[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


        SURROUNDING THE OCEAN: PRC INFLUENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION
                               __________

                             APRIL 18, 2023
                               __________

                           Serial No. 118-14
                               __________

        Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
        
        
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       Available:  http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://
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                               __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
                    
52-142PDF                  WASHINGTON : 2023                          


                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                   MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey   GREGORY MEEKS, New Yok, Ranking 
JOE WILSON, South Carolina             Member
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania	   BRAD SHERMAN, California
DARRELL ISSA, California	   GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
ANN WAGNER, Missouri		   WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
BRIAN MAST, Florida	           DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
KEN BUCK, Colorado	           AMI BERA, California
TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee	           JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee	   DINA TITUS, Nevada
ANDY BARR, Kentucky	           TED LIEU, California
RONNY JACKSON, Texas	           SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania
YOUNG KIM, California	           DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota
MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida	   COLIN ALLRED, Texas
BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan	           ANDY KIM, New Jersey
AMATA COLEMAN-RADEWAGEN, American  SARA JACOBS, California 
    Samoa		           KATHY MANNING, North Carolina
FRENCH HILL, Arkansas	           SHEILA CHERFILUS-MCCORMICK,Florida
WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio		   GREG STANTON, Arizona
JIM BAIRD, Indiana		   MADELEINE DEAN, Pennsylvania
MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida		   JARED MOSKOWITZ, Florida
TOM KEAN, JR., New Jersey	   JONATHAN JACOBS, Illinois
MIKE LAWLER, New York		   SYDNEY KAMLAGER-DOVE, California
CORY MILLS, Florida		   JIM COSTA, California
RICH MCCORMICK, Georgia		   JASON CROW, Colorado
NATHANIEL MORAN, Texas	           BRAD SCHNEIDER. Illinois
JOHN JAMES, Michigan
KEITH SELF, Texas
                                     

                    Brendan Shields, Staff Director

                    Sophia Lafargue, Staff Director

                                 ------                                

                      Subcommittee on INDO-PACIFIC

                      YOUNG KIM, California, Chair

ANN WAGNER, Missouri	           AMI BERI, California, Ranking Member
KEN BUCK, Colorado	           ANDY KIM, New Jersey
MARK GREEN, Tennessee	           BRAD SHERMAN, California
ANDY BARR, Kentucky		   GERALD CONNOLLY, Virginia
AMATA RADAWAGEN, American Samoa    WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio		   JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
                                     
                    Sophia Lafargue, STAFF DIRECTOR

                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

                               WITNESSES

Baruah, Darshana, Fellow, South Asia Program, Carnegie Endowment 
  for International Peace........................................     7
Payne, Jeffrey, Assistant Professor, Near East South Asia Center 
  for Strategic Studies, U.S. Department of Defense..............    18
Samaranayake, Nilanthi, Research Program Director, Center for 
  Naval Analysis.................................................    26

                                APPENDIX

Hearing Notice...................................................    54
Hearing Attendance...............................................    56
Hearing Minutes..................................................    57

    STATEMENT SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD FROM REPRESENTATIVE CONNOLLY

statement submitted for the record from Representative Connolly..    58

            RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Responses to questions submitted for the record..................    60

 
        SURROUNDING THE OCEAN: PRC INFLUENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

                        Tuesday, April 18, 2023

                          House of Representatives,
                  Subcommittee on the Indo-Pacific,
                      Committee on Foreign Affairs,
                                                    Washington, DC.

    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m., in 
room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Young Kim (chair 
of the subcommittee) presiding.
    Mrs. Kim of California. The Subcommittee on the Indo-
Pacific of the Foreign Affairs Committee will come to order.
    The purpose of this hearing is to build emphasis and 
awareness around the Indian Ocean's critical trade routes and 
Beijing's expanding footprint in the Indian Ocean Region.
    I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
    So I want to welcome everyone to the Indo-Pacific 
Subcommittee's second hearing for the 118th Congress.
    Today's hearing will examine the PRC's influence in the 
Indian Ocean. The Indian Ocean Region, IOR, is of critical 
importance for the United States, its allies, and its partners. 
The IOR is a high-traffic trade route through which, roughly, 
70 percent of all the world's container ships pass through. 
These routes are vital to global energy supply routes and 
supply chains.
    Fourteen IOR countries, such as Malaysia and Singapore, are 
among the busiest ports in the world. And as the IOR countries 
seek to expand their trade, we should expect that these ports 
will accommodate even more ships in the future.
    The CCP's growing influence in the IOR is concerning and 
poses a number of environmental, economic, and security 
challenges. In the interest of protecting key supply routes and 
keeping the Indian Ocean free and open, the United States 
maintains a military presence in the Indian Ocean out of the 
Naval Base at Diego Garcia Island and is currently the dominant 
naval force in the region.
    But the PRC seeks to displace U.S. presence in the IOR. The 
People's Republic of China understands the strategic importance 
of the Indian Ocean, and while its naval presence is 
comparatively small to that of the United States or other 
partners and allies in the region, the People's Liberation Army 
Navy, PLAN, is stepping up its maritime presence there.
    And the PRC's commercial shipping fleet far outnumbers 
ours, not to mention the near constant presence of the Chinese 
fishing vessels, which engage in illegal, unregulated, and 
unreported fishing. For example, China's fishing vessels have 
been overfishing key resources like yellow tuna, which I love, 
a vital resource for many economies in the region.
    The PLA also constructed its first overseas military base 
in Djibouti, conveniently located at the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, 
which, roughly, 10 percent of all crude oil and natural gas 
shipments flow through annually.
    To solidify this maritime presence, the PRC's Belt and Road 
Initiative is also very active in the IOR. CCP-owned companies 
are making major investments in ports around the Indian Ocean, 
including Pakistan, Bangladesh, Burma, and Thailand. And I'm 
concerned that in the near future these ports could be used for 
the regular deployment of a larger naval force in the IOR.
    The PRC also financed major infrastructure projects in Sri 
Lanka, including a port. The debt burden was too great for the 
Sri Lankan government to bear, and the Sri Lankan economy 
collapsed, creating a new vacuum of instability in the IOR.
    The United States must rigorously pursue and maintain 
multilateral dialog on trade, security, and the environment to 
ensure the Indian Ocean Region stays free and open. In 2017, 
the United States, India, Australia, and Japan created the 
Quadrilateral Security Dialogue 2.0, Quad 2.0, to improve 
cooperation on shared concerns in the IOR, and it has served as 
a productive avenue for cooperation on maritime security, 
cybersecurity, energy security, infrastructure, 
counterterrorism, pandemic preparedness, and supply chain 
resilience, among other issues. I'm committed to ensuring that 
these conversations remain productive and that we continue 
generating concrete and positive outcomes in the quadrilateral 
relationship.
    The United States must also continue bilateral and 
multilateral military exercises with security partners in the 
region. These exercises are an avenue to improve 
interoperability and cooperation between militaries with a 
common interest in maritime security and keeping the Indian 
Ocean free from PRC dominance and control.
    So, with that, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses 
and members of the subcommittee.
    The chair now recognizes our ranking member, Mr. Bera, the 
gentleman from California, for any statement that you may have.
    Mr. Bera. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, and thank you for 
hosting this important hearing. And it plays off of the initial 
subcommittee hearing as well.
    When we think about the construct of the region, whether it 
is East Asia, whether it is the South China Sea, whether it is 
the Indian Ocean Region, the goal here is not to seek conflict 
with China. The goal here is, actually, to create a rules-based 
order to protect freedom of navigation, to protect the free 
movement of goods and services, and maritime security in the 
region.
    It also is to recognize the Exclusive Economic Zones of 
countries in the region, to recognize that rules-based order 
and the rule of law. It also is to create mechanisms for 
dispute resolution.
    And the reason why I start my comments with that is, far 
too often, you will hear the PRC under Xi Jinping say, ``Well, 
we're responding to the United States and responding to the 
United States aggression in the region and presence in the 
region.'' That is absolutely false.
    The reason why we have to get ahead of this in the Indo-
Pacific, in the Indian Ocean Region, is because we do not want 
to deal with the same challenge that we are dealing with the 
South China Sea at present and the countries in the South China 
Sea.
    As the chairwoman pointed out, we see the establishment of 
bases in Djibouti. We see the Chinese looking to establish a 
naval base in Cambodia. Issue of real concern--concerns that, 
as I have traveled through the region, in Cambodia, we have 
expressed that concern that this is about Cambodian 
sovereignty. It is not about a foreign presence establishing a 
presence in your own country.
    When I traveled to Sri Lanka, we raised the issue of the 
Hambantota port and the debt diplomacy and the challenges that 
that was going to present; the fact that a foreign presence 
could gain a presence there in an extremely important navigable 
waterway; and control the movement of goods and services.
    So I think this is an extremely important hearing to have. 
Again, it is not that we seek confrontation with China, but 
what we do seek is a peaceful, prosperous, and stable 21st 
century, where each country can move their goods, services, 
feel secure; where there is respect for sovereignty, respect 
for Exclusive Economic Zones.
    And again, it is not apples-to-apples. The Indian Ocean is 
different than the South China Sea, but what we have seen is a 
pattern of bad behavior, as the PRC established islands in the 
South China Sea, established a presence there.
    We have seen their gray zone operations in Vietnam. And I 
met with the speaker of the Philippine Parliament earlier 
today, along with the delegation from the legislature. We have 
watched the gray zone tactics in the Philippines and elsewhere 
in that region. We have watched overfishing in the Pacific 
Islands Region.
    So, again, the message to the PRC is: we do not seek 
conflict and confrontation. What we seek is a rules-based order 
where we can all thrive; we can all prosper; we can all find 
stability. And that rules-based order has been prosperous for 
every country Asia, probably none more so than China.
    The reason hearings like this are so important is we do 
have to work together with like-valued, like-minded 
participants, like India, like Australia, like Japan, through 
the Quad coalition, as well as others. Again, the goal here is 
not to seek confrontation, but the goal here is to establish 
that rules-based order, where we all respect each other's 
sovereignty; we trade together; we work together. And 
unfortunately, the United States is having to act because of 
provocations from China.
    I thank you for this hearing. I look forward to the 
witnesses' testimony and the questions on this, again, 
important topic.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you, Ranking Member.
    Other members of the committee are reminded that opening 
statements may be submitted for the record.
    And we are pleased to have a distinguished panel of 
witnesses before us today on this very important topic. I want 
to introduce our witnesses.
    First is Mrs. Darshana Baruah, who is a fellow at the 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Thank you for 
joining us.
    And Mr. Jeffrey Payne is a research fellow at the National 
Defense University. Thank you for joining us.
    I'm going to butcher this. Ms. Nilanthi Samaranayake, she 
is the research program director at the Center for Naval 
Analysis. Thank you for joining us.
    Your full statements will be made part of the record, and I 
will ask each of you to keep your spoken remarks at 5 minutes 
in order to allow time for member questions. And we have your 
written testimony. We will hope to follow along.
    So let me now recognize Mrs. Baruah for your opening 
statement.


   STATEMENT OF DARSHANA BARUAH, FELLOW, SOUTH ASIA PROGRAM, 
           CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE


    Ms. Baruah. Thank you.
    Good afternoon, Chair Kim, Ranking Member Bera, and 
distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the 
opportunity today to address you on China and its influence in 
the Indian Ocean Region.
    My testimony today looks at the strategic significance of 
the Indian Ocean, the PRC's influence across the region, and 
the importance of partnerships. I will conclude with a few 
recommendations for Congress to consider.
    One of the biggest challenges to understanding the Indian 
Ocean Region today is the continental division of an ocean into 
subregions, such as South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. My 
work through the Indian Ocean Initiative at the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace studies and assesses the 
Indian Ocean as one continuous geographic theater and its 
implications on the Indo-Pacific. I argue study of the maritime 
domain requires a maritime approach.
    In particular, the Indian Ocean should be viewed through 
the prism of chokepoints: the Strait of Malacca, Bab-el-Mandeb, 
and the Strait of Hormuz. The safety, security, and stability 
around these chokepoints are paramount for energy transitions 
across the Indian Ocean, and for many nations, including the 
People's Republic of China.
    On China and the Indian Ocean, Beijing has long articulated 
its dilemma around the Strait of Malacca, a critical chokepoint 
for movements of energy and goods between China and much of the 
wider globe. Along with Bab-el-Mandeb Strait and the Strait of 
Hormuz, movements across the Indian Ocean are essential for 
China's engagements with Africa, the Middle East, island 
nations, and Europe. After all, it is in the Indian Ocean that 
China established its first-ever overseas military facility in 
Djibouti.
    Unlike the United States, China, however, perhaps views the 
ocean as one continuous theater. It is one of the nations, if 
not the only nation, to have an embassy in each of the six 
islands in the Indian Ocean Region--Sri Lanka, Maldives, 
Mauritius, Seychelles, Madagascar, and Comoros.
    While China is considered a new player in the region, 
Beijing has longstanding engagements with many littorals and 
has steadily increased its economic, diplomatic, political, and 
military engagements with the wider region.
    The United States has had longstanding presence in the 
Indian Ocean, too. However, Washington's engagements in the 
region have been more focused on continental challenges in the 
past decades, while using the maritime domain as a transit 
route.
    The division of the Indian Ocean into continental silos and 
the Department of Defense's separation of the theater into 
three combatant commands, INDOPACOM, CENTCOM, and AFRICOM, 
somewhere challenges the understanding of the American domain 
in the region.
    There is perhaps no nodal point in the Department of State 
or Department of Defense at this point in time that monitors 
and assesses the Indian Ocean as one continuous region. If 
there truly is a competition with China, then the United States 
is not paying enough attention to China's interests, 
vulnerabilities, and opportunities in the Indian Ocean Region 
and the impact of that on the wider Indo-Pacific.
    Even during any potential crisis around the Taiwan Strait, 
there will be an Indian Ocean component because China will seek 
to secure its sea lines of communications and energy transits 
across the Indian Ocean. Viewing the Indian Ocean as one region 
will help the United States identify and examine the 
implications for the Indo-Pacific.
    I would like to conclude with three specific 
recommendations for Congress to consider in the Indian Ocean.
    First, I recommend Congress to ask for a National Security 
Strategy on the Indian Ocean Region in its entirety--from the 
eastern coast of Africa to the western coast of Australia, 
examining the region against the United States' own priorities, 
interests, and competition.
    Second, to increase attention on maritime domain awareness, 
through partnerships. India, Australia, France, the United 
Kingdom, and Japan are all key players and partners in the 
Indian Ocean, both in the traditional and non-traditional 
security aspects.
    On the Quad and India, I recommend the United States invest 
more in bilateral relationship to strengthen the multilateral 
format. There is an acute need for maritime domain awareness, 
particularly on underwater domain awareness, such as monitoring 
movements of submarines.
    Finally, I recommend greater attention toward challenges 
emerging from climate change and humanitarian disasters, 
particularly for island nations. Development projects, aid, 
military training, diplomatic visits, and exchange are all 
avenues for more sustained engagements in the region. The 
United States should be paying attention to these challenges to 
better identify areas of support and interactions.
    I thank you for your time for hosting this hearing on the 
Indian Ocean today, which is a significant development in 
advancing the conversation. I look forward to your questions 
and comments and sharing more during that interaction.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Baruah follows:]

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    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you, Ms. Baruah.
    I will now recognize Mr. Payne for your opening remarks.


  STATEMENT OF JEFFREY PAYNE, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR, NEAR EAST 
  SOUTH ASIA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
                            DEFENSE


    Mr. Payne. Chairwoman Kim, Ranking Member Bera, 
distinguished members of the subcommittee, my thanks for 
appearing before you today.
    My comments today, I want to emphasize two overarching 
points. The first being that China's engagement throughout the 
IOR has expanded its influence and is continuing to expand its 
influence.
    However, second, despite China's deepening regional 
footprint, there remain opportunities for the United States to 
further national interest throughout the IOR. The United States 
can and should remain the partner of choice for much of the 
region, regardless of China's expanding influence, by 
invigorating the efforts of our regional partners.
    China's engagement throughout the IOR has been discussed 
for decades. From the String of Pearls to the Belt and Road 
Initiative, China is perceived as a State seeking influence in 
this region. China is a critical trade partner for many of the 
IOR littorals, not only throughout the Arabian Peninsula, a key 
area of U.S. foreign policy emphasis, but also in South Asia, 
Southeast Asia and Eastern Africa.
    China's economic engagement through its BRI is evolving, 
emphasizing its Maritime Silk Road Initiative, its maritime 
dimension over the Silk Road Economic Belt, its overland trans-
Asian route. The trend lines for Chinese presence throughout 
the IOR revealed why it is a logical choice for the People's 
Liberation Army's first overseas base in Djibouti, as the 
previous speaker highlighted.
    The same progressive steps that signal China's regional 
intent in the Western Pacific decades ago is being replicated 
to a degree in parts of the IOR. Exercises in the IOR, 
specifically, with Russia and Iran, have taken place. Beijing's 
economic attention toward the IOR is increasingly accompanied 
by a security dimension.
    But the IOR itself must not be perceived as a region where 
China's economic and diplomatic overtures are simply taken at 
face value. A lack of interregional trust is being combated by 
a continued support of multilateralism by the region and a 
development commitment to regional adaptation. Subregional 
organizations, like the Indian Ocean Commission, the Indian 
Ocean Naval Symposium, or the Bay of Bengal Initiative for 
Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation, or BIMSTEC, 
far easier, are each examples of how the region is seeking ways 
to overcome regional political separation.
    Combined maritime forces should be noted. It was initiated 
with regional partners by the United States, and it stands as 
one of the most successful maritime security cooperative 
efforts in the world. And it is a constant asset for the region 
to enhance its naval and maritime law enforcement capability.
    When it comes to U.S. interests, the IOR, as was detailed 
already, includes three combatant commands from the United 
States Department of Defense, four bureaus within the 
Department State. The United States sustains a constant 
diplomatic presence throughout the region. Yet, the United 
States does not see the IOR in the same way as it does the 
Pacific. As some in the region will call it, the U.S. presence 
and U.S. engagement has been inconsistent over the years.
    The Indo-Pacific concept of the United States, however, 
includes a sizable portion of the eastern IOR, and a U.S. 
commitment to free and open Indo-Pacific means invigorating 
partnerships with regional States committed to the sustainment 
of established rules and norms.
    India emerges as a prime example of this partnership that 
we can pursue. Consistent diplomacy has expanded the 
cooperative efforts and it has culminated in what is currently 
Quad 2.0.
    Beyond India, relationships with ASEAN, the Middle East, 
and East Africa are also a diplomatic focus of the United 
States. Established U.S. partnerships in the Arabian Peninsula 
remain focused on existing security challenges, but are also 
expanding attention toward emerging challenges and new forms of 
regional architecture.
    It should be noted NAVCENT's investment in Task Force 59, 
which combines maritime domain awareness efforts with unmanned 
systems, public-private partnerships, and regional 
collaborations is an example of some of the things the United 
States is doing to adapt to new possible challenges and new 
parameters in the IOR.
    Throughout the Department of State and the Department of 
Defense, and other U.S. Government sections, there is an 
effort, an increasing effort, to show up for the IOR. My 
recommendations to consider for today are:
    Promote U.S. foreign policy efforts and goals throughout 
the region. Strategic communications is something we have 
struggled with, and China has banged its drums very loudly in 
the region. We need to be more consistent and loud in the sort 
of things that we are doing. Comparatively, the U.S. presence 
dwarfs what China has done, but it often is not perceived that 
way.
    Second, recognize and respond to regional requests for 
security assistance. The region is no longer asking for much 
stuff as they are asking for training and assistance on how to 
be better with what they have.
    And finally, think of ourselves as helping the region 
develop greater connective tissue.
    I thank you for your time and turn it back over to you, 
Chairwoman.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Payne follows:]

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    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you, Mr. Payne.
    I now recognize Ms. Samaranayake.


STATEMENT OF NILANTHI SAMARANAYAKE, RESEARCH PROGRAM DIRECTOR, 
                   CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSIS


    Ms. Samaranayake. Thank you.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you for your opening 
statement.
    Ms. Samaranayake. Good afternoon, Chairwoman Kim, Ranking 
Member Bera, distinguished members of the subcommittee.
    Thank you for the invitation to testify today. I will 
summarize my written statement, which reflects solely my own 
research and views.
    I discuss three issues to address the hearing's objective.
    The first is what we see China doing in the Indian Ocean; 
namely, military and economic presence.
    Second, it is important to recognize the existing 
constraints on greater presence and influence by China in the 
Indian Ocean, as well as enablers of stability.
    Third, I examine U.S. interests in the Indian Ocean, and 
then, close with some recommendations.
    My assessment is that, while there is a more streamlined 
focus on the Indo-Pacific region over the past 5 years, this 
focus hasn't always translated into greater attention to the 
Indian Ocean. It is understandable when viewing China's 
assertiveness in the South and East China Seas, for example. 
But in terms of U.S. strategy toward the Indo-Pacific, the 
United States continues to understand the region through a 
Pacific lens.
    This can be seen in the three highest-level strategy 
documents that have been released over the past year: the 
National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and 
the Indo-Pacific Strategy. There is only one substantive 
mention of the Indian Ocean in each of the three documents.
    As a result, we need to discern what exactly U.S. security 
strategy is in the Indian Ocean. I see three objectives. The 
first is protecting the free flow of commerce. The second is 
maintaining military access in the Indian Ocean.
    And the third objective is more implicit than explicit. In 
this environment of strategic competition, the United States 
needs to ensure that the Indian Ocean does not assume greater 
priority than the increasingly interconnected Pacific, Arctic, 
and Atlantic theaters. In other words, the Indian Ocean needs 
to remain a lesser priority for the United States, as it 
allocates limited resources globally in a new era of strategic 
competition.
    Going forward, U.S. officials will need to preemptively 
manage wildcards to keep crises from erupting in the Indian 
Ocean that would divert U.S. attention and resources away from 
other requirements in other regions.
    I will close with some recommendations to consider for 
preserving stability in the Indian Ocean.
    By taking steps to strengthen smaller Indian Ocean 
countries' security and economic development, the United 
States, the Quad, and allies, and partners will enhance these 
countries' own ability to counter threats from competitors.
    One, better understand the structural economic situation in 
which middle-income countries find themselves. Given the large 
numbers of this group in the Indian Ocean, this issue is worthy 
of greater U.S. attention and influence in those outcomes.
    Two, analyze non-traditional security trends in the Indian 
Ocean. The National Security Strategy's focus on some of these 
issues affecting South Asian partners is notable, as these 
countries often speak about being at the frontlines of battling 
climate change and COVID-19, as well as marine pollution and 
shipping disasters. Illegal fishing, in particular, should be 
studied more systematically, given the importance of fish 
stocks to food supplies.
    Three, develop a set of indicators and warnings for the 
Indian Ocean and track them annually, especially compared with 
the Pacific theater. Some examples worth monitoring are whether 
China is engaging in unsafe military encounters in the Indian 
Ocean, and if smaller countries are beginning to conduct 
bilateral exercises with China.
    Four, avoid outsourcing U.S. policy toward the smaller 
South Asian countries. The Indo-Pacific Strategy's single, 
substantive mention of the Indian Ocean is framed in terms of 
U.S. support of India's leadership in South Asia and the Indian 
Ocean.
    This raises a question about how directly involved the 
United States will be with India's smaller neighbors and to 
what extent it will defer to India's preferences. These 
countries are already suspicious of the U.S.-India relationship 
in the context of China and in the backdrop of India's 
dominance in the region. However, the United States has clear 
advantages for, as well as interest in, the smaller South Asian 
countries.
    Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Samaranayake follows:]

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    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you, Ms. Samaranayake. I'm 
going to say it over and over until I get it right, OK, before 
the end of the hearing.
    [Laughter.]
    But I would like to recognize myself for 5 minutes for 
questioning.
    As was noted by all of our witnesses, the importance of the 
Indian Ocean as we counter CCP's growing influence in the 
region, especially in the Indo-Pacific, cannot be overStated. 
So thank you for your testimoneys.
    The PRC has greatly expanded their presence in the Indian 
Ocean, through, as Mr. Payne mentioned, the Maritime Silk Road 
and Belt and Road Initiatives. So, a question to you is, how 
successful have these initiatives been in IOR countries and 
what advantages does the PRC derive from success of these 
initiatives?
    Mr. Payne can start, and the others can also respond.
    Mr. Payne. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
    In terms of the Belt and Road Initiative and its maritime 
dimension, China has learned what every other major economic 
actor--the sea is cheaper and it is more efficient than 
transcontinental transport. And so as a result, they have 
emphasized themselves as a maritime power, not just in the 
Western Pacific, but globally.
    How successful it has been? Pretty substantially, actually. 
It depends. Again, it varies across the region. Eastern Africa 
is different than South Asia, different than the Middle East 
and North Africa.
    But if we are thinking about the selling point that China 
has that, say, the United States or Europe, or other 
established lending States have, it is that China's system, 
because of its authoritarian nature, can move far faster than 
ours. And its banking and financial structures are far more 
opaque than the international standard.
    So, for the region, it was we need a new port or we need 
new highways, or we need energy productivity facilities. They 
go to the established vendors and it is going to take years. If 
they go to China, the speed was quick. Now, the trend, though, 
the recent trend is that China's pace is slowing substantially, 
and this is where the advantage presents for the United 
States--where China came in with a bang, but now it is starting 
to act just like every other actor. And so who gives you the 
better deal in the long run? This is the selling point that the 
United States and our allies and partners have vis-a-vis China 
in the region.
    Thank you.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Go ahead, Ms. Baruah.
    Ms. Baruah. I will take the question on sort of what does 
China gain from these projects and presence. And I think in my 
research it is really the experience. China is not an Indian 
Ocean nation. It is not based in the Indian Ocean. That means 
to be able to operate itself, operate and sustain its navy. 
Whether it is economic, political, military, it needs more 
experience in sailing in these waters and to be able to be more 
present. And I think these projects are also a way to sustain 
that and increase that interaction, making themselves more 
aware of the domain and what it presents for them to be more 
present.
    And I think--it is in my written testimony--China first 
started deploying to the Indian Ocean consistently in 2008 in 
support of its anti-piracy mission. But, by 2014, it had 
deployed submarines in support of the anti-piracy mission, 
which it did not necessarily need submarines. But it was an 
experience in the domain, which is China's biggest disadvantage 
in comparison to the United States or any of its partners, that 
China does not have first-hand experience of being in the 
region.
    Mrs. Kim of California. OK. I want to give the last 
witness, without saying your last name again, time to respond.
    Ms. Samaranayake. Thank you.
    Yes, I think of China, when I look at China's activities 
from an Indian Ocean perspective, I see it as almost an 
experimentation theater for China, where, if you think about 
when it first started to deploy in the counter-piracy 
deployments in 2008-2009, that was after a long time of having 
not visited the Indian Ocean. They had conducted some goodwill 
visits in the 1980's just in South Asian countries, but, then, 
they started this concerted, regular patterns of deployments 
for counter-piracy.
    And then, you fast forward just 5 years later. By that 
point, they had already deployed a submarine as part of the 
counter piracy. So kind of escalating a little bit in terms of 
different platforms, getting some experience.
    And then, you can look 5 years later. They have already 
established their first-ever overseas base in Djibouti. So even 
just kind of checking in every 5 years, you wonder, in 2025, 
will they have sailed the aircraft carrier by that time? It 
seems to be a very fast-moving theater where China can employ 
new activities, conduct deployments. And I see it as an 
experimentation theater.
    Mrs. Kim of California. I wanted to do some followup 
questions, but, again, in the interest of time, I'm going to 
reserve my time. And I will now recognize Ranking Member Bera 
for your 5 minutes of questioning.
    Mr. Bera. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
    Let me start with Ms. Baruah. You talked about the 
importance of coalition building. And I agree with the premise 
that much of Congress' and recent Administrations' focus really 
has been on the Indo-Pacific and not necessarily the Indian 
Ocean Region. And much of our focus in the Indo-Pacific has 
been on coalition building. And I think sometimes we think 
about the Quad in that context of Indo-Pacific strategy and 
coalition building. If we think about that coalition building 
in the Indian Ocean Region, we do suggest that we take the 
existing structure of a Quad and perhaps build off of that.
    In addition, obviously, that includes two major Indian 
Ocean countries, Australia and India. The United States not 
being an Indian Ocean country, while we are a Pacific nation, 
my sense is that to maintain maritime security, freedom of 
navigation, geopolitical strategy there, we are going to have 
to find those partners that are very present in the region. So 
I would be curious about that.
    And then, to any of the witnesses, India is the big 
country. You know, we, obviously, do a lot in the defense 
space. We do a lot of joint training with our navies. India, 
historically, is a non-aligned country, though, and I would be 
curious to get the perspective of, should we be thinking about 
that partnership with India and Australia and building off of 
that, where, obviously, we are going to be a major player there 
as well?
    Ms. Baruah. Thank you. Thank you, Ranking Member.
    No, absolutely, I think partnerships would be the basis for 
Washington's presence in the Indian Ocean. As you have noted, 
it is a Pacific power, after all, but I would add with great 
interest and presence in the Indian Ocean already.
    On the Quad, on taking the existing structure, absolutely, 
I think the Quad did come up; Quad 1.0 came up because of the 
tsunami Indian Ocean Region, which was answer to a disaster at 
hand. And the four countries, without any formal structure, was 
able to coordinate amongst themselves and provide the 
assistance that the region needed.
    But even when you go back currently and look at the Quad 
statements, there isn't much Indian Ocean in there. It is far 
more focused on the Pacific and Southeast Asia because of 
geographical divisions of the Indo-Pacific between the four 
members at play. For India, it looks at the Indian Ocean in its 
entirety. And so does Japan from Africa to the Western Coast of 
Australia. But both the United States and Australia ends it 
with India.
    So you end up leaving out much of the Western Indian Ocean, 
which includes the Persian Gulf, which is important to India. 
And I think that is a conversation amongst the Quad on how can 
the Quad countries coordinate and work together in building 
that effort in the Indian Ocean without perhaps drawing out 
resources from the Pacific.
    There are also other partners beyond the Quad that the 
United States has that the United States, Washington, can look 
to. And I know this is more on the Atlantic side of it, but 
France is a key player in the Indian Ocean Region. France is 
very much present physically in the Indian Ocean and in the 
Pacific. And any European nation, whether it is France, the 
United Kingdom, or Germany, when they think to the Pacific, 
they have to transit the Indian Ocean. So Indian Ocean security 
is paramount for them as well.
    So when the United States is speaking to these partners, 
NATO allies, treaty allies, I think there could be an Indian 
Ocean component to that, since they are already there, and they 
will have to be there, regardless of what Washington chooses to 
do.
    There are also partnerships between friends of Washington, 
such as India, Australia, and France, who all have coasts and 
island territories in the Indian Ocean Region. Again, they have 
to be present there. They are there.
    I think it is about what the United States wants to do in 
the Indian Ocean and how that can be coordinated, which is why 
I think a strategy in the Indian Ocean defining what is in the 
United States' interest and how the United States will use the 
Indian Ocean would be a critical starting point.
    Mr. Bera. Would you like to----
    Ms. Samaranayake. Sure. I would second Darshana's point 
about France and the Indian Ocean. First of all, India has a 
very strong navy-to-navy relationship with France. So I think 
that is an important relationship where, even though the Quad 
involves four countries, it is useful to kind of think beyond 
that particular geometry and look at some bilateral 
relationships, or perhaps trilateral relationships. So the 
Indian navy, the French navy, a strong working relationship.
    Also, in the Western Indian Ocean, that is a bit of an area 
that does not get a lot of attention from a U.S. policy 
perspective, but France has a lot of presence in the Western 
Indian Ocean. The Indian navy conducts operations in the 
Western Indian Ocean. So that is where that bilateral part of 
the Quad can be useful.
    Mr. Bera. Yes, can I ask--I'm a little bit embarrassed that 
I do not know this. I know the joint exercises that we do in 
the Indo-Pacific. Do we do joint training exercises with the 
French navy, with the Indian navy in an organized way?
    Ms. Samaranayake. You mean bilaterally?
    Mr. Bera. Or trilaterally, where the three countries are 
training together in the Indian Ocean Region.
    Ms. Samaranayake. Yes, there have been some multilateral 
exercises, like the Malabar exercise that involves the United 
States, India, Japan, and Australia. So that is one. France 
also has some exercises as well.
    Mrs. Wagner [presiding]. The gentleman yields back.
    And I now recognize myself for 5 minutes.
    And I want to thank our witnesses, certainly, for their 
service and their expertise.
    China is working to push, clearly, the boundaries of its 
sphere of influence well beyond its home waters, using a 
combination of diplomatic and economic bullying, predatory 
investment, and the creation of new economic and military 
infrastructure overseas to project power throughout the Indo-
Pacific region.
    China sees the Indian Ocean as a threat to its hegemonic 
ambitions, I will say. Its fears--it fears the United States 
and like-minded partners' dominance in the region, and it is 
working to weaken the linkages between Indian Ocean countries 
and the United States.
    China's efforts to expand its influence in the Indian Ocean 
are a threat to our partners' security and prosperity. However, 
in coordination with our Quad partners, the United States has 
an opportunity to consolidate and secure a free and open and 
rules-based order throughout the region. To protect our friends 
and allies from China's bullying and foster a more prosperous 
region, robust U.S. engagement in the Indian Ocean Region must 
remain a pillar, I think, of our foreign policy.
    The PRC relies on the Indian Ocean for trade, especially 
energy. And, Mr. Payne, what actions is the PRC taking to 
reduce supply chain risks and chokepoints? How can the United 
States maintain and leverage Beijing's vulnerabilities in the 
Indian Ocean?
    Mr. Payne. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman, for the 
question.
    It is complicated. It is multifaceted. But the biggest 
asset is starting where a lot of those resources that China 
imports domestically come from, and that is from the wider 
Middle East.
    There is a lot in the press. There is a lot of attention 
about how established U.S. partners are economically reliant on 
China, and somehow, that is fundamentally changing the 
relationship.
    I would say that that is, fundamentally, not the case. It 
is not proving to be the case, for a whole host of reasons. 
But, principally, the economic relationships of the Middle East 
to China have to flow through a security architecture the 
United States helped to establish, and it remains healthy.
    That is why I draw attention to combined maritime forces, 
the U.S. Fifth Fleet, the regional architecture that is being 
developed. All of these are adaptations of the fact that there 
are more actors, and actors who may be seeking to undermine the 
rules that won't be allowed to do so.
    And then, you add in the partnerships developed with India, 
conversations with ASEAN. The United States has to maintain its 
current effort and diversify how it approaches it, allowing the 
region more input.
    China has to navigate everything.
    Mrs. Wagner. And I'm going to cut you off there because I 
have so many other questions and so little time.
    Ms. Baruah, is our current level of engagement in the 
Indian Ocean sufficient to meet its strategic imperative? And 
what else must the United States do to enhance our 
partnerships, presence, and ability to operate in the Indian 
Ocean?
    Ms. Baruah. Thank you, Madam Vice Chair.
    I think the United States has a lot of presence in the 
Indian Ocean Region, but, as I mentioned in my opening 
statement, it is directed more toward the continental 
challenges because of the priorities of the last few decades, 
whether it is the Middle East or Afghanistan.
    And I think taking stock of the existing resources in the 
Indian Ocean and redirecting it to the maritime domain would 
perhaps help assess how can the United States do better in the 
region without taking over resources from the Pacific.
    And what can the United States do in terms of the Indian 
Ocean Region? I think twofold. One, with its own key partners, 
whether it is with India or with France, if the United States 
is willing to expand its relationship into the Indian Ocean 
Region and others, it can focus on the military and the 
strategic aspects of it, whether it is on chokepoint control or 
whether it is on giving protection on energy lines.
    And a second is, actually, to engage meaningfully with the 
littorals and island nations of the Indian Ocean Region. The 
U.S. Navy transits the Indian Ocean Region very regularly 
between the Seventh and the Fifth Fleet. But you are sending an 
aircraft carrier into a region with a lot of island nations 
with only the coast guard, or some of them do not even have 
that. So you are not necessarily engaging them at a level that 
they need that interaction with.
    Mrs. Wagner. And I thank you.
    This leads to my next question, which you will have to 
answer for the record, since I'm going to run out of time. But 
the People's Liberation Army Navy and Chinese Coast Guard have 
significantly increased their presence in the Indian Ocean 
waters and their visits to ports in Indian Ocean countries.
    Ms. Samaranayake--no, no--Samaranayake.
    Ms. Samaranayake. Yes?
    Mrs. Wagner. You know what I mean.
    [Laughter.]
    Say your name properly.
    Ms. Samaranayake. It is Samaranayake.
    Mrs. Wagner. Oh, Samaranayake, of course. We should have 
just asked from the very beginning, right?
    [Laughter.]
    What carrots and sticks can we offer Indian Ocean countries 
to ensure that the PLAN and Chinese Coast Guard are not given 
access to strategic ports in the region, and where should the 
United States prioritize an increased Navy and Coast Guard 
presence?
    I have gone over my time. I'm going to let you submit your 
answer for the record, if you would, please.
    And next I would recognize Representative Sherman for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Sherman. Six hundred years ago, Emperor Zhu Di sent 
Admiral Zheng He into the Indian Ocean. I probably 
mispronounced those names, but that seems to be a theme of this 
hearing in any case.
    China has been absent from the Indian Ocean for about half 
a millennia. It is now back. Not everything that China does in 
the Indian Ocean area is evil. Most of it is just regular 
commercial transactions. And not everything that is evil, or at 
least a power projection, is something that we need a 
multibillion dollar response to. We do not need, and we cannot 
afford, another two or three aircraft carrier groups to deploy 
to the Indian Ocean.
    In a perfect world, we would be in control of all of the 
response. Being that it is an imperfect world, we should have a 
strong relationship with India, not that I'm spotlighting any 
great imperfection with India. It is not as perfectly aligned 
with the United States as we are. But India has the advantage 
of being right there in the middle of the Indian Ocean. And I 
think that cooperating with India makes an awful lot of sense.
    China does not engage in foreign aid. Now and then, they 
just call it foreign aid, but they do not do anything that is 
genuinely charitable. They regard themselves as a poor country 
and are working around the world to tell us that they are a 
developing country and should be accorded all of the benefits 
accorded to developing countries.
    Now, China is trying to expand its relationship with the 
Islamic world, concluding in the Indian Ocean Region which 
stretches from Indonesia to Egypt. And yet, they have a million 
Uyghurs in prison, God knows how many killed. And they have 
told Burma/Myanmar, ``Kill as many Rohingya as you want. It 
won't affect us. As a matter of fact, we'll root for you.''
    How effective have we been in letting the Muslim 
populations from Indonesia to Egypt know what China is doing 
and making them pay a price? This is kind of outside the 
briefing memo. So I do not know whether any of you have focused 
on this. Does anyone have an answer to this or should we just 
have a response for the record?
    I think the fact that our three experts do not know is the 
answer to the question, which is the United States never makes 
China pay a price in terms of its popularity in the Islamic 
world and elsewhere. We are just too nice. We do not push. We 
do not degrade and denigrate. But China's behavior toward 
Muslims, Uyghur and Rohingya, in particular, deserves 
denigration. We are too nice to do that.
    Now, there is a tendency for us to look at naval resources 
because that is exciting. You know, there are 21-year-old 
Massachusetts Air National Guardsmen. If they are going to play 
a video game, it is going to be about the Navy. But I will tell 
you what they are not going to play a video game on: bond-
rating agencies.
    Yet, our bond-rating agencies have allowed China to hide--
well, allowed countries that borrow from China to hide that 
debt and not put it on their balance sheet. And then we take 
the position that if somebody does not repay China, that hurts 
their bond agency rating. We have got to ask the question, why 
would Sri Lanka even repay China? Just keep the port and tell 
them to go away. Well, you are not going to borrow any more 
money from China, but Sri Lanka has borrowed plenty.
    The main reason is bond-rating agencies under our control 
will downgrade them. So the question--again, this is outside 
the briefing memo, so you may want to respond for the record--
is, should we mandate that bond-rating agencies do not cause a 
country's rating to decline if they just point whatever finger 
seems to be convenient in the direction of Beijing when they 
come to collect the debt? That is to say, stiff China; it does 
not hurt your rating.
    Any comment?
    Mrs. Kim of California [presiding]. Mr. Sherman's time has 
expired.
    Mr. Sherman. My time has expired. Please----
    Mrs. Kim of California. But I would allow the witnesses to 
submit your responses in writing, if that is OK. Will that be 
sufficient? Thank you.
    I now recognize Representative Barr for your questioning.
    Mr. Barr. Well, Mr. Sherman, that was an interesting 
question. And so I'm going to take my time to allow the 
witnesses to answer it. Should we direct the bond-rating 
agencies to not downgrade Sri Lanka if they stiff Beijing?
    Mr. Payne. I am not an expert in that and I cannot say 
this. But what I can say is that one of the things we can 
highlight, and we should highlight more openly, is the lack of 
transparency inside of China's banking, regulatory, financial 
structures. They do not conform to international standards.
    It is part of the reason why most lending agencies around 
the world, whether bilaterally or through the IMF or World 
Bank, following a contractual, open, transparent process.
    In terms of that, that is what I would highlight. In terms 
of anything beyond that, forgive me, it is just beyond my----
    Mr. Barr. I think it is a fair point that bond-rating 
agencies should take into effect debt-trap diplomacy and the 
coercive nature of Belt and Road.
    Let me ask any of the witnesses about the Strait of Malacca 
and the potential of a Taiwan conflict. Can you describe the 
impact of a Taiwan invasion, what the impact would be on 
international trade through the Strait of Malacca? Should the 
PLA cross the Taiwan Strait, would the PLA Navy attempt or even 
be able to secure its own supply lines through the Strait of 
Malacca? Or would the PRC be limited to operations around 
Taiwan?
    Ms. Baruah. I can start to answer. Thank you so much.
    On the Strait of Malacca and Taiwan crisis, I think that 
will be an element that PRC would be monitoring and assessing. 
Because a lot of energy transits the Strait of Malacca and 
there is nothing to reroute around it at this point in time.
    However, because of the nature of movements of goods at sea 
and the globalized world, it is going to be very hard to single 
out just Chinese vessels transiting the Strait of Malacca, and 
particularly, block the waterways for Chinese vessels or 
commercial ships, because it is the same tankers also carrying 
oil for Japan and South Korea and the Philippines, and every 
other nation in Southeast Asia.
    But I think it is a vulnerability in the way that China 
often talks about, which is the reference to the Strait of 
Malacca dilemma, which is that their critical energy routes and 
their sea lines are vulnerable to the United States and Indian 
presence across the Strait of Malacca. And if there is any 
notion or if there is any attempt at establishing deterence for 
a Taiwan Strait crisis on the Maritime domain, I think that 
would come around the Strait of Malacca.
    Mr. Barr. Let me stick with you, Ms. Baruah. In the Pacific 
Islands, we have seen the importance of larger Western 
multinational banks like ANZ Bank----
    Ms. Baruah. Mm-hmm.
    Mr. Barr [continuing]. Offering financial services to the 
various islands, as opposed to Chinese banks. This keeps 
economic ties with our allies and gives greater oversight to 
PRC attempts to financial corruption and elite capture. Who is 
the main provider of financial services to the populations 
across the six islands in the Indian Ocean? Is it Indian banks, 
African banks? Are we seeing Chinese banks try and push out 
existing providers? What threat do Chinese banks pose to anti-
corruption efforts and countering Belt and Road in the Indian 
Ocean Region?
    Ms. Baruah. I think the question here as far as the islands 
are concerned is, it starts with the geopolitical aspect of it. 
Because, for a long time, the traditional players in the Indian 
Ocean were missing from even visiting the islands. For a long 
period, nobody visited Sri Lanka from any of the traditional 
players. Last year, or perhaps early this year--I'm forgetting; 
I can correct that later--but the Chinese foreign minister was 
in Comoros. I cannot think of the last time any big player sent 
a high-level delegation to a country in the Western Coast of 
Africa. So islands went to whoever was there present and 
willing to offer assistance.
    And that comes from bilateral relationships--the World 
Bank, IMF, Asian Development Bank, and whoever is willing to be 
there and to present that. But, most often, they also say that 
a lot of the resources and the capital and the investments 
present today are not accessible to them in a way that they 
would like. So bilateral loans in funds work better, and with 
China's regulations, this works in the----
    Mr. Barr. Thank you.
    Well, in addition to the maritime domain awareness and what 
the Quad is doing there, Quad banks should be active in the 
Indian Ocean.
    Let me just, finally, ask Ms. Samaranayake about debt-trap 
diplomacy and back to Sri Lanka. The world has seen the effects 
of Sri Lanka's economic fallout. Is that impacting China's 
reputation negatively as a provider of credit to Indian Ocean 
countries?
    Ms. Samaranayake. Congressman Barr, yes, I would say the 
events that happened in Sri Lanka over the last summer, people 
saw how China was dragging its feet on providing any type of 
assistance or attention to Sri Lanka, as it was struggling 
through. Essentially, its economy collapsed.
    Mr. Barr. Thank you. I yield back.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you.
    I now recognize Representative Castro for your 5 minutes.
    Mr. Castro. Thank you, Chairwoman; thank you, Ranking 
Member, also, for holding this important hearing on China's 
growing influence in the Indian Ocean Region.
    Last Congress, I introduced the Indian Ocean Strategic 
Review Act to ensure the United States has a clear and 
comprehensive vision for how the Indian Ocean Region fits into 
the Indo-Pacific strategy.
    As you all laid out in your testimoneys, the United States 
now uses the term ``Indo-Pacific,'' which is meant to reference 
the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, but our attention is 
almost entirely on the Pacific Ocean and not the Indian Ocean. 
Both the Biden Administration and the previous Administration's 
Indo-Pacific strategies barely mention the Indian Ocean Region.
    My bill would put the ``Indo'' back in Indo-Pacific. The 
Indian Ocean Region Strategic Review Act passed the House as 
part of the COMPETES Act last Congress, and as I understand it, 
this is the only legislation in Congress that focuses on U.S. 
policy in the Indian Ocean Region.
    I'm glad we are having this hearing and I hope to use you 
all's testimony and expertise to inform revisions to my bill in 
this new Congress. And so I have a few questions for you all.
    Ms. Samaranayake, thank you for being here today.
    You referenced the ongoing dispute between Mauritius and 
the United Kingdom over the island of Diego Garcia, which hosts 
the U.S. naval facility at Diego Garcia. As you described in 
your testimony, this is, arguably, the United States' most 
important location for basing forces. My question is, what 
would be the impact on the United States national security if 
we were to lose access to the naval facility at Diego Garcia?
    Ms. Samaranayake. I think it would be very concerning if 
the United States lost access to Diego Garcia. It is a critical 
base for operations, not only eastward to the Pacific, but also 
westward to the Middle East. And we have seen wars and the need 
for the United States to flow forces across the Indian Ocean. 
So it is really a critical base for the United States.
    Mr. Castro. And we regularly mention India as a partner in 
the Indian Ocean Region, but they also back Mauritius' claim 
over the island, which would have serious consequences on U.S. 
national security. How would you describe India's position on 
this dispute and its impact on our national security?
    And, Ms. Baruah, I would welcome your views on this as 
well.
    Ms. Samaranayake. India has a very close relationship with 
Mauritius just historically and also in terms of security 
relationships and in terms of the Mauritius coast guard, for 
example. So India is going to support Mauritius. It is not a 
surprise. There is also a colonial element or aspect of the 
U.K.-Mauritius dispute over the Chagos Islands. So India, just 
in terms of its history and non-alignment movement it is going 
to support Mauritius.
    That said, practically speaking, India has become more 
comfortable with the U.S. presence in Diego Garcia, 
particularly in the last decade or so, especially as their 
threat perceptions of China have increased.
    Mr. Castro. All right. Let me ask you--oh, please proceed. 
I'm sorry.
    Ms. Baruah. I just wanted to add on Diego Garcia that, yes, 
Diego Garcia is a critical base for the United States, and, in 
fact, it was absolutely necessary for the United States' 
engagement for the Gulf War or Afghanistan, or any, because it 
is equidistant from Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia. So 
it can be reached in terms of air power.
    Having said that, the Mauritius Prime Minister at least on 
three occasions has come out and said that ``We are willing to 
give the base for a hundred years to the United States 
directly.'' So when the United States actually does not accept 
the U.N. ruling which says that the U.K. and the United States 
is illegally occupying the island, the United States somewhere 
is impacting its own conversation on rules-based international 
order. So for the countries of the region, it is not just China 
breaking international norms and rules, but it is also the 
United States and the United Kingdom.
    So I think there is more merit to going back to the table 
and consulting directly, having conversation with Mauritius and 
renegotiating the base, because they are willing to give the 
base to the United States. It is just recognizing that the time 
of separation was done through decolonization which was not 
attempted properly.
    Mr. Castro. All right. Let me ask you one more question. 
You may have to give some of the answer just for the record 
because I'm running out of time.
    Ms. Baruah. OK.
    Mr. Castro. But, in your testimony, you recommend that 
Congress should commission a study on existing U.S. resources 
in the Indian Ocean and examine how they can be utilized for 
maritime needs and gaps in the region. In your opinion, what 
are some of the main needs and gaps that the United States 
faces in its engagement in the Indian Ocean? And how can it 
maximize its existing presence and assets?
    I think I only have like 25 seconds.
    Ms. Baruah. I think, again, because of the United States' 
presence in the Middle East and Africa and Afghanistan, the 
resources there exist, but I think it will need taking stock of 
what is it that the United States can redirect without really 
pulling away from resources in the Pacific. Because, no matter 
how much we say the Indian Ocean is important, the Pacific will 
always be the primary theater. It is geography.
    One aspect is also a lot of the engagements are not as 
high-intensity. I think a lot of them are low-hanging fruits, 
whether it is in terms of providing disaster resilience, 
infrastructure, simple infrastructure projects that go 
against--sorry, I will stop there, I think.
    Mrs. Kim of California. You can summarize, yes.
    Ms. Baruah. OK. Projects in terms of, whether it is coast 
guard interaction, whether it is climate change, whether it is 
disaster resilience, whether it is humanitarian assistance, I 
think those would be the areas where the United States can 
effectively and productively engage and provide assistance to 
the region without necessarily pulling away from other aspects 
of the theater.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you.
    Let me now recognize Representative Andy Kim.
    Mr. Kim of New Jersey. Thank you.
    Actually, to kind of pull on that thread a little bit, so 
we can kind of keep that conversation going, as we kind of 
think through how do we have this kind of whole-of-government 
approach and engagement that way. I cannot recall which 
testimoneys it was in, but kind of laying out the U.S. 
Government approach when it comes to the Indian Ocean. The 
State Department is divided across multiple bureaus. On the 
military side, it is across multiple different COCOMs.
    And I guess I'm just trying to get a sense of like, what do 
you think we are missing by having this fragmented kind of 
viewpoint of the Indian Ocean area? Is it that we are missing 
certain issues and topics? Or do you think it is more about 
sort of a deprioritization, kind of as my colleague was saying, 
that it kind of plays often kind of second fiddle in terms of 
people's mindsets of hot spots? I guess I just wanted to kind 
of throw that out there for you all.
    Ms. Baruah. If I'm not wrong, I think the last written 
public strategy from the United States on the Indian Ocean 
dates back to the 1970's. I do not think the United States has 
written a comprehensive Indian Ocean strategy in the last 
couple of decades. So I think a lot of the policies that are 
continuing today are a continuation of something that came up 
in the cold war period. A lot of the islands were not even 
sovereign nations at that point in time.
    What the United States is missing by the fragmentation, the 
fragmented view of the Indian Ocean, is the new Indian Ocean in 
the 21st century and its impact on the wider Indo-Pacific. 
Where the base in Djibouti came up, it was perhaps classified 
as an Africa problem, but when you think Africa, you think 
continental; you are not thinking maritime. So you are not 
really connecting the dots in terms of how having a base in 
Djibouti or having another base somewhere else in the Indian 
Ocean will help China secure the Strait of Malacca.
    And I think the fragmentation of bureaus in the Department 
of State and Department of Defense is because it is a 
bureaucratic challenge. And I think that most nations across 
the world do it because, after the cold war, the ocean got 
divided into continental silos.
    But perhaps that is something that the National Security 
Council could have, a nodal point to monitor the entire region 
on its own and to link the missing dots. Because China is also 
not the only new player in the Indian Ocean Region. It is also 
Saudi Arabia. It is UAE. It is Turkey. Russia had a base in the 
Red Sea in Sudan that came up just before the Ukraine war. So 
there are links between these in terms of how developments in 
one aspect of the world, of the ocean, will have an aspect on 
the other side, and somebody somewhere has to monitor and study 
that.
    Mr. Kim of New Jersey. Go ahead. Mr. Payne?
    Mr. Payne. I would just add that there are advantages to 
some of our seams in our bureaucratic structure. It is decried 
often in the region, but we can walk and chew gum at the same 
time. I think that, comprehensively, whether it be the National 
Security Council or Congress, or some element can consider the 
IOR.
    The things I would emphasize are:
    One, we have to think about the IOR from a maritime domain. 
It does not have to purely be that, but we cannot lose sight of 
the water.
    And second, there is experimentation that we are using and 
developing new approaches that will have a large relevance for 
the Indo-Pacific, or possibly the North Atlantic, that are 
being developed in the IOR by the United States and its 
partners. I brought up Task Force 59 out of CENTCOM. AFRICOM is 
developing certain kinds of partnerships with regional 
partners. All of these things just do not get enough attention. 
And I think there should be a more concerted efforts in drawing 
attention to those efforts.
    Ms. Samaranayake. I think the issue is, clearly, a 
coordination piece. As you mentioned, there are three combatant 
commands that have responsibilities for parts of the Indian 
Ocean. And for each of those combatant commands, the Indian 
Ocean piece is always secondary. So I think that is one aspect 
in terms of what we are missing, to your question.
    And another thing, we can go back in history. We can look 
at the unified command plan, how combatant commands have had 
responsibilities in the past. Even when all of those waters 
were under the responsibility of the Pacific Command, there is 
still a time/distance factor that it is just impossible to get 
over. So even if the coordination is improved, there are still 
priorities in the Pacific, and then, there is the entire Indian 
Ocean piece. So I think that the issues of coordination can be 
addressed, but there is still the time/distance factor.
    Mr. Kim of New Jersey. Yes, I mean, look, you know, I have 
worked in some of these different elements of the bureaucracy 
at the State Department and the Pentagon. And to the point, it 
is not just about the strategy. I mean, what you said is 
concerning to me as well, but what we also know is that it is 
about the implementation of that. And so if you do not even 
have sort of a strategy writ large--but even if you did, the 
implementation gets all the more difficult when you think about 
these different jurisdictions.
    And I would like to try to think through this more 
concerted effort to try to figure out how we can break through 
some of those types of silos and be able to have the kind of 
level of prioritization. So I really appreciate it.
    With that, I will yield back.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you. Thank you, 
Representative Kim.
    And I now recognize myself, another Kim, for a second round 
of questioning.
    You know, it was talked about, Sri Lanka. I think we should 
use that as a textbook example of the consequences of the PRC's 
debt-trap diplomacy.
    And I want to ask you a question about, how did countries 
in the region, especially the ones with the Belt and Road 
projects ongoing on their soil, react to the collapse of the 
Sri Lankan economy?
    Ms. Samaranayake. I think they have learned from the Sri 
Lanka example to be much more wary of China, especially in 
terms of taking any kind of loans. They are looking more for 
other options, such as grants, for example, and for a direct 
investment, as opposed to taking loans. But my sense is that 
countries are a lot of wary after looking at the case of Sri 
Lanka.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Well, let me also talk about the 
PRC sending submarines into the IOR. Will the Djibouti base 
help PRC submarines avoid detection, and if so, is that a 
security concern for the United States?
    Mr. Payne. The base in Djibouti was projected to be one 
thing, and it turned out to be something different. Its mere 
presence, it is a complication for the United States. It does 
not mean that it, fundamentally, reshapes the Red Sea or the 
Gulf of Aden. The U.S. Navy will make sure that they are the 
ones that are leading the coalition of partners.
    However, it does signal that the IOR in total is going to 
be a theater for Chinese naval operations, whether it starts 
with counter-piracy, it evolves into joint exercises, and then, 
moves on to larger missions that are related to ISR 
capabilities. It is something that is a trend that you have 
noticed that follows a similar pattern of the Western Pacific.
    Now, in terms of the base itself's relevance to other than 
a refuel and resupply, I do not see much. But that does not 
mean what the trend lines are showing. The trend lines are 
showing that the People's Liberation Army Navy is intent on 
having an ongoing and substantive presence in the IOR.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you, Mr. Payne.
    Did you want to add to that?
    Ms. Baruah. To quickly add on that is, again, Djibouti 
base, China has a base. So does the United States, France, 
Japan. So there are multiple players in there.
    But I think it is the deployment of submarines into the 
Indian Ocean Region that is concerning, which has increased in 
frequency and also in quantity. It is not hard to detect 
submarines in the bases. The hardest part is tracking their 
movement in open seas, which is where my recommendation on 
working on maritime domain awareness, but underwater domain 
awareness. If we are able to track them and know where they 
are, I think that is first in creating awareness on what routes 
they are taking; how they are moving; where are they making 
ports of call.
    The base part is not that difficult to monitor because of 
technology, but it is the open seas which require very specific 
and coordinated intelligence and information-sharing between 
partners to be able to do that. I think that is where the 
missing layer is. It is not maritime domain awareness over, but 
it is underwater that is a necessity in the Indian Ocean.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you.
    One last question in the remaining time. We talk a lot 
about potential blockade of Taiwan by China and the aggression, 
and the impact it will have in the Indo-Pacific arena. So we 
are talking to allies, especially when the ranking member and I 
were part of the congressional delegation to Asia. Just 
recently, we came back from it.
    A lot of conversations center around how the allies and the 
partners in the region will be there to help protect Taiwan, 
should it be attacked by China. So I want to ask you, how could 
the Strait of Malacca deter a PRC invasion of Taiwan? Will they 
be there to work with us?
    Ms. Baruah. I think that would come down to a United States 
conversation with its partners and friends in the region. And I 
think the two key players in this would be Australia and India, 
because of geography and because where they have their 
territories, Cocos Keeling, Andaman and Nicobar Islands. They 
are absolutely critical pieces of geography, if there is any 
chance of or there is any attempt or political appetite to 
establish something. But, again, it depends on the political 
conversation between what the United States is willing to do 
with the partners and also what the partners are willing to 
provide.
    But I had said previously, it is going to be hard to block 
the Strait of Malacca purely for Chinese movement of energy 
shipping because of an issue of globalization and the tankers 
that carry----
    Mrs. Kim of California. In the remaining time, I want to 
ask, what does possible instability in the IOR mean for supply 
chains to the United States?
    Mr. Payne. It would be a compounding kind of cataclysm for 
the global market. It wouldn't hit us as immediately as the 
rest of the world, but Europe would be substantially disrupted 
economically. The developing States of the IOR, the littorals, 
would have immediate impacts, possibly undermining regional 
States. Southeast Asia would have dramatic impacts. And quite 
frankly, in that situation, China would do everything possible 
to redirect a lane elsewhere.
    So the discussion, open discussion, about it is absolutely 
helpful because it shows the world that, again, sunlight is the 
best disinfectant. So us talking about it openly is helpful.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you.
    I know I went over my time, but I would like to yield time 
to Ranking Member Bera for your questions.
    Mr. Bera. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
    This has been a great hearing, by the way, because, again, 
I will readily admit that we spend a lot of time focused on the 
Pacific, and this is eye-opening for the Indian Ocean Region.
    I'm looking at a map that kind of lays all of this out, and 
when I look at Djibouti and the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, I 
see a chokepoint. I see the Strait of Hormuz; I see a 
chokepoint. I see Gwadar Port and the economic corridor that 
China is building with Pakistan. So even if there is a block at 
the Malacca Strait, there are still ways for them to continue 
to get energy.
    I see the Strait of Malacca. I see China building a trade 
corridor, although Burma is not extremely stable right now, 
through Burma as well, as places to move things forward.
    So, again, I agree with the supposition that this is a 
place where we need to spend more time and energy. And China 
might be playing a long game here. They may be looking at this 
from a longer perspective.
    How would you advise we think about the Maldives? Because, 
again, as I'm looking at this map here as well, I see a lot of 
these trade routes and I see the Maldives is fairly important. 
I recognize that, you know, we've grouped them all by Sri Lanka 
in terms of our diplomatic presence. I mean, I think one thing 
we ought to do is reestablish a diplomatic presence there.
    So, outside of that, though, what is happening in the 
Maldives and how should we be thinking about that from a 
geopolitical strategic perspective?
    Ms. Samaranayake. Sure. I think the decision to open an 
embassy in Maldives is a significant one. So right now they 
have established the chief of mission to Maldives. So that 
process is underway of establishing a full embassy in terms of 
having that representation in Mali itself, as opposed to in 
Colombo at present.
    Also the U.S. Coast Guard actually sent a ship to 
Maldives--the first visit in over a decade. So the fact that 
U.S. sea service is paying that kind of attention, especially 
the Coast Guard, which has limited resources, that they are 
going to Maldives and they are showing that kind of attention 
is also important from a partner mission perspective. Also, the 
United States also trains Maldives--the coast guard, the 
marines--and has training exercises.
    So I think that type of attention is very welcome from 
Maldives' perspective because they are looking at their 
Exclusive Economic Zone and the fact that they are limited in 
capacity in terms of being able to surveil that wide swath of 
sea. And so they need as much capacity as possible.
    Ms. Baruah. So about 1200 small islands together make up 
the sovereign nation of Maldives. And one of the biggest issues 
they have is monitoring all of those outlying islands and what 
is going on there. Their biggest issues are illegal fishing, 
drug trafficking, and human smuggling. So maritime domain 
awareness, whether it is through radars, whether it is through 
sensors, whether it is through assets, to be able to do that, I 
think are key areas where Maldives really wants some assistance 
and would welcome it.
    The biggest security challenge that all of the island 
nations define as their No. 1 security challenge is not China; 
it is not the United States; it is not India. It is climate 
change. And everything that is done around has to have some 
aspect of how that would help them elevate their issues that 
emerge because of climate change.
    One specific example on U.S. engagement with islands and 
others in the region is to invite for training in terms of 
military courses and colleges, war colleges, or Hawaii in terms 
of INDOPACOM, to get more familiar in terms of the expertise of 
the United States both in teaching strategy and policy to its 
officers. They end up going to military and war colleges 
elsewhere. So why not the United States as well? And it is a 
pretty low-hanging fruit that can be offered, and I think it is 
a great way to also create familiarity between different 
militaries.
    Mr. Bera. Just in the remaining time that I have, much of 
the things that we are thinking about with regards to the 
Pacific Island nation States, we should also be thinking about 
with the islands in the Indian Ocean Region. Just quickly, on 
the Strait of Malacca, we have mentioned the importance of 
Australia and Indonesia--or Australia and India--but Indonesia 
is right there. Malaysia is right there. Singapore is right 
there. How should we be thinking about that engagement? 
Indonesia has got a developed navy; has some abilities there. 
India and Indonesia are also having conversations as well.
    For anyone, in the remaining time, how should we be 
thinking about that?
    Ms. Samaranayake. I think in these discussions about the 
Strait of Malacca, those three countries are often ignored or 
forgotten about, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore. They take 
great care in terms of the security of the Strait of Malacca. 
So when we are thinking about these issues of big powers, the 
United States, even India, those three countries, that is the 
most critical. So I think there needs to be more attention paid 
to those three countries.
    Mr. Bera. More engagement? More dialogue?
    Ms. Samaranayake. Yes, when we are talking about the Strait 
of Malacca.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Let me now recognize Representative 
Andy Kim.
    Mr. Kim of New Jersey. Yes, I just have a couple of quick 
ones here.
    I guess, you know, oftentimes, when we talk about the 
challenges vis-a-vis China, we often kind of couch it as it is 
kind of a United States-China kind of dynamic, and then, 
duality there. But, you know, you all, at least in your written 
testimoneys, you really kind of pointed out some of the other 
players that are there.
    And I guess I just wanted to kind of get a sense from you 
of some of the partners and allies that we have, whether 
European, Pacific, or others. Is there room there for 
particular ones to be able to kind of step up even more in the 
area? You know, can we kind of be thinking about encouraging 
and working with some of our allies and partners that do have 
presence, do have capacity to be able to do more? So I kind of 
just wanted to get a little bit of your sense there.
    Mr. Payne, it looks like you have something?
    Mr. Payne. Yes. We at the NESA Center work on this a lot. 
And, yes, the short answer is there are more things that our 
partners and allies can do on what they are currently doing. 
But it is a very complicated conversation related to what we 
call niche capabilities, things that specific countries are 
better at than others.
    Some may not want to direct it toward the Pacific theater. 
Others may want to focus on another area. So these are all very 
complicated conversations among defense ministries as well as 
ministries of external affairs, and so forth.
    However, one of the things that is developing is a great 
commitment on following the region's tune. That has been one of 
the biggest problems, comprehensively, that major actors, 
whether of the region or not of the region, have not done. Is 
they consider the region fragmented, and therefore, we write 
the tune and the region will dance. The region has its own 
tunes that it is writing, and the other actors, especially 
major powers like the United States, are starting to respond to 
that. Because not only does it mean that we do not have to lead 
and keep our eyes focused on the Pacific, but it means that 
things that are already inherently domestically favored in the 
region can get greater.
    Mr. Kim of New Jersey. How do we start to hear that tune 
some more? I mean, is it about us having greater presence in 
the region, more engagement, interactions?
    Mr. Payne. There's different ways, things. I would 
emphasize, specifically, defense institution building, 
capability enhancement from the security side of things, from 
the diplomatic side.
    Giving credence by showing up to specific conversations 
related to everything from climate change; marine protection; 
coastal development; women, peace, and security issues. These 
are all topics we could list that all give us something that 
isn't a huge leap for the United States to take, that we are 
already taking, but our partners and allies can jump onboard 
with this.
    Mr. Kim of New Jersey. Yes, go ahead.
    Ms. Baruah. I think, again, reemphasizing the need for a 
strategy or sort of looking at what the United States seeks to 
do in the Indian Ocean Region would help identify there. 
Because there are a lot of existing platforms and avenues 
already. It is how you responsibly leverage it.
    For instance, Japan has TICAD, which means they interact 
with Africa already, all the islands and the African continent, 
part of Tokyo's conversation in that. Why not also introduce an 
element on the Indian Ocean and a United States-Japan 
conversation because that work is already happening?
    But to be able to do that, I think--and the same applies 
for France and the European Union. They are all present there 
in different formats and different groupings and different 
institutions and platforms. But before the United States can 
ask what to do, I think it probably needs to lay out what it 
wants to do and what are the interests, and how it wants to 
approach.
    And I think that is where the strategy and the disconnect 
is providing a challenge in actually having a coherent 
approach. There are a lot of conversations with the European 
Union on maritime security, and with France, but I'm pretty 
sure the Indian Ocean does not really feature in it, while both 
of them are very present there.
    Ms. Samaranayake. I think it is useful to think about the 
Western Indian Ocean. France has a strong presence there and is 
an ally of the United States. In the Central Indian Ocean, 
India is right at the center and it has a growing partnership, 
a major defense partnership with the United States. And then, 
in the Eastern Indian Ocean, Australia, and, of course, the 
United States and Australia are Five Eyes allies. So I think 
those three partners are useful for thinking about how to 
engage in the Indian Ocean.
    Increasingly, though, Japan is an important player and ally 
of the West, especially as it contributes capacity, maritime 
capacity building, providing patrol boats, that sort of thing. 
And, of course, in terms of the economics as well, a lot of 
these smaller countries have looked at Japan for maritime 
infrastructure.
    Mr. Kim of New Jersey. Yes. Yes, just in the last few 
seconds here, I mean, what I'm trying to think about as well--
and we can continue this conversation--is about how do you try 
to scale some of those effects. And so it is good to hear some 
of the partnerships that are there.
    The other aspect is, you know, are these coalition 
partnerships and allies--can that be a substitute for us? Or is 
that something that--like what is the baseline level of our 
engagement? To what extent can we leverage coalition or to what 
extent does that not quite scratch the edge of what we are 
trying to get done?
    But, with that, I will yield on back. Thank you.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Would you like to respond quickly? 
I will give you about 30 seconds, if you can do it. Otherwise, 
submit your responses in writing. Writing? OK?
    Thank you so much. You have endured about an hour and a 
half with us. Thank you so much.
    I know I got this right. Ms. Samaranayake, Mr. Payne, Ms. 
Baruah, thank you so much for your testimoneys and also 
answering the questions from our members today.
    The members of the committee may have some additional 
questions for you. So our staff and our committee will 
followup, and if you would be so kind to respond to those in 
writing, as you do to Mrs. Kim's last question, that will be 
great.
    Mrs. Kim of California. So, let's see. I now want to 
recognize Ranking Member Bera, if you have any final, closing 
thoughts?
    Mr. Bera. No, other than this was a great hearing. And, 
again, I think it does shine the light on the importance of 
paying attention to the Indian Ocean Region, and while we have 
got a lot of assets there, let's think about how we use those 
assets, those relationships, and those alliances.
    Again, no one is seeking conflict here, but we are seeking 
free and open waterways, you know, maritime security, freedom 
of navigation, and the like, in the 21st century. That should 
be the goal of all nations. So that is what we hope to achieve.
    Mrs. Kim of California. I think the common theme today was, 
you know, we are in a strategic competition with China. And so, 
especially on the waters, we do not want China to dominate that 
and have closed water for us and the rest of the allies and 
partners in the area. So we do want to work toward having an 
open and fair ocean, especially in the Indian Ocean.
    So thank you. It was really educational, productive, and a 
very wonderful conversation we had today.
    So, in closing, pursuant to committee rules, all members 
may have 5 days to submit statements, questions, extraneous 
materials for the record, subject to the length limitation.
    So, without objection, the committee stands adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 3:38 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

                                APPENDIX

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    STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED FROM REPRESENTATIVE CONNOLLY

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            RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

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