[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


              THE IMPACT OF RUSSIA'S INVASION OF UKRAINE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH 
                                 AFRICA

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                            SUBCOMMITTEE ON
         MIDDLE EAST, NORTH AFRICA, AND GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM

                                 OF THE

                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                              MAY 18, 2021

                               __________

                           Serial No. 117-133

                               __________

        Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs


Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov, 

                       or http://www.govinfo.gov
                     
                     
                     
                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                  GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York, Chairman

BRAD SHERMAN, California              MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Ranking 
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey                  Member
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia	      CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida	      STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
KAREN BASS, California		      SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts	      DARRELL ISSA, California
DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island	      ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
AMI BERA, California		      LEE ZELDIN, New York
JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas	              ANN WAGNER, Missouri
DINA TITUS, Nevada		      BRIAN MAST, Florida
TED LIEU, California		      BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania	      KEN BUCK, Colorado
DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota	      TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota		      MARK GREEN, Tennessee
COLIN ALLRED, Texas		      ANDY BARR, Kentucky
ANDY LEVIN, Michigan		      GREG STEUBE, Florida
ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia	      DAN MEUSER, Pennsylvania
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania	      AUGUST PFLUGER, Texas
TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey	      PETER MEIJER, Michigan
ANDY KIM, New Jersey	              NICOLE MALLIOTAKIS, New York
SARA JACOBS, California		      RONNY JACKSON, Texas
KATHY MANNING, North Carolina	      YOUNG KIM, California
JIM COSTA, California		      MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida
JUAN VARGAS, California		      JOE WILSON, South Carolina
VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas		      RON WRIGHT, Texas
BRAD SCHNEIDER, Illinois              
                                   
                    Sophia Lafargue, Staff Director

               Brendan Shields, Republican Staff Director

                                 
                                 ------                                

 Subcommittee on Middle East, North Africa, and Global Counterterrorism

                 THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida, Chairman

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia         JOE WILSON, South Carolina, 
DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island            Ranking Member
TED LIEU, California		     SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
COLIN ALLRED, Texas		     ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey	     LEE ZELDIN, New York
KATHY MANNING, North Carolina	     BRIAN MAST, Florida
WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts	     TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
BRAD SHERMAN, California	     GREG STEUBE, Florida
JUAN VARGAS, California		     RONNY JACKSON, Texas
BRAD SCHNEIDER, Illinois	     MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida
                                 
                      Casey Kustin, Staff Director
                           
                           
                           C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

                               WITNESSES

Notte, Dr. Hanna, Senior Research Associate, Vienna Center for 
  Disarmament and Non-Proliferation..............................     8
Wehrey, Dr. Frederic, Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for 
  International Peace............................................    15
Welsh, Ms. Caitlin, Director, Global Food Security Program, 
  Center for Strategic and International Studies.................    25
Rumley, Mr. Grant, Senior Fellow, The Washington Institute for 
  Near East Policy...............................................    34

                  INFORMATION SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Information submitted for the record.............................    59

                                APPENDIX

Hearing Notice...................................................    68
Hearing Minutes..................................................    69
Hearing Attendance...............................................    70

         STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD FROM REPRESENTATIVE CONNOLLY

Statement for the record from Representative Connolly............    71

            RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Responses to questions submitted for the record..................    73

 
THE IMPACT OF RUSSIA'S INVASION OF UKRAINE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH 
                                 AFRICA

                        Wednesday, May 18, 2022

                          House of Representatives,
             Subcommittee on the Middle East, North
                Africa and Global Counterterrorism,
                      Committee on Foreign Affairs,
                                                    Washington, DC.

    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:08 p.m., in 
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Theodore E. 
Deutch (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
    Mr. Deutch. The Subcommittee on the Middle East, North 
Africa and Global Counterterrorism will come to order. Without 
objection, the chair is authorized to declare a recess of the 
subcommittee at any point and all members will have 5 days to 
submit statements, extraneous material, and questions for the 
record, subject to the length limitations in the rules.
    As a reminder, members who are participating virtually, 
please keep your video function on at all times, even when you 
are not recognized by the chair. Members are responsible for 
muting and unmuting themselves consistent with House Resolution 
8 and the accompanying regulations. Staff will only mute 
members and witnesses as appropriate when they are not under 
recognition, to eliminate background noise.
    And pursuant to notice, the subcommittee is meeting today 
to hear testimony on Russia's invasion of Ukraine in the Middle 
East and/or its invasion of Ukraine and the impact in the 
Middle East and North Africa. I see that we have a quorum and I 
will recognize myself for the purpose of making an opening 
statement.
    I would like to extend a warm welcome to our witnesses, Dr. 
Hanna Notte who is with us virtually; Dr. Frederic Wehrey--
Wehrey, sorry--also with us virtually; Ms. Caitlin Welsh; and 
Mr. Grant Rumley. I thank you for joining us today for what I 
know is a timely and important discussion. I also want to take 
a moment and acknowledge a delegation from the Ukrainian 
parliament that is here with us today. I want to thank you for 
coming and I want you as both, please, as a fellow 
parliamentarian and a proud American, I want you to know that 
we stand with you and with your country at this difficult time. 
Of course.
    It has been 12 weeks since Russia's illegal and unjust 
invasion of Ukraine. And in that time, we have seen over six 
million Ukrainian refugees flee their homes. We have seen the 
destruction, Russian destruction of hospitals, apartments, 
Ukrainian culture sites, as well as horrific war crimes and 
atrocities committed by Russian forces in Bucha and elsewhere.
    From the start, the United States, our European allies, and 
partners around the world coalesced in opposition to the 
invasion and in support of the Ukrainian people. And while the 
eyes of the world are on Ukraine, there is no question that 
this war has dramatically shifted the international landscape 
as we know it and has caused major ramifications in just about 
every country and region around the world. The Middle East is 
no exception.
    Russia and Ukraine, together, provide roughly one-third of 
the total global wheat exports and the majority of supply to 
the MENA region. In 2019, Egypt, Lebanon, Libya, the UAE, 
Israel, Tunisia, and Oman, all imported nearly half of their 
annual supply of wheat from the two countries. So the Russia 
invasion not only interrupted the wheat harvest and exports in 
Ukraine, but also impacted countries' ability and desire to 
purchase wheat from Russia and impeded the global supply of 
fertilizers. As a result, wheat prices have risen more than 60 
percent this year, and when combined with the COVID pandemic 
and mounting economic constraints, high dependence on Russian 
and Ukrainian food exports exacerbate humanitarian crises in 
parts of the region like Syria and Yemen.
    Moreover, high food prices and shortages have the potential 
to cause social unrest, severe instability, fiscal crises, and 
waves of migration. I am eager to hear from our witnesses today 
on the impact of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on food 
security in the region, and specifically what the U.S. and our 
international partners can do to help alleviate the needs.
    Russia has a significant conventional military and 
mercenary presence in the Middle East and North Africa but the 
war in Ukraine has caused Russia to shift resources and 
attention away from the region. Russia has had a naval 
installation in Tartus, Syria, since the early 1970's and has 
been integral to Bashar al-Assad's, in enabling his regime to 
cling to power. And while the success of Russian forces and the 
necessity of Russian support in Syria heightened perceptions of 
Russian influence, its failures in Ukraine have sobered the 
region's understanding of Russian capabilities and reduced the 
desire for Russian defense exports.
    Russia has had a military presence in Libya since the 2019 
civil war when it intervened on behalf of Khalifa Haftar 
through the deployment of Russian military personnel and 
mercenaries from Syria and the Kremlin-backed private military 
force, the Wagner Group. While fighters remain in Libya today 
on Moscow's behalf, a significant number of them have moved to 
Ukraine in recent weeks to reinforce Russia's battered army, 
and I hope to hear more from our witnesses today about Russia's 
current force posture in the Middle East and North Africa, 
their operational and strategic goals in the region, and how 
these have shifted since the invasion of Ukraine in February.
    On the diplomatic front, countries in the Middle East and 
North Africa region are an important asset to the world's 
response against the Russian invasion of Ukraine. With Russia 
accounting for approximately 34 percent of the oil and 40 
percent of the natural gas to Europe, countries in the region 
have the opportunity to support new supply sources and to help 
solidify European energy independence from Russia.
    Russia has attempted to advance diplomatic relations with 
countries in the Middle East like Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, 
and Libya. Over the past few years, in particular, Russia has 
perceived an opportunity to court regional leaders who seek 
leverage against the U.S. or to exploit concerns of U.S. 
partners about the reliability of U.S. support. Russia's 
behavior on many important regional issues, including Bab al-
Hawa border reauthorization in Syria coming up in July, is 
threatening international stability and security further.
    In addition, Russia has long aligned itself with Iran and 
supported its malign behavior across the region and beyond. 
Just as the United States and our partners have coalesced in 
opposition to Russia's invasion of Ukraine and its violation of 
Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity, so too must we 
unite against Iran in support of our regional partners 
including Israel and the Gulf States whose territory and 
citizens are constantly under threat from Iran and its proxies.
    A vast majority of U.S. partners and allies in the region 
stood together at the United Nations in voting to condemn 
Russia's invasion of Ukraine; however, when it came suspending 
Russia's right of membership at the Human Rights Council, a 
significant number of countries in the region chose to abstain. 
And I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today about 
Russia's shifting diplomatic influence in the Middle East, the 
role that countries in the MENA region can or should play to 
further isolate Russia, and the impact that these challenges 
will have on U.S. foreign policy.
    Again, I thank our witnesses for being here. I am grateful 
for our friends from the Ukrainian parliament who are here, and 
I will now yield to Ranking Member Wilson for his opening 
remarks.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Chairman Ted Deutch. And Chairman 
Deutch, I want you to know how grateful we are for your 
leadership, what a difference you have made as you are 
concluding your service in Congress. You have made such a 
positive difference and particularly we can see the positive 
difference that you have made recently with the additional 
funding for the people of Ukraine to show our affection for the 
people of Ukraine.
    And how fitting to have a delegation of Ukrainian 
parliament present because they should know that Americans are 
united to send a message to the people of Ukraine that we 
appreciate their resolve, their courage, and a message to Putin 
that indeed he is sacrificing young Russians solely for the 
benefit of his personal aggrandizement of oil and money and 
power, and so what a time for all of us to come together.
    And I appreciate this hearing in particular about Putin's 
war in Ukraine and the consequence in the Middle East/North 
Africa region. Certainly, we see an example of Putin's maniacal 
destabilization goals exemplified through his involvement in 
the Middle East and North Africa. The world is at a conflict 
between democracy with rule of law opposed by authoritarians 
with rule of gun. There is the sad sequence developing of Putin 
invading Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia with the Chinese 
Communist Party invading Taiwan as Iran seeks to vaporize 
Israel and India is destabilized. We must all stand firm.
    The world has witnessed Putin's murderous atrocities in 
Syria as Putin props up the butcher Bashar al-Assad in his 
continued war on his own people who desire a democratic and 
free Syria. The images of bombed-out hospitals and schools in 
Ukraine are a mirror image of what we have witnessed in Syria 
at Aleppo. Without Putin, Assad could not have been able to 
carry out atrocities on the scale that have been witnessed. 
This unholy alliance is critical for Putin to maintain a 
footprint in the region.
    Utilizing Hmeimim and the naval base at Tartus, Russia's 
only overseas naval facility outside of the former Soviet 
borders, Putin stages exercises and protects power in the 
Mediterranean. In Libya, Russia continues its support of 
warlord Khalifa Haftar and further destabilizing a country 
trying to rebuild.
    I was grateful to lead the Libya Stabilization Act with 
Chairman Ted Deutch to hold Russia accountable for its malign 
actions in Libya. Putin's murderous Wagner Group is deployed 
across war zones in the Middle East aligned with authoritarian 
regimes wreaking havoc in committing human rights' violations. 
It remains to be seen how Putin's war in Ukraine has affected 
Wagner Group's deployments across the MENA region.
    A critical sequence of Putin's war is the effect on the 
global wheat supply. More than one-fourth of the world's wheat 
comes from Russia and Ukraine, with Ukraine's harvest season 
nearing. Incredibly, 80 percent of the wheat imported by Egypt 
is from Ukraine. Putin's war has shut down ports, displaced 
farmers, severely jeopardized the forecast for exportable 
wheat; the effects of this are obvious to the entire region and 
to the MENA as a top customer as Putin has revealed himself to 
be the destabilizing actor, that he is creating opportunities 
for the United States to step in as the more reliable 
alternative with regards to security assistance.
    The United States should continue to leverage sanctions 
imposed on Russian arms sales and by encouraging MENA countries 
to enact their sanctions to prevent their countries from 
becoming a haven for dirty money that fuels Putin's war. Make 
no mistake, Putin's goals are insidious. He seeks to establish 
reliance and extort countries to do his bidding. A bizarre 
beneficiary of the changing energy landscape will undoubtedly 
be Iran. With the Administration's inclination to lift 
sanctions on the regime in Tehran in an effort to return to the 
disastrous JCPOA, we will see other countries follow China's 
lead in importing Iranian oil to fuel the destruction of 
Israel.
    I thank our witnesses for their time and expertise and I 
look forward to hearing from you. With that, I yield back.
    Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Wilson. Thanks again to our 
witnesses for being here today. Let me remind the witnesses to 
please limit your testimony to 5 minutes and, without 
objection, your written statements will be made a part of the 
hearing record. I will now introduce our witnesses.
    Dr. Hanna Notte is a senior research associate with the 
Vienna Center for Disarmament and Nonproliferation focusing on 
arms control and security issues involving Russia, the Middle 
East, their intersection, and implications for U.S. and 
European policy. She completed her doctorate at Oxford 
University in 2018 on the topic of U.S.-Russian cooperation in 
the Middle East. She is fluent in Russian and Arabic. She is a 
German national residing in Berlin and Vienna. Her 
contributions have appeared in Foreign Policy, the Washington 
Post, War on the Rocks and Carnegie, among others.
    Dr. Frederic Wehrey is a senior fellow in the Middle East 
Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace where 
he focuses on geopolitics, security and governance in Libya, 
North Africa, and the Gulf. He has testified before the U.S. 
Senate and House on multiple occasions, served as a consultant 
to the United Nations and other international organizations, 
and prior to joining Carnegie, he served for 21 years in the 
active and reserve components of the U.S. Air Force with tours 
across the Middle East and Africa. He holds a doctorate from 
the University of Oxford and a master's degree from Princeton 
University.
    Ms. Caitlin Welsh is the director of Global Food Security 
Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies 
where she provides insight and policy solutions to global and 
U.S. food security challenges. She brings over a decade of U.S. 
Government experience to this role, serving most recently on 
the National Security Council and National Economic Council as 
director of Global Economic Engagement where she coordinated 
U.S. policy in the G7 and G20. Prior to the White House, Ms. 
Welsh spent over 7 years in the Department of State's Office of 
Global Food Security, including as acting director, offering 
guidance to the Secretary of State on global food security.
    And finally, Mr. Grant Rumley is a senior fellow at The 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy's program on Great 
Power Competition and the Middle East where he specializes in 
military and security affairs in the Middle East. From 2018 to 
2021, Grant served in both the Trump and Biden Administrations 
as an advisor for Middle East policy in the Office of Secretary 
of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Policy, and prior to joining OSD, Mr. Rumley was Research 
Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies where his 
research focused on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
    As we can see, we have an esteemed group of witnesses 
today. I thank all of them for being here. I will now recognize 
the witnesses for 5 minutes each and, without objection, your 
prepared written statements will be made a part of the record.
    Dr. Notte, you are recognized.

STATEMENT OF DR. HANNA NOTTE, SENIOR RESEARCH ASSOCIATE, VIENNA 
          CENTER FOR DISARMAMENT AND NON-PROLIFERATION

    Dr. Notte. Chairman Deutch, Ranking Member Wilson, members 
of the subcommittee, members of the Ukrainian parliament, 
thanks very much for inviting me to participate in today's 
hearing. My name is Hanna Notte. I am a senior research 
associate at the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-
Proliferation and I am here to speak solely on my own behalf.
    As Russia settles into a protracted war of aggression 
against Ukraine, the ripple effects are being felt across the 
Middle East. High energy and food prices are just one example. 
So what should we expect regarding Russia's role in the MENA 
region going forward?
    It has been my assessment which was reaffirmed in 
conversations I had in Moscow just days before the invasion of 
Ukraine that Russia's approach to the region has settled into a 
stable modus operandi in recent years. First, Moscow's military 
presence in Syria has given it a buffer zone on its southern 
flank to counter perceived threats from within the region, but 
also to deter NATO outside the European theater. And second, 
Russia has turned to the region to diversify its economic 
relations with a focus on arms sales, civilian nuclear exports, 
and wheat supplies. And in building influence, Russia has 
largely followed what I would call a low-cost, high-disruption 
approach, also using hybrid tactics such as private military 
companies and disinformation.
    Now these Russian interests in the region will not 
fundamentally change with the invasion of Ukraine. Today, 
Russia's regional diplomacy remains highly active, aimed at 
offsetting the impact of Western sanctions and demonstrating 
that Moscow is not isolated internationally. However, I would 
expect Russia's activities to be accompanied by a certain 
military risk aversion, for instance, vis-a-vis U.S. forces in 
Syria, while the bulk of its military remains consumed in 
Ukraine. It wants to preserve existing gains in Syria.
    Now let me turn to the question of Russian cooperation in 
specific areas. Starting with arms control and non-
proliferation, though Moscow seemed intent on spoiling 
negotiations to restore the JCPOA in early March, it 
subsequently dropped demands for written guarantees that its 
cooperation with Tehran would not be hindered by sanctions 
imposed over Ukraine. But still, I think the geopolitical 
situation might make Moscow less willing to help finalize a 
nuclear deal. As in the past, Russia is also unlikely to 
support any U.S. efforts to curb Iran's use of missiles and 
proxies in the region because, essentially, Iran's regional 
strategy pins down U.S. resources while elevating Russia as a 
regional mediator which serves Russian interests well.
    Just a few words on the implications of Russia's nuclear 
saber-rattling over Ukraine for proliferation trends in the 
region, I think those will require careful monitoring. Regional 
countries took note of a nuclear weapons State using veiled 
nuclear threats to deter the conventional defense of a 
nonnuclear weapons State and they will reflect what this 
precedent means for their own security.
    Just a few words on Syria, Security Council Resolution 2585 
on the provision of humanitarian aid to northwest Syria is up 
for renewal in July. Now rationally speaking, the Kremlin 
should cooperate to avoid a worsening of Syria's food crisis 
especially if an endgame in Ukraine remains out of reach. But 
considering the current level of tensions between Russia and 
the West, I think the United States should be prepared for a 
Russian Security Council veto, regardless.
    Alongside continued Russian stalling on the Syrian 
constitutional committee, Moscow has no serious interest in 
seeing the committee advance. It will instead try to foster a 
Gulf Arab counterweight to Iran and Syria through 
normalization, especially for the contingency that Russia may 
need to scale back its own presence in Syria due to Ukraine.
    Now let me finally turn to some views on the Ukraine war 
from within the MENA region. First, unfortunately, I think 
there is a widespread perception that the Ukraine war is not 
their war. That it is a great power, NATO-Russia war partially 
fueled by NATO and U.S. actions vis-a-vis Russia. Second, there 
are accusations of Western double standards. The military 
support to Kyiv, the reception of Ukrainian refugees, these are 
rightly or wrongly viewed as proof that the West cares 
significantly more about conflicts in Europe's neighborhood 
than those in the Middle East.
    Third, regional elites worry about U.S. conventional 
security guarantees. They fear that the threats posed by Russia 
and China will accelerate a decline in U.S. power in the Middle 
East and they also fear that the U.S. will have limited 
bandwidth to confront Iran's missile and proxy activities. And 
with those fears, they feel they cannot afford to put all their 
eggs into the U.S. basket.
    And then finally, each regional State has very distinct 
business and security interests with Russia. As a result--and I 
will end here--I think U.S. opportunities to get regional 
States to turn against Russia are circumscribed. Loosening 
these ties that States have been building with Russia will 
require a heavy lift, a U.S. regional strategy that is both 
comprehensive and specific. Comprehensive in addressing those 
threat perceptions that have led regional countries to seek 
diversified great power relations in the first place, and 
specific in mitigating each country's distinct interest in 
doing business with Russia.
    Thank you for your attention.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Notte follows:]

    
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Mr. Deutch. Thank you very much, Dr. Notte.
    Next, Dr. Wehrey, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

   STATEMENT OF DR. FREDERIC WEHREY, SENIOR FELLOW, CARNEGIE 
               ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

    Dr. Wehrey. Chairman Deutch, Ranking Member Wilson, members 
of the subcommittee, members of the Ukrainian parliament, thank 
you for the opportunity to speak with you here today about how 
Russia's invasion of Ukraine has impacted Russian arms sales 
and other military activities in the Middle East and North 
Africa.
    I join you remotely from Tripoli, Libya, a city that bore 
the brunt of a Russian military assault in the form of hundreds 
of mercenaries from the Wagner Group who were backing a Libyan 
warlord in a bid to topple the Libyan Government. While this 
assault failed, it caused thousands of deaths and it left deep 
political divisions in its wake. Moreover, thousands of Wagner 
personnel and advanced Russian weaponry remain entrenched 
across Libya.
    In many respects, Russia's Libya campaign epitomizes its 
renewed activism across the Middle East which has included 
military intervention, arms sales, grain exports, diplomatic 
mediation and a willingness to talk to all sides, energy and 
infrastructure projects, and propaganda in media. This 
engagement is largely opportunistic and ad hoc. It seizes on 
instability and power vacuums. It exploits the insecurities of 
U.S. partners in the region about the reliability of U.S. 
support and their displeasure with the conditionality that the 
U.S. sometimes attaches to its arms sales.
    Russian arms deliveries, in contrast, are faster and free 
from restrictions related to human rights, but Russia cannot 
provide the security guarantees that many Arab States have 
depended on from the United States. Now in the wake of its 
invasion of Ukraine, Russia is trying to reap dividends from 
its investment in the region, call in favors, and capitalize on 
local ambivalence and hostility to the United States both from 
States and from Arab publics.
    America's Arab security partners have deferred on joining 
the Western condemnation of Russian aggression and some have 
refused efforts to isolate Russia economically. Meanwhile, 
Russia is trying to divert Wagner forces and Syrian militia 
fighters to Ukraine from both Syria and Libya. But both the 
scale and military significance of this deployment should not 
be overStated. The actual number of Syrians who have arrived in 
Ukraine is unclear and Libyan contacts with firsthand knowledge 
have told me that thousands of Wagner troops still remain very 
much present in Libya.
    On top of this, these mercenaries and the Syrian fighters 
will find a vastly more capable foe in Ukraine than the ones 
they previously fought and, more importantly, Russia's 
disastrous war in Ukraine is tarnishing its reputation as an 
arms supplier in the Middle East. Russian weapons have been 
shown to be flawed in combat and often fatally so. Battlefield 
expenditures and attrition have whittled away Russia's 
inventory, especially precision munitions, and sanctions have 
eroded its defense industrial base especially electronic 
components.
    As a result, Russia won't be able to fulfill its existing 
commitments and potential buyers will be increasingly dissuaded 
from turning to Russia. This shortfall could be modestly 
exploited by China which possesses large quantities of Russian-
made arms and spare parts which it could use to keep existing 
inventories in the region up and running. China could also 
intensify its efforts to sell its own advanced weaponry like 
drones.
    Now in response to this new landscape, the U.S. should 
avoid trying to coax its Arab partners back into the fold with 
promises of more weapons and more formal security commitments. 
Neither Russia nor China can really flip any State in this 
region into its orbit, and for too long Arab regimes, 
especially Arab autocrats, have cleverly courted assistance 
from Moscow and Beijing to extract arms deals from Washington 
and to obtain leniency on human rights.
    Instead of taking this bait, the U.S. should amplify the 
effects of Russia's diminished reputation as an arms provider 
while also using financial sanctions and especially the more 
effective and consistent application of the 2017 CAATSA 
sanctions to constrain Russian arms flows. The U.S. should also 
try to fill its partners' legitimate defense needs with 
transfers of its own or through European partners or regional 
producers like Turkey or Israel.
    But the U.S. shouldn't let this charged moment of great 
power rivalry distract it from focusing on the daunting 
socioeconomic and political problems that the Middle East and 
its societies face. These problems include authoritarian 
governance and corruption; the fallout from the pandemic; and, 
of course, food insecurity arising from the Ukraine war; 
climate change; the looming end of the hydrocarbon era; and the 
lack of opportunities, economic opportunities to name but a 
few.
    These problems present a far more pressing threat to both 
long-term stability and to U.S. interests than any encroachment 
by Moscow, or Beijing for that matter. They demand a fresh, 
holistic approach from the U.S. rather than a return to the 
overly securitized policies that have defined the American 
presence in the Middle East for decades.
    Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you here today. 
I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Frederic Wehrey follows:]

    
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Mr. Deutch. Thank you very much, Dr. Wehrey.
    Ms. Welsh, you are recognized.

STATEMENT OF MS. CAITLIN WELSH, DIRECTOR, GLOBAL FOOD SECURITY 
    PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

    Ms. Welsh. Chairman Deutch, Ranking Member Wilson, 
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank for the 
opportunity to testify today, and welcome to members of the 
Ukrainian parliament. Following is a summary of my written 
testimony which I have submitted to the committee.
    Russia's invasion of Ukraine leaves few agricultural 
markets untouched and threatens food security for millions in 
and outside the Black Sea. The war has reduced supplies and 
increased prices of foods exported from Ukraine and Russia, 
namely wheat, maize, and sunflower oil; driven up demand for 
substitute products; and reduced fertilizer exports from the 
Black Sea. Today's high cost of energy puts further pressure on 
food and fertilizer prices.
    Most vulnerable to the impact of these price spikes are 
countries for whom wheat is a major source of calories, that 
rely on imports to meet their food security needs, and that 
source a significant proportion of their imports from Ukraine 
and Russia. This characterizes many countries in the Middle 
East and North Africa. Levels of food insecurity caused by this 
war and appropriate policy responses differ depending on 
context. For example, Egypt is the world's largest importer of 
wheat, sourcing over 70 percent of its wheat from the Black Sea 
which presents problems for its budget. Egypt spends about $3 
billion annually for wheat imports, and over $3.2 billion on 
its bread subsidy program. Experts recommend that Egypt 
diversify its sources of wheat imports, reduce per capita 
consumption of bread, more efficiently target its food subsidy 
program, and adapt its agricultural sector to water shortages 
and climate related threats.
    The Russia-Ukraine war is raising the cost of food at a 
time of extreme food insecurity amid the civil war in Yemen 
where over the half the population are food insecure, including 
over 30,000 in famine-like conditions. Yemen relies on imports 
to meet its food needs. The total value of food imports exceeds 
the value of all exports from Yemen. Emergency aid is critical 
to addressing levels of food insecurity there, and it is 
particularly important to maintain the value of cash transfers 
in the face of high inflation.
    The Russia-Ukraine war is limiting access to wheat for 
Lebanon, already in one of the worst economic crises in the 
world. Lebanon has not recorded economic growth since 2017 and 
food price inflation reached 400 percent in December 2021. 
Lebanon procures approximately 75 percent of its wheat from 
Russia and Ukraine, and experts recommend Lebanon shore up 
wheat supplies for the near term and ensure equitable 
distribution of bread through social safety net programs and 
rebuild its grain silos to insulate itself and perhaps other 
countries in the region from supply and price shocks.
    And although Gulf countries import up to 90 percent of 
their food, including from the Black Sea, they have thus far 
weathered the agriculture market impacts of Russia's war on 
Ukraine. A range of efforts have bolstered food security in the 
GCC whose countries are also benefiting from high oil prices. 
Still, analysts recommend GCC countries encourage domestic 
agricultural production, invest in agricultural companies, and 
build in and maintain food reserves to buffer the effects of 
future crises.
    Some policy prescriptions differ country to country based 
on context while others are recommended broadly: Refrain from 
imposing export bans; avoid hoarding and panic buying; continue 
to exempt food and fertilizer from sanctions; and provide 
humanitarian assistance through the U.N. World Food Programme.
    The U.S. and global responses to the food security impacts 
of Russia's war are still unfolding. Today and tomorrow, 
Secretary Blinken will host two meetings on this exact topic at 
the U.N. in New York. G7 Development, Health, and Finance 
ministers are meeting in Germany this week and discussing 
solutions to food insecurity caused by this war. And 2 days 
ago, Secretary Yellen announced actions from international 
financial institutions to address this crisis.
    In the 2015 intelligence community assessment on global 
food security, the IC warned that--and this is a quote: Large 
exportable supplies of key components of food production come 
from States where conflict and government actions could cause 
supply chain disruptions that lead to price spikes. In years to 
come, conflict, climate change, and other factors will continue 
to affect food security particularly in the MENA region.
    In their responses to today's global food crises, 
policymakers would be wise to consider investing in mechanisms 
that help food importing countries weather today's and future 
supply and price shocks. Thank you for the opportunity to 
testify. I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Welsh follows:]

    
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    Mr. Deutch. Thank you very much, Ms. Welsh.
    And Mr. Rumley, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

 STATEMENT OF MR. GRANT RUMLEY, SENIOR FELLOW, THE WASHINGTON 
                 INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY

    Mr. Rumley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Deutch, 
Ranking Member Wilson, members of the subcommittee, members of 
the Ukrainian parliament, thank you for the opportunity to 
testify today on the issue of Russia's invasion of Ukraine and 
its impact on the Middle East and North Africa. I am honored to 
be included alongside such distinguished scholars.
    Russia is one of the few countries in the world to maintain 
a relatively positive diplomatic standing with nearly every 
country in the Middle East. It does so through a combination of 
an active military presence, high-level diplomatic engagement, 
and a concerted effort to position itself as a viable source of 
arms should countries seek non-U.S. materiel.
    Russia's military presence in the region is well-
documented. By Russia MoD statements, Russia has deployed over 
60,000 troops to Syria since intervening in 2015. From its two 
bases in Syria, Hmeimim and Tartus, Russia is able to project 
power into the eastern Mediterranean, influence the course of 
the Syrian civil war, and intervene in countries like Libya. 
Russia complements this military posture with an active and 
often effective arms sales pitch across the region, often 
seeking to exploit gaps left by the U.S. Turkey's acquisition 
of the S-400 and Egypt's purchase of the Sukhoi 35 are well-
known, but others in the region continue to be interested in 
Russian materiel.
    Russia's invasion of Ukraine, however, threatens Russia's 
standing in the region. Already, reports indicate Russia has 
begun withdrawing some troops and mercenaries from the region 
to support its invasion of Ukraine. While we can expect these 
reports to continue, if the war continues to go poorly for 
Russia, I am skeptical of a full Russian withdrawal and instead 
expect Russia to continue to consolidate its forces until it is 
left with a skeleton presence at Hmeimim and Tartus, its most 
strategic assets in the region.
    On arms sales, the Russian defense industry, which has 
struggled to produce key platforms following sanctions 
initially placed after its 2014 invasion of Ukraine, will 
likely have to prioritize replenishing the Russian military 
over exporting. Further, customers of Russian arms may struggle 
with the resources to maintain and sustain the materiel in 
their inventory. Still, so long as Russia is able to make 
platforms, there will likely always be potential customers of 
Russian arms.
    Given all this, I recommend the U.S. consider the following 
steps: First, clarify the U.S. policy regarding the 
implementation of CAATSA. I know the CAATSA debate in the U.S. 
usually pits delaying a determination against issuing a waiver, 
but delaying a determination only leaves partners more 
confused. Issuing a waiver sends a clear message to countries 
around the world as to what the U.S. sees as acceptable 
regarding a future relationship with Russia.
    Second, maintain the U.S. presence in northeast Syria. A 
diminished Russian presence may create a vacuum for ISIS. 
Additionally, a key Russian demand in negotiations over Syria's 
future has been that all U.S. forces leave the country. As 
Russia's presence wanes on the ground, ours may grant us more 
leverage in negotiating over Syria's future.
    Third, proactively shape partner requests in order to 
explore enhanced production possibilities. Many of our partners 
in the Middle East and North Africa seek not only U.S. arms but 
help in planning for a post-petroleum future. They seek 
technological sharing, co-production, and support for their own 
defense industrial base. By shaping multiyear acquisition 
strategies with partners individually, the U.S. can prioritize 
partner needs while also potentially opening the possibility 
for enhanced production capabilities.
    Provide off-ramps to countries in the middle of major arms 
transactions with Russia or who have recently purchased Russian 
systems. Turkey and Egypt are two examples of traditional U.S. 
partners with significant Russian arms in their inventories. 
There may now be a window to begin to wean them off Russian 
arms. Elsewhere in the world, the U.S. may also want to 
consider expanding the availability of foreign military 
financing to traditional Russian customers in order to lure 
them away from Russia.
    Prepare select platforms for simultaneous export in order 
to better compete with great power competitors. As drones 
increasingly populate the Middle East, a common complaint from 
partners is the lack of an exportable, effective U.S. counter-
UAV platform especially when Russia and China market one. To 
better compete with great power competitors, the U.S. must 
compete in this space as well.
    And finally, continue targeting Russian sanctions evasion 
efforts to ensure lasting impact to the Russian defense 
industry. In particular, this effort should focus on Chinese 
companies and the potential for China to supply Russia with 
dual-use components that may support its defense acquisitions. 
I thank you again for your time and look forward to your 
questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Rumley follows:]
    
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    Mr. Deutch. Thank you very much, Mr. Rumley, and thanks to 
all of the witnesses. I will now recognize members for 5 
minutes each. Pursuant to House rules, all time yielded is for 
the purpose of questioning our witnesses. Because of the hybrid 
format at this hearing, I will recognize members by committee 
seniority, alternating between Democrats and Republicans. If 
you miss your turn, please let our staff know so that we can 
come back to you. If you seek recognition, you must unmute your 
microphone and address the chair verbally. I will defer my time 
until the end, and with that recognize Mr. Cicilline for the 
purpose of questioning the witnesses.
    Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Chairman Deutch. And thank you to 
you and to Ranking Member Wilson for holding today's hearing on 
this very important issue. And I too want to welcome our 
colleagues, the members of the Ukrainian parliament, and say 
that the Congress of the United States and the American people 
stand very firmly with the Ukrainian people in your fight for 
democracy not only for your future but for the future of 
democracy in the world, so it is an honor to have you with us. 
And thank you to our witnesses for your very compelling 
testimony.
    I want to begin with you, Ms. Welsh. I was in the region 
recently with the chairman and then with Senator Coons and met 
with David Beasley of the World Food Programme and he provided 
a similar, kind of very daunting and terrifying future in terms 
of food insecurity and particularly with what was happening at 
the Port of Odessa where food is just apparently going to rot 
because the Russians won't let it be offloaded.
    So I am wondering what--and then you also spoke about the 
fertilizer shortage, so it is not only the immediate food 
insecurity, but it is also the ability to plant for the next 
season. What should we be doing in addition to, obviously, 
providing additional resources to programs like the World Food 
Programme? What else can Congress do to mitigate the impact 
both in the short term and the long term of this really 
devastating impact on food security in the region?
    Ms. Welsh. Thank you for that question, for an excellent 
question. I will note that the worst impacts, I think, are 
still to come. The restrictions that we have seen in exports 
are exports from the last season's harvest. The current season 
is still in the ground ready for harvest in the coming months. 
The USDA has put out its first estimate of the proportion of 
that harvest that will not be able to be exported and they 
estimate a reduction of over 11 million metric tons of wheat 
from Ukraine that won't be able to make it out of Ukraine. So I 
think that effects will continue at least in the medium term.
    In addition to providing robust financing for WFP, which I 
sense Congress is willing to do, I think it is, well, it is 
incredibly important to continue to do that not only for those 
who are immediately impacted in Ukraine and by this crisis, but 
for those who are experiencing acute food insecurity absent 
this crisis in the Horn of Africa, in the Sahel region, et 
cetera.
    Also note that the World Food Programme has estimated that 
because of this war the cost of production for--the cost of 
operation for WFP have risen up to $23 billion per month. So I 
think it is incredibly important to continue robust financing 
for WFP and in addition to that, you know, as I mentioned, we 
are in the midst of formulation of U.S. and global responses.
    In the long term, of course, it is very important to 
continue to invest in resilient agriculture, especially in the 
face of climate change. The way that I view this situation 
though is that apart from emergency assistance on the one hand 
and long-term assistance, which is agricultural development, on 
the other hand we need a financing facility to help food-
importing countries, perhaps those that are not experiencing 
the worst of this crisis, to afford the cost of imports.
    And I am sensing that that is what Secretary Yellen was 
announcing with financing from the IFIs on Monday, and that 
that is also what we could expect to hear out of the G7 in 
June.
    Mr. Cicilline. Thank you.
    Dr. Notte, earlier this year, I joined Chairman Meeks and 
Chairman Deutch, along with others, urging the Biden 
Administration to continue its efforts to restore human rights 
as a vital pillar in our bilateral relationships with Egypt. 
And I am wondering if you could comment on how you see Russia's 
invasion of Ukraine affecting U.S.-Egyptian bilateral relations 
and, you know, what opportunities does the Administration have 
to deepen these ties and how do we do so while also honoring 
our commitment to human rights?
    And also how does Egypt perceive Russia in terms of its 
strategic partnership and has that changed since their brutal, 
barbaric invasion of Ukraine?
    Dr. Notte. Thank you very much for the question, 
Congressman. I think the first thing you have to say is that 
while Egyptian-Russian relations go way back by decades, the 
Soviet Union had a stake in Egypt, and important relations one 
really shouldn't overState the depth and the importance of the 
Egyptian-Russian relationship.
    There are some trade relations. There are the wheat 
supplies, that is true. Russia intends to build a nuclear power 
plant at El Dabaa in Egypt, so that is certainly sort of a 
strategic area where the Russians want to position themselves. 
And then there are the occasional arms sales to Egypt in an 
Egyptian effort to diversify its arms procurement. But, you 
know, the relationship hasn't really evolved much beyond that.
    One should also say, I think, that Egypt has looked 
favorably somewhat upon Russia's role in Libya as seeing Russia 
and its partnership with General Haftar sort of as a, as a sort 
of guarantee that the Egyptian-Libyan border remains somewhat 
stable and the Egyptians have looked toward the Russians to 
ensure that.
    Now when it comes to sort of undermining Russian commercial 
opportunities in Egypt, with the El Dabaa power plant, I think 
countries in the region might well doubt that Rosatom, which is 
the company that is building those power plants, can be an 
attractive provider in the future. Rosatom hasn't been 
sanctioned yet, but the companies that usually, the banks that 
provide loans for those power plants like Sberbank, when it 
comes to the Turkish power plant Akkuyu, have been sanctioned. 
And also a nuclear power plant is a decades-long investment and 
there might well be doubts about Russia's ability to service 
and maintain strategic technologies, whether its arms or 
whether its nuclear power plants, in the future.
    So I would actually expect a certain hesitancy by countries 
like Egypt to procure these strategic technologies from Russia 
going forward. And I think the United States should make clear 
those limitations of the Russians in their own bilateral 
consultations with the Egyptians.
    Mr. Cicilline. Thank you so much. My time has expired. I 
yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Deutch. And thank you, Mr. Cicilline. Mr. Wilson is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And indeed, as we have 
our visiting parliamentarians from Ukraine, what an 
extraordinary time in history, you should be aware. I 
appreciate the leadership of Chairman Ted Deutch assisting in 
the 40 billion-dollar aid package. That is the largest package 
that truly has ever occurred so quickly because it is done 
heartfelt.
    And then I am really grateful that as our parliamentarians 
if you have a chance to travel across the United States, you 
are going to find out something and that is that on virtually 
every street there is a flag of Ukraine in front of one, two or 
three homes. And then I am really grateful that I was able to 
provide a flag of Ukraine. When you visit the Statehouse in 
South Carolina and you visit with the Governor Henry McMaster, 
who is a strong friend of Ukraine, the first thing you are 
going to see when you get to the office is the flag of Ukraine.
    So you are thought of, your courage. From our perspective, 
it is Don't Tread On Me/Live Free or Die, the American 
Revolution. With that, a question for Mr. Rumley. What factors 
do you think would assist in deterring U.S. partners from 
purchasing Russian military equipment? What can we do to 
prevent China from backfilling the defense procurement space 
that may be vacated by Russia in the Middle East?
    Mr. Rumley. Thank you for that question, Congressman. I 
definitely think customers of Russian arms are going to have 
several hurdles going forward not only with simply maintaining 
and sustaining what they have already purchased, but in some of 
the basic logistics, even the payment process. A Russian bank 
complained last month that it wasn't able to process close to a 
billion dollars in payments from India and Egypt over arms 
sales. I think countries that purchase Russian arms will also 
now have to consider the potential that they may incur 
secondary sanctions in addition to running afoul of CAATSA.
    I think from our standpoint, there are many ways that we 
can amend our security cooperation approach. The Middle East, I 
think, is a key theater for the future of great power 
competition. Not only have we been competing with Russia in 
terms of arms sales there, but China increasingly has sold 
armed drones to the region. They have sold it to traditional 
partners--Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the UAE. And what 
they are doing is oftentimes what we are not willing to do.
    Our partners in the region seek coproduction, they seek 
technology sharing; China and Russia are willing to work 
together to build these advanced platforms. Russia and the UAE 
inked an agreement several years ago to produce a fifth-
generation fighter. Nothing has come of that yet. China and 
Saudi Arabia, however, signed an agreement a couple months ago 
to jointly produce armed drones in Saudi Arabia.
    And so I think the U.S. may want to think creatively in 
terms of both what we sell, how we sell it, and what we are 
doing to make this more of a relationship and something beyond 
a strict transaction.
    Mr. Wilson. Putin uses the base in Syria to challenge 
NATO's southern flank, a direct threat to Turkey, to Greece, to 
Bulgaria, to Albania, to Italy. Can you provide more 
information on how Russia uses this base to challenge NATO? You 
detailed how Russia's military presence in Syria supports 
Russia's power protection. Is there anything the United States 
can do to limit the Russian presence in Syria and therefore 
their projection in the region?
    Mr. Rumley. Yes. Thank you, Congressman. Their presence in 
Syria has evolved from a modest airstrip in 2015 to a base at 
Hmeimim that by open source reporting can serve as a logistics 
hub, a medical hub. It has the runways to host Russia's most 
advanced bombers. There were reports before Ukraine that Russia 
was deploying Tu-22 bombers there and hypersonic missiles. 
Their facility at Tartus, likewise, has--their ability to stage 
naval assets there has expanded. They can now stage up to 11 
ships there. So it has grown from a rather modest beginning to 
something much more, I think, challenging from a U.S. 
standpoint.
    In terms of what we can do, I think we can continue to 
support Ukraine and the defense of Ukraine and the longer that 
Russia is bogged down in Ukraine, the harder it will be for 
Russia's military to extend and maintain its presence in the 
Middle East.
    Mr. Wilson. I was disappointed to hear that Russia has a 5-
year agreement with Egypt to use its airbases and air space. 
How utilized is this agreement by the Russian Federation in the 
last 5 years and what factors will influence Egypt's decision 
of whether to renew the agreement?
    Mr. Rumley. Thank you, Congressman. I think Dr. Wehrey 
might be able to provide some details as well here. I think 
from Egypt's standpoint, the basing agreement fits into both 
their shared objectives with Russia in terms of intervening in 
the Libya conflict. I think it also fits into their 
diversifications since President Sisi came to power of seeking 
to diversify both who they buy from, but also where they--who 
they jointly cooperate with on a military front.
    I think it is, I cannot say for certain whether they will 
renew it. I know there is the option to automatically renew the 
agreement. But again, the effects of Ukraine may make it 
difficult for Russia to maintain much of a presence there.
    Mr. Wilson [continuing]. Input in the future, Egypt should 
be such an important part of stability in the Middle East and a 
strong ally of the United States so any way we can back them up 
to not be reliant on anything that relates to Putin. I yield 
back.
    Mr. Deutch. I thank the ranking member and yield 5 minutes 
to Mr. Malinowski.
    Mr. Malinowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So obviously, for 
a lot of countries in the Middle East and North Africa, the war 
in Ukraine has brought significant economic challenges, food 
and security, for example, countries like Egypt and Libya, 
Yemen, Tunisia. But for other countries, particularly from some 
of the oil-rich countries in the Persian Gulf, the war from 
everything I can see has brought nothing but economic benefits 
that they have taken advantage of.
    Right now, there is a shortage of about 1.5 million barrels 
a day of oil on the global markets, if you count the Russian 
oil that has been lost due to sanctions and then throw in what 
we have generated additionally from our strategic reserves. And 
all of the experts I have spoken to tell me there are only two 
countries in the world that have the capacity to make up that 
shortfall in a short period of time and that is Saudi Arabia 
and the United Arab Emirates. And yet they seem to have made a 
deliberate choice for several months not to use that power to 
stabilize these global energy markets and they have made a lot 
of money at it.
    The Saudi Arabia's Aramco, for example, the State-owned oil 
company, in the first quarter of 2022 made a profit of $40 
billion in comparison to $22 billion in the first quarter of 
the previous year. That is 124 percent increase, an 18 billion-
dollar windfall from basically the increased oil prices from 
the Ukraine war. By refusing to play their role, they have 
enabled Russia to make a lot more money because the price of 
oil is higher on their remaining oil exports and they have 
seriously hurt the United States and our western European 
allies. All of our constituents are feeling this right now. 
They have made it extremely hard for us, harder than it 
otherwise would have been to impose the types of sanctions on 
Russian energy that are needed to bring this war to an end.
    So I wanted to ask you, Mr. Wehrey, I mean, first of all, 
can you think of any countries in the world that are doing more 
to undermine our sanctions on Russia than Saudi Arabia and the 
UAE? And two, why are they doing this? What are the concessions 
that they are trying to extract from us as part of this 
process?
    Dr. Wehrey. Thank you for the question, Congressman. I 
think you raise a very important point about the nature of our 
partnership with these two States. And the idea that because of 
the Ukraine war we should redouble our efforts to solidify 
those partnerships and especially in terms of security and 
arms, I think we need to question what that partnership has 
gotten us in the region to begin with.
    We have sold these countries arms. They have used arms in 
ways that have been destabilizing in the region that have 
killed civilians. In many cases, these arms are bought purely 
for prestige or used for domestic repression. Simply selling 
arms to these countries often doesn't give the U.S. leverage. 
So the entire range of security outcomes from our giving arms 
to them, you know, really hasn't gotten us anything.
    And now, of course, you raise the issue of oil. They are 
not coming on board with us here. There is a whole list of, you 
know, logic. They have relationships with China. They are 
trying to extract more guarantees from us. I mean the United 
Arab Emirates have demanded a formal security pact from the 
United States. And so that goes to my earlier point in my 
statement that these States have seized upon this moment, this 
very charged moment of great power rivalry and they are trying 
to manipulate it. They are trying to extract as much as they 
can from us. And I do think we need to, frankly speaking, call 
them on their bluff. You know, Russia and China are not going 
to step in and defend these countries from Iranian missiles. 
They are not going to play the role. I think the U.S. has to be 
comfortable with a degree of security diversification in the 
region, a degree of multipolarity.
    Mr. Malinowski. I just have a few seconds left, but I mean 
doesn't this raise the question of who is the superpower in 
this relationship, right, are we leveraging them or are they 
able to leverage us? I mean I recall President Trump actually 
got the Saudis to pump less oil in 2020 by threatening to pull 
our troops out of the kingdom. And it took basically a few days 
to get that concession once he was willing to play that card.
    I mean what, and it has taken us months this year, so far 
unsuccessfully, to get a similar result by different means. So 
what lesson do you draw from that?
    Dr. Wehrey. Well, I think you are right, Congressman. We 
have, still, enormous cards we can play in terms of the defense 
that we are providing them in terms of the systems that we put 
on their soil. There is a naval patrol that we just agreed to 
with the Saudis, so I mean we are already doing so much. We do 
have enormous cards and we are the superpower. We need to start 
acting like it and we need to be confident in doing so, I 
think. And we still have seniority in the relationship, to 
answer your question.
    Mr. Malinowski. Thank you. I yield back.
    Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Malinowski. Mr. Steube is 
recognized.
    Mr. Steube. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My questions are for 
Mr. Rumley. Israel has publicly condemned Russia's invasion of 
Ukraine through announcements and votes in international 
settings. Israel also sought to provide political support and 
humanitarian relief for the Ukrainians, including allowing over 
15,000 Jewish and non-Jewish refugees to enter Israel, without 
alienating Russia. In some instances, Israel officials served 
as communicators between their Russian and Ukrainian 
counterparts.
    Since 2015, Russia's military presence and air defense 
capabilities in Syria have given it influence over Israel's 
ability to conduct air strikes there. Israel has depended on 
access to Syrian air space to target Iranian personnel and 
equipment especially those related to the transport of 
munitions or precision weapons technology to Hezbollah and 
Lebanon.
    How has Russia repositioned its forces in the Middle East 
since the start of the Ukrainian conflict?
    Mr. Rumley. Thank you for the question, Congressman. We 
have seen reports that Russia has repositioned its forces in 
the region, mostly consolidated into airbases, pulling out from 
sort of different parts of the country, I think, further in the 
east. It is hard to verify these reports as they all are open 
source, but I think your question is an important one because 
it gets at Israel's equities in Syria and its relationship with 
Russia.
    And I think we cannot underscore enough just how much the 
IL-20 shootdown in 2018 impacted both the Israeli military, but 
also the Israeli security leadership today. Israel's priority 
is freedom of action in Syria and maintaining freedom of action 
in Syria in order to destabilize Iran's activities there, 
Iran's ability to support its proxies in Lebanon and Hezbollah.
    And so I think Israel has to navigate that fine balance 
with Russia as Russia has deployed S-300's in support of Bashar 
al-Assad and S-400's in support of its own premium assets, so 
it is certainly a fine line and I think we have seen Israeli 
policy from the start of Ukraine reflect that.
    Mr. Steube. Currently, five countries operate in or 
maintain military forces in Syria--Russia, Turkey, Iran, 
Israel, and the United States. The Assad government backed by 
Russia and Iran and aligned military forces controls about two-
thirds of Syria's territory including most of the major cities. 
Russia's military influence also extends to North Africa. The 
Syrian regime also helps funnel money back to Russian 
oligarchs.
    How have Russian partners like Iran and Assad responded to 
redeployments in the region?
    Mr. Rumley. Thank you, Congressman. Yes, I think what we 
are very likely to see is where Russia repositions and 
withdraws Iran and its proxies will look to fill that vacuum. I 
think that is, going back to my remarks, what makes our 
presence in northeastern Syria all the more important both to 
ensure that any withdrawal doesn't create a vacuum that ISIS 
and its elements can exploit, but also that we can be there to 
monitor and potentially disrupt Iranian activities to fill that 
vacuum.
    And so I think given the strain placed on the Russian 
forces, it is likely we are going to see a more active Iranian 
activity in the region.
    Mr. Steube. Former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin 
Netanyahu had a close working relationship with Vladimir Putin 
and the two leaders maintained a hotline which allowed the 
Israel military to alert Russian forces of incoming strikes in 
Syria. However, it is clear that even before Russia's war with 
Ukraine, Putin and Israel's new Prime Minister Bennett do not 
share the same relationship. Russia's assistance to Syrian 
force in intercepting Israeli missiles in July 2021 
demonstrates this. So how do the security dynamics in Syria 
impact Israel's approach to Ukraine with respect to Russia?
    Mr. Rumley. Yes. That is a great question. Thank you, 
Congressman. I think it is clear that so long as Russia has its 
air defense systems in Syria in support of Bashar al-Assad, it 
will maintain some form of leverage over Israel's ability to 
conduct operations in Syria and strike back at that Iranian 
infrastructure.
    I think that I cannot speak to the Bennett/Putin 
relationship, but I do think it is a combination both of 
navigating that dynamic in Syria but also him being relatively 
new. The Putin/Netanyahu relationship had many years to develop 
and so I think it was both probably not great timing for 
Bennett to inherit this crisis, but I think we are going to 
continue to see Israel navigate a fine line in its relationship 
with Russia.
    Mr. Steube. I have a couple of seconds left, real quick. 
What are the risks to Israel's security by supporting Ukraine 
against the Russian invasion?
    Mr. Rumley. Yes, Congressman. There is always the risk that 
is ever present on Israel's mind that Russia may turn on its 
air defense systems and begin to attempt to deny Israel freedom 
of action in Syria.
    Mr. Steube. Thanks for your time here today. I yield back.
    Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Steube. I will yield myself 
time, first, for questioning. Let me start with Dr. Notte. I 
wanted to followup, Dr. Notte, on your reference to Russia's 
veiled nuclear threats and ask what that--what is it that you 
believe, how is it that you believe that will impact the Middle 
East in particular, and can you speak to those nuclear threats 
and the possibility of nuclear, tactical nuclear strikes by 
Russia and the impact on proliferation in the Middle East 
region?
    Dr. Notte. Thank you for the question, Chairman. I think at 
this point, one can only speak anecdotally and somewhat 
speculatively to the impact that this nuclear saber-rattling 
over Ukraine has for the region. I can certainly share that 
regional interlocutors have taken note of this threat and are 
really asking, is this is a safe world to live in where some 
countries have nuclear weapons and those that do not have them 
can be coerced, can be blackmailed, and can be the victim of a 
conventional aggression without someone coming to their aid.
    And I think it is the combination of those threats and how 
they are perceived in the region, plus the worry about a 
growing Iranian nuclear threat, which many in the region 
believe will not be mitigated even if we have a restoration of 
the JCPOA. Many believe that Iran might end up with a threshold 
nuclear capability anyway and then it is just one step away 
from weaponization.
    `So it is really the combination of those two factors and 
they worry that the United States might have insufficient 
bandwidth to give those, you know, assurances to those 
countries to mitigate that threat that I think sort of gets 
them thinking. I am not prepared to say today that on that 
basis countries have concluded to, you know, pursue a nuclear 
program or a nuclear option hedging, but I do believe that it 
is something that capitals will consider.
    Mr. Deutch. And you referenced the bandwidth issue of the 
United States and questions about the perception of what that 
bandwidth might be and whether it is great enough. I want to 
followup with, specifically, with a question about Russia and 
the comment that--actually, I think Dr. Wehrey and Mr. Rumley, 
you both spoke to this--the failure of the Russian invasion to 
roll through Ukraine.
    The challenges that the Russian military has had, show the 
limit of Russia's capability. And for countries in the MENA 
region, that may have looked--well, they previously looked to 
Russia as a potential security partner, one who is less 
demanding, as I think a couple of you said, than the U.S. may 
be.
    How is their failure in Ukraine being perceived and how can 
the United States capitalize on the failures of Russia and 
Ukraine to show that the United States including our values 
remain a dedicated ally to Middle Eastern countries? And Mr. 
Rumley. We will certainly even go to Dr. Wehrey.
    Mr. Rumley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think that is 
absolutely right. I think for potential customers and current 
customers of Russian arms in the Middle East, right now, 
assuming you are able to maintain and sustain what you have 
bought, you are assuming Russia's going to be able to build and 
even export future materiel. And assuming you will be able to 
pay for it, I think there will still be some appetite in the 
region for Russian arms.
    I think Middle East partners and partners globally will 
distinguish between the way Russia has used its forces and the 
standalone capabilities of some of these platforms. I think 
also the prices for these may drop dramatically in the future 
and so there are likely always going to be customers out there 
looking for cheap arms that come with less perceived strings 
attached to it.
    I think the U.S. has several partners in the middle of 
major Russian arms purchases that we can, like Turkey and the 
S-400 that has requested the F-16 or Egypt and Sukhoi 35 that 
has requested the F-15, I am not saying we have to sort of make 
a deal right now for that, but I think it is clear that these 
countries are going to have gaps, gaps in their capabilities 
where they had planned on having Russian platforms to 
complement. And we can work with our partners and work with our 
own defense industry and see if there is ways in which we can 
provide off-ramps for them to gradually disinvest these Russian 
platforms.
    Mr. Deutch. I thank you.
    Dr. Wehrey, you had said earlier that Russia cannot really 
offer security guarantees in that their weapons aren't good. Do 
you want to speak to that?
    Dr. Wehrey. Right. Thank you for the question. You know, it 
is perceived, really, a sort of transactional, commercial 
approach, you know, it hasn't--and I think States in the region 
have responded. They haven't moved, you know, their 
relationships with Russia to the sorts of relationships that 
really define alliances and partnerships. They haven't opened 
up access to bases a lot of times, you know, and so I think it 
is a mutual understanding.
    When countries in the region buy U.S. arms, they believe 
they are buying much more than the capability, the hardware; 
that they are purchasing an insurance policy, right. And I 
think especially for, you know, States in the Gulf, there is a 
fundamental sense of insecurity. These are States that face 
Iran, but they are also autocrats. I mean they are insecure 
because of their political systems. They face dissent from 
within. We saw that with, you know, Egypt.
    And so they are purchasing a whole stream of, you know, 
U.S. assurances--they believe they are--and Russia is not going 
to come in and replace that. It is not going to, you know, and 
even the U.S. isn't. So again, I think, you know, in light of 
its disastrous performance in Ukraine, and to be clear, there 
have been other instances in Crimea where Russian hardware was 
also shown to be defective, but I think this is of a 
qualitatively different level. You know, the U.S. needs to let 
this speak for itself.
    And as my co-panelist mentioned, I do think there is an 
opportunity to help wean partners off of Russian systems 
through co-production, through alternative, you know, 
suppliers. We need to provide that opening for them. But, you 
know, we shouldn't get back into the arms race game, you know, 
I think we need to keep our eye on the long-term problems in 
the region which, as I mentioned, are enormous and relate to 
governance and economy.
    Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Dr. Wehrey.
    I have a number of questions on food security issues for 
Ms. Welsh, but I am going to yield to Mr. Perry next and we 
will come back, Ms. Welsh, on the next go-around.
    Mr. Perry, you are recognized.
    Mr. Perry. I thank the chairman. Sorry to be late. Other 
things going on. To the witnesses, good to see you. I think my 
question is probably for Mr. Rumley, and instead of reading all 
this I know you talked about off-ramps, or at least I suspect 
you did even though I wasn't here, you know, we just passed $40 
billion in a Ukraine assistance package and I think that we are 
depleting our own supply of javelins and stingers. There are 
not being produced as far as I know, or if they are in not much 
capacity, so we are reducing our own stockpile at this very 
moment.
    In that context, what do you think is the scope of your 
proposed expansion to the Foreign Military Financing program 
and how would you square your off-ramps for these additional 
countries with our shortages? So you are talking about adding 
additional countries; meanwhile, we are depleting what we have 
based on the one country that is obviously being attacked and 
invaded right now militarily, but this puts the United States 
in a perilous position. We have to protect ourselves, right. I 
mean you put your oxygen mask on first on the airplane before 
you put it on each other. There is a reason for that and it is 
a similar situation here.
    Mr. Rumley. Thank you, Congressman. The issue of co-
production is one means, I think, to address a common complaint 
which is buying from America takes too long; that it is too 
complicated; that if we get in line to buy something from the 
U.S. we are going to have to wait years to get it. A good 
example is the F-16. There are over 20 countries in the world 
that fly the F-16. We currently, Lockheed Martin builds it out 
of one facility. That facility if you get in line today, you 
are probably not getting the F-16 for 5 years from when you 
sign on the dotted line for it. In the 1970's and the 1980's, 
we co-produced the F-16 with three other European countries and 
we were able to get them off the line faster. The initial order 
at those facilities was for a thousand F-16s. The initial order 
for the F-16 plant in South Carolina was for 90 F-16s for 
Taiwan and Morocco.
    And so from an industry standpoint, it is a question of 
scale, and so they are not able to, I think, ramp up the 
production because while the demand gets closer to a thousand 
over time--it is at 128 last I checked--it is not there yet. 
And so I think we can use Foreign Military Financing, longer 
security cooperation planning, working with our partners on 
sort of multiyear acquisition timetables to then also 
communicate and send a message, send a signal to the defense 
industry that these orders for upgrades, for new kits that are 
going to come down the road, you can start to plan around that 
and potentially address some of these production lags.
    Mr. Perry. So just being the devil's advocate in the 
conversation here and being the guy that kind of sees that 
government creates something, there is a problem that 
government probably created, and then has the solution for it 
which usually is a bigger problem in the end, in my opinion, 
but why are we at this point with foreign military sales or 
financing? Like how did we get there that that is the solution? 
Like when you say that your initial order was for a thousand, 
and there is no doubt in my mind that we were able to complete 
that, what has changed between then and now that puts us in a 
position where we have to go to other countries for production 
and potentially compromise national security and intellectual 
property, et cetera, and quite honestly, just the work to be 
done in America? What has changed that has put us in this 
position?
    Mr. Rumley. Absolutely, Congressman, I think the initial 
order for the F-16 was because it was a new platform that was 
coming off the line. Right now, the F-16 is used by a lot of 
countries but it is not the most premier platform in our own 
arsenal and so as we have developed more platforms. We have 
poured more resources into developing the Joint Strike Fighter, 
the F-35, for instance.
    So I think co-production is one way to both speed up 
delivery for platform----
    Mr. Perry. Yes, but hold on a second. So I get it. It is 
essentially what we would call--although I think it is a 
fantastic machine and if I had my choice that would be one of 
the things I would choose to fly. But it is essentially a 
legacy aircraft from an American perspective. We should be able 
to turn them out like--like all the tooling and the die, all 
that stuff is done and all the questions, potentially, have 
already been answered for years upon years.
    Why aren't we just cranking these things out like, you 
know, an assembly line factory?
    Mr. Rumley. Yes. Absolutely, Congressman, I think and I 
would have to defer to defense industry on this one. I think it 
is simply the out-year demand signal that makes it hard for 
industry to allocate all the resources toward----
    Mr. Perry. I mean it is not a finite pie. We got, I mean in 
some respects maybe you do not have manpower or something, but 
that is the question. What has changed that we cannot produce 
what we need to produce in a timely fashion? And it doesn't 
seem like, really, I do not know if you just do not have the 
answer or you are guessing or whatever and I am not saying you 
should. But it doesn't seem to be that I am getting, I do not 
hear anything that makes me think that we shouldn't be able to 
do this. I yield.
    Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Representative Perry.
    Representative Manning, you are recognized.
    Ms. Manning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to our 
witnesses for being here today. I want to go back to the issue 
of food security that we have been talking about just a little 
bit. Mr. Malinowski talked about the enormous benefit that some 
of the Gulf countries are getting in terms of banner oil 
profits.
    So Ms. Welsh, or any of the others who want to weigh on 
this, what is the capacity or the willingness, really, of the 
wealthier Gulf countries to set up and help provide financing 
and food to those who need it the most within the region?
    Ms. Welsh, do you want to comment on that?
    Ms. Welsh. Certainly. Thank you, Representative, for that 
good question. You know, I do not know specifically. I can 
speak to past efforts from my time at the State Department to 
get Gulf countries to invest multilateral financing facilities 
for agricultural development, for example. Those efforts were 
not necessarily successful. So in my own experience, it hasn't 
been easy to get Gulf countries to invest in food security and 
agriculture for the rest of the region.
    I do think that that is potentially an untapped source, 
untapped resource when it comes to the impacts on food 
security. Again, we are seeing high oil prices highly 
correlated to the price of food, which again it is only 
exacerbating the problem. So I think it is a good point that 
you brought up.
    Ms. Manning. Thank you. And what about the impact of 
countries' export bans on the region such as India's recent ban 
on wheat? What other sources are there, potential sources for 
countries that previously relied on Russian or Ukrainian 
imports to diversify their supply?
    Ms. Welsh. Thank you for that question. At present, about 
20 countries are putting in place export restrictions. They are 
not outright bans, but restrictions on some products. India has 
not outright banned its exports. It is still letting some of 
its exports to continue to countries that it had agreements in 
place prior, prior to last week, and it is also exempting 
humanitarian assistance from its export restrictions. 
Regardless, India's restrictions are coming at a very bad time, 
of course.
    Other options are production from other producing regions, 
from United States, Argentina, Australia, but again prices are 
global so for all importing countries the ultimate bill is 
going to be higher.
    Ms. Manning. Thank you.
    Mr. Rumley, I want to turn to you. In your testimony, you 
mentioned that Russia will face difficulty maintaining its 
current posture in the Middle East. Which countries are poised 
to fill in the gap and how can we prevent Iranian-backed forces 
from benefiting from this situation that Russia has gotten 
itself into, particularly in Syria?
    Mr. Rumley. Thank you, Congresswoman. I think the answer 
was in the question. I think especially in Syria, Iran and its 
proxies are going to look to fill the gap there. I think we 
have already seen sort of initial reports suggesting as much. 
Hezbollah has also been active in Syria in the past. Again, I 
would just say, I do think that while we see them 
repositioning, I do not think we will see a total withdrawal 
unless Ukraine goes dramatically worse for Russia.
    In Libya, I would defer to Dr. Wehrey who is there right 
now on that, but I would expect that there is no shortage of 
foreign support flooding into that conflict.
    Ms. Manning. What are the options for preventing the 
Iranian-backed forces in Syria from increasing their bad 
actions?
    Mr. Rumley. Yes, Congresswoman. One of the issues, I think, 
that we have is that we do not have a ton of great options for 
it. Our force presence there is we do not have the authorities, 
necessarily, to combat the Iranian presence. I think our 
presence in northeast Syria and our presence at al-Tanf 
garrison serves as a bit of a disruption to Iran's efforts to 
establish what we called the GLOC, the ground line of 
communication. But again, I am not certain how much we will be 
able to necessarily thwart them.
    I think our other partners in the region, most in 
particular Israel, are currently working on this problem set 
and working to roll back some of Iran's gains there, and so I 
think perhaps the best way to answer that is to continue to 
support Israel.
    Ms. Manning. And what impact if any do you see by the 
recent election in Lebanon?
    Mr. Rumley. Thank you, Congresswoman. I think what we are 
seeing out of Lebanon is unfortunately likely to be not what 
the country needs in terms of delivering proper governance. I 
think the election results were leaning toward the inconclusive 
at this point in terms of who is going to actually come out on 
top, and I am most of all concerned for the future of Lebanon 
and its people.
    Ms. Manning. Thank you. I believe my time is about to 
expire. I yield back.
    Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Ms. Manning.
    Mr. Burchett, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Burchett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is always a 
pleasure being with you. I have several questions. I will get 
right to them. Do you all think that the countries in the 
Middle East and North Africa regions will have some second 
thoughts about buying Russian-made armaments after seeing them 
in the field in Ukraine? It seems like they have been a little 
less than successful.
    Mr. Rumley. Yes, Congressman. I think the performance is 
not up to perhaps the sales pitch. But while, as I said 
earlier, while I do think their reputation has taken a hit, I 
think customers will distinguish between the way Russia has 
fought this conflict and the way its standalone platforms 
operate.
    Mr. Burchett. Yes, I agree with you. In the Second World 
War, you know, they had the T-34 tanks and they took on the 
much stronger German Tigers and other things and they whipped 
them. A German tank commander said we would blow one up and 
there would be 12 more behind them. But the interesting thing 
about it was that they, during the Second World War, they would 
have maybe a tank crew of four people, I believe, and they 
would have three different languages in there and they had a 
lot of difficulties there, but apparently now they have similar 
languages but they just do not have the fighting men that they 
did.
    Do you think there is any, do you think that the Russians 
are using Syrians to fight in the Ukraine? Has that been pretty 
much documented or is that just internet rumors?
    Mr. Rumley. I think, as I understand it, Russia's key gap 
in the Ukraine right now is one of manpower, and so I would 
expect them to continue to call up their mercenaries around the 
region to support their efforts there.
    Mr. Burchett. So is that a maybe?
    Mr. Rumley. It is hard to say from an open source 
standpoint.
    Mr. Burchett. All right. That is an honest answer. How do 
you think we will be able to prevent the Chinese from filling 
the defense procurement space, so have it that may be vacated 
by the Russians in the Middle East?
    Mr. Rumley. I think, yes, Congressman. I think Dr. Wehrey 
actually hit the nail on the head there when he said, when he 
noted that China has a lot of legacy Russian platforms and will 
likely be a leading candidate to transfer some of these 
platforms to countries that had purchased Russian arms in the 
past and may be seeking maintenance and sustainment for them.
    I think China is already active in the Middle East, already 
flooding the market with armed drones. It is already looking to 
market other platforms as well. It sold their defense systems 
to Serbia. It is looking to advance its arms sales. And so if 
we aren't going to be the supplier, China is, in my view, going 
to step in.
    Mr. Burchett. OK. What is the situation of the food in the 
region, the food imports, due to the Russian invasion of 
Ukraine?
    Ms. Welsh. Thank you for the question, Representative. As I 
noted, many countries in the Middle East and North Africa rely 
on imports from Russia and Ukraine. And at present, I will say 
that it is an open question. As I noted earlier, USDA has 
projected that 35 percent of the current crop, current wheat 
crop from Ukraine, will not be harvested this year. So their 
crop is, their exports are curtailed at the same time Russia's 
exports are continuing.
    Russia has been exempted. Russia's agricultural exports and 
fertilizer has been exempted from sanctions for the United 
States, EU, and other countries, so Russia continues to export. 
In fact, USDA is estimating that Russia's exports are 
increasing at this time, and I am also seeing open source 
reporting of Russia stealing grain from Ukraine, relabeling it, 
and exporting it at a premium to countries in the Middle East 
and North Africa.
    Mr. Burchett. Russians are going to do like Russians are 
going to do. They are thieves, basically.
    Are there any counter ISIS operations at risk due to 
Russia's invasion of Ukraine? And if you could, if that is a 
yes, could you explain that to me?
    Mr. Rumley. That is a great question, Congressman. I do 
not----
    Mr. Burchett. You will get nowhere complimenting me up here 
with these people. They will just mark you down a couple 
notches, so it is better if you insult me like they do. Like 
Ted does. Just kidding.
    Mr. Rumley. No, it is an important question. It is one my 
former colleagues in the Department of Defense will be looking 
at. I think that the biggest risk perhaps to the D-ISIS mission 
and our presence in Syria is any potential one-off conflicts or 
clashes with both Iranian-aligned groups, but also Russian 
mercenaries like we saw in 2018 in Deir ez-Zor. Ostensibly, 
should Russian mercenaries be pulled back from areas of Syria 
that may alleviate some of those concerns, so I am optimistic 
we will be able to continue the D-ISIS mission.
    Mr. Burchett. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back 6 
seconds of my time.
    Mr. Deutch. Thank you very much, Mr. Burchett. And I, for 
the record, would never insult you.
    I have just two final questions before we wrap up this, I 
think, really important and productive hearing. One, Dr. Notte, 
I just want to go back to you on this nuclear issue again. 
There has been some conversation here, there has been 
conversation, generally, about, a lot of conversation here 
about our allies in the region and their belief in America's 
staying power in the region. There is some suggestions that our 
allies are trying to manipulate us.
    I would just ask you since you spoke about nuclear 
proliferation, from the perspective of our allies, in 
particular the Emiratis who faced attacks on Dubai from 
Iranian-backed groups, and on the Saudis who faced attacks on 
their soil, and given the ongoing threats from Iran, from the 
IRGC, is when you look at the region and you think about 
nuclear proliferation it seems clear, but I want to make sure I 
am not missing anything, that for those countries the best 
decision is to stand with the United States against Iran's 
malign influence in the region and against Iran's efforts to 
develop nuclear weapons. And it seems also in the best interest 
of the United States to make clear that it is our position that 
Iran--that we won't tolerate Iran's malign activities and that 
we will never allow Iran to have nuclear weapons. Do you agree 
with that?
    Dr. Notte. Thank you, Chairman. I absolutely agree with 
this assessment. I do think that there is partially a problem 
that the United States has at the level of perception. You 
know, there is this widespread perception that the United 
States is not taking the missile and proxy threat by Iran 
seriously enough, is not doing enough, when of course, and some 
other witnesses have said it, the United States is still doing 
a lot in the region while certainly Russia and Iran, Russia and 
China will not support regional countries in withstanding the 
missile and proxy issue either. In fact, I would pose to you 
that it is to Russia's advantage if Iran and proxy and missile 
threats destabilize the region to a certain extent because 
again it pins down U.S. resources that could otherwise be freed 
up for elsewhere.
    So I think that perception has to be mitigated. Make 
clearer to partners that the United States is still very much 
engaged. Witness Wehrey noted the new naval force that has been 
put in place for the Red Sea. I believe the new CENTCOM chief 
is currently visiting the region.
    I think the United States could also do a little more to 
perhaps leverage European allies in sort of carrying the burden 
of responsibility for mitigating the Iranian proxy and missile 
threat in the region. The Europeans have not been historically 
very involved in that effort and Europe is the direct 
neighborhood of the Middle East. We Europeans are fundamentally 
reliant on stability in the region, so perhaps more could 
happen there.
    But yes, I fundamentally agree with your assessment that it 
is the best choice of regional countries to partner with the 
United States, perhaps also now building on operationalizing 
the Abraham Accords, more defense and deterrence cooperation 
between Gulf Arab States and Israel, where again CENTCOM is 
also positioning itself in a leading role to support that 
process.
    Mr. Deutch. So I appreciate that, Dr. Notte.
    Mr. Rumley, then I will turn to you. The best approach, 
just trying to pull some of what Dr. Notte said together, is 
for the United States to lead the effort to stand up to Iran. 
That means rallying our allies including, I think Dr. Notte is 
quite right, our allies in Europe and it also means standing 
and working with our allies in the region. Israel as part of 
CENTCOM now means there are greater opportunities from a 
security standpoint to work together with Israel, our Gulf 
allies in the region to confront this.
    But the best way to do that is for just as America has 
rallied support from our allies in opposition of Russia's 
violation of the territorial integrity of Ukraine, we should be 
doing the same thing with respect to Iran, correct?
    Mr. Rumley. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman. I think there is a 
real desire in the Middle East right now for a type of security 
architecture designed to combat Iran's, or counter at least, 
Iran's malign activities in the region. You will recall the 
previous Administration tried to sort of build the security 
architecture. It did not work for a number of reasons. I think 
it was A, a bit too ambitious. At the time, it tried to cover 
so many disciplines and subdisciplines. It was also before the 
Abraham Accords and the normalization.
    But things have changed now. We have these normalization 
agreements. We have these peace agreements. We have moved 
Israel under the UCP into CENTCOM. So I think we have the 
window and the opportunity to start building this and I would 
recommend that we start with sort of a modest approach. Focus 
on one capability like air defense and link our partners in the 
region, bring in our European partners as well, and work with 
our partners in the region on establishing sort of a network of 
air defense systems to counter Iran's activities.
    Mr. Deutch. Mr. Rumley, I agree with you as well.
    Ms. Welsh, let me just wrap up with you. Mr. Rumley talked 
about how things are different. I want to just finish by 
talking about how things were before and what we need to do to 
ensure that we do not go back there. High food prices were one 
of the driving forces behind Arab Spring, and the question is 
whether the food insecurity issues as wrought by the conflict 
between Russia and Ukraine, Russia's invasion of Ukraine and 
the rising food prices that we have seen contribute to anti-
government sentiment, contribute to instability, and what 
should we be doing to ensure that we are in the best position 
to prevent instability and to work to continue to address 
humanitarian needs and the need for greater democracy and human 
rights in the region.
    Mr. Wilson. Chairman? OK.
    Mr. Deutch. I am sorry?
    Mr. Wilson. Mr. Chairman, not to interrupt our witness, but 
I appreciate you raising the issue of the Iranian nuclear 
threat and I would like to submit for the record an article 
that we just received, Iran is in Position for a Surprise 
Nuclear Breakout, by Andrea Stricker of the Foundation for 
Defense of Democracies. And I would like to move that this be 
included in the record. Thank you very much.
    Mr. Deutch. Without objection, Mr. Wilson.
    [The information referred to follows:]
    
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    Mr. Deutch. I would point out that--to you as ranking 
member, before, since you surprised us, it took a while for 
your image to appear so you were literally the voice of god in 
this hearing room, which invites lots of thoughts on our part. 
But it was good to hear you and we----
    Mr. Wilson. Very unusual.
    Mr. Deutch [continuing]. Appreciate you submitting that for 
the record.
    Ms. Welsh?
    Ms. Welsh. Thank you, Chairman Deutch, for your question. 
Certainly, high food prices put pressure on governments as you 
mentioned during the Arab Spring. U.N. food price index reached 
an all-time high, and the period of the highest prices directly 
coincided with protests that led to regime change in Tunisia, 
Libya, Egypt, and again protests across the Middle East and 
North Africa.
    High food prices are very rarely, if ever, the only cause 
of protests that lead to regime change. They do cause 
disruption, political and social disruption when there are 
preexisting sentiments, preexisting displeasure with, you know, 
with government or other factors. We can expect high food 
prices to lead to disruptions in places where there are 
governance challenges.
    What we can do to quell those impacts are as I mentioned 
all the efforts that are under discussion in the global fora 
right now to blunt, to reduce the price of food for food 
importing countries. So that is a short-term response. And 
short-term responses, I would put both emergency humanitarian 
assistance, which it is incredibly important to continue to 
fund that robustly, and also financing for countries that are 
not the most food insecure but still need funding to meet their 
food security needs, which to me is a separate bucket and I 
consider that a separate response in emergency assistance.
    In the long term, I think it is very important to continue 
to invest in agricultural systems particularly in the Middle 
East and North Africa where water security is a very big 
challenge, to continue to invest in agricultural production in 
countries that are food importing, in the food producing 
countries, in major exporting countries around the world. We 
shouldn't though assume, we shouldn't confuse investing in 
agriculture to be a short-term solution, because certainly at a 
time of high fertilizer prices it might help in the long term 
but certainly not in the short term.
    Mr. Deutch. Great. I appreciate your insight. I think it is 
clear from the hearing and the interest of the members the 
Russian invasion of Ukraine has no doubt altered the course of 
world events. That is particularly true in the Middle East and 
North Africa, the effect as it relates to food security and 
military presence and the diplomatic landscape. With support 
from the United States and partners in the region, we will have 
to meet these challenges and we have the opportunity to be a 
key pillar of resistance to Russian influence and aggression 
both in Ukraine and around the world in the region.
    And I appreciate all that our witnesses contributed to this 
conversation. I thank them for being here today. Members of the 
subcommittee may have some additional questions for you and we 
ask our witnesses to please respond to those questions in 
writing. I would ask my colleagues to--that any witness 
questions for the hearing record be submitted to the 
subcommittee clerk within five business days.
    And with that, without objection, the hearing is adjourned. 
Thank you very much.
    [Whereupon, at 3:43 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

                                APPENDIX

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         STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD FROM REPRESENTATIVE CONNOLLY

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            RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

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