[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

FINDING THE RIGHT FREQUENCY:
5G DEPLOYMENT AND AVIATION SAFETY

=======================================================================

(117-40)

REMOTE HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON
AVIATION

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

__________

FEBRUARY 3, 2022

__________

Printed for the use of the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Available online at: https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-
transportation?path=/browsecommittee/chamber/house/committee/
transportation

______

U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
49-706 PDF WASHINGTON : 2023

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon, Chair
SAM GRAVES, Missouri ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON,
DON YOUNG, Alaska District of Columbia
ERIC A. ``RICK'' CRAWFORD, Arkansas EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
BOB GIBBS, Ohio RICK LARSEN, Washington
DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California
THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
RODNEY DAVIS, Illinois JOHN GARAMENDI, California
JOHN KATKO, New York HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
BRIAN BABIN, Texas Georgia
GARRET GRAVES, Louisiana ANDRE CARSON, Indiana
DAVID ROUZER, North Carolina DINA TITUS, Nevada
MIKE BOST, Illinois SEAN PATRICK MALONEY, New York
RANDY K. WEBER, Sr., Texas JARED HUFFMAN, California
DOUG LaMALFA, California JULIA BROWNLEY, California
BRUCE WESTERMAN, Arkansas FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida
BRIAN J. MAST, Florida DONALD M. PAYNE, Jr., New Jersey
MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania MARK DeSAULNIER, California
JENNIFFER GONZALEZ-COLON, STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
Puerto Rico SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California
TROY BALDERSON, Ohio ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland
PETE STAUBER, Minnesota TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey
TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee GREG STANTON, Arizona
DUSTY JOHNSON, South Dakota COLIN Z. ALLRED, Texas
JEFFERSON VAN DREW, New Jersey SHARICE DAVIDS, Kansas, Vice Chair
MICHAEL GUEST, Mississippi JESUS G. ``CHUY'' GARCIA, Illinois
TROY E. NEHLS, Texas ANTONIO DELGADO, New York
NANCY MACE, South Carolina CHRIS PAPPAS, New Hampshire
NICOLE MALLIOTAKIS, New York CONOR LAMB, Pennsylvania
BETH VAN DUYNE, Texas SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
CARLOS A. GIMENEZ, Florida JAKE AUCHINCLOSS, Massachusetts
MICHELLE STEEL, California CAROLYN BOURDEAUX, Georgia
KAIALI`I KAHELE, Hawaii
MARILYN STRICKLAND, Washington
NIKEMA WILLIAMS, Georgia
MARIE NEWMAN, Illinois
TROY A. CARTER, Louisiana

Subcommittee on Aviation

RICK LARSEN, Washington, Chair
GARRET GRAVES, Louisiana STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
DON YOUNG, Alaska ANDRE CARSON, Indiana
THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky SHARICE DAVIDS, Kansas
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania KAIALI`I KAHELE, Hawaii
JOHN KATKO, New York NIKEMA WILLIAMS, Georgia
BRIAN J. MAST, Florida HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin Georgia
BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania DINA TITUS, Nevada
TROY BALDERSON, Ohio SEAN PATRICK MALONEY, New York
PETE STAUBER, Minnesota JULIA BROWNLEY, California
TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee DONALD M. PAYNE, Jr., New Jersey
JEFFERSON VAN DREW, New Jersey MARK DeSAULNIER, California
TROY E. NEHLS, Texas STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
NANCY MACE, South Carolina ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland
BETH VAN DUYNE, Texas GREG STANTON, Arizona
CARLOS A. GIMENEZ, Florida COLIN Z. ALLRED, Texas
MICHELLE STEEL, California CONOR LAMB, Pennsylvania, Vice
SAM GRAVES, Missouri (Ex Officio) Chair
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON,
District of Columbia
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
JOHN GARAMENDI, California
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon (Ex
Officio)

CONTENTS

Page

Summary of Subject Matter........................................ vii

STATEMENTS OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE

Hon. Rick Larsen, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Washington, and Chair, Subcommittee on Aviation, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Prepared statement........................................... 3
Hon. Garret Graves, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Louisiana, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Aviation,
opening statement.............................................. 4
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Hon. Peter A. DeFazio, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Oregon, and Chair, Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, opening statement.............................. 6
Prepared statement........................................... 8
Hon. Sam Graves, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Missouri, and Ranking Member, Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, opening statement.............................. 10
Prepared statement........................................... 10

WITNESSES
Panel 1

Hon. Stephen M. Dickson, Administrator, Federal Aviation
Administration, oral statement................................. 11
Prepared statement........................................... 13

Panel 2

Nicholas E. Calio, President and Chief Executive Officer,
Airlines for America, oral statement........................... 46
Prepared statement........................................... 48
Hon. Eric Fanning, President and Chief Executive Officer,
Aerospace Industries Association, oral statement............... 53
Prepared statement........................................... 55
Cathryn Stephens, A.A.E., Airport Director, Eugene Airport, on
behalf of the American Association of Airport Executives, oral
statement...................................................... 59
Prepared statement........................................... 61
Captain Joseph G. DePete, President, Air Line Pilots Association,
International, oral statement.................................. 64
Prepared statement........................................... 66
Faye Malarkey Black, President and Chief Executive Officer,
Regional Airline Association, oral statement................... 70
Prepared statement........................................... 72
James Viola, President and Chief Executive Officer, Helicopter
Association International, oral statement...................... 80
Prepared statement........................................... 82
Hon. Meredith Attwell Baker, President and Chief Executive
Officer, CTIA, oral statement.................................. 85
Prepared statement........................................... 86
Dennis A. Roberson, President and Chief Executive Officer,
Roberson and Associates, LLC, oral statement................... 93
Prepared statement........................................... 94

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD

Submissions for the Record by Hon. Peter A. DeFazio:
Letter of February 7, 2022, and 5G Timeline from Captain
Joseph G. DePete, President, Air Line Pilots Association,
International.............................................. 121
Letter of February 2, 2022, from Present and Former Members
of the Federal Aviation Management Advisory Council........ 126
Statement of Ed Bolen, President and Chief Executive Officer,
National Business Aviation Association..................... 127
``Analysis of 5G Deployment: Executive Summary,'' by
Professional Aviation Safety Specialists, AFL-CIO.......... 129
``Analysis of 5G Deployment: White Paper,'' February 2022, by
Professional Aviation Safety Specialists, AFL-CIO.......... 130
Statement of Terry L. McVenes, President and Chief Executive
Officer, RTCA, Inc......................................... 136

APPENDIX

Questions from Hon. Sam Graves of Missouri to Hon. Stephen M.
Dickson, Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration........ 139
Questions from Hon. Eleanor Holmes Norton to Hon. Eric Fanning,
President and Chief Executive Officer, Aerospace Industries
Association.................................................... 141
Question from Hon. Peter A. DeFazio to Hon. Meredith Attwell
Baker, President and Chief Executive Officer, CTIA............. 142

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

February 1, 2022

SUMMARY OF SUBJECT MATTER

TO: LMembers, Subcommittee on Aviation
FROM: LStaff, Subcommittee on Aviation
RE: LSubcommittee Hearing on ``Finding the Right
Frequency: 5G Deployment and Aviation Safety''
_______________________________________________________________________

PURPOSE

The Subcommittee on Aviation will meet on Thursday,
February 3, 2022, at 11 a.m. EST in 2167 Rayburn House Office
Building and virtually via Zoom for a hearing titled, ``Finding
the Right Frequency: 5G Deployment and Aviation Safety.'' The
hearing will examine how the C-band spectrum was reallocated
for 5G wireless services, the aviation industry's safety
concerns with the recent 5G deployment, and the effects of the
recent deployment on the U.S. aviation industry and national
airspace system (NAS). The Subcommittee will hear testimony
from two panels. The first panel will feature the government
witness from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The
second panel will include witnesses from: Aerospace Industries
Association (AIA), Airlines for America (A4A), Air Line Pilots
Association (ALPA), American Association of Airport Executives
(AAAE), CTIA, Helicopter Association International (HAI),
Regional Airline Association (RAA), and a telecommunications
consultant.

BACKGROUND

I. FCC AUCTION OF C-BAND FOR 5G

On November 18, 2019, Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) Chair Ajit Pai informed Congress of the FCC's intention
to hold a public auction of mid-band wireless spectrum from
3.7-3.98 GHz, also known as the C-band, to fuel the deployment
of 5G.\1\ At the time, many aviation stakeholders expressed
concerns about potentially harmful radio frequency interference
with certain aviation safety equipment, including radio
altimeters,\2\ which operate in the adjacent 4.2-4.4 GHz band
(aviation band).\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Marguerite Reardon, ``FCC to auction C-band spectrum for 5G'',
CNET (November 18, 2019), available at https://www.cnet.com/tech/
mobile/fcc-to-auction-c-band-spectrum-for-5g/.
\2\ Radio altimeters are also known as radar altimeters or RADALT.
\3\ Letter of Edward Yorkgitus, Aviation Spectrum Resources to
Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, GN
Docket No. 12-122 (filed Oct. 25, 2019) available at: https://
ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/10620182163379/
19062019%20Aviation%20Associations%20Joint
%20Ex%20Parte%20Filing%20Dkt%20No%2018-122.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In response to the FCC's announcement, the FAA sent a
letter on September 30, 2019, to the Interdepartment Radio
Advisory Committee (IRAC), which is responsible for advising
the National Telecommunications and Information Administration
(NTIA) on spectrum decisions within the federal government,
expressing reservations about the auction of the spectrum
adjacent to the aviation band. In this letter, the FAA also
notified the IRAC of testing that was being conducted by the
Aerospace Vehicle Systems Institute on the resilience of a
variety of altimeters against 5G interference.\4\ Additionally,
on December 1, 2020, the General Counsel (and future Acting
Secretary) of the Department of Transportation (DOT), Steven
Bradbury, and FAA Administrator Steve Dickson sent a letter to
the NTIA urging the agency to delay the FCC's upcoming auction
due to concerns over the impact it could have on aviation
safety.\5\ However, the NTIA did not enter the letter into the
FCC docket for consideration.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Letter of Michael Richmond, FAA Interdepartment Radio Advisory
Committee Representative to Peter Tenhula, Chairman, Interdepartment
Radio Advisory Committee (filed Sept. 30, 2019).
\5\ Secretary Steven Bradbury and Administrator Steve Dickson,
Expanding Flexible Use of the 3.7 to 4.2 GHz Band, FAA & DOT (December
1, 2020), available at: https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/2021-
10/DOT_Letter_to_NTIA_FCC3.7_GHz_Band_Auction.pdf.
\6\ Fed Aviation Admin., FAA Statements on 5G (Jan. 2, 2022),
available at: https://www.faa.gov/newsroom/faa-statements-5g.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Following the FAA and DOT letters, the House Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure Chair Peter DeFazio sent a
letter to FCC Chair Pai urging the FCC to postpone its
scheduled C-band auction due to other federal agencies'
concerns surrounding the potential harmful 5G interference with
radio altimeters.\7\ Nonetheless, on December 8, 2020, the FCC
began its public auction of the C-band, which yielded 21
winning bids and $81 billion in revenue.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, Chair
DeFazio Calls on FCC to Postpone Tomorrow's Scheduled Auction of a
Portion of 3.7-4.2 GHz Radio Frequency Spectrum, Citing New Research
That Amplifies the Safety Concerns of the Aviation Community (December
07, 2020), available at: https://transportation.house.gov/news/press-
releases/chair-defazio-calls-on-fcc-to-postpone-tomorrows-scheduled-
auction-of-a-portion-of-37-42-ghz-radio-frequency-spectrum-citing-new-
research-that-amplifies-the-safety-concerns-of-the-aviation-community.
\8\ See FCC Public Notice, Auction of Flexible-Use Service Licenses
in the 3.7-3.98 GHz Band for Next-Generation Wireless Services, AU
Docket No. 20-25 (Aug. 7, 2020), available at https://docs.fcc.gov/
public/attachments/FCC-20-110A1.pdf; FCC Announces Winning Bidders in
C-band Auction, FCC (February 24, 2021), available at: https://
www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-announces-winning-bidders-c-band-auction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

II. RADIO ALTIMETERS

Radio altimeters are fundamental flight instruments found
on most commercial aircraft and many general aviation aircraft
that enhance safety and flight operations by providing
measurements of an aircraft's clearance height above the ground
terrain and any obstacles.\9\ On approach during flight within
2,500 feet of the ground terrain, the radio altimeter serves as
a pilot's primary altitude-measuring instrument and is used for
all-weather approaches and landing procedures; radio
altimeter(s) enable a pilot to verify descent progress and
distance to the ground on an approach, detecting unsafe
situations.\10\ Use of a radio altimeter is critical in
enabling safe arrivals, particularly during inclement weather,
low cloud layers, or other instances of low visibility.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ RTCA Inc., Assessment of C-Band Mobile Telecommunications
Interference Impact on Low Range Radar Altimeter Operations (October 7,
2020), available at: https://www.rtca.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/
SC-239-5G-Interference-Assessment-Report_274-20-PMC-2073_
accepted_changes.pdf.
\10\ Jim Sparks, Radio Altitude: The Instrument of Choice,
AviationPros (July 2003), available at: https://www.aviationpros.com/
home/article/10387134/radio-altitude-the-instrument-of-choice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to the FAA, the ``receiver on the radio altimeter
is typically highly accurate, however it may deliver erroneous
results in the presence of out-of-band radiofrequency emissions
from other frequency bands.'' \11\ Such interference from
adjacent bands, or out-of-band radio frequency emissions, could
pose a hazard to aircraft in flight by causing faulty or
erroneous radio altimeter readings.\12\ Erroneous altimeter
readings are a cause for concern at all phases of flight,
particularly in automated flight deck systems that rely on
accurate altimeter readings for a variety of systems and
functions. For example, in 2009 a Turkish Airlines aircraft
landing at Amsterdam-Schiphol Airport experienced a faulty
radio altimeter reading that was fed into the automated flight
deck system while on approach, contributing to the aircraft's
fatal crash and resulting in nine deaths.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Fed. Aviation Admin., Safety Alert for Operators, Subject:
Risk of Potential Adverse Effects on Radio Altimeters when Operating in
the Presence of 5G C-Band Interference (Dec. 23, 2021), available at:
https://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation_industry/airline_operators/
airline_safety/safo/all_safos/media/2021/SAFO21007.pdf.
\12\ Fed Aviation Admin., 5G and Aviation Safety (Jan. 2, 2022),
available at: https://www.faa.gov/5g.
\13\ Frances Fiorino, Boeing Warns of Possible 737 Altimeter Fault,
Aviation Week (March 2009), available at: https://web.archive.org/web/
20120322020140/http://www.aviationweek.com/
aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=comm&id=news/
ALT030509.xml&headline=
Boeing%20Warns%20of%20Possible%20737%20Altimeter%20Fault.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Radio altimeters also provide height-above-terrain
information, which can serve as a critical component for other
systems on an aircraft, such as the Terrain Awareness and
Warning System (TAWS).\14\ Terrain warning is required in the
U.S. for all air carrier operations due to numerous fatal
Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) accidents,\15\ and has
been the subject of several National Transportation Safety
Board recommendations.\16\ Fortunately, there has not been a
single passenger fatality due to a CFIT accident on an U.S.
Part 121 aircraft equipped with TAWS since the system deployed
in the late 1990s.\17\Prior to this time, CFIT accidents were
the leading cause of fatalities in commercial aviation.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Hop Potter, Implementation of Terrain Awareness and Warning
System (TAWS)--Final Report to CAST, Skybrary (May 2006), available at:
https://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/
SE001:_Terrain_Awareness_Warning_System_(TAWS)_-_Final_Report and
subsequent analysis of aircraft accident databases since 2006.
\15\ 14 CFR 121.354 (2022).
\16\ Hop Potter, supra note 14.
\17\ Id.
\18\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the fall of 2020, the Radio Technical Commission for
Aeronautics (RTCA), a non-profit organization, completed a six-
month study of radio frequency interference from 5G network
emissions with radio altimeter performance.\19\ The RTCA study
stated that, without appropriate mitigations and guardrails,
deployment of 5G wireless services in the C-band could cause
``catastrophic failures leading to multiple fatalities.'' \20\
The RTCA study also concluded that the aviation industry cannot
mitigate such a risk alone and suggested the FCC, FAA, and
aviation and telecommunications (telecom) industries work
together to ensure radio altimeters are safeguarded in the
interest of public safety.\21\ While the FCC offered the
aviation sector a 220 MHz guardrail (3.98-4.2 GHz) between
bands to help prevent harmful interference, many aviation
stakeholders maintained that this mitigation measure alone was
not enough.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ RTCA, Assessment of C-band Mobile Telecommunications
Interference Impact on Low Range Radar Altimeter Operations, (October
7, 2020), available at: https://www.rtca.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/
10/SC-239-5G-Interference-Assessment-Report_274-20-PMC-2073_
accepted_changes.pdf.
\20\ Id. at 88.
\21\ RTCA, supra note 19.
\22\ Bevin Fletcher, Aviation Wireless Industries Clash Over C-band
Interference, Fierce Wireless, (August 2021), available at: https://
www.fiercewireless.com/regulatory/aviation-wireless-industries-clash-
over-c-band-interference.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Since May 2021, the Department of Defense has been leading
an interagency effort to test the potential effects of certain
5G technologies on radio altimeters, primarily on military
aircraft, focusing on improving the performance of equipment to
protect against harmful interference.\23\ There have also been
calls for developing performance standards for radio altimeters
to ensure all altimeters are designed to filter out
interference and are better performing given that no standards
for radio altimeters currently exist. Although the RTCA is
working on revising the minimum operational standards for
altimeters, aviation stakeholders anticipate that the process
of setting those standards and receiving approval from the FAA
will take several years, after which more time will then need
to be allotted for manufacturers to begin producing and
installing these new altimeters.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ Valerie Insinna and Aaron Mehta, As 5G auction continues,
Pentagon turns to safety planning, Defense News (January 21, 2021),
available at: https://www.defensenews.com/air/2021/01/21/as-5g-auction-
continues-pentagon-turns-to-safety-risk-mitigation-plans/.
\24\ Bani Sapra, Bringing 5G to the skies is more complicated than
it seems, Wired (May 5, 2021), available at: https://wired.me/science/
bringing-5g-to-the-skies-is-more-complicated-than-it-seems/.
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III. 5G DEPLOYMENT AND THE FAA'S RESPONSE

A. SPECIAL AIRWORTHINESS INFORMATION BULLETIN AND INITIAL 5G DEPLOYMENT
DELAY

The current situation over 5G deployment escalated in
November 2021 when the FAA issued a special airworthiness
information bulletin alerting manufacturers, operators, and
pilots that action may be needed to address potential
interference with radio altimeters caused by 5G deployment.\25\
Verizon and AT&T, which were expected to roll out 5G services
in the C-band on December 5, 2021, subsequently announced they
would delay their 5G rollout for 30 days, in order to provide
additional time to address the aviation industry's
concerns.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ Special Airworthiness Bulletin on potential adverse effects on
radio altimeters, Federal Aviation Administration (November 2, 2021),
available at: https://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/
rgSAIB.nsf/dc7bd4f27e5f107486257221005f069d/27ffcbb45
e6157e9862587810044ad19/%24FILE/AIR-21-18.pdf.
\26\ Cat Zakrzewski, AT&T and Verizon will delay rollout over
airplane interference concerns, Washington Post (November 4, 2021),
available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/11/04/att-
verizon-5g-delay/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. FAA AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES (ADS) ON RADIO ALTIMETERS

In early December 2021, the FAA issued a set of ADs, which
included a directive that required revising flight manuals to
prohibit certain operations requiring radio altimeter data when
in the presence of 5G C-band signals, such as landing in low
visibility conditions.\27\ This AD would apply to areas and
airports later identified through Notice to Air Missions
(NOTAMs).\28\ The AD was expected to prevent the dispatch of
flights to certain airports and locations during times of low
visibility--such as fog, rain, and snow--and result in
significantly more flight diversions and cancellations.\29\ A4A
estimated at the time that if the AD had been in effect in
2019, approximately 345,000 passenger flights, 32 million
passengers, and 5,400 cargo flights would have been impacted in
the form of delayed flights, diversions, or cancellations.\30\
HAI also estimated that a large portion of their fleet could
have been grounded without significant relief from the FAA.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ FAA, supra note 12.
\28\ Id.
\29\ FAA, supra note 6.
\30\ David Shepardson, U.S. airlines warn 5G wireless could wreak
havoc with flights, Reuters (December 15, 20221), available at: https:/
/www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/us-airlines-warn-5g-
wireless-could-cause-havoc-with-flights-2021-12-15/.
\31\ HAI, Statement on FAA ADs Related to 5G Wireless Interference,
(December 8, 2021), available at: https://rotormedia.com/hai-statement-
on-faa-airworthiness-directives-related-to-5g-wireless-interference/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. DECEMBER 2021 INFORMATION SHARING AGREEMENT

One of the primary reasons the FAA issued a wide-reaching
AD to mitigate potential harmful interference from 5G signals
is because the FCC did not possess, and the telecom industry
had not provided, data which contained the requisite critical
information the FAA needed to provide an in-depth technical
analysis.\32\ This prevented the FAA from conducting the
critical risk assessments needed to put the proper mitigations
in place prior to the originally scheduled deployment. Finally,
in December 2021, the FAA confirmed that the telecom industry
had begun transmitting the technical data (such as 5G base
station locations) for the FAA to accurately assess the risk to
aircraft radio altimeters.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ Briefing provided to Committee staff by FAA on January 3,
2021.
\33\ Information provided to Committee staff by the FAA on Dec. 20,
2021.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On December 22, 2021, Verizon and AT&T announced, through
the wireless industry trade association, CTIA, an agreement
between CTIA, AIA, and A4A, to begin sharing otherwise
confidential technical data amongst their member companies.\34\
This information sharing agreement was critical for providing
engineers and experts from the airlines and aviation
manufacturers with previously unavailable data that allowed
them to more accurately assess the potential risk of 5G signals
to aircraft radio altimeters.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ CTIA, Joint Statement from CTIA, AIA and A4A on 5G and
Aviation Safety, (December 22, 2021), available at: https://
www.ctia.org/news/joint-statement-from-ctia-aia-and-a4a-on-5g-and-
aviation-safety#::text=December%2022%2C%202021-
,Joint%20Statement%20from%20CTIA
%2C%20AIA%20and,on%205G%20and%20Aviation%20Safety%20.&text=%E2%80%9COur%
20
belief%20is%20that%20by,5G%20while%20preserving%20aviation%20safety.%E2%
80%9D.
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D. JANUARY 3, 2022, AGREEMENT

On January 3, 2022, Verizon and AT&T announced another two-
week delay of 5G deployment, from January 5, 2022, to January
19, 2022, after DOT Secretary Buttigieg and FAA Administrator
Dickson called on both telecom companies to delay deployment
for two weeks in a December 31, 2021, letter.\35\ As part of
that deal, Verizon and AT&T agreed to continue sharing the
geographical locations of 5G ground stations and supply a more
in-depth understanding of how the more powerful 5G signals of
those stations would function within the C-band.\36\
Additionally, the FAA, in consultation with aviation
stakeholders, agreed to identify 50 priority airports which
would be subjected to temporary 5G ``exclusion zones,'' areas
where 5G deployment would be prohibited within at least 1.25
miles beyond the ends of the runway and about a half mile to
either side.\37\ These priority airports were identified by the
FAA and selected based on their traffic volume, number of low-
visibility days, and role as a diversion location for other
airports that may experience disruption.\38\ This agreement was
originally intended to only be in place for six months and gave
the telecom industry the right to reject any of the originally
agreed upon mitigations already in place. However, the terms of
this agreement were later superseded by another agreement on
January 18, 2022.
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\35\ Associated Press, AT&T, Verizon delay new 5G service after
Buttigieg request, (January 3, 2022), available at: https://
www.boston.com/news/technology/2022/01/03/att-verizon-delay-new-5g-
service-after-buttigieg-request/.
\36\ Id.
\37\ FAA, supra note 12.
\38\ FAA, supra note 6.
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E. JANUARY 18, 2022, AGREEMENT

On January 18, 2022, a day before the scheduled nationwide
deployment of 5G, Verizon and AT&T announced they would delay
deployment around certain airport runways.\39\ This move was in
response to an A4A letter expressing concern over the recently
issued FAA NOTAMs that placed flight restrictions affecting a
significant number of airports, not just the 50 priority
airports previously covered under the January 3, 2022,
agreement.\40\ The new agreement,\41\ which the DOT and FAA
also helped broker, called for expanded exclusion zones that
prohibit 5G deployment within at least two \42\ miles of
runways at all 87 airports affected by FAA NOTAMs.\43\
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\39\ David Shepardson, AT&T, Verizon pause 5G rollout near U.S.
airports to avoid flight disruptions, Reuters, (January 19, 2022),
available at: https://www.reuters.com/
business/aerospace-defense/biden-administration-talks-head-off-5g-
aviation-standoff-2022-01-18/.
\40\ See David Shepardson, Major U.S. airlines warn 5G could ground
some planes, wreak havoc, Reuters, (January 18, 2022), available at:
https://www.reuters.com/technology/
exclusive-major-us-airline-ceos-urge-action-avoid-catastrophic-5g-
flight-2022-01-17/.
\41\ While the FAA has briefed the Committee on the general outline
of the January 18, 2022, agreement, some of the specific details of the
agreement remain undisclosed.
\42\ The actual area for which deployment is prohibited is
approximately 3 miles, but this extra mile is to ensure that an
aircraft's radio altimeter will be performing accurately within 2 miles
of an affected airport's runway. The FAA also continues to refine these
areas, based on evolving risk, and it may change over time.
\43\ While there have been several different types of 5G-related
NOTAMs recently issued by the FAA, this is specifically in reference to
the Instrument Approach Procedure (IAP) NOTAMs that restrict specific
low visibility approach operations at certain airports.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The expanded exclusion zones around specific airports were
designed to allay the FAA's concerns with 5G interference
enough to permit the agency to issue more alternative methods
of compliance (AMOCs), which in turn would allow more aircraft
to operate at those airports even in low visibility
conditions.\44\ According to the FAA, unlike the previous
mitigation agreements that were agreed to, the terms of this
agreement are not expected to expire until the FAA determines
it is safe to deploy 5G within that two-mile radius.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\44\ FAA, supra note 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

IV. CURRENT STATE OF PLAY

Since the January 18, 2022, targeted delay, the FAA has
issued a number of AMOCs which allow a large percentage of the
commercial air carrier fleet to continue operations at all of
the 87 airports that received Instrument Approach Procedure
NOTAMs.\45\ In the case of 5G, an AMOC is essentially an
exemption to the AD, allowing (a) a specific aircraft, with (b)
a specific radio altimeter, to land at (c) specified airports,
even in low visibility conditions, regardless of whether the
airport has a 5G NOTAM or not.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\45\ FAA, supra note 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The aircraft models that have received an AMOC and are
approved as of January 31, 2022, represent at least 90 percent
of the U.S. commercial fleet (compared to just 45 percent
before the January 18, 2022, agreement) and include Boeing 717,
737, 747, 757, 767, 777, 787, MD-10/-11 models; Airbus A300,
A310, A319, A220, A320, A321, A330, A340, A350 and A380 models;
Embraer 120, 170, and 190 regional jets; CL-600/CRJ regional
jets; DHC-8 turboprops and ATR turboprops.\46\ However, those
AMOCs are limited to the above aircraft models that possess one
of 20 approved radio altimeters.\47\ While helicopter operators
have not yet received an AMOC and are still restricted by
certain airspace related NOTAMs, the FAA did grant a two-year
waiver to the AD to allow most medical emergency flights to
continue under certain conditions.\48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\46\ FAA, supra note 12.
\47\ Id.
\48\ Helicopter Ass'n Int'l Partial Grant of Exemption, Regulatory
Docket No. FAA-2021-1028, Exemption No. 18973 (Jan. 13, 2022),
available at: https://rotormedia.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/
Approved-HAI-5G-Partial-grant.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When the FAA originally announced the first round of AMOC
approvals prior to the January 18, 2022, agreement, low
visibility operations were only permitted at 48 of the 87
affected airports. This agreement has enabled the FAA to expand
the list of airports to all 87 airports.\49\ It is worth noting
that even with these AMOCs, sporadic disruptions are still
expected throughout the NAS. For instance, there are still a
significant number of commercial aircraft, particularly
regional commercial aircraft, that have either yet to receive
an AMOC or received a limited AMOC that still prohibits or
severely restricts the aircraft from operating in low
visibility conditions at certain airports.\50\ Additionally, as
the FAA continues to receive and review additional information
pertaining to the deployment of new 5G base stations, the
agency will need to issue new NOTAMs for airports and areas
that subsequently face higher risk of 5G interference for
aircraft. As the potential risks of 5G interference to aircraft
are determined, AMOCs--which expire at the end of each month--
will need to be reviewed and reissued.\51\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\49\ FAA, supra note 6
\50\ FAA, supra note 12.
\51\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thus, continued collaboration between the FAA, FCC, and
aviation and telecom stakeholders, and compliance with the
known terms of the January 18, 2022, agreement is necessary to
ultimately maintain aircraft safety and reduce further
disruptions to the NAS.

V. INTERNATIONAL 5G DEPLOYMENT

While 5G deployment has started to occur in as many as 40
other countries, there are several significant differences that
make comparisons between those countries and the United States
difficult. For instance, most of these countries either (1) use
drastically lower 5G power levels than the United States, (2)
have implemented other mitigation strategies prior to
deployment to prevent interference, namely 5G antennas' angle
requirements or expansive exclusion zones near airport runways,
or (3) operate their allocated frequencies for 5G farther away
from the radio frequency band used by radio altimeters, thereby
reducing the risk of interference. Additionally, they all have
much less commercial aviation activity than the United States.
Below are some examples of 5G deployment outside of the United
States and the mitigations those regions have implemented:
LEurope: The 3.4-3.8 GHz band is utilized for 5G
in Europe. However, there is a separation of an additional 100
MHz more than what will be provided in the U.S., reducing the
risk of potential interference.\52\ The power levels permitted
in most of Europe are 23 percent less than those that would be
permitted in the U.S.\53\ The European countries specified
below have additional mitigations in place.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\52\ A4A, 5G Interference: Frequently Asked Questions, available
at: https://www.airlines.org/5g-frequently-asked-questions/.
\53\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
LFrance: French regulators have imposed 5G
exclusion zones (primarily around the Nice and Charles de
Gaulle Airports) to protect public safety.\54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\54\ Ex Parte Letter from aviation stakeholders to Marlene Dortch,
Secretary, Federal Communications Commissions, Docket No. 18-122 (filed
Nov. 18, 2021), available at: https://www.airlines.org/wp-content/
uploads/2022/01/Aviation-Industry-Reply-to-CTIA-11-19-2021-2022-01-03-
15_57_10.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
LCzech Republic: Prague Airport has imposed 5G
exclusion zones to protect public safety.\55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\55\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
LUnited Kingdom (UK): Power levels are
significantly lower in both the frequency ranges 3.4-3.8 GHz,
and 3.805-4.195 GHz by 62 percent and 99 percent,
respectively.\56\ The UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) has
stated that 5G mobile base stations operating below 3.8 GHz
pose a viable interference threat to radio altimeters.\57\ The
UK CAA also stated that lower power levels in the 3.8-4.195 GHz
range may be an issue for helicopters, especially those used
for emergency services.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\56\ Id.
\57\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
LAustralia: Compared to Europe and the United
States, Australia operates farther away from the radio
frequency band used by the radio altimeter. Additionally, the
power levels permitted in Australia are 76 percent lower than
allowed in the United States.\58\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\58\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
LJapan: Japan has deployed 5G up to 4.1 GHz and
the power levels permitted for 5G are at least 90 percent below
those permitted in the United States.\59\ The macro cell power
levels are 96 percent below or only four percent of that
permitted in the U.S., while the small cell power levels are
less than one percent of what is permitted in the United
States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\59\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
LCanada: Canadian regulators recently announced
they would restrict certain 5G services around airports,
placing ``exclusion zones'' around 26 airports where outdoor 5G
base stations would not be permitted to operate--but indoor 5G
operations would be allowed.\60\ Canada also established
``protection zones'' where 5G operations would be allowed, with
restricted power. Canada will now require, until it decides
otherwise, that the 5G antennas tilt down, rather than
horizontally or upward, so as not to interfere with radio
altimeters.\61\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\60\ Diana Furchgott-Roth, Canada Limits 5G to Protect Air Travel,
Forbes, (November 21, 2021), available at: https://www.forbes.com/
sites/dianafurchtgott-roth/2021/11/21/canada-limits-5g-to-protect-air-
travel/?sh=593ae2737247.
\61\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
LSouth Korea: 5G is limited to 3.42-3.7 GHz and
the maximum permitted 5G power is 95 percent less than the U.S.
levels.\62\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\62\ A4A, supra note 52.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

WITNESSES

Panel 1

LThe Honorable Steve Dickson, Administrator,
Federal Aviation Administration

Panel 2

LNicholas E. Calio, President and CEO, Airlines
for America
LThe Honorable Eric Fanning, President and CEO,
Aerospace Industries Association
LCathryn Stephens, A.A.E., Airport Director,
Eugene Airport, on behalf of American Association of Airport
Executives
LCaptain Joe DePete, President, Air Line Pilots
Association
LFaye Malarkey Black, President and CEO, Regional
Airline Association
LJames A. Viola, President and CEO, Helicopter
Association International
LThe Honorable Meredith Attwell Baker, President
and CEO, CTIA
LDennis Roberson, President and CEO, Roberson and
Associates

FINDING THE RIGHT FREQUENCY: 5G DEPLOYMENT AND AVIATION SAFETY

----------

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 2022

House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Aviation,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:01 a.m., in
room 2167 Rayburn House Office Building and via Zoom, Hon. Rick
Larsen (Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Members present in person: Mr. Larsen of Washington, Mr.
DeFazio, Mr. Graves of Louisiana, Mr. Graves of Missouri, Mr.
Young, Mr. Perry, Mr. Katko, Mr. Burchett, and Mr. Garcia of
Illinois.
Members present remotely: Mr. Carson, Ms. Davids of Kansas,
Mr. Kahele, Mr. Johnson of Georgia, Ms. Titus, Ms. Brownley,
Mr. Payne, Mr. DeSaulnier, Mr. Lynch, Mr. Stanton, Mr. Allred,
Mr. Lamb, Ms. Norton, Ms. Johnson of Texas, Mr. Massie, Mr.
Mast, Mr. Fitzpatrick, Mr. Balderson, Mr. Stauber, Dr. Van
Drew, Mr. Nehls, Ms. Van Duyne, Mr. Gimenez, and Mrs. Steel.
Mr. Larsen. I call the meeting of the House Subcommittee on
Aviation to order.
I ask unanimous consent that the chair be authorized to
declare a recess at any time during today's hearing.
Without objection, so ordered.
I also ask unanimous consent that Members not on the
subcommittee be permitted to sit with the subcommittee at
today's hearing and ask questions.
Without objection, so ordered.
And as a reminder, please keep your microphone muted unless
speaking. If I hear any inadvertent background noise, I will
request that the Member mute their microphone. And I will not
say please, despite the instructions.
To insert a document into the record, please have your
staff email it to DocumentsT&I@mail.house.gov.
I will now recognize myself for an opening statement.
Good morning, and welcome to today's Aviation Subcommittee
hearing titled, ``Finding the Right Frequency: 5G Deployment
and Aviation Safety.''
On January 24th, 25th, and 26th, Alaska Airlines cancelled
over 50 flights at Paine Field in Everett, my hometown. Was it
the thicker than unusual 24-hour fog? No, planes fly in worse.
Was it the Embraer 175 radio altimeter? Also no; the airplane
flies with that radio altimeter all the time. Was it the runway
orientation? Was it pointing the wrong way? Well, that is a
silly assumption to make. Was it the presence of a radio tower
with a soon-to-be activated 5G transmitter? No, not just that.
Unfortunately, the problem was all of those things coming
together in a perfect storm of technology. This true story
about 5G and aviation safety shows that the problem we are
addressing today has more layers than a Dagwood sandwich.
So, what do we do when we are faced with a complex problem
like this? We break it into parts, and we focus on basic
principles. And our basic principle in this subcommittee is
aviation safety.
So, how to ensure that 5G and aviation safety can coexist,
in the words of several of our witnesses? What I hope emerges
from this hearing is that the subcommittee has a firm grasp of
what the telecommunication and aviation industry, the FAA, the
FCC, the NTIA, and others can do to anticipate future 5G
rollout conflicts, avoid them, what impact future FCC auctions
may have on aviation operations, and establish a process,
formal or informal, to proactively address these conflicts.
In preparation for today's hearing, here is what I
concluded.
The aviation industry has expressed concerns about 5G
interference as far back as 2015 at the World Radio Conference.
I also found out there is actually something called the World
Radio Conference.
I also found out the NTIA, the Federal agency responsible
for coordinating spectrum policy, failed to communicate the FAA
concerns through the formalized FCC process.
I found that telecom engineers and aerospace engineers have
the name ``engineer'' in common, but beyond that, they speak
actually different engineering languages when they speak to
each other and when they speak to each other at all. But I
understand that is changing as well, and that is a positive
outcome.
I found that the industries, aviation and telecom, have
misaligned cultures on this issue, with telecom being about
clearer, faster communications as its selling point, and
aviation has aviation safety as its selling point. It is what
gives the public confidence in flying.
I also found out that this is not a Federal Government only
problem. It is also an industry problem.
So, what can we do to help aviation safety and 5G coexist?
Well, I think there is an imperative here. There will be a
continued rollout of the C-band from the 3.7 to 3.8 megahertz
on the spectrum and eventually the 3.8 to 3.98, which will
bring us that much closer to the 4.2 megahertz band where the
aviation band starts.
There is a potential for future auctions as well. And then
there is 6G coming down, and it means different things to
different people. And we don't know what it means for aviation
safety. So, we need to begin to understand that.
I think we need to establish informal and formal
communication between the FAA and the FCC moving forward as
well. So that, hopefully, we don't have to have another hearing
like this.
I would like to think that, perhaps, that in foreign policy
what they call a track 2 dialogue can be convened, which is an
informal, nongovernmental discussion, in this case, on 5G, on
radio altimeters, on next steps that can be then used to inform
the more formal mechanisms. Sort of sort these things out
informally and then inform the formal mechanisms.
I certainly look forward to other ideas that we are going
to hear from our witnesses today. And as we move forward, maybe
we can get this Dagwood sandwich down to bite-sized chunks
moving forward.
With that, I yield the balance of my time, and I will
recognize Representative Graves from Louisiana for an opening
statement.
[Mr. Larsen's prepared statement follows:]

Prepared Statement of Hon. Rick Larsen, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Washington, and Chair, Subcommittee on Aviation
Good morning and welcome to today's Aviation Subcommittee hearing
titled ``Finding the Right Frequency: 5G Deployment and Aviation
Safety.''
On January 24th, 25th and 26th, Alaska Airlines cancelled over 50
flights at Paine Field in Everett, Washington, my hometown.
Was it the thicker than usual 24-hour fog? No, planes fly in worse.
Was it the Embraer 175 radio altimeter? Also no.
Or the runway orientation? Was it pointing the wrong way? That's a
silly assumption to make.
Was it just the presence of a radio tower with a soon-to-be
activated 5G transmitter? No, not just that.
Unfortunately, the problem was all of those things coming together
in a perfect storm of technology.
This true story about 5G and aviation safety shows that the problem
we are addressing today has more layers than a Dagwood sandwich.
What do we do when we are faced with a complex problem like this?
We break it into its parts and focus on basic principles. Our basic
principle on this subcommittee is aviation safety.
So how do we ensure that 5G and aviation safety can coexist, in the
words of several of our witnesses.
What I hope emerges from this hearing is that the Subcommittee has
a firm grasp of what the telecommunication and aviation industries, the
FAA, the FCC, the NTIA and others can do to anticipate future 5G
rollout conflicts, avoid them, and what impact future FCC auctions may
have on aviation operations, and establish a process, formal or
informal, to proactively address these conflicts.
In preparation for today's hearing, here is what I have concluded:
The aviation industry has expressed concerns about 5G
interference as far back as 2015 at the World Radio Conference.
The NTIA, the federal agency responsible for coordinating
spectrum policy, failed to communicate the FAA concerns through the
formalized FCC process.
Telecom engineers and aerospace engineers have the name
``engineers'' in common, but beyond that, they speak different
engineering languages when they speak to each other and when they speak
to each other at all. But I understand that is changing as well, and
that is a positive outcome.
The industries, aviation and telecom, have misaligned
cultures on this issue, with telecom being about clearer, faster
communications as its selling point, and aviation has aviation safety
as its selling point. It's what gives the public confidence in flying.
This is not a federal government only problem. It is also
an industry problem.

So what can we do to help aviation safety and 5G coexist?
It is imperative that there will be a continued rollout
of the C-band from 3.7 to 3.8 MHz on the spectrum and eventually 3.8 to
3.98, which will bring it closer to the 4.2 mHz band where the aviation
band starts. There's a potential for future auctions as well. And then
there's 6G coming down, and it means different things to different
people, and we don't know what it means for aviation safety. So we need
to begin to understand that.
I think we need to establish an informal or formalized
communication between the FAA and the FCC moving forward as well, so
hopefully we don't have to have another hearing like this.
I would like to think that perhaps in foreign policy what
they call a Track II dialogue can be convened, which is an informal,
non-governmental discussion, in this case on 5G, on radio altimeters,
on next steps that can be used to inform the more formal mechanisms--
sort of sort these things out informally and the inform the formal
mechanisms.

I certainly look forward to other ideas that we are going to hear
from our witnesses today.
As we move forward, maybe we can get this Dagwood sandwich down to
bite-sized chunks.

Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate you having this hearing.
Mr. Chairman, the United States has the safest aviation
industry in the world. It is the safest way to travel. We have
the gold standard in regard to safety and innovation. We also--
I believe I can speak for everyone on this panel--Republicans,
Democrats, everyone--supports the deployment of 5G C-band and
trying to help to bridge the digital divide.
I don't think that there is anyone here that would stand in
front of aviation safety and block efforts to advance, and I
don't think that there is anyone here that would block efforts
to improve technology, communication, and, again, to help to
bridge the digital divide.
Yet, if we look at what has happened and we found ourselves
in this absolutely ridiculous, inexcusable situation, after
knowing for years that there were challenges here, that there
were issues here, and finding ourselves in a situation where at
the very last minute there were claims, cries, demands, what
have you, to delay deployment in something that was entirely
preventable, something as the chair noted, issues had been
raised not months before, but years and years before, and we
found ourselves in this situation.
There is something called Parkinson's law. Parkinson's law
is that you are going to use every bit of time available to you
to finish a task. In this case, we didn't even do that. We saw
two very capable agencies, or three, if you include NTIA, just
simply sit here and play chicken with one another or whatever
ridiculousness happened and now we ended up threatening
aviation safety. We had flights cancelled.
And let me tell you something, Tim Clark, the CEO of
Emirates, the airline, said, quote: ``This is one of the most
delinquent, utterly irresponsible issues'' he has seen in his
aviation career. This is the CEO of a company, of an airline.
There is no excuse for us to be in this situation. This is what
you would expect from some other country without the governance
structure, without the strong civil support structure that we
have in the United States. It is embarrassing and I will say it
again, ridiculous, and it is inexcusable.
The traveling public expects that airlines are going to be
safe. We already have enough uncertainty related to schedules
and weather and other things that we don't need to create our
own problems further disrupting or creating uncertainty in
airline travel.
This committee takes aviation safety incredibly seriously
as you have seen from what we have primarily focused on over
the last 3 years. So, how do you balance this issue of aviation
safety and deployment of 5G C-band to make sure that you can
continue to have altimeters that work, you can continue to have
aviation safety, and you can continue to deploy this new
technology and improved communication?
The first step is leadership. It is leadership, and it is
fundamental changes in the two primary agencies, the FAA and
the FCC, in terms of how they approach things in this case.
Most of the time, I think the agencies sit there and they wait
for people to come to them.
And in this case, we saw agencies, both sitting there
waiting, in many cases, and it simply didn't work. It caused
the problem that we are facing today.
I think we can partially blame the clash of cultures at the
two agencies with very different missions. The communications
regulator, the FCC, is searching for evidence that there are
problems with altimeters and 5G interference. And the FAA, the
aviation safety regulator, is searching for proof that there
are none. Totally different approaches.
And make no mistake that what is going on right now, we are
still in the middle of this mess. We have temporary extensions,
mitigation features, and Band-Aids. We are still in the middle
of a big mess.
And although the temperature has been turned down for now,
there is an awful lot of work to be done by all parties as we
move forward. To Administrator Dickson, I do want to thank you
and your team for working through the holidays diligently and
over the past month to keep our aviation system safe and
operating while the significant rollout of 5G C-band across the
country has occurred. And I know we have asked a lot of your
team and I know they are going to be asking for a whole lot
more over the next few months.
We need them analyzing the data they are receiving from
radio altimeter manufacturers, wireless communication
companies, and aircraft manufacturers, and reporting what they
have learned about potential interference. We need a lot of
work in terms of the alternatives, I guess, approved in order
to allow aviation safety to continue.
We need them working with RTCA to expedite the development
and publication of new radio altimeter standards and
manufacturers to move forward. I look forward to hearing from
the witnesses today. I want to say, again, I am glad everyone
is working well together now. It shouldn't have taken this
long, and I think that the White House and others should have
stepped in well before we reached a level of chaos.
Mr. Chairman, thanks, again, for having the hearing, and I
look forward to hearing from our witnesses.
[Mr. Graves of Louisiana's prepared statement follows:]

Prepared Statement of Hon. Garret Graves, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Louisiana, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Aviation
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate you having this hearing
The United States has the safest aviation industry in the world. We
have the gold standard in safety and innovation, something this
committee has focused on significantly over the last three years.
I also believe I can speak for everyone on this panel, whether
Republican or Democrat, that we all support the deployment of 5G C-band
and efforts to help to bridge the digital divide and improve wireless
connectivity throughout our country.
Unfortunately, a lack of leadership resulted in those two goals not
being able to coexist, and we find ourselves in an absolutely
ridiculous, inexcusable situation. After knowing for years that there
would be hurdles in deploying a new band of spectrum, nothing was done
to cooperate and mitigate those risks. At the very last minute before
deployment of this new technology, we heard cries and demands for
delay. This was entirely preventable.
We saw three very capable agencies--FCC, FAA, and NTIA--play
chicken with one another. And that game of chicken ended up threatening
aviation safety.
There is no excuse for us to be in this situation. This is what you
would expect from a country that doesn't have the governance structure
that we have in the United States. It's embarrassing and I will say it
again--ridiculous and inexcusable.
The traveling public expects that airlines are going to be safe.
We already have enough uncertainty related to schedules and weather
as the industry is recovering from the pandemic, and we don't need to
create additional problems that further disrupt airline travel.
So, how do you balance aviation safety and the deployment of 5G C-
band, ensuring that our altimeters are operational to support aviation
safety and, at the same time, continue to deploy new technology to
improve communication?
It starts with leadership and requires fundamental changes in the
two primary agencies'--the FAA's and the FCC's--approach and
anticipation of conflicts within their mission areas. Neither agency
should sit back and wait to be acted upon by the other, and each agency
should consider how its internal culture influences that operational
procedure.
The communications regulator, the FCC, searches for evidence that
there is interference between 5G and aviation safety technologies. And
the FAA, the aviation safety regulator, searches for proof that there
isn't any. Totally different approaches.
While both agencies are actively engaged in a constructive dialogue
today, these challenges are not yet overcome. We are still in the
middle of this mess with temporary extensions, mitigation features, and
band-aids. And although the temperature has been turned down for now,
there is an awful lot of work to be done by all parties as we move
forward for this band of spectrum, and for future technological
advances which will undoubtedly pose similar risks.
Administrator Dickson, I want to thank you and your team for
working diligently through the holidays and over the past month to keep
our aviation system safe and operating while the significant rollout of
5G C-band across the country has occurred.
And I know we've asked a lot of your team, and I know we are going
to be asking for a whole lot more over the next few months. We need
them to analyze the data they're receiving from radio altimeter
manufacturers, wireless communication companies, and aircraft
manufacturers, and report what they've learned about potential
interference and deploy mitigation strategies which preserve aviation
safety while ensuring deployment of this next generation of
technologies. We need a lot of work in terms of the alternatives
approved in order to allow aviation safety to continue.
We need them to work with RTCA to expedite the development and
publication of new radio altimeter standards and manufacturers to move
forward. I look forward to hearing from the witnesses today, but I want
to say again that I am glad everyone is working well together now. But
it shouldn't have taken this long. That the White House didn't step in
well before we reached this level of chaos is inexcusable.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing and I look
forward to hearing from our witnesses.

Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Graves.
The Chair now recognizes the chair of the full committee.
Mr. DeFazio of Oregon is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. DeFazio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Well, you both have
well outlined the extraordinary lack of communication and
coordination between the FCC and the FAA and, of course, the
NTIA is supposed to arbitrate these sorts of things and
intervene--National Telecommunications and Information
Administration--but they just received their first permanent
head since the beginning of the Trump Presidency.
There were five interim heads during his Presidency and,
hopefully, the new head will be able to put them in their
rightful place of coordinating as we move forward, because we
are not done with this yet. We have temporary measures in
place, but there are going to be more towers put out there. The
companies consider their towers, their heights, their strength,
their location to be proprietary data. It can't be proprietary
data.
You can't just plop one down next to a critical approach
into an airport, but that is what was going on.
And the industry refused to share that data, even though
there was a very specific request made by the FAA on November
2nd. And, finally, on December 22nd, they began to release data
on where their secret towers were, what their powers were,
where the antennas were pointed, and that is when we began to
realize this was going to be a big problem.
And, in fact, for the first 2 days, they said, oh, you
can't give this data to anybody. You can't share it. This is
secret. So, till we finally--the lawyers worked it out, and the
FAA could work with the manufacturers and the airlines, and the
airports have not really been particularly well-informed
throughout this whole process. And there is just phenomenal
room for improvement.
There needs to be a formalized process. Memorandums of
understanding between affected agencies, you know, dealing with
the FCC. This isn't the first instance. The FCC decided to sell
off half of the vehicle-to-vehicle safety band. We are moving
to automated vehicles and we are trying to develop things,
crash avoidance, vehicle communication, and they said, no, it
is much more important that people can stream high D while
walking down the street on their cellphone. So, they sold off
half of that spectrum.
They are being litigated and hopefully they will lose, and
we will preserve that for the future of automobile safety. They
also disregarded the concerns of the Department of Defense on
letting Ligado turn on its satellites with the potential
degradation of critical GPS.
It is a pattern of ignoring consequences beyond the
consequences to the profitability of the telecom industry. That
is their only focus. Telecom wants this, they need this, they
got to have it. That has got to change, and hopefully the NTIA
can negotiate this, or maybe it has to be mandated by Congress.
You are going to have memorandums of understanding. You are
actually going to meaningfully cooperate and coordinate with
these other agencies. You are going to take your, sort of,
regulated--we don't really regulate telecoms any more, that is
why we have the crappiest cellphone service in the world. Your
regulated entities are going to communicate things to us, to
the affected parties, that will affect their industries. I
mean, that only makes sense. That only makes sense.
It is so disappointing, and we still have denial. We are
going to hear from a witness today that says, oh, we have much
greater safeguards than France now. Oops, not true. Oh, they
are operating at a much higher power in France. No, two and a
half times higher here. The antenna angles are mandated to be
tilted down in France and they have exclusion zones and the
list goes on around the country, around the world. And they
said, oh, because it is safe elsewhere, where everybody else
has taken measures to protect aviation, but we didn't until the
last minute. And it is a temporary agreement and something has
to be worked out long term in the next 6 months. As they deploy
more of these towers, they want to put them right in the
flightpath because we want to get to that neighborhood over
there. That is going to be a high-profit center for us, so, we
want to have an antenna right there.
There have to be some restrictions and agreements, because
we cannot have conflicting industries. Having a dropped call is
way less serious than having a dropped airplane out of the sky.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[Mr. DeFazio's prepared statement follows:]

Prepared Statement of Hon. Peter A. DeFazio, a Representative in
Congress from the State of Oregon, and Chair, Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure
Thank you, Chair Larsen, for calling this important hearing today
focused on the recent deployment of 5G technologies and its impact on
the aviation industry and National Airspace System. I would like to
thank FAA Administrator Dickson as well as the many aviation and
telecom stakeholders for appearing before us today. I would also like
to note that while FCC Chairwoman Rosenworcel had a conflict and could
not join us today, the committee very much looks forward to hearing
from her in the future on this issue.
If the events of the last two months have taught us anything, it's
that the current interagency process for auctioning off spectrum is
completely broken. My colleagues and I watched in complete dismay as
the deployment of 5G originally proceeded without any of the safety
mitigations the FAA, aviation industry, and I have long called for.
This resulted in a disorienting display of 5G fits and starts over the
last several months, inevitably due to the FCC auctioning off 5G
spectrum without any concrete plan in place to safely deploy these
technologies without interfering with aviation.
But it did not have to be this way!
Despite what recent coverage of 5G deployment might suggest, the
concerns expressed by the FAA and aviation industry are nothing new.
In fact, numerous aviation stakeholders, including many we will
hear from today, expressed concerns to the Trump-appointed, former FCC
Chairman Ajit Pai, prior to and after the FCC voted to open up the C-
band for wireless use all the way back in 2018. But they were ignored.
In September 2019, the FAA sent a letter to the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration, or NTIA, expressing
concerns that critical aviation systems could be impacted by harmful
interference from C-band emissions and requesting the FCC delay further
action until more studies could be done. However, they were ignored.
In November 2019, I sent a letter to former FCC Chairman Pai
expressing my concern about the FCC's continuing disregard for aviation
safety and urging the agency to delay moving forward unless they
include strong mitigations to prevent harmful interference with
aircraft. I was ignored.
In December 2020, the FAA and DOT sent a letter to the NTIA stating
the ``FCC's [current] path in this proceeding is insufficient to
address our concerns'' and urging them to delay the FCC's upcoming
auction. However, the NTIA failed to enter the letter into the FCC's
docket for consideration, and again, they were ignored.
And this isn't exclusive to aviation or the FAA. In 2019, the FCC
proposed to give away more than half the bandwidth previously reserved
for transportation safety and connected vehicles, despite my objections
and those of many other transportation stakeholders.
The FCC's history of subordinating transportation safety to
corporate broadband interests has predictably resulted in the current
mess we find ourselves in and must change if we hope to avoid a similar
result in the future.
Now the telecom industry has argued that the safety mitigations the
FAA and aviation industry are advocating for, and which the telecom
industry has begrudgingly accepted only recently, are unnecessary
because 5G deployment is occurring in as many as 40 other countries,
with no confirmed reports of harmful interference with aircraft.
However, what they fail to mention is that most of these countries
use either drastically lower 5G power levels than the U.S., operate 5G
further away from the frequency used by aircraft radio altimeters, or
have required significant safety mitigations, such as airport exclusion
zones or 5G antennae placement requirements, to limit the potential for
harmful interference to aircraft.
Additionally, no other country even comes close to having the level
and complexity of civil aviation activity that exists in the U.S.
As I've stated before, to make this comparison without recognizing
the critical differences that exist between the U.S. and every other
country that has deployed 5G technology is disingenuous, misleading,
and displays a glaring disregard for the potential safety measures
needed to protect the flying public.
Now I want to be clear. I do not oppose the deployment of 5G.
On the contrary, I know faster wireless speeds will help provide
many great benefits for Americans, and have tremendous potential
applications in the tech, healthcare, and national security fields.
But let's not suggest the risks of delaying 5G deployment were ever
equal to the risks deployment could pose to aviation safety.
A dropped call or the inability to access a slightly faster
internet connection is not nearly the same as the risk of a potential
aviation accident. In fact, it's not even close.
Radio altimeters serve as a pilot's primary altitude measurement
during flight and are critical to enabling safe arrivals, particularly
during inclement weather or other instances of low visibility. The risk
of flying an aircraft with a compromised radio altimeter can be
disastrous.
For instance, in 2009 a Turkish Airlines flight experienced faulty
radio altimeter readings while on approach, contributing to its fatal
crash landing that resulted in nine deaths.
The consequences of getting this right are enormous. We cannot
afford to dismiss the aviation industry's concerns regarding the
importance of accurate radio altimeter readings.
We must do everything we can to prevent or limit the potential for
5G signals to interfere with these devices.
There are some who believe that the risk of 5G potentially
interfering with aircraft radio altimeters is a ``low risk'' event that
should be ignored. But this committee has learned that the consequences
of ignoring even ``low-risk'' events in aviation can be catastrophic.
The two crashes of Boeing 737 MAX airplanes in 2018 and 2019 may
have been considered ``low-risk'' by some, but ultimately led to the
tragic loss of 346 lives.
Furthermore, in the wake of the 737 MAX crashes, this committee and
the American public, rightfully, questioned the FAA's lax oversight of
the 737 MAX certification process and its commitment to safety.
But now there are critics--mostly those who tend to have no
background in aerospace engineering or aviation safety--condemning the
FAA for doing the very thing this committee and the American public
have been calling on for decades: to do everything in its power to
protect the American public from any and all risks to aviation safety.
We must not now, or ever, condemn the FAA for prioritizing safety.
Despite my continued concerns for how this process has played out,
I am strongly supportive of the recent agreement reached between
Verizon, AT&T, and the Biden administration to ensure we have 5G
exclusion zones near all airports affected by the recent 5G deployment.
This agreement and continued collaboration between the telecom
industry, aviation stakeholders, and the FAA will help ensure we can
maintain aviation safety while also limiting the disruption to the
aviation industry and American travelers.
Important questions remain: What are the precise details of the
recent deal announced? How long are the current safety mitigations
expected to last? What is the FAA doing to ensure it is communicating
with all aviation stakeholders in a swift and transparent manner,
particularly with regard to new AMOCs or NOTAMs the agency plans to
issue? And what are the FAA, telecom industry, and aviation
stakeholders doing to ensure we are fully prepared for future broadband
deployments?
I look forward to receiving answers to these important questions
today. I yield back.

Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Chair.
The Chair recognizes Representative Graves of Missouri for
an opening statement.
Mr. Graves of Missouri. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking
Member Graves, for having this hearing. And I also want to
thank our witnesses on both panels for being here. It is no
secret that our Nation continues to grapple with one crisis
after the next. Thankfully, though, we are here today to talk
about one crisis that was narrowly averted, at least for the
time being.
And I want to commend the aviation and telecom industries
for their collaborative efforts to ensure that aviation safety
and 5G deployment can safely coexist.
It goes without saying that alarmist headlines, especially
those about complex avionics and spectrum issues, lead to
unhelpful finger pointing and distract from serious and
technical efforts that produce some lasting solutions.
Regrettably, many of these headlines were byproducts of a
botched Government coordination process, even though the issues
have been raised publicly now for years. The American people
would have been better served had the Government acted much
sooner than it did in bringing together the experts at FAA and
the FCC, and related industries, to address the issues at hand.
Here we are now, and I know that Members on both sides of
the aisle are eager to hear what is going to happen in the
short term, the medium term, and the long term to fully and
permanently resolve any issues with potential 5G interference
with radio altimeters.
As always, aviation safety is the number one priority of
this subcommittee and the FAA. And that safety can only be
ensured when we are not lurching from one deadline to the
other. Safety also requires certainty, and that is sorely
lacking right now from both air carriers and wireless carriers.
This topic is an issue of immense economic significance to
both the telecommunications and aviation industries. It is
crucial that all parties, under the most recent agreement, use
this time to work together to devise and implement a permanent
solution that facilitates 5G rollout and ensures aviation
safety that works for all of the users of the system, whether
they are major air carriers, regional airlines, helicopters, or
general aviation operators. That is the balance that we have to
strike, and again, Mr. Chairman, I am not going to pile on
anymore. I think we have made our point, all of us.
So, I look forward to hearing the witnesses and what they
have to say and how we are going to move forward.
Thank you, again, Mr. Chairman.
[Mr. Graves of Missouri's prepared statement follows:]

Prepared Statement of Hon. Sam Graves, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Missouri, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure
Thank you, Chair Larsen and Ranking Member Graves, and thank you to
our witnesses on both panels for being here today.
It's no secret that our Nation continues to grapple with one crisis
after the next. Thankfully, though, we're here today to talk about one
crisis that was narrowly averted, for the time being. I want to commend
the aviation and telecom industries for their collaborative efforts to
ensure that aviation safety and 5G deployment can safely co-exist.
It goes without saying that alarmist headlines, especially those
about complex avionics and spectrum issues, lead to unhelpful finger
pointing and distract from serious and technical efforts that produce
lasting solutions.
Regrettably, many of these headlines were by-products of a botched
government coordination process, even though the issues have been
raised publicly for years now. The American people would have been
better served had the government acted much sooner than it did in
bringing together the experts at FAA and FCC, and the related
industries, to address these issues.
But we're here now, and I know that members on both sides of the
aisle are eager to hear what has to happen in the short-, medium-, and
long-term to fully and permanently resolve any issues with potential 5G
interference with radio altimeters.
As always, aviation safety is the number one priority of this
subcommittee and the FAA. That safety can only be ensured when we're
not lurching from one deadline to another. Safety also requires
certainty, something that is sorely lacking right now for both air
carriers and wireless carriers.
This topic is an issue of immense economic significance to both the
telecommunications and aviation industries. It's crucial that all
parties, under the most recent agreement, use this time to work
together to devise and implement a permanent solution that facilitates
5G rollout and ensures aviation safety that works for all users of the
system, whether they're major air carriers, regional airlines,
helicopters, or other general aviation operators. That is the balance
that we have to strike, and I look forward to hearing from our
witnesses today to see how we do it.

Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Representative Graves.
So, before we turn to our witnesses, there was a floor
schedule put out earlier. So, for the Members, there is no plan
for votes on the floor till about 4:15. There is a 1:30 p.m.
bipartisan classified briefing, and the House floor will go
into recess at 1:30 p.m.
It doesn't impact us, but just for your planning purposes,
there won't be any need for us to break as a subcommittee, but
at 1:30, the classified briefing is on the Russia/Ukraine
issue, but the floor does not plan to vote till about 4:15 just
for planning purposes. It should give us freedom to get through
this, but folks may want to go to the briefing as well.
We will now turn to our witnesses. We will be hearing two
panels today with each panel followed by questions from
Members.
I will now like to welcome our first panel, which consists
of one person, the Honorable Steve Dickson, Administrator of
the Federal Aviation Administration. Administrator, thank you
for joining us today, and we look forward to your testimony.
And without objection, your full statement will be included
in the record. Since it is part of the record, the subcommittee
requests that you limit your oral testimony to 5 minutes.
Mr. Dickson, you may proceed.

TESTIMONY OF HON. STEPHEN M. DICKSON, ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL
AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

Mr. Dickson. Thank you, Chair Larsen. And good morning,
Chair Larsen, Chair DeFazio, Ranking Members Graves and Graves,
and the members of the subcommittee.
Thank you for the opportunity today to discuss the FAA's
efforts to keep aviation safe in the presence of 5G C-band
wireless technology. We have continually maintained that
through mutual cooperation, 5G and aviation can safely coexist.
We have the safest aviation system in the world, and we
don't take that for granted, something that is hard earned
every day.
We have achieved this because we take actions to mitigate
known and potential risks to safety. And that is why the FAA
has been involved in a sustained effort since well before the
2020 spectrum auction to highlight and now mitigate potential
5G interference with critical flight systems.
I want to thank this committee for its help and support of
aviation safety during this period. Our job would be
significantly more difficult without the continued support of
this committee.
We also appreciate the wireless companies voluntarily
providing us with the data that we need to maintain safety
while minimizing flight disruptions during this rollout. Now,
we are always concerned about radio frequency interference when
it comes to aviation infrastructure, but in 2018, a new
potential threat emerged. The MOBILE NOW Act directed the FCC
to evaluate the feasibility of auctioning spectrum that is
adjacent to the band where radio altimeters operate.
The FAA and the aviation industry urged caution. Boeing and
the Air Line Pilots Association on filings to the FCC back in
2018 called for more analysis of this issue.
The FAA collaborated with or supported research efforts
that revealed that 5G operations could significantly degrade or
completely interrupt radio altimeter operation during critical
phases of flight.
And in December of 2020, the Acting Deputy DOT Secretary
and I sent a letter to the NTIA outlining our concerns about
aviation safety backed up by the recent studies.
We asked that the auction be delayed so that we could
conduct safety risk assessment and identify mitigations.
Ultimately, the auction occurred and two of the wireless
companies that acquired the C-band spectrum scheduled the
initial deployment in early December of 2021.
We engaged with our interagency partners throughout the
year in an effort to access the information that was necessary
to inform aviation safety mitigations.
Ultimately, as the deployment approached in late 2021,
Secretary Buttigieg and I requested two pauses from the
wireless companies until mid-January of 2022. During the delay,
we established a direct relationship with the wireless
companies to receive the necessary information, transmitter
locations, power levels, and signal shape characteristics to
begin making an aviation safety assessment.
The wireless companies also agreed to keep towers turned
off around airports that have low-visibility approaches. The
safety model that we developed, along with the new data that we
had access to from the telecommunications companies, allowed
the FAA to determine which combination of altimeters and
aircraft could be cleared to land in low-visibility conditions
for specific runways at airports with 5G towers nearby.
On January 19th, the wireless companies activated 5G C-band
service in many of the 46 markets. Our analysis of the wireless
company data has allowed us to target anticipated problem areas
more precisely, reducing the impact of both industries. And
while we have avoided significant disruption to commercial
aviation, we recognize that some communities and operations
have been affected because we have not been able to fully
mitigate interference risk for certain radio altimeters.
Now we know from long experience that early and open data
exchange between everyone, stakeholders and regulators, has
proven to be critical to identify and mitigate safety risks.
Aviation remains the safest form of transportation because
of our commitment to being data-driven in our processes, and we
will lean on it as we set new standards for altimeter
performance in the new environment that is created by the 5G C-
band deployment.
Spectrum is a limited resource, but the demand is
essentially infinite, and we know that it will increase in
coming years. The FAA's primary concern is and always will be
the safety of the aviation system, but we firmly believe that
by working together, 5G and aviation, can and will, safely
coexist.
Moving forward, we are also ready to work across industry
and with our Federal partners on a more thoughtful, inclusive,
and collaborative approach to future spectrum policy and
initiatives.
Thank you very much for the chance to provide this update,
and I look forward to answering your questions.
[Mr. Dickson's prepared statement follows:]

Prepared Statement of Hon. Stephen M. Dickson, Administrator, Federal
Aviation Administration
Chair Larsen, Chair DeFazio, Ranking Members Graves and Graves, and
members of the subcommittee: thank you for the opportunity to be here
today to discuss fifth-generation wireless network technology--or 5G--
and aviation. To start, I would like to thank each of you for your
continued unwavering support for aviation safety. Although the
Department of Transportation (Department) and the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) have made great progress in advancing our safety
objectives related to 5G, we understand that our job would be
significantly more difficult without the continued support of this
committee and we greatly appreciate it. Similarly, the progress we have
made on 5G would not have been achievable without the active leadership
and sustained commitment of Secretary Buttigieg. The Secretary's
engagement on this issue has significantly raised awareness of the
safety concerns associated with 5G and his collaboration with the FAA
and the wireless telecommunications companies (wireless companies) has
helped enable much of the progress we have achieved in support of the
safety and efficiency of the national airspace. We also appreciate the
ongoing positive collaboration with the wireless companies and the
participation of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Their
willingness to work with us and provide us with needed data has allowed
us to effectively carry out our mission and chart a path forward that
maintains safety while minimizing flight disruptions.
The FAA's first priority is the safety of the national airspace.
That has guided the agency's actions so aviation and 5G can safely
coexist. Cooperation with the FCC, the wireless companies, the aviation
industry, and others has been critical to minimize disruptions to
aviation while more than 90 percent of the wireless companies' 5G
deployment has been able to go forward as planned.
Background
Before I provide you with further details, I would like to lay the
foundation of the 5G issue and offer some background on how we got to
this point. At the outset, it is important to keep in mind that the FAA
is responsible for the safe and efficient use of the national airspace.
The FAA does not regulate electromagnetic spectrum or the
telecommunications industry. Although the FAA manages assigned spectrum
related to certain airspace management ground systems, for example, 5G
has been a novel issue for the aviation industry. Also, all of the work
that we have done in coordination with stakeholders outside of
aviation, including the wireless companies, has been achieved through
voluntary cooperation.
I wanted to provide some highlights of the history of this issue.
In 2018, the MOBILE NOW Act directed the FCC to evaluate the
feasibility of commercial wireless deployments in the 3.7-4.2 gigahertz
(GHz) band (C-band).\1\ That same year, in filings with the FCC, Boeing
communicated its concern that aeronautical safety services that operate
adjacent to the C-band should be adequately protected.\2\ Also in 2018,
the Airline Pilots Association (ALPA) urged in a filing to the FCC that
appropriate steps be taken to ensure that interference on avionics by
mobile wireless systems be fully analyzed and mitigated.\3\ The ALPA
filing also referenced a study presented to the International Civil
Aviation Organization expressing similar concerns as far back as
2014.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ See section 605(b) of Title VI of Division P of the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 https://www.govinfo.gov/content/
pkg/PLAW-115publ141/pdf/PLAW-115publ141.pdf
\2\ https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/121184623679/Boeing%20C-
band%20NPRM%20Reply%20
Comments%2012%2011%202018%20final.pdf
\3\ https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/10531182083849/
ALPA%20Comments%2017-183%2018-122.pdf
\4\ https://www.icao.int/safety/acp/ACPWGF/ACP-WG-F-30/ACP-WGF30-
WP14%20Radio%20
Altimeter%20Adjacent%20Bands%20Compatibility%20Study%20with%20IMT-
FINAL%20
Rev1.docx
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additionally, since 2018 the FAA has either partnered with or
supported specific research conducted by the Aerospace Vehicle Systems
Institute (AVSI), a cooperative research entity, and RTCA, a non-profit
aerospace consensus standards development organization, concerning the
potential effects of C-band interference on aircraft avionics. In 2019,
the FAA sent a letter to the National Telecommunications and
Information Administration (NTIA) requesting that it consider the
implications of the AVSI research and that it work to ensure that
aircraft altimeters that operate in spectrum adjacent to the C-band do
not receive harmful interference.
In March 2020, the FCC released a report and order making 280
megahertz (MHz) of the C-band available for 5G services.\5\ Their plan
was to begin auctioning C-band spectrum on December 8, 2020.\6\ Shortly
before that auction, the then-Acting Deputy Secretary of Transportation
and I sent a letter to the NTIA expressing our concerns with the
potential impact on aviation safety.\7\ We noted in the letter that
recent testing had revealed the potential for harmful interference with
radio (also known as radar) altimeters installed aboard aircraft and we
requested a deferral of the auction to allow the FAA to conduct a
safety risk assessment and identify mitigations. In our letter we
referenced, for example, a 2019 study by AVSI that summarized
preliminary data suggesting altimeter performance degradation from out-
of-band interference.\8\ An October 2020 report by RTCA was also
referenced in the letter.\9\ The RTCA report concluded that 5G
operations in the C-band may create harmful interference to some radio
altimeters that would significantly degrade or completely interrupt
their operation during critical phases of flight. As concerning as
these and other findings have been to us, we also noted in our letter
that we recognized the importance of making spectrum available for
commercial purposes and ensuring American leadership in this space. We
have continually maintained that, through mutual cooperation, 5G and
aviation can safely coexist.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-expands-flexible-use-c-band-
5g-0
\6\ https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-begins-major-5g-spectrum-
auction
\7\ https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/2021-10/
DOT_Letter_to_NTIA_FCC3.7_GHz_
Band_Auction.pdf
\8\ https://avsi.aero/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/AVSI-RA-Interim-
OOB-Interference-Report-211206.pdf
\9\ https://www.rtca.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/SC-239-5G-
Interference-Assessment-
Report_274-20-PMC-2073_accepted_changes.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Radio altimeters operate in the 4.2-4.4 GHz range. Even with a
frequency separation of 220 MHz, from 5G operations, there may still
exist potential harmful interference under certain circumstances. As a
pilot, I know from experience that a radio altimeter is one of the most
crucial pieces of safety equipment aboard an aircraft. Radio altimeters
are used in low visibility landings and are the only sensors aboard
civil aircraft that provide a pilot with a direct measurement of the
distance between the aircraft and the ground or other obstacles. Many
other critical safety systems rely directly upon input from radio
altimeters including terrain awareness warning, wind shear
surveillance, traffic collision avoidance, tail strike prevention,
automated landing, and other related cockpit display and alert warning
systems. Harmful interference affecting any of these systems has the
potential to be catastrophic. There is no scenario under which harmful
interference is acceptable from a safety standpoint, absent sufficient
mitigations to address that interference.
Operational Mitigations
Before and since the 2020 spectrum auction, the FAA has been
involved in a sustained effort to assess and mitigate the risks
associated with potential degraded radio altimeter performance. Prior
to the initially scheduled 5G roll out for December 5, 2021, the
Department and the FAA successfully worked with the telecommunications
carriers to agree to a 30-day pause of the deployment to allow added
time for safety mitigation actions. The FAA moved quickly to take
advantage of the delay to protect the safety of the flying public:
In November, and again in December of 2021, the FAA
issued Special Airworthiness Information Bulletins to inform
manufacturers, operators, and pilots of the planned deployment of
5G.\10\ The bulletins contain detailed guidance for aircraft and
altimeter manufacturers as well as aircraft operators and pilots and
sought information from each group to further assist the FAA in
assessing the reliability and accuracy of altimeters and the potential
risks of 5G deployment on aviation safety.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ https://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/
rgSAIB.nsf/dc7bd4f27e5f1074862
57221005f069d/27ffcbb45e6157e9862587810044ad19/$FILE/AIR-21-18.pdf
https://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgSAIB.nsf/
dc7bd4f27e5f1074862
57221005f069d/379cfb187d16db10862587b4005b26fc/$FILE/AIR-21-18R1.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On December 7, 2021, the FAA issued an Airworthiness
Directive (AD) for all transport and commuter category airplanes
equipped with a radio altimeter.\11\ The AD was based on our
determination that radio altimeters cannot be relied upon to perform
their intended function if they experience harmful interference from 5G
C-band wireless broadband operations. The AD requires revising the
flight manual to incorporate limitations prohibiting certain operations
requiring radio altimeter data when in the presence of 5G C-band
harmful interference in areas identified by Notices to Air Missions
(NOTAMs). A similar AD was issued on the same day for helicopters.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/2021-12/
FRC_Document_AD-2021-01169-T-D.pdf
\12\ https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/2021-12/
FRC_Document_AD-2021-01170-R-D.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On December 23, 2021, the FAA issued a Safety Alert for
Operators (SAFO). The SAFO provides information and guidance to
operators regarding the risk of potential adverse effects on radio
altimeters when operating in the presence of 5G C-band wireless
broadband signals, and the role of NOTAMs in identifying the geographic
areas where certain operations requiring a radio altimeter are
prohibited in the presence of 5G signals.

Simultaneous with each of these safety actions, the FAA and the
Department continued to engage with wireless company officials, who
agreed to an additional voluntary two-week pause in 5G deployment to
provide the FAA with a path forward that would allow for sufficient
safety mitigations and minimize disruptions in air travel. On December
31, 2021, Secretary Buttigieg and I proposed an interim solution to the
wireless companies.\13\ We suggested that with an additional two-week
pause in deployment, the FAA and the aviation industry would identify
key airports where a buffer zone with minimized 5G transmissions would
permit aviation operations to continue safely while the FAA continued
assessments of the interference potential around those airports. Our
goal was, and continues to be, to identify mitigations for key airports
to enable as many commercial aircraft as possible to operate safely in
all conditions. This will allow for 5G C-band to deploy around these
airports on a rolling basis, such that all C-band planned locations can
be activated barring unforeseen technical challenges or new safety
concerns.
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\13\ https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/2021-12/12.31.2021%20-
%20DOT%20and%20FAA
%20Letter%20to%20ATT%20and%20Verizon%20.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We also conveyed that the FAA will safely expedite the review and
determinations regarding proposals for Alternate Methods of Compliance
(AMOC) for operators with high-performing radio altimeters to operate
at those airports. The FAA may approve AMOCs for altimeter/aircraft
configurations that have been proven to meet equivalent levels of
safety in this novel environment. An FAA-approved AMOC allows an
aircraft with a particular model of altimeter to conduct operations
that require a radio altimeter in a geographic area where such
operations would otherwise be prohibited because of 5G. As part of the
agreement, the wireless companies agreed to provide the FAA with data
relevant to existing and planned locations as well as operating
characteristics of 5G base stations. The data provided has allowed the
FAA to precisely determine which aircraft are cleared for specific
runways at airports in the 5G area based on altimeter equipage and
antenna location. This information is captured in the approved AMOCs
and its accuracy is the foundation of the coexistence of aviation
safety and 5G deployment in the short term. To date the FAA has issued
over 20 AMOCs for commercial and business jets, covering approximately
90 percent of the U.S. commercial fleet.
Since January 19, 2022, wireless companies have activated more 5G
C-band towers in 46 markets nationwide. Prior to and since the 5G
deployment, the FAA has worked around the clock to enable
implementation of mitigations, where needed, to address risks.
Approximately 80 airports with low-visibility approaches in 5G
deployment areas were identified, and the wireless companies agreed to
turn off approximately 500 towers in the vicinity of those airports.
These mitigations have enabled airlines and other flight operators to
access most runways at airports in places where 5G is deployed, even in
low visibility conditions. Although some flights have been affected by
safety mitigations required in 5G deployment areas, significant
disruptions to the air transportation system have been avoided.
Further, our analysis of the data received has allowed us to focus our
efforts and work much more efficiently.
Moving Forward
The FAA is continuing to work with avionics manufacturers to
evaluate altimeters and review manufacturer testing data to measure the
accuracy, reliability, and robustness of each model. This includes data
for altimeters used in regional and business aircraft. Also, the FAA is
allowing helicopter air ambulance operators to continue using safety-
enhancing night vision goggles in areas where the aircraft's radio
altimeter could be unreliable due to 5G C-band interference as
identified by NOTAMs. Similar to commercial aircraft, helicopters may
perform day and night operations that do not require the use of a radio
altimeter. Further, despite the breadth and diversity of the general
aviation fleet, the FAA is working as quickly as it can to enable these
aircraft to operate safely and efficiently.
As referenced earlier, NOTAMs let pilots and others know where 5G
is present and operations are restricted. Although the wireless
companies' actions creating buffer zones reduce the strength of 5G
signals around airports, they do not fully eliminate it. The
restrictions in a NOTAM do not apply if an aircraft has an altimeter
that is approved by an AMOC for that location. Some aircraft, however,
still do not have an approved AMOC for their altimeter. Additionally,
even aircraft with an AMOC-approved altimeter may not be allowed to
operate at all runways in the 5G area. Consequently, the restrictions
outlined in the NOTAMs remain in place while the FAA continues to
determine the accuracy and reliability of other altimeters that have
not been approved by an AMOC.
We are confident we will work through this issue safely with
minimal disruptions, but we acknowledge that some altimeters--
especially older models used by certain segments of the aviation
industry--may not receive approval as being safe in the presence of 5G
emissions and interference, and may need to be replaced. The
strengthening partnership across the aviation and telecommunications
industries and the federal government has enabled substantial progress.
In coming weeks, FAA will move quickly to use testing data and other
insights to further refine our models and safely enable additional 5G
deployment.
Spectrum is a limited resource, and demand for it will likely
increase in coming years, including new applications across the
transportation sector. As we move forward, we will work with the
industry and our federal partners to strengthen processes to safely
unlock the rapid innovation that we seek as a nation. Early and open
communications with stakeholders from all involved industries, and a
robust interagency process, are key to identifying and solving
potential issues long before they have a real-world impact.
Thank you for the chance to provide this update and we look forward
to continued engagement with the committee and subcommittee on this
important issue.

Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Administrator Dickson.
We are going to start with the chair of the full committee,
Mr. DeFazio of Oregon. Mr. DeFazio, you are recognized.
Mr. DeFazio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Administrator Dickson, thanks for being with us today.
As we have said, we understand what happened and we want to
be certain it doesn't happen again, but we are in sort of a
temporary hold here, and it is not totally clear to me, and I
think others, what happens at the end of the 6-month voluntary
period.
I have heard some say, no, it is not limited to 6 months
and others saying, yes, it is limited to 6 months. So, could
you, for instance, where they have turned off towers in
proximity to airports with CAT III approaches and low-
visibility issues, the lower power, how is this going to be
solved long term, and how long do the temporary measures stay
in place, and what are we going to do permanently?
Mr. Dickson. Well, thanks for the question, Chair DeFazio.
And all parties are working together very effectively at this
point, and we have agreed to take the immediate steps necessary
to avoid disruption to the aviation system and to stay at the
table and work in good faith to determine the next steps. But
so far, the telecom companies, as I mentioned, have agreed to
refrain from activating their 5G towers that are unacceptably
close to runways, according to the FAA safety model, which we
continue to refine.
They are also providing us with more data in a timely
fashion to provide certainty and more predictability to the
aviation system and also to help refine our safety analysis.
And they are working with us as I speak, actually, on a flight
test program that will contribute meaningfully to establishing
the new standards for radio altimeters and also to refine what
we are doing right now.
So, I am encouraged by the progress. We are certainly in a
much better place today than we were 2 to 3 weeks ago, and we
certainly don't want to be repeating these deadlines that we
have had to overcome. We are finally getting the specific
detailed information that we need to make accurate safety
assessments and that is what we are focused on.
And the wireless companies, again, I think they have
learned a lot about aviation safety. And we have certainly
learned about their business. We are asking them for data that
they have never had to provide to the Government before. So,
that has been very beneficial to both sides, and we will
continue that dialogue as we go forward.
Mr. DeFazio. Right. I think we had two sets of engineers
with different languages, and I am glad they are now
communicating and understanding some of the concerns. We are
going to hear from an industry representative, an organization
that says, safe everywhere else in the world, and we are taking
stronger measures than any other country in the world, things
that haven't been done elsewhere. But I have seen pretty
specific data that that isn't true.
Can you address that? I mean, other countries have taken
measures for exclusion zones, antenna strength, antenna
direction, and other things. Is that correct? Many other
countries.
Mr. Dickson. That is correct. But there really is no
comparison with either the aviation system or what is going on
in the United States with 5G deployment. Our environment is not
the same in either case. The power levels in other countries
are different, the location on the spectrum is different, and,
again, we have the most complex and dynamic airspace in the
world.
Also, I think, it is important to remember that we are
regulating the manufacturers here as well, and so, to some
degree, many countries around the world, their aviation safety
regulators have a reduced scope of responsibility compared to
the FAA.
So, we have got to make sure that if a hazard is identified
that we prove that whatever that hazard is has been completely
mitigated from a safety perspective and that the system remains
safe.
And to that end, laboratory testing did show that there was
a hazard from 5G C-band interference, and so, we have to prove,
again, to ourselves that there is no hazard, and we are working
diligently to do just that.
Mr. DeFazio. OK. Thank you. I am about to run out of time,
but I assume that we are going to be looking at perhaps a new
generation of altimeters or some sort of filtration or
something, but I mean, I am very concerned about the ongoing
deployment and the ongoing protections that will be put in
place. So, I am pleased the industry is cooperating at this
point and, hopefully, we can work this out together.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
The Chair recognizes Representative Graves of Louisiana for
5 minutes.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Administrator Dickson, thank you very much for your testimony
today.
Look, I heard your answer to the chair about the U.S.
system being more complex. I get it, but I also think that we
have greater capabilities, and I am going to say it again, this
is inexcusable. It is inexcusable to disrupt air operations,
and I think it is inexcusable to delay or prevent the
deployment of technology.
Can you just help us to understand, with the incredible,
pardon the pun, runway we had in this instance knowing for
years that--maybe that wasn't as good as a Dagwood sandwich,
but----
Mr. Larsen. Not even close.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Not even close, but just help me
understand, how did we get ourselves in this situation?
Mr. Dickson. Well, really, two parts--I will try to answer
both parts of your question, Ranking Member Graves. As was
noted in some of the opening remarks, the aviation sector
concerns date back to 2015, and I will provide a detailed
chronology. I will go through all of those details here, but
over a period of years, the FAA participated in testing, we
connected with foreign authorities, including ICAO, and
communicated our concerns clearly to the FCC via NTIA.
We also have, back to Chair DeFazio's point, RTCA Special
Committee 239 formed in early 2020 to develop permanent radio
altimeter standards and began that work later in the year, and
that work continues to this day.
When the FCC released the R&O on C-band in March of 2020,
we asked for the analysis that supported the conclusion that
the limits that were being put in place were sufficient to
protect aeronautical services, radio altimeters, in particular,
but it wasn't until the summer of 2021 that we received that
analysis, and it actually resulted in transmission limits and
characteristics that indicated that the R&O values are not
sufficient to protect radio altimeters.
And as I said a few minutes ago, we tried for over a year,
and we were asking for this data. As it turns out, the FCC
didn't even have the data that we needed. And we discovered
that when we started to work directly with the
telecommunications companies. They had never had to provide
this kind of information to the Government before. They had
never had to think about how the signal would impact an
airplane moving in three dimensions through space.
And so, it is certainly my hope, and I think all of us
recognize that the process did not serve anyone well, in this
particular case, and so, it is in everyone's interest to
examine the Federal spectrum process to ensure it's coordinated
across executive branch agencies to ensure that we service and
resolve issues----
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. And Administrator, I am concerned
about even during this interim time, do you believe the FAA has
the bandwidth, has the capability to process the alternatives,
the AMOCs between now and July?
Mr. Dickson. It is a huge focus for us and all of the
submissions that we have had--I am not aware that we have any
pending submissions right now. In fact, we are meeting with the
manufacturers on a daily basis, really, to refine their
analysis as they discover more about the capabilities of the
systems that are currently installed on aircraft.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. OK. And going back to your comment
earlier about the timeline and information, that would be
helpful if you could provide us with that. I would like to
better understand the timeline and how we ran into this
problem.
Now, look, it is no secret, we are going to have 6G, 7G, in
addition to the immediate issue we have of between now and July
of trying to resolve this. Can you, one, help us understand if
you believe the FAA has the resources, the capabilities it
needs to continue this process through July and beyond as we
have new technology roll out and innovation rolls out and new
capabilities within communications?
Can you give us some comfort or help identify resources you
think that the FAA may need to ensure that this doesn't happen
again?
Mr. Dickson. Well, we are using not only internal agency
resources, but also industry resources as well. And I think
that now that we are past the initial deployment, we have asked
the telecommunications companies for longer line of sight on
their deployments. And you know what? This is one of the
differences between the aviation industry and the
telecommunications industry. They are not used to the precision
that we need to have when we are rolling out new technologies.
If you think about air traffic control, when we make
improvements to technology within our air traffic control
facilities around the country, we have a very disciplined
technology waterfall, training, change management, both inside
and outside the agency as new capabilities such as data
communications are rolled out.
That happens over a period of years, and because we are
literally--we are not changing the tires on the cars that are
going down the road, we are changing the oil on the engine as
the airplanes fly. And 50,000 flights a day operating three
dimensions. The telecommunications companies' customers are on
the ground, and so, they have never had to think about how
those signals impact airplanes moving in three dimensions. That
is what we are working on now.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you. Appreciate it. Yield
back.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Graves. I recognize myself for 5
minutes. Thank you, Administrator.
Some questions. In testimony, we are going to hear later
from Mr. Roberson, I hope I have the name pronounced correctly.
He talks about, that ``the unfortunate truth is that there is a
real problem, but it is what can be described as an `edge case'
problem, that is, a problem that only occurs in unusual
circumstances and for a very limited number of aircraft.''
Does the term ``edge case'' exist in aviation testing, and
if there is an edge case, is it allowed to exist in an aviation
scenario?
Mr. Dickson. No. We have to, as I said earlier, we have our
commercial aviation system essentially engineered so that there
is less than a one in a billion chance of a catastrophic
failure. And so, any time there is any change in that system
that creates additional risk, we have to prove to ourselves
that it is safe.
So, it is not enough to be comfortable or to have low-risk
activities. I think that in Chair DeFazio's written statement,
he talked about the 737 MAX. I mean, that is a good example of
something that some people might have thought was low risk or
fairly remote possibility. We can't accept that. The traveling
public doesn't accept it, and we certainly don't accept it at
the FAA.
We have worked for decades to make sure that aviation
safety risk is driven down to the levels that it is today.
Mr. Larsen. I will even say that on the 737 MAX case,
people thought what happened was an implausible scenario.
Clearly, it was not, and we can't tolerate that at all.
I want to ask a little bit more about Mr. Graves' comments
and actually Chair DeFazio's comments with regards to the
AMOCs. Now, for those listeners at home, an AMOC is an
alternative method of compliance, A-M-O-C. It is basically an
exemption to what otherwise you couldn't do. It allows you to
do the thing that you want to do, in this case, fly an
airplane, land an airplane on a runway in the presence of a 5G
signal.
And so, the FAA has been issuing these AMOCs, these
essentially exemptions to the rule, but there are so many AMOCs
that you have issued from the FAA with regards to this, that
the exception is becoming the rule, but I don't think that is a
very good way to run a National Airspace System. We have to get
back to a point where the exception is an exception to the rule
as opposed to the rule being the exception.
So, Administrator, what are you all doing to be sure that
these AMOCs at some point go away and we get back to a National
Airspace System that can be run safely and efficiently without
all these AMOCs?
Mr. Dickson. Well, it is a great question, and I would
divide the answer into two parts. The first one is, what are we
going to do to provide more predictability and certainty to all
of our stakeholders around the system?
And we have been working on the problem. There has been a
sense of urgency around that, but we are getting up on a
cadence of we have asked the telecommunications companies for
longer line of sight on their deployments, so that we are not
within a week of the next tranche of towers having to put this
relief out on very short notice.
And I am confident that in the coming weeks that we will
get on a more regular cadence and hopefully reduced impact as
we go forward.
We are also working to refine our safety model, which will
help us as we recognize areas where risk may be acceptable. We
are not yet looking at: can we refine power levels. And so,
there are several levers here that we are looking at in terms
of mitigations that can provide some relief.
The ultimate solution, though, and I think you will hear
something about this on the second panel later, is the setting
of new performance standards and airworthiness standards. That
work is underway at RTCA Special Committee 239, as I speak. And
I think, unfortunately, a lot of the people around industry who
would be working on that effort, which is really the long-term
solution, are involved in getting us through this period right
now.
But what we think is going to happen is, once those new
standards are set, then there will be new performance standards
and new designs. Potentially, STCs for filtering devices and
other things. There are some promising discussions that we are
having with some of the manufacturers about being able to
improve the performance of existing equipment that is out
there, and we will continue to focus on that as an interim
solution as well while we work toward the long term.
Mr. Larsen. There is going to be a lot of technical detail
that we--as I have talked to you in the past, we don't need to
understand everything about this as Members of Congress, but we
do need to understand enough of this so that we can inform the
policy. And as you all move through this, we need to be sure
that we move through this with you.
You have also outlined the fact that just within the C-
band, there is still more to happen, just as a result of the C-
band auction, including the 3.8 to 3.98 rollout. There are
auctions in the future certainly, and the technology of
communication is changing, and the discussion about 6G as an
example of that, and we don't know right today what that means
for the work of the FAA as well.
Is that a fair assessment?
Mr. Dickson. I think that is definitely fair. And there are
other executive branch agencies, DoD, in particular, that have
some equities in this area with future auctions that are being
contemplated. So, we need to address the process issue now as a
country, I would be in 100 percent agreement with that.
Mr. Larsen. Well, I will just turn it over--looking for
ideas about how we can either see that it is formalized or at
least an informal consultation process going forward better
than what we have had.
With that, I do have next Representative Balderson from
Ohio as next up for 5 minutes.
Mr. Balderson. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Good morning, everyone, and Administrator Dickson, thank
you for taking the time to come before this committee.
My first question is, the deployment of 5G is critical to
America's competitiveness and it is crucial that we get these
networks online as quickly as possible while minimizing any
disruptions to aviation services ensuring safe air travel.
My question for you is, how did the FAA make the
determination that 5G would ensure harmful interference, and
did the FAA perform any testing to validate the concerns in the
RTCA study?
Mr. Dickson. Well, thank you for the question. As I
mentioned, we had indicated our concerns with the C-band
spectrum back in 2015 at the radio conference that Chair Larsen
referred to in his remarks. We also participated in various
testing, the AVSI testing, as well as the RTCA testing as well.
We communicated our concerns to the FCC as all of this was
happening through NTIA, and we worked in good faith through the
interagency process.
When I asked for the delay of the auction, along with the
Department of Transportation, we asked that our concerns be
forwarded on to the FCC, and unfortunately, that didn't happen.
But we have been consistent in raising our concerns, and I
know that there is a way to work together through this. As was
said earlier, the two industries look at risk very differently
and processes very differently, and we don't regulate the
telecommunications industry. So, there was no way for us to
access their data until we had the agreements in place with
them in late December.
And now in that relatively short span of time, we have been
able to make a lot of progress. In the future, we need to have
processes in place that allow that to take place before the
actual rollout, and I think we will be in much better shape.
Mr. Balderson. All right. Thank you very much. My followup:
What specific measures or mitigations is the FAA looking for
from wireless industry to make it possible to deploy 5G
networks in the C-band around airports within the terms of
their FCC licenses as soon as possible?
Mr. Dickson. Well, as I said, we have already refined our
safety model, which creates essentially a safety zone and a
performance buffer for radio altimeters around airports, and we
continue to refine that. The flight testing that we are doing
with them right now, we are doing that in conjunction--we have
designed those flight test scenarios using FAA flight test
aircraft. We have designed those flights in conjunction with
the telecommunications industry engineers.
As a matter fact, their engineers are actually onboard FAA
aircraft. We are reporting all the parameters of what the
signal looks like as it impacts the airplane in various
performance scenarios. And so, as we get that data, that will
help us to sharpen our analysis. It will also inform the
performance requirements for modifications to radio altimeters
or the new performance standards for retrofit equipment if that
becomes necessary.
Mr. Balderson. OK. Thank you very much for both those
answers.
And Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you very much.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Balderson, for yielding back 1
minute and 10 seconds. Appreciate it.
I now recognize the gentleman from Hawaii, Representative
Kahele. You are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Kahele. Mahalo, Mr. Chair. And thank you so much for
putting on this really important committee. And hello to Chair
Larsen and Ranking Member Graves and Administrator Dickson for
convening this critical hearing so that we can ensure that our
subcommittee is able to conduct proper oversight into the
deployment of 5G.
As a commercial airline pilot with Hawaiian Airlines, I
understand firsthand the importance that radio altimeters play
to ensure pilots are able to fly in all weather conditions. The
aviation industry has spent years warning that 5G signals could
cause radio frequency interference with altimeters, and I am
disheartened that it has come to this point.
There was clearly a breakdown in the interagency
communications process. I think Chair DeFazio highlighted the
failure of the Trump administration to put the right people in
the right positions to ensure that this didn't happen. It did.
And as a result, it has disrupted millions of passengers in our
communities, especially our airlines.
I have a question for Administrator Dickson. The first
question I have is--and I can only speak for the airline that I
work for. Hawaiian Airlines' AMOCs expire on 28 February 2022.
That is in 25 days. I don't know what the other expiration
dates are for all the other U.S. airlines and the locations
that they fly to, when their AMOCs expire. I can only speak to
Hawaii's flagship airline, which expire on 28 February 2022.
The amount of workload that pilots have to deal with, that
the airlines, the dispatchers have to deal with, they are
already stressed in dealing with COVID, and now they have to
deal with potential disruptions in their instrument approaches
for CAT II and CAT III runways.
And so, my question is, what is the plan between now and
the next 25 days? Are we going to extend those AMOCs again? Are
we going to get right up to the 23rd, 24th of February and
potentially have another disruptive day throughout our Nation's
airspace system? What are we doing to plan between now and the
next 25 days for not just this airline's current AMOCs, but the
other U.S. domestic fleets' AMOCs that potentially have
expiration dates in the near future?
Mr. Dickson. Congressman, thank you very much for the
question, because as you point out very correctly,
predictability and consistency is extremely important in our
business. I am an operator myself, I am a pilot myself, and I
know exactly what you are talking about. The last thing that
you want is uncertainty on the flight deck or at the dispatch
desk.
The reason that the AMOCs expire is based on the next
tranche that we expect from the telecommunications companies
and their ability to be able to provide us with precise
latitude/longitude, elevation, signal shape, all the things
that I talked about earlier so that we can apply that. We have
a tool that we have developed in the last few weeks that allows
us to take their data--and this is getting to be more and more
of a routine occurrence--we take their data, we put it into the
tool, and determine where the pressure points are and whether
their next deployment will comport with our safety model around
airports to ensure safe performance for radio altimeters.
That process has been because the initial deployment
happened on the 19th of January, and then there was another
tranche the 1st of February, there has been pretty rapid
succession of AMOCs. We expect for that cadence to be longer as
we go forward. We have asked for as much forward visibility as
we possibly can. And this gets in to the difference that I
talked about a minute ago between the two industries about how
new technologies are rolled out.
This time of year, the telcos are experiencing delays with
work crews and things like that. We are learning a lot about
their business, and I promise you, we are going to smooth this
process out and make it more predictable because that is in
everyone's best interest. And they have committed to work with
us on that.
Mr. Kahele. Thanks, Administrator. I will use my last 20
seconds just for a yes-or-no answer. Can you ensure our
operators on the flight deck and the passengers in the back to
these critical airports that require CAT II or CAT III
approaches that these airports are safe to fly into and execute
a successful instrument approach with the current AMOCs that
exist today?
Mr. Dickson. Absolutely. Safety is something that we will
not compromise. And if we have authorized low-visibility
operations, you can count on the level of safety for the
performance of those systems that we have always counted on and
the public counts on.
Mr. Kahele. Thank you, sir. And mahalo, Chair.
I yield back.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you. The Chair recognizes Representative
Burchett from Tennessee for 5 minutes.
Mr. Burchett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure
following my ukulele-playing colleague from Hawaii. Hope to
visit him soon. Maybe we could organize a codel over there,
preferably beach side. That would be good.
Mr. Larsen. Sorry. We didn't start the clock. Could you
take 10 seconds off Mr. Burchett's clock, please?
Mr. Burchett. I am sure that will make YouTube.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is for FAA Administrator
Dickson.
Sir, the aviation industries' concerns about harmful 5G C-
band interference aren't new, and I realize this was touched on
earlier, but I want to get a little more specific. And as you
pointed out in your testimony, you raised some of these
concerns yourself in a letter to the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration back in 2020,
I believe.
So, why did the FAA wait until it is almost too late,
dagummit, until the month before the originally scheduled
rollout to start taking some safety mitigation actions?
Mr. Dickson. Well, thank you for the question. If you are
talking about the last few weeks, again, we did not have the
data that we needed because we don't regulate the
telecommunications companies. We did not have the data that we
needed until we were able to work with them directly.
And as we discovered, when we began that dialogue, the data
that we were asking for from them, they actually had never
provided to the Government before. So, that really was where we
started from in late December and early January, and has
brought us to where we are now.
Mr. Burchett. So, the information that you got, they never
delivered, was that the reasoning why it got to you so late or
is that just after the fact?
Mr. Dickson. That is certainly once we got to the point--we
had asked for the delays because we didn't want disruptions to
the aviation system. We knew that there was a risk to radio
altimeters, but we didn't have the ability to put specific
mitigations in place and tailor them by fleet type and by
airport until we had the specific deployment data from the
telecommunications companies; otherwise, we are in a position
where we have to assume that 5G C-band is blanketing the entire
country, and so, you are in this least common denominator
situation.
That is where we were in November, and we are certainly in
a much better place now than we were then. But we have got a
lot of work in front of us, as I have been saying.
Mr. Burchett. Where are we now in relation to preparedness
as in relation to November as you stated?
Mr. Dickson. Well, we have the mainline fleet types, the
larger aircraft. We still have some lower performing regional
jets and other parts of the aviation community that are
impacted. I am concerned about that. Helicopters are another
area that we are going to have to pay close attention to.
So, we are working on alternative means of compliance for
those types of operations, for first responders and air
ambulance-type operations as well. So, a lot of the
conversations have been about the air carriers, but the entire
aviation community, you know, we need to make sure that their
concerns are addressed as well.
Fortunately, for those other types of operations, there is
not the kind of reliance on radio altimeters that you see in
commercial aviation, but it is an important safety tool that we
want them to have.
Mr. Burchett. Do y'all have some date, arbitrary or
otherwise, of compliance?
Mr. Dickson. We will have to--the performance standards for
C-band resistant radio altimeters are in development now. That
work has been going on for some months now, and it will be some
period of time. These standard-setting processes take time.
I think the encouraging news to me is that this flight test
activity that we are undertaking that is helping us get through
the period that we are currently in, will also be very
beneficial in setting those new standards. Because we will have
real-world data that we can use to go back to the avionics
manufacturers and help inform those new designs, but there will
probably be some airplanes that we will have to retrofit new
equipment.
At a minimum, I think, we will see significant retrofit of
filtering devices to make sure that the existing avionics are
C-band resistant.
Mr. Burchett. Thank you. I can hear my father saying as we
are going down the beach in Myrtle--going down the road in our
old station wagon in the 1970s when we were fussing in the back
seat, my brother and sister and I, generally it was all their
fault, not mine. I was generally in the role of the
peacekeeper, but I could hear my dad saying, don't make me come
back there.
So, I would hope at some point y'all would fix this up and
don't make us come back here.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Representative Burchett.
The Chair recognizes Representative Johnson of Georgia for
5 minutes.
Mr. Johnson of Georgia. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
holding this very important hearing.
Aviation in the United States is the safest in the world,
and I am sure my colleagues would agree that our intention is
to make sure that it remains that way. So, the issue that we
are facing right now is that the 5G services launched on
January 19 used frequencies in a radio spectrum known as the C-
band, which can interfere with the safety equipment in
aircraft, specifically, radio altimeters.
Although the FAA raised concerns that the 5G networks may
interfere with some aircraft, the Federal Communications
Commission authorized the rollout of these networks.
Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport is one of the
busiest and most efficient airports in the world. And while
Hartsfield itself is not directly impacted by the 5G rollout,
many of the airports that fly to and from Hartsfield-Jackson
are.
The inability of the FAA, FCC, and the aviation and telecom
industries to reach consensus on aviation safety regarding 5G
is very concerning. Numerous stakeholders have been discussing
and weighing the challenges to the rollout of 5G technology
since at least 2015. That includes the FAA, the FCC, National
Telecommunications and Information Administration, the aviation
industry, and telecom companies. And despite 7 years of
deliberation, Government agencies were unable to reach a
consensus on whether 5G interference was safe for the aviation
industry in time for the 5G rollout last month.
Mr. Dickson, what has prevented the FAA from coordinating
more effectively with the FCC to address industry interference
concerns?
Mr. Dickson. Well, thank you, Congressman, and greetings to
you in Georgia. I am very familiar from my heritage at Delta
Airlines with the operations of Hartsfield-Jackson and
understand and appreciate your concerns.
We recognize that the existing process for spectrum
allocation did not serve anyone well. And it is in everyone's
best interest, including aviation and the FAA, to examine the
coordination process across the executive branch. Because we
are going to be at this--you know, there is no free spectrum
anymore. So, we are going to be at this, not only with 5G C-
band, but with other spectrum auctions in the future. So, we
need to make sure that we surface and then resolve, that is the
key, I think that you are talking about, is have a resolution
process for these issues.
My job is to make sure that the safety of the traveling
public and the safety of the aviation system is not
compromised. That is a very high bar. And so, I am not going to
back off from that. And I would expect the FAA to do that.
Mr. Johnson of Georgia. Well, thank you. I appreciate your
diligence, and good to see you today. Is it your opinion, sir,
that the 5G sale and rollout timeline as executed by the FCC
under the previous administration overlooked safety concerns?
Mr. Dickson. Again, I would just say that the process
didn't serve anyone well. I am not pointing fingers at anyone
or another agency. We have to work together. And we have to
recognize, as we said a few minutes ago, that these are two
very different industries. But the airspace infrastructure has
to be maintained. But it has to be able to coexist with 5G. We
certainly all want that in our communities as we go forward.
So, we have got to make sure that we are working hand in
glove with each other to enable these new technologies to roll
out, but to do it in a safe and predictable manner.
Mr. Johnson of Georgia. Well, let me ask you this then, Mr.
Dickson, what steps can be taken now to ensure that as 5G
technology is rolled out, the lack of interagency communication
does not create additional problems down the road?
Mr. Dickson. Well, I think Ranking Member Graves talked
about leadership. It is going to take leadership. Secretary
Buttigieg has been providing a lot of that leadership. We also
have an interagency group, including the Department of
Transportation and the FAA, the Department of Commerce, the
FCC, the Department of Defense meeting now on spectrum issues
and the coordination process. And I expect that to certainly
leverage the lessons that we have learned throughout this
journey that we are all on.
Mr. Larsen. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Johnson of Georgia. I yield back.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you. The Chair recognizes Representative
Gimenez of Florida for 5 minutes.
Mr. Gimenez. Thanks, Chairman. A couple of questions
concerning the safety aspect of this. Would you say that the
telephones that are used by the passengers inside the
airplane--I know we for years have been told we have to go on
airplane mode--are the dangers now heightened because of this
5G, as more and more passengers have 5G phones? And if they
fail to heed the instructions of the flightcrew, does that pose
a danger to the airplane, to the aircraft? Could it pose a
danger to the aircraft?
Mr. Dickson. Well, you are highlighting an issue that is
actually part of the testing that we are doing. Because what we
have to do is--the towers are generally smart towers. So, if
you look at 5G, as more demand is placed on the tower, the
power will increase. And so, if you have demand on the
telecommunications system that is coming from the airplane,
could that focus power on the aircraft as it is flying in low-
visibility conditions? These are the kinds of things that you
can only determine through the kind of flight testing that we
are doing now, and with the telecommunications and aviation
industry sharing information with each other. So, I think it is
an open question, but it is certainly one of the things that we
are looking at.
Mr. Gimenez. Have you put some kind of instructions to
flightcrews now to make sure that this happens? Because I know
that on the flights--I fly all the time between Miami and my
hometown and here, I know that people keep their phones on;
they don't put it on airplane mode. Have you instructed the
airlines to be more vigilant and to make sure that these phones
are actually on airplane mode in light of the fact that we
don't know what these things will do?
Mr. Dickson. Well, it is a great question. And we have
communicated that to the air carriers through the safety
awareness bulletins that we have put out. We will continue to
that, and we are continuing to have dialogue on how we make
sure that that is not happening on aircraft. But it is a
difficult issue. It is not like you have got flight attendants
or pilots who are looking over everyone's shoulder on the
airplane. So, it is a risk that we have to be very cognizant
of.
Mr. Gimenez. And one thing you can do is actually tell
people why it is important to put on it airplane mode. People
just say, put it on airplane mode. We don't know why we have to
put it on airplane mode. Well, now maybe it is a good reason to
say, hey, you need to put it on airplane mode because we don't
know what these things do to the altimeter. That would probably
make me put it on airplane mode. So, if you could do that and
inform the passengers, maybe more of them will comply. Because
right now, I bet you most people don't have the faintest idea
of why we go on airplane mode.
Mr. Dickson. Well, we'll look at that.
Mr. Gimenez. OK. One other thing, when exactly did you know
that this was an issue--not when you wrote the letter--but when
did you know that this could have been an issue?
Mr. Dickson. Well, I think the aviation community knew back
in 2015. That is where the concerns were initially focused. But
we started to--at the working level, my spectrum engineers and
all that really were communicating directly with their
counterparts at the FCC and elsewhere, back as early as 2019
and probably even 2018.
Mr. Gimenez. And nothing was done about it?
Mr. Dickson. Well, again, we kept raising the concerns. And
then after the--tried to get the auction delayed until we could
work through the appropriate safety mitigations. And then we
asked for the underlying data. And, again, it just shows the
difference between how telecommunications looks at spectrum
versus how it interacts with critical safety systems on
aircraft.
Mr. Gimenez. Well, I guess we got caught up in the race to
5G. We wanted to be the first at the 5G, this Nation did. I
guess that is why we wanted to sell spectrum. But it seems to
me that in the 6 years in between, we could have figured out
these solutions way before we had the implementation. But that
is Monday morning quarterback. Thank you very much, and I will
yield my time back. Thank you.
Mr. Dickson. Thank you.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you. The Chair now recognizes
Representative Allred of Texas for 5 minutes.
[No response.]
Mr. Larsen. Just a moment.
All right. We will go to Representative Lamb of
Pennsylvania for 5 minutes.
[No response.]
Mr. Larsen. Going once, going twice.
Representative Johnson of Texas, you are recognized for 5
minutes.
[No response.]
Mr. Larsen. Representative Johnson from Texas, I see you on
the screen, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
[No response.]
Mr. Larsen. Just a moment. Administrator?
[Pause.]
Mr. Larsen. We will come back.
Representative Lynch.
[No response.]
Mr. Larsen. We have got a list of names here. I am assuming
they are----
[Pause.]
Mr. Larsen. Representative Payne of New Jersey.
Representative Payne, you are recognized for 5 minutes. Hold on
a second. Hold on a second.
Representative Johnson, are you ready?
Ms. Johnson of Texas. I am sorry, did you call me?
Mr. Larsen. I did call you, Representative Johnson, yes.
Ms. Johnson of Texas. Yes, I am ready.
Mr. Larsen. We are going to go to Representative Johnson
from Texas for 5 minutes. You are recognized.
Ms. Johnson of Texas. Thank you very much. Let me thank you
and the witnesses. I would like to ask, Administrator Dickson,
why did the data exchange between Verizon, AT&T, and the FAA,
and the rest of the aviation community only begin at the end of
December 2021, knowing that this was on the horizon?
Mr. Dickson. Well, thank you, Representative Johnson. The
real issue is that we don't regulate the telecommunications
companies, so, we don't have a direct relationship with them.
And so, we had to basically put in place nondisclosure
agreements. In the aviation community, we regulate the
manufacturers and the operators. And part of the safety that we
enjoy in the U.S. with aviation is that they are required to
share their data with us, even though it is proprietary. So,
this was a new process for them.
And once we put that protocol in place, the data started to
flow, but it was some time--it was a few days before it was
really usable, because it was in different formats, and it
wasn't really--there wasn't an understanding of the kind of
data that we needed, because they had never had to produce it
for the Government before, again, because we are talking about
how the signal impacts aircraft that are flying through the
air.
Ms. Johnson of Texas. OK. I am wondering, do you believe
that FAA and the Department of Transportation should have a
more formal role in assessing the risk of spectrum or to the
transportation safety?
Mr. Dickson. Again, this process didn't serve anyone well,
including, certainly, the aviation sector. And it also didn't
serve the telecommunications industry well. So, I do believe
that it is, again, in everyone's interest to examine this
process, the Federal spectrum process. How it is coordinated
across agencies, the FAA among the agencies, but not the only
player, and make sure that we surface and then have a process
to resolve concerns and issues upfront. That will put us in a
much better place.
Ms. Johnson of Texas. How close are you on getting the
altimeter certification for private jets? Are you near? Or is
it on the horizon?
Mr. Dickson. Well, the permanent solution is going to be
some months away, if not a year or two. Because, again, we have
to set new airworthiness standards. There is an industry group
that is working on that. We will take that information in, it
will also be harmonized with Europe and other authorities
around the world. Because so many aviation authorities around
the world are very interested in what we are doing to regulate
our aviation manufacturers in the U.S.
So, once those new standards are set, then the aviation
manufacturers will come to us with their designs and then we
will certify them for use on commercial aircraft going forward.
Ms. Johnson of Texas. Thank you very much. And thank you,
Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Representative Johnson. The Chair
now recognizes Representative Mast of Florida for 5 minutes.
Mr. Mast. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it.
Sir, I want to talk a little bit about 5G, FAA, National
Telecommunications and Information Administration, and a
connection, a relationship between all of them and how they are
working together in order to make sure that we have safe
transportation. We can look at this on a number of different
fronts. Did the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration, which oversees public radio waves, did they
offer to test civilian aircraft equipment last year?
Mr. Dickson. Not that I am aware of.
Mr. Mast. There was a Wall Street Journal article that said
that that took place. So, the reporting on that is wrong?
Mr. Dickson. There is no NTIA testing that I am aware of,
of the kind that we would need to do to demonstrate the
[inaudible] performance of radio altimeters or critical systems
on aircraft.
Mr. Mast. My understanding is that there was not any
testing, but my understanding is also that there was an offer
by the NTIA to do testing, and that the FAA did not allow the
NTIA to move forward. Is that the case of what happened?
Mr. Dickson. I will have to look into that specific. I am
not aware of exactly what you are referring to. Again, it would
depend on how the testing is set up and whether it has a
sufficient level of rigor for aviation safety certification.
Mr. Mast. So, you are saying there would be a barrier for
the FAA to say we are just not going to allow this testing to
take place?
Mr. Dickson. If it is FAA testing, and there would be other
participation, I think that that would be something that we
would be very interested in.
Mr. Mast. All right. Yeah, we will make sure that we get
you the article, so that we can get a response from you on what
exactly took place with that situation. I appreciate the
testimony today. And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield my time
back.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Representative Mast. All right. Now
we have Representative Allred from Texas.
Mr. Allred. Yeah, I am here, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Larsen. All right. You are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Allred. OK. Sorry about that, Mr. Chairman. You know,
technical difficulties. And I want to thank Administrator
Dickson for being here with us. Nice to see you again, sir. As
a Member representing Dallas, a region that has one of the
busiest airports--and really, airspaces--in the country, this
has been a very important discussion.
And I just have one question for you, sir. It is about
whether if the aviation industry is able to design and
manufacture new radio altimeters, how long would it take for
FAA--as an estimate--to certify those?
Mr. Dickson. Well, again, the new standards for C-band
resistant radio altimeters are yet to be set. And so, we will
participate in that activity. It is a special committee that
has been set up under the auspices of RTCA Special Committee
239. And our technical experts are participating in that
activity as are stakeholders from around the aviation
community.
Once those standards are set, we will be using them to
develop new certification standards that will determine which
radio altimeters perform well and which ones need to be
upgraded. And that is what the manufacturers will bring back to
us, those new designs.
We are seeing some promising activity among the
manufacturers for devices that may be added to the existing
fleet out there. But those would be in the--not in terms of new
certifications, but they would certainly improve the
performance of what is out there in the fleet and provide
additional operational flexibility to those airlines or other
operators that may have low-performing equipment right now.
Mr. Allred. Where are y'all in reviewing those additional
items?
Mr. Dickson. We are talking with manufacturers on a regular
basis. I know that we had actually one of the radio altimeter
manufacturers in, I believe, yesterday, talking about product
improvements that they were planning to make. So, those
discussions are ongoing on a pretty frequent basis.
Mr. Allred. That wouldn't need an entirely review process.
Is that right, or no?
Mr. Dickson. Not if it is an improvement to an existing
design or a filter, for example. Remember that radio altimeters
actually--the same radio altimeter on different airplanes can
perform differently----
Mr. Allred. Right.
Mr. Dickson [continuing]. Depending on how it is installed
in the aircraft, how long the wiring is, and things like that.
So, we have to look at the actual radio altimeter and the
airplane combination together.
Mr. Allred. OK. Well, obviously, whatever we do, we want to
do it as safely as possible. But given places like Dallas where
you have these big airports, and we want to also move forward
with this technology, I hope that we can find something
together. If there is anything we can do as a committee to
support you in that, I hope you will let us know.
Mr. Dickson. Thank you.
Mr. Allred. Yeah.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Larsen. All right. Thank you very much, Mr. Allred. The
Chair recognizes Representative Massie of Kentucky for 5
minutes.
Mr. Massie. Thank you, Chairman Larsen. The FCC has an
obligation to ensure over time that the radio spectrum is used
for its highest and best use. In fact, it was Obama in 2010 who
said, free up some space for these telecommunications devices.
And I was shocked when I dug into this to find out how much of
the spectrum the aviation industry uses.
And I am wondering, by 1982 standards, it might have been
the highest and best use of that spectrum. But now that we have
got better radio frequency modulators and an ability to use
this space--by the way, no more frequency is getting
manufactured. We have got all that God has given us. It is like
land on the planet. So, we have to be really careful with this
space, and use it the best way.
What I was shocked to find out is that the radio altimeter,
which is basically a 1980s version of Mark Twain putting a rope
in the water and measuring how far down things are, uses 200
megahertz of spectrum. And it has got a 200-megahertz guard
band if you are not concerned about the low-power satellite
spectrum, and you are actually concerned about the 5G spectrum.
It is like you are sitting in an airplane seat, and there
is an empty seat next to you, and you are complaining about the
seat on the other side of the aisle, is kind of the analogy
here. Which in 1982, I understand, which is the last time these
standards came out, it all worked out.
But here is how valuable this spectrum is. It was auctioned
off--280 megahertz of it was auctioned off 1 year ago and
brought $81 billion. So, to use the radio altimeters--we are
using 200 megahertz, which is about $300 million of megahertz.
That is its commercial value. We are using about $60 billion of
spectrum to figure out how far from the ground the airplane is
when it gets within a couple thousand feet of the ground. It
makes me wonder if we are kind of being sloppy with the
spectrum usage in other aviation fields.
I know that, FAA Administrator, I think you were involved
in helping to develop the ATC digital communication between the
plane and the tower. Do you have some familiarity with that?
Mr. Dickson. Yes.
Mr. Massie. And it is my understanding that all of the VHF
NAV for aviation fits in 10 megahertz, from 108 to 118 slot.
And then we have got the audio communications that fit in 20
megahertz above that. And y'all were able to use just 1
megahertz to get all of the digital communications between the
ATC and the planes.
Mr. Dickson. Yes, sir. Do you want me to respond?
Mr. Massie. Well, if I am wrong, just correct me, but let
me go on a little bit forward. If we were going to design radio
altimeters now, how much spectrum do you think we would need?
Would we need the whole 200 megahertz, which is $60 billion
worth of spectrum? Could we do it with 10 megahertz, which
would be $3 billion? Could we do it with 1 megahertz?
Mr. Dickson. I am not a spectrum expert myself, but if you
are asking me whether we can use spectrum more efficiently, I
think the answer is yes. But we have to have a strategy for
being able to do that. And remember, when commercial aircraft
are certified and put into service, they will operate safely.
And we engineer them to carry the public for a period of 30 to
40 years.
And so, if we are going to put that kind of retrofit
mandate and standards development into avionics, that needs to
be part of our national strategy. And maybe that is something
that can come out of this spectrum process.
But my point here is, we need to have the data of what we
are designing around so we can set the standards for the
avionics manufacturers and the airframe manufacturers to be
able to produce those new units. And will they use spectrum
more efficiently? I would say that they will.
Mr. Massie. That was the whole point of my questioning, and
you completely understand it. So, I want to make sure that we
don't just solve this problem, but we solve the problem going
forward. Because we are not inventing anymore spectrum. We
can't create it. And we want to make sure that the aviation
industry is a good steward. And I understand the changes
happened faster with telecommunications than they could have
possibly been certified in aircraft. But I appreciate you being
willing to get in front of it and look for ways to sort of be a
better steward----
Mr. Larsen. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Massie [continuing]. Of the spectrum. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Larsen. The Chair recognizes Representative Payne of
New Jersey for 5 minutes.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thought I was going to keep getting bumped back. It is
like the bunny hop. Two steps forward; one, two, three back.
Mr. Larsen. I apologize for the confusion.
Mr. Payne. No problem. No problem. I am team player, and I
am with you, sir.
Mr. Administrator, 5G deployment has the potential to
provide high-quality cellular service to millions of Americans.
However, we must ensure that the deployment is, obviously, in a
safe manner, and that it does not impact aviation operations,
which you have articulated today, so we are on the same page
there.
Having multiple airports located in or near densely
populated areas, such as my congressional district in Newark,
adds another layer of complexity to keeping Americans safe when
they travel on airplanes. How is the FAA taking this into
account regarding the future actions on 5G deployment?
Mr. Dickson. Well, I would say, again, we are working in
good faith. And the telecommunications companies are working
with us as well, Verizon and AT&T currently. And that is
creating opportunities for us to deploy additional 5G C-band,
but make sure that aviation safety is protected, not only in
terms of the technical performance of the aircraft and the
radio altimeters, but also in terms of greater predictability
for the flying public and for everyone that is using the
National Airspace System. That is always going to be our top
priority, ensuring the safety of our national airspace and the
ability of Americans to be able to travel domestically and
abroad safely.
Mr. Payne. Thank you for that. Now, on to the future. There
are areas in which the Federal Government could have done
better, quite a few, in anticipating issues with 5G deployment
and taking proactive steps to avoid problems so close to the
rollout of services, which has been a common theme today.
I don't know when, but eventually, there will be a
successor to 5G. It is my sincere hope that history does not
repeat itself with these problems. What lessons has the FAA
learned so far with the problems encountered with 5G
deployment, and how will it inform future actions with next-gen
networks?
Mr. Dickson. It is a great question, and I think that--you
know, I have talked about the Federal spectrum process, and
that there are interagency discussions right now on spectrum
issues. But I think, more broadly, different industries that
are intersecting each other--for example, a lot of our aviation
infrastructure these days that used to be on the ground is
actually on the aircraft. And we don't use radar, for example,
as a primary means of surveillance anymore. Radar is still very
important. But we have data link, the ADS-B system on the
aircraft transmitting very precise positions to our
controllers. GPS, certainly, are on commercial aircraft. And we
are talking here about radio altimeters.
So, as we go on, it is not just C-band, it is also other
spectrum activities. We just need to make sure that we are very
coordinated as a Federal Government, but also that industries
are able to share data and information with each other. And
that, certainly, the proprietary nature of their corporate
information is protected, but that they are able to have
dialogue and interchange so that we don't have one set of
engineers saying one thing and another set of engineers saying
something else.
Mr. Payne. Thank you for that. And I feel that in the
future we need to maybe look at the agency that has
jurisdiction over a certain area. You can go to and request
help in getting information that you need if it is lagging. So,
I think that would be a really, really useful thing to have.
Part of your problem was that you didn't have any
jurisdiction over them. So, whatever is the entity that does,
you should be able to go and request that they work with you on
these matters. So, that is something that maybe I will take a
look at. But thank you for your time. And, Mr. Chairman, I
yield back.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Representative Payne. Next up will
be Representative Katko. You are recognized for 5 minutes.
After which will be Representative Carson. Katko and then
Carson.
Representative Katko, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Ranking
Member Graves, for having this hearing today. This discussion
is essential to providing clarity to millions of Americans who
are understandably confused about the rollout of 5G and its
impact on aviation.
You will be hearing from a panel of industry stakeholders
later today, but I want to focus on the Federal response to the
5G and, more specifically, the lack of coordination between FCC
and the FAA leading up to this deployment.
In my district in central New York, this issue gained very
significant attention during the week of January 17 when we
found out that Syracuse Hancock International Airport had
temporarily lost clearance from the FAA for certain low-
visibility landings.
Now, I want to tell you something that is earth shattering,
it is often a lot of clouds in Syracuse, especially this time
of year. Today, for example, we are getting 1\1/2\ feet of
snow. So, it is not uncommon to have this issue. And we didn't
know about any of this until January 17 when they were
informed.
Now although some of these have been resolved right now,
questions still remain, and it is understandable than this
initial disruption raises significant concerns for the airport
and for passengers. In our region, Hancock International
Airport plays a very key role in facilitating travel and acting
as an access point for a very large area for commerce. The same
is true for hundreds of other airports across the country and
for the communities they serve.
Even temporarily jeopardizing the availability of services
at these locations can cause major disruptions and diminish
public trust in air travel, at a time when industry is already
struggling mightily to recover from the impact of the COVID-19
pandemic. And given that the Federal agencies involved had
years to prepare for this rollout, it just seems like this is
an absolutely unacceptable way to handle it.
I agree with Chairman DeFazio's comments earlier that no
one wants to see planes falling out of the sky, obviously, and
we've got to make sure we are safe. Well, how the hell did we
get to the point where there is so much brinkmanship going on
with this when we had 5 years in the making? It wasn't until
December of 2021 that the FAA and FCC even entered into an
information-sharing agreement.
So, I have got to ask you, Mr. Dickson, how did it come to
this where the airports were just basically at the last minute
getting these directives coming out? I mean, this was bubbling
up for quite a long time.
Mr. Dickson. Well, thank you, Congressman. I am very
familiar with having spent a few years in my youth in upstate
New York, a beautiful part of the country. I am very familiar
with the weather up there having flown into Syracuse many
times.
So, as a former pilot myself and with an operational
background, I understand that our stakeholders and the
airport's community feel frustrated. I don't blame anyone for
being frustrated by the use of----
Mr. Katko. So, yes, I understand that, there is
frustration, but how did it come to this, and how are we going
to make sure this doesn't happen again? Because we are talking
about an awful lot of commerce here, we are talking about--you
know, there are obviously safety issues. But it kind of makes
me worried about safety issues when you get directives at the
last second, which tends to indicate that you really didn't
have a plan, number one, or you didn't understand the gravity
of the situation ahead of time. So, how did it come to it--
briefly--and how are we going to fix it to make sure it doesn't
happen again?
Mr. Dickson. Well, until we have the direct dialogue with
the telecommunications companies and their commitment to modify
their initial deployment, we weren't in a position to authorize
the kinds of poor weather operations. So, we had had to
communicate several weeks prior that this was an issue. When we
provided the relief, we are actually providing that relief to
the manufacturers, not to the airlines or the airports.
And so, part of what we are working through now, and I
think we are in a much better place, is if we get earlier
deployment data from the telecommunications companies, that
will allow us to have better line of sight on issues. And----
Mr. Katko. I understand that, but, sir, it goes back again,
5 years. You knew this possibility was coming for 5 years. And,
again, I am at the last second. So, how can we help you if you
need help from us? Is there something we need to do, or is
there something you need to do to make sure you don't get
caught like this again in the future? Because, quite frankly,
it gives people the feeling that the bureaucratic malaise in
Washington is alive and well. There are two agencies that
weren't talking to each other until the last minute, number
one.
And then, number two, you not knowing what is going on
until right at the end, and then you have to issue these things
which cause disruptions in the system, when you have been
working on this issue for 5 years.
Mr. Dickson. Well, so, talking about not the actual initial
rollout, but again, the broader issue of spectrum policy and
strategy as a country, absolutely, that needs to be addressed.
And so, again, we are involved in the interagency conversation
with the Department of Transportation, Department of Defense,
Department of Commerce, and others to make sure that----
Mr. Larsen. The gentleman's time has expired. Please finish
up. Thank you. Representative Carson, you are recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Carson. Thank you, Chairman. Administrator Dickson,
while I respect the need for an independent FCC, that does not
mean that the FCC does what it pleases without real
collaboration with other agencies and robust oversight. I think
it is a shame, sir, that the FCC declined our invitation to
testify today, quite frankly. NTIA is supposed to act as an
intermediary between these agencies and the FCC. One can only
look at where we are today and really conclude that the process
has failed. Do you agree with me on the process being broken,
sir? What are your thoughts?
Mr. Dickson. Well, as I said before, the process did not
serve anyone well. It did not serve the aviation community
well, and, certainly, the FAA. And it also did not serve the
telecommunications industry well. We certainly need to do
better as a country.
Mr. Carson. Yes, sir. Do you see the process which led us
to this hearing today being workable without Congress stepping
in to clarify the intent of the process? How do we keep this
kind of problem from happening again?
Mr. Dickson. Well, I think that we need to stay focused on
it. I believe that this is something where we can have--Chair
Larsen talked about informal dialogue. If we can put mechanisms
in place so that affected agencies are not interested parties
in these proceedings, but actually their equities are
recognized in the process, and that there is a mechanism for
early data sharing. Because that is really what it comes down
to is the data that we need to be able to make the decisions
within--in this case, to preserve and protect aviation safety.
That is what really needs to happen throughout this spectrum
process. And I believe that the conversations that we are
having within the executive branch certainly have that goal in
mind.
Mr. Carson. Thank you, sir. I yield back, Chairman.
Mr. Larsen. The Chair recognizes Representative Brownley of
California for 5 minutes.
Ms. Brownley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Mr.
Administrator, for being here. In answering some of the other
Members' questions, you talked about leadership being necessary
so that this doesn't happen again, to bring agencies together
and working together. You mentioned that Secretary Buttigieg
has been demonstrating some of that leadership currently.
So, I just--I guess I don't want to beat a dead horse
here--so, what was the White House doing to help you and assist
you during this timeframe?
Mr. Dickson. Well, I am grateful for the support from the
National Economic Council, its engagement in this matter to
facilitate the dialogue that we needed to have between two very
different industries.
Again, as I have stated several times, the FAA had
communicated our safety concerns over a period of several
years. And, ultimately, the decision was made to proceed with
the spectrum auction consistent with the FCC's determination,
and then we had to act upon that reality. I wish there would
have been a way to avoid that. I think that with this
subcommittee's support, and certainly what we are doing now as
part of this interagency process, we will see an improved
process in the future.
And, again, I think that this is an area that we just need
to stay focused on to make sure that we can have a better
outcome. Because this is not the last spectrum issue that we
are going to be facing as a country. As someone said earlier,
there is only a finite amount, and we have got to figure out
how to enable future spectrum for beneficial public use.
Ms. Brownley. Thank you for that, Mr. Administrator. So, I
have two general aviation airports in my district. I have a
naval base, and I have the 146th Airlift Wing of the California
National Guard. So, my question is how is all of this impacting
general aviation, and how are we working with DoD in terms of
military National Guard?
Mr. Dickson. Well, we are working very closely with DoD as
we do on a whole host of issues because, obviously, they share
the civil airspace for their training and other activities that
the FAA is responsible for. And, certainly, we have commercial
flights occasionally flying into military bases, so we have got
to pay attention to the issues there as well.
In terms of general aviation, we have raised awareness in
that community. The vast, vast, vast majority of those
operators are not certified to do what we call Category II and
Category III low-visibility approaches at less than a half mile
visibility. So, they are not seeing the same kinds of impacts
as the commercial air carriers. But there are other systems on
the airplane that we have raised their awareness of, but they
aren't in critical phases of flight.
So, we are soliciting, we are working with our General
Aviation Joint Steering Committee to make sure that we are
getting information both from individual operators and the
associations that represent them, so that we can all add that
into the mix as we develop new standards for this equipment on
airplanes going forward.
Ms. Brownley. So, would you characterize general aviation
airports as being out of the woods in terms of any danger?
Mr. Dickson. I would say the biggest impacts are on a
couple hundred airports that we have that have low-visibility
approaches. In a 5G environment, where you don't have that kind
of capability, it is very expensive. You are usually not going
to see a general aviation airport with that kind of capability.
It is a very expensive infrastructure to put in place because
you have got a certified flightcrew, certified airplane, and a
certified runway with approach lights, and a lot of very
expensive infrastructure. That is usually not going to be what
you've got at a GA airport. So, the impacts are not as great,
but that community is something that we are paying very close
attention to to make sure that they can continue to operate the
way that they have previously.
Ms. Brownley. Well, I hope that will continue to be the
case. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you. The Chair recognizes Congresswoman
Holmes Norton for 5 minutes.
Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Can everybody hear me?
Mr. Larsen. We can hear you just fine.
Ms. Norton. My question is to Administrator Dickson. 5G
operates on the C-band, but that is a mid-band wireless
spectrum from 3.7 to 3.98 GHz. But that is adjacent to a 4.2 to
4.4 GHz band used by certain aviation safety equipment,
including radio altimeters.
In 2021, there was a safety alert to operators where the
FAA warned, and here I am quoting, ``the receiver on the radio
altimeter is typically accurate, however it may deliver
erroneous results in the presence of out-of-band radio
frequency emissions from other frequency bands.''
So, my question, Administrator Dickson, is if the
deployment of 5G wireless services in the C-band poses
potential, unsafe interference with aviation safety equipment,
are there alternative frequencies that telecommunications
companies can use for their 5G rollout, and what is the nearest
frequency in which 5G can operate that would not pose a risk of
their interference to radio altimeters?
Mr. Dickson. Well, thank you, Congresswoman Norton. It is
good see you this morning. In answer to your question, there
are other 5G frequency bands. But the C-band is particularly
attractive. It has certain characteristics that make it, in
terms of coverage and power levels, that make it very
beneficial for 5G. And I think everyone--we certainly recognize
that.
In terms of the safety information that we have put out, we
had a responsibility to notify the aviation community of the
potential for interference based on the studies that had been
done, and then the work that we are doing now in terms of
testing, and also the avionics manufacturer is doing in terms
of testing, is continuing to demonstrate the performance of the
radio altimeters. And we will continue to work as we move
forward.
Ms. Norton. Thank you. This next question is for Mr. Viola.
Mr. Viola, I am interested in this because----
Mr. Larsen. Congresswoman?
Ms. Norton. Yes?
Mr. Larsen. He is on the second panel, if you want to put
it in the record.
Ms. Norton. Oh, he is on the second panel.
Mr. Larsen. Yeah.
Ms. Norton. OK. Sorry.
Mr. Larsen. That is fine.
Ms. Norton. Thank you. Finally, let me ask if it is
impossible or impracticable for 5G to operate on a different
frequency, how costly would it be to upgrade the radio
altimeters on regional jets and helicopters that are most
susceptible to interference? How much time would be needed to
approve of this new equipment?
Mr. Dickson. Well, again, what we are doing is we are
addressing the rollout that we have in front of us, making sure
that we take appropriate steps to ensure that aviation safety
is maintained. But in parallel, the new standards for radio
altimeters are in the process of being developed. And once they
are developed, it could be that some existing radio altimeters
that are out there have satisfactory performance with the new
standard. We don't know exactly where that cut point is yet.
But then for those that do need to be replaced that don't
meet the new standard, the manufacturers will produce new
designs that the FAA will certify, and then those can be
installed on those fleet types. I don't have the specific
numbers on what that potential expense is, but I would imagine
there is probably somebody on the second panel that can speak
to that point.
Ms. Norton. How much time it would take to approve the new
equipment?
Mr. Dickson. You know what, again, once the standards are
set, which is probably, in my estimation, it is going to be
probably about this time next year, is an optimistic scenario,
but then I know that there is work going on at the
manufacturers right now in anticipation of new standards being
set, and we will have to see what that looks like once we get
those newer standards in place.
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Congresswoman Holmes Norton. Next up
is Representative Stauber of Minnesota.
Mr. Stauber. Thank you very much, Chair Larsen. I thank you
all for being here today. As we look at 5G deployment and in
general other advancements in technology, we obviously need to
ensure that we were using fact-based analysis. This will best
facilitate an economic environment that allows the economy to
grow and technology to advance while also ensuring customer
safety.
When it comes to 5G, we have all heard both sides of this
argument, and to be fair, it is a little difficult to decipher
at times. I agree that passenger safety must be the most
paramount priority and any interference with navigational or
operational instruments demands a solution. I also understand
that advances in technology like 5G can be important tools for
the future. And it is important that the Government foster
innovation, not stifle it.
Mr. Dickson, in your opinion, what is the perfect solution
to this issue? Is it more buffer zones? Is it reorienting the
towers? Is it an instrument fix to the altimeters? What do you
think can be negotiated that is fair to both parties, and how
soon do you think that can be achieved?
Mr. Dickson. Well, it is a great question. And, again, we
have got the short-term solution. I think the key to all of
this is early and very transparent data exchange. And that
process only began in earnest between the aviation sector and
the telecommunications companies back in late December. And we
made tremendous progress in a very short period of time. I wish
there had been a mechanism for that kind of exchange to happen
earlier, and I think that we would be in a different place, but
we can't rewrite that history.
So, moving forward, I think we want to enable technology
and innovation as you state, but we have got to make sure that
there is a mechanism for affected stakeholders' interest to be
accounted for. And that does happen on occasion, but it did not
happen in this particular case, and we need to make sure that
it does.
Mr. Stauber. And how soon do you think it can be achieved?
Can you give the committee a timeline? What is your thought?
Mr. Dickson. Well, again, the mitigations we have in place
in terms of the 5G deployment patterns and the presence around
airports, what our safety model looks like, the flight testing
that we are doing right now, all of that is going to continue
to refine what the problem set is. It is going to continue, I
believe, to shrink the problem over the next few months.
But the ultimate solution is using the data that we have
now and the performance characteristics of the existing radio
altimeters out there in the fleet to develop these new
airworthiness standards. And that is probably not going to
happen within the next year or so. An optimistic scenario is
probably early 2023, and then the manufacturers will have the
information that they need to be able to manufacture new units
for those lower performing parts of the fleet that are
operating currently.
But in the meantime, working together and the mitigations
that we have in place will be very beneficial in making sure
that we can continue air commerce and have it done in a safe
way for the public, but also enable additional 5G C-band to
form, to happen simultaneously.
[Pause.]
Mr. Dickson. I am sorry, you are on mute.
Mr. Larsen. Representative Stauber, you are on mute.
Mr. Stauber. Thank you, Mr. Chair. So, what is your
agency's very near-term plan to ensure this is resolved and
working together? Do you have a working plan to get together so
we are not doing this at the last minute, or rushing the
information or rushing the process?
Mr. Dickson. Yes, that is a great question. And Secretary
Buttigieg in our meeting with the telecommunications companies
on a regular basis to ensure that we are staying, that we are
continuing to focus on, on moving forward together. And our
technical teams are meeting daily, if not multiple times a day.
As I had mentioned earlier, we have set up flight test
scenarios at some airports around the country, and we will
continue do that. And that will give us the fidelity that we
need in terms of what does this signal look like when it is
actually arriving at the airport. That is research that had
never been done before. And that will be very beneficial in
both the near-term mitigations that we need to continue to pay,
but also in developing a long-term solution.
Mr. Stauber. Well, thank you very much. Mr. Chair, how much
time do I have left?
Mr. Larsen. Sorry you are out of time, Mr. Stauber.
Mr. Stauber. Well, thank you, Mr. Chair. I turn it back to
you.
Mr. Larsen. Right. I have two words for you, Mr. Stauber,
stay warm.
Mr. Stauber. Thank you.
Mr. Larsen. It is minus 6 in Duluth, Minnesota, right now,
folks. I would like to recognize Representative Titus of Nevada
for 5 minutes.
Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you,
Administrator, for being here. I would like to go back to the
question that Ms. Brownley posed, and just to put a point on
it, general aviation is so important to the Las Vegas economy.
We fly a lot of tourists in commercially, but those corporate
jets and those executive jets that fly into Henderson and North
Las Vegas bring people to Raiders games, to prize fights, to
conventions, so, I am glad that you are working on that to be
sure that they are accommodated with this new technology as
well.
Mr. Dickson. Absolutely, no, it is very important. And,
again, the initial focus was on international commercial wide-
body aircraft. We didn't want Americans to be stranded overseas
and not be able to get back up and get back home. And we have
continued to work through all of the approvals.
And as the manufacturers bring us for their proposals for
how their systems will perform, we will process them as quickly
as we possibly can. I am really proud of how quickly the agency
has been able to respond at a time that has been very important
to our country.
Ms. Titus. Well, I appreciate that because so often we are
reacting as opposed to being ahead of the game, and then we get
behind Europe, we get behind Australia, and we try to catch up.
And that is especially true of the FAA before you were there. I
am not putting this on you, but they were so hidebound, we
couldn't get them to do anything to keep up with the
technology.
And with this new 5G that we are trying to deal with, I
would ask you too about the advanced air mobility. This new
technology is coming. I was pleased to introduce a bill with
the chairman and the ranking member. I wonder, are we trying to
get ahead of the game with that, or is that also going to be
reactive? And the same question I might ask about drones, we
have all heard a lot about drones, and the development of the
drones in the airspace and all. Are we thinking about any plans
to deal with that?
Mr. Dickson. Well, and I will--taking drones first, we have
made a lot of progress, but we have got a ways to go. An
example of the rigor of the approval process that we go through
is when we did the rulemaking on remote identification.
We engaged all of our Federal partners in that and had to
actually change our approach a little bit based on the work
that we had done with them. But, ultimately, we want to get
drones. We just completed an aviation rulemaking committee on
beyond visual line of sight operations rather than doing it at
scale, rather than with individual exemptions. And I am excited
to see that proceed on into the future.
That rulemaking is definitely on our very short to-do list.
With advanced air mobility, we are working with several
manufacturers. I have actually spent some time with several of
them. I was at an industry roundtable about 3 months ago
talking about the near-term opportunities. I think the good
news there is that our existing regulatory structure that we
have around a lot of helicopter operations and other types of
air mobility-type operations will serve us well in the early
going.
We have the first machines that we expect to be certified
probably around 2024. So, in the aviation business that is
right in front of us. So, we are looking forward to seeing that
technology roll out. Think it will be very beneficial to
society and great for our communities as well.
Ms. Titus. Well, thank you. It is a difficult job you have
balancing this 5G, so we can be competitive, especially now we
are talking about competitiveness with China. We need to do
that and yet the FAA's main priority has always been safety,
which we want to be sure that the American public feels like
they can travel by air safely.
Mr. Dickson. Absolutely. We need to do both.
Ms. Titus. Well, thank you very much.
I will yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you. Representative Titus yields back.
And I recognize Representative Van Drew of New Jersey for 5
minutes.
Dr. Van Drew. Thank you, Chairman, and thank you, Ranking
Member, for holding this hearing on this critical issue.
This committee has no higher responsibility than ensuring
the safety of the flying public. The issue of 5G interference
with aircraft radio altimeters is very serious. It is
unfortunate that we are in this situation and it was certainly
preventable. We can and must act to address the immediate
problem and to ensure that it never happens again.
Administrator Dickson, you and the FAA are working
diligently, you are working hard to move this issue forward. It
is clearly the FAA's top priority right now to ensure that the
5G rollout occurs in the safest and least disruptive way
possible.
I commend your focus, and I know that you will keep it up.
I am concerned that this will not be the last time that the FAA
runs into spectrum management issues. Spectrum conflicts are
only going to become more common as the airspace fills with new
entrants. With the growth of the UAS industry, the United
States airspace could have millions of drones flying around the
country with hundreds of different operators. These companies
will need spectrum to manage these drones without question.
Much of the FAA's spectrum capability comes from the
Spectrum Engineering Office. So, Mr. Administrator, I have
several questions to ask. What role has the FAA Spectrum
Engineering Office played in the process of detecting and
solving the 5G interference issue before us? And now and into
the future, do we need more resources? These are changing times
and changing technologies, we need the resources to deal with
this.
How will the expansion of the UAS industry complicate the
spectrum environment?
Thank you.
Mr. Dickson. Thank you, Congressman Van Drew. And I know
that you have particular focus on this. We have talked about
the capabilities of the tech center and our very highly capable
team there. As I said, this process did not serve anyone well,
and we needed to do better, and we will.
In terms of resources, I think that if we can improve the
process, we are well resourced for what we have in front of us.
My spectrum engineers, the last 3 months I have been talking
with them on almost a daily basis. They are a very capable
group, but this is not an issue that is going away.
And as a matter of fact, in order to be able to continue to
enable the kind of innovations that you are talking about, it
is something that we are focused on in our workforce plan. We
really need to make sure that we are bringing the kinds of
21st-century expertise and experience into the agency that we
will need to move these forward.
So, I look forward to continuing to work with you on those
very important issues.
Dr. Van Drew. Good. I appreciate it. I look forward to it
as well. Nothing could be more important right now.
And I yield back, Chairman.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Representative Van Drew.
The Chair recognizes Representative Stanton for 5 minutes.
Mr. Stanton. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Can you see
me OK?
Mr. Larsen. Yes. It is fine and hear you fine.
Mr. Stanton. All right. Our Nation needs 5G and the
capabilities it brings. At the same time, safety of our
national airspace must be a key priority for passengers,
pilots, and crew. Administrator Dickson, you are tasked with
the hard job of making both of these things happen right now.
When did the FAA begin the process to review and improve
existing radio altimeters in 5G deployment areas and were there
barriers that prevented FAA from doing those assessments
earlier?
Mr. Dickson. Well, again, the formal process for providing
the approvals was dependent upon having the deployment data
from the telecommunications industry, because--remember, we are
not certifying new equipment right now. We are addressing what
we call an unsafe condition that has been identified in radio
altimeter avionics.
So, when you do that, we issue an airworthiness directive
that essentially, in this case, does not allow the use of that
technology on the airplane. So, to continue to enable poor
weather, low-visibility-type operations, again, operations in
most cases of less than a half mile visibility where the pilot
is doing what we call Category II or a Category III auto
landing approach, the radio altimeter is very critical in that
phase of flight.
And until we had the specific deployment data, for example,
latitude/longitude, elevation, is the tower on a hill, what is
the height of the tower, signal strength, all of that
deployment information, that is the information that we needed
to be able to put our protection zones in place.
And then once we did that, the aviation manufacturers came
to us with the level of performance that they are testing
indicated their radio altimeters would perform satisfactorily.
Some of them range from a few hundred feet. Some of them are
well over several miles where they are potentially vulnerable
at this point to C-band interference.
And so, we continue to work that, and we will continue to
work with the manufacturers to ensure that only those
operations that can be conducted safely will be allowed to
continue.
Mr. Stanton. Are there other technical concerns with
interference other than just with radio altimeters?
Mr. Dickson. Well, there are other--some airplanes have--
the root cause of all of this is the performance of the radio
altimeter, but what has happened with certain aircraft types is
that the radio altimeter has been architected into other
automatic systems on the aircraft.
For example, thrust reversers or spoilers, they are the
panels that come up on the wing after landing to help slow the
airplane down, those types of things in older aircraft types,
you may have had a sensor on the wheel that detected when the
airplane was on the ground. Now with some newer aircraft
designs, the radio altimeter is used as a backup or perhaps
even primary to those sensors, and that safety enhancement,
actually, becomes compromised as well.
I think the good news here is that the same relief that we
are providing for low-visibility approaches is also protecting
those systems on the aircraft as well.
Mr. Stanton. What measures does the FAA have in place to
ensure that the data provided by the telecom industry regarding
5G deployment areas, such as tower locations and activations,
power levels, et cetera, what measures do you have in place to
ensure that it is accurate, reliable, and shared with you in a
timely matter moving forward?
Mr. Dickson. Well, again, I am having regular conversations
with their leadership. We are having technical exchanges on a
daily basis. We have developed a level of familiarity and a
level of collaboration, and frankly, a building level of trust.
It is always trust but verify, and that is part of what
flight testing is telling us is, we think that the technical
specifications and what they have committed to us is actually
the way that things will perform in the real world. The flight
testing is helping us to validate things like signal shape and
power.
And again, frankly, the kind of information exchange that
we are having with them is information that they were never
required to provide before. In fact, they had never even really
thought about the impact of a C-band signal on a moving
aircraft. It was just not something that was within their
calculus.
And so, now we are, just in the last few weeks, we are
certainly working with each other much more effectively than we
were before.
Mr. Stanton. Trust but verify.
I yield back.
Mr. Larsen. Thanks, Representative, very much.
So, as I understand it, for this panel, that is all the
Members who have questions. And we have other Members waiting,
but that is for the second panel. Going once? Going twice?
Great.
Administrator Dickson, thank you for joining us and thank
you for giving us a little over 2 hours of your time to ask
some questions.
I think the second panel will also give us some very
interesting perspective for us to explore based on some of the
things you said. And we will be in touch with you with further
questions, as well as some followup on how we can help out, but
thank you very much for joining us today.
Mr. Dickson. Thank you for your support and for your
leadership.
Mr. Larsen. For the members on the panel, we are going to
take a 10-minute recess. Some of us haven't had the chance to
get up and walk around like others. So, we are going to take a
10-minute recess and we will back for the second panel.
[Recess.]
Mr. Larsen. I call the subcommittee back into session.
I now call up panel 2. I will ask the witnesses on panel 2
to please turn your cameras on and keep them on for the
duration of the panel. I want to welcome the witnesses on our
second panel.
I will just go through the introduction of each one.
Nick Calio, the president and CEO of Airlines for America.
The Honorable Eric Fanning, president and CEO of the
Aerospace Industries Association.
Cathryn Stephens, airport director, Eugene Airport, on
behalf of the American Association of Airport Executives.
Captain Joe DePete, president of the Air Line Pilots
Association.
Faye Malarkey Black, president and CEO of the Regional
Airline Association.
James Viola, president and CEO of the Helicopter
Association International.
The Honorable Meredith Attwell Baker, president and CEO of
CTIA.
And Dennis Roberson, president and chief executive officer
of Roberson and Associates and also a proud graduate of the
Washington State University.
Thank you for joining us today, and I look forward to your
testimony.
Without objection, our witnesses' full statements will be
included in the record. And since your written testimony has
been made part of the record, the subcommittee requests that
you limit your oral testimony to 5 minutes.
With that, we will start with Mr. Calio. You are recognized
for 5 minutes. You may proceed.

TESTIMONY OF NICHOLAS E. CALIO, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OFFICER, AIRLINES FOR AMERICA; HON. ERIC FANNING, PRESIDENT AND
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, AEROSPACE INDUSTRIES ASSOCIATION;
CATHRYN STEPHENS, A.A.E., AIRPORT DIRECTOR, EUGENE AIRPORT, ON
BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF AIRPORT EXECUTIVES;
CAPTAIN JOSEPH G. DePETE, PRESIDENT, AIR LINE PILOTS
ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL; FAYE MALARKEY BLACK, PRESIDENT AND
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, REGIONAL AIRLINE ASSOCIATION; JAMES
VIOLA, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, HELICOPTER
ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONAL; HON. MEREDITH ATTWELL BAKER,
PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, CTIA; AND DENNIS A.
ROBERSON, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, ROBERSON AND
ASSOCIATES, LLC

Mr. Calio. Thank you, Chairman DeFazio and Larsen and
Ranking Member Graves and Graves.
A4A appreciates the opportunity to testify. Given the
unprecedented impacts of the pandemic, it is quite notable that
an unrelated problem would rise to be the most disruptive issue
facing our industry, yet here we are. Commercial aviation is
the safest mode of transportation in the world due in part to
technology like radio altimeters. They are essential tools that
provide input to many other critical safety systems on an
airplane.
Since the spring of 2018, A4A and others in the aviation
industry, have been raising concerns about radio altimeters in
the new 5G environment. I point you to the timeline of cautions
we raised, which is attached to our written testimony. As time
ran out ahead of the scheduled, and then rescheduled deployment
dates, A4A sounded the alarm.
I and all of our member CEOs signed a letter warning of
significant disruption to air passengers, shippers, the supply
chain, and delivery of needed medical supplies. The
restrictions that were being imposed on the industry would have
impacted approximately 345,000 passenger flights, 32 million
passengers, and 5,400 cargo flights each year in the form of
delayed flights, diversions, or cancellations.
The past few months have been nothing short of a harrowing
sequence of looming deadlines and impending Government action.
The process that led up to this operational nightmare or
potential operational nightmare should be held up as a
cautionary tale of lack of communication and coordination gone
awry.
It is not a partisan problem or issue; it is a Government
coordination problem that needs to be rationalized going
forward. As a result of the FCC's decision not to address
aviation safety concerns, the FAA rightly did.
The situation could and should have been directly addressed
prior to the spectrum auction, but we are encouraged by recent
progress. Today, we are in a far better place thanks to the
work of many, including the White House, the NEC, DOT, FAA,
aviation stakeholders, and the telecommunications companies.
Both the telecom and aviation industries have been thrust
into this avoidable calamity by a Government process that
failed to provide an adequate amount of interagency
communication and recognition of decisional consequences down
the line. We sincerely appreciate the telecoms' coordination
efforts.
We are also grateful to those in Congress who have lent
their voices to drive solutions. Chairman DeFazio, in
particular, we would like to thank for giving attention to this
issue going back at least 3 years. For A4A, we are acutely
focused on driving our Government partners to quickly find a
permanent set of solutions that will allow 5Gs to expand while
also protecting aviation from disruption.
Specifically, we are asking for a long-term, transparent
process that brings everyone to the table to work in a
collaborative manner. Unfortunately, the current process has
provided a complicated web based on aircraft-by-aircraft,
runway-by-runway, radio altimeter-by-radio altimeter
determinations made on a flight-by-flight basis.
The situation isn't static either, but rather there are a
constant ebb and flow of new 5G towers and airline and airport
operating changes. The complexity that has been added to the
aviation operations, along with the impacts on human factors
involved, which I am sure Captain DePete will talk about,
desperately calls for a stable approach that only the
Government can provide.
Just this past weekend, there was another round of
reevaluations referred to as the AMOC process as mentioned by
Administrator Dickson. It is paramount that the FAA continues
to implement a permanent and more accurate risk evaluation
tool, as well as improving its notifications and limitations
process. There is no reason the types of mitigations that have
been implemented internationally at the onset of the process,
not after, through intergovernmental communication, could not
have been effectively dealt with here in the United States.
We are now trying to manage through the existing crisis,
but it will likely take years, not weeks, to fully address. In
the near term, we need a razor-sharp focus on the FAA honing a
permanent evaluation tool.
In the long term, we need a critical review of the
intergovernmental communication during spectrum reallocation
processes, and we need a long-term transparent process, as I
said, that includes all stakeholders. Make no mistake about it,
the aviation industry fully supports new technologies in
deployment of 5G, however, it must be done in a manner that
allows aviation and 5G to coexist safely.
There likely will be a 6G and 7G and many other spectrum
utilization issues in the future. They should be seamlessly
integrated in the broader economy without causing seismic
disruptions to critical industry segments.
We have no doubt the United States can find a way to lead
both aviation safety and 5G access, but it needs to be done
right.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[Mr. Calio's prepared statement follows:]

Prepared Statement of Nicholas E. Calio, President and Chief Executive
Officer, Airlines for America
Airlines for America (A4A) appreciates the opportunity to testify
today regarding the ongoing implementation and deployment of 5G C-band
transmission and its impact on the aviation industry, supply chain and
broader economy. Given the unprecedented impacts of the COVID-19
pandemic and the unpredictability caused by the ever-changing global
disruption it has caused, it is notable that a non-pandemic issue would
rise to be the most disruptive issue facing our industry.
While the last three months have been nothing short of a harrowing
sequence of looming deadlines and impending government action, I am
encouraged by the progress that has resulted from the collaborative
actions taken by the stakeholders represented on the panels today.
There is still much work to be done, and we are unfortunately only at
the beginning of what is expected to be a long odyssey, but we are in a
much better place today than where we were just a few short weeks ago.
Progress would not have been possible without the work of the White
House, the National Economic Council (NEC), the Department of
Transportation (DOT), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),
Federal Communications Commission (FCC), aviation stakeholders and the
telecommunications industry. In no small part, many in Congress have
also lent their voice to raise concern and provide the leadership
necessary to drive solutions. I would like to specifically thank
Chairman DeFazio for his long-standing attention to this issue. He
recognized the gravity of the situation well over two years ago,
highlighting concerns to the FCC prior to the spectrum auction. Mr.
Chairman, we are grateful for your actions on this matter.
From a commercial aviation perspective, we are acutely focused on
finding a set of solutions that allows 5G to expand to the C-band while
also protecting aviation from any operational restrictions. It is
imperative the data sharing, testing and honing of safety assurance
tools continues at a rapid pace. The breadth and complexity of the
operating changes to the aviation environment caused by these events,
along with the impacts on human factors, desperately call for a
methodical, predictable and routine set of solutions to stabilize our
operating framework. This should be the mutual goal for all
stakeholders.
Background
In 2017, the FCC signaled its intention to auction C-band spectrum
that would reallocate a portion of the 3.7-4.2 GHz frequency band,
making the frequency spectrum from 3.7-3.98 GHz available for flexible
use, including 5G in the C-band applications.
Before the FCC's auction, the FAA determined that C-band mobile
telecommunications signals could interfere with low range radio
altimeter operations. The interference concerns were material because
radio altimeters are the only device on every aircraft that can
directly measure the distance between the aircraft and the ground. Data
from those radio altimeters also feeds into several other safety-
critical flight control and warning systems that are needed in all
phases of flight.
Subsequently, the FAA and DOT jointly wrote to the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) expressing
interference concerns. Despite being aware of the concerns, the FCC
auctioned the spectrum to new licensees in December 2020 in a manner
that did not address the core aviation interference concerns.
Per the FCC order, starting on December 5, 2021, the telecom
licensees were allowed and scheduled to activate their 5G in the C-
band. The telecom licensees have subsequently voluntarily modified
their deployments to work with the FAA and aviation stakeholders to
address interference issues around U.S. airports. Those efforts are
ongoing.
Aviation Safety
Safety is the top priority of U.S. airlines. Through decades of
work and collaboration, air travel is the safest mode of transportation
both domestically and globally. For airlines, our first commitment is
to the safety of our passengers, our crewmembers and the public.
Commercial aviation has achieved historical levels of safety due, in
part, to technology investments made to enhance landing safely and
which rely on the radio altimeter, such as Enhanced Ground Proximity
Warning Systems, auto throttle, Head-Up Display, stability
augmentation, tail strike warning, windshear warning, braking scale and
pointer.
Consistent with our culture of safety, through a series of meetings
and filings with the FAA, the broader aviation industry has long
conveyed its safety concerns with the FCC's actions and the potential
consequences. These concerns include radio altimeters providing
erroneous information to a variety of critical onboard aircraft systems
when the aircraft is in the vicinity of 5G C-band broadcasting towers,
especially for flights operating in Instrument Meteorological
Conditions (IMC). The aviation industry has also consistently attempted
to engage the FCC to discuss aviation safety risk mitigations and allow
for the safe and efficient deployment to 5G technology. A timeline of
these engagements is attached below.
As a result of the FCC's decision to not address aviation safety
concerns, the FAA has taken their own actions to address the aviation
safety risks of 5G in the C-band. The FAA determined that ``radio
altimeters cannot be relied upon to perform their intended function if
they experience interference from wireless broadband operations in the
[5G C-Band].'' The FAA issued an Airworthiness Directive (AD) requiring
revisions to airplane flight manuals (AFM) to incorporate limitations
prohibiting certain radio altimeter-dependent operations when the
operation is in the presence of 5G C-band interference from known or
suspected 5G C-band deployments near airports, which the FAA identifies
through Notices to Air Missions (NOTAMs). Accordingly, operational
prohibitions are the new operating baseline at airports with nearby 5G
C-band deployments under low visibility conditions, resulting in
extreme operational impacts. However, pursuant to its Alternative
Methods of Compliance (AMOC) process, the FAA has permitted (on a time-
limited basis) certain aircraft that are equipped with radio altimeters
capable of functioning without adverse interference to operate without
restrictions at airports with known 5G C-band deployments.
However, we continue to be concerned with the operational
uncertainty of a monthly AMOC process that requires a revaluation of
the approved airports each time the telecom companies provide new 5G C-
band tower locations, which could result in the loss of access to a
previously covered airport. In the near term, we believe the FAA should
continue its collaboration with stakeholders to find and implement
permanent, efficient and more accurate risk evaluation tools and
mitigations, including fixes to 5G in the C-band deployment as well as
FAA's notification and limitations process.
Initial Aviation Impact Analysis
Shortly after the FAA issued its AD, A4A surveyed our members to
assess the potential impact of the FAA actions and found:

The expected costs to the flying public, shippers and airlines
would be significant as the AD would materially disrupt airline
operations. For example, if the AD were applied in arrears to
A4A members' 2019 operations, approximately 345,000 passenger
flights, 32 million passengers and 5,400 cargo flights would
have been impacted in the form of delayed flights, diversions
or cancellations. A4A estimates that U.S. passenger airlines
would incur an incremental $1.7 billion in operating costs
annually. Separately, A4A cargo operators estimate that the
directive would have cost them $400 million annually resulting
from the disruption to their time-sensitive operations.

Further, the FAA AD would exact a heavy toll on passenger and
shippers in the form of lost wages and productivity as well as higher
operating costs. According to the FAA, the value of air travelers' time
is worth $47.10 per hour. In 2019, the actual duration of the average
flight arrival delay was 64 minutes. Based on this, A4A estimates the
annual impact cost to passengers to be approximately $1.59 billion. At
the time, we stressed that these estimates were also conservative as
they did not address the ripple effect of delays throughout the system
that result when flights are cancelled, diverted or delayed.
Additionally, the estimates only measured the direct impacts to
airlines and their customers. The analysis did not account for the
impact to lost business for hospitality providers (i.e., missed
meetings, hotel stays, restaurants, lost wages from indirect service
providers, etc.). The ripple effect would be felt well beyond the
airline sector and significantly impact the broader economy.
Revised Aviation Impact Analysis
As more information was disseminated throughout January, it became
clear the harm to aviation that would result from deployment of 5G in
the C-band near airports would be substantially worse than originally
anticipated for two key reasons.
First, most of the 50 airports that were identified by the FAA for
relief would still be subject to flight restrictions. Unless major hubs
are cleared for aircraft to fly, the vast majority of the traveling and
shipping public would essentially be grounded. This means that on any
given day, more than 1,100 flights (both passenger and cargo) and
100,000 travelers would be subjected to cancellations, diversions or
delays.
Second, flight restrictions would not be limited to poor weather
operations. As outlined above, because radio altimeters provide
critical information to other safety, flight control, alerting and
navigation systems in modern airplanes, multiple modern safety systems
on aircraft would be deemed unusable causing a much larger problem than
what was known in early January. Airplane manufacturers also informed
operators that there are huge swaths of the operating fleet that would
need to be indefinitely grounded. In addition to the chaos caused
domestically, this lack of usable widebody aircraft could potentially
strand tens of thousands of Americans overseas.
As of late January, the FAA has codified the manufacturer's
concerns on four fleets of large aircraft, severely limiting or
curtailing their operations at NOTAM-affected airports regardless of
weather conditions, and more directives are expected.
The impact of these additional variables, along with the ripple
effects they would create across passenger and cargo operations, our
workforce and the broader economy would simply be incalculable and
untenable. Airline customers rely on airlines to transport time-
sensitive perishable products such as pharmaceuticals, vaccines,
organs, critical supply chain parts and many other high-value items.
Every one of the passenger and cargo carriers would also be struggling
to get people, shipments, planes, and crews where they need to be. We
were on the precipice of the nation's commerce grinding to a halt.
Thankfully, the ongoing coordination and progress has allowed us to
avoid these massive economic and operational disruptions for the most
part.
Clearing the `Air' & `Airwaves'
Some in the media and other observers have tried to portray this
situation as a conflict between the airline industry and the
telecommunications industry. That is simply not the case. In fact,
airlines fully support 5G--but it needs to be deployed in a manner that
allows 5G and aviation to coexist safely. We are grateful to our
telecommunications colleagues and are hopeful they continue to play a
critical role in sharing information with the FAA and FCC to help
mitigate any interference issues. We cannot avoid significant
disruption to the aviation system without their continued collaboration
and transparency.
The truth of the matter is that both of our industries have been
thrust into this avoidable economic calamity by a government process
that failed to provide an adequate amount of interagency communication,
understanding and recognition of decisional consequences. The
circumstances and challenges we face currently could and should have
been directly addressed prior to the spectrum auction.
International Examples: It's Not What You Do, It's How You Do It
Much has been said and inferred regarding 5G deployment
internationally. The FAA has noted that international examples versus
U.S. 5G deployment are apples-to-oranges comparisons. As opposed to the
process cited above, other countries reportedly heeded aviation
concerns and addressed them through various mitigations prior to 5G C-
band technology deployment.
On its dedicated 5G website, the FAA cites France as an example for
comparison to the U.S. The FAA chart (attached) indicates the resulting
deployment of 5G C-band in the U.S. is significantly distinguishable
from deployment of 5G C-band in France because the FCC licensed the use
of the spectrum at exponentially higher power levels. The allocated
frequencies are also generally farther away from the radio frequency
band used by radio altimeters. We understand that many other countries
have also effectively utilized a combination of exclusion zones around
airports, lower power levels and directional changes to antennas to
mitigate interference.
There is no reason to believe these types of mitigations could not
have been contemplated and implemented at the on-set of the regulatory
process through proper inter-governmental communication channels.
Lessons Learned
The Committee and Congress should be aware that it will likely take
years, not days or weeks, to fully and permanently mitigate the
interference issues caused by deployment of 5G in the C-band. The
interference issues have created a complex web of aircraft-by-aircraft,
runway-by-runway, radio altimeter-by-radio altimeter determinations on
a flight-by-flight basis. They have created a complicated matrix of
variables and uncertainty in the operational deployment of aircraft
assets and as we have seen, will still cause cancellations, delays and
diversions even under the best of scenarios. In some cases, we are
simply hoping for good weather so flights can be cleared to land at
their intended destinations.
The U.S. aviation industry should not be in this position and the
process that led to this operational nightmare should be held up as
cautionary tale of government communication and coordination gone awry.
It is not a partisan problem; it is a government process problem that
desperately needs to be addressed. One can assume there will be a 6G,
7G and many other spectrum utilization issues in the future; those
efforts should be seamlessly integrated into the broader economy
without causing seismic disruptions to critical industry segments.
Unfortunately, there are no easy answers for the current dynamic, but
there a framework can be put in place to make sure this never happens
again to our industry, or any other for that matter.
Conclusion
We appreciate all the actions taken by various stakeholders to
avert catastrophic disruption to the traveling and shipping public, the
global supply chain and the U.S. economy. The day-to-day
unpredictability remains a significant challenge for airlines, but the
work over the course of the last few weeks is an important step toward
achieving a permanent solution that will allow the U.S. to continue
leading the world in aviation safety while also expanding our nation's
5G network.

attachment 1
_______________________________________________________________________
MYTH: Aviation Raised 5G Concerns at the Last Minute
FACT: Aviation Started Raising Concerns as Far Back as May 2018
_______________________________________________________________________
TIMELINE
_______________________________________________________________________
2018
March 2018--The Mobile Now Act is enacted, authorizing the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) through notice and comment on the
feasibility of allowing commercial wireless services, licensed or
unlicensed, to use or share use of the frequencies between 3700
megahertz and 4200 megahertz.

April 2018--FCC issues public notice encouraging the public to comment
on potential for more intensive use of the 3.7-4.2 GHz Band to submit
those filings in this docket.

May 2018--A4A files comments in response to FCC public notice raising
radio altimeter and satellite communication (SATCOM) interference
concerns.

July 2018--FCC issues Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on
Expanding Flexible Use of the 3.7 to 4.2 GHz spectrum band.

October 2018--AVIATION SPECTRUM RESOURCES, INC. (ASRI) files comments
to FCC reiterating aviation industry concerns on the potential impact
to radio altimeter and SATCOM.
2019
October 2019--AEROSPACE VEHICLE SYSTEMS INSTITUTE (AVSI) files
``Behavior of Radio Altimeters Subject to Out-Of-Band Interference''
report in FCC rulemaking docket, raising the potential for interference
issues affecting the 4.2-4.4 GHz band start for commercial aircraft.

November 22, 2019--HOUSE TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE (T&I)
COMMITTEE Chair DeFazio sends letter to FCC warning of potential
interference to radio altimeters from 5G deployment in the C-Band.
2020
February 21, 2020--AVIATION INDUSTRY COALITION sends ex parte letter
and presentation to FCC raising safety concerns.

February 28, 2020--FCC issues Order to move forward with auctioning
``C-band'' spectrum.

May 2020--AVIATION INDUSTRY COALITION files petitions for
reconsideration of the FCC Order.

October 7, 2020--RADIO TECHNICAL COMMISSION FOR AERONAUTICS (RTCA)
completes a six-month assessment of interference from 5G network
emissions with radio altimeter performance, revealing a ``major risk
that 5G telecommunications systems in the 3.7-3.9 GHz band will cause
harmful interference to [radio] altimeters on all types of civil
aircraft.''

December 2020--AVIATION INDUSTRY COALITION submits letter of support
for petition for reconsideration.

December 1, 2020--DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION (DOT) AND FEDERAL
AVIATION ADMINISTRATION (FAA) submit joint letter voicing interference
concerns to the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration (NTIA)and request NTIA to submit their letter to the FCC
public docket. NTIA did not submit the letter to the FCC docket.

December 7, 2020--HOUSE T&I COMMITTEE Chair DeFazio sends letter to FCC
asking the agency to delay its C-Band auction.

December 8, 2020--FCC begins auction of the 3.7-3.98 GHz frequency
band.
2021
February 2021--FCC completes $81 billion auction of the 3.7-3.98 GHz
frequency band and subsequently issues licenses to AT&T and Verizon to
begin deployment on December 5, 2021.

May 2021--AVIATION INDUSTRY COALITION sends letter to FCC supporting
aviation petition for reconsideration and responding to Cellular
Telecommunications Industry Association (CTIA) FCC filing.

July 2021--AVIATION INDUSTRY COALITION sends letter to DOT raising
imminent safety risk facing aviation industry.

August 2021--AVIATION INDUSTRY COALITION sends presentation to FCC
raising safety concerns and asking for a taskforce to resolve concerns.

November 2, 2021--FAA issues Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin
alerting manufacturers, operators and pilots that action might be
required to address potential interference with aircraft radio
altimeter caused by the rollout of 5G wireless broadband on December 5,
2021.

November 3, 2021--FAA AND FCC announce that AT&T and Verizon have
agreed to delay the 5G C-band deployment from December 5, 2021 to
January 5, 2022.

November 5, 2021--AVIATION INDUSTRY COALITION sends letter to National
Economic Council (NEC) urging it to ``work with the FCC and FAA to
convene a joint industry working group and continue to delay the
deployment of 5G technologies in this band until the safety and
efficiency of the [National Air Space] is ensured.''

November 19, 2021--HOUSE T&I COMMITTEE Chair DeFazio and Aviation
Subcommittee Chair Larsen send letter to FCC urging the agency not to
go through with any 5G C-band deployments until the FAA conducts a risk
assessment that proves no further ``mitigations are necessary or that
all necessary mitigations are in place,'' and requesting FCC to provide
FAA with any technical data related to aviation and 5G broadband
service.

November 24, 2021--AT&T AND VERIZON issue a proposal committing to
adopt ``additional precautionary measures'' for 6 months to mitigate
the potential impact of 5G on radio altimeters.

December 3, 2021--AIA AND OTHER AVIATION STAKEHOLDERS circulate a
counterproposal to the telecom industry's November 24 mitigation
proposal.

December 7, 2021--FAA issues two Airworthiness Directives (ADs)
identifying safety concerns and outlining potential flight
restrictions. The ADs state that ``radio altimeters cannot be relied
upon to perform their intended function if they experience interference
from wireless broadband operations in the 3.7-3.98 GHz frequency band
(5G C-Band).''

December 22, 2021--A4A, AEROSPACE INDUSTRIES ASSOCIATION (AIA) AND CTIA
announce agreement to work together in coordination with the FAA and
FCC to ``identify a path forward.''

December 23, 2021--FAA issues second Special Airworthiness Information
Bulletin and a Safety Alert for Operators regarding the ``Risk of
Potential Adverse Effects on Radio Altimeters when Operating in the
Presence of 5G C-Band Interference.''

December 30, 2021--A4A files emergency petition with the FCC to stay
initiation of the deployment of 5G around certain airports until a
solution can be identified.
2022
January 4, 2022--WHITE HOUSE announces agreement with AT&T and Verizon
to delay the 5G C-band deployment by two weeks from January 5 to
January 19, 2022 and to reduce the 5G signal power and not activate
transmitters in close proximity to up to 50 priority airports for six
months through July 5, 2022.

January 17, 2022--A4A sends a letter--signed by the CEOs of the leading
cargo and passenger airlines--to National Economic Council Director
Brian Deese, Transportation Secretary Pete Buttigieg, FAA Administrator
Steve Dickson and FCC Chairwoman Jessica Rosenworcel urging immediate
action to address major disruptions to the traveling and shipping
public as a result of the deployment of new 5G service near airports
scheduled to begin on January 19.

January 18, 2022--WHITE HOUSE announces agreement with AT&T and Verizon
to deploy 5G on January 19, 2022 except around key airports and to
continue working with the federal government on safe 5G deployment at
those locations.

attachment 2

FAA Comparison Chart

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Source: FAA.gov/5G

Mr. Larsen. Thank you very much, Mr. Calio.
I will now turn to Mr. Fanning. Mr. Fanning, you are
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Fanning. Thank you. Chairman DeFazio, Chairman Larsen,
Ranking Member Sam Graves, Ranking Member Garret Graves, and
members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to appear
today and for your leadership on this important matter.
In partnership with the FAA and other Government partners,
U.S. aviation manufacturers and our airline customers set the
gold standard of safety worldwide. Maintaining this
unprecedented level of safety is our priority mission. For this
reason, we have been expressing serious concerns about possible
interference with a key aviation safety device known as a radio
altimeter upon deployment of the new 5G service in the C-band.
Spectrum is the lifeblood of our industry, and we support
5G rollout. It will be important to our industry, it will be
important to the more than 2 million people who work in our
industry, and it will usher in new advances for our society,
but it must be done in a way that assures the U.S. gold
standard of safety defined as the chance of 1 catastrophic
incident in 1 billion flight-hours.
We know we can do this because as an industry we do it
every day, introduce complex technologies into society safely.
AIA members manufacture first-in-class fixed-wing and rotary
aircraft of all sizes, each with extensive safety features. One
of the most critical is the radio altimeter, which is the
workhorse of the overall integrated safety system.
While it is a simple device, it has the most consequential
of purposes, helping to save lives. Altimeters help pilots
determine an aircraft's altitude. These highly reliable devices
are essential to a number of aircraft functions, including
precision approach, landing, ground proximity, and collision
avoidance. All commercial and most general aviation aircraft,
as well as helicopters, use an altimeter.
Altimeters are unique to each aircraft type and model. They
are designed, manufactured, tested, and certified against the
most rigorous safety requirements as a single component and
then again as part of the aircraft's integrated safety system.
Altimeters are especially important for pilots dealing with
low-visibility conditions and in other situations like wind
sheer, which causes rapid decrease in airspeed due to wind
flows near the ground. It can be particularly hazardous during
takeoff and landing. In such an environment, fluctuation in
atmospheric pressure can result in airspeed indicators and
barometric altimeters providing misleading indications to the
flightcrew, but the radio altimeter can be trusted, and it is
this device they must rely on to execute a successful escape
maneuver.
Beginning in 2018, aviation stakeholders began calling for
collaboration to address potential interference because of the
altimeter's essential safety function. While progress is now
occurring, this is not the same as declaring the problem
solved. The mitigation measures underway are temporary and
focus on our largest cities. We need to ensure that all
airports, including airports in small and mid-sized
communities, can maintain their operations' safety as rollouts
continue.
The U.S. aviation system is incredibly complex. It is not
nearly as simple as adopting another country's safety playbook
for 5G development for reasons including orientation of the
base tower and differing maximum power levels. Our efforts must
be specific to U.S. needs and safety requirements.
Based on where we are today, the development of new
standards will take considerable time. Because of this, a
proposal to retrofit out-of-band filters or other solutions
cannot be accomplished overnight.
Manufacturing and certifying new radar altimeter designs on
a forward-fit basis is the ultimate goal, but that will take
even longer. It will take extensive testing, certification, and
time. The U.S. has set the gold standard as the safest aviation
system in the world, and we have incredibly high requirements
to keep it that way. Policy is an essential element to
maintaining this level of safety, but currently there is no
formal requirement for 5G interference tolerance, an incomplete
understanding of spurious emissions, and no agreed-upon worst-
case interference scenario.
One of the lessons learned in this case is that the effects
of spectrum relocation or sharing are not simple. The auction
process seeks to address and indemnify in-band users that are
being relocated, but the effects of interference on nearby
users and the requisite mitigation, as in this case, is not
adequately addressed by all regulations.
There will be future generations of technologies and
spectrum auctions. We need to modernize the regulatory
framework before this happens again. The ultimate goal is to
maximize 5G while minimizing disruptions. There will be a gap
between the end of the 6-month compromise and when the ultimate
solution is identified and implemented.
That means a process must be established to provide ongoing
information sharing and dialogue between Government and all
private-sector stakeholders, and a process that also helps us
avoid finding ourselves in this position again as we
contemplate future additions to spectrum.
Thank you to the committee for listening to our
perspectives, and I look forward to your questions.
[Mr. Fanning's prepared statement follows:]

Prepared Statement of Hon. Eric Fanning, President and Chief Executive
Officer, Aerospace Industries Association
Introduction
Chairman DeFazio, Chairman Larsen, Ranking Member Sam Graves,
Ranking Member Garret Graves, and members of the committee, thank you
for inviting me to appear before the Aviation Subcommittee today. My
name is Eric Fanning, and I serve as the President and CEO of the
Aerospace Industries Association (AIA). For over 100 years, AIA has
advocated for America's aerospace and defense (A&D) companies and the
more than two million men and women who are the backbone of our
industry.
AIA applauds this committee for its ongoing leadership in ensuring
5G in the C-Band will safely coexist with users of the National
Airspace System. Chairman DeFazio and Chairman Larsen, we are
particularly thankful for your ongoing work to highlight aviation
safety concerns about potential 5G interference to multiple federal
agencies and the White House as far back as November 2019. Over the
past two-plus years, your staff continuously took time to meet with AIA
and other members of the coalition to best understand how we can safely
deploy 5G. For these things, we are grateful.
Our Industry's Role in Protecting Aviation Safety
Today, AIA represents over 300 aerospace and defense (A&D)
companies ranging from family-run businesses to larger corporations
exporting products around the globe. Our membership includes aircraft
and engine manufacturers, companies that design and build radio
altimeters and other aircraft systems that are integrated with them, as
well as a vital supply chain network of companies that provide
equipment, parts, maintenance, repair, and other services. Our members
would tell you that our companies are in the safety business. And over
the latest 25 years, in partnership with the Federal Aviation
Administration, we set the highest safety standards across the globe.
We are proud to be considered part of this ``gold standard'' safety
system.
AIA members manufacture fixed-wing and rotary aircraft of all
sizes. These aircraft are first-in-class--superior in design and
performance. The safety features are extensive, starting in the
cockpit, deployed throughout the cabin, found in the engines, and even
on the wings. One of the most critical safety features in an aircraft
is a radio altimeter, which is the workhorse of the overall integrated
safety system. While it is a simple device, it has the most
sophisticated of purposes--helping to save lives.
Altimeters help pilots determine a jet's altitude and its distance
from other objects. These devices are essential to a number of aircraft
functions, including precision approach, landing, ground proximity, and
collision avoidance. It is the only sensor that provides this crucial
information. All commercial and most general aviation aircraft, as well
as many helicopters, use an altimeter. The devices are unique to each
aircraft type and model. They are each designed, manufactured, tested,
and certified against the most rigorous safety requirements and
standards as a single component. They also go through the same
stringent process once integrated into a specific aircraft where they
are tested and certified as part of a coordinated aviation safety
system.
Altimeters are especially important for pilots when dealing with
low-visibility conditions and in other situations such as encountering
windshear. Because of the rigorous safety standards of the aviation
industry and their reliability, radar altimeters are the backbone of an
aircraft's overall safety system.
To provide a real-world example of one of many critical instances
where radar altimeters are used, consider when an aircraft encounters
windshear. Windshear is a weather phenomenon that causes aircraft to
experience a rapid decrease in airspeed due to wind flows near the
ground. This can be particularly hazardous during takeoff and landing.
When encountering a windshear, the pilot flying the aircraft may need
to execute a manual escape maneuver, which adjusts pitch to a nose-up
altitude and increases engine thrust to full power. It is worth noting
that escape maneuvers often happen at low altitudes. The co-pilot or
cockpit audible alerts then continuously call out radar altitude to
help with decision making as they work to avoid ground contact. Loss
of, or erroneous, radar altitude readings during the escape maneuver
due to interference would greatly reduce the chances of a successful
and safe outcome.
Because of the unique and necessary role altimeters play in
aviation, concern arose quickly about possible interference upon
deployment of new 5G service in the C-Band from a broad group of
stakeholders, ranging from the airlines, commercial pilots, the
helicopter and regional airline associations, the manufacturers, and
others.
Aviation Industry Support of 5G
While safety is the cornerstone of our business, the aerospace and
defense (A&D) industry is also an ecosystem rooted in technology and
innovation. That means our sector needs advanced telecommunication
services to include 5G and beyond and supports their rollout. Spectrum
is the lifeblood of our industry, and we need safe, reliable, and
continuous access to various bands, not just for today's technologies,
but also for technologies that will be integrated into our airspace in
the future.
Perhaps more than any other industry, the A&D industry knows what
it is like to introduce complex technologies into society and is
committed to doing it safely. That is why we are confident that 5G in
the C-Band and aviation can safely coexist. Over the past several
years, our industry's concerns regarding the pending use of 5G in the
C-Band have been focused on continued adherence to the highest level of
aviation safety. Safety isn't as easy as flipping a switch, so the
manufacturers' design and technical expertise must be brought into
play. Again, I want to reiterate that you can't just provide a band-aid
solution to assure gold-standard safety, which is defined as the chance
of one catastrophic incident in one billion flight hours. We will
continue to offer industry expertise to our government partners and
airline or general aviation customers to help mitigate any possible
interference.
How Did We Get Here?
While we would all like to focus our efforts on continuing to make
progress toward a safe and comprehensive resolution, examining how we
arrived at this hearing is important for policymakers, the public, and
the organizations involved in this issue.
In 2018, the FCC released the first Public Notice expressing its
intent to auction spectrum in the 3.7-4.2 GHz band (or C-Band).
Consequently, AIA submitted comments to the FCC highlighting the
potential inference to aeronautical communications and safety services,
including radio altimeters, operating in the 4.2-4.4 GHz band. Over the
last four years, AIA and our colleagues across the aviation industry
have worked diligently to provide the FCC, FAA, National
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), Department of
Defense (DoD), the White House, and Members of Congress with as much
data as possible on the potential for interference.
Additionally, with the FCC's encouragement, the Radio Technical
Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) studied this issue. While the
telecommunications industry was invited to participate in the analysis,
it chose not to do so. In October 2020, RTCA concluded that 5G systems
operating in the C-Band would likely cause interference with
altimeters. Shortly thereafter, in December 2020, the Acting Deputy
Secretary of Transportation and the FAA Administrator wrote to the NTIA
expressing safety concerns over the planned auction and asking that it
be deferred.\1\ According to the Wall Street Journal,\2\ this letter
did not receive broad attention because it was not made public in the
NTIA regulatory docket.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Letter to National Telecommunications and Information
Administration re: ``Expanding Flexible Use of the 3.7 to 4.2 GHz
Band'', December 1, 2020, signed by Steven G. Bradbury, Acting Deputy
Secretary and General Counsel, U. S. Department of Transportation and
Steve Dickson, Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration.
\2\ ``Agencies Feud Over Aviation Safety, 5G Rollout'', Wall Street
Journal, November 15, 2021.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One of the key arguments against the aviation industry's concern is
that 5G technology has been deployed in other countries around the
world without causing harm to public and aviation safety. However,
conditions are different in the United States due to three important
factors: power levels, proximity to airports, and orientation of base
towers.
The U.S. aviation system is incredibly complex. It's not nearly as
simple as adopting another country's safety playbook for many reasons,
such as orientation of the base tower and differing maximum power
levels. The deployment examples from other countries come with specific
government-mandated restrictions, lower power levels, and different
technical features that must be considered in making any comparison
between the U.S. and overseas 5G deployment. Here are some specific
examples which make the American deployment of 5G in the 3.7-4.2 GHz
range different:
Japan: While Japan has deployed 5G up to 4.1 GHz, the
power levels permitted for 5G are at least 90% below those permitted in
the United States. If 5G providers in the United States operated 5G
with this mitigation, then the issue with aviation users would be
reduced.
Europe: The 3.4-3.8 GHz band is utilized for 5G. However,
the amount of separation from adjacent bands is 100 MHz farther than
authorized in the United States, meaning that interference is less
likely to occur, and the maximum power level permitted in most of
Europe is well below the level permitted in the United States.
France: Regulators in France imposed mitigations on the
use of 5G--exclusion zones--to protect public safety. This type of
mitigation is consistent with recommendations made to the FCC by the
aviation industry.
Australia: Compared to Europe, Australia operates even
farther away from the radio frequency band used by the radio altimeter.
In addition, the power levels permitted in Australia are 76% lower than
that allowed in the United States.

The A & D industry believes in the incredible potential of 5G for
our country and our companies, and we are committed to find ways to
ensure that 5G in the C-Band and aviation can safely coexist. For this
reason, in 2018 we called for a collaborative environment for the
aviation industry and the telecommunications industry to share
information. Our goal was to provide both the FAA and FCC with
necessary data to address potential interference and, in turn, come to
a long-term mutually agreeable solution that addressed the needs and
concerns of all parties. Unfortunately, that collaboration did not
begin until December 2021, the same month FCC licenses allowed 5G
services to begin.
In July 2021, the FAA met with AIA and the aviation industry and we
expressed a need for information from the telecommunications industry
including details such as 5G tower locations, antenna angles, and power
levels. AIA subsequently joined a letter of 20 aviation associations
and aerospace companies to the Department of Transportation and
Department of Commerce requesting support from the Administration to
facilitate interagency coordination and information sharing between the
aviation and telecommunications industries.\3\ In November 2021, the
National Economic Council (NEC) began discussions with both respective
industries and the deployment of 5G in the C-Band was delayed by one
month to January 5, 2022.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Aviation industry stakeholder letter to Transportation
Secretary Pete Buttigieg and Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo, July 14,
2021.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Between December 2021 and the beginning of this year, aviation
engineers and technical experts worked tirelessly to collaborate and
examine the consequences of interference. We are grateful Verizon and
AT&T agreed to another delay on January 3, 2022, until January 19,
2022, as we began to receive the FAA's Notice to Air Missions (NOTAMs)
and manufacturers could empirically analyze the impact to specific
aircraft and their radio altimeter models and ultimately propose
Alternative Means of Compliance (AMOCs).
Thanks to strong communication and cooperation among the government
and the aviation and telecommunication industry, significant progress
has been made over the past few weeks. The intervention of this
Committee, along with that of the NEC, the DOT, and the FAA has been a
catalyst for bringing the different stakeholders together. Since the
January 3rd agreement was signed, AT&T and Verizon have been working
with aviation manufacturers daily--sharing data and developing
additional mitigations to allow most commercial flights to take off and
land safely. Fortunately, the telecommunications companies agreed to
delay full deployment on January 18, 2022. While the process is
belatedly making significant positive progress, there is more work to
be done for 5G to deploy safely.
While the FAA is currently working with the manufacturers,
airlines, and the telecommunications companies, and progress is being
made, it is important to note this is not the same as declaring the
problem solved. What matters most is the percentage of overall U. S.
aviation operations that are affected because they do not have an
appropriate temporary approval from the FAA as reflected in an
Alternative Means of Compliance (AMOC). Delays are still occurring, and
AMOCs have not yet been approved for most regional airline operations,
general aviation aircraft, or most helicopter operations.
As this subcommittee knows well, our aviation system is a complex
network of airports in small and mid-sized communities as well as big
cities. FAA's 2021 National Plan of Integrated Airport Systems lists
3,300 active airports in the United States. Many of these airports in
small communities depend heavily on aviation because of remoteness or
other factors. We need to ensure that all airports can maintain their
operations, not just the large ones, as the 5G rollout continues.
Furthermore, we will need to ensure the same agreements are in place as
additional licensees deploy their systems. It is clear there is much
more to be done over the coming months.
While we wish intergovernmental coordination had been stronger and
given more credence to the views of aviation experts and regulators,
our industry needs 5G services and is committed to seeing their
rollout, while preserving the highest levels of aviation safety at the
same time. The aviation industry has the most knowledgeable and
accomplished engineers, pilots, systems operators, and avionics experts
in the world. Moving forward, it is our hope that their expertise on
the complex science of machines in flight is given deference and
greater weight as the NTIA and FCC continue their difficult job of
deciding how to effectively utilize limited radiofrequency spectrum.
We are glad to be making progress and working together, but by no
means are we on a glide path. With many outstanding questions still on
the table, there are disruptions in our future, even with further
compromise and collaboration.
What Can This Committee Do?
The United States has set the gold standard as the safest aviation
system in the world, and we have incredibly high requirements to keep
it that way. But currently, there is no formal requirement for 5G
interference tolerance, an incomplete understanding of spurious
emissions, and no agreed-upon worst case interference scenario. Based
on where we are today, the development of new standards, including the
implementation of minimum performance standards via Technical Service
Orders (TSOs), will take considerable time. Because of this, a proposal
to retrofit out-of-band filters or other solutions cannot be
accomplished overnight. Manufacturing and certifying new radar
altimeter designs on a forward-fit basis is the ultimate goal, but that
will take even longer. In fact, it will take testing and take time.
One of the lessons learned in this case is that the effects of
spectrum relocation or sharing are not simple or clear-cut. The auction
process seeks to address and indemnify in-band users that are being
relocated to make room for new purchasers, whether 5G or other
licensees. However, the effects of interference on nearby users and the
requisite mitigation--as in this case--is not adequately addressed by
the regulations governing spectrum allocation and auction. Aviation is
left with the task of financing these fixes, over both the short- and
long-term, and it is not clear whether auction proceeds are available
for this purpose. We believe that needs to be considered.
Finally, we hope Congress will consider changes to the spectrum
auction process to consider the views of the government's aviation
safety experts more appropriately in the DOT and the FAA. Just three
months ago, Congress provided the DoD and the Congressional Armed
Services Committees with additional authorities in future spectrum
actions affecting the 3.1 to 3.45 GHz band in H.R. 3684, the
Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act. This provision was designed to
ensure this potential auction does not cause DoD the same kind of
problems we are now experiencing in aviation, and ensures the
appropriate Congressional committees are involved early in the process.
Our aviation system is too important to our economy, and too vital to
our small, rural communities, to face mass groundings again in the
future. We urge this Committee and the Congress to explore similar
authorities for the DOT, to ensure that the coordination with this
committee, and the role of our government's aviation authorities, are
strengthened in future spectrum decisions.
We are not out of the woods yet and some disruptions are likely.
The process will take a while because the stakes are so high. We are
hopeful we can anticipate and address challenges or concerns earlier in
the future. We know that the telecommunications industry carriers will
continue to innovate, as will aviation. Spectrum is the lifeblood of
our industry, and we need safe, reliable, and continuous access to
various bands, not just for today's technologies, but also for
technologies that will be integrated into our airspace in the future.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

Mr. Larsen. Thank you very much, Mr. Fanning.
For the introduction of Ms. Stephens, I turn to the chair
of the full committee, Chair DeFazio.
Mr. DeFazio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yes. Thank you for
the opportunity to introduce the next witness, Cathryn
Stephens. She is the airport director in Eugene, Oregon, and
she will offer both the perspective of an airport that does
have a lot of low-visibility issues in the wintertime.
In fact, many, many years ago, I had to kind of strong-arm
the FAA to get a CAT II system because they said we didn't have
enough flights, but we had more diversions and cancellations
than almost any other airport that I could find, so they
relented, and we got it. But if we couldn't use it, we would be
back to those days of people ending up in Portland and driving
down on a bus. So, that is not acceptable.
She is a recognized leader in the city of Eugene, largest
city in my district. She was named airport manager of the year
by the Oregon Airport Management Association. She is a director
for the AAAE and chairs the association's Diversity, Equity,
and Inclusion Committee. She has done a lot for inclusion and
innovation broadly across the airport community, not just for
my airport. And she was helpful also to the committee as we
work through coronavirus relief and the IIJA, Infrastructure
Investment and Jobs Act, and highlighting as she will, perhaps
today a bit, the 5G issues in transitioning our airport, and I
appreciate her taking the time to be here today.
Thanks, Cathryn.
Ms. Stephens. Thank you so much for that introduction,
Chairman DeFazio.
Mr. Larsen. You are recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Stephens. Thank you. Chair DeFazio, Ranking Member
Graves, Chair Larsen, Ranking Member Graves, and members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the invitation and for your
continued leadership on issues of importance to airports and
the aviation industry.
I am testifying today on behalf of the American Association
of Airport Executives where I am a member of the board of
directors. I currently serve as airport director at the Eugene
Airport, and I would like to briefly express my personal
appreciation to Chair DeFazio, my hometown Congressman, who has
done so much for our community and for airports and the
aviation industry during his distinguished career.
Thank you, Chair DeFazio.
Getting it right with the continued rollout of 5G and
subsequent enhanced telecommunication services is imperative
for airports in every segment of the highly interdependent
aviation system. As the deployment continues, it must be done
in a way that does not jeopardize aviation safety or
significantly limit operations during low-visibility
conditions.
Delays, diversions, flight cancellations, and the grounding
of aircrafts during low-visibility events, all of which remain
possible as the 5G C-band rollout continues, aren't just an
inconvenience, they ripple across the country and the globe
quickly with significant negative impacts.
Airports are on the front line of dealing with the fallout
when disruptions occur, yet we haven't had much involvement in
the 5G C-band deployment to this point or insight as to what
the path will be moving forward, and that must change moving
forward.
At the Eugene Airport, for example, there are currently
low-visibility flight limitations related to the 5G C-band
deployment, even though Eugene is not one of the initial 46
markets in which these services are being offered.
We were surprised and concerned to learn of these
limitations which posed significant challenges at EUG and
flight disruptions for our passengers. To give you a sense of
the magnitude of the issue, if the FAA's flight restrictions
had been in place in 2021, there would have been about 90 low-
visibility days impacting up to 40 percent of our flights per
day.
More broadly, it is positive that the immediate systemwide
crisis we all feared with the initial deployment on January
19th has been averted. We commend AT&T and Verizon for their
voluntary actions to establish deployment buffer zones at
affected airports, and we appreciate the FAA's diligence to
clear more than 90 percent of the U.S. commercial fleet to
operate into affected airports in certain low-visibility
situations as part of the AMOC process.
Unfortunately, these fixes are both limited and temporary.
We understand that the buffer zones where 5G C-band signals
have been limited since January 19th around more than 80
affected airports are shifting short term and remain in effect
only because of the good graces of the telecommunications
companies.
We further understand that the FAA's AMOCs for aircraft
will be subject to constant review, refinement, and alteration
potentially. Additionally, there are still some regional
aircraft that are not yet approved to fly during low-visibility
conditions, including at the Eugene Airport.
While only a small percentage of the fleet, these aircraft
provide critical air service to many small communities. The
recent cancellations at Paine Field, which appear to be
resolved at least for now using the newly approved AMOCs,
illustrate the painful impact that can be felt at smaller
airports when key aircraft are prohibited from operating. Over
the past few weeks, airports have seen cancellations,
diversions, and other impacts resulting from the inability of
aircraft to operate at affected airports in low-visibility
conditions.
Problems at spoke airports aren't just a local problem,
they cascade and create disruptions, hassles, and problems
throughout the system. So, how do we move forward? First, we
need a permanent solution that provides long-term certainties
at airlines, airports, passengers, and all segments of the
industry. Not knowing long term what aircraft can fly where,
under what conditions, is a serious problem for an industry
that requires certainty for scheduling and planning.
We also need better communication from our Federal partners
and additional data and information sharing, transparency, and
aviation industry involvement. The lack of insight into the
location of 5G towers that could impact operations at
individual airports is incredibly frustrating. With better
information and more active involvement, airports and our
aviation industry partners could be proactive in preparing
rather than reactive as we have been forced to be in recent
weeks.
In closing, I would summarize by saying that the temporary
reprieve of recent weeks has been positive, but airports have
significant concerns about what lies ahead. We need a permanent
solution that acknowledges the benefits of 5G services while
also addressing the critical need for our Nation's aviation
system to function 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, and in low-
visibility conditions. AAAE stands ready to work with our
Government and industry partners to address these critical
needs.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[Ms. Stephens' prepared statement follows:]

Prepared Statement of Cathryn Stephens, A.A.E., Airport Director,
Eugene Airport, on behalf of the American Association of Airport
Executives
Chair DeFazio, Ranking Member Graves, Chair Larsen, Ranking Member
Graves, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity
to appear before you today to highlight airport industry concerns and
the perspective of an individual airport operator on the effects of 5G
C-Band deployment on the nation's aviation system.
My name is Cathryn Stephens, and I am the Airport Director for the
Eugene Airport (EUG) in Eugene, Oregon. I am testifying today on behalf
of the American Association of Airport Executives (AAAE), where I serve
on the Board of Directors. AAAE is the world's largest professional
organization representing individuals who manage and operate more than
850 public-use commercial and general aviation airports across the
country.
As you have clearly recognized in putting together today's hearing,
getting it ``right'' when it comes to the continued rollout of 5G and
other critical telecommunication services in the months and years ahead
is imperative for the continued safe and efficient operation of the
nation's highly interdependent aviation system. The fact that you have
gathered witnesses representing airports, mainline carriers, regional
carriers, manufacturers, helicopter operators, and pilots speaks to the
importance of this issue across the aviation industry.
As has been widely reported, progress has been made in recent weeks
to mitigate the immediate impacts of the 5G C-Band rollout on the
aviation system and to prevent potential interference with aircraft
operations that could have resulted in a significant safety hazard. The
voluntary action taken by Verizon and AT&T on January 18 in advance of
the January 19 rollout and the subsequent work by the Federal Aviation
Administration to clear a large percentage of the U.S. commercial
aircraft fleet to conduct low-visibility operations into affected
airports are notable.
Still, questions and concerns remain about what the days, weeks,
months, and years ahead will mean as the situation evolves and as the
deployment of 5G continues in communities across the country. Already,
some airports--including Paine Field in Washington State--have seen
significant flight cancellations during low-visibility events because
of limitations placed on specific aircraft that routinely operate at
their facilities. Other airports are seeing flight delays and
diversions due to similar aircraft limitations as bad weather impacts
operations at nearby airports. The list of affected airports could grow
as more low-visibility events occur.
Disruptions, diversions, flight cancellations, and the grounding of
aircraft during low-visibility events--all of which hang over our
industry and our passengers as a real possibility as the 5G C-Band
rollout continues--aren't just an inconvenience, they ripple across the
country and the globe quickly with significant, negative impacts on
passengers, airports, communities, businesses, our supply chain, and
the economy.
While we are grateful for the measures that have been put in place
to partially address immediate concerns--and commend AT&T and Verizon
for their voluntary actions to date--we need to be clear: the temporary
and partial fixes that have been in place to this point simply aren't
acceptable in the long-term. We need a permanent solution that
acknowledges the importance of 5G services to consumers, businesses,
the economy, and national security and the significant investments by
telecommunications providers while also addressing the critical need
for our nation's aviation system to function 24 hours a day, 365 days a
year, in low-visibility conditions.
We also need better communication from our federal partners and
additional data and information sharing, transparency, and aviation
industry involvement to understand exactly where we are with 5G
deployment and where we are headed.
It's incredibly frustrating to me and my airport colleagues, for
example, to not have insight into the location of 5G towers that could
impact operations at our facilities and to lack information and
certainty on what aircraft will be able to serve our airports under
what circumstances in the future as 5G deployment continues.
Uncertainty is a major problem in the aviation industry. Unfortunately,
we find ourselves awash in uncertainty at the present time.
Airports and our aviation industry partners need more insight and
involvement on the path ahead so that we can be proactive in preparing
rather than reactive as we have been forced to be in recent weeks. All
airports--including those not immediately impacted by the initial
January 19 rollout--must prepare for and deal with potential delays,
diversions, cancellations, and other impacts, but we lack the
information, insight, and involvement to do so effectively. That must
change moving forward.
The Eugene Perspective: Uncertainty, Questions, and Potential
Operational Impacts
The challenges, frustrations, questions, uncertainty, and potential
operational impacts for affected airports are readily apparent at
Eugene. Despite being outside of the 46 Partial Economic Areas (PEAs)
where 5G C-Band was deployed on January 19, EUG and a handful of other
airports outside of the initial PEAs have been subject to Instrument
Approach Procedure (IAP) Notice to Air Missions (NOTAMs), which
significantly limit aircraft operations during low-visibility
conditions--conditions that can be routine in our area. These NOTAMs
were issued by the FAA to identify the airport IAPs affected by 5G C-
Band interference and prohibited for use by the U.S. commercial fleet
through an FAA airworthiness directive.
At EUG and the 87 other airports with similar IAP NOTAMS related to
5G deployment, no operations can occur in low-visibility conditions
unless the FAA has granted the aircraft manufacturer an Alternative
Means of Compliance (AMOC), which allows specific aircraft to fly into
specific airports under specific conditions. Unfortunately, we have no
insight into the conditions specified or the ability to review them as
they are provided only to the manufacturer that holds the AMOC. The FAA
does not make those approvals publicly available.
While it is positive that the FAA has reviewed and approved AMOCs
on an expedited basis to cover at least 90 percent of the U.S.
commercial aircraft fleet, we are not yet at the point where all
aircraft previously serving my airport and others can continue to
operate in low-visibility conditions. The continued inability for
certain aircraft to operate during low-visibility conditions poses a
particular problem for airports that may only receive service or that
receive the vast majority of service from those aircraft.
Unfortunately, we do not know whether or when all aircraft that
previously served my airport can continue to operate in low-visibility
conditions now or in the future. The FAA has already acknowledged that
some altimeters will have to be retrofitted or replaced based on
existing data. As altimeters that are unable to function properly in a
5G C-Band environment are identified, those aircraft will presumably be
taken out of service until the altimeters can be upgraded, which will
cause further impact on my airport and others.
As I understand it, the recent cancellations at Paine Field offer
an example of how unique and limited some of the recent fixes are. When
fog rolled in and visibility became limited, one of the main aircraft
serving the airport was effectively banned from operating, forcing the
carrier to cancel all flights in and out of the airport. For smaller
airports, including mine, where regional flights on smaller jets are
common, we can't afford to simply shut down when the weather turns bad.
As I mentioned previously, given the interdependent nature of the
aviation system, problems at ``spoke'' airports aren't just a local
problem, they cascade and create disruptions, hassles, and problems
throughout the system.
The potential for significant disruptions is apparent at my
airport. If the FAA's flight restrictions had been in place in 2021,
conservatively there would have been about 90 low-visibility days
impacting up to 40 percent of our flights per day. We would have
projected similar disruptions this year without the issuance of the
AMOCs. But with those AMOCs under monthly review and anticipating
additional disruptions as the next rounds of 5G C-Band rollout, we know
there will be additional disruptions if no action is taken to
immediately and safely return additional regional aircraft to service.
EUG operates under low visibility conditions frequently during the
winter months. For airport operations we utilize a ground control
protocol, called the surface movement guidance control system or SMCGS,
about 50 percent of winter days, usually lasting an average of about
three hours.
During low-visibility conditions, our airline partners utilize the
CAT II/CAT III Instrument Landing System (ILS CAT II/III) on the field
to land with visibility down to as low as 300 feet.
Before the ILS CAT II/III system was installed 17 years ago, fog
impacted air service reliability at EUG, and frequent delays and
cancellations literally drove our local passengers two hours away to
Portland International Airport. With the current ILS, our local
passengers were finally able to stay off the freeway and fly local with
confidence.
Unrestricted utilization of the ILS CAT II/III approach by the U.S.
commercial fleet is critical for safe and functional commercial air
service at EUG, as well as the rest of the airport system where our
flights connect.
What's Next?--Questions and Recommendations
The recent positive developments related to the initial 5G C-Band
deployment have been welcome news to protect the safety of the National
Airspace System and avoid major disruptions to our air transportation
system. However, they may be a temporary reprieve and only made
possible by the good graces of AT&T and Verizon. Lingering questions
must be answered, and action must be taken to ensure that the remaining
underlying issues are addressed and fixed permanently. Our questions at
this point, include:
Does the FAA anticipate that all aircraft that were
previously allowed to operate in low-visibility conditions at affected
airports will eventually be able to operate again?
If so, what is the timeline for gaining AMOCs for these
aircraft?
If not, what percentage of the fleet could be rendered
inoperable under low-visibility conditions at affected airports? Will
those aircraft need to have their altimeters upgraded and what kind of
impact will that have on our aviation system?
Why did the FAA issue NOTAMs and restrict some operations
from occurring at some airports outside of the 46 PEAs? Were the
telecommunications companies authorized to have their 5G C-Band network
deployed in areas outside of the 46 PEAs?
How long are AT&T and Verizon willing to keep the buffer
zones--areas around runways where the companies agreed not to activate
5G towers--that helped limit the impacts of 5G C-Band deployment at
affected airports?
How many 5G towers exist within these buffer zones and
how are these towers affecting operations at our airports?
By what criteria is the FAA evaluating and approving
AMOCs for specific aircraft to operate at specific airports under
certain conditions? For example, how did the FAA determine that a
buffer zone was necessary to ensure that low-visibility operations
could continue at affected airports?
How can airports--and other stakeholders that are unable
to review AMOCs--easily determine what aircraft have been approved by
the FAA to service what runways at what airports and under what
conditions?
If or when the telecommunication companies decide to
remove or narrow the buffer zones, potentially on July 5, what airports
would be impacted and how would the FAA proceed to mitigate those
impacts?
What efforts is FAA engaged in to determine if low-
visibility operations could occur at affected airports within a smaller
buffer zone? What is the FAA doing to mitigate the operational impact
at those airports?
How will the FAA ensure that similar operational impacts
do not occur when the 5G C-Band network is deployed in the rest of the
country in December 2023?

Answers to these and other questions raised by the industry along
with additional transparency and data and information sharing are
critical for airport operators and the aviation industry. Again, we
need to be proactive in preparing for what comes next rather than
reactive. In a recent letter to the FAA and FCC leadership, AAAE made
the following, specific recommendations for a long-term solution:
Creating narrowly tailored and sufficiently sized
``buffer zones'' around runways at all affected airports where the 5G
C-Band will be deployed to ensure continued operations in low-
visibility situations.
Providing substantially more transparency into the scope
of operational impacts that are expected to occur at individual
airports to enable them to better prepare for and manage disruptions.
We believe this can best be accomplished through the implementation of
permanent data sharing mechanisms between the telecommunications
companies, FAA, airports, and the aviation industry. To that end, we
believe the establishment of a high-level working group to include
airports merits serious consideration.
Canceling, or providing substantial justification for,
the IAP NOTAMs that were issued for airports that are located outside
of the 46 markets where Verizon and AT&T have been authorized to deploy
the 5G C-Band base stations.

In closing, I do not want to downplay the significant actions that
have been undertaken in recent days by AT&T and Verizon or the FAA.
What looked to be a potential crisis for 88 airports across the
country, including EUG, beginning on January 19 has been averted
largely, and we are learning every day of additional aircraft cleared
to fly into affected airports.
Unfortunately, pockets of pain persist, and it is clear that the
reprieve may be temporary and dependent on the willingness of the
telecoms to operate in a limited fashion in some areas. As the
situation evolves, continued vigilance is required from Congress, the
FAA and DOT, the White House, telecommunication companies, and the
entire aviation industry. AAAE stands ready to work with the government
and our industry partners to address these critical needs.
I am grateful for the opportunity to provide the views of the
airport community on how we can minimize operational impacts moving
forward and appreciate your attention to this issue. Thank you for your
consideration and the opportunity to testify.

Mr. Larsen. Thank you very much, Ms. Stephens.
The Chair now recognizes Captain DePete for 5 minutes.
Mr. DePete. Thank you, Chairman DeFazio and Ranking Member
Graves, Chairman Larsen and Ranking Member Graves, and the
subcommittee members. I am Captain Joe DePete, president of the
Air Line Pilots Association, International, which represents
more than 62,000 U.S. and Canadian pilots.
For airline pilots, safety is nonnegotiable. It is not
about politics or profit. For this reason, it was an affront to
us when the Federal Communications Commission, the FCC,
licensed part of the C-band spectrum to the telecom sector
without heeding or even acknowledging our concerns about
aviation safety.
This situation shows that the FCC's stovepiped approach
threatens safety and is also forcing pilots to conduct
extensive work-arounds for the foreseeable future. This is no
way to run a railroad, and it is certainly no way to operate
the world's safest air transportation system.
So, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. We
would also thank Chairman DeFazio and committee members for
voicing concern for aviation safety in the new 5G rollout.
Your leadership, along with that of Transportation
Secretary Buttigieg and FAA Administrator Dickson, forced
telecom companies to delay implementation until risks are
addressed.
As early as 2018, ALPA took issue with the 5G deployment
plans. We urge the FCC and telecom companies to share the data
to identify potential risk. We contacted the FCC Chair and
Commissioners, but they ignored our concerns and instead ceded
to those with an $80 billion interest in a quick launch.
Radar altimeters use radio waves to calculate how high the
aircraft is above the terrain. Pilots and onboard safety
systems use this data to navigate flights, especially during
approach and landing in poor conditions.
We have already seen the effects of the new 5G service at
locations like Paine Field in Everett, Washington, and ALPA is
sharing with the FAA all reports of interference. Deploying the
new service in the United States held challenges. FCC
authorized 5G signals here transmit using antennas aimed at the
horizon and at higher power levels and closer to airports than
anywhere else on the planet. For example, France approved 5G
with antennas aimed below the horizon at one-third the
transmission power and with runway safety areas two and a half
times larger than those in the United States.
For pilots, new 5G service injects more complexity and more
risk into already complex flight operations. We must now
analyze how 5G regulatory directives affect departure, arrival,
and alternative airports. The increased pilot workload
reinforces the importance of having at least two qualified,
trained, and rested pilots on every flight deck.
The U.S. air transportation system is the world's safest.
If another industry seeks to introduce risk into the system,
the burden should be on that industry to prove its actions
won't degrade aviation safety. The launch of the new 5G service
caused an avoidable crisis. The process must be reformed so
that the United States can continue to be a world stage
competitor in 5G and set the global standard in aviation
safety.
So, what can we do? We need action to fund and charge the
FAA with staying informed and included in national spectrum
strategies. We need to require the FCC to share publicly the
new service transmitting data when issuing new or revising an
existing license. We need to require the FCC to collaborate
with and defer to U.S. Government agencies charged with safety
oversight. We need to grant the FAA authority to reject new or
expanded FCC spectrum applications that affect aviation until
safety can be ensured. And finally, we need to require the FAA
to share information on approved alternative methods of
compliance.
Airline pilots, as the arbiters of safety, are trained for
life to decide when every flight is safe. However, the U.S.
Government must do more to safeguard air transportation as 5G
service expands, and ALPA pilots are more than ready to assist.
Thank you very much.
[Mr. DePete's prepared statement follows:]

Prepared Statement of Captain Joseph G. DePete, President, Air Line
Pilots Association, International
Chairman DeFazio and Ranking Member Graves, my name is Captain Joe
DePete, and I am the president of the Air Line Pilots Association,
Int'l (ALPA). I am proud to say that I represent 62,000 pilots flying
for 38 airlines in the United States and Canada. The airline pilots
flying the line today are literally on the front lines of aviation
safety, working in very challenging circumstances that have been
created by the deployment of 5G mobile wireless in the C-Band of radio
spectrum.
For ALPA pilots, safety is nonnegotiable. It's not about politics
or profit. On every flight, our customers--including members of this
committee--entrust us with their lives and livelihoods. For that
reason, it was an affront to airline pilots when the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) sold and licensed a section of the C-
Band spectrum to wireless companies without heeding--or even
acknowledging--our concerns about potential interference with the radar
altimeters we use to safely navigate our aircraft. Their stove-piped
policymaking process and single-minded focus on doing the bidding of
the telecom industry not only put the public at risk, but it has also
forced pilots to perform extensive workarounds to ensure the safety of
flight--workarounds that we expect will be needed for the foreseeable
future.
This is no way to run a railroad, and it's certainly no way to
operate the world's safest air transportation system.
We have been tracking the potential interference that mobile
wireless transmissions in the C-Band could have on aircraft radar
altimeters for years. Our first written submission to the FCC docket
was on May 29, 2018, less than 30 days after the FCC opened the docket
for comments. At that time, ALPA expressed concerns about the proposal
and encouraged the FCC to work with the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) and aviation industry representatives to mitigate the potential
interference concerns. Radar altimeters are the only sensor onboard a
civil aircraft which provides a direct measurement of the clearance
height of the aircraft over the terrain or other obstacles. In addition
to pilots' use of radar altimeters during a flight, many other aircraft
systems utilize the data they generate, to properly function.
The situation we find ourselves in has taken the complexity of an
already intricate operation to a new level. The current system of
preflight planning and dispatch of an airline flight--which already
includes fuel planning; review, minimum equipment list, and status of
all aircraft systems; review of weather at departure point; monitoring
weather and systems en route; and monitoring weather at the destination
airport while planning for contingencies along the way--now includes
additional risk. Flight crews are now expected to know the type of
radar altimeter the aircraft is equipped with, applicable airworthiness
directives, whether that airframe/altimeter combination has been issued
an alternate method of compliance (AMOC) for the intended destination
airport and runway, and whether the alternate airport is still legal.
This added complexity reinforces what everyone in this room knows: The
most important safety feature on every airline flight is two highly
experienced, well trained, and rested pilots on the flight deck.
Anyone who believes that this process can be automated, flight deck
crew reduced, or required experience levels shortened seriously needs
to go on the line and attempt this operation for themselves.
Two full weeks of 5G interference with radar altimeters have gone
by. Incidents of radar altimeter anomalies have occurred. Pilots
operating in today's 5G-induced chaos have had significant burdens
added to each and every workday. Meanwhile, flights have been canceled
and delayed, costing families money while introducing unwelcome delays
in the supply chain for businesses large and small. Here are some of
the new steps and considerations that each pilot faces when they go
fly.
Notices to Air Missions
Pilots must review Notices to Air Missions (NOTAMs) published by
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to understand how each flight
they make is affected by 5G interference with their radar altimeters.
Frequently, the print-out for all the NOTAMs on a domestic flight
between two large cities can be many pages, discussing items such as
unlit obstructions, changes to procedures, taxiway closures, and other
important flight data. Some of this data is static and does not change.
The 1,851 5G-related NOTAMs that were published by the FAA are
unique in that the NOTAMs change with the ongoing 5G deployment. This
requires pilots to find and then carefully review them each time, even
if they have seen them before. There may be differences for this flight
than what they flew to the same airport, even if it was yesterday.
Airworthiness Limitations on the Aircraft--Airworthiness Directives and
AMOCs
Pilots are now required to know and follow the details regarding
5G's effects on aircraft airworthiness. Every aircraft has a new
limitation due to 5G. An airworthiness directive (AD) published by the
FAA in December 2021 limits aircraft approach and landing operations
during periods of low clouds and visibility when NOTAMs are published
for 5G interference. However, the FAA has subsequently approved
alternate methods of compliance that provide relief from the 5G AD for
certain aircraft types and radar altimeter combinations. Pilots now
need to evaluate the aircraft to determine which of two 5G
airworthiness scenarios applies each time they are dispatched an
aircraft to fly.
If the aircraft is operated with reduced capabilities as described
in an AD and activated by the 5G interference NOTAMs, pilots must plan
accordingly. The AD mandates changes to the minimum weather conditions
acceptable for landing. The AD requires the evaluation of weather
conditions at the departure, destination, and alternate airports and
makes sure that they can safely conduct the flight with the reduced
capabilities as stipulated in the AD. The AD requires pilots to
continuously monitor weather conditions while en route to the
destination and alternate airport weather more closely, so that if the
need to divert arises, they can select a diversion airport that has
weather conditions suitable for the aircraft capabilities.
If the aircraft is operated with fewer or no restrictions because
the aircraft has an approved AMOC for 5G, pilots must study the AMOC
that applies to their aircraft carefully. They will need to verify that
the AMOC can be applied at the airports and anticipated runways for
their flight. In some cases, the AMOC applies to the departure but not
the destination (or vice versa). Other possible situations are where
the AMOC can be used at an alternate airport where a 5G NOTAM is
published, but otherwise the flight can be conducted normally because
neither departure or arrival is a 5G impacted airport.
The complexity of the situation gets worse because the FAA has
issued some AMOCs that approve low-weather operations only to specific
runways at certain airports. Therefore, when low-visibility conditions
exist, the pilot will need to plan ahead and be sure to only utilize
the runways allowed by the AMOC. When needing to access the ``approved
runway for the AMOC,'' the flight crew will need to coordinate with air
traffic control, which adds to both pilot and controller workload.
The AMOC is valid for 30 days, so the list of airports and runways
that an aircraft is allowed to apply the AMOC to will change
frequently. It is possible that an aircraft with an approved AMOC
today, may no longer be approved the next time a pilot is assigned to
that aircraft. In addition, if a pilot is rated to fly multiple types
with one Type Rating, such as multiple models of the Boeing 737 or the
common type among the Airbus 319/320/321 and/or if the airline has
multiple makes or models of radar altimeters installed, they will also
need to stay on top of the AMOC approvals for the specific aircraft
they will be flying.
Finally, as the FAA has stated, some aircraft may never be able to
receive an AMOC due to the installed performance of the radar altimeter
on the aircraft.
Additional Limitations Not Covered by ADs or AMOC
Some aircraft manufacturers have added additional guidance and
revised certain flight deck procedures that need to be followed at
airports where there is a 5G NOTAM. This is above and beyond the AD
from the FAA. This means that, even on a sunny, cloudless day, the
aircraft manufacturers have modified aircraft flight manuals for
operating in the United States 5G environment. The pilot must now
review these additional or revised procedures prior to flight and
implement them when operating to or from the 5G airport.
Selecting Alternate Airports and Preflight Planning
Even more than usual, the pilot must also work very closely with
airline dispatchers to ensure that alternate airports are still viable
given the forecast weather and aircraft's 5G limitations. If the
likelihood for poor weather is high, then the pilot and dispatcher will
need to decide which alternate airport is less likely to be impacted by
weather based on forecast conditions hours into the future. For some
flights, there are multiple alternate airports. Once the flight plan,
with alternate airport selection is finalized, pilots will then need to
evaluate the fuel required for the flight, with the necessary reserves.
In some cases, pilots may need to add more fuel to account for weather
forecasts or other unanticipated delays created by the 5G situation,
thereby making the flight more expensive to operate and increasing our
carbon footprint.
Monitoring and Addressing Radar Altimeter Issues In-Flight
The 5G deployment has also added to a pilot's in-flight workload.
There is now the potential for weather to wreak havoc with the flight.
For example, low clouds or low visibilities at the destination airport
will more frequently force decisions to divert to the alternate
airport. If the low clouds and low visibilities ``go up and down'' over
the course of several hours, then pilots may need to enter a holding
pattern in hopes that the weather will improve to acceptable conditions
for landing. Or, as discussed above, they will need to coordinate with
air traffic control for a specific runway that is approved as part of
their AMOC. All of these scenarios add workload and complexities that
flight crews now need to work through.
Pilots must also be prepared for in-flight 5G interference to
result in a radar altimeter failure on the flight deck. When that
happens, there may be additional failure alerts or changes in aircraft
system behavior as critical safety systems are affected by unreliable
radar altimeter altitude information. For example, the Traffic Alert
and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) changes its alerting behavior
based on radar altitude.
Pilots will need to plan for the fact that certain systems may be
unavailable in the arrival, approach, and landing phase of the flight.
Although pilots pay close attention to the aircraft's operation,
degraded safety systems such as terrain avoidance, certain collision
warning features, and the automatic deployment of spoilers and reverse
thrust are unwelcome changes in the aircraft's capabilities. The loss
of these systems eliminates safety features, thereby adding risk.
If this all seems complicated--that's because it is. And to think
that airline pilots may do this multiple times per day while changing
aircraft resulting in new AMOCs and NOTAMs to consider is daunting and
adds risk. It is not an understatement to say that every airline pilot
flying in America's airspace system today has the additional burden of
reading, understanding, and making contingency plans based on a full
understanding of all the above for each and every flight.
What I've described above is a summary of what pilots face today.
While some airlines have provided pilots with information and tools to
help navigate the 5G situation, other airlines have provided only a
minimal amount of guidance. It appears that the FAA might need to spend
a bit more time ensuring that all operators are stepping up to
consistently provide accurate data to flight crews. We are monitoring
this situation very closely and listening to our pilots who are
navigating this difficult situation.
Action Needed Going Forward
ALPA appreciates the productive technical discussions between the
aviation industry and the wireless industry that began in early
January. The discussions allowed the FAA to rapidly approve the AMOCs
described earlier, which in turn has to date largely prevented a
breakdown in reliable airline services for passengers and shippers.
This current situation was avoidable. If FCC and the wireless
industry had been willing to talk to the FAA and aviation industry
experts in 2019, prior to the FCC report and order, or even prior to
the auction in 2020, we are certain that a better technical solution to
this issue could have been worked out without the rancor expressed in
public, and that the mobile wireless industry could have bid on the
spectrum with a more complete understanding of the future operating
environment and without the threat to aviation safety. We have seen
other countries address 5G in the C-Band much more successfully.
One of my fellow witnesses testifying at this hearing today is the
president of CTIA, the mobile wireless trade association. They have
been fond of saying that 5G works in 40 other countries, why not here?
Well, I can tell you that if the FCC had adopted the 5G C-Band rules
that are currently used in Japan, for example, we wouldn't even need to
be here today.
The maximum power level permitted in Japan is two percent of the
maximum power authorized in the FCC Order for the U.S.\1\ And even with
this significantly lower power, Japan still restricts the siting of 5G
transmitters away from aircraft flight paths. CTIA simply can't have it
both ways.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Japan Macro-cell limits are 63 watts (48 dBm/Mhz), while US
rural power limits are 3280 watts (65 dBm/MHz). See ICAO Frequency
Spectrum Management Panel paper FSMP-WG11-WP30.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We can further contrast what happened in the U.S., with what
happened in Canada and in France. In both countries, when the issue of
radar altimeter interference was raised by the aviation safety
regulator, they collaborated with each countries' spectrum regulator to
put in place restrictions around airports before the 5G signal
broadcasts began.
In Canada authorities placed zones around each of the 26 most
critical airports that prohibit deployment of 5G transmitters, and
further place power limits in a protection zone that covers up to 1000'
above ground. Canada has also put in place a national antenna down tilt
requirement to further reduce the power of the 5G signals that are seen
by aircraft, including for helicopter operations like medevac, which
routinely must operate at low altitudes and away from predefined
heliports and landing zones.
Action by Congress is needed. A detailed analysis of the risk
mitigation strategy for 5G in the C-Band should have been completed by
the FAA, the FCC, the aviation industry, and the wireless industry much
earlier in the process. With millions of air travelers' lives on the
line, a federal agency with no foundational knowledge of our aviation
system should not be the final arbiter of spectrum decisions.
There are more hurdles for aviation as the 5G rollout in the C-Band
continues. The expansion of the 5G network and the expiration of
certain temporary mitigations requires immediate action. Failure to
reach a data-driven solution that does not needlessly introduce
additional risk to the national air space and costs to the aviation
industry will result in the same chaotic and inefficient situation we
find ourselves in today.
The FAA's use of an AD and NOTAMs to ensure airline safety was the
right step to take, and we fully support that action. The U.S. airline
industry's safety record did not reach the current levels of
performance without significant expertise and dedication by frontline
employees including pilots, air traffic controllers, aviation
maintenance technicians, flight attendants, and air traffic system
maintenance personnel. ALPA and aviation labor in partnership with the
FAA and the airlines have assembled risk-predictive, data-driven safety
analysis systems and methodologies that have resulted in documented
safety levels far above any other mode of transportation. Going
forward, we welcome and should demand ongoing and detailed information-
sharing with other stakeholders in government and the private sector.
Action is needed, and a process needs to be established to ensure
that in the future, the FCC shares information and data that allows
airlines to fully engage our risk analysis and safety data reviews
before spectrum decisions are finalized. The FCC should be required to
be forthcoming with as many details as possible on the transmitting
specifications that they are proposing when issuing a new or revised
spectrum approval, and they should work collaboratively when other
regulators are involved in approving safety-related matters. In our
view, the norm should be for FCC to defer to the federal safety
regulators of the FAA or other agencies charged with safety oversight.
I urge you and others on the committee to insist going forward that we
require the use of a collaborative process as other countries
successfully utilized.
Legislation is also needed to allow FAA to share critical
information needed for safety analysis and risk mitigations that affect
aircraft operators. This is information approved as part of any
applications or petitions and should be publicly shared with key
aviation stakeholders. In the current situation, the FAA should be
allowed to share certain information about the approved alternative
methods of compliance to ensure that a consistent understanding of
rapid-changing circumstances is happening in real-time. This could be
accomplished, for example, by having the applicant include a draft
statement for public release upon approval of an application or
petition, which requires inclusion of equipment make and model, and
other critical information such as airports where an approval will be
effective.
The FAA should also be funded and charged to stay better informed
and included as a key stakeholder in any national spectrum strategies,
including mobile wireless (5G or future) radio spectrum strategies. The
FAA should be empowered to interact directly with FCC when required and
not be limited in coordination by relying on another federal agency
that does not understand aviation's carefully designed and very robust
safety risk mitigation strategy.
Lastly, the FAA should be granted the authority to reject new or
expanded FCC spectrum applications that affect aviation until safety
can be ensured.
Mr. Chairman, we thank you and the committee for holding this
timely and important hearing. The ongoing challenges that airline
pilots are facing due to 5G interference with radar altimeters does not
appear to be just a short-term issue, and there does not appear to be
an end game defined, which means that your continuous monitoring of
this situation is very much required and appreciated.
On behalf of the more than 62,000 ALPA pilots working every day to
safely arrive at their destination with passengers and cargo, I thank
you for the opportunity to share our perspectives with you today.

Mr. Larsen. Thank you very much, Captain DePete, for your
testimony.
And I now want to call on Faye Malarkey Black, you are
recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Black. Thank you, Mr. Chair, Chair DeFazio, Ranking
Member Graves and Graves and committee members. I appreciate
the opportunity to speak today. RAA represents regional
airlines that operate 44 percent of the Nation's flights and
connect every corner of the country. Fully two-thirds of U.S.
airports are served only by regional airlines.
RAA was among those, including this committee, called for
safeguarding safety and operational integrity of the aviation
system before 5G rollout, yet FAA issued thousands of NOTAMs
prohibiting airport operations in low visibility where new 5G
signals interfere with aircraft radio altimeters. Alternative
methods of compliance, or AMOCs, are granted only if
manufacturers can show their equipment withstands the new
interference.
This patchwork of broad restrictions and case-by-case
approvals has been disastrous. Airlines are uncertain when and
what clearances they might get for which aircraft, if any. The
impact on regional airlines has been particularly pronounced.
Not one regional aircraft AMOC had been issued when 5G went
live. Even now, because negotiated safeguards against 5G
interference are insufficient for the typical regional
altimeter, the FAA has issued far fewer of those compared with
larger equipment. And more than half the fleet remains
restricted at dozen of airports.
These restricted aircraft provide more than 130,000 monthly
flights and provide the only source of air service to 27
airports. Passengers almost immediately experienced disruption.
One carrier had 63 5G cancels the first week displacing 1,800
passengers, some of those at Paine Field. Yesterday morning, an
airline's entire inbound operation to Houston was delayed, nine
flights were cancelled when 5G barred low-visibility
approaches. By mid-day, 1,400 passengers were displaced.
Earlier, an RAA member endured eight 5G cancels, not due to
severe weather, just wet runways. Operational limitations have
also caused denied boardings. One carrier was limited to using
just 23 of its 50 seats as runway conditions changed. Even
small reductions can make a 50-seat flight unprofitable and
threaten the viability of the route.
I urge this committee not to view these disruptions as mere
pockets of pain. The list of excluded airports is now at 70 and
growing each time a new tower turns on. Consider that all three
New York metropolitan airports are excluded now, and more than
one-quarter of the flights operate there are on aircraft now
prohibited weather.
The downstream consequences are vast. Regional airlines
support the Nation's hub and spoke system. If 5G degrades their
reliable schedules, then the integrity of the entire network is
compromised. For smaller airports, fewer flights mean fewer
options to recover displaced passengers and crew.
For communities served by aircraft now banned in weather,
that specter of completely avoidable economic calamity is still
very much at hand. FAA's NOTAMs and AMOCs were designed to
protect aviation safety from the 5G hazard. Still, we must be
careful that we do not trade one set of risks for another.
The entire industry must react, understand, and mitigate
new risk each time a set of NOTAMs and AMOCs is offered. The
introduction of more than 1,500 simultaneous NOTAMs is
unprecedented. Each one complicates and increases the workload
for dispatch, pilots, and ATC. For each approach, crews must
determine if their aircraft is approved to utilize the approach
being used for that airport, that runway, find and review the
appropriate NOTAMs, and review the AMOC listing to determine
what approach minimums apply before beginning the approach.
ATC also faces significant new airspace saturation with
scores more flights holding, circling, and diverting even as
mild weather rolls in. We enjoy an exceptionally high level of
aviation safety in the United States, due in part to many
layers of safety procedures and tools.
The radio altimeter is one such tool that enhances
situational awareness. And 5G interference takes it away. In
discussing risk, RAA doesn't wish to alarm passengers. Our
members have taken every step to mitigate these risks and will
not compromise safety. Flights will be grounded. Unfortunately,
they have been. We must find a better and more sustainable path
forward.
Today's patchwork of NOTAMs and unattainable regional AMOCs
creates two tiers of reliability in our system. One for cities
and another for everywhere else. I want to make this abundantly
clear: Radio altimeters on regional aircraft aren't faulty or
defective. These altimeters are operating as they should based
on current regulatory and certification standards set by the
FAA. Regional airlines have invested millions in these tools to
allow safe, reliable air service in weather. Now we can't use
them because the FAA auctioned C-band spectrum without fully
considering the consequences.
We can't lose our sense of urgency. FAA must continue to
refine data to determine if an aircraft can safely operate at
airports. If they can't, better mitigations are needed. A
roadmap may be found abroad where lower 5G power, down-tilted
antennas, and wider exclusion zones protect more aircraft.
FAA must also improve its NOTAMs and AMOCs process to
ensure cohesiveness, timeliness, and predictability. I spent my
career advocating for small community service [inaudible]
activity. For travelers that means air service. We support 5G
too, but aviation safety and [inaudible] must be [inaudible].
I thank the committee for inviting me today. Thank you.
[Ms Black's prepared statement follows:]

Prepared Statement of Faye Malarkey Black, President and Chief
Executive Officer, Regional Airline Association
Overview of Regional Airline Industry and Radio Altimeters
My name is Faye Malarkey Black. I am the President and CEO of the
Regional Airline Association (RAA). Regional airlines play a critical
role in the U.S. air transportation system, particularly for smaller
communities. The safety of our passengers, crewmembers, and the public
is and will remain our top priority. This safety cannot be compromised.
RAA appreciates the opportunity to testify before the Committee today
and share our experiences with 5G deployment and the impact that it has
had on the operation of our aircraft and on small community air
service.
RAA represents 17 regional airlines, which operate 44% of the U.S.
scheduled passenger departures and directly employ over 65,000
individuals. Regional airlines specialize in operating smaller aircraft
that are rightsized for markets with fewer passengers traveling at
once. Regional airlines carried about 73 million passengers in 2020--
reflecting COVID-19 impacts--and carried a more typical 165 million
passengers in 2019. Regional airlines provide more than half of the air
service in 30 states and more than 75% of the air service in 15 states.
Most importantly, regional airlines offer the only source of scheduled,
commercial air service at 66% of U.S. airports. In fact, major airlines
directly operate at about 34% of US commercially served airports, while
regional airlines operate at 94%. Because major airlines cannot serve
smaller airports with larger, mainline aircraft, most partner with
regional airlines to reach these customers. The goal of this
arrangement is to bring air service connectivity and a seamless,
reliable travel experience to passengers in every corner of the
country. While regional airlines contribute significantly to civil
aviation's overall $1.8 trillion economic footprint, air service at
small communities (defined as small and non-hub airports) drove $152
billion in direct economic activity in 2019, supporting over one
million jobs and $43 billion in local taxes and wages.
As this Committee knows, Radio Altimeters are critical sensors on
board aircraft. This advanced technology enables and enhances numerous
different safety and navigation functions throughout all phases of
flight. On all types of aircraft, situational awareness of the flight
crew is paramount to ensuring safe flight operations, especially flying
in busy airspace, close to the ground, or in low visibility scenarios
such as Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC). The radar altimeter
plays a critical role in providing situational awareness in these
operating conditions. Not only do radar altimeters provide a displayed
indication of height above terrain to the flight crew, but they also
form the basis of auditory altitude callouts during terminal landing
procedures. Additionally, on commercial aircraft, the radar altimeter
provides input to critical aircraft safety systems including, but not
limited to, Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance Systems (TCAS),
Terrain Awareness Warning Systems (TAWS) Airborne Collision Avoidance
Systems (ACAS), windshear detection systems, flight control systems and
autolanding functions, including auto throttle and ground lift dump and
thrust reversers. This usage by a wide variety of systems onboard the
aircraft leads to the possibility of specific operational impacts that
go beyond a general loss of situational awareness or risk of controlled
flight into terrain.
Background--Radio Altimeter 5G Signal Interference
This Committee has been relentless in engaging with the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA), the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) and stakeholders in both aviation and telecommunications industry
throughout the leadup to the deployment of 2.7-3.98 gigahertz (GHz)
frequency band (``5G C-Band'') services on January 19, 2022. We are
grateful for this engagement, which has certainly helped to drive
progress on this complex issue. We also appreciate the engagement of
the FAA, along with the Agency's willingness to hear RAA's remaining
concerns. RAA was among stakeholders who consistently warned that
deployment of 5G technologies must proceed only after resolving clear
and well-reasoned concerns that 5G transmissions would pose a threat to
the safety and operational integrity of our aviation system, by
interfering with radio altimeters.
Unfortunately, the FCC did not ensure sufficient mitigations to the
root problems associated with 5G C-band interference and the FAA has
concluded that interference with radio altimeters by wireless broadband
operations presents an aviation safety hazard near airports.
Consequently, the Agency issued an Airworthiness Directive days before
the first anticipated rollout, warning that low-visibility operations
would be restricted near 5G transmitters to mitigate the safety hazard.
The Agency later issued an unprecedented 1,537 Notice to Air Missions
(NOTAMs) specific to aerodromes, airspace, and instrument approach
procedures. The FAA drew these NOTAMs according to its worst-case
expectation of signal interference vulnerability and, accordingly,
established a new baseline of vastly restricted operations when
visibility drops below the established minimums.
The operational impact of these NOTAMs is extensive. At dozens of
U.S. airports impacted by the first-tier rollout of 5G services, NOTAMs
restrict operators from performing a vast array of approaches in low-
visibility conditions. The primary impact of the NOTAMs serves to limit
the use of the radio altimeters when flying instrument approaches in
poor weather conditions. However, this is not the only operational
impact as radio altimeters feed a wide range of additional, critical
aircraft systems. Analysis by the aircraft manufacturers of the
restrictions on the use of certain onboard systems has revealed
additional landing and takeoff limitations that impact operations. The
FAA acknowledges safety may also be upheld through Alternate Methods of
Compliance (AMOCs), which the Agency approves when the AMOC provides an
acceptable level of safety. Recognizing that some installed radio
altimeters might be less impacted by 5G interference, the FAA directed
aircraft original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) to submit data showing
their radio altimeters are capable of functioning without interference
by encroaching 5G signals to gain AMOC approval.
This process of allowing a patchwork of approvals, on a case-by-
case basis, to clear some aircraft at some airports, has been
tremendously challenging for the entire industry. Airlines face
uncertainty over when and what clearances they might get for which
aircraft at which airports, if any. The process and outcomes have been
particularly troubling for regional airlines, which were initially
excluded from consultation on mitigation agreements with the
telecommunications industry that would make achieving AMOCs more
feasible. Perhaps as a result, the narrow runway safety zones and
buffer zone mitigations were not designed to protect the typical
regional aircraft altimeter. Tellingly, an earlier agreement between
the FAA and FCC focused exclusively on fifty so-called priority
airports and ignored most regional airports altogether. When 5G was
turned on January 19, most mainline aircraft had received at least
partial AMOCs for their safe operation, but no regional OEM AMOCs had
been issued at all.
This meant, when 5G went live, regional airlines remained
restricted from operating during periods of low visibility at every
airport with NOTAMs in place, even as headlines proclaimed the crisis
was averted. Throughout the week, FAA continued to triage AMOC
approvals according to its view of systemic impact, prioritizing
regional airlines and aircraft last among commercial airlines. While
the reasoning behind this prioritization may well have been aimed at
relieving greater systemic pressure, we urge all stakeholders to
consider that mitigating disruption at the aggregate-level does nothing
for the tens of millions of passengers left vulnerable. Whether they
are traveling for premium health care, to see a loved one, or just
trying to get home to their families, passengers experience disruption
as individuals and today's ever-changing NOTAMs and AMOCs expose
regional airline passengers to more disruption. To this day, the FAA
has been able to issue dramatically fewer AMOCs for regional aircraft
compared with larger equipment and over half the regional fleet remains
prohibited from operating in reduced visibility at dozens of key
airports (See Appendix A). In many cases, the specific fleet types
excluded from low visibility operations at hub airports operate more
than a third of the airport's total departures. Regional airlines
provide substantial support for the nation's intricate hub and spoke
system; if 5G is allowed to degrade their reliable schedules then the
integrity of the entire national air service network will be
compromised. Put another way, the specter of ``completely avoidable
economic calamity'' and vast disruption our major airline partners
warned against last month remains very much in play for smaller
communities who rely on aircraft that remain excluded from key airports
in weather.
Two regional jets, the E135/145 (E145) and the E170/175/190 (E175),
face particularly pronounced restrictions. The E145, a 50-seat aircraft
scheduled for 31,383 departures (4.3% U.S. departures) in January,
comprises 14% of the regional jet fleet and has no AMOC approved or
pending for any operation that requires radio altimeters. The FAA has
issued NOTAMs at 66 such airports used by regional airlines with low
visibility approaches at the time of this writing, including 57 of the
189 U.S. airports the E145 serves today (Appendix B). Operating in 46
states, the E145 provides the only source of air service to 26
airports. (Appendix C). The E175 comprises 40% of the regional airline
fleet, has a dual class configuration that can seat up to 76 passengers
and was scheduled for 108,646 January departures (14.9% U.S.
departures). Although this aircraft was granted an AMOC, that AMOC
initially excluded 57 of the 69 NOTAM'd airports it serves. Overall,
the E175 is used to provide air service to 167 U.S. airports, is used
to provide the only source of air service to one airport (Paine Field)
and supports more than 30% of the departures at 37 airports (Appendix
C).
On Sunday, January 30, the FAA used a revised safety analysis model
to issue new NOTAMs and AMOCs associated with current upcoming 5G
deployments. Adjustments to the FAA's model brought 21 more airports
into the E175 AMOC but left 33 airports excluded and newly excluded two
more (JFK, ALB) for a current total of 35 excluded airports. The E145
remains excluded from all airports with NOTAMs. As more 5G towers are
turned on and transmission signals are turned up and even as more high-
speed internet users impact the signal, we expect even more airports to
become excluded. This will almost certainly disadvantage more
communities and passengers.
Despite relatively fair weather \1\ in the first week of 5G
deployment, regional airlines almost immediately experienced delays and
cancelations due to weather that would not have restricted operations
before the signal interference. Several notable examples occurred in
the Pacific Northwest, including one RAA member with a total of 63 5G
related cancelations or delays between the January 19 rollout and
January 31st. As several members of this Committee can attest,
lingering fog is a typical weather pattern in the area. When visibility
drops below certain levels \2\, no flights may operate. In other cases,
the use of radio altimeters guides precision approaches to allow safe
landings in certain categories of reduced visibility. Paine Field (PAE)
in Everett, Washington, is served exclusively by the E175. Because of
the proximity of the 5G tower to the runway, the E175's AMOC at the
time did not cover approaches into the main runway. Because this is the
runway authorized for low visibility approaches, all flights in and out
of the airport were cancelled on Monday, January 24th, shutting down
air service to the airport specifically and directly because of the 5G
runway restrictions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The extent of 5G cancelations associated with the 1/28-29/22
weather event in the Northeastern U.S. is not yet known.
\2\ The FAA denotes qualified U.S. airports and runways for
Category I (CAT I), Category II (CAT II) and Category III (CAT III)
Instrument Landing System (ILS) operations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I urge this Committee not to view the disruptions in Pacific
Northwest as merely pockets of pain and proof of a successful 5G roll
out that has minimized disruptions; rather, they should be viewed as
indicative of what awaits other parts of the country in the event of
bad weather. The reality is that regional airlines operate in both
large and small airports throughout the country; making considerable
connections through the hubs to serve the spokes. Here are just a few a
few examples of larger airports where the regional aircraft without an
AMOC at the airport have a significant market presence:
LGA has no AMOC for the E175. Of 20,293 scheduled flights
in January, 7,395 were E175 aircraft equating to 36% (more than 1 of 3
flights).
EWR has no AMOC for the E175. Of 15,764 scheduled flights
in January, 2,853 were E175 aircraft equating to 18% (nearly 1 of 5
flights).
JFK has no AMOC for the E175 or E145. Of 23,203 scheduled
flights in January, 5,701 were E175 aircraft (no E145 ops) equating to
25% (1 in 4 flights).
PHL has no AMOC for the E175 or the E145. Of 8,973
scheduled flights in January, 2,517 were E175 or E145 aircraft equating
to 28% (more than 1 in 4 flights).
RDU has no AMOC for the E175. Of 5,456 scheduled flights
in January, 1,911 were E175 aircraft equating to 35% (more than 1 in 3
flights).
IND has no AMOC for the E175 or the E145. Of 4,102
scheduled flights in January, 1,531 were E175 or E145 aircraft equating
to 37%. (More than 1 in 3 flights)
PDX has no AMOC for the E175. Of 5,039 scheduled flights
in January, 822 were E175 aircraft equating to 16%.
STL has no AMOC for the E175 or E145. Of 6,246 scheduled
flights in January, 668 were E175 or E145 equating to 11%.
MSP has no AMOC for the E175 or E145. Of 11,575 scheduled
flights in January, 1,171 were E175 or E145 aircraft equating to 10%.

For smaller markets, where there are fewer total departures and a
high percentage of departures on aircraft without an AMOC, the impacts
carry a different type of systemic impact. With fewer flights overall,
airports served by regional airlines have fewer options to recover
passenger and crew disruptions when diversions, cancelations and delays
occur. Here is a sampling of airports in this category, where one or
both aircraft lack an AMOC for an airport have significant regional
departures: CLE (32% regional) CVG (31%) JAX, (36%) RIC (35%) OKC (34%)
ROC (42%), LIT (51%), GSO (43%), MDT (39%), HSV (40%), SBP (49%), STS
(70%), ORH (81%).
Even at airports where service is permitted under certain AMOCs,
many regional aircraft face other restrictions, such as limitations on
runways. This is particularly troubling because regional airlines
experience greater diversity in size, geography, weather, and runway
characteristics at airports they serve, relative to other operators.
One RAA member endured eight 5G interference cancelations in a single
morning the week 5G went live--not due to a snowstorm or intense
thunderstorms--but rather, wet runways at the arrival airport. In other
cases, airlines are taking weight penalties to mitigate against 5G
impact on systems. Another RAA member, already restricted outright from
operating at multiple airports during weather, incurred weight
penalties at airports it could serve. This required a real-time
reduction in payload that forced the denied boarding of eight
passengers across two flights. In addition to burdening those displaced
passengers, even small reductions to the seating capacity of a 50 seat
passenger aircraft quickly make for an unprofitable flight. Long term,
such impacts threaten the viability of small community routes.
Leaving dozens of airports and millions of passengers vulnerable to
sweeping disruptions is unsustainable and unacceptable. Today's
patchwork of NOTAMs and airport specific AMOCs that exclude regional
aircraft is creating a two-tiered national aviation system where
communities that rely on regional airline service are disadvantaged and
subject to more disruption, while those served exclusively by larger
aircraft are less vulnerable. It must be made abundantly clear that
radio-altimeters on regional aircraft aren't faulty or defective; they
are operating as they should, based on current regulatory and
certification standards established by the FAA. Unfortunately, these
standards became irrelevant when the FCC auctioned C-Band spectrum near
the radio altimeter operating frequency without full consideration of
the consequences.
Aviation Safety
Most importantly, FAA's extensive use of NOTAMs creates a massive
differential in workload and procedures that itself introduces risk
into the aviation system. Fundamentally, NOTAMs are Irregular
Operations (IROPs). While the NOTAMs and their associated AMOCs are
offered to protect aviation safety from the 5G hazard, we must be
extremely careful that we do not trade one set of risks or another.
Pilots in the airline industry are trained to a set of practices and
procedures, which have changed abruptly. The introduction of more than
1,500 NOTAMs simultaneously is unprecedented. The entire industry must
react, understand, and mitigate new risk each time a new set of NOTAMs
and AMOCs is offered. Each NOTAM and AMOC complicates and increases the
workload for aircraft dispatch professionals and pilots. Pilots
performing short haul flights often fly to multiple destinations in a
single day. Every approach requires the crew to determine if their
aircraft is approved to utilize the approach being used currently for
that airport and runway, then find and review the appropriate NOTAMs
and review the AMOC listing to determine what approach minimums apply
to the safely begin an approach. This workload shift will not be
limited to airline crews. In cases where flights are dispatched before
weather moves in, Air Traffic Control (ATC) will be required to handle
significant airspace saturation associated with diversions and
holdings. This in turn could spur ground stops and other systemic
delays to allow ATC to safely handle the traffic flow.
One very important factor behind the extremely high level of safety
the U.S. aviation system enjoys today lies with the many layers of
procedures and safety tools it employs. The introduction of these
NOTAMs removes one such tool, by limiting use of the radio altimeter to
enhance situation awareness. In discussing these risks, RAA does not
wish to alarm U.S. airline passengers. Our members have taken every
step to mitigate these risks and will not compromise safety. Flights
will be grounded, and unfortunately, they have been. We must find a
better and more sustainable path forward.
Comprehensive and Permanent Solutions
Regional airlines have invested millions of dollars in advanced
safety technologies like radio altimeters that allow safe and reliable
air service for the traveling public during periods of poor weather.
Without their use, flights will continue to be canceled, delayed and as
necessary, diverted. This imposes a terrible burden on regional
passengers. We should not be willing to accept two levels of
reliability in this country and the FAA and FCC must not allow 5G
interference to undermine and waste these investments by failing to
ensure adequate protections for all aircraft. The FAA, the White House,
FCC, telecommunication companies and aviation stakeholders must further
commit to resolving underlying factors causing 5G C-Band interference
near airports and mitigate those to protect safe operations at all
airports--today and moving forward.
The FAA should continue to review its analysis and modeling of 5G
interference and refine this based on updates from telecom companies
related to tower location, signal strength, and positioning, to
determine if aircraft can safely operate at currently excluded
airports. If the FAA find that these aircraft cannot safely operate
under the current mitigations, the Agency and the White House should
engage directly with the telecommunication companies to pursue other
mitigations to restore that safe operation. Potential tactics may
include efforts that have worked well abroad, such as additional
lowering of 5G C-band power levels, requiring a downward tilt on
airport-proximate 5G antennas, and creating exclusion zones near
airports that protect all aircraft from transmission interference if
necessary. Based on the limitations associated with some current
regional aircraft AMOCs, these exclusion zones may need to be larger at
certain airports.
Continued and improved communications, including greater
consultation of regional operators and stakeholders, will be central to
the successful, safe deployment of 5G services. It is important that
the FAA continue to work with the FCC and telecommunications
stakeholders to ensure future communications are less hindered by Non-
Disclosure Agreement-driven opacity and other factors, so that direct
and clear data-sharing can expand between stakeholders. RAA also asks
that the FAA improve upon its process of issuing NOTAMs and AMOCs to
ensure better cohesiveness, timeliness, and predictability.
Conclusion
As an organization that supports air service to communities large
and small, RAA believes in the power of connection. We are committed to
working with all stakeholders, including this Committee, to ensure
aviation safety is upheld and that an appropriate balance is struck
between two important modes of connection: successful deployment of 5G
services while preserving the integrity of the country's air
transportation network. I thank the Committee for this opportunity to
testify today and look forward to taking your questions at the
conclusion of the panel.

Appendix A--Airports with NOTAMs Excluded from AMOCs-- Select Regional Airline Fleet
Black \\ denotes airport excluded in first round but cleared 1/31. Gray \\ denotes newly
excluded on 1/27.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NO AMOC NO AMOC
Airport List Name CAT II/III Approach E175 E175 NO AMOC NO AMOC
01.27.22 01.31.22 E145 Q400
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AFW............................. Fort Worth Alliance Yes................ ........ ........ X .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ALB............................. Albany Yes................ ........ 7 X ....... .......
International. 0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AUS............................. Austin Bergstrom... Yes................ ........ ........ X .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BDL............................. Bradley Windsor Yes................ ........ ........ X .......
Locks.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BFI............................. Boeing Field....... Yes................ X X X .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BFL............................. Bakersfield........ Yes................ X X ....... .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BHM............................. Birmingham......... Yes................ X X X X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BLI............................. Bellingham......... Yes................ X X X .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BNA............................. Nashville.......... Yes................ ........ ........ X X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BOS............................. Boston Logan....... Yes................ ........ ........ X .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BUR............................. Burbank............ Yes................ ........ ........ X .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BWI............................. Baltimore.......... Yes................ ........ ........ X .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CAE............................. Columbia........... Yes................ ........ ........ X .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHS............................. Charleston SC...... Yes................ X X ....... .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CLE............................. Cleveland.......... Yes................ ........ ........ X .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CLT............................. Charlotte.......... Yes................ X 1___0 X .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CVG............................. Cincinnati......... Yes................ X 1___0 X .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DAL............................. Dallas............. Yes................ ........ 7 X ....... .......
0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DAY............................. Dayton............. Yes................ X X X .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DFW............................. Dallas Fort Worth.. Yes................ ........ ........ X .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DTW............................. Detroit............ Yes................ ........ ........ X .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
EWR............................. Newark............. Yes................ X X X .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FWA............................. Fort Wayne......... Yes................ X 1___0 X .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
GSO............................. Greensboro......... Yes................ X 1___0 X .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
GSP............................. Greenville Yes................ ........ ........ X .......
Spartanburg.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
HIO............................. Hillsboro OR....... Yes................ X X X .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
HOU............................. Houston Hobby...... Yes................ X 1___0 X X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
HPN............................. White Plains....... Yes................ X X ....... .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
HSV............................. Huntsville......... Yes................ ........ ........ X .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
IAH............................. Houston George Bush Yes................ ........ ........ X .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
IND............................. Indianapolis....... Yes................ X X X .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ISP............................. Islip.............. Yes................ X X ....... .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
JAX............................. Jacksonville....... Yes................ X 1___0 X .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
JFK............................. New York JFK....... Yes................ ........ 7 X X .......
0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LAX............................. Los Angeles........ Yes................ X X X .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LGA............................. La Guardia......... Yes................ X X ....... .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LIT............................. Little Rock........ Yes................ X X X .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MCI............................. Kansas City........ Yes................ X X X .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MCO............................. Orlando............ Yes................ ........ ........ X .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MDT............................. Harrisburg......... Yes................ X 1___0 X .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MEM............................. Memphis............ Yes................ X X X .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MHT............................. Manchester NH...... Yes................ X X ....... .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MKE............................. Milwaukee.......... Yes................ X 1___0 X .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MOD............................. Modesto............ Yes................ ........ ........ X .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MRY............................. Monterey........... Yes................ ........ ........ ....... X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MSN............................. Madison WI......... Yes................ ........ ........ X .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MSP............................. Minneapolis, St. Yes................ X X X .......
Paul.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MSY............................. New Orleans........ Yes................ X 1___0 X .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
OAK............................. Oakland............ Yes................ X X X .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
OKC............................. Oklahoma City...... Yes................ X X X .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ORH............................. Worcester MA....... Yes................ X X ....... .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ORD............................. Chicago O'Hare..... Yes................ X 1___0 X .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PAE............................. Everett............ Yes................ X 1___0 X .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PDX............................. Portland OR........ Yes................ X X ....... .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PHL............................. Philadelphia....... Yes................ X X X .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PHX............................. Phoenix............ Yes................ ........ ........ X .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PIT............................. Pittsburgh......... Yes................ ........ ........ X .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PVD............................. Providence......... Yes................ X X X .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RDU............................. Raleigh Durham..... Yes................ X X X .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RIC............................. Richmond........... Yes................ X X X .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ROC............................. Rochester NY....... Yes................ X X X .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RST............................. Rochester MN....... Yes................ X 1___0 X .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SBP............................. South Bend......... Yes................ X X ....... .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SEA............................. Seattle Tacoma..... Yes................ ........ 1___0 ....... .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SJC............................. San Jose........... Yes................ X X ....... .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SLC............................. Salt Lake City..... Yes................ X 1___0 X .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SNA............................. Orange County...... Yes................ X X ....... .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
STL............................. St Louis........... Yes................ X X X .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
STS............................. Sonoma County...... Yes................ X X X .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SWF............................. Stewart NY......... Yes................ X 1___0 X X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SYR............................. Syracuse........... Yes................ ........ ........ X .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TPA............................. Tampa.............. Yes................ X X X .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\\ Editor's note: Colors were changed from green and orange in the original testimony to black and gray,
respectively, in order to display the denotations in a black and white format.

Appendix B--26 Airports Served Exclusively by the ERJ145
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% ERJ
ERJ 135/ Total Other 135/
Jan-22 145 Flights Flights 140/
Flights 145
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ABI......................................... Abilene, TX.................... 213 213 0 100.0%
ALO......................................... Waterloo, IA................... 58 58 0 100.0%
ART......................................... Watertown, NY.................. 45 45 0 100.0%
BKW......................................... Beckley, WV.................... 107 107 0 100.0%
BPT......................................... Jack Brooks, TX................ 76 76 0 100.0%
CCR......................................... Buchanan Field, CA............. 33 33 0 100.0%
CEC......................................... Del Norte County, CA........... 30 30 0 100.0%
CLL......................................... Easterwood, TX................. 193 193 0 100.0%
CMI......................................... Willard, Il.................... 151 151 0 100.0%
CVN......................................... Clovis, NM..................... 54 54 0 100.0%
DBQ......................................... Dubuque, IA.................... 46 46 0 100.0%
DIK......................................... Dickinson, ND.................. 53 53 0 100.0%
DRT......................................... Del Rio, TX.................... 59 59 0 100.0%
FLO......................................... Florence, SC................... 80 80 0 100.0%
GCK......................................... Garden City, KS................ 61 61 0 100.0%
GGG......................................... East Texas Regional, TX........ 126 126 0 100.0%
GLH......................................... Greenville, MS................. 52 52 0 100.0%
LAW......................................... Lawton, OK..................... 94 94 0 100.0%
MCN......................................... Macon, GA...................... 54 54 0 100.0%
PGA......................................... Page, AZ....................... 40 40 0 100.0%
PGV......................................... Greenville, NC................. 93 93 0 100.0%
PKB......................................... Mid-Ohio, WV................... 53 53 0 100.0%
SBY......................................... Salisbury, MD.................. 119 119 0 100.0%
SPS......................................... Wichita Falls, TX.............. 213 213 0 100.0%
TXK......................................... Texarkana Regional, AR......... 95 95 0 100.0%
TYR......................................... Tyler-Pounds, TX............... 211 211 0 100.0%
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Appendix C--37 Airports with 30% or More Departures by E175
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ERJ 170/ % ERJ
Jan-22 195 Total Other 170/
Flights Flights Flights 195
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PAE......................................... Paine Field, WA................ 259 260 1 99.6%
ORH......................................... Worcester Regional, MA......... 121 149 28 81.2%
SUN......................................... Friedman Memorial, ID.......... 203 260 57 78.1%
STS......................................... Sonoma, CA..................... 302 432 130 69.9%
ACV......................................... Humbolt County, CA............. 153 220 67 69.5%
HHH......................................... Hilton Head, SC................ 64 95 31 67.4%
XNA......................................... Northwest Arkansas, AR......... 730 1,312 582 55.6%
RDM......................................... Redmond, OR.................... 375 687 312 54.6%
BOI......................................... Boise, ID...................... 1,149 2,247 1,098 51.1%
SBP......................................... San Luis Obispo, CA............ 218 443 225 49.2%
CMH......................................... Columbus, OH................... 1,866 3,873 2,007 48.2%
CHS......................................... Charleston, SC................. 1,037 2,360 1,323 43.9%
PIT......................................... Pittsburgh, PA................. 1,864 4,461 2,597 41.8%
MSO......................................... Missoula, MT................... 150 372 222 40.3%
ILM......................................... Wilmington, NC................. 228 585 357 39.0%
EYW......................................... Key West, FL................... 497 1,276 779 38.9%
PSC......................................... Pasco, WA...................... 208 539 331 38.6%
GRK......................................... Killeen-Fort Hood, TX.......... 113 296 183 38.2%
LIT......................................... Little Rock, AR................ 488 1,280 792 38.1%
ORF......................................... Norfolk, VA.................... 763 2,073 1,310 36.8%
LGA......................................... New York, LaGuardia............ 7,395 20,293 12,898 36.4%
FCA......................................... Kalispell, MT.................. 102 280 178 36.4%
JAX......................................... Jacksonville, FL............... 1,031 2,856 1,825 36.1%
IND......................................... Indianapolis, IN............... 1,478 4,102 2,624 36.0%
RDU......................................... Raleigh-Durham, NC............. 1,911 5,456 3,545 35.0%
HLN......................................... Helena, MT..................... 52 154 102 33.8%
SAV......................................... Savannah, GA................... 525 1,555 1,030 33.8%
DCA......................................... RR Washington National, DC..... 4,743 14,101 9,358 33.6%
SDF......................................... Louisville, KY................. 731 2,185 1,454 33.5%
EUG......................................... Eugene, OR..................... 301 919 618 32.8%
SGF......................................... Springfield, MO................ 261 797 536 32.7%
OKC......................................... Oklahoma City, OK.............. 680 2,111 1,431 32.2%
MTJ......................................... Montrose, CO................... 137 428 291 32.0%
BOS......................................... Boston, MA..................... 6,082 19,476 13,394 31.2%
PSP......................................... Palm Springs, CA............... 507 1,629 1,122 31.1%
BUF......................................... Buffalo, NY.................... 628 2,032 1,404 30.9%
MFR......................................... Medford, OR.................... 222 721 499 30.8%
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Mr. Larsen. Thank you very much.
The Chair recognizes Mr. James Viola, president and CEO of
Helicopter Association International. You are recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Viola. Thank you. Chairman DeFazio, Chairman Larsen,
Ranking Member Sam Graves, Ranking Member Garret Graves, and
members of the subcommittee, thank you for your leadership and
for holding this hearing. I appreciate the opportunity to
provide testimony today. I have been involved in aviation for
more than 35 years and began my aviation career in the U.S.
Army with the majority of my flying done as a special
operations helicopter pilot. I later joined the FAA where I
most recently served as the director of general aviation safety
assurance. I now serve as the president and CEO of Helicopter
Association International.
Throughout my career, I have been dedicated to safety and
the continued development and refinement of safe aviation
operations. The unique capabilities of vertical flight means we
can accomplish missions that no other aircraft can. And our
industry is also expanding, bringing on to the flight deck
exciting technologies such as advanced air mobility and eVTOL
aircraft.
Our operations are conducted at lower altitudes and at
lower speeds. Many flights are conducted from start to finish
without the use of airports. Every day, vertical flight serves
the public good. Our members do everything from air medical,
law enforcement, firefighting, heavy construction to urban air
mobility, and even more. Helicopter air ambulance operators
transport roughly 1,000 injured or critically ill patients
every day.
The FAA, in carrying out its mission to maintain aviation
safety, put into place restrictions on helicopter flight
operations through NOTAMs and airworthiness directives, or ADs,
in order to mitigate the risk of 5G interference with aircraft
radio altimeters. For helicopters, the AD prohibits certain
operations requiring radio altimeters.
The restriction in the AD, which prohibits takeoff and
landings, has significant far-reaching consequences for the
rotorcraft industry. We may be unable to conduct certain
missions and provide public services, especially when you
consider that limitation applies to nearly 2,000 NOTAM
designated locations.
To combat the impacts of 5G interference, the FAA
implemented an alternative method of compliance, or AMOC. To
date, the focus has been on part 121 air carriers and the FAA
has done tremendous work there, but this is a Band-Aid approach
to a permanent problem that is constantly changing. The
rotorcraft AMOC procedures have not been formally released by
the FAA. The process is still being fine-tuned.
We believe it is critical that the FAA continue the same
level of urgency and commitment as they have had for commercial
aviation to mitigate operational impacts on helicopter
operations and the essential services they provide to save
lives, protect communities, and support jobs. It must be
recognized that rotorcraft's operational environment is vastly
different than the airlines.
Helicopter operations which take place at much lower
altitudes than airline flights could very well conduct their
entire flight within the zones of this interference. Rotorcraft
utilize airports, as well as unapproved locations such as
streets, parking lots, or fields. The other avenue to combat
the operational impact of 5G interference is the exemption
process.
The FAA partially approved a HAI petition for exemption
allowing helicopter air ambulance operators to continue flying
with restrictions. This relief will also allow them to use
night vision goggles in the helicopter air ambulance
operations. Ninety-seven percent of the 1,250 helicopters used
in helicopter air ambulance now have an HAI exemption.
I want to be very clear: HAI and our members are not
against 5G. However, due to our mission profiles and
operational parameters, 5G interference is a particular concern
to the vertical flight sector. We want to ensure that 5G is
deployed in such a way that it can safely coexist with aviation
operations. The development of new radio altimeters with
filters that can withstand 5G interference will take time, and
the cost for operators to purchase and install these new
altimeters is of particular concern to the industry.
In the short term, HAI is focused on working with the FAA
on AMOC process and additional exemptions with mitigations to
allow operators to provide services to their communities. In
the long term, we urge Congress to enact reforms to provide
better transparency and coordination on the spectrum issues.
The Department of Commerce and its Federal Advisory Committee
have studied the issues of equitable access to spectrum and
identified several recommendations.
The reason we are here today is clear: Misaligned spectrum
policy has disadvantaged aerospace and aviation users. It is
imperative we find a solution to address the currently failed
system so that we are not in the same situation again.
I thank the committee again for the opportunity to provide
the perspective of the vertical flight industry, and I look
forward to continuing our work together in these important
issues. My full comments are offered for the record. I welcome
any questions.
[Mr. Viola's prepared statement follows:]

Prepared Statement of James Viola, President and Chief Executive
Officer, Helicopter Association International
Chairman Larsen, Ranking Member Graves, and Members of the
Subcommittee, I want to thank you for holding this hearing on the
urgent issue of 5G interference with safety-critical aviation
equipment. Thank you for your leadership in defending aviation safety.
I also want to express my sincere appreciation for the opportunity to
provide testimony today.
I have been involved in aviation for more than 35 years and have
flown more than 70 types of aircraft, both helicopter and fixed-wing,
military and civilian. I began my aviation career in the US Army, with
the majority of my flying done as a special operations helicopter
pilot. I later joined the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), where
I most recently served as director of General Aviation Safety
Assurance.
I now serve as president and CEO of Helicopter Association
International (HAI). As the professional trade association for the
international helicopter industry, HAI represents more than 1,100
companies and over 16,000 industry professionals in more than 65
countries. Each year, HAI members safely operate more than 3,700
helicopters and remotely piloted aircraft approximately 2.9 million
hours. HAI is dedicated to the promotion of the helicopter as a safe,
effective method of commerce and to the advancement of the
international helicopter community.
Throughout my career, I have been dedicated to safety and the
continued development and refinement of safe aviation operations.
Serving the Public Good
The unique capabilities of vertical flight--the ability to land and
take off from practically anywhere, the maneuverability, and the
ability to hover or fly at very low speeds--means we can accomplish
missions that no other aircraft can. Another way we differ from fixed-
wing aircraft is that our operations are conducted at lower altitudes
and at slower speeds.
Every day, vertical flight serves the public good. Our members do
everything from air medical, law enforcement, firefighting, heavy
construction, utility patrol and maintenance, urban air mobility, and
more. And our industry is expanding, bringing onto the flight deck
exciting technology such as advanced air mobility and electric vertical
takeoff and landing (eVTOL) aircraft.
All over the country, from densely populated cities to oil rigs 200
miles offshore, helicopters are used to save lives, serve and protect
American citizens, and support critical industries in demanding
environments--and many of those missions are conducted from start to
finish without the use of airports.
As just one example of how vertical flight serves the public good,
consider air medicine. Helicopter air ambulance (HAA) operators
transport roughly 1,000 injured or critically ill patients every day.
Up to 50,000 of the more than 300,000 people transported by HAA
operators during 2021 were transported from off-airport or unimproved
areas--meaning the 5G mitigations proposed to maintain an equivalent
level of safety at airports will have no effect on those operations.
The loss of a single life because of misguided 5G-related policies
would be reprehensible.
5G Flight Restrictions
In carrying out its mission to maintain safety in the US National
Airspace System, the FAA has put into place restrictions on helicopter
flight operations to mitigate the risk of 5G interference with aircraft
radio altimeters. The FAA has communicated these restrictions via two
channels: a series of Notices to Air Missions (NOTAMs) and
Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2021-23-13.
The FAA uses NOTAMs to define the geographic locations where 5G
interference occurs. As of Jan. 27, 2022, the agency has issued 5G-
related NOTAMs for 1,904 locations around the country.
AD 2021-23-13 states that when operating in US airspace, the
following operations requiring radio altimeters are prohibited in areas
defined by the presence of 5G C band wireless broadband interference as
identified by NOTAM:
Performing approaches that require radio altimeter
minimums for rotorcraft offshore operations. Barometric minimums must
be used for these operations instead.
Engaging hover autopilot modes that require radio
altimeter data.
Engaging search and rescue (SAR) autopilot modes that
require radio altimeter data.
Performing takeoffs and landings in accordance with any
procedure (Category A, Category B, or by Performance Class in the
Rotorcraft Flight Manual or Operations Specification) that requires the
use of radio altimeter data.

For each mission, an operator must review their Rotorcraft Flight
Manual and Operations Specification to determine if the use of radio
altimeter data is required by provisions of Title 14 of the Code of
Federal Regulations. If a radio altimeter is required and if the
mission's flight path would overlap a geographic location identified by
a 5G-related NOTAM, then the restrictions listed in the AD apply to
that flight.
The first and third bullets impact specific segments of our
industry. However, the fourth bullet, which prohibits takeoffs and
landings in areas identified by 5G-related NOTAMs, has significant,
far-reaching consequences for the rotorcraft industry's ability to
conduct missions and provide public services, especially when you
consider that prohibition applies to nearly 2,000 US locations.
The issue is not limited to radio altimeter performance alone.
According to the FAA Safety Alert for Operators 21007 of Dec. 23, 2021,
``a wide range of other automated safety systems rely on radio
altimeter data.'' The agency goes on to note that 5G interference and
the ensuing anomalous radio altimeter inputs could cause flight
controls, including autopilots, to operate in an unexpected way, which
pilots may not detect in time ``to maintain continued safe flight and
landing.''
Alternative Methods of Compliance
To reduce these impacts of 5G interference, the FAA has implemented
an Alternative Method of Compliance (AMOC) process. This process
evaluates the installed radio altimeter aboard an aircraft and its
ability to withstand spectrum interference.
To date, the focus has been on Part 121 carriers, and the FAA has
done an outstanding job of streamlining the process to issue as many
approvals as they have. We support these efforts for the airlines. The
AMOC process is vital to ensure a healthy, viable US aviation industry.
Currently the rotorcraft AMOC procedures have not been formally
released by the FAA; the process is still being worked on and fine-
tuned. We believe it is critical that FAA continue the same level of
urgency and commitment, as they have had for commercial aviation, to
mitigate operational impacts upon helicopter operations and the rest of
general aviation, and the essential services they provide to save
lives, protect communities, and support jobs.
The effects of 5G deployment are not limited to the nation's
busiest airports, and mitigations by wireless carriers should not be
limited to those locations either. As we start evaluating AMOCs for
rotorcraft, we must recognize that the airlines' operational
environment is vastly different than the one for rotorcraft. An
airliner is only in the zone where it could potentially be impacted by
5G interference for a short duration, generally during the critical
period of takeoffs and landings. The vast majority of its flight is
conducted at high altitudes, out of the range of 5G interference.
Conversely, helicopter operations, which generally take place at
much lower altitudes than airline flights, could very well conduct
their entire flight within the zones of interference. In addition,
while airplanes must take off and land from airports, rotorcraft can
utilize a much wider variety of sites, including heliports and
unimproved locations such as streets, parking lots, or fields. The
voluntary measures proposed by the wireless carriers would provide
modest 5G limitations at the surface of public-use heliports, of which
there are only 55 in the country. That number is dwarfed by the
estimated 6,533 to 8,533 HAA landing sites in the United States, with
more than 4,000 being private-use heliports co-located at hospitals.
HAI has partnered with the FAA to maximize the efficiency the AMOC
process. Knowing that the FAA would be under immense pressure to
approve a large amount of AMOCs, HAI took steps to ensure that critical
helicopter operations could be prioritized. In cooperation with the
FAA, HAI developed a 5G AMOC Portal, where operators can report how
their operations are being impacted by 5G interference. These reports
are shared with the FAA, providing the agency with additional
intelligence on 5G impacts.
Exemptions
The other avenue to reduce the operational impact of 5G
interference is the exemption process. HAI is pleased that the FAA
partially approved a petition for exemption that HAI had submitted in
anticipation of 5G C band deployment, seeking relief from regulations
that require a normally functioning radio altimeter for certain
operations.
This exemption allows Part 119 certificate holders authorized to
conduct HAA operations under Part 135, subpart L, to continue Part 135
helicopter operations while employing radar altimeters that may not
function normally due to 5G interference. The relief will also allow
the use of night-vision goggles (NVGs) in HAA operations.
These exemptions are contingent on certain conditions and
limitations. All pilots conducting operations under the exemption are
required to receive and maintain a record of proper training.
Additional conditions for NVG operations include the installation of a
movable searchlight and a requirement for pilots or crew members to
establish radio contact with ground personnel at a landing site so they
can receive and confirm a description of the landing site.
To date, 40 HAA operators have submitted Letters of Intent to use
the HAI Exemption. This accounts for 1,206 helicopters in operation, or
97% of the approximately 1,250 helicopters used in HAA operations.
This exemption provides a significant path for moving forward, not
only for HAA operators but for the countless communities and hospital
networks that would otherwise have been deprived of the critical life-
saving support that can only be offered by helicopter operations. This
exemption will allow HAA operators to continue to do what they do
best--save lives.
The Path Forward
I want to be very clear: HAI and our members are not against 5G.
However, due to our mission profiles and operational parameters, 5G
interference is of particular concern to the vertical flight sector. We
want to ensure that 5G is deployed in such a way that it can safely
coexist with US aviation operations.
Under the exemption and with the proper mitigations in place, HAA
missions can move forward. However, other rotorcraft industry sectors
do not have similar exemptions that enable them to continue operations.
Critical public-service missions, including firefighting, utility work,
and law enforcement, and economically important ones, such as
transportation and flight training, are severely constrained if
operating in areas for which a 5G-related NOTAM has been issued.
Additionally, emerging technologies such as advanced air mobility
operations that are projected to begin operations in dense urban
areas--the exact areas of 5G deployment--could face severe
restrictions.
The development of new radar altimeters with filters that can
withstand 5G interference is critical to the vertical flight industry's
ability to continue flying and serving the public good. However,
developing and certifying new radar altimeters will take time.
Additionally, the cost for operators to purchase and install these new
altimeters is of significant concern to the industry. My members ask
why they should be financially responsible for installing new equipment
to mitigate the safety risk imposed by another corporation's decision
to deploy 5G wireless systems.
In the short term, HAI is focused on working with the FAA and the
AMOC process to determine which radio altimeters and aircraft models
can withstand 5G interference. Additionally, HAI will continue to
explore for FAA approval exemptions and accompanying operational
mitigations that will help operators to continue to provide aviation
services to their communities.
In the long term, we urge Congress to enact the necessary reforms
to provide better transparency, efficiency, and coordination on
spectrum issues by the FCC and other government agencies. Various
parties, including the Department of Commerce and its Federal Advisory
Committee, have studied the issue of equitable access to spectrum in
the U.S. and identified several recommendations. It seems clear that
misaligned domestic spectrum policy, to the disadvantage of aerospace
and aviation users, is what brings us here today. We do need to find a
solution to address how a currently failed system can be fixed so that
we are not in the same situation again. The deployment of 5G will not
be the last spectrum issue to resolve. Let's begin to work now to
ensure that the problems we faced with the 5G rollout will not occur in
the future.
Ensuring the safety of those who fly--whether pilots, crews, or
passengers--is always HAI's top priority. As such, we will continue to
advocate for reasonable limitations on 5G deployment so that safety-
critical equipment on helicopters is not compromised by harmful
interference. HAI will also continue to work with regulators to develop
solutions that maintain safety and preserve the helicopter community's
ability to operate in a 5G environment.
I thank the Committee again for the opportunity to provide the
perspective of the vertical flight industry and look forward to
continuing our work together on these important issues. I welcome any
questions.

Mr. Larsen. Thank you very much for your testimony. And we
will now turn to Ms. Baker from the CTIA. You are recognized
for 5 minutes.
Ms. Baker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for
including the wireless industry in today's hearing. I am glad
to be here together with the aviation leaders, and the keyword
for me is ``together.'' I am very happy to report that millions
of Americans today are benefiting from next generation 5G
service. Those same Americans are flying across the country and
across the world safely. We got here thanks to a great deal of
hard work in the past few years, particularly in the past few
weeks.
We have shown that engineer to engineer there is a path
forward together. As of today, 90 percent of commercial planes
have been cleared demonstrating the successful coexistence of
5G and flights. We are committed to working to clear the
remaining planes and being a good partner with aviation. I very
much share the view expressed by American Airlines CEO Doug
Parker that we are in the right spot.
Technical experts are encouraged and information sharing
has been key. An agreement between CTIA, A4A, and AIA helped
drive this breakthrough. I also share the confidence of Scott
Kirby, the CEO of United, who said that we will get to a final
resolution. Like him, I just wished it had happened earlier.
Rewind a few weeks and the press tried to pit the future of
wireless versus aviation. That was always a false choice. We
can and must have safe flights and robust 5G.
Nearly 40 countries around the world have shown us it can
happen, and it is happening now in communities across our
country. We have been preparing to bring C-band spectrum into
service for years. A regulatory rulemaking, global study, this
has been a bipartisan priority to drive our national wireless
leadership and close the digital divide.
That extended process only reinforces how proud I am of
AT&T, Verizon, and the U.S. wireless industry for being so
responsive to aviation concerns.
After spending billions on spectrum license and billions
more deploying networks, they hit pause. They took repeated
steps to ensure that we are in the position we are today. They
delayed, in the public interest, fully confident of our ability
to coexist effectively. They first postponed their launch
voluntarily for 30 days to give aviation more time to evaluate
altimeter performance. They then took steps to reduce their
power in the air to protect airports and heliports, all in
response to aviation concerns.
Then they agreed to 2 additional weeks of delay. In doing
so, they adopted even more temporary protections around
airports. Still then, the carriers, the day before launch,
agreed not to turn on cell towers in the immediate area around
specific airports. The FCC called these the most comprehensive
efforts in the world to safeguard aviation technologies. And
they are.
This is the type of U.S. corporate leadership we need.
These temporary steps are on top of the FCC's balanced rules
that were the culmination of years of expert review, capturing
the feedback of both aviation and wireless interests.
This hearing is rightfully focused on protecting aviation
safety. We share that objective wholeheartedly and now have
real-world evidence of it in the United States.
I wish to close by sharing how excited I am for our 5G
future. Accenture just last week released a report noting that
broadly deployed 5G will help us achieve up to 20 percent of
the administration's climate goals.
5G will also create new home broadband competition and help
close the digital divide in each of your districts. 5G is well
worth the wait. That is why getting the full power 5G as
envisioned by the FCC is so important, and it is why getting
access to the next phase of C-band is so critical.
The enhanced collaboration between our industries will make
that a reality. The last few weeks have given us a clear
roadmap to do so. This is about our global competitiveness and
creating new opportunities in towns, small and large. We will
do all of that while ensuring safe flights. That is really
great news, and we should celebrate that.
I look forward to your questions.
[Ms. Baker's prepared statement follows:]

Prepared Statement of Hon. Meredith Attwell Baker, President and Chief
Executive Officer, CTIA
Chairman DeFazio, Ranking Member Graves, Subcommittee Chairman
Larsen, Ranking Member Graves, and Members of the Subcommittee, on
behalf of CTIA and the U.S. wireless industry, thank you for the
opportunity to testify today.
Congress and this Committee have been laser focused on critical
investments to our nation's infrastructure. The Infrastructure
Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) recognized the key role that 5G plays in
closing the digital divide and supported low-income households so they
can stay connected. These historic investments in both our physical and
digital infrastructure are integral to our connected future across
America.
Your leadership is also critical in supporting the safest air
traffic system in the world. We can--and must--have both safe flights
and robust and reliable C-Band 5G. I appreciate you holding this
hearing.
There is Broad Support and Commitment to Advancing C-Band 5G and
Aviation Safety
Last month, President Biden emphasized the U.S. Government's
``commit[ment] to rapid 5G deployment'' while ensuring that aviation
will ``safely co-exist.'' \1\ The wireless industry fully endorses the
President's statement and is committed to working collaboratively with
altimeter vendors, aircraft manufacturers, the airlines, helicopters,
airports, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA), the White House, and Congress--in sum,
all stakeholders--to enable full-scale C-Band 5G deployments while
maintaining air traffic safety.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Statement by President Joe Biden on 5G Deployment Agreement,
The White House Briefing Room (Jan. 4, 2022) (``President Biden Jan. 4
Statement'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The hard work over the last several weeks demonstrates that the
United States can achieve the dual imperatives of air traffic safety
and C-Band 5G. On January 19, 2022, AT&T and Verizon successfully
launched 5G services in the initial tranche of C-Band 5G spectrum, the
3.7-3.8 GHz band, and Americans have continued to travel safely across
the nation.
I am proud of how AT&T and Verizon responded in the face of
concerns about C-Band 5G and the claims of potential interference to
radio altimeters. Despite all available real-world evidence--including
existing C-Band 5G networks operating abroad using the same frequencies
with the same permitted power levels and with no reported incidents of
interference to air traffic safety--AT&T and Verizon acted to allay
public concern and to give the FAA and the aviation industry additional
time to evaluate altimeter performance with 5G. Specifically, since the
FAA issued its statement on 5G/altimeter co-existence on November 2,
2021, AT&T and Verizon delayed their launches twice and committed to
three different sets of voluntary temporary measures.
I also want to thank the FAA for its actions in recent weeks to
turn to an altimeter-by-altimeter review and keep Americans flying
safely and with minimal disruption. As of January 28, 2022, the FAA has
cleared 20 altimeter models and 90% of the U.S. commercial fleet for
low visibility landings in the vicinity of C-Band 5G networks.\2\ This
clearance rate demonstrates co-existence is attainable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ FAA, 5G and Aviation Safety, https://www.faa.gov/5g (last
updated Jan. 28, 2022).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With continued collaboration and enhanced transparency, and relying
on sound science and good engineering, I firmly believe we will achieve
an outcome that permits robust C-Band 5G and continued air traffic
safety across the American skies. To that end, I am encouraged by
recent statements from airline leaders. As United's CEO Scott Kirby
said, ``[w]hile I wish it happened earlier, the good news is we now
have everyone engaged.'' \3\ And American Airlines CEO Doug Parker
noted that technical experts working on 5G and air traffic safety
``seem encouraged that we'll be able to address this in a way that
allows for full deployment of 5G, including near airports.'' \4\ The
wireless industry is committed to working with our aviation
counterparts, the FCC, the FAA, and all of government to do the work
necessary to achieve both robust C-Band 5G and safe skies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Chris Isidore, Major airlines say the 5G doomsday scenario is
over, CNN Business (Jan. 21, 2022), https://www.cnn.com/2022/01/20/
business/airlines-outlook-5g-truce/index.html.
\4\ Id.
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The Promise of 5G and the Importance of C-Band 5G
5G wireless broadband networks are transforming the way we live and
work, with speeds up to 100 times faster than 4G networks, connectivity
responsiveness that is five times quicker, and network capacity that
can handle 100 times the number of devices. In the transportation
sector alone, 5G is beginning to help foster driverless cars, increase
the efficiency of public transportation, and improve roadway safety and
save lives. 5G will help update and build the industries of the future,
including healthcare, smart manufacturing, logistics, and agriculture.
The Boston Consulting Group projects that 5G networks will add $1.5
trillion to America's economy and create 4.5 million new jobs over the
next decade.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Enrique Duarte Melo et al., 5G Promises Massive Job and GDP
Growth in the US, Boston Consulting Group (Feb. 2021), https://
www.ctia.org/news/report-5g-promises-massive-job-and-gdp-growth-in-the-
u-s. Conversely, delayed access to 5G spectrum has real impacts: every
six-month delay in 5G deployment costs our nation's economy $25 billion
in economic benefits over the next decade, risks America's
competitiveness, and jeopardizes our ability to ensure global 5G
leadership. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Further, a recently released Accenture study quantifies the
importance of 5G wireless services to addressing climate change.\6\
Accenture concluded that in the U.S., use cases on 5G networks are
expected to enable a 20 percent contribution toward carbon emission
reduction targets, helping the country meet its climate change goals.
Accenture finds that 5G use cases will have the same effect as taking
nearly 72 million cars off the road for a year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Monica Kuroki et al., 5G Connectivity: A Key Enabling
Technology to Meet America's Climate Change Goals, Accenture (Jan.
2022), https://newsroom.accenture.com/news/5g-enabled-technologies-
could-solve-for-one-fifth-of-us-climate-change-target-by-2025-new-
study-finds.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rapid deployment of the C-Band is key to the U.S.'s global
leadership in this developing 5G ecosystem, with economic and national
security implications. Our global competitors understand that wireless
leadership means billions of dollars in economic growth and millions of
jobs in the industries of tomorrow, such as Smart Cities and the
Internet of Things. Unfortunately, other countries possess significant
advantages in the availability of spectrum for wireless innovation--for
example, China is freeing up hundreds of megahertz of mid-band spectrum
for 5G.
Maintaining our global leadership in wireless and meeting the ever-
growing demand for next-generation wireless requires access to
spectrum, and the FCC on a bipartisan basis has made strides to open up
new frequency bands that will power 5G. Mid-band spectrum is the
``sweet spot'' of spectrum innovation and is a key factor for 5G, as it
provides high speeds over a broad coverage area, making sure no one
gets left out of the New Economy. As a presidential candidate,
Secretary Buttigieg committed to ``[s]peed up next generation wireless
expansion . . . support[ing] clearing more government and other
spectrum (like the C-band).'' \7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Investing in an American Asset: Unleashing the Potential of
Rural America, Pete for America, Aug. 6, 2019, https://
peteforamerica.com/policies/unleash-rural-opportunity/ [https://
archive.ph/MiFF7].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
But America is playing catch-up, as the U.S. has a limited amount
of mid-band spectrum available to power 5G networks. Across the globe,
the C-Band is the mid-band workhorse for 5G. Nearly 40 countries are
already using this spectrum with no threat to air safety. In the U.S.,
policymakers and industry stakeholders alike have been working to open
up the C-Band for 5G for years, including international review dating
back as early as 2003 and more recently as part of a 2017 FCC inquiry
and the 2018 bipartisan MOBILE NOW law.\8\ In February 2020, the agency
adopted a comprehensive order enabling 5G in the C-Band with carefully
crafted technical rules to allow C-Band 5G to safely operate with
altimeters. The FCC reviewed the concerns expressed by the aviation
industry and concluded that ``the technical rules on power and emission
limits we set for the [C-Band 5G] Service and the spectral separation
of 220 megahertz should offer all due protection to [altimeter]
services in the 4.2-4.4 GHz band.'' \9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Expanding Flexible Use in Mid-Band Spectrum Between 3.7 and 24
GHz, Notice of Inquiry, 32 FCC Rcd 6373 (2017); MOBILE NOW Act, Pub. L.
No. 115-141, Division P, Title VI, Sec. 601 et seq. (2018).
\9\ Expanding Flexible Use of the 3.7 to 4.2 GHz Band, Report and
Order and Order of Proposed Modification, 35 FCC Rcd 2343, 2485 395
(2020) (``C-Band Order'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In February 2021, the FCC completed an auction of 280 megahertz of
C-Band spectrum that generated more than $81 billion for the U.S.
Treasury--the largest spectrum auction in history. AT&T and Verizon won
licenses in many of the most populated geographic areas in the 3.7-3.8
GHz band and, under the FCC's rules, paid incumbent users billions of
dollars more to clear the spectrum by December 5, 2021. The remaining
licenses, covering the full band from 3.7-3.98 GHz, are scheduled to
become available for 5G by December 2023.
Following the auction, AT&T and Verizon sprang into action,
investing billions of dollars to deploy C-Band 5G network
infrastructure across the country, while thousands of employees worked
to prepare the network, and thousands more were trained to engage with
customers about C-Band 5G--all in the lead up to the scheduled launch,
last December 5, 2021.\10\
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\10\ Letter from John Stankey, Chief Executive Officer, AT&T, Inc.
& Hans Vestberg, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Verizon
Communications, Inc., to Pete Buttigieg, Secretary, U.S. Department of
Transportation & Steve Dickson, Administrator, FAA, at 2 (Jan. 2, 2022)
(``AT&T Verizon Jan. 2 Letter''), https://www.politico.com/f/-
?id=0000017e-1c36-dee4-a5ff-fe3e997f0000.
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Wireless Providers' Voluntary Delays and Steps to Pare Back the C-Band
5G Launch Have Allowed Aviation Stakeholders to Verify 5G Can Co-Exist
Effectively
I am proud of AT&T and Verizon for their responsiveness to FAA and
aviation concerns. The wireless providers have delayed launch twice,
for a total of six weeks, and committed to voluntary measures
restricting full-power C-Band 5G for six months in addition to the
protections in the FCC's rules. The wireless industry remains confident
that 5G poses no risk to air traffic safety but has taken these steps
to allow the FAA time to evaluate altimeter performance with C-Band 5G.
On November 2, 2021, just over a month before AT&T and Verizon were
set to launch the first C-Band 5G networks in the U.S., the FAA issued
a pronouncement on C-Band 5G, a Special Airworthiness Information
Bulletin (SAIB) identifying a potential risk of C-Band 5G resulting in
adverse effects to altimeters.\11\ The FAA sought information on
altimeter design and deployment on aircraft, as well as testing
results. The SAIB followed press reports a few days earlier suggesting
there could be flight cancellations, delays or diversions if the FCC
did not suspend C-Band operations.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ FAA, Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin; Risk of
Potential Adverse Effects on Radio Altimeters, AIR-21-18 (Nov. 2, 2021)
(``SAIB AIR-21-18''), https://rgl.faa.gov/
Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library-/rgSAIB.nsf/
dc7bd4f27e5f107486257221005f069d/27ffcbb45e
6157e9862587810044ad19/$FILE/AIR-21-18.pdf.
\12\ Andrew Tangle & Ryan Tracy, FAA Plans Warnings to Pilots,
Airlines Over New 5G Rollout, Wall St. J. (Oct. 29, 2021), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/faa-plans-warnings-to-pilots-airlines-over-new-5g-
rollout-11635524648.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although the FCC had conducted a rigorous analysis and found no
harmful interference to altimeters, and the FAA's SAIB recognized that
other nations' C-Band wireless networks have not resulted in any
documented reports of interference, the FAA acted in large part based
on a single, flawed industry study. In response, on November 4, AT&T
and Verizon announced the first of what would become two delays in the
launch of C-Band 5G. Specifically, the two wireless providers
voluntarily postponed their C-Band launches for one month, from
December 5 until January 5, 2022, as a show of good faith to help
provide aviation stakeholders additional time.\13\ The FCC and the FAA
issued a joint statement, noting that ``[a]viation safety and
technology leadership are national priorities, and with today's
announcement these companies have demonstrated their commitment to
both.'' \14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Cat Zakrzewski, AT&T and Verizon will delay 5G rollout over
airplane interference concerns, Wash. Post (Nov. 4, 2021), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/11/04/att-verizon-5g-delay/.
\14\ Linda Hardesty, AT&T, Verizon postpone C-Band rollouts until
air safety review, FierceWireless (Nov. 4, 2021), https://
www.fiercewireless.com/operators/at-t-verizon-
postpone-c-band-rollouts-until-air-safety-review#::text=-
The%20FAA%20and%20the%20Federal,
impact%20on%20aviation%20safety%20technologies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This first delay was followed by discussions with the government
officials in which AT&T and Verizon provided vast and unprecedented
access to their 5G network deployment designs, radiofrequency planning,
and equipment performance.\15\ On November 24, AT&T and Verizon
announced they would supplement the FCC's restrictions with a set of
voluntary precautionary measures that would last for six months, or
until July 5, 2022, unless credible evidence exists that real-world
interference would occur if the measures were relaxed.\16\ The
temporary measures took two forms: the wireless providers agreed to (1)
lower the power of C-Band transmissions across America including
nationwide limits on power projected to the sky (where altimeters are
in use), and (2) effectively curtail C-Band operations in broadly
defined areas near public airports and helipads. AT&T and Verizon
certified these commitments, making them enforceable by the FCC.\17\
The FCC recognized these new temporary measures as among ``the most
comprehensive efforts in the world to safeguard aviation
technologies.'' \18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Letter from Joan Marsh, Executive Vice President of Federal
Regulatory Relations, AT&T Services, Inc. & Kathleen M. Grillo, Senior
Vice President--Public Policy & Government Affairs, Verizon, to Jessica
Rosenworcel, Chairwoman, FCC, GN Docket No. 18-122, at 5 (filed Nov.
24, 2021).
\16\ Id. at 6.
\17\ Letter from Joan Marsh, Executive Vice President of Federal
Regulatory Relations, AT&T Services, Inc. & William H. Johnson, Senior
Vice President--Federal Regulatory & Legal Affairs, Verizon, to Marlene
H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, GN Docket No. 18-122, at 1 (filed Dec. 31,
2021) (``AT&T Verizon Dec. 31 Letter'').
\18\ See Matt Daneman, AT&T, Verizon Limit C-Band Deployments Near
Airports, Helipads Through July 6, at 2, Commc'ns Daily (Nov. 26, 2021)
(quoting FCC spokesperson).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On December 7, 2021, the FAA issued two Airworthiness Directives,
stating that ``radio altimeters cannot be relied upon to perform their
intended function if they experience interference from wireless
broadband operations in the 3.7-3.98 GHz frequency band.'' \19\ The
wireless industry's temporary measures were not addressed at all in the
directives. The Airworthiness Directives previewed restrictions that
would be imposed on pilots with the release of Notices to Air Missions
(NOTAMs) at a later date.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Airworthiness Directives; Transport and Commuter Category
Airplanes, 86 Fed. Reg. 69984 (Dec. 9, 2021); Airworthiness Directives;
Various Helicopters, 86 Fed. Reg. 69992 (Dec. 9, 2021).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On January 2, 2022, following more discussions with the White
House, the Department of Commerce, the FCC, the Department of
Transportation, and the FAA, AT&T and Verizon announced a further set
of additional voluntary precautionary measures for the same six month
period, until July 5, 2022, again in the spirit of cooperation and good
faith. The wireless providers adopted C-Band exclusion zones around
runways at certain airports that mirror those that are already in use
in France, one of the very few C-Band 5G nations with any airport
mitigations, with slight adaptation to reflect the modest technical
differences in how C-Band is being deployed in the two countries.\20\
And on January 3, 2022, AT&T and Verizon agreed to a second delay for
the C-Band 5G launch, from January 5 to January 19. President Biden
praised the agreement and noted, ``we're grateful to all parties for
their cooperation and good faith.'' \21\ Secretary Buttigieg and
Administrator Dickson thanked AT&T and Verizon for these voluntary
steps that ``will give us additional time and space to reduce the
impacts to commercial flights.'' \22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ AT&T Verizon Jan. 2 Letter.
\21\ President Biden Jan. 4 Statement.
\22\ Letter from Pete Buttigieg, Secretary, U.S. Department of
Transportation & Steve Dickson, Administrator, FAA, to John Stankey,
Chief Executive Officer, AT&T, Inc. & Hans Vestberg, Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer, Verizon Communications, Inc., at 1 (Jan. 3, 2022),
https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/2022-01/
USDOT%20Letter%20to%20ATT%20Verizon_
20220103.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. providers have agreed to airport exclusions zones like France,
large geographic protections for air traffic around airports, and a
nationwide limit on power levels above the horizon for six months. No
other country has such protections in place.
Beginning in early January 2022, the FAA issued nearly two thousand
NOTAMs, restricting certain operations requiring altimeter data in the
vicinity of airports and heliports.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ FAA, FNS NOTAM Search, https://notams.aim.faa.gov/notamSearch/
nsapp.html#/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2022).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On January 18, a day prior to the C-Band 5G launch, AT&T and
Verizon announced further voluntary temporary measures around
airports.\24\ Secretary Buttigieg noted, ``[w]e recognize the economic
importance of expanding 5G, and we appreciate the wireless companies
working with us to protect the flying public and the country's supply
chain.'' \25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ See Ian Duncan & Lori Aratani, Wireless carriers to limit 5G
near airports after airlines warn of major disruptions, Wash. Post
(Jan. 28, 2022) https://www.washingtonpost.com/transportation/2022/01/
18/airlines-disruptions-5g-verizon-att/; Letter from Airlines for
America, to Brian Deese, National Economic Council Director, Pete
Buttigieg, Secretary, U.S. Department of Transportation, Steve Dickson,
Administrator, FAA & Jessica Rosenworcel, Chairwoman, FCC, at 1 (Jan.
17, 2022), https://www.airlines.org/news/a4a-urges-immediate-action-to-
address-5g-interference/.
\25\ FAA, 5G and Aviation Safety, January 18, 2022 Statement from
U.S. Transportation Secretary Pete Buttigieg (Jan. 18, 2022), https://
www.faa.gov/5g.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Secretary Buttigieg and Administrator Dickson also referred to the
temporary measures as a better way forward, ``while permanent fixes are
rapidly put into place.'' \26\ These voluntary delays and roll-backs of
full-scale C-Band deployments have created economic burdens and
disrupted network deployments, but AT&T and Verizon committed to these
temporary measures in the public interest to give the FAA and aviation
industry additional time to evaluate altimeter performance with C-Band
5G. And these steps put us in the position we are in today: the FAA has
now cleared 20 altimeter models and approved 90% of the U.S. commercial
fleet for landing in low-visibility approaches in areas with C-Band
5G.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ Letter from Pete Buttigieg, Secretary, U.S. Department of
Transportation & Steve Dickson, Administrator, FAA to John Stankey,
Chief Executive Officer, AT&T, Inc. & Hans Vestberg, Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer, Verizon Communications, Inc., at 1 (Dec. 31, 2021),
https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/2021-12/12.31.2021%20%20-
DOT%20and%20FAA
%20Letter%20to%20ATT%20and%20Verizon%20.pdf.
\27\ FAA, 5G and Aviation Safety, https://www.faa.gov/5g.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With Sound Science and Good Engineering, the FCC Set Strong Rules to
Protect Altimeters
In the lead up to the 2020 C-Band Order, the FCC examined concerns
raised about C-Band 5G/altimeter co-existence, taking into account
comments by aviation interests, the nature of radio altimeters deployed
on aircraft, and new C-Band 5G deployments. The FCC found--based on the
record before it, global study of C-Band wireless dating back nearly
two decades, and interagency dialogue--that ``the technical rules on
power and emission limits we set for the [C-Band 5G] Service and the
spectral separation of 220 megahertz should offer all due protection to
[altimeter] services in the 4.2-4.4 GHz band.'' \28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ C-Band Order, 35 FCC Rcd at 2485 395.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These restrictions are rigorous and significant. The FCC adopted a
substantial protective barrier, or guard band, that separates 5G C-band
signals from aviation signals--a minimum of 220 megahertz from 3.98
GHz, the uppermost portion of C-Band 5G, to the 4.2-4.4 GHz altimeter
band and, for the 3.7-3.8 GHz spectrum that AT&T and Verizon just
launched, a separation of 400 megahertz. By way of reference, the
entire FM radio band spans 20 megahertz. The 220 megahertz separation
is more than twice the size of the separation requested by some
aviation stakeholders in the FCC record.\29\ And it is more than twice
the size of the guard band in Japan, where 5G networks operate up to
4.1 GHz and down to 4.5 GHz, just 100 megahertz from the 4.2-4.4 GHz
altimeter band, with no reports of interference to air traffic safety.
The FCC rightly concluded that its large guard band and its carefully
crafted technical rules on power and emission limits would fully
``protect aeronautical services in the 4.2-4.4 GHz band.'' \30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ Id. at 2484 391 (citing Comments of The Boeing Company
(Boeing Reply), GN Docket No. 18-122, at 5-6 (filed Dec. 11, 2018)).
\30\ Id. at 2485 395.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The FCC's technical rules mandate that wireless emissions beyond
the C-Band 5G frequency border are sixty million times lower than the
maximum power allowed for in-band C-Band 5G operations. And leading
equipment vendors have confirmed that out-of-band C-Band 5G
transmissions at the 4.2 GHz band, the edge of the radio altimeter
band, are one and one-half billion times lower than the maximum power
per megahertz allowed for C-Band operations.\31\ The C-Band rules and
systems are designed to be very good neighbors, greatly limiting the
amount of signals that reach spectrum users in adjacent bands, let
alone altimeter users operating hundreds of megahertz away.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ See AT&T Verizon Dec. 31 Letter at 3 (citing Letter from Mark
Racek, Sr. Director Spectrum Policy, Ericsson, to Marlene H. Dortch,
Secretary, FCC, GN Docket No. 18-122, at 1-2 (filed Sept. 13, 2021);
Letter from Jeffrey A. Marks, Vice President, Regulatory Affairs,
Nokia, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, GN Docket No. 18-122, at 1
(filed Sept. 21, 2021)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To rebut the FCC's findings, aviation interests primarily rely on a
single industry study,\32\ but that study applied flawed methodology
and implausible scenarios to claim interference. That study's flaws are
now well documented.\33\ And most notably, the study's assertions are
contradicted by real-world deployments of C-Band 5G in nations around
the world.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ See RTCA, Inc., Assessment of C-Band Mobile Telecommunications
Interference Impact on Low Range Radar Altimeter Options, RTCA Paper
No. 274-20/PMC-2073, at 21 Table 6-4, 67 Figure 10-16, and 87 (Oct. 7,
2020), https://www.rtca.org/wp-content/uploads/-2020/
10/SC-239-5G-Interference-Assessment-Report_274-20-PMC-
2073_accepted_changes.pdf.
\33\ See, e.g., Letter from Kara Graves, Assistant Vice President,
Regulatory Affairs, CTIA, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, GN
Docket No. 18-122, at 3 (filed Nov. 3, 2021) (``CTIA Nov. 3 Letter'');
Letter from Kara Graves, Assistant Vice President, Regulatory Affairs,
CTIA, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, GN Docket No. 18-122 (filed
Oct. 27, 2020); Letter from Kara Graves, Assistant Vice President,
Regulatory Affairs, CTIA, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, GN
Docket No. 18-122 (filed Sept. 3, 2021); see also, e.g., Letter from
Doug Hyslop, Vice President, Technology and Spectrum Planning, CTIA to
Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, GN Docket No. 18-122 (filed Aug. 26,
2020); Letter from Kara Graves, Assistant Vice President, Regulatory
Affairs, CTIA to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, GN Docket No. 18-
122 (filed Oct. 30, 2020); Letter from Kara Graves, Assistant Vice
President, Regulatory Affairs, CTIA to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary,
FCC, GN Docket No. 18-122 (filed Nov. 17, 2020); Letter from Scott K.
Bergmann, Senior Vice President, Regulatory Affairs, CTIA to Marlene H.
Dortch, Secretary, FCC, GN Docket No. 18-122 (filed Dec. 7, 2020);
Letter from Kara Graves, Assistant Vice President, Regulatory Affairs,
CTIA to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, GN Docket No. 18-122 (filed
Mar. 4, 2021). See Comments of CTIA, Docket Nos. FAA-2021-0953 & FAA-
2021-0954 (filed Jan. 24, 2022) (``CTIA FAA Comments'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Real-World Evidence from Nearly 40 Nations Confirms C-Band 5G and Air
Traffic Safety
As stakeholders examine the possibility of interference to
altimeters, it is important to account for the real-world experience of
wireless broadband networks operating in C-Band spectrum in 38
countries in Europe and Asia with no reported impact on radio
altimeters in the same 4.2-4.4 GHz band. The vast majority of these
countries have no altimeter-specific restrictions on C-Band
deployments. Many of these nations have C-Band 5G operations in the
same band as AT&T and Verizon's Phase 1 spectrum (3.7 to 3.8 GHz) and
with power limits that are the same or allow higher power than what the
FCC adopted, including Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Ireland, Romania, and Spain and, overlapping part of the band, Greece
and New Zealand.\34\ The flawed aviation study would predict rampant
interference to altimeters in these countries, but there has been none.
While some nations authorize C-Band 5G at lower power levels than the
U.S., those lower power levels would still cause widespread
interference, according to the industry study that aviation interests
rely on. That study invented a ``safe'' level of C-Band 5G dramatically
lower than any C-Band 5G rules permit in any country; as but one
example, the United Kingdom exceeds the aviation-purported ``safe''
level by 40,000x--with no reported incidents of interference to air
traffic safety.\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ See CTIA FAA Comments at 9-10. See also CTIA Nov. 3 Letter
(noting that at least two hundred thousand 5G base stations are already
operating today with technical rules and proximity to radio altimeter
operations that the aviation industry's modeling assumptions would
suggest should be seeing harmful interference, yet no known reports of
interference exist); Letter from Jennifer L. Oberhausen, Assistant Vice
President, Regulatory Affairs, CTIA, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary,
FCC, GN Docket No. 18-122, at 1 (filed Dec. 31, 2021).
\35\ See CTIA FAA Comments at 11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Every day U.S.-registered aircraft, carrying thousands of U.S.
citizens, land in these nations without incident. The FAA's SAIB
recognized that no interference has been documented to date due to
wireless broadband operations internationally.\36\ And the European
Union Aviation Safety Agency, the EU's authority for aviation safety,
reported in 2021 that ``[f]or the time being, EASA does not identify
any conditions that compromise safety and reports no occurrences of
interference from 5G base stations to aeronautical radio altimeters.''
\37\ These real-world deployments, subject to regulation equivalent to
or similar to the FCC C-Band Order's spectral separation and technical
limits, show that the U.S. framework for C-Band 5G ``protect[s]
aeronautical services in the 4.2-4.4 GHz band.'' \38\ If interference
were occurring, engineers would have seen it long before now across the
globe.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ See SAIB AIR-21-18 at 1.
\37\ European Commission Directorate-General for Communications
Networks, Content and Technology, Commission Activities related to
radio spectrum policy at 5 (June 16, 2021), https://rspg-spectrum.eu/
wp-content/uploads/-2021/06/RSPG21-018final_commission_activities.pdf.
\38\ C-Band Order, 35 FCC Rcd at 2485 395.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Next Steps: Charting a Course for Resolution
The steps AT&T and Verizon have taken in the last few months have
put the U.S. in the position we are in today: C-Band 5G deployments in
the 3.7-3.8 GHz band, to the benefit of U.S. consumers and industry,
with continued safe and secure air travel. The temporary measures have
given time for the FAA to clear altimeter models and approve aircraft
models without widespread, significant disruption to air travel. As
noted above, these temporary measures halt in July, and by then we will
be less than 18 months from the December 2023 deadline for incumbent
relocation that will pave the way for launch of all 3.7-3.98 GHz C-Band
5G operations.
The wireless industry is committed to working as a good partner to
resolve aviation concerns, and to do so promptly. These discussions
must be guided by sound science and good engineering, and informed by
real-world experience. Our track record shows we are committed to C-
Band 5G and air traffic safety. We urge government agencies to engage
collaboratively with industry, to be transparent in their analysis and
their actions, and to identify the information they are relying on in
their decisionmaking. With this framework, I am confident that we will
continue to have the safest air traffic in the world and robust, full-
scale C-Band 5G. I am hopeful that the positive collaboration in the
past few weeks provides a clear path to resolution in timely fashion--
well in advance of any deadlines--for the full-scale, nationwide launch
of C-Band 5G across the 3.7-3.98 GHz band.
Thank you again for this opportunity to testify, and I look forward
to your questions.

Mr. Larsen. Thank you very much for the testimony.
I now turn to Dennis Roberson, president and CEO of
Roberson and Associates, and I hope a proud Washington State
University graduate. Dr. Roberson, you are recognized.
Mr. Roberson. Absolutely. Thank you. Good afternoon,
Chairman DeFazio and Larsen, Ranking Members Graves and Graves,
and members of the Aviation Subcommittee. Thank you for the
opportunity to testify on this important topic. I am, as you
have heard, Dennis Roberson, president and CEO of Roberson and
Associates, the technology consulting firm serving both
Government and commercial customers.
My testimony represents my personal views and is not
provided on behalf of any other organization. As you know, on
January 19th, high-speed 5G cellular service was launched by
both AT&T and Verizon based on their spectrum auction wins last
year. The aviation community fought this rollout over the last
several months initially focusing on safety of life issues and
more recently massive disruptions in the airline flight
schedules.
This has been headline news with claims and counterclaims
between AT&T and Verizon and the aviation industry. The
cellular providers point to the nearly 40 nations who have
successfully deployed 5G in the so-called C-band. While the
aviation community countered and today included that many of
these countries have significant restrictions on the spectrum
use that did not exist in the United States.
All this has made for a very confusing and contentious
situation marked by lack of information and the inability of
the FCC and FAA to resolve the conflict in a timely manner.
That is the top level state of play, but is there really a
problem? And going forward, what should be done to resolve the
current concerns?
First, the unfortunate truth is that there is a problem
with the design of some of the aviation industries' older radar
altimeters. Now to get a little technical, the altimeters are
supposed to operate in their assigned spectrum bands between
4.2 and 4.4 gigahertz.
When these devices were originally designed, they had very
low-power satellite neighbors. Since the altimeters operate on
a radar principle looking for a signal reflected from the
ground, their receivers couldn't detect the satellite signals.
This led the altimeter designers to largely ignore their
assigned spectrum boundaries and as a result, these receivers
are sensitive to transmissions from far outside their assigned
band.
For decades, this was not an issue, but with new neighbors
moving in, these old altimeters now have a potential
interference problem. Adding a little more technical
information to the mix, the AT&T and Verizon 5G service
operates from 3.7 to 3.8 gigahertz or 400 megahertz away from
the altimeter band.
To put this into perspective, the whole FM radio band is
only 20 megahertz wide. Because of the vast separation between
the 5G cellular spectrum and the altimeter spectrum allocation,
the FCC determined that there shouldn't be an issue.
Unfortunately, this is not the case for old, technically wide-
open altimeters.
Though the altimeters were once stand-alone instruments,
today, as you have heard, they are highly integrated into the
aircraft's avionics. If, for instance, the altimeters say the
airplane is still in the air when it is actually landed, the
operation of the reverse thrusters and spoilers that rapidly
reduce the airplane's speed on the ground will be blocked. I am
told that on an icy runway, this failure could increase the
landing distance by as much as four times, which for short
runway airports, for example, Washington's Reagan National
Airport, could be an enormous problem.
So, where do we go from here? First, my understanding and
the good news is that most modern altimeters do not have a 5G
interference problem. The FAA is currently determining both the
robustness of various altimeter models and which altimeters are
installed on which aircrafts, certifying those aircrafts that
have altimeters that properly filter out 5G transmission.
Using this process, the FAA has cleared 20 altimeter models
and certified 90 percent of the commercial fleet. Those
aircraft that don't have appropriate altimeters should be
required to replace their altimeters or suffer a significant
reduction in the weather conditions in which they are allowed
to fly. Given this straightforward, but critical set of steps,
aircraft can be safely flown and landed in the presence of 5G
technology. And importantly, AT&T and Verizon can fully deploy
their high-performance 5G networks.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before the
committee this afternoon, and I, too, look forward to your
questions.
[Mr. Roberson's prepared statement follows:]

Prepared Statement of Dennis A. Roberson, President and Chief Executive
Officer, Roberson and Associates, LLC
Good morning Chairman Larsen, Ranking Member Graves, and Members of
the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee's Aviation
Subcommittee. By way of background, I am Dennis Roberson and I serve as
the President and CEO of Roberson and Associates, LLC, a technology and
management consulting firm serving government and commercial customers.
In addition, I am a Research Professor at Illinois Institute of
Technology and serve in advisory or board roles for several start-up
companies in the technology space. Prior to my current roles I served
as Executive Vice President and Chief Technology Officer of Motorola
and over the years have held executive positions at AT&T, Digital
Equipment Corporation (now part of HP), IBM and NCR. I also served as
the Chairman of the FCC's Technological Advisory Council for the past
eight years and serve on the Department of Commerce Spectrum Management
Advisory Committee. My technical focus and personal passion through
these roles has been to optimize the use of our nation's increasingly
valuable spectrum resources through both technology enhancements and
enhanced spectrum management policies and practices.
January 19th was the day that High Speed 5G Cellular service was
launched by both AT&T and Verizon based on their very expensive
Spectrum Auction wins at the FCC last year. The Aviation world
including the FAA, commercial airline and private aircraft communities,
airport authorities, and others have fought this roll-out for the last
several months initially focusing on safety of life issues and more
recently talking about massive disruptions in airline flight schedules.
This has all been headline news with claims and counterclaims between
the two major cellular providers operating in the contested spectrum
band and the aviation industry. For their part, the cellular providers
point to nearly 40 nations who have successfully deployed 5G in the so-
called C-Band spectrum while the aviation community counters with the
fact that these countries have significant restrictions on the use of
the band which until recently did not exist in the U.S. All this has
made for a very confusing and contentious situation created by the lack
of information and the failures of the FCC and FAA to resolve their
differences in a timely fashion while the cellular carriers have
delayed their roll-out and altered their plans on an almost weekly
basis. 19 January was the day when all the hoopla finally came to a
head when AT&T and Verizon began to deploy their high speed 5G service
minus any deployments within a few miles of a major U.S. airport.
That is the top-level state of play but is there really a problem
and going forward what should be done now to eliminate the current
concerns? First, the unfortunate truth is that there is a real problem,
but it is what can be described as an ``edge case'' problem, that is, a
problem that only occurs in unusual circumstances and for a very
limited number of aircraft. So, what is the problem? Fundamentally, the
problem is a design issue with the aviation industry's radar
altimeters. These are the devices that sense how high the aircraft is
above the ground and especially in bad weather when ground visibility
is limited and runway conditions are suboptimal, this is a crucial
component of an aircraft's ability to safely land. Now to get a little
technical. The altimeters are supposed to operate in their assigned
spectrum band between 4.2 and 4.4 GHz. Unfortunately, when these
devices were originally designed, they had very low power neighbors,
i.e., satellites beaming their information to the earth from very
distant orbits. Since the altimeters operate on a radar principle
looking for a signal reflected from the ground their receivers couldn't
detect the very low power neighboring satellite signals. This led the
early designers of the altimeters to decide they really could ignore
their assigned spectrum boundaries and as result they allow transmitted
energy far outside their band into the receiver. For decades this was
not an issue given their quiet neighborhood, but with new neighbors now
moving in (AT&T and Verizon), the spectral space that they were
allowing into the receiver is now a potential problem.
Adding a little more technical information to the mix, AT&T and
Verizon have now commenced operation in the spectrum range from 3.7 GHz
to 3.8 GHz, i.e., 400 MHz away from the altimeter band. To put this in
perspective, the whole FM radio band (all stations) is only 20 MHz
wide, so the spectral separation between the new 5G cellular band and
the altimeter band is very, very large. The FCC for its part when
granting the use of the band (which will ultimately be expanded to
cover 3.7 to 3.98 GHz) determined that there shouldn't be an issue
because of the vast separation between the 5G cellular use of the new
spectrum and the altimeter spectrum allocation. Unfortunately, this is
not the case for old, technically ``wide open'' altimeters. These radar
altimeters may send out a signal and be unable to discern the reflected
signal because of energy from the far away 5G towers entering the
receiver, causing the radar altimeter to either fail to function or
possibly provide a false reading.
To make matters worse, though the altimeters were once only a
standalone instrument that had an altitude indicator on the pilot's
panel, today the altimeter is highly integrated into the avionics for
modern aircraft. If for instance the altimeter says the aircraft is
still in the air when it has actually landed, it will cause the reverse
thrusters and spoilers that normally create a rapid reduction in the
airplane's speed on the ground to not operate. I am told that in icy
runway conditions the lack of reverse thrusters and spoilers could
increase the landing distance by as much as four times which for short
runway airports (e.g., Washington's Reagan National Airport or even
worse Chicago's Midway Airport) with the potential for poor landing and
runway conditions could be an enormous problem.
So how do we get out of this mess? First, most of the time the
situation is not nearly as bad as the dire challenges the worst-case
scenarios would suggest. Modern altimeters are well designed and do not
have the problem of looking far outside their assigned band. The
addition of a very low-cost component, historically a small piece of
ceramic, called a filter at the antenna input to the altimeter receiver
eliminates the issue of looking outside the altimeters assigned band.
Of course, retrofitting and certifying a new radar altimeter in an
aircraft is a non-trivial expense in both time and dollars. Happily,
most modern altimeters have filters and will not experience any 5G
interference problem. The FAA is currently determining both the
robustness of various altimeter models, having currently cleared some
20 altimeter models, and which altimeters are installed on various
aircraft, certifying those aircraft that have altimeters that properly
filter out 5G transmissions. Those aircraft that don't have appropriate
altimeters should be required to replace their altimeter or suffer a
significant reduction in the weather conditions in which they are
allowed to fly. Using this process, the FAA has reported that
approximately 90% of commercial aircraft have been certified for safe
operation in the presence of 5G transmissions.
Given this straightforward, but critical set of steps, the aviation
world can be returned to a safe environment in the presence of 5G
technology and AT&T and Verizon can fully deploy their new C-Band
systems including deployments around airports. As an important aside,
while all of this turmoil has been proceeding, it should be noted that
T-Mobile's deployment of high speed 5G is currently unimpeded by these
concerns since it operates in spectrum that is even further away from
the altimeter band at 2.5 GHz.
Hopefully this Testimony will help clarify the technical aspects of
this high-profile issue and the way forward. I look forward to hearing
the questions or comments that this testimony inspires.

Mr. Larsen. Thank you very much for your testimony. I
appreciate the technical descriptions in language we can
understand here on the committee. I appreciate that.
And with that, I will turn to the chair of the full
committee, Chair DeFazio, for 5 minutes.
Mr. DeFazio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will go back to a
question I put to the Administrator, which is, what happens at
the end of 6 months?
Right now, yes, we have cleared 90 percent of the planes,
but that is with exclusion zones and lower power in proximity
to the airports. In the testimony of CTIA, they say that they
will last for 6 months or until July 5th unless credible
evidence exists that real-world interference would occur.
Well, the British aviation CAA found that, in fact, there
is a viable interference threat to radio altimeters. France was
cited by CTIA as well. We are doing exactly like France. Well,
not exactly. They also have to deflect their antennas down and
they have exclusion zones. Czech Republic has exclusion zones.
They aren't doing those things for fun; they are doing those
things because they think there is a real and credible threat
to aviation.
So, then other places--well, the Canadians also are now
adopting exclusion zones around 26 airports where base towers
might be deployed. And then other nations, Japan, 5 percent of
the power here--no. 90 percent below here. Australia, 76 below
here.
We have the strongest signals and as initially deployed, no
protections for aviation or airports. And we are saying, well,
there are just a few old obsolete altimeters. Well, there is a
NOTAM out on the 787, I think that is the most modern airplane
in America's fleet, that their thrust reversers might not work
in presence of 5G.
And I don't think they went out and bought an old altimeter
for the 787. So, this is real. So, the question I would have to
the CTIA--I mean, I think that the companies have come around,
but I know you are running an organization, the associations
are generally run by the lowest common denominator member, and
I think both Verizon and AT&T have recognized the real problems
and we are trying to work through it, but I don't think that
that is reflected in your testimony.
So, What do you think is going to happen after 6 months,
Ms. Baker?
Ms. Baker. Well, thank you for your question, Mr. Chairman.
I would say that we are working cooperatively, as Administrator
Dickson said, and that we have made a great deal of progress,
and the cooperation continues. And so, it is my firm belief
that the aviation industry is going to get comfortable with the
idea that these guard bands that Dennis Roberson just mentioned
are so significant that there will not be interference in the
altimeter proceedings.
We feel confident that France is the outlier, and that most
countries have not required any air support-specific
protections. And the reason we keep mentioning France is
because that is what AT&T and Verizon adopted in this temporary
protections to give the FAA time to address the altimeters. And
as we can see, the FAA is rolling off of these altimeter
restrictions as quickly as they can.
Mr. DeFazio. But--excuse me. But France is permanent. I am
not aware that it goes away in 6 months. Czechoslovakia
exclusion zones are permanent; they don't go away in 6 months.
Canada, the exclusion zones are permanent; they don't go away
in 6 months. And we are talking about, in 6 months, we are not
going to have exclusion zones anymore, and we are going to be
just so much more comfortable than France, Czechoslovakia,
Great Britain, and Canada, that we are like, yeah, it is OK.
Because then as soon as I land, my God, I am going to be able
to stream 5G while I am still sitting on the airplane. Wow.
That is great. I would rather know that I am going to land
safely than being able to do that.
Ms. Baker. Mr. Chairman, with due respect, I think the
chart that you are working on doesn't fairly capture the most
recent conditions. 5G is deployed in France in the same band,
and the authorized power in France is higher than the FCC
rules. France is only one of three nations with airport-
specific specifications today. And we applied that protection
temporarily to help the FAA process.
Given our nationwide limits skyward and the airport
protections, the U.S. provides more protection today than
France does for aircrafts. Again, France is an outlier, and
there are at least----
Mr. DeFazio. And Canada----
Ms. Baker [continuing]. To have----
Mr. DeFazio. And Canada and Czechoslovakia and many other
nations that operate at a fraction of the power here in the
United States who haven't seen fit to have to have exclusion
zones because they are not worried about extraordinarily large
high signals, strong signals interfering.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time has expired.
Mr. Larsen. The Chair recognizes Representative Graves of
Louisiana.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Under the current 5G rollout plan, telecom providers are
going to be, I guess, using the space in the vicinity of
airports in a 3.7 to 3.8 band. They are going to temporarily
delay the 3.8 to 4.0 as a cushion in the interim period.
Mr. Roberson, I am curious, could you talk about whether
you believe that current 3.7 to 3.8 is going to cause
interference with radio altimeters? Do you think that the
cushion of 3.8 to 4.0 is sufficient at this time?
Mr. Roberson. Yes. As I testified, it is a very large
cushion. It is really an unprecedented amount of spectrum that
separates the 3.7 to 3.8 to the 4.2 to 4.4.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. And so, at this point, you don't
anticipate that there will be conflicts with radio altimeters
with that type of cushion in place?
Mr. Roberson. There should not be. It is possible to create
it. And as I testified, in early days, because there was no
strong signal anywhere in the vicinity, radar altimeters were
designed without any filtering at all. So, they saw anything in
a very, very large area. But with filters--and we should
identify that filters are little pieces of ceramic,
historically, that cost nickels and dimes. I have actually
personally made them in Motorola, as their executive vice
president/chief technology officer. So, it is a very small
thing.
But I do understand why, in the earlier timeframes, since
there was no interference outside the band, that the designers
chose to eliminate those because there was no reason for them.
But now there is, and now these altimeters do have a problem.
But those are old altimeters. My understanding is that new
altimeters do have the filtering, which is appropriate, and
therefore, don't have a problem.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Which is why when I spoke earlier
that I think that engagement with RTCA to make sure that
appropriate technological sort of protocols in manufacturing
moves in a direction to ensure consistency there.
Ms. Baker, thank you for being here today. I appreciate
your testimony. As we noted in opening statements, I think you
heard a lot of frustration across the panel with just how we
found ourselves in this situation. Certainly, 5G is not the
latest--or, excuse me, going to be the end all/be all in regard
to technology. We are certainly going to be moving, in fact,
already are moving in the direction of 6G and 7G.
Can you share a little bit about your lessons learned in
this process and how we prevent, moving forward, these types of
conflicts from happening again?
Ms. Baker. Well, thank you so much for your question. And I
think we share your frustration, because we followed the FCC
rules. The FCC came out with their rules in March of 2020. And,
how this didn't get resolved before--certainly before the
auction in December of 2020, I don't understand. I have worked
at NTIA. I know the Government's IRAC process, that is the
interagency coordinating process, should have driven a
resolution. I have seen that process work on really hairy
spectrum issues from broadcasters to DoD to FBI surveillance.
I wasn't there, so I can't speak to why it didn't work
here. But we need to get the agency input early, and let the
spectrum engineers do their job. Because this is a technical
engineer issue, and we have the best engineers, certainly the
best spectrum engineers in the world.
I think now that we have a permanent head of NTIA in Alan
Davidson and Jessica Rosenworcel as Chairman of the FCC, they
have an opportunity now to take a fresh look at what is working
and what is not, and we certainly hope that they will.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you. I appreciate it.
I want to make note there was an article in Politico today,
I think, indicating that my friends over here had a meeting
with the FCC. And I do just want to urge--I am very
disappointed FCC is not here today. I heard there was a
scheduling conflict, which I think, as important as this issue
is, that this should have been the priority as opposed to other
things. But I do want to make sure that we all acknowledge this
is a bipartisan issue; we should be working together on it.
And in addition to frustration with the FCC not being here,
I want to remind my friends next to me and down the aisle there
that we would be happy to join them in future meetings with the
FCC.
I yield back.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
I will recognize myself for 5 minutes.
Mr. Fanning, in my opening testimony, I talked about the
process moving forward, in part, the technical process moving
forward. We have a rollout that will continue in the 3.7 to
3.8. Then we have a rollout from 3.8 to 3.98. And then there is
the future of 5G, and then there is 6G, and there are options
in the future as well. And I said, well, I thought maybe we
could create an informal technical process. And maybe it is not
the RTCA process, but something that is more informal that can
begin to inform some of these technical issues before they get
formalized and then passed up to the process.
Have you all at AIA thought about this type of new process
or a different process so that we are helping to get ahead of
these issues in the future?
Mr. Fanning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We have. The
groundwork for that is starting, even as we speak really, in
the last month, the great work that is being done between the
aviation industry and the telecom industry. There is a lot of
sharing of data, a lot of coming together, a lot of
understanding of each other's sides, as you and Ranking Member
Graves talked about in your opening comments. And we need to
build on that, not just to answer Chairman DeFazio's question
about what happens at the 6-month point, what happens between
that point and when we solve and implement the issue that we
are faced with now, but that we continue going forward, so we
don't find ourselves in the place we are now, and we can avoid
what Dr. Roberson talked about, which is making sure that
everybody who is in spectrum is cognizant of how spectrum is
being used elsewhere and all new entrants are as well.
So, I think part of what we would suggest for a new process
going forward is that we expand the definition of
``stakeholder'' to be more exclusive. Other Government agencies
like the Department of Defense, industries that aren't just in
the band that is being discussed but are adjacent to it,
because we have been building out spectrum and utilizing
spectrum, increasing how we utilize spectrum over decades. And
so, it has become more complex in many ways.
What we saw here was, we are regulating spectrum in the
21st century using a 20th-century model. But I do think that
there are indicators that we are already doing this informally,
because a lot of important work is being shared.
Mr. Larsen. Yeah. Thank you. I will explore that later
after the hearing with you all. I need to move on to Captain
DePete.
And, Captain DePete, in your testimony, you discussed added
workload about 5G deployment that has been created for pilots
and a level of uncertainty. Can you expand a little bit on what
added workload, how that has been put on pilots as a result of
the 5G rollout?
Mr. DePete. Certainly. And thank you for the question, Mr.
Chairman. And also, Nick, I know you referred to this in terms
of the human factors that are involved with this. We operate
the safest air transportation system in the world here, and
that has been through collaboration. And I do find it somewhat
ironic, if I might just begin by saying that we have--and this
is not to be funny, but in the ``Cool Hand Luke'' movie--the
failure to communicate. These are communication companies that
we have been asking a long time to collaborate with that have
rejected those offers.
So, having said that, our pilots are really becoming quite
saturated by the number of NOTAMs that are outdated. A lot of
work goes into preparation for a flight. And I know
Representative Stauber has spoken on many occasions about the
conditions of the NOTAM system. And I know the work in this
committee has been extraordinary to try to push that along to
improve that process.
But you can imagine, in a busy cockpit, in a situation
where an airline may need to divert into an alternative
airport, the amount of work involved in that, especially since
the AMOCs could be changed regularly, right? They are specific
to runways, they are specific to airports. Now our crews also
have to know what particular equipment they have on their
airplanes, what the configuration is. And as Administrator
Dickson had pointed out earlier, that is very dependent on a
lot of different things, including how those systems are
connected to the other safety systems on the airplane.
So, yeah, I am not as sanguine about this at the moment as
I have heard some others. In fact, I am concerned very much.
And I think Chairman DeFazio, I think, articulated it very
well. What is going to happen in 6 months, right? We are going
to have to continue to work this.
Thankfully, we have on every airplane a minimum of two
well-trained, well-qualified, adequately rested pilots; the
most highly trained pilots in the world. But this is on their
shoulders. They have to sign for the airplane every day. I am
not sure the telecommunications CEOs have to sign and say, this
should not be a problem. That doesn't work in aviation. And all
the people on this committee know that, right? You have all
worked together. That is why we have achieved the greatest, I
mean, I think in the history of humankind, the safest form of
transportation. And when you consider the conveyance, it is
remarkable.
So, I know I ran out of time, but I think that answers your
question.
Mr. Larsen. That does answer my question, and----
Mr. DePete. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you. I will be able to maybe return to a
second round.
Mr. DePete. Sure.
Mr. Larsen. With that, I will recognize Representative
Balderson of Ohio for 5 minutes.
Mr. Balderson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Sorry about that. I
hit the button with my notebook.
Thank you all for being here, the witnesses being here for
our second panel today.
My first question is for Ms. Baker. CTIA has been deeply
involved in spectrum allocations for broadband services,
including many instances where spectrum was relocated from
Federal use or where specialized sharing and coexistence issues
have to be worked out between commercial users and Federal
institutions.
Can you discuss the FCC's role, as the expert agency in
radio interference matters, how Federal agencies typically
resolve such matters with commercial users through the NTIA,
and whether the FAA followed these processes in this case?
Ms. Baker. Well, thank you very much for the question. And
I can't speak to the specific whether the FAA followed this or
not, because I would not have been in the room. I will say,
typically, there is a Government agency called the IRAC at
NTIA. They are congressionally mandated to advocate for Federal
Government users.
As I think maybe you mentioned earlier, spectrum is at a
premium, and the using of spectrum efficiently is allowing us
to continue to lead the world in many, many of, you know,
automated transportation, wireless, broadcasting, you name it.
So, I do think the FCC and the NTIA coordinate on the
Federal and the commercial spectrum, and they have been able to
work out multiple really complex deals, such as moving
broadcasters, such as relocating DoD radars. I think I
mentioned AWS-3, which was a DOJ and FBI surveillance.
So, when they say that we haven't shared data, we are
competitively sensitive in where we roll out and what the
individual launching of cell sites are. So, this is not
something that the FCC considers. They consider back to the
guard bands. They consider whether the spectrum that they are
allocating, which typically a guard band is 5 megahertz, here
it is going to be 200, whether that causes interference.
So, there is a very complex process, and Congress has
weighed in multiple times on how to relocate and what gets paid
for, frankly. That is the Government's job.
Mr. Balderson. OK. Thank you very much for that answer.
My next question is for Mr. Roberson. Thank you, Mr.
Roberson, for being here. You were on the FCC's Technical
Advisory Board for the C-band order. Can you provide some
insight on how the FCC came to the conclusion that the
mitigation measures adopted in the order would be enough to
protect aviation safety?
Mr. Roberson. Yes. Unfortunately, a little correction. The
Technological Advisory Council specifically is precluded from
weighing in on any issue that is before the FCC. So, the
Technological Advisory Council serves as the headlights,
looking out into the future.
Now, having said that, the Technological Advisory Council,
along with many Government agencies, identified that mid-band
spectrum was crucial for 5G competitiveness, and, therefore, it
is something truly important for the United States for
competitiveness with the rest of the world to have capabilities
in that spectral area. And, in fact, Congress dictated that
that area of spectrum should be considered.
As to the specific details of what were done, that is
beyond my purview of the details. But I will note that how FCC
works on these kinds of issues is to secure information from
all available sources, and then based on what has been input
into the docket, for their engineers to carefully review that
material and then render a decision. So, that is how the
process is supposed to work.
Mr. Balderson. OK. My followup--and thank you for
clarifying that. My followup--and we are short on time, because
I always like to give the chairman back extra time--can you
expand on Ms. Baker's insight regarding the FCC's role as the
expert agency on radio interference matters?
Mr. Roberson. Not really. I thought she provided an
excellent answer. There is a process through the NTIA as the
agency that provides the information to the FCC's docket,
representing all groups, FAA, DoD, all the rest. And that
process, no involvement, but as has been reported, there was
apparently a breakdown in that link of getting information from
the FAA into the FCC docket.
Mr. Balderson. Thank you very much. I appreciate that.
Mr. Chairman, sorry. I almost tried.
Mr. Larsen. You were so, so close, Representative
Balderson.
I will say it is pretty clear there was a big breakdown in
NTIA delivering that information to the FCC.
All right. Next up is Representative Kahele of Hawaii.
Mr. Kahele. Aloha, Mr. Chairman. And thank you so much for
the second half of this hearing.
My question is for Captain DePete. Captain DePete, you know
as well as I do that safety is nonnegotiable. Pilots will fly
when it is safe to fly. And we must not and cannot put profits
above the safety of our pilots, our flightcrews in the back,
and our passengers. This process between the selling of the C-
band to wireless companies through the FAA airworthiness
directive has forced pilots, especially our regional pilots and
general aviation pilots, to perform extensive maneuvers to
ensure the safety of the flight due to the potential for radar
altimeter interference.
Captain DePete, you stated in your testimony that the FCC
proceeded with the spectrum action without acknowledging ALPA's
concerns. When did and how did ALPA first raise these concerns?
And as the arbiters of safety, how can we ensure in the future
that pilots' concerns, like ALPA's, are taken more seriously?
Mr. DePete. Representative Kahele, thanks a lot for that
question. Very important one obviously.
So, it just so happens I have a document here that is six
pages of single-spaced. For us it began, actually, prior to
2018. But in 2018, we made an official request to the FCC
expressing our concern about this. And then I would gladly
provide this into the record for the committee to just see what
ALPA had done since that time.
And we have pretty much tried to go everywhere we could go
to--including FAA and other--with DOT, everybody, to bring this
to everyone's attention. And it was ignored. It was ignored by
the FCC, and it was also ignored by the telecom industry. And I
think they need to understand too, Representative Kahele, how
we created this safe system that is not a forensic model
anymore. It is a risk-predictive model where it is 1 billion to
the chance of something going wrong, and that is why it is such
an amazingly safe system. And our pilots planned and took a
role in it. Our pilots are the essential workers, right? They
are frontline workers who took us through COVID. And now we are
looking at these kinds of human factors concerns which really
were unnecessary. It is an introduction of risk that was
completely unnecessary.
So, we are doing all we can. We are not going to let work
let up. I mean, thankfully, Administrator Dickson has been
highly accessible. I speak to him probably every other day. He
has been holding briefings regularly to inform us all, so that
has been good.
And then on our aircraft itself, it is always a challenge
too, as you know, to be able to discern how you are having an
interruption, right? We don't have a 5G light on the cab. Now,
if it is an inoperative radio altimeter, obviously we could
spot that quickly. However, if it is false or erroneous
information, that is where the problem comes.
But what I can say is this: By representing 62,000 pilots
who are doing an incredible job handling this situation, we are
the last arbiters of safety, and the airplane never leaves the
gate unless it is safe to do so. If they don't continue to
share the information, the airplanes won't fly. They will make
a decision. No airplane will ever leave the gate unless the
pilots understand it to be safe because they are the ones that
sign for the aircraft. I hope I answered some of those
questions.
Mr. Kahele. Yeah, you bet. And just I will use the
remaining 1\1/2\ minutes for a followup.
Mr. DePete. Sure.
Mr. Kahele. I know ALPA probably has and is having to
track--this is a lot of information--a spreadsheet with
aircraft----
Mr. DePete. Uh-huh.
Mr. Kahele [continuing]. Height, equipment, AMOCs,
expiration dates. I talked earlier to Administrator Dickson
about how the State's flagship carrier Hawaiian Airlines has
AMOCs for all their airfields that they travel to, but they are
going to expire in 25 days, and why this AMOC exemption is
really important. Because if we don't have this, then pilots
are forced into this bracket where, if the weather was zero-
zero at a destination, and they can't get into that airfield,
they are going to have to divert to their destination
ultimately. And if they can't get in, everyone else can't get
in either. So, now you have 36 planes lined up at a destination
alternate, you have fuel issues, you are number 27 in line. Can
you speak to that from our pilots in the flight deck that have
to deal with that?
Mr. DePete. Absolutely. As an instructor pilot myself too,
I have seen the workload rise in a cockpit pretty dramatically
at times, right, when we are handling a situation. But in a
divert situation in particular, right, you know as well as I do
how busy it can get. But imagine now to have to consider all
these other possibilities, knowing the configuration of the
aircraft, ensuring that you have the data so the dispatch of
our company's--the company's dispatch offices are going to be
really, really tasked in ensuring that they are feeding us
really good information. If we make the--if it is not accurate,
up-to-date information, obviously it could lead us down a
rabbit hole we don't ever want to go in.
So, it is challenging, and it is really falling on the
shoulders of our pilots. But, thankfully, we are the most well-
trained pilots in the world.
Mr. Kahele. Thank you, Captain DePete. And mahalo.
Mr. Chair, I yield back.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you. The Chair recognizes Representative
Fitzpatrick of Pennsylvania for 5 minutes.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Captain DePete, good to see you, sir. Two very brief
questions, revisiting the altimeter issue. Radio altimeters are
one of the most important instrument a pilot has. Any
interference, obviously, is unacceptable. Two questions. Could
you tell us what warning signs or ways to tell if a radio
altimeter is experiencing interference while in flight? And
second, regarding your opening statement about the anomalies,
could you explain these instances and describe how common
altimeter irregularities are in general?
Mr. DePete. Representative Fitzpatrick, great to see you
again. Thank you for those two questions.
As I indicated it from Representative Kahele, it is very
difficult to tell, right? If it is an inoperative radio
altimeter, we have that occasionally happen, although they are
hugely reliable, we have been doing fine landing in airports
all over the world, right, without this problem. 5G introduced
a new risk. But if it is inoperative, we can probably put that
together pretty accurately. However, if it is erroneous
information, that is where the key is, in that you don't know
it is erroneous. You are going to rely on a lot of [inaudible]
with these integrated systems on more modern airplanes.
We are talking about connections to terrain awareness,
EGPWS, throttles, our throttles, right? An uncommanded
reduction in our throttles to idle while we are on close final
in a wide-bodied airplane can create a rapid sink rate. So, our
pilots are going to really Johnny-on-the-spot on this and
really be ready to react and, thankfully, they are well-trained
and they can do that. But it is unfortunate we put them in that
situation.
So, did that answer that part of that question? What was
the second part, again, I am sorry?
Mr. Fitzpatrick. Just explaining, regarding your opening
statement----
Mr. DePete. Yeah.
Mr. Fitzpatrick [continuing]. Some of the instances and
describe how common altimeter irregularities are in general.
Mr. DePete. Yeah. No, they are very reliable systems, and
we have more than one, so, it has been really good. And it
depends, like, in terms of the particular configuration on the
airplane and the way they are wired into the systems as to how
those anomalies would be shown to the flightcrews. So, that is
where the complexities really begin. And throw on top of that
the issues that we talked about before with the number of
NOTAMs that have been put into the system now makes for a very
challenging environment.
So, along with flying the airplane, we are having to manage
this 5G situation, which from a human-factor standpoint, not
the best.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. Thank you, Captain. Good to see you.
Mr. DePete. Thank you. You too.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. I yield the balance of my time to
Representative Graves of Louisiana.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you, Mr. Fitzpatrick, I
appreciate that.
I want to ask, following up, Ms. Baker, a quick yes or no
question. Do the telecoms have any type of shield from
liability? Are you held harmless if there is an interference
issue that leads to an accident?
Ms. Baker. I don't know. I would say we take our--we take
our mission so seriously. We also have 911 delivery. And I
would have to defer to lawyers as to any sort of safe harbor,
but I would say no harmful interference is, in fact, what we do
for a living and take it very seriously.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you.
Mr. Calio, the AMOC process, the alternatives that we
discussed earlier, do you have concerns about the ability for
the airlines to safely and, I guess, efficiently operate under
this process?
Mr. Calio. Yes, we do. Right now, it is, like I said during
my oral testimony, it is a constant ebb and flow. And Joe just
referenced the pilots. It is ever-changing.
And I would like to clarify one thing. Ninety percent of
aircraft have been cleared, but they haven't been cleared to
land everywhere. That has a particular impact on the regional
carriers, which I think needs to be looked at. But this
constant churn of AMOCs once every month is something we can't
continue to live by because we can't do a 30-day rolling
operational planning process.
So, we are working together very carefully right now. Our
engineers are talking to the engineers from the telecom camp,
from the FAA and the manufacturer. So, that is producing good
results for right now. We need to come up with a better process
long term, because this can't be kept in place where every 30
days it changes where you can fly, when you can fly, how you
can fly, which runway you can fly into.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Yeah, I agree. Thank you very
much.
Ms. Baker, coming back to you, look, the telecom industry,
the FCC deals with deconfliction across technology all the over
the place. This one dealing with aviation shouldn't be the
first time we tread into this category. Is there a process that
other administrations have used to help with deconfliction that
result in a better outcome?
Ms. Baker. This was option No. 107, and I have never seen
anything like this before. So, I would say this is an anomaly.
And, hopefully, we have got all the processes in place now to
make sure that we are working with the aviation industry as
cooperatively as possible. But, yes, the FCC takes comments,
and they have spectrum experts that handle these issues all the
time.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
The Chair recognizes Representative Johnson of Texas for 5
minutes.
Ms. Johnson of Texas. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to ask Ms. Black----
Mr. Larsen. Representative Johnson, do you have a radio or
something on in your office? Otherwise, if everyone can please
mute.
Ms. Johnson of Texas. Hold on. I am sorry. That is a
meeting with me in the White House.
Mr. Larsen. Well, you will need to mute whatever meeting is
taking place in order to ask questions.
Ms. Johnson of Texas. I am getting rid of it. Thank you. I
am sorry. I am multitasking.
But, Ms. Black, both DFW and Love Field Airport have
numerous regional flights from Dallas to smaller cities
throughout the southwest region in the State of Texas. And I am
concerned about 5G technology's possible effect on small groups
and smaller airports. Would you be able to elaborate on that
concern?
Ms. Black. Yes. And thank you very much for that question,
Congresswoman. And that is exactly the point. You are right to
be concerned about that. I want to say again, these are
aircraft that were perfectly fine and certificated
appropriately, but they now need AMOCs to operate in an
environment that has been compromised by the 5G signal.
About 14 percent of the regional fleet have no AMOC at all
and no AMOC pact pending. Another 40 percent of the fleet, as
Nick said just before, has a very limited AMOC, excludes dozens
of airports. So, altogether, one or both of these fleet types
are still restricted for 70 airports in weather.
So, if you are in a hub, you might get restricted right
there, but if you are traveling through that hub, then you
don't get to your spokes. And in some cases, you might not have
an AMOC at the hub or the spokes. These are aircraft--they are
the only source of air service to smaller communities. With
half of them sat down in weather at key airports, that is a big
problem for smaller communities.
Ms. Johnson of Texas. Thank you very much.
Now, Mr. Calio, I understand that 5G technology has been
successfully implemented throughout Europe and in many Asian
nations. What do you think is the difference here in the United
States that makes us believe that we have got to do so much to
mitigate this issue for how long?
Mr. Calio. Thank you, Congresswoman. In our view, which is
not Ms. Baker's view, there is a difference between what has
been implemented overseas as to what is being implemented here.
I think it points out, in fact, the divergence of facts, if you
listen to the testimony, suggest again we need a better, more
transparent, long-term process. These all should have been
worked out ahead of time. We should not be arguing about this
right now.
And this is not really an argument between us and the
telecom. We take a very different view. We rely on the FAA as
our safety regulator. They have engineers. They believe that
there was a possibility of interference.
So, I would say, you have got different testimony on what
happens overseas and what happens here. What we need to be
looking for long term is an answer to not only why it happened,
but more importantly, how we do not let it happen again and how
we will resolve things going forward.
Ms. Johnson of Texas. Thank you very much.
Now, perhaps both of you can comment on this. The altimeter
plays an important role in airline flight. What would be the
cost to replace the old altimeters on an average per plane?
Mr. Calio. I will be happy to start. I do not know the
answer to that at this point. What I do know, and Mr. Fanning
can probably jump in here if you would like, but it is a very
long-term process. Even to modify a current altimeter has to go
through a certification process.
Again, the difference in culture between the FAA and the
FCC, for example, is always--our imperative is safety. You
cannot compromise safety under any circumstance. So, we are
talking--that is why I said earlier in my oral testimony, this
is a matter of years, not days and not weeks. Is it something
that is being looked at? Yes. As the Administrator pointed out,
yes, it is, but it is just getting underway, and it is going to
take time.
Ms. Johnson of Texas. Thank you very much.
Ms. Black, did you have--or anyone else like to comment on
that?
Ms. Black. I would just add that this issue is going to be
with us for years and years. So, we have already talked about
rolling out 6G, 7G. So, will we need to go out and buy new
altimeters every time we roll out at 6G or 7G?
Now, I don't have the exact cost either. I don't think they
are nickels or dimes. But I do know that airlines spend
millions of dollars investing in new safety tools, and so did
airports, as Chairman DeFazio said earlier in the first panel,
spent billions to become all-weather airports. So, we just want
to make sure that all of these airports can use that
technology.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you very much.
Ms. Baker. If I may, I would just like to----
Mr. Larsen. I am sorry. No. I am sorry. The gentlewoman's
time has expired.
And we will now go to Mr. Van Drew, Representative Van Drew
from New Jersey for 5 minutes.
Dr. Van Drew. Thank you, Chairman.
I want to thank everybody for being here today and their
wonderful testimony. This is important stuff. Your
organizations actually represent essentially the entire
aviation and telecommunications industries, and it is a massive
part of the United States economy.
Earlier today, I asked the FAA Administrator, Mr. Dickson,
about how new entrants to the airspace, like drones, will
complicate spectrum management into the future. I do not
believe the FAA is currently equipped for the future of
aviation spectrum management.
The current 5G crisis was foreseeable. Individuals within
the FAA Spectrum Engineering Office have been sounding the
alarm for nearly a year. The spectrum office did not have the
authority to make this issue a priority until it was too late.
I believe that we must empower the Spectrum Engineering
Office within the FAA. It must be provided greater procedural
authority and voice so that our country is able to handle the
spectrum challenges into the future.
So, I direct my question to Eric Fanning, president and CEO
of Aerospace Industries Association, and Meredith Attwell
Baker, president and CEO of CTIA. Do you think the current
situation shows us that the FAA is not properly equipped to
meet the spectrum challenge of the future, such as drone
integration? Further, do you believe that the FAA Spectrum
Engineering Office must be empowered with authority to better
manage spectrum resources, get spectrum to market faster,
ensure capability and compatibility, and prevent conflicts like
the ones we are experiencing right now?
And if any other witnesses concur with this sentiment, feel
free to make that known. Thank you. I will wait for your
answer.
Mr. Fanning. Congressman, thank you. I will start and say
that I think it is an issue of empowering for the FAA. And what
I was saying earlier that all stakeholders, we need to think of
this more broadly as we move forward as we use spectrum, its
limited bandwidth, as we use it for more complex technology,
stronger signals, we need to have all the stakeholders that are
in spectrum empowered to be a part of the conversation. Some
formalized new process that brings all of us together rather
than just thinking of spectrum in stovepiped bands, to think
about it in its entirety. Because, clearly, that is part of
what the issue was here.
This was an FCC-controlled process, and the FAA raised
concerns but wasn't empowered to do anything about it other
than raise it. They have great engineers. They cooperate with
industry which has world-class engineers. And so, I think we
have to look across all the stakeholders in spectrum, certainly
the FAA when it comes to aviation safety, and make sure that
they are a part of the process in anything that we do as we
expand what we use spectrum for going forward.
Dr. Van Drew. Thank you.
Ms. Baker. So, thank you so much for the question. And I
would say the FAA is the safety regulator, and FCC and NTIA are
the spectrum regulators. I fully support FAA having more
engineering resources. I think many of the agencies that use
spectrum could use more engineering resources, whether it is
the Department of Energy, who regulates nuclear, or the
Department of the Interior, who use spectrum to measure the
height of rivers. I think everybody could use more spectrum
knowledge now that we are using spectrum for so many different
things.
I think that we need to take another look at the consultive
process, because this is an NTIA issue that they should be able
to raise the FAA's issues with the FCC and advocate for the
FCC. We can't have everyone have their own special regulator of
spectrum. We need to speak with one voice.
And so, I fully support the concept. I just want to be
clear that the FCC and NTIA are the spectrum regulators who
need to be fully informed, and agencies like the FCC--the FAA,
excuse me, really do need to be part of this process and----
Dr. Van Drew. Absolutely. I agree with you. And I think you
hit it on the head. And we need the leadership. So, as all
those voices come together, you also need the leadership so we
are on the same page and we have the regulation that we need. I
think we would do so much better. You can't have people in
different spots doing different things not knowing, which is
kind of what happened here, what the other fellow was doing.
So, I think you really made a good point, and I agree with you
on that.
And I yield back.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
The Chair recognizes Representative Payne of New Jersey for
5 minutes.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let's see. I understand that aerospace companies are
responding to 5G deployment concerns by utilizing filters on
existing equipment as stopgap measures to compensate for signal
interference. This would not have been necessary if there was
proper communication across the Federal Government regarding
the potential issues with 5G signals and technical concerns
reached the appropriate parties. Inevitably, there will be a
new technology to replace 5G.
Mr. Fanning, how would proper communication of technical
concerns make future rollouts of new technologies less chaotic?
Mr. Fanning. Well, first and foremost, which I think all of
the panelists agree with, is that the process starts earlier.
So, there is something that we need to amend or modify to the
process to make sure these concerns are surfaced earlier.
As was stated at the beginning of this hearing by the chair
and the ranking member, there are different cultures, different
goals, different agendas on these industries. And as a country,
we need them both to succeed. And so, making sure that dialogue
starts earlier and perhaps never stops, because we know there
are going to be future auctions, future technologies introduced
into spectrum, to make sure that all of the relevant players,
the stakeholders, and those who are affected by it are at the
table and can voice their concerns and have them acted upon
earlier. Because we certainly have been--the airlines, the
pilots, the manufacturers--have been talking about this for a
very long time.
So, we need to make sure that there is not just dialogue
but that there is a process in place to act on those concerns
from an earlier point. Because we do have amazing engineers in
all of our companies, but to reach the certification standards,
the safety standards that aviation is held to for justifiable
and important reasons, takes a lot of time. It is a very high
bar to prove something won't happen, as Congressman Graves
said, than to try and prove that it will happen.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, sir.
I am glad we are having this hearing, and all are coming to
the same conclusions, and everybody is hearing the same
information from each other across the whole gamut.
Ms. Baker, I am grateful that telecommunications companies
and the Biden administration were able to reach a deal to delay
5G deployment near airports, including Newark Liberty
International Airport. However, these exclusion zones will
expire, and 5G service will be fully deployed. How will
telecommunications companies work with the Biden administration
to ensure that full deployment of 5G will not cause any
additional safety concerns?
Ms. Baker. Well, thank you so much for your question. The
process now, everyone is at the table. We are working with the
FAA to give them the information they need. They asked for it
in November, we got it to them in December. We are every day
making progress. I feel confident we will continue to make this
progress.
So, in July, when the temporary restrictions, if they don't
go way before--because I am hopeful that the FAA will
understand that they are--and find and feel comfortable 100
percent that there is not interference here, that there are
plenty of countries around the world, such as Denmark to Spain
to Ireland, who are using the same spectrum with the same power
levels, and there is no interference.
So, I am hopeful the FAA will be comfortable enough so when
we reach--they roll off these temporary restrictions, and then
when we roll out in phase 2, which is December of 2023, we will
already have the process in place to make everyone comfortable
that there is no interference here.
Mr. Payne. OK. Well, thank you.
And, with that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
I now recognize Representative Nehls for 5 minutes.
Mr. Nehls. Thank you, Chairman Larsen and Ranking Member
Graves. And thank you for having this hearing. I am truly glad
that Administrator Dickson testified, but I am truly
disappointed the FCC refused to be here today.
Both industries represented here today and their customers,
the American people, have been failed by how the Government
handled the spectrum auction and the concerns with altimeters.
Just yesterday, on the Highways and Transit Subcommittee
autonomous vehicle hearing, we heard about the FCC was looking
into C-band for AVs in the nineties. That was 30 years ago, and
we still don't have AVs on the road. It is mind-boggling that
they had the foresight for that but auctioned off C-band for 5G
without fully examining how it would impact the companies
involved.
I definitely would have liked an explanation from the FCC
so we could prevent this from happening again. And I am truly
disappointed the Chairwoman refused to testify here.
I do thank our industry witnesses for being here. And my
first question is for good Captain DePete. When operating an
aircraft, how do pilots know if there is an interference
problem with a radar altimeter in their aircraft?
Mr. DePete. All right. Thank you for that question,
Representative Nehls. And in regards to your FCC complaint, you
are getting the same silent treatment, the committee is getting
the same silent treatment that we have gotten over the years.
So, I certainly can commiserate with you on that.
In terms of trying to see and understand what is going on
in an airplane, in the old airplane styles where we had
federated systems, meaning that all the instruments were not
digital and they were all spread out, we can kind of do checks
and balances, see if one conformed with the other and make a
decision on that and begin to go down a decision tree. In these
new modern airplanes where the systems are integrated, which
takes a great deal of understanding to understand how they are
integrated because they are all different, it is a little
difficult to discern sometimes what is actually happening in
the airplane when there is a malfunction.
If it is just a malfunction, if it is broke, if the system
just stopped working, there are warnings that will be alerted
to the crew. However, if it is false information, that is the
tricky one, right? And how it affects other systems. We might
see that first manifested in itself with some unusual throttle
activity. We might see it--unfortunately, you would think
terrain avoidance would be pretty important. Imagine if we
didn't get the warnings that we were approaching terrain that
we should, right? Or we got them when we shouldn't, and that
creates another problem as well.
So, that is a really outstanding question. I think that is
the one I get the most of, and it is challenging.
Mr. Nehls. Thank you, Captain.
And I have a couple of questions for Ms. Baker. Given that
5G is already being delivered to the U.S. public using other
spectrum bands, what is the importance of rapidly launching C-
band spectrum for 5G?
Ms. Baker. Thank you so much. I am glad you asked that
question. It is a really important one. 5G is--C-band is the
background of 5G across the country. It is because it has
unique characteristics, it goes very far, it carries a lot of
data. And for this, it really will bring us--it is going to
change. I think it is the most transformative technology that
we have seen in decades. And it is going to happen to our
economy, our education, our health, even our transportation.
I mentioned Accenture put out a report last week that said
if we deploy 5G, we will be 20 percent on our way to achieving
the administration's climate goals. So, it is really important
not to delay for full power. If we do, we are just going to
harm America and your constituents.
Mr. Nehls. Thank you.
And my last question, a little lengthy here, but the
volunteer precautionary measures agreed to by AT&T and Verizon
will last for roughly 6 months from launch. Yet both have
emphasized they anticipate efforts to reduce or eliminate those
precautionary measures even before that 6-month period ends.
Why is allowing full utilization of the C-band spectrum for 5G,
i.e., used without the precautionary measures under the FCC's
originally adopted technical rules, so time-critical? Do you
understand that?
Ms. Baker. I did. And thank you for that question, too. I
think it is important to take a look at the temporary
restrictions. Let's take the 2 miles, 2 miles within an
airport. If you are in Rayburn--which I can't tell if you are--
if you are in Rayburn and you go to National Airport, that is
approximately 2 miles. If you are in Boston Logan and you go to
Boston Common, that is 2 miles. So, that exclusion area is
going to put large swaths of metropolitan areas and, frankly, a
lot of underserved areas not being able to have 5G and just
going to enhance the digital divide and leave people behind in
a way that we just don't want to do.
Mr. Larsen. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Nehls. Thank you both.
Mr. Larsen. I will turn to--yeah, thank you--Representative
Brownley of California for 5 minutes.
Ms. Brownley, no?
OK. Representative--OK. Congresswoman Holmes Norton for 5
minutes.
Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Now, my first question is for Mr. Viola, president of the
Helicopter Association. I represent the Nation's Capital and,
as you know, the President and Congress are located here. In
your testimony, you noted increased risks of 5G interference to
helicopters, given that helicopter operations generally take
place at much lower altitudes than airline flights and could
conduct their entire flight within zones of 5G interference.
The development of new radio altimeters with filters that
can withstand 5G interference is, therefore, critical to
helicopter and rotorcraft safety. But the cost for operators to
purchase and install these new altimeters is of significant
concern. Could you estimate the cost to helicopter operators to
upgrade to newer, more resilient radio altimeters, and how do
helicopter operators plan to cover this cost?
Mr. Viola. So, thank you very much, Congresswoman Holmes
Norton. I appreciate that question.
Helicopters are just so much different from what we have
been hearing today, as far as when the radar altimeter actually
kicks in. You heard a lot about the 121 in airlines where most
of their flight will be without that radar altimeter because it
actually turns off once you get so high above the terrain.
The helicopters use a radar altimeter a lot of times for--
where it is actually known about is because of reduced
visibility. So, when we have good visibility, the radar
altimeter is a safety aspect that gives us additional, not only
our eyes telling us how far we are off the ground, because
normally--especially if you are talking about coming in to get
the President or yourself or someone flying around the DC area,
you are actually deconflicting with the airliners that are over
the top of you, you are coming up the river. So, over the
water, that is where the pilot will glance over to make sure
that he has maintaining the proper altitude above the ground.
So, the importance of that and being able to not be
affected by 5G in the filtering, you asked about the cost, I
don't actually have the cost for those. And, of course, a lot
of those aircraft are going to be on the military side, too.
And I haven't been read into how much work they have been doing
with the military aircraft to try to upgrade their radar
altimeters. A lot of this----
Ms. Norton. Could the cost impact the timeline for
upgrading rotorcraft fleets?
Mr. Viola. Well, what our problem right now with the
rotorcraft fleet is that the AD, the airworthiness directive,
and the NOTAMs--we are still having conversations with the FAA
to determine what that actually means for the vertical flight
community. Because the AD, the airworthiness directive,
actually says that the radar altimeter is unairworthy. And then
the NOTAM there supposedly says those are the areas where it
may be unairworthy.
And so, we have no AMOCs yet for the rotorcraft or the
vertical flight community. And we are working very closely with
the FAA to get there. And so, we are actually held back by
regulations. And a lot of times you will hear me talk about
regulations shouldn't apply to just helicopters, it should be a
mission set. And so, right now, the FAA has told us
helicopters--and that is why we specifically went in and we
have made sure we got an exemption for the air ambulance
missions because we want to make sure they can deploy.
So, what they did for the air ambulance mission is the FAA
says, OK, you can fly without the radar altimeter, even though
it is required by rule, if you do additional training for all
your pilots and you have a movable search light. So, it is
things like that that they are trying to come up with, that
equivalent level of safety. And that is why, until we get
AMOCs, we really can't even get a cost estimate.
Ms. Norton. Mr. Fanning, I would like to ask you about the
logistics of upgrading radio altimeters for the U.S. air flight
fleet. What steps are involved in that process? How long would
it take to upgrade the altimeters for the entire fleet, and how
much would that cost? And who currently bears the burden of
that cost? Mr. Fanning.
Mr. Fanning. Thanks for that question. There is a lot in
there. The first thing we need to know is the operating
environment that we will find ourselves in. So, what will be
the standards based on that operating environment. So, what is
the worst-case scenario for interference when 5G is fully
rolled out. Then, as Administrator Dickson said earlier, we
have to set the standards to that, and that could take easily
into 2023 for the manufacturers to start designing, building
for the certification process. So, there is testing
certification. Once the FAA certifies something, then the
manufacturers can build it at scale.
Rolling it out to the whole fleet is another timeline
altogether, because, also as Administrator Dickson said, these
airplanes are designed to fly people for 35, 40 years. And so,
it can take a long time to rotate a next generation of
technology unless you are doing it inside of the lifespan of
the aircraft.
So, we are talking about a lengthy process to get next-
generation new radio altimeters into the entire fleet. And that
creates a lot of variables with the cost for what that could
be. We just don't have an answer for that right now. And who
pays for it is another question also. Historically, when a part
of spectrum is auctioned off, there are proceeds set aside to
mitigate the impact of those people inside that bandwidth, but
it hasn't taken into account adjacent bandwidth. So, it is a--
--
Mr. Larsen. Thank you. You have to wrap up your answer. It
is a great question, but we need to move on the timeframe of
the committee. But we would appreciate a followup written
answer to that.
The Chair recognizes Representative Perry of Pennsylvania
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Roberson, in your testimony you state, quote, ``All
this made for a very confusing and contentious situation
created by the lack of information and the failures of the FCC
and FAA to resolve their differences in a timely fashion while
the cellular carriers have delayed their rollout and altered
their plans on an almost weekly basis,'' unquote.
I think we can all agree that this is confusing and
contentious. The situation should have been and could have been
avoided had the administration had the foresight to bring folks
together and figure this out prior to the deadline.
Unfortunately, Secretary Buttigieg was asleep at the wheel with
yet another crisis under his watch. And as you pointed out,
quote, ``there is a real problem, but it is what can best can
be described as an `edge case' problem, that is, a problem that
only occurs in unusual circumstances and for a very limited
number of aircraft,'' unquote.
So, if I can ask you this: What do you think prevented the
FAA, the FCC, and both industries from coming together and
addressing these edge cases before it became a crisis.
Mr. Roberson. I think a big part of it has been discussed
already, and that is the way in which the process works. The
FCC makes their decisions. They are the authorized body to make
decisions on spectrum. And they make those decisions
exclusively on the basis of the information that is provided to
them in their docket.
In this case, the information that the FAA had and the
concerns weren't communicated through the NTIA to the FCC. So,
they didn't have that information to act upon. So, that is a
process miss that exists.
In terms of other inputs--and there were a variety of those
who communicated that they did provide information to the
docket. The FCC is always looking for technical information
that they can act upon. And so, while there were considerable
worries that were expressed about radar altimeters and
operation in general, those weren't quantified in a way that
the FCC could act upon that. So, this is a process that needs
to be improved.
If I might, there is a fundamental one, too, that I
suggested but didn't fully address, and that is that FCC itself
doesn't regulate receivers. It regulates transmitters. So, as I
described, for the altimeter designers, they felt free to
design an altimeter that looked well outside their authorized
band. And there is no prohibition, legal prohibition for them
to not do that. The view historically was the market forces
with----
Mr. Perry. And the FCC didn't--the FCC didn't realize that
or consider that or didn't know that?
Mr. Roberson. This has been an item that has been under
discussion for more than 40 years about receiver standards and
the need for some form of regulation or guideline around
receivers, but it is more complex probably than time would
permit right now.
Mr. Perry. All right. If I can ask you another question
here. You also pointed out that the aviation world, including
the FAA commercial airline and private aircraft communities,
airport authorities and others, have fought this rollout for
the last several months, initially focusing on safety of life
issues and, more recently, talking about massive disruption in
airline flight schedules.
And that is what you said. Much of this, I believe, is
primarily based on a study by RTCA filed with the FCC in
November of 2020.
The question is: Have you reviewed the study? And, if so,
do you find that the RTCA study provides credible evidence that
5G will cause problems with radio altimeters, and can you
explain the basis for your response? And also, have there been
instances of 5G interference with radio altimeters to date
anywhere in the world where 5G has been implemented?
Mr. Roberson. Yeah. Two-part questions. First part, I have
reviewed and my team--40 people in the company--we have
reviewed the RTCA study and do find that there are some
significant flaws in the study where very worst, worst-case
assumptions were made. And this is one of the things that was
discussed earlier. It would be very helpful if RTCA and
telecommunications engineers could have gotten together in a
more timely way to review those studies and to hash out the
inconsistencies in the ways that the study was conducted.
On the question of recorded incidents where there have been
difficulties with radar altimeters, this is probably a question
better asked of Meredith, but, to my knowledge, there is no
instance in the world that there has been a problem with radar
altimeters at this point.
Mr. Perry. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you very much.
I now turn to Representative Garcia of Illinois for 5
minutes.
Mr. Garcia of Illinois. Thank you, Chairman Larsen and
Chairman DeFazio, for holding this hearing on aviation safety
and the impact of 5G. Thanks to all the witnesses.
As many of our witnesses have alluded to today, there is
currently a 2-mile restriction on deploying 5G around most
major public airports in this country, including Midway Airport
in Chicago.
Let me be clear. I support the FAA's interim orders to
preserve aviation safety, including the 2-mile restriction on
5G deployment, but there are certain tradeoffs to these orders.
Midway Airport is unusual because there are a lot of residents
that live right around the airport. The airport is about 1
square mile and is surrounded by working-class neighborhoods
directly across the street, as this map shows.
Many of you might have experienced this fact flying into
Midway where planes go pretty close over homes. It is always an
exciting landing experience. This poster behind me shows the 2-
mile radius that constituents of mine live around. They are
primarily Latino and Black, and lack access to quality
broadband.
In fact, my own district office, which is 3 miles away,
just outside the circle, has very poor broadband. For these
residents and my district office, cellphone service is the
primary way of accessing the internet. So, the potential lack
of 5G in the long term, combined with the fact that telecom
carriers are planning to shut down their 3G networks at the end
of the year, is potentially devastating for these communities
and residents around Midway Airport.
We cannot permanently prevent these residents from using
5G. We must expeditiously find a way to fully deploy 5G while
keeping the same level of aviation safety that we all achieve
under the FAA's interim orders.
For Ms. Baker and Mr. Fanning, a question. I am deeply
concerned about how long 5G access may be restricted in the
neighborhoods adjacent to airports, especially when these are
almost always working-class Latino and Black neighborhoods who
already face significant barriers to broadband access. In your
opinion, what is the long-term solution that will allow
residents around airports to fully have 5G while maintaining
the necessary level of aviation safety? And roughly, how long
will it take us to get there?
Ms. Baker. So, thank you so much for your question. I think
that is a really, really important one. I am going to first
answer the previous question, but there has been no reported
interference from 5G in the areas in the almost 40 countries
that rolled out 5G. But to your point, we have agreed
voluntarily and temporarily to exclusion zones around these
airports.
And I think you raise such an interesting and important
thing that we cannot exacerbate this digital divide. And so,
what we are doing is working as cooperatively as we possibly
can with the aviation industry and with the FAA to clear these
zones as quickly as possible. And we have agreed to do this
until July 5. And at that point--we hope we will be done sooner
than that.
We have made tremendous progress and we really have been
cooperating well, and I am proud of our industry and I am proud
of your industry. And it took too long to get here, but I am
glad we are there.
Mr. Garcia of Illinois. Well, thank you for that.
And as you noted in your testimony, telecom companies have
in the past paid other spectrum users to vacate parts of the
spectrum or upgrade their equipment so that telecom companies
can fully use that spectrum.
Would telecom companies be willing to pay some of the cost
for airlines to upgrade their planes' altimeters that are at
risk of interference so that we do not have these restrictions
in place?
Ms. Baker. So, I actually think it is premature to go
there, because this hearing seems to presuppose that there is
interference, where we don't believe that there is. So, I think
we need to let the engineers do their job. And as far as who
pays, yes, there have been all sorts of instances where,
through a spectrum relocation fund or through a designation
from Congress, there has been use--Congress can use the
proceeds of this, you know, of an $80 billion auction as they
wish.
And so, that part is really up to the Government, but I
don't accept the premise that there is actually interference at
this point.
Mr. Garcia of Illinois. And before I run out of time, if
your members aren't considering a plan, are they considering
any cellphone plan pricing compensation for residents who are
paying for 5G but cannot access 5G networks?
Ms. Baker. Well, we are doing what we can to close the
digital divide, and we are encouraged that in the
infrastructure bill, Congress actually has helped us do that.
So, I think there will be longer support to low-income families
to help pay for their cellphone and broadband service,
particularly as it becomes the competitive choice of many,
especially low-income folks.
Mr. Garcia of Illinois. Looking forward to that
conversation. Thank you.
And I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Garcia.
We are going to do a second round. I recognize the chair of
the full committee for 5 minutes.
Mr. DeFazio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I did hear a couple of very disturbing assertions. Mr.
Roberson said, oh, well, RTCA was based on the worst, worst
case. Tell that to the 346 families of the people who died on
the MAX. That was supposed to be a worst case, worst, worst
case. Very improbable. We don't run aviation that way in this
Nation.
And then I heard also--I think it was Ms. Baker--that while
the FCC auctioned it with Ajit Pai blowing off all concerns and
not putting in any restrictions, but they followed the rules.
Well, that was the other thing, the conclusion of our
investigation, that both the FAA and Boeing said, well, we
followed the rules, just 346 people died.
We changed the damn rules. And, that is a question that
needs to be raised about this, about this issue, and the lack
of cooperation and coordination. I mean, there is a lot of talk
about the NTIA run by the fifth political hack in a role under
the Trump administration didn't forward the concerns of the
FAA, but they had been directly communicated to Ajit Pai by
everybody--by the pilots, by the airlines, by this committee,
by the RTCA and others. And Ajit Pai just blew it all off
because they were in a hurry to get it out there, and I am sure
they were under a lot of pressure from the telecoms to get it
out there. And we don't want to have any mitigations. We want
to be able to have the most powerful towers in the world.
We have got to get some facts straight. My staff checked
again with the FAA on the strength of the signals in France,
and they say it is 15 to 85 watts, and Ms. Baker says it is
more powerful in France, but they had France at 631 watts. So,
I guess I don't understand watts. I always thought higher
wattage, more powerful. I don't know. Plus, they deflect the
antennas down. And that is permanent.
So, to say, oh, we might not need any measures, it is like,
we don't think there is interference. There is another. Oh, we
don't think there is interference? Think?
We have to absolutely--100 percent to the minus nine
power--know. That is the risk in aviation. One in one billion.
And I don't think we know that yet, because you have got the
Civil Aviation Authority of the United Kingdom saying that they
pose a viable interference threat to radio altimeters. Canada
has just adopted exclusion zones around 26 airports. These are
not insignificant countries, and they are much more similar to
ours than Slovenia or whatever ones you are quoting out there
that fly four airplanes a day.
So, I am just not happy with the way that--like I said, I
think the telecoms are getting it now, at least Verizon and
AT&T. I don't think CTIA is getting it. And, I want to make
sure that others get it. I mean, the RTCA report, worst, worst
case--well, that is what we plan for is the worst, worst case.
To Ms. Stephens, and this is a concern about the FAA. I
don't think the FAA has been particularly transparent with
airports. Can you comment on that?
I mean, for instance, I was told by the Administrator on
Thursday, Eugene wouldn't be impacted, and on Thursday,
Portland was on their list, and then on Friday it wasn't, but
no one seems to understand how that all worked.
Ms. Stephens. Thank you, Chair DeFazio, for that question,
and, yes, it is very true. The information has not been free
flowing and transparent, and that has been a real challenge for
airports to be able to plan and understand why we are being
impacted in the way we are being impacted.
Eugene wasn't even supposed to be in the first rollout, and
then we got the surprise NOTAM on the day of the 5G rollout and
needed to try to understand very quickly why we were on the
list and how we were going to be impacted. We never truly
understood, we still don't know why we are on that list and
have the NOTAM in place, and now the majority of our carriers
have needed to be operating under AMOCs during low-visibility
operations and, in fact, we still have one aircraft type that
is not cleared with an AMOC to be able to operate at Eugene.
That impacts our passengers. Aside from the headaches that
it causes for people trying to run airports, it really does
impact our passengers. I was flying back to Eugene on Tuesday
with a layover in Salt Lake City waiting at the gate for the
Eugene flight, and I heard two passengers talking about how 2
weeks prior they had taken the same flight back into Eugene and
then they were diverted to Portland because of fog in Eugene
and they were not able to land. That just goes to what we have
been battling all these years, Congressman, is making sure that
people can use their local air service.
Mr. DeFazio. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you. Just a few followups.
I want to underscore a point that the chair made about the
language being used. Ms. Baker's comments or testimony said--
you state the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics, RTCA,
study applied flawed methodology and implausible scenarios.
The actions of the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation
System, or MCAS, flaw that overrode pilot auctions in the
flight deck of 737 MAXes was an implausible scenario, and yet
it did happen. We are in the implausible, implausible scenario
business, and so, that is why there is such a thin safety
margin in aviation.
That is why, frankly, we take personally because we take
responsibility for aviation safety on this subcommittee. We
talk about implausible scenarios because there really aren't
implausible scenarios when it comes to aviation safety.
So, I just want to underscore that point about that, using
that term, because it really sort of tells me that you all
don't really get what we are trying to do. I think that has
changed. Granted, I think that has changed, but also it seems
to underscores a fundamental foundational problem that got us
here in the first place.
I mentioned in the beginning about just very different
cultures, different cultures between the industries, different
cultures between the agencies involved. So, I hope we have made
that point strongly.
Mr. Viola, on helicopters, given the fact that there are
currently no AMOCs for helicopters, just how are--I presume
helicopters are flying, but what does your future look like
right now?
Mr. Viola. Well, thank you very much for the question,
Chairman Larsen. Well, that is kind of the problem we have. We
have got some regulatory compliance issues, and because of the
ADs and the NOTAMs, there are a lot of aircraft that aren't
flying right now. And so, we are really working for
clarification as to what are the requirements.
If the aircraft is required or if it was a newer aircraft
that has a radio altimeter on it, well, then that is when the
AD kicks in on certain types of--you actually need to rewrite
what the procedures are that describe when the radar
requirement was needed. And then if the aircraft didn't have a
radar altimeter and didn't need it, then those aircraft can
still fly.
So, we are still, last night and even this morning before
our testimony here, working to see what exactly--if everybody
in the FAA can agree to what the AD means for helicopters and
what the NOTAM actually means for helicopters. Does it mean a
possible interference or does it mean that you can't fly in
that area at all?
Mr. Larsen. Your testimony said there are 55 public use
heliports in the country--is that right--on page 6 of your
testimony?
Mr. Viola. Yes.
Mr. Larsen. Fifty-five heliports. But that number is
dwarfed by anywhere from 6,533 to 8,533 helicopter or ambulance
landing sites in the United States. Is that right?
Mr. Viola. Yes, sir. That is correct.
Mr. Larsen. You have any indication that any of these
numbers were taken into any consideration by the NTIA or the
FCC as they looked at these issues?
Mr. Viola. No. We have----
Mr. Larsen. None at all?
Mr. Viola. We have no indication that they tried to avoid
any of our known heliports. And I think it is kind of the same
thing as it is for the airports, where normally, when a risk is
introduced to aviation or there are methods or systems that
prevent that risk from being introduced, I think in this case
here, the risk is introduced and now we are dealing with it.
Mr. Larsen. It is backwards.
Mr. Fanning, if you talk to your members, is there one
single radio altimeter fix or is it multiple fixes for
altimeters based on the altimeter?
Mr. Fanning. We don't know yet. The real testing only
started once we got the data, the information from the
telecoms, and the FAA is in daily conversation with the
manufacturers about what they are learning, which also feeds
into the AMOCs. It has been stated, but it is worth repeating,
that an AMOC is not a permanent thing, and it doesn't give
blanket coverage. Each AMOC is different, and they are adjusted
or reviewed every 30 days.
So, there is no one fix yet because we still don't have a
full definition of the problem, but there is some optimism that
the more modern altimeters are going to test well. But we just
don't know what falls into those three buckets of an existing
altimeter that is going to be fine with 5G, those that have to
be retrofitted with a filter, and those that just won't work in
the environment.
But we are gathering the data in real time and, again,
daily conversations with the FAA and also with the telecoms to
get that data so we can test against it.
Mr. Larsen. All right. All right.
I want to thank the panelists, the second panel, for your
testimony and your informative answers to help us understand
these issues a lot better than we did even for us 3 years ago,
2 years ago, 1 year ago, 6 months ago, 2 months ago, and even
last week. But we have been, as a committee, subcommittee,
trying to get up to speed on these issues as well. But having
said that, I see that there is a lot more work to do, so we are
going to stay very engaged on this as well.
With that, that concludes our hearing.
I want to thank the witnesses again. I ask unanimous
consent that the record of today's hearing remain open until
such time as our witnesses have provided answers to any
questions that may be submitted to them in writing, and I would
expect you all to get a few questions.
I also ask unanimous consent that the record remain open
for 15 days for any additional comments and information
submitted by Members or the witnesses to be included in the
record of today's hearing.
Without objection, so ordered.
With that, this subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:37 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

Submissions for the Record

----------

Letter of February 7, 2022, and 5G Timeline from Captain Joseph G.
DePete, President, Air Line Pilots Association, International,
Submitted for the Record by Hon. Peter A. DeFazio
February 7, 2022.
The Honorable Rick Larsen,
Chair,
Subcommittee on Aviation, House Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, 2163 Rayburn House Office Building, Washington,
DC 20515.
The Honorable Garret Graves,
Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Aviation, House Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, 2402 Rayburn House Office Building, Washington,
DC 20515.
Dear Chair Larsen and Ranking Member Graves:
Thank you for holding the very productive and informative hearing
on Thursday, February 3, 2022, on ``Finding the Right Frequency: 5G
Deployment and Aviation Safety''. We have created the safest aviation
system in the world thanks to your leadership, commitment to safety,
and steadfast support for a collaborative safety risk-management
environment between frontline employees, the regulator and airline
operators. ALPA stands ready to build on that record of safety and
support you as we ensure that no third party will ever again be able to
introduce risk into the national airspace system without labor,
airlines and the regulator having a full say in the matter.
As I mentioned during the hearing, enclosed is a timeline of
aviation's interactions with the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC), highlighting where the Air Line Pilots Association,
International (ALPA) joined our fellow industry organizations in
advocating for a collaborative approach for safe 5G deployment in the
C-Band. Unfortunately, the FCC not only failed to heed our concerns,
but they willfully neglected to carry out their regulatory
responsibilities and ask licensees for critical data needed to plan for
launching 5G while maintaining aviation safety. This failure on the
part of the FCC has resulted in uncertainty, complexity, and increased
workload for every flight. For airline pilots, safety is nonnegotiable.
It's not about politics or profit. For this reason, it was an affront
to us when the FCC licensed part of the C-Band spectrum to the telecom
sector without acknowledging our concerns about aviation safety.
Below is additional information for the record regarding the
validity of the RTCA report, the cost to retrofit radar altimeters,
concerns about telecommunications providers refusal to share necessary
information, and the need to evaluate 5G risks to all aviation
operations.
There has been significant criticism of ``the RTCA report.'' RTCA,
Inc. (formerly known as the Radio Technical Commission for
Aeronautics), is a 500-member not-for-profit standards development
organization that serves as the primary forum in the United States for
the development of avionics standards. The members of RTCA include
unions, all airline aircraft manufacturers, avionics providers,
airlines, airports, companies that serve as the air traffic control
infrastructure industrial base, and more. The engineers and experts who
attend RTCA represent the best technical minds of industry and U.S. and
foreign governments. By working in a consensus-based environment, RTCA
and its member participants have a long history of developing standards
for aviation equipment that provide the necessary performance to ensure
safety in operations.
In conjunction with its European-based, sister organization,
EUROCAE, the standards they have developed have been adopted by safety
regulators; including the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the
European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), Transport Canada, and the
Agencia Nacional de Aviacao Civil of Brazil; for most of the electronic
navigation equipment on board commercial airplanes. The International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has also recognized and adopted RTCA
standards as a method of compliance as well.
To be absolutely clear, the staff of RTCA do not write the
standards, their members do. The members of RTCA develop consensus-
based standards and all participant concerns are reconciled before a
document is published. In cases where they cannot be reconciled, the
dissenting opinions, known as ``non-concur comments'' are included in
the document. This process was followed by RTCA during its review of
radar altimeters and the C-Band 5G environment.
After the FCC Report and Order for Flexible Use of C-Band was
issued, the RTCA President made several efforts to reach out to the
wireless industry, including CTIA, to invite them be part of the
process in developing the report which was eventually filed to the FCC
docket in October 2020. While CTIA members attended, and provided an
inadequate level of meaningful data, the information was used
nonetheless to evaluate the 5G signal impact on radar altimeters. The
intent was to work collaboratively with the wireless industry to ensure
safe deployment of 5G C-Band with minimum disruption to aviation at
least 18 months prior to the activation of C-Band service.
Unfortunately, RTCA's data-driven report was rebuffed by the same CTIA
members who were unwilling to provide data to support their dissenting
views; their non-concur and rationale are fully documented in the RTCA
report.
The hearing provided damning insight into how broken the federal
radio spectrum and licensing process is in relation to aviation safety
and the need for immediate reform. Notably, I am troubled by the FAA
Administrator's disclosure that productive conversations between the
agency and the telecommunications providers did not begin until early
January. It was further noted that the FCC had never asked the wireless
industry for the data needed to conduct the safety risk mitigation
assessment. Given that the agency legally tasked with oversight of the
telecommunications industry completely failed to provide critical
information relevant to the safety of the U.S. airspace system and
voluntary dialogue by private sector companies did not begin until the
precise time their actions posed catastrophic harm to public safety, it
is clear there is a systemic failure of governance over the wireless
industry's use of spectrum, disclosure of information, and licensing.
This necessitates a redesign of the government's authority over these
providers, including granting affected agencies, like the FAA,
authority to reject or modify new or expanded spectrum applications as
well as the ability to directly interact with the FCC.
The hearing also raised questions regarding the importance of
modifying and developing radar altimeter equipment and standards to
potentially solve spectrum problems. To that end, it is important to
make note of the costs involved. While it is difficult to provide
specific information, we are generally aware that avionics upgrades can
be more expensive than many would ever imagine. Because multiple radar
altimeters are installed aboard large air transport aircraft, the cost
of the modified or new equipment, including the cost of labor to
install the equipment, and the cost of aircraft time out of service,
the overall cost could easily be $100,000-$150,000 per aircraft,
depending on the aircraft type. Of course, there are still a lot of
hurdles to jump through before we know for sure, just exactly how
difficult and involved that this equipment upgrade will be, so the
estimated costs are also subject to change.
In developing the new radar altimeter standards, a key piece of
information needed before standards can be written is the external
interference environment that radar altimeters must be able to tolerate
globally, for the next several decades. To meet this demand, the
aviation industry needs the active cooperation and input of the
wireless industry to define the environment. We are pleased to hear
that the FAA intends to share their flight test data with RTCA, for the
development of future radar altimeter standards.
Once new altimeter standards are available, the timeline for
design, testing, certification, manufacturing, and installation is
likely to take four or more years, even with priority placed on these
upgrades. There may also be additional unforeseen costs to accelerate
the process and upgrade all airliners, including those operated by
international airlines operating in U.S. airspace. This truly is a
global problem.
During the hearing, I noted my concern with CTIA's continued
sensitivity toward protecting proprietary information between
competitors AT&T and Verizon. I wish to emphasize that in aviation, we
do not compete on matters of safety. ``One Level of Safety'' has been
the foundational principle for ALPA. The aviation industry, which
features intense competition between carriers, manufactures and other
parties, is nonetheless able to share information necessary for
addressing matters of safety. The wireless industry can and must be
held to the same standard. It appears that Verizon and AT&T are
beginning to understand the need to share data for the advancement of
safety, even if their trade association, CTIA, does not.
Finally, as we look forward to new entrants to the aviation
system--Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems and drones, Advanced Air
Mobility, Hypersonic aircraft, and Commercial Space operations--we need
to make sure that these entities are also not impacted by 5G
interference. A thorough review and risk mitigation of the systems used
by these stakeholders is also needed before allowing 5G in the C-Band
to continue expansion.
The U.S. air transportation system is the world's safest. As I said
during the hearing, I feel very strongly that if or when another
industry seeks to introduce risk into the system, the burden should be
on that industry to prove its actions won't degrade aviation safety.
The launch of the new 5G service caused an avoidable crisis. The
process must be reformed so that the United States can continue to be a
world-stage competitor in 5G and set the global standard in aviation
safety.
In closing, we again thank you for holding such a productive
hearing. Speaking for the 62,000 pilots flying for 38 airlines that
ALPA represents, we strongly encourage the committee's continued
attention on the C-Band matter, and also in taking steps to ensure that
this unnecessary breakdown in intragovernmental processes never happens
again.
Sincerely,
Captain Joe DePete,
President, Air Line Pilots Association.

Attachment: ``5G Timeline Doc 02072022''

cc: The Honorable Peter A. DeFazio, Chair
House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

The Honorable Sam Graves, Ranking Member
House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

Attachment: ``5G Timeline Doc 02072022''

Below is a list of activities surrounding the issue of 5G and Radar
Altimeters (radalts). ALPA actions and participation is noted where
appropriate.

Docket 17-340 opened on 12/1/2017--Spectrum Policy Recommendations
2018
1/31/18--Aviation Spectrum Resources, Inc. (ASRI)--comments
on need to protect aviation spectrum:
https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/1013180946363/
ASRI%20Comments%20TAC%20Spectrum%20Policy-FINAL.pdf

2/15/18--Boeing comments on need to protect aviation
spectrum:
https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/10216647614758/
Boeing%20TAC%20Recommendations%20Reply
%20Comments%202%2015%202018%20final.pdf

FCC Docket 18-122 opened on 4/18/2018--Flexible Use of 3.7-
4.2 GHz

5/29/18--ALPA Initial Comments:
https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/10531182083849/ALPA%20Comments%2017-
183%2018-122.pdf

5/31/18--ASRI initial filing:
https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/10531846006939/
ASRI%20ex%20parte%20Gen%20Dkt%20No%2018-122.pdf

6/19/18--Aviation Industry (ALPA, AOPA, A4A, AFC, AIA, GAMA,
HAI, IATA, NATA, NBAA)--summary of discussions with Commission on need
to protect radalts:
https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/10620182163379/
19062019%20Aviation%20Associations%20Joint%20
Ex%20Parte%20Filing%20Dkt%20No%2018-122.pdf

10/29/18--ASRI again comments on need to protect radar
altimeters, recommending FCC work with FAA.
https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/1030875426359/ASRI%20-%2020181029-_C-
Band_NPRM_
Filing-FINAL_Rev1a.pdf

12/17/18--Aviation Industry (including ALPA) met with FCC
technical staff on need to protect radalts
https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/12172825300371/
12.17.18%20Aviation%20Industry%20Ex-Parte
%20FINAL.pdf
2019
10/25/19--Aviation Industry (including ALPA) met with FCC
technical staff again on need to protect radalts
https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/1025793221250/
Aviation%20and%20Aerospace%20FCC%20
Engineering%20Meeting%20Ex%20Parte%20Notice%20(FINAL%2010-25-19).pdf

11/12/19-2/19/20--aviation met 6 additional times with FCC
staff on protecting radalts
2020
2/21/20--Aviation Industry (including ALPA)--warning of
interference on RadAlts if Draft Report and Order goes forward:
https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/10222078579238/202002121-3.7-
4.2%20GHz%20Aerospace
%20Aviation%20Associations%20Letter%20to%20FCC%20GN%2018-122-FINAL.pdf

Industry (including ALPA) meetings with Commissioners' Staffs
2/21/20

3/3/2020--FCC Report and Order--https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/
filing/0303046335999

Additional FCC Docket 18-122 Items:
5/26/20--Aviation Industry (including ALPA) Petition for
Reconsideration--asking for FCC to convene aviation/telcom industry
work group:
https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/10527379225572/C-
BAND%20Petition%20for%20Recon.pdf

Sec. Note that this Petition did NOT oppose the Order, but
asked for FCC leadership in identifying mitigations

7/9/20--Aviation Industry Reply Comments to Petition:
https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/10710274414682/
Aviation%20Petitioners%20Reply%20to
%20Oppositions.pdf

12/7/20--Aviation Industry files proposals for mitigations to
protect radalts:
https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/12072836329004/20201207-
Aviation%20and%20Aerospace
%20Suggested%20C-Band%205G%20Mitigations%20GN%2018-122-
Filed%20Version.pdf

12/7/20--Aviation Industry (including ALPA) filed letters
asks FCC to delay spectrum auction:
https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/filing/1207131706609
2021
5/12/21--Aviation Industry (including ALPA) describes how
CTIA analysis of aviation concerns is incorrect
https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/105130442707885/
Organizations%20Supporting%20Aviation
%20Safety%20Ex%20Parte%2012%20May%202021.pdf

8/10/21--Aviation Industry (including ALPA) describes
technical details of radalt and need to protect
https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/1081157361951/
Aviation%20and%20Aerospace%20Ex%20parte%20
Notice%20Aug%206%202021%20w%20OET%20WTB%20IB.pdf

8/27/21--Meetings including ALPA, with FCC commissioner
Carr's staff:
https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/10827030728422/
Rad%20Alt%20Aug%2026%20Watson%20Meeting
%20Ex%20Parte%20Letter%20FILED.pdf

October 2021--ALPA begins to lead industry coalition coms
efforts including common talking points used by all coalition members

11/2/21--Aviation Industry including ALPA filing asking for
details of 5G deployment in order to develop aviation-side mitigations
https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/1103321105177/
Aviation%20Community%20FCC%20Filing%20for
%20Needed%205G%20Parameters.pdf

11/4/21--Verizon and AT&T voluntarily agree to delay their
turn on from
12/5/21 to 1/5/21.

11/4/21--Aviation industry including ALPA began a series of
meetings with the White House National Economic Council (NEC). The NEC
begins leading interagency meetings between the FCC and FAA.

11/19/21--Aviation Industry including ALPA reply to CTIA,
describing how international deployments differ from US
https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/1119034580247/
Aviation%20Industry%20Reply%20to%20CTIA
%2011-19-2021.pdf

11/24/21--AT&T and Verizon offer a six month reduction in
power around airports. The aviation coalition determines that this
action is insufficient to protect even one model of transponder as
compared to the RTCA report.
https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/11241848723664/2021-11-
24%20ATT%20Verizon%20Letter%20
FINAL.pdf

12/06/21--Aviation files a counter-proposal to the Verizon/
AT&T letter, which provides protection to aviation radar altimeters:
https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/1206159800868/
Aviation's%20Safety%20Proposal%2012.6.pdf

12/07/21--FAA issues the Airworthiness Directives which
prohibit certain operations in TBD areas where 5G interference is
expected. The FAA will issue NOTAMs to activate the ADs.

12/07/21--ALPA issues safety alert to all members about FAA
AD on all transport and commuter category aircraft with radar
altimeters

12/09/21--Boeing holds multi-model operator telcons with
customers worldwide, with ALPA also included, to describe that Boeing
aircraft will be subject to the ADs, and that in their opinion further
restrictions may be necessary.

12/10/21--ALPA joins in a meeting with airline tech pilots on
the impact of the 5G restrictions.

12/14/21--ALPA coordinates with coalition members on
background materials for reporters and transmits on behalf of industry

12/14/21--ALPA has a telcon with NATCA to discuss ATC side of
handling radar altimeter AD/NOTAMs. ATC does not know what to expect.
We supported any action by NATCA to slow traffic as needed to manage
the unknown impacts starting on 1/5/22.

12/16/21-12/17/21--Aviation including ALPA visit with staff
for each of the 4 FCC Commissioners. Aviation made the case that there
will be severe economic impacts to airline passenger and cargo
operations, with significant schedule impacts and passenger
disruptions. Helicopter safety operations will be grounded. The FAA
restrictions will not be easy or fast to overcome with Alternate
Methods of Compliance (AMOCs), and that FCC needs to act to prevent and
industry economic disaster on 1/5/22.

12/20/21--ALPA letter to Senator Cantwell and Senator Wicker
debunking myth that 5G is being deployed successfully in other
countries without mitigation.

12/23/21--FAA issues an updated SAIB:
https://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgSAIB.nsf/
dc7bd4f27e5f1074
86257221005f069d/379cfb187d16db10862587b4005b26fc/$FILE/AIR-21-18R1.pdf

12/23/21--FAA issues SAFO 21007 with example NOTAMs:
https://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation_industry/
airline_operators/airline_safety/safo/
all_safos/media/2021/SAFO21007.pdf

12/31/21--DOT asked Verizon and AT&T to delay their roll out
5G in order to work on mitigations that will protect more of aviation
around several major airports. Verizon and AT&T rejected any further
delay on 1/2/22, with an offer to implement limitations as in France.
Aviation tech team has determined that the offer is only partial
limitations that France has imposed, and does not protect aviation
sufficiently.
2022
1/2/2022--ALPA filed a comment in support of the A4A Petition
for Emergency Stay on the FCC Docket:
https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/10102521821451/
ALPA%20Comments%20In%20Support%20of%20
A4A%20Petition%2001.02.2022%20Final2.pdf

1/2/2022--ALPA sent a letter to FCC Chair Rosenworcel, asking
for FCC to work collaboratively with aviation, to share data that shows
that aviation's safety case is met.
https://www.alpa.org/-/media/ALPA/Files/pdfs/news-events/letters/
2022/0103-5g-fcc-rosenworcel.pdf?la=en

1/4/2022--Additional voluntary action by Verizon and AT&T;
delay until
1/19/2022 for start of 5G service.

1/18/2022--ALPA issues safety alert to pilots prior to 5G
signal broadcasts beginning.

2/3/2022--ALPA testifies before the Aviation Subcommittee of
the U.S. House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee reinforcing
how the recent deployment of AT&T and Verizon's 5G services to impact
aviation safety.

Letter of February 2, 2022, from Present and Former Members of the
Federal Aviation Management Advisory Council, Submitted for the Record
by Hon. Peter A. DeFazio
February 2, 2022.
The Honorable Peter DeFazio,
Chairman,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, U.S. House of
Representatives, Washington, DC 20515.
The Honorable Rick Larsen,
Chairman,
Subcommittee on Aviation, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC
20515.
The Honorable Sam Graves,
Ranking Member,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, U.S. House of
Representatives, Washington, DC 20515.
The Honorable Garret Graves,
Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Aviation, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC
20515.
Dear Chairmen and Ranking Members:
The undersigned are present and former members of the Federal
Aviation Management Advisory Council (MAC). This letter represents our
personal viewpoints alone, however, and is not sent in any official
capacity on behalf of the Management Advisory Council or any other
organization. We are writing to express our personal views on recent
developments involving the FCC and the FAA's concern about possible
harmful interference from 5G towers using C-band spectrum in the
vicinity of airports. We would ask that this letter be included in the
record of the February 3 hearing before the Subcommittee on Aviation.
Like everyone, we were dismayed that the much-anticipated rollout
of new 5G networks by AT&T and Verizon had to be postponed and modified
as the result of aviation concerns that had not been addressed
beforehand to the FAA's satisfaction. Like all Americans, we look
forward to benefiting from the promise of 5G technology. We also
believe, however, that the root cause of the disruption has not been
sufficiently understood in the commentary we have seen to date. That
root cause is a system for spectrum regulation that is no longer wholly
fit for purpose--not, at least, where FCC decisions potentially
compromise the statutory responsibilities of other federal agencies
like the FAA.
It is not our purpose to opine on whether the FCC's analysis of the
potential for interference is better than that of the FAA or vice
versa. First, that question is complicated by recent reports of the
FAA's inability to obtain timely data it needed to assess accurately
whether such interference would reduce the reliability of critical
aircraft safety equipment--notably radar altimeters. (Earlier research
filed with the FCC clearly said it would.) Second, it is essentially
beside the point. What is not in dispute is that the FAA, responsible
for an aviation system whose safety record is second to none, remained
uncertain about the validity of the FCC's analysis and thus was
required to take the actions that it did.
More importantly, once the FCC was made aware of the FAA's
concerns--concerns expressed over a period of years by both the FAA and
the aviation industry--it should have affirmatively undertaken to
resolve those concerns to the mutual satisfaction of everyone
concerned. Rather than seek that mutually satisfactory solution,
however, the FCC reverted to the familiar confines of the formal
administrative process. It reviewed submissions to the record, formed
its conclusions, and based its decision on those conclusions. That
process--while wholly in keeping with the conventional regulatory
jurisprudence--simply does not appropriately acknowledge that Congress
vested final responsibility for aviation safety decisions in the FAA
alone.
The confusion, delay, and frustration that followed the decision
were wholly foreseeable and could have been avoided entirely had the
FCC adopted a more collaborative approach early in the process--
ideally, before launching a formal proceeding. The FAA cannot be
treated as just another ``interested party'' that can be expected to
accept quietly an outcome it deems insufficiently tested in the real
world. Indeed, walking away from the issue despite its continuing
uncertainty would represent a clear violation of the FAA's statutory
obligation to ensure the safety of flight.
Simply put, the FAA should not be required to bear the burden of
proof before the FCC on a matter of aviation safety; if anything, it
should be just the reverse. The bottom line is clear: the FCC should
never be permitted to make a decision on the use of spectrum that the
FAA believes might compromise aviation safety; it must ensure that the
FAA's concerns are resolved to its satisfaction before making any
decision, and certainly before auctioning spectrum, lest bidders be
inadequately informed of possible limits on the use of the spectrum
they are bidding on.
A legislative amendment might easily be crafted to establish a more
appropriately balanced process--one that recognizes that Executive
Branch agencies like the FAA are not mere ``interested parties'' but
rather instruments of government policy in their own right. They have a
legal obligation to take whatever action they deem required by the
public interest and, as we have seen, will do so.
We believe, however, that a more readily available solution should
be encouraged. The problem might be resolved easily by a memorandum of
understanding between the FCC and the Executive Branch in which the FCC
commits that it will make no decision that another agency believes will
adversely affect critical systems for which that other agency is
responsible before achieving a mutually acceptable agreement with that
agency regarding the mitigations to be undertaken. The FCC would
formally adopt that commitment as a standing policy; it would be within
the scope of its statutory discretion to do so.
If such an understanding cannot be achieved quickly among the
affected agencies, we would advocate seeking a legislative solution.
Without one or the other, we can look forward to many more conflicts of
this kind as the electromagnetic spectrum becomes increasingly crowded,
injecting an unacceptable level of uncertainty and instability into FCC
decisions that are essential to America's future growth and prosperity.
Respectfully,
Stephen A. Alterman,
President, Cargo Airline Association.
Linda Hall Daschle,
former FAA Deputy Administrator.
Derek Kan,
former OMB Deputy Director, and former DOT Under Secretary of
Transportation for Policy.
Will Ris,
former SVP, Government Affairs, American Airlines.
Brian Wynne,
CEO, Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International.
Peter J. Bunce,
President and CEO, General Aviation Manufacturers Association.
Christopher A. Hart,
former Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board.
Donna McLean,
former DOT Assistant Secretary for Budget and Programs, and Chief
Financial Officer.
Jeffrey N. Shane,
former DOT Under Secretary of Transportation for Policy.

Statement of Ed Bolen, President and Chief Executive Officer, National
Business Aviation Association, Submitted for the Record by Hon. Peter
A. DeFazio
On behalf of the National Business Aviation Association (NBAA),
thank you for holding this hearing to discuss critical aviation safety
concerns related to 5G telecommunications networks operating from 3.7-
3.98 gigahertz (GHz), a commonly referred to as the C-band. NBAA
represents more than 11,000 member companies and professionals that
rely on general aviation aircraft for business purposes. Like
commercial airlines, general aviation operators also rely on radio
altimeters for various safety-critical functions, including low-
visibility operations and other onboard safety systems. Beginning in
2015, NBAA and a broad coalition of aviation stakeholders raised
detailed safety concerns about the potential for 5G interference with
radio altimeters. We appreciate the Subcommittee's continued attention
to this important matter.
NBAA members operate at thousands of airports across the nation,
many of which are not served by commercial airlines. For example,
general aviation aircraft deliver organs for transplant, perform air
medical flights, assist in the aftermath of natural disasters and
deliver critical supplies related to the COVID-19 pandemic. The United
States general aviation industry, including business aviation, supports
1.2 million jobs and $247 billion in economic output.
Radio altimeters are crucial for many general aviation missions,
especially for low-visibility landings and helicopter operations. Also,
radio altimeter data on the precise distance of the aircraft from the
ground is integrated into other safety-critical flight control and
warning systems needed for all phases of flight. This integrated nature
of aircraft avionics systems means that simply replacing the radio
altimeter is not an option or is prohibitively expensive. Potential
radio altimeter replacement costs are of specific concern to general
aviation aircraft operators since 85% are small and mid-sized
businesses.
With the significant benefits that 5G technology will provide for
connectivity across the nation, NBAA believes these networks must
safely co-exist with aviation. Achieving these benefits and preserving
aviation safety requires enhanced interagency collaboration between the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC), and other government stakeholders. In 2019, the
aviation industry formally expressed concerns to the FCC about the
implementation of 5G networks and conducted a study using the best
available information at that time, which identified issues with radio
altimeter interference. During this time, the aviation industry has
been open to working with the FCC, FAA, and other agencies to advance
the discussion on these issues.
Unfortunately, since the December 2020 auction of the 5G-C
spectrum, the required levels of coordination did not occur. This lack
of coordination meant that as the rollout of 5G networks approached
this year, we were in a reactive position because the necessary
proactive coordination had not occurred. We applaud the FAA's dedicated
work to quickly issue Airworthiness Directives, Notices to Air Missions
(NOTAMs), and other guidance on the impact of 5G networks. Still, the
reactive nature of these efforts created significant challenges and
uncertainty for general aviation operators.
Following the activation of 5G networks, the FAA is to be commended
for its work to approve Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs) that
allow most commercial air carrier aircraft to operate safely at
airports where there is potential for 5G interference. However, the FAA
has only issued limited mitigations for business aircraft and
helicopters to date. Without approved AMOCs or other relief, these
aircraft continue to be prohibited from conducting low-visibility
approaches and are subject to other flight restrictions in all 5G
deployment areas, which will expand across the country. We respectfully
request that the FAA dedicate the necessary resources to approve
Letters of Acceptance for data submittals by altimeter manufacturers
and supporting AMOCs, where appropriate, for general aviation aircraft
and helicopters.
With the current AMOC process, the FAA must re-issue each approval
every 30 days, which requires significant agency resources. As new 5G
towers come online, the FAA must review the data to determine if
existing AMOCs still maintain an adequate level of safety or if
modifications are necessary. This process of reviewing data and
analyzing AMOCs for the commercial air carrier fleet means that FAA
resources are often not available for general aviation aircraft
operators and manufacturers. If the telecom providers could share data
on tower locations and deployment plans with the FAA as soon as it
becomes available, the agency could manage the AMOC process more
proactively and dedicate additional resources to general aviation
operators.
As the 5G rollout continues across the country, the FAA will face a
growing workload to review and re-issue AMOCs each month. By working
collaboratively with the FCC, telecom providers, and other
stakeholders, the FAA could have better visibility into future 5G
impacts. For example, data sharing between the FAA and telecom
providers in as close to real-time as possible would allow the FAA to
perform a more forward-looking analysis and could mitigate the need to
re-issue AMOCs every 30 days. The general aviation community looks
forward to working with the FAA on an improved process so we can
continue accessing airports across the nation and performing our
critical missions.
The dynamic and on-demand nature of business aviation operations
also means that receiving NOTAMs on 5G restrictions with relatively
little notice presents significant challenges. Unlike commercial
airlines, most business aviation flights do not operate on a fixed
route between the same airports. NBAA members can access more than
5,000 public-use airports in the U.S., requiring additional detailed
flight planning before each trip. The requirement to operate to such a
diverse group of airports is another reason that enhanced data sharing
and more lead time on subsequent phases of the 5G rollout will be
essential to the general aviation community.
Finally, we will continue to see rapid advancements in aviation and
telecommunications technology that will present additional wireless
spectrum challenges in the coming years. For example, advanced air
mobility (AAM) aircraft are currently undergoing FAA certification
review and will have unique spectrum requirements for safe operation.
Long-term plans from AAM operators include autonomous vehicle
operation, which will have different spectrum needs and safety
considerations from piloted aircraft. Groups including RTCA, Inc. are
already reviewing these complex issues, which will require more of our
focus in the coming years. We encourage robust interagency coordination
on future spectrum use and potential challenges involving all relevant
government agencies, including the FCC and industry stakeholders.
This hearing is an important opportunity to review the next steps
on the 5G rollout and identify key lessons learned. We applaud the
commitment of this Subcommittee and the FAA for their continued efforts
to ensure the highest level of aviation safety. NBAA looks forward to
working with the Aviation Subcommittee, FAA, and other agencies as we
continue developing strategies to co-exist safely with next-generation
wireless networks.

``Analysis of 5G Deployment: Executive Summary,'' by Professional
Aviation Safety Specialists, AFL-CIO, Submitted for the Record by Hon.
Peter A. DeFazio
Analysis of 5G Deployment: Executive Summary
The Professional Aviation Safety Specialists, AFL-CIO (PASS), the
union representing more than 11,000 Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) and Department of Defense (DoD) employees, is providing an
analysis of the deployment of 5G and the potential for radio frequency
interference with National Airspace System (NAS) systems and equipment.
PASS utilized extensive review of various aviation and
telecommunication industry white papers as well as conducting a
literary review of research papers within the Institute of Electrical
and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) library.
Radio frequency interference (RFI) is a well-known phenomenon in
the electromagnetic spectrum.\1\ It is, as defined by the FAA Spectrum
Engineering & Policy department, any emission, radiation, or induction
that obstructs, or repeatedly interrupts, a radio communications
service operating in accordance with established regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ NASA. ``The Electromagnetic Spectrum,'' modified March 2013.
https://imagine.gsfc.nasa.gov/science/toolbox/emspectrum1.html.
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Radio Frequency Interference
Best Practices Guidebook, February 2020.
Arecibo Observatory. ``Sources of Radio Frequency Interference.''
https://www.naic.edu/sondy/rfi.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The introduction of 5G radios into the aviation band of frequencies
adds to an already complex environment of the electromagnetic spectrum.
Many of the traditional unintentional RFI scenarios become an area of
concern due to the proximity of frequency allocation as well as the
physical location of the 5G radio emitters near aviation facilities.
Over the years, as more users have been introduced into a spectrum
allocation block, the users--especially in non-safety of life
applications--have interfered with one another and the spectrum has
become very noisy and degraded due to the amount of emissions in close
frequency to one another.
The 5G emissions are known to interfere with RADAR altimeters.\2\
These altimeters are used by many systems on the aircraft and any
interference creates significant safety risk in low visibility landing
situations. RADAR altimeter is integrated into the avionics suite of
many aircraft, adding necessary sensor information and data points to
complete a logic sequence in the autopilot and other integrated systems
computing performance calculations. Any level of interference results
in a layer of safety being compromised.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Federal Aviation Administration, ``Safety Alert for Operators:
Risk of Potential Adverse Effects on Radio Altimeters when Operating in
the Presences of 5G C-Band Interference,'' December 23, 2021.
Federal Aviation Administration, AD 2021-23-12 and AD 2021-23-13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The process for RFI resolution and mitigation can be a
collaborative effort and should include all stakeholders to reach the
best solutions. It is paramount that all aspects are considered to keep
the aviation industry safe. PASS suggests the following additional
solutions to safe progress:
All manufacturers of 5G radios should send their radio to
the FAA Technical Center for evaluation by the Spectrum Engineering
division for testing for possible RFI scenarios.
Different placement of antennas relative to airfields,
including beam management.
No radiation zones in the direction of airports and
facilities that support aviation safety.
Radiate the 5G radios at lower output power levels.
Install antennas tilted downward to reduce potential
interference to flights.
Height restrictions on 5G radio towers to reduce line of
site to aviation equipment.
Fault detection and reporting on 5G radios to assist in
faster RFI resolution.
Apply spurious emission standards utilized in Europe to
5G radios in the United States.

PASS represents specialists at the FAA who are on the front lines
when it comes to locating and documenting interference issues as well
as inspectors who are responsible for investigating reports of aviation
incidents. The crucial work these employees perform has the potential
to be impacted by the deployment of 5G and PASS appreciates the
opportunity to allow our concerns to be presented. The union strongly
believes that addition of 5G without carefully mitigating risk to
aviation will complicate the RFI resolution process by adding new
interference potentials. It is crucial that both the Federal
Communications Communication (FCC) and FAA dedicate resources
specializing in 5G interference as future 5G rollouts are planned.

``Analysis of 5G Deployment: White Paper,'' February 2022, by
Professional Aviation Safety Specialists, AFL-CIO, Submitted for the
Record by Hon. Peter A. DeFazio
Analysis of 5G Deployment: White Paper
The following is an analysis conducted by the Professional Aviation
Safety Specialists on 5G deployment and the potential for radio
frequency interference with National Airspace System equipment.
Introduction
There is the potential for newly deployed 5G radio access
technology to cause radio frequency interference (RFI) in the nation's
air traffic control system. This paper looks at the known interference
potential with the RADAR/Radio altimeter in aircraft, as well as other
potential interference issues that may arise with various ground- and
space-based navigation systems within the National Airspace System
(NAS).
Since 1977, the Professional Aviation Safety Specialists, AFL-CIO
(PASS), has represented more than 11,000 employees of the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) and Department of Defense (DoD) who
install, maintain, support and certify air traffic control and national
defense equipment, inspect and oversee the commercial and general
aviation industries, develop flight procedures, and perform quality
analyses of complex aviation systems used in air traffic control and
national defense in the United States and abroad.
Nearly 700 million air travelers fly throughout the U.S. each year
and PASS-represented employees are there to ensure the safety of the
aviation system. Any mistakes or missteps could be catastrophic for the
American flying public. As the demand for air travel continues to
increase, so does the need to maintain the highest level of safety,
integrity and reliability of the NAS. From inspectors who ensure
industry compliance with FAA safety standards to systems specialists
who protect the safety and efficiency of critical aviation systems,
PASS-represented employees are focused on safety, every step of the
way.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Professional Aviation Safety Specialists. ``About PASS.''
https://passnational.org/index.php/about-pass/about-pass
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Methodology
Utilizing extensive review of various aviation and
telecommunication industry white papers as well as conducting a
literary review of research papers within the Institute of Electrical
and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) library, PASS has reviewed and
developed the following analysis of the 5G radio, focusing on 5G and
its potential to cause harmful interference with both NAS and user
equipment. Spectrum analysis techniques as defined in the FAA's radio
frequency interference course developed and taught at the William J.
Hughes Technical Center in Atlantic City, N.J., were utilized in
analysis of all potential interference hazards identified in this
paper.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Federal Aviation Administration, William J. Hughes Technical
Center, ``RFI Resolution Course.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For the purposes of this research, the union analyzed the potential
for harmful interference caused by frequency allocation, power
radiation levels, spurious and erratic transmissions, as well as other
unintentional harmful interference caused by the improper operation or
failure of the 5G radio. The goal and the methods used were to take a
safety perspective viewpoint in order to analyze all potential hazards,
along with how to identify them, while simultaneously developing a
means to mitigate the hazards for all stakeholders involved.
Careful consideration and time were dedicated to reviewing the
design and use of the technology being deployed by the
telecommunications industry for use in the 5G radio. PASS ensured that
all aspects of beam management, radio location, frequency allocation,
tower heights and power levels were considered in the analysis of 5G in
regard to aviation equipment and potential interference, utilizing
similar criteria as seen in the South Korean research on 5G conducted
by the Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute.\3\ Any
mathematical formulas, equations or techniques are from referenced
material and online resources.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Ho-kyung Son and Young-jun Chong, Interference Analysis for
Compatibility Between 5G System and Aeronautical Radio Altimeter,
published as part of 2020 International Conference on Information and
Communication Technology Convergence (ICTC), October 21-23, 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Literary Review
Radio Frequency Interference: An Overview
Radio frequency interference (RFI) is a well-known phenomenon in
the electromagnetic spectrum.\4\ Research into what types of RFI exist,
such as intermodulation and how to mitigate the effects on
communication equipment, date back 100 years or more and is well
documented research.\5\ Modern day RFI is still an issue that many
manufacturers try to address during the engineering and design phase of
any electronic device. Even with multiple aspects of RFI taken into
consideration during design, unforeseen issues often arise or there are
issues that simply cannot be avoided. Regarding the aviation industry,
there are multiple types of interference reported each day within the
NAS which affect the operation of NAS components. As more users enter
or become adjacent to the frequencies that are utilized for safety of
life applications, it is extremely important that all aspects of RFI be
considered and mitigated before they are introduced into the NAS and
become unknown risks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ NASA. ``The Electromagnetic Spectrum,'' modified March 2013.
https://imagine.gsfc.nasa.gov/science/toolbox/emspectrum1.html.
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Radio Frequency Interference
Best Practices Guidebook, February 2020.
Arecibo Observatory. ``Sources of Radio Frequency Interference.''
https://www.naic.edu/sondy/rfi.html.
\5\ K. Chang, Intermodulation Noise and Products Due to Frequency-
Dependent Nonlinearities in CATV Systems, published as part of IEEE
Transactions on Communications (Volume 23, Issue 1), January 1975.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Harmful interference as defined by the FAA Spectrum Engineering &
Policy department is any emission, radiation, or induction that
obstructs, or repeatedly interrupts, a radio communications service
operating in accordance with established regulations. Some types of
intentional interference are: Phantom controller, electronic attack
(military), GPS jammers and any illegal operation by an unauthorized
user. Some types of unintentional interference are brute force, spurs,
intermodulation, as well as faulty, degraded and/or aging electronic
equipment (see ``Interference Concerns'' below). Most RFI experienced
by the FAA is unintentional in nature and takes cooperation between
multiple stakeholders to resolve.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Federal Aviation Administration, William J. Hughes Technical
Center, ``RFI Resolution Course.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aviation Band of Frequencies
The introduction of 5G radios adjacent to. Many of the traditional
unintentional RFI scenarios become an area of concern due to the
proximity of frequency allocation, as well as the physical location or
proximity of the 5G radio emitters. By design, 5G is intended to
operate within the frequency range and power thresholds set forth by
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and should not infringe on
the use of any other adjacent frequencies.\7\ It is important to note
that the telecommunications industry's 5G radios encompass a large
variety of equipment and manufactures. These multiple types of 5G
radios fall under 3rd Generation Partnership Project's (3GPP) \8\ n77
technical standards, which cover spectrum allocation from 3.3GHz to
4.2GHz. The aviation band has utilized the spectrum from 4.2GHz to
4.4GHz for RADAR altimeters for over 40 years. The introduction of the
5G radios places a non-safety of life user near a frequency band which
is utilized in safety of life applications.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ CFR Title 47.
\8\ 3GPP. https://www.3gpp.org/.
\9\ Federal Aviation Administration, ``Safety Alert for Operators:
Risk of Potential Adverse Effects on Radio Altimeters when Operating in
the Presences of 5G C-Band Interference,'' December 23, 2021.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The reason for concern regarding this added allocation is
warranted. Over the years, as more users are introduced into a spectrum
allocation block, the users--especially in non-safety of life
applications--begin to interfere with one another and the spectrum
becomes noisy and degraded due to the number of emissions in close
frequency to one another. Radio frequency interference has been
increasingly observed in data recorded by several airborne and
spaceborne radar sensing systems.\10\ It is important that before new
users enter the spectrum, an assessment of the risks to aviation are
performed to assure that safety of life applications can be maintained.
Listed below in the table are the authorities for documenting RFI and
reporting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ The National Academies Press, ``Summary of the Radio-Frequency
Interference Workshop,'' November 8, 2013.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Table 1. Authority Contact Information for RF Interference Reporting
\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\11\ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Radio Frequency
Interference Best Practices Guidebook, February 2020.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Authority Contact Information
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FCC 24/7 Operations Center................ https://fccprod.service-
now.com/psix-esix/
Phone: (202) 418-
1122
Email:
FCCOPS@fcc.gov Non-Aviation
GPS Outages: USCG......................... https://www.navcen.uscg.gov/
?pageName=gpsUserInput
Aviation GPS Outages: FAA................. https://www.faa.gov/
air_traffic/nas/gps_reports/

Military GPS Outages worldwide: GPSOC..... https://gps.afspc.af.mil/
(may not open for non-
military users)
------------------------------------------------------------------------

One major reason that PASS is concerned with RFI related to 5G
radios is due to experience with new devices over the past 10 to 15
years. With the introduction of 4G LTE and WiFi devices, there was an
increase of RFI with systems such as the Terminal doppler weather RADAR
and other NAS equipment. Radio frequency interference issues with
broadband transmission media have been an important capacity and
coverage issue for 4G, LTE, WiFi and other deployments. Interference
modes unrecognized previously have risen to importance in the new
wireless environment. Some of the issues encountered with 4G (e.g.,
from FM to LTE, CATV to LTE, and LTE to CATV) raise valid concern with
5G deployment.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Chris Horne, LBA Blog, ``4G LTE Radio Interference Forum
Debuts,'' November 11, 2013. https://www.lbagroup.com/blog/4g-lte-
radio-interference/
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
RADAR Altimeters
PASS represents bargaining unit employees at the FAA who are on the
front lines when it comes to documenting and finding interference
issues. Other unions in the aviation industry have spoken loudly about
their concern of interference issues on 5G deployment, and PASS would
like to echo those concerns, as well as describe some of the added
complexity around the issue.
PASS-represented airways transportation systems specialists (ATSS),
FAA job series 2101 employees, are located at airports across the
nation and have a very complex job. An ATSS is often asked to document
any complaints of interference and track and locate the source. This
task is not an easy one as the source of interference is often not
known and can be very difficult to find if it is not a continuous
interference. When a pilot or controller reports RFI, the ATSS is
notified to investigate what may be the cause. Often this may include
interfacing with multiple entities and agencies to identify the source,
creating a long process that takes a great amount of time.
The first step is information gathering, trying to find out how
often the interference happens and if it was reported by multiple
users. In the case of 5G, the issue becomes a safety concern because of
several factors: including but not necessarily limited to the location
of the emitters, the power of the emitters, the frequency allocation of
the emitters, and degraded or broken emitters and their interference
potential (known and unknown). According to the FAA, the current known
interference caused by the 5G emitters is with RADAR altimeters.\13\
These altimeters are used by many systems on the aircraft and any
interference creates a significant safety risk in low visibility
landing situations and various other situations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Federal Aviation Administration, ``Safety Alert for Operators:
Risk of Potential Adverse Effects on Radio Altimeters when Operating in
the Presences of 5G C-Band Interference,'' December 23, 2021.
Federal Aviation Administration, AD 2021-23-12 and AD 2021-23-13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Because of its long history of integrity and accuracy the RADAR
altimeter is integrated as a core sensor feed into the avionics suite
of many aircraft, adding necessary information and data points to
complete a logic sequence in many modern and automated aircraft
systems. For instance, upon landing, the RADAR altimeter is used to
assist in verifying that an aircraft has reached the ground and to
initiate a sequence involving other systems (ground spoilers, thrust
reversers, autobraking systems, etc.) that slow the aircraft in a
timely and predictable manner. Airlines calculate performance data
based on the full functionality of these systems and the FAA authorizes
flight crews to plan for and utilize certain runway lengths based on
the availability of those systems. If the weather is a concern and the
aircraft or its crew is not able to utilize the full complement of
systems, the required length of runway increases greatly. In December
2021, the FAA issued two Airworthiness Directives (ADs) that were
prompted by a determination that radio altimeters cannot be relied upon
to perform their intended function if they experience interference from
wireless broadband operations in certain frequencies. During takeoffs
and landings, as a result of this interference, certain airplane
systems may not properly function. With the current 5G deployment, as
with all ADs issued, PASS-represented employees in Aviation Safety are
tasked with ensuring the ADs are complied with by the aviation
community.
Of specific concern is that the RADAR altimeter is used by airlines
and by many smaller operators such as Helicopter Air Ambulance (HAA)
operators performing emergency medical transportation. When conducting
HAA operations, many takeoffs and landings are off airport. HAA flight
crews are picking up trauma patients by the side of the road on
improvised landing sites that have not had a full analysis of the
possible 5G interference afforded to similar operations at airports and
heliports. Some of these landing sites can be in very close proximity
to cellular towers. It is in the best interest of all stakeholders that
a failure situation is considered and planned for properly. At a
minimum, the capability to alert the telecommunications service
provider of an out of tolerance frequency, or power output, should be
considered on all deployed devices.
Interference Concerns
The introduction of the 5G radios (NR) emitter towers in proximity
of landing environments or communication and navigational equipment
means that there is a new source of potential RFI that did not
previously exist.
The largest area of concern for interference with 5G radios (NR)
exists with the radio altimeters located in the aircraft. The system
provides data to both the pilot display and automated systems on
airframes, such as ground proximity warning, terrain awareness and
warning (TAWS), flight control and deployment of altitude dependent
systems. The radio altimeter is a critical safety function in landing/
take-off, low level maneuvering, and avoiding changes in terrain that
may not be visible at night or during bad weather. The technical
requirements are that the FMWC altimeter sweeps at 200MHz, with a
transmit power ranging from 0.1 to 100 watts. The protection criteria
as per the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) standard is that
desensitization occurs at I/N = -6dB.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), ``Radio
Altimeter Spectrum,'' February 6, 2018. https://www.icao.int/NACC/
Documents/Meetings/2018/RPG/RPGITUWRC2019-P08.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In a study by the Aerospace Vehicle Systems Institute (``AVSI'')
project team on the ``Effect of Out-of-Band Interference Signals on
Radio Altimeters,'' it was stated that while the altimeters considered
in the testing are representative of the majority of systems fielded by
commercial and private aviation, it is not a comprehensive set of data
for all altimeters operating under all conditions.\15\ The same holds
true for the 5G radios. There are different service providers and
carriers deploying different radios that are manufactured by multiple
vendors, thus the potential for interference is greatly expanded and
dependent upon what type of 5G radio is interfering with what type of
altimeter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Notice of Ex Parte Meeting, GN Docket No. 18-122, Aerospace
Vehicle Systems Institute (``AVSI''), ``Effect of Out-of-Band
Interference Signals on Radio Altimeters,'' February 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Brute Force
Excessive output power and the location of the 5G radios (NR)
emitters have the potential to cause brute force. If 5G radios are near
the aircraft's radio altimeter, communication or navigation receivers,
there is potential for RFI. Every receiver has a point at which a
signal outside its Radio Frequency band pass will break through and
overload. The receiver becomes desensitized, causing the receiver to be
driven into nonlinear operation.\16\ The undesired signal gets detected
in a highly garbled manner or the receiver becomes so desensitized that
signal detection is impossible.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ J. Gavan and M. B. Shulman, Effects of Desensitization on
Mobile Radio System Performance Part I: Qualitative Analysis, published
as part of IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology, November 1984.
Tian Tian, Hongshun Zhang and Yanzhi Hu, ``Study on UWB
compatibility with airborne receivers of Tactical Air Navigation
System,'' 2008 World Automation Congress.
\17\ Federal Aviation Administration, William J. Hughes Technical
Center, ``RFI Resolution Course.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The location and power output of the 5G emitters near airports
raises concern for potential brute force scenarios with Navigational
Aids (NAVAIDS) such as Instrument Landing Systems (ILS), Distance
Measuring Equipment (DME) and other ground-based navigation systems.
Unless the source is extremely strong, the signal may not be detectable
on the ground making it necessary to get a flight inspection aircraft
in the area to identify the source.
An additional aspect of concern for brute force is the beam
management utilized by 5G radios (NR). The beam management technology
allows the 5G radio to focus concentration on the user equipment (UE)
from the base station tower (gNB) toward the users. This creates a
scenario where the beam management system can aim and direct the power
toward an aircraft on final approach, causing the possibility for brute
force to be increased if the UE on the aircraft is not in airplane
mode.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ Giordani, M., M. Polese, A. Roy, D. Castor, and M. Zorzi. ``A
tutorial on beam management for 3GPP NR at mmWave frequencies,'' IEEE
Comm. Surveys & Tutorials, Q1 2019.
IEEE Spectrum, Engineering Resources. https://
engineeringresources.spectrum.ieee.org/
?pt=dir&page=engineeringresources.
MathWorks, Hybrid Beamforming for Massive MIMO Phased Array
Systems. https://www.mathworks.com/content/dam/mathworks/white-paper/
gated/93096v00_Beamforming_
Whitepaper.pdf.
MathWorks, Visual Antenna Coverage Map and Communication Links.
https://www.mathworks.com/help/comm/ug/visualize-antenna-coverage-map-
and-communication-links.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Spurious Emissions
Any electronic device has the potential to generate spurious
emissions. When an electronic device radiates on an unintended
frequency, such as transmitting the same frequency as another device,
that is a spurious emission. In many cases, radios and electronics
generate spurious emission when operating normally. The 5G radios have
the potential to generate spurious emissions.\19\ These spurious
emissions on a frequency, or frequencies, outside the assigned
bandwidth are often generated from faulty transmitters or radio
frequency amplifiers. Any signal above -104 dBm at a receiver's input
has the potential to cause RFI.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Federal Aviation Administration, William J. Hughes Technical
Center, ``RFI Resolution Course.''
IEEE Spectrum, Engineering Resources. https://
engineeringresources.spectrum.ieee.org/
?pt=dir&page=engineeringresources.
\20\ Federal Aviation Administration, William J. Hughes Technical
Center, ``RFI Resolution Course.''
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Radio Frequency Interference
Best Practices Guidebook, February 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The testing and data on what types of spurious emissions a 5G radio
is capable of emitting while in normal operation or failed states has
not been gathered. The problem when deploying new equipment into the
aviation band of the spectrum is knowing exactly how that device
operates and whether or not it has sufficient filtering on the output
of the transmitters amplifier section to prevent spurious emissions.
Erratic Emissions
The location of the 5G radio near airports or in close proximity to
communications and navigations equipment off an airport also raises the
potential for erratic emissions. Erratic emissions, which is a specific
type of spurious emissions, radiate off the assigned frequency to the
radio and sweep across the frequency spectrum. These signals are highly
dependent on several factors such as power level, temperature and
humidity. Often these are very hard to source due to the intermittent
nature of the RFI on specific frequencies caused by the sweeping
nature, even though the source is constant.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ Federal Aviation Administration, William J. Hughes Technical
Center, ``RFI Resolution Course.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The testing and data on what types of erratic emissions a 5G radio
is capable of emitting while in normal operation or failed states has
not been gathered. As with spurious emissions, the aviation industry
does not know if the 5G radio will generate erratic emissions. The
major difference with erratic emissions compared to spurious emissions
is the erratic emissions have the potential to take out or interfere
with multiple types of equipment simultaneously as it sweeps across an
often very broad range of spectrum.
RFI Resolution and Mitigation
The process for RFI resolution and mitigation can be a
collaborative effort and should include all stakeholders to preempt any
interference, and then address it if it still occurs. It is paramount
that all aspects are considered to keep the aviation industry safe.
FAA, aviation industry and telecommunications communication systems
and compatibility assessments with currently fielded radio altimeters
are not ``one size fits all,'' so the RTCA SC-239 Assessment \22\ is a
good starting place, but we must continue this work to ensure the two
industries can exist in the safest way possible.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ Radio Technical Committee for Aeronautics, SubCommittee-239,
Low Range Altimeter, ``Assessment of C-Band Mobile Telecommunications
Interference Impact on Low Range Radar Altimeter Operations'' (RTCA
Paper No. 274-20/PMC-2073) October 7, 2020. https://www.rtca.org/wp-
content/uploads/2020/10/SC-239-5G-Interference-Assessment-Report_274-
20-PMC-2073_
accepted_changes.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additional solutions to safe progress may include:
All manufacturers of 5G radios should send their radio to
the FAA Technical Center for evaluation by the Spectrum Engineering
division for testing for possible RFI scenarios.
Different placement of antennas relative to airfields,
including beam management.
No radiation zones in the direction of airports and
facilities that support aviation safety.
Radiate the 5G radios at lower output power levels.
Install antennas tilted downward to reduce potential
interference with flights (see graphic below).
Height restrictions on 5G radio towers to reduce line of
site to aviation equipment.
Fault detection and reporting on 5G radios to assist in
faster RFI resolution.
Apply stringent spurious emission standards within
aviation safety bands to 5G radios in the United States.

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Conclusion
PASS recognizes the efforts of airline unions and other aviation
organizations for raising concerns about 5G deployment and protecting
the safety of the flying public. We also would like to thank the FAA
and the telecommunications industry for working together to implement
and deploy 5G in the safest way possible. The delay and identification
of 50 airports with wireless transmitters in close proximity to runways
is a good start, but we must also protect small airports, helicopters
and general aviation.
The aviation safety concerns raised regarding interference to radio
altimeters from wireless operations pose a hazard to the flying public.
The current stop-gap solution is a preliminary response to mitigate the
threat of 5G to aviation safety. However, it does not establish a
sufficiently comprehensive and predictable framework for permanently
addressing imminent and potential hazards to aviation caused by 5G
radio interference.
PASS believes that there is a need to reinvest in the personnel
within the FCC and FAA who are dedicated to preventing interference
issues before they arise and resolving them when they occur. Over the
past 10 years, the FCC has closed multiple field offices. The state of
Florida has only one FCC office to investigate and deal with all
reported RFI issues in the entire state. In addition, the FAA does not
have adequate staffing in the job series 2101 or 0856 field for those
who specialize and resolve RFI issues.
The addition of 5G will complicate the RFI resolution process by
adding new interference potentials. It is crucial that federal agencies
and telecommunications companies dedicate resources toward the
prevention of 5G interference as future 5G rollouts are planned.

Statement of Terry L. McVenes, President and Chief Executive Officer,
RTCA, Inc., Submitted for the Record by Hon. Peter A. DeFazio
Chair Larsen, Ranking Member Graves, and Members of the
Subcommittee:
My name is Terry McVenes, and I am the current President and Chief
Executive Officer of RTCA, Inc. RTCA was founded as the Radio Technical
Committee for Aeronautics in 1935, and is a private, not-for-profit
corporation that works with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),
regulators in other countries, and industry experts to develop
technical performance standards. These standards serve as a basis for
government certification of equipment used by tens of thousands of
aircraft flying daily throughout the world's airspace. With over five
hundred members, RTCA represents organizations, entities, and
governments from across the globe including aircraft and avionics
manufacturers, service providers, research and development
organizations, academia, and uncrewed aviation systems.
On October 8, 2020, RTCA, Inc. submitted an ex parte filing in the
Federal Communications Commission docket to provide the Commission with
the benefit of our completed report entitled ``Assessment of C-Band
Mobile Telecommunications Interference on Low Range Radar Altimeter
Operations'' (``RTCA MSG Report''). This report was the culmination of
a six-month multi-stakeholder group (``MSG'') effort--the 5G Task
Force--that commenced in April 2020 when the RTCA Special Committee 239
(``SC-239'') issued an invitation to the public to participate. The
Commission had encouraged such multi-stakeholder efforts to examine
spectrum coexistence issues with radar altimeters as noted in the
Commission's Report and Order in the matter of Expanding Flexible Use
of the 3.7-4.2 GHz Band (``Order''). The RTCA MSG Report was informed
by detailed information made available by the commercial wireless and
aviation industries regarding their respective systems and was
therefore able to examine issues of compatibility more thoroughly
between existing radar altimeters and prospective flexible use
licensees than were the earlier preliminary analyses submitted to the
Commission. As explained in the RTCA MSG Report, the analysis found
serious threats of harmful interference to today's installed radar
altimeters from anticipated flexible use licensed deployments,
including from spurious emissions into the radar altimeter band.
At the time published, the RTCA MSG Report represented the most
comprehensive analysis and assessment of the potential for interference
to radar altimeters caused by 5G signals. It was based on the most up-
to-date information exchanged between the commercial mobile industry
and the aviation industry. This included experts in the design and
manufacturing of radar altimeters. As stated in the Report, our
analysis and its conclusions should not be considered as a definitive
one-time assessment but should serve as the basis for ongoing work and
analysis to continue to ensure that radar altimeters will function as
intended to enable continued safe aviation operations.
Although we stand ready to continue our assessment of the
relationship between 5G service and the proper functioning of radar
altimeters as further information becomes available, it is important to
note that the Report's findings and analysis remain uncontradicted by
any authoritative response based on valid scientific and engineering
methodology. Critics of the RTCA MSG Report have stated it should be
dismissed because of improper assumptions and the parameters analyzed.
Others have stated that the issue of potential 5G interference was
looked at two years ago and no problems were uncovered. However, those
calls for dismissal have never been backed up by hard science or
engineering analysis. To our knowledge, no authoritative studies have
been conducted that contradict the findings of the Report, and other
independent testing has confirmed the RTCA findings. Furthermore, RTCA
has not been approached to conduct further analysis or study based on
new assumptions or parameters. Therefore, RTCA continues to stand
behind the RTCA MSG Report from both a scientific and engineering
perspective as well as its unbiased conclusions.
RTCA applauds the recent efforts of technical collaboration between
the telecommunications industry and the FAA that has led to allowing
more operations into airports while enabling the safe implementation of
5G service across the United States. Further dialogue between the
aviation and mobile wireless telecommunications industries will be
crucial in continuing to develop mitigations that will allow for both
aviation and 5G implementation to be conducted in a safe and efficient
manner. That dialogue must continue to take place with a proactive and
transparent methodology, including further details of 5G
implementations that may be used in deterministic analysis of the
potential boundary conditions for failure or interference with low
range radar altimeters.
While the current short-term collaborative mitigation activity is
to be commended, RTCA is continuing our longer-term effort via SC-239.
This special committee was established by RTCA in December 2019 to
update the current minimum operational performance standards for radar
altimeters. Our focus is protecting future radar altimeters from
existing and planned in-band and out-of-band interferences.
It is important to note that future development and implementation
of innovative technologies from both aviation and non-aviation
interests are undoubtedly going to require new allocations of spectrum
frequencies. It is also likely that those future allocations have the
potential to conflict with those frequencies that have traditionally
been allocated for aviation use. To address these future concerns, RTCA
recently stood up a new special committee, SC-242, to take a broader
look at potential frequency spectrum conflicts, analyze all of the
current avionics standards in place, and then identify those areas that
need to be addressed so that aviation interests can be out in front of
any potential frequency conflicts early on in future technology
development. We encourage Congress to support and promote appropriate
government and industry parties to proactively participate in efforts
such as ours so that the challenges we have witnessed in recent months
can be minimized or avoided.
The importance for the United States to maintain its international
leadership in the implementation of modern technologies such as 5G
cannot be overstated. Not only are billions of dollars at stake, but
there are significant infrastructure and national security interests at
stake as well. It is imperative that the appropriate government
agencies collaborate early with each other, coupled and along with both
aviation and non-aviation industries. Working together towards
solutions early in the developmental process and based on an open and
transparent exchange and analysis of factual engineering data by all
parties will allow the United States to maintain leadership in the
deployment of new technologies such as 5G as well as protecting the
safety of the traveling public.
With our unprecedented history of accomplishments since 1935, RTCA
stands by to serve as a facilitator for such future dialogue. By
providing the necessary leadership for participatory decision-making
and consensus building, we aim to serve not only the aviation industry,
but also serve as a catalyst for the advancement of technology and
innovation on behalf of the American people.
Thank you for the opportunity to provide this written testimony.

Appendix

----------

Questions from Hon. Sam Graves of Missouri to Hon. Stephen M. Dickson,
Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration

Question 1. On January 12, 2022, the United States Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) announced that it was developing a proposal
under the Clean Air Act (CAA) to issue a proposed endangerment finding
for lead emissions from piston-engine aircraft. 170,000 piston aircraft
in the United States typically require leaded aviation gasoline to
operate. Restricting the availability or use of aviation gasoline,
which may occur if the EPA issues an endangerment finding, would be
devastating to general aviation and the entire aviation industry if no
low-cost, widely obtainable unleaded replacement fuel is available.
The FAA's Piston Aviation Fuels Initiative (PAFI) is intended to
identify unleaded aviation gasoline alternatives that can be used
across the piston aircraft fleet.
Answer. There are approximately 190,000 piston aircraft in the
United States that typically require leaded aviation gasoline (avgas)
to operate. Tetra-Etyly Lead (TEL) has been added to avgas since 1921
to prevent engine damage and knocking at higher power settings. Today,
avgas remains the only transportation fuel in the United States to
contain lead.

Can you please provide the Committee with a detailed status update
on PAFI, including:
1.a. PAFI's mission;
Answer. PAFI was formed to test and evaluate high-octane candidate
gasolines, required by piston-engine aircraft, to replace 100 low lead
(100LL) and to ultimately enable the transition of the entire U.S.
aircraft fleet to unleaded gas.

1.b. a timeline of PAFI's milestones (denoting milestones
accomplished and those still outstanding);
Answer. There are currently two candidate fuels being evaluated
under PAFI as part of the initial program phase. This initial phase
will determine if either or both of the candidate fuels are viable
replacement fuels for 100LL.
If a fuel is successful in the initial phase, more extensive
testing will be performed, including detonation testing with more
engines and greater number of test conditions, longer durability test
cycles, a comprehensive materials compatibility testing, and finally,
flight testing using the candidate fuel on a variety of aircraft types.
The anticipated timeline for completion of the initial phase is by
the end of 2022. Completion of the final testing phase is dependent on
the ability of the candidate fuels to meet the testing requirements.

1.c. an estimate on when fleetwide certification or availability
of an unleaded aviation gasoline is expected;
Answer. In parallel with the planned fuel testing, the FAA is
developing a Fleet Authorization Process, as outlined under section 565
of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018. The Act allows the use of an
unleaded aviation gasoline as a replacement for a leaded gasoline if
the Administrator ``adopts a process (other than the traditional means
of certification) to allow eligible aircraft and engines to operate
using qualified replacement unleaded gasoline in a manner that ensures
safety.''
The FAA will address fleet authorization of unleaded aviation fuels
for different octane levels. The FAA anticipates fleet authorization
for lower octane fuels will be available next year.
PAFI will continue to evaluate, test, and qualify high-octane
aviation unleaded fuels with the objective to ultimately transition the
fleet to unleaded aviation fuel.

1.d. action items and costs associated with ensuring the
widespread availability of unleaded aviation gasoline, including the
installation of new airport fueling systems;
Answer. The information requested will be part of the government-
industry collaborative Eliminate Aviation Gasoline Lead Emissions
(EAGLE) initiative, which launched earlier this month, to include
efforts to determine the fuel infrastructure, airport infrastructure
and associated commercial viability of unleaded aviation gasoline.

1.e. a copy of the most recent version of the PAFI Steering Group
Charter; and
Answer. See attached [below]:
Piston Aviation Fuels Initiative Steering Group (PSG)
May 29, 2013
Charter
In support of their ongoing commitment to facilitating the
development and deployment of a high octane fuel that will have the
least impact on the existing general aviation fleet and distribution
system, the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA), American
Petroleum Industry (API), Experimental Aircraft Association (EAA),
General Aviation Manufacturers Association (GAMA), National Air
Transportation Association (NATA), National Business Aircraft
Association (NBAA) and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) have
joined to form the Piston Aviation Fuels Initiative Steering Group.
Purpose of the Piston Aviation Fuels Initiative Steering Group
(PSG): To facilitate, coordinate, expedite, promote and oversee the
Piston Aviation Fuels Initiative (PAFI) based on the recommendations of
the Unleaded Avgas Transition Aviation Rulemaking Committee Final
Report.
The role of the PSG includes providing supporting data and
coordinating the activities of member organizations in support of the
PAFI program. The PSG will establish a technical advisory committee
comprising representatives from key stakeholder organizations to
support the development of PAFI project activities and identify and
engage subject matter experts as necessary to accomplish specific
tasks. The Technical Advisory committee will help identify the
resources needed to support unique PAFI tasks, such as the generation
of job aids, and with support of the Industry Co-Lead solicit and
coordinate the in-kind support needed from industry to support the
development and approval of unleaded aviation gasolines.
The PSG is organized as an industry-FAA coalition comprising
industry associations and the FAA to coordinate the resources and
support necessary for the program. The PSG will form working groups
composed of necessary FAA and industry subject matter experts to
develop procedures, plans, and other necessary information to conduct
the fuel testing. The PSG will engage with industry stakeholders who
allocate manpower and other resources to support these working groups
and the test program.
Duration: The PSG is established with an initial five-year charter
in support and recognition of the Preparatory and Project phases of the
PAFI. The PSG will undergo an annual review of its charter, membership,
and purpose to address the potential changing needs and tasks as the
industry moves closer to the Deployment stage of new fuels.
Schedule: Members of the PSG will meet at a minimum of twice each
year to receive a formal report on the status of the PAFI. The PSG will
also conduct regular conference calls to support the activities of the
PAFI leads and the Technical Advisory Committee.
Overview of PAFI: The FAA's Unleaded Avgas Transition Aviation
Rulemaking Committee (UAT ARC) recommended the establishment of a
collaborative industry-government initiative referred to as the Piston
Aviation Fuels Initiative. The objectives of this initiative are to
identify candidate unleaded aviation gasolines, provide for the
generation of qualification and certification data on those fuels, and
facilitate fleet-wide certification of the selected candidate fuel(s)
with the least impact on the existing piston-engine aircraft fleet. The
PAFI program is designed to support the identification of the most
viable fuels consistent with the FAA 2025 Flight Plan goal of
identifying a viable unleaded aviation gasoline by 2018. Additional
work will be necessary to develop a transition plan that supports the
production and distribution of a fuel and transition of the existing
aircraft fleet, including support for the certification of any hardware
modifications that might be necessitated by a new fuel. The complexity,
cost and timeline for successful transition is unknown at this time and
will be partially dependent on the properties and capabilities of the
fuel(s) that successfully emerge from the PAFI program.
Identification of candidate unleaded aviation gasolines for the
PAFI program shall be based on ``Fuel Development Roadmap--AVGAS
Readiness Levels'' developed by the UAT ARC that identifies the key
milestones in the aviation gasoline development process and the
information needed to support assessment of the viability of candidate
fuels in terms of impact upon the existing fleet, production and
distribution infrastructure, environment and toxicology, and economic
considerations. The elements of PAFI will be a PSG, FAA Test Program,
FAA review board, and a centralized FAA certification office.
PAFI includes an FAA test program which is composed of a subset of
Test & Evaluation tasks from the UAT ARC final report based on the
expected level of funding. The FAA test program will test candidate
fuels at the FAA William J. Hughes Technical Center to generate data
that can then be used by the candidate fuel developer/sponsor to
support both ASTM production specification development and FAA fleet-
wide certification, eliminating redundant testing activities. It
includes procurement of necessary equipment and services to conduct
tests in two phases: Phase 1 fuel properties testing of up to ten
candidate fuels, and Phase 2 engine and aircraft testing of up to two
candidate fuels.
PAFI will also include the establishment of an Industry Co-Lead and
an FAA Co-Lead. The Industry Co-Lead, reporting to the PSG, will act as
the industry program manager, monitoring, directing and coordinating
overall industry-related PAFI activities, and interface with industry,
government and candidate fuel developers. The FAA Co-Lead (manager of
the Fuels Program Office, AIR-20) will act as the FAA program manager
and will monitor direct and coordinate overall government-related PAFI
activities.
PAFI Steering Group
Members
May 29, 2013
Craig Fuller,
President & CEO
Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association

Bob Greco,
Group Director, Downstream and Industry Operations
American Petroleum Association

Jack Pelton,
Chairman of the Board
Experimental Aircraft Association

Peter A. White,
Fuels Program Office (AIR-20), Manager
Federal Aviation Administration
Pete Bunce,
President & CEO
General Aviation Manufacturers Association

Tom Hendricks,
President & CEO
National Air Transportation Association

Ed Bolen,
President & CEO
National Business Aviation Association

1.f. any other information relating to the certification of
unleaded aviation gasoline, whether part of PAFI or not.
Answer. To-date, a small percentage of the piston engine fleet is
permitted to operate on unleaded fuels through FAA-approved
Supplemental Type Certificates (STCs).
These unleaded fuels include:
UL 91 (91 Octane, ASTM Spec D7547);
UL 94 (94 Octane, ASTM Spec D7547);
Automotive gasoline (ASTM Spec D4814);
82 UL (ASTM Spec D6227-04);
GAMI Gl00UL (100 Octane).

On February 23, 2022, the FAA announced a new initiative that
outlines how our country can safely eliminate the use of leaded
aviation fuel by the end of 2030 without adversely affecting the
existing piston-engine fleet. The initiative, EAGLE, builds upon a
continuing collaboration with Industry through PAFI.
The effort to remove leaded aviation fuels will be based on four
pillars of action that involve the FAA, the EPA, fuel suppliers and
distributors, airports, engine and aircraft manufacturers, research
institutions, associations, environmental experts, communities and
other key stakeholders. The four pillars are:
Develop Unleaded Fuels Infrastructure and Assess
Commercial Viability;
Support Research & Development and Technology
Innovations;
Continue to Evaluate and Authorize Safe Unleaded Fuels;
and
Establish Necessary Policies.

Questions from Hon. Eleanor Holmes Norton to Hon. Eric Fanning,
President and Chief Executive Officer, Aerospace Industries Association

Question 1. I would like to ask about the logistics of upgrading
radio altimeters for the U.S. air fleet. What steps are involved in
this process? How long would it take to upgrade the altimeters for the
entire fleet? How much would that cost and who currently bears the
burden for that cost?
Answer. Our members are hard at work on this process. We believe
there is a near term solution which includes retrofitting with a filter
for those models that can accommodate them. As part of that work we are
collaborating with the FAA to define how much potential interference a
radio altimeter can tolerate and still be relied upon.
We do know that some radio altimeter models will not be able to be
retrofitted, and those will require a new design. Over the long term we
would expect that all models will need to be replaced. This requires
the publication of a new standard.
The first step for a standard was taken in 2019 when RTCA formed a
group to begin this process. However, a new standard will require a
total re-write because the current criteria require a substantial
update to enable them to work with U.S. and international operational
systems.
Originally the group expected to complete the standard this year,
but the current crisis has impacted this work because the same staff
are now prioritizing the analysis of data and designing near-term
fixes. The expectation now is that a new standard could be ready in the
third or fourth quarter of 2023.
It is critical that the standard be written with the future in
mind. This will require that the telecommunications industry provide
data and plans for future operating environments, as well as the
current ones. The development lifecycle for an altimeter can be
measured in decades, so it is important for aviation to understand what
6G and 7G look like twenty years from now.
Regarding timelines, the retrofitting for aircraft where a near-
term solution is possible could take up to a year. The standard
development, design of new radio altimeters, certification and
replacement should be measured in years. It is difficult at this
juncture to ascertain the costs of such a multi-year program, until the
final operational environment is defined and the standard completed.

Question from Hon. Peter A. DeFazio to Hon. Meredith Attwell Baker,
President and Chief Executive Officer, CTIA

Question 1. It is my understanding that many of the wireless
providers will be shutting down their 3G networks in order to make room
for expanding 5G networks. This will not only impact connectivity for
rural users who won't have immediate access to 5G, but there are
numerous impacts on home security, in-vehicle technology and transit.
It is my understanding that unless there is a delay in the shuttering
of 3G systems, more than 60 transit agencies will lose their real-time
transit information platforms because those systems run off of a 3G
network and supply chain issues have impeded their ability to upgrade.
Absent real-time information about the location of trains and buses,
many transit riders will consider other modes of travel, creating
serious safety, congestion, and climate impacts for areas across the
country.
As a matter of public safety and equity, will wireless providers be
delaying their planned shut down of 3G service in order to give more
time for transit agencies and others to adjust to the change?
Answer. Thank you for the question, Mr. Chairman. As you are aware,
the national wireless carriers have each announced plans to transition
the spectrum being used for 3G services to 5G services. Since those
announcements, the industry has undertaken extensive efforts to educate
its customers using 3G devices, including public transportation
companies and transit agencies, about 3G sunset plans and how to
continue service uninterrupted. Those outreach efforts included general
3G sunset notices and reminders via direct mail, email, text messages,
business team engagement, industry outreach, website tools,
whitepapers, articles, and webcasts, all for the purpose of minimizing
customer disruption. The industry has also offered IoT customers
services to obtain replacement devices and tailored solutions to
streamline device procurement, activation, and configuration. In the
months leading up to the 3G sunset, the industry has engaged with
public transportation agencies and telematics companies to assist in
device migration efforts. The wireless industry has offered assistance
to migrate devices more quickly and has even offered temporary roaming
solutions. As an industry, we commit to remain focused on assisting
those few remaining 3G customers to work through any device migration
efforts.