[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



 
                                     
                         [H.A.S.C. No. 118-22]

                                HEARING

                                   ON

                   NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

                          FOR FISCAL YEAR 2024

                                  AND

              OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS

                               BEFORE THE

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION
                               __________

          SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES HEARING

                                   ON

                   FISCAL YEAR 2024 BUDGET REQUEST OF

                     THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FOR

           FIXED-WING TACTICAL AND TRAINING AIRCRAFT PROGRAMS
                               __________

                              HEARING HELD
                             MARCH 29, 2023

                                     
                  [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
                    
52-383                     WASHINGTON : 2024                                       
  


              SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES

                 ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia, Chairman

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio              DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado               JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
SAM GRAVES, Missouri                 RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona
DON BACON, Nebraska                  SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California
LISA C. McCLAIN, Michigan            MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey
PAT FALLON, Texas                    PATRICK RYAN, New York
CARLOS A. GIMENEZ, Florida           JEFF JACKSON, North Carolina
NICK LaLOTA, New York                STEVEN HORSFORD, Nevada
RICHARD McCORMICK, Georgia

                 Heath Bope, Professional Staff Member
               James Vallario, Professional Staff Member
                    Payson Ruhl, Research Assistant

                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

              STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Norcross, Hon. Donald, a Representative from New Jersey, Ranking 
  Member, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces...........     4
Wittman, Hon. Robert J., a Representative from Virginia, 
  Chairman, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces.........     1

                               WITNESSES

Cederholm, LtGen Michael S., USMC, Deputy Commandant for 
  Aviation, U.S. Marine Corps....................................    11
Hunter, Hon. Andrew P., Assistant Secretary of the Air Force 
  (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), Department of the Air 
  Force..........................................................     6
Loiselle, RADM Andrew J., USN, Director, Air Warfare, U.S. Navy..    10
Ludwigson, Jon, Director, Contracting and National Security 
  Acquisitions, U.S. Government Accountability Office............    14
Moore, Lt Gen Richard G., Jr., USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans 
  and Programs), U.S. Air Force..................................     7
Schmidt, Lt Gen Michael J., USAF, Program Executive Officer, F-35 
  Lightning II Program...........................................    12
Stefany, Frederick J., Acting Assistant Secretary of the Navy 
  (Research, Development and Acquisition), Department of the Navy     9

                                APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

    Hunter, Hon. Andrew P., joint with Lt Gen Richard G. Moore, 
      Jr.........................................................    42
    Ludwigson, Jon...............................................   114
    Schmidt, Lt Gen Michael J....................................    84
    Stefany, Frederick J., joint with LtGen Michael S. Cederholm 
      and RADM Andrew J. Loiselle................................    62
    Wittman, Hon. Robert J.......................................    39

Documents Submitted for the Record:

    [There were no Documents submitted.]

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

    [There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

    Mr. Courtney.................................................   144
    Mr. Turner...................................................   150
    Mr. Wittman..................................................   139

                 FISCAL YEAR 2024 BUDGET REQUEST OF THE

  DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FOR FIXED-WING TACTICAL AND TRAINING AIRCRAFT 
                                PROGRAMS

                              ----------                              

                  House of Representatives,
                       Committee on Armed Services,
              Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces,
                         Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 29, 2023.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:39 p.m., in 
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Robert J. 
Wittman (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT J. WITTMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE 
FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND 
                             FORCES

    Mr. Wittman. I want to call the Subcommittee on--the 
Tactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee to order. I would 
like to welcome our witnesses today. Thank you so much for 
joining us. And this is our first subcommittee hearing of the 
118th Congress.
    I want to thank my colleagues for being here. I want to 
thank the ranking member. Don, thank you so much for all that 
you have done up to now, all of your leadership on the 
subcommittee, and everything that you will do also going 
forward. So it is great to be here with my new ranking member 
colleague, Don Norcross, and my true friend, Joe Courtney, who 
was a colleague there on Seapower [Subcommittee on Seapower and 
Projection Forces] and also a colleague here on TAL 
[Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces]. So a great 
opportunity.
    So we are here today, as we know, to review the 2024 budget 
request for the Department of Defense's fixed-wing tactical and 
training aircraft programs.
    Again, I thank our witnesses for testifying today, and I 
welcome both new and returning members, as I have said, to our 
TAL subcommittee. Hopefully, we will have a few members on our 
side of the aisle actually show up. So we will give the 
attendance award today to Don and his colleagues, so.
    I look forward to being able to lead the subcommittee. I 
really look forward to serving with Don in his capacity. We 
have a critically important role here as we review over $133 
billion of programs in our jurisdiction, the largest of any of 
the hardware subcommittees.
    And as I have stated many times in the past, the National 
Defense Strategy is clear in its focus on China as our Nation's 
pacing threat. During my previous tenure as ranking member on 
the Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee, we oversaw 
critical capabilities of the long-range strike and long-range 
logistics portfolios. They are essential components of 
executing INDOPACOM's [U.S. Indo-Pacific Command's] military 
strategy and enabling operational successes of the joint force 
competing against the tyranny of distance in response to an 
ever-increasing Chinese aggression.
    Additionally, I truly believe that these long-range 
capabilities I just described are even more essential as they 
augment and support the tactical fighter fleet. However, I am 
though worried about the Department's current direction 
regarding the composition of our United States military's 
tactical air force structure and how our fighters are going to 
function in that realm and what the required capabilities will 
be within that effort.
    I am concerned that our existing force structure is 
optimized for a counterinsurgency fight and is not prepared to 
address the challenges posed by an expected threat in the 
INDOPACOM area.
    As I review the plans for each service, two threads are 
particularly concerning. First, our fighter force structure 
continues decreasing. And second, we are not able to deliver 
replacement aircraft at affordable prices to achieve similar 
quantities going forward. Meanwhile, our adversaries continue 
outpacing us building and fielding their own lethal fighter 
aircraft capability and capacity.
    I find we also continue to ask ourselves whether or not 
this administration and the Department of Defense strives to 
maintain the U.S. as the enduring global power or whether they 
continue down the evident glide slope of reducing us to a 
regional power in that status.
    For the Air Force, their fiscal 2023 through fiscal 2028 
plan includes divesting 801 fighter aircraft but only buying 
back 345 new F-35A and F-15EX aircraft.
    The F-15EX program of record is not fully funded. The 200 
planned Next Generation Air Dominance manned fighters are many 
years away from fielding and will cost taxpayers hundreds of 
millions of dollars per aircraft.
    The Air Force has yet to figure out how they will buy 1,763 
F-35A aircraft after acknowledging their major operating cost 
assumption of $4.1 million per aircraft per year is 
unachievable. The Air Force in this budget cancelled the 
electronic warfare upgrade for the fleet of the existing F-16s, 
which now puts into question the viability and survivability of 
that aircraft fleet in the future and which could be construed 
as an intentional precursor to justifying divestment of a 
significant amount of that capable fleet at a later date.
    And while the Air Force's new Collaborative Combat Aircraft 
concept may hold promise in affordability and making up for 
fighter capacity shortfalls, there is still a long road ahead 
where we have to integrate autonomous capability seamlessly 
amongst manned platforms and especially when the Air Force 
still can't get their fourth- and fifth-generation manned 
fighter aircraft to reliably share tactically relevant data 
during combat air operations.
    Meanwhile, the Navy has a strike fighter shortfall. This 
year it amounts to 17 aircraft. And that number grows in the 
future until 2030. The Navy has yet to sign a contract for 20 
aircraft appropriated over the past 2 years and still has not 
achieved their planned purchase rate of 24 F-35C aircraft per 
year.
    They still have not demonstrated they can affordably modify 
legacy Block 2 Super Hornets into Block 3 capable aircraft. 
They have reduced the F-35C squadron force presentation in 
carrier air wings from 2 squadrons of 10 aircraft to 1 squadron 
of 16 aircraft and have similar challenges as the Air Force in 
affordably trying to field their version of the manned Next 
Generation Air Dominance aircraft.
    And I would be remiss if I didn't also mention the Marine 
Corps. While I support the overall contours of the Commandant's 
Force Design 2030 concept regarding land forces, I currently 
also have concerns with the plans regarding aviation force 
structure.
    I would like to understand why the Marine Corps plans to 
remove 54 combat-coded F-35B and C aircraft in attrition 
reserve status for a total of 117 attrition reserve aircraft or 
28 percent of their fleet but still maintains an overall 
program of record of 420 F-35 aircraft, especially when F-35B 
and C fully mission capable rates have averaged over the past 
years at only 27 percent and 21.5 percent, respectively.
    Finally, I want to discuss the F-35 program given it's 
[currently] planned to [comprise] a significant portion of our 
future tactical air fleet around the world, presuming we are 
still able to afford all 2,456 aircraft for the U.S. and 
approximately 1,000 aircraft for partners and foreign 
customers.
    Upfront, I want to unequivocally state that the F-35 will 
be the most advanced tactical aircraft the United States has 
ever built. Although multiple challenges exist across various 
aspects of the F-35 enterprise, I want to highlight two near-
term issues.
    F-35 is currently planned to achieve full operational 
capability status after the full TR-3 [Technical Refresh 3] and 
Block 4 capabilities of the aircraft are fielded in 2028, 27 
years after the program began. That is by any measure 
unacceptable, and the program has to do better.
    We currently understand that TR-3 is approximately $700 
million over budget. And the last update we received from the 
program office about delivering TR-3 capability is April 2024 
of next year, which puts it a year late to the previous plan.
    We have to make sure that we do better because the original 
projected date of delivery was April of 2023. We have learned 
the late TR-3 delivery is now impacting existing fighter 
squadrons, divesting of their legacy fighter aircraft but not 
receiving the planned 35A replacements in time, which would 
leave the fighter squadrons and highly trained personnel 
without any significant aircraft for significant periods of 
time.
    To quote a senior Air Force official I have met with on the 
topic, they have said we currently are paying for a great 
capability, but we are currently only getting a good capability 
fielded.
    The second issue is F-35 propulsion and the thermal 
management system modernization. As I continue gathering facts 
and data about the existing program and review the budget 
proposal of the Department to pursue a sole-source industry 
solution known as the Engine Core Upgrade, or ECU, I would like 
to understand more from our witnesses about the avionics 
cooling requirements that have been set by the services, in 
addition to understanding the technical risk, the schedule, and 
system integration assessments the program office performed 
related to major subsystems for power and fuel thermal 
management and electrical generation that they have made in 
their proposal.
    Again, I want to thank the witnesses today for appearing 
before us, and now yield to our ranking member from the great 
State of New Jersey, Mr. Don Norcross.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Wittman can be found in the 
Appendix on page 39.]

 STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD NORCROSS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW 
 JERSEY, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND 
                             FORCES

    Mr. Norcross. Thank you, Chairman, and congratulations. It 
is great to have you here. You are surrounded by your ex-
chairman, who is your good friend, and apparently I am only the 
friend. So I have to work on that also.
    Mr. Wittman. Good friend also.
    Mr. Norcross. Good friends. But it is great to be here, and 
I look forward to continuing to work with you, having served 
under you on Seapower for a number of years. And to all of our 
witnesses here today, thank you very much.
    As we come out of this pandemic, we are still experiencing, 
as has been said before, the hangover of a supply chain 
challenge, which goes along with much of the workforce trying 
to get them back up. But I think it is important to remember 
and to thank those who continued to work during the pandemic. 
You cannot build these jets from home. You cannot build them on 
Zoom. So to all the men and women who toiled every day during 
the pandemic, I very much appreciate it along with all of our 
service men and women.
    In reviewing the Air Force and Navy request this year for 
tactical aircraft, there is clearly great justification as ever 
for this subcommittee's continued detailed oversight of these 
large, complex, and expensive programs.
    This hearing is one of the most important that we do each 
year. And understandably we often focus on the issues related 
to cost, performance, schedule, and management of these. 
However, with this budget request, we need to also get answers 
from our witnesses about what they are assessing and managing 
of the strategic risk associated with our tactical aviation 
force structure.
    An example is the Air Force will produce 72 aircraft in 
year 2024 but plans to retire 131, and the chairman has already 
talked about that, a net loss of 59 tactical fighter aircraft. 
Moreover, looking at 2028, they plan to procure 288 aircraft 
and retire 685. Although these numbers don't tell the entire 
game, they are certainly a clue as some of the challenges we 
are going to face.
    We should all want reassurances that we are not retiring 
too much capability too soon, especially given the continued 
delays with the F-35, TR-3 Block 4, and the NGAD [Next 
Generation Air Dominance] systems that are not going to be 
fielded for a number of years.
    We appreciate the Air Force witnesses addressing the 
strategy for management of this risk with tactical aviation 
capability and capacity. The Navy and Marine Corps' force 
structure analysis and plans are just as challenging, and a 
coherent message at times is elusive. Three years ago, the Navy 
strike fighter shortfall would last until 2030. Two years ago, 
the Navy told us that the strike fighter shortfall would be 
resolved to zero in 2025. And we have been briefed that the 
strike [fighter] shortfall will not be resolved until 2031.
    Related, the Marine Corps plan reduces the number of 
tactical fighter aircraft in operational squadrons, and all 
this makes oversight of the Navy/Marine Corps' management of 
risk more difficult, especially concerning the projections 
drastically change from year to year, understanding that COVID 
[coronavirus disease] did have a play in here but certainly 
doesn't make up for all of it.
    Finally, focusing on the F-35 program, the most expensive 
program in our Nation's history. Although this program has 
tremendous accomplishment, it also suffers from enduring 
delays, cost overruns, and management decisions that are 
particularly recent engine malfunctions that had temporarily 
halted the deliveries.
    The Joint Simulation Environment delay is delaying IOT&E 
[initial operational test and evaluation] full-rate production 
decision. We heard that. And also we have yet to field the need 
for the TR Block 4 capabilities. And certainly we would like to 
hear Mr. Hunter lay out the Air Force's rationale for its 
recent decision to go with the Engine Core Upgrade to the 135 
engine instead of the alternative.
    It is especially helpful to have the GAO [U.S. Government 
Accountability Office] here today as they had been in past 
years as Congress, with an independent assessment of this key 
program including strong, actionable recommendations for how we 
can improve.
    The bottom line is that with many difficult and challenging 
acquisition and sustainment objectives occurring this decade, 
we need to understand what adjustments the program's leadership 
is undertaking to achieve realistic schedules, reliable cost 
estimates that deliver an affordable and full capability that 
many nations are relying upon to support their national 
security requirement.
    Mr. Chairman, as this is our first hearing, I would like to 
take an opportunity to introduce our member who has left 
already, as I just looked down. So Pat Ryan from New York's 
18th District and Jeff Jackson from North Carolina 14th, both 
of them great experience, have served our Nation well, and we 
look forward to their participation in the future. You can't 
make this up. With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Wittman. Well, thank you to my good friend, Mr. 
Norcross. Don, thanks so much. And, believe me, I know how it 
is with members going in and out.
    So we are now going to go to our witnesses. We have before 
us testifying today the Honorable Andrew Hunter, Assistant 
Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics; Lieutenant General Richard Moore, Deputy Chief of 
Staff for Air Force Plans and Programs; Mr. Jay Stefany, Acting 
Assistant Secretary of Navy for Research and Development and 
Senior Acquisition Executive for the F-35 program; Rear Admiral 
Loiselle, Director of Navy's Air Warfare Division; Lieutenant 
General Mike Cederholm, Deputy Commandant of Marine Corps 
Aviation; Lieutenant General Michael Schmidt, F-35 Program 
Executive Officer; Mr. Jon Ludwigson, Director of the 
Contracting and National Security Acquisition Team for the 
Government Accountability Office.
    Mr. Hunter, we will start with you.

STATEMENT OF HON. ANDREW P. HUNTER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE 
 AIR FORCE (ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS), DEPARTMENT 
                        OF THE AIR FORCE

    Mr. Hunter. All right. Well, thank you, Chairman Wittman 
and Ranking Member Norcross. It is a pleasure to be back. And 
all the members of the subcommittee, thank you for the 
invitation to testify. Lieutenant General Moore and I are very 
pleased to be here to provide testimony on the Air Force's 
fiscal year 2024 budget request for fixed-wing tactical and 
training aircraft. And I will hit the highlights, because it is 
a big panel, in my open testimony and look forward to 
responding to your detailed questions as you desire.
    The Air Force's fiscal year 2024 budget request reflects 
our commitment to developing a threat-informed future Air Force 
equipped to win a high-end fight. Last year, Secretary Kendall 
and General Brown outlined the seven operational imperatives we 
must meet to succeed.
    The operational imperatives were the combined work of the 
entire Air and Space Force teams, combining the best insights 
of our operators, operational analysis, and the acquisition 
enterprise. As a result of this analysis and work, we have over 
$25 billion requested in fiscal year 2024 for operational 
imperative related investments.
    Our fiscal year 2024 request balances this investment in 
critically needed new capability with recapitalization and 
modernization of our existing platforms. I will highlight just 
a few of the key investments in my opening remarks.
    I do want to emphasize that the F-35 is the cornerstone of 
our future fighter fleet, and we have fielded nearly 400 F-35As 
to date. In the near-term, we are very focused and must focus 
on fielding the F-35 Block 4 capability that we need to address 
advanced threats.
    While crewed fighters will remain the core of the U.S. Air 
Force combat power, a centerpiece of our FY24 [fiscal year 
2024] budget request is the uncrewed Collaborative Combat 
Aircraft [CCA], which will provide new combat capabilities and 
cost-effective capacity to the fighter force.
    CCA is the single largest operational imperative 
investment, with over $6 billion requested across the FYDP 
[Future Years Defense Program]. In fiscal year 2024, we are 
investing hundreds of millions to rapidly begin development of 
the first CCA platform and to leverage our extensive, existing 
work on autonomy to underpin CCA. We are establishing an 
operational experimentation unit to work with existing 
platforms and capable partner nations to prove out the concept 
of operations for CCA.
    Also, as we modernize the bulk of our F-22 fleet, we are 
transitioning from F-22 to NGAD. Funds garnered by divesting F-
22 Block 20s are going to be reinvested or are being reinvested 
in NGAD development across the FYDP and the transition timeline 
is dependent on our progress of achieving the success and 
development of NGAD.
    The Air Force is ensuring cost control on NGAD by driving 
continuous competition for air vehicles, mission systems, 
software, and by mandating the use of the government-owned 
reference architecture. We are also changing the way we execute 
highly complex acquisition programs by taking a hands-on 
approach to digital engineering that accelerates prototyping, 
drives efficiencies in manufacturing, and reduces costs in 
operation and sustainment.
    Our FY24 request funds aircraft design, development tests, 
and the integration of advanced mission systems as well as 
cooperative development of the agile mission suite.
    Perhaps the most essential element of our fiscal year 2024 
request is our efforts to develop effective battle management 
to meet the pacing challenge.
    The PEO [program executive office] C3BM [command, control, 
communications, and battle management] established last year is 
delivering and integrating cutting-edge battle management 
command and control capabilities and systems and driving 
digital infrastructure investments that ensure Air and Space 
Forces can succeed in high intensity conflict by coordinating 
complex missions across the joint force at scale.
    Operationally optimized ABMS [Advanced Battle Management 
System] and JADC2 [Joint All-Domain Command and Control] is 
foundational to many of our operational imperatives. The fiscal 
year 2024 President's budget requests over $500 million to 
enable ABMS to remain on track and to deliver initial 
capabilities, such as the cloud-based command and control 
tactical C2 [command and control] software to multiple of our 
air defense sectors as well as our digital infrastructure 
efforts for software-defined wide-area networking and 
deployable edge solutions for battle management teams at 
multiple echelons.
    In order to achieve these efforts and the many others that 
we will discuss in today's hearing, it is critical that we 
avoid the delays that would be driven by a continuing 
resolution. This substantial investment in new capability, much 
of it is critically dependent on receiving funding in fiscal 
year 2024 and receiving it as soon as we possibly can.
    We estimate approximately 12 new-start programs in fiscal 
2024 that would be unable to begin until a full year 
appropriation was received absent special authority from 
Congress. So we cannot cede any more time during our critical 
moment in the Air Force's transition to the future force. I 
look forward to working with the subcommittee.
    [The joint prepared statement of Mr. Hunter and General 
Moore can be found in the Appendix on page 42.]
    Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Hunter. Lieutenant General 
Moore.

  STATEMENT OF LT GEN RICHARD G. MOORE, USAF, DEPUTY CHIEF OF 
           STAFF (PLANS AND PROGRAMS), U.S. AIR FORCE

    General Moore. Well, thank you, Chairman Wittman and 
Ranking Member Norcross, for the opportunity to testify today 
about the Air Force's fiscal year 2024 budget request. On 
behalf of the Department of the Air Force, thank you for your 
continued leadership and your unwavering support of the United 
States military and our programs.
    For over 70 years, the Air Force has provided air 
superiority to American joint forces as well as our allies and 
partners. They have rightly come to depend on us. Together, we 
survived and won the Cold War, and we fought the war on terror 
but times are changing.
    While our attention was focused elsewhere, China was 
watching, learning, and provisioning for the future. Today we 
are in the midst of a difficult transition from a legacy force 
built to support counterterrorism ops to one built to deter 
Chinese aggression and if necessary win against any peer 
competitor. Congress' continued support of Air Force budget 
requests and force structure decisions is encouraging, and we 
are grateful.
    Fiscal year 2024 represents another opportunity for us to 
work together to remain the world's preeminent power projection 
force. We cannot afford to stop short of achieving the force 
our Nation needs. Our most valuable resources--manpower, money, 
and time--remain extremely limited. We must be disciplined in 
our decisions and focus our investments on what we need most.
    Through the lens of the Department's seven operational 
imperatives, we have aligned our funding request to design a 
force that will give our adversaries pause. In our FY24 
request, the Air Force remains focused on achieving a fighter 
force mix that provides a capable, sustainable, survivable, 
affordable, and properly sized force that can operate across a 
range of mission sets.
    We seek to maximize procurement of the F-35 and F-15EX, 
invest in the Next Generation Air Dominance family of systems, 
and we prioritize the munitions portfolio with multiyear 
procurements of advanced weapons tailored to our pacing threat.
    Visibility and persistence play a key role in shaping 
information warfare objectives to influence adversary actions 
and perceptions. Winning in a future high-end conflict requires 
accelerating investments and transitioning from aging 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms to a 
connected, persistent, and survivable force.
    In this FYDP, we look forward to fielding the E-7 as a new 
air moving target indicator capability as well as bringing on 
other platforms in this portfolio. The FY24 budget request is a 
shining example of the significant progress we are making 
towards closing key capability gaps, but the hard choices are 
not behind us. We must remain united as a department and as a 
nation to successfully overcome barriers to change.
    Time is our most valuable asset on the path to 
modernization, but it is no longer on our side. Our adversaries 
are watching, and we must act now to make the difficult choices 
it takes to modernize. American lives and those of our allies 
and partners rely on our ability to deliver air superiority. We 
cannot fail in this endeavor.
    We look forward to once again working with Congress to 
shape a lethal force that efficiently and affordably provides 
the most capable air power for our Nation. I'm honored to sit 
here today with Honorable Hunter and my joint teammates. And I 
look forward to answering your questions.
    Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Lieutenant General Moore. We will 
now go to Assistant Secretary Stefany.

 STATEMENT OF FREDERICK J. STEFANY, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY 
OF THE NAVY (RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION), DEPARTMENT 
                          OF THE NAVY

    Mr. Stefany. Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member Norcross, 
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the 
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the 
Department of Navy's tactical aviation programs.
    Sustaining our naval tactical air superiority is critical 
to engaging in competition now and winning the high-end fight 
if necessary. We thank Congress and this committee in 
particular for your continuing support of these programs.
    The Department of the Navy is committed to investing in 
aviation and strike weapon programs. We need to support our 
national security priorities.
    The FY24 budget calls for procurement of 88 new aircraft, 
which include 35 F-35s for the Navy and the Marine Corps, 26 
METS [multi-engine training system] training aircraft, 15 CH-53 
heavy-lift helicopters, 2 KC-130 J's, and 10 unmanned aircraft.
    We continue to focus on the flying hour program and our 
aircraft depot maintenance to ensure our naval aviation 
enterprise can operate and repair the Navy's fleet of today 
while training the pilots we need.
    Our strategic FY22 [fiscal year 2022] budget completes the 
shift to fifth-generation fighter procurement with the 
acquisition of 175 F-35s across the FYDP. It also shows a ramp-
up in our R&D [research and development] for the development of 
our next-generation fighter family of systems.
    As the service acquisition executive for the Joint Strike 
Fighter, I am working closely with all three U.S. services, 
Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Program Office, 
and our industry partners to continue reducing program costs 
and ensuring implementation of a sustainment strategy that 
meets the need of the fleet and the entire F-35 enterprise.
    Of note, late last year we completed negotiations and 
awarded the contract for construction of almost 400 aircraft 
across Lots 15 to 17, and we have begun discussions with 
industry on the next production contract.
    This budget request also takes full advantage of the new 
authorities granted by Congress in last year's National Defense 
Authorization Act on streamlining multiyear procurement process 
for critical munitions. Not only will this authority allow the 
Department to replenish our munitions stockpiles, which have 
been used in support of the war in Ukraine, it will support 
efforts to strengthen our industrial base capacity to develop, 
procure, and field munitions at scale. We have started 
discussions with both the Air Force and the Army on how best to 
implement these new multiyear authorities across multiple 
product lines at the same facilities.
    Overall this budget represents a deliberate, informed 
development of a modernized integrated all-domain naval force 
for the future fight. It requires us to think differently, move 
faster, and prioritize every dollar to meet an uncertain and 
complex security environment.
    Thank you once again for the opportunity to appear before 
your subcommittee, and I look forward to your questions.
    [The joint prepared statement of Mr. Stefany, General 
Cederholm, and Admiral Loiselle can be found in the Appendix on 
page 62.]
    Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Stefany. We will now go to Rear 
Admiral Loiselle.

   STATEMENT OF RADM ANDREW J. LOISELLE, USN, DIRECTOR, AIR 
                       WARFARE, U.S. NAVY

    Admiral Loiselle. Thank you, Chairman Wittman, Ranking 
Member Norcross, and the distinguished members of the 
subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear today. I 
look forward to discussing the Department of the Navy's 
aviation programs, providing background and rationale for the 
Department's fiscal year 2024 budget request, strategic 
priorities, and budgetary goals.
    The United States Navy and Marine Corps persistent global 
maritime presence sustain the U.S. power projection across the 
globe from the 11 most survivable airfields in the world, the 
American nuclear aircraft carrier.
    TACAIR [tactical air] assets delivered from our carrier air 
wings are vital to controlling the seas, projecting national 
power, and providing long-range fires as necessary to win the 
high-end fight.
    The Navy closely integrates global force management plans 
and operations within the combatant commander requirements to 
maximize CVW [carrier air wing] deployments through our 
deployable aircraft carriers on the master aviation plan. This 
requires close management of our fourth-generation F/A-18 
aircraft inventory through service life modification and fifth-
generation requirements through procurement of F-35C aircraft.
    As we modernize carrier air wings to pace the threat, we 
must continue analyzing strike fighter shortfall through both 
an evaluation of the quantity of aircraft available and the 
capabilities of both the aircraft and their weapons that are 
necessary to defeat our adversaries.
    We continue to be successful with our industry partners in 
executing the service life modification on our fourth-
generation fleet at a significantly lower cost than that of a 
newly procured F/A-18 Super Hornet while still delivering 
similar Block 3 capabilities.
    While higher Department of Navy budgetary priorities meant 
deferred procurement of F-35s, the Navy is committed to the F-
35C carrier transition plan and the TR-3 Block 4 upgrades for 
all aircraft in the Navy's inventory, which will reduce long-
term sustainment costs associated with managing both Tech 
Refresh 2 and Tech Refresh 3 configurations simultaneously.
    After successful deployments with VFA-147 [Strike Fighter 
Squadron 147] and VMFA-314 [Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 
314], the Navy continues to learn and better qualify costs, 
mission capable rates, and operations of the F-35C. And we look 
forward to gaining more deployment data from VFA-97 [Strike 
Fighter Squadron 97] aboard the USS Carl Vinson later this 
year.
    As we keep our air wings ready for the fight today, we are 
laying the foundation to implement the air wing of the future. 
The air wing of the future refers to the composition of the 
carrier air wing as it onramps advanced capabilities and 
capacity measured at key milestones in the near, mid, and long 
term. The carrier air wing will adapt and transform from a 
predominantly manned to a team manned-unmanned force structure 
over the next two decades.
    The Next Generation Air Dominance family of systems is the 
mechanism by which the air wing of the future projects power. 
It is comprised of both manned and unmanned tactical platforms 
with advanced weapons, centers, and networks to attain and 
maintain air superiority.
    The F/A-XX is the manned quarterback strike fighter 
component of this family of systems, orchestrating manned-
unmanned teaming at the leading edge of the battlespace. 
Included in the unmanned tactical platforms for the NGAD family 
of systems are ``loyal wingman'' unmanned aircraft referred to 
as Collaborative Combat Aircraft. These CCA's will augment 
current and next-generation crewed platforms with lower cost 
complementary capabilities to increase combat effectiveness in 
highly contested environments.
    Collectively, the carrier air wing will maintain strike 
fighter capability and capacity to pace the most stressing 
threat through the thirties and beyond.
    As we implement the air wing of the future, we are 
concurrently developing alternative methods of achieving high-
end training at lower cost. The introduction of tactical 
surrogates will enable pilots to maintain critical stick and 
rudder skills at a fraction of the cost per flight hour of our 
high-end tactical strike fighters.
    Live virtual and constructive training will enable air crew 
to conduct end-to-end kill chain training in a simulated 
environment, mitigating the requirement to continually expand 
our live-training ranges.
    As the naval aviation enterprise manages fiscal 
constraints, we thank Congress and this subcommittee for your 
continued support of important aviation priorities, including 
the flight hour program, critical aircraft upgrades, and 
investment in future capabilities. I look forward to your 
questions.
    Mr. Wittman. Rear Admiral Loiselle, thanks again. We'll now 
go to Lieutenant General Mike Cederholm.

     STATEMENT OF LTGEN MICHAEL S. CEDERHOLM, USMC, DEPUTY 
           COMMANDANT FOR AVIATION, U.S. MARINE CORPS

    General Cederholm. Thank you, sir. Chairman Wittman, 
Ranking Member Norcross, and distinguished members of the 
subcommittee, it is my humble privilege to appear before you in 
these hallowed halls today. Marine aviation continues to be 
organized, trained, equipped, and ready to fight and win 
anywhere on the globe. And while our heritage is ironclad, we 
should expect no credit tomorrow for the accomplishments or the 
posture of today.
    The Marine Corps' F-35 program of record remains 420 
aircraft procured through 2032. Marine aviation remains fully 
committed to the F-35 and is continuing with a transition to an 
all F-35 fifth-generation TACAIR force, a linchpin in force 
design, and we have heard the Commandant say force design is 
here today.
    Our F-35 squadron construct provides the most lethal and 
sustainable fifth-generation capability forward deployed and 
globally engaged to support any tasking. The Marine Corps has 
provided an immediate 66 percent increase in TACAIR assets 
aboard L-class amphib [amphibious] ships in a Marine 
expeditionary unit available to the combatant commander time 
now through 2067.
    We are working closely with the Joint Program Office and 
other services to ensure vital weapons capabilities are 
delivered to the fleet on an acceptable timeline and at cost. 
As the F-35 continues to see upgrades in its mission systems 
capabilities, the requirement for increased cooling capacity 
continues to grow to ensure lethality for the remainder of its 
expected service life.
    The Marine Corps prioritizes the Engine Core Upgrade and 
power and thermal management system upgrade to meet our defined 
requirements. Continued congressional support of the Marine 
Corps Block 4 modification budget is vital to our success.
    Looking to the future, the Marine Corps is teaming with the 
Navy in the development of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force 
unmanned expeditionary family of systems. These efforts include 
acceleration of prototyping and experimentation of TACAIR 
Collaborative Combat Aircraft and building a common 
interoperable system control architecture for control of joint 
and all assets.
    And while we have an obligation to prepare for the future, 
we also have a mission to be prepared today to fight and win 
right now. Congress funding of the aviation readiness accounts 
over the past 7 years has led to improving readiness of our 
aircraft every year since 2017. I would ask for your continued 
support in funding of the USMC [United States Marine Corps] 
sustainment accounts.
    In closing, I would like to thank Congress, and this 
subcommittee in particular, for your continued support of 
Marine Corps aviation. We are ready to fight and win today and 
well into the future. Thank you once again, and I look forward 
to your questions.
    Mr. Wittman. Lieutenant General Cederholm, thank you so 
much. We will now go to Lieutenant General Schmidt.

STATEMENT OF LT GEN MICHAEL J. SCHMIDT, USAF, PROGRAM EXECUTIVE 
               OFFICER, F-35 LIGHTNING II PROGRAM

    General Schmidt. Thank you.
    Mr. Wittman. Lieutenant General Schmidt, if you will turn 
your microphone on.
    General Schmidt. Yes, sir. Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member 
Norcross, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank 
you for this opportunity to update you on the F-35 Lightning II 
Program. Since you last received testimony on the F-35 program 
in April 2022, our adversaries' aggression has increased. 
Meanwhile, the alliances and partnerships resident within our 
F-35 enterprise have only grown stronger.
    The October 2022 National Security Strategy acknowledges we 
are living in a decisive decade marked by geopolitical and 
technological uncertainty. My job is to meet the demands of 
this decade by putting decisive capability in the hands of our 
U.S. services, international partners, and a growing number of 
foreign military sales customers.
    These capabilities are directly enabled by the trust, 
confidence, and oversight of this subcommittee. I am grateful 
for your support in the fiscal year 2023 National Defense 
Authorization Act, and I look forward to a continued engagement 
with you and your staff as you execute the fiscal year 2024 
legislative cycle.
    The mission of the F-35 program remains the delivery of the 
world's most capable, affordable, and available fifth-
generation air system. Over the past year, we have made 
progress across each of these domains and have reached several 
significant milestones, including delivery of 900 F-35 aircraft 
and 1,000 F-35 engines.
    Meanwhile, our nuclear certification schedule remains on 
track, and the enterprise has logged over 625,000 hours while 
operating from 27 bases and 10 warships around the world. None 
of this would be possible without the dedication of the men and 
women of the F-35 Joint Program Office, including U.S. and 
international government, military, and industry personnel.
    I have been proud to witness these contributions firsthand 
while meeting with pilots, maintainers, software developers, 
production line workers, and personnel spanning every corner of 
this complex global network.
    Over the past 8 months, I've listened to operators share 
spectacular stories about how the F-35 performs, senses, and 
communicates, and to maintainers who appreciate the ease of 
maintaining the aircraft when critical parts are available.
    In support of our operators, the Block 4 capabilities we 
are delivering are critical in deterring and defeating evolving 
threats. As we provide affordable and effective capability 
today, we are also executing a war on readiness to mature 
sustainment processes and maximize F-35 availability for 
decades to come.
    While we have accomplished much over the last year, we have 
much more work ahead of us. In recent years, the Tactical Air 
and Land Forces Subcommittee has made expectations clear with 
respect to key focus areas, such as Tech Refresh 3 delivery and 
Block 4 capability development, air system modernization, depot 
stand-up and supply chain maturity, sustainment cost reduction, 
and other critical program activities.
    Since becoming program executive officer in July of 2022, I 
have carefully evaluated plans and progress across these lines 
of effort and look forward to providing you with a 
comprehensive update today.
    Alongside our colleagues at the Government Accountability 
Office, we are working aggressively to drive lasting results 
that will position the growing F-35 fleet for success across 
capability, availability, and affordability today and for 
decades to come.
    While this is my first opportunity to brief you as the F-35 
PEO [Program Executive Officer], I fully own the challenges set 
forth above, and my team and I will deliver on our commitments. 
Our warfighters and the men and women they defend deserve 
nothing less. Thank you once again for the opportunity to share 
the story of the F-35 with you today.
    [The prepared statement of General Schmidt can be found in 
the Appendix on page 84.]
    Mr. Wittman. Lieutenant General Schmidt, thank you so much. 
We will now go to Mr. Ludwigson.

STATEMENT OF JON LUDWIGSON, DIRECTOR, CONTRACTING AND NATIONAL 
  SECURITY ACQUISITIONS, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

    Mr. Ludwigson. Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member Norcross, 
and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity 
to discuss our work examining tactical aircraft and the F-35. 
Tactical aircraft, including the A-10, F-15, F-16, F/A-18, F-
22, and the multiservice F-35 variants are critical to 
achieving and maintaining air dominance.
    About half of DOD's [Department of Defense's] current 
tactical aircraft fleet were first produced before 2000 and are 
more than 25 years old. As we reported in December, DOD is 
making and proposing changes to its mix of tactical aircraft 
but lacks key portfolio-level analysis to better inform its 
decisions.
    Congress, DOD, and the services face difficult decisions 
regarding investments to retain existing aircraft, divesting of 
some aircraft, and funding of replacement aircraft, among 
others. Last year DOD proposed spending an average of $20 
billion per year toward these efforts.
    While DOD is taking some narrower steps to improve its 
portfolio management practices, it has not conducted an 
integrated analysis that provides insights into the 
interdependencies and risks across all tactical air platforms 
and all services.
    We believe that conducting an integrated portfolio review 
would benefit DOD and the Congress as they balance these 
decisions.
    Looking at the F-35 program and including preliminary 
insights from a report forthcoming later this year, challenges 
continue to delay completion of the baseline development and 
challenge modernization efforts.
    Regarding the baseline development, the program has 
struggled to complete and validate the simulator needed for 
final testing. In addition, aircraft and engines have been 
delivered late and have not met reliability and maintainability 
metrics set for them.
    Regarding modernization, the Block 4 effort aimed at 
upgrading the F-35 to face modern threats has continued to lag 
schedule estimates, exceed cost estimates, and expand its 
scope. More recently, the program has begun moving to modernize 
the engine and related systems.
    The original specifications were not reflective of the 
eventual full cooling and power needs of the aircraft, which 
contributed to accelerated wear and tear on the existing 
engine. Further, the existing cooling system and engine faces 
limits in supporting new planned capabilities. To address these 
issues, the program is taking steps to develop an enhanced 
power and thermal management system [PTMS] and a new engine.
    Based on our preliminary analysis, these engine related 
efforts lack key elements of a full business case to support 
decisions and are proceeding without requirements. We are also 
concerned that the program may seek to develop and acquire this 
complex, costly, and important upgrade of the PTMS, engine, and 
related systems within the F-35 program and without its own 
baseline cost and schedule.
    Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member Norcross, this concludes 
my statement. I would be happy to answer any questions you may 
have.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Ludwigson can be found in 
the Appendix on page 114.]
    Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Ludwigson. I appreciate your 
perspective there. Very, very informing. General Schmidt, let 
me begin with you. I want to get your thoughts and ideas on the 
schedule for TR-3 hardware upgrade.
    As we have seen, the schedule has now moved another year to 
the right. Can you give me an idea, is that schedule estimate 
still accurate and tell me what's occurring currently with the 
development, testing, and production of the TR-3 hardware and 
what can we expect in that realm as it relates to delivery in 
2024? Are there other things that may be unexpected that could 
move things even farther to the right? So give me your thoughts 
on where we are with the development, testing, and production.
    General Schmidt. Chairman, thank you very much for the 
question. So you said a lot there. So let me try to pick that 
apart a little bit.
    So relative to the complex TR-3 development effort, we are 
behind, as you know. We really started out in development of 
the hardware itself was behind and has now matured to the point 
where the hardware is proving itself reliable. All of the 
hardware has passed the 800-hour reliability requirements for 
safety of flight. All of the hardware is well past the halfway 
point of getting to the 8,000-hour life requirement for the 
hardware.
    The hardware itself, the initial production of the hardware 
to support all of the testing, all of the production lines, 
that yield was slow, very slow. I will tell you, I just 
reviewed it this morning. In the last few weeks, over the last 
month or so, we are much better than where we were even just 
recently in delivering hardware to the various test sites and 
the production line.
    Software got a late start. Software integration has been 
challenged, and they had a late start. We went to flight test 
for the first time on January 6. We have flown 25 times as of 
yesterday. It is very important for us to get the next software 
drop, which should come in a month or so. The next software 
drop that unleashes most of the tactical capabilities in there 
so we can truly do a flight test for score, you know, across a 
large spectrum of the requirements.
    You said earlier April 2024 was the end date. I will say we 
did a schedule risk assessment, 80 percent schedule risk 
assessment, yes, that is the JPO's, the Joint Program Office's 
scheduled risk assessment is April 2024. Lockheed's is December 
of 2023. To me there is kind of a window there.
    Additionally, we have put measures in places to try to 
deliver the capabilities actually this fall to add additional 
flight test aircraft. I was just out with the squadron 
commanders last week of both the Air Force and Navy's flight 
test squadrons out at Edwards and that team is doing everything 
they can to deliver those capabilities as early as possible not 
to mention everything our team is doing, the whole software 
team, and all the industry teams that make up that hardware.
    But that's kind of the window, sir, the December 2023 to 
April 2024 to get TR-2 equivalent capability on TR-3 jets, 
which is the bar that we are measuring ourselves against, sir.
    Mr. Wittman. That's great. It's great to hear that you have 
talked with the pilots that are doing the development testing 
and will ultimately be involved in where the production goes 
and that hopefully April 2024 is the worst case scenario. So 
it's good to hear that things aren't moving farther to the 
right.
    I want to go to Mr. Ludwigson's testimony where he talked 
about the F135 business case analysis, better known as the BCA, 
and that it wasn't performed in the traditional manner of which 
you see business case analysis performed. And I want to talk 
about the things he specifically pointed out.
    He said it didn't contain service-approved cooling 
requirements over the service life of the aircraft. It didn't 
involve a completed technical risk assessment of developing and 
integrating the aircraft's subsystems as we talked about the 
power and thermal management systems involved in the 
modernization, a completed risk schedule assessment, approved 
acquisition strategy, and an independent cost estimate 
performed by an outside agency.
    I want to get your perspective. Do you agree or disagree 
with GAO's assessment of this analysis?
    General Schmidt. Sir, I am not sure I can answer what 
exactly an approved proper business case analysis is by the GAO 
standards, but made a lot of good points in there. We compared 
these engines, the AETP [Adaptive Engine Transition Program] 
engine, the current engine, modernization of the current engine 
as well as identifying a significant power and thermal 
management system requirement. And we evaluated numerous 
options of power and thermal management systems to get us to 
various levels of cooling and power that is required.
    I would say that as Mr. Ludwigson mentioned, we have been 
eating into the life of this engine since the beginning of the 
program because we did underspec the engine and its 
requirements. So we are building costs into this program by 
eating into the life of this engine with additional overhauls 
that are expected over the life of the program.
    To say I didn't have any requirements, I have a derived 
requirement for power and thermal management because I'm 
running out of power at the end of Block 4. So, yes, I believe 
I have a derived requirement.
    I also believe I have a derived requirement for engines 
because we can't keep eating the life out of this engine and 
adding costs to an engine that has been underspec'd since the 
beginning.
    He probably makes a--he makes a good point on not having a 
requirement specifically for what is the high-end margin that 
we are trying to get to. Those are discussions that we are 
having with services. How much margin do we want to build to? 
And we are working through the acquisition strategy and all the 
technical rigor that would be required for me to sign up to an 
acquisition program baseline and make a full commitment to the 
schedule and the technical requirements of the program.
    Mr. Wittman. Thank you. This subcommittee is doing its due 
diligence to understand all the aspects of both ECU and AETP, 
both from Pratt & Whitney and General Electric. We want to make 
sure we have all of the information. We are going through the 
Joint Program Office BCA to understand that. It is good to get 
Mr. Ludwigson's perspective on that.
    We would love too to get your perspective. There are other 
things in what would be a traditional BCA as pointed to, things 
additionally that would be helpful to the committee. You know, 
our job is not to take a position. The JPO has made that 
decision. Our job as a subcommittee is to fully understand all 
aspects of this.
    And, listen, I think that this issue is going to come back 
up again with the committee in discussions. I have no 
reservations about that happening. But I want to make sure that 
everyone has the full scope of information.
    Having been through this debate when F-35 was first coming 
onboard with engines, I want to make sure that we are fully 
informed on the entire scope of decision-making. So anything 
there, too, that has been pointed out by Mr. Ludwigson that 
would be helpful to the committee as it relates to information 
in the elements that he states are lacking, those things would 
be incredibly helpful to the committee.
    So, Lieutenant General Schmidt, thank you so much for your 
efforts there in letting us know. And with that, I am going to 
go to my good friend, Mr. Norcross.
    Mr. Hunter. Mr. Chairman? Could I address the----
    Mr. Wittman. Yes, please, please, Mr. Hunter.
    Mr. Hunter [continuing]. Business case just very briefly?
    Mr. Wittman. Yes.
    Mr. Hunter. I wanted to say I have read the GAO testimony, 
and I think they make some good points about analysis that is 
good to do and that we will do and should do. You know, 
business case analysis is designed to inform a decision. And so 
depending on what decision one is making, the way that one 
structures the BCA can be different.
    I do think what--the work the JPO performed did inform the 
decision that was in play at the time, which was an investment 
decision on what path forward to take between ECU and AETP. And 
I think the Department did have the information it needed to 
make that decision. I think some of the other elements that 
were referenced are needed things, and as the general 
referenced, we will work through those decisions in the 
acquisition strategy in implementing the program.
    Mr. Wittman. Sure. Well, listen. I think it will be helpful 
if you let us know your thoughts and ideas about things that 
might be available to further develop and refine what is in the 
BCA.
    Listen, our interest is not in relitigating the decision. I 
can tell you, it will be debated, I think, within this 
committee as well as on the House floor. Our job is not to 
relitigate that. But our job is to make sure that we fully 
gather every significant piece of information in both 
situations, ECU and AETP, make sure that our subcommittee 
members, as well as the full committee members, have full 
awareness of all that information.
    If there are additional things in the BCA that are lacking, 
things that you can further refine, please make sure that you 
get that to us because that will be helpful because our members 
need to have every shred of that information because I am 
confident there will be continued debate about this decision 
going forward.
    So, again, Honorable Hunter, thank you so much for that, 
and I will go, again, to my good friend, Don Norcross.
    Mr. Norcross. Thank you, Chairman. I wasn't going to start 
out this way, but since we have heard from two of you, I think 
Mr. Ludwigson, you are entitled to your position to address 
some of the questions that have come up in the way they look at 
it.
    Mr. Ludwigson. Thank you, sir. And I believe all of the 
documents that we have referred to are important to inform the 
decision. When you think about the way these investment 
decisions are made, especially a large important decision, 
normally it would follow a pattern of looking through to see if 
there was a material solution, then through an AOA [analysis of 
alternatives], and then a BCA is built to construct the case of 
why a specific decision is being made.
    And what I think a traditional BCA allows you to do is to 
understand the risks you are taking and the consequences of the 
risks you are taking because in a perfect world, of course, you 
know all the information, and there is no risk. In the reality 
that we all have to live in, there are risks.
    It is important to understand what those risks are. And 
with respect to the PTMS and the engine, you want to understand 
what is the status of the technologies that go into those, what 
is the cost estimate, and what are the contingencies within 
that cost estimate to get to a solution that delivers to the 
warfighter what you say you need when you need it. And so those 
assessments of cost and schedule really help you understand the 
extent to which an independent view of technology, how that 
populates into the cost and schedule estimate. I hope that 
answers your question, sir.
    Mr. Norcross. Well, needless to say extremely complicated 
in looking at some of the challenges that we are facing from 
near and far. This is the fifth year the panel in different 
configurations have come before us, specifically since I 
chaired. And it seems like we are in the same place identifying 
problems, slightly different. TR-3 obviously has been one that 
is ongoing. Is this getting better?
    Mr. Ludwigson. Well, as I alluded to, based on our 
preliminary work, the report that should be in your hands in 
the next few weeks, we are concerned about the three things 
that I raised at the end, which is--I will go to the third one 
first, which is developing the path toward a PTMS and an engine 
within the F-35 program is concerning if that is the path 
forward because it doesn't establish that sort of baseline cost 
and schedule estimate that allows--you build in the 
accountability for the services, for the contractor to be able 
to know if things are going well or going poorly.
    I think we saw some of this in a similar path with respect 
to Block 4, and I think I worry a little bit that the engine 
looks a little bit like Block 4 except in this case the program 
is really poised to move from a development program into 
sustainment where there will be less overt visibility to 
oversight committees like this one.
    Mr. Norcross. Well, last year I think we did this jointly 
with Readiness [Subcommittee on Readiness] and obviously, the 
sustainment of this aircraft has been a major question for some 
time. And I know we are trying to get at that particularly with 
the beating that the engine has been taking for the thermal 
management.
    I want to just shift gears here a little bit and talk to 
Mr. Hunter about the divestment of the Block 20, the F-22s, 
which you have talked about repeatedly hoping to retire. But as 
you know, there is a prohibition. So when it comes to this 
budget, how are you handling the requests that you are asking 
versus the budget that is submitted?
    Mr. Hunter. Sir, I'll defer to General Moore on this. But 
in broad strokes, we are requesting, again, the authority to 
retire the F-22 so with a legislative proposal to enable that. 
And our budget assumes the success of that proposal.
    General Moore. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Hunter, and thank you, 
Ranking Member Norcross. We maintain our position from the FY23 
[fiscal year 2023] budget and that is that the F-22s, the Block 
20 specifically, are not combat representative. And we again 
propose to divest them.
    We seldom link any particular offset to any particular 
investment, but in this case all of the resources that came 
from the Block 20 went directly to NGAD. And we believe that we 
must get to NGAD in order to be able to continue confronting 
Chinese aggression into the thirties. And so that to us was a 
trade that was worth making. And we also note that upgrading 
the Block 20s to a combat configuration is cost prohibitive and 
very time intensive.
    Based on the most advanced weapons that an F-22 Block 20 
can carry now, it is not competitive with the J-20 with the 
most advanced weapons the Chinese can put on it.
    Mr. Norcross. But it could be used for training?
    General Moore. It could be used for training, but the 
configuration of the cockpit is different than the 
configuration of a combat representative aircraft. And so as we 
train pilots in a Block 20 aircraft, there is negative learning 
that occurs. They have to unlearn some of the things that they 
learn in the Block 20 when they go to an operational aircraft.
    Mr. Norcross. So the number that has been tossed around is 
$470 million, correct, in the first year, excuse me, for the 
budget 2024?
    General Moore. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Norcross. So you are assuming that it is successful. So 
the question comes down if it is not successful, what do you 
do?
    General Moore. So if it is--if the divestiture is precluded 
but not appropriated, then we will have to work through how the 
F-22 program makes it to the end of the year. If it is 
prohibited and appropriated, then certainly we would fly out 
the program for the next year based on the funding received.
    Mr. Norcross. So you had indicated that with these savings, 
it would go directly into NGAD.
    General Moore. They did. And that--in the budget proposal 
that is before the Congress, those funds are moved from F-22 to 
NGAD and that happened actually in the FY23 cycle, and we 
maintain that position in this budget.
    Mr. Norcross. So in the event that it is not approved, does 
that mean that money will not be available for NGAD?
    General Moore. I couldn't say that that is what will 
happen. We will have to work with the Congress and determine 
how we'll make the F-22 program make it to the end of the year 
in the event that divestiture is prohibited but continued 
operations are not appropriated.
    Mr. Norcross. Thank you. There is a number of the issues 
surrounding the engine selection, but I know Mr. Courtney wants 
to dig into that a little bit more. But obviously this takes 
care of an issue at least in the short-term in our world of the 
great stress that is going on those engines, cutting down to 
1,600 hours, which is significant. But we didn't spec that out 
in the beginning. They have had a number of programs. But then 
there also is the time factor when the new ECU would come into 
effect. So what year are you looking, assuming things move in 
that direction that that engine would be available?
    Mr. Hunter. Sir, I think General Schmidt might have a more 
detailed timeline. It is a development program so there will be 
multiple years on the order of 6--well, greater than 5 years of 
development work on the ECU and then we would do production. So 
it is out in the future, but General Schmidt may have more 
detailed numbers.
    General Schmidt. Sir, we have laid out notional dates in 
the BCA with the professional staff members. In the 2030 to 
2032 range. It is very important that we do the full 
acquisition strategy. I want to look at all of the risks and 
opportunities.
    I will tell you one thing that I want to understand for 
sure, sir, is our flight test infrastructure, knowing how 
important it is to have a fully instrumented flight test 
aircraft with our Block 4 and our aging flight test 
infrastructure. All of that work on old airplanes going on 
right now, it has been a LIMFAC [limiting factor] in us getting 
through even some of the TR-3 testing and some of where we see 
TR-4 going.
    It is just very important, sir, that I do a full technical 
baseline review of the engine program and lay that out in 
acquisition strategy for Mr. Stefany and Dr. LaPlante to see 
before I commit to a date on the delivery of the ECU. But the 
notional dates are laid out pretty well in the BCA.
    Mr. Norcross. I have a number of other questions, but I 
know we have members here to ask questions so I yield back.
    Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Don. I appreciate that. We are 
going to go now to Mr. LaLota.
    Mr. LaLota. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, 
gentlemen, for your service and for your input to our budgeting 
process. I represent the eastern part of Long Island, home to 
the 106th Rescue Wing of the Air National Guard. And, Admiral, 
during your opening statement you mentioned the Carl Vinson. 
Twenty years ago I deployed on her and to that WESTPAC [Western 
Pacific] back then, so I appreciate you recalling those 
memories.
    So my first question is for Lieutenant General Schmidt and 
Mr. Ludgwison regarding the F-35. I understand the Air Force's 
goal by 2040 is to have a tactical fighter fleet that provides 
the capability, capacity, and affordability to meet air 
superiority and global strike needs. And on the way to 2040, 
the Air Force plans to rightsize current aircraft inventories 
and invest in future capabilities such as Next Generation Air 
Dominance family of systems which includes the F-35 
modernization, Technical Refresh 3, and Block 4 software 
capability.
    The GAO has reported on the F-35 Block 4 software quality 
issues, some of which are not discovered until the software is 
delivered to the fleet. So to General Schmidt and Mr. 
Ludwigson, what progress, if any, has been made to improve the 
quality of Block 4 software development and to ensure the 
government is getting a quality product?
    General Schmidt. Sir, thank you very much. So, I would say 
generally, sir, we have not downed the numbers of deficiencies 
out there in the field year after year as we have added 
capabilities. The number of overall deficiencies are lower.
    By the way, I also was on the USS Carl Vinson just last 
week and had an awesome opportunity to hang out with all the 
pilots and maintainers and everything that makes F-35s work on 
that ship. It was absolutely incredible.
    I would say relative to--and it kind of links up with 
something that I think Representative Norcross said, was in the 
Joint Simulation Environment, which we've had challenges with 
in the past trying to get to IOT&E, full completion of IOT&E. I 
am very impressed with the progress of what NAVAIR [Naval Air 
Systems Command] and the contractor and AFOTEC [Air Force 
Operational Test and Evaluation Center] are doing to get to a 
simulation environment that truly simulates every one of our 
capabilities to validate where the deficiencies are or are not. 
It is absolutely incredible the progress they have made over 
the last 5 months.
    I asked them, I said, I need to put a line in the sand in 
December to get to milestone C. That means we have to do runs 
for score, DOT&E [Director, Operational Test and Evaluation] 
has been very supportive of this as part of the process. And so 
all I can say is--what I'm trying to say is we are actually 
producing this Joint Simulation Environment to truly understand 
in a completely synthetic environment with all of our threats 
represented where those airplanes and the deficiencies are.
    And once that capability gets through IOT&E, we can upgrade 
the Joint Simulation Environment to the latest software version 
because we are held to the previous version to get through 
IOT&E. So that will be a remarkable tool for proving out all of 
our deficiencies or lack thereof in a simulated environment, 
which will be much more efficient than we do it today.
    Mr. LaLota. Thanks. We appreciate you keeping a watchful 
eye on that. Did you want to add to that, Mr. Ludwigson?
    Mr. Ludwigson. Yes, sir. I believe that in our forthcoming 
report to be, as I said with the Department for agency comment 
and with you all for review during that time, we do highlight 
the fact that there are a number of--they brought in an 
independent assessment to help with the software development 
process. They had recommendations. Many of them similar to 
recommendations the GAO has made over the years.
    I believe that they have started to implement those 
recommendations, including bringing in automated software 
testing, which can be critically important to make sure that 
you are testing against the regression, so the older 
capabilities as you add new capabilities, and that can be very 
helpful.
    I also think that the shift--they have adopted a shift to 1 
year releases of new capabilities. We have concerns about that 
being a movement against sort of the way you develop agile 
software as you regularly and routinely get this out to the 
user community. This delays it still further than where they 
had been previously.
    Mr. LaLota. Thanks for your work. Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. LaLota. I will now go to Mr. 
Courtney.
    Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to all 
the witnesses for, again, your really solid testimony. General 
Schmidt, I just wanted to note on page 7 of your testimony, you 
pointed out this problem that took place December 2022 where 
there was a crash. And within 2 months, a solution had been 
found with a lot of people who worked really hard and who are 
really smart in terms of coming up with a fix for that program. 
It is actually quite an extraordinary effort, engineers and all 
the stakeholders, to make sure that a solution was found.
    And it is good news to see in the report that the 
deliveries are going to be basically caught up by May 1. I 
mean, it's really an amazing turnaround. So thank you, again 
for--and I will share that with the folks back in East Hartford 
and Middletown. I don't know if you wanted to comment on that.
    General Schmidt. Sir, just to echo everything you just 
said. Yes, it was a challenge that we discovered, the residence 
issue between the main fuel throttle valve and the tube. But, 
you know, think about the December timeframe when we saw that 
and that team of engineers at Pratt & Whitney, in the JPO, in 
the Navy, in the Air Force, worked 7 days a week from then to 
get this engineering change out to our aircraft, to our fleets, 
to our low time engines, which were the ones affected by this, 
to allow for this safety mitigation engineering change to be 
implemented in a rather short period of time, actually a very 
innovative solution, by the way, this orifice that they came up 
with. So, yes, I'm very proud of that team across the board. I 
couldn't be more proud.
    Mr. Courtney. Great. Thank you. Well, it's great to see Mr. 
Stefany here. Again, he just kind of migrates from one 
subcommittee to another. You know, but, again, you're obviously 
wearing your hat for the Navy here today in terms of, you know, 
a whole slew of issues in terms of aircraft. And I just want 
to, again, focus on, you know, the question of the Engine Core 
Upgrade for F-35, which obviously the Navy is, you know, 
certainly an important partner in terms of the way that 
decision process is made.
    And, again, your testimony pretty much echoed Mr. Hunter's 
testimony that basically the core upgrade will restore engine 
life and prevent degradation for the Navy variant as well as 
the other two and partner nations at the lowest cost. I mean, 
is that the bottom line in terms of the way the Navy views this 
decision in the budget?
    Mr. Stefany. Yes, sir. First of all, the thermal management 
system, I think, is the most important. You know, that's a 
near-term thing that has to be done no matter what. And then I 
believe, as the Navy and Marine Corps together, and I don't 
want to necessarily speak for my two colleagues here, the 
ability to have a single solution across the Navy and Marine 
Corps aircraft inventory was critically important to us.
    Mr. Courtney. Great. General, maybe on behalf of the Marine 
Corps, I don't know if you would want to weigh in?
    General Cederholm. Thank you, sir. Just one addition to 
that. I fully concur with everything that has been said, sir. 
On the Marine Corps perspective what this Engine Core Upgrade 
does is it gives us a greater bring-back capability to the 
boat. What does that mean? We can bring back 1,000 pounds more 
to the boat, which gives us life. Fuel is life. Time on station 
is life for us. So that is why we are excited about the ECU and 
the PTMS upgrade, sir.
    Mr. Courtney. Thank you. Again, having been around here 
awhile, I remember the last time we were debating this engine 
issue. And Admiral Roughead was CNO [Chief of Naval Operations] 
at the time and did sort of point out the fact that the Navy 
has a special sort of, you know, issue that they have to 
contend with, which is space on aircraft carriers.
    And that they just really don't have, you know, again the 
capacity to deal with, you know, large and multiple versions of 
engines. And, you know, that still resonates with me that, you 
know, as we move forward on this decision that we have to be 
mindful that all three services, you know, have to sort of--we 
have to be sensitive to, you know, what their needs are.
    So, again, I think, you know, the decision by the Air Force 
in terms of funding ECU is, you know, a pretty powerful 
statement to Congress. And, you know, I look forward to, like 
the chairman, you know, continuing this discussion. But we are 
not a debate club. You know we have to make decisions, and we 
have to move forward at some point and with that I yield back.
    Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Courtney. I appreciate your 
perspective. We will go now to Mr. Gimenez.
    Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am interested in 
the PCA [Penetrating Counter Air] and CCA programs. When do you 
anticipate that the PCA and CCA programs will be operational 
and part of our fleet?
    Mr. Hunter. So they are on different timelines although 
they are closely obviously related to one another as part of a 
family of systems.
    For the NGAD program, we are working very hard to deliver 
in the 2030s. That is a very high-end capability, and it is 
geared to the environment that we anticipate will be there, the 
security environment that we will have to operate in in that 
timeframe.
    Mr. Gimenez. Is that early thirties, middle thirties, late 
thirties, what? Thirties is 10 years.
    Mr. Hunter. Early 2030s, sir.
    Mr. Gimenez. Okay.
    Mr. Hunter. And for the CCA, that is a program where we are 
very much focused on speed to ramp. So we are looking to field 
that capability as rapidly as possible. It will be integral to 
the way that we approach industry and ask them for proposals 
that they demonstrate their ability to perform as quickly as 
possible. And so we anticipate fielding that in the 2020s, in 
the later 2020s.
    Mr. Gimenez. So CCA is not tied to PCA? It is as soon as 
you can get it out and then somehow tied to whatever aircraft 
we have in the inventory at the time.
    Mr. Hunter. That is our approach. So it will work with 
multiple tactical platforms within the Air Force.
    Mr. Gimenez. Okay. In 2019, you indicated that the Air 
Force would need seven additional fighter aircraft squadrons. 
Is that still the case?
    Mr. Hunter. I think in terms of force structure, let me 
defer to General Moore on that.
    General Moore. Thanks, Mr. Hunter. Thank you, sir. Capacity 
is certainly an issue. But I would say since 2019, what we 
would now look towards for capacity is, as you just mentioned, 
CCAs. The premise of this program was that the kind of fighters 
that we are buying in order to create the amount of iron that 
needs to be in the air to confront an adversary like China, it 
is not affordable the way we have been doing it. And so the way 
that we can do that affordably is by buying CCAs and by 
creating mass with CCAs.
    And so the question that we will have to answer as CCAs 
come into the fleet is what actually does a fighter squadron 
look like? Are CCAs a part of a fighter squadron or are they a 
separate entity altogether? Do they deploy as one entity or do 
they come together on the battlefield?
    And in order to do that, we put in our budget in the 24 
[2024] cycle, as you'll see, an experimental operations 
squadron. Ordinarily, we provide a requirement to industry. 
They come back with what we've asked for, and we know that it 
does exactly what we asked.
    In this case, we have asked a question to industry to see 
what is possible rather than tell them exactly what we want. So 
what we receive back in terms of CCAs, we will have to develop 
tactics, techniques, procedures, employment models, and all of 
that to make sure that we can get the most out of them possible 
and answer the kind of questions that I posed before.
    That is a funded project in our budget; it goes along with 
the dollars for CCA. And whether or not we need additional 
fighter squadrons will depend on how this all turns out. But 
certainly capacity is an issue and the mass that it takes to 
confront an adversary like China is intense.
    Mr. Gimenez. No, I understand that. I understand that. My 
concern is that the development you have in your plan, a 
reduction in the force of about 400 aircraft. And it is not 
necessarily tied to development of the CCA. I mean if you can--
I understand that once you have a CCA that you can, you know, 
reevaluate and see how many aircraft you need. But before 2028, 
we may need all the aircraft that we have right now and more.
    General Moore. Yes, sir. But the ones that we will need in 
2028, they have to be capable of operating on the battlefield 
that we foresee.
    Three-quarters of the aircraft that we divest in the budget 
year and two-thirds of the aircraft that we divest across the 
FYDP are A-10s and F-15Cs. The A-10s are not capable of 
operating in a high-end fight.
    Mr. Gimenez. I understand. I understand.
    General Moore. F-15Cs last year when we were here there 
were two aircraft at Kadena that were grounded and would never 
fly again, and two more that could only fly a one-time flight 
to the boneyard. Now it is three that are grounded forever and 
four that can only--that are only capable of a one-time flight 
to the boneyard. Of every 10 aircraft in the F-15C fleet that 
we put into depot, only 2 of them come out. Those aircraft are 
not going to be useful in FY28 [fiscal year 2028] because they 
are not going to still be flying. That, as I said, is three-
quarters of the aircraft we divest in the budget year.
    Mr. Gimenez. Fair enough. The other concern that I have is 
the retirement of the F-22s. You have 32 F-22s that you want to 
retire. They are, as far as I know, still the preeminent 
fighter that we have. And we only have 185 of them. That causes 
me some concern that we are going to retire 32 of them. Okay?
    General Moore. Yes, sir. Those particular F-22s are not the 
highest end fighters we have. They don't have the most advanced 
communications. They don't have the most advanced electronic 
warfare. They don't carry our most advanced weapons. They are 
not the same as the other parts of the F-22 fleet to Block 30 
and 35. And they are extremely unlikely to ever become so. It's 
cost prohibitive and would take over a decade to make that 
transition.
    Mr. Gimenez. Fair enough. Thank you. I yield back.
    Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Gimenez. We will now go to Mr. 
Horsford.
    Mr. Horsford. Thank you, Chairman Wittman and Ranking 
Member Norcross. Last June the Air Force's 65th Aggressor 
Squadron with F-35 fighters formally stood up at Nellis Air 
Force Base in my district.
    The 65th Aggressor Squadron provides U.S. Air Force with 
fifth-generation red air to replicate the advanced threats 
posed by other fifth-generation fighters from China and Russia, 
helps trains students at the Air Force Weapons School, and 
assists in red flag exercises to help train pilots from other 
services and our allies.
    Also in my district is the Nevada Test and Training Range, 
which supports the current and future testing and training. And 
it is the only location that can train fifth-generation systems 
in a live environment.
    Lieutenant General Moore and Lieutenant General Schmidt and 
Mr. Hunter, how many tactical aircraft and with what 
capabilities does the service need to achieve its mission and 
on what analysis is this based?
    General Moore. Sir, Lieutenant General Moore. I would go 
back to the discussion about how we intend to fight and about 
how CCAs are integrated into the force.
    So I think as we determine what the attributes of CCAs will 
be, what is possible for industry to deliver, we will be able 
to get to a closer answer to that.
    I think right now we foresee between 1,000 and 1,100 
mission aircraft in the fighter world but that will surely 
change because of CCAs. I don't know that CCAs will compete 
against manned fighters. That certainly is not our intent. But 
we will have to see what it takes as we go forward.
    The threat also drives this. And the threat is changing 
dramatically and quickly. And so this is not a static number. 
It is a number that we will continue to monitor going forward.
    Mr. Hunter. And if I could just add to that, sir. One of 
the key insights from our operational imperatives work was the 
way in which our different platforms work together. And it is 
essential that they be able to work together in order to 
actually perform the missions that the operational imperatives 
were examining in order to make sure that we can, you know, 
prosecute a mission from start to finish, and it involves 
critical space assets to make that happen, and it involves 
aerial networks that connect our tactical and our ISR 
[intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] and our 
command and control platforms together.
    And so it is really the linkage that is critical to 
success. And so the numbers are obviously incredibly important. 
Without aircraft, you can't do it. But what we discovered was 
most essential in many cases was the linkages between systems.
    Mr. Horsford. And can you explain to the committee the 
capabilities gap of a fourth- and fifth-generation fighter, 
please?
    Mr. Hunter. I mean, for the most part, having a fifth-
generation platform is sort of the price of entry into a highly 
contested environment. Without having the characteristics that 
we see on our fifth-generation platforms, we simply won't be 
invited to the game.
    Now having said that, there are fourth-generation platforms 
that do provide important roles from stand-off and in other 
ways. They are an important part of our force and that is why 
we are maintaining that throughout the next two decades.
    But for the most highly contested environment, the fifth-
generation platforms, that their characteristics are 
survivability, and the mission systems that they provide and 
the fused avionics is really the price of entry to the fight.
    Mr. Horsford. Lieutenant General Moore, Secretary Kendall 
recently announced a commitment to acquire unmanned 
Collaborative Combat Aircraft in large numbers. So can you 
comment on the missions the CCAs will be performing?
    General Moore. Yes, sir. So we see three kind of basic 
mission sets for Collaborative Combat Aircraft. The first is 
the ability to augment the combat force as shooters. The second 
is the ability to conduct electronic warfare. And the third is 
the ability to be sensors in the battlespace.
    We will concentrate first on the ability for CCAs to 
augment shooters and to be shooters themselves. And then we 
will look to the ability to use them for electronic warfare as 
well as sensors on the battlefield. First and foremost, though, 
we will look to use them to be shooters and to augment the 
combat force.
    Mr. Horsford. Great. Thank you to the panel. Thank you for 
your testifying today. And thank you to my colleagues. I yield 
back.
    Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Horsford. We will now go to Mr. 
Bacon.
    Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Chair. And I appreciate all of you 
being here. I want to piggyback on some of the questions from 
my friend from Florida here. And so my question is to General 
Moore and maybe Mr. Hunter, if you want to add to it.
    What I understand is we are going to be procuring 288 
aircraft over the FYDP, but we are divesting 685 so that's a 
400 aircraft delta roughly that we are going to be decreasing. 
And you are saying those are mainly A-10s and F-15Cs?
    General Moore. Four hundred nine of the aircraft we are 
divesting across the FYDP are A-10s and F-15Cs.
    Mr. Bacon. Okay. So there is another 200 and so. Are they 
F-16s or what are they?
    General Moore. Sir, there are some pre-block F-16s and our 
proposal for the F-22 Block 20.
    Mr. Bacon. Okay. The concern that we have--sorry, maybe 
this isn't quite close enough here, is that at some point we're 
so low on our fighter inventory that--and I get it, most of 
these aircraft, we don't want them for China, but there could 
be other contingencies out there.
    So I am hearing from some of our recently retired four-
stars their fear that we are going below the floor we need. Is 
there concern that we are going too low because we are--this is 
the lowest we have ever been. [Inaudible] go back since the 
fifties or post-World War II, and we are dropping down another 
400. Is there a point where we are taking too much risk?
    General Moore. So there is no zero risk scenario. But we 
are very concerned about the balance between near-term risk 
that impacts the combatant commander's ability to fight tonight 
as well as our need to modernize.
    I am proud to say that we have said for several budget 
cycles that we needed to procure 72 new fighters a year and 
this budget does that.
    Mr. Bacon. Right.
    General Moore. And we are grateful for the Department for 
the resources that it takes to make that proposal. And we will 
continue as we go forward to do what we can within our 
established budget top lines to maximize the procurement that 
will get us the capacity that you described.
    Mr. Hunter. If I could just weigh in.
    Mr. Bacon. Sure.
    Mr. Hunter. You know, there is a balance of risk here. And 
so as the general said, there is risk on both sides and there 
is no no-risk posture. I am more concerned about the risk that 
we face against the pacing challenge than I am about the 
concern that--that the risks that we have in performing some of 
those other missions that you referenced.
    Mr. Bacon. Is there any way to increase the F-35 production 
from 48? If we are going to drop 400 aircraft in net, is there 
a way that we can expand that F-35 production? Forty-eight 
seems like a low bar, but maybe I am wrong. And I open that up 
to maybe our F-35 leader here. But what do you think? Is there 
a way we could expand that production higher?
    Mr. Hunter. We have been working for several years to get 
to 48, which we have achieved so give us one moment to 
celebrate that. But I would also point in addition, right, 24 
F-15EXs, so I think that is a key part of the picture as well.
    Mr. Bacon. Okay.
    Mr. Hunter. But I will let the general speak to production 
capacity.
    General Schmidt. Sir, that is a production capacity 
question. We have contracted for 156 aircraft a year in Lot 17, 
which is FY23 delivered in 2025. So they have hit close to 
that. This is the first time we have gone up to 156. I think 
they will hit 156.
    I do want to make sure that the supply chain that supports 
both a spectacular production line as well as the sustainment 
side of maintaining all of those airplanes around the world, 
that when I want to make sure a supply chain that supports 
production at a higher rate than 156 that we also have the 
supply posture to support everything else we need around the 
world.
    But, yes, I think we could go higher than 156. I would want 
to make sure we are making the investment for the right reasons 
because to stay at a level versus paying to get there and then 
falling back down. Our partners and FMS [foreign military 
sales] customers and international partners are obviously a 
huge part of this program and continue to demand----
    Mr. Bacon. I get it. So we have to divide it up with our 
friends. Understand. Maybe this is why--I understand the F-35s 
were on the unfunded list and then taken off. Is that why it 
was taken off because we were at capacity?
    General Moore. Sir, there were never F-35s on the unfunded 
list this year.
    Mr. Bacon. Okay.
    General Moore. The Department worked very carefully to make 
sure that the number of aircraft we said we needed were in the 
base budget. And there were never F-35s on the unfunded 
priorities list this year.
    Mr. Bacon. I would like to ask maybe one question for the 
record since I am out of time. I heard there were some issues 
with the Joint Simulation Environment and how that could 
potentially affect the full-rate production of F-35s. Is there 
a way we can get an update--I will just have to take it for the 
record.
    General Schmidt. Yes, sir. So I asked to set a line in the 
sand for December of this year, 2023, and working with DOT&E, 
AFOTEC, NAVAIR, who is developing the Joint Simulation 
Environment, our team, and Lockheed, whether we could get there 
from here.
    I am very proud of collaboration that has happened over the 
last 5 months. We have a plan to run IOT&E for score in about 
the August timeframe, which would support some kind of a 
report, I think, from the DOT&E by December to support that 
milestone C deg.ll-rate production decision at the end of the 
year. That is the plan that I am working towards, and a lot of 
people are trying to help.
    Mr. Wittman. Sure. Thank you, Mr. Bacon. We will now go to 
Mr. Norcross.
    Mr. Norcross. Just a real quick clarification. When we 
start to up the numbers of the actual planes rolling off the 
line, one of the issues we had is to make sure the engines 
which come from obviously elsewhere, Pratt & Whitney, were 
there. They were running at such high production that the parts 
for the engine were not going to be available for the depot and 
repair.
    Where are we on that issue because that directly impacts 
the question that was just asked?
    General Schmidt. That is a great question, sir, and it is a 
supply chain. I just met with Pratt & Whitney on that subject 
Tuesday. They are doing a lot of work to continue to fill their 
supply chain, both that supports the production engines as well 
as all of the support sustainment of our fleets around the 
world.
    It is still a concern. I think in the supply chain side, at 
the same time, you know, we could talk about maybe the power 
module challenges we had last year, which that is not one of my 
top drivers. And I am very proud of our team at Tinker, of 
Pratt & Whitney, and all of the folks that work together to 
take power modules from being--having 48 holes a little over a 
year ago to 1 hole last month for power modules.
    But those kinds of things eat into parts and all of that 
stuff. So it is a great question, sir. It is certainly on my 
radar all the time relative to making sure we have parts 
supporting our engine supply chain moving forward.
    Mr. Norcross. Because I think we all understand the need 
for more aircraft, but robbing Peter to pay Paul because our 
partners, ourselves around the world that need these parts. And 
if they are going into new ones, somebody else is coming up 
short. Really difficult, but I am glad you are getting at it, 
and I yield back.
    General Schmidt. I would just say one thing to that, sir, 
is that while most--we have had a number of late engines as 
identified by the GAO, many of them late. Those were not 
necessarily due to part shortages, at least on the production 
line. They have had some quality things that have been 
corrected over time. But they have delivered engines in general 
within the given timeframe needed, but some of them late, sir.
    Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Norcross. Now I'll go to Mr. 
McCormick.
    Dr. McCormick. Thank you, Mr. Chair. First of all, I am 
very glad you clarified how we are going to be decommissioning 
the F-22s. I was a little concerned when we started talking 
about that because I was very proud to have them make their 
first kill this year. And I just wanted to make sure that we 
sustain that brilliant program.
    With that said, Lieutenant General Schmidt, I am tracking 
that Moody Air Force Base is planning to divest the A-10s, 
which makes me kind of sad as a former forward air controller. 
The F-35s are going to replace--are they going to have a 
similar mission or something entirely different as far as what 
they are going to be applied for?
    Mr. Hunter. Let me start, and I will let General Moore 
speak to it as well. But, you know, the F-35 is very much a 
multimission aircraft. So they will be fully capable of 
performing the close air support mission as are other Air Force 
assets. I noted General Brown spoke to this with direct 
experience from his time in three different Air Force 
platforms, none of which was the A-10 or the F-35 doing close 
air support.
    But that will definitely be a part of the F-35's mission, 
but it is also core to several missions that we see in 
INDOPACOM, which may or may not involve close air support like, 
you know, defensive counter air, offensive counter air. There 
is a whole range of missions the F-35 will be equipped to 
perform for the Air Force.
    Dr. McCormick. So basically, we are just picking up greater 
flexibility in the greater mission to come?
    Mr. Hunter. Correct.
    Dr. McCormick. Okay. Great. I'll save the remainder of my 
time for Lieutenant General Cederholm, who took the liberty of 
explaining something to me about the F-35 program. There are a 
lot of Marines, former Marines--Marines that have retired who 
had big concerns about how we organized our F-35s.
    And I just wanted to have you break down the squadron 
organization and how we have gone from 16 to 10 and how that 
affects our mission going forward and how that is going to give 
us greater flexibility into the future. And by the way, just 
for the record, I brought my writing material just to take good 
notes for my Marines out there.
    General Cederholm. Sir, thank you very much, and I totally 
dig the crayons. I hope I don't start eating them here in a 
second.
    Sir, on paper, I understand the concern that some former 
Marines may have. And taken alone, I understand the genesis of 
that. But when you put it into context as we discussed earlier, 
sir, I posit that the resulting factor changes when you put it 
into transition, when you put the transition into motion. What 
do I mean by that?
    Since 2007, our program of record has been 420. And it has 
always centered around 18 squadrons for the last decade. 
Eighteen squadrons are going to comprise our F-35 transition 
for the last decade. That gives us the capability, the 
capacity, and the sustainability, long-term sustainability, to 
fly off of L-class ship amphibs, to fly off of carriers, to fly 
off of land-based, and to fly off of austere expeditionary air 
bases.
    The Commandant's decision to move to 18 squadrons, still 
the central part of our construct, but our 10 aircraft in those 
squadrons is the swiftest, most lethal and long-term 
sustainable construct of the 3 constructs we have had over the 
last 15 years as we have ramped up this transition in the 
program.
    Just to give you one short example, sir, cognizant of your 
time, this transition to 10 squadrons, we have found we have 
the ability now to deploy 10 F-35Bs, a full squadron onboard 
the MEUs [Marine expeditionary units], which as you know are 
globally deployed and engaged forward deployed. That is a 66 
percent increase in TACAIR firepower, fifth-gen TACAIR 
firepower, out on the point that was not available under any of 
the other constructs.
    So I am excited. The Marine Corps remains committed to 420, 
and I am excited at what this airplane will bring for the MAGTF 
[Marine air-ground task force], the joint force maritime 
component commander, and the joint force, sir.
    Dr. McCormick. Fantastic explanation. I appreciate that. 
And just with that, I will yield, with making sure we represent 
the rotary wings.
    General Cederholm. Love the 53 [CH-53 helicopter], sir.
    Dr. McCormick. Oorah.
    Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. McCormick. We will now go to 
Mr. Fallon.
    Mr. Fallon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, doctor, I thank 
you for bringing the crayons. I might use them later.
    You know, when we talk about fixed-wing aircrafts, it seems 
like there is something--it didn't matter what the service is. 
There is something that we have in common. It's delays, right? 
I mean, we are talking about upgrades are delayed, engines are 
delayed, new airframes, retirements, that kind of thing. So and 
delays usually mean extra costs.
    So what I wanted to ask was, and, you know, there seems to 
be a lot of handwringing as well and hey, we will do better in 
the future. But how can we, moving forward, prevent these 
really persistent delays? I'd just open it up to the esteemed 
panel if anybody wants to tackle that one.
    Mr. Hunter. Well, do you want your question--would you 
rather focus on F-35 or is your question broader, too?
    Mr. Fallon. Just in general like the next weapon system 
that we have, what can we do. And, yeah, I would love to touch 
on the F-35.
    Mr. Hunter. Yeah, well, let me just if I could talk a 
little bit, since I've talked about speed to ramp on 
Collaborative Combat Aircraft about that approach because we 
have a very--it is a very demanding schedule that we are 
forecasting for that program and so it will be a challenge.
    The way that we address that challenge, partly it is the 
resourcing, which starts quickly in this budget request. It is 
a substantial request for the Congress. Partly it is about 
having very, very, very disciplined and specifying requirements 
and not reaching for more than is achievable in the timeframe 
that we are trying to achieve. And that is the core in the--
when we go out to industry and ask them for proposals, the core 
will be making sure that what we are asking for is achievable 
in the timeframe in which we are asking it.
    And so I think that is that balance that we strike across 
many platforms. And so if you look at Block 4, that is a very 
sophisticated and advanced capability. We asked for it because 
it is essential to the fight that we see coming and so we need 
that capability. We asked for it on a fairly rapid timeframe. 
And I think that is where we got a little disconnected. And you 
see where we are today and that we wanted a very advanced 
capability, and we wanted it very quickly.
    I think when all is said and done, I am still reasonably 
optimistic that, you know, when all the dust settles, and we 
all look back and say given what we asked industry to do with 
the Block 4 capability, I think there is a chance we could 
still look back and say we actually accomplished that fairly 
quickly, but it wasn't as quickly as we initially projected and 
asked them to do.
    Mr. Fallon. General Schmidt, how many F-35s can we build in 
a year?
    General Schmidt. In a year, sir? One hundred fifty-six is 
our rate for----
    Mr. Fallon. Over a 12-month period?
    General Schmidt. Yes. We will deliver that in 2025. So we 
are a little less than that right now, but that is our Lot 70. 
Our FY23 is what we went on contract for, 156 per year. That is 
all together, U.S. and international.
    Mr. Fallon. And it is $90 million roughly?
    General Schmidt. For an F-35A is about $82.5 million, and 
yes, sir, and higher for Bs and Cs.
    Mr. Fallon. You know, I'm just worried about when you look 
forward, if God forbid, we had to get into some kind of a 
conflict in Asia with China over Taiwan or something like that, 
you know, what we are seeing in Ukraine about just attrition 
and making sure that, I mean, these are obviously very 
expensive, but that we would have the capability to replace our 
losses.
    Do you feel confident as far as the F-35 goes that we 
could? I mean, are you talking assuming a pretty significant 
conflict with a major power like China?
    General Schmidt. So I think you are maybe asking a broader 
question, sir, which is should we invest in additional capacity 
to deal with? Is that what you are asking, sir, I think?
    Mr. Fallon. Yeah.
    General Schmidt. We can--that is a decision, you know, we 
can all make or discuss is the value of investing in additional 
capacity to deal with real-world things.
    General Schmidt. You think the F-35 is----
    Mr. Stefany. Sir, if I could jump in maybe to help the 
general. The limiter right now is a single company that makes 
the fuselage, Northrop Grumman. So we can bring a--and we are 
looking to bring a second company in to help that line and move 
that limit to a higher, right? We are limited by just having a 
single fuselage maker.
    Mr. Fallon. And is the greatest threat to an F-35 another 
aircraft that is maybe a fifth-gen or is it SAMs [surface-to-
air missiles] and, you know, the A2/ADs [anti-access/area 
denial]?
    Mr. Hunter. Yes, sir, I would say it is all of the above. 
And it really depends on what mission the F-35 is engaged in. A 
ground strike mission it is going to be the SAMs and A2/AD. And 
in an air-to-air mission, it is going to be those enemy 
aircraft.
    Mr. Fallon. Okay. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I yield back. 
Thank you.
    Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Fallon. We will go to our 
members and see if anybody else has any additional questions. 
Mr. Gimenez?
    Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So we are talking 
about--I want to follow up on my colleague, Mr. Bacon, and the 
production. And I am really concerned about retiring 400 
aircraft and not having the replacement for those 400 aircraft 
because we don't know when the next fight is. And my concern is 
that we have too few and not enough replacement. So we are 
going back to this F-35 and the production.
    You were asking for, I believe, what, 72 additional 
aircraft. How many were F-35s?
    General Moore. Forty-eight F-35s and 24 F-15EXs.
    Mr. Gimenez. Yes. We can produce 100 and something, 150 
aircraft a year. So is that based on budget or is that based on 
what you want or what you need? Because I want to know--I want 
to base our production on what you need. And I am not sure that 
what you are asking for is what you need. I think that what you 
are asking for is what you think you can afford.
    General Moore. So I think it is a combination. There 
certainly is an affordability component, not just in procuring 
the airplanes, but also in maintaining and operating them. 
There is a manpower component in how rapidly we can bring on 
pilots and maintainers, and there is also a production line 
capacity.
    So all of those things come together and that is how 48 
comes to be. So in a world with unlimited resources, there 
could certainly be a different number. But in the world that we 
operate in where both manpower, production line capacity, as 
well as budget top line all come into play, 48 is where we 
landed in this budget. And 72 has been the number we have used 
for the last several cycles to say that that is the minimum 
that we need to both bring down the fleet age and increase our 
capability.
    Mr. Gimenez. Again, you kind of went around, but I think 
that the answer is a lot of it has to do with the budget, what 
your budget constraints are. And I was asked the question about 
what we need to spend on defense. And my answer was whatever we 
need to spend on defense is what we need to spend on defense.
    And, again, that 400 number of fewer aircraft really 
concerns me until we get the CCAs. And actually, what I would 
like to see is just the CCAs be an additional capability and 
not just supplanting, you know, the other combat aircraft. So 
if it is budget, then Mr. Chairman, I think we need to deal 
with that.
    Mr. Wittman. Very good.
    General Moore. Yes, sir. And we do not intend for CCAs to 
reduce the number of manned fighters in the inventory. They are 
intended to do exactly as you mentioned, to augment, to create 
mass in an affordable way.
    Mr. Wittman. Very good. Thanks, Mr. Gimenez. Dr. McCormick, 
any additional questions?
    Dr. McCormick. No.
    Mr. Wittman. All right. Very good. Listen, I appreciate the 
box of crayons up there. Could you hand me one? They are all 
there, though, right? They are all there. I love it. I love it. 
Don, any additional questions?
    Mr. Norcross. No. I just want to thank the witnesses. 
Obviously, a very large topic and thanks for coming here and 
sharing your testimony. And to those who are behind you, 
figuratively, I thank them also.
    Mr. Wittman. Very good. I do have one concluding question 
for Secretary Hunter. I want to look a little bit more at the 
T-7 program. It was supposed to be the Air Force's marquee 
digital engineering and production program. However, we see the 
award of the production contract has actually slipped by 3 
years.
    We are at a point right now where the prime contractor, 
Boeing, is going to get underway without there being a formal 
contract. I just want to know, how does the Air Force and the 
Defense Contract Management Agency [DCMA] plan to do proper 
oversight and look at the assembly and production of the 
aircraft without having a contract, a formal contract, awarded. 
Do you have any concerns about the prime contract, beginning 
production without a contract?
    Mr. Hunter. So as you have indicated, Boeing has notified 
the Air Force they intend to begin production of the initial T-
7s at risk. So that is at their risk.
    We have been working with DCMA to come up with a solution 
where they can do observation of the production process so that 
when we get to the point of accepting aircraft, we will know 
that it in fact meets our requirements. And, again, the at risk 
part means if when we get there it doesn't meet our 
requirement, Boeing will then have to pay for any corrections 
to any deficiencies that are identified.
    But actually, I think your staff highlighted this issue 
about DCMA and its ability to work on the program when Boeing 
is at risk to us. And we believe we have identified a path 
forward which we are in the process of implementing to get them 
engaged in that.
    Mr. Wittman. Okay. Very good. It would be great for us to 
have up-to-date information as you pursue that. Listen, it is 
great that Boeing is willing to jump out there and take the 
risk on T-7, but we also don't want to get too far in the risk 
category and then have things grind to a halt because things 
have gone far awry or there is a lack of communication between 
the Air Force and Boeing on what is necessary.
    So it can end up okay. But I want to make sure that we 
understand, you know, where things could also go awry. And GAO 
obviously highlighted that to us and wanted us to make sure 
that we were aware of that. And obviously, there is risk on 
both sides.
    It is great that Boeing is willing to take risk. But there 
is significant risk, too, on the Air Force's side. So we 
definitely want to make sure that we are kept informed as that 
continues to go forward.
    Mr. Hunter. Yes. And I should note that we did have a 
substantial achievement in February of getting through 
performing a sled test, dealing with some of the issues with 
the escape system that we were hung up on that would allow us 
to get to military flight release and begin the developmental 
tasks. So we are now moving forward from areas where the 
program had gotten stalled.
    Mr. Wittman. Okay. Very good. Thank you, Secretary Hunter. 
I want to thank again our witnesses. Thank you so much for 
joining us today. Incredibly helpful. Lots of things going on 
with tactical aircraft. That is both a challenge, but a good 
thing too that we are moving forward in a lot of these 
different areas.
    Please keep us informed on the progress that is being made. 
There will be, I'm sure, much additional discussion by the full 
committee as we go forward with T-135, F-35, retirements, the 
whole realm of what happens in the tactical aircraft realm.
    So I appreciate what you all do. We look forward to 
continued conversations. And with that, this hearing is 
adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 5:23 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]


      
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                            A P P E N D I X

                             March 29, 2023

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              PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                             March 29, 2023

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              QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                             March 29, 2023

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                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN

    Mr. Wittman. According to the F-35 JPO, the F-35 Block 4 upgrade is 
estimated to require 32Kw, and up to 51kW of power and cooling for 
planned capabilities fielded beyond Block 4 on the F-35 roadmap being 
developed by JPO and the services via the recently awarded Lockheed 
Systems Engineering Integration and Testing (SEI&T) contract. What is 
the Air Force's required power and cooling requirements growth profile 
for full Block 4 and future Block of capabilities beyond Block 4? When 
will the Air Force validate and formalize these power and cooling 
requirements for the service-life of the F-35A?
    Mr. Hunter. Air Force F-35 requirements beyond Block 4 have not yet 
been formalized and validated. Air Combat Command is working with the 
F-35 JPO to formalize requirements for known (intended) future 
capabilities. The timeline for formalizing known (potential) future 
capabilities is yet to be determined.
    Mr. Wittman. What is Air Combat Command's current performance 
capabilities requirements estimate for F-35A power, cooling, aircraft 
combat radius beyond full Block 4 capabilities during the service-life 
of the F-35A?
    Mr. Hunter. Air system power and cooling capacity requirements are 
derived from required mission system upgrades. Power and cooling 
requirements for known (potential) future capabilities beyond Block 4 
during the service-life of the F-35A are still evolving. With respect 
to aircraft combat range, emerging threat capabilities may warrant 
modifying operational requirements to extend the F-35 combat radius.
    Mr. Wittman. The subcommittee understands that HAF/A5, in 
coordination with Air Combat Command, performed an operational 
assessment regarding baseline F135, F135 ECU, and AETP technologies and 
what each propulsion system modernization capability provided to F-35A 
regarding thrust, subsonic and transonic acceleration improvements, 
combat radius, external weapons carriage capacity, weapons kinematic 
employment, fuel efficiency, and aerial refueling aircraft support. 
What were the specific results of the Air Force's operational analysis 
for each of the 3 configurations of available propulsion system 
technologies regarding F-35A thrust, subsonic and transonic 
acceleration improvements, combat radius, external weapons carriage 
capacity or limitations, weapons kinematic employment improvements, 
fuel efficiency, and aerial refueling aircraft support.
    Mr. Hunter. The results of the Air Force Operational Benefits 
Analysis and F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO) Business Case Analysis 
(BCA) determined the Adaptive Engine Transition Program (AETP) engines 
met the operational needs and provided the best overall F-35A 
operational performance, including significantly more range, better 
fuel efficiency, and increased thrust. However, the F135 Engine Core 
Upgrade will restore engine life and prevent degradation for all three 
F-35 variants at an affordable cost. Findings from these and other 
operational analyses informed the DOD decision to move forward with the 
F135 Engine Core Upgrade and accompanying power and thermal management 
system upgrades.
    Mr. Wittman. In what way(s) is the USAF leveraging onboard serial 
bus data to increase fleet readiness and drive cost efficiencies across 
the service's maintenance processes?
    General Moore. The following response was drafted by the 
Secretariat for Acquisition and Air Staff for Logistics, Installations, 
and Mission Support.
    The Department of the Air Force has developed a Condition Based 
Maintenance Strategic Implementation Plan. The plan integrates 
predictive analytics using Artificial Intelligence & Machine Learning, 
data from sensor-based systems, and enhanced reliability centered 
maintenance. The Air Force can predict failures and enable maintainers, 
at field and depot level, to replace components at opportune times to 
maximize aircraft availability using all these technologies.
    Mr. Wittman. Readiness is the backbone to the Department's ability 
to project power and keep the Homeland safe; how does the USAF 
determine readiness across aircraft fleets, particularly at the 
platform level? How is the USAF considering, leveraging, and 
integrating onboard platform data to make informed decisions about 
conditions-based and predictive maintenance requirements?
    General Moore. The following response was drafted by Secretariat 
for Acquisition and Air Staff for Logistics, Installations, and Mission 
Support.
    Lead Commands will establish availability standards and capability 
goals in accordance with Air Force policy and guidance. Readiness for 
each mission design series is calculated annually using prescribed 
equations and subject to recurring senior leader oversight. For 
example, the Air Force Material Command Readiness of Combat 
Capabilities Review provides program performance details relative to 
the established lead command standards and requirements.
    And as stated in the previous question, the Department of the Air 
Force has developed a Condition Based Maintenance Strategic 
Implementation Plan to leverage various technologies to maximize 
aircraft availability.
    Mr. Wittman. According to the F-35 JPO, the F-35 Block 4 upgrade is 
estimated to require 32Kw and up to 51kW of power and cooling for 
planned capabilities fielded beyond Block 4 on the F-35 roadmap being 
developed with JPO and the Lockheed Systems Engineering Integration and 
Testing (SEI&T) contract. What is the Navy's and Marine Corps' required 
power and cooling requirements growth profile for Block 4 and future 
Block(s) of capabilities beyond Block 4 for the service-life of the F-
35B and F-35C? When will the Navy and Marine Corps formalize these 
requirements?
    Mr. Stefany. The Engine Core Upgrades (ECU) and Power Thermal 
Management System (PTMS) modernization efforts will support Block 4 
capability requirements and restore the F135 service life and drive 
down sustainment costs. The services are continuing to work with the F-
35 Program Office to define and validate requirements associated with 
air vehicle integration and beyond Block 4 mission systems 
enhancements. A draft statement of requirements is being circulated 
among stakeholders for review and ultimate approval.
    Mr. Wittman. Does F-35B currently deploy or operate on any Navy 
aircraft carriers?
    How would onboard CVN maintenance operations be affected--
positively or negatively--with installation of AETP technology into F-
35C?
    Admiral Loiselle. No Sir, the F-35B does not currently deploy or 
operate on any Navy aircraft carriers. Navy aircraft carriers are not 
designed to support fixed-wing VSTOL operations since they lack 
modifications to the landing area required to support F-35B operations. 
Due to the developmental nature of AETP and its focus on integration 
with the F-35A, impacts to onboard CVN maintenance operations are 
unknown at this time. The DON does anticipate onboard CVN maintenance 
operations would likely be negatively affected by the installation of 
AETP technology into F-35C due to the following:
    1.  The modular design of the F135 permits the transport of 
replacement modules to and from the CVN in the CMV-22; to limit impact 
to CVN maintenance operations, AETP would need to be of similar modular 
design to prevent negative impacts.
    2.  Negative impacts to CVN maintenance operations are also 
anticipated supporting a bifurcated fleet. Until production capacity 
and operational demands support the retrofit of all F-35C aircraft, 
parts and spares for two engines will be required, negatively impacting 
the already limited space on the CVN.
    3.  Lastly, negative impacts of bifurcation will be realized given 
the Marine Corps has no plans to procure AETP for installation in F-
35C. The AETP is not compatible with F-35B, which is the variant that 
comprises a majority of the Marine Corps' fleet. Bifurcating the USMC 
propulsion fleet, and the overall F-35 enterprise fleet, would be cost 
prohibitive.
    Mr. Wittman. Does F-35C currently deploy or operate on any Navy 
large-deck amphibious ships?
    How would onboard large-deck amphibious ship maintenance operations 
be affected--positively or negatively--with installation of F135 ECU 
technology into F-35B?
    Admiral Loiselle. No Sir, F-35C does not currently deploy or 
operate on any Navy large-deck amphibious ships. Amphibious ships are 
not designed to facilitate F-35C operations, and lack the arresting 
gear and catapults required for the F-35C to take-off from and land on 
amphibious ships.
    The DON anticipates onboard amphibious ship maintenance operations 
should not be significantly affected by Engine Core Upgrade (ECU) 
technology inclusion in F-35B aircraft. As ECU installations occur 
through the 2030s, there will be a bifurcated propulsion fleet since 
F135 will continue service in non-upgraded aircraft until their 
scheduled overhauls occur. However, the DON assesses the potential 
maintenance impacts can be mitigated by inventory management and 
deployment planning that ensures the ability to employ all-ECU or all-
F135 Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU) is possible. Additionally, 
similar ECU/F135 designs should limit the need to deploy with 
significantly different support equipment on potential ECU/F135 mixed 
deployments.
    Mr. Wittman. Does F-35B currently deploy or operate on any Navy 
aircraft carriers?
    How would onboard CVN maintenance operations be affected--
positively or negatively--with installation of AETP technology into F-
35C?
    General Cederholm. No Sir, the F-35B does not currently deploy or 
operate on any Navy aircraft carriers. Navy aircraft carriers are not 
designed to support fixed-wing VSTOL operations since they lack 
modifications to the landing area required to support F-35B operations.
    Due to the developmental nature of AETP and its focus on 
integration with the F-35A, impacts to onboard CVN maintenance 
operations are unknown at this time. The DON does anticipate onboard 
CVN maintenance operations would likely be negatively affected by the 
installation of AETP technology into F-35C due to the following:
    1.  The modular design of the F135 permits the transport of 
replacement modules to and from the CVN in the CMV-22; to limit impact 
to CVN maintenance operations, AETP would need to be of similar modular 
design to prevent negative impacts.
    2.  Negative impacts to CVN maintenance operations are also 
anticipated supporting a bifurcated fleet. Until production capacity 
and operational demands support the retrofit of all F-35C aircraft, 
parts and spares for two engines will be required, negatively impacting 
the already limited space on the CVN.
    3.  Lastly, negative impacts of bifurcation will be realized given 
the Marine Corps has no plans to procure AETP for installation in F-
35C. The AETP is not compatible with F-35B, which is the variant that 
comprises a majority of the Marine Corps' fleet. Bifurcating the USMC 
propulsion fleet, and the overall F-35 enterprise fleet, would be cost 
prohibitive.
    Mr. Wittman. Does F-35C currently deploy or operate on any Navy 
large-deck amphibious ships?
    How would onboard large-deck amphibious ship maintenance operations 
be affected--positively or negatively--with installation of F135 ECU 
technology into F-35B?
    General Cederholm. No Sir, F-35C does not currently deploy or 
operate on any Navy large-deck amphibious ships. Amphibious ships are 
not designed to facilitate F-35C operations, and lack the arresting 
gear and catapults required for the F-35C to take-off from and land on 
amphibious ships.
    The DON anticipates onboard amphibious ship maintenance operations 
should not be significantly affected by Engine Core Upgrade (ECU) 
technology inclusion in F-35B aircraft. As ECU installations occur 
through the 2030s, there will be a bifurcated propulsion fleet since 
F135 will continue service in non-upgraded aircraft until their 
scheduled overhauls occur. However, the DON assesses the potential 
maintenance impacts can be mitigated by inventory management and 
deployment planning that ensures the ability to employ all-ECU or all-
F135 Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU) is possible. Additionally, 
similar ECU/F135 designs should limit the need to deploy with 
significantly different support equipment on potential ECU/F135 mixed 
deployments.
    Mr. Wittman. Understanding that only the F135 ECU can integrate 
into the F-35B platform, will the F-35B be limited to only hosting 
Block 4 capabilities during the service-life of the F-35B aircraft due 
to limitations on integrating additional power and cooling capacity, 
and vertical lift aircraft performance requirements?
    General Schmidt. The existing F135 engine and the 32-kW Power 
Thermal Management System (PTMS) effort, currently on contract with 
Lockheed Martin, support the necessary capabilities for all Block 4 in 
development but not full implementation. The Business Case Analysis 
(BCA) studied additional configurations and capabilities beyond Block 4 
to ensure the cooling, electrical, and fuel thermal management systems 
will be able to support future capability growth. The Engine Core 
Upgrade (ECU) & PTMS Modernization will restore full engine life, 
increase vertical lift, and provide additional cooling for future 
capability growth. This is common for all 3 variants and is not unique 
to only the F-35B.
    Mr. Wittman. Is F-35B planned to field capability beyond Block 4 
and what power, cooling, and aircraft flight performance limitations 
are currently known as Lockheed's Systems Engineering Integration and 
Testing (SEI&T) contract with F-35 JPO has progressed in its analysis?
    General Schmidt. In order to ensure the F-35 continues to outpace 
threats, all three Services intend to add capabilities on all variants 
beyond Block 4. The most notable limitation for incorporation of future 
capabilities is the Power Thermal Management System (PTMS), which will 
require an upgrade regardless of engine solution. While current F135 
engine can support further cooling with a new PTMS design, it will come 
at the cost of a greater reduction in engine life and future 
performance. Therefore, to support the future capabilities roadmap, a 
new PTMS and Engine Core Upgrade (ECU) is required to overcome current 
limitations and restore engine life. In addition to PTMS, electrical 
power systems and fuel thermal management system (FTMS) upgrades may be 
required. In terms of performance limitations, the current F135 
propulsion system is expected to run out of Vertical Landing Bring Back 
(VLBB) margin by Lot 19 for F-35B. Additionally, for externally-carried 
heavy weapons, preliminary analysis indicates operational limitations 
imposed related to weight, center of gravity, airspeed, altitude, and 
weapons employment.
    Mr. Wittman. Will any F-35 aircraft variant be required to 
implement additional Bleed and Burn operations with F135 ECU to host 
capabilities at 47-51kW of power and cooling required for the service-
life of any F-35 aircraft variant? If so, what service-life and/or cost 
impacts will this pose on F-35 variant aircraft during the service-life 
of each aircraft variant?
    General Schmidt. Bleed and Burn (BnB) remains one of the options 
being assessed as part of the Program's System's Engineering and 
Manufacturing Design (EMD) Phase for the Power Thermal Management 
System (PTMS) solution set to meet future mission system cooling 
requirements. There would be no impact to engine life; however, there 
could be a small reduction in combat radius and potentially a life 
impact on the PTMS which is being assessed. The limiting factors for 
using BnB would be related to the PTMS system, not the engine.
    Mr. Wittman. What is the unrefueled combat radius, subsonic and 
transonic acceleration capabilities of an F-35C with an F135, ECU, 
XA100, and XA101 installed?
    General Schmidt. Based on the results of the analysis conducted by 
Lockheed Martin, Pratt and Whitney, GE, and the Government, the 
following combat radius and acceleration values were calculated for 
each of the configurations assessed for the F-35C.

        Note--No values were calculated for the XA-101 as it was 
        determined that the modifications required for it to fit into 
        the F-35C were too extensive to be meet cost and schedule 

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    Mr. Wittman. Would F-35C weapons bring-back onto CVN 
limitations be positively or negatively impacted with installation of 
AETP technology into F-35C?
    General Schmidt. A full system engineering and shipboard 
integration assessment, for both the aircraft and the aircraft carrier, 
is required to address any weight and performance impacts associated 
with installing and operating an F-35C with AETP afloat.
    Mr. Wittman. How would installation of AETP technology into F-35C 
address the time limitation issue with flight time in afterburner on 
the F-35C currently with F135 baseline or F135 ECU installed?
    General Schmidt. The afterburner limitation is temperature and time 
driven, as it relates to the proximity of the exhaust plume to the 
airframe. The JPO will not be able to fully understand the change, if 
any, to this limitation for AETP or Engine Core Upgrade (ECU) for any 
variant most likely until the completion of flight test.
    Mr. Wittman. Are the XA100 and XA101 compatible with the F-35A and 
F-35C? What airframe modifications, if any, are required for each 
engine to integrate AETP technology into each variant?
    General Schmidt. Yes, we believe that both XA engines are 
compatible with the F-35A and the F-35C, although only limited AETP 
engine and airframe integration analysis was performed for both 
options. The JPO AV engineering team--who is responsible for the 
structural loads, fatigue life, thermal management, flying qualities, 
and weight and balance impacts of integrating these engines--would need 
a more in-depth review of the analysis in order to identify all risk 
areas where life impacts or modifications may exist. Specifically for 
the F-35C tailhook, we do know that both XA engines would require 
airframe modifications.
    Mr. Wittman. What additional operational level maintenance support 
equipment and/or tooling is required above the support equipment 
required for the F135 or F135 ECU in order to sufficiently maintain 
either the XA100 or XA101 in the field?
    General Schmidt. Our sustainment & cost team reviewed the AETP & 
Engine Core Upgrade (ECU configuration for the BCA and assessed that 
AETP has zero commonality to the F135, while the ECU will have roughly 
60% commonality. AETP is a new engine requiring all new infrastructure 
from the ground up for support equipment, tooling, publications, 
spares, etc., while the ECU requires new support only for those 
redesigned sections of the engine.
    Mr. Wittman. Are there any major obstacles to exporting AETP 
technology to F-35 program Partners or current/planned FMS customers?
    General Schmidt. Lieutenant General Schmidt has no input, since it 
is outside of the JPO's decision-making jurisdiction. The AETP PMO 
provided the following:
    Air Force Life Cycle Management Center (AFLCMC)--There are no 
anticipated major obstacles to exporting AETP technology to some or 
possibly all F-35 program Partners or current/planned FMS customers. 
The Air Force recently approved an AETP Topline to initiate the 
exportability process, but an export decision has not been made at this 
time.
    Mr. Wittman. Understanding the F135 gearbox will likely need to be 
redesigned and retrofitted to support higher electrical power demands, 
at which point in time and for which capabilities can the gearbox no 
longer support mission systems? What is the cost estimate for 
redesigning and retrofitting a new F135 gearbox?
    General Schmidt. The current F135 gearbox can support up to 47 kW 
levels of horsepower extraction. This is the structural design limit of 
the gearbox. A study is underway to determine what capabilities can be 
supported at this limit.
    The Engine Core Upgrade (ECU) is contracted to meet the 62 kW 
installation requirements, and a gearbox upgrade is part of the ECU 
design. The ECU and gearbox upgrade are installed at an F135 scheduled 
depot overhaul, and it is estimated that the gearbox upgrade during 
that overhaul will be roughly 8% greater than today's estimate. First 
engine overhauls begin this year, so actual costs are not yet known.
    If AETP was pursued, it would also need an upgraded gearbox in line 
with the requirements levied on ECU, but it would need to be a fully 
purchased spare instead of a depot overhaul upgrade.
    Mr. Wittman. What Fuel Thermal Management System (FTMS) 
modifications are necessary to support additional cooling capacity for 
any combination of PTMS and F135 baseline, ECU, and AETP propulsion 
technologies? What is the cost, engineering analysis and technical risk 
assessment to date that has been completed to assess FTMS modifications 
for all propulsion options evaluated? What maintenance actions and 
schedule duration would be involved to modify existing FTMS systems on 
fielded aircraft to host additional cooling capabilities beyond 32kW of 
power and cooling capacity?
    General Schmidt. Overall, AETP engines performed better than any 
two-stream engine (F135, ECU--Engine Core Upgrade) because of the 
superior heat rejection from the cooled third stream. This means that 
more heat would need to be rejected into the fuel for F135 and ECU than 
for AETP, imparting additional thermal stress on the Fuel Thermal 
Management System (FTMS). At higher mission system demand loads, such 
as those seen in the 62kW configuration, more extensive FTMS 
modifications will likely be necessary for ECU and F135 than for AETP.
    Multiple FTMS technologies are being assessed on both the engine 
and PTMS to address the potential, additional heat transfer to the fuel 
system. Additional studies are necessary to fully quantify which system 
is necessary and what the costs are to upgrade those systems, as it is 
still highly dependent on the engine design, PTMS, and the maximum 
necessary mission system cooling solution. This will be addressed 
through the standard engineering development and the design phase and 
review process.
    For a more comprehensive review of impacts of future capabilities 
on the FTMS please refer to section 5.3 of the BCA report--Fuel Thermal 
Management System (FTMS) Results.
    Mr. Wittman. Did the BCA directly assess the F-35 aircraft's 
electrical power system (EPS) as it relates to hosting additional 
capabilities and power/thermal management capacity requirements? Were 
any limitations of the existing EPS uncovered? If so, please describe 
and what actions would be necessary to accommodate hosting mission 
system capabilities beyond Block 4 systems?
    General Schmidt. The BCA did not directly assess the electrical 
power system. However, as potential planned mission system upgrades 
were evaluated, the limitations of the existing electrical power system 
(EPS) were uncovered. Other than the F135 gearbox, the EPS limitations 
are independent of the engine and/or PTMS solution. Any new engine (ECU 
or AETP) will require a gearbox redesigned for the anticipated higher 
electrical demand of future mission systems. The F135 gearbox, however, 
would eventually be unable to support the electrical demands of 
additional mission systems beyond the 47kW capability class.
    The aircraft electrical distribution system is also limited, with 
the F-35C having the least margin for growth and the F-35A having the 
most. Several options on minimizing impacts of future capabilities on 
the electrical distribution system were initially assessed as part of 
the BCA. Additional studies are underway to fully understand the 
electrical risks and the options to address future capability growth.
    For a more comprehensive review of the impacts from future 
capabilities on the electrical system please refer to section 5.4 of 
the BCA report--Electrical Power System (EPS) Results.
    Mr. Wittman. Does the JPO plan to remove the F-35's Engine Ice 
Protection System (EIPS) from each aircraft variant of the F-35? If so, 
why? What risks are involved by removing the EIPS? If the EIPS is not 
removed from each aircraft variant, how does this affect each aircraft 
variant's ability to support mission system capability growth that 
would require at least 47kW of power and cooling capacity?
    General Schmidt. The Engine Ice Protection System (EIPS) removal is 
undergoing studies as part of continued affordability improvement, to 
determine the operational impacts of removing this system. The removal 
decision will be part of the next steering boards discussion, which 
includes US Services & Partners assessment and approval of any changes.
    Removing the EIPS would help mitigate the electrical margin 
shortfall, but it would not be fully sufficient, depending on how many 
mission systems are added. A study to address the safety impacts of 
removing the EIPS is well underway, and sufficient data will be 
available to support a decision this upcoming Fall of 2023. If EIPS is 
not removed, electrical power growth will be a significant concern for 
all three F-35 variants. For capability growth beyond a 47kW roadmap, 
costly upgrades may be required, including an upgraded Engine Starter/
Generator (ES/G), upgraded Inverter Converter Controller (ICCs), extra 
contactors, and larger wires. These costs are not known at this time 
and are therefore not included in the Business Case Analysis (BCA).
    Mr. Wittman. Did the BCA analyze all aircraft integration 
activities required for the modernization of all aircraft variants of 
the F-35 regarding propulsion and thermal management systems necessary 
to increase power and thermal management cooling capabilities and 
capacity for the service-life duration of the F-35 aircraft? What 
aircraft integration considerations, if any, were not addressed in the 
BCA and what aircraft integration considerations are considered 
incomplete and require further study and assessment?
    General Schmidt. The full integration and required testing 
activities of a new engine, Power Thermal Management System (PTMS), and 
Fuel Thermal Management System (FTMS) was beyond the scope of the 
Business Case Analysis (BCA). The integration of a new engine, PTMS and 
any other required systems modification will be assessed through the 
program's Systems Engineering development and design phase, as well as 
through all design reviews common to all new design activities. 
Preliminary Design Review is the first event-driven activity that will 
address the integration and full system risks that might not have been 
assessed in the BCA.
                                 ______
                                 
                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COURTNEY
    Mr. Courtney. The FY24 budget requests $254.685 million for F-35A 
F135 Engine Modernization. What are the long-term impacts if an engine 
core upgrade is not fully funded for the F-35A in FY24?
    Mr. Hunter. If the engine core upgrade is not fully funded, we will 
have delayed fielding of improved F-35 capabilities and restoration of 
engine life, with impacts to the organic industrial base.
    Mr. Courtney. Does PTMS modernization and an engine core upgrade 
provide the necessary capabilities for Block 4 aircraft?
    Mr. Hunter. Yes, the Power Thermal Management System (PTMS) 
modernization and engine core upgrade will provide sufficient power and 
cooling capacity for Block 4 aircraft while also restoring engine life 
for each of the variants.
    Mr. Courtney. What are the risks associated with fielding all new 
technology and an unproven system? And what are the sustainment impacts 
for future costs of a bifurcated fleet with multiple engines?
    Mr. Hunter. In the full context of risk to the integration of AETP 
technology, it should be considered that three stream adaptive engine 
technology has been in development for nearly two decades, and the AETP 
engines themselves have been in design and development for over a 
decade with significant investment in their maturation. Prototype 
engines have been built and run, and AETP is in the final stages of 
design maturation. Additionally, some aircraft integration work has 
been completed with AETP; however, additional work remains. For 
example, comprehensive airframe structural analysis, stability and 
controls development, air vehicle subsystem interoperability, support 
equipment and maintenance tool (ALIS/ODIN) updates, and dedicated 
flight test and certification. If the Air Force were to procure AETP, a 
bifurcated fleet would require the USAF to either realign existing or 
establish new sustainment infrastructure (e.g., depot facilities, 
support equipment, spares, manpower, training, contracts, and technical 
manuals) to support a two-engine fleet (F135 ECU and AETP). Although 
AETP design requirements pushed maximum re-use of existing support 
equipment and tooling, further analysis and development is required to 
determine how much interchangeability can exist between F135 ECU and 
AETP. The Air Force has successfully managed similar sustainment 
impacts with the introduction of the F110 engine into the F-16 and 
subsequently the introduction of both the F110-GE-129 and F100-PW-229 
improved performance engines into the F-16 and F-15 fleets.
    Mr. Courtney. Does PTMS modernization and an engine core upgrade 
provide the necessary capabilities for Block 4 aircraft?
    General Moore. As indicated by Honorable Hunter, the PTMS 
modernization and engine core upgrade meets the current requirements 
approved by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. The propulsion 
modernization for the F35 is required to acquire the Block-4 
capabilities necessary to win in a highly contested environment.
    Mr. Courtney. What are the risks associated with fielding all new 
technology and an unproven system? And what are the sustainment impacts 
for future costs of a bifurcated fleet with multiple engines?
    General Moore. The following response was drafted by the 
Secretariat for Acquisition and Air Staff for Logistics, Installations, 
and Mission Support.
    The Department of the Air Force is focused on delivering 
transformational operational capabilities as quickly as possible. All 
new technologies and systems are rigorously evaluated, tested, and 
validated before they are fielded. The rigorous process reduces risk to 
the greatest extent possible, while meeting guidelines and criteria for 
operational safety, reliability, and sustainability.
    Sustaining a bifurcated fleet with multiple engines is likely to 
increase life cycle operating and support (O&S) costs, since the Air 
Force would need to maintain two separate engine maintenance and repair 
pipelines. However, the operational benefits could outweigh additional 
cost sustainment issues. Additionally, competition between multiple 
engine manufacturers may promote better engine performance, increased 
engine reliability, and improved contractor responsiveness. A second 
engine production line may also enable engine production to surge 
during contingencies.
    Mr. Courtney. The FY24 budget requests $120.881 million for F-35B 
F135 Engine Modernization. What are the long-term impacts if an engine 
core upgrade is not fully funded for the F-35B in FY24?
    Mr. Stefany. The services fully funded development of PTMS and 
propulsion modernization across the FYDP based on the estimate 
available at the time of budget submission. These funding levels are in 
alignment with established cost share ratios. Any change to an 
individual service's funding levels would result in a proportional 
adjustment by the other services or developmental efforts will be 
delayed until funding is available for the Marine Corps share.
    Mr. Courtney. The FY24 budget requests $56.259 million for F-35C 
F135 Engine Modernization. What are the long-term impacts if an engine 
core upgrade is not fully funded for the F-35C in FY24?
    Mr. Stefany. There is an adjustment in work by the program office 
and Navy to align funds across the FYDP that were inadvertently entered 
for the Power Thermal Management System (PTMS) project unit instead of 
the Engine Core Upgrade project unit in the budget submission. Once 
that adjustment is complete, the services will have fully funded 
development of PTMS and propulsion modernization across the FYDP based 
on the estimate available at the time of budget submission. These 
funding levels are in alignment with established cost share ratios. Any 
change to an individual service's funding levels would result in a 
proportional adjustment by the other services or developmental efforts 
will be delayed until funding is available for the Navy's share.
    Mr. Courtney. Does PTMS modernization and an engine core upgrade 
provide the necessary capabilities for Block 4 aircraft?
    Mr. Stefany. Yes, PTMS modernization and an Engine Core Upgrade 
(ECU) will provide the necessary capabilities for Block 4. The Navy and 
Marine Corps are currently working with the F-35 Program Office to 
validate and explore PTMS/ECU capability to support follow-on growth 
(beyond Block 4) for additional mission systems enhancements.
    Mr. Courtney. What are the risks associated with fielding all new 
technology and an unproven system? And what are the sustainment impacts 
for future costs of a bifurcated fleet with multiple engines?
    Mr. Stefany. The risks associated with fielding all new technology 
and an unproven system are similar to any other program fielding a new 
technology. Development timelines, cost estimate accuracy, and 
capability performance are among the areas of concern. The F135 ECU is 
currently the only option available to support all variants as AETP is 
not compatible with the F-35B and will likely require modifications to 
accommodate the F-35C. The Navy and Marine Corps have no plans to 
procure AETP for incorporation into F-35C.
    If USAF procures the AETP, it will bifurcate the F-35 Enterprise 
and break apart the existing sustainment infrastructure. A decision to 
procure AETP would impact all US Services as well as Partners and FMS 
customers in two ways. First, and most notably, it would require the 
USAF to establish a completely new sustainment infrastructure (depot 
facilities, SE, spares, manpower, training, etc.) quickly to support a 
large existing fleet along with their remaining F135 engines. Likewise, 
the financial requirement for the rest of the partnership, to include 
the DON, will also increase as the baseline of the joint program was to 
leverage commonality to maximize cost savings. Second, the current 
infrastructure funded and established would need to be realigned, 
agreements with our Partners would be broken, and sustainment costs 
would rise due to the significant reduction in shared resources and 
reduced quantities of scale. Per the BCA, it is estimated that a 
decision to pursue both AETP and ECU would result in roughly an 
additional $30B Life Cycle Cost increase while adding overall readiness 
risks across the entire program.
     Mr. Courtney. Does PTMS modernization and an engine core upgrade 
provide the necessary capabilities for Block 4 aircraft?
    Admiral Loiselle. Yes, PTMS modernization and an Engine Core 
Upgrade (ECU) provide the necessary capabilities for Block 4 aircraft. 
The services are currently working with the JPO to validate and explore 
PTMS/ECU capability to support follow-on growth (beyond Block 4) for 
additional mission systems enhancements.
    Mr. Courtney. What are the risks associated with fielding all new 
technology and an unproven system? And what are the sustainment impacts 
for future costs of a bifurcated fleet with multiple engines?
    Admiral Loiselle. The primary risk associated with fielding all new 
technology and an unproven system is cost. From a procurement 
perspective, the cost of producing an AETP engine (essentially a 
completely new engine) versus a core upgrade to the F135 is 
substantial; bifurcating the propulsion fleet, and the overall F-35 
enterprise fleet, would likely be cost prohibitive.
    Given the significant differences between F135/ECU and AETP, the 
sustainment impacts of a bifurcated fleet would include increased costs 
associated with requirements for additional manpower, different support 
equipment, training and subject matter expertise.
    Mr. Courtney. Does PTMS modernization and an engine core upgrade 
provide the necessary capabilities for Block 4 aircraft?
    General Cederholm. Yes, PTMS modernization and an Engine Core 
Upgrade (ECU) provide the necessary capabilities for Block 4 aircraft. 
The services are currently working with the JPO to validate and explore 
PTMS/ECU capability to support follow-on growth (beyond Block 4) for 
additional mission systems enhancements.
    Mr. Courtney. What are the risks associated with fielding all new 
technology and an unproven system? And what are the sustainment impacts 
for future costs of a bifurcated fleet with multiple engines?
    General Cederholm. The primary risk associated with fielding all 
new technology and an unproven system is cost. From a procurement 
perspective, the cost of producing an AETP engine (essentially a 
completely new engine) versus a core upgrade to the F135 is 
substantial; bifurcating the propulsion fleet, and the overall F-35 
enterprise fleet, would likely be cost prohibitive.
    Given the significant differences between F135/ECU and AETP, the 
sustainment impacts of a bifurcated fleet would include increased costs 
associated with requirements for additional manpower, different support 
equipment, training and subject matter expertise.
    Mr. Courtney. When is the expected development and fielding of 
Engine Core Upgrade across all variants? o What was the expected 
development and fielding of AETP for the Alpha and Charlie variant?
    General Schmidt. They would field about the same time, around FY32, 
taking all things into consideration.
    Per the Business Case Analysis (BCA), the Government assesses that 
AETP Engineering Manufacturing Development (EMD) will take five years, 
starting in 2024, and will cost $6.3B. Initial Service Release (ISR) is 
expected by the end of 2029, and aircraft deliveries with an AETP 
engine should commence in Lot 23 (2031) or Lot 24 (2032). F135 Engine 
Enhancement funding provided by Congress in FY22 allowed development of 
the Engine Core Upgrade (ECU) to commence in late 2022, which would 
enable Initial Service Release (ISR) by the end of 2029 and aircraft 
equipped with ECU engines to deliver in Lot 24 (2032), should ECU be 
fully funded.
    Mr. Courtney. Since 2019, please show, by year, the delta between 
removals and depot outputs for power modules for engine availability.
    General Schmidt.

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    

    There is no longer a power module (PM) backlog issue. From 2019 
to 2021, the JPO had a negative delta, as illustrated by comparing PM 
removals to depot output. In 2022, the JPO had a positive depot output. 
This positive depot output affected PM backlog burndown and the 
rightsizing of the global depot network PM pipeline. Propulsion 
readiness is now on track. Thank you for the support enabling the 
enterprise to reach this point 5 years earlier than originally 
anticipated!
    Mr. Courtney.: In your testimony, you acknowledge the extensive 
process between Government and industry to ensure mitigations efforts 
fully addressed the pause in F135 delivery following the December 15, 
2022 mishap. Can you provide more detail into the work that was done 
between the Government and contractor to accelerate the mitigation 
process?
    General Schmidt. The same amount of rigor was performed in the 
validation of the current, interim mitigation to resume F135 deliveries 
as for any other F135 modifications or engineering change. The 
accelerated mitigation process (culminating in fleet incorporation) was 
due to a highly integrated and motivated project team--composed of SMEs 
from the JPO, DON, USAF, Pratt and Whitney, and Lockheed Martin--
committed to resume engine deliveries and return affected operational 
assets back to service. Some examples/details that highlight the 
successes of the team include: acceleration of airworthiness artifacts 
through pre-communication to set expectations based on fleet need; 
identifying and prioritizing test facilities to perform engine 
validation testing; testing over 80 data points to validate the 
mitigating hardware; supplier-to-field communications to state--to the 
day--when hardware would be available for fleet retrofit; and 
leadership removing barriers as they were encountered. Regular 
communications were established to keep vertical and lateral 
stakeholders apprised of efforts and to reduce potential inefficiencies 
with mitigation efforts.
    Mr. Courtney. Does PTMS modernization and an engine core upgrade 
provide the necessary capabilities for Block 4 aircraft?
    General Schmidt. The F135 base engine and the 32 kW effort, 
currently on contract with Lockheed Martin, supports necessary 
capabilities for Block 4 currently in development. The Business Case 
Analysis (BCA) studied additional configurations and capabilities, 
beyond the current Block 4 configuration in order to ensure the 
cooling, electrical and fuel thermal management systems can support 
future capability growth. The Engine Core Upgrade (ECU) and Power 
Thermal Management System (PTMS) modernization will enable the engine 
to meet its full life requirement, while providing up to 62 kW of 
growth capability for the air system.
    Mr. Courtney. What are the risks associated with fielding all new 
technology and an unproven system? And what are the sustainment impacts 
for future costs of a bifurcated fleet with multiple engines?
    General Schmidt. The risks associated with fielding all new 
technology and an unproven system are similar to any other program 
fielding new technology. Development timelines, cost estimate accuracy, 
and capability performance are among the areas of concern. The Air 
Systems Modernization Business Case Analysis (BCA) report, section 5.5, 
summarizes the risks associated with fielding the various levels of 
technology options.
    If USAF procures the Adaptive Engine Transition Program (AETP), it 
will bifurcate the F-35 Enterprise and break apart the existing 
sustainment infrastructure, which has been funded and built. A decision 
to procure AETP would impact all US Services as well as F-35 
Cooperative Partners and FMS customers in two ways. First, and most 
notably, it would require the USAF to quickly establish a completely 
new sustainment infrastructure (depot facilities, SE, spares, manpower, 
training, etc.), to support a large existing fleet along with their 
remaining F135 engines. Likewise, the financial requirement for the 
rest of the partnership, to include the Department of the Navy (DON), 
will also increase as the baseline of the joint program was to leverage 
commonality to maximize cost savings. Second, the current funded and 
established infrastructure would need to be realigned, agreements with 
our Partners would be broken, and sustainment costs would rise due to 
the significant reduction in shared resources and reduced quantities of 
scale. Per the BCA, it is estimated that a decision to pursue both AETP 
and ECU would result in roughly an additional $30B Life Cycle Cost 
increase while adding overall readiness risks across the entire 
program.
    Mr. Courtney. Does PTMS modernization and an engine core upgrade 
provide the necessary capabilities for Block 4 aircraft?
    Mr. Ludwigson. Program officials we met with estimate that the 
power and thermal management system (PTMS) and engine core upgrade, 
collectively, could support Block 4 and other planned capabilities 
through 2035. However, the content of Block 4 has changed considerably 
since its inception and DOD has not approved all of the future 
capabilities in the F-35 program office's plan. Therefore, there is 
some uncertainty regarding how far into the future the program office's 
proposed PTMS and engine core upgrades could support.
    As we testified on March 29, 2023, Block 4 and other planned 
capabilities require even more cooling capacity and air pressure than 
the PTMS and the engine can support, respectively. The current design 
of the engine and PTMS, collectively, will not meet the cooling 
capacity needed to support future capabilities planned beyond 2029. 
Based on the program office's estimates, if they do not upgrade the 
PTMS by 2029, the program will not be able to support new capabilities 
planned after that year. Program officials stated that with an upgraded 
PTMS, the current F135 engine could support capabilities planned 
through 2035, albeit with a significantly degraded engine lifespan. 
Therefore, the program determined it need to upgrade both the PTMS and 
engine to support future planned capabilities and restore engine life, 
which in turn the program estimates could reduce life cycle sustainment 
costs.
    While the program reports that it generally knows the cooling 
capacity it will need to support Block 4 and other capabilities through 
2035, program officials stated that the military services have not 
validated those capabilities as performance requirements, so they are 
notional. Furthermore, we have reported that the content of Block 4 has 
evolved considerably since the program first estimated it would 
comprise 66 capabilities delivered through 2026. As of July 2022, 
according to the program's most recent plan submitted to Congress, it 
expects to deliver 80 Block 4 capabilities through 2029 and has yet to 
define post Block 4 capabilities through 2035.
    Until the military departments approve the capabilities planned 
through 2035, the program is limited in determining what additional 
power and cooling is needed to support future capabilities. By clearly 
defining the military services' requirements, the program would reduce 
risks of poor program outcomes such as not meeting future power and 
cooling needs and cost and schedule growth. Our previous work found 
that key enablers of a good business case include firm, feasible 
requirements that are clearly defined, affordable, and clearly 
informed. Until the military services define their requirements for 
engine and thermal management modernization, they will be at risk of 
selecting modernization options without understanding the future cost, 
schedule, and technical effects.
    Mr. Courtney. What are the risks associated with fielding all new 
technology and an unproven system? And what are the sustainment impacts 
for future costs of a bifurcated fleet with multiple engines?
    Mr. Ludwigson.
    A. GAO has found that incorporating immature technologies into 
plans for developing weapons systems increases the likelihood of cost 
overruns and delays in product development, which we also previously 
identified within the F-35 program.\1\ For example, in October 2001, 
GAO reported that the F-35 program was at risk of not meeting its 
affordability objective because critical technologies were not 
projected to be mature by the planned start of development.\2\ At the 
time, we noted that the failure to do so could result in increases in 
costs, schedule delays, and compromised performance as problems arise 
in product development and recommended DOD mature those technologies. 
At that same time in October 2001, the program estimated the F-35's 
development and procurement would cost $233 billion. As of December 
2021, that figure had risen to $416.2 billion--an increase of about 
$183 billion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ GAO, Technology Readiness Assessment Guide: Best Practices for 
Evaluating the Readiness of Technology for Use in Acquisition Programs 
and Projects [Reissued with revisions on Feb. 11, 2020.] GAO-20-48G 
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 11, 2020).
    \2\ GAO, Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition: Mature Critical 
Technologies Needed to Reduce Risks GAO-02-39 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 
19, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Proceeding with immature technology, raises the risk of not 
delivering the full capability expected or needed. If a project has a 
lower Technology Readiness Level (TRL) than recommended by preliminary 
design review, the project does not have a solid technical basis of its 
design and the program could put itself at risk of approving a design 
that is less likely to remain stable.\3\ Major design modifications can 
cause substantial and costly changes in the manufacturing process. The 
F-35 program experienced this previously when the manufacturing process 
was altered due to redesigning required to resolve weight and 
performance problems discovered after the first F-35 aircraft entered 
production.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ GAO recommends maturing critical technology to a TRL 7, where 
the technology is demonstrated in an operational environment, before 
this milestone.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The more mature technology is at the start of the program, the more 
likely the program will succeed in meeting its objectives. When certain 
critical technologies are assessed as immature or as not progressing as 
planned, a best practice is to use the Technology Readiness Assessment 
(TRA) report information to:
      consider or identify an alternate or backup technology;
      initiate development of a Technology Maturation Plan 
(TMP), a project management tool that is used to address immature 
critical technologies;
      update the program's risk management plan by ensuring 
that all potential critical technologies are included in the program's 
risk management database and plan; and
      update or revise cost and schedule risk assessments, as 
appropriate.
    The program's comparative analysis of engine and PTMS upgrade 
options did not include an assessment of the technology readiness for 
the various engine and thermal management modernization options. 
Furthermore, while the program has not completed a formal TRA for each 
engine and PTMS option, it has assessed some aspects of technology 
maturity. For example, program officials stated that they assessed 
technology maturity for the engine core upgrade option but not for the 
PTMS upgrade options. Officials noted, however, that the PTMS 
contractors estimated that its components are immature, with many 
around a TRL 3. A TRL 3 means development and analysis of separate 
elements of the technology have begun, but these elements are not yet 
integrated. If these technologies are not matured by the start of 
development, the program risks moving forward with an unstable design 
that can cause cost increases and schedule delays.
    B. Our prior work has identified existing challenges with F-35 
engine sustainment.\4\ For example, in July 2022, we found that an 
increasing number of F-35 aircraft have not been able to fly because 
they were non-mission capable due to the engine, including not having 
an operating engine or waiting for specific parts to repair the engine. 
In that same report, we reported that engine modules sent to depot have 
taken significantly more time to repair than planned. Since fall 2020, 
DOD has been implementing corrective-action plans to improve the 
capacity of its engine-repair maintenance depots. DOD's plans have 
resulted in improvements over time. These plans focus on (1) improving 
depot capacity--the facilities, personnel, support equipment, and 
necessary spare parts--to make the necessary repairs to the engine and 
(2) taking actions to reduce maintenance demands by improving the 
reliability and maintainability of spare parts and extending the time 
the engine can remain on the aircraft. However, DOD's plans are highly 
dependent on assumptions about obtaining funding over the coming years 
and its ability to address future risks. For example, as the F-35 fleet 
grows the depot maintenance infrastructure to repair F-35 engines will 
have to grow and become more robust.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ GAO, F-35 Aircraft: DOD Should Assess and Update Its Engine 
Sustainment Strategy to Support Desired Outcomes, GAO-22-104678 
(Washington, D.C.: July 19, 2022).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A bifurcated fleet with multiple engines would likely mean that the 
DOD selected both the Adaptive Engine Transition Program option--to 
support the F-35A and C variants--, and the engine core upgrade 
option--to support all F-35 variants. According to program officials, 
bifurcating the fleet with multiple engines would present additional 
sustainment challenges and costs to those that the department currently 
faces, as the program would have two different engines to sustain.
    According to program officials, multiple engines would require 
changes to the existing infrastructure that supports engine 
sustainment, such as depot maintenance facilities. Furthermore, program 
officials told us that DOD would likely need to train maintainers and 
create supply chains to provide spare parts for each engine in 
operation.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER
    Mr. Turner. The F-35 Block 4 upgrade requires 47kW of power and 
cooling. What are the Air Force's projected power and cooling 
requirements for Block 4+ and Block 5 and what are the expected years 
when those power and cooling capacities must be delivered? When will 
the Air Force formalize these requirements?
    Mr. Hunter. Air Force F-35 requirements beyond Block 4 have not yet 
been formalized and validated. Air Combat Command is working with the 
F-35 JPO to formalize requirements for known (intended) future 
capabilities. The timeline for formalizing known (potential) future 
capabilities is yet to be determined.
    Mr. Turner. The F-35 Block 4 upgrade requires 47kW of power and 
cooling. What are the Air Force's projected power and cooling 
requirements for Block 4+ and Block 5 and what are the expected years 
when those power and cooling capacities must be delivered? When will 
the Air Force formalize these requirements?
    General Moore. As indicated by Honorable Hunter, the Air Force F-35 
requirements beyond Block 4 have not been formalized and validated. Air 
Combat Command is working with the F-35 Joint Program Office to 
formalize requirements for future capabilities. The timeline for 
formalizing potential future capabilities is yet to be determined.
    Mr. Turner. Readiness is the backbone to the Department's ability 
to project power and keep the Homeland safe; how does the [USAF] 
determine readiness across aircraft fleets, particularly at the 
platform level? How is the [USAF] considering, leveraging, and 
integrating onboard platform data to make informed decisions about 
conditions-based and predictive maintenance requirements?
    General Moore. The following response was drafted by the 
Secretariat for Acquisition and Air Staff for Logistics, Installations, 
and Mission Support.
    Lead Commands will establish availability standards and capability 
goals in accordance with Air Force policy and guidance. Readiness for 
each mission design series is calculated annually using prescribed 
equations and subject to recurring senior leader oversight. For 
example, the Air Force Material Command Readiness of Combat 
Capabilities Review provides program performance details relative to 
the established lead command standards and requirements.
    The Department of the Air Force has developed a Condition Based 
Maintenance Strategic Implementation Plan. The plan integrates 
predictive analytics using Artificial Intelligence & Machine Learning, 
data from sensor-based systems, and enhanced reliability centered 
maintenance. The Air Force can predict failures and enable maintainers, 
at field and depot level, to replace components at opportune times to 
maximize aircraft availability using all these technologies.

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