recent rush of over 1,000 immigrants there in El 
Paso when someone put something out on social media that the 
border was going to be open. We know that drug cartels have 
become emboldened in the fact that they are making huge sums of 
illegal profits off of both human smuggling and narcotics 
smuggling.
    But when the Chief said that five of the nine border 
sectors were not secure, in his opinion--and he is your Chief 
of the Border Patrol. He said five of the nine sections were 
not secure. Now, he didn't specifically mention which sectors. 
I believe he was probably referring to Del Rio, El Paso, the 
RGV sector, Tucson, and then the last either being San Diego or 
Yuma, but I did not follow up with him exactly which sectors 
that he was referring to.
    And he also talked about the number of got-aways that is 
reported by the administration he believes is actually an 
underreporting, and that, in his opinion, that that number is 
10 to 20 percent higher.
    And so during the 2-plus years of this administration, we 
have seen over 4.8 million encounters. DHS has reported 1.2 
million got-aways. So that is going to be a total of 6 million 
encounters along the southwest border.
    Just looking at the population of the States throughout the 
United States, that total number, if they were all placed in 
the same geographical area, that would be the 20th largest 
State in the United States.
    And so, I guess my question to you, Secretary, is, do you 
still maintain that, with all the statistical data that is out 
there and with the statements of your Border Patrol Chief, do 
you still maintain today that our border is secure?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, you have covered a 
tremendous amount of land in your remarks.
    I very much appreciate the time that we have spent together 
addressing the seriousness of the challenge at our southern 
border. I look forward to meeting with you and to discussing 
the matters that you have raised in your remarks preceding your 
question.
    I work very closely with Chief Ortiz. Actually, I selected 
Chief Ortiz to lead the U.S. Border Patrol, and I am very proud 
of his leadership and very supportive of it.
    The seriousness of the challenge at our southern border 
cannot be understated. We are focused intensely on it. I 
welcome the opportunity to speak with you about what we are 
doing about it, the surge of resources, the new programs that 
we are implementing, and how we are maximizing the resources 
that we have to deliver the most effective results. I look 
forward to doing so.
    Mr. Guest. And just yes or no--and I know I am over time. 
And I apologize, Mr. Chairman.
    But yes or no, do you maintain today that, in light of the 
statements made by Chief Ortiz, that the border is secure?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, I stand by my prior 
assessment because, indeed, I define it as maximizing the 
resources that we have to deliver the most effective results.
    Our ability to detect, interdict, and respond to threats 
has increased over the years because of our incredible 
personnel, because of our use of technology and harnessing 
innovation as force multipliers.
    Mr. Guest. Mr. Chairman, I think I am over time. So I will 
yield back.
    Mr. Joyce. Thank you, Mr. Guest.
    The chair recognizes Mr. Cloud.

                       BORDER WALL: CONSTRUCTION

    Mr. Cloud. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    And thank you for being here.
    In 1996, we passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Response Act of 1996, as well as the Secure Fence Act 
of 2006, in part to authorize the construction of barriers 
along the southern border.
    You are aware of that, correct?
    Secretary Mayorkas. I am.
    Mr. Cloud. I will note that was under both Democrat and 
Republican administrations.
    In 2021, we funded more border infrastructure. You are 
aware of that?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Yes.
    Mr. Cloud. And I am sure, this is basic constitutional, but 
as the Article I branch, our job is to make the law. Your job 
is to execute the law. Is that correct?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Oh, most certainly. As a matter of 
fact, I have been very proud to enforce the laws.
    Mr. Cloud. And yet you canceled contracts for construction 
of the border wall. Is that true, you have canceled contracts 
for construction of the border wall?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, I can assure you that we 
will comply with all our legal obligations.
    Mr. Cloud. Right now we are paying for border wall to be 
stored instead of built. Is that correct?
    Secretary Mayorkas. I have approved, as I testified 
earlier----
    Mr. Cloud. Is that correct, yes or no?
    Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. Approximately 129 gates in 
gaps. That project is underway.
    Mr. Cloud. Yes or no, are we paying for border wall to be 
stored----
    Secretary Mayorkas. We are indeed.
    Mr. Cloud [continuing]. Instead of built? Thank you.
    That includes Texas, who is trying to buy it, to build it 
themselves. You stopped Texas from buying border wall?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, I am not familiar with 
that. I will certainly look into that and touch base with you 
in the days following.
    Mr. Cloud. You keep talking about force multipliers as 
well. When I talk to the boots on the ground, they talk about 
the border infrastructure, specifically the wall, the roads 
that go along with it, the getting--chopping down the carrizo 
cane, the technology that is involved, all being one of the 
most effective force multipliers in the sense that you can have 
two or three people patrol a few miles of border as opposed to 
dozens.
    It is pretty significant that we do this. Yet Biden's 
border budget request takes the money that we have already 
allocated and moves it to other directions. Isn't that correct?
    Secretary Mayorkas. I am confused by your question, 
Congressman. I can assure you that----
    Mr. Cloud. The border that you are here to propose takes 
money that we have already allocated for the border wall and 
moves it to other objectives. Isn't that correct?
    Secretary Mayorkas. We are seeking to invest in people.
    Mr. Cloud. It is a yes-or-no question.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, we are seeking to invest 
in people and technology.
    Mr. Cloud. It is not an either/or, people or border 
infrastructure.
    Secretary Mayorkas. No. That is why I am saying I----
    Mr. Cloud. You are taking what we have already authorized, 
what we have already appropriated for border wall construction, 
and you are wanting to rescind that and use it for other 
purposes. Isn't that correct?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, we will comply with our 
legal obligations for fiscal year 2023.

                  BORDER SECURITY OPERATIONAL CONTROL

    Mr. Cloud. That is a very well-worded way to get around. 
You find these loopholes, and you are missing the objective, 
the overall objective of securing the border by finding these 
little legal loopholes to get out of things.
    For example, the Secure Fence Act of 2006 defines what 
operational control is as ``the prevention of all unlawful 
entries into the United States, including entries by 
terrorists, other unlawful aliens, instruments of terrorism, 
narcotics, and other contraband.''
    To be clear, that is the only definition that exists 
legally of operational control. Isn't that correct?
    Secretary Mayorkas. I believe that is the statutory 
definition under the Secure Fence Act of 2006.
    Mr. Cloud. And I understand a point that you have made that 
it does say ``all'', and as long as it says ``all'' you can 
never perfectly achieve operational control. You made that 
point.
    But have illegal entries increased or decreased since you 
became Secretary?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Oh, there is no question.
    Mr. Cloud. Have they increased or decreased?
    Secretary Mayorkas. First of all, you are absolutely 
correct that under the Secure Fence Act definition, no 
administration has achieved operational control. It speaks of 
preventing all unlawful entries. That means, one, get it right.
    Mr. Cloud. Right. But your job should be to be moving us in 
the proper direction.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Oh, we have----

               MIGRANT ENCOUNTERS: UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN

    Mr. Cloud. And we have more illegal entries. We have 
terrorists coming across our border. And the fentanyl coming 
across our border has increased. All these things have gotten 
worse, not better.
    So whether you say you have perfectly achieved it, you are 
certainly not moving toward it. You are moving away from it.
    And we all appreciate the boots on the ground who are doing 
their best to do the job. But I can tell you, I have been down 
there, they really don't appreciate the job that they are 
seeing and the leadership that they see coming out of your 
office right now.
    One other question I wanted to ask you. How many children 
have been lost between you and HHS?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, we do not--I don't know of 
a single child that we have lost in our responsibility to turn 
over an unaccompanied child to the Department of----
    Mr. Cloud. To----
    Secretary Mayorkas. Excuse me.
    Mr. Cloud. To HHS, yeah.
    Secretary Mayorkas. To the Department of Health and Human 
Services within 72 hours, which is our legal requirement.
    I am not aware----
    Mr. Cloud. The Biden administration cannot find 42,577 
children.
    Secretary Mayorkas. If I may, Congressman, I am not aware 
of a single child that we have lost in executing our 
responsibility to take an unaccompanied child in our custody 
and turn it over to the Department of Health and Human 
Services.
    Mr. Cloud. Right now the Biden administration cannot find 
42,577 children who are going to, quote, ``sponsors,'' many of 
whom are connected to cartels. And it astonished me yesterday 
that you have never seen these.
    I personally dug these out of the mud at a gap in the 
border. It says ``coming'' and ``going'' in Spanish on it. On 
it are digital numbers that the cartels use to track people to 
make sure they are paying their way both before they get into 
our country and after they get into our country.
    I brought these as a gift to you because I have a number of 
others, and I will be happy to give these to you.
    Last year we were told that we were going to plus up the 
budget, and because of it, we would be able to secure our 
border. We would do all these great things, raises for the good 
men and women, boots on the ground.
    And I asked this question. I said the problem is, is we 
write the check to secure the border and the Biden 
administration gets it and they say: Yay, more money for human 
trafficking operations.
    How is that going to change?
    Yet, what we have seen over the last year is the continued 
operation of the border being even more a sieve, even more 
aiding and abetting the cartels in their nefarious actions that 
destabilize Central and South America, Mexico, and make our 
communities less safe.
    And so if we are going to address the border funding, we 
have got to see action and we have got to see those trends 
reversed.
    I apologize, Chair, for going over. I yield back.
    Mr. Joyce. Thank you, Mr. Cloud.
    Mr. Guest is recognized.

                     MIGRANT ENCOUNTERS: STATISTICS

    Mr. Guest. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Secretary, just getting back to border statistics, when 
you became Secretary the last month, January of 2021--I 
understand you were not Secretary for the entire month--there 
were 95,000 encounters along the northern and southern border. 
Two months later, in March of 2021, that number jumped to 
192,000.
    Since that time, there have only been 2 months during your 
time as Secretary where those numbers have dropped below 192. 
October of 2022, 187. January of--I guess that would have 
been--January of fiscal year 2022 would have been 186.
    So we have seen those numbers increase very dramatically. 
Now, we know they are down from the all-time high of December. 
December they were over 300,000. And we have seen a drop. They 
still are greater than they were fiscal year last year.
    So January of 2023, the numbers still outpaced January of 
2022. February of 2023, the numbers outpaced February of 2022. 
We know last year set a record of 2.7 million, up from the 
previous record the year before of 1.9 million. And as I 
understand, we are on track to once again break that record 
once again.
    And so I am trying, by using statistical information, to 
get back to how this administration can again maintain that the 
border is secure.
    I know you say we do a better job of detecting individuals 
coming across, but I think we do a poor job of deterring anyone 
from coming across. It does not appear to me that anyone has 
any concern about coming across the border and any potential 
consequences that that may result in.
    Let me ask you this, Mr. Secretary. Do you believe that 
wall construction, or walls in general, that they are an 
important component to securing the border?
    And I understand we are not going to be able to build a 
wall from sea to shining sea, and that is not what I am talking 
about. But I am talking about, in particular sectors of the 
border, have we not seen that walls are effective?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, may I respond to something 
that you said preceding your question?
    Mr. Guest. Yes, sir.
    Secretary Mayorkas. There are two things to remember, if I 
may.
    Number 1 is that the level of migration throughout the 
hemisphere signifies that it is not a challenge specific to our 
southern border. It is a very serious challenge at our southern 
border but not exclusively so.
    You speak of deterrence, you speak of reducing the number 
of encounters. On January 5, we issued new policies with 
respect to some of the most challenging demographics that we 
were encountering at our southern border, Cubans, Nicaraguans, 
Venezuelans, and Haitians. We must keep in mind that it is very 
difficult to remove individuals from Cuba, Venezuela, and 
Nicaragua because of our absence of diplomatic relations.
    What we have said is that we will deliver a safe, orderly, 
and lawful pathway for you if you avail yourself of it. We 
screen and vet individuals before they arrive at our border. If 
you don't use those lawful pathways, we indeed will deliver a 
consequence to you if you show up in between the ports at our 
southern border.
    We have seen an approximately 95-percent drop in the number 
of encounters of individuals from those four nationalities in 
between our ports of entry at our southern border.
    That is the type of structure, that is the policy 
underpinning that we need to pursue, and I very much look 
forward to doing so with you.
    More fundamentally, we need to work together to pass 
immigration reform because this system is broken.
    Mr. Guest. Well, and I agree the system is broken. I mean, 
immigration court has over a 2 million-case backlog.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Indeed.

                       BORDER WALL: CONSTRUCTION

    Mr. Guest. We last year adjudicated roughly 300,000 cases. 
So my math, my public school math from back in high school, if 
you equate that out, that is a 7-year backlog.
    And so as we are talking about we are allowing people to 
remain in the country, we are not allowing them to remain in 
the country for days or weeks. We are allowing them to remain 
in the country for years.
    And so when someone has been in the country for 7 years 
before they have an immigration hearing, that to me is a broken 
system.
    And I understand that that is beyond your control. But 
clearly our immigration system is broken. Our asylum system is 
broken.
    But we do not have a secure border, Mr. Secretary. And that 
is where you and I would just have to disagree. I do not see 
any circumstance where I can go back to the people that elected 
me and tell them that our border is secure.
    But I would like to know, as it relates to barriers, 
fences, walls, whatever you want to call them--Secretary Ortiz 
was here. Again, briefed members of this committee 2 weeks ago. 
He said that that is an important part of border security, wall 
construction. He told us in the hearing that we had in McAllen 
that he disagreed with the administration when they stopped 
wall construction.
    Apparently you must agree that there is at least some 
benefit of it because you talk about the fact that you have 
approved 129 projects.
    Now, those projects, you say, are to close gaps. So they 
are not really for new wall construction, for any significant 
purpose, but at least to close gaps.
    So how important are fences? How important are barriers? 
And why has this administration acted so slowly to incorporate 
that into the entire strategy?
    I mean, we are looking at a border strategy. And it seems 
to me that this administration, whether it be you or whether it 
be the people that you answer to, are just saying: We are not 
going to build any walls. Walls are bad.
    I disagree with that. I think that walls are beneficial. I 
think that they do a great job.
    And I know I have gone over time. So I am going to allow 
you to answer. And then I will yield back.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, you are correct that the 
asylum system, as part of the entire immigration system, is 
broken. They are all broken.
    You mentioned that that is beyond anything that we can do. 
Actually, this is the first administration that has done 
something about it within its administrative authorities. We 
issued an asylum officer regulation that enables asylum 
officers, rather than immigration judges, to make the final 
asylum adjudication.
    We are taking that years-long process that is unworkable 
and bringing it down to less than a year. That is our 
objective. I do believe that closing the gaps is important, 
which is precisely why I approved those projects.
    Mr. Joyce. Thank you, Mr. Guest. My public school math also 
agrees with you.
    Ms. DeLauro, the distinguished ranking member of the whole 
committee, is here.

                 FY 2024 BUDGET: IMPACTS OF BUDGET CUTS

    Ms. DeLauro. Thank you. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, 
and to you, Ranking Member. I said in the last hearing thank 
you for allowing me to just interlope here. There are about 
five hearings today and I am trying to get to all of them.
    And welcome to you, Mr. Secretary. It is a pleasure to see 
you.
    Mr. Secretary, you recently highlighted to this committee 
some of the challenges the Department would face if it were to 
cut, as some Republicans would like, cut fiscal year 2024 to 
the 2022 levels. Challenges, I think, would be alarming: 
reducing Customs and Border Patrol frontline law enforcement 
staffing, reducing the Department's ability to prevent drugs 
from entering the country, and cutting Federal assistance to 
States and localities.
    Another area that I am going to ask you to comment on is 
cutting TSA at our airports and what that would mean. And then 
a quick question about the Coast Guard.
    So if you can, describe in further detail how dangerous 
would the cuts be. What would be the impact of cutting the--
going back to 2022 levels in terms of Border Patrol, drugs 
entering the country, trafficking, et cetera?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Ranking Member DeLauro, thank you very 
much for your question.
    Cutting that budget down to its fiscal year 2022 level 
would be devastating across the breadth of the entire 
Department of Homeland Security mission.
    Not only would it weaken our efforts to secure the border, 
not only would it weaken our fight against the cartels and 
stopping the flow of fentanyl, it would mean longer lines at 
airports at a time when travel, lawful trade--lawful travel--is 
rebounding, a source of economic prosperity. The American 
public would be waiting hours and hours at airports.
    Our cybersecurity would be weakened at a time when adverse 
nation-states are enhancing their cyber attacks and cyber 
capabilities to do us harm. We would be less protected.
    Communities around this country would be less protected 
against an increasing frequency and gravity of natural 
disasters. We would not be able to respond as ably and to 
improve the resilience of communities across the country.
    I was just in Rolling Fork, Mississippi, seeing a community 
devastated by a natural disaster, a vicious tornado. This past 
Sunday I was there.
    So that covers FEMA.
    Our United States Coast Guard would not be adequately 
resourced at a time when securing the Arctic and the Indo-
Pacific is more important than ever, given the aggression of 
Russia and the People's Republic of China.
    Our leaders would be less protected given a cut in funding 
to the United States Secret Service, which also does 
extraordinary financial investigations that help to secure the 
homeland.
    It would be a devastating move.
    Ms. DeLauro. I just would say--and, obviously, you know, I 
think sometimes we lose track of the breadth of the mission, of 
the portfolio of the Department of Homeland Security.
    And so that if you tracked in each of the areas and you 
make these extreme cuts that what--and I just say this in all 
sincerity, that I think the reason why I raise it is because--
and this is to all of my colleagues on both sides of the 
aisle--that it is easy to say we are going to go from--we are 
going to go--in 2024 we are going to go back to 2022.
    But one has to take a look at what the consequences are 
about areas that you care about. Some that you don't care 
about, you are happy that it us going back. But those things 
that you do consider and care about are really going to be at 
great risk.
    And the comments of the emphasis on border and the issue of 
drugs and the trafficking, and the trafficking of youngsters, 
et cetera, would be, according to what you have talked about, 
is that would lessen our opportunity to be able to deal with 
that effort.
    And I would just say about waiting lines at airports, 
Americans are not terribly excited about waiting in lines at 
airports or anywhere else, and I think the repercussions on 
that would be pretty critical.
    I appreciate your testimony today. I really do. But I 
particularly commend you for the work that you do, not an easy 
task as the Secretary of Homeland Security. But thank you very, 
very much for your commitment and dedication to the effort.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Thank you, Ranking Member DeLauro.
    Ms. DeLauro. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Really appreciate it.
    Mr. Joyce. Thank you. And I can't believe for a moment you 
wait in any lines, Ranking Member DeLauro.
    Ms. DeLauro. I do, especially the line that is for either 
Sally's or Pepe's Pizza in New Haven. You don't jump the line 
because it is a political disaster.
    Thank you. [Laughter.]
    Mr. Joyce. Sheriff Rutherford is recognized.

                      MIGRANT ENCOUNTERS: VETTING

    Mr. Rutherford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Secretary, I was very glad to hear you speak well of 
Chief Ortiz. I have met him a few times. I think he is a man of 
integrity, honesty. He speaks his mind. And I think when he 
spoke of the lack of operational control at our southern 
border, I think he did that out of a respect for his position, 
the officers that he works for.
    And I certainly hope that there is no pressures brought to 
bear on him, that he doesn't retire here in 6 months. He is a 
good man. And I hope we can all continue to support him after 
this.
    I want to bring up migrant vetting. We know that DHS and 
HHS have facilitated the movement of migrants into the interior 
of the country without notifying local government agencies. And 
this is done either through grants to nonprofits or, in some 
cases, the unaccompanied minors, we even governmentally do 
that.
    And the problem with the lack of vetting, that these 
migrants are getting popped up in my hometown of Jacksonville, 
Florida, where we had a case where an illegal immigrant came 
across the border, lied about his name, lied about his age, was 
vetted by DHS, turned over to HHS. They still couldn't verify 
who he was because he was using a fake name and a fake date of 
birth, a fake date of birth that made him a juvenile.
    And so we sent him to the interior of the country. We sent 
him to his uncle, his Uncle Cuellar in Jacksonville. Not his 
uncle. They didn't vet his uncle. They just accepted it. They 
make a phone call, and that is it. They don't vet Uncle 
Cuellar.
    They sent Mr. Ulloa to Jacksonville. He killed Mr. Cuellar. 
That is because of our system where we are not vetting people 
properly.
    Then, on top of that, this administration is not even 
confirming the identities of people that we are turning 
children over to. We have got cases where many children are 
going to the same sponsors, to the same kids. We are 
participating in child trafficking, all with the coordination--
or all without the coordination or notification of any local 
government officials, particularly law enforcement.
    The non-detained dockets consist of people that have been 
released to the interior of the country, and they are either 
waiting for their case to work through the immigration court 
system or they have an order for removal.
    In fiscal year 2022, ICE's annual report, it was indicated 
that there was a 29 percent increase in that number that is 
waiting there, their time on the docket.
    Another really shocking number to me was that there are 1.2 
million people that have had their cases adjudicated, they have 
gone through that long wait and been adjudicated, and now we 
have a final order of removal, but they are still in this 
country, 1.2 million.
    The number of people with final removal orders on the non-
detained docket continues to grow. ICE is not making this a 
priority. And deportations are, even though they are up this 
year, they are way down from where they had been before, even 
under the Obama administration.
    Now, in fact, the last time you testified before this 
subcommittee we discussed the deportation numbers. And I want 
to revisit that topic briefly.
    In 2022, as I just mentioned, it did go up a little bit, to 
72,177 migrants. And that is an increase from 2021 when there 
were only 59,000 removals. But that is still far below the 
Trump years. That is even far below the Obama years.
    Now, the last time you were in front of this committee you 
said ICE was removing a higher percentage of criminal aliens in 
fiscal year 2021, and that was true, but it was a larger 
percentage of a much, much smaller number.
    Now, finally, since we allow people to invade our country 
because we do nothing to stop them. All we do is process them 
more quickly.
    The whole six-pillar program, that when Title 42 goes away, 
the entire six-pillar program--I have read every pillar--not 
one of them is designed to stop somebody from coming to America 
illegally. It is to process them more quickly so we can get 
them to the interior of the country. And when we don't vet them 
properly, they are going to kill more of our American citizens. 
That is what I am opposed to.
    Now, because of the situation at the southern border, as 
was mentioned earlier by one of my colleagues, now we have a 
problem at the northern border. In fact, we just saw an 846 
percent increase in illegal crossings at the northern border.
    President Biden's open border policies have made every town 
a border town and put our constituents--my constituents--at 
risk. Every CBP officer, every ICE officer, the cartels, 
everyone knows it, even Chief Ortiz.
    With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Joyce. Thank you, Sheriff.
    Last but not least, Mr. Trone. I apologize for the delay.
    Mr. Trone. No problem. We had a couple of--lots of 
conflicts.
    Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for being here today.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member.
    In this complex and often toxic landscape, we certainly 
appreciate the challenges you face. And we want to thank you 
very much and appreciate your service.
    Safe and orderly legal migration is in line with our shared 
American values and good for the communities, good for the 
economy. In this Nation we do not look down on immigrants 
seeking a better life, we seek to lift them up, and they become 
part of the fabric of our Nation.
    Extreme Republicans do not want to acknowledge that 
securing our borders against drug trafficking and fixing our 
broken immigration system, they are not mutually exclusive.
    We know that 90 percent, over 90, is trafficked through 
official points of entry, driven by U.S. citizens and legal 
residents, not asylum seekers. Cartels are not packing opioids 
in backpacks to be carried across the border. That is a myth, 
and it is harming our ability to develop data-driven and 
bipartisan solutions.
    So, Congress, we need to work with the administration to 
address this opioid epidemic as a public health crisis, not one 
linked to immigration, and expanding treatment for substance 
use disorder, and of course disrupting drug trafficking as we 
can.
    Across the southern border ports of entry U.S. trucks and 
commercial vehicles are scanned selectively and not too often. 
The TCOs have long benefited from this. CBP needs to increase 
their routine scanning of these vehicles at the ports of entry.
    The President's budget put in $305 million for new, 
nonintrusive inspection technology to increase the efficiency 
of the 200,000 cars arriving daily without impacting business 
and critical trade. But without a systemic rollout at all the 
ports of entry, smugglers will continue to go back and forth 
and we play whack-a-mole as they move their products elsewhere.
    The White House policy of ONDCP has set a goal of 123 
scanners, large-scale scanners, up by fiscal 2026. Help us 
explain why we are 3 years behind.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, thank you very much for 
the question.
    We are really pushing forward on our implementation of the 
nonintrusive inspection technology. It is an easy, fast, 
effective way of detecting contraband of different types, 
including fentanyl, in passenger vehicles and in trucks and 
trailers through the ports of entry.
    We need the funding to purchase additional technology. We 
need the funding to hire additional personnel. We are looking 
to harness artificial intelligence.
    We also are critically in need of modernizing our ports of 
entry, the fundamental infrastructure, which is so antiquated 
in so many critical areas.
    For example, one of the ways that we seek to implement the 
nonintrusive inspection technology is in the preprimary 
screening area.
    The Nogales port of entry that I visited last week--not my 
first time certainly--the Nogales port of entry is immediately 
on the line, on the border, and does not allow for the 
preprimary inspection that CBP considers to be optimal.
    So we have a number of hurdles that we need to cross, and 
the FY 2024 budget addresses those hurdles most effectively.
    Mr. Trone. And 3 years behind?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, we are working feverishly. 
Ranking Member Cuellar noted the challenges of a slow 
procurement process, which is precisely why we have the 
Procurement Innovation Lab to cut through that. We are moving 
as quickly as we can.
    Mr. Trone. Well, we appreciate that. And please keep up the 
work.
    And I yield back.

               MIGRANT ENCOUNTERS: MARITIME INTERDICTIONS

    Mr. Joyce. Thank you, Mr. Trone.
    Upon mutual agreement with the ranking member, we are going 
to proceed to a second round of questions. And I recognize 
myself to start.
    The Coast Guard is interdicting near record numbers of 
maritime migrants. Fiscal year 2022, the Coast Guard 
interdicted 12,500 migrants, primarily in the Caribbean transit 
zone. At times during the past year, its assets were at 
capacity for holding migrants.
    Discouraging migration along marine routes by prompt 
interdiction is important both for U.S. border security and the 
safety of the potential migrants, particularly when the boats 
on which the migrants travel are often overcrowded and not 
seaworthy.
    The vast majority of migrants interdicted by the Coast 
Guard are returned directly to their home nation. They are not 
processed on U.S. soil.
    Despite the dangers of marine migration routes, increased 
security on the land border may push migrants to attempt 
migration via maritime routes.
    How does the budget support the increased number of 
migrants interdicted along maritime routes?
    Secretary Mayorkas.
    Mr. Chairman, we are very focused on the challenge of 
maritime migration. We saw an uptick in that, given the 
situation in Haiti, which is extremely dire, and given the 
authoritarian, repressive regime in Cuba.
    We surged U.S. Coast Guard assets in the maritime 
environment to increase our interdiction capabilities.
    We also are critically enhancing our communications in 
those island countries to ensure that people understand the 
perils of that journey--too many people perish at sea.
    We also are building lawful pathways for individuals to be 
screened and vetted in advance and to come in a safe and 
orderly way to the United States, rather than taking that 
journey.
    All of those efforts actually have recently reduced the 
level of maritime migration that we are experiencing.
    With respect to our fiscal year 2024 budget, we are 
increasing the funding for the United States Coast Guard, which 
is so vitally important, as well as for other agencies within 
the Department that contribute to our maritime security.
    Mr. Joyce. My understanding is that Coast Guard assets have 
been at capacity for the interdictions in holding migrants. 
What is your plan if the number of migrants continue or 
increase?
    Secretary Mayorkas. We have surged Coast Guard assets. We 
also have increased our processing efficiency. We have 
communicated robustly with individuals who might intend to 
migrate with respect to the perils of the journey. We have a 
multipronged effort to ensure that we are minimizing the number 
of people who take to the seas.
    The program that we announced on January 5 with respect to 
the Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans also has 
contributed to a decrease in the number of individuals taking 
to the seas because we have delivered for them a lawful, safe, 
and orderly path.
    Mr. Joyce. I would urge you in your position as Secretary 
to use your bully pulpit to put out the message that you are 
not going to be processed here, that you are not welcome here, 
and to stay where they are at. But that is up to you, sir, from 
here.
    I recognize the ranking member, Mr. Cuellar, for any 
questions he may have.

                         FY 2024 BUDGET: HIRING

    Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Again, looking at the Secure Act, just to make sure, the 
statutory definition says it means the prevention of all 
unlawful entries, et cetera, et cetera. That means when this 
got passed under President Bush, he did not have operational 
control. Same thing under Obama, same thing under Trump, and 
certainly under Biden now. It is what we do toward that goal 
that is important. But no President has had true operational 
control.
    Also, just as a point of reference, Mr. Secretary, when you 
look at the last administration, let's say the second year of 
funding that Congress provided under the Homeland Security, 
fiscal year 20--let's look at the second year of the prior 
administration.
    Fiscal year 2018, the Homeland funding was $47.7 billion. 
The second year of this administration, it is 86.5, which is 
fiscal year 2023. So it is almost double the amount of money 
that we put in.
    For CBP, the prior administration, the second year, fiscal 
year 2018, CBP had $14.2 billion and ICE had $7.1 billion. If 
you compare fiscal year 2023, it is CBP had $16.7 billion and 
ICE had $8.42 billion.
    So the money has increased under this administration--or 
Congress has increased it, should I say--which leads me, we can 
add money, but it still goes to repercussions.
    Again, you treat migrants with respect and dignity. But at 
the end of the day, if we have to say goodbye, adios, then we 
have to do that. I mean, otherwise, if we don't have 
repercussions--and this is something very important to our 
border security folks that you have.
    You agree that repercussions are important, correct?
    Secretary Mayorkas. I do, Congressman. We are a Nation of 
laws and a Nation of immigrants. We sought to deliver a greater 
consequence through our title 8 authorities, and we were 
enjoined from doing so.
    Mr. Cuellar. And, again, just briefly on the wall, because 
I want to ask you about your parole program that you-all 
implemented.
    But on the wall itself, with all due respect, that is a 
14th century solution to a 21st century problem that we have. I 
can spend $36 million on a mile for fencing, and all I need is 
$100 to buy a ladder to take care of that particular fence.
    I think the numbers have changed, $36 million per mile, 
depending on the terrain, and you can spend about $2 million on 
technology for one mile of fencing. So I think that technology 
would be a lot better.
    And for anybody that is not familiar with Texas, as you 
know, the boundary is the middle of the river. But the fence 
has to be, because of certain reasons, has to be--usually it is 
a quarter of a mile or sometimes longer.
    So you can talk about having a fence, but you cross the 
river, touch the bank, and guess what? They can ask for asylum 
at that time, or they can use drones to cross drugs itself.
    So, again, I want to make sure we have the money for the 
personnel and the technology. That is very important.
    And on the personnel, it is not only hiring agents. I want 
to hire more agents. I know the Border Patrol chief says that 
they are behind on the 300 agents that we allotted to.
    But it is also the support staff that is there, the 
analysts and the other folks. And especially for ICE. There 
might be some people that don't want to hire ICE agents.
    I do want to hire ICE agents. But we do need to hire the 
support staff for ICE so they can track the individuals that 
they are supposed to.
    So if you can talk about the support staff that we need to 
hire besides Border Patrol agents or CBP agents.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Thank you so much, Ranking Member 
Cuellar.
    It is so vitally important to increase the number of our 
personnel, including at ICE. The special agents, the 
Enforcement and Removal Operations officers, do extraordinary 
work and critical law enforcement work.
    They can't do that work without the support of other 
personnel. It is a process from beginning to end.
    We need a tremendous number of additional personnel, which 
is why the fiscal year 2024 budget provides for increased 
numbers of those personnel across the enterprise.

                               H-2B VISAS

    Mr. Cuellar. My time is also up, but let me just briefly 
mention this. And I know Congressman Harris is here.
    H-2A, H-2B visas is a pathway that we really need to look 
at. I have looked at the numbers. And we have got to get this 
done one way or the other, increase those numbers on that.
    Quickly on the parole pathway that you-all implemented on 
January 5.
    And I will close with that, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Joyce. Thank you, Mr. Cuellar.
    I recognize----

                            PAROLE PROGRAMS

    Mr. Cuellar. Well, can he just say a little bit about the 
parole?
    Mr. Joyce. You know, of course, he can answer your 
questions. Excuse me for interrupting.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Mr. Chairman thank you.
    Ranking Member Cuellar, the parole programs that we 
announced on January 5 for the Cuban, Haitian, Nicaraguan, and 
Venezuelan nationals who are arriving at our southern border in 
between ports of entry in unprecedented numbers because of the 
repressive, authoritarian regimes in three of those four 
countries, and of course in Haiti, the terrible conditions 
there, we built lawful, safe, and orderly pathways for them to 
come to the United States. We deliver a consequence for those 
who don't take advantage of those pathways and who arrive in 
between the ports of entry.
    We have seen an approximately 95-percent drop on the number 
of encounters at our southern border in between the POEs of 
those four nationalities. That is the model that we are 
employing amidst or within a terribly broken immigration 
system.
    Mr. Cuellar. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Joyce. Thank you.
    The chair would recognize Mr. Cloud.

                            BORDER SECURITY

    Mr. Cloud. Thank you, Chair.
    And I apologize. I have to run to help down on the floor 
really quick. But I wanted to make a couple of points really 
quick.
    And that is, why does that word ``all'' exist in that 
statute? I don't think it is so that administrations can come 
before us and have an out to what their obligation is. I think 
it there is to emphasize the fact that in whatever 
discretionary rulemaking you have that you should be doing 
everything you can to meet this objective.
    And what we have seen is the reverse of that, that whatever 
authorities you have are doing everything you can to create 
more of a flow, to transport more people into the United 
States.
    And from a larger perspective, yes, I agree, work visa 
programs, immigration, and border security are related. But 
they are three distinct issues. We have to secure the border 
first.
    My wife is a naturalized citizen. And at some point we, the 
vast majority of us, are descendants of citizens at some point.
    But half the world's population makes less than $10 a day. 
We do not solve those issues by bringing everybody to the 
United States. We have to secure our border.
    And I will just ask you one more question. How many people 
can fit on a ladder?
    Secretary Mayorkas. I don't understand. I don't understand 
your question.
    Mr. Cloud. The point is, is that we have thousands of 
people riding trains. We have seen thousands of people charge 
our border. And with a wall, even if they can build a ladder, 
it restricts the flow and helps provide a force multiplier for 
our people.
    They keep asking for border infrastructure, including a 
wall, including the technology, including the roads. We can 
build it. And it is modern technology, and we all know it.
    And I yield my time to Mr. Newhouse or to the chair.
    Mr. Cuellar. I will take your time. [Laughter.]
    Mr. Joyce. Nice try, Mr. Cuellar.
    The chair recognizes Ms. Underwood.

                       DISASTER RECOVERY POLICIES

    Ms. Underwood. Thank you so much.
    Mr. Secretary, I would like to talk about disaster 
recovery. As you know, this is an area where my team and I have 
been really digging in and working with your staff on big 
picture questions around equity and resilience.
    We know that FEMA wasn't designed with equity in mind. So 
it has never worked equally for everybody.
    Under our current system, disaster recovery can actually 
make inequities worse than they were before a natural disaster. 
Studies have found that in counties affected by large 
disasters, Black survivors saw their wealth decrease by an 
average of $27,000, while White survivors saw their wealth 
increase by an average of $126,000. And that is on top of the 
already enormous racial wealth gap in this country.
    Bold and deliberate policies are the only way we will be 
able to combat systemic racism and inequality that is built 
into our Federal disaster preparation, response, and recovery 
efforts.
    Under Administrator Criswell's leadership at FEMA, I have 
been pleased to see equity that is being instilled as the 
foundation of emergency management. It is literally the first 
goal in FEMA's 2022 to 2026 Strategic Plan.
    We are a few months into 2023. Can you share an update on 
FEMA's work to make disaster response more equitable so far 
this year?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman Underwood, we are focused 
intensely on this area. If I may share with you an anecdote?
    Ms. Underwood. Sure.
    Secretary Mayorkas. There was an article in the paper 
following a disaster that struck a very poor Black community, 
and the individuals in that community were unable to present to 
FEMA the required documentation of proof of ownership. 
Therefore, they risked being left disenfranchised and unable to 
access assistance to which they were entitled because of that 
lack of documentation.
    Our policy back then did not meet their needs because this 
community didn't have deeds of trust and other documentation 
because their homes, very, very modest homes----
    Ms. Underwood. Sure.
    Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. Were passed down from 
generation to generation.
    I read that article and we changed our policies, and we 
adapted our policies to meet the reality in which people live. 
We said that perhaps utility bills, an affidavit would suffice 
to address home ownership so that we can reach an otherwise 
disenfranchised community.
    This issue of fairness, of equality, is of critical 
importance, not just in FEMA but throughout our entire 
Department.

                         DHS EQUITY ACTION PLAN

    Ms. Underwood. Excellent.
    A big picture focus on equity is needed Department-wide, 
too, not just at FEMA. I know that DHS has a Department-wide 
Equity Action Plan that identifies programs with the greatest 
potential on advancing equity.
    Can you provide an update on implementing that plan?
    Secretary Mayorkas. We are very, very well underway in that 
regard, and I have asked every single agency and every single 
office to execute on that plan.
    With respect to details, Congresswoman Underwood, I would 
be pleased to share with you more specificity in terms of our 
progress in that plan.
    That is indeed one of DHS's organizational priorities.
    Ms. Underwood. OK. Well, I certainly do look forward to 
getting that information.
    I would like to echo Ranking Member DeLauro's comments 
about the Republican leadership's proposed cuts and how 
devastating that would be to programs like these, which would 
be essential to helping every American in the response to a 
disaster, to make sure that we have equitable recovery in 
communities across this country.
    I put people over politics, and I certainly am not 
interested in supporting those types of draconian cuts.
    Thanks for being here today, sir.
    And I yield back.
    Mr. Joyce. Thank you very much, Ms. Underwood.
    The chair recognizes Mr. Newhouse.

                     FENTANYL: OPERATION BLUE LOTUS

    Mr. Newhouse. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Secretary, just had a couple more things I wanted to 
talk to you about.
    You talked, as well, about fentanyl. I think I can safely 
say it is destroying our communities throughout the country.
    Recently in my district in central Washington I held a 
roundtable. I had multiple law enforcement representatives, 
families that were personally impacted by losing children to 
fentanyl. I had judges represented, prosecutors represented, 
people that provide services to young people and to drug 
addicts. And let me tell you, I am sure you have heard, the 
stories are devastating and truly moving.
    So it is not a stretch to say that this drug is destroying 
our communities. Last year 100,000 people died from drug 
overdoses, largely from fentanyl. That is more--you and I are 
both of the age we remember--that is more than all the 
casualties in the Vietnam war in one year. So it is a huge 
issue.
    I wanted to ask about Operation Blue Lotus. It is a new 
program, barely a month old. It looks like it is promising. Are 
there other plans in the administration to address fentanyl? 
Are there other options?
    I think is it Title 32 that provides for the National Guard 
Counterdrug Program to show a force at, I guess, between the 
ports of the entry, if that is where the issue is.
    I think I can say, if this--if fentanyl was COVID, I dare 
say the administration would have closed down the country until 
we had a handle on it. It seems to me that we should be putting 
all our efforts into this, pulling out all the stops to stop 
this scourge in our country.
    So could you elaborate on some of those questions?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, I stand with you 100 
percent with respect to the scourge of fentanyl, the threat 
that it poses to our communities, which is why we are focused 
so intensely on it. I would be very proud to share with you 
details about Operation Blue Lotus that began last week.
    I also, before that, want to assure you that this is not 
just a DHS effort, but it is an entire administration effort. 
We have a strategy. In fact, the Homeland Security Advisor of 
the President led a delegation, consisting of individuals, 
leaders from multiple departments and agencies, to Mexico to 
address the fentanyl challenge that we encounter in the United 
States.
    I met with the law enforcement agencies in our Department 
to review our preexisting all-of-Department strategy against 
fentanyl.
    I never, in my nearly 23 years of public service, have 
combated a drug as toxic and dangerous as fentanyl.
    We decided that what we needed to do was, in addition to 
the resources that we already were bringing to bear at our 
ports of entry, which is where more than 90 percent of the 
fentanyl is brought into the United States, to surge even more 
resources.
    Specifically, Homeland Security Investigations special 
agents not only display force, they do so much more, because 
they bring the interdiction capability and the investigative 
and prosecution capability.
    They are at the ports of entry. When we interdict the 
fentanyl, they can commence an investigation immediately of the 
individuals apprehended and refer them for prosecution, as is 
most strategic to the Department of Justice.
    It is an extraordinary effort. I believe that we seized 900 
pounds of fentanyl in the very first week of Operation Blue 
Lotus.
    We are not stopping at Operation Blue Lotus. I agree with 
you 100 percent. This caused the death of approximately 70 or 
more thousand Americans in 2022.
    This is a problem that has been building for years. In, I 
think it was in 2020, during the last year of the Trump 
administration, it killed nearly 58,000 Americans.
    This is not a challenge that is new. It is a challenge that 
has been increasing year over year. We have to address it. We 
indeed are bringing an all-of-administration fight to it.
    Mr. Newhouse. Is the National Guard Counterdrug Program 
being utilized?
    Secretary Mayorkas. I will have to get back to you on that 
specific aspect of it.
    Mr. Newhouse. Like I said, it seems like we should be 
pulling out all the stops here.
    So thank you for that, and look forward to the progress in 
Operation Blue Lotus.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Joyce. Thank you, Mr. Newhouse. I think you would have 
unanimous support for declaring war on fentanyl, wherever it is 
coming from.
    Mr. Trone is recognized.

                       FENTANYL: EFFORTS TO FIGHT

    Mr. Trone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And I appreciate all the efforts of our Republican 
colleagues and the total unanimous support we do have to work 
together. This is so bipartisan.
    You know, I lost a nephew. He died of a fentanyl overdose 
in 2016. And since 2014, this scourge has just replaced heroin. 
And at $200 a kilo cost versus $6,000 a kilo cost and 50 times 
more powerful, it is a losing battle.
    And we must do a couple of things. But, most importantly, I 
was co-chairman with Tom Cotton on the synthetic opioids 
commission. We spent over a year on this issue with the RAND 
Corporation on a budget from the NDAA.
    And we concluded at the end of the day that, quite frankly, 
we were not going to stop the precursors from China because 
China wasn't helping us. We were not going to stop the fentanyl 
coming across the border because Mexico was doing zero.
    And Obrador had adopted, President Obrador has adopted a 
policy of ``Hugs, Not Bullets.'' You are familiar with that. 
And he has made a decision not to take on the drug cartels at 
the top level, other than some few face-saving gestures 
periodically like before the last visit we had.
    So without their cooperation, Senator Cotton and ourselves 
agreed that we had to focus on the demand side, because we 
can't win on the supply side without Mexico and China who has 
just totally turned us down.
    And with the cartels controlling roughly 30 percent of the 
$1.2 trillion of the GDP in Mexico, they are a force well to be 
reckoned with and they are armed to the teeth: 56,000 murders, 
less than 1 percent solved. It is a country that is wracked 
with murder and corruption at the highest levels throughout the 
entire country.
    So what is going to change? How are we going to change the 
government to work on the supply side in Mexico when Obrador 
has just said forget it?
    Do you see this new policy as a real chance that something 
can happen? Because having been there on the ground and met 
with all of their folks, I just don't see it.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman Trone, let me at the very 
outset express my condolences for the loss of your nephew. I am 
very, very sorry to hear of that.
    We have to address this on all fronts, both the supply side 
and the demand side, and indeed we are doing so.
    You are correct that too much of the precursor chemicals 
and the manufacturing equipment are coming from China, and we 
have to stop that. We are working on that with our 
international partners, including with Mexico.
    I do want to say that we, as a Department and as an 
administration, are cooperating with the country of Mexico in 
the fight against fentanyl. We are working with it to help it 
secure its seaport where the precursor chemicals and the 
equipment are coming from China.
    We have transnational criminal investigative units. Our 
Homeland Security Investigations personnel are working with 
their counterparts in Mexico to interdict the flow of fentanyl, 
to interdict the proceeds from the trafficking of fentanyl. We 
are increasing our partnership with Mexico. That partnership 
has improved significantly since you perhaps last addressed it. 
We are very, very focused.
    As I referenced a few minutes ago, the Homeland Security 
Advisor, Dr. Sherwood-Randall, and the Homeland Security 
Advisor of President Bush, led a delegation, including the 
Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security and the Deputy Attorney 
General of the United States, to Mexico to explore how we can 
partner more effectively. That delegation was very well 
received.
    A high-level delegation from Mexico is coming to the United 
States, I believe, in mid-to-late April to advance that 
partnership further.
    We cannot do it alone, and I think we have a cooperating 
partner, much more so than in the past, in Mexico right now.
    Mr. Trone. I am not going to hold my breath. The Mexican 
Government has a lot of reasons not to be invested in this, 
given the power of the cartels in the country and the 
lawlessness that how the whole country is run.
    So good luck. Keep at it. But I think we got to focus on 
the demand side, because that is where we have a real chance to 
make a difference.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Joyce. Thank you, Mr. Trone.
    Mrs. Hinson is recognized.

                         BORDER SECURITY: CHINA

    Mrs. Hinson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Secretary, there have been some extremely concerning 
reports of increased numbers of Chinese nationals crossing at 
our southern border. Are you aware of those reports, and are 
you talking with CBP about them?
    Secretary Mayorkas. I am aware of those reports, 
Congresswoman. I am working with Customs and Border Protection 
and other parts of the Department of Homeland Security, and 
with other parts of the United States Government to address 
that. We are focused intensely on the security of the border in 
all respects.
    Mrs. Hinson. Does anywhere in your requested budget note 
those reports or how you are going to specifically address the 
Chinese Communist Party as they work to exploit our open 
borders?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, our request for 
increased funding in support of border security efforts that we 
have underway, not just at our ports of entry, but in the 
detection, interdiction, and prevention of illegal entries in 
between our ports of entry, that request for increased funding 
gets to this challenge as well as to the other aspects of the 
challenge of securing our southern border.

                      MIGRANT ENCOUNTERS: REMOVALS

    Mrs. Hinson. I think one of the biggest concerns is a clear 
lack of communication between CBP and ICE, and this is 
something that has been ongoing for quite some time. It is 
apparent in this budget request. And, as said earlier, I think 
increasing numbers and throwing out catchy names looks nice, 
but I think there needs to be follow-through.
    I mean, we are 2 years into a border crisis, and attempting 
to muddle through it without accountability or addressing these 
that these policies have caused, our border is not secure and 
the Chinese Communist Party is exploiting that.
    180,000 fewer removals in 2022 under ICE than in 2017, more 
than 2.2 million more encounters in 2022 fiscal year than in 
2017. I think Iowans and Americans deserve accountability here 
for their tax dollars and for their numbers. Do you agree with 
that?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Oh, absolutely. But your data is 
misleading, if I may respectfully----
    Mrs. Hinson. If it is misleading, I am going by data that 
came directly from the Customs and Border Protection agents. In 
2022 fiscal year, 2.76 million encounters; fiscal year 2017, 
526,901. My public school math shows that is more than 2.2 
million more encounters in that time.
    So I have some other questions for you, Mr. Secretary. Are 
you aware of the number of Americans who have been killed or 
attacked by illegal immigrants since you took office?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman Hinson, last year we 
removed and expelled approximately 1.4 million people. That is 
the greatest number----
    Mrs. Hinson. But are you aware of the number of Americans 
who have been killed or attacked by illegal immigrants? It 
should be an absolute priority for you not only to know that 
number but to know names of these victims.
    Are you aware of the number of CBP agents who have been 
attacked or assaulted in the line of duty at the southern 
border since you took office?
    Secretary Mayorkas. So, as I was answering your prior 
question, we removed and expelled approximately 1.4 million.
    Mrs. Hinson. Sir, the number is 1,100 attacks on CBP agents 
at our southern border from 2021 to 2023.
    Secretary Mayorkas. That is precisely why we are 
prioritizing the prosecution under title 18, section 111, I 
believe it is.
    Mrs. Hinson. Well, if you look at the number of fewer 
criminals that were actually deported, at the criminality data, 
if you look at fiscal year 2019, 247,000 removals. 56.86 were 
convicted criminals. Again, that number dropped to 67,000 
removals. So when you look at the percentages there, clearly 
you are not prioritizing that, because the criminals speak for 
themselves.
    If you are aware that there have been thousands of known 
criminals that have crossed our southern border. There have 
been over 1,000 CBP agents assaulted. Children are being forced 
into trafficking, as many of my colleagues have said. There are 
migrants dying every week trying to cross our border.
    If you are aware of all these failures and you have done 
nothing, what will it take for you to resign and step down from 
this job? Because I see this as a complete failure. What will 
it take?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, you are mistaken in your 
citation of statistics. You clearly do not understand the 
immigration system and how it interplays with the Public Health 
Order of Title 42 of the United States Code. So what I would--
--
    Mrs. Hinson. Well, what I understand, Mr. Secretary, is 
that you are failing at doing your job. These numbers from 
Customs and Border Patrol speak for themselves. The American 
people understand that border security is national security, 
and this is a failure.
    The policies of this administration have directly 
contributed to the numbers that I am citing right here, sir. 
And I am happy to share this document with you too if we need 
to reconcile our numbers. But, in my mind, it is very clear 
there has been a complete failure in you doing your job here 
and we need new leadership, as far as I am concerned.
    I yield back, Mr. Chair.
    Mr. Joyce. Thank you, Mrs. Hinson.
    Dr. Harris is recognized.

                        BORDER SECURITY: CARTELS

    Mr. Harris. Thank you very much. And, you know, as the son 
of naturalized Americans, look, I believe in legal immigration, 
but not what is going on at our southern border now.
    Let me just ask you, do you support naming the cartels 
foreign terrorist organizations?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman----
    Mr. Harris. It is a simple answer. It is yes or no. Do you 
support the bill in the Senate that labels them as foreign 
terrorist organizations? I have a limited amount of time. That 
is a very simple question. Do you support it or not?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, it is not a simple 
question.
    Mr. Harris. OK, good. Let's go on to the next one, because 
you obviously have not made a decision on that. This is clear-
cut. You would be much better off if you labeled them foreign 
terrorist organizations, your ability to control the border. 
But, as the gentlelady from Iowa suggested, you don't want to 
control the border. This President doesn't want to control the 
border.
    Now, I am glad you visited the border a month ago. You have 
a border czar, don't you? Who is the border czar in the 
administration? Oh, you don't that answer? I will tell you. It 
is Vice President Harris. I know you want to delay as long as 
possible. It is Vice President Harris.
    When was the last time she was at the border? Not within 
100 miles on an energy project. At the border. When was the 
last time?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman----
    Mr. Harris. It was June 2021. I know you are delaying. It 
was June 2021. She has only been there one time 2 million 
crossings ago. Now, let me tell you something. If you have a 
problem somewhere and you are running an organization, you 
actually keep on visiting the border to figure out if you are 
solving the problem. Our border czar should also resign, 
because she isn't doing her job either.
    Finally, TSA has asked for billions of dollars in new money 
functionally by budget gimmicks that transfer money. You 
mentioned that airports are actually an economic tool in some 
States. What is the State's share of TSA protection at 
airports? How much do States contribute to those TSA lines at 
airports, percent?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, is this a question that 
you actually will allow me to answer?
    Mr. Harris. I yield the rest of my time to Mr. Guest.
    Mr. Joyce. The chair recognizes Mr. Guest.

                      BORDER SECURITY: STATISTICS

    Mr. Guest. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Secretary, Chief Ortiz posted on Twitter on March 17, 
said the week in review: Seven agents assaulted; 34,800 
apprehensions; 16,900 approximate got-aways; $307,421 seized; 
1,117 pounds of cocaine seized; 658 pounds of marijuana; 77 
pounds of fentanyl; 69 pounds of meth; 21 firearms; 8 sex 
offenders; one gang member; one warrant; one assault with a 
deadly weapon.
    The Chief then posted the stats from last week. This post 
was posted 4 days ago. This week in review: 8 agents assaulted; 
33,000 apprehensions; 15,292 approximate got-aways; 239 pounds 
of meth; 50 pounds of cocaine; 106 pounds of fentanyl; 8 sex 
offenders; 14 firearms seized; $129,318 seized; and 17 gang 
members apprehended.
    The Chief then posted just 2 days ago, we are talking about 
what has happened just over the weekend: 1 agent assaulted; 
14,200 apprehensions; 399 pounds of cocaine; 185 pounds of 
meth; 135 pounds of fentanyl; 55 pounds of marijuana; $64,000 
seized; one firearm; one stolen vehicle; one gang member; and 
two sex offenders.
    Again, Mr. Secretary, it baffles me and others, when 
presented with evidence such as this from the Chief of the 
Border Patrol and the numbers that we have seen over the last 2 
years, that this administration continues to maintain that the 
border is secure.
    And I know that you and I will never agree on that. We will 
just have to agree to disagree. But I hope you understand the 
frustration that we, as Republicans, see when those statements 
are made to Congress that when we see what is happening on a 
weekly basis, those stats are startling.
    And for this administration to come in before Congress and 
testify that the border is secure because we are doing a better 
job of detecting, I think that that is just an inaccurate, if 
not a false, misleading statement.
    One of the things that Chief Ortiz said 2 weeks ago is he 
said that CBP, he said that under this administration has 
become the processing enterprise. To kind of expand out, he 
basically said that securing and apprehending the border came 
second and took a backseat to the fact that we are processing, 
and that we are processing and allowing illegals into the 
country in an expedited manner.
    I see in your recent budget request, beginning on page 3 
and continuing onto page 4, you state that: Fiscal year 2024 
budget includes a Southwest Border Contingency Fund of up to 
$4.7 billion, an emergency funding source to respond to 
immigrant surges along the border.
    I have been to the soft-sided facilities. I was at the 
soft-sided facility in El Paso, a facility that is just 
basically a gigantic tent that is out in the middle of nowhere. 
And that facility, I was told that the cost of that facility on 
an annual basis is $200 million, just for that facility. And 
again, that includes the staff that mans that, and I know that 
there is medical personnel and processing personnel and food 
personnel, all the things that go along with that.
    But you equate that across the southern border. And I know 
that there are multiple processing centers. If there are just 
five soft-sided facilities, that is $1 billion a year that we 
are spending just on processing alone.
    I know that when these processing sectors become full, that 
we will often then fly immigrants to other sectors to have them 
processed. And I was told that that costs roughly $90,000 per 
flight.
    And so, I believe that Chief Ortiz is correct when he says 
that what has happened, or this administration is, instead of 
trying to secure and stop the flow of illegal immigrants coming 
across the border, we have just gotten better at processing 
those immigrants.
    And that to me is extremely disturbing, disturbing that we 
are not doing any better job of preventing people--and we can 
talk about the conditions that exist in South America and some 
of these other countries and those push factors, but we also 
have to address the pull factors, which is that immigrants 
believe that once they step foot on the soil of the United 
States that they are going to be able to claim asylum--and that 
in most cases that is correct--and that, as we know and we 
talked about the broken immigration court, that they are going 
to be allowed to remain in the country for 7-plus years before 
their case is ultimately adjudicated. And so, those things are 
very disturbing to me.

                       BORDER SECURITY: TITLE 42

    I do want to ask you a question, particularly as it relates 
to title 42. We know title 42 ends May 11. When title 42 was 
originally set to expire late last year, there were numbers by 
DHS that talked about that there was believed that there would 
be a surge of immigrants somewhere roughly 9- to 14,000. I have 
seen estimates as high as potentially 18,000, but let's just 
take 14,000. 14,000 immigrants a day over 30 days, that is 
420,000 immigrants, a number that would dwarf our previous high 
of 300,000 that we saw in December.
    Do you still anticipate--when Title 42 ends, are you still 
anticipating a surge? Are you preparing for the surge, and that 
once these immigrants come across the country that we are able 
to handle the volume that we will be seeing, assuming that 
these estimates that DHS prepared are accurate?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman Guest, let me answer your 
question. Then I want to say, if I may, a few things in 
response to what you expressed before the question was posed.
    Yes, we continue, of course, to prepare for the end of 
Title 42 on May 11. We began preparing in September of 2021. We 
published a six-pillar plan. We refreshed that six-pillar plan 
in April of 2022.
    Let me assure you that we indeed are indeed, trying to 
prevent unlawful entries at our southern border. What we 
implemented on January 5 is a powerful example of how we are 
trying to prevent that, and doing so effectively while staying 
true to our asylum laws, the asylum laws that Congress has 
passed. That January 5 program, as I have testified previously, 
has proven extraordinarily successful, number one.
    Number two, with respect to what you articulated. I do not 
understate the gravity of the challenge at the southern border. 
I want to assure you of that. Some of the data that you shared 
speaks of the gravity of the challenge accurately, correctly. 
It also speaks to the heroic work of our U.S. Border Patrol 
agents.
    With respect to processing, case processing--and Chief 
Ortiz certainly will communicate this--we have been very, very 
focused on deploying personnel to do that processing, contract 
personnel, case processing personnel, to make sure that our 
Border Patrol agents are out in the field doing the law 
enforcement work that they are equipped to do.
    We, in addition, fundamentally need to fix, as you and I 
agree, our broken immigration system.

                   BORDER SECURITY: DRUG TRAFFICKING

    Mr. Guest. Mr. Secretary, one last question.
    And I know I am bleeding over into my time, Mr. Chairman. 
And then I will yield back and will not ask for any additional 
time.
    Mr. Joyce. We will just let it roll right into yours.
    Mr. Guest. Thank you.
    Last question, as it relates to drug trafficking, what we 
are seeing across the border as a whole: Do you believe that 
one of the primary missions, if not the primary mission of DHS, 
should be to prevent the flow of illegal drugs--cocaine, 
methamphetamine, particularly fentanyl, heroin--from coming 
across the southern border?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Yes.
    Mr. Guest. So you do believe that, correct?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Yes, along with our federal partners 
and State and local partners. It is an all-in effort.
    Mr. Guest. And I know that--and you and I may disagree on 
those that come through ports of entry versus not. I believe 
that many of the estimates that I have seen from DHS believe 
that 90 percent of the illegal drugs flow into the country 
across ports of entry. Is that correct as well?
    Secretary Mayorkas. That is correct. When I cite that 
statistic, I am speaking specifically about fentanyl.
    Mr. Guest. Yes, sir. And so, then let me ask you: As I 
understand from looking at your budget request, there is, is it 
$305 million for new technology?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Yes.
    Mr. Guest. And that would be including scanners and things 
along the border, maybe canine officers, things to be able to 
better detect, better screen traffic that is coming across the 
United States?
    Secretary Mayorkas. That is in addition to, for example, 
canine officers. That is with respect to our technologies such 
as nonintrusive inspection technology, which is so effective.
    Mr. Guest. And so I guess my concern, if that should be--
and I believe that it should be one of the primary missions, if 
not the primary mission, of DHS to prevent the flow of illegal 
drugs coming into the border, your budget has requested $4.7 
billion for emergency funding to respond to the immigrant 
surge, but only $305 million to upgrade the necessary 
technology to control our ports of entry. Because ports of 
entry, they also fall under DHS. Every vehicle, every 
individual that comes across there, we have the potential to 
screen those individuals, but it would seem to me that our 
priorities are misaligned.
    If we are spending $4.7 billion for processing and we are 
only spending $300 million for new technology, technology that 
could keep drugs out of our community, technology that could 
keep young people from ingesting fentanyl and help stop this 
drug crisis, I will just tell you that, as a prosecutor, that I 
believe those priorities are misaligned.
    And so do you believe that we should be spending more than 
the $305 million that is in the budget? And I understand that 
as the budget that came from your Department, but do you 
believe that that is an adequate amount, particularly comparing 
that to the $4.7 billion that you have requested to respond to 
the surge?
    And I will allow him to answer and then I yield back. Thank 
you, Mr. Chairman.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, I would welcome the 
opportunity to share with you all of the money that we are 
spending to interdict and to prevent drugs from entering our 
country through the because the $305 million is with respect to 
technology. That is not our only investment. We also are 
investing in personnel. We also are investing through the 
infrastructure legislation that passed, a monumental 
achievement. We also are investing in modernizing our POEs so 
that we can maximize the impact of the devotion of personnel, 
of the implementation of new technologies.
    So I would welcome the opportunity to speak with you, 
because the $305 million is, by no means, the only investment 
in the effort that you and I agree needs to be a high priority.
    Mr. Joyce. Thank you, Mr. Guest.
    For the get-back questions that were asked today members of 
the subcommittee had, I would ask you to respond within 15 
business days. And any of the members who have additional 
questions that they want to put in writing, I would ask you to 
also respond to those within 15 business days of your receipt.
    I would like to thank you again for being here, Mr. 
Secretary.
    And, with that, the subcommittee stands adjourned.
    [Answers to submitted questions follow:]
    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
                                [all]