[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]




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                  DU RING AND AFTER THE FALL OF KABUL:
                EXAMINING THE ADMINISTRATION'S EMERGENCY
                      EVACUATION FROM AFGHANISTAN

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               ----------                              

                             March 8, 2023

                               ----------                              

                            Serial No. 118-9

                               ----------                              

        Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs


       Available:  http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://
                            docs.house.gov, 
                       or http://www.govinfo.gov
                       
                       
                       


  DURING AND AFTER THE FALL OF KABUL: EXAMINING THE ADMINISTRATION'S 
                 EMERGENCY EVACUATION FROM AFGHANISTAN
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 




                           

 
                  DURING AND AFTER THE FALL OF KABUL:
                EXAMINING THE ADMINISTRATION'S EMERGENCY
                      EVACUATION FROM AFGHANISTAN

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                             March 8, 2023

                               __________

                            Serial No. 118-9

                               __________

        Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs


       Available:  http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://
                            docs.house.gov, 
                       or http://www.govinfo.gov
                       
                             ______

             U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 
 51-854PDF          WASHINGTON : 2024                     
                       
                       

                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                   MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey     GREGORY MEEKS, New York, Ranking 
JOE WILSON, South Carolina               Member
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania            BRAD SHERMAN, California
DARRELL ISSA, California             GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
ANN WAGNER, Missouri                 WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
BRIAN MAST, Florida                  DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
KEN BUCK, Colorado                   AMI BERA, California
TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee              JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee             DINA TITUS, Nevada
ANDY BARR, Kentucky                  TED LIEU, California
RONNY JACKSON, Texas                 SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania
YOUNG KIM, California                DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota
MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida        COLIN ALLRED, Texas
BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan              ANDY KIM, New Jersey
AMATA COLEMAN-RADEWAGEN, American    SARA JACOBS, California
    Samoa                            KATHY MANNING, North Carolina
FRENCH HILL, Arkansas                SHEILA CHERFILUS-MCCORMICK, 
WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio                 Florida
JIM BAIRD, Indiana                   GREG STANTON, Arizona
MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida               MADELEINE DEAN, Pennsylvania
TOM KEAN, JR., New Jersey            JARED MOSKOWITZ, Florida
MIKE LAWLER, New York                JONATHAN JACOBS, Illinois
CORY MILLS, Florida                  SYDNEY KAMLAGER-DOVE, California
RICH MCCORMICK, Georgia              JIM COSTA, California
NATHANIEL MORAN, Texas               JASON CROW, Colorado
JOHN JAMES, Michigan                 BRAD SCHNEIDER. Illinois
KEITH SELF, Texas

                                     

                                     

                    Brendan Shields, Staff Director

                    Sophia Lafargue, Staff Director


                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

                               WITNESSES

Hoang, Francis Q., Executive Chairman, Allied Airlift 21.........     9
Vargas-Andrews, Tyler, Sergeant, U.S. Marine Corps...............    18
Mackler, Camille, Executive Director, Immigrant Advocates 
  Response Collaboration.........................................    28
Lucier, Peter, Team America Relief...............................    39
Gunderson, Aidan, Former Specialist, U.S. Army...................    50
Mann, David Scott, Lieutenant Colonel (Retired), and Founder, 
  Task Force Pineapple...........................................    65
Lloyd, Anna, M SGT (Ret.) USMC...................................    73
Owen, Ben, President/CEO, Founder Flanders Fields................    86
Gasper, Catalina L., CDR USN, Retired............................    91
Haight, Eric, SGT. USMC, Retired.................................    96
Nisperpos, Ernest, Lt. Col. Founder Aces & Eights Group..........    98
Phaneuf, Jeffery, former Captain, USMC...........................   102
Long, Hon. Mary Beth.............................................   105

     INFORMATION SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD FROM REPRESENTATIVE PERRY

Information submitted for the record from Representative Perry...   126
Washington Post article submitted for the record.................   280

                                APPENDIX

Hearing Notice...................................................   325
Hearing Minutes..................................................   327
Hearing Attendance...............................................   328

    STATEMENT SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD FROM REPRESENTATIVE CONNOLLY

Statement submitted for the record from Representative Connolly..   329

      STATEMENT SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD FROM REPRESENTATIVE MEEKS

Statement submitted for the record from Representative Meeks.....   331

      STATEMENT SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD FROM EVACUATE OUR ALLIES

Statement submitted foe the record from Evacuate Our Allies......   341

      LETTERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD FROM REPRESENTATIVE WILSON

Letters submitted for the record from Representative Wilson......   357

             ADDITIONAL MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Additional materials submitted for the record....................   365

            RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Responses to questions submitted for the record..................   430


                  DURING AND AFTER THE FALL OF KABUL:



                EXAMINING THE ADMINISTRATION'S EMERGENCY



                      EVACUATION FROM AFGHANISTAN

                        Wednesday, March 8, 2023

                          House of Representatives,
                      Committee on Foreign Affairs,
                                                   1Washington, DC.

    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:12 a.m., in 
room 210, House Visitor Center, Hon. Michael McCaul (chairman 
of the committee) presiding.
    Chairman McCaul [presiding]. The Committee on Foreign 
Affairs will come to order.
    The purpose of this hearing is to examine the 
Administration's disastrous emergency evacuation from 
Afghanistan.
    I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
    In the spring of 2021, against the advice of his top 
generals and the intelligence community, President Biden 
announced he would unconditionally withdraw all American troops 
from Afghanistan--a decision that I opposed.
    I and many on this committee received multiple briefings 
from the State Department, the Department of Defense, the 
intelligence community, and the difference in their assessments 
was stark. Both DoD's and the IC's outlook were very grim in 
their assessment, while the State Department, mimicking the 
White House, consistently painted a rosy picture, ignoring the 
realities on the ground.
    The President promised, quote, ``There's going to be no 
circumstances where you see people being lifted off the roof of 
an embassy like in Vietnam.'' Yet, they were.
    Multiple people in the Biden Administration said they had 
planned for every contingency. They did not. Instead, they 
spent the next 4 months ignoring the realities. As a result, 
when the Taliban rapidly captured territory during the summer 
of 2021, and entered Kabul on August the 15th, we simply 
weren't ready.
    Because of the Biden Administration's dereliction of duty, 
the world watched heartbreaking scenes unfold in and around the 
Kabul airport for the next 2 weeks--a sea of humanity 
desperately trying to make it through airport gates that 
represented freedom. We all saw the images of desperate Afghans 
clinging to planes as they took off--with some plummeting from 
the sky to their deaths; mothers handing their children to 
strangers over the airport walls, willingly giving them up in 
the hopes of saving their lives.
    And then, horror struck on August 26th. A suicide bomber at 
Abbey Gate killed 13 American servicemember, injuring at least 
45 more, and killing approximately 170 Afghans. That day was 
the deadliest day for American troops in Afghanistan in 10 
years.
    We are joined here today by Marine Sergeant Tyler Vargas-
Andrews and former Army Specialist Aidan Gunderson. Both were 
deployed to Afghanistan during the evacuation. They can give a 
firsthand account of what it was like inside Kabul airport 
during those harrowing 2 weeks.
    Sergeant Vargas-Andrews, a sniper at Abbey Gate, was 
gravely injured in the terrorist attack that occurred. He has 
undergone 44 surgeries and has lost both his leg and his arm, 
as well as his kidney. Thank you, sir, for the courage to be 
here today.
    Former Specialist Gunderson, a medic with the 82d Airborne, 
was one of the first people on the scene helping anyone that he 
could.
    Gentlemen, this Nation owes you a debt of gratitude--not 
just for your service to our country, but also for the work 
both of you did to help numerous people to safety during the 
evacuation, saving so many lives. You should be proud of all 
that you have done, and I would like to thank you for your 
service.
    I would also like to ask the many Afghanistan veterans here 
today to please stand and be recognized.
    [Applause.]
    On behalf of a grateful Nation, we thank you.
    In the midst of the unfolding chaos in Kabul in August 
2021, the United States State Department was all but useless. 
Like myself, many of my colleagues, including people on both 
sides of the aisle in this room today, were forced to become 
mini-State departments. We worked any avenue we could to rescue 
Americans, Green Card holders, and our Afghan allies that we 
promised we would protect. ``No one left behind'' was the 
credo. We violated that promise.
    Thankfully, though, in the void left by an absent State 
Department, many Americans stepped up to fill the vacuum, 
primarily organized by veterans, groups like Allied Airlift 21, 
Team America, and Task Force Pineapple--just to name a few that 
saved thousands of lives.
    And that is why I am honored to have France Hoang, Peter 
Lucier, and Scott Mann here with us today as well. All three of 
these men worked tirelessly to rescue as many people as they 
could during this evacuation. It was often referred to like 
Schindler's list: if you were on the list, you made it out 
alive. If you weren't, you did not.
    What happened in Afghanistan was a systemic breakdown of 
the Federal Government at every level and a stunning--
stunning--failure of leadership by the Biden Administration. 
Because even though President Biden said, and I quote, ``If 
there's American citizens left, we're going to stay to get them 
all out,''--end of quote--we now know that he left more than 
1,000 American citizens in Afghanistan, in addition to the 
almost 200,000 Afghan partners and allies that we promised we 
would save. We promised them we would help them, only to 
abandon them to the Taliban, not to mention the women who were 
left behind to the mercy of the Taliban and their Sharia law. 
This was an abdication of the most basic duties of the United 
States Government--to protect Americans and leave no one 
behind.
    I want every Gold and Blue Star family member and every 
veteran out there watching this today to know that I will not 
rest, and this committee will not rest, until we determine how 
this happened and hold those responsible for it accountable.
    And before I close, I would like to honor the 13 
servicemembers who died at Abbey Gate that tragic, tragic day:
    Staff Sergeant Darin Hoover.
    Sergeant Johanny Rosario.
    Sergeant Nicole Gee.
    Corporal Hunter Lopez.
    Corporal Daegan W. Page.
    Corporal Humberto Sanchez.
    Lance Corporal David Espinoza.
    Lance Corporal Jared Schmitz.
    Lance Corporal Rylee McCollum.
    Lance Corporal Dylan Merola.
    Lance Corporal Kareem Nikoui.
    Petty Officer Third Class Maxton Soviak.
    And Staff Sergeant Ryan Knauss.
    Can we please have a moment of silence to honor the memory 
of these fallen heroes and all of the fallen heroes in the 
Afghan conflict?
    [Moment of silence.]
    May God bless them and God bless their family, and God 
bless the United States of America.
    And with that, I turn to our ranking member for his opening 
statement.
    Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And let me begin my remarks by thanking all of the 
witnesses for appearing before the committee today, and to 
thank those who served in our Armed Services for your service 
to our great country.
    I want to particularly recognize Specialist Gunderson and 
Sergeant Tyler Vargas-Andrews, two of the witnesses on the 
panel today who were deployed to Hamid Karzai International 
Airport to assist with the non-combatant evacuation operation 
during August 2021.
    Gentlemen, I can only imagine--only imagine--the pressure 
that so many of you faced during the evacuation operation, 
which allowed for us to facilitate the evacuation of over 
100,000 people.
    Specialist Gunderson, in your written statement, you write, 
``No amount of mental preparation or military training could 
have prepared me for Abbey Gate.'' I was struck by that 
statement and the description in your testimony. What an 
incredible weight and responsibility. I could only imagine what 
that is like.
    It brings up for me the emotion that I have felt when I 
hear from veterans of the war in Afghanistan describe their 
experiences, both in Afghanistan and upon their return home, 
many of whom I have met that come from my district--where I was 
told of repeated deployments and the separation from their 
families; watching fellow soldiers suffer from injury or the 
trauma of seeing them die; the difficulty of returning home and 
reintegrating back into their home life--tough; the 
heartbreak--the heartbreak--of our Gold Star families having to 
face empty seats during the holidays.
    So, I honor all of your service, and it underscores to me 
that the President of the United States made the right decision 
to bring all our troops home, because I cannot in good 
conscience imagine sending more American men and women to fight 
in Afghanistan.
    We are here today to examine the emergency evacuation from 
Afghanistan in August 2021 and the Administration's broader 
relocation efforts. It is often said it is easier to start a 
war than to end it. The war in Afghanistan is no different. 
This war that began as an effort to decimate Al Qaeda ballooned 
into a nation-building exercise that lasted across four 
Administrations and saw more than 800,000 U.S. servicemembers 
deployed; and, yes, the tragic deaths of over 2,461 Americans, 
including the 13 killed during the evacuation operation.
    And while the U.S. Government planned for a wide range of 
contingencies, the worst possible scenario happened. Despite 
repeated assurances--some right here in the Capitol of the 
United States of Afghan President Ghani--he fled the country, 
and the Afghan government and Security Forces collapsed faster 
than expected, and before the withdrawal of our military had 
been completed.
    Despite the harsh realities on the ground, a lingering ISIS 
threat, and heightened uncertainty as the Taliban took control, 
our diplomats, military, and intelligence professionals 
facilitated an unprecedented and heroic evacuation never seen 
before. We worked with more than two dozen countries to 
evacuate American citizens and lawful permanent residents to 
relocate Afghans who had helped us; citizens of our allies and 
partners, and at-risk Afghans to the United States or transit 
locations across the globe.
    In the end, more than 120,000 people were evacuated to 
safety under some of the most difficult conditions imaginable. 
It was in a complex and dangerous environment thousands of 
miles away. And so, I commend our brave U.S. military and 
civilian personnel working closely with so many civil society 
organizations and everyday Americans for achieving this.
    But, while the historic Afghanistan airlift brought many 
people to safety, we must acknowledge that there were mistakes 
along the way. And as a result, many Afghans who supported the 
American war effort over the past 20 years continued to seek 
pathways to immigrate to the United States.
    As in most things, context matters. The evacuation did not 
happen in a vacuum. The culmination of policy decisions 
informed and influenced the events of August 2021 and continued 
to shape how we navigate ongoing relocation and diplomatic 
efforts today.
    In the years preceding the 2021 withdrawal, the decision to 
engage in the direct negotiations with the Taliban, at the 
exclusion of the Afghan government, and the invitation to meet 
at Camp David conferred international legitimacy to the 
Taliban. The deal that derived from these negotiations required 
the withdrawal of our forces without forcing the Taliban to 
fulfill any real commitments or separating from Al Qaeda, or 
agreeing to a cease-fire, or negotiating with the Afghan 
government.
    I recalled in the last Congress this precipitous U.S. troop 
drawdowns were ordered throughout 2020 without regard to the 
Taliban's compliance with the deal. This same deal forced the 
Afghan government to release 5,000 Taliban fighters, severely 
altering the power and structure of the country.
    Meanwhile, U.S. immigration mechanisms available to our 
Afghan allies faced longstanding challenges. The SIV program 
for Iraq and Afghanistan, established in 2006, statutorily 
capped participants at 50 per year. In 2007 and 2008, it capped 
this number at 500. Though the caps on SIVs grew over the 
years, it did not comport with the numbers of Afghans who would 
have qualified.
    Separate from the legislative limitations placed on the SIV 
programs, executive branch agencies processing and vetting SIV 
applications were also time-consuming and resource-challenged. 
On top of that, the previous Administration actively undermined 
U.S. immigration refugee admissions and mechanisms and 
specifically paused the processing of Special Immigrant Visas 
applications entirely in 2020, creating a backlog, more than 
17,000 applications. In fact, at the start of the current 
Administration, there had not been a single interview of an SIV 
applicant going back to March 2020.
    In total, these policy decisions not only altered the 
balance of power and reduced U.S. leverage in Afghanistan, but 
created incredibly difficult circumstances, as we worked to 
bring allies to safety and the U.S. war in Afghanistan to a 
close.
    So, despite these challenges, the Biden Administration took 
decisive steps to honor its promises to the Afghans that have 
stood with us by restarting the SIV interview process, speeding 
up the SIV processing, and surging additional consular offices, 
adjudicators, and other personnel to restart the program. The 
Administration also worked to repair the institutional damage 
done to the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program and established 
priority referral categories for Afghans within.
    So, as I conclude, we must acknowledge this important 
effort to relocate vulnerable Afghans, and it is ongoing, and 
that this Administration is actively working to help those 
still in Afghanistan safely leave the country.
    But the evacuation and relocation process are not without 
faults, many of which will require decisive action and 
legislation from the U.S. Congress--not only our executive 
branch agencies or the White House. We are here to understand 
the full context of our Afghan evacuations and ongoing 
relocations, so that we can streamline the process and make 
necessary improvements to fulfill our promises to our Afghan 
allies going forward.
    We must further enhance cooperation and communication with 
the wide array of civil society stakeholders and everyday 
Americans, like our witnesses who are here today who have 
dedicated significant time and resources to this effort.
    So, I fully support, Mr. Chairman, bipartisan oversight as 
we focus on solutions to safely relocate those deserving 
Afghans and address the broader challenges to our SIV and 
Refugee Assistance Programs.
    Our country has paid a great cost during the war in 
Afghanistan. Our aim, then, should not be simply to score 
political points here today, but, rather, to focus on real 
solutions that will help real people. That is the best way to 
honor the sacrifices of so many Americans who served in or 
supported our interests in Afghanistan over the last 20 years, 
especially and including our witnesses here today.
    So, I look forward to their testimony, and I yield back my 
time.
    Chairman McCaul. I thank the ranking member. He yields 
back.
    And I, too, am committed to those who were left behind and 
are still left behind. We need to get them out. We need to get 
them the hell out of there.
    Other members of the committee are reminded that opening 
statements may be submitted for the record.
    Chairman McCaul. We are pleased to have a very 
distinguished group of heroes before us.
    France Hoang is a national security professional with over 
20 years of experience. A graduate of West Point, he served at 
the White House before becoming the executive officer of an 
Army Special Forces company in Afghanistan in 2009. Currently, 
he serves as the executive chairman of Allied Airlift 21, one 
of the volunteer organizations set up to help get people safely 
out of Afghanistan. To date, Allied Airlift 21 has helped over 
500 individuals evacuate the country.
    Sergeant Tyler Vargas-Andrews has served in the United 
States Marine Corps for five and a half years. He and his 
sniper team were deployed to Kabul airport in 2021 to assist 
with the evacuation. They were stationed at Abbey Gate as a 
primary ground reconnaissance and observation asset. While 
there, they helped evacuate over 200 U.S. nationals. Sergeant 
Vargas-Andrews was gravely wounded at the bombing at Abbey Gate 
on August 26, 2021. As a result, he lost multiple organs, two 
of his limbs, and suffered numerous other injuries. He has had 
44 surgeries to date. He is appearing in his personal capacity 
and his testimony does not represent the views or opinions of 
the Department of Defense or U.S. Marine Corps.
    Ms. Camille Mackler is the executive director of the 
Immigrant Advocates Response Collaboration, also known as 
Immigrant ARC, which she helped form and has led since February 
2017.
    Peter Lucier is a Marine veteran and a recent graduate of 
the St. Louis University School of Law. He currently serves as 
the lead for strategic partnerships and allied organizations 
for Team America Relief, a member organization of the 
AfghanEvac Coalition. Since August 2021, Team America Relief 
has assisted thousands of Afghans, as well as American 
citizens, in connecting the resources to assist in relocation 
and safe passage out of Afghanistan.
    Former Specialist Aidan Gunderson served 4 years with the 
82d Airborne Division as a combat medic. Before leaving the 
military in July 2022, he was deployed from August 14th to 
August 30th of 2021 in Afghanistan, where he assisted with the 
evacuation. Aidan and his company also evacuated over 200 
trusted civilians through Operation Pineapple Express.
    And finally, Lieutenant Colonel Scott Mann, former Green 
Beret, served multiple tours in Afghanistan, founded Task Force 
Pineapple, a volunteer organization set up to help get people 
safely out of Afghanistan. Task Force Pineapple has 
successfully evacuated around a thousand Afghan allies to date.
    I want to thank all of you for being here today. Your full 
statements will be made a part of the record.
    And I now recognize Mr. Hoang for his opening statement.

   STATEMENT OF FRANCIS Q. HOANG, EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN, ALLIED 
                           AIRLIFT 21

    Mr. Hoang. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Meeks, 
members of the committee, thank you for inviting me here today 
to testify as just one of thousands of Americans who 
volunteered to help those left behind in Afghanistan.
    My name is France Hoang. In August 2008, I was an Associate 
Counsel to the President, working in the White House as a 
lawyer. One year later, I was a captain deployed to Afghanistan 
as the executive officer of a U.S. Army Special Forces company.
    Every day that I served in Afghanistan, Afghan allies like 
Jabar, pictured here, an Afghan security guard, stood bravely 
beside me. Like tens of thousands of other Afghans who chose to 
support our mission, Jabar was branded a traitor by the Taliban 
and targeted for reprisals.
    Afghans like Jabar put their lives and the lives of their 
families in jeopardy for us and for our mission. Recognizing 
this, those of us who served in Afghanistan and our Nation as a 
whole made a solemn promise to stand by them.
    For over 160,000 Afghans, our Nation has failed--failed to 
live up to this promise. A number of Afghan allies have come to 
the United States, but over 80 percent of the Afghans who stood 
by us, at great risk to themselves and their families, remain 
left behind.
    In August 2021, during the rushed and chaotic withdrawal 
from Afghanistan, I and thousands of others received frantic 
pleas for help from our Afghan allies whose lives were in 
peril. Driven by a desire to save those who had stood shoulder-
to-shoulder with us, we did what we could from half a world 
away.
    Working from our homes and using every digital tool at our 
disposal, thousands of us guided tired and scared Afghan 
families to crowds in Taliban checkpoints. The weight of this 
work was crushing. We left jobs, drained savings, reopened old 
wounds.
    We looked in horror as our screens filled with images of 
violence and desperation outside the gates of Kabul airport. We 
wept as we listened to messages left by children pleading for 
our help.
    Nine times out of ten, our efforts failed. But every 
success was a family saved, a promise kept. Hundreds of 
volunteer groups, including Allied Airlift 21, were responsible 
for getting thousands of people into Kabul airport and safety.
    But the work was not done. On August 27th, when the gates 
of Kabul airport closed to our allies, Allied Airlift 21, 
several private companies, and other volunteer groups organized 
a desperate, all-day, 200-mile journey for six buses filled 
with Afghan allies and Americans through Taliban-controlled 
territory to the city of Mazar-i-Sharif.
    This treacherous journey included an attempted bus-jacking 
and the birth of a baby onboard one of the buses. Our group 
eventually got 400 Afghan allies and Americans to Mazar, where 
we hoped to charter a flight to safety.
    We spent the next 3 weeks hiding these 400 people from the 
Taliban, keeping them alive with the generosity of American 
donors. On September 17th, 2021, a privately chartered plane 
lifted into the skies above Afghanistan with 380 souls onboard, 
including 128 Americans, 152 children, and one newborn baby. 
All 380 passengers are now in America, alive and free, 
including Jabar, his wife, and their eight children.
    My passion for helping our Afghan allies comes from a 
deeply personal place. You see, nearly 50 years ago, I was one 
of those rescued children. On April 23d, 1975, my family was 
evacuated by American forces from Saigon.
    Weeks earlier, President Ford proclaimed that America had a 
profound moral obligation to its Vietnamese allies. He and 
Congress, then, followed those words with action--rising above 
political differences to evacuate and resettle 130,000 
Vietnamese allies. Because of their tremendous political will 
and courage, I am alive and free today.
    I have been blessed with the opportunities that only 
America provides and grew up inspired by the sheer knowledge 
that America stood by me and many like me. That led me to apply 
to West Point, then serve in the U.S. Army, and eventually, 
helped organize a flight that saved 152 children who will now 
grow up knowing that America stood by them and their families.
    We often talk about America as a shining city on a hill, a 
beacon of freedom and opportunity to the world. I along with 1 
million other Vietnamese immigrants are living proof that 
America can live up to those ideals.
    Your predecessors in office fulfilled America's commitment 
to me, my family, and other Vietnamese allies. Now, it is our 
turn to summon the courage to fulfill our commitment to the 
Afghan allies still left behind.
    Before I close, I would like to thank two groups.
    First, to all those who stepped forward to help our Afghan 
allies--veterans, volunteers, civil servants, Members of 
Congress, their staffs, and our families--thank you for 
creating hope when hope became forlorn.
    Second, and more importantly, to our Afghan allies, 
especially those in Afghanistan, thank you for your courage. We 
have not forgotten you and we will not rest until the promises 
that our Nation made to you are honored.
    I look forward to your questions. Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Hoang follows:]

                                 HOANG
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 

    Chairman McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Hoang.
    I now recognize Sergeant Vargas-Andrews for his opening 
statement.

 STATEMENT OF TYLER VARGAS-ANDREWS, SERGEANT, U.S. MARINE CORPS

    Sergeant Vargas-Andrews. Good morning, Chairman, Ranking 
Member Meeks, and Members of Congress. Thank you for inviting 
me to speak to you all about my Marine Corps Scout Sniper 
Team's experience during the evacuation in Kabul, Afghanistan.
    This is my perspective; this is my account, and not the 
DoD's.
    I'm Sergeant Tyler Justin Vargas-Andrews. I'm 25 years old 
and from northern California, a professionally instructed 
gunman and radio operator for my team.
    My sniper team was Reaper 2, part of Victor 2/1 Weapons 
Company, attached to Echo Company, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, 
from Camp Pendleton, California.
    In June 2021, after having just left Kuwait, we were 
deployed to Saudi Arabia as a show of force. We practiced a few 
small-scale, non-combatant evacuation operations in the event 
we were needed in Afghanistan. August came, and 2 weeks later, 
we left for Kabul.
    Reaper 2 and Echo Company had a close relationship with the 
colonel of this special-purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force. 
He kept us informed of the situation on the ground in 
Afghanistan, and we were ready to go--so we thought.
    An infantry platoon of roughly 40 marines and my assistant 
team leader left for Kabul on August 15th. They eventually 
faced the Afghan civilian crowd that overran the Hamid Karzai 
International Airport. The rest of us arrived on August 16th.
    All the marines linked up and staged inside a gym in HKIA 
not far from the airfield. We connected with our command and 
received our first mission later that night.
    From August 17th to the 18th, we surveilled and reported on 
Taliban activity from the top platform of a satellite tower 
near the civilian airport terminals in HKIA. We reconnected 
with another sniper team and moved back toward our staging area 
that night.
    Our team traveled to Abbey Gate forward on the afternoon of 
the 19th and set up a position in the tower, as marines in riot 
gear were sent through the crowd to cordon off a couple hundred 
people, as we tried to begin some form of processing.
    Hundreds of people came in waves, surging through the gate 
multiple times, physically fighting us. Living out of our 
tower, we conducted 24/7 operations at the gate. The next 7 
days were surreal. Nothing prepared us for the ground 
experience we were about to encounter. It was chaos, but we 
worked together to figure out the next best steps.
    Tens of thousands of people descended upon Abbey Gate. We 
were looking for anyone with a blue passport, first and 
foremost. People were suffering from extreme malnutrition, 
dehydration, heat casualties, and infants were dying.
    Afghans who were brutalized and tortured by the Taliban 
flocked to us pleading for help. Some Afghans, turned away from 
HKIA, tried to kill themselves on the razor wire in front of us 
that we used as a deterrent. They thought this was merciful 
compared to the Taliban torture that they faced.
    Countless Afghans were murdered by the Taliban 155 yards in 
front of our position day and night. With only shipping 
containers between us, the Taliban would routinely murder 
people under our observation at their checkpoint.
    We communicated the atrocities to our chain of command and 
intel assets, but nothing came of it. The troops on the ground 
had to tirelessly work to control the crowds day and night.
    Department of State staff in HKIA would completely shut 
down processing Afghans every evening and into the morning, 
leaving ground forces with a nightmare. They did not work in 
reasonable rotations and very much presented an unwillingness 
to work in other situations as well.
    No matter our health or condition, the marines stood watch 
and engaged in disorderly and dangerous crowds. State was not 
prepared to be in HKIA. In fact, State would not want to deal 
with the Afghans unable to be processed, weakening the security 
of the perimeter. State would take us away from our mission to 
walk Afghans out to meet the fate of the Taliban, condemning 
them to death.
    The Taliban grew in numbers and strengthened their position 
around HKIA with gun trucks, while having occasional visits by 
Taliban leadership.
    On August 22d, an improvised explosive device, IED, probe 
took place down in the canal running along the perimeter of 
HKIA. This was ISIS or the Taliban performing an IED test run.
    We reported this to our chain of command. Days later, we 
received word to be on the lookout for two vehicle-borne IEDs 
described as a gold or white Corolla and a green Mazda 
convertible.
    Around 2 a.m. on August 26th, intel guys confirmed the 
suicide bomber in the vicinity of and nearing Abbey Gate--
described as clean-shaven, brown-dressed, black vest, and 
traveling with an older companion. I asked intel guys why he 
was not apprehended sooner, since we had a full description. I 
was told the asset could not be compromised.
    Throughout the entirety of the day on August 26th, 2021, we 
disseminated the suicide bomber information to ground forces 
Abbey Gate. He was spotted somewhere from noon to 1 p.m. by 
myself, then-Sergeant Charles Schilling, and another--the 
anomaly in the crowd who was clean-shaven and fit the 
description exactly, traveling with an older gentleman. The 
individual was consistently and nervously looking up at our 
position through the crowd. The older of the two wore a black, 
silky hijab that was covering his face most of the time.
    They both had obvious mannerisms that go along with who we 
believed them to be. They handed out small cards to the crowd 
periodically, and the older man sat calmly and seemingly 
coached the bomber.
    Over the communication network, we passed that there was a 
potential threat and an IED attack imminent. This was as 
serious as it could get. I requested engagement authority, 
while my team leader was ready on the M110 Semi-Automatic 
Sniper System. The response: leadership did not have the 
engagement authority for us; do not engage.
    I requested for the battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel 
Brad Whited, to come to the tower to see what we did. While we 
waited for him, Psychological Operations individuals came to 
our tower immediately and confirmed the suspect met the suicide 
bomber description.
    He eventually arrived and we showed him our evidence, the 
photos we had of the two men. We reassured him of the ease of 
fire on the suicide bomber. Pointedly, we asked him for 
engagement authority and permission. We asked him if we could 
shoot. Our battalion commander said, and I quote, ``I do not 
know.'' End quote.
    Myself and my team leader asked very harshly, ``Well, who 
does? Because this is your responsibility, sir.'' He again 
replied he did not know, but would find out. We received no 
update and never got our answer.
    Eventually, the individual disappeared. To this day, we 
believe he was the suicide bomber. We made everyone on the 
ground aware. Operations had briefly halted, but, then, started 
again. Plain and simple, we were ignored. Our expertise was 
disregarded. No one was held accountable for our safety.
    About 1730, Staff Sergeant Darin Hoover, a friend and 
mentor, came to get me from the tower to go help find an Afghan 
interpreter in the crowd. We found the interpreter and his 
brother, both with American passports. They told us of five 
family members still in the canal.
    I stayed there waiting for the family members, standing 
against the 2-foot canal wall. Ten minutes passed. Then, a 
flash and a massive wave of pressure. I'm thrown 12 feet onto 
the ground, but instantly knew what had happened.
    I opened my eyes to marines dead or unconscious lying 
around me. A crowd of hundreds immediately vanished in front of 
me, and my body was catastrophically wounded with 100 to 150 
ball bearings now in it.
    Almost immediately, we started taking fire from the 
neighborhood and I saw how injured I was, with my right arm 
completely shredded and unusable. I saw my lower abdomen soaked 
in blood.
    I crawled backward roughly 7 feet because I thought I was 
still in harm's way. My body was overwhelmed from the trauma of 
the blast; my abdomen had been ripped open. Every inch of my 
exposed body, except for my face, took ball bearings and 
shrapnel.
    I tried to get up, but could not. Laying there for a few 
minutes, I started to lose consciousness, when I heard Chas, my 
team leader, screaming my name, as he ran to me. His voice 
calling to me kept me awake.
    When he got to me, he dragged me to safety and immediately 
started triaging me, tying tourniquets on my limbs and doing 
anything he could to stop the bleeding and start plugging 
wounds, with the help of the other marines. I was awake through 
most of it--screaming, moaning, and cursing.
    I ask you to please ask me about getting shot at the tower 
in Abbey Gate and how no one wanted my report post-blast. Even 
NCIS and the FBI failed to interview me. Ask me to elaborate on 
my ordeal post-blast, and ask me about this one little girl and 
her family that I reunited.
    Our military members and veterans deserve our best because 
that is what we give to America. The withdrawal was a 
catastrophe, in my opinion, and there was an inexcusable lack 
of accountability and negligence.
    The 11 marines, one sailor, and one soldier that were 
murdered that day have not been answered for.
    Thank you for giving me this opportunity to speak.
    [The prepared statement of Sergeant Vargas-Andrews 
follows:]

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 


    Chairman McCaul. Thank you, Sergeant, for that very 
powerful and courageous testimony.
    I now recognize Ms. Mackler for her opening statement.

  STATEMENT OF CAMILLE MACKLER, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, IMMIGRANT 
                ADVOCATES RESPONSE COLLABORATION

    Ms. Mackler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Before I begin, I just want to say thank you to Sergeant 
Vargas for everything, and what happened to you matters. And I 
am grateful for the opportunity here today to hear these 
stories, which were our lives for so long, but that everyone 
should know about.
    Before I begin, I also want to express how privileged I 
feel to be included on this panel today on International 
Women's Day. I have met and worked alongside incredibly 
courageous women--Afghan, American--from the world over in the 
last 2 years. And today, I bring them in this room with me, and 
I hold in my heart the voices and the courage of the girls and 
women still in Afghanistan who are silenced and living out of 
view.
    I'm the executive director of Immigrant ARC, a coalition of 
legal service providers in New York. I'm also a visiting senior 
fellow at the Truman Center for National Policy. I have been an 
immigration attorney and advocate for nearly 20 years, and I am 
on the leadership committees of both the Evacuate our Allies 
Coalition and the AfghanEvac Coalition.
    I first became involved in efforts to evacuate our 
vulnerable Afghan allies in January 2021, when a small group of 
us started pushing for Special Immigrant Visa holders and 
others to be included in the then-imminent troop withdrawal. 
Like countless other civil society leaders, veterans, and 
everyday Americans, I pivoted on August 15th to help facilitate 
the Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation, or NEO.
    I am humbled and awed by the actions and sacrifices of my 
fellow panelists and those I speak for today. At the same time, 
I know that what happened in August 2021 was the product of 
decades-long inaction and systemic failures that we can no 
longer ignore.
    To ensure that the actions we heard today were not in vain, 
we must use this moment to create and implement better 
solutions. After all, as we have been told, those who ignore 
history are condemned to repeat it.
    We saw that in Afghanistan. We tried to learn the lessons 
from Vietnam and we were ignored, and we cannot allow a future 
generation to go through this as well.
    So, what are the solutions? First and foremost, Congress 
should pass the Afghan Adjustment Act. Afghans that we all, 
including many of those of us here in this hearing today, 
worked to evacuate to safety in the United States are 
resettled. And though there are challenges, many of them are 
thriving. This is their home and they deserve to have the peace 
of mind of knowing that it is their permanent home.
    The AAA would allow those who are here to obtain permanent 
legal status. It would strengthen pathways for those that we 
left behind, and it would bring new options to help those that 
need them the most. Additionally, passing the AAA will ensure 
increased oversight in the ongoing relocations and 
resettlement.
    We also must increase interagency coordination. One of the 
biggest failures of the U.S. Government was the inability to 
functionally coordinate across agencies ahead of the 2021 
withdrawal. Too many agencies, including the Department of 
Defense, the Department of State, the Department of Homeland 
Security, the National Security Council, and others, had 
overlapping jurisdictions and no clear mandate, which allowed 
for too much passing of the buck.
    However, the White House refused to create this mechanism 
of their own accord. Congress should use its Article I 
authority to mandate a body like that going forward.
    In the years and months since the evacuation, much of this 
infrastructure has been created in an ad hoc manner through 
various departments. Congress must ensure that the executive 
branch coordinates these independent teams in one unified line 
of effort.
    We must codify the CARE team and continue the relocations. 
One of the most innovative approaches we've seen in the 
aftermath of the Afghan crisis is the creation of public-
private partnerships, in this case named the Coordinator for 
Afghan Relocation Efforts, CARE, which is housed in the 
Department of State, and it helps coordinate ongoing 
relocations. Congress should work on legislation to codify this 
effort and systemize government-civil society partnerships. I 
should note the role that AfghanEvac, a coalition of over 200 
veteran organizations, as well as civil society groups, have 
had in shaping CARE.
    We must improve the SIV system. The improvements to the 
Special Immigrant Visa Program will not only provide avenues to 
honor the promise we made to our Afghan allies, but it will 
also be an important foundation and roadmap for how we support 
U.S. allies and collaborators in future conflicts.
    We must authorize enough visas to account for the entire 
eligible population; provide resources to allow for 
adjudication of applications within the 9-months statutorily 
required; provide flexible consular processing; invest in 
diplomatic and logistical capital to solve procedure issues, 
and require the Department of State to catalog and search U.S. 
Government contracts, such as the DoD did in Project Rabbit, to 
take the administrative burden off of applicants who are in 
danger.
    Finally, we need a permanent, lasting, and functional SIV 
program. We need resources dedicated to protecting current and 
future allies. The U.S. Government relies heavily on local 
partners during conflict, but falls short on protecting those 
collaborators after the military engagement ends.
    We need Congress to create an ombudsman for allies office, 
a high-ranking U.S. official with the authority and 
responsibility to serve the interests and protection of wartime 
allies, so that this never happens again.
    And finally, we need better pathways. We need to modernize 
and invest resources in the U.S. refugee system which is 
administered by the Department of State, and we need to pass 
comprehensive immigration reform.
    Every week, me and my colleagues get asked for help on 
behalf of an Afghan or an Afghan family, and every week my 
answer is the same: ``I simply have no options to offer you.'' 
If they did not come through the NEO, they have no pathways to 
come to the United States.
    Our immigration laws prevented us from being able to 
meaningfully help tens of thousands of Afghans. To help those 
who are left behind, as well as to prevent the same catastrophe 
from happening in the future, we must make legal pathways to 
the United States broader and easier to navigate.
    Mr. Chairman, you said at the end of your remarks, ``We 
need to get them out. We need to get them the hell out.'' We 
need immigration pathways to do that. Help us change our 
immigration law, so that we can get them out.
    Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Mackler follows:]

                                MACKLER
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 


    Chairman McCaul. Thank you, Ms. Mackler, and I also 
appreciate your assistance getting so many Afghans out of 
there. And I agree with you, we have to get them the hell out.
    I now recognize Mr. Lucier for his opening statement.

         STATEMENT OF PETER LUCIER, TEAM AMERICA RELIEF

    Mr. Lucier. Chairman, Ranking Member Meeks, members of the 
committee, thank you for inviting me here today to speak on 
this important topic that is so close to my heart.
    I would also like to thank my fellow witnesses here today--
the veterans, those who were on active duty during those 
chaotic weeks in August, and the other volunteers and advocates 
who have been and done so much powerful work in this space.
    In addition to the witnesses here today, I would also like 
to thank some organizations that I have worked with and had the 
honor to know who have made an incredible difference these last 
17 months:
    The International Institute of St. Louis, our local 
resettlement agency, which has welcomed nearly a thousand 
Afghans into our community in St. Louis, who make our community 
stronger. And they continue to welcome more Afghans and other 
refugees today.
    The AfghanEvac Coalition, which is comprised of more than 
200 organizations, both private volunteer efforts like my own 
and larger; traditional advocacy organizations who advocate on 
behalf of immigrants, migrants, and refugees.
    The Evacuate our Allies, our sister coalition with 
AfghanEvac, who does incredible work on advocacy and teaches us 
all about complex immigration policy.
    The entire ecosystem of volunteers from all across the 
country who may not be affiliated with a group, but who have 
stepped up during this time of crisis to assist those in need.
    And my own organization, Team America Relief, which at our 
height was comprised of more than 220 volunteers, assisting 
more than 70,000 Afghans seeking safe passage from that country 
who currently face dire risks, and those who have already made 
their way to the United States who face an uncertain legal 
future, as their status remains in a difficult place.
    My name is Pete Lucier. I'm from St. Louis, Missouri. I 
enlisted in the Marine Corps in 2008 after graduating from St. 
Louis University High School. I served for 5 years as an 0311 
infantry rifleman in the United States Marine Corps and 
deployed to Afghanistan in 2011.
    During that time in that deployment, and in my work since, 
the failures of that war, the lack of oversight and unclear 
mission, became more and more clear. Those failures were 
codified in the fall of Kabul in August 2021.
    The subject of the hearing today is the weeks leading up to 
that, those chaotic 2 weeks and the period after. However, many 
mistakes were made over the course of the last 22 years that 
had led us to this moment. And our examination of those 
mistakes must include an urgent focus on finding solutions to 
the grave threats that so many Afghans that I work with, and so 
many others work with, face today.
    As we examine those mistakes and look at solutions, if I 
leave this committee with only one thought, it is this: it is 
not too late. We are going to talk a lot today about all of the 
mistakes that were made leading up to that, but urgent action 
right now will save so many lives. There are so many people 
that so many organizations work with today, and it is not too 
late to take swift action to assist those.
    Prior to the fall of Kabul in 2022, civil society engaged 
with both Congress and the Biden Administration to take a look 
at how we could get more of our allies out faster. 
Unfortunately, that process never materialized, and on August 
15th, Kabul fell to the Taliban.
    My involvement in this movement began around August 15th. I 
began some fundraisers for resettlement charities here in the 
United States, and I hoped that would be the sum total of my 
involvement. But, shortly after those fundraisers were 
launched, one of those resettlement agencies reached out to me 
as a veteran and asked if I could help get just one person 
through the gates.
    That started the last 17 months of my work in this space, 
just trying to assist one person. By the end of those 2 weeks, 
the one person on my list had grown to 4,000, and by the end of 
2021, Team America had more than 70,000 names in its data base 
that it was seeking to assist.
    During that period in August, there were specific 
challenges that groups like mine faced. Coordination with 
government was difficult during that chaotic time. In addition 
to that, the private groups like my own formed a chaotic 
environment. There was not clear prioritization, and inequities 
in those private evacuations led to inequitable outcomes. Many 
Afghans remain trapped in third countries as a result of moving 
across international borders, and we continue to see to assist 
those today.
    After that time, civil society groups continued to engage 
with both the State Department, the Administration, and 
Congress. We broadened our efforts to continue to assist so 
many left behind.
    We cannot ignore the roots of this crisis. Systemic issues 
over multiple Administrations from both parties contributed to 
a major humanitarian need that neither party was willing to 
address. This is not the story of a Biden failure or a Trump 
failure. This is the story of an American failure and the 
effect it has had, and continues to have, on Afghans who served 
alongside myself and so many others.
    The failures that led to this point are owned and shared by 
four Administrations, by Congress, and by 320 million 
Americans. This was our war. It is crucial that we learn from 
these failures, to know what actions must now be undertaken. 
And most importantly, as I said, it is not too late. For years 
we have failed our allies, folks who fought and bled along 
folks like myself and my brothers and sisters in arms.
    But, even now, swift action will make a dramatic impact on 
the lives of many. Moreover, such action will be keeping with 
the highest ideals that we share as a Nation.
    Thank you for the opportunity to share my testimony today, 
and thank you for your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Lucier follows:]

                                 Lucier
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 


    Chairman McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Lucier.
    I now recognize Specialist Gunderson for his opening 
statement.

   STATEMENT OF AIDAN GUNDERSON, FORMER SPECIALIST, U.S. ARMY

    Specialist Gunderson. Good morning, Chairman McCaul, 
Ranking Member Meeks, and members of the committee. It is an 
honor to be here today. Thank you for inviting me to speak in 
conducting this hearing on the disastrous withdrawal of 
Afghanistan.
    I was on the ground in Hamid Karzai International Airport, 
known as HKIA, in Kabul, Afghanistan, during August 2021. I 
want America to know the truth. The Afghanistan withdrawal was 
an organizational failure at multiple levels.
    My name is Aidan Gunderson, and my desire to serve came 
from my mother, a former Army medic. I enlisted in the Army as 
an airborne combat medic before graduating high school in 2018. 
Stationed at Fort Bragg with the 82d Airborne Divisions, I saw 
two deployments--one to Camp Taji, Iraq in 2020, and then, to 
Kabul.
    On August 12th, 4,000 soldiers prepared for a rapid 
deployment, destination unknown. Forty-eight hours later on my 
21st birthday, a hundred soldiers and I boarded the plane with 
no further confirmation of the mission.
    During the travel day, I went through many emotions, 
thinking about every possible scenario that we could face. Just 
before we landed, we learned that the President of Afghanistan 
fled the country and we would land in Kabul soon. I vividly 
remember the wheels touching down the night of August 15th and 
thinking to myself, ``Are we going to land in a firefight?''
    Not a single person on that plane was prepared for Kabul. A 
sense of dread spread over me, and to make matters worse, the 
only food and water we had was what we packed in our rucksacks 
before leaving America. To say all the supplies were scarce is 
an understatement.
    After 12 hours on the ground at HKIA, we finally had our 
first mission. On August 16th, we were told to secure the part 
of the northern boundary of HKIA.
    In the Army, medics stay with the company first sergeant. I 
remember checking in on the soldiers in the northern guard 
towers. Up there, looking over Kabul, I saw large buildings and 
highways filled with Toyota trucks, and these truck beds were 
loaded with 20 Taliban fighter with AK-47s and RPGs pointed in 
the air. The entire airport was surrounded.
    I also remember the chaos of hundreds of Afghans gathering 
on the runway. The U.S. troops needed support. We found an 
unmanned fire truck, started it up, and drove off. We came to 
the middle of the runway, where blood saturated dusty clothing 
and head scarves smoldered on the ground. These covered the 
dead bodies that had fallen from the landing gear of the planes 
that had just taken off. At this moment, I truly understand 
that the Afghans were risking everything, even death, to escape 
the Taliban.
    The crowds grew so unwieldy and dangerous that the U.S. 
leadership called Afghan allies to the airport to help us gain 
control. These Afghan partners did so by brutal means, but 
these actions saved our lives and allowed the evacuation to 
start.
    From August 19th on, I remained near Abbey Gate in a small 
shack while my company performed security operations and I 
treated injuries. As days past, we heard round-the-clock 
gunshots and screams from Abbey Gate. The gunfire was either 
the Taliban executing someone or a warning shot used for crowd 
control. It was complete chaos, and to make matters worse, 
there was no interpreters.
    On August 22d, my first sergeant, my commander, and I went 
to Abbey Gate because of the escalating situation with the 
crowd. An Afghan man approached us with his wife and young 
daughter shouting, ``82d, 82d, 82d.'' At first, we avoided him 
because our mission was security. He begged us to call the 
number on his phone. We did not understand, but we could see 
that his eighth-month pregnant wife needed medical attention. 
The crowd had trampled her and she needed to get to the 
hospital. However, we did know where that was within the 
airport because no one had given us a map of HKIA.
    We searched for the Norwegian hospital in an abandoned Ford 
Ranger with the family seated in the back. While the first 
sergeant drove, the Afghan handed his phone over. Congressman 
Mike Waltz was on the line. This Afghan man was his 
interpreter. The Congressman thanked us for helping, and soon 
after, my first sergeant's and my commander's phone numbers 
were spread to the various people back in the United States. 
This became the ``digital Dunkirk.''
    Today, I sit beside Lieutenant Colonel, or retired 
Lieutenant Colonel Scott Mann of Task Force Pineapple, who was 
one of many that coordinated through my first sergeant and 
commander nonstop. As texts came in, the first sergeant would 
say, ``Come on, doc. We've got more people to save.'' We 
received a pre-established system. Anyone with a pineapple 
image on their phone was then matched to our phone records.
    We searched the Afghans for explosives and weapons, and 
then, rushed them through the gate. I still carry these 
horrific scenes of Abbey Gate, even the smell. Mothers carrying 
dead babies, and the Taliban mercilessly beating people and 
civilians begging for their lives. The crowd grew more 
desperate and erratic, and they knew they would be left behind.
    On August 26th, after 11 days on the ground, I exited my 
vehicle near the Abbey Gate. I took 10 steps from my vehicle 
and felt a heavy punch to my chest. I looked up and saw a large 
plume of smoke and debris shooting into the sky.
    Immediately, we ran toward the explosion, and the smell of 
feces and urine that constantly filled the corridors of HKIA 
was replaced with an overwhelming stench of iron. Screams from 
little children, women, and grown men echoed in the tight 
corridor. Marines and corpsmen around me fought through tears 
to provide lifesaving aid to our motionless and severely 
injured American brothers and sisters.
    Over the next hour, I tried to save the lives of countless 
marines. We all tried our best. It was a nightmare. An injured 
marine with blood-soaked pants squeezed my hand as tightly as 
he could and looked into my eyes yelling, ``I do not want to 
die,'' as we took the first truckload of marines into the 
hospital. I reassured him that he would be fine, but, as I 
carried him inside, I did not know if he would survive.
    I was born 1 year before 9/11. For 20 years of my life, we 
were at war, and there I was watching the enemy take over the 
country's capital.
    Departing on August 31st on one of the last flights out of 
the country, I was relieved to be headed home, but I wondered 
how the horror I had just witnessed had changed me, how it 
would change us all. I can assure you that it has.
    This war is not over for millions of people in Afghanistan 
and the U.S. Thoughts of those 2 weeks have plagued my mind 
since coming home. I see the faces of all the people we could 
not save, all those that we left behind. I wonder if our Afghan 
allies fled to safety or they were killed by the Taliban. Every 
day I think about my brothers and sisters that died in 
Afghanistan and the family and friends missing them.
    Mostly, I think about the 13 marines, or the 13 Americans 
killed at Abbey Gate. Their deaths should not have happened. 
They should be alive today, and I, like many others, should not 
be forced to carry this burden for the rest of our lives.
    Please consider those 13 and me, as you conduct this 
investigation. Please consider the youth of America who 
continue to serve and never put them in that position again. 
Please remember our allies left behind to face death because 
they served alongside us.
    Thank you for hearing this truth and I look forward to your 
questions.
    [The prepared statement of Sergeant Gunderson follows:]

   [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 

    
    Chairman McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Gunderson.
    I now recognize Lieutenant Colonel Mann for his opening 
statement.

 STATEMENT OF DAVID SCOTT MANN, LIEUTENANT COLONEL (RETIRED), 
               AND FOUNDER, TASK FORCE PINEAPPLE

    Lieutenant Colonel Mann. Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member 
Meeks, committee members, thank you for this opportunity to 
testify before you today.
    I'm here to relive August 2021 with all of you, not as a 
Democrat or as a Republican, but as an American combat veteran 
that is going to do my best to represent over 800,000 
Afghanistan war veterans and their families, but with my own 
point of view. I'm a Green Beret and a retired lieutenant 
colonel with nearly 23 years in service and three combat tours 
in Afghanistan.
    I would like to start with a question: what does an 
American promise mean today? There is a promise in the military 
that is both explicit and implicit: I have your back. We were 
trained that way and it is in our blood.
    But, in August 2021, the leaders who held us to that 
standard went silent while our Afghan allies were left behind. 
The U.S. Government may not have had the backs of our Afghan 
allies, but our veterans did.
    For as long as we have been a nation, our veterans have 
been a moral compass for doing the right thing, especially in 
hard times. As we try to figure out where to go from here, I 
suspect we are going to need that moral compass more than ever.
    You will not find many veterans sitting out here today who 
relish being involved in this Afghan evacuation. We paid our 
dues and we tried to move on with our lives. I know jumping 
back into the quagmire of Afghanistan was certainly not part of 
my military retirement plan.
    But, like thousands of other veterans across the country 
watching Kabul collapse on August 15th, 2021, I received a 
phone call from a friend that absolutely crushed me. ``I'm not 
afraid to die,'' he said to me. ``I just do not want to die 
alone.'' Those were the words that dragged me back into the 
Afghanistan conflict.
    His name was Sergeant First Class Nezamudin Nezami, but I 
just called him ``Nezam.'' His father was a mujahideen fighter 
who was killed by the Soviets when he was 4 months old. He had 
no money, no family, no hope. Yet, somehow, he became an Afghan 
commando, one of the elite warriors who were trained by U.S. 
Special Operations to do really 95 percent of the fighting in 
the country.
    Green Berets, including me, who worked with Nezam, we loved 
him like a brother. He volunteered for every mission every day. 
He was family.
    But, despite numerous inquiries to the State Department, 
Congress, and even Army Special Operations Headquarters, about 
his SIV status, Kabul was falling and no one was coming to help 
him.
    This was a guy who was shot through the face protecting 
U.S. Green Berets from a Taliban ambush. And for me, he was the 
same guy that, even while he was being hunted and texted by the 
Taliban, would call me to ask how my kids were doing.
    Over the next few weeks, I assembled a small team of 
volunteers, mostly veterans from across the country, that we 
called Task Force Pineapple, to guide Nezam and hundreds more 
to safety. We did not have any resources or battlefield access 
or time, but we had something that a lot people did not--
relationships and trust.
    We used cell phones, knowledge of the terrain, and an 
encrypted chat room to guide at-risk commandos and their 
families at night, navigating through that suffocating crowd, 
through an open sewage canal, and then, in the position to link 
up with known NATO servicemembers like Aidan who were standing 
watch near a 4-foot hole in the perimeter fence.
    Pineapple was not the only group. There were hundreds of ad 
hoc volunteer groups doing similar work, many of them sitting 
out here today, from breakfast tables to basements across the 
world--Jane, a Gold Star wife who lost her husband Chris in 
Afghanistan; Will, a double amputee, fighting to save the 
interpreter who saved his life on the battlefield, and dozens, 
even hundreds more.
    We helped hundreds of allies, but thousand were left 
behind, and at great cost to this vulnerable veteran population 
who had already given so much. My buddy Steve, who was wracked 
with post-traumatic stress and a traumatic brain injury from an 
IED, screamed into his pillow and pounded his bed because his 
children were in the next room, as his former interpreter was 
detained at a Taliban checkpoint and was pleading over the 
phone, ``Steve, they are beating my wife. My children are 
watching this, for God's sake. What should I do? Can I fight 
them? Why is this happening?''
    Jay, a former Navy SEAL in Pineapple, received a text on 
Signal from his Afghan partner, ``My daughter has been 
trampled, sir. I know we're going to miss our chance to escape, 
but she's unconscious and barely breathing. It's OK, my friend. 
Thank you for trying.''
    This whole thing has been a gutting experience. I never 
imagined I would witness the kind of gross abandonment, 
followed by career-preserving silence of senior leaders, 
military and civilian.
    As a result of the way that we have left Afghanistan, we 
are on the front end of a national security crisis, as 27 
violent extremist groups are now operating on former NATO 
security bases with Taliban top cover. And I think we are on 
the front end of a mental health tsunami, as 73 percent of our 
Afghan war veterans say they feel betrayed by how this war 
ended.
    Calls to the VA hotline have spiked 81 percent in the first 
year since the Afghan withdrawal, and they keep coming. My 
friend Brad was found dead a few months ago in a Mississippi 
hotel room. His wife Dana confirmed to me that the Afghan 
abandonment reactivated all the demons that he had managed to 
put behind him from our time in Afghanistan together, and he 
just couldn't find his way out of the darkness of that moral 
injury.
    America is building a nasty reputation from multi-
generational systemic abandonment of our allies, that we leave 
a smoldering human wreckage from the Montagnards of Vietnam to 
the Kurds in Syria.
    Our veterans know something else that this committee might 
do well to consider. We might be done with Afghanistan, but it 
is not done with us. The enemy has a vote. If we do not set 
politics aside and pursue accountability and lessons learned to 
address this grievous moral injury on our military community, 
and right the wrongs that have been inflicted on our most at-
risk Afghan allies, this colossal foreign policy failure will 
follow us home, and ultimately, draw us right back into the 
graveyard of empires, where it all started.
    Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
    [Applause.]
    [The prepared statement of Lieutenant Colonel Mann 
follows:]

                                  mann
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 


    Chairman McCaul. Thank you, Lieutenant Colonel Mann.
    And I want to thank you for working with me and my office, 
my staff, getting people out. And you described the chaos and 
the moral injury, I think is how you put it. And I think 
everybody, this whole panel, sustained moral injury, and I 
think the Nation sustained moral injury from what happened.
    I would like to recognize other people in the hearing room 
who also assisted, and they are here to support their friends 
testifying.
    I ask unanimous consent to have written statements of the 
following people who have assisted with the evacuation be 
entered into the record:
    Anna Lloyd with Task Force Argo; Ben Owen, president and 
CEO of Flanders Fields; Christopher Purdy with Human Rights 
First; Catalina Gasper, COO of No One Left Behind; Mary Beth 
Long, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Counternarcoterrorism; Jeff Phaneuf, director of advocacy at No 
One Left Behind; Thomas Kasza with the 1208 Foundation; 
Sergeant Eric Haight, retired, and Lieutenant Colonel Ernest 
Nisperos with Aces & Eight.
    Without objection, so ordered.
    [The information referred to follows:]

                     STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD LLOYD
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 
                     


                     STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD OWEN
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 


                    STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD GASPER
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 


                    STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD HAIGHT
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1854.030

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1854.031

                   STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD NISPEROS
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 

                    STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD PHANEUF
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 


                     STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD LONG
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 


    Chairman McCaul. I now recognize myself for 5 minutes of 
questioning. It is hard to even know where to start.
    But I want to turn to you, Sergeant Vargas-Andrews. You 
described the scene as chaotic; that the State Department was 
not prepared; that they would completely shut down processing 
every evening and into the morning, leaving you and your 
colleagues with a ``nightmare,'' you called it. Could you 
describe that?
    Sergeant Vargas-Andrews. Yes, I can, Chairman. So, for us, 
obviously, ground forces at Abbey Gate, and it was like this at 
other gates as well, but at Abbey, you know, helping process 
between--you know, seven of us on our cyber team, we would go 
down, and if we weren't on the gun and we weren't catching a 
few winks, we would be down processing nationals and civilians, 
and, you know, talking with everyone down there.
    And from us, we were passed from our chain of command, you 
know, throughout the evening to halt processing Afghans, to 
stop searching them. We kind of had to keep control of the 
crowd that was left over in the evening throughout, I would 
say, sundown to sunup.
    There was no plan in place throughout the evening, and the 
State Department would not take Afghans that we processed or 
searched. So, eventually, we just stopped throughout the 
evening.
    I'll go back to you.
    Chairman McCaul. Yes. And I think, because you are correct, 
there was no plan. There was no plan. And the plan was to leave 
the Taliban in charge of this evacuation, which led to the 
chaos and the bloodshed that ensued after that.
    I want to focus, specifically, on what you saw on August 
26th. I know, be on the lookout, an intelligence bulletin went 
out identifying two individuals as a potential IED threat----
    Sergeant Vargas-Andrews. That is correct.
    Chairman McCaul [continuing]. To the Abbey Gate.
    Sergeant Vargas-Andrews. Yes. Routinely, we would send two 
or three guys back to collect intel from our intel assets over 
in the Joint Operations Command. And that morning around 2 
a.m., we were passed that a suicide bomber was in the vicinity 
and in the surrounding neighborhoods, potentially moving toward 
the gate. We were told that he was wearing a brown man dress, a 
black vest. He looked clean-shaven and to be younger with an 
older man traveling as his companion. And we saw just that on 
the 26th, you know, around 12:30 in the afternoon.
    Chairman McCaul. And, in fact, you said you passed along 
the communications network that there was a potential threat, 
an IED attach imminent. And in your words, this was as serious 
as it gets.
    Sergeant Vargas-Andrews. That is correct. We had eyes on 
these two individuals that fit the exact description that we 
were given from our intel assets. And we had pictures. We had 
them, clear as day, to be able to see through our scope, with 
ease of fire on both individuals, as well as through our 
spotting scope. We have high-powered optics with quality lenses 
on our cameras to take clear-cut pictures of everything that we 
see. That is an enormous part of our job, is to----
    Chairman McCaul. Do you still have those photos?
    Sergeant Vargas-Andrews. They were taken on an SD card when 
we turned them over to intelligence.
    Chairman McCaul. Then, you said you requested from your 
commander, Lieutenant Colonel Brad Whited, to come to the tower 
to see what you saw, and the Psychological Operations came to 
the tower and confirmed that the suspect met the suicide bomber 
description, is that correct?
    Sergeant Vargas-Andrews. That is correct, yes.
    Chairman McCaul. So, you had them?
    Sergeant Vargas-Andrews. We did.
    Chairman McCaul. And then, you showed this evidence and you 
asked your commander if you could shoot?
    Sergeant Vargas-Andrews. We did, Chairman. Both myself and 
my team leader asked for engagement authority, and he responded 
with he did not have that authority. So, we asked who did. He 
told us he did not know and would go find out.
    In that time, in the time of talking with him and keeping 
eyes on this individual over the course of 30 minutes, the two 
individuals both disappeared into the crowd of thousands, as 
shown on the slides, as I was talking. I mean, I think everyone 
can understand, by looking at some of those pictures that I had 
up there, how enormous the crowd was. I mean, it was 
unfathomable, very easy to move through and conceal yourself, 
and that is what happened.
    Chairman McCaul. So, you asked for engagement permission, 
and your commanding officer says, ``I do not know.''?
    Sergeant Vargas-Andrews. That is correct.
    Chairman McCaul. He does not know if you have permission to 
take out the threat?
    Sergeant Vargas-Andrews. Yes.
    Chairman McCaul. There are no rules of engagement on the 
ground?
    Sergeant Vargas-Andrews. We were told to pass to our 
command if we saw any suspicious activity or hostile intent, 
and that is exactly what we did. We were not returned with an 
answer.
    Chairman McCaul. And then, you asked, ``Well, who does?''
    Sergeant Vargas-Andrews. Yes.
    Chairman McCaul. ``Who does know?'' And he says he does not 
know, but would find out, and he never got an answer to you?
    Sergeant Vargas-Andrews. He never did.
    Chairman McCaul. And the individual disappeared?
    Sergeant Vargas-Andrews. That he did.
    Chairman McCaul. And you believe that that was the suicide 
bomber?
    Sergeant Vargas-Andrews. We do.
    Chairman McCaul. And then, you said, ``We made everyone on 
the ground aware. Operations had halted. . . . started again. 
Plain and simple, we were ignored. Our expertise was 
disregarded.'' And then, last, ``No one was accountable for our 
safety'' that day.
    Sergeant Vargas-Andrews. That is correct, Chairman.
    Chairman McCaul. No one was accountable? No one was held 
accountable?
    Sergeant Vargas-Andrews. No one was, and no one is to this 
day.
    Chairman McCaul. Did your battalion commander run that 
request up the chain of command?
    Sergeant Vargas-Andrews. He should have. That was his 
responsibility to. I do not know if he did. I do not have an 
answer to that.
    Chairman McCaul. Wouldn't that be the normal protocol?
    Sergeant Vargas-Andrews. That would be the normal protocol, 
Chairman.
    Chairman McCaul. But we do not know. And as a result, we 
have 13 dead servicemen/women; we have a 170 Afghans killed, 
and 45, including yourself, sir, injured?
    Sergeant Vargas-Andrews. That is correct.
    Chairman McCaul. Because that threat could not be taken out 
because your commanding officer couldn't give you the order?
    Sergeant Vargas-Andrews. That is correct.
    Chairman McCaul. Amazing.
    I now recognize the ranking member.
    Mr. Meeks. Again, let me thank each witness for their 
testimony, each member for their service to our country, for 
your being courageous.
    I have listened very intently. And in listening, you know, 
I started thinking about a number of members of the service, 
many who had served in the military. And I have had 
conversation with several Gold Star family members who lost 
individuals, lost family members in Afghanistan.
    And I began to think, then, what is the major, one real 
question that I have? And I want to address it. I guess I will 
address it to you, Pete, and then, to you, Lieutenant Colonel 
Mann.
    The one decision that I know that the President of the 
United States made was to stop the war in Afghanistan, to 
leave, to exit. So, Mr. Lucifer, Lucier, the question is, 
Should the President have made the decision to exit the war in 
Afghanistan, in your opinion?
    Mr. Lucier. Yes, thanks for the question, Ranking Member. 
And ``Lucifer'' happens all the time, especially with, yes, 
back in the day when we used to get telemarketers on the 
landline.
    So, it is a good question. It is a difficult one. It is one 
that I struggle with. Prior to all this, I took actions and 
spoke to some Members of Congress here today about how I felt 
about how the war had been conducted and where we ought to go.
    Should we have stayed in Afghanistan? Strictly in my 
personal opinion and experience, it is that war was a 
frustrating one. In 2011, conducting counterinsurgency 
operations felt vague without direction. So, it was difficult. 
And seeing the violence and the lives lost and the friends I 
lost during the conflict, and then, after, it is tough.
    Ultimately, that is not my decision to make. I'm not sure 
that I have the right answer. Afghanistan was incredibly 
complex. It is surrounded by regional partners. There's nuclear 
folks in the region. It is hard. Making those decision is hard, 
and that is what we ask our elected leaders to do. 
congressional oversight was lacking for 20 years of war. You 
know, budgets were passed year after year with little 
examination of how the war was going. So, there was little 
pressure for the way that we were conducting the war to change.
    So, it is a good question, but, ultimately, the work that I 
do as an advocate, and with the organizations that I do, is 
focused on helping those left behind. We cannot change that 
decision, but there's a lot of people on my list who are trying 
to get here, and there's lots of things that we could do to 
help them that aren't being done. So----
    Mr. Meeks. I want to get to that, because that is we have 
got to talk about, also, the things that we can do.
    But I do want to give Lieutenant Colonel Mann an 
opportunity, because I think that is a fundamental issue. I 
know, as I said, you know, we lost 2,461 Americans, including 
the 13 that were killed--all of which, each and every one of 
them breaks my heart.
    But I know I had difficulty in talking to some, even before 
the evacuation, as to what are we doing there. And ultimately, 
the President had to make a decision. Either we stay--as the 
prior Administrations had to make a decision. President Trump, 
President Obama, you know, these other Administrations, they 
had to make a decision: do we escalate or do we not? And that 
is something that a Commander-in-Chief has to decide.
    But I guess each of us may have our own personal opinions. 
What is yours?
    Lieutenant Colonel Mann. I appreciate the opportunity to 
answer that question, Ranking Member Meeks. And I would just 
say, like Pete, you know, I am not a policy guy.
    But what I will say is, as a career Special Forces officer 
who spent a good amount of time in Afghanistan helping to build 
capacity for the Afghan Security Forces to be an antibody to 
violent extremist groups, so that we did not have to do it, 
that was, for the Special Forces community, that was something 
very near and dear to our hearts, especially when what happened 
on 9/11 pointed so directly to the absence of a ground 
intelligence capability and a viable partner for us.
    And so, we fought and we bled for 20 years to build an 
Afghan Special Operations Forces capacity. And while I know the 
meta-narrative is that the Security Forces withdrew, did not 
fight, the reality is the Afghan Special Ops did 95 percent of 
the fighting and fought to the very end. Most of them ran out 
of bullets. Many of them were overrun.
    And so, my point on that is I believe that that could have 
been a responsible antibody to violent extremist groups with a 
small footprint that do advise and assist. And I believe that 
we could have maintained that.
    But, instead, we allowed the contract heir to go away and 
all of the maintenance. They were left without any air support, 
any medevac, and they were not able to do what Special 
Operators are great at doing. So, I believe that they could 
have stayed in an advisory capacity.
    And now, what we are left with is 27 violent extremist 
groups on the rise, unfettered safe haven, and only the 
National Resistance Front as the antibody to it, and nothing 
else.
    Mr. Meeks. I had a followup, but I know I'm out of time. 
So, I will yield back.
    Chairman McCaul. The chair recognizes Mr. Smith.
    Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you for calling this extraordinarily important 
hearing. You know, lessons learned without accountability--we 
have to have accountability. This is, I think, perhaps the most 
important hearing that we have had, and I want to thank you for 
convening it.
    Let me just ask a couple of questions in the very limited 
time.
    Sergeant Vargas-Andrews, in early September 2021, a 
National Security Council spokesperson characterized the 
Taliban as acting ``business-like and professional.'' And in 
your testimony--obviously, we just heard it--you talked about 
how ``Countless Afghans were murdered by the Taliban 155 yards 
in front of our position day and night,'' and that the Taliban 
routinely murdered ``people under our observation at their 
checkpoint. We communicated the atrocities to our chain of 
command and our intel assets but nothing came of it.''
    Colonel Mann, you pointed out--and again, all of your 
testimoneys are extraordinary and so helpful, and 
heartbreaking--but you pointed out that your buddy Steve, his 
former interpreter was detained by the Taliban. He was pleading 
over the phone, ``They're beating my wife. My children were 
watching this, for God's sake. Should I fight them? Why is this 
happening?''
    You talked about it being a ``gutting experience.'' Then, 
you go on to say, ``I never imagined . . . the kind of gross 
abandonment, followed by career-preserving silence of senior 
leaders, both military and civilian.''
    And coming from you, and from all of you, that kind of 
sentiment today, where are our top leaders? Have any of us 
heard President Biden and Vice President Harris at the State of 
the Union, or at any other venue, talk and convey to those left 
behind, both the Americans and our allies, ``you're not 
forgotten.''? And to say we will not let up in terms of our 
pursuit? You have had to do it kind of like a private sector 
initiative--at great risk to yourselves. And you might want to 
speak to those risks.
    And let me just say, also, the past is often prologue. We 
know that. And I read People's Daily and Global Times every 
day, and they have one editorial after the other telling the 
people of Taiwan right now: look at what Biden did in this 
egregiously flawed exodus. To the people of Taiwan, America 
will not have your back.
    And, you know, it is important that we always have the back 
of our friends and allies. These are people who bled with you, 
lost their lives with you.
    So, if you could speak to any of those issues, I would 
appreciate it. But, you know, who is the one person who got 
held to account? An officer who went on social media 
criticizing the exodus. You know, they threw the book at him. 
Why weren't there more truth-tellers in all of this? So, if you 
could?
    Sergeant?
    Sergeant Vargas-Andrews. Can you clarify what you are 
asking?
    Mr. Smith. Well, I am asking about this lack--you know, the 
two sets of information that went out. People telling us that 
they were professional, that they are acting with decorum, 
certainly, and business-like, when you were seeing a completely 
opposite phenomena right in front of you--people getting killed 
at their checkpoints, and you saw it firsthand.
    Sergeant Vargas-Andrews. What I would say, the only thing 
professional about the Taliban is them professionally being 
able to brutalize and torture people. There was no sense of 
civility or being what you would consider a regular human being 
in that situation. I mean, the Taliban were out there doing 
what they have done best as long as we have been at war with 
them----
    Mr. Smith. Yes.
    Sergeant Vargas-Andrews [continuing]. As long as they have 
been organization.
    I mean, they continued to brutalize people in front of us 
because they knew that they could, because we weren't going to 
do anything about it. And that is exactly what happened.
    Mr. Smith. Right.
    Colonel?
    Lieutenant Colonel Mann. Congressman, I will just speak to 
the personal and organizational responsibility piece. I was 
brought up by really outstanding Special Forces NCOs who taught 
me that one of the most important things that you can ever do 
as a leader is, when you screw up, you take responsibility for 
it. You take personal accountability/responsibility for your 
actions, whatever they are. And I think most of the veterans 
sitting out here today would agree with that, regardless of 
their politics.
    And one of the things that--I know I made tons of mistakes 
in this war that I will have to live with for the rest of my 
life. There's some folks that are not here because of some of 
the mistakes I made.
    But I think where we are now is this moral injury that has 
been heaped upon, not just our veterans, but our Gold Star 
family members, our families, the fallen, our military family 
members, that are trying to look around right now and figure 
out what this was all about--did this sacrifice matter?
    And when we have a violation of what we know to be right by 
those that we trust, it does not matter where that comes from, 
the fact of the matter is the only way to move from moral 
injury to moral recovery is for leaders to step forward, first 
and foremost, and take responsibility for what happened. There 
is no way that we can ascertain lessons learned or where we go 
from here if leaders do not responsibly step forward and own 
it.
    And I think, yes, it starts with the Commander-in-Chief, 
but it needs to go all the way down to our retired admirals and 
generals and sergeants major, all of them. We are going to have 
to really lean into this mental health issue to address this 
thing. It is going to take all leaders at all levels to 
acknowledge that this thing was a serious mistake and it cannot 
ever happen again.
    Mr. Smith. I see I'm out of time. Thank you so very much.
    Chairman McCaul. The chair recognizes Mr. Connolly.
    Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And thank you to all of our witnesses. It is sobering and 
very moving to hear you.
    And, Mr. Vargas-Andrews, your pain and your sacrifice, I 
want you to know, will stay with us for a long time, and I hope 
will guide us, as we make life-and-death decisions about war 
and peace. Because human beings are at stake. It isn't just 
broad, big, huge, geopolitical dynamics. It is people like you 
who have to bear the brunt of the decisions we made, and we 
need to bear that responsibility.
    So, thank you for having the courage to be here. Thank you 
for shedding your tears with us. And know that you are making a 
difference with your testimony here today on all of us.
    And, Lieutenant Colonel, I do not know your politics, but I 
think what you said needs to be taken to heart at several 
levels. But let me pick the one about the reputation of the 
United States with respect to being a faithful ally. I couldn't 
agree with you more. I think that is really important.
    And it goes back to 1975 at least in the fall of Saigon, 
which, by the way, was very messy, not a pretty sight at all. 
Talk about faithlessness; all kinds of people were left behind 
in a very ugly and public way. And for years thereafter, it 
remained chaotic--boat people, coming from Vietnam primarily, 
to get away from the communist regime.
    And you are right to point out the question of, will we be 
faithful to the Kurds, and what is our obligation to those 
Afghans left behind?
    I also want to say, I hope this hearing does not descend 
into just a ``let's pick on the other party's President,'' 
because that is a revisionist view of history and serves no 
purpose, and does not bring honor to the table.
    As you said, Lieutenant Colonel, mistakes were made over a 
series of Administrations, going back to George W. Bush 
deciding there were weapons of mass destruction and Iraq was a 
priority, and we took our eye of what we were trying to do in 
Afghanistan.
    It was not President Biden who decided to meet with the 
Taliban and to exclude the government we were supporting from 
those negotiations in Doha. It was President Trump. Imagine--
imagine--what that did to the Afghan morale in the military and 
their government, to know that the United States, their chief 
patriot and supplier and ally and partner in the field, had 
decided to only meet with what you have just described as a 
murderous, torturing, amoral force at best--the Taliban.
    It was not President Biden who set an absolute withdrawal 
date. It was President Trump. And everything unraveled from 
that. President Biden inherited that.
    Yes, what happened in August 2021 was messy and violent and 
something to be avoided at all costs, if we could, but it did 
not happen sui generis in August 2021. It had a history. There 
was a context and there were previous decisions made that led 
to that tragedy.
    And to try to now make this a partisan advantage cheapens 
the experience of so many who gave so much, including our 
Afghan allies. And I hope we keep that in mind, and I hope we 
can use this hearing to good purpose, instead of narrow, 
partisan political purpose, which, in my view, serves no 
purpose at all.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields back.
    The chair now recognizes Mr. Wilson.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Chairman Mike McCaul and Ranking 
Member Greg Meeks.
    And we certainly appreciate the service of each of you and 
the other veterans who are here today.
    And I agree with President Donald Trump, and that is that 
the Afghan abandonment was the most colossal military and 
foreign policy mistake in the history of the United States. We 
had 13 of our servicemembers murdered. We have had an unknown 
number of our allies and Americans left behind in Afghanistan 
to the murderous Taliban. It is inexcusable.
    I had the opportunity to visit with our troops 10 times in 
my service, and I saw the great work that you did. First of 
all, the veterans of Afghanistan, you kept us safe for 20 years 
after 9/11. And we should have learned from 9/11 that Osama bin 
Laden operated out of a cave in Afghanistan.
    We are setting our country up currently, as you identify, 
with 27 different terrorist groups in a safe haven to attack 
America again. And the thought that we would not have had--as 
Congressman Smith and I were just talking about, President 
Trump made it clear that he would maintain Bagram Air Base.
    With that in mind, my 10 visits--and I first went and there 
was rubble. The Soviets had destroyed the country up to just 
one lane of traffic. I saw the roads clear. I saw the roads 
paved. I saw the sidewalks built. It was so inspiring to see 
young boys going to school in groups with baseball caps, and 
then, to see young girls going to school in white scarves. We 
saw a society being developed, and then, sadly, it was 
abandoned.
    It is personal to me. My National Guard unit, the 218th 
Brigade of the South Carolina Army National Guard served for a 
year in Afghanistan with the Adjacent General Bob Livingston, 
and it was so inspiring. Our troops were all over the country 
in small outposts. And they developed a great affection for 
their Afghan brothers.
    And then, I'm grateful, my youngest son, First Lieutenant 
Hunter Wilson, served for a year in Afghanistan as an engineer. 
So, it is very personal to me, and that is why I just consider 
it so disgraceful, the betrayal of the people of Afghanistan, 
the betrayal of the service by NATO allies, by American troops.
    And disgracefully, on August the 26th, the President had a 
press conference, and I want to quote what he said. ``The 
military have all contacted me, usually by letter, stating that 
they subscribe to the mission as designed.'' End of quote.
    I, that day, sent a letter to the Presiding asking him for 
copies of these letters. I know the letters do not exist. I 
have faith in the American military. And so, every 2 months, I 
have been asking for the letters. I have never got a response. 
And it would seem like to me the American media might be 
interested, too. Where are these letters?
    There is disgrace which has paved the way for war criminal 
Putin to threaten, to invade Ukraine; to threaten, by the 
Chinese Communist Party, to threaten Taiwan; to provide for the 
mullahs in Tehran to plan for the vaporization of the people of 
Israel and the vaporization of the people of the United States.
    With that in mind, I would like to ask a question to 
Sergeant Vargas-Andrews and to Specialist Gunderson. Were the 
troops given clear and consistent direction as to who should be 
granted entry into the airport?
    Specialist Gunderson. Can you say that one more time, 
Congressman, please, your question?
    Mr. Wilson. The question I have is, were the troops, were 
you given clear and consistent direction as to who should be 
granted entry into the airport? And did the State Department 
fulfill their responsibility to properly screen and admit 
Afghan allies?
    Specialist Gunderson. Well, thank you for the question, 
Congressman.
    I cannot speak to the State Department and how they did. I 
know that the marines at Abbey Gate and I looked for SIVs and 
blue passports, but I do not think I was ever given like, from 
my leadership, a direct guidance, like ``This is who we are 
pulling out and this is who we are not.''
    Mr. Wilson. Well, you did your best.
    And Sergeant?
    Sergeant Vargas-Andrews. Myself, I know for a while at the 
gate a lot of guys had no idea what Special Immigrant Visas 
even looked like. It took people asking, higher-ups asking 
because--``Here, look for this and look for passports.'' We 
know what passports look like. The majority of people know what 
passports look like, but, as far as Special Immigrant Visas, it 
was probably 4 days into the gate before I started seeing them.
    Mr. Wilson. And again, thank you all.
    And, Mr. Lucier, thank you. I appreciate your family, and 
best wishes on your continued success.
    Thank you. I yield back.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields back.
    The chair recognizes Mr. Keating.
    Mr. Keating. I just want to thank all our witnesses and all 
in the audience, and anyone that is listening to this, for 
their service.
    And I want to associate very strongly with your remarks. 
Given the experience I have had, it is not as personal, by any 
means; it is not as powerful, by any means, but it is carved in 
my mind indelibly, as a Gold Star family, in particular.
    It was in Helmand Province when, as a congressional Member, 
I visited with the troops there and listened to our leaders in 
terms of strategy. As often is the case with so many of us, we 
will say, ``If there's anything I can ever do for you,''--I 
told the marines that were protecting us--``please let me 
know.''
    In this one instance, they said, ``Well, sir, there is, if 
you would.'' And so, that evening I went to the marketplace in 
the village with them, and we went to meet a gentleman, a man 
that was there. And I found out that they wanted, simply, a 
Member of Congress to thank this Afghan civilian because he was 
risking his life every day--telling them where the IEDs were 
planted; telling them what the strategies and the movements of 
the Taliban would be.
    And I asked him, when I met him, I said, ``Why are you 
risking your life to this extent to do that?'' And behind him, 
he reached back and pulled forth his 8-year-old boy and he 
said, ``I just want him to have the same freedom/education that 
you have in your country here in Afghanistan.'' I will never 
forget that moment.
    And those are the people you have been talking about, 
people that risked their lives to protect us and our soldiers. 
And we just do not owe these allies--we just do not owe them, I 
do not think--we would be benefited by their citizenship as 
Americans. With their shared values, with their demonstrated 
courage, and with their personal commitment to democratic 
values, they would be outstanding American citizens. And I do 
not want that point lost, either.
    And I do not want another point lost, particularly with our 
witnesses here that served us so well. And that is to say thank 
you for what happened in those final days. Thank you for your 
bravery.
    We were briefed on the dangers that would occur in our 
classified briefings. It is the most dangerous part of the war, 
they said. And you were there. And some of your lives will 
never be the same, along with many of the colleagues, you 
said--people that are injured physically, people with hidden 
injuries that will never quite be the same.
    But you saved, help save 120,000 people during that very 
difficult situation. It could have been better, but you did it. 
And it was 120,000 people just in those 15 days, 76,000 
Afghans, that were saved. Thank you. And that shouldn't be 
lost, as we look at everything else and lessons learned.
    I know how difficult it was, not directly as you, but, you 
know, our office was 24/7. And I was on the phone, I was 
actually on the phone with an Afghan family, talking to, I'll 
just call it, a U.S. official, at the Abbey Gate. And as I was 
on the phone, explosions went off within their sight. And that 
is how dangerous this whole situation was you experienced. And 
thank you for sharing so much more.
    But that commitment that we have--and I was not the only 
office; other offices were working, trying to extricate people, 
bring them here, get them beyond that danger and move them 
forward. But we worked together in doing that. We had direct 
effect with 62 individuals, and my staff just did not sleep.
    And one of them, by the way, has left us this week and is 
going to go work for CARE. She was so moved, as an Army veteran 
and person that worked in our office, with this, she has now 
changed her career to help this. And that is important as well.
    And I hope we do not gather too much--but I'm running out 
of time. I will just say this: the testimony--and I read every 
word of it a couple of times--was very moving. The most 
important words that stuck out to me, beyond just looking at 
lessons learned or the bipartisan back-and-forth of whose fault 
it is, it is 21 years; there is a lot of fault to go around. 
But it was the words that Mr. Lucier said, that it is not too 
late for us to evacuate our remaining Afghan allies and settle 
them in the United States. It is not too late.
    So, I will work with all of you, I pledge, not just as a 
cosponsor, a proud cosponsor of the Afghan Adjustment Act last 
Congress, and wanting to do that again in this Congress, and 
continuing to work with groups, as we have, like AfghanEvac, 
going forward.
    The purpose of this hearing, as was your purpose in 
serving, was to help other people. So, let's take this hearing 
and put aside the ``who did it?'' and, for once in a bipartisan 
way, let's say--take the words that I just quoted Mr. Lucier--
it is not too late to go forward, and let's do that.
    And I yield back.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields.
    The chair recognizes Mr. Perry.
    Mr. Perry. I thank the chairman.
    I want to submit the following items for the record: the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations minority report titled, 
``Locked Up,'' and the Special Inspector General for Afghan 
Reconstruction report titled, ``Why the Afghan Security Force 
Collapsed.''
    Chairman McCaul. Without objection.
    [The information referred to follows:]

                           COMMITTEE MEMBERS
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 

                        WHY THE AFGHAN SECURITY
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 
                        
                        


    Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I want to thank the individuals that have spent the time 
and the energy to come here today. It is important that we 
hear, that we listen and hear, your message and feel your 
message. It is important that you get to tell your story.
    But I am frustrated. Today, you should be here telling your 
story and there should be some other folks here to hear your 
story--the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Where are they? Mr. 
Chairman, there had better be a hearing with the full committee 
with them here.
    This is the biggest foreign policy failure since we left 
Vietnam--very similar, right? The only difference may be in 
some ways is the cost and the fact that a Huey was leaving the 
embassy in Hanoi, and instead, a Chinook was departing with 
billions of dollars on it and the President of Afghanistan. 
That was the image that the United States saw. That is the 
difference of this foreign policy failure.
    While my friends on the other side of the aisle say, 
``Don't ascribe any blame to it,'' and then, go on to ascribe 
blame to what happened--remind everybody that the President of 
the United States, the Commander-in-Chief, knew this was 
coming, had 6 months, over 6 months, to deal with this, and 
ignored everything he was being told. And what is the cost of 
that? Thirteen U.S. servicemembers murdered. Our American 
servicemembers deserve better. Our country deserves better.
    How many did we leave stranded? The Senate Foreign Affairs 
Committee report ``Locked Up'' said, ``The State Department 
continuously misled or outright contradicted themselves.'' 
Well, isn't that coincidental? How many times is this 
government going to lie to us and cost us our lives?
    The Coordinator for Afghanistan Relocation Efforts, Beth 
Jones, said, at times, there were 100 waiting. And then, we 
found out maybe it is thousands. We do not even know how many 
because they did not know how many, because they were 
incompetent. They were unprepared.
    And these folks did the work that our government would not 
do--forced into a position because of incompetence and lack of 
preparation, and quite honestly, lack of care. Billions of 
dollars worth of assets left in Afghanistan. We do not know 
where they were. We do not know where they are. Sold to Russia, 
Ukraine, cartels, Syria? We have no way of knowing because the 
server storing the records crashed in March 2021. How 
convenient. How convenient.
    We do know this: we left biometrics behind, facial images, 
fingerprints, the addresses of the people that helped these 
people--for the Taliban to go round up and publicly murder, 
torture, and kill. Unacceptable. Unacceptable betrayal. 
Unacceptable.
    Yet, we are still not talking to those who are involved. My 
friends on the other side of the aisle says, ``Well, do not 
ascribe any blame.'' We are not trying to ascribe blame. We 
would like some accountability.
    For 2 years, we have been coming to this committee hearing. 
You could have come. They weren't interested in hearing from 
you. The only reason you are here now is because we are in 
charge and the chairman asked you to come.
    But I encourage the chairman, for a full committee hearing, 
with you here to face the people that put you in the position.
    Sir, it is not your battalion commander's fault that he did 
not get the rules of engagement to allow you to engage. 
Somebody above him stopped that person, stopped your commander 
from issuing the order. Because I guarantee you commanders in 
the field want to service the enemy and keep their troops safe. 
That is what we want to do.
    We need to know who did it. There needs to be an 
accountability. And so far, no one has been held accountable, 
except some poor marine in uniform who said, ``Something has 
gone terribly wrong here and we need to do something about 
it.''
    Those folks, the folks at the top, the folks that made the 
decision to betray you, and to betray our allies, and betray 
our country, they need to come before this committee and the 
American people and explain how this happened and who is going 
to be held accountable, so that it does not happen again. We 
cannot continue to do this.
    Mr. Chairman, I request a full committee hearing with the 
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, so we can get to the bottom of 
this and ascribe accountability.
    And I yield the balance.
    Chairman McCaul. That is certainly our game plan. We are 
starting with the eyewitnesses to the Abbey Gate bombing. And I 
want to thank all of you for being here today, and the veterans 
groups who got these people out.
    We lost a lot of them. But if you all hadn't stepped up to 
the plate, nobody would have gotten out of there.
    So, the chair recognizes Mr. Cicilline.
    Mr. Cicilline. Thank you.
    I want to begin by thanking our witnesses for being here 
today, and obviously, recognize the extraordinary service and 
sacrifices you have all made to our country, and to recognize 
the Gold Star families and other members of the military who 
have joined us today, for sharing very powerful testimony.
    I will say at the outset that--let me be very clear that 
there was never going to be a good time to leave Afghanistan, 
but this forever war needed to come to an end. And amidst the 
unavoidable turmoil of ending war that had spanned two decades, 
the Biden Administration carried out an unprecedented 
evacuation, helping more than 120,000 people evacuate.
    After two decades of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, 
today's hearing should be focused on examining the full scope 
of this conflict, its failures and its successes, including how 
U.S. foreign policy and strategy led to this moment. And now, 
we can continue our efforts to assist and relocate vulnerable 
Afghans.
    I fear, however, that today's hearing was not convened in 
that spirit, but, rather, as an attempt to distract us from the 
full picture, and even in some cases to try to score political 
points, which I believe dishonors the lives lost and the 
bravery of those who sit before this committee.
    When the Trump Administration pressured the Afghan 
government to free 5,000 Taliban fighters, it affected events 
on the ground. When the Trump Administration negotiated 
directly with the Taliban, undermining the Afghan government, 
it affected events on the ground. And when the Trump 
Administration dismantled our Nation's refugee programs, it 
impacted events on the ground.
    And so, I know a lot of the discussion today is about our 
obligation to those who assisted us in this war, and I think we 
all recognize the important responsibilities that we have, but 
I want to ask, very specifically, about the conditions that 
were in place that made that more difficult.
    And, Mr. Lucier or Ms. Mackler, these questions are 
specifically for you. President Trump instituted a set of 
immigration policies that really centered on reducing the 
numbers of non-white refugees and immigrants allowed to come 
into the United States. He slashed staffing across the 
interagencies for those dedicated to processing such 
applications, including the Special Immigrant Visa Program. And 
he instituted, of course, the infamous Muslim ban.
    Throughout the Administration, the number of Afghan SIVs 
processed plummeted, while applications continued to rise, 
causing the wait times for SIV applicants to balloon to more 
than 2 years by January 2021.
    In June 2021, Secretary Blinken dedicated an additional 50 
personnel to process SIV applications. But, by that point, the 
average wait time was more than 700 days. The backlog at the 
time the Biden Administration took office was more than 17,000 
cases.
    And so, my first question is, in your experience, what kind 
of damage to the immigration system, to the refugee admission 
process, and to other U.S. institutions, was done during this 
period? And how did it make it more difficult to bring out the 
very people that we were attempting to bring out? And did you, 
in light of what existed at the time, did you notice any 
willingness from members of the Trump Administration to 
streamline the process for SIV applicants, refugees, or 
humanitarian parolees, particularly in the wake of the Trump 
Administration's negotiated withdrawal agreement with the 
Taliban?
    Ms. Mackler. Thank you for your question, Congressman. I 
can take the first stab at answering.
    I have been an immigration attorney for almost 20 years, 
and I can assure you that the immigration system has been 
broken for far longer than that, and that it is systemic 
failures over Administration after Administration that has led 
us to where we are today. And we need to start looking at 
solutions to all of that, not just what one Administration did.
    When the current Administration took office, resources had 
been decimated in many areas, including the refugee 
resettlement area. The SIV process had ground to a halt. 
Backlogs are a factor of life in all immigration proceedings. 
We look at the SIV system because it is a clear way of helping 
some Afghan allies, but there are many who could potentially 
help through family visa processing, but that also is just, you 
know, stuck in endless backlogs. The refugee resettlement 
process, like I said, takes years and had to rebuild to get 
even back to where it was prior, in the early days of this 
Administration.
    So, I think we need to take a much bigger view. The 
immigration system is not functional. It is not functional and 
it has not been functional for decades. And we need to take a 
look at it, and we need to figure out how we realign it with 
our values and how we want to be able to show up; and how 
allies, like those in Afghanistan, who had absolutely, and 
continue to have, no pathways--even those who made it here are 
stuck in unending asylum backlogs.
    And so, there has been a lot of reports put out there. The 
International Refugee Assistance Program, IRAP, has really 
comprehensive reports on how to fix the SIV system for sure. 
But I think, overall, we just need to agree that the system 
does not allow us to bring people to the United States who we 
want here. And it is a much bigger question, I guess.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman's time has expired.
    The chair recognizes Mrs. Wagner.
    Mrs. Wagner. I thank the chairman.
    And I would like to point out to my good friends and 
colleagues on the other side of the aisle that the subject of 
this hearing is ``the Fall of Kabul: Examining the 
Administration's Emergency Evacuation from Afghanistan.'' It is 
very specifically that.
    And I want to thank the chairman for organizing this long-
overdue hearing to examine the Biden Administration's 
responsibility for the catastrophic fall of Afghanistan.
    In the 117th Congress, Democrats held a grand total of two 
hearings on this critical issue--leaving the American people I 
think confused and frustrated. I am hopeful, I am confident 
that, under Chairman McCaul's leadership, we will get to the 
bottom of this tragic debacle.
    And I want to thank our witnesses for sharing their heart-
wrenching experiences with us today. And I want to recognize 
their courageous service and sacrifice in Afghanistan. I'm 
deeply grateful, along with my colleagues, all Americans, for 
her heroism and your testimony.
    My eldest son Raymond, an Army Ranger, served as a combat 
infantry officer in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring 
Freedom. In fact, he attended the same St. Louis Catholic High 
School as Mr. Lucier did, graduating just 1 year apart. I 
suspect you share the same fundamental motivation, Mr. Lucier, 
that brought you, both my son and you, to Afghanistan from St. 
Louis--that Americans, and indeed, all men and women, should be 
free of tyranny and able to live without fear.
    U.S. servicemembers' achievements in fighting terrorism, 
protecting human rights, and advancing women's equality should 
be celebrated as an example of America's compassionate 
leadership and dedication to human dignity and to our own 
safety and security.
    The Biden Administration's dishonorable flight from 
Afghanistan was a betrayal of our servicemembers and the brave 
Afghans who lived, worked, and fought alongside them. It made 
America less safe, and it created a human tragedy of 
unthinkable proportions. The Administration needs to take 
responsibility for its staggering failures.
    Secretary Blinken sat in front of this committee in one of 
the just two hearings that we had. While American families 
mourned 13 sons and daughters tragically killed in the 
terrorist attack on Kabul airport, others worried and prayed 
over the dozens and dozens of injured. The Secretary had no 
answers for us.
    A St. Louis area family, the Schmitzes, buried their son 
that week. He was killed at HKIA, Abbey Gate, at just 20 years 
old.
    American soldiers acquitted themselves with incredible 
valor in an unimaginably dangerous and chaotic and traumatic 
situation. Sergeant Vargas-Andrews, Specialist Gunderson, I 
want you to know that every member of this committee is honored 
to be with you today and listen to your story. Thank you.
    The American people deserve answers to understand why these 
tragedies unfolded. Servicemembers and their families deserve 
answers. We have to hold the Administration accountable.
    Lieutenant Colonel Mann, I am so grateful that you shared 
the story of Hasina Safi, former Minister of Women's Affairs. 
Today is International Women's Day. And it is heartbreaking 
beyond words to think of thousands of brave, smart, capable 
Afghan women and girls barred from their schools and 
workplaces, confined to their homes, prevented from accessing 
basic necessities and even lifesaving health care.
    Why did it fall to Task Force Pineapple to extract Minister 
Safi? Should the Department of State have made every diplomatic 
effort to bring her out of danger?
    Lieutenant Colonel Mann. Thank you, Congresswoman.
    We were very surprised when--the bulk of our focus was on 
Afghan Special Operators--and when we learned that Minister 
Safi was on the run, it came as a real shock. What I do know is 
that Ambassador-at-Large Kelley Currie, who had worked women's 
global affairs, was helping to guide her, along with a range of 
other women leaders. And they had tried time and time again, to 
include reaching directly out to Washington, DC. I mean, 
understand that Hasina Safi was the Minister of Women's 
Affairs.
    Mrs. Wagner. Yes.
    Lieutenant Colonel Mann. She was one of four----
    Mrs. Wagner. I know who she is.
    Lieutenant Colonel Mann [continuing]. Female ministers in 
the entire country, and arguably, the most wanted and hunted 
woman in Afghanistan at that time. Her ministry actually became 
the Ministry of Virtue and Vice, as the Taliban took over, 
ironically. And so, she was on the run. No one from the State 
Department brought her in.
    And so, what she ended up doing was, it was coordinated for 
her to move into what we called the Pineapple Express, which 
was moving through the open sewage canal with her family, and 
up to a point of recognition, where this young man right here, 
and a couple of other paratroopers, pulled her inside the wire.
    And one thing I will just say--I have to throw a shoutout 
to the 82d Airborne on this one--she had a terrible fear of 
soldiers from when she was a child as a refugee. The Russian 
soldiers, the Soviets, had really abused her father. So, when 
she learned, it was not the sewage canal that terrified her; it 
was going and having to be confronted with NATO soldiers, and 
she was terrified about it.
    And it was his first sergeant, Jesse Kennedy, who in the 
middle of the night reached down and grabbed her hand and 
pulled her out. And he said, ``My name's Jesse. You're safe 
now.'' And Hasina says that, when she went into that canal, she 
had five brothers, but when she came out she had six. And they 
are still in contact to this day.
    So, I do not know fully why a sitting minister was not 
brought in by the State Department, but I do know that, had it 
not been for the 82d Airborne and the people right there at 
that hole in the fence, that she probably wouldn't have made 
it.
    Mrs. Wagner. I thank you all.
    I appreciate the chair's indulgence. I yield back.
    Chairman McCaul. The chair recognizes Mr. Sherman.
    Mr. Sherman. Thank you.
    One of the most difficult things for our intel community to 
do is to apprise will to fight. They can look at the number of 
weapons and capacity and see who can fight, but the question 
is, Who will? And they have gotten it wrong a couple of times 
in just the last couple of years.
    They analyzed the Afghan army, determined that they could 
fight successfully for at least, say, 4 months. And then, they 
looked at Ukraine and they thought the Ukrainian people might 
cave in 4 days. Turned out to be wrong in both cases. That does 
not mean they are not the best in the world. It just means 
determining the will of a soldier to fight is very difficult.
    One of the things that strikes me, not only about this 
evacuation, but others, is American citizens go to a war zone 
and they say, ``I just want to go anywhere I want. My 
government is supposed to protect me.'' And there are limits on 
what the U.S. Government can do.
    So, I put forward the SAFE Act--and I would like to have 
some more cosponsors when I do it again this year--to say that, 
if Americans go to a war zone, they would register. They are 
encouraged to now, but we would require them to register.
    We saw 15,000 American citizens in 2006 in Lebanon with a 
lack of registration, and that was identified in the GAO report 
as a significant problem in getting Americans out of Lebanon.
    We started this evacuation, and obviously, we were focusing 
on Afghans who are our friends and eligible for immigration, 
but the absolute core of the American Government's 
responsibility is for American citizens and Green Card holders.
    Mr. Lucier, in October 2021, before this committee, the 
Deputy Secretary of Management and Resources for the State 
Department said that the withdrawal would have been easier, as 
to U.S. citizens--and that is the focus here--if those citizens 
had been required to register with the embassy.
    You have experience in dealing with the withdrawal of 
American citizens. Do you agree?
    Mr. Lucier. Thank you for the question, sir.
    Yes, this was one of the areas in which my organization 
sought to assist and make the evacuation go smoother. We had an 
open intake form through which folks could either be referred 
to us or could self-register. Among those were many American 
citizens, at least about 88 during the 2-week NEO period.
    Mr. Sherman. If I can interrupt, were there people who 
hadn't registered two or 3 months before the withdrawal that, 
then, were seeking help, and we did not know where they were? 
Situations where, had people registered when they went into the 
war zone, it would have been more helpful?
    Mr. Lucier. Yes, sir, that was one of the primary 
difficulties. That is what made groups like mine necessary, is 
that data submission that you are talking about that could have 
happened ahead of time.
    Mr. Sherman. Hope to get some more cosponsors on the SAFE 
Act.
    I have got another question for you. I do not know if it 
has come up here, but there have been criticisms of the Biden 
Administration for the fact that weapons that we provided the 
Afghan army, we did not recover on our way out. So, these 
weapons were spread out over a very big country, or fairly 
large country, Afghanistan. They were, by definition, in the 
hands of armed men.
    Mr. Lucier, if we had wanted to go and reclaim these 
weapons, and sent American military all over where those 
weapons were, and demanded their return, could we have done 
that and gotten those weapons back without any American 
casualties?
    Mr. Lucier. While I'm not a military logistics expert, that 
certainly seem just common sense to have been an incredibly 
difficult task, as we attempted to retrograde from that 
country, sir.
    Mr. Sherman. Yes. The fact is that it is very difficult to 
leave a hostile situation and withdraw and do it in a pristine 
manner. We saw in Vietnam--and I know Mr. Hoang's family saw in 
Vietnam--how difficult that is, and that was with a South 
Vietnamese military that was far more impressive than the 
Afghan military.
    But, just around the world, withdrawals are difficult. They 
are never pristine. They are never organized. They never go to 
plan.
    And finally, of course, the Trump Administration did not do 
any of the interviews to identify the SIVs; did not prepare for 
this withdrawal. America decided we did not want a forever war, 
and there is no pristine way to withdraw.
    I yield back.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields.
    The chair recognizes Mr. Issa.
    Mr. Issa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I did not plan on responding to the previous round of 
questions, but I just want to contrast, perhaps, what was just 
said.
    President Trump left office in January. Colonel Mann, when 
did you first know there was going to be a hasty withdrawal or 
a withdrawal of Americans?
    Lieutenant Colonel Mann. I started to suspect that things 
were coming off the rails, and that it was going to be a very, 
very chaotic withdrawal, around late April. And that was mainly 
because my friend Nezam was sending play-by-play Signal texts 
on the falling of each district.
    Mr. Issa. OK. So, areas of the conflict began to change in 
April. When were you first notified by the State Department 
that your services would be needed to help evacuate American 
citizens?
    Lieutenant Colonel Mann. I never received direct 
notification from the State Department that our help would be 
needed.
    Mr. Issa. And to your knowledge, were either you or our 
American allies, were they aware of anything before, basically, 
the embassy evacuated in the night without notice?
    Lieutenant Colonel Mann. No, Congressman. August 15th was 
when everything started for us.
    Mr. Issa. OK. So, in the 8 months between the departure of 
President Trump and the hasty withdrawal in the night without 
telling our allies, our NATO allies, if there was planning, it 
certainly did not come to those who, then, took it on 
themselves to help get American citizens out, right?
    Lieutenant Colonel Mann. I think that is correct, 
Congressman.
    Mr. Issa. OK. I want to go over some numbers very quickly. 
To your knowledge, you and the other partners that were helping 
get Americans out, you totaled names and numbers of people. Was 
that a handful of people that you totaled up were left behind, 
as of August 15th?
    Lieutenant Colonel Mann. It was a much larger, I mean, what 
I would think of handful, much larger.
    Mr. Issa. Well, was it 50 or 100?
    Lieutenant Colonel Mann. It was in the hundreds, probably 
pushing closer to a thousand, not in Pineapple, but in the 
various groups as we talked to each other.
    Mr. Issa. OK. So, various groups who reported, as you did, 
to the State Department, and coordinated with them, would give 
numbers. That number was greater than 100 or 200; greater than 
300 or 400; actually, greater than 500 or more, by name, of 
American citizens, right?
    Lieutenant Colonel Mann. Memory is a little foggy, but I 
would feel comfortable saying greater than 500.
    Mr. Issa. So, how is it the State Department and the 
President's spokesperson were talking about numbers that were 
always less, you know, a handful, and then, later less than 
100? Did you give your numbers, and did the other organizations 
give their numbers, to the State Department, and thus, to the 
Administration?
    Lieutenant Colonel Mann. I can only speak for--well, I 
know, for Pineapple, we were consistently submitting names and 
information on American citizens and Green Card holders that we 
were helping.
    Mr. Issa. OK. And the only way somebody got out, 
essentially, after the fall, was names were given. The State 
Department, then, passed that on to our government, and they 
allowed them to be manifested onto those planes coming in from 
Doha airlines, right, Qatar Airways?
    Lieutenant Colonel Mann. Well, the first challenge during 
the period of the NEO was to actually get them inside the 
perimeter. For us, that was an even bigger challenge than 
getting them on an airplane, was getting them inside the wire.
    Mr. Issa. Did you ever get, you or your people ever get, to 
the fence with blue passports in hand and be turned away?
    Lieutenant Colonel Mann. Yes.
    Mr. Issa. So, American citizens got to the fence. There is 
an American or NATO person on the other side. And they were 
unable to get through the fence. Why was that?
    Lieutenant Colonel Mann. Just to be clear, the American 
citizen that we were helping was told to go to a specific gate 
by the State Department. When he got to that gate, thinking he 
was going to load a bus with his family, it was actually a 
Taliban checkpoint and they were beaten.
    Mr. Issa. And so, the Taliban turned them away?
    Lieutenant Colonel Mann. Correct. Yes.
    Mr. Issa. OK. One of the challenges that I keep asking--and 
for anyone on the panel--is, did any of you get or participate 
in any part of planning of this, what Mr. Sherman called, an 
always chaotic withdrawal? Did any of you participate in April 
in any planning for withdrawal of Americans? Did any of you 
participate in May? Did any of you participate in June? Just 
raise your hand.
    You participated in June in planning for the withdrawal?
    Ms. Mackler. We did not participate in the planning, 
Congressman. But, starting in April, we started calling for the 
inclusion of Afghan allies in the withdrawal of troops. And we 
had a sustained advocacy strategy that crescendoed over time 
and culminated on August 15th, when we had to pivot to the 
civilian----
    Mr. Issa. But I'm talking about the actual plan for the 
embassy personnel----
    Ms. Mackler. No.
    Mr. Issa [continuing]. To leave, the base to be closed?
    Ms. Mackler. No.
    Mr. Issa. So, at anytime before August 15, did any of you 
have any contact with American leaders, DoD or State, or other 
agencies, that gave you an alert and the ability to be part, to 
plan the withdrawal of American citizens?
    So, it is fair to say that the Administration's chaotic 
withdrawal certainly included the fact that they did not--the 
very people who got Americans out after August 15th, none of 
you were informed or given any opportunity to prepare prior to 
August 15th, is that correct?
    Well, Mr. Chairman, I know there's a lot of other things we 
are going to delve into, but I think the one fact that I would 
hope that we get to from the Administration is, if they were 
planning between January, when they said that they were given 
this requirement to get out, and August, when they left, if 
they were planning. I would like us to have the record of who 
they were planning with, so we would know why our NATO allies 
found themselves without transportation, in addition to those 
Americans.
    And with that, I yield back.
    Chairman McCaul. Yes, duly noted.
    Now, the chair recognizes Ms. Titus.
    Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member.
    And thank all of you for being so brave, for what you did 
before and what you are doing today, to tell your story. And 
you deserve our attention and we want to hear from you. There 
has been a lot of pontificating up here with no questions, but 
you are the ones who really can advise us and inform us.
    I would like to pick up on the last question about the 
communication between the Administration and any of you all. 
Communication is a two-way street. And I know you have 
influence; you were in a previous Administration. Mr. Mann, we 
have heard about all the connections you have.
    Did any of you, the two of you I would ask first, reach out 
to the Administration and express concern that, like the 
Inspector General's report, that this agreement that we were 
going to pull out was really abandoning Afghanistan? Or that 
the Taliban would take over? You are in the field. Did you 
express that concern to them, as part of the intelligence that 
they gathered, Mr. Mann?
    Lieutenant Colonel Mann. Congresswoman, I did not 
explicitly engage the Biden Administration or any of the 
governmental organizations. And the reason, if I could offer 
it, was, leading up until August 15th, I really did not intend 
to get involved with this.
    Ms. Titus. Well, how about the Trump Administration, when 
the agreement was first made that set all of this in motion?
    Lieutenant Colonel Mann. What I will say is that I was very 
vocal publicly about both Administrations and how they were 
handling the withdrawal, and that it was going the wrong 
direction. But that was the extent of my involvement with that.
    Ms. Titus. Mr. Hoang?
    Mr. Hoang. Congresswoman, prior to August 15th, 2021, I had 
retired to private life and was not involved with policy 
matters at this level anymore.
    Ms. Titus. OK.
    Mr. Hoang. And it was only because of the urgent need that 
myself and many of the volunteers you see seated behind me saw, 
that we jumped back into the fray.
    Ms. Titus. All right. Well, thank you.
    Sometimes hindsight is 20/20. And if we had gotten involved 
earlier, we might not be able to have so much to criticize 
later.
    You know, you talk about abandoning the Afghans. I do not 
want to abandon them again. So, I would like to ask you, every 
one of you, how you feel about the Afghan Special Immigrant 
Visas. We heard from Mr. Cicilline how it took longer; there 
was a backlog. A lot of them had been cut out. We know that 
members of this committee, including 16 Republicans, voted 
against speeding up the Afghan Special Immigrant Visas. Would 
that not be helpful now to maybe right some of the wrongs that 
occurred back in August? Just go down the row and tell me if 
you do support extending those visas.
    Mr. Hoang. Yes, I think the SIV program is a very important 
program to help our Afghan allies. I think that there is a 
tremendous need to enable the executive branch to increase both 
the throughput and capacity to process those visas and 
transport the people who have been granted a visa, or approval 
for a visa, out of Afghanistan post-haste.
    Ms. Titus. OK. I know the immigration problem is bigger 
than this, but let's focus on this. I mean, we could be talking 
about temporary protected status or other things. But just this 
particular program, do you support that?
    Sergeant Vargas-Andrews. I would agree. I would agree with 
extending SIVs continually, as long as individuals are properly 
vetted and not bringing more threats into America.
    Ms. Titus. OK. So, you feel comfortable with those people 
getting to come and be here, and be by our side, and with a 
pathway to citizenship, or whatever?
    Sergeant Vargas-Andrews. As long as they are properly 
vetted, yes.
    Ms. Titus. OK. Thank you.
    Ms. Mackler. I mean, yes, I support expanding the SIV 
system. It needs to be fixed. There's a lot of different fixes 
that we can get into in more detail at some other time.
    I would also say that SIVs are a very small slice of the 
Afghans who were left behind. Only a very small number of those 
would qualify for SIVs, as it is currently written.
    Ms. Titus. Well, do we need to reform that process and 
expand that visa, so that more people would qualify for it?
    Ms. Mackler. Reform, expand. Expand the definitions of who 
is included in a family member would be a start.
    Ms. Titus. And we can do that while still answering the 
question from the gentleman next to you about keeping people 
safe and secure?
    Ms. Mackler. There is no more highly vetted individuals in 
this country than anybody who goes through our immigration 
system. There are multiple checks at every layer for every kind 
of immigration status; it is insane. And what most Americans do 
not realize, the SIVs are even more doubly vetted because they 
had to be requalified to work with our military every 6 months.
    Ms. Titus. Exactly. So, why would somebody vote against it?
    Go ahead.
    Mr. Lucier. Yes, thank you, Congresswoman.
    The SIV program is where I spend the majority of my time. 
So, I will try to be as brief as possible.
    Very briefly, on your previous question of worrying about 
the Afghan allies left behind, you might not remember this, 
Congressman Crow, but, actually about 3 years ago, I was in 
your office with Common Defense. And we were asking about, you 
know, the end of the forever war campaign. And at the end of 
that, myself and another veteran spoke to you, and you said you 
were hesitant to sign onto the campaign because, from your 
experience in Iraq, Kurds had been left behind, and you were 
worried about the exact same thing happening to our Afghan 
allies. It is a moment that stayed with me powerfully for a 
very long.
    Ms. Titus. Will you answer my question?
    Mr. Lucier. Yes, ma'am.
    Ms. Titus. We will let Mr. Crow have his own time.
    Mr. Lucier. Yes. Yes, ma'am. I'm sorry.
    Real quickly, so just like Camille said, every 6 months, 
they underwent incredibly vigorous background checks, which 
included polygraphs and counterintelligence screening. During 
the security screening process itself, they go through 17 
different intelligence agencies' kind of data base checks. It 
takes four to 7 years to get an SIV.
    I am in support of extending the program, but more so this 
backlog issue. There are both administrative and congressional 
fixes that could make this problem incredibly faster. And also, 
like she said, it also could be expanded or using other 
pathways to bring other at-risk people who currently are not 
included in the statutory requirements, who do not meet SIV, 
but who are incredibly at risk, who are also equally vetted, 
and who are facing, you know, a dire, dire circumstance in 
Afghanistan right now. So, absolutely, ma'am.
    Ms. Titus. Perhaps that is where we should direct our 
energy, is improving that system, so we do not abandon more 
people.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentlelady's time has expired.
    The chairman recognizes Mr. Mast.
    Mr. Mast. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I would say part of what, for myself, sharing my own 
personal story allows me to cope with the loss of friends and 
things like that each day, is being haunted by the questions 
of: what if we took a different road? What if we were a foot to 
the left? A foot to the right? Constantly thinking about what 
if we would have done that thing, caring about it, the fact 
that I still care about it, and still think about those people 
that I visited in Arlington, that helps me personally to cope 
with loss.
    And to answer Ranking Member Meeks' question about should 
we have withdrawn from Afghanistan or not, whether somebody 
believes we should or should not have withdrawn, it is evident 
to everybody that it should not have been done in the manner in 
which it was done. But this Administration is perfectly 
comfortable not being haunted by the losses that took place. I 
do not know how they live with that, because I wouldn't be able 
to.
    I want to ask some questions of you, Sergeant. You, 
essentially, lived in a tower with your team, your rifle, your 
ammo, a camera for 10 days?
    Sergeant Vargas-Andrews. That is correct.
    Mr. Mast. Over those 10 days, those 10 nights, you were in 
there day and night?
    Sergeant Vargas-Andrews. Yes, we were.
    Mr. Mast. In those 10 days and nights, did you witness the 
Taliban not letting people through their own checkpoint to get 
to your checkpoint?
    Sergeant Vargas-Andrews. Multiple times.
    Mr. Mast. Did you witness the Taliban beating people?
    Sergeant Vargas-Andrews. Yes, we did.
    Mr. Mast. Did you witness the Taliban executing people?
    Sergeant Vargas-Andrews. Yes.
    Mr. Mast. Was this recorded?
    Sergeant Vargas-Andrews. We had footage of it, yes.
    Mr. Mast. For those last 10 days, essentially, of the 
withdrawal, you were literally the front line. You were the 
front line of the withdrawal. It nearly took your life.
    So, since that day, and in the 558 days in a wakeup since 
that time, have you ever been interviewed by any part of the 
U.S. Government about what you witnessed on the front line?
    Sergeant Vargas-Andrews. Not by a single individual or 
organization.
    Mr. Mast. So, the Pentagon has never come to you and said, 
``Hey, you were in front. You were with your team. You were 
looking through the scope on your rifle. What did you see from 
those thousands of individuals out front?''
    Sergeant Vargas-Andrews. Never.
    Mr. Mast. The Marine Corps never asked you, when you woke 
in Walter Reed, ``Hey, Sergeant, can you tell us from your 
perspective what took place?''
    Sergeant Vargas-Andrews. No, they did not.
    Mr. Mast. The State Department, Secretary Blinken, others, 
they never came to your room in Walter Reed and said, ``Hey, 
can you tell us what did you see about the SIVs or others that 
were trying to get through to be processed?''
    Sergeant Vargas-Andrews. No, they did not.
    Mr. Mast. They never came and asked you, ``Hey, is it true 
that people in the State Department were, essentially, knocking 
off at 6 p.m. or not processing individuals at nighttime, when 
you were still having to sit in a tower at all hours?''
    Sergeant Vargas-Andrews. No, they did not.
    Mr. Mast. Battalion commander, company commander, did they 
ever come and ask you for your story?
    Sergeant Vargas-Andrews. The company commander in a 
personal capacity, yes, but not through the chain of command or 
on behalf of the Marine Corps.
    Mr. Mast. CIA? FBI? Anybody else? They never came to ask 
you, ``Hey, can you tell us, when you were looking through the 
scope on your rifle, what made you think that you identified 
the bomber?''
    Sergeant Vargas-Andrews. No.
    Mr. Mast. The intel folks that said, ``Hey, this is what 
you're looking for on this day. We think it might be an 
individual that appears like this and traveling in this way and 
undertaking these actions,'' the intel folks did not come and 
ask you afterwards, ``Hey, what did you see through your rifle 
scope?''
    Sergeant Vargas-Andrews. No, they did not.
    Mr. Mast. Are you aware that at some point some folks in 
the Pentagon made this statement, that ``All the people near 
the blast were concussed or unreliable.''?
    Sergeant Vargas-Andrews. I am aware of that statement, yes.
    Mr. Mast. How does that make you feel, that you have not 
been asked, as somebody that was on the front line of this; 
that, apparently, they do not care to hear what you saw and 
what you witnessed?
    Sergeant Vargas-Andrews. It makes me feel like my service 
is not valued to this country by the government.
    Mr. Mast. Thank you, Sergeant.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields.
    The chair recognizes Ms. Wild.
    Ms. Wild. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And let me just start by saying, Sergeant Vargas-Andrews, 
and that your service is very much valued by many of us in the 
U.S. Government. I just want to be on record as saying that.
    Afghanistan has to serve as a lesson about forever wars 
that the U.S. gets involved in. And I say that as the daughter 
of a proud Air Force career officer who served in two wars, and 
I have a huge respect for the military, having grown up in that 
environment my entire childhood. But I do think we also have to 
be very cautious about forever wars, and we have seen that for 
sure.
    I really appreciate the opportunity to have this hearing. 
In August 2021, I made it very clear that I did not think this 
evacuation was executed in a way that reflected the 
extraordinary sacrifices of our U.S. servicemembers and our 
Afghan allies. As a Democrat, I was critical of the execution 
of this withdrawal.
    Having said that, let me just be perfectly clear that I 
long ago thought it was time for us to get out of Afghanistan, 
and I'm not changing that. It is just the manner in which this 
withdrawal occurred.
    I continue, though, to have very deep concerns about the 
number of Afghan allies that were left behind and whose 
families now face unspeakable dangers from a Taliban regime 
that is once again persecuting women and girls and shows 
absolutely no respect for human life.
    But, at the same time, here is what I am not willing to do. 
I am not willing to ignore the two decades of intelligence 
failures that led our country to sacrifice the lives of so many 
of our brave servicemembers and to spend hundreds of billions 
over two decades propping up an Afghan government that was 
utterly incapable of defending itself.
    And I'm not willing to ignore the fact that the previous 
Administration did, in fact, negotiate the underlying agreement 
for withdrawal with the Taliban. This was not the failure of a 
single Administration. It is the failure of multiple 
Administrations of both parties over two decades. And 
unfortunately, our servicemembers who put their lives on the 
line, and those who lost their lives and lost parts of their 
bodies, our Afghan allies, and the American people deserve real 
answers on why we found ourselves in a 20-year war that was 
impossible to win.
    And I just want to close my remarks by saying, I started by 
saying that this should be a lesson in forever wars. I haven't 
heard it yet today, but I categorically reject any comparison 
of the Afghanistan war to what is currently going on in Ukraine 
and the United States support of Ukraine. And I just want to 
make that perfectly clear.
    With that, I would like to move to Mr. Lucier, please. Sir, 
your testimony was very helpful, especially in terms of 
understanding of the SIV process. And in the interest of 
brevity, I'm going to just ask you: you write in your testimony 
about the impact of the previous Administration's travel ban 
and so-called extreme vetting policy against Muslim majority 
countries. Can you help us understand what the impact of those 
practices was on the SIV program during that time and what kind 
of fixes could be made?
    Mr. Lucier. Absolutely. And thank you, ma'am.
    So, when we look at the SIV process, prior to the fall of 
Kabul, we were looking at an average of four to 7 years from 
submission of COM approval application to issuance, and 
ultimately, travel, usually assisted by IOM, which SIVs qualify 
for.
    So, how do we get to those four to 7 years, which is much 
longer than the 700 days earlier quoted, which constitutes the 
State Department processing time? So, during the previous 
Administration, one of the ways in which we saw this number 
particularly grow--COM adjudication and that approval process 
does take a very long time. But, in the previous 
Administration, what we really saw was a wait for folks who had 
submitted their DS-2160 visa applications and were waiting for 
interviews, or after their interviews, a long time waiting for 
visas--so long, in fact, that SIVs are unique among all IV 
applicants, in that they will wait to do their medical panel 
screenings until they have been notified that they have passed 
security vetting, because medical panels expire after 6 months. 
Every other IV applicant can regularly be assured that that 
visa will issue after an interview before that 6-month expiree. 
But, for SIVs, it could take much, much longer.
    So, with extreme vetting, DS-5550's, and other additional 
types of security measures that were put in place--for example, 
the FBI bulk data collection that looks at social media and 
things--what we saw was that folks, after their interviews, saw 
incredibly increased wait times because this incredibly already 
vetted population that already faced very strict scrutiny with 
regards to security concerns, these extra burdensome, 
incredibly administratively inefficient processes really, 
really lengthened that time out for SIVs after they had already 
interviewed.
    So, they think that they are almost through the process, 
and then, they can wait sometimes years in an administrative 
processing black hole in a refused status, in an INA 212(g) 
refused status, for a very, very long time. So, that period saw 
a jump in the length of time it took for an SIV to become 
issued and make their way to the U.S. safely, as well as a 
dramatically reduced number of SIVs actually, ultimately, end 
up being issued, both because interviews were sometimes unable 
to happen, but, even those who were interviewed, subjected to 
these extra requirements, could get highlighted in ways that 
there's lots and lots of stuff. But that extreme vetting and 
that extra layer of security vetting--again, this population 
was already incredibly vetted--really lengthened that time out 
and prevented many, many more people from coming before----
    Ms. Wild. Thank you, sir. My time is up, but I appreciate 
your answer. Thank you so much.
    Chairman McCaul. The chair recognizes Mr. Burchett.
    Mr. Burchett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I appreciate all the witnesses and the incredible sacrifice 
you all made.
    In the first 2 weeks of the Afghanistan evacuation, staff 
in my district office were contacted by nearly 30 Afghan 
citizens. Of those 30, we were able to get 15 out. A year and a 
half later, five others are still waiting on Special Immigrant 
Visas in Afghanistan. We do not know what happened to the 
others.
    A young lady in my office, Madison Heinsohn, worked around 
the clock on that. I say, ``around the clock.'' With the State 
Department checking out at six o'clock, a lot of the calls 
remained unanswered.
    And on August 26th, as you know, a suicide bomber attacked 
innocent civilians near the Hamid Karzai International Airport 
in Kabul. A hundred and eighty-two people were killed, 
including 13 U.S. servicemembers.
    One of those servicemembers was my constituent, Army Staff 
Sergeant Ryan Knauss. There's his picture right there. I know 
Ryan's momma and daddy and stepmomma and his family, and they 
are just wonderful people. We live in the same community there 
in Knoxville and they are dear friends of mine.
    And Staff Sergeant Knauss was transported to a hospital, 
where he was pronounced dead. He is listed as the last casualty 
of war in Afghanistan and was laid to rest in Arlington 
National Cemetery. I attended that funeral.
    Mr. Gunderson, you were one of the first individuals on the 
scene to provide medical assistance. And, of course, there's a 
chance that you did so for Staff Sergeant Knauss. I know I 
speak for me and the rest of the good folks in east Tennessee 
and his family, and we thank you for that, brother.
    Sergeant, it was not in my notes, but your testimony was 
very compelling to me.
    And I'm not sure the proper way to do this, Mr. Chairman, 
but I would like to make an official inquiry into how his 
requests were denied from the State Department to the U.S. 
military. And I'm sure I am stepping on some toes, which is 
purely intentional. And maybe we can get to the bottom of that.
    Chairman McCaul. Yes, that will be part of our 
investigation for sure.
    Mr. Burchett. I would love that.
    Chairman McCaul. Yes.
    Mr. Burchett. And I would appreciate that. And I want to 
make that in the form of an official inquiry. Due to Mr. Mast's 
questioning, that brought a lot of things to mind.
    But let me switch gears again. Colonel Mann, what is at 
stake for Afghans who worked for the U.S. if they are unable to 
get out of Afghanistan?
    Lieutenant Colonel Mann. Congressman, I wish you had time 
to ask every one of these people sitting behind me, because 
they are leading groups right now that are still on the phone 
talking to Afghan commandos, Afghan Special Forces, Khas, Keta-
e-Khas, Special Mission Units.
    The National Mine Reduction Group, who went in front of 
IEDs as we went on missions, these people are being hunted down 
systematically, methodically, by the Taliban. Most of their 
homes of record have compromised. The records have been 
compromised. They have been ratted-out in large degrees. They 
cannot get a job. Because if they go and get a job and present 
any type of credentials, they are immediately identified as a 
member of the Afghan Special Operations community.
    And we have seen scores of these individuals who have 
disappeared, who have been detained, who have been tortured, 
and who have, indeed, been executed. And many times, these 
veterans behind me who have seen a lot of combat and a lot of 
trauma, they are getting these pictures as they are sitting at 
the breakfast table with their kids and trying to find some way 
to help the family out.
    So, what I would say is that the Afghan Special Operations 
community, in particular, and even higher than that, the 
National Mine Reduction Group, the small group of Afghans who 
stood between Special Operators and IEDs, are at extremely high 
risk right now of being hunted and killed as time goes on.
    Mr. Burchett. Thank you.
    Sergeant Vargas, can you explain to me a little bit about 
the mental toll that the withdrawal had on our veterans?
    Sergeant Vargas-Andrews. Yes, I can. As another member 
stated earlier, and as the lieutenant colonel stated, the moral 
injury, the moral mental injury, I mean, I do not think you can 
quite measure that.
    Mr. Burchett. You cannot see those ones, can you?
    Sergeant Vargas-Andrews. No, you cannot.
    Mr. Burchett. You know, my father served in the Pacific in 
the Second World War, and he got out without a scratch. I think 
he suffered from what people call survivor's guilt because he 
was in the worst of it. His colonel was Chesty Puller, as a 
matter of fact. So, you know where he was.
    Sergeant Vargas-Andrews. I definitely thank you for your 
father's service.
    I know for myself, for guys on my team, you know, friends 
of mine who were out there serving, it is, I mean, through any 
war that veterans have been a part of, it is hard enough being 
a servicemember in the military. Whether you go to war or not, 
that mental toll is significant. But going overseas, going to 
war, seeing the things that we have, personally seeing the 
things that I have, you know, everyone handles things 
differently, and I think the approach on mental health that 
some of these individuals are trying to take is extremely 
important.
    I know, for myself, the reason that I am here today, and 
continued from the day that I woke up in Walter Reed, have 
continued to be vocal about the things that my men and women 
have experienced who served next to me, because I have the 
ability to speak about those things that I have experienced. 
So, it is my responsibility, as long as everyone else involved 
in here in this committee, to continue to advocate and vouch 
for those individuals involved.
    Mr. Burchett. Thank you all so much.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I appreciate everybody who has served our country. Growing 
up in a family that was very partial to veterans, they were 
always my heroes. And we have got four or five on this 
committee that are my personal heroes, and I will add you all 
to that list. So, thank you, brother, for serving our great 
country.
    Sergeant Vargas-Andrews. Thank you.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman's time has expired.
    The chair recognizes Mr. Allred.
    Mr. Allred. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And thank you all for your service, for your testimony, 
both written and verbal. It has been incredibly moving for all 
of us, and I think it is important for us to hear that.
    The bravery and efficiency of our Armed Forces allowed us 
to, even in the darkest times, rescue 124,000 Afghans and 
Americans who were saved from a very dark fate under Taliban 
rule. And we owe you all an incredible debt of gratitude for 
your service.
    Those lives include Mohammad Afzal Afzali and his family, 
who, ultimately, settled in my district and who I had the 
privilege of meeting and helping them get out. Mr. Afzali used 
a letter that I wrote in support of his application to get out. 
He was one of those people with identification papers at the 
airport.
    His kids are the sweetest little kids. And he did not just 
rescue his kids; he took out four other kids that belong to 
other families that he delivered here to the United States.
    And your bravery, your professionalism saved those people's 
lives. They are real people. I know them. And I thank you.
    It is true that those were dark days, but I also felt that 
watching our service men and women care for babies and 
families, to me, represented the very best of America. The 
professionalism, the empathy, the humanity that you all showed 
I think set an example for the world.
    It is also true that you should not have been in that 
position. The fact that American troops found themselves 
dependent on the Taliban for perimeter security and assistance 
is a disgrace.
    But we have to come back to the question of how we got to 
that point. And that answer is not one, honestly, that just 
begins with the final chaotic days of the withdrawal, but dates 
back to the decision to withdraw under the previous 
Administration--a decision that I questioned when Secretary 
Pompeo was sitting in your seats in this committee 4 years ago 
this month.
    I asked why we had abandoned previous U.S. policy regarding 
negotiations directly with the Taliban, undercutting the Afghan 
government; why we were not insisting that they agree to 
respect the Afghan constitution and its provisions protecting 
women and minorities. And Secretary Pompeo dismissed me on the 
record in this committee.
    And it is also true that ending our presence in Afghanistan 
was and is in our national interest. And we should all note 
that 2022 was the first year in this century that no American 
servicemember lost their lives in Afghanistan.
    Any fair analysis of the events of this withdrawal have to 
include all of the context. And not recognizing that reality is 
disingenuous and taints with partisanship something that should 
be bipartisan--bringing American troops home, acknowledging 
their sacrifices, and making sure that we serve our allies.
    To me, the question now is, What do we do with the lessons 
that were learned and how do we support the 100,000 Afghans, 
like the Afzalis, who are here now?
    So, Ms. Mackler, I want to thank you in your testimony for 
raising the Afghan Adjustment Act. I agree with you, and the 
sentiments from others on the panel, that we should support the 
Afghan nationals who put themselves in harm's way by supporting 
our mission and who are here in the United States now.
    So, if you could in the minute that I have left, discuss 
why you believe the Afghan Adjustment Act is important and what 
it would do?
    Ms. Mackler. Thank you, Congressman, for the question.
    Briefly, when those 75,000 or so Afghans landed on American 
soil after the NEO, they had no pathways under immigration law 
to be admitted into the United States. And so, they were here 
on a temporary permission called parole, which will expire for 
the most part in August of this year. They have no ways of 
staying here for the future without the Afghan Adjustment Act. 
They have no way of setting down roots. They have no way of 
simply having immigration legal status and all that that 
confers--of even maybe 1 day becoming U.S. citizens.
    And so, I think, first and foremost, to give that 
permanency and the sense of ``welcome home'' that we are hoping 
to offer these Afghan allies, we have to pass the Afghan 
Adjustment Act. The Afghan Adjustment Act also includes fixes 
for the SIV system. In part, it allows for Afghans beyond those 
who were evacuated in that first wave to settle here.
    And as I have mentioned over and over again in this 
hearing, we do not have immigration pathways; we just do not 
have immigration pathways that are available to Afghans. I get 
asked every single day for somebody's help for an immigration 
option, and they do not exist. The Afghan Adjustment Act will 
at least serve this population to allow them to be here and to 
live in America safely, freely, and with all that comes with 
that.
    Mr. Allred. Thank you.
    I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman McCaul. The chair recognizes Mr. Green.
    Mr. Green. Thank you, Chairman, for your persistent 
leadership on this issue.
    And thanks to our witnesses for being here today. Thank you 
for your service to our country.
    Rangers lead the way; Night Stalkers do not quit.
    Many of you may recall from the movie ``Lone Survivor'' the 
Night Stalker helicopter that crashed attempting to rescue 
stranded Navy SEALs. All onboard perished, including my friend 
Stephen Reich and another man I know well from the unit, Master 
Sergeant Trey Ponder. Trey's parents are my constituents, and I 
often see them at events in the district.
    Before I begin my comments, I want to say a word to my 
fellow Afghanistan veterans. Our service and our sacrifices 
were not in vain. We kept our Nation safe from a terrorist 
attack for 20 years. No one who served and, like myself, lost 
friends should ever feel it was for nothing. We protected 
America. You protected America for 20 years.
    And when I signed into the 160th Special Operations 
Aviation Regiment, one of the first guys to greet me was a guy 
named Cory. Cory was recovering from wounds he had sustained on 
Roberts' Ridge. The Navy SEAL Neil Roberts had fallen from one 
of our aircraft, which was unable to rescue him. And so, we 
live by the code: leave no man, leave no woman behind.
    So, two Chinook helicopters were dispatched with a massive 
quick-reaction force. As they landed, they landed to attempt to 
rescue Roberts, both were shot down. And 40 or so Rangers, 
SEALs, and Special Operations aviators were stranded on that 
hilltop surrounded by 250 Taliban. The intense battle that 
lasted almost 24 hours, seven Americans gave their lives 
because they lived by the oath: leave no man behind.
    The Ranger code, which I learned back in the day, has a 
line or two that is relevant for today. Every Ranger graduate, 
every member of the Ranger regiment knows this creed. Those 
lines, and I quote: ``I will never leave a fallen comrade to 
fall into the hands of the enemy. Under no circumstance will I 
ever embarrass my country.''
    Senior general officers at the Pentagon have told me they 
insisted that the evacuation occur from Bagram Air Base. Those 
leaders--now, we can debate about whether or not we should 
have, could have, would have, whether Biden should have 
stopped, not withdrawn at all--but they decided to withdraw. 
And senior general officers told me that the evacuation--told 
him the evacuation should have occurred from Bagram Air Base. 
Those leaders told the President, ``We need 3500 soldiers to 
guard the base for the exfil.'' According to those generals, in 
a room at the White House, the President himself said, ``No. Go 
to 600 troops.'' With 600, you cannot hold Bagram. So, the 
decision to exfil from Kabul became necessary. That decision 
killed 13 American warriors and left hundreds of American 
citizens behind enemy lines, many of whom fell into the hands 
of the enemy.
    And more, that decision made by Joe Biden to leave 
Americans behind was an embarrassment to this Nation. And it 
most certainly crystalized Vladimir Putin's decision to invade 
Ukraine. And I will debate that with anyone who cares to take 
me on.
    Now, in the few minutes that I have, Colonel Mann, do you 
think that the exfil would have been safer from Bagram Air 
Base, had we surrounded that with 3500 troops? Thank you.
    Lieutenant Colonel Mann. I do, Congressman.
    Mr. Green. Thank you.
    I'm going to ask a sensitive question now. I have an answer 
that is tragic for myself, but I'm going to ask a question of 
all of the veterans here. Do you know anyone who soon after 
this disastrous withdrawal committed suicide because they felt 
like it was all for nothing? Yes, I see lots of heads nodding.
    Lieutenant Colonel Mann. Yes.
    Mr. Green. I do, too. The blood of those men and women's 
hands are on the President, period. We live by the oath ``Leave 
no man behind.'' It would be great if the Commander-in-Chief 
did as well.
    Now, I want to say, very quickly, reiterate what I said at 
the beginning. Take this to your friends. Take this to our 
brothers and sisters. It was not in vain. We kept America safe 
for 20 years. Those sacrifices saved Americans' lives from a 
terrorist attack back home.
    Thank you for your service. Thank you. Thank you for your 
sacrifice. God bless you.
    And, Mr. Chairman, I yield.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields back.
    Ms. Jacobs is recognized.
    Ms. Jacobs. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And first, I want to thank all of our panelists for your 
service to our country, both if you served in the military, but 
also all the work that you did to help get people out of 
Afghanistan and get them to safety.
    And, Sergeant Vargas-Andrews, I know you deployed from 
Pendleton. I represent the San Diego area. And I want to say a 
special thank you to you for your service and your sacrifice. 
You have made our country very proud.
    We have talked a lot about the criticisms of how the 
evacuation happened, and I share many of them. In fact, I was 
one of the original members of the Honoring Our Promises 
Working Group that my colleague, Mr. Crow, co-led on a 
bipartisan basis. And my office worked with many of your groups 
to help get hundreds of Afghans out of Afghanistan, and we are 
still working to help get folks through the SIV process.
    But I think a lot of the criticism that we have heard 
should actually be leveled at this body, at this committee, 
because it is our job to oversee the State Department. And over 
the years, we have systematically underfunded and 
underappreciated their work, to the point where, when we had to 
do this NEO, the State Department did not have the capacity it 
needed to do the mission we were asking of it.
    And I would welcome working with my colleagues on both 
sides of the aisle to figure out how we boost State Department 
funding and capacity and oversight, to make sure that the State 
Department has the capacity it needs in the future, not only 
for a scenario like this, but because we know that diplomacy 
helps prevent and minimize conflict. And we could prevent more 
situations like this.
    Now, Specialist Gunderson, you said in your testimony that 
you were born 1 year before September 11th. I'm not quite as 
young as you, but I am the youngest person on this dais, and I 
was in middle school when September 11th happened.
    And we have talked a lot about the failure of oversight and 
the abdication of responsibilities. And I want to talk about 
the abdication of responsibility of this body. Because Congress 
did not take a single vote on the war in Afghanistan since you 
were 1 year old and I was 11 years old. That is 21 years that 
Congress allowed this war to continue without ever doing our 
job in oversight to make sure that what we were doing was 
actually making sense.
    And our generation has been told over and over our entire 
lives that we are making gains; that we just needed a little 
more time, a little more resources; that we were turning a 
corner.
    Now, San Diego is one of the largest military communities 
in the country, and we are a large Afghan community, refugee 
community as well. So, I take this very personally, because we 
lost more than 2300 servicemembers and tens of thousands of 
Afghans over the 20 years and countless more from the trauma 
they experienced there. And my colleague, Mr. Green, talked 
about that so eloquently.
    Watching our troops leave Afghanistan was a stark reminder 
of the cost of two decades of war, but it was also a stark 
reminder of how we got there--of the many, many years where we 
had military leaders come in front of us and tell us, ``We just 
need a little more resources, a little more time. We're turning 
a corner,'' where they were telling the public that we were 
winning, when privately our military leaders knew that that was 
never going to be possible.
    And, Mr. Lucier, you wrote about this so poignantly in an 
op-ed in The Washington Post in December 2019. And, Mr. 
Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to enter his op-ed into the 
record.
    Chairman McCaul. Without objection, so ordered.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 

    Ms. Jacobs. Thank you.
    And I want to read a few sentences from this. I quote, 
``However, despite knowledge at the top that little progress 
was being made in Afghanistan, that victory was never likely, 
and that the entire enterprise seemed to be fatally mismanaged, 
this isn't the story that the government or the military told 
the public. And again, instead, time and time again, officials 
talked about how local forces were getting better; how it was 
impossible for the Taliban to win this fight, and the infamous 
sound bite that American forces always seem to be turning a 
corner in Afghanistan.''
    And my last quote from this: ``The inability of top 
officials to tell the truth made it harder for me to come home 
from war.''
    Now, Mr. Lucier, following on the ranking member's 
question, do you think the outcome would have been different if 
we had stayed two, five, ten more years?
    And I know we talked about the mental health consequences 
of this retrograde on servicemembers, and I feel that 
personally; I do. But can you speak to the mental health 
implications of fighting an unwinnable war and how you would 
have felt, as a veteran, if we kept sending young people to 
experience those horrifying things, while knowing that we 
couldn't win?
    Mr. Lucier. Yes, ma'am. Thank you.
    It is a difficult question. I spoke out in favor of 
bringing that war to an end because of exactly my experiences. 
It was difficult to continue to watch the news and in a small 
byline somewhere, because Afghanistan was not at the time 
making a lot of headlines, but you would see a KIA notice from 
somewhere over there, and then, texting your friends, ``Oh, do 
we know who it is yet? And is it someone I know?'' It was an 
odd way to experience the war that I left in May 2012 for it to 
continue to visit my life on the news, as I always tried to 
move on and go to school.
    I do not know what the right answer was to ending that war. 
What I do know is that that lack of oversight that you cited; 
that we did not have public conversations for the last 20 
years; that congressional hearings on foreign policy writ 
large, but, specifically, Afghanistan, have statistically 
declined, and that we did not have a robust public conversation 
about the war that I fought, and that people were continuing to 
deploy to for the 10 years after I got home, that had already 
been going on for 10 years, meant that we weren't as prepared 
to have a conversation about withdrawal because there was not a 
robust record; because there hadn't been congressional 
oversight, public discussion.
    It was a war that at times felt forgotten, except for folks 
like myself, Gold Star families, and Afghans who made it here. 
And it is worth noting how many had come here and how many are 
now here. Seventy thousand Afghan troops, military----
    Chairman McCaul. The gentlelady's time has expired.
    The chair recognizes Mr. Davidson.
    Mr. Davidson. I thank the chairman. A very heartfelt thanks 
for having this hearing.
    Frankly, it is a shame that we had to wait this far after 
the events in Afghanistan to have a hearing like this. And 
while this committee is generally very collaborative and 
bipartisan, I think the delay in it should be noted.
    And part of the problem has been the lack of accountability 
for, frankly, senior leaders, whether in uniform or out of 
uniform. People that were deployed on the ground were held 
accountable for all kinds of things--rules of engagement that 
often were incompatible with the missions that they were 
assigned to do; a lack of a clear mission. No one ever really 
defined what victory was for many years on the ground there. 
Yet, we kept sending people over. Each commander would define 
it a little differently.
    You do not have to have served in uniform to know that it 
is a bad plan to get the military out first, and then, try to 
get the civilians out. The fact that it turned out the way that 
it did is probably better than you would think, if you took the 
military out first, and then, got the civilians out.
    But I just wonder, Mr. Hoang, if you could comment about 
the challenges you faced.
    As a Member of Congress, as the chairman highlighted in his 
opening remarks, you know, I was dealing with people who were 
sending me copies of American blue passport-holding citizens, 
dozens of them in areas of the country--Mazar-i-Sharif, for 
example--trying to get out, desperately trying to get out; a 
manifest with hundreds of people on planes, working with the 
State Department.
    And finally, the people on the ground there would get a 
safe third country to give them clearance to leave. And rather 
than help, our own State Department contacted the safe third 
country and worked to cancel the clearance, so that people 
stayed on the ground. Now, I still cannot figure out a motive 
for that, but I know that it happened.
    So, I cannot imagine the people that were stuck on the 
ground, the people that risked their own lives to help us 
accomplish our disjoined mission there over years, and some of 
whom were lost after they had to disperse and wait and hide, 
and be hunted down, because our State Department gave control 
of our embassy and all of our known allies over to the Taliban. 
And it, basically, turned into a hunting list. They hunted them 
down in their homes. And I just cannot imagine that.
    But I know a lot of you had a hand in this, but, Mr. Hoang, 
if you could comment on what it was like in the kind of role 
that you and others played? Because, frankly, the idea that we 
needed civilian dollars to come in and do this is mind-blowing. 
I mean, this is clearly the mission of the United States of 
America. Yet, we were trying to bridge it from people who felt 
a bond of loyalty and did. So, thank you for doing that. But, 
also, just what were you confronting as you were dealing with 
that?
    Mr. Hoang. Congressman, thank you. I appreciate the 
question.
    There has been a lot that has happened in the last year and 
a half that has shaken my faith in our government. There was a 
yawning gulf between our obligations to our allies and what our 
government was able to do in August 2021.
    However, thousands of our citizens saw that yawning gulf 
and jumped in and helped. And they did it from their bedrooms. 
They emptied out their savings accounts. They took on 
challenges that they shouldn't have been in a position to have 
to take on. So, my faith in America and Americans has never 
been stronger.
    It was unreal at times to get requests, and I'm not the 
only person on this panel that has received these requests from 
congressional offices, from executive-level agencies, from 
high-ranking officials asking for help evacuating their allies. 
Me, us, private citizens, receiving requests from our own 
government to assist what is, essentially, a governmental 
function.
    So, it was humbling. It was terrifying. It was at times 
stupefying.
    Mr. Davidson. Well, it is well said.
    And I have just got to say, look, we had a conversation 
here. Republicans, particularly Republican veterans, came back 
here to Washington, DC, to, basically, plead with the 
Administration to make this an event-based exit, not a time-
driven thing, but an event-driven thing. When do we get all of 
our people out? Well, OK, that is the last day there, and not 
until then.
    Instead, the Administration stayed on a timeline of 31 
August. And inconceivably to me, we had colleagues who wanted 
to deny that the missions that you guys were part of in the 
private sector, trying to save people in other parts of the 
country, were even happening. And but for the records that we 
preserved and were on State Department computers, I truly 
believe they would have continued to try to deny and lie and 
say that they weren't even there.
    Thankfully, we have the evidence. We had the proof. And 
your statement, ``We still have faith in the American people,'' 
is well-founded.
    And may God bless this country, the people who are still 
trapped in Afghanistan. And may we finally do the right thing.
    I yield.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields.
    The chair recognizes Ms. Manning.
    Ms. Manning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And I want to thank each and every one of the witnesses for 
joining us today.
    I want to express my deep gratitude to those of you who 
served for your selfless service to our country, and to all of 
you for helping Americans and vulnerable Afghans to get to 
safety.
    As we all know, the war in Afghanistan lasted for over 20 
years, over four Administrations, and over 10 Congresses. And 
the American people fought and paid for this war in so many 
ways. They deserve a full accounting, as many mistakes were 
made along the way by many, many decisionmakers over many 
years.
    So, I would like to start with the February 2020 Trump Doha 
agreement. Mr. Lucier, when I read that agreement, I was 
shocked by how few conditions there were in that agreement. 
There were no protections for the women and girls in 
Afghanistan, for the Afghan people who had helped us and worked 
side-by-side with our forces. Frankly, there were hardly any 
requirements for the Taliban to meet.
    So, in retrospect, what should have been done differently 
in negotiating or reaching that agreement?
    Mr. Lucier. Thank you for the question.
    Like you pointed out, too, I think robust safeguards and 
for vulnerable populations would have been helpful and 
prevented some of the situations that we see today.
    But, again, just to pivot back a bit, you know, I think 
some of my feelings about the war, how it was conducted, and 
how it ended, are reflected in that op-ed and something that I 
have spoken about.
    But I just want to pivot back again to the Team America has 
these 70,000 folks who are here. And these questions about how 
the war should have ended, there are lots of interesting and 
difficult questions that we can all grapple with, and that 
maybe perhaps we should have grappled with at the time. But I 
am really focused on there's a lot of folks who are relying on 
me, my team, and other folks here at this witness stand.
    Those are important conversations that we can have, but 
these folks who are facing life and death and dire 
circumstances are really relying on us to take actions moving 
forward. And so, that is where I am spending the majority of my 
time and effort and research. And what I am much more familiar 
with is how to get more SIVs here; how to protect maybe the 
women and girls who weren't protected by that 2020 agreement. 
But that is what I am focused on and the stories that I hope to 
tell here today.
    Ms. Manning. Thank you for that.
    And I have to agree that one of the most wrenching 
tragedies of the Taliban's takeover has been the devastating 
impact on the women and girls of Afghanistan--women who had 
high-ranking positions, who had good, productive jobs, who are 
no longer able to work. Girls who were attending school, who 
loved learning, who were preparing for the future, who are no 
longer able to get any education.
    And several years ago, before the withdrawal, we had a Zoom 
meeting with a group of these women. And we asked them if they 
were trying to get out. And surprisingly, they said, no, that 
they wanted to stay and fight for the soul of their country.
    So, Ms. Mackler, I want to ask you, What is being done to 
help women and girls in Afghanistan, and what more can be done?
    Ms. Mackler. I do not know. I'm an immigration lawyer. As I 
said, they have no options. I think there is only pressure that 
can be put on the Taliban to uphold international standards of 
human rights and to treat them in a certain way.
    Just today, The New York Times had an article on how these 
women and girls are suffering even more right now under the 
cruel winter that Afghanistan is going through.
    I think we have to continue to shine a light on the 
conditions that they are under and continue to exert pressure.
    I will say I have met some truly extraordinary women. I was 
very privileged in the early days of the evacuation to help one 
young woman, barely 23 years old, who escaped hours before the 
fall of Kabul and had been running a nonprofit in Afghanistan 
to education women. And she continues to do that from the 
United States. And she is not the only one who I know has come 
here and continues these efforts within other networks of women 
to continue the work that was happening, even if it is less 
visible now by necessity.
    Also, many of them, including one of my own colleagues who 
was the commander of a female tactical platoon who worked with 
our cultural sensitivity teams in the U.S. military, and who 
works with me now working on Afghans who have been resettled in 
UpState New York, she and others like her have continued to 
tell me that their biggest wish, their biggest desire, is to 
return, to be able to find a way 1 day to return, so that they 
can keep fighting that fight.
    Ms. Manning. I want to thank all of you for all the work 
you are doing. I wish we could hear more.
    My time is expired and I yield back.
    Mr. Mast [presiding]. The gentlelady yields.
    The chair now recognizes Mr. Waltz.
    Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And I, too, want to thank everyone for joining us today. I 
know this is painful and it is deeply personal. It is deeply 
personal to many of us.
    I have here pictures of one of my interpreters, Spartacus, 
who was beheaded by the Taliban, a young man of 19 years old 
who only wished to 1 day come to America, as he was literally 
saving my life.
    I have here a picture of Raheem, who we did manage to get 
out on the SIV program. I'm standing next to him building a 
well for his village. But you know what? What did the Taliban 
do when we successfully--since this was such an outstanding 
success--get these people out? They are hunting down his 
family. They have captured his cousin, tied him up behind a 
Taliban truck, drug him through the village, and killed him--to 
say: do not you dare ever work for America or work with 
America, or work with the West again. And they have also beaten 
his brothers nearly to death. So, even when we are successful, 
they start targeting and going after the families.
    Mr. Hoang, Mr. Mann, you had to, basically, become your own 
State department. You had to charter international flights; you 
had to arrange country clearances; you had to deal with 
international borders--because the State Department failed. Is 
that an accurate statement? Do you disagree with that 
statement?
    Lieutenant Colonel Mann. I do not disagree with that, 
Congressman.
    Mr. Hoang. Congressman, the State Department found itself 
in a very difficult situation with very little guidance, as far 
as we can tell; no advanced planning for this exact scenario, 
and unclear lines of authority. And so, while many individuals 
at the State Department tried their best to help us, they found 
themselves hamstrung by the bureaucracy.
    Mr. Waltz. No, thank you for that clarification because 
this was a failure at leadership, at the most senior levels of 
the State Department and the White House.
    Mr. Mann, do you have members of Task Force Pineapple, 
veterans, who have exhausted their personal savings trying to 
help these Afghans?
    Lieutenant Colonel Mann. I do. There's a friend of mine, 
Duke, who is in the Moral Compass Federation with us, who says 
that so many of our veterans have, basically, taken on an 
Uncle-Sam-sized problem with their pension funds.
    Mr. Waltz. Do you know--I know--do you know members that 
have exhausted their children's 529 plans?
    Lieutenant Colonel Mann. Some of them are in this room 
right now.
    Mr. Waltz. Do you know members that survived multiple 
deployments with their marriages, but, now, they are heading to 
divorce?
    Lieutenant Colonel Mann. Yes.
    Mr. Waltz. Do you know members that are thinking of or have 
committed suicide? You mentioned Brad. He was my friend, too. 
He was my operations officer. He is now dead because of this 
moral injury.
    How many--well, I do not even know if you can quantify it, 
but you mentioned an 81 percent increase. There has been a 40 
percent increase just in the last anniversary in texts to the 
suicide hotline.
    At the same time, is it fair to say these veterans feel 
betrayed by their own government?
    Lieutenant Colonel Mann. I do.
    Mr. Waltz. Do you think that added to their moral injury to 
see the President of the United States calling this an 
``outstanding success''? I quote.
    Lieutenant Colonel Mann. I believe even more hurtful is the 
non-mentioning of it in two State of the Union Addresses.
    Mr. Waltz. Thank you. Because that is what I was about to 
ask you. Do you think the fact that he did not even say the 
word ``Afghanistan'' hurt them even more? Didn't even say the 
word.
    Lieutenant Colonel Mann. I do.
    Mr. Waltz. Mr. Hoang--actually, for everybody on the 
panel--is this war over? Does anybody think this war is over? 
Because we have had members of this committee, the House 
Foreign Relations Committee, Foreign Affairs Committee of the 
U.S. Government, U.S. House of Representatives, and the 
President of the United States, and the Secretary of Defense, 
and the Secretary of State celebrate the fact that the war is 
over. Did the Taliban, Al Qaeda, ISIS get the memo that we 
decided, that the President decided the war was over? Is this 
war over?
    Do we still have people trapped behind enemy lines, over 
80,000? I know the answer is yes. In fact, today, this morning 
at 9:23 a.m., I received a desperate email from one of my 
interpreters who was formerly a school teacher, but decided to 
work for a better future for women and children in Afghanistan. 
He is now being hunted. He has been in hiding for 2 years. 9:23 
a.m. this morning. Do you think he thinks this war is over?
    Are the Taliban systematically hunting these people down? 
Anybody disagree with that; that this is top-down, top-driven?
    I will just end with this: Mr. Mann, you are absolutely 
right, what happens in Afghanistan does not and will not stay 
in Afghanistan. Members of this committee celebrated when 
President Obama pulled us out of Iraq in 2011 with no follow-on 
plan. ISIS, the caliphate comes roaring in 3 years later, and 
we now have more members, more military members, back dealing 
with that than when we left in 2011. They were wrong then and 
they are wrong now.
    And, Mr. Chairman, I will just close with saying I have 
never been more proud of my fellow Americans and veterans as I 
am with this group, but I have also never been more disgusted 
with my own government. This was a callous, cold-hearted, 
incompetent episode on the part of this Administration, and it 
is not worthy of the men and women that we all carry on these 
bracelets and their sacrifice.
    I yield.
    Mr. Mast. Mr. Waltz yields back.
    The chair now recognizes Mrs. Cherfilus-McCormick.
    Mrs. Cherfilus-McCormick. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    I want to, first, start off by saying thank you so much for 
your courage, your testimony, and your service.
    More importantly, our focus is to get this right. We are 
dedicated to ensuring that you are supported and the next time 
around that we hear testimony that we can actually move 
forward.
    And with that being said, I have a question for Mr. Lucier. 
Tell us about your experience helping American citizens to 
evacuate. In particular, what were the challenges and what 
worked well?
    Mr. Lucier. Thank you, Congresswoman. Yes, happy to talk 
about that.
    So, at Team America, as I said earlier, you know, either 
friends and family of American citizens who are in Afghanistan 
or those who were there themselves identified themselves to us. 
And then, our goal was to do kind of a pre-verification on that 
data, make sure that they actually were blue passport holders 
in whatever ways we could, and then, coordinate with the 
government entities on the ground at the time in order to try 
to arrange for their safe passage to the airport. And then, 
offer some guidance and the best intelligence information 
available at the time to help them make that trip safely from 
their homes and apartments in Kabul to the gates, and have that 
coordinated ahead of time, so that they could swiftly move 
through.
    It was a difficult process when you have folks self-
identifying because of the lack of identification ahead of 
time, where they are not required to register with the STEP 
program. Lots of information was coming in very quickly. That 
was one of the challenges.
    Many folks self-identified as American citizens who were, 
in fact, not because they thought it would get them through the 
gates faster. So, having to kind of adjudicate that for 220 
volunteers who had no experience adjudicating immigration 
paperwork was difficult and required a lot of oversight and 
cooperation.
    We had a relatively good amount of success and felt 
pretty--it was not perfect, but for the situation that was 
there, getting American citizens through the gate, my 
experience was that, typically, if we found the right person 
and were able to identify somebody, they were able to kind of 
prove out that blue passport holder. Usually, heaven and earth 
would move.
    I think, like I said, we had 88 American citizens who 
identified who were able to verify. At the end of the NEO 
process, only four were remaining, and all four had self-
selected to remain. They had been offered multiple times that, 
you know, U.S. Special Forces and other types of operators 
would go out into the city to get them. But because they had 
extended family members who they could not bring with them--we 
call it a refusal to separate from those extended family 
members--they chose to remain in Afghanistan.
    That was my experience and that is what occurred with Team 
America. I know that there are other stories, but that was 
mine.
    And really quickly, I would like to talk about the story of 
one of those folks. At Team America, we have people assigned 
case numbers, but we called her ``Afghan Betty White.'' She was 
a grandmother and she was with her grandchildren and other 
folks, and nieces. And one attempt was made, I believe, to 
actually get to her, and then, two more times she was offered 
that assistance, but she chose to remain.
    The Taliban knocked at her door. She yelled back at them. 
But Afghan Betty White also had diabetes and she was unable to 
access her medication while she was there. We knew that. We 
urged her to leave, but she did not want to leave her family. 
But the opportunity was available, but she chose to stay, and 
it was a courageous act.
    Unfortunately, in December 2021, because she did not have 
that access, she passed away. It was a tough moment and a tough 
day for Team America. We had all talked to her. And so, it was 
hard for us, for somebody that we knew who was eligible to 
leave, but who chose not to, and who made that courageous 
choice and, ultimately, in a way, kind of gave her life for her 
family.
    So, the process with American citizens was incredibly 
difficult. It was hard. We had to learn a little bit on the 
fly, but, generally, the cooperation with government on 
American citizens and with ACS, American Citizen Services at 
State, for us at least--maybe we were just lucky--was very 
good.
    Mrs. Cherfilus-McCormick. Ms. Mackler, beyond an 
immigration pathway into the United States, what do you see as 
other necessary lines of efforts in terms of diplomatic 
engagement, humanitarian, or economic assistance, multilateral 
work with partner countries or areas, to ensure we are helping 
vulnerable Afghans and defending the U.S. interests and values 
with respect to Afghanistan?
    Ms. Mackler. I think the answer, when we talk about 
immigration, is always going to be that we should allow people 
who want to come to come and people who want to stay home to 
stay home.
    I know that our Afghan partners have spoken a lot about not 
supporting sanctions or other ways that reduce the Afghan 
economy because they are really suffering right now 
economically. And so, continuing to support them, continuing to 
fight, especially for women and girls, but for all Afghans; 
continuing to allow them to live with dignity and, you know, 
without the starvation or the poverty or the disease that we 
are seeing right now are all efforts that we should be looking 
into. And then, supporting our allies--I mean, not everyone 
wants to live in the United States, either--and allowing them 
the choice of migration and not having it be by force.
    Mrs. Cherfilus-McCormick. Thank you for your testimony.
    Mr. Chair, I yield back.
    Mr. Mast. The gentlelady yields.
    The chair now recognizes Mr. Kean.
    Mr. Kean. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    First, I would like to thank our witnesses for their 
service to our country and to actions during the withdrawal in 
August 2021.
    Like so many of you, I cannot forget the images on TV 
showing Afghan civilians crowding around the gates of HKIA and 
the aftermath of the Abbey Gate bombing, which claimed the 
lives of 13 American servicemembers and 169 Afghan civilians.
    Despite the valiant efforts of our servicemembers during 
the withdrawal and two decades of American dedication and 
sacrifice in Afghanistan, the American people witnessed a 
terrible conclusion to this Nation's longest war.
    Mr. Gunderson, I want to thank you for being here today. 
And during your testimony, you indicated that not a single 
person on your flight to Afghanistan was given the appropriate 
preparation for what they would encounter in Kabul. Could you 
speak to what were some of the impacts of this lack of 
preparation; what could have been done differently, and how did 
this compare to other deployments?
    Specialist Gunderson. Thank you, Congressman, for the 
question.
    I think the lack of preparation came from the fact of lack 
of not knowing what the ground situation was going to be. I 
know for myself, the entire 20-hour flight over to the other 
side of the world was long, and I thought nonstop about what we 
might see, and I never predicted what was going to be on the 
ground.
    I think we did not know what was going to be on the ground 
and we just hoped for the best. Like, luckily, there were 
things of water and things of food that we were able to find. 
But, without those things, like we asked every day, like what 
are we going to do when we run out of water? We did not know. 
There was no plan. Thankfully, we did not run out of food or 
water.
    Yes, I will send it with you.
    Mr. Kean. OK. Thank you.
    Sergeant Vargas-Andrews, you have described the scenes and 
sounds of the Taliban shooting and brutalizing Afghanis outside 
the wire of HKIA. How did you and the other servicemembers feel 
being put in a position of having to stand by and watch while 
the Taliban engaged in these acts?
    Sergeant Vargas-Andrews. Myself and my team in the tower 
felt pretty useless, especially the Army or someone moved 
shipping containers about 150-130 yards in between us and the 
Taliban and their checkpoint. So, guys on the ground did not 
always see what was going on, but, I mean, we were just 
helpless. We felt helpless. You know, we passed it over to 
intel. We let people know what was going on, but unable to do 
anything.
    Mr. Kean. Thank you.
    We have discussed today at length much of what went wrong 
during the withdrawal, and we have heard the witnesses share 
their stories about those chaotic and frightening days. My 
question to the entire panel: what are some of the biggest 
questions concerning the withdrawal that have yet to be 
answered? And what do you think from your experience that we, 
as lawmakers here in Congress, need to be asking? And who 
should be held accountable?
    And if we could start with you, sir?
    Mr. Lucier. The biggest questions for me remaining from the 
withdrawal are: what is going to happen to the--I believe the 
number is about--of the folks who made their way to America, 
72,000 of them are on parole. What is going to happen to them, 
right? That question remains unanswered.
    And the second one is the CARE team that we have talked so 
much about that does so well, their funding isn't secured right 
now. So, the next Administration could move away from that and 
we would lose all the lessons learned and the robust public-
private partnership that has developed.
    So, those two questions remain very large over this 
community, and until they are answered, our work will remain 
largely in this kind of nebulous, difficult period where we do 
not have certainty, whether it is for the Afghans for how they 
will continue to live in America or, you know, what is going to 
happen to this partnership.
    Mr. Kean. OK. Colonel?
    Lieutenant Colonel Mann. Congressman, I would just say one 
of the big questions on my mind is, How do we help all of these 
veterans and other volunteer groups hang up the phone? They 
have been on the world's longest 911 call since this happened. 
And as we have talked about, they have cashed in their pension 
funds and retirement accounts, and it is taking a massive toll, 
not just on their fiscal capability, but on their mental 
health, and they are not going to quit. They are never going to 
quit doing this until we figure out how to responsibly relieve 
them of what they are doing to provide this humanitarian 
support. And we have got to figure it out.
    Mr. Kean. Thank you.
    Chairman McCaul [presiding]. The gentleman yields.
    The chair recognizes Mr. Stanton.
    Mr. Stanton. Thank you very much, Chairman.
    Thank you to each of our panelists for your bravery and 
dedication, service to our country, and in evacuating American 
citizens and our Afghan allies in incredibly dangerous 
circumstances. Your work, and the work of thousands of combat 
veterans, saved many, many lives, and this body owes you a huge 
debt of gratitude.
    But, for tens of thousands of our Afghan allies who we 
brought to the United States, their arrival was also the start 
of a nearly 2-year-long bureaucratic purgatory--one that has 
left them without permanent legal status.
    I want to draw this committee's attention to one particular 
vulnerable group. In the weeks before Kabul fell, my team and I 
helped to evacuate women who served in the Afghan National 
Army's Female Tactical Platoon. These FTPs, as they are called, 
were combat soldiers who were recruited, rigorously vetted, and 
trained by elite U.S. strike forces. These courageous, amazing 
women risked their lives by going where male soldiers couldn't 
in a majority Muslim country--searching and questioning women 
and children in pursuit of Taliban targets.
    The platoon conducted 2,000 missions, including high-risk 
and highly classified missions alongside Green Berets, Navy 
SEALs, and Army Rangers. Their work to support the American 
mission and their gender makes them and their families a top 
target for the Taliban.
    Yet, the women from this unit who are now here in the 
United States, only one has been granted asylum. They have been 
kept in legal limbo for well past the allotted 180-day 
deadline, some for nearly a year.
    These women have done their part, submitted their 
applications, gone through interviews. Now, they are just 
waiting--waiting without information that they are owed.
    I am deeply frustrated by how uncertain their futures still 
are. They served side-by-side with our soldiers. These women 
put their lives and their family lives on the line to assist 
the United States. Is this how we repay our allies?
    In August, tens of thousands of evacuees, including FTPs, 
will have been here for nearly 2 years and will lose their 
parole status. It is a moral failing that, despite broad and 
bipartisan support, Congress cannot come together to pass the 
Afghan Adjustment Act to fix this and give these FTPs and 
thousands of others certainty and stability.
    Ms. Mackler, in your testimony you touched upon the 
importance of passing the Afghan Adjustment Act. You also 
mentioned the work your colleagues are doing with FTPs here in 
the United States. If Congress does not pass the Afghan 
Adjustment Act, and does not provide legal residence pathways 
to FTPs and other evacuees, what could happen to your clients 
and evacuees like them?
    Ms. Mackler. Thank you for the question, Congressman.
    One of the FTP commanders works with me at IARC, working on 
helping Afghans resettle in New York State and is one of the 
ones who is still in legal limbo.
    So, first of all, just to be clear, the AAA, the Afghan 
Adjustment Act, would actually extend the SIV protections to 
FTPs. So, that's No. 1.
    If they do not, the same for them as for any other Afghans 
who are here currently on parole status, if there is no 
extension of that parole, and no other solutions come up, then 
they will be subject to deportation proceedings. They will be 
here without status, meaning that they will be at risk of 
immigration enforcement.
    Many of them have applied for asylum. I cannot say for 
certainty if all of them have, but many of them have. Because 
of the vetting requirements, many asylum applications are being 
held up long past the 180 days. We are seeing a lot of Afghans 
being interviewed; not very many are actually getting 
adjudications of their asylum claims.
    So, simply put, they will be at risk of deportation. 
Deportation to where? is the question. But, nonetheless, their 
lives here are not able to begin until this----
    Mr. Stanton. Yes, this is unacceptable solution or 
situation for many of us.
    With that, I will yield the remainder of my time to our 
leader on the Afghan Adjustment Act in our caucus, 
Representative Crow.
    Mr. Crow. Thank you, Mr. Stanton.
    In the little bit of time that I have, I will have some 
time to address other issues here momentarily, but I just want 
to send a message to my fellow veterans and to those who might 
be listening.
    Never confuse your individual service with policy decisions 
that are made in Washington, DC. Each of you stood up; you 
raised your right hand; you did your job. And it was right; it 
was honorable. It remains right and honorable. And this country 
owes you a great debt of gratitude for that service. And you 
should be proud because I am proud of you. And so many people 
are proud of you.
    Policy decisions will be made here. Mistakes will happen. 
We will debate that. We will have those discussions. But do not 
confuse those with that right and honorable service that all of 
our fellow veterans share.
    Thank you. I yield back.
    Mr. Stanton. Well stated.
    I yield back.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields.
    The chair recognizes Mr. Moran.
    Mr. Moran. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you to all of you that are here today. I am 
devastated by the testimony and the stories that we are 
hearing.
    And I will just tell you, from my perspective, the foreign 
policy, the national defense policy, and the Homeland Security 
policy of the U.S. must clearly be strong, steady, and 
strategic. Our policies and practices must adhere to these 
principles; otherwise, our allies will not trust us; our foes 
will not fear us, and neither will respect us.
    Without such policies and practices, and without the 
resulting trust and respect that comes with them, our country's 
practical ability to lead in this world collapses alongside its 
broken principles. America will no longer be able to claim the 
moral high ground, and foreign allies will no longer be able to 
trust that we will stand with them in those critical times.
    Additionally, I am convinced that it will incentivize our 
foes to become more aggressive, and it will decentivize anyone 
from partnering with us. Both are devastating to this Nation 
and heightens the chance for additional military conflict and 
additional loss of both military and civilian life.
    Now, I want to turn to Sergeant Vargas-Andrews. And in your 
testimony, I want to give you an opportunity to address some of 
those things, because you asked us to give you the opportunity 
to elaborate on your ordeal post-blast. If you haven't had 
sufficient opportunity today to do that, I want to give you 
some more opportunity to elaborate on what you have been 
through since then.
    Sergeant Vargas-Andrews. I appreciate that, Congressman.
    For myself, at this time, or at the time leading up to the 
blast, I was behind our gun in the tower. We had another 
individual, Sergeant Andrew Valencia observing as well. We were 
continuing to scan the crowd for any threats.
    And about 1730, Staff Sergeant Darin Hoover came and 
retrieved me from the tower to go gather an interpreter and his 
family member from the canal. The other half of our team was 
back staging gear in case we had to pull out quickly.
    And I walked out there to the canal with Staff Sergeant 
Hoover. And talking about the situation, he was a combat 
veteran prior to that and had explained how that was unlike 
anything that he had ever experienced in his time in 
Afghanistan prior.
    We walked out to that canal and pulled our interpreter. He 
had a sign with what we had suggested putting on it to identify 
him. Pulled out his brother and did a search on them for 
weapons and any threat.
    Moves to take them to the main search area for processing. 
And, you know, he stated that he had family still in the canal. 
He had a wife and four kids back there. And so, we stayed down 
in the canal that day. I told him, I assured him that, you 
know, I would--he had proper documentation. He had passports 
for them. And I assured him that we would pull out, do 
everything we could to pull out his family, the remainder of 
them. And so, that I would stay down there for, you know, 20 to 
30 minutes, and then, ensure another individual was helping him 
while we waited for his family to appear.
    I stayed down in that canal facing the far side of the 
canal against the canal wall, and with Staff Sergeant Hoover 
within 4 or 5 feet of me. About 10 minutes went by, and that is 
when the suicide bomber detonated.
    Post that, I opened my eyes finally--I knew right away what 
had happened--and started crawling through the sound of gunfire 
from the neighborhood, and started crawling backward. And, you 
know, over the course of a few minutes, could not--I was 
overwhelmed by my injuries, but I was awake and aware.
    And the other half of our team had just come back. Charles 
Schilling and the rest of the guys had gone up to the tower to 
convene and make sure everyone was OK. He asked for bolt 
cutters that I had carried on my pack. He ran out there, you 
know, disregarded his own life; got to me, and him screaming my 
name and getting to me, and throwing tourniquets on me, as well 
as triaging me along with other marines, saved my life.
    He cut open a hole in the fence at the base of that tower 
and cut down the casualty-carrying distance probably by 120 
yards at least, and to this day, he has not been recognized for 
that. So, I wanted to publicly recognize him for that.
    Him and the actions of my friends that day saved my life, 
and I will leave it at that. Back to you.
    Mr. Moran. I certainly appreciate that testimony. I know it 
is difficult for you.
    Mr. Hoang, you were talking earlier about, I think you used 
the phrase, ``Thank you for hope when hope becomes forlorn.'' 
As I recall, that comes from that speech ``Duty, Honor, 
Country.''
    And I want to ask you, when you think of those three 
hallowed words--duty, honor, country--do you think that our 
withdrawal in Afghanistan met with those principles in that 
moment?
    Mr. Hoang. As I said earlier, I think that there is a lot 
that has happened that has shaken my faith in government. And 
there is a lot to be desired about the way our government 
executed that withdrawal.
    However, as I stated earlier, the way our Americans, my 
fellow Americans, stepped in and did what needed to be done 
when they saw our government following short will forever 
inspire me.
    Mr. Moran. Thank you for that.
    And I will just add, I think duty is what we do; honor is 
how we do it, and country is why we do it. And in this 
instance, I do not believe we did our duty with the honor that 
you deserve; that the American people deserve, and the people 
of Afghanistan deserved.
    Thank you guys today.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields back.
    The chair recognizes Ms. Dean.
    Ms. Dean. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Ranking 
Member Meeks.
    Thank you to all of our witnesses today. It feels very 
inadequate to say, but thank you for your service to our 
country, and that includes so many in our audience I know and I 
do not know.
    This is painful, powerful testimony that is important for 
us to hear. So, I am glad you are here. I thank you for being 
willing to go through this repeated pain. We owe a tremendous 
debt to all of you.
    We owe a tremendous debt to the more than 800,000 service 
men and women who served our country over the course of 20 
years. More than 2400 lost their lives; more than 20,000 
wounded, and I am not even beginning to touch those who will 
never be the same in spirit and following post-traumatic 
stress. We have lost so many, as you have cited, to death by 
suicide.
    I come to this hearing awash with awe in all of you; 
sadness with the reality of this war, and other wars, of 
course. But I also come to it with great humility, knowing that 
I cannot get near what you do; what you have done; what you 
have sacrificed. I cannot get near it.
    But I do think this is important to bring out the facts, 
the truth, of the end of this war, and as some have cited, it 
is not over.
    So, I will start with Sergeant Vargas-Andrews. Thank you 
for your service, your sacrifice. It is inadequate to say I'm 
sorry. But, man, oh, man, we are proud of you.
    I wanted to followup on two of the questions. You wrote in 
your testimony that I had read, and then, you had also 
mentioned it again. You said, ``Ask me about one little girl 
that I reunited with her family.'' Would you tell us that 
story?
    Sergeant Vargas-Andrews. I would. Thank you, ma'am.
    You know, I think what I can say is, for a lot of people 
out there, the actions that they had, specifically, at Abbey 
Gate and around the airport, there were a lot of moments to 
them that were worth the mental strain to the servicemembers.
    For myself, that first day at Abbey Gate, after we were 
working to push back the crowds, I was on the ground. And a 
little girl had squeezed her way through the crowd. She was 
about 7 or 8 years old, holding a 4-month-old, I would estimate 
a 4-or 5-month-old baby in her arms, and holding the hand of 
who I assumed to be her little brother, who was about 4 or 5 
years old. And they were all dirty and bruised; I mean, tear-
streaked faces.
    And at the time in this chaos, it was just like I had 
tunnel vision and saw her, and I was like I need to help them. 
It was just a very odd sight to see.
    And I picked up the baby and the little boy, and she 
followed me. I motioned for her to follow me to get to a safe 
area within the crowd.
    I noticed the baby's face was blue and purple. And so, I 
went to the nearest person that resembled a medic and started 
asking if they had a small breathing bag, a BVM, to conduct 
CPR, because I did not know if the baby had already passed, but 
assumed it was not breathing and did not want to injure the 
baby by trying to perform CPR on it myself.
    And the individual--I do not know who it was--you know, I 
sat there and watched them resuscitate, help resuscitate this 
baby, and the face flushed pink; he started crying. And the 
little girl started asking for her dad, just crying and tugging 
on my uniform.
    I took her back to the gate and could tell that she was 
asking for her father, and climbed up on the SUVs overlooking 
the razor wire and held her up. And I was just trying to ask 
her, you know, ``Do you see your dad?'' Like ``Abba,'' like 
trying to make her understand what I was saying. And she 
understood.
    And we sat up there for a minute or two, and in this crowd 
of hundreds of people below us, she just pointed in the 
direction, you know, maybe 30-40 people back. And there's all 
these hundreds of people holding up papers, documents, and 
whatnot. And there is this one individual just holding a bunch 
of family's luggage with his hands on his head just crying and 
looking at her. And I was like, that is her dad.
    And I let the troops down right there at the opening of the 
gate know to help get this guy through, pulled him through. And 
the little girl hopped off the SUV and ran to him and hugged 
him, and he hugged her. Both cried. Took them over--took and 
reunited them with the other two children, and he had paperwork 
for all his family, showing their pictures, and whatnot.
    And so, for me, that was a moment that my personal injury 
was worth it. And I know those three little kids will have a 
life of freedom and opportunity now because of that.
    Thank you.
    Ms. Dean. You know, there is an expression in the Jewish 
tradition that I always lean on, even though I'm a person of 
Catholic faith. And it is, to have saved a single life is to 
have saved the whole universe. So many of you have done that.
    You are in the process of it. Help us make sure we live up 
to our obligation to the remaining people, whom we must save, 
rescue, get on with their lives, as we also try to help the 
women and girls.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back and I thank you.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentlelady yields.
    We have votes on the House floor right now. So, the 
committee will stand in recess until 2:20 for votes.
    And I know it has been a long hearing, but if you could 
stay, we would greatly appreciate that. I think there are still 
eight more members that have questions.
    So, we stand in recess until 2:20.
    [Recess.]
    Mr. Hill. The Committee will come to order. Mr. James, if 
you're ready, I recognize you for 5 minutes.
    Mr. James. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Ladies and gentlemen, 
first, as a brother in arms, I want to thank you for your 
service.
    I graduated from West Point in 2004. I became a Ranger 
qualified Apache pilot and flew 750 hours combat in Operation 
Iraqi Freedom. We fought in different wars, but we both, we all 
stood up for this Nation.
    Our service continues today. You answered the call 
initially because of something deep down in your soul that 
taught you, that told you that you had an obligation, not an 
option, to continue your service and give back. Even to the 
point where you felt called, putting yourself in grave danger, 
to answer those in the world who also share what we believe all 
men created equal, all men and women allowed to breathe free, 
and protecting American ideals are things that you did, putting 
your lives on the line to protect those. I want to personally 
thank you for your service.
    You've said many times that there is a feeling that's 
palpable amongst the American people that we have betrayed our 
allies and we have betrayed those who stood up with us during 
our time of need. And, we abandoned them in theirs.
    We also got some feedback on addressing the 72,000 who are 
already over here in a probationary status and also CARE teams 
not being funded.
    My first question is, in the little recess that we had, 
it's been a long day. I grant you that. And, I appreciate it. 
But, are there any other things that we can do right now?
    Any gaps that we can address in Congress to make sure that 
we can make amends for this retreat in some small way?
    Mr. Hoang. Congressman, I'd like to answer this. There's 
been mention before of the Afghan Adjustment Act. I am 
personally in favor of passing that Act.
    I believe it's a bipartisan negotiated framework. It 
provides the adjustment of the status that the Afghans that are 
here that do not have currently a pathway to citizenship. It 
enlarges SIV eligibility. And, it reinserts Congress' 
prerogative in this area.
    And so, I think a number of folks that are setting behind 
me also support it. And, we've advocated for that in the past.
    Lieutenant Colonel Mann. If I could just offer one thing, 
Congressman. On top of that, I believe I had spoken earlier 
about the NMRG, the National Mine Reduction Group, this group 
of individuals was actually not part of the Afghan special 
operations community, but, were rather specially trained by 
Afghan SOF for force protection in mine clearing.
    Therefore, they're eligible right now for SIV. They're 
extremely organized and very coherent. And, there are groups 
right now that are in this room that are actively guiding them 
and I believe could be one of the first, you know, big wins in 
how we get the most at-risk Afghans over here post blast.
    And, I think looking at the NMRG as our first look for 
severely at-risk groups to get over here, because they're 
already SIV eligible. If we could lean in with the private 
groups that are working that right now, I think we can see an 
immediate success.
    Mr. Lucier. Yes. Thank you so much for the question, 
Congressman. That's really, you know, I think, the most 
important thing we can do is really focus on what we can do 
now.
    There are so many things. The things that fall within 
Congress's purview, just to kind of go down some of the things 
within the Afghan Adjustment Act,
    Right, 72,000 people, many of whom are applying for asylum 
right now who, like that is not a system that's designed to 
handle it, and it's already incredibly backlogged.
    So, by creating a separate pathway, it will allow all of 
those 72,000 to go through an additional vetting process, but 
also provide for their, you know, continued employment status, 
all the things that come with immigration status, and prevent 
them from falling into right, not just being out of status and 
subject to deportation hearing, but employment authorizations 
and all these other things.
    So, just to double-down on how important that is. Some of 
the other provisions that were within that Act that failed to 
pass in December and then March last year, include, you know, 
expanding the SIV program for folks like Lieutenant Colonel 
Mann is talking about, with the NMRG group, the FTPs, and 
certain Afghan Special Forces groups.
    So, like, we needed the Afghan Adjustment Act yesterday. We 
really needed it last year, because we are coming up on this 
parole deadline for so many people.
    And it's going to affect, like in St. Louis, our local 
community's employers who took, you know, a lot of 
responsibility on giving these people jobs, if those people 
fall out of employment authorization status that affects them 
and their ability to make a living.
    But also, you know, it's going to make it difficult for 
small businesses in the future to be able to, you know, hire 
refugees and people who make our communities better.
    More oversight on the State Department on the SIV program, 
we need better numbers and data for in order to know where we 
need to make those changes. Software updates, just more funding 
for that program particularly.
    And, more oversight so when those fixes do not happen, 
Congress can call them to account. Like, we really need like a 
strong congressional oversight presence on these programs in 
addition to, you know, keeping them funded and viable. Thank 
you.
    Mr. James. Thank you for your answer. Thank you for your 
service. I yield back.
    Mr. Hill. Thank you, Mr. James. Mr. James yields back. Mr. 
Moskowitz, you're recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Moskowitz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, let 
me just say, thank you all for your service. As a 
representative of the American government, I think Democrats 
and Republicans who made these decisions together owe you not 
just a debt of gratitude, but an apology.
    You do not just deserve our thanks, but, you deserve 
someone to look you in the eye and say that they're sorry for 
the decisions that they made. You deserve accountability.
    This was a clear American failure. It was not a partisan 
failure. And, it's funny, I did not hear one of the witnesses 
assign any political blame. Because we all know that the venom 
of politics are not going to get you the answers that you need.
    It's not going to get you the accountability you need. And, 
it's not going to prevent this from happening to young service 
men and women again.
    Mr. Hoang, you said that we should rise above political 
differences. I'm afraid we may not be capable of doing that any 
longer. I hope as we investigate this issue further, I hope, 
Mr. Chairman, that we are able to do that.
    You are all heroes. And, there are heroes on this 
Committee. There are heroes who have seen the horrific images 
that you have seen, the sights, the smells, and have lost 
limbs. I've never seen that on the battlefield.
    But, I did see it in my own neighborhood and in my own high 
school in Parkland when a gunman walked into my high school and 
killed 17 people, including 14 kids. I was at the school within 
hours.
    I saw the images, the parents, the screaming, the funerals, 
the memorials. I cannot imagine the mental health impact of 
what you all dealt with. The invisible scars that you have to 
experience. I want to thank you for coming and sharing your 
stories and experiences with us.
    One of the lesser known stories about the tragedy that 
happened in my hometown and at my high school, is that the 
Federal Government had been given information before the 
shooting of who the shooter was and that this shooting was 
imminent. And, the Federal Government did nothing with that 
information. They failed to act.
    And, so I know firsthand about what it's like when lives 
are on the line and the government fails. When they make 
mistakes. It can have catastrophic consequences.
    And so, what I want to focus on, is I want to focus on 
accountability for the gaps. And, I want to focus on how do we 
solve these problems so that they do not happen again.
    And so, what I want to do, is I want to hear from you, 
Sergeant Vargas-Andrews, because I found your testimony to be 
compelling and honest. You do not need to hear from me. I want 
to hear from you.
    And, I think the American people deserve to hear from you. 
So, I'm going to yield you the balance of my time so that you 
can talk about whatever else you want to talk about that you 
think we should know and how we can prevent something like this 
from happening again.
    Sergeant Vargas-Andrews. Thank you very much, Congressman. 
What I'll start with is that another member of the committee 
made the comment that there should be more oversight on the 
State Department, ensuring that they're prepared.
    And, that in the future they are--that those actions by the 
State Department, those in charge of them are more proactive 
then reactive. Obviously changes now would be due to situations 
like this that have occurred.
    But, a lack of preparedness at a lot of levels of 
leadership are the reason why, you know, August 26, 2021, 
happened the way it did. And, those 2 weeks happened the way 
that they did.
    As well as on the military side of things, ensuring that 
rules of engagement in such a high-tension environment, you 
know, it's not like we were just getting sent on patrols to go 
into villages and things like that. We were Marines, 
infantrymen forced to do a humanitarian aid mission gone wrong.
    And, you know, I will not say wrong. A lot of lives were 
saved. But, in a lot of ways there are many issues that arose 
with it. And, any way that the Committee can help to enforce 
that between the State Department and the military. Back to 
you.
    Mr. Hill. The gentleman yields back. The gentleman from 
Texas, Mr. Self, is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Self. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, Colonel 
Mann, I'm a retired Army Lieutenant Colonel and a Green Beret, 
the second, after my colleague Mr. Waltz.
    I was in Bagram early in the war though, in 2002, and I was 
also down in Kabul. And, as early as it was, before the big 
buildup, it was obvious to me that Bagram was defensible, Kabul 
was not.
    By the way, I asked a friend of mine, Big John, I'll not 
use his last name, I asked Big John if he had any hints for me 
for this hearing. And, he said no, that Scotty Mann will 
present my position adequately.
    So, I appreciate you doing that, because I think you spoke 
for Big John, who is, for everyone else, Big John was in a 
different task force, not Task Force Pineapple.
    From what I've heard today, and I'm glad frankly that I had 
a chance to step out, because I was, I think I was hearing 
echoes of the past from another Democrat from 2012 era, where 
we lost four soldiers, four service members in a place called 
Benghazi.
    And, the saying at that time was, what difference does it 
make? It makes a difference. It makes a difference that this 
Committee is going to hold someone accountable. And, I intend 
to join my colleague Mr. Waltz and my colleague Mr. Perry, in 
demanding that this Committee hold someone accountable for 
this.
    I also want to comment on one--before I do that, I want to 
say thanks for everybody coming. None of us want to relive our 
experiences in the Middle East.
    And, I regret that you have had to do that in this public 
of a forum. I try not to do this with my wounded warrior 
friends. And, I thank you for doing it.
    We continue to pay a price around the world. We're focused 
on this 2 week period probably in Afghanistan. But, we continue 
to pay the price around the world with the perceived weakness 
of America.
    And, notice I did not say the weakness of American, because 
I echo the comments of one of the panel members, that the 
American people are still strong, we just have weak leaders.
    We continue to pay the price around the world, specifically 
in Ukraine, because immediately after this debacle, Putin 
started moving forces and equipment into place to invade 
Ukraine.
    I've also heard comparisons to Vietnam. These two do not 
compare. I personally know General Carey and Tony Wood, who 
were responsible for planning and executing the last evacuation 
of Saigon. And, they had to do it surreptitiously because of 
State Department and senior military reticence to even let them 
plan the operation.
    So, history does repeat itself. And, if we want to make 
sure that the future is not like the past, then we will get to 
the bottom of this.
    I do not have any questions. I know where you've been. I've 
been there. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Hill. The gentleman yields back. Mr. Jackson, you're 
recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Jackson. I'd first like to give a very special 
heartfelt thank you to each of you for coming. And, I'd like to 
also apologize in advance for the pain that you endured, that 
you suffer, and that we ask you to recount over and over again.
    For the wounds that have not healed. For the friends and 
family that have been also casualties from your pain and 
sacrifices.
    I would like to ask you, Mr. Hoang, if you could please 
weigh in on what's working or what needs to be further fixed in 
the Afghan Act.
    Mr. Hoang. Thank you, Congressman. So, the Afghan 
Adjustment Act, like I mentioned, is, I think, one of three 
things that Congress should look at going forward.
    Passing that Act, as my fellow panelist, Mr. Lucier, 
mentioned, adjusts the status of various Afghans, enlarges that 
status, and also reasserts Congress' appropriate role in 
oversight.
    Second, as I mentioned earlier, and Congress should 
strongly look at any way to enable the executive branch to 
increase the capacity and throughput of both processing SIVs, 
P1s, P2s, and then relocating those individuals once they 
qualify for immigration status.
    And third, I echo the comments made by various members that 
we need to conduct thoughtful, nonpolitical accountability with 
the goal of preventing what happened in August 2021, from ever 
happening again.
    Mr. Jackson. Thank you. Ms. Mackler, would you like to add 
anything to that, please? On the Afghan Adjustment Act, on 
what's working at the State Department or what should be 
improved?
    Ms. Mackler. There's various questions there. On the Afghan 
Adjustment Act, I think it's a thoughtful piece of legislation 
that's been worked on by both sides. And, probably represents 
the best that we can do right now for Afghans who are here, and 
for allowing for continued relocations.
    I think it is urgent that it pass. We need to give the 
Afghans who are here, need the confidence to know that they 
have pathways. And, that their future is not uncertain past 
August.
    On the State Department, I think there were many decision 
failures and systemic failures along the way. And, I've sort of 
spoken about that today.
    I will say that since August 15, 2021, we have seen 
innovation and we have seen them step up. Probably not enough.
    And chronically, these agencies are under-resourced and 
underfunded. We need the SIV system, we need to clear the 
backlogs to start with. And so, we need resources in these 
agencies to adjudicate these applications to clear backlogs.
    And, not just the SIV backlogs, which are phenomenal. But, 
also for example, family petitions. Many Afghans who are here, 
I was just working with a young man, an SIV recipient because 
he was an interpreter in Afghanistan, who is now a U.S. 
citizen, who has no way of bringing his parents because of the, 
sorry, some of his family members, because of the backlogs that 
continue, his siblings and such.
    So, even in the family based immigration system, for 
example, we need to be resourcing these various areas so that 
they can function better.
    I think at the State Department the CARE Team has shown us 
what public/private partnership can look like and how effective 
that it can be. And so, we need to resource that.
    We should create the Ombudsman for Allies Office, probably 
within the Department of State to make sure that these issues 
no longer happen.
    I think these are all starts. These are all in my written 
testimony if you wanted them.
    Mr. Jackson. Thank you very much. And, if you will, if I 
can call you Colonel Mann, promotion, for these soldiers that 
are home, and, I know it does not necessarily fall within our 
jurisdiction, but what can we do for the soldiers?
    It pains me, it's agonizing. I was once a professor, and to 
see so many young soldiers, I felt your pain. I cannot imagine 
what you've gone through at your age to deal with friends and 
comrades that have died and to feel abandoned once you've come 
home.
    And, to have feel as if you've abandoned a mission again. 
You did not abandon your mission. It was wrong on this side. 
You were right. I congratulate you, applaud you, appreciate 
you.
    But, Colonel Mann, what can we do for our soldiers, 
veterans so they can feel the love, and support, and respect 
they deserve?
    Lieutenant Colonel Mann. Thank you for that, Congressman. I 
would say just say, one of the big things I think we need to 
do, is we need to explore and get deeper on what moral injury 
is.
    Right now, it's really, it's something that people are 
talking a lot about. But, I think there needs to be a lot more 
work on what it really is. And, getting it integrated into the 
mental health system so that we understand it and that we 
recognize it as a very, very serious thing.
    Again, there's a recent study by a group called More In 
Common, that says 67 percent of Afghan war veterans feel 
betrayed. That is the devil's cocktail if we do not get in 
front of that.
    So, I think exploring that. And then, again, I think our 
senior leaders at every level on both sides of the political 
aisle, and both retired and active military leaders, need to 
dive into this moral injury issue with some level of 
acknowledgment that it has happened.
    And then, we have to work together to put measures in place 
that will assure those folks that have been affected by this 
that it will not happen again.
    Because otherwise, most of the folks affected by this, 
they're not going to come along, because they're just going to 
wait for it to happen again. Except this time, it's going to be 
their kids.
    And, I think that's why we're seeing issues with 
recruiting, retention, public trust in the military has 
dropped, what, 11 points since the collapse.
    So, I think the leadership involvement on this, and really 
getting honest and talking about it, both in the active duty 
community, reserve community, and in the retired officer and 
senior enlisted community, that's what it's going to take to 
move from injury to recovery.
    Mr. Hill. The gentleman yields back. Mrs. Kim is recognized 
for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you, Chairman. I want to 
thank the Committee Chair and the Ranking Members for convening 
this hearing so we can hear directly from you who have served 
and experienced during the Afghan withdrawal.
    And so, I want to thank you for being here and enduring 
these long hours telling your stories. And, this is the 
beginning of hopefully, not only do we do the accountability of 
what actually happened, but, how can we prevent going forward 
but at the same time bring some, you know, amplify the stories 
of what happened so we do not repeat the same mistakes.
    You guys really stepped up when the Administration let so 
many down. And, along the way you saved so many lives. So, I 
want to let you know that your service will never be forgotten.
    And, we will not let your stories go untoward, which is why 
we're having these hearings. So, I want to thank you. The U.S. 
withdrawal from Afghanistan was very difficult for veterans who 
served, to watch.
    In fact, according to the Department of Veterans Affairs, 
the calls that were made to the Veterans Hotline really 
increased by 98 percent, almost 100 percent between August 14 
and August 29. So, you can see this was a very, very difficult 
time for the veterans.
    So, we owe it to you, the veterans who served in 
Afghanistan, to get answers to what went wrong during that 
withdrawal. And, I see this hearing as a venue, an avenue to 
those conversations that we're starting.
    During that process we saw Australia, New Zealand, and 
Singapore sending personnel to assist with the evacuation. So 
did Japan and South Korea, sending a few aircraft to also 
assist in that evacuation process.
    And, my office worked very closely with the Canadian 
government when we couldn't get answers from our government. 
So, I want to know what your coordination was like, if any, 
with other countries' servicemen and women on the ground.
    And, let me ask specifically Mr. Hoang and Mr. Mann, was 
our State Department helpful in coordinating that? And, was it 
mostly coordinated through other foreign ministries or amongst 
personnel on the ground?
    Mr. Hoang. Thank you, Congresswoman. For our September 17 
flight, in order for it to take off, we needed four different 
authorizations. We needed permission from the Taliban to depart 
Afghanistan. We needed permission to fly into Qatar airspace. 
We needed permission to land at Al Udeid and prioritization to 
be, put our personnel there.
    We had to negotiate all those things without a diplomatic 
relationship with the new government of Afghanistan and in a 
situation that was very, very dynamic.
    Prior to the departure of the United States from 
Afghanistan on August 30, there was a task force in place at 
the State Department to coordinate all those things. And, there 
was a very clear process.
    I distinctly remember on the day that we announced that our 
country's diplomatic and military presence had ended in 
Afghanistan that task force ended operations.
    And, we were specifically told that at this point the 
evacuation was over. That, you know, private citizens needed to 
figure out their own solution. And, I was at a loss, as were my 
co-organizers.
    Luckily, while the official State Department task force had 
ended, there were individuals in the State Department who still 
cared, who stepped up, who tried to figure out solutions for us 
and other private volunteer groups, despite the lack of clear 
authority and clear policies on this. They are also unsung 
heroes in this. And, they were working inside the bureaucracy.
    But yes, it was very difficult, Congresswoman, to figure 
out how to get a plane off the ground in a country where we no 
longer had a presence.
    Mrs. Kim of California. That's really speaking volumes that 
Members of Congress and our veterans and the evacuation support 
system, they had to rely on other nations to help our citizens 
and allies in a time of need. If you can add to that, please?
    Lieutenant Colonel Mann. I'll just build on that. I think 
that there were outstanding individuals that went above and 
beyond the call within the State Department to help us get 
folks in.
    But, what I will say is that overall, it was very, very 
difficult to coordinate with the State Department during the 
evacuation. I think we got better.
    And, I think that the private/public partnership that was 
displayed by these volunteer groups with the government and the 
State Department is probably precedent setting. And, I do not 
think it's going away.
    In future crisis like this we're going to continue to see 
it. So, we need to figure it out.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Um-hum.
    Lieutenant Colonel Mann. And then the other thing that I 
would just say, is that I think that the private groups came up 
with a lot of solutions, proposed solutions that were very 
viable with potential third countries and places to go, lily 
pads.
    And, it seemed to me that they were dismissed out of hand 
as these weren't viable groups or viable organizations. But 
yet, they were the very people that were turned to whenever 
someone needed to get out in dire straits.
    And so, I think listening to these private groups more and 
putting their solutions into play, because they have a lot of 
really good ideas on third countries and other options. And, I 
think the State Department listening to them more and opening 
the aperture more for that dialog is critical.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you very much.
    Mr. Hill. Thank you and the gentlewoman yields back. Mr. 
Crow is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Crow. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to all of 
you. I want to reiterate what I said a little while ago about 
your heartfelt testimony, which I have found to be compelling 
with all of you, candid, honest, and incredibly insightful. 
And, I appreciate your service then and now going forward so we 
can have this discussion.
    There's been a lot of talk about this being America's 
longest war. This is not just an August 2021 issue, although it 
is absolutely worth diving deep into August 2021.
    But, over 2,400 Americans gave their life during this war. 
Countless Afghans gave their lives. Two decades, four 
Administrations, ten Congresses. A lot of talk about a moral 
failure.
    And, there have been several moral failures that have 
occurred. One of them has happened within the U.S. Congress, 
because it is the U.S. Congress that has the authority, and the 
obligation, to decide matters of war and peace. And, to force 
conversations, tough conversations about these issues. About 
SIV programs, about refugee programs, about authorizations for 
use of military force.
    And, we have abdicated time and time and time again. To 
this day, we have abdicated that authority. And, it is time to 
take it back, to force that conversation, because we owe it to 
you, we owe it to all of our veterans to do so.
    A couple of facts remain though. No. 1, there was no status 
quo. This notion that there was a status quo in August 2021 
that could have continued, is not true.
    President Biden inherited a deal that was signed by 
President Trump. And, at the end of that deal, when it came 
time for our troops to leave, the Taliban were going to launch 
a massive, all-out assault on U.S. forces.
    We had 2,000 troops in country at that time. And, they 
couldn't have defended themselves. And they couldn't have 
defended the Afghans. So, we would have had to plus up to 
15,000, 20,000, 25,000, pick a number, it would have been a 
massive surge. And we'd be fighting and dying to this day. And, 
I do not believe that we should have done that.
    The last is the evacuation. The problems, the challenges, 
the missteps with the evacuation, have been well documented. 
And, you have helped illustrate those further. I agree with 
you, we have to be honest about that.
    My criticisms of the Administration have been well 
documented. And, we have to be honest about that, that 
challenge so we make sure it never happens again.
    I want to make sure though when we're having that 
discussion that we are clear on the civil servants, those in 
the State Department, those in the Defense Department, that 
poured their hearts and souls also into this to protect the 
people that they fought with and served with.
    I have had countless conversations where those civil 
servants, those men and women have broken down into tears, 
because they too lost friends and left friends behind. And, I 
think we have to acknowledge that a lot of people within this 
Administration and going forward, have done that work.
    So, with that in mind, Ms. Mackler, I'd like to turn to 
you. We've talked a lot about the SIV program. I've done a lot 
of work on that program, as have many of you.
    But, I want to talk a little bit more in the time that we 
have left on the non-SIV elements that we have to address. And 
all those civil society leaders, judges, girls, women, 
journalists, others, who are fighting to get out. Who cannot do 
so under the SIV program.
    But, we need to expand the P1, P2, other programs. What do 
we need to do, and how do we get those folks prioritized?
    Ms. Mackler. Thank you, Congressman. That is such a great 
question. The P1, P2 programs are refugee resettlement 
programs. They require an individual to have worked for a U.S. 
military contractor, NGO, or a media organization, and to be 
referred into that program by those individuals.
    So, we've been getting a lot of questions recently about 
that. About, you know, the new sponsor circles and refugee 
sponsor circles that were recently announced by the Department 
of State. None of that will help really, quite frankly.
    And, the individuals that you're talking about the civil 
servants, the lawyers, the judges, everybody else in civil 
society who built up Afghanistan, you know, modeled on the 
promise that we made them, of the Afghanistan that we promised 
them, they have quite frankly, no options.
    And, sometimes we've been able to place those who have 
education. We've been able to get, you know, fellowships, using 
visas for internships, all very temporary solutions. All very, 
visas for performers, visas for scientists, things like that.
    But, the options are just frankly, very, very, very, very 
limited.
    Mr. Crow. Do we need a new category of visa to address 
these folks?
    Ms. Mackler. We need a new category of visas to have our 
immigration policies and laws reflect the labor needs that this 
country has right now, and the economic needs as of right now. 
I mean, this goes to the agricultural sector, the industrial 
sector, as much as the, you know, the more highly educated 
sectors and fields.
    I mean, right now you can come and study in our 
universities and then not stay, because there are no visa 
options for you even though you've been educated here. And so, 
across the board we need more pathways, more generous pathways.
    And then, in addition to that, we need to clear the 
backlogs. There are a lot of folks who would be able to bring 
family members, who would be able to bring others, who are 
choosing not to come because they would have to leave family 
behind. And, a lot of that is just sort of caught up in the 
backlogs.
    So, I would start there. And, I would also just say, I know 
we're out of time, but, I would also say, you know, things that 
do not require legislative fixes, but just putting more 
resources into these agencies that are chronically underfunded 
so that we can get through the applications. Right now, it 
takes a year to get a work permit.
    Mr. Hill. The gentleman yields back. I ask unanimous 
consent that the gentleman from Iowa, Mr. Nunn, be allowed to 
sit on the dais and participate in today's hearing. Without 
objection, so ordered.
    I now recognize myself for 5 minutes for questions. First, 
let me join with my colleagues today, it's been a long day, and 
thank each of you for your testimony before the Committee in a 
forthright way. It's all appreciated and you can tell that on 
both sides of the aisle, how meaningful your personal testimony 
is about the tragedies in August 2021 were.
    And, to my colleagues on the other side of the aisle who 
are making sure that this is a bipartisan catastrophe, I 
believe that there have been mistakes made for 22 years in a 
variety of ways as it relates to any war we fight, particularly 
the war fought in Afghanistan.
    But, let's be clear, if we knew were leaving at the 
beginning of the Biden Administration, based on the Trump 
Administration, then where was the plan? Where was the plan to 
properly evacuate?
    And, as my friend Mr. Crow knows, we had two briefings. One 
in April 21 and one in July 21 or June 
21, in the House of Representatives, classified 
briefings, bipartisan.
    And, the veterans who fought in Afghanistan were the most 
skeptical of what we were listening to in the spring of 1921 
and early summer of 1921, briefed by the IC, the intelligence 
community and the military, about the plan, because there was 
no evidence of a plan.
    So, we may well not have had a choice but to leave. But, 
how you leave is a choice. And, it could have been done, in my 
view, in an extraordinarily more effective manner.
    And, it was a failure not of intelligence, but of political 
and leadership failure in my view. And, I agree with the 
witness that have suggested that this led and contributed to 
Putin's calculus about what would come next.
    Since it is International Women's Day, let me start with my 
trip to Kabul in 2015 when I witnessed firsthand Afghanistan's 
steps in positive way then for social progress with the help of 
the United States and without the brutal control of the 
Taliban.
    On that trip I met a young woman, Naid Hazar, who was from 
Jalalabad. And, I took tea with her that afternoon, and she was 
a Fulbright Scholar at the University of Arkansas, earning a 
master's degree in anthropology.
    And, she wanted to be home in Afghanistan with her career 
as an independent researcher and writer. And, before what 
happened in 1921, that just reminded me of what a future of a 
free Afghanistan might have looked like. And we abandoned our 
allies and our innocent civilians like Naid to the Taliban.
    Colonel Mann, thanks for your testimony, and especially 
your focus on Afghan women. And, I've seen firsthand that 
positive force that they were playing in Afghan civil society 
before our withdrawal.
    How much process on the status of women has been undone 
under the Taliban regime?
    Lieutenant Colonel Mann. Thank you, Congressman. I feel 
pretty under-qualified to address this in the sense that I 
believe, hopefully where this will go, I mean, I'm going to try 
to address it.
    But, I think, in the future hopefully, we'll have a range 
of women leaders on the panels as well, addressing this, 
hopefully from Afghanistan as well. Because I think there are, 
is so much that we need to dig into on this.
    What I can tell you is what I'm hearing from leaders of the 
group sitting behind me right now that are very engaged with at 
risk Afghans in country. And, of course people that we've 
worked with in Task Force Pineapple.
    And, what we have done, is to literally wind the clock back 
to a pre-9/11 draconian civil society in Afghanistan where 
women and girls are relegated to not much more than property, 
if that. And, the atrocities that are occurring at a 
humanitarian level right now, against women and girls, are 
unconscionable.
    And, I can tell you in interviewing Minister Hasina Safi, 
the Minister of Women's Affairs, when we were talking about 
that day when everything fell apart, you know, I'll paraphrase 
what she said was, you know, everyone in the west for years has 
talked about advancing women's rights in the world and 
advancing women's rights in Afghanistan. But, on the day we 
needed it most, it was nowhere to be found.
    Mr. Hill. Thank you. And, I agree completely. And, I hope 
we do have a panel, as we explore the wrongs of this evacuation 
process, of women.
    I appreciate your testimony. I'm proud to be with you. I 
want to thank all of the groups that worked doing the job that 
the State Department should have done.
    We still have cases in my office unresolved. And, when I 
visited Quantico to meet SIVs, 6,000 people at Quantico, there 
were less than 100 that were SIVs. And, we did not take care of 
the SIVs in this process.
    And, I yield back. I now recognize my friend, Mr. Bera for 
5 minutes.
    Mr. Bera. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I first off want to 
recognize Sergeant Vargas-Andrews. And, you're from Folsom, 
California. I had the privileges of representing Folsom in a 
prior Congress.
    I also want to recognize all the veterans here with their 
family members, and everyone who served over the years for your 
service. When I meet a veteran, I do not know if they're a 
Democrat or a Republican. And, when they serve, they're just 
meeting the task that's in front of them, the mission that 
they've been given. So, thank you, and be proud of that.
    I'm glad that my colleague, Representative Green talked 
about that. You should be proud of your service. We're proud of 
your service. So, for all of the veterans, the men and women 
that served, and their families, thank you for that, and we're 
proud of you.
    But, Lieutenant Colonel Mann, you did talk about the 
healing process and what we need to do and the pain. And you 
know, we certainly saw it with Vietnam veterans who returned 
and suffered in silence for years. Let's learn from that.
    Let's try to start the healing process. And you know, we've 
touched on a couple of things that we could actually do. We 
cannot rewrite the past, but we can, you know, understanding 
the past, understanding the mistakes, learning from those 
mistakes, we should do that oversight.
    And, I think, you know, we all agree upon that. We should 
not abandon the Afghans that helped us, that supported us, the 
family members. You know, I'm proud to represent Sacramento 
Country, which I think is the largest, has the largest 
population of Afghan refugees.
    I know my staff in those days in August and September, you 
know, submitted over 10,000 names for humanitarian parole. The 
calls that they were getting, you know, were heartbreaking.
    And, I know all of our staffs were going through a lot of 
those calls along with, you know, many of the veterans. We 
should honor that.
    And, we touched on the Afghan Adjustment Act. Ms. Mackler, 
let me ask you a question. If we do not pass that Act by 
August, what's going to happen?
    Ms. Mackler. Tens of thousands of Afghans who were 
evacuated will remain in limbo at risk of deportation, unable 
to begin their lives, unable to move past this moment and keep 
going to safety and protection.
    Mr. Bera. So, to my Republican colleagues and my Democratic 
colleagues, that is a tangible thing that we can do. We can 
pass the Afghan Adjustment Act. We can, you know, certainly 
protect the folks that are here.
    The State Department was overwhelmed. I'm glad that, you 
know, someone on the panel had talked about the individual 
members who stepped up and, you know, went beyond their call of 
duty.
    Let's fix this problem. Let's continue to, you know, get 
folks out of Afghanistan, family members, women, and others 
that are at risk to the best of our ability. We can do that.
    Lieutenant Colonel, you touched on the moral injury. And, 
you know, we certainly have to think about what that looks 
like, understand it. And then think about what we need to do to 
heal that moral injury.
    Do you have some thoughts on how we should approach that?
    Lieutenant Colonel Mann. The one thing that I haven't 
covered yet is, we did a, one of the guys in Pineapple did an 
interview with a gentleman named George, who lives in 
Fayetteville, North Carolina.
    And, George has been very, very active as a former Green 
Beret, in evacuating partners on to, into North Carolina and 
settling onto farmland that he's helped them acquire.
    The interesting thing about George as a Green Beret, is the 
indigenous partners that he's evacuating are Montagnards. He's 
a Vietnam era Green Beret, who has been evacuating Montagnards 
for decades.
    And, his nonprofit has been doing this very, very 
successfully. And, when asked, George how long are you going to 
do this? And he said, until I'm dead.
    And, I think the point that, this goes back to one of the 
comments that was made earlier, I believe it was by 
Congresswoman Titus, about why weren't we, you know, talking to 
the Trump Administration and previous Administrations about 
what was going on?
    The reality is, we were living our lives. We were running 
our businesses. We were running our nonprofits. We were raising 
our kids. We were, we had run the miles as veterans and had 
completed our times of service.
    And, we were drawn back into this not of our own volition, 
but by a set of circumstances that we could not stand for. That 
we couldn't, you know, people asked me why I got involved with 
this? I said because my three boys are watching me right now.
    And, you know, so my point is, this is going to continue to 
go. And, what we've got to do is to find a way to responsibly 
relieve the veterans of this burden, or the moral injury 
recovery is going to be very difficult.
    Mr. Bera. Well, and that's something that we have in our 
power. That we should do and undertake as bipartisan Members of 
Congress. To think about how we can work with the State 
Department Administration to address that and relieve you of 
some of that burden.
    But, to get the mission done as you did. Thank you. And, 
I'll yield back.
    Mrs. Kim of California [presiding]. I now recognize Mr. 
Mills for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Mills. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. Thanks for everyone 
who's here on this panel. Like many of you on this panel, I too 
served.
    And, I'm proud to say that I was an Army combat veteran who 
had served and had spent time not just in Iraq, but also time 
in Afghanistan.
    But, I'm also one who will actually call things the way 
they are. We've allowed our operations to continue to be drug 
out, modified, changed, with no clear military objectives.
    And, the minute that we thought that we were nation 
builders, we had already lost our way. That is not the intent 
of the United States Armed Forces.
    You want counter-terrorism, you want counterinsurgency 
strategies, we'll be the ones to go to. You want policing and 
nation building, that's not our role. So, that was a failed 
strategy from the beginning whenever we actually got into that.
    You want to deal with FID strategies, I know that 
Lieutenant Colonel Mann knows all about being able to train 
asymmetrics and to be able to understand foreign internal 
defense. And, all of you know what it is like to sacrifice. 
And, that means a lot to me.
    You know, the same people who will come in this room, my 
colleagues on the left, and say, we should not politicize this. 
And yet, politicize it.
    These are the same individuals that what they're really 
trying to say, and I'll go ahead and translate, is that we do 
not really want to uncover and actually have accountability for 
who is responsible and claims to be the Commander in Chief.
    That's what this is about. We left Americans behind. We 
left our Afghan allies behind to die. And, we have to accept 
that.
    Like many of you, I couldn't sit there with my hands tied. 
Because we all have to, when we die, answer for our challenges 
and say, we had a capacity, a capability, a skill set that we 
could utilize.
    So, my team actually had gotten put together after 
Congressman Ronny Jackson had called me and told me about this 
woman, Marian, and her three children, who were born and raised 
Amarillo, Texas natives, who were being left behind by the 
Biden Administration.
    He called the DoD for help. They told him they were in the 
midst of withdrawal. He called the State Department they told 
him they would text to find out where she was. Go to this gate, 
you can get in. Just waive your blue passport, there's an 
agreement with the Taliban. And, we all know that was false.
    So, instead of worrying about my political run and my 
candidacy, we put a team together of former squadron members, 
and we flew over there and actually attempted to rescue 28 
AMSIDs in our G650, who had approved PPRs, our plane actually 
being modified, it would be carriage of a humanitarian 
aircraft.
    And, as we're 2,000 off the feet of final approach, we were 
denied entry, which resulted in multiple different changes in 
our platform. But, ultimately, we wouldn't be deterred.
    And, we did conduct the very first successful overland 
rescue, making sure that mother, her 15 year old son, her 11 
year old daughter, her 2 year old daughter, were allowed to 
come back to the country that they were a part of.
    You guys know something about that. And we will get 
answers. There will be accountability. And, I'll have 
resignations or impeachments one way or another.
    Now, speaking on that, Sergeant, do you feel that if you 
would have been enabled to have actually have gone with a green 
light to take out what you had identified as a BOLO, that that 
would have prevented the incident that occurred on August 26, 
and preserved the 13 U.S. service members lives?
    Sergeant Vargas-Andrews. Thank you, Congressman. What I can 
say is that the worst case scenario of the individual that we 
fired upon who we suspected to be the bomber, not being the 
bomber, someone in the crowd who is the bomber, is going to 
think twice when they see someone else's face get caved in or 
their chest get caved in and killed.
    They're going to understand that America is paying 
attention. That we're going to take action to the things that 
are occurring and the threats that are, that were prevalent 
during that time there.
    Mr. Mills. I completely agree. And, we know the 
psychological impact on the battlefield that a sniper can 
actually produce.
    Lieutenant Colonel Mann, do you believe that if we had 
maintained our presence in Bagram Air Base with the force 
protection capabilities, but also the ability to have those 
buildings to do proper vetting so we did not need to put over 
70 percent of people unvetted onto this successful operation 
airlift, and I will use the actual rabbit ears, that we could 
have run two simultaneous runways, not just on HKIA, but on 
Bagram, and actually have led to a more successful and safer 
mission on the evacuation?
    Lieutenant Colonel Mann. I do Congressman. And, I believe 
we could have also leveraged the power of the groups, of the 
volunteer groups to assist in that as well in a more orderly 
and organized fashion.
    Mr. Mills. You know, I'll tell you something, I'm sure that 
others in this room have actually heard it as well. You know, 
after we had actually attempted to do multiple rescues of 
Americans and was thwarted by the Biden Administration on 
multiple occasions, when we did finally get a successful 
evacuation, do you know what the CNN first headline was? State 
Department saves four Americans.
    And, it was not until I went onto Hannity and I went onto 
MacCallum, and I started blasting the fact that this was untrue 
with photos, just like the one I have behind me, did they 
actually retract their statements.
    Guess what? America is not defined by the U.S. Government. 
America is defined by the American citizens who are not willing 
to sit back and do nothing.
    With that, I yield back.
    Chairman McCaul [presiding]. The gentleman yields back. The 
Chair recognizes Mrs. Kamlager-Dove.
    Mrs. Kamlager-Dove. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And, I want to 
thank all of you all for spending today with us. I know it's 
been long.
    I especially want to thank our service members for your 
heroism and your sacrifice. It takes courage to serve our 
country. And, it also takes courage to share your stories and 
your pain.
    As your testimoneys highlight, which I read before coming 
here, when it comes to the withdrawal from Afghanistan, it is 
imperative that this Committee conduct robust oversight and 
engage in a full interrogation of all the facts in order to 
uncover lessons we desperately need to learn about the failure 
of our involvement in Afghanistan.
    You all have made powerful points about the obligation that 
we have as a country to help those who suffer from persecution 
and tyranny. What started in August 2021 is far from finished. 
And, the test of our commitment to our Afghan partners is not 
about what happened just over those 2 weeks, but the way we 
continue to support them in the months and years ahead.
    So, Ms. Mackler, you pointed out that the administrative 
burden of putting together an application is on the applicant 
at risk, even for information the U.S. Government already has 
access to. I know that Project Rabbit is a new effort by DoD to 
verify the employment of SIV applicants who worked with DoD 
contractors.
    From your perspective, has this mechanism improved 
processing times? And, are there any successes that we can 
implement in other parts of the application process?
    Ms. Mackler. Yes, absolutely. From everything I understand 
the DoD's Project Rabbit really did help move applications 
through.
    One of the peculiarities of the SIV program is that you 
require a Chief of Mission confirmation that the service, you 
know, of the time in service. And that it meets all of the 
requirements. And that that was satisfactorily done.
    And, that means that an applicant, often at risk or in 
danger, you know, where they are, has to gather the paperwork 
that proves their employment, that proves their service, to 
reach out to Chief of Mission, to the Chief of that Mission who 
may no longer be, you know, available. And, to get them to 
issue the letters that they need.
    And so, putting that burden back on the U.S. Government, 
which in theory should have all of that paperwork far more 
easily accessible, instead of putting it on the applicant, who 
is often scrambling, often has no longer the connections or the 
ability to contact especially when military personnel get 
deployed from one place to another or go up in rank, things 
like that.
    I mean, I was one time asked if I had a connection to 
General Petraeus, because that was who was needed to get the 
Chief of Mission approval. And, I do not have him on my speed 
dial.
    So, these things that are, but that create very real 
obstacles, and the Chief of Mission approval has been a bit of 
a drawing line in the sand. Without it, folks not only cannot 
continue with their SIV application, they aren't able to 
qualify for the relocation flights.
    When the Administration did at the end of July and August 
start moving SIV applicants into the United States, it had to 
be past that stage. And so, expanding projects like Project 
Rabbit, it from all accounts would help speed that up.
    And, in general, putting that burden back on the U.S. 
Government to find within their files information they should 
already have, would certainly ease the burden on the applicant.
    Mrs. Kamlager-Dove. Thank you for that. You also mentioned 
in your testimony desperate capabilities in the U.S. 
government's Uniting for Ukraine program in contrast to the 
challenges of the Afghan system, especially when it comes to 
managing out of country processing.
    So, can you provide some more detail as to what the 
differences are, and what improvements are needed to ensure our 
treatment of Afghan refugees matches our treatment of Ukrainian 
refugees?
    Ms. Mackler. Sure. I need to put it simply, after the fall 
of Kabul, many Afghans who did not qualify for any immigration 
options started applying for what's called humanitarian parole.
    I think at last count over 70,000 applications were still 
pending. And, the U.S. Government told us that they had no 
ability to adjudicate them.
    Each application costs $575 per person. I mean, if you have 
a 6-month old baby, you're paying $575 for you and $575 for 
your 6 month old baby.
    These applications just kind of piled up. And, they had no 
ability, they said they had no ability to adjudicate them. They 
had no ability to create a categorical program by which people 
could just apply based on under, you know, an Afghan related 
category.
    When the Ukraine invasion happened, and the U.S. Government 
looked at how to help Ukrainians who also needed protection, 
they created a categorical program to help people apply for 
parole and come to the United States.
    And, I think that there are a lot of differences, both in 
terms of the experience, the resources, the personnel, the 
leadership that these departments had.
    But, it is clear that the government could do it, because 
they did it for Ukraine. So, they should do it for Afghans as 
well.
    Mrs. Kamlager-Dove. Thank you. And, with that, I yield 
back, Mr. Chair.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentlelady yields back. The Chair 
recognizes Mr. McCormick.
    Dr. McCormick. Thank you, Mr. Chair. What a great honor it 
is for me to be in your presence. I appreciate you serving your 
country. I appreciate you coming and being here with us today. 
Semper fidelis.
    Prior to withdrawal, I noticed that when I was there in 
2016, we lost an American service member, another person died 
while we were there. But, over the course of that last 10 years 
we were in Afghanistan, we did not lose too many people if I 
remember correctly. Would you all agree?
    For those of you who are historians of the Afghan war, in 
the last 10 years we lost probably fewer than we lost that last 
day we withdrew.
    So, I would make the case that with fewer people then we 
have stationed in Spain, a country we've never fought in, we 
stabilized an entire country in a very strategically important 
area.
    Where now we have half the population in abject slavery 
because of their gender. Where you now have a harboring nation 
of many bad guys who want to do bad things to good people.
    So, I would make the case that maybe we shouldn't have 
withdrawn. We do not, it does not matter, I do not care who the 
President is. I'm not going to make this political.
    And, I find it ironic that some of the Democrat colleagues 
that I have here today say we shouldn't make this political. 
And then immediately the next sentence out of their mouth is, 
it's Trump's fault. I do not really care.
    But, I do not think we can start the healing process until 
we do have accountability. And, I do not feel like we have 
that. And, you talked about healing, Lieutenant Colonel.
    I want to talk to you as a senior ranking guy on the panel 
at least for right now. For those members who haven't been 
through Command and Staff or War College, just some basic 
questions here.
    Let's see, can a military leader move a date for any 
withdrawal any time they please if they're the top guy or gal?
    Lieutenant Colonel Mann. As like a withdrawal of forces? 
No.
    Dr. McCormick. So, they cannot decide what date they want 
to move out on?
    Lieutenant Colonel Mann. I think if it's his, if it's his 
operation, yes.
    Dr. McCormick. So, for example, if you're the Commander in 
Chief, you can decide what date you want to leave, right?
    Lieutenant Colonel Mann. Sure. Absolutely.
    Dr. McCormick. Are you married to any date that some prior 
Commander who no longer is in charge, are you obligated to the 
date that they set previously?
    Lieutenant Colonel Mann. It's typically event driven.
    Dr. McCormick. Yes. So, you can decide if you're the 
Commander in Chief, what date you want to withdraw. And, how 
you want to do it, correct?
    I mean, that's basic command and leadership. You can 
decide, if you're in charge, you get to call the shots. I'm 
showing this because I think if we want to blame somebody else 
for your leadership mistakes at that time, I think that's a 
false narrative. And, I think that's been done several times 
during this argument of accountability.
    And, I want to ask each one of you, because this is the 
important part, we're here to talk about one specific day, and 
one specific withdrawal, and one specific location.
    Do you think there was accountability for those people who 
made egregious mistakes, and I think we can all say that 
somebody made egregious mistakes that day, do you think those 
people were held accountable?
    Does anybody think that there was accountability and that 
who was held accountable?
    [No response.]
    Dr. McCormick. So, I'm assuming nobody here thinks that 
anybody's held accountable. So, my question is, if we're going 
to have an entire hearing, and we're going to have all these 
fine people who have sacrificed their lives, and we talk about 
traumatic brain injuries, limbs lost, family members lost, 
friends lost, time spent away from family, years away from our 
family.
    And then, we look down the line and we say, not one person 
was held accountable that made these decisions, then how can we 
learn? And how can we heal?
    And, that's my question to you, how are we, I'm getting 
emotional right now, because this stuff matters. If we do not 
have accountability for the people who made those decisions, 
how can you, how can we heal as people and as a nation?
    And, it's my humble opinion that we haven't had one ounce 
of accountability, unless you can tell me where you've seen it. 
And, if you cannot, it got to hurt you. And, there were stone-
cold silence when I asked you if anybody was held accountable. 
That's how I feel too.
    And, that's why we have suicide problems, in my opinion, as 
an ER doctor who gets to witness people. Coming to the ER with 
horrible PTSD and depression and suicidality because of this 
war.
    You guys have any other idea of how we can heal without 
accountability? So, have we done our job to hold those people 
who made the decisions, who are responsible for those decisions 
on that day, in that theater, have we held them accountable?
    And, you're allowed to have an opinion. As a matter of 
fact, there's nobody more qualified to have an opinion than 
you. Have we held anybody accountable?
    Sergeant Vargas-Andrews. Not yet, Chairman.
    Dr. McCormick. Thank you. And with that, I yield.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields back. The Chair 
recognizes Mr. Lawler.
    Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman for hosting this 
hearing. A very straightforward hearing. During and after the 
fall of Kabul, examining the Administration's emergency 
evacuation from Afghanistan.
    This is not a hearing about rehashing 20 plus years' worth 
of policy. This is not a hearing about looking back as to why 
we went to Afghanistan in the first place. This is not a 
hearing about decisions made during the war.
    This is a hearing about the withdrawal and the epic failure 
of the Administration with respect to that withdrawal. Let me 
say to each and every one of you, on behalf of the American 
people, I'm sorry.
    None of you should have been put in that situation. That is 
a failure of leadership. It is a failure of government. And, it 
is a failure of our military leadership. Not you.
    This should not have happened. For my colleagues on the 
other side of the aisle who have spent the entirety of this 
hearing trying to figure out a way to not deal with the 
consequences of these decisions, but to somehow look and try to 
point fingers at prior Administrations, the President of the 
United States is the Commander in Chief. The buck stops with 
him.
    He had a responsibility. If he disagreed with the prior 
Administration's handling, if he disagreed with the prior 
Administration's plan, fix it. To set a date certain and then 
move that date up.
    I was a member of the New York legislature. I was not in 
Congress. I watched in horror as planes were taking off and you 
had people running down the tarmac trying to get on that plane 
so they could save their lives, the lives of their children, 
the lives of our service personnel. The lives of people in 
Afghanistan who worked closely with our men and women in 
uniform. It is shameful what happened.
    And, as a citizen, not as someone who has served, not as 
somebody who was on the ground there, as a citizen, it was 
horrifying to watch. Thirteen service members dead. Their 
families gutted.
    All of you heartbroken, dealing with the aftereffects of 
that. I know as a State representative, dealing with our local 
veterans organization, the increase in the number of people, 
veterans who were dealing with PTSD as a result of that, 
suicide, absolutely shameful.
    So, this is about accountability. This is about 
transparency. And, this is about ensuring this never, ever 
happens again. There is not one American who should ever be 
left on the ground in a war zone.
    And, the people who sacrificed so much in Afghanistan to 
help us, to leave them there, an absolute disgrace. I note 
Lieutenant Colonel, in your addendum on women and children, 
today is International Women's Day, to allow what has 
transpired since, shameful.
    All of you are owed a debt of gratitude from your 
government, from your country. And, you are owed more than 
anything, the truth. That hopefully, in part, is what we were 
able to accomplish with this hearing today.
    So, I thank you for your time and your testimony. God bless 
you all. And thank you. I yield back.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields back. The Chair 
recognizes Mr. Barr.
    Mr. Barr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your 
vigilance in pursuing the truth in this Committee. And, thank 
you to our witnesses. Thank you for being here today. Thank you 
for your service to our country.
    And, thank you for doing what many in our government did 
not do, which is the work to help those who helped the United 
States in our fight against radical Islamic terrorism when we 
were there in Afghanistan.
    And, some call this a chaotic withdraw. Others call it an 
unconditional retreat. Whatever, however you want to 
characterize it, it was a disgraceful episode and a failure of 
leadership to see 13 U.S. service members needlessly killed at 
HKIA because we did not choose to use Bagram as a better 
alternative for extraction.
    And, put our young men and women, many Marines, in a 
terrible situation, and our Afghan allies in a terrible 
situation. Leading to not only leaving behind $7 billion worth 
of U.S. equipment in the hands of the Taliban but leaving 
behind more than 800 American citizens and tens of thousands of 
our Afghan allies remaining there in jeopardy at the hands of 
blood-thirsty Taliban enemy after the last U.S. military 
aircraft departed August 31, 2021.
    Lieutenant Colonel Mann, this has been asked and probably 
answered in this lengthy hearing already. But, based on your 
experience in the country, do you think it would have been a 
more effective plan to execute a withdrawal out of Bagram as 
opposed to HKIA?
    Lieutenant Colonel Mann. Congressman, I do think it would 
have been more effective and more tenable to utilize Bagram as 
a platform for NEO.
    Mr. Barr. Mr. Hoang, in your testimony you discussed your 
efforts to get both Americans and Afghan allies on planes out 
of Mazar-I-Sharif, and the fact that it took 3 weeks before 
they were able to depart, can you please let this Committee 
know what led to that 3 week delay?
    Was the Taliban the biggest hurdle? Was the State 
Department helpful or hurtful? And, how were you able to 
overcome those hurdles?
    Mr. Hoang. All those things were hurdles, Congressman. We 
did not have an adequately sourced plan as far as we could 
tell.
    We were operating in conditions that the State Department, 
frankly, was unsure. Individuals they were unsure of their 
authorities and their resources.
    We had to figure out ways to negotiated with the new 
Taliban government for departure. We managed to overcome those 
things using frankly, financial resources No. 1.
    And, No. 2, operational experience of the volunteers, 
gained from hard-earned time on the ground in Afghanistan. And, 
then three, relationships.
    Mr. Barr. Well, I just cannot thank you enough for doing 
again, what the State Department was not able to do or should 
have been doing.
    And, finally, I want to read into the record a letter I 
received from a constituent Marine who served at HKIA August 17 
to August 31, 2021. And who, because of his experience, ended 
his active service prematurely.
    He says, I was an infantry machine gun squad leader, First 
Battalion, 8th Marines, Bravo Company. Our Company was running 
security operations north gate HKIA. Within my first 2 hours at 
the gate, I saw Afghan soldiers shooting civilians as a warning 
for the other civilians to stop trying to overrun our position.
    The main orders were to keep Afghan civilians under control 
because of threat of suicide bomber was high. We would have to 
fight with men, women, and children with nonlethal weapons, 
firing warning shots from our weapons, hand to hand combat 
fighting all day.
    I watched men step on and kill children to get entry to the 
airport. I watched women throw their dead children into a 
sewage canal where we would also take dead civilians who had 
died due to injuries sustained by the Taliban.
    Our chain of--a woman handed me her dead infant and asked 
me to help, but I couldn't. Our chain of command directed us to 
throw flash bang grenades at civilians to calm them down and 
none of us had ever used flash bangs before.
    My fellow Marines and I were in charge of kicking out and 
turning away desperate civilians who did not have proper 
paperwork. Men, women, and even children would beg my fellow 
Marines and me to kill them.
    I had to inform an Afghan man with his wife, baby, and 
multiple children he had to leave. He grabbed my rifle and 
begged me to kill him and his family, because his entire family 
would be raped and burned alive by the Taliban. And, I threw 
him out. I did everything I could to get them through, but my 
command told me to kick them out.
    I hit an older man in the head with a baton on accident, 
and I saw his head dent and his eyes roll back. I saw a woman 
get shot in the chest about ten yards away. I had to fight 
through the crowd to defend her while our Navy corpsman gave 
her medical aid. Her crying children were on top of her.
    I was helping beat people back to make space. A man ran up 
to me saying it was his sister, and I was so angry I threw the 
man and jumped on top of him. I was about to hurt him until 
someone stopped me. Civilians like this man would try to 
pretend they were family of someone injured and they were so 
desperate for understandable reasons.
    I remember one lady in particular who had two young 
daughters, dropping to her knees crying and asking us to kill 
her kids before the Taliban could get to them. Based on 
procedures put in place by the command, I still had to kick 
them out. I remember her telling me when her daughters are 
raped repeatedly, it would be my fault.
    For this Administration, for this White House, for this 
State Department to put our Marines like this young constituent 
of mine in that position, to put our allies, our Afghan allies 
in this position, to put our U.S. service members who were 
killed at HKIA in this position, is a disgrace.
    It is a disgrace. And, there needs to be accountability for 
my Marine constituent, who is no longer a Marine. Disgraceful.
    Thank you all for telling the truth, because the truth that 
is coming out today because of your testimony, the truth that 
comes out from my constituent, a brave Marine put in that 
position, that tells the story of a failure of leadership.
    I yield back.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields back. Last, but not 
least, Mr. Nunn is recognized.
    Mr. Nunn. Mr. Chair, thank you very much. And to the 
Foreign Affairs Committee for having us here today. I want to 
first off thank the Gold Star families who joined us.
    I want to thank the veterans who stood up, both in 
Afghanistan and beyond, to help save lives. To the civilians, 
to the volunteers, to our allies across the board, many of us 
served in Afghanistan and many more have served on Signal, in 
chat rooms, and at the wee hours of the morning while doing our 
main job, to help save Americans, our allies, and the future of 
this country.
    Specifically, I want to thank Sergeant Vargas. You are a 
reflection of so many young men and women who went to serve our 
country in the best way possible.
    While you manned the post as a sniper, you provided 
countless hours of over-watch, protecting so many on the 
ground, including a young man from my district, a Marine, 
Specialist Daegan Page, who died at Abbey Gate.
    You knew the right thing to do. Leadership did not empower 
you to be able to save lives. And, that is not on you. Thank 
you for your service.
    Again, on the 26th of August, so many of you in this room, 
who I see both as friends, as allies, as a band of brothers and 
sisters who stood up, thank you.
    When HKIA fell, hundreds of Americans were left outside the 
wire. Thousands of our friends and allies who had stood with us 
for decades, putting their life ahead of ours, jeopardizing 
what their children and their future looked like, to make sure 
we were able to get on those aircraft and fly out.
    I'm honored to be able to, just this week, honor Major 
Lunning, who is the last medical nurse to fly out with a group 
of Americans and Afghans on the C17 that saved their lives as 
they traveled to Germany. Unfortunately, hundreds more had to 
be left behind.
    I want to tell briefly the story of the Sayed family, who 
was at the bombing at Abbey Gate. We first came into contact 
with them, I'd done three combat tours, flying recon operations 
over, and our interpreter who did nine combat tours with us was 
saved and is now a U.S. citizen in my community back home.
    But, contacting us, they identified that this engineer, a 
grandfather who had worked with the U.S. Embassy, who was 
promised evacuation, who went to Abbey Gate, was hit in the 
explosion.
    Despite the fact that he was mangled, the Taliban 
approached him, they said, what did you do for the Americans? 
Why are you leaving our country?
    He said, I'm an engineer. I helped build waterways. What is 
an engineer? I build a future for our country, for our 
children. They immediately shot him in the leg and left him for 
dead in the middle of the street in front of his children.
    Despite this, Mr. Sayed walked across an open battlefield 
to save his two young children and his wife and asked for 
evacuation. We were working an operation at Mazar-I-Sharif at 
the time, working with Kam Airways.
    Members who had never met each other, Americans and folks 
around the world, formed a group called Task Force Argo. And, 
together we were able to get five flights out of Mazar-I-Sharif 
in the north and save 3,000 Afghan allies and 40 Americans on 
that first flight of 380.
    But, that is only part of the story. The truth heroism 
exists I the faces of each of you in this room, who, despite 
the fact that you reached out for help from our Federal 
Government, you got no answer.
    And, Mr. Sayed was able to not only navigate a caravan of 
40 vehicles north over an 8-hour journey, we asked him, would 
you please pick up two young women whose husband has gone 
missing. They were students, and on Monday they were going to 
university. By the middle of the week, they were beaten in the 
street because they did not have a head-covering. Their future 
was one of rape and forced marriage.
    But, poor Mr. Sayed, he put them in the back of his Toyota 
Corolla, with his small children, and together, they made this 
journey north. They were stopped multiple times throughout the 
night by the Taliban. And, they were asked time and time again, 
who are these women? And he would say, I am their grandfather, 
we're going to a wedding.
    But, this cover story was not developed out of thin air. It 
was the work of volunteers who helped at every checkpoint 
report back on what was going on. Who helped provide a clean 
pathway and made sure that there was a safe harbor when they 
arrived in Mazar-I-Sharif. And, over the course of the next 
weeks, that turned into months, flight after flight saved these 
individuals.
    There are many of you who are on this panel today, and I 
cannot thank you enough. This digital Dunkirk, this rescue from 
Afghanistan is a direct reflection of what you did to save 
these lives, the lives of people who had spent decades saving 
ours.
    So, with that France I want to first of all commend you and 
everything that you did to help evacuate with your team and the 
hundreds of volunteers behind the scenes, not just here, but 
around the world, who did that.
    I want to speak specifically to the issue of flying folks 
out of Mazar-I-Sharif. Was the U.S. State Department or the 
Taliban the harder force in being able to get those aircraft 
off the ground and save those lives?
    Mr. Hoang. They were equally hard, Congressman. And in both 
cases, both were operating from a place of confusion, of lack 
of information, and lack of authority. Literally, both sides of 
the governmental coin.
    Mr. Nunn. Adrian, I'd like to speak to you on what the U.S. 
government's, was there ever a single point of contact within 
the State Department that you could reach out to? That you had 
the ability to, Colonel, to actually have a conversation to 
seek evacuation?
    Lieutenant Colonel Mann. There was no, Congressman, really 
that we ever found. What we found that worked very well, was 
Aidan's unit in particular, was very responsive and looking to 
do more. And, they had what seemed to be a very good working 
relationship with State Department at Apron 8 for out-
processing.
    So, we really relied on them to do that. We could never 
figure out how to do that direct engagement.
    Mr. Nunn. And, France, you talk about a moral obligation 
that we have. Is there also a national security implication for 
what has occurred?
    Mr. Hoang. Congressman, when we left Afghanistan, we not 
only left behind allies, we left behind our honor. We left 
behind our credibility.
    If we want allies to fight alongside us in the future, we 
need to be credible when we tell them that we're going to stand 
by them. We need the strategic option of working by, with, and 
through allies in the future.
    And, without the credibility that comes from standing by 
the allies in Afghanistan, we're not going to get that 
cooperation in future fights. And then, we're going to have to 
either choose as a Nation, to be less effective on the global 
stage, or choose to spend more of America's blood and treasure 
to achieve the same outcomes.
    Mr. Nunn. Thank you. Mr. Chair, my appreciation, because 
what was our darkest hour in Afghanistan, is made better by the 
actions that each of you took to be able to save lives and 
chart a better course for our country.
    We on this panel owe it to you to be able to get answers 
and truth so this never happens again. With that, Mr. Chair, 
thank you, and I yield back.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields. Before I close, I'd 
like to recognize the Ranking Member for any comments that he 
may have.
    Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me first thank all 
of our esteemed witnesses for appearing before our Committee 
today.
    And, I said it once, and I'll say it again, let me really 
thank you also for saving and evacuating over 120,000 people in 
17 days under the most difficult conditions imaginable in a 
complex and dangerous environment thousands of miles away.
    I want to thank you. There were successes in this 
evacuation and there were mistakes. We need to acknowledge 
both.
    I want to particularly thank and also commend all of you 
who worked to help not only our Afghan allies and partners, but 
also for being advocates for the rights and pathways of 
refugees and immigrants more broadly.
    Ms. Mackler, your work in particular, including for 
coordinating legal services for those impacted by the Muslim 
ban in my own district at JFK Airport, lays bare how much more 
work we need to do in Congress to fix our broken immigration 
system.
    And, as I said in my opening remarks again, extricating 
ourselves from two decades of a quagmire in Afghanistan was 
always going to be a difficult task. And, I believe that we are 
deluding ourselves if we believe that this could have been as 
an easy operation given the deteriorating security situation 
and rapidly changing events on the ground that no one could 
have predicted.
    This undertaking further, was further complicated by sets 
of policy, and these are just facts, policy decisions made by 
the previous Administration that altered the balance of power 
in Afghanistan and hindered our ability to honor our commitment 
to thousands of brave Afghans who stood side by side with us 
over the course of the past two decades.
    And yes, I must say that I am deeply concerned by some of 
my colleagues who paint the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan 
with such broad strokes as to divorce the emergency evacuation 
from those choices and the full context that led up to the 
events in August 2021. They do not stand, that does not happen 
in a vacuum and by itself.
    I believe we must commit ourselves to responsible, 
bipartisan oversight. And, we just ensure that we are taking a 
sober look at how we reached this outcome in Afghanistan after 
20 years of war.
    But, we also must look at how we can prevent the same 
mistakes from going and being made again going forward. And 
yet, under the most challenging circumstances, you, along with 
our diplomats and intelligence professionals, mobilized this 
whole of government effort to evacuate American citizens.
    There are important lessons to be learned from mistakes 
that were made. Yet, the impossible has also happened. Due to 
your tireless work, the State Department and other U.S. 
Government personnel, lives were saved.
    And, I couldn't help but feel, as I said at the beginning, 
when I think of all, and I think we need to recognize and honor 
all 2,461 members of the United States Military that lost their 
lives during this 20 years of war.
    And, as I close and yield back, I just want to, because I 
just was reflecting, ask unanimous consent, being a Member from 
New York, I just wanted to put in the record the names of the 
112 members of the United States Military that lost their lives 
in this war that came from my State of New York.
    I, to the Gold Star families here and to those that may be 
listening, to those that I have met and talked in regards, 
talked to in regards to the 20 years, including the evacuation, 
my heart, my prayers, my soul, reaches out to you.
    And, those of us that sit in the U.S. Congress, we also 
take the responsibility that we have, to pass the legislation 
that we need to do to make sure that this does not happen 
again.
    And with that Mr. Chair, I ask for the update.
    Chairman McCaul. And, without objection, so ordered. And, 
let me just say, it's my tenth term in Congress, and I do not 
think I've had a more powerful experience with a hearing.
    All of you stood up in a time when our government did not, 
and let down people that were left behind, from American 
citizens to Afghan partners who are still there.
    To all the women, and my heart really goes out to them on 
International Women's Day, as they now live under the Taliban 
and Sharia law that never probably have experienced it. Many 
have not.
    And, it's been a dark chapter. But, as the Ranking Member 
said, what you did is a bright light in terms of saving so many 
countless lives.
    And, we got the briefings here in Washington, but you just 
gave us all a front row seat to what really happened that day. 
And, it was incredibly powerful, the testimony from all of you.
    What are we leaving behind? We know China is there. The DNI 
testified in front of the Senate Intelligence Committee today 
on the global terrorism threat in Afghanistan. She says, Al 
Qaeda viewed the Taliban's seizure of power as a victory for 
the global jihad. And, Al Qaeda remains committed to attacking 
U.S. interests.
    And, on ISIS Khorasan, almost certainly retains the intent 
to conduct operations in the west. And, will continue efforts 
to attack outside of Afghanistan.
    I pray the threat goes away. But, I'm not as naive to think 
it will. I was a counter-terrorism Federal prosecutor. I was 
Chairman of the Homeland Security Committee when we stopped so 
many of these threats to conduct external operations in the 
United States of America.
    So, for the veteran out there listening, was it worth it? 
Yes. I was worth it. You protected America. And, some gave 
their lives to protect America and what it stands for. And, we 
do have to learn from the mistakes of the past. And we'll 
continue to do that.
    But, I just want to thank you for what you've done for the 
veteran. You know, whether it's saving lives, whether it's the 
PTSD, whether it's a suicide, rates which we know are going up 
after what happened.
    And, we also know that this has had a projection of 
weakness that has invited aggression and war from Putin in 
Ukraine, to Chairman Xi's threatening of the Pacific. There is 
a cause and effect.
    And, we know that after August, when Afghanistan fell, the 
Russian Federation, we saw it, the surveillance videos, the 
satellite imagery of the Russian Federation moving to Ukraine. 
And, that is the axiom of history that peace through strength. 
Weakness invites aggression.
    Now, I hope we can project strength to stop war like this 
one. And, I just want to say to anyone listening to this, and I 
know it's being carried live on C-SPAN and a lot of other 
outlets, if you have any information about the withdrawal in 
Afghanistan, please do not hesitate to contact our House 
Foreign Affairs website at ForeignAffairs.House.gov.
    We simply want to get the truth out. And, as I said in my 
opening statement, our veterans deserve it, and our Gold Star 
mothers and families deserve the truth. And, people do need to 
be held accountable.
    Nothing demonstrates that more, sir, than your powerful 
testimony about having the suicide bomber in your grasp, and he 
got away. And, what we could have stopped but for some decision 
made above you, not to respond to that threat.
    That's probably one of the saddest things out of this 
hearing. And, we pray for you and all the veterans out there. 
And, we want to say thank you on behalf of the U.S. Congress, 
both Republican and Democrat.
    So, with that, we're going to close the hearing. I thank 
the witnesses. Members may have additional questions, and you 
may submit those in writing.
    Pursuant to Committee rules, all Members may have 5 days to 
submit statements, questions, extraneous materials for the 
record. And, without objection, the Committee stands adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 4:01 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

                                APPENDIX

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         STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD FROM REPRESENTATIVE CONNOLLY
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                     STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD MEEKS
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                          EVACUATE OUR ALLIES
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                             WILSON LETTER
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             ADDITIONAL MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
             
             
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            RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
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