[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 9123 Introduced in House (IH)]
<DOC>
118th CONGRESS
2d Session
H. R. 9123
To encourage increased trade and investment between the United States
and the countries in the Western Balkans, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
July 24, 2024
Mr. Keating (for himself, Mr. Lamborn, and Mr. Goldman of New York)
introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on
Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on the Judiciary, for
a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for
consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the
committee concerned
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To encourage increased trade and investment between the United States
and the countries in the Western Balkans, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Western Balkans
Democracy and Prosperity Act''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as
follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Findings.
Sec. 3. Sense of Congress.
Sec. 4. Definitions.
Sec. 5. Codification of sanctions relating to the Western Balkans.
Sec. 6. Democratic and economic development and prosperity initiatives.
Sec. 7. Promoting cross-cultural and educational engagement.
Sec. 8. Peace Corps in the Western Balkans.
Sec. 9. Young Balkan Leaders Initiative.
Sec. 10. Supporting cybersecurity and cyber resilience in the Western
Balkans.
Sec. 11. Sense of Congress regarding an interim agreement.
Sec. 12. Reports on Russian and Chinese malign influence operations and
campaigns in the Western Balkans.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress finds the following:
(1) The Western Balkans countries (the Republic of Albania,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, the Republic
of Kosovo, Montenegro, the Republic of North Macedonia and the
Republic of Serbia) form a pluralistic, multi-ethnic region in
the heart of Europe that is critical to the peace, stability,
and prosperity of that continent.
(2) Continued peace, stability, and prosperity in the
Western Balkans is directly tied to the opportunities for
democratic and economic advancement available to the citizens
and residents of those seven countries.
(3) It is in the mutual interest of the United States and
the seven countries of the Western Balkans to promote stable
and sustainable economic growth and development in the region.
(4) The reforms and integration with the European Union
pursued by countries in the Western Balkans have led to
significant democratic and economic progress in the region.
(5) Despite economic progress, rates of poverty and
unemployment in the Western Balkans remain higher than in
neighboring European Union countries.
(6) Out-migration, particularly of youth, is affecting
demographics in each Western Balkans country, resulting in
population decline in all seven countries.
(7) Implementing critical economic and governance reforms
could help enable investment and employment opportunities in
the Western Balkans, especially for youth, and can provide
powerful tools for economic development and for encouraging
broader participation in a political process that increases
trade and prosperity for all.
(8) Existing regional economic efforts could have the
potential to improve the economic conditions in the Western
Balkans, while promoting inclusion and transparency.
(9) The Department of Commerce, through its Foreign
Commercial Service, plays an important role in promoting and
facilitating opportunities for United States trade and
investment.
(10) Corruption, including among key political leaders,
continues to plague the Western Balkans and represents one of
the greatest impediments to further economic and political
development in the region.
(11) Disinformation campaigns targeting the Western Balkans
undermine the credibility of its democratic institutions,
including the integrity of its elections.
(12) Vulnerability to cyberattacks or attacks on
information and communication technology infrastructure
increases risks to the functioning of government and the
delivery of public services.
(13) United States Cyber Command, the Department of State,
and other Federal agencies play a critical role in defending
the national security interests of the United States, including
by deploying cyber hunt forward teams at the request of partner
nations to reinforce their cyber defenses.
(14) Securing domestic and international cyber networks and
ICT infrastructure is a national security priority for the
United States, which is exemplified by offices and programs
across the Federal Government that support cybersecurity.
(15) Corruption and disinformation proliferate in political
environments marked by autocratic control.
(16) Dependence on Russian sources of fossil fuels and
natural gas for the countries of the Western Balkans ties their
economies and politics to the Russian Federation and inhibits
their aspirations for European integration.
(17) Reducing the reliance of the Western Balkans on
Russian natural gas supplies and fossil fuels is in the
national interest of the United States.
(18) The growing influence of China in the Western Balkans
could also have a deleterious impact on strategic competition,
democracy, and economic integration with Europe.
(19) In March 2022, the United States launched the European
Democratic Resilience Initiative to bolster democratic
resilience, advance anti-corruption efforts, and defend human
rights in Ukraine and its neighbors in response to Russia's war
of aggression.
(20) The parliamentary and local elections held in Serbia
on December 17, 2023, and their immediate aftermath are cause
for deep concern about the state of Serbia's democracy,
including due to the final report of the Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe's Office for Democratic
Institutions and Human Rights, which--
(A) found ``unjust conditions'' for the election;
(B) found ``numerous procedural deficiencies,
including inconsistent application of safeguards during
voting and counting, frequent instances of
overcrowding, breaches in secrecy of the vote, and
numerous instances of group voting''; and
(C) asserted that ``voting must be repeated'' in
certain polling stations.
(21) The Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe also noted that Serbian officials accused primarily
peaceful protestors, opposition parties, and civil society of
``attempting to destabilize the government'', a concerning
allegation that threatens the safety of important elements of
Serbian society.
(22) Democratic countries whose values are in alignment
with the United States make for stronger and more durable
partnerships.
SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is a sense of Congress that the United States should--
(1) encourage increased trade and investment between the
United States and allies and partners in the Western Balkans;
(2) expand United States assistance to regional integration
efforts in the Western Balkans;
(3) strengthen and expand regional economic integration in
the Western Balkans, especially enterprises owned by and
employing women and youth;
(4) work with allies and partners committed to improving
the rule of law, energy resource diversification, democratic
and economic reform, and the reduction of poverty in the
Western Balkans;
(5) increase United States trade and investment with the
Western Balkans, particularly in ways that support countries'
efforts--
(A) to decrease dependence on Russian energy
sources and fossil fuels;
(B) to increase energy diversification, efficiency,
and conservation; and
(C) to facilitate the transition to cleaner and
more reliable sources of energy, including renewables,
as appropriate;
(6) continue to assist in the development, within the
Western Balkans, of--
(A) strong civil societies;
(B) public-private partnerships;
(C) independent media;
(D) transparent, accountable, citizen-responsive
governance, including equal representation for women
and youth;
(E) political stability; and
(F) modern, free-market based economies;
(7) support the expeditious accession of those Western
Balkans countries that are not already members to the European
Union and to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (referred
to in this section as ``NATO'') for countries that desire and
are eligible for such membership;
(8) support--
(A) maintaining the full European Union Force
(EUFOR) mandate in Bosnia and Herzegovina as being in
the national security interests of the United States;
(B) encouraging NATO and the European Union to
review their mission mandates and posture in Bosnia and
Herzegovina to ensure they are playing a proactive role
in establishing a safe and secure environment,
particularly in the realm of defense;
(C) working within NATO to encourage contingency
planning for an international military force to
maintain a safe and secure environment in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, especially if Russia blocks
reauthorization of the mission in the United Nations;
and
(D) a strengthened NATO headquarters in Sarajevo;
(9) continue to support the European Union membership
aspirations of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, North
Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia by supporting meeting the
benchmarks required for their accession;
(10) continue to support the overarching mission of the
Berlin Process and locally-driven initiatives that are
inclusive of all Western Balkans countries and remains aligned
with the objectives and standards laid out by the European
Union as requirements for accession to the European Union;
(11) continue to support the cultural heritage, and
recognize the languages, of the Western Balkans;
(12) coordinate closely with the European Union, the United
Kingdom, and other allies and partners on sanctions
designations in Western Balkans countries and work to align
efforts as much as possible to demonstrate a clear commitment
to upholding democratic values;
(13) expand bilateral security cooperation with non-NATO
member Western Balkans countries, particularly efforts focused
on regional integration and cooperation, including through the
Adriatic Charter, which was launched at Tirana on May 2, 2003;
(14) increase efforts to combat Russian malign influence
campaigns and any other destabilizing or disruptive activities
targeting the Western Balkans through engagement with
government institutions, political stakeholders, journalists,
civil society organizations, and industry leaders;
(15) develop a series of cyber resilience standards,
consistent with the Enhanced Cyber Defence Policy and Readiness
Action Plan endorsed at the 2014 Wales Summit of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization to expand cooperation with
partners and allies, including in the Western Balkans, on cyber
security and ICT infrastructure;
(16) articulate clearly and unambiguously the United States
commitment to supporting democratic values and respect for
international law as the sole path forward for the countries of
the Western Balkans; and
(17) prioritize partnerships and programming with Western
Balkan countries that demonstrate commitment toward
strengthening their democracies and show respect for human
rights.
SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate;
(B) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House
of Representatives; and
(D) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives.
(2) ICT.--The term ``ICT'' means information and
communication technology.
(3) Western balkans.--The term ``Western Balkans'' means
the region comprised of the following countries:
(A) The Republic of Albania.
(B) Bosnia and Herzegovina.
(C) The Republic of Croatia.
(D) The Republic of Kosovo.
(E) Montenegro.
(F) The Republic of North Macedonia.
(G) The Republic of Serbia.
(4) Western balkans country.--The term ``Western Balkans
country'' means any country listed in subparagraphs (A) through
(G) of paragraph (3).
SEC. 5. CODIFICATION OF SANCTIONS RELATING TO THE WESTERN BALKANS.
(a) In General.--Each person listed or designated for the
imposition of sanctions under an executive order described in
subsection (c) as of the date of the enactment of this Act shall remain
so designated, except as provided in subsections (d) and (e).
(b) Continuation of Sanctions Authorities.--Each authority to
impose sanctions provided for under an executive order described in
subsection (c) shall remain in effect.
(c) Executive Orders Specified.--The executive orders specified in
this subsection are--
(1) Executive Order 13219, as amended by Executive Order
13304 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking property of
persons who threaten international stabilization efforts in the
Western Balkans); and
(2) Executive Order 14033 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to
blocking property and suspending entry into the United States
of certain persons contributing to the destabilizing situation
in the Western Balkans), as in effect on such date of
enactment.
(d) Termination of Sanctions.--The President may terminate the
application of a sanction described in subsection (a) with respect to a
person if the President certifies to the appropriate congressional
committees that such person--
(1) has not engaged in the activity that was the basis for
such sanctions, if applicable, during the two-year period
immediately preceding such termination date; or
(2) otherwise no longer meets the criteria that was the
basis for such sanctions.
(e) Waiver.--
(1) In general.--The President may waive the application of
sanctions under this section for renewable periods not to
exceed 180 days if the President--
(A) determines that such a waiver is in the
national security interests of the United States; and
(B) not less than 15 days before the granting of
the waiver, submits to the appropriate congressional
committees a notice of and justification for the
waiver.
(2) Form.--The waiver described in paragraph (1) may be
transmitted in classified form.
(f) Exceptions.--
(1) Humanitarian assistance.--Sanctions under this Act
shall not apply to--
(A) the conduct or facilitation of a transaction
for the provision of agricultural commodities, food,
medicine, medical devices, humanitarian assistance, or
for humanitarian purposes; or
(B) transactions that are necessary for, or related
to, the activities described in subparagraph (A).
(2) Compliance with international obligations and law
enforcement activities.--Sanctions under this Act shall not
apply with respect to an alien if admitting or paroling such
alien is necessary--
(A) to comply with United States obligations
under--
(i) the Agreement between the United
Nations and the United States of America
regarding the Headquarters of the United
Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947,
and entered into force November 21, 1947;
(ii) the Convention on Consular Relations,
done at Vienna April 24, 1963, and entered into
force March 19, 1967; or
(iii) any other international agreement; or
(B) to carry out or assist law enforcement activity
in the United States.
(3) Exception for intelligence activities.--Sanctions under
this Act shall not apply to--
(A) any activity subject to the reporting
requirements under title V of the National Security Act
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.); or
(B) any authorized intelligence activities of the
United States.
(4) Exception relating to importation of goods.--
(A) In general.--The requirement to block and
prohibit all transactions in all property and interests
in property under this Act shall not include the
authority or a requirement to impose sanctions on the
importation of goods.
(B) Defined term.--In this paragraph, the term
``good'' means any article, natural or manmade
substance, material, supply or manufactured product,
including inspection and test equipment, and excluding
technical data.
(g) Rulemaking.--The President is authorized to promulgate such
rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions
of this section (which may include regulatory exceptions), including
under section 205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(50 U.S.C. 1704)).
(h) Sunset.--This section shall cease to have force or effect
beginning on the date that is 8 years after the date of the enactment
of this Act.
SEC. 6. DEMOCRATIC AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND PROSPERITY INITIATIVES.
(a) Anti-Corruption Initiative.--The Secretary of State, through
ongoing and new programs, shall develop an initiative that--
(1) seeks to expand technical assistance in each Western
Balkans country, taking into account local conditions and
contingent on the agreement of the host country government to
develop new national anti-corruption strategies;
(2) seeks to share best practices with, and provide
training to, civilian law enforcement agencies and judicial
institutions, and other relevant administrative bodies, of the
Western Balkans countries, to improve the efficiency,
transparency, and accountability of such agencies and
institutions;
(3) strengthens existing national anti-corruption
strategies--
(A) to combat political corruption, particularly in
the judiciary, independent election oversight bodies,
and public procurement processes; and
(B) to strengthen regulatory and legislative
oversight of critical governance areas, such as freedom
of information and public procurement, including by
strengthening cyber defenses and ICT infrastructure
networks;
(4) includes the Western Balkans countries in the European
Democratic Resilience Initiative of the Department of State, or
any equivalent successor initiative, and considers the Western
Balkans as a recipient of anti-corruption funding for such
initiative; and
(5) seeks to promote the important role of an independent
media in countering corruption through engagements with
governments of Western Balkan countries and providing training
opportunities for journalists on investigative reporting.
(b) Prioritizing Cyber Resilience, Regional Trade, and Economic
Competitiveness.--
(1) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(A) promoting stronger economic, civic, and
political relationships among Western Balkans countries
will enable countries to better utilize existing
resources and maximize their economic security and
democratic resilience by reinforcing cyber defenses and
increasing trade in goods and services among other
countries in the region; and
(B) United States investments in and assistance
toward creating a more integrated region ensures
political stability and security for the region.
(2) 5-year strategy for economic development and democratic
resilience in western balkans.--Not later than 180 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State
and the Administrator of the United States Agency for
International Development, in coordination with the heads of
other relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall submit
to the appropriate congressional committees a regional economic
development and democratic resilience strategy for the Western
Balkans that complements the efforts of the European Union,
European nations, and other multilateral financing
institutions--
(A) to consider the full set of tools and resources
available from the relevant agencies;
(B) to include efforts to ensure coordination with
multilateral and bilateral partners, such as the
European Union, the World Bank, and other relevant
assistance frameworks;
(C) to include an initial public assessment of--
(i) economic opportunities for which United
States businesses, or those of other like-
minded partner countries, would be competitive;
(ii) legal, economic, governance,
infrastructural, or other barriers limiting
United States trade and investment in the
Western Balkans;
(iii) the effectiveness of all existing
regional cooperation initiatives; and
(iv) ways to increase United States trade
and investment within the Western Balkans;
(D) to develop human and institutional capacity and
infrastructure across multiple sectors of economies,
including clean energy, energy efficiency, agriculture,
small and medium-sized enterprise development, health,
and cyber-security;
(E) to assist with the development and
implementation of regional and international trade
agreements;
(F) to support women-owned enterprises;
(G) to promote government and civil society
policies and programs that combat corruption and
encourage transparency (including by supporting
independent media by promoting the safety and security
of journalists), free and fair competition, sound
governance, judicial reform, environmental stewardship,
and business environments conducive to sustainable and
inclusive economic growth; and
(H) to include a public diplomacy strategy that
describes the actions that will be taken by relevant
agencies to increase support for the United States
relationship by citizens of Western Balkans countries.
(3) Briefing.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall provide a
briefing to the appropriate congressional committees that
describes the progress made towards developing the strategy
required under paragraph (2).
(c) Regional Trade and Development Initiative.--
(1) Authorization.--The Secretary of State and the
Administrator of the United States Agency for International
Development, in coordination with the heads of other relevant
Federal departments and agencies, may coordinate a regional
trade and development initiative for the region comprised of
each Western Balkans country and any European Union member
country that shares a border with a Western Balkans country
(referred to in this subsection as the ``Western Balkans
region'') in accordance with this subsection.
(2) Initiative elements.--The initiative authorized under
paragraph (1) shall--
(A) promote private sector growth and
competitiveness and increase the capacity of
businesses, particularly small and medium-sized
enterprises, in the Western Balkans region;
(B) aim to increase intraregional exports to
countries in the Balkans and European Union member
states;
(C) aim to increase United States exports to, and
investments in, countries in the Balkans;
(D) support startup companies, including companies
led by youth or women, in the Western Balkans region
by--
(i) providing training in business skills
and leadership; and
(ii) providing opportunities to connect to
sources of capital;
(E) encourage and promote inward and outward trade
and investment through engagement with the Western
Balkans diaspora communities in the United States and
abroad;
(F) provide assistance to the governments and civil
society organizations of Western Balkans countries to
develop--
(i) regulations to ensure fair and
effective investment; and
(ii) screening tools to identify and deter
malign investments and other coercive economic
practices;
(G) review existing assistance programming relating
to the Western Balkans across Federal agencies--
(i) to eliminate duplication; and
(ii) to identify areas of potential
coordination within the Western Balkans region;
(H) identify areas where application of additional
resources could expand successful programs to 1 or more
countries in the Western Balkans region by building on
the existing experience and program architecture;
(I) compare existing single-country sector analyses
to determine areas of focus that would benefit from a
regional approach with respect to the Western Balkans
region; and
(J) promote intraregional trade throughout the
Western Balkans region through--
(i) programming, including grants,
cooperative agreements, and other forms of
assistance;
(ii) expanding awareness of the
availability of loans and other financial
instruments from the United States Government;
and
(iii) coordinating access to existing trade
instruments available through allies and
partners in the Western Balkans region,
including the European Union and international
financial institutions.
(3) Support for regional infrastructure projects.--The
initiative authorized under paragraph (1) should facilitate and
prioritize support for regional infrastructure projects,
including--
(A) transportation projects that build roads,
bridges, railways and other physical infrastructure to
facilitate travel of goods and people throughout the
Western Balkans region;
(B) technical support and investments needed to
meet United States and European Union standards for air
travel, including screening and information sharing;
(C) the development of telecommunications networks
with trusted providers;
(D) infrastructure projects that connect Western
Balkans countries to each other and to countries with
which they share a border;
(E) the effective analysis of tenders and
transparent procurement processes;
(F) investment transparency programs that will help
countries in the Western Balkans analyze gaps and
establish institutional and regulatory reforms
necessary--
(i) to create an enabling environment for
trade and investment; and
(ii) to strengthen protections against
suspect investments through public procurement
and privatization and through foreign direct
investments;
(G) sharing best practices learned from the United
States and other international partners to ensure that
institutional and regulatory mechanisms for addressing
these issues are fair, nonarbitrary, effective, and
free from corruption;
(H) projects that support regional energy security
and reduce dependence on Russian energy;
(I) technical assistance and generating private
investment in projects that promote connectivity and
energy-sharing in the Western Balkans region;
(J) technical assistance to support regional
collaboration on environmental protection that includes
governmental, political, civic, and business
stakeholders; and
(K) technical assistance to develop financing
options and help create linkages with potential
financing institutions and investors.
(4) Requirements.--All programming under the initiative
authorized under paragraph (1) shall--
(A) be open to the participation of Albania, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia,
and Serbia;
(B) be consistent with European Union accession
requirements;
(C) be focused on retaining talent within the
Western Balkans;
(D) promote government policies in Western Balkans
countries that encourage free and fair competition,
sound governance, environmental protection, and
business environments that are conducive to sustainable
and inclusive economic growth; and
(E) include a public diplomacy strategy to inform
local and regional audiences in the Western Balkans
region about the initiative, including specific
programs and projects.
(d) United States International Development Finance Corporation.--
(1) Appointments.--Not later than 1 year after the date of
the enactment of this Act, subject to the availability of
appropriations, the Chief Executive Officer of the United
States International Development Finance Corporation, in
collaboration with the Secretary of State, should consider
including a regional office with responsibilities for the
Western Balkans within the Corporation's plans to open new
regional offices.
(2) Joint report.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Chief Executive Officer of
the United States International Development Finance Corporation
and the Administrator of the United States Agency for
International Development shall submit a joint report to the
appropriate congressional committees that includes--
(A) an assessment of the benefits of providing
sovereign loan guarantees to countries in the Western
Balkans to support infrastructure and energy
diversification projects;
(B) an outline of additional resources, such as
tools, funding, and personnel, which may be required to
offer sovereign loan guarantees in the Western Balkans;
and
(C) an assessment of how the United States
International Development Finance Corporation can
deploy its insurance products in support of bonds or
other instruments issued to raise capital through
United States financial markets in the Western Balkans.
SEC. 7. PROMOTING CROSS-CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL ENGAGEMENT.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) promoting partnerships between United States
universities and universities in the Western Balkans,
particularly universities in traditionally under-served
communities, advances United States foreign policy goals and
requires a whole-of-government approach, including the
utilization of public-private partnerships;
(2) such university partnerships would provide
opportunities for exchanging academic ideas, technical
expertise, research, and cultural understanding for the benefit
of the United States; and
(3) the seven countries in the Western Balkans meet the
requirements under section 105(c)(4) of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151c(c)(4)).
(b) University Partnerships.--The President, working through the
Secretary of State, is authorized to provide assistance, consistent
with section 105 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
2151c), to promote the establishment of partnerships between United
States universities and universities in the Western Balkans,
including--
(1) supporting research and analysis on foreign policy,
cyber resilience, and disinformation;
(2) working with partner governments to reform policies,
improve curricula, strengthen data systems, train teachers and
students, including English language teaching, and to provide
quality, inclusive learning materials;
(3) encouraging knowledge exchanges to help provide
individuals, particularly at-risk youth, women, people with
disabilities, and other vulnerable, marginalized, or
underserved communities, with relevant education, training, and
skills for meaningful employment;
(4) promoting teaching and research exchanges between
institutions of higher education in the Western Balkans and in
the United States; and
(5) encouraging alliances and exchanges with like-minded
institutions of education within the Western Balkans and the
larger European continent.
SEC. 8. PEACE CORPS IN THE WESTERN BALKANS.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the Peace
Corps, whose mission is to promote world peace and friendship, in part
by helping the people of interested countries in meeting their need for
trained men and women, provides an invaluable opportunity to connect
the people of the United States with the people of the Western Balkans.
(b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of the Peace Corps should submit a
report to the appropriate congressional committees that includes an
analysis of current opportunities for Peace Corps expansion in the
Western Balkans region.
SEC. 9. YOUNG BALKAN LEADERS INITIATIVE.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that regular
people-to-people exchange programs that bring religious leaders,
journalists, civil society members, politicians, and other individuals
from the Western Balkans to the United States will strengthen existing
relationships and advance United States interests and shared values in
the Western Balkans region.
(b) BOLD Leadership Program for Young Balkans Leaders.--
(1) Sense of congress.--The Department of State, through
BOLD, a leadership program for young leaders in certain Western
Balkans countries, plays an important role to develop young
leaders in improving civic engagement and economic development
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and Montenegro.
(2) Expansion.--BOLD should be expanded, subject to the
availability of appropriations, to the entire Western Balkans
region.
(c) Authorization.--The Secretary of State should further develop
and implement BOLD, which shall hereafter be known as the ``Young
Balkan Leaders Initiative'', to promote educational and professional
development for young adult leaders and professionals in the Western
Balkans who have demonstrated a passion to contribute to the continued
development of the Western Balkans region.
(d) Conduct of Initiative.--The goals of the Young Balkan Leaders
Initiative shall be--
(1) to further build the capacity of young Balkan leaders
in the Western Balkans in the areas of business and information
technology, cyber security and digitization, agriculture, civic
engagement, and public administration;
(2) to support young Balkan leaders by offering
professional development, training, and networking
opportunities, particularly in the areas of leadership,
innovation, civic engagement, elections, human rights,
entrepreneurship, good governance, public administration, and
journalism;
(3) to support young political, parliamentary, and civic
Balkan leaders in collaboration on regional initiatives related
to good governance, environmental protection, government
ethics, and minority inclusion;
(4) to provide increased economic and technical assistance
to young Balkan leaders to promote economic growth and
strengthen ties between businesses, investors, and
entrepreneurs in the United States and in Western Balkans
countries;
(5) to tailor such assistance to advance the particular
objectives of each United States mission in the Western Balkans
within the framework outlined in this subsection; and
(6) to secure funding for such assistance from existing
funds available to each United States Mission in the Western
Balkans.
(e) Fellowships.--Under the Young Balkan Leaders Initiative, the
Secretary of State shall award fellowships to young leaders from the
Western Balkans who--
(1) are between 18 and 35 years of age;
(2) have demonstrated strong capabilities in
entrepreneurship, innovation, public service, and leadership;
(3) have had a positive impact in their communities,
organizations, or institutions, including by promoting cross-
regional and multiethnic cooperation; and
(4) represent a cross-section of geographic, gender,
political, and cultural diversity.
(f) Public Engagement and Leadership Center.--Under the Young
Balkan Leaders Initiative, the Secretary of State shall take advantage
of existing and future public diplomacy facilities (commonly known as
``American Spaces'') to hire staff and develop programming for the
establishment of a flagship public engagement and leadership center in
the Western Balkans that seeks--
(1) to counter disinformation and malign influence;
(2) to promote cross-cultural engagement;
(3) to provide training for young leaders from Western
Balkans countries described in subsection (e);
(4) to harmonize the efforts of existing venues throughout
Western Balkans countries established by the Office of American
Spaces; and
(5) to annually bring together participants from the Young
Balkans Leaders Initiative to provide platforms for regional
networking.
(g) Briefing on Certain Exchange Programs.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall provide
a briefing to the appropriate congressional committees that
describes the status of exchange programs involving the Western
Balkans region.
(2) Elements.--The briefing required under paragraph (1)
shall--
(A) assess the factors constraining the number and
frequency of participants from Western Balkans
countries in the International Visitor Leadership
Program of the Department of State;
(B) identify the resources that are necessary to
address the factors described in subparagraph (A); and
(C) describe a strategy for connecting alumni and
participants of professional development exchange
programs of the Department of State in the Western
Balkans with alumni and participants from other
countries in Europe, to enhance inter-region and intra-
region people-to-people ties.
SEC. 10. SUPPORTING CYBERSECURITY AND CYBER RESILIENCE IN THE WESTERN
BALKANS.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) United States support for cybersecurity, cyber
resilience, and secure ICT infrastructure in Western Balkans
countries will strengthen the region's ability to defend itself
from and respond to malicious cyber activity conducted by
nonstate and foreign actors, including foreign governments,
that seek to influence the region;
(2) insecure ICT networks that are vulnerable to
manipulation can increase opportunities for--
(A) the compromise of cyber infrastructure,
including data networks, electronic infrastructure, and
software systems; and
(B) the use of online information operations by
adversaries and malign actors to undermine United
States allies and interests; and
(3) it is in the national security interest of the United
States to support the cybersecurity and cyber resilience of
Western Balkans countries.
(b) Interagency Report on Cybersecurity and the Digital Information
Environment in Western Balkans Countries.--Not later than 1 year after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in
coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland
Security, and the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, shall
submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that
contains--
(1) an overview of interagency efforts to strengthen
cybersecurity and cyber resilience in Western Balkans
countries;
(2) a review of the information environment in each Western
Balkans country;
(3) a review of existing United States Government cyber and
digital initiatives that--
(A) counter influence operations and safeguard
elections and democratic processes in Western Balkans
countries;
(B) strengthen ICT infrastructure and cybersecurity
capacity in the Western Balkans;
(C) support democracy and internet freedom in
Western Balkans countries; and
(D) build cyber capacity of governments who are
allies or partners of the United States;
(4) an assessment of cyber threat information sharing
between the United States and Western Balkans countries;
(5) an assessment of--
(A) options for the United States to better support
cybersecurity and cyber resilience in Western Balkans
countries through changes to current assistance
authorities; and
(B) the advantages or limitations, such as funding
or office space, of posting cyber professionals from
other Federal departments and agencies to United States
diplomatic posts in Western Balkans countries and
providing relevant training to Foreign Service
Officers; and
(6) any additional support needed from the United States
for the cybersecurity and cyber resilience of the following
NATO Allies: Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Croatia.
SEC. 11. RELATIONS BETWEEN KOSOVO AND SERBIA.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the Agreement on the Path to Normalization of
Relations, which was agreed to by Kosovo and Serbia on February
27, 2023, with the facilitation of the European Union, is a
positive step forward in advancing normalization between the
two countries;
(2) Serbia and Kosovo should seek to make immediate
progress on the Implementation Annex to the agreement referred
to in paragraph (1);
(3) once sufficient progress has been made on the
Implementation Annex, the United States should consider
advancing initiatives to strengthen bilateral relations with
both countries, which could include--
(A) establishing bilateral strategic dialogues with
Kosovo and Serbia; and
(B) advancing concrete initiatives to deepen trade
and investment with both countries; and
(4) the United States should continue to support a
comprehensive final agreement between Kosovo and Serbia based
on mutual recognition.
(b) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States
Government that--
(1) it shall not pursue any policy that advocates for land
swaps, partition, or other forms of redrawing borders along
ethnic lines in the Western Balkans as a means to arbitrate
disputes between nation states in the region; and
(2) it should support pluralistic democracies in countries
in the Western Balkans as a means to prevent a return to the
ethnic strife that once characterized the region.
SEC. 12. REPORTS ON RUSSIAN AND CHINESE MALIGN INFLUENCE OPERATIONS AND
CAMPAIGNS IN THE WESTERN BALKANS.
(a) Reports Required.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and every two years thereafter, the
Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the
Director of National Intelligence, and the heads of other Federal
departments or agencies, as appropriate, shall submit a report to the
appropriate congressional committees regarding Russian and Chinese
malign influence operations and campaigns carried out with respect to
Balkan countries that seek--
(1) to undermine democratic institutions;
(2) to promote political instability; and
(3) to harm the interests of the United States and North
Atlantic Treaty Organization member and partner states in the
Western Balkans.
(b) Elements.--Each report submitted pursuant to subsection (a)
shall include--
(1) an assessment of the objectives of the Russian
Federation and the People's Republic of China regarding malign
influence operations and campaigns carried out with respect to
Western Balkans countries--
(A) to undermine democratic institutions, including
the planning and execution of democratic elections;
(B) to promote political instability; and
(C) to manipulate the information environment;
(2) the activities and roles of the Department of State and
other relevant Federal agencies in countering Russian and
Chinese malign influence operations and campaigns;
(3) a comprehensive list identifying--
(A) each network, entity and individual, to the
extent such information is available, of Russia, China,
or any other country with which Russia or China may
cooperate, that is supporting such Russian or Chinese
malign influence operations or campaigns, including the
provision of financial or operational support to
activities in a Western Balkans country that may limit
freedom of speech or create barriers of access to
democratic processes, including exercising the right to
vote in a free and fair election; and
(B) the role of each such entity in providing such
support;
(4) the identification of the tactics, techniques, and
procedures used in Russian or Chinese malign influence
operations and campaigns in Western Balkans countries;
(5) an assessment of the effect of previous Russian or
Chinese malign influence operations and campaigns that targeted
alliances and partnerships of the United States Armed Forces in
the Western Balkans, including the effectiveness of such
operations and campaigns in achieving the objectives of Russia
and China, respectively;
(6) the identification of each Western Balkans country with
respect to which Russia or China has conducted or attempted to
conduct a malign influence operation or campaign;
(7) an assessment of the capacity and efforts of NATO and
of each individual Western Balkans country to counter Russian
or Chinese malign influence operations and campaigns carried
out with respect to Western Balkans countries;
(8) the efforts by the United States to combat such malign
influence operations in the Western Balkans, including through
the Countering Russian Influence Fund and the Countering
People's Republic of China Malign Influence Fund;
(9) an assessment of the tactics, techniques, and
procedures that the Secretary of State, in consultation with
the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of
Defense, determines are likely to be used in future Russian or
Chinese malign influence operations and campaigns carried out
with respect to Western Balkans countries; and
(10) recommended authorities or activities that the
Department of State and other relevant Federal agencies could
enact to increase the United States Government's capacity to
counter Russian and Chinese malign influence operations and
campaigns in Western Balkans countries.
(c) Form.--Each report required under subsection (a) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
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