[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 7962 Introduced in House (IH)]
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118th CONGRESS
2d Session
H. R. 7962
To advance United States long-term trade competitiveness and economic
leadership in the Indo-Pacific region.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
April 11, 2024
Mrs. Miller of West Virginia (for herself, Mr. Panetta, Mr. Smith of
Nebraska, Mr. Beyer, Mr. LaHood, and Mr. Bera) introduced the following
bill; which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To advance United States long-term trade competitiveness and economic
leadership in the Indo-Pacific region.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``United States Trade Leadership in
the Indo-Pacific Act''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress finds the following:
(1) The United States is an Indo-Pacific power.
(2) The Indo-Pacific region, spanning from our Pacific
Coastline to the Indian Ocean, is home to over half the world's
people, including nearly 60 percent of youth, and is at the
center of the 21st-century global economy, accounting for 60
percent of global gross domestic product and two-thirds of the
world's economic growth in 2022.
(3) The Indo-Pacific region also includes some of America's
closest military allies and partners, several of the world's
largest militaries, and 5 nations allied with the United States
through mutual defense treaties. The region also contains
strategic rivals with growing military capabilities, in
particular the People's Republic of China (PRC). Our partners
are critical for responding to potential threats in the region,
maintaining credible deterrence, and for fostering peace.
(4) There is broad bipartisan agreement that the United
States must have a strong and durable economic strategy in the
Indo-Pacific to advance our commercial, geostrategic, and
national security interests and support our allies and partners
in the region.
(5) This is especially true and increasingly urgent in the
face of heightened aggression and pressure from the PRC, which
seeks to expand its influence by actively pursuing trade
agreements with key partners in the Indo-Pacific that establish
preferential treatment for goods and services, deepen supply
chain integration, and establish rules based on the PRC's
state-led authoritarian economic model that undercut America's
workers, businesses, and economic security.
(6) For decades, the United States has sought to persuade
the PRC to eliminate harmful trade practices and act
responsibly within the global rules-based trading system.
Unfortunately, the PRC has not substantially changed its
behavior and has instead used forced labor, subsidies and
overproduction, intellectual property theft and the forced
transfer of technology, authoritarian digital governance
policies, economic coercion, and other unfair practices to
advance an economic model that undermines human rights,
American industries and workers, and market-based economies
around the world.
(7) The PRC is now actively seeking to increase trade ties
in the Indo-Pacific region as a means to increase its economic
influence and increase supply chain dependency on the PRC. One
of the most prominent examples of the PRC's growing economic
influence in the Indo-Pacific region is the Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which entered into
force in January 2022. RCEP is now the largest trade agreement
in the world, encompassing 15 countries that account for 30
percent of the global economy. This agreement will increasingly
put the United States at a competitive disadvantage as the
economies of the PRC, Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia,
Japan, Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, New Zealand, the
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam grow more
integrated.
(8) The PRC is also actively negotiating numerous other
regional and bilateral trade agreements throughout the region
and is attempting to accede to the Comprehensive and
Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) as
well as the Digital Economic Partnership Agreement (DEPA).
(9) The PRC's aggressive assertion of its economic
interests in the Indo-Pacific through the use of trade
agreements underscores the need for the United States to
provide a meaningful and credible alternative to achieve our
economic and national security goals.
(10) American workers and businesses also face competitive
pressures as other countries in the region pursue regional
rules and preferential trade agreements without the
participation of the United States. There are now more than 200
preferential trade agreements in force with at least one party
from the region and over 100 more are under negotiation or
pending ratification.
(11) Recognizing this void in American leadership, the
Biden administration launched negotiations with Australia,
Brunei, India, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia,
New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam
(with Fiji joining shortly thereafter) on the Indo-Pacific
Economic Framework (IPEF) in 2022, with the aim of deepening
trade ties, strengthening supply chain resiliency, accelerating
the development of climate infrastructure, and countering
corruption.
(12) In November 2023, IPEF partners signed an agreement on
supply chain resiliency and announced the substantial
conclusion of negotiations on several additional agreements but
have not finalized an agreement that includes commitments on
trade. The Biden Administration has not sought to consult with
Congress on the IPEF pillars.
(13) To inform future policymaking, Congress should work
with the administration in a bipartisan manner to examine
current United States economic policy toward the Indo-Pacific,
the impacts of regional trade agreements on American
competitiveness, and policies to advance United States
objectives in the region.
(14) Through a more comprehensive trade and economic
strategy toward the Indo-Pacific region, the United States
could exert greater leverage to improve labor rights and help
level the playing field for American workers, enhance
environmental standards, counter non-market economies and
authoritarianism, construct more resilient supply chains,
better meet the needs of our allies and partners, and grow our
economy by addressing barriers to trade for American products.
SEC. 3. INVESTIGATION OF IMPACT OF INDO-PACIFIC REGIONAL AGREEMENTS ON
UNITED STATES COMPETITIVENESS.
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the United States International Trade Commission shall conduct and
conclude an investigation to examine--
(1) how preferential market access provisions, including
tariffs, quotas, and services commitments, in existing Indo-
Pacific regional trade agreements, including the Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) Agreement and the
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific
Partnership (CPTPP), affect United States exports and growth
opportunities in the Indo-Pacific region;
(2) how existing non-tariff barriers, including regulatory
practices, relatively lower labor and environmental standards,
different rules for sectors ranging from agriculture and the
digital economy, and standard-setting in these areas as part of
existing Indo-Pacific regional and bilateral trade agreements,
impact the competitiveness of American workers and businesses;
(3) the impact of existing Indo-Pacific regional trade
agreements on United States supply chain resiliency and
connectivity, and in particular its impact on the People's
Republic of China's role in key global supply chains; and
(4) differences between the United States-Mexico-Canada
Agreement (USMCA) and CPTPP, RCEP, or other regional trade
agreements in the Indo-Pacific that would likely have a
substantial impact on United States businesses and workers.
SEC. 4. INDO-PACIFIC TRADE STRATEGY COMMISSION.
(a) Establishment.--
(1) In general.--There is hereby established an independent
commission to be known as the ``Indo-Pacific Trade Strategy
Commission'' (in this section referred to as the
``Commission''), to develop findings and recommendations for a
comprehensive trade strategy for the Indo-Pacific region for
purposes of--
(A) ensuring sustained United States economic and
geopolitical leadership in the Indo-Pacific region;
(B) promoting United States innovation, exports,
and economic opportunities for workers and businesses;
(C) countering the People's Republic of China's
aggressive trade agenda;
(D) promoting United States values, norms, and
standards;
(E) strengthening the United States economy;
(F) bolstering United States economic and national
security, including by addressing the vulnerabilities
identified in the G7 Leaders' Statement on Economic
Resilience and Economic Security of May 20, 2023; and
(G) promoting United States supply chain
resilience.
(2) Effective date.--This subsection shall take effect on
the date that is 30 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act.
(b) Membership.--
(1) Number and appointment.--The Commission shall be
composed of 12 members appointed as follows:
(A) 6 members appointed by mutual agreement of the
Chair of the Committee on Ways and Means of the House
of Representatives and the Ranking Member of the
Committee on Finance of the Senate.
(B) 6 members appointed by mutual agreement of the
Chair of the Committee on Finance of the Senate and the
Ranking Member of the Committee on Ways and Means of
the House of Representatives.
(C) None of the appointed members shall be a Member
of the House of Representatives or a Member of the
Senate.
(2) Qualifications.--The members of the Commission shall be
individuals who have well-documented expertise, knowledge, or
experience in the Indo-Pacific region, and--
(A) international trade;
(B) economic and supply chain issues;
(C) labor matters; or
(D) environmental policy.
(3) Meetings.--The Commission shall--
(A) hold public hearings and meetings;
(B) hold classified hearings or meetings, if
necessary to discuss classified material or
information;
(C) provide an opportunity for public comment,
including sharing of research and policy analysis,
through publication of a solicitation for public
comments during a period of not less than 45 days;
(D) consult quarterly with Congress, specifically
with members of the Committee on Ways and Means of the
House of Representatives and members of the Committee
on Finance of the Senate; and
(E) submit, not later than 18 months after the date
of the enactment of this Act, a final report to
Congress, specifically to the members of the Committee
on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives and
members of the Committee on Finance of the Senate.
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