[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                    CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES TO INVES-
                     TIGATING THE ORIGINS OF PANDEMICS AND 
                     OTHER BIOLOGICAL EVENTS

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                        SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND 
                               INVESTIGATIONS

                                 OF THE

                    COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                            FEBRUARY 1, 2023

                               __________

                            Serial No. 118-4
                            
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]                            


     Published for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce

                   govinfo.gov/committee/house-energy
                        energycommerce.house.gov
                        
                                ________

                   U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
52-000 PDF                  WASHINGTON : 2024                    
          
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------     
                        
                    COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE

                   CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
                                  Chair
                                  
MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas            FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey
ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio                  Ranking Member
BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky              ANNA G. ESHOO, California
H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia         DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida            JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio                   DORIS O. MATSUI, California
LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana               KATHY CASTOR, Florida
RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina       JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland
TIM WALBERG, Michigan                PAUL TONKO, New York
EARL L. ``BUDDY'' CARTER, Georgia    YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina          TONY CARDENAS, California
GARY J. PALMER, Alabama              RAUL RUIZ, California
NEAL P. DUNN, Florida                SCOTT H. PETERS, California
JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah                 DEBBIE DINGELL, Michigan
DEBBBIE LESKO, Arizona               MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
GREG PENCE, Indiana                  ANN M. KUSTER, New Hampshire
DAN CRENSHAW, Texas                  ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
JOHN JOYCE, Pennsylvania             NANETTE DIAZ BARRAGAN, California
KELLY ARMSTRONG, North Dakota, Vice  LISA BLUNT ROCHESTER, Delaware
    Chair                            DARREN SOTO, Florida
RANDY K. WEBER, Sr., Texas           ANGIE CRAIG, Minnesota
RICK W. ALLEN, Georgia               KIM SCHRIER, Washington
TROY BALDERSON, Ohio                 LORI TRAHAN, Massachusetts
RUSS FULCHER, Idaho                  LIZZIE FLETCHER, Texas
AUGUST PFLUGER, Texas
DIANA HARSHBARGER, Tennessee
MARIANNETTE MILLER-MEEKS, Iowa
KAT CAMMACK, Florida
JAY OBERNOLTE, California
                                 ------                                

                           Professional Staff

                      NATE HODSON, Staff Director
                   SARAH BURKE, Deputy Staff Director
               TIFFANY GUARASCIO, Minority Staff Director
              Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations

                      H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia
                                 Chairman
MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas            KATHY CASTOR, Florida
BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky                Ranking Member
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina          DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado
GARY J. PALMER, Alabama              JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
DEBBIE LESKO, Arizona, Vice Chair    PAUL TONKO, New York
DAN CRENSHAW, Texas                  RAUL RUIZ, California
KELLY ARMSTRONG, North Dakota        SCOTT H. PETERS, California
KAT CAMMACK, Florida                 FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey (ex 
CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington       officio)
    (ex officio)
                             C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
Hon. H. Morgan Griffith, a Representative in Congress from the 
  Commonwealth of Virginia, opening statement....................     2
    Prepared statement...........................................     4
Hon. Kathy Castor, a Representative in Congress from the State of 
  Florida, opening statement.....................................    10
    Prepared statement...........................................    12
Hon. Cathy McMorris Rodgers, a Representative in Congress from 
  the State of Washington, opening statement.....................    14
    Prepared statement...........................................    16
Hon. Frank Pallone, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the 
  State of New Jersey, opening statement.........................    19
    Prepared statement...........................................    21

                               Witnesses

Karen L. Howard, Ph.D., Acting Chief Scientist and Director, 
  Science, Technology Assessment, and Analytics, Government 
  Accountability Office..........................................    24
    Prepared statement...........................................    27
    Answers to submitted questions...............................   136
Tom Inglesby, M.D., Director, Center for Health Security, Johns 
  Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health......................    43
    Prepared statement...........................................    45
    Answers to submitted questions...............................   138
Asha M. George, D.P.H., Executive Director, Bipartisan Commission 
  on Biodefense..................................................    54
    Prepared statement...........................................    56
    Additional material submitted for the record \1\
    Answers to submitted questions...............................   139
Gerald W. Parker, D.V.M., Ph.D., Associate Dean for Global One 
  Health, College of Veterinary Medicine & Biomedical Sciences, 
  Texas A&M University...........................................    72
    Prepared statement...........................................    74
    Answers to submitted questions...............................   144
Michael J. Imperiale, Ph.D., Arthur F. Thurnau Professor, 
  Department of Microbiology and Immunology, University of 
  Michigan.......................................................    89
    Prepared statement...........................................    91
    Answers to submitted questions...............................   148

                           Submitted Material

Inclusion of the following was approved by unanimous consent.
Report of the Government Accountability Office, ``Pandemic 
  Origins: Technologies and Challenges for Biological 
  Investigations,'' January 2023 \2\

----------

\1\ Four reports submitted by Dr. George have been retained in 
committee files and are collected in one document at https://
docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF02/20230201/115347/HHRG-118-IF02-Wstate-
GeorgeA-20230201.pdf.
\2\ The report has been retained in committee files and is included in 
the Documents for the Record at https://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/
IF02/20230201/115347/HHRG-118-IF02-20230201-SD002.pdf.
Report of the Government Accountability Office, ``Public Health 
  Preparedness: HHS Could Improve Oversight of Research Involving 
  Enhanced Potential Pandemic Pathogens,'' January 2023 \2\
Report of the Office of Inspector General, ``The National 
  Institutes of Health and EcoHealth Alliance Did Not Effectively 
  Monitor Awards and Subawards, Resulting in Missed Opportunities 
  to Oversee Research and Other Deficiencies,'' January 2023 \2\
Report of the Center for Health Security, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg 
  School of Public Health, ``Discussion on the Future Science and 
  Technology of Biological Attribution: Summary of 6 December 
  2022 meeting organized by the Office of Science and Technology 
  Policy,'' January 24, 2023.....................................   127

----------

\2\ The report has been retained in committee files and is included in 
the Documents for the Record at https://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/
IF02/20230201/115347/HHRG-118-IF02-20230201-SD002.pdf.

 
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES TO INVESTIGATING THE ORIGINS OF PANDEMICS 
                      AND OTHER BIOLOGICAL EVENTS

                              ----------                              


                      WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 1, 2023

                  House of Representatives,
      Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,
                          Committee on Energy and Commerce,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:16 p.m., in 
Room 2322, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. H. Morgan 
Griffith (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
    Members present: Representatives Griffith, Burgess, 
Guthrie, Duncan, Palmer, Lesko, Crenshaw, Armstrong, Cammack, 
Rodgers (ex officio), Castor (subcommittee ranking member), 
DeGette, Schakowsky, Tonko, Ruiz, Peters, and Pallone (ex 
officio).
    Also present: Representatives Carter, Miller-Meeks, and 
Dingell.
    Staff present: Kate Arey, Content Manager and Digital 
Assistant; Sean Brebbia, Chief Counsel, Oversight and 
Investigations; Sarah Burke, Deputy Staff Director; Lauren 
Eriksen, Clerk, Oversight and Investigations; Theresa Gambo, 
Financial and Office Administrator; Grace Graham, Chief 
Counsel, Health; Nate Hodson, Staff Director; Tara Hupman, 
Chief Counsel; Peter Kielty, General Counsel; Emily King, 
Member Services Director; Chris Krepich, Press Secretary; Clare 
Paoletta, Professional Staff Member, Health; Alan Slobodin, 
Chief Investigative Counsel, Oversight and Investigations; John 
Strom, Counsel, Oversight and Investigations; Joanne Thomas, 
Counsel, Oversight and Investigations; Austin Flack, Minority 
Junior Professional Staff Member; Waverly Gordon, Minority 
Deputy Staff Director and General Counsel; Tiffany Guarascio, 
Minority Staff Director; Liz Johns, Minority GAO Detailee; Will 
McAuliffe, Minority Chief Counsel, Oversight and 
Investigations; Christina Parisi, Minority Professional Staff 
Member; Harry Samuels, Minority Oversight Counsel; Caroline 
Wood, Minority Research Analyst; and C.J. Young, Minority 
Deputy Communications Director.
    Mr. Griffith. I call the Subcommittee on Oversight and 
Investigations to order.
    Looks like everybody is seated.
    Good afternoon, everyone, and welcome. The Subcommittee on 
Oversight and Investigations is going to start.
    And I will now recognize myself for 5 minutes for an 
opening statement.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, A REPRESENTATIVE 
         IN CONGRESS FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

    I'm Morgan Griffith. Good to be with you all this evening. 
I welcome you all to our first Oversight and Investigations 
Subcommittee hearing of the 118th Congress, and I would like to 
congratulate Ranking Member Kathy Castor on her appointment to 
that post.
    Ms. Castor. Thank you.
    Mr. Griffith. Thank you. It's good to have--it's good to 
have somebody to work with.
    This afternoon's subcommittee hearing will explore the 
importance of pandemic origin investigations as a means of 
bolstering our country's pandemic preparedness and biodefense 
capabilities.
    To date, over 1 million Americans have died from COVID-19. 
The pandemic brought our country to a standstill. It cost our 
economy around $15 trillion in economic damage. Businesses were 
shut down. Schools were closed. The Nation is still recovering 
from the pandemic's impact and the damage that it caused.
    It has been a little over 3 years since COVID-19 emerged, 
and questions on its origins remain. Given the toll of the 
virus--that the virus has taken, that's unacceptable.
    I believe the substantial circumstantial evidence favors 
COVID-19 emerging due to a research-related incident, but this 
committee will continue to investigate the origins of the 
COVID-19 pandemic since we have jurisdiction over public health 
and Federal biomedical research.
    Today, though, we will look beyond the COVID-19 pandemic 
and understand what structures, technologies, and capacities 
are needed to more clearly investigate the origins of disease 
outbreaks in the future. Being able to quickly identify the 
root cause of a disease outbreak or biological incident has 
important benefits ranging from countermeasure development to 
differentiating between whether an outbreak was due to a 
deliberate release, an accidental release, or a natural event.
    By all accounts, the risk of catastrophic biological 
incidents and infectious disease pandemics is increasing. As 
the world becomes more connected, barriers that once helped 
limit disease from spreading across the globe are being 
removed.
    Further, human-animal interactions are also increasing. The 
last two decades have seen a global proliferation of 
laboratories conducting research on potential pandemic 
pathogens, increasing the possibility that future pandemics may 
have a research-related origin.
    Of the approximately 60 biosafety level 4 labs, which are 
designed to work on the most dangerous of pathogens that are 
around the globe, at least 20 have been built in the last 
decade. More than 75 percent of these labs are located in urban 
centers where a virus, if it escaped, could spread with ease.
    As an aside, the Wuhan Institute of Virology appears to 
have conducted at least some high-risk coronavirus research at 
a biosafety level 2 lab.
    In the United States, we have recently seen high-risk 
research done to intentionally modify pathogens, such as NIH's 
experiments to enhance monkeypox's virulence, as well as 
conflicting reports as to what coronavirus research Pfizer is 
conducting to anticipate future variants.
    Although there is little we can do to predict the timing of 
the next outbreak, there is a lot we can do now to prepare for 
that next outbreak.
    Currently, there is no coordinated whole-of-government plan 
for investigating the origins of a disease outbreak or a 
biological incident. However, as our witnesses will testify 
today, a coordinated approach across the Government, academia, 
and the private sector is needed.
    The focus of today's hearing will be a Government 
Accountability Office Technical Assessment on the Technologies 
and Challenges for Investigating the Origins of Pandemics. This 
study was conducted at the request of all 26 Republicans on the 
committee in June 2021 and is based on insights GAO gained by 
working with the National Academies of Science and the leading 
pandemic experts in the U.S.
    This GAO report is significant because it is believed to be 
the first stand-alone detailed document that specifically 
identifies what technologies and areas of scientific expertise 
are needed to conduct rigorous pandemic origin investigations. 
Existing pandemic preparedness plans have mentioned the need 
for investigating the origins of pandemics but have neither 
spelled out the challenges nor the specifics of how to conduct 
an effective probe.
    One of the challenges laid out in the report is the need 
for investigators to have more access to samples from early 
cases in order to be effective in determining the pandemic's 
origin. We must address this issue since some government 
originations, including the government of the Chinese Communist 
Party, have a history of withholding this type of information.
    This report and the upcoming hearing can provide the basis 
for a bipartisan effort to improve our biodefense strategies by 
incorporating details on investigative approaches and taking 
the recommended actions.
    Speaking for the Republicans on this subcommittee, we look 
forward to working with our Democrat colleagues constructively 
to deliver solutions and pave a path forward for America to 
work in a common purpose for the greater good.
    I eagerly await today's discussion and learning more about 
how to best address these complex issues.
    I also want to thank the witnesses for being here today and 
for being a part of this discussion. And I apologize we're 
starting late, but that's what happens with votes.
    And, with that, I yield back to myself and now recognize 
the gentlelady from Florida, Ms. Castor, for her 5 minutes for 
an opening statement.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Griffith follows:]
    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
  OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. KATHY CASTOR, A REPRESENTATIVE IN 
               CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA

    Ms. Castor. Well, thank you, Chairman Griffith.
    I'm pleased to be here as the ranking member for the first 
hearing of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations in 
the 118th Congress along with some outstanding Democratic 
colleagues and our professional staff.
    And congratulations to you, my friend and colleague. I look 
forward to working with you in the months ahead.
    This committee's jurisdiction touches on so many critical 
issues that affect the everyday lives of our neighbors, from 
the ability to access lifesaving healthcare to ensuring that we 
provide clean energy solutions at lower cost for consumers and 
provide a more livable planet for our children and future 
generations.
    We have the ability in this subcommittee to ensure that our 
policies are carried out in a way that helps Americans in the 
ways we intended. And, when we shine a light on the challenges 
and shortcomings, we should work together on solutions that 
will improve our Government's ability to help our neighbors 
back home.
    Today's hearing addresses one component of our evolving 
ability to respond to a pandemic--identifying a pandemic's 
origin and focusing on the tools to prevent the next one.
    Understanding the origin of a pandemic is useful to inform 
the necessary public health response. For example, if a virus 
is found to have jumped from a particular species of animal to 
humans, we can take steps to better monitor that species of 
animal and improve the necessary handling procedures to 
mitigate future risk. Pinpointing the origin of a disease is a 
piece of information that can be used in developing public 
health policies and for conducting further research.
    But it must be accompanied by informed leadership that 
supports good science, that listens to experts and rallies the 
public to act--act together for the common good, including, for 
example, encouraging the use of safe and effective vaccines. 
Putting this information into action requires that government 
officials, especially our leaders at the State and Federal 
level, take seriously the threat that a pandemic poses.
    I appreciate the work that the Government Accountability 
Office put into the report at the center of today's hearing. 
There is a lot in that report to understand, and I look forward 
to doing that with this expert panel of witnesses.
    The GAO makes some sensible policy recommendations that 
could contribute to a stronger national public health system: 
increasing collaboration across borders, developing new 
technologies for researchers, standardizing and improving 
transparency and collected data, and strengthening our 
scientific workforce. I hope we can have a continuing 
discussion in this committee and subcommittee on how we can 
work towards all of those goals.
    I do have to mention that this hearing was sprung on us 
with short notice before the committee was even formally 
organized, and I will let others judge whether there really is 
a good cause that warrants an exception to the notice 
requirement here. But, either way, it does limit the ability of 
Members and witnesses to prepare themselves on complicated 
topics.
    In her remarks at the committee organizing meeting 
yesterday, Chair Rodgers mentioned the importance of trust in 
doing the work that we do. I agree strongly with that 
sentiment, and I trust that, going forward, for the sake of 
constructive oversight work, we can ensure that Members, staff, 
and witnesses have the lead time necessary to tackle the 
complex issues that come before this subcommittee, as we have 
done in the past.
    I want to close my remarks by noting that, in December, 
before the 118th Congress even began, then-incoming chairs of 
two other subcommittees sent the administration excessive 
document demands and a laundry list of dozens of public 
servants at our health agencies who they sought to interview in 
a witch hunt over the origin of the current pandemic.
    That generates the exact kind of hostility and fear in the 
scientific community that the GAO report warns about, stating 
that researchers may experience unwanted attention, pressure, 
harassment, or influence because of their involvement in 
pandemic origin investigations, and that experienced 
researchers may refuse to participate in such investigations as 
a result.
    Democrats will not ignore bad-faith efforts to erode 
trust--trust in science, or impede the work of scientists 
defending the health and safety of the American people. I 
appreciate, Chair Rodgers and Chairman Griffith, that this 
subcommittee has begun its work in a different manner, by 
bringing in serious witnesses to navigate today's challenging 
topic. And I truly hope that, as we continue the committee's 
important oversight work in this area and in others, that we do 
so in that same spirit.
    Thank you, and I yield back my time.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Castor follows:]
   [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
   
    Mr. Griffith. I thank the gentlelady and now yield 5 
minutes to the chair of the full committee, Mrs. McMorris 
Rodgers, for her opening statement.

      OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, A 
    REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

    Mrs. Rodgers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And I appreciate you convening this hearing about the 
challenges and the opportunities around investigating the 
origins of pandemics and other biological events. And 
congratulations on becoming the chairman of this important 
subcommittee.
    And, to the ranking member----
    Mr. Griffith. Thank you for letting me do it.
    Mrs. Rodgers [continuing]. Ms. Castor, congratulations on 
becoming the ranking member.
    I look forward to working with you, and I am fully 
committed to building trust. This week was an exception when it 
came to the notices for the hearings this week due to issues on 
both sides of the aisle that had come up at the beginning. But 
I am committed to abiding by the rules. I want the Members to 
be prepared fully for every committee hearing.
    The COVID-19 pandemic has been catastrophic for the United 
States and the world. And I think about--I think about the 
people who have lost loved ones, many times without the chance 
to say goodbye, the first responders who worked around the 
clock day and night, and every person who served on the front 
lines to provide hope and comfort in our communities. 
Government-enforced lockdowns and school closures have hurt our 
children's well-being mentally, physically, and academically.
    In addition, the pandemic cost the United States economy 
more than $15 trillion. Consider the hundreds of thousands of 
people whose businesses were shuttered, whose livelihoods were 
uprooted, who lost everything. We owe it--we have a 
responsibility to every American to get to the bottom of the 
origins of COVID-19.
    Investigating the origins of COVID-19 has been very 
difficult and challenging. Some of the hurdles we face are 
because of inherent scientific challenges. For reference, it 
took 13 years to determine the origins of the SARS outbreak. In 
addition, the Chinese Government has lied to America and the 
global health community on information related to COVID-19.
    This is unacceptable, and my hope is that we will join 
together in our search for the origins of the pandemic with the 
same bipartisan unity that an airplane crash investigation or 
other tragedy would receive. The lesson learned is that we have 
to treat investigating the origins of pandemics as a part of a 
pandemic preparedness, with a single point of accountability 
within the Federal Government.
    According to a paper recently released by the Johns Hopkins 
Center for Health Security, quote: ``There does not appear to 
be a single office within the United States Government that 
owns the challenge of bio attribution. We need a plan, we need 
a point person, and we need greater accountability.''
    In request--in response to a request from the Energy and 
Commerce Republicans, GAO conducted a technical assessment on 
the origins of pandemics. This report examined, one, key 
technologies available for pandemic investigations; two, 
strengths and limitations of these tools; and, three, the 
cost--the crosscutting challenges researchers face in 
determining a pandemic's origin. The GAO's technical assistance 
is perhaps the first stand-alone document that addresses the 
issue of investigating the origins of pandemics in great 
detail.
    The need for pandemic origins determinations has been noted 
in other documents, but preparation for investigating the 
origins of a pandemic or other serious biological events has 
not been treated as a major component of biodefense strategy.
    The GAO detailed the difficulties with such investigations, 
including lack of sufficient access to samples and genetic 
sequence data; lack of standardized processing for submitting, 
accessing, and using genetic sequence data; lack of experts in 
certain fields.
    Overall, we must be united in our efforts to investigate 
the origins of COVID-19 pandemic and prepare for future 
pandemics. It is the public health question of our generation. 
We cannot afford to be divided. It will hurt our ability to 
prepare for the next pandemic, which could be more severe.
    The evidence and the experts tell us that the risk of 
pandemic are increasing for various reasons, such as a surge in 
international travel or more development in remote areas that 
leads to more human interaction with animals and novel viruses.
    We need to be better prepared. Our goal is for today's 
hearing to inform bipartisan efforts on this committee toward 
reauthorizing pandemic preparedness legislation.
    I thank the witnesses for their participation, and I do 
thank you for participating on short notice. We appreciate your 
cooperation and look forward to the hearing.
    And I yield back.
    [The prepared statement of Mrs. Rodgers follows:]
    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Mr. Griffith. Thank the gentlelady.
    Now recognize the ranking member of the full committee, Mr. 
Pallone, for his 5 minutes of opening statement.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK PALLONE, Jr., A REPRESENTATIVE 
            IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY

    Mr. Pallone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    It's good to see you and our ranking member here today and 
leading this committee on both sides of the aisle.
    I want--welcome the opportunity to begin what I hope will 
be a constructive Congress overseeing the response to COVID-19 
and evaluating lessons learned so that we can be ready to 
prevent and tackle future biological threats facing Americans.
    We all know too well from COVID-19 that biological threats 
are persistent. They're likely to become even more common due 
to climate change, urbanization, globalization. In order to 
improve our response to future pandemics, it is critical that 
healthcare experts are able to research viruses and where they 
came from in order to quickly identify sequence and understand 
emerging diseases. And this research allows us to develop 
countermeasures to help prevent death and disease.
    Now, none of this is possible without ongoing, long-term 
government support for scientific research. As an example, it 
was Congress' decades-long investment in basic research that 
enabled virologists and researchers to develop safe and 
reliable COVID-19 therapeutics and vaccines in record speed.
    And now the Biden administration has taken it one step 
further with the implementation of its National Biodefense 
Strategy. This strategy presents another opportunity to 
encourage collaboration amongst government and research 
sectors, enhance our capacity to prevent biological incidents 
before they happen, and respond to pandemics when they occur.
    The White House Office of Science and Technology Policy 
recently convened a group of experts in immunology and virology 
to discuss how to develop our national expertise in identifying 
pandemic origins. I understand that at least one of our 
witnesses was in attendance, and I look forward to hearing 
about how Congress can further support productive collaboration 
between the research community and government in the future.
    It's important to remember that any inquiry into the 
origins of pandemics is merely one component of a broader 
strategy to protect Americans from viral disease and prevent 
future virological episodes. Therefore, as we discuss the 
origins inquiry, I think we should keep a couple of principles 
in mind.
    First, investigating pandemic origins is useful insofar as 
it helps us fulfill government's primary responsibility: 
protecting the health and well-being of citizens. Understanding 
past pandemics is essential to understanding future ones. For 
example, as our witnesses described in their written 
testimonies, lessons learned from the studies of SARS-1, MERS, 
and H1N1 gave us the tools and infrastructure to quickly 
understand SARS-CoV-2 during the early COVID-19 outbreak.
    The lessons learned also enabled the record-speed 
development of monoclonal antibodies and drug therapies. 
Unfortunately, it's only a matter of time before the next 
pandemic occurs, and it's critical that we apply the lessons 
that the research community has learned from COVID-19 to refine 
our abilities to identify, prevent, and respond to biological 
threats.
    The second principle: We must incorporate origin 
investigation into holistic funding in support of our public 
health infrastructure. This includes everything from 
strengthening our healthcare system, tackling the increase in 
zoonotic health risks caused by climate change, and creating 
and enabling an environment for research and scientific 
collaboration.
    Third principle: We must keep politics out of any 
investigation. Instead, it must be guided by science and 
evidence rather than conjecture and speculation. And I do have 
deep concerns that any origins investigation will turn 
political, which would be extremely harmful to public health. 
As a recent report by the GAO found, the current acrimony 
surrounding the overly partisan rhetoric of the COVID-19 
origins debate could push researchers out of the field just at 
a time when we need this critical workforce to be strong.
    The broad-based research bans and moratoria have taken the 
place of constructive conversations about improvements to 
biosecurity, and this has put a chilling effect on research 
that the American people depend on to retain our competitive 
edge globally and to achieve medical and scientific 
breakthroughs. If we're not following the right evidence, we 
won't learn the right lessons.
    Democrats are committed to following the scientific 
evidence to where it leads so that we can make sure that any 
origins inquiry leads to tangible improvements in the life of 
Americans.
    So I welcome this opportunity to examine the remaining 
barriers to properly identifying pandemic origins as part of 
our broader efforts to protect the health and well-being of 
Americans.
    And, with that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Pallone follows:]
    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Mr. Griffith. I thank the gentleman. I thank the gentleman 
for yielding back.
    That now concludes our Member opening statements.
    The Chair would like to take this opportunity to remind 
Members that, pursuant to the committee rules, all Members' 
opening statements that they would like to submit will be made 
a part of the record.
    All right. Now we want to--we're getting close to you all 
now. We want to thank you all for being here today and taking 
the time to testify before this subcommittee. Each witness will 
have an opportunity to give an opening statement, followed by a 
round of questions from Members. And I assume that you all know 
the timing schedule. You have 5 minutes. Yellow light means 
you've got a minute left. The red light means you're over time, 
and I may have to call you down, but it won't be harsh.
    So, first, let me recognize Dr. Karen L. Howard, Acting 
Chief--I thought we did that after we introduced them.
    Yes. I'll do that afterwards.
    So, first, let me introduce Dr. Karen L. Howard, Acting 
Chief Scientist, Director of Science and Technology Assessment 
Science, Technology Assessment, Analytics, U.S. Government 
Accountability Office; Dr. Tom Inglesby, Director of Center for 
Health Security, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public 
Health; Dr. Asha-- Asha--thank you--and I apologize--M. George, 
Executive Director of the Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense.
    And, at this point, I would like to recognize Dr. Burgess 
to introduce our next witness.
    Dr. Burgess?
    Mr. Burgess. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And I want to thank and introduce Dr. Gerry Parker for 
testifying today. Dr. Parker brings vast experience, accrued 
over decades of service in public health, biodefense, and the 
military. Notably, he was an asset to our Nation's Federal 
response to COVID-19 and the 2001 anthrax attacks.
    He now serves as associate vice president for public 
health, preparedness, and response, and a principal 
investigator for the Texas A&M Center for Innovation and 
Advanced Development and Manufacturing.
    Prior to his appointment at Texas A&M, Dr. Parker was 
Deputy Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense 
and the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Preparedness 
and Response at Department of Health and Human Services. He 
also served at the Department of Homeland Security.
    Prior to his civilian government service, Dr. Parker held a 
variety of assignments during his impressive 26-year military 
career in the United States Army.
    Thank you again, Dr. Parker, for your service, and for 
being willing to testify and help us today.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Griffith. Thank you, Dr. Burgess.
    And now I will introduce--Ms. Dingell had hoped to be here 
to introduce you. But, as we said earlier, there were a number 
of meetings going on, and people were bouncing in and out. And 
I apologize for that, but I would like to introduce Dr. Michael 
Imperiale. Did I get that right? Close?
    He is the Arthur Thurnau Professor at the University of 
Michigan Medical School.
    Thank you so much for being with us.
    And, as you know, the testimony that you are about to give 
is subject to title 18, section 1001, of the United States 
Code. When holding an investigative hearing, this committee has 
the practice of taking testimony under oath.
    Does anyone have an objection to testifying under oath?
    Seeing no objections, we'll move forward.
    And, also, the Chair would advise you that, under the rules 
of the House and the House--and the rules of this committee, 
you are entitled to be advised by counsel.
    Does anyone wish to be advised by counsel during their 
testimony today?
    Again, based on nods of head, no one has requested the 
opportunity to have counsel present with them at this time.
    In that case, if the witnesses would please rise. This is 
where we get you standing up again.
    And raise your right hand, and I'll swear you in.
    [Witnesses sworn.]
    Mr. Griffith. All have stated affirmatively that they will 
tell the truth.
    All right. We appreciate it. Now you can remain--you can 
return to your seats.
    Thank you all, and I would now recognize Dr. Howard for 5 
minutes to give her opening statement.

 STATEMENTS OF KAREN L. HOWARD, Ph.D., ACTING CHIEF SCIENTIST 
 AND DIRECTOR, SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, AND ANALYTICS, 
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE; TOM INGLESBY, M.D., DIRECTOR, 
 CENTER FOR HEALTH SECURITY, JOHNS HOPKINS BLOOMBERG SCHOOL OF 
  PUBLIC HEALTH; ASHA M. GEORGE, D.P.H., EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 
BIPARTISAN COMMISSION ON BIODEFENSE; GERALD W. PARKER, D.V.M., 
    Ph.D., ASSOCIATE DEAN FOR GLOBAL ONE HEALTH, COLLEGE OF 
     VETERINARY MEDICINE & BIOMEDICAL SCIENCES, TEXAS A&M 
UNIVERSITY; AND MICHAEL J. IMPERIALE, Ph.D., ARTHUR F. THURNAU 
     PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF MICROBIOLOGY AND IMMUNOLOGY, 
                     UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

              STATEMENT OF KAREN L. HOWARD, Ph.D.

    Dr. Howard. Chair Rodgers, Ranking Member Pallone, Chair 
Griffith, Ranking Member Castor, and members of the 
subcommittee, I am pleased to be here today to discuss our 
Report on Technologies, Challenges, and Policy Options for 
Pandemic Origin Investigations.
    In the last 20 years, several pandemics have led to 
significant loss of life and economic disruption.
    Pandemics can arise from natural sources, notably, 
transmission from animals to humans. Pandemics could also 
emerge from laboratory work, either through an accidental 
infection in the lab, or through release of a pathogen from a 
lab. By conducting timely, effective pandemic origin 
investigations, we can learn more about how these diseases 
arise and reduce high-risk activities to prevent future 
outbreaks or limit their impact.
    In our report, we identified several technologies that can 
help establish pandemic origins. Chief among these is genetic 
sequence analysis, which identifies the genetic sequence of a 
pathogen and compares it to the sequences of known pathogens 
stored in databases.
    Researchers also gather evidence for pandemic origins by 
analyzing blood samples, tracking the spread of the disease 
through a population, and conducting laboratory-based studies 
to better understand how the disease may be transmitted. These 
techniques are mature and have been used to establish the 
likely origins of several previous pandemics.
    However, experts told us that origin investigations are 
hindered by three nontechnological challenges: first, the lack 
of sufficient access to samples and sequence data. There can be 
many reasons for this. For example, there is often a lack of 
awareness of the need to collect and store samples for later 
use, especially early in an outbreak. Other reasons include 
privacy concerns, national sovereignty, and the possibility of 
negative consequences for sharing information.
    The second challenge is the lack of standardized database 
processes. There are many databases, both public and private, 
for storing genetic sequence data. These databases were often 
designed for other purposes and may not ideally suit the needs 
of origin investigators.
    Experts told us that the user interfaces can be cumbersome, 
especially when trying to work across multiple databases. 
Crucial data may be missing or unreliable, and the rapidly 
increasing volume of data will likely strain the limits of 
available infrastructure and computing power.
    The third challenge is the lack of a sufficient 
interdisciplinary workforce. The need and the resources to 
support an appropriate workforce often fluctuate as pandemics 
rise and then wane.
    There is uneven global distribution of the skilled staff we 
do have. There are silos between the many disciplines needed 
for this work. And some researchers told us they faced 
criticism because of their involvement in determining pandemic 
origins, which can cause skilled researchers to avoid the 
field.
    We've identified five policy options that can help address 
these challenges. One key option is for policymakers to 
proactively establish multinational agreements to collect, 
store, and share samples and data. Taking this step in advance 
would allow for rapid mobilization of the protocols at the 
earliest signs of an outbreak when the data and samples are 
most critical for determining origins. Ideally, such agreements 
would clearly delineate roles and responsibilities, as well as 
collaboration and coordination mechanisms.
    Other policy options include developing standardized 
processes for database submission and access, along with 
improved user interface tools, and investing in the training 
and retention of skilled staff.
    We also identified a fifth crosscutting option: development 
of a detailed national strategy targeted specifically toward 
pandemic origin investigations. Such a strategy could address 
all three key challenges and improve the ability of experts to 
more effectively investigate future pandemics.
    In conclusion, pandemic origin investigations can be 
facilitated by current technologies but still face key 
challenges that hinder the ability of the U.S. and other 
nations to respond effectively and reduce the likelihood and 
severity of future pandemics.
    Chair Rodgers, Ranking Member Pallone, Chair Griffith, 
Ranking Member Castor, and members of the subcommittee, this 
concludes my prepared statement.
    I would be happy to respond to questions.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Howard follows:]
   [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Mr. Griffith. Thank you very much.
    I now recognize Dr. Inglesby for 5 minutes for an opening 
statement.

                STATEMENT OF TOM INGLESBY, M.D.

    Dr. Inglesby. Chair Rodgers, Ranking Member Pallone, Chair 
Griffith, Ranking Member Castor, and members of the 
subcommittee, thank you for the chance to speak with you today.
    I want to commend you for focusing on how to build our 
capacity to determine the source of future pandemic and 
biological events. This capacity could help us diminish the 
chance of those events, whether they were to come from a 
natural source, a lab accident, or the deliberate use of a 
biological weapon from a U.S. adversary.
    If bio attribution efforts around future biological events 
showed that a certain animal management practice was 
responsible for an event, that practice could be stopped. If it 
showed something started in a lab, the responsible lab 
practices could be ended or changed. If it showed a biological 
event was deliberately started, it would have national security 
consequences.
    The capacity to determine the source of a biological event 
will be a form of deterrent against such attacks in the first 
place, and strong attribution tools could help the U.S. to 
avoid being deliberately deceived about the source, debunking 
false-flag efforts by adversaries who try to assign blame to a 
country that had no responsibility for it.
    Attribution science is also critical in the work to grow 
the U.S. bioeconomy, which is a growing, dynamic part of the 
U.S. economy. These tools could help us protect the biotech 
products that the U.S. creates, whether they are crops, food, 
energy, medicines, or other biologically produced materials.
    Biological attribution science relies on a range of 
approaches and data sets, including genetic sequencing, 
bioinformatics, and access to genetic databases in the U.S. and 
around the world.
    A recent White House OSTP meeting on strengthening bio 
attribution highlighted the need for establishing more robust 
international databases, for funding the science base, applying 
machine learning tools to this endeavor, and integrating data 
across government.
    I strongly support the five GAO recommendations in their 
report, including the importance of international sequence 
sharing, strong standards for databases around the world and in 
the U.S., improving tools for this work, building the workforce 
we need, and setting national strategy.
    Much of the key science resides outside government, either 
in research universities or the private sector, so the 
Government should be funding the development of that science.
    The administration's National Biodefense Strategy, which 
came out in October 2022, does commit to strengthening national 
attribution capacity. And now, the administration, with the 
support of Congress, should identify specific agency 
responsibilities around that work--goals, timelines, and budget 
requirements. And my intuition is that more funding is needed 
for this work, and possibly new authorities for data collection 
are needed, but that obviously is something that the Congress 
will be looking into and making conclusions about.
    In conclusion, the U.S. doesn't have yet the scientific 
research and databases, operational plans, or international 
partnerships that can reliably identify the source of future 
pandemics and biological events. Building this capacity will 
have great benefit to protecting health, national security, and 
the bioeconomy, and so should be a high priority for the 
administration and Congress now.
    Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you, and I'm 
happy to take questions.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Inglesby follows:]
    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Mr. Griffith. Thank you very much.
    And we'll now recognize Dr. George for her 5 minutes.

              STATEMENT OF ASHA M. GEORGE, D.P.H.

    Dr. George. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Griffith, Ranking Member Castor, and members of 
the committee, thank you for the opportunity to speak with you 
today about Federal biological attribution activities, those 
activities undertaken to investigate the source and cause of 
pandemics and other biological events.
    I also see Chair McMorris Rodgers and Ranking Member 
Pallone, and very much appreciate your attendance as well.
    I am Dr. Asha M. George, executive director of the 
Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense, which is cochaired by 
former Senator Joe Lieberman and Governor Tom Ridge. They and 
the rest of our Commissioners send you their greetings and 
thank you for examining this critical element of national 
biodefense today.
    Our Commission released its first report, ``A National 
Blueprint for Biodefense,'' in 2015. In it, we warned that the 
Nation was catastrophically vulnerable to biological threats 
and that the Government needed to take bold, immediate action 
to eliminate those vulnerabilities. Congress and the 
administrations have taken up a number of our recommendations 
since 2015, including establishing requirements for a National 
Biodefense Strategy, an annual biodefense budgetary crosscut, 
and biological intelligence management, all of which were 
recommendations we made in our blueprint, but much remains to 
be done.
    We are in the unenviable position of having to prepare for 
more biological events while still responding to and recovering 
from COVID-19.
    Our experience with this pandemic shows that even a single 
difficult-to-control disease can produce devastating 
consequences for the world. We must develop better ways to 
respond to biological events and better determine how and why 
they arise.
    The anthrax events of 2001, laboratory accidents and 
various pandemics, such as H1N1, H5N1, Ebola, SARS, MERS, and 
of course COVID, have time and again revealed our lack of 
coordination and capability to fully understand and make 
decisions regarding the origins of biological threats. 
Regardless, there is still no formal biological attribution 
apparatus in place.
    Many Federal departments and agencies bear responsibility 
for biological attribution or some part of it, yet most of 
their efforts remain uncoordinated. Law enforcement, public 
health, agriculture, intelligence, military, diplomatic, 
science, commerce, and other communities all have roles to play 
but largely operate independently.
    The Nation needs a robust biological attribution framework, 
and they need it now.
    Our Commission recommends that Congress direct the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services, in coordination with 
the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary 
of Agriculture, the Secretary of the Interior, the Attorney 
General, and the Director of National Intelligence to establish 
a Federal interagency working group to develop this national 
biological attribution apparatus with clearly defined roles, 
responsibilities, and requirements, and milestones for 
adjudicating attribution information, and informing decisions 
following any biological events with national security 
implications.
    The Commission also recommends an overhaul of the Federal 
Select Agent Program in order to reduce our vulnerability to 
laboratory accidents and improve our ability to determine 
whether--to determine whether a laboratory inadvertently 
released a disease into the environment.
    Additionally, the Commission included recommendations in 
its Athena agenda, about 15 science and technology priority 
areas that we believe are important to achieve an Apollo 
program for biodefense. These included genetic sequencing, 
pathogen surveillance, data analytics, outbreak forecasting, 
and synthetic biology. All of these could provide valuable 
contributions to investigations into the origins of pandemics.
    We have submitted four of our reports along with my written 
testimony containing recommendations addressing biological 
attribution and related enablers for the record and for your 
consideration. \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The reports have been retained in committee files and are 
collected in one document at https://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF02/
20230201/115347/HHRG-118-IF02-Wstate-GeorgeA-20230201.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Later this year, our Commission will release the second 
edition of the ``National Blueprint for Biodefense,'' taking 
into account successes and challenges since 2015.
    The blueprint will provide a roadmap for continued efforts 
by the legislative branch and the executive branch to address 
national biodefense. We hope you will consider these 
recommendations as you continue the important oversight, 
investigation, and authorization activities of this committee.
    Thank you again for the opportunity to come before you 
today on behalf of the Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense.
    I would like to thank Hudson Institute for serving as our 
fiscal sponsor, our donors for supporting our work. And, 
speaking as former congressional staff, I would like to thank 
the congressional staff for their tireless efforts to address 
this important topic.
    Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. George follows:]
    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Mr. Griffith. I thank the gentlelady.
    Now recognize Dr. Parker for his 5-minute opening 
statement.

          STATEMENT OF GERALD W. PARKER, D.V.M., Ph.D.

    Dr. Parker. Chairperson Rodgers, Ranking Member Pallone, 
Chairman Griffith, Ranking Member Castor, and distinguished 
members of the committee, I am honored to appear before you 
today for this hearing, ``Challenges and Opportunities to 
Investigating Origin of Pandemics and Other Biological 
Threats.''
    Congressman Burgess, I'm honored by the introduction today, 
so thank you very much for that. And the only thing I might add 
is I was--I'm also a former commander of USAMRIID, the Army's 
maximum biocontainment lab. It was 20 years ago. But my 
experience there, I think, is very relevant to this topic.
    Naturally occurring infectious disease outbreaks with 
pandemic potential are occurring with alarming increased 
frequency. In addition to natural biological threats, the 
fusion of advanced technologies, worldwide expansion of high-
containment labs with uneven biosafety and biosecurity 
controls, and access to dangerous pathogens are increasing the 
possibility of unnatural, accidental, or deliberate outbreaks.
    Unfortunately, global capacities and international 
agreements needed to investigate and rapidly attribute unknown 
emerging infectious disease outbreaks are inadequate. Outbreak 
organizations are a core competency of public health, 
especially where scientists were familiar with known diseases 
of natural origin within their borders. In cases and within the 
United States, public health has an exemplary record where 
their investigations are geared to rapidly find the source, to 
prevent additional cases and learn how to prevent future 
outbreaks. That is the same objective for investigating the 
source of a pandemic, whether natural or unnatural.
    Now I would like to share just one example that actually 
impacted me directly.
    Exactly 1 week after the tragic events of September 11, 
2001, letters obtaining lethal anthrax spores were postmarked 
and mailed. The anthrax letter attacks marked the first 
significant act of bioterrorism in the United States.
    That deliberate incident highlighted our vulnerability to 
rapid onset infectious diseases, whether deliberate, natural, 
or accidental. The attack also highlighted our inability to 
rapidly investigate an unnatural outbreak.
    As you recall, the FBI attributed the perpetrator to a lone 
U.S. scientist from the lab I once commanded, USAMRIID. 
Unfortunately and tragically, the scientist committed suicide 
as the FBI was planning his indictment in 2008, so the case was 
never tried in a court of law.
    Attribution to determine who is responsible for deliberate 
or negligent accidental breach that leads to a community 
outbreak or worse is essential to hold those responsible for 
their actions, prevent future outbreaks, and serve as a 
deterrent.
    Attribution and supporting microbial forensic science are 
also important to exonerate and rule out suspected perpetrators 
or negligent actions. Investigations with forensic rigor for 
natural outbreaks that lead to a pandemic are equally important 
to the enormous toll on societies worldwide.
    There must be trust in the outcome of the investigation and 
confidence a future pandemic will be prevented. The experience 
with COVID-19 and past precedent confirm there are no effective 
international agreements, protocols, or guidelines that provide 
needed authority to rapidly attribute the source of a pandemic 
or other biological threats.
    Multilateral organizations, like the World Health 
Organization, have mechanisms to aid member states investigate 
within their own borders, if requested. Biological and Toxin 
and Weapons Convention has a framework to adjudicate 
allegations of suspected treaty violations. However, both have 
inherent limitations that hinder their ability to rapidly 
investigate transborder infectious diseases. Their inherent 
limitations are amplified during periods of geopolitical 
tension and enhanced power rivalries.
    The biggest challenge to improving our ability to rapidly 
attribute the source of a pandemic reside in overcoming these 
geopolitical forces. Otherwise, samples to tests, database 
access, and ability to examine all source information will not 
be available or independently verifiable.
    But there are opportunities that reside through enhanced, 
responsible, international collaboration and application of 
innovative technologies via multidisciplinary One Health 
approaches.
    In closing, I want to state, above all, the Nation is 
counting on a strong biodefense and health security leadership 
with a national leadership structure to drive effective 
coordination, collaboration, and innovation. This includes 
implementation of effective microbial science and technologies 
that were hastily pulled together to support the Amerithrax 
investigation 20 years ago with far too little attention since 
then.
    Thank you for the opportunity to appear before this 
hearing. I'll look forward to answering any questions you may 
have.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Parker follows:]
    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Mr. Griffith. Thank the gentleman.
    Now recognize Dr. Imperiale for his 5-minute opening 
statement.

            STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. IMPERIALE, Ph.D.

    Dr. Imperiale. Thank you.
    Chairwoman Rodgers, Ranking Member Pallone, Chairman 
Griffith, Ranking Member Castor, members of the subcommittee, 
thank you for inviting me to meet with you today to discuss 
this important topic.
    I will focus on the need to maintain and invest in a strong 
life sciences research program to tackle future pandemics, 
including determining attribution. The Life Science Research 
Enterprise in the U.S. is second to none, providing 
understanding of and cures for diseases, supporting more than 
half a million jobs, and contributing in many other ways to the 
economy.
    Much of the success can be traced to recommendations made 
in 1945 by Vannevar Bush, the first Presidential science 
advisor. He recognized that Federal funding of research at 
universities would amplify the return on investment. Not only 
would cutting-edge research get done, but students would be 
involved, and they would go on to become the next generation of 
scientists.
    The results of this strategy are no better illustrated than 
by our response to COVID-19. In the spring of 2020, hundreds of 
university laboratories pivoted their efforts to tackle this 
disease. Government and private-sector investments in Operation 
Warp Speed spurred new public-private partnerships.
    Working from the extremely strong foundation laid by 
decades-long U.S. Government investments in basic research, we 
made tremendous progress in a short period of time. We were 
vaccinating people before the end of the year. Monoclonal 
antibody and drug therapies soon followed. We must acknowledge 
the hard work and creativity of thousands of scientists in the 
U.S. and around the world. These ongoing efforts are allowing 
us to emerge from the pandemic relatively quickly. The loss of 
life and effects on the economy could have been much worse.
    Recognition of these substantial accomplishments is taking 
a back seat to concerns about the possibility that another 
pandemic may arise due to inadvertent release of a pathogen 
from a laboratory that is working to protect us from these 
threats. Some even contend that scientists are not considering 
the potential risks.
    Scientists are committed to biosafety. In the 1970s, it was 
concerned scientists who assembled the group of experts to 
debate the benefits and risks of recombinant DNA, leading to 
guidelines for safe conduct of this work. Infectious disease 
researchers prioritize biosafety, because we know the harm 
these agents can cause to ourselves and our communities. This 
is why we study infectious agents.
    We work with biosafety professionals to implement the 
appropriate equipment and procedures to perform the work 
safely. Through increased research and investment in applied 
biosafety, we can continue to improve in this area. A related 
concern about potential risks of studying pathogens surrounds 
the concept of gain-of-function experiments. Gain-of-function 
covers a broad area of experimentation in which, as the term 
states, an organism is given or requires a new property. In the 
vast majority of cases, these properties are innocuous or, 
indeed, beneficial. Engineering bacteria to synthesize insulin 
has greatly facilitated its production and its use in millions 
of patients. This is gain-of-function research.
    Nature does this experiment all the time. Antibiotic 
resistance is a gain of function. There is value in gain-of-
function research. The question is how we address concerns that 
an experiment might result in a pathogen with potential to 
cause severe harm or even a pandemic if it gets out of the 
laboratory, either accidentally or through malfeasance. Clearly 
such research needs careful consideration.
    These experiments should only be performed when they are 
addressing a significant biomedical question of pressing 
concern, other approaches are not available or are severely 
suboptimal, and the work can be performed safely.
    To conclude, I'd like to return to where I began. The U.S. 
Science Research Enterprise has been so successful because of 
the investments you and your predecessors have made, allowing 
the best scientists to contribute to the betterment of 
humankind and saving countless lives. Regardless of the origin 
of the next pandemic, we must invest in a strong public health 
infrastructure that will allow for surveillance for the next 
threat and a robust response when that threat arises. The 
scientific community understands the responsibility it has to 
the public, who both fund our research and are the recipients 
of the benefits of that research.
    Other countries see the success of our strategy and are 
copying it. Now, their research programs are thriving. To 
ensure that the U.S. maintains its prominence in performing 
this lifesaving research, we must be careful not to throw sand 
in the gears that may slow our progress, dissuade U.S. 
scientists from conducting this research, or discourage young 
people in our country from being a part of our amazing 
scientific system.
    And we absolutely must continue this research. This is the 
only way we will be better prepared the next time an infectious 
agent jumps from nature into the human population. Our national 
and economic security depend on our continued leadership in 
life sciences research.
    Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Imperiale follows:]
    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Mr. Griffith. I thank you very much. That now concludes our 
opening statements.
    At this time, I would ask unanimous consent of the 
committee for the following Energy and Commerce Committee 
members to be allowed to participate in today's hearing. In 
keeping with our tradition, Representative Carter, 
Representative Miller-Meeks, and Representative Dingell have 
asked to waive on.
    And, without objection, that will be the order of the day.
    As a reminder, these Members will be recognized to ask 
questions after all other subcommittee members have been 
recognized.
    All right. Point of order just for a second, so that folks 
know my philosophy on this committee, I believe our job is to 
get the facts. Obviously that requires a lot of information. So 
we will aggressively pursue getting facts so this committee can 
make decisions. And, once we have the facts, documents, and 
data, then we can have our disagreements based on our 
philosophical perspective.
    Now, that should not intimidate young research scientists. 
It should not intimidate people in telecom or in energy and any 
of the areas that we're going into. But sometimes research 
shows us things that we weren't expecting to find, and 
sometimes that can be controversial. And I was sitting up here 
listening and immediately thought of Galileo and Copernicus.
    So we need the research. Sometimes we'll get answers that 
we like. Sometimes we'll get answers that we don't like.
    All right. That being said, I will recognize myself for 5 
minutes to begin the questioning phase of this hearing.
    Dr. Imperiale, please explain the difference in intentional 
modifications that pathogens were created using genetic 
engineering and serial passaging, which gets to your gain-of-
function part of your testimony just now.
    Dr. Imperiale. Yes. So--so deliberate engineering requires 
some sort of forethought and knowledge as to what types of 
changes need to be made to achieve whatever the goal of that 
experiment might be, all right? So it's really kind of a 
deliberate attempt to modify an organism, whereas successive 
passaging, you're selecting for a phenotype, right, or a 
behavior of that pathogen.
    And we don't know necessarily from the outset what that's 
going to be. You know, sometimes we're trying to achieve a 
specific goal, but--but the--the results are always not what we 
anticipate.
    Mr. Griffith. And so--but--and I liked your definition of 
gain of function. I think that's easy for people to understand.
    So both of these in certain circumstances--certainly 
genetic engineering but also serial passaging--could be gain-
of-function research. Isn't that true?
    Dr. Imperiale. That's correct, but what I wanted to make 
the point is that not all gain-of-function research is going to 
make something more dangerous.
    Mr. Griffith. Oh, absolutely. And--and that doesn't mean we 
shouldn't look at it. We've just got to be careful with it.
    Do you know if they were doing either of these intentional 
modifications at the Wuhan laboratory?
    Dr. Imperiale. I do not. I am not that familiar----
    Mr. Griffith. Fair enough.
    Dr. Imperiale [continuing]. With the work that was going on 
there.
    Mr. Griffith. Do you know if they are doing--are doing or 
were doing either of these intentional modifications on 
monkeypox at the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious 
Diseases within the NIH?
    Dr. Imperiale. I also do not know that.
    Mr. Griffith. OK. Does anybody know the answers to those 
questions? It's fine if you don't. I'm just trying to get info. 
Sometimes you've got to ask the question to find out. All 
right.
    Dr. George----
    Dr. Inglesby. Chair--Chairman?
    Mr. Griffith. Oh, yes.
    Dr. Inglesby. I don't know--I don't have----
    Mr. Griffith. Dr. Inglesby?
    Dr. Inglesby [continuing]. Any personal understanding of 
what happened regarding the monkeypox research you talked 
about, but there is a public account of that in Science 
Magazine which describes work combining different clades of 
monkeypox, the characteristics of one clade which is more--more 
virulent with one clade that's more transmissible.
    Mr. Griffith. Thank you very much. You just gave the 
homework assignment to my staff. Find me the article. They'll 
do that.
    Dr. George, based on the track record of the Chinese 
Communist Party's government, we really can't rely on them 
getting--we can't rely on them giving us early case data in a 
potential pandemic situation. Accordingly, should we allow any 
of our U.S. research dollars on potential pandemic pathogens to 
go to institutions that are predominantly controlled by the 
Chinese Communist Party?
    Dr. George. Well, I would say two things.
    First, it's not just China that doesn't do a great job of 
reporting out. Many countries don't for many, many various 
reasons.
    Secondly, I would say, when it comes to issuing grants, 
whether they're Federal grants or somebody else's grants, the 
Government has the opportunity to put in a requirement in 
advance. It can be a requirement for anything, and they could 
put in a requirement to say, in order to get----
    Mr. Griffith. OK.
    Dr. George [continuing]. These grant dollars----
    Mr. Griffith. So----
    Dr. George [continuing]. You have to----
    Mr. Griffith [continuing]. That leads me to another 
question that's down the list a little ways. We had that in 
our--in our dollars that were sent to--ultimately to--ended up 
in the Wuhan lab through EcoHealth Alliance, and NIH didn't 
properly monitor it.
    So do we need--one, do we need additional teeth in addition 
to your recommendation that we have somebody who is--who is a 
point person in a team to make sure that we have people taking 
a look at these things when we're dealing with dangerous 
pathogens?
    Dr. George. I think we need to make sure that we are 
emphasizing biosurveillance throughout the world, and this is 
part of it, which----
    Mr. Griffith. Yes, ma'am. And let me say, I really 
appreciated your comment that it's not just the Chinese 
Communist Party that's--that's got issues. There were lots of 
organizations, and that's why, in my opening statement, I said 
government--I included the Chinese specifically, but I also 
referenced other governmental entities, because we--this is a 
problem that we need to get straightened out worldwide. And I 
appreciate your testimony on that as well.
    OK. According--Dr. Howard, according to the GAO report, it 
was stated that we need more early samples from those with 
potential pandemic disease to be effective in determining 
pandemic origins. How do we better address this issue to ensure 
that foreign countries comply with what we were just talking 
about in getting us that data?
    Dr. Howard. As we mentioned in our report, we do recommend 
and have proposed policy options that would encourage the 
development of multilateral agreements in advance of any 
pandemic that would encourage multinational sharing of samples 
and data. That would hopefully help address that issue.
    Mr. Griffith. Do they--do they respond to financial 
negatives if they don't? Is that something that works in that 
community?
    Dr. Howard. The experts we spoke with did mention to us 
that there are incentives that might be useful in some cases.
    Mr. Griffith. I'm looking at negative incentives, but I 
appreciate it.
    My time is up, and I yield back to myself.
    I recognize--and now recognize the gentlelady from Florida, 
Ms. Castor, for her 5 minutes of questioning.
    Ms. Castor. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And thanks again to all of our witnesses. You've really 
helped set the table for an examination of the tools we need to 
prevent the next pandemic.
    And I heard you loud and clear. Good leadership and good 
science are essential in preventing and responding to 
pandemics. I guess, simply put, understanding the origin of 
pandemics can help us prevent the next one. For example, 
understanding the origin of SARS, MERS, and H1N1, that was 
critical in jump-starting the scientific community's response 
to COVID-19.
    Dr. Imperiale, in a recent piece in the Journal of 
Virology, you wrote that, when we were facing a colossal crisis 
in the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic, scientists were 
able to draw on previous research on coronaviruses to 
understand SARS-CoV-2 more quickly. This, in turn, saved lives 
and prevented further economic destruction by facilitating the 
rapid development of vaccines, tests, therapies. We really got 
shots in the arms in a record time.
    How did researchers' understanding of the origins of prior 
coronaviruses help the scientific community understand COVID, 
and what impact did it have on the Nation that was struggling 
to confront this pandemic?
    Dr. Imperiale. Thank you.
    I think the main impact there was that, since we knew where 
those previous viruses came from, it sort of gave us the 
obvious place to look for the origins of the current 
coronavirus, because we know that these viruses exist in 
certain places in nature, in bats in particular. They generally 
move through an intermediate host before they can jump into the 
human population. And so, using that foundational knowledge, we 
were able to then kind of, you know, look for the places where 
it was most likely to have arisen.
    Ms. Castor. And then, Dr. Inglesby, how does knowing the 
origin of a pandemic contribute to an effective public health 
response and help policymakers know how to best protect the 
public from a pandemic disease?
    Dr. Inglesby. Yes. Well, I think the more that we have 
confidence in the source of a future biological event, the more 
that we will have--can develop strategy to try and prevent 
future events along the same line.
    So, if there is an animal husbandry practice that has in 
some way resulted in an epidemic or a biological event, then 
that could be changed. Similarly, if there is a laboratory 
practice, that could be changed.
    So I think the more that we understand where it came from, 
the more that we have a chance of trying to diminishing the 
risks for that particular source in the future.
    Ms. Castor. And the--the GAO details in its report that 
there are many challenges to determining the origin of a 
pathogen. They found that such investigations take time, noting 
that it took approximately 13 years to determine the origin of 
the 2002-2003 SARS pandemic.
    Dr. Imperiale, in a 2021 report, you stated: In the absence 
of clear-cut answers, we need to continue to study these 
viruses because science is the best defense against pandemics. 
So how can we make sure that the scientific community has the 
resources, and how important--we're going to focus on the--the 
genomic sequencing and--and--but it seems like, still, the very 
basic data gathering on the ground of samples and just having--
again, having that skilled workforce and collaboration with 
scientists and epidemiologists around the globe will remain 
vital to preventing future pandemics.
    Dr. Imperiale. So, first and foremost, Congress has to 
maintain its strong support for research in our--in our Nation. 
And, if we want to be able to continue to learn more about 
these pathogens and learn more about the characteristics that 
allow them to infect humans, and that then will inform what we 
should be looking for in terms of what's out there in nature 
and what we should be thinking about in terms of what's being 
worked on in laboratories.
    So I think that's the biggest thing, is that we have to 
continue to increase our knowledge. And I think we also have to 
make investments in more work where we can start to be able to 
better predict what the characteristics are of a virus that may 
allow us to make that jump and be virulent and be transmissible 
and have all these properties that we're concerned about.
    We--we don't have good computational tools at the present 
time to be able to just take a sequence from a virus and say, 
``Oh, yes, based on that sequence, I know exactly how that's 
going to behave.'' Oftentimes we have to do the experiment in 
the laboratory to understand that behavior.
    Ms. Castor. Thank you very much.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Griffith. The gentlelady yields back.
    I now recognize Chairwoman McMorris Rodgers.
    Mrs. Rodgers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And again, thank you, everyone, for being here and sharing 
your insights.
    I wanted to start with Dr. Inglesby. There does not appear 
to be a single office within the United States Government that 
owns the challenge of bio attribution. How would having one 
official who can be held accountable in the United States 
Government for coordinating the Federal efforts on determining 
attribution make a difference in the effort to investigate the 
origins of pandemics?
    Dr. Inglesby. Well, I mean, I think as a general principle, 
the more that we understand who is responsible for the 
strategy, the budget, the execution of a program, the more that 
we increase the chances of success and for progress.
    I think right now the National Biodefense Strategy does 
identity key agencies, which I think is a big step forward and 
didn't really exist before. So that is a big step. But there 
are many agencies, as we've talked about here, there are many 
agencies that are involved and have important responsibilities, 
and ultimately that, I think in the ideal case, would roll out 
to a single office that then could coordinate that.
    There are science parts of this process, investigative 
parts of this. There's science diplomacy internationally. So, 
ultimately, it is going to require the efforts of many agencies 
and offices, but if we have one central place where this is 
responsible, one leader for responsibility, I think there's a 
higher chance of success and more rapid forward movement.
    Mrs. Rodgers. Thank you.
    You referenced the administration's National Biodefense 
Strategy. It does not include the National Institutes of 
Health. It includes a lot of agencies but not the National--at 
least, NIH is not listed.
    Given the vast networks that NIH has within the research 
community and the connections of the NIH internationally, 
shouldn't the NIH be playing a role in the Federal efforts to 
investigate pandemic origins?
    Dr. Inglesby. Yes, I do. I assumed that, when HHS was 
identified as the lead agency in the strategy, that that would 
include elements of NIH science as part of that. CDC is also 
included. But you're right, it isn't articulated. And I do 
think it would be certainly a big part of it.
    Mrs. Rodgers. OK. Thank you for that.
    Now, this is a question to each of the witnesses. I'll 
start with Dr. Howard. Does the science exist to know, from 
looking at the genetic sequence, whether a pandemic had a 
natural origin or came from a laboratory?
    Dr. Howard. With certainty, no.
    Mrs. Rodgers. OK.
    Dr. Howard. In most cases, when you look at the results of 
a pandemic origin investigation, they talk about likely origin, 
and the science, the community is comfortable with where they 
land but very rarely would they say they are certain.
    Mrs. Rodgers. OK.
    Go ahead.
    Dr. Inglesby. I agree, and I think that there's almost two 
questions--there are two questions of different levels of 
complexity. The first is natural versus engineered. And then 
the second question is: If engineered, where on Earth did it 
come from? And both of those questions are very hard, and I 
think most scientists will agree that it is--even the first 
question, natural versus engineered, can be very difficult to 
determine just from sequence, because engineering is 
sophisticated enough so that we--it is possible to obscure the 
signals of engineering.
    I'm sure Dr. Imperiale would have more to say about that, 
but that's the view.
    Mrs. Rodgers. OK. Thank you.
    Dr. George.
    Dr. George. I would say that I agree with my colleagues, 
and also, when we're talking about investigations, any kind of 
investigation, that's just one piece of information. It would 
be like asking, well, if we have fingerprint evidence, is that 
enough to say for sure somebody did something?
    We would always say that we need a lot of data from a lot 
of different sources. They come together to make that 
determination.
    Mrs. Rodgers. Thank you.
    Dr. Parker. And I'll use the anthrax letter example, and 
that was the case where there was a lot of genomic sequence 
information of the anthrax strain, but it took all of the other 
investigative pieces of information that finally allowed the 
FBI to make the conclusion that they did.
    Mrs. Rodgers. Thank you.
    Dr. Imperiale. I would agree that right now we can't say 
with certainty what the origin was, but I think that the vast 
majority of the evidence right now points towards a natural 
exposure in Wuhan that did not occur in the laboratory. And I 
could go through a very long laundry list----
    Mrs. Rodgers. OK, that's fine.
    Dr. Imperiale [continuing]. Of the evidence for and against 
that, but I won't do that.
    But I want to just remind the committee that scientific 
knowledge is provisional, right. So we learn things, and we 
come to a conclusion, and then we learn more, and we modify our 
conclusions, and that's the way that this----
    Mrs. Rodgers. Thank you. I have one more question I want to 
get to.
    The Federal Government funds virus hunting activities in 
the field where researchers come into contact with bats 
harboring unknown viruses. Do these research activities pose a 
risk of human spillover?
    And I wanted to ask Dr. Parker that question.
    Dr. Parker. Well, I would say certainly if the people who 
are not--collecting the viruses are wearing proper PPE and 
adhering to all the safety requirements. So that's a must that 
they need to do that, and there's too many examples that we've 
seen that maybe that's not happening--particularly, I would 
say, in low-to-middle-income countries.
    Mrs. Rodgers. I yield back.
    Mr. Griffith. The gentlelady yields back.
    I now recognize the ranking member of the full committee, 
Mr. Pallone, for his 5 minutes.
    Mr. Pallone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Democrats on this committee have long prioritized a 
response to pandemic preparedness and response, and over the 
past 2 years we've taken steps to foster a resilient public 
health workforce, protect disproportionately impacted 
communities, tackle the effects of climate change, zoonotic 
disease transmission, and empower researchers to understand how 
outbreaks begin and spread.
    Now today's panel is well-suited to help us understand how 
Congress can foster the type of collaboration necessary with 
the research community in a way that provides scientific 
breakthroughs while maintaining public confidence.
    So I wanted to ask two questions. I'll start--I don't know 
if I'll get to everybody. I might move around. But first let me 
start with Dr. Howard. But I have to tell you before I ask 
these two questions, when I listened to you, and you explained 
all the pitfalls to finding things, I wondered whether we ever 
would find anything, because there were so many sort of 
pitfalls that you mentioned there.
    But, with that in mind, what are the most effective tools 
that Congress could be providing the research community so that 
we can better identify the origins of pandemics and maybe get 
around some of the pitfalls that you mentioned?
    And then, secondly, how can we use those findings to 
benefit the health and well-being of the public?
    Dr. Howard. The policy options that we propose in our 
report are intended to address those same challenges that I 
enumerated in my statements. So, for example, developing better 
database interfaces, standardized processes so that researchers 
can work across a range of databases in a more efficient 
manner, incentivizing the retention and training of the 
experienced workforce that we need. And we really do believe 
that a national strategy would be very helpful, a strategy 
focused on pandemic origin investigations.
    It's easy in the larger world of biodefense for pandemic 
origin investigations to get lost a little bit as a very 
specific subset, and we believe that a strategy that is 
targeted towards those investigations would be more effective.
    Mr. Pallone. All right.
    Well, now since you and Dr. Imperiale sort of volunteered 
there that you thought that this--or that the evidence shows 
that this started in Wuhan but not in a lab, I ask you the same 
questions. In other words, again, is it--are there more 
effective tools that Congress could be providing the research 
community so we can better identify origins, particularly in 
light of what you just said about COVID?
    And, again, how can we use those findings to benefit the 
health and well-being of Americans?
    Dr. Imperiale. I agree very much with what my colleague 
just said. I think Congress can invest in better tools with 
which to do surveillance, better tools to which to analyze the 
data. We're really good at collecting data, but we're not quite 
as good as really figuring out how to pull the relevant 
information out of those data to make informed decisions.
    So those are two of the areas that I would recommend.
    Mr. Pallone. I guess I'll just go to the others.
    Dr. George, perhaps, the same questions?
    Dr. George. Mr. Pallone, we could give you a list of all 
the nifty things that are out there that could use some more 
investments, and we're happy to provide the committee with 
that, but I think we're talking about two types of investment. 
One would be for the science and the scientific tools that 
you're talking about: better genetic sequencing, better 
laboratory tests and so forth.
    The other has to do with just the normal, everyday public 
health stuff that people have to do, things that would help 
with epidemiology and biostatistics, things that would help 
with data management, data analytics, modernizing some of the 
systems we have that--you know, here, in the United States, 
we're still--some people are still using fax machines to get 
data around, I think. You know, I can tell you that they 
probably need some computers and some connectivity to switch 
over to something else.
    Mr. Pallone. Well, let me just ask Dr. Imperiale. There's 
less than a minute left.
    What kind of long-term investments by Congress are 
necessary to help researchers and public health officials 
prepare for or respond to prevent the next pandemic?
    Mr. Imperiale. So I think that one of the main 
responsibilities of any government is to protect its citizens, 
and we put a lot of effort into our Department of Defense in 
protecting us from those kinds of threats, but I think we don't 
put the same sort of emphasis into our public health 
infrastructure to protect us from not just these kinds of 
events but the everyday sorts of medical occurrences that we 
need better work on for our people.
    So I think we need to really make a strong investment in 
public health infrastructure. And, as you know, right, public 
health infrastructure is distributed. There's the Federal part 
of it, there's State, there's local, and there's got to be a 
better way then to figure out how to coordinate that.
    Mr. Pallone. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Griffith. Thank you. The gentleman yields back.
    Now I recognize Dr. Burgess from Texas for his 5 minutes of 
questioning.
    Mr. Burgess. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Dr. Parker, I'm so glad to have you here today. As a fellow 
Texan, you get it, that you never want to attribute anything to 
coincidence if there's a natural explanation and conspiracy 
theory.
    So you provided us the four instances where you cataloged 
the outbreak, unnatural outbreak examples in your written 
testimony, and I just wondered, you know, after reading those--
and I appreciate you providing those to the committee--what are 
your thoughts on what happened or didn't happen at the Wuhan 
Institute of Virology?
    Dr. Parker. Well, first, you know, I provided those 
examples because I think they provided some examples and 
insights on past precedent for the challenges with unnatural 
outbreaks and some of the issues that get to what I think are 
the real challenges for understanding how to investigate and 
attribute in the international stage, and that is the lack of 
the--the inherent limitations.
    Say, in the WHO, they have to be invited into a member 
state. Same with the BWC. In fact, the BWC really doesn't apply 
to a natural outbreak, but they give some insights also to the 
behavioral characteristics like denial, deflection, obstruction 
that are hard to overcome when we're thinking about the future 
and how we're going to solve some of these things and the 
problem.
    And I just, in my written testimony, I gave--and I'll--my 
written testimony stands for the record, and both hypotheses 
are possible, and I think that's where I'll leave it.
    Mr. Burgess. Well, you wouldn't have known--like the 1977 
Russian flu outbreak. It was only much later in the timeline 
that you learned because someone came forward who wasn't 
forthcoming in 1977. Is that correct?
    Dr. Parker. Confession is another characteristic, you know, 
and the Rajneeshee bioterror incident in the United States, 
that's another incident of confession that happened much later. 
In fact, that incident, it was attributed to a normal foodborne 
illness. There were some suspicions that it might be bioterror 
or intentional, and it wasn't until a devoted cult member 
admitted almost a year later, and the FBI came back in and 
investigated it and determined that the cult member was telling 
the truth.
    Mr. Burgess. And then there was a further incident with the 
former Soviet Union with anthrax that did not come to light 
until I guess after, what, the breakup of the Soviet Union when 
someone came forward?
    Dr. Parker. It was after the breakup of the Soviet Union. 
It happened in 1979 in Sverdlovsk. That was essentially a 
maintenance issue that somebody left the HEPA filter out, 
according to the person who debriefed the intelligence 
community in the U.S. and the United Kingdom.
    And, for over a decade, it was a campaign of deflection, 
denial, obfuscation until the factor came out and debriefed and 
determined it was a malfunction in the--in inhalational 
anthrax, not contaminated meat.
    Mr. Burgess. Well, you know, you just--I think the point is 
that, in spite of everything that we put into it, you know, 
maybe you come back to the John Stewart theory. You have an 
outbreak of chocolaty goodness in Hershey, Pennsylvania, and 
maybe the culprit is the chocolate factory, not a steam shovel 
bathing with a cocoa bean. I mean, there is that aspect of it.
    This thing seemed to line up that--and, look, I'll share 
with you, I was very concerned about this early on in the 
sequence of the pandemic. In fact, several of us on the Doctors 
Caucus had a classified briefing down in the SCIF and asked 
that very question: Is this truly just a novel coronavirus that 
has now come upon the scene? And we were assured by everyone 
who was there at that briefing that that was, indeed, the case, 
that there was no cause for concern.
    I didn't know about your four cases at that time, or I 
might have been much more suspicious than I was.
    Dr. Parker. Well, they're not my four cases, but.
    Mr. Burgess. Right. The four cases that you've brought to 
the committee. And I appreciate you. I appreciate you doing 
that.
    Back in the first bird flu in 2005, I had the opportunity 
to go to Geneva, Switzerland, and talk to the good people at 
the World Health Organization, and I will tell you my takeaway 
from that was that, if it were not for the United States Center 
for Disease Control, there wasn't much there for the World 
Health Organization and their global outbreak alert response 
network. It was really the boots on the ground as far as 
providing us protection on--from a global perspective, but it 
was CDC personnel that would not--I don't--my opinion, that 
would not have existed in the World Health Organization, just 
by itself.
    Dr. Parker. Agreed.
    Mr. Burgess. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll yield back.
    Mr. Griffith. I thank the gentleman for yielding back.
    I now recognize the gentlewoman from Illinois, Ms. 
Schakowsky.
    Ms. Schakowsky. Thank you very much.
    I'm just concerned that, in the conversations that are 
around the potential risks of certain research, that it has 
created--that there's been these myths around virologists and 
their research. And these inaccurate, inaccurate portrayals 
undermine our broad goal of protecting the public and their 
health, and I'm just concerned that we go down the wrong path.
    So--let me get it right. Dr. Im-per-ah-tay?
    Mr. Imperiale. Imperiale.
    Ms. Schakowsky. Imperiale. Thank you.
    So you actually recently wrote that the current discussion 
on the origin of COVID-19 ushered in, and I quote, ``ill-
informed condemnation of virology.''
    And I'm wondering if you can describe the type of research 
that's been happening around and including the research that 
you're doing at the University of Michigan and why some of the 
myths that are surrounding these discussions are inaccurate.
    Dr. Imperiale. Thank you.
    So I think there are two things that contribute to this 
inaccuracy. The first is, again, this debate about whether it 
was a natural exposure or a lab leak. Just by saying the 
possibility that there was a lab leak immediately throws 
suspicion on the research community. So there is that part of 
it.
    And then there was this other issue that I mentioned about 
gain-of-function experiments and whether those were being done 
or not. And that also then, basically, led to this word out 
there, and it wasn't just kind of a rational debate, which has 
been going on for many years, but now social media, the 
traditional media saying that, you know, there are these 
scientists out there, and they're doing these Wild West 
experiments with no consideration of what the potential risks 
are for those experiments.
    And I can tell you that, first of all, that's not true. We 
care very much about those risks, as I mentioned earlier, but 
moreover what I'm concerned about is that I have a number of 
colleagues who study these viruses, these very viruses that may 
cause the next pandemic, who are receiving threats on their 
lives because of this misinformation that's out there about 
virologists just not being--not doing the right thing.
    And that very much concerns me because, if those 
individuals get discouraged from continuing this type of 
research and if that sort of behavior discourages young people 
from entering into the field, that's going to leave us in a 
less better place in the future.
    Ms. Schakowsky. So let me ask you this, too. In a paper you 
wrote, you warned that, while maybe some changes need to be 
improved or reassessed, that there could--that we have to watch 
out for unintended consequences. And could you describe--so 
what are those unintended consequence that we have to watch out 
for?
    Mr. Imperiale. Sure.
    So, you know, so, first of all, we should always be 
improving the way we do things in general, but certainly it 
applies to the safety of our laboratory research. So there's no 
doubt there.
    One of the most fascinating things about science is we have 
a hypothesis, and we do an experiment, and we get a result 
that's completely out there that we did not anticipate at all, 
and that's really exciting sometimes. But I can imagine where 
that type of result could mean, hey, look, we just created 
something that might be dangerous.
    And so we have to always be cognizant that we might get 
that unanticipated result and then be taking the appropriate, 
responsible actions to figure out what do we do now with that 
information.
    Ms. Schakowsky. Have you seen any of those kinds of 
consequences? Are there students, are there researchers who are 
discouraged by this conversation to get involved?
    Dr. Imperiale. I don't know of any specific examples, but I 
know, about 10 years ago, when we were having these discussions 
about the H5N1 transmissibility experiments, that a colleague 
of mine did a survey of students, and many of them indicated 
that this was causing them to rethink whether they wanted to go 
into these areas of research.
    Ms. Schakowsky. I think that's a shame.
    And I yield back.
    Mr. Griffith. The gentlelady yields back.
    I now recognize Mr. Palmer for his 5 minutes.
    Mr. Palmer. I thank the chairman, and I thank the witnesses 
for being here today.
    I'll pull back from my microphone a little bit. There seems 
to be an echo.
    I want to go a little bit in a different direction here. 
I've got some concerns about organizations, agencies that are 
responsible for protecting the public and the world, really, 
from pandemics like this.
    And Taiwan reported, as early as late December 2019, 
concerns of human-to-human transmission. They submitted some--
an inquiry to the WHO that really wasn't transmitted to the 
rest of the world in a timely manner. And I just wonder--and, 
Dr. Howard, you talked about early access to many sequences of 
the virus. I don't think anybody would argue that it is 
extremely important that, when there's concerns like this, that 
everyone should have been informed.
    And we should be concerned about any organization that is 
responsible for protecting us from things like this being 
intimidated and withholding that information.
    Dr. Howard. As we noted in our policy options, we do think 
it's really important that that national strategy does assign 
roles and responsibilities for the various stakeholders. Who's 
going to be the lead? What are the support agencies? What are 
their specific tasks? Who does what? And that those processes 
are in place in advance of a pandemic so that protocols can 
immediately be activated once something like that comes into 
play.
    Mr. Palmer. Well, we've already seen instances of other 
pandemics, SARS and things like that, that I just don't think 
we're at a point now where we can ignore anyone--legitimate 
concerns being raised.
    And I would say that the Taiwanese CDC, their version of 
the CDC would be someone who should legitimately been listened 
to, and that should have been followed up on by WHO.
    I just--your response from any of you. Obviously, I mean, I 
don't think anyone would disagree with that.
    The other concern that I have is how China has responded to 
us. They, obviously, withheld information.
    And there is a report. I don't know if you're familiar with 
it, from Internet 2.0, that indicates that the Chinese, 
particularly in Wuhan, were buying massive amounts of 
polymerase chain reaction tests, PCR tests, as early as May of 
2019. I think it went up fivefold in some places. In Hubei 
Province, it maybe went up tenfold. I'm not sure on that last 
number.
    But I don't know when that information first became 
available, but it seems to me if they're ordering that number 
of tests, then the Chinese, as early as May of 2019, probably 
had some concerns about human-to-human transmission. Would that 
be a reasonable assumption?
    Dr. Howard. Our report did not look at the origins or any 
particular pandemic. Instead, we were more forward-looking at 
how to address the challenges to the field as a whole.
    So I would defer to my other colleagues.
    Mr. Palmer. Dr. Howard? Any view? Am I treading in ground 
that you don't want to walk on? I mean----
    Dr. George. I would say that PCR tests and technology are 
used for many, many things. I don't think that one piece is 
evidence in and of itself can lead you directly to the Chinese 
knowing about this----
    Mr. Palmer. Well, why would they buy fivefold amount in 
that one month if they weren't concerned about something? And 
particularly--I mean, this is clearly abnormal. I don't think 
they were stockpiling.
    So I think it's something that we've got to take into 
account in this, and as we go forward in looking into this, I 
mean, it's obvious that I don't think we can count on--at any 
point that the Chinese are going to be forthcoming about how 
this started and how--when they first knew it.
    Dr. George. Mr. Palmer, I would just say I agree that this 
is an important piece of information that needs to be added to 
all the other pieces of information when we're talking about an 
investigation into this pandemic or any pandemic, and it really 
points to the need to have a variety of people involved in the 
investigation.
    Who would have found out about that? Is it somebody on the 
finance side? Is it somebody who's understanding supply chains 
or export control? That's not necessarily your public health 
person, you know, over at the CDC. It's not necessarily a 
scientist at NIH. So it points to the need to have a varied 
group of people involved in the investigation.
    Mr. Palmer. You just, I think, validated the point I'm 
trying to make. This has got to be a broad-ranging 
investigation.
    And, with that, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity 
to raise these questions.
    Mr. Griffith. I thank the gentleman. He yields back.
    I now recognize the gentlelady from Colorado, Ms. DeGette.
    Ms. DeGette. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 
Congratulations on taking the gavel.
    And congratulations to our ranking member. I know you're 
going to do a wonderful job, Kathy, and I'm happy you're there 
at the helm.
    As the chairman alluded to earlier, we had a number of 
investigations on the source of the coronavirus, and we did 
have blockages because it's difficult to get information from 
China, and that's why, Dr. Howard, I was really happy to see 
report where you're looking forward about what we can do in the 
future.
    But I was also very intrigued, Dr. Imperiale, to hear you 
responding to Congresswoman Schakowsky's questions about the 
politicization of this research, because this is very--I think 
you'll agree with me, this research is really important towards 
developing vaccines and other ways to combat future unknown 
pandemics. Wouldn't that be accurate to say?
    Dr. Imperiale. Very much so.
    Ms. DeGette. And, Dr. Parker, I saw you nodding along when 
Congresswoman Schakowsky was asking about the politicization. 
I'm wondering if you can expand on your views on that.
    Dr. Parker. Sure. I think it's extremely unfortunate this 
has become so politicized and acrimonious. It's very 
unfortunate.
    And I agree with Dr. Imperiale that the vast majority, 
almost all of our scientists and virologists are responsible 
individuals. They are responsible scientists, but we still--our 
biocontainment, our biosafety enterprise has been evolving over 
the last 40, 50 years. Probably the most significant was the 
1974, 1975 that was mentioned when we first began to put 
guidance in for genetic engineering.
    And we've evolved over those years, and we're in an 
evolving point right now with--the NSABB released a report last 
week that addresses some of these issues with research that 
might generate an enhanced potential pandemic pathogen----
    Ms. DeGette. And when we have--I guess I would ask the two 
of you. When we have this politicization of a pandemic like 
this, that's really going to inhibit--and, again, Dr. 
Imperiale, you talked about that a little bit. It's going to 
inhibit our ability to in a thoughtful way develop the research 
that we need to prevent and treat it. Wouldn't that be fair to 
say?
    Dr. Parker. Well, I hope not. You know, somehow we've got 
to get rid of this acrimonious, you know, debate and 
discussion, but we also have to look and try to find as best we 
possible can how did SARS-2 emerge.
    Ms. DeGette. Right.
    Dr. Parker. I mean, we cannot ignore that. How did SARS-2 
emerge? We need--we owe that to the American public and the 
rest of the world to try to understand to the best of our 
ability. We may not, ultimately, get dispositive or definitive 
information, but we need to understand as best we can, but we 
need do that in a way that's not so acrimonious.
    Ms. DeGette. I completely agree with you, and it's a 
frustrating endeavor because you are dealing with--and the 
chairman and I have talked about this many a time. You're 
dealing with a country, the country from which it emerged, 
which is not--you know, which is not--which is opaque. It's not 
transparent.
    And so the WHO and everybody else has been doing yeoman's 
work trying to get this information, but we may never have 
definitive information. Instead, in my view, what we should be 
doing is what Dr. Howard and the GAO are recommending--and, 
frankly, the scientific community at large--which is developing 
these strict guidelines.
    And the U.S. can develop strict guidelines for how we deal 
with labs doing this research.
    Yes, go ahead.
    Dr. Parker. Yes, and I think it's very important that the 
United States actually demonstrate some leadership in 
biosafety, biosecurity in research with enhanced potential 
pandemic pathogens. That's been something that's been kind of a 
gap for quite some time. And so I think we're at a point, too, 
if we can try to improve our own policies here in the United 
States, then we're in a better position to provide leadership 
worldwide because really the issue is on the international 
stage.
    Ms. DeGette. That's right.
    Dr. Parker. I have complete confidence, actually, in our 
labs in the United States, in our high containment enterprise. 
It's not perfect, but I have much more confidence than around 
the world.
    Ms. DeGette. Right.
    Mr. Palmer. But we've got to work----
    Ms. DeGette. Dr. Imperiale, do you agree with that?
    Dr. Imperiale. I would agree with that. I think we have to 
play a leadership role here. You know, I have not seen 
containment facilities outside of the U.S., but I've heard, you 
know, anecdotal stories that they do not adhere to the same 
standards that we do.
    And we have to remember. This has to be an international 
effort----
    Ms. DeGette. Yep.
    Dr. Imperiale [continuing]. To study these organisms.
    Ms. DeGette. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    Mr. Griffith. Thank you, gentlelady.
    And I now recognize the gentleman from Kentucky, Mr. 
Guthrie.
    Mr. Guthrie. Thank you very much. Thanks for the 
recognition.
    And I apologize. I like to listen to all the testimony and 
then try to form my questions from that.
    We also have another committee, a subcommittee that was 
meeting, which I chair, so my obligation was to be there most 
of the time. But I did get to hear--and it's the Health 
Subcommittee, so it's important to what we're talking about 
today.
    I did hear a little bit of Dr. Imperiale's testimony and 
about gain-of-function research because, you know, we need to 
ban what needs to be banned, and we need to--and you defined 
it--it's been defined so differently. And I remember I was 
going to have a--it wasn't in a public setting. We didn't have 
hearings with some of the more prominent people you see in NIH.
    So I only--so I had--but I had a private phone call, and I 
was kind of advised when I was going to talk to him. He says, 
``If you ask them about gain-of-function research, they're 
going to say no. But if you say, could have anything been done 
to the virus, if it came from a bat to a human, could anything 
have been done anywhere artificially in a lab or so forth that 
happened, and just kind of broaden it with a''--he said that's 
possible. That was a time when you were still banned from 
Twitter if you thought it came from the Wuhan lab.
    And so, you know, it kind of gets to if somebody says, ``Is 
this gain-of-function research?,'' it's so technical, some 
people can say no when 99 percent of America would say yes, 
that was gain-of-function research in the way that we want to 
define it.
    So I guess what I'm getting at, we've got to do some 
reforms of NIH and CDC and others. And could I just maybe get 
a--I think, Dr. Imperiale, you even said--I heard you say that 
gain of function--this is gain-of-function research. I can't 
remember exactly what you said, and that's OK, but this other 
is and it's not.
    And so it just seems--or can--just go down the panel and 
start with you. Can you give a concise or reasonable definition 
in laymen's terms--I'm not a scientist--of what gain-of-
function research is and what it's not?
    Dr. Imperiale. Sure. So gain-of-function research is any 
research in which an organism or a cell or a virus or bacterium 
acquires a new function. And so antibiotic resistance is an 
example. That's not research, but that's natural.
    So much of this research is very innocuous. A lot of 
genetics labs do this kind of research all the time to try to 
understand functions of genes and things like that, but there 
is a small fraction of this research that involves these types 
of pathogens that we're talking about today that does need 
added consideration as to whether it should be done and can it 
be done safely.
    So that would be my definition.
    Mr. Guthrie. If any of you have anything to add, I would 
love to hear different perspectives.
    Dr. Parker. I totally agree with that, and it is a 
confusing definition, but by far the vast majority of research 
that virology or the biologists will do with gain of function 
is actually helpful. There is that very small subset that could 
possibly generate a pandemic potential pathogen that requires 
additional consideration.
    Mr. Guthrie. But you don't stumble onto that, right? When 
you're going into your research, you could say, ``Well, I know 
I'm going to study a gene to see if I can gain this function so 
it can go kill cancer cells.'' I mean, that--but you know going 
in that you're risking--is it a risk, or could it be, wow, ``I 
stumbled upon this''?
    Dr. Parker. It depends on the research and the goals of the 
research and so forth, but, yes, the investigator should have 
that--I'll use the definition in the policy--reasonable 
anticipation, which is, you know, hard to define, too, but they 
would have some reasonable anticipation that it could.
    And, when they're thinking about that and proposing that 
type of research, it should require more conversation, and 
hopefully that conversation starts at the PI level, because the 
PI in the institution I think actually knows more about the 
research and the way to mitigate risk at that level.
    But if it could potentially generate, then it ought to be 
reviewed at the funding level and maybe reviewed at the 
department level, too, because the consequences could be so 
great.
    Mr. Guthrie. Should the funding agency do the review, or 
should it be independent?
    Dr. Parker. I believe the review ought to be from the 
continuum from the institution, the funding agency. And if it 
really could generate an EPP, or enhanced potential pandemic 
pathogen, then the department level should review it as well as 
a final review.
    Now, the review continuum and the processes and procedures 
need to be better streamlined so they're not delayed and et 
cetera, et cetera. So--and the benefits really need to be 
clarified, that the--as was said, that the research truly, if 
it could generate a potential----
    Mr. Guthrie. I'm kind of running out of time. Dr. Inglesby, 
you look like you're ready to say something.
    Dr. Inglesby. I was just going to say that the science 
community----
    Mr. Guthrie. I don't mean to skip you, Dr. George.
    Dr. Inglesby. In the last years has, in general, moved away 
from that term ``gain of function'' because it does encompass 
so much and really focused on this term ``enhanced potential 
pandemic pathogen research.''
    If a researcher proposes to make a pathogen more 
transmissible or more virulent or if that could be the result 
of the work, that's the area of work where I think, you know, 
we all have a lot of concern about making sure that we do it 
right and do it safely. But it's a very, very specific area of 
work. It's not gain of function writ large.
    Mr. Guthrie. Thank you. I appreciate that. That's very 
enlightening, and I appreciate your time.
    And I yield back.
    Mr. Griffith. The gentleman yields back.
    Now recognizing the gentleman from New York, Mr. Tonko.
    Mr. Tonko. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    While most viruses emerge from outside the U.S., viruses 
know no borders, as we all know. As a result, much virus-
related research takes place in other countries. Ensuring that 
American scientists can collaborate internationally in research 
strengthens the health and economic security of the American 
public and also allows us to answer critical questions about 
where pandemics originate.
    According to Dr. Howard's testimony, GAO has found that, 
while researchers already have the technologies to determine 
the origins of a pandemic, better international collaboration 
is necessary if we want to get evidence-based answers about how 
pandemics, indeed, start.
    So, Dr. Howard, how would improving international 
collaboration increase our ability to determine the origins of 
a pandemic?
    Dr. Howard. The policy option that we proposed in our 
report was to proactively establish multinational agreements on 
data sharing, sample sharing, and roles and responsibilities in 
the event of a pandemic origin investigation, the outbreak of a 
pandemic.
    Mr. Tonko. Thank you.
    And I can imagine such collaboration can also be useful in 
other aspects of pandemic research and response.
    Dr. Imperiale, how do the American people benefit from 
collaboration with researchers abroad? And what tangible 
scientific advancements in pandemic preparedness and response 
have been made through international collaboration?
    Dr. Imperiale. We benefit from collaboration because it's 
the nature of how science has become in the modern age. No one 
laboratory really has the ability to address all aspects of any 
given question that needs to be answered in order to develop 
these approaches, and so we need that sort of collaboration, 
and oftentimes those collaborators are not within the United 
States.
    And so the way these collaborations started, they're very 
organic. I will read the literature, and I'll see, oh, you 
know, researcher X in country Y is working on the same sort of 
thing, and I will reach out to that person and say, ``Do you 
want to collaborate?''
    So we have to be able to take advantage of the global 
expertise that's available.
    Mr. Tonko. And we need, I would think, to ensure that 
virus-related research outside of the U.S. is done safely.
    So, Dr. Inglesby, you have written extensively about the 
need to be--to thoughtfully balance investments in 
international research capable of generating scientific 
breakthroughs with concerns about national security and public 
safety. So how can the U.S. work productively and 
constructively with governments and researchers abroad to 
ensure that research is being conducted safely?
    Dr. Inglesby. Well, I think one major step forward is the 
policy review process underway right now. The White House NIH 
are leading with the input of NSABB and Dr. Parker. That's well 
along. I think we will have a stronger policy at the end of 
that.
    And I think, after we have that in place, it will be 
important for the U.S. to be working with other governments to 
ensure that they also are thinking about the risks and benefits 
of this kind of work.
    In general, international collaboration. I absolutely agree 
with what's already been said. International collaboration is 
really essential around this work to try and improve our 
protection against infectious disease risks. Infectious disease 
risks come from around the world. Scientists are doing 
important work around the world. The more that we know what 
other scientists are doing, the better we will do, the more 
we're engaged in the event there's a crisis, and we have 
personal connections or collaborations underway that can help.
    But in that very particular area of dual-use research and 
enhanced potential pandemic pathogen research, that's where we 
should be working as a government with other governments to try 
and develop a common approach to dealing with this in the time 
ahead. Because the U.S. has been ahead of other governments, 
and I think it would be useful to help other governments think 
about it.
    Mr. Tonko. OK. Are there any barriers from the other 
countries joining in that international compact?
    Dr. Inglesby. I think some countries are much less likely 
to be interested in sharing data than others. We've talked a 
bit about that already, but the more that we have scientific 
collaboration going, the more chance we have, I think, around 
sharing data.
    And there is now the beginning of this pandemic treaty 
negotiation that's going on in Geneva, and part of that is a 
discussion about how we can share data better around the 
beginning, if possible, epidemic origins.
    Mr. Tonko. It sounds encouraging.
    I do hope that we can continue to have a rigorous 
conversation about biosecurity, and investigating the origins 
of pandemics, we ensure that well-founded concerns about safety 
are addressed alongside the need for critical collaboration 
with our international partners.
    And, with that, Mr. Chair, I yield back.
    Madam Chair, I'm sorry. I yield back.
    Ms. Lesko [presiding]. I switched on you.
    Mr. Tonko. Yes. Thank you.
    Ms. Lesko. I'm going to call on myself. I'm Debbie Lesko 
from Arizona.
    First, I want to thank all of you. Very informative, very 
complicated issue but very important issue.
    My first question is for Dr. Parker. On September 12, 2019, 
the Wuhan Institute of Virology took down its online depository 
of data and viral sequences. The database was intermittently 
accessible from December 2019 to February 2020, before being 
permanently taken offline in February of 2020.
    Do you think that the U.S. should continue to fund any type 
of research that they were doing in the Wuhan Institute on the 
virus in China?
    Dr. Parker. Well, first, I don't have any more information 
than you have on the database, but I have read that U.S. funds 
probably contributed some to that database. So that raises, 
certainly raises a question of if we contributed some funds to 
that, not all but some funds, we should have access to that 
database.
    Ms. Lesko. I agree.
    Dr. George, I have a question for you. It has come to light 
through Freedom of Information Act litigation that State 
Department cables from our Beijing Embassy in March of 2018 
warned that biosafety practices at the Wuhan Institute of 
Virology were inadequate. Yet there is no evidence that 
information reached NIH, who continued to fund research at the 
WIV.
    How can we ensure better coordination and information 
sharing?
    Dr. George. Madam Vice Chair, it's an excellent question.
    There are all kinds of examples of what you just gave with 
all different departments and agencies, people picking up on 
something, maybe communicating to somebody else, and then that 
information doesn't go anywhere else.
    I think that, sadly, because of COVID, people are more 
sensitized now. And perhaps, in the future, if somebody had 
that same sort of assessment, even if they thought, ``Gee, I'm 
not 100 percent sure, I'm over here at the State Department,'' 
I think they might be more inclined to not necessarily go from 
an embassy or consulate directly to NIH but, instead, at least 
go all the way up to the State Department and over to HHS.
    That needs to happen across the entire Federal Government.
    Ms. Lesko. I agree. We certainly learned that.
    Dr. Parker, the GAO report cites a sampling effort in China 
aimed at tracing the origins of two pandemic pathogens, SARS 
and SARS-2, where despite generating a database of over 17,500 
animal samples, researchers did not find any closely related 
coronaviruses.
    Wouldn't you expect to find a closely related coronavirus?
    Dr. Parker. I'm not sure I'm familiar with that data--or 
that report from the GAO report. So I'm not sure if I should 
comment on that.
    Ms. Lesko. OK.
    Anyone else have any--do you want to add anything?
    Dr. Imperiale. Yes, I would add that, yes, we have not yet 
found a virus that's an exact match to SARS-CoV-2, right, that 
arose in the early part of the pandemic. But the 
epidemiological data of where the cases clustered early on all 
point towards the live animal market in Wuhan.
    I can also tell you that there is no evidence that the 
Wuhan lab was working on any virus that has a sequence that's 
close enough to SARS-CoV-2 to say that it arose from there. So 
sequence data here, based on what we have, is not helping.
    As someone mentioned earlier, it took us over 10 years to 
find the exact match to the first SARS.
    Ms. Lesko. Thank you.
    Dr. Parker, do you have any doubt that COVID-19 emerged in 
China?
    Dr. Parker. All of the genomic data points back to Wuhan.
    Ms. Lesko. Thank you.
    And I yield back.
    Yes. Next up, I'll call on Mr. Peters from California.
    Mr. Peters. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    One of the benefits of being down here is that everyone has 
asked a lot of the questions already, but I do want to follow 
up on something before.
    I wanted to talk about biomedical research safeguards that 
currently exist to manage the effects of potentially risk--risk 
in the United States, and I just wanted to follow up on an 
exchange earlier between Dr. Parker and Dr. Burgess about an 
anthrax outbreak in the '70s.
    My understanding is that, Dr. Parker, you believe that this 
testimony--your testimony was that this occurred due to an 
incident in a Soviet lab. Do you recall that testimony?
    Dr. Parker. Yes, it was a Soviet lab in Sverdlovsk.
    Mr. Peters. And just to be clear, how would you--would you 
compare--how would you compare the biosecurity standards in a 
Soviet lab during the Cold War with U.S. standards today?
    Dr. Parker. Well, I was too young to----
    Mr. Peters. OK.
    Dr. Parker. I had not entered into the biodefense field in 
1979. So it's kind of hard for me to comment on that.
    However, you know, I would say, during the--you know, after 
the fall of the Soviet Union, I made a number of trips to 
Biopreparat, the--kind of the civilian equivalent of the 
military, MoD, military defense facilities. They're good 
scientists, former Soviet and now Russian scientists. They are 
very good scientists, but their laboratories were in great 
disrepair at that time because they didn't have funding because 
of the situation of the collapse of the government.
    And so we were very concerned about----
    Mr. Peters. Nineteen seventy-nine is a long time ago, but 
would it be fair to say that it's wrong to assume that they're 
the same, the standards? We wouldn't have evidence that they're 
the same, would we?
    Dr. Parker. No. We didn't have eyes on the ground.
    Mr. Peters. I'd be suspicious myself that they're the same.
    But, in any event, Dr. Imperiale, maybe you can describe 
the steps that researchers and institutions already take to 
mitigate risks and design safe research projects and how they 
might be improved.
    Dr. Imperiale. Right. So, first of all, I can tell you that 
biosafety in the United States has been constantly improving 
over the years. I mean, the precautions that we take, the 
equipment that we have today are much superior than when I 
started as a researcher in graduate school in the late 1970s. 
So that's--there's that.
    We also have these different levels of biocontainment from 
1, the lowest level, to 4, and we assign the appropriate level 
of containment based on the nature of the pathogen being worked 
on. And so the most dangerous pathogens are worked at with the 
highest level of containment.
    I had the opportunity to visit a BSL-4 laboratory in Boston 
a few years back, and it's remarkable to me how that building 
was designed, the procedures they have in place to protect us.
    And so, if the facility is designed properly and the 
procedures are being followed the way they're supposed to be, 
the chances of an accident are very, very small.
    Mr. Peters. Actually, I think I saw similar things in our 
visit to the CDC, which we took as a committee, a lot of the 
same containment features.
    What role do you think Congress can play in making sure 
that the public and other policymakers are distinguishing 
between legitimate concerns about risk and ill-informed fears 
based on conspiracy theories or supposition?
    Dr. Imperiale. That's a good question. You can't legislate 
this. And I guess it's more just the way that, you know, you 
all talk about these things when you're making statements to 
the public and such to ensure that, you know, we're not 
overgeneralizing things, that we're--you know, again, I'll come 
back to the gain-of-function thing, right. We're not painting 
this whole area of research as having potential risk.
    As Dr. Inglesby said, there's a very, very small number of 
experiments here where we need to be carefully considering what 
we're doing there.
    So I think it's more of the way the communication occurs. 
It's the way we talk about things. And also, then, when 
misinformation is put out there, pushing back against it.
    Mr. Peters. I'll just say I appreciate very much the 
witnesses. I think that this committee will be looking at ways 
to make sure that we're prepared next time. This is an 
important part of that discussion, as is making sure we're 
getting vaccines early, as is making sure we deal with supply 
chain issues that we've discovered during the pandemic.
    And I appreciate the hearing and the witnesses.
    And I yield back.
    Mr. Griffith [presiding]. The gentleman yields back.
    And now I will recognize Mr. Duncan of South Carolina.
    And everybody needs to lean into their mikes. We're having 
a little bit of a mike problem.
    Mr. Duncan. Yes, thanks. That mike was janky.
    If SARS-CoV-2 naturally spilled over in Wuhan, that's a 
heck of a coincidence. It means that SARS-CoV-2 reached Wuhan 
undetected and spilled over basically at the front door of 
China's premier coronavirus research facility without leaving 
behind any affected animals.
    WIV scientists who have been studying coronaviruses for 20-
plus years never expected to have one emerge in Wuhan. Based on 
the research, they expected a virus like SARS-CoV-2 to emerge 
1,600 miles away in a rural area of southern China.
    Laying aside those coincidences for a moment, if SARS-CoV-2 
emerged naturally, it really seems to undermine the rationale 
for projects like Global Virome Project. Governments have spent 
hundreds of millions of dollars on researchers collecting 
viruses from caves and other remote areas, but it doesn't seem 
to have resulted in us being any better prepared.
    So, Dr. Peters, is there some other part of the human-
animal interface we should be focusing on?
    Dr. Parker. I think you meant Parker?
    Mr. Duncan. Parker. I'm sorry. It's been a long day, sir. 
I'm sorry.
    Dr. Parker. I have to admit, when I first was briefed about 
the Global Virome Project very specifically, actually at a 
conference we hosted at Texas A&M several years ago, it looked 
impressive, but the more I thought about it and I talked to 
other people--including, actually, Christian Anderson was 
briefed the following year--and although there could be some 
merit to something like that, I think the available dollars 
that we have would be much better used at basic public health, 
animal health, diagnostics, surveillance, reporting systems, 
particularly in low/middle-income countries.
    That's where some of these viruses are really going to 
emerge, in the low/middle-income countries and disease 
hotspots, and we really need to use our aid dollars because 
some of this was not aid--it was using aid development dollars, 
U.S. aid. And I think the objectives of our aid dollars ought 
to be going to development and low/middle-income countries and 
then, specifically, for public health and animal health 
capacities.
    Mr. Duncan. So, just as a sidebar question, you know, we've 
been studying and working on Ebola. Do we have any of these 
type labs set up in Africa that maybe we should be concerned 
about viruses escaping from that you know of, Dr. Parker?
    Dr. Parker. Certainly, we've had--I'm not sure if we have 
actually U.S.-funded labs, but we need collaborations on the 
African Continent with the scientists there to be on the 
ground. And I would say we also--education is very important, 
and having an opportunity to collaborate with universities and 
having 20 opportunities with U.S. universities and universities 
that are in low/middle-income countries specifically so that we 
can actually work on degree education.
    We do a lot of training, but training may be necessary but 
not sufficient. And what we can do to actually grow the 
intellectual capacity of some of these countries will be----
    Mr. Duncan. But no labs that you know of that are similar 
to Wuhan that you're aware of?
    Dr. Parker. On the African Continent, no.
    Mr. Duncan. Yes, sir.
    Dr. Parker. Well----
    Mr. Duncan. Close to Ebola.
    Dr. Parker. South Africa has a long history and has a very 
distinguished scientific record in South Africa.
    Mr. Duncan. Right. Thank you.
    I'm going to shift gears.
    We had mentioned academia will play a large role in bio 
attribution investigations. However, academics can be subject 
to pressure from colleagues, funding agencies, and irate 
members of the public who disagree with their findings. It is 
essential that dissenting voices not be censored or 
intimidated.
    How can Congress sponsor collaboration and data sharing 
between researchers and others in academia under those 
understandings? And what initiatives are currently 
constructive, and what's nonconstructive?
    And I'll direct that back to Dr. Parker, but if anyone 
would like to chime in in 2 minutes.
    Dr. Parker. Sure. Thank you.
    One, I think continue just to--recognition of the 
importance of academia and university-based research and how 
university-based research needs to be fully supported and the 
life sciences need to be fully supported. So I think just that 
recognition and continued discussion will be very helpful. 
Certainly, funding is absolutely necessary. It can't be done 
without resources.
    Mr. Duncan. Yes, but we see all times funding directs the 
outcome and sometimes changes the hypothesis from the very 
beginning, or at least by the end date, so----
    I know we've beat a horse here for the last couple of hours 
that we've been on this hearing, but I think Americans and my 
constituents want to make sure the United States Government 
investigates the origin of COVID-19 that took so many lives and 
is not negating the understanding and empathy, sympathy for the 
lost individuals and the pain that the families felt and the 
strain it put on the hospitals, our healthcare workers and 
whatnot.
    But coming to the conclusion of what happened in Wuhan, how 
it escaped or how it occurred naturally is very, very 
important. I think personally that it escaped from the lab, it 
wasn't natural. And that was in my initial comments.
    I'm glad to see what GAO has put forth. I want to wish you 
guys, as researchers, the best of luck as you anticipate and 
collaborate on the origin of COVID-19 so we can get an answer 
so we can keep this tragedy from happening.
    We're never going to stop a pandemic from happening. We 
always--my best friend is a doctor. He told me we were due for 
a pandemic, and he wasn't surprised when this one happened and 
sweeped across the globe. But to find out that it may have been 
manufactured and may have escaped the lab is kind of alarming 
to so many people. We need to make sure that doesn't happen 
again.
    With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Griffith. Thank you to the gentleman.
    Now recognizing the gentleman from California, Mr. Ruiz, 
for his 5 minutes.
    Mr. Ruiz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I think we can all agree that biomedical research is 
critically important to improving our understanding about how 
pandemics begin, developing effective vaccines and 
therapeutics, and creating policies to contain future 
outbreaks. Ensuring that research is conducted safely with 
robust biosecurity standards is essential to the safety of 
researchers and the public alike.
    Clear standards can help us weigh the benefits of potential 
research against its risk and gives us guidance for making 
reasoned, evidence-based decisions about which research is 
appropriate and under what conditions.
    Dr. Imperiale, how should Congress weigh the risks that 
certain types of research carries against the benefits? And how 
can clear biosafety guidelines help in that evaluation?
    Dr. Imperiale. I think that Congress has to listen very 
carefully to the experts in these areas who are doing this 
research so that they can understand why we want to do these 
experiments, how we're going to do it, and that--whether or not 
we've got the appropriate protocols in place to perform it 
safely. So I think that, you know, a dialogue and a partnership 
between Congress and the research community would really go a 
long way here.
    Mr. Ruiz. So I know that there are a lot of ethical boards 
in doing clinical research. In terms of the biomedical 
research, aren't there certain guidelines for safety already 
that exist, or do you think that we need to create more robust 
safety guidelines?
    Dr. Imperiale. Yes, very much so. As I alluded to, there 
are guidelines for working with recombinant DNA and also with 
infectious agents. These are--come out of the NIH. They come 
out of the CDC. Institutions are required to follow those 
guidelines as a term and condition of Federal grant support. 
And so we have committees that review these, you know, 
experiments before they're being performed.
    We, in the laboratory, look at these things very carefully 
before we're performing these experiments. When we propose 
grants, there's that review at the NIH level and, when 
necessary, at a higher level if it is this very specialized 
category.
    So these--this research is being reviewed extensively at 
multiple levels and also throughout the lifespan of the 
research.
    Mr. Ruiz. And so how can we, you know, design a thoughtful 
biosecurity framework, right, that offers robust safeguards and 
risk-management strategies that also doesn't stifle potential 
innovative and biomedical breakthroughs?
    Dr. Imperiale. So for me again?
    Mr. Ruiz. Yes, it's you.
    Dr. Imperiale. Sure. OK, so, yes, I think it comes down to 
what we've all been talking about here, right, which is that we 
need to, first of all, understand what experiments are 
important to do. What are the really important questions that 
need to be answered?
    So I would make the argument, if someone wants to do an 
experiment because they think, ``Wow, you know, I think this 
would be interesting to answer question X,'' but they can't 
convince me that there's a compelling need to answer that 
question, except to, perhaps, you know, add to our knowledge 
base in a more existential manner, then I think we can't take 
risks under those types of circumstances, right.
    But if there's an experiment and even maybe a gain-of-
function experiment that is going to give us critical 
information that may be necessary to prevent a pandemic or 
develop a therapeutic or deal with antibiotic resistance in 
bacteria, then I think we have to be willing to maybe take a 
little bit higher risk because of the importance of answering 
that question.
    But we have to make sure that we've got the appropriate 
precautions in place to mitigate that risk and make it as 
minimal as possible.
    Mr. Ruiz. So, one, we have different levels of that kind of 
risk research at the CDC, and they have their equipment. But 
one other thing that Dr. Parker said was that oftentimes the 
higher-risk locations of the origins of any pandemic are in 
low-to-middle-class-income countries where the risks of 
communicable diseases are higher, and you're talking about 
making sure we have safety in our protocols.
    Well, that's going to require collaboration with other 
countries, with investments in other countries, to ensure that 
research is done at the site in order--and identification is 
done at the site in order to contain it. And I just need to 
make a comment here that this is very important to understand, 
that global health security is our health security, and taking 
an American-only approach to withdraw from other countries in 
global health and investing in those underserved countries is 
only putting ourselves at risk and doesn't meet the national 
security interests of our Nation.
    So I think it's very important to understand that this 
requires also investments in biosecurity and infrastructure in 
those other countries as well.
    And I--with that, I yield back my time.
    Mr. Griffith. I appreciate the gentleman yielding back.
    I now recognize the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Crenshaw.
    Mr. Crenshaw. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I was--I don't want to spend too much time on this, but I 
was a little surprised to hear that the new consensus is that 
it's a wet market. It seems the consensus before that was--with 
a lot of pretty good evidence, was lab leak theory.
    What was the new evidence exactly? Why is it so compelling 
that it's--it's no longer the Wuhan Institute of Virology's 
fault for their--for their shoddy parameters and standards of 
cleanliness, but now it's the wet market when that had been 
thoroughly debunked in late 2020 after looking at the data and 
testing animals in the wet market, all of that?
    Dr. Imperiale. Yes. So--so there are a few pieces of 
evidence there. So the first is that the epidemiological 
evidence, where the original clusters of cases occurred, all 
mapped to that market, OK? So that's the first piece of 
evidence.
    Mr. Crenshaw. That's Chinese data, just to be clear.
    Dr. Imperiale. No, no, no, no. This is U.S. data.
    Mr. Crenshaw. Well, I just read it, just now.
    Dr. Imperiale. It's consistent data. Secondly----
    Mr. Crenshaw. Provided by China.
    Dr. Imperiale. Secondly--secondly, there is evidence now 
that there may have been two independent introductions of the 
virus into the population. And the chances that two independent 
introductions occurred in the laboratory are pretty small. We 
can't rule it out, but they're pretty small.
    And, as I mentioned before, there is absolutely no evidence 
that that laboratory was working with SARS-CoV-2, OK? So--now, 
we haven't found an animal with SARS-CoV-2, right, but we can 
apply Occam's razor here, right?
    Mr. Crenshaw. I don't know. Occam's razor says----
    Dr. Imperiale. In the past----
    Mr. Crenshaw [continuing]. You know, we have a--we have a 
chocolate flood, and there is a Hershey plant nearby. Maybe 
it's the Hershey plant. I don't know. So----
    Dr. Imperiale. Well----
    Mr. Crenshaw [continuing]. Maybe--maybe we don't know. I 
don't want to spend too much time on it because we're arguing 
about things I don't think we can possibly know. Let's get to 
my real line of questioning, please, Doctor.
    Dr. Imperiale. Can I make a point, though, if you don't 
mind? I----
    Mr. Crenshaw. No, I do mind, because they're giving us 4 
minutes now instead of 5.
    So I think--I don't know--I think we don't know, and I 
think that's--what we're trying to figure out is how we can 
assure ourselves that we will know in the future.
    So, Dr. George, I want to go back to you now.
    You've called for a Federal biological attribution 
apparatus. Multiple administrations have failed to heed this. 
So we wouldn't have this argument right now. We would have a 
group of--a Federal agency that's designated to do this.
    Can you talk through that? Why is that so important? Do we 
have the tools to do that, and is it just a matter of making 
sure that those tools are working together for this common 
cause of attribution that would help policymakers?
    Dr. George. Yes, sir, and yes, sir. I think--we have a lot 
of tools. Of course, we could--we could have more. We could 
have better technology.
    We have a variety of Federal departments and agencies and 
others who are doing work in this space. You know, again, the 
FBI going down one path when it comes to law enforcement 
issues. You've got Department of Defense going off on another 
path when it comes to biological weapons. You have CDC going 
off on another path looking at public health things.
    Mr. Crenshaw. And, you know, does the intelligence 
community have a directive currently to say we need 
intelligence on virology labs in China? Like, is--would that 
even be on their radar?
    I know recently we've been successful in implementing a 
national intelligence manager for biological threats at the 
ODNI. That seems like a good step forward. So do you think that 
will improve things and provide those kind of requirements that 
I was just talked about?
    Dr. George. I think it will improve. It will improve 
things. However, there are more parts of the intelligence 
community that are addressing biological threats, and they all 
need to be further strengthened.
    I do think they have more directives now. I don't know that 
they're specific to virology versus bio in general. But I think 
that they need to be engaged sooner. I don't think we should be 
letting things roll down the pike, and then suddenly, you know, 
a year, 2 years later, say, ``Gee, we think there might be 
something else to be gained by engaging the intelligence 
community,'' and then asking them----
    Mr. Crenshaw. Right.
    Dr. George [continuing]. To come in belatedly.
    Mr. Crenshaw. I'm sort of out of time, but, Dr. Parker, 
you're nodding your head like you wanted to say something. 
You're from Texas A&M, so I've got to let you.
    Dr. Parker. Yes. It's--I think back. We actually only had 
one laboratory in the United States. It was kind of built and 
designed for these kinds of things, and that's the NBACC lab at 
Fort Detrick. Unfortunately, I don't, you know, think it has 
its same kind of mission focus as it was originally envisioned. 
It would be a laboratory that could support microbial forensics 
investigations for attribution that would support the law 
enforcement and intelligence community, and I think today is 
probably only focused on law enforcement, which is necessary.
    Mr. Crenshaw. Well, that will be a future question. Do we 
create a whole new program or agency for this, or can we build 
upon something that already exists?
    Dr. Parker. We have to just--you know, I think it's just we 
have to put the leadership focus on microbial attributions and 
the scientists that support that. And--but I don't think we--we 
need to be thinking about how this also supports multiple 
things--day-to-day surveillance, genomics--that can support 
both public health needs and the investigations that go for 
attribution. And Dr. George may have a different opinion than 
me, but that's OK. We differ on----
    Mr. Griffith. We'll have to get that opinion later.
    The gentleman yields back.
    Recognize Mr. Armstrong for his 5 minutes.
    Mr. Armstrong. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Academia, science, is 
going to play a huge role in how we could deal with the next 
pandemic. Nobody should be penalized or politicized for any of 
these decisions. We like science. We have the greatest 
healthcare, the greatest food supply in the history of the 
world. Science is the reason for all of those things.
    But the--but there is another problem with science. And 
it's almost like you take--everything you design in order to 
get a real result is to eliminate confirmation bias, and then 
you lock everybody in their house, and you give them 6 more 
hours a day with these little machines in their hand that are 
only designed to enhance their confirmation bias. And you 
continue to have these things continue to move forward and 
continue to move forward, not the least of which it was called 
a novel coronavirus. So we were learning as we were going, and 
there's two different sides of this. There is U.S.--the U.S. 
portion and the global response.
    But the GAO report mentions concerns over academics being 
subject to pressure from people who disagree with their 
findings. And I think it is important to acknowledge the 
pressures felt by academics on both sides of the COVID-19 
debate.
    While scientists at the NIH have taken a lot of criticism 
over their origins theories, it was also unacceptable to see 
scientists and academics who argued in favor of the lab leak 
COVID-19 theory--a theory at least everyone knows now is at 
least viable--were censored, ridiculed, and criticized.
    So the criticism of academics happens on all sides of the 
origin question. We need to protect researchers, academics, and 
other professionals who are often controversial--who offer 
controversial findings and conclusions on origin investigations 
from workplace consideration and retaliation.
    And then, on the international stage, we said we have to 
take--but the question is we have to take advantage of global 
expertise, but the second part of that question is without 
being taken advantage of.
    Dr. Parker, you said denial, deflection, obstruction. The 
WHO's constitution states that the health of all people is 
fundamental to the attainment of peace and security and is 
dependent upon the fullest cooperation of the individual 
states. The problem is, for over the last 3 years, the WHO has 
not received the honest cooperation from the CCP in regards to 
investigating the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic. In fact, 
WHO itself, veiled behind public praise for the CCP's COVID 
response, expressed frustration over significant delays in 
receiving complete information, data, and genomes related to 
COVID-19.
    WHO praised the CCP despite the CCP delaying information 
sharing that hamstrung global responses to the pandemic. If the 
WHO pursued an appeasement strategy with the CCP to get 
cooperation, it didn't work. Instead, we got deflection, 
denial, and obstruction.
    I think it's clear that the United States having 
information early is important to determine the origin so that 
we can respond appropriately to the next pandemic. Offline, my 
colleague and I here were talking about, before this had ever 
happened, how much that early information would have really 
worked on the street in Dickinson, North Dakota. I am not 
entirely sure my constituents would have locked down before a 
single case got here.
    But it's happened now, and we know it now. And so I have 
one question. And I think it's important. Has the CCP's 
obstruction and WHO's refusal to address the obstruction set a 
precedent for other state actors to refuse cooperation? What 
can we do in the future to make sure we take advantage of the 
global expertise without getting taken advantage of?
    Dr. Parker?
    Dr. Parker. That is a good question. And I'm not sure I 
have a good answer, but I know one thing that we cannot do is 
walk away from the international stage--and continue to engage 
in these discussions. I know--and some of these diplomatic 
discussions may not lead to where we would like it to go, but 
we're not going to get there at all unless we--if we walk away 
from the diplomatic stage and these negotiations.
    Diplomacy is hard, and diplomacy in this area is very hard. 
But we--I don't think we're going to be creating another WHO or 
whatever, but we have to make the WHO that we have work. And 
that will take diplomacy and negotiations. And those 
negotiations should, maybe first and foremost, make sure that 
we are protecting the vital, essential United States interests.
    Mr. Armstrong. Well, and Dr. George talked about positive 
reinforcements and the Chair talked about negative 
reinforcements, but it's really important because we can't do 
it as a government if our citizens don't trust this. And they 
don't trust it right now. And there is plenty of blame to go 
around on that, but some of it exists with the institutions 
that we put in place to trust.
    And, with that, I yield back.
    Mr. Griffith. Appreciate the gentleman yielding back.
    Now recognize the gentlelady from Florida, Mrs. Cammack.
    Mrs. Cammack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I'll jump right in.
    So this question has already been posed by one of my 
colleagues, but I want to follow up on this. It is about the 
GAO report which cites the sampling effort in China that was 
aimed at tracing the origin of the two pandemic pathogens.
    Now, there was a database of 17,500 animal samples. It was 
said--and I think it was you, Dr. Parker, that said you weren't 
familiar with that report. It is page 15, last sentence, second 
paragraph.
    This states that 17,500 animal samples were used, and not 
one had a closely related trigger to coronavirus.
    I am not a scientist, so educate me. How many animal 
samples would it take? Because what we're hearing today, to the 
point that my colleague from Texas is saying, is that this is 
now something from a wet lab, contrary to everything we've been 
briefed on for the last 2 years.
    Dr. Parker. Well, I think animal samples doesn't tell me 
what genomic samples are in those animal samples. I think that 
must be referring to the September database that went offline, 
perhaps? I don't know. But, just because there is--they're 
animal samples or clinical samples, whether they be fecal, 
oral, tissue samples, doesn't tell me what genomic samples were 
identified in there. But I think--you know, so that----
    Mrs. Cammack. And, because we're short on time, I'm going 
to jump to the next one.
    This is for really the panel at large: How much money is 
invested in research projects either in China or in 
collaboration with Chinese researchers? Who is responsible for 
tracking this research? And, to the comment that was made 
earlier about critical communication between scientists and 
researchers, how do we protect United States' data--health data 
and populations, particularly when the Chinese Government at 
the highest levels is suppressing information, withholding 
information, even to the WHO in the middle of a pandemic?
    Don't all jump in at once.
    Dr. Imperiale. I do not know how much U.S. dollars is going 
into research at China. I'm sorry.
    Mrs. Cammack. OK. Dr. Parker?
    Dr. Parker. Yes, I don't know that number either, but, you 
know, I think that's a number that should be asked of--of the 
Federal funding agencies that work there.
    Mrs. Cammack. Dr. George?
    Dr. George. I think that whoever is taking a look at 
China's bioeconomy probably has more information about that. 
But I also think that, on the point of the role of the Chinese 
Federal Government and what they're doing, it's not--it's not 
just about denial of information and sharing with other people. 
Let's not forget they--they are looking for genetic information 
from a whole lot of people all throughout the world----
    Mrs. Cammack. Yes.
    Dr. George [continuing]. With some very popular genetic 
tests. I think we need to broaden our awareness. And we need 
somebody to be--to be--to be paying attention to all of this.
    Mrs. Cammack. Thank you, Dr. George.
    Dr. Inglesby. Yes. And they're really fair questions. I 
unfortunately don't know the funding level for the Chinese 
science enterprise. I do think collaboration between the U.S. 
and China has the potential to be useful in the future but with 
appropriate safeguards and disclosure and accountability and 
transparency.
    I do think, to your other question about how do we keep 
putting pressure on the system, working with other partners 
around the world to continue to ask for information about what 
happened basically--or in animal sampling and, you know, the 
environmental sampling and in the laboratory is--continues to 
be very important.
    The WHO now is in that position, is asking for that 
information from China. I think Director General even a month 
ago said: All hypotheses remain on the table. China needs to 
provide additional information.
    And, to Dr. George's last point, I completely agree that 
China has a strategy of acquiring genomic information from 
around the world, including in the U.S., but has laws against 
other countries acquiring genomic information from within 
China. And so I think we should all be playing on a level 
playing field and be much more aware of where our information 
in the bioeconomy and personal information is going, in 
particular to China, but to other countries.
    Mrs. Cammack. Thank you.
    Dr. Howard, as quickly as you can.
    Dr. Howard. Our work was not designed to look at the 
resources being extended on particular research.
    Mrs. Cammack. Thank you.
    I yield.
    Mr. Griffith. Thank the gentlelady for yielding.
    Seeing no other witnesses of the regular subcommittee here, 
I would now recognize the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Carter.
    And so that the committee members will know, or so that the 
witnesses will know what's happening, is they've called for 
votes, and that's why people have been picking it up a little 
bit and why everybody's going to leave except myself and my 
colleague, the ranking member, except--and Buddy, who is going 
to ask questions.
    Go ahead, Buddy. You're up.
    Mr. Carter. All right. I--well, thank you, first of all. 
Thank you all for being here.
    Mr. Chairman, thank you for allowing me to waive on, and 
thank you for having this hearing as our first oversight 
hearing. How appropriate after suffering through the last 3 
years, 2 years or whatever without having these type of 
hearings that we want on this subject matter.
    And I'll be very quick. I've just got a couple of 
questions. We all know--it's gone over how much this has cost 
us in the way of lives, how much it's cost us in money. We 
don't know yet the impact that the lockdowns and everything 
else and the lack of children going to school has had, but we 
know that it's going to be tremendous in the future.
    I want to ask you, Dr. Howard, in your work, have you ever 
compared oversight and compliance in U.S. taxpayer-funded 
research facilities in foreign countries to that in domestic 
institutions?
    Dr. Howard. I'm not familiar with prior GAO work in that 
area, but we can do a little research and get back to you.
    Mr. Carter. I'd appreciate that, because it's my 
understanding that the NIH, for instance, exempts foreign 
animal labs from compliance with U.S. laws. And that's very 
concerning, especially if they're sending money over for 
research in places like the Wuhan Lab of Virology and other 
labs in China and Russia. This is something that I'm very 
concerned about.
    Dr. Inglesby, I want to ask you--and this will be my last 
question. I'll go real quick, but thank you for being here, 
first of all.
    The Center for Health Security released a report in 2018 
that was titled ``The Characteristics of Pandemic Pathogens.'' 
This point isn't too far in. It's the executive summary, but I 
think it's a good one. It says, ``Although most classes of 
microbe could evolve and/or be manipulated in ways that would 
cause a catastrophic risk to humans, viruses are the most 
likely class of microorganism to have this capacity.''
    Let's assume we read nothing else in that report except for 
this. Can we just take that point away from this to say that we 
need the most--we need to be most careful when we--with Federal 
policy covering viral research as opposed to other research?
    Dr. Inglesby. I think it--Federal policy needs to be most 
careful around proposals to make pathogens--in particular, 
viruses--more transmissible or more lethal, and that's the--
what we call enhanced potential pandemic pathogen research.
    I think a lot of viral research poses no obvious risk at 
all within a laboratory, but there is a very specific area of 
viral research around making viruses more transmissible, which 
requires, I think, very special attention, very special review 
by the Government.
    Mr. Carter. You know, I know there is a danger in 
generalizing, and I know you all have defined gain-of-function 
research as being much more than probably what most people 
think of it as, but I've got to tell you I've got serious 
reservations. I don't think I'm the only one. I think Americans 
have serious reservations about this.
    With all due respect to research--and I do have a great 
respect for research. I'm a pharmacist. I went through pharmacy 
school, saw researchers working diligently. And what has 
happened through research and development in my career as a 
pharmacist is nothing short of miraculous.
    But, at the same time, when we talk about gain-of-function 
research, I can't help but think--you know, a quote from--from 
Einstein was the only thing more dangerous than ignorance is 
arrogance. And, in my opinion, gain-of-function research is 
nothing more than intellectual arrogance. And I think there is 
a real danger there, and I don't think I'm the only one who 
believes that. I think there are a lot of Americans right now 
who believe that.
    So, having said that, Mr. Chairman, thank you for--again, 
for allowing me to participate, and thank all of you for being 
here.
    Mr. Griffith. Thank you very much. That concludes our 
witnesses who we have asked today.
    I would remind all the Members that they have 10 business 
days to submit additional questions for the record, and I ask 
the witnesses to submit their responses within 10 days of 
receipt of those questions.
    Without objection, the subcommittee is adjourned.
    Thank you all very much.
    [Whereupon, at 4:36 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
    [Material submitted for inclusion in the record follows:]
    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    

                                 [all]