[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                          [H.A.S.C. No. 117-63]

                  ENGAGEMENT WITH ALLIES AND PARTNERS

                               __________

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                              HEARING HELD

                             MARCH 1, 2022


                                     
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

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                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
48-843                     WASHINGTON : 2023                    
          
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                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                    One Hundred Seventeenth Congress

                    ADAM SMITH, Washington, Chairman

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island      MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
RICK LARSEN, Washington              JOE WILSON, South Carolina
JIM COOPER, Tennessee                MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut            DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
JOHN GARAMENDI, California           ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia
JACKIE SPEIER, California            VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri
DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey          AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona               MO BROOKS, Alabama
SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts          SAM GRAVES, Missouri
SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California        ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland,          SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
RO KHANNA, California                TRENT KELLY, Mississippi
WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts    MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
FILEMON VELA, Texas                  MATT GAETZ, Florida
ANDY KIM, New Jersey                 DON BACON, Nebraska
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania       JIM BANKS, Indiana
JASON CROW, Colorado                 LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan             JACK BERGMAN, Michigan
MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey           MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
VERONICA ESCOBAR, Texas              MIKE JOHNSON, Louisiana
JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine               MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee
ELAINE G. LURIA, Virginia, Vice      STEPHANIE I. BICE, Oklahoma
    Chair                            C. SCOTT FRANKLIN, Florida
JOSEPH D. MORELLE, New York          LISA C. McCLAIN, Michigan
SARA JACOBS, California              RONNY JACKSON, Texas
KAIALI'I KAHELE, Hawaii              JERRY L. CARL, Alabama
MARILYN STRICKLAND, Washington       BLAKE D. MOORE, Utah
MARC A. VEASEY, Texas                PAT FALLON, Texas
JIMMY PANETTA, California
STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida
Vacancy

                     Paul Arcangeli, Staff Director
               Mark Morehouse, Professional Staff Member
               Patrick Nevins, Professional Staff Member
                      Natalie de Benedetti, Clerk
                           
                           C O N T E N T S

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                                                                   Page

              STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Ranking Member, 
  Committee on Armed Services....................................     3
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Chairman, 
  Committee on Armed Services....................................     1

                               WITNESSES

Karlin, Hon. Mara E., Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
  Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities, U.S. Department of Defense..     4
Lewis, Hon. Jessica, Assistant Secretary of State for Political-
  Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State.....................     6

                                APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

    Karlin, Hon. Mara E..........................................    63
    Lewis, Hon. Jessica..........................................    68

Documents Submitted for the Record:

    Statement of Hon. Michael McCaul.............................    77
    Statement of Hon. Gregory W. Meeks...........................    75

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

    Mrs. Bice....................................................    82
    Mr. Crow.....................................................    81
    Dr. Green....................................................    82
    Ms. Jacobs...................................................    83
    Mr. Khanna...................................................    81
    Mrs. Murphy..................................................    83
    Ms. Slotkin..................................................    82
    Ms. Speier...................................................    81

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

    Mr. Gaetz....................................................    91
    Dr. Jackson..................................................    93
    Mr. Kahele...................................................    94
    Mr. Scott....................................................    88
    Ms. Speier...................................................    87
    Mr. Waltz....................................................    93
                  
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                  ENGAGEMENT WITH ALLIES AND PARTNERS

                              ----------                              

                          House of Representatives,
                               Committee on Armed Services,
                            Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 1, 2022.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:59 a.m., in 
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Adam Smith 
(chairman of the committee) presiding.

  OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
       WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

    The Chairman. I call the hearing to order.
    Welcome, our witnesses and members. This is a hybrid 
hearing. We have some members participating remotely, so I have 
to read this statement.
    Members who are joining remotely must be visible on the 
screen for the purposes of identity verification, establishing 
and maintaining a quorum, and participating in the proceeding 
and voting.
    Those members must continue to use the software platform's 
video function while in attendance unless they experience 
connectivity issues or other technical problems that render 
them unable to participate on camera.
    If a member experiences technical difficulties, they should 
contact the committee staff for assistance. Video of members' 
participation will be broadcast in the room and via the 
television internet feeds.
    Members participating remotely must seek recognition 
verbally, and they are asked to mute their microphones when 
they are not speaking.
    Members who are participating remotely are reminded to keep 
the software platform's video function on the entire time they 
attend the proceeding. Members may leave and rejoin the 
proceeding. If members depart for a short while for reasons 
other than joining a different proceeding, they should leave 
the video function on.
    If members will be absent for a significant period or 
depart to join a different proceeding, they should exit the 
software platform entirely and then rejoin it if they return. 
Members may use the software platform's chat feature to 
communicate with staff regarding technical or logistical 
support issues only.
    Finally, I have designated a committee staff member to, if 
necessary, mute unrecognized members' microphones to cancel any 
inadvertent background noise that may disrupt the proceeding.
    So thank you for joining us.
    Today, the full committee's hearing is on engagement with 
allies and partners. We have two witnesses with us this 
morning: the Honorable Mara Karlin, Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities from DOD [U.S. 
Department of Defense], and the Honorable Jessica Lewis, who is 
Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, 
Department of State.
    Well, thank you very much. I appreciate you being here. To 
some degree, the topic is self-explanatory. So I'll try not to 
go on too long in my opening statement, except to say that 
partners and allies are absolutely crucial to everything that 
we're doing in the world.
    Certainly, in this moment, we understand that as well as we 
ever have. In our efforts to stop Russia's unlawful invasion of 
Ukraine, to make sure that Putin does not succeed in this, we 
could not possibly do it on our own, clearly and obviously, and 
the stronger our partnerships are in the world, the better able 
we are to bring pressure against Russia and to support Ukraine 
in this effort. And this applies across the board to the global 
challenges that we face.
    There has been a lot of talk in the last few years about 
how we're pivoting from one threat to another. You know, we 
have the discussion what is the greatest threat we face--let's, 
you know, pick one and focus on it. China is the popular one to 
focus on.
    But I think on this committee, we all recognize that the 
threat list is pretty clear--China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, 
and transnational terrorist threats.
    I'll give a prize, by the way, to anyone who comes up with 
the pneumonic for that so we can just sum it up in a quick 
little acronym.
    But that's it. And when you ask the question, okay, which 
one of these threats worries you the most, that depends on the 
day, okay. There's no way we can say, okay, well, those two, 
they aren't really a big problem.
    They're all there and they all have the potential to rise 
to the top in any given moment. As powerful as we are as a 
nation, as strong as our military and our economy are, we could 
not possibly meet all of those threats on our own.
    The way to meet those threats is through allies and 
partnerships, and through a rules-based international order, 
which is the entire point of what we have been trying to set up 
since the end of World War II, and the thing that, right now, 
Vladimir Putin both threatens most profoundly but also is 
making it clear why it is so important for nations of the world 
to join in that effort.
    So to do that, we need to work on partnerships and we have 
been, and I think the Biden administration has done an 
excellent job in the year-plus that they've been in office of 
reaching out to allies and trying to build those partnerships.
    And then that comes in a variety of different forms. 
Certainly, we have, you know, reengaged with NATO [North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization], worked more closely with Europe 
to build up that partnership. But also, in Asia, we have the 
Quad, as it is now being called, with India, Japan, Australia, 
and the U.S. working together on a variety of different issues.
    Now, the AUKUS agreement, which brought us closer with 
Australia and the United Kingdom, was another way to partner. 
On a number of different issues we've looked for ways to work 
more closely with India.
    Partnership is crucial to us meeting those national 
security objectives and connected to that, of course, is 
building partner capacity--the better off our partners are to 
help us with national security threats, to help us with 
development assistance, the more hands we have to accomplish 
the goals and tasks that we are looking to accomplish.
    So I think this is an incredibly important hearing just in 
general, but particularly now as we are directly confronted 
with a threat that requires a global response, that requires 
allies and partners to work together, it drives home why that 
issue is so important.
    So I look forward to the testimony and the questions and 
answers. And with that, I yield to Ranking Member Rogers, for 
his opening statement.

 STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA, 
          RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

    Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I really 
appreciate you organizing this hearing today and I appreciate 
the witnesses being here, taking the time to prepare. I know it 
takes a lot of effort.
    Given Putin's war of choice, now is an especially important 
time for us to focus on how we provide security assistance to 
our allies and partners.
    Security assistance, cooperation, and partnership programs 
run the full gamut from training to lethal aid. It enhances our 
diplomatic efforts to promote peace, it strengthens our global 
presence, and it improves our ability to defend ourselves and 
our allies.
    These programs have proven successful in countering 
terrorism and positioning us to prevail in the great power 
competition.
    In countries around the globe, security system enables--
assistance enables us to effectively confront malign influence 
of China and Russia. There is no greater example of the 
potential of these programs than what we see in Ukraine.
    Unfortunately, the assistance provided by Ukraine--to 
Ukraine by this administration hasn't reached its full 
potential. It's been too little too late. This crisis began 
unfolding back in October.
    At that time, Senator Inhofe and I implored Secretary 
Austin to send anti-air and anti-ship capabilities to Kyiv. Our 
hope was that the administration would take that threat from 
Putin seriously and publicly airlift Javelins, Harpoons, and 
Stingers as deterrence.
    For months, Ukrainians pleaded with us to send them these 
systems. But the White House chose not to act. They were more 
concerned about provoking Putin than defending democracy in 
Ukraine.
    It took until January of this year for the first shipments 
to arrive in Ukraine and according to public press reports, it 
was only a couple of days ago that the administration finally 
agreed to send Stingers, after Germany, Finland, and the 
Baltics. As I said, it's been too little too late.
    We're seeing the horror of Putin's war play out in front of 
us. My colleagues and I sounded the alarm that Ukraine needed 
more lethal aid months ago. We sponsored legislation to provide 
that aid. So I implore the Speaker to bring the NYET [Never 
Yielding Europe's Territory] Act up for a vote as soon as 
possible.
    With Ukraine under attack, it is now more important than 
ever to reinforce our NATO allies, especially those on the 
Eastern Front.
    Romania, Poland, and the Baltic States need advanced 
integrated air defense assets, missile systems like the HIMARS 
[High Mobility Artillery Rocket System] and the ATACMS [Army 
Tactical Missile System] and enhanced permanent U.S. troop 
presence. And they need it yesterday.
    China is acting now--is watching now as how we respond to 
this crisis. Now is not the time for equivocation. This 
administration needs to stand up to Putin. The security of our 
Nation and our allies are at stake.
    Thank you again to our witnesses for joining us this 
morning. I look forward to your testimony.
    Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to enter into the 
record a statement from Ranking Member McCaul.
    With that, I yield back.
    The Chairman. Hearing no objection, so ordered.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 77.]
    The Chairman. Ms. Karlin, you are recognized.

   STATEMENT OF HON. MARA E. KARLIN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF 
DEFENSE FOR STRATEGY, PLANS, AND CAPABILITIES, U.S. DEPARTMENT 
                           OF DEFENSE

    Dr. Karlin. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers, and 
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the 
opportunity to testify before you today.
    I respectfully submit my written statement for the record 
and will provide brief opening remarks.
    I appreciate the invitation to testify before you today on 
the Department of Defense's approach to engagement with our 
allies and our partners through security cooperation.
    The United States is at a pivotal moment with our allies 
and partners in meeting the challenges of today and tomorrow. 
Together, we face unprecedented challenges to our security, 
including the People's Republic of China's global ambitions to 
rival the United States, and Russian aggression that threatens 
the territorial integrity of Europe today in Ukraine.
    All the while, we battle historic transnational threats 
like climate change and a global pandemic. One of the most 
important ways that we will meet these challenges is by 
renewing a U.S. strategic advantage: our unmatched network of 
allies and partners.
    Security cooperation is an important tool that helps key 
allies and partners strengthen their defense and enhances our 
ability to rely on one another in a time of need.
    The forthcoming National Defense Strategy will emphasize 
how the Department will strengthen these alliances and 
partnerships to advance national security through integrated 
deterrence.
    As Secretary Austin has underscored, integrated deterrence 
is working across domains and the spectrum of conflict, knit 
closely with the rest of the government and our allies and 
partners on the most critical security challenges.
    The Department of Defense has learned from large-scale 
assistance programs that for lasting impact a comprehensive 
engagement plan means more than training and equipping.
    We aim to help partners with not only specific capabilities 
but also with institutional integrity and an ability to promote 
our shared values, notably the promotion and protection of 
human rights and good governance and legitimacy of the security 
sector.
    Resilient partnerships thrive when values and deeds align. 
Security cooperation aims to uphold that approach. To be sure, 
the degree of partnership should not be measured by the 
quantity of security cooperation programs, but rather by their 
quality, including transparency and effectiveness of security 
cooperation and assistance.
    A key aspect of the success of the security cooperation 
enterprise is collaboration to ensure the policy and strategic 
alignment of security cooperation. That includes the Department 
of Defense and the Department of State, as demonstrated by 
today's hearing.
    Internal to the Department of Defense, we are tightening 
our alignment as well. We recently brought the Defense Security 
Cooperation Agency under the umbrella of the Assistant 
Secretary for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities in the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense for Policy to facilitate better 
collaboration and coordination within the Department of Defense 
and with our external partners.
    We also formed a new Office for Global Partnerships, which 
deliberately integrates humanitarian assistance, disaster 
relief, and human rights with the existing processes related to 
security cooperation.
    We are emphasizing the centrality of these areas of defense 
cooperation in a way that benefits allies and partners in need. 
Success requires teamwork, and I can assure you that our entire 
team is focused on embracing it.
    The Department's focus on security cooperation has evolved 
over time, and it has greatly benefitted from congressional 
reforms.
    Five years ago, Congress enacted unprecedented legislation 
empowering the Department to support allies and partners 
through a consolidated range of title 10, U.S. Code, security 
cooperation authorities designed to advance U.S. interests and 
with full coordination of the Department of State.
    In doing so, the message was clear. Security cooperation 
should be deliberate and holistic. It should evolve based on 
consistent learning and reflect the values the United States 
stands for.
    Today, our cooperation with allies and partners includes 
military-to-military engagements, capacity building, education 
and training activities, humanitarian assistance activities, 
and robust exercises with key partners.
    While the Department has implemented these reforms through 
meaningful improvements to security cooperation, more remains 
to be done.
    To seize the opportunity for further change, we are 
focusing on three priority areas: prioritizing who and what we 
invest in, focusing on sustainable impact, and adopting a 
holistic integrated approach to how we execute security 
cooperation programs.
    I began by sharing with you how the U.S. network of 
alliances and partnerships is a strategic advantage that 
competitors cannot match.
    I conclude by sharing that this advantage is not a given. 
It requires active involvement by the entire U.S. Government, 
listening to partners' concerns and contexts, and taking a 
thoughtful and deliberate approach to how we employ our 
resources to meet our priorities.
    This is facilitated by good strategy, good policy, and 
close partnership among the Department of Defense, the 
Department of State, and Congress.
    I appreciate your leadership on this critical issue and I 
thank you for the opportunity to share our vision for 
engagement with allies and partners through security 
cooperation. Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Karlin can be found in the 
Appendix on page 63.]
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Ms. Lewis.

 STATEMENT OF HON. JESSICA LEWIS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE 
    FOR POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

    Ms. Lewis. Good morning.
    Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers, distinguished 
members of the committee, I am honored to be here today. I'm 
going to give my oral statement and ask that my written 
statement be submitted for the record.
    The Chairman. I'm just going to tell you to pull the 
microphone a little bit closer to you with my microphone off. 
So it is--yeah, that's good. Thanks. Go ahead.
    Ms. Lewis. Thank you. I'm here to speak with you about the 
importance and value of security cooperation and security 
assistance and the vital role these functions play as tools of 
foreign policy in our relationships with partners and allies.
    I sit before you to discuss these matters at a time when 
that proposition is being tested and displayed as at few points 
in history as the bombs rain down on the hospitals and schools 
of Kyiv, as the Russian tanks roll through the Ukrainian 
countryside, as we see before our eyes the sights of war in the 
European theater that we had imagined had been retired to 
history.
    I can say that I am proud of the support the United States 
have provided to Ukraine in and in advance of their time of 
need and proud of the remarkable courage of the Ukrainian armed 
forces and the Ukrainian people as they wield our assistance to 
push back on Russia's unforgivable assault.
    And our support to Ukraine demonstrates the wide arrays of 
tools that State and the Department of Defense can bring to a 
partner's security sector.
    Since assuming office last January, this administration has 
provided over $1 billion to Ukraine's defensive capabilities, 
including through foreign military financing, the DOD Ukraine 
Security Assistance Initiative, and other program lines.
    Through the Multinational Joint Commission, we work with 
Ukraine and our allies to identify military requirements and 
match funding streams to support the needed defensive 
capabilities, ranging from radars to Javelins.
    Through the Excess Defense Articles program we have 
delivered to Ukraine armed Coast Guard cutters to create 
asymmetric maritime capability in the Black Sea.
    In addition, through our programs such as the International 
Military Education and Training authority, we have supported 
the development of a cadre of professional and Western-looking 
mid- and senior-level Ukrainian officers, and through a series 
of exercises the Defense Department has strengthened the 
interoperability of our forces and Ukraine's tactical and 
operational capabilities.
    Then, as the threat from Russia sharpened, we have used the 
Presidential Drawdown Authority an unprecedented three times in 
the space of 6 months, including this weekend's $350 million 
package, the largest Presidential drawdown package in U.S. 
history, to provide urgently needed ammunition, Javelin anti-
tank missiles, and the Stinger man-portable air defense systems 
to Ukraine.
    At the same time, we continue to expeditiously process and 
approve requests for deliveries of U.S. origin material, 
military equipment to Ukraine from our allies and partners, 
which is the theme of this hearing, under our Third Party 
Transfer authority.
    As the Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs, 
or PM, the mission--this mission is at the core of my 
responsibilities. PM is on the front lines of this effort that 
links diplomacy and defense to bolster U.S. national security.
    My team works closely with the Department of Defense, with 
Congress, and the U.S. defense industry to deliver tools and 
training that supports our foreign policy, strengthens our 
allies' and partners' abilities to provide for their defense, 
and contributes meaningfully to the stability of the rules-
based international order.
    Day to day the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs 
oversees approximately $7 billion in security sector assistance 
programs annually, which accounts for roughly 20 percent of the 
Department of State and USAID's [United States Agency for 
International Development's] total annual assistance.
    This assistance includes foreign military financing, an 
appropriated grant assistance program through which partners 
are able to procure U.S.-origin defense capabilities almost 
entirely by buying into the Defense Department procurement 
process; and International Military Education and Training that 
enables foreign military personnel to study beside their U.S. 
counterparts.
    In addition, the bureau concurs on behalf of the Secretary 
of State with multiple Department of Defense security 
cooperation authorities totaling approximately $9 billion 
annually as required by law.
    And we share this burden of security challenge--of security 
with our allies and partners and we work together to address 
the challenges around the world.
    These tools, Mr. Chairman, apply not only in times of 
crisis but help us shape a world that is less susceptible to 
such threats.
    As we turn as well to the pacing threat from the PRC 
[People's Republic of China] and its model of autocracy poses 
to the rules-based order, we can look to security cooperation 
and security assistance as a key element of our response.
    For decades, for example, we have worked to strengthen our 
security cooperation with key allies such as Japan and South 
Korea, while creating new partnerships with countries like 
Vietnam and while working hand in glove with Taiwan to 
strengthen that brave island's defense and deterrence. And this 
administration intends to deepen and expand that cooperation in 
the months and years ahead.
    Over the years, commitments like these have created new 
opportunities for interoperability, new allies to deter 
aggressive behavior, and new partners to help meet global 
challenges.
    Real partnership means bearing burdens together with 
everyone doing their part because no single nation can afford 
to carry that weight alone.
    So I thank you for the opportunity to testify before you 
today. The Department of State would not be able to achieve the 
level of security cooperation we have without our key partners: 
the Department of Defense, the interagency, our foreign 
partners, and you, the United States Congress.
    I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Lewis can be found in the 
Appendix on page 68.]
    The Chairman. Thank you very much.
    Dr. Karlin, as you mentioned in your remarks, I think one 
of the big advantages that we have in terms of, you know, 
building alliances, what we have to offer the world is security 
assistance.
    We're better at it than most people who--or any other 
country that could offer it, both in terms of the quality of 
the equipment, the training we provide, and we have a number of 
programs, as you know, that, you know, enable defense 
cooperation and providing defense equipment.
    At the same time, there's increasing pressure, depending on 
the countries that we're helping. You know, throughout Africa, 
you know, there's been, you know, people we have helped who 
have then led coups against the government.
    Certainly, right now in the Middle East there's particular 
focus on, you know, Saudi Arabia and the UAE [United Arab 
Emirates] where we have built partnerships with them. The war 
in Yemen has put pressure on our government to back off and not 
provide that security assistance. In the Philippines we have 
had that problem as well.
    Now, we attempt to balance that. We have the Leahy law 
that, you know, requires, you know, respecting human rights. 
I'm just wondering, how do we strike that balance?
    And I'm particularly focused on the UAE. The situation in 
Yemen is very, very complex. But, at a minimum, at this point, 
we have slow-walked some of our weapon sales that were supposed 
to go to UAE because of those concerns.
    How do you see us balancing that? Because what I'm fearful 
of right now is a lot of countries, and the UAE is at, you 
know, the top of that list--we saw that they were one of the 
countries that abstained in the vote against Russia--they're 
hedging their bets, and if it doesn't come from us, they're 
going to go to Russia and China.
    How do we avoid losing those folks while we're concerned 
about what else they might be doing--concerns about human 
rights, concerns about conflict in the region?
    You know, how does the DOD look at balancing those 
concerns, and I'd be interested in Ms. Lewis' comments about 
that as well.
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you very much, Chairman.
    In your opening remarks, you had talked about how we can't 
do this on our own and I think that is spot on. Indeed, we 
shouldn't do it on our own.
    It works so much better, as we're seeing in Ukraine, of 
course, today, when we have knit together a cohort of countries 
to really ensure effective security cooperation.
    What's different about when the United States gives 
security cooperation, as you know, is that we have some real 
standards. We don't support corruption. We don't support 
transactional relationships.
    What we try to do is emphasize the rule of law. We try to 
emphasize human rights. All in line with our values, because at 
the end of the day, frankly, that makes militaries more 
effective and that's in all of our interests.
    So as we work closely with the UAE, in particular, we work 
with them on their--on protecting their territory, defending 
their territory.
    But as with all countries, it's important that we have 
frank conversations about how and in what ways we think they 
can be more effective at what they're trying to do. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Ms. Lewis.
    Ms. Lewis. Thank you. First of all, I'd like to concur with 
Dr. Karlin on the importance of providing our security 
assistance and working very closely together with our allies 
and partners around the world, and as you mentioned, we have to 
really continue to balance those concerns with our deep and 
strong relationships as we work with countries.
    Also, on UAE specifically, we remain committed to providing 
the F-35s and the MQ-9s. We are having regular discussions with 
the UAE on----
    The Chairman. If I may--we remain committed to that.
    Ms. Lewis. Yes.
    The Chairman. It doesn't seem to ever happen and they're 
starting to notice.
    Ms. Lewis. We are talking to them on a regular basis. They 
know that we are committed, and we are making sure that they 
have all of the information they need to move forward with 
those, and at the same time, making sure that they are also 
complying with the commitments that they made as part of that 
process and we're continuing that discussion with them.
    I would also note, and I think Dr. Karlin mentioned this, 
that the UAE is really facing enhanced threats from the Houthis 
inside Yemen, and we have also remained committed to partnering 
with them as they manage that problem and that challenge.
    The Chairman. Thank you. And one last question.
    The cooperation between the Department of Defense and 
Department of State and also development assistance, if you 
could talk a little bit about how well you work together.
    I mean, this was a big focus, you know, certainly, coming 
out of Iraq and Afghanistan, but in the counterterrorism effort 
across Africa, you know, across Asia and the Middle East.
    You know, it's not just security assistance that we 
provide. We also want to make sure that we're providing 
development assistance and to do that we need, certainly, State 
and DOD working together but, you know, a number of other 
agencies.
    You mentioned the rule of law being important. Department 
of Justice is involved in that. Certainly, when we're talking 
about health care, that's where you get into USAID. How well do 
you think that partnership is working the sort of 
intergovernmental approach here to go forward?
    Ms. Lewis. Thank you, Chairman.
    I think the level of cooperation is really unprecedented 
and for a lot of that I have to thank Congress because the 2017 
National Defense Authorization Act, one of the big priorities 
as, I think, we all saw in it was to ensure that we were 
talking as often as possible, talking from the earliest stages 
of which countries and programs would we prioritize, how would 
we design them, how would we look at execution, and then how 
would we do assessment, monitoring, and evaluation, and that 
goes beyond kind of more traditional security cooperations to 
involve things like humanitarian assistance and disaster 
relief.
    It really is a close-knit partnership that involves 
extremely regular dialogues, which I think has resulted in a 
more healthy and productive approach to this issue.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Ms. Lewis. May I just add that I think, as we look at our 
foreign policy--the foreign policy of the United States--we 
need diplomacy, we need development and, obviously, we need to 
have our security assistance deeply involved as well.
    And I have to say, you know, having been here for 4 months 
that I am truly impressed with the deep cooperation at every 
level, from the action officer all the way up to the most 
senior levels of the Department, as well as with USAID, as we 
look at how to counter the threats that the U.S. faces.
    But also, as you point out, if we're going to solve these 
problems, we have to work hand in glove. One of the things I'm 
very focused on is security sector governance, and part of that 
is because of the issues that you have just raised.
    We need to make sure that ministries of defense know how to 
procure in ways that combat corruption. We need to be talking 
about our American values in terms of democracy, human rights.
    So--and we have to work hand in glove on all of those 
programs with USAID and other pieces of the State Department.
    The Chairman. Thank you very much. Appreciate it.
    Mr. Rogers.
    Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the 
opportunity. I am the uglier version of Mr. Rogers.
    [Laughter.]
    The Chairman. So Mr. Wittman. I apologize.
    Mr. Wittman. That's okay, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that.
    Ms. Lewis, Dr. Karlin, thank you so much for joining us 
today.
    I want to go directly to what I see as a divergence in 
what's happening in the world as it relates to larger spheres 
of influence, the United States and China specifically.
    As we watch China work to expand their spheres of influence 
what we see is a very transactional effort that they take.
    They go to countries, they engage them, they build a road 
for them, they build a building, and in exchange for that 
either have an agreement for certain resources in the country, 
promising economic development, and that never quite occurs.
    We see Chinese nationals come in and do the work, all these 
things, and the country afterwards goes, well, where's the 
benefit to this country?
    Now, for years through USAID we did many of the same 
intended things but in a much, much different way. The Chinese 
with their One Belt, One Road Initiative, too, are looking to 
tie countries together but also to isolate.
    I think there's a great opportunity there for us in many 
areas of the world to build or redevelop relationships, 
especially in countering the Chinese effort and how they do 
things through opportunism and through exploitive means with 
these other countries and I think those countries are starting 
to see it.
    But in many instances, we haven't had the best record in 
what we have done to develop relationships with other 
countries.
    So my question to this is, what do we do--twofold. What do 
we do to counter the Chinese efforts as they look to establish 
these relationships?
    I argue they're transactional. And what do we do to create 
longer term relationships and what do we do--and how do we do 
it in areas that are incredibly important like Southeast Asia, 
like Indonesia and Micronesia and Malaysia, those areas that we 
know are, unfortunately, I think, moving towards the influence 
of China because they're watching how things are unfolding?
    And do you think it begins with developing deeper economic 
relationships that would then lead to strategic relationships?
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you very much. I think, Ranking Member, 
that you are spot on when you were talking about these--this 
transactional approach that the Chinese take, and I would add 
to that that is fomenting dependencies.
    It encourages corruption. It undermines the institutions 
and the rule of law, and it's, as you know so well, it's just a 
completely diametrically opposed approach to what we do, and 
frankly, to what's good for that country and good for that 
country's people.
    And so regarding your first question on kind of how we 
counter it, I think it's twofold. One is to shine a spotlight. 
Make sure that all the countries see what's happening and 
understand what's going on and why that's not in their long-
term interest.
    The second thing I would say is help them understand why 
our model is different, why our model of strengthening their 
institutions, of institutional capacity building, strengthening 
advisors within their ministry of defense, showing them that 
that alternative model, ensuring that they can sustain the 
materiel we give them and it doesn't break down quickly.
    So that's how I would answer your first question.
    On your second question in the longer term--and I'll defer 
to Assistant Secretary Lewis on the foreign policy elements of 
it--but it would seem to me that a more holistic approach, a 
more whole-of-government approach, does have an outsized 
effect.
    I would just note on Southeast Asia, we're seeing some 
really positive steps for some of these. I think part of it is 
because of our--the relationships are getting closer. Part of 
it is, I think, that they're seeing this approach the Chinese 
are taking and the faults within it.
    But just to take one example, in Indonesia, the chief of 
defense spent 8 years studying in the United States. He's 
trying to professionalize their military. He wants to heighten 
institutional capacity building with us.
    So I think we're seeing some positive case studies that we 
really do need to build on.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Wittman. Ms. Lewis.
    Ms. Lewis. Thank you. I fully concur with Dr. Karlin, and I 
really appreciate you asking this question.
    I think this is a central focus of our work right now, and 
we do need to--and I completely believe that not only does the 
United States have the best military equipment available, but 
what you get when you purchase from the United States is the 
total package.
    That's what Dr. Karlin was referring to. You get the 
training. You get the deep relationships with us. We work with 
you on maintenance on all of the pieces. And as you point out, 
we're not coming in and you end up debt-laden and, you know, 
asking for minerals on the side.
    And so--and I think we have focused on that. We need to 
focus on that both in the region itself, but I also think in 
Africa, in Latin America as well. And so this is a center of 
our focus at the State Department.
    The Chairman. And the gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Langevin is recognized.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Can you hear me 
okay?
    The Chairman. Yes, we got you. Go ahead, Jim.
    Mr. Langevin. Very good. Let me begin.
    First, I want to thank our witnesses for your testimony 
today. Very insightful.
    Dr. Karlin, if I could start with you. Over the last week, 
we have seen an uptick in Chinese aggression against Taiwan, as 
much as the world has had its eyes on the Russian invasion of 
Ukraine.
    Can you discuss the importance of activities like the 
Pacific Deterrence Initiative or the Ukrainian Security 
Assistance Initiative in supporting and assuring our allies?
    Mr. Larsen [presiding]. Before they answer--this is the 
chair--Jim Langevin, if you could just try to be a little more 
clearer, directly into your microphone it would be helpful for 
us in the room. Thanks.
    Mr. Langevin. Okay. Thank you. I'll pull it closer.
    Mr. Larsen. Did the witnesses get the question?
    Dr. Karlin. Congressman, if you don't mind, I actually only 
got about half of it and I'd hate to miss some of it. If you 
don't----
    Mr. Larsen. All right. Let's do everyone a favor and start 
the clock over at 5 minutes. Can we do that? I'm going to do 
that.
    [Laughter.]
    Mr. Larsen. Love it when Adam's not here. So start the 
clock over at 5 minutes, and Representative Langevin, go ahead 
again.
    Mr. Langevin. Okay. Thank you.
    The question is for Dr. Karlin. Are you hearing more clear 
now?
    Dr. Karlin. Much better, sir.
    Mr. Langevin. Okay. Over the last week, we have seen an 
uptick in Chinese aggression against Taiwan, as much of the 
world's attention and eyes has been focused on the Russian 
invasion of Ukraine.
    Can you discuss the importance of activities like the 
Pacific Deterrence Initiative or the Ukraine Security 
Assistance Initiative in supporting and assuring our allies?
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you very much, Congressman, and thanks 
for your patience on the technical side.
    We have absolutely seen this uptick by the Chinese around 
Taiwan over the last week but also even over the last few 
months, and I would say we are watching it very closely. We are 
talking to our allies and partners about it and looking at what 
steps that we need to take as well, because it's problematic, 
it is unhelpful, and it is also unsafe.
    More broadly, you had cited, Congressman, these holistic 
initiatives, like the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, the 
security cooperation initiative as it relates to Ukraine.
    I might even add to that list things like the European 
Deterrence Initiative that Congress had pulled together a few 
years ago. What's really nice about these efforts is they 
ensure that we're taking a holistic approach to how we are 
dealing with a challenge.
    Just to take one of those examples, when we look at the 
Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, that has resulted in 
billions of dollars of support to Ukraine since the 2014 
Russian invasion. It's also been helpful in working with 
Ukraine on some necessary defense reforms that they have needed 
to make.
    So, overall, I think these efforts help us as we approach 
challenges in a more holistic way. Thank you.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
    And, Dr. Karlin, if I could continue with you. You know, we 
understand that the concept of integrated deterrence will play 
a large role in the upcoming National Defense Strategy and I've 
long believed that no war will ever be fought again without the 
inclusion of cyber.
    So how will cyber be incorporated into, in quotes, 
``integrated deterrence'' both in our plans and strategies and 
alongside our allies?
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you, Congressman. That is absolutely an 
area that we are looking closely at. It is really easy to take 
a traditional approach to conflicts and think, as we are 
looking at responses, what's the ground element, what's the 
maritime element, for example.
    And we know that there are newer and different domains that 
we have got to account for. Cyber is a perfect example. Space 
is another one.
    And so what's nice about the concept of integrated 
deterrence is it forces us to baseline looking across the 
different domains, looking across the spectrum of conflict, and 
doing that in partnership with our colleagues across the 
government and also with our closest allies and partners.
    So this is fundamental to how, I think, we need to think 
about future contingencies and future concepts of operations. 
Thank you.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you. My next question--I'll start with 
Ms. Lewis and then if we have time, Dr. Karlin can chime in as 
well. But technological cooperation with our allies and 
partners is critical to our success abroad.
    However, we have seen various interoperability issues 
hindering us and our allies from quickly and effectively 
working together.
    So what are we--what efforts are we making to ensure that 
we are in lockstep with our allies and partners and they are 
with us when it comes to our technological capabilities?
    Ms. Lewis. Well, first of all, thank you for raising this 
very important question, and we are focused on this----
    Mr. Larsen. Could you pull the microphone closer, please.
    Ms. Lewis. Yeah. Second time I'm having that problem.
    We will--what I was saying is we are singularly focused on 
this question of interoperability and I know both here--both at 
the State Department and the Defense Department, and as we work 
with our partners and allies, we are looking at providing them 
with systems where they can work with our military and 
sometimes that also includes upgrading systems that they 
already have.
    So we have worked across Europe and then with other close 
allies to make sure that we are moving forward with upgrading 
all of their equipment when necessary and, again, providing 
them with what they need.
    On the tech side, I think I will say that we do always have 
to be careful as we are supplying and working with our partners 
to make sure that we are protecting our own technology and 
that, you know, is something we also work on at the same time 
as we work on interoperability. Thank you.
    Mr. Langevin. Very good. Thank you. I think my time is just 
about up. So thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    The Chairman [presiding]. Thank you.
    Mr. Wilson is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for the 
witnesses being here today.
    Dr. Karlin, in the midst of Putin's war, I regret your 
focus on climate change based on extremist science is 
particularly bizarre today as the Biden policies of destroying 
energy jobs in America led to the United States purchase of 
Putin oil to finance the mass murder that's going on today in 
Ukraine. And now to focus additionally on electric cars with 
Chinese batteries by this extremist philosophy to finance the 
largest military buildup in peacetime in world history, which 
will empower the Chinese Communist Party against American 
families.
    Getting real, instead of diverting to the environmental 
extremism, we need to face the existential threat of Putin 
today and the Chinese Communist Party maybe later today.
    In light of that, to address what we're doing now, I was 
grateful to introduce the Ukraine Democracy Defense Lend-Lease 
Act of 2022.
    This was to streamline the process of lending military 
equipment in defense of civilian populations in Ukraine. It's 
very ironic that when I was in St. Petersburg, I discovered 
that the lend-lease policy was largely responsible for saving 
Russians in the Nazi siege of Leningrad, and now we have a 
program that could save the Ukrainians in the siege of Kyiv by 
Putin.
    With this particular program, is there any effort and what 
can be done to promote lend-lease, to promote the law that I 
proposed, and what can be done even without the law?
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you very much, Congressman. I am not 
familiar with this exact law that you cite.
    But I would note, broadly, that we have had a steady 
drumbeat of assistance and support to Ukraine, to the 
legitimate government of Ukraine, and to helping its military 
as it, quite literally, is engaging in the fight today.
    We have focused that assistance, which has come together 
quite astonishingly quickly. I think Assistant Secretary Lewis 
has noted that the level of that support has been unprecedented 
in Presidential Drawdown Authority and we're really trying to 
tailor that to the needs that Ukraine's military has today and 
to systems that we know they are already trained on that they 
can employ.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Wilson. And, additionally, it's been cited--again, I'm 
really grateful. The leadership--President Donald Trump is the 
person who provided the first Javelin missiles to defend the 
people of Ukraine, and then flash forward, who would imagine 
how successful; now Germany is providing Javelin missiles after 
initially saying they wouldn't even allow the Javelin missiles 
of Estonia to cross their country.
    And so, indeed, President Vladimir Zelensky has unified the 
world to defend the people of Ukraine. With that in mind, 
have--has the United States provided Harpoon missiles to the 
Zelensky government?
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you very much, Congressman. You noted 
Germany's unprecedented move, and I will just say I think it's 
extraordinary to see what our European allies have been doing 
to support Ukraine, particularly over the last few days. It's 
quite literally unprecedented.
    In terms of the support that we have been giving Ukraine, 
particularly through the Presidential drawdowns, since 
September there's been a wide range of support including 
Stinger missiles, Javelin missiles, anti-tank rocket systems, 
grenade launchers, more than 2,000 tons of ammunition, 
including mortar and artillery rounds, small arms, machine 
guns. It is, indeed, a lengthy list of capabilities.
    Mr. Wilson. And I'm glad to see the change in policy 
because when I was in Kyiv in December, the plan was to provide 
$40 million after the invasion. And so, thank goodness, again, 
President Zelensky has been so successful.
    Additionally, Ms. Lewis, back on Taiwan, we have the 
agreements that we have with INDOPACOM [U.S. Indo-Pacific 
Command] to provide defense, and on the very day that Putin 
invaded Ukraine there were military flights by the Chinese 
against Taiwan.
    We need to be providing every and any item that could be 
provided of the most advanced equipment to protect the 23 
million people of Taiwan. What is being done diplomatically to 
do this?
    Ms. Lewis. Thank you for the question, Congressman.
    And I agree that we need to make it absolutely clear that 
our support for Taiwan is rock solid. We have provided $18 
billion to them in security assistance and we are going to 
continue to do that.
    We are working on--with them on making sure that they have 
the appropriate asymmetric defense capabilities and we will 
continue to do so.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, and peace through 
strength. Thank you.
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Larsen is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Just for the record, 2017 
U.S. imports of Russian crude and petroleum products was 3.84 
percent in 2017 as a total, up to 6.87 percent in 2020, and 
it's increased last year. It's going to take a little while for 
us to turn off the momentum that started in 2017 with Russian 
crude oil imports.
    Having said that, I want to move on to the actual situation 
we're talking about, and ask Ms. Karlin what details you can 
provide to this committee about the DOD's portion of the recent 
$6.4 billion requests from the administration to support 
Ukraine and Europe?
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you very much, Congressman. My 
understanding is that much of that focuses on the force posture 
changes and the costs that are inherent in those--the operating 
costs--given that, of course, while we have had a very sizable 
force posture in Europe, I think it's been about 80,000 or so. 
We have----
    Mr. Larsen. About 93,000 or so. Yeah.
    Dr. Karlin. I'm sorry, sir?
    Mr. Larsen. It's higher than that. Go ahead.
    Dr. Karlin. So it has since surged, of course. So now we 
have got about 100,000 either in Europe or in European waters. 
And so my understanding is most of that request really looks at 
those operating costs and then a chunk of it is looking at 
replenishment of stocks since we have now done kind of the 
third--the unprecedented Presidential drawdown.
    So this would help fill some of the materiel that the 
military services have then been able to facilitate the 
transfer of to Ukraine.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Larsen. Yeah. If Russia manages to control Ukraine so 
it's--so that Ukraine is no longer an independent, sovereign 
country, what DOD tools exist to support making Ukraine an 
independent sovereign country again that has control over its 
own borders?
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you very much, Congressman. Of course, it 
should not go without saying that what we are seeing in Ukraine 
right now is completely a decision by President Putin.
    Mr. Larsen. It is a decision by Putin. There's only one 
president responsible for this invasion. That's President 
Putin. So the question I have is what DOD tools exist to 
support making Ukraine an independent, sovereign country? If we 
can just get to that.
    Dr. Karlin. Of course. Thank you very much.
    Mr. Larsen. We can give speeches up here, too. I don't 
really want the speeches.
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you very much, Congressman. What we're 
doing is trying to ensure our commitment to NATO is rock solid. 
That has been critical to our force posture.
    As it relates to Ukraine specifically, we're doing all we 
can to support the legitimate government of Ukraine and its 
military right now as it, frankly, is engaging in such a 
critical fight. And we understand this is a dynamic situation, 
one that we, of course, closely with our colleagues at the 
Department of State are monitoring closely.
    Mr. Larsen. If there's not a legitimate government in 
Ukraine at some point in the near future, what DOD tools exist 
to support the legitimate leadership of Ukraine?
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you, Congressman. While I understand it 
is a dynamic situation, as I noted, we're focused on supporting 
the legitimate government. I'm a little wary of getting into 
hypotheticals right now.
    But I can very much assure you we're looking at a wide 
range of scenarios, cognizant that further developments may 
warrant a relook. And I know that that is an effort that we 
will want to do very closely with our State Department 
colleagues, of course, but in particular, very closely with 
Congress, whose support for Ukraine has just been extraordinary 
throughout this period.
    Mr. Larsen. Yeah, I know it's something we don't want to 
contemplate too much openly. But I do want to contemplate that 
we have to have options that we have to consider from the 
congressional side to be supportive.
    So if you're thinking about additional--the use of existing 
authorities or additional authorities, at least within the DOD, 
it'd be helpful to keep us informed of that as you move along.
    Dr. Karlin. Absolutely, Congressman.
    Mr. Larsen [presiding]. Yeah. Thanks. With that, I'll yield 
back and I recognize the actual ranking member as opposed to 
the pretend ranking--kind of tricked us all when Rob sat down.
    Mike Rogers for as much time as Adam used.
    Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman. I only have one question 
and I hope you all can answer it. You know, the President has 
announced that he's sending additional U.S. troops over to join 
our NATO allies in the Eastern European Front NATO countries to 
help with those people fleeing Ukraine--the refugees.
    We have been talking about sending additional permanent--
permanently stationed troops to Romania and Poland and in the 
Baltics prior to the invasion, and my question is does the 
administration support this result that after this invasion 
that we make those troop presence--make that troop presence 
permanent in those Eastern European Front countries?
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you very much, Congressman.
    Obviously, we are following the situation really closely. 
As you might recall, last August or so, September or so, 
Secretary Austin released his Global Posture Review, which 
looked closely at our posture in Europe and largely saw that it 
was about right.
    We recognize this dynamic situation now requires us to give 
it another fine tooth look to see what's necessary to ensure 
that we have got deterrence of Russia and that we can 
absolutely 150 percent say that NATO is safe and secure.
    So we're looking at what sort of troop presence, whether 
it's rotational or permanent, is necessary, given this current 
security environment, both in the near term and, frankly, in 
the long term.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Rogers. Great. Well, I do think that it would send a 
great message to our NATO allies that we are serious about what 
the President said in his public address a few days ago when he 
said we were absolutely going to do everything in our power to 
protect our NATO allies--their borders.
    I think the best way to demonstrate this is to enhance our 
position there. We do need an additional brigade in Romania on 
the Black Sea. I'd like to see the Stryker Brigade that's moved 
there temporarily made permanent.
    Poland has agreed to pay for basing if we would establish a 
permanent base there. I think that's an obvious that we should 
do. But also the Baltics are very vulnerable. So I do hope that 
you all will look at establishing permanent basing in those 
areas.
    And with that, I yield back.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you. The chair recognizes Mr. Courtney 
for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the 
witnesses this morning.
    Again, Mr. Chairman, I'd ask that two items be admitted to 
the record: an article from Reuters, which shows that Canadian 
oil exports actually shattered records in recent weeks.
    So the notion that there's pipeline, you know, interference 
in terms of Canadian oil is, clearly, not being--is not in 
conformance with the data. Also, oilprice.com just reported 
yesterday or a couple days ago that the U.S. rig count has 
grown for the 18th straight week.
    So the notion that the Biden administration is suppressing 
oil and gas or that Canadian oil is not coming into the U.S., 
as both of these industry journals indicate is, in fact, not 
correct.
    Mr. Larsen. Without objection.
    [The information referred to is retained in the committee 
files.]
    Mr. Courtney. When we talk about ways to help our allies in 
the situation in Ukraine, I think, you know, one--and it's not 
strictly under the Department of Defense, but the approach that 
the administration took in terms of sharing intelligence over 
the last, really, 2 or 3 months is very, I think, distinctive 
in terms of that, you know, we did not sort of try and really 
pick and choose which allies we're going to get information or 
even the world, for that matter.
    And I just wonder if you could maybe spend a minute, Dr. 
Karlin, just sort of talking about the thinking behind that 
approach and why it really helped, I think, blunt any false 
flag operations or any other misinformation in terms of the 
lead-up.
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you very much, Congressman. I do think 
this was an unprecedented effort to shine the spotlight on 
Russia's plans and Russians--Russia's behavior, and no doubt 
we'll want to study its impact for years and years.
    It was extraordinary to watch the work of the intelligence 
community and just how quickly they were able to do this 
declassification when necessary or to make material releasable 
to our allies and partners.
    I don't believe that a day has gone by since early December 
where either in the Defense Department or the State Department 
there hasn't been a discussion with an ally or partner on what 
we are seeing, what we're understanding, and trying to share 
that.
    That's been useful in ensuring that we have a common threat 
picture. It's also, I think, been useful to the world, to our 
public, so that they understand contrary to when we have seen 
Russian disinformation in the past, like in 2014--no kidding--
who is exactly to blame for what's going on and that is solely 
President Putin. Thank you.
    Mr. Courtney. That helped in terms of making sure there was 
no daylight with our allies in terms of everyone's 
understanding of what, in fact, was going on. Is that right?
    Ms. Lewis. One hundred percent. And I think we have really 
seen NATO, Europe, our allies and partners around the world 
come together and speak with a united voice against what Putin 
is doing inside Ukraine. And I think this effort--again, I have 
to join Dr. Karlin in commending the intelligence community for 
the unbelievable work they did, A, in producing the 
intelligence, informing policymakers such as yourselves, and 
then making sure that it was accessible to our allies and 
partners so that they understood what was going on.
    I know at the State Department that this has been a key 
part of the conversation that we have had on, literally, a 
daily basis.
    Mr. Courtney. You know, as long as we're talking about 
unprecedented efforts by the administration, I'd like to just 
spend a second on AUKUS, which, again, is, obviously, the 
crown--it's sharing technology that, arguably, is the crown 
jewels--nuclear propulsion technology, which we have done with 
only one other country back in 1958 with the U.K. [United 
Kingdom].
    And, again, I would just note that the public opinion polls 
in Australia after that agreement was announced were over 60 
percent approval and very little opposition, which I think has 
really gone a long way in terms of reasserting the fact that 
we're serious about that alliance with that country.
    But could you also just comment for a second on the fact 
that there's other aspects than just submarines and that 
there's other ways that AUKUS is going to strengthen our bonds, 
and also that it's not exclusive just to the three countries?
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you very much, Congressman. I really 
appreciate that you brought up AUKUS, which is this historic 
effort to knit together our country, Australia, and United 
Kingdom with a serious robust technological security 
partnership.
    The undersea piece is probably the first one. I think it's 
the one so many of us have focused on, but it's very much 
expanding, looking into key areas like artificial intelligence 
and quantum as just two of them. And I think, frankly, this 
unprecedented effort is critical to Indo-Pacific security.
    I think when we look at, you know, our relationship with 
Australia, just to take that as, obviously, one that is 
historic, Australia has fought next to the U.S. military, I 
think, in just about every conflict over the last 100 years or 
so.
    As we see how we can get into the most sensitive 
technological cooperation, I think it just puts us in a very 
different ball game. Thank you.
    The Chairman [presiding]. Thank you. The gentleman's time 
has expired.
    Dr. DesJarlais.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to our 
witnesses for being here today.
    I'll start with Dr. Karlin. In your opening statement, I 
was pleased to hear your emphasis on the importance of 
integrated deterrence and, as you know, the foundation of 
integrated deterrence is our nuclear deterrent.
    As the Biden administration undertakes its Nuclear Posture 
Review, have you solicited input from our European allies in 
your preparation for the NPR?
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you very much, Congressman. Indeed, we 
have and we have done it at a wide variety of levels from the 
Secretary of Defense all the way down to the desk officer.
    We have done it closely with our colleagues at the State 
Department and at the White House, and we have really done all 
we can to ensure we're hearing from our European allies and 
also, I would note, our close allies in the Indo-Pacific--South 
Korea, Japan, and Australia. Thank you.
    Dr. DesJarlais. What are you hearing from them in terms of 
the nuclear declaratory policy? That seems to be a hot topic 
and there seems to be indication that there may be a weakening 
of the no first use in terms of the Biden administration. What 
are our allies saying in regards to that?
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you very much, Congressman.
    In this wide variety of discussions, we have heard a lot 
from our closest allies and they--the importance that they also 
put on extended deterrence, as we do.
    We have talked to them a lot and heard their thoughts on 
our need to have a safe, secure, and effective nuclear 
deterrent, and we have ensured throughout these conversations 
that we are getting their inputs and that as decisions will be 
made by the President, of course, that we are in close 
discussions with them. Above all, I would just underscore that 
our extended deterrence commitments remain ironclad. Thank you.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. I personally have had members of 
countries such as Poland reach out to me stressing the 
importance of not adopting a no first use declaratory policy, 
and I know that that's been in the talks, considering Russian 
strategic nuclear exercises.
    I think that it's important that we do the right thing 
there and I think that--the impression I get from our allies is 
that they would not want us to have a no first use declaratory 
policy.
    So I would just add that. Also, there's been mention of 
dropping our low-yield nuclear weapons program, and do you have 
any insight on that?
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you very much, Congressman. I would say 
the Nuclear Posture Review, which has been a really rigorous 
interagency effort since, gosh, July or August or so, has 
really looked holistically at our nuclear capabilities, tried 
to tie them to our understanding of threat scenarios, the 
impact they have on deterrence, or the impact that they have on 
assurance.
    And I think that once final decisions are made on that 
you'll see that, and once those decisions are made, I'd be more 
than willing to sit down and speak with you or your staff about 
this. Thank you.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. Thank you.
    Let's shift to China. We have kind of nibbled around this a 
little bit today. Obviously, what's going on with Russia and 
Ukraine we have to keep our eye on China and Taiwan. You know, 
we have seen Chinese military planes regularly probe Taiwanese 
airspace, accompanied by overt threats from Beijing towards 
Taipei.
    Would you say that the current allocation of security 
cooperation resources is appropriate to the level of threat 
that Taiwan faces?
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you very much, Congressman. We're 
actually looking at this exact issue right now to ensure that 
how we allocate security cooperation is in line with our 
National Defense Strategy, which we are in the throes of 
wrapping up.
    We have got to ensure that it is aligned to our biggest 
concerns and that includes Indo-Pacific security as a top 
priority.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. For both you and Ms. Lewis, I 
understand that Taiwan has made requests to the administration 
for access to foreign military financing dollars. It is 
apparent to me that if any country has needed this funding, 
it's Taiwan. What has been the cause for the delay and would 
congressional action help expedite this request?
    Ms. Lewis. Well, first of all, I really want to thank you 
for the question because I do think we need to continue to 
focus on China and Taiwan even at this moment where we are, 
understandably, looking at what's happening inside Ukraine.
    And I think as you may know, we have provided over $18 
billion of foreign military sales to Taiwan since 2017. We are 
always looking at ways to enhance that and improve their 
capabilities.
    We're particularly focused, as I mentioned before, on 
building the asymmetric capabilities of Taiwan and we are 
working with them on a regular basis to do so.
    We're always happy to continue to work with your office and 
other Members of Congress with additional ideas and ways that 
we can do so effectively.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you both. I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Gallego is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to our 
witnesses for joining us today.
    I want to start by offering my thoughts to the people of 
Ukraine as Russia continues to launch an unprovoked and wholly 
unjustifiable invasion in Ukraine. I want to make myself very 
clear that the United States stands with Ukraine. Champions of 
freedom and democracy around the world stand with Ukraine, and 
Russia will not go unpunished, as the Biden administration is 
demonstrating.
    Ms. Karlin--Dr. Karlin, I apologize--thank you for your 
testimony. In your written remarks you described the way the 
Department approaches security cooperation with states on 
Russia's and China's periphery differs from how it's employed 
elsewhere.
    One of my proudest accomplishments in Congress was leading 
the effort last year to authorize the Baltic Security 
Initiative, a security cooperation program providing targeted 
support to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.
    As Russia continues to directly threaten European security, 
how do you see security cooperation with the Baltic States, 
going forward?
    What more do you think the Department can and should do 
through security cooperation vehicles to support our most 
vulnerable NATO allies at the time--at this time of heightened 
tensions?
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you very much, Congressman.
    We absolutely want to ensure that our security cooperation 
programs are tailored to the needs of that country and also to 
how and in what ways we might want that country to think about 
the use of its military.
    And those front line partners, whether in Europe or in 
Asia, are going to inevitably have different needs and 
different requirements. We are in very consistent deep talks 
with the Baltic States to ensure that they're getting the 
support that they need, and what is, I think, just so notable 
about this time period is not just the security cooperation 
kind of discreetly but, more broadly, the force posture changes 
that we have seen as well where we're seeing NATO members, 
really left and right, putting their troops in one another's 
territory.
    So I think those conversations have gone very smoothly to 
date. That is not least, I think, because of the efforts that 
you have made in ensuring that they are getting the prioritized 
assistance, and over these coming weeks and months, I think it 
will be important that we take this concept further to ensure 
that they are receiving what they need.
    I think, you know, just to take those countries as 
examples, we see capacity. We see capability. We see political 
will. We see appropriate context.
    We see countries that follow the rule of law and human 
rights. So a lot of the criteria that we think about, they 
really do follow in spades. Thank you.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you.
    And Dr. Karlin, I believe it's essential that we have 
greater flexibility in providing this crucial support to our 
Baltic allies.
    As you know, section 333 of the title 10, U.S. Code, is the 
Department's primary authority for training and equipping to 
build partner capacity. What is your assessment of 333? Are 
there other further steps that the Department should take to 
make the best use of it?
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you very much, Congressman, and my 
colleague may want to add on this topic as well.
    But I would say the reforms that Congress put in the 2017 
National Defense Authorization Act really brought together this 
patchwork of authorities. They enabled greater focus on 
collaboration between State and DOD and also this push on 
assessment, monitoring, and evaluation.
    I think we're seeing that flexibility, on the whole, is 
largely in a good place. To the extent that it is possible, 
however, to get funding that lasts beyond 1 year, those longer 
term programs, what's nice about that is we can design them 
more holistically. We can ensure that temporally there's enough 
bandwidth to execute them on time. Thank you.
    Ms. Lewis. Congressman, thank you for raising the Baltics 
and thank you for the hard work that you and many others have 
done. And I do think the Baltic Security Initiative has been 
incredibly important in increasing the funding that those 
countries receive.
    I also think it's notable that those countries often work 
together as they look to band together, literally, to increase 
their security and I would also--it would be remiss of me not 
to mention the unbelievable support they have also provided to 
Ukraine at this time and I think we all owe them thanks for 
that.
    On your second question, in terms of security cooperation 
and security assistance writ large, I echo Dr. Karlin that we 
believe that the way that we work together is incredibly 
important to both the Department of Defense and the Department 
of State.
    I would also add, on the State Department side a lot of our 
funding is earmarked, and so we would look for additional 
flexibility, particularly to be able to respond to situations 
exactly like we find ourselves in in Ukraine so that we can 
both help continue to support Ukraine but also the eastern 
flank states, including the Baltics, moving forward. Thank you.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Gaetz is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Gaetz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Our partnerships have 
value but they also have costs, Dr. Karlin. Saudi Arabia is a 
country that still tolerates anti-Semitic madrassas. They throw 
gay people off of buildings. They murder their critics.
    The Saudi consulate in LA [Los Angeles] gave material 
support to 9/11 hijackers, who were predominantly Saudi, and we 
trained some of their pilots in my community in Pensacola and 
one of the people we were training killed three of my 
constituents because he was radicalized by al-Qaida on the 
Arabian Peninsula.
    What comfort can I give my constituents that the Department 
is doing everything possible and putting pressure on our 
partners to ensure they're doing everything possible so that 
the people involved in our training programs don't pose a 
threat to our force?
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you very much, Congressman.
    I'll focus just on the part of who we train and Assistant 
Secretary Lewis may want to give the broader picture.
    We have a whole lot of very serious vetting procedures in 
place to ensure that the individuals--the units we're working 
with are following the rule of law, are upholding human rights, 
and when we see something is not happening as it should, we 
immediately pause and study so that we can understand what's 
going on and if we have concerns about our assistance and how 
it is being employed.
    Mr. Gaetz. Ms. Lewis, do we have confidence that that 
process that failed, you know, in this particular case in 
Pensacola has been improved upon since then?
    Ms. Lewis. Yes, and let me take a bit of a step back, first 
of all, to say I appreciate you raising the question and I know 
how important this is to both you and the entire community.
    So thank you for raising it. And I know that both the State 
Department and the Department of Defense are always committed 
to doing everything we can to make sure that we're protecting 
our communities here at home.
    But yes, we have worked hand in glove with the Department 
of Defense to improve, and we'll continue to do so, vetting in 
all of our programs. I think one of the key pieces that we look 
at is making sure that these programs are there to strengthen 
and deepen our relationships with these countries and at the 
same time that they do make sure that we have the right people 
coming to them. So happy to continue----
    Mr. Gaetz. Yeah. I would greatly appreciate, for the 
record, if there's a way for either of you to extend those 
remarks on specific ways that there might have been 
improvements subsequent to that terrorist attack in my 
community.
    And speaking of less than fully helpful Gulf monarchies, 
Ms. Lewis, what is the administration's reaction to the UAE 
abstaining in the Security Council? They lobbied so hard to get 
the seat on the Security Council and here, this highly 
consequential conflict, they seem to be less than entirely 
cooperative with our position.
    Ms. Lewis. Well, and I'm--appreciate the question, and I 
think that as we look at the relationship with the UAE, we have 
a robust relationship with them. To just take a step back, as 
you know, we have--UAE has recently faced threats from the 
Houthis and we have been supporting them----
    Mr. Gaetz. And we have helped them.
    Ms. Lewis. Exactly.
    Mr. Gaetz. Why won't they help us?
    Ms. Lewis. I think we are having a robust conversation with 
them, asking them to continue to work with us in this situation 
on Ukraine.
    Mr. Gaetz. Is the administration disappointed with the 
abstention?
    Ms. Lewis. I think the administration has asked all of our 
friends and partners and allies to support us.
    Mr. Gaetz. Yeah, but this is a specific one because like 
you say, we have helped them with the Houthis. We have sold 
them a bunch of stuff. The chairman wants to accelerate the 
delivery of F-35s to them. And I'm just wondering, are we 
disappointed that they abstained?
    Ms. Lewis. I think we have concerns about that, and we are 
working with them and talking to them about that, moving 
forward.
    Mr. Gaetz. Are you confident in a change in position in the 
UAE, given that we're now seeing reports that Putin is 
targeting civilians in Kyiv?
    Ms. Lewis. I'm not comfortable speaking for another country 
on what they may or may not do, but I think you're raising 
legitimate questions about moving forward. I know that 
they're--while we have been here, I think, there are votes 
potentially or discussions happening right now in the United 
Nations, and I will continue----
    Mr. Gaetz. Like, what's the timeframe--the window of time 
that the State Department evaluates as, like, the essential 
window to get the UAE off the sidelines, given their position 
on the Security Council?
    Do you think that this has to happen in the next week for 
it to be effective or do you think we can have sort of a long 
drawn out dance of the veils with the Emiratis?
    Ms. Lewis. I think that as we look at this relationship 
with the Emiratis, as we do with all of our relationships with 
our partners, our allies, and our friends, we have to both be 
able to work together on the critical security issues that we 
share and also raise concerns when we do have them.
    Mr. Gaetz. Final point. Do you think a reason they 
abstained is because they haven't gotten the MQ-9s and the F-
35s yet?
    Ms. Lewis. In my view, we have worked very closely with 
them and are continuing those conversations on the MQ-9----
    Mr. Gaetz. But do you think that's a factor in the 
abstention?
    Ms. Lewis. I'm not able to speak for another country on 
their thinking, but I do know we are--we continue to be 
committed on both the MQ-9s and the F-35s.
    Mr. Gaetz. Maybe we shouldn't be. I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Carbajal is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you, 
Secretary Lewis and Secretary Karlin, for being here.
    This hearing on the importance of allies and partners is 
coming at a critical time. The strength and resolve of our 
alliances and relationships are being tested more than they 
have been in decades.
    I want to thank President Biden and his administration for 
the commitment to address the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 
close coordination and collaboration with not only NATO allies 
but partners across the world.
    While the tragic situation in Ukraine is far from over, we 
have seen a great value of being unified economically, 
diplomatically, and militarily. A go-at-it-alone strategy would 
be ineffective. My thoughts are with the Ukrainian people and 
stand in solidarity with Ukraine's effort to repel Putin's 
invasion.
    Secretary Karlin, when we discuss U.S. security assistance 
provided to our allies and partners, often it focuses on the 
sale and export of defense articles.
    However, the tangible assistance is limited if the 
receiving nation doesn't have the institutional knowledge and 
personnel ready to fully operate and maintain the assets. How 
does the partner nation's ability to maintain U.S.-provided 
security assistance factor into the scope of capabilities 
provided?
    What have you found most effective at improving operational 
and maintenance capabilities with partner nations?
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you very much, Congressman, and I 
couldn't agree more with your initial comments about the unity 
that we have seen and how crucial that has been for 
effectiveness.
    This issue of maintaining and sustaining equipment that is 
given to allies and partners is crucial. We have a really 
robust program in place and use monitoring program to ensure 
that the materiel that we have given our allies and partners is 
being accounted for so that the right folks have that materiel.
    More broadly, we spend a lot of time working with them on 
the procedures needed for sustainment. What we don't want is 
for them to have a situation where they have some sort of 
platform or asset but they haven't really taken good care of 
it, and therefore, are not--are not ready and able to use it.
    So it's crucial. I would also say, frankly, it's one of the 
top points that we emphasize in the utility of this 
partnership. We don't want them to have an airfield full of 
planes without spare parts that don't fly.
    That's not in their interest. It's not in our interest, at 
the end of the day. So it really is crucial to how we approach 
security cooperation. Thank you.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Dr. Karlin.
    Secretary Lewis, while I know each partner nation has 
unique political dynamics and security needs, is there a 
particular tool capability that the U.S. provided or provides 
to partner allies through security assistance programs in 
addition to what was just mentioned--through security 
assistance programs that has been most effective at advancing 
the State Department's foreign policy objectives?
    Ms. Lewis. Well--and thank you for that question--I 
actually think one of the amazing things about our cooperation 
is that we really do have a range of tools that, I think, 
working together with any given country can move our foreign 
policy objectives forward. So we have arms transfers, which I 
think is what people talk about the most frequently, where 
we're providing other countries with the capabilities that they 
need and that match our foreign policy goals.
    We also have other programs like International Military 
Education and Training programs where we really bring together 
and bring into our training programs the senior military 
leadership and future leaders. That, I think, is incredibly 
important.
    I have been focused on and really am delving into the 
question of security sector governance. So this is the concept 
of how can we work not only to provide capabilities but also to 
increase the effectiveness of, for example, ministries of 
defense; how can we provide training so that when countries are 
procuring, the system is designed to make sure there isn't 
corruption, that when they're designing their training programs 
that they're taking a look at things like human rights, 
international law.
    All of these tools have to come together. And I would also 
be remiss to mention that it's not only our security 
cooperation and security assistance, but we have to work hand 
in glove with our diplomacy but also with our colleagues at the 
U.S. Agency for International Development as they also work on 
things like writ large rule of law in a country that then feeds 
into our work.
    And so I look forward to working with you and your staff as 
we continue to address these important issues.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I'm out of 
time. I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Bacon is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both for 
being here today.
    What's going on in Ukraine has just been heartbreaking, to 
see what's happening to the Ukrainian citizens. Today, we're 
seeing reports of mass murders, indiscriminate killing, really, 
war crimes, and my perception of what has happened is the 
security order has changed. It's probably going to be changed 
for decades.
    What Putin is really saying is might makes right. I'm a 
bully. You can't stop me. And so--and the only country that can 
do that is America standing up with our allies.
    I've only had, really, one feedback--constructive criticism 
of the administration leading up to this. I think we should 
have sold or given Ukraine more advanced air defense and anti-
shipping capabilities. They could surely have used that this 
past week. And then once the invasion occurred, I thought the 
sanctions were a little slow.
    But now, I think, we're in a pretty darn good spot, except 
for what I would like to see is also go after energy. The fact 
that America is going to be giving Russia today $70 million to 
purchase oil--their oil exports to us--and we're going to do 
that every single day, is propping up their economy and it's 
propping up their ability to wage war.
    So, hopefully, we take on the energy exports of Russia as 
well. I'm also the co-chair of the Baltic Security Caucus. I 
know my colleague talked about this briefly.
    But the number one feedback we do hear from them is they 
would like to have U.S. troops permanently assigned in the 
Baltics for deterrence. Have we considered that and is that an 
option, from your perspective? Thank you.
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you very much, Congressman, and I 
couldn't agree more with you on your diagnosis of the situation 
that we are seeing around Ukraine. I think it is, indeed, 
heartbreaking and I think we will feel and see the effects of 
it for years to come.
    And that actually does get to the Baltic security piece. 
Thank you for your leadership on that one. As you may know, 
Secretary Austin has made multiple trips, in fact, to the 
Baltics in--just over the last few months, in fact.
    When we're looking at our permanent posture in countries, 
we're really trying to take into account a wide variety of 
criteria, and I think, given the changes that we have seen in 
the security environment right now, it's incumbent on us to 
step back and look at how things have changed.
    So when Secretary Austin announced the Global Posture 
Review results last fall, I think we had seen our posture in 
Europe was about right and now we need to step back and see 
what's changed and what does that look like, whether that's 
rotational, whether that's permanent, whether it's different 
types of units or capabilities. Thank you.
    Ms. Lewis. Just to add, and first of all, I really want to 
thank you for your remarks. I do think it is heartbreaking 
what's happening and I think the security order has changed and 
that we all need to come together at this incredible moment in 
history, and, again, watching the Ukrainians fight for their 
country has truly been inspirational, I think, for all of us.
    On your question on the Baltic security, as I mentioned 
before, they have just been--they have also been extraordinary.
    Mr. Bacon. They've led.
    Ms. Lewis. Really, and they probably understand the threat 
better than most, given the map. And, as I mentioned before, we 
really appreciate the congressional leadership on this front.
    I think the Baltic Security Initiative has allowed us to 
provide additional funding to them. I also think one of their 
strengths is that they work together as they look at 
capabilities, moving forward, and we are going to continue to 
work with them on that from the State Department side of the 
house.
    Mr. Bacon. You may want to consider putting air defense 
units, U.S.-run, you know, whether it's longer range air 
defense or a variety, because I think you got to protect your 
long-range air defense with short-range.
    Maybe we'll put some air defense capabilities there with 
U.S. forces. But having a U.S. flag there, a permanent one, is 
a deterrence. The Russians will know they're not just going 
into the Baltics.
    Of course, they're a NATO country, but they are attacking 
U.S. forces when they do so, and I think it would have a--I 
think it would have a reassuring effect for the Baltics who are 
very small, as you know, about 5 million people.
    So my second question--and there's only about a minute 
left--is Taiwan. What can we be doing now with Taiwan weapons-
wise to strengthen deterrence? What kind of capabilities can we 
be giving them?
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you, Congressman. I'll briefly say, as I 
think you know, we have done about $18 billion in assistance to 
them since 2017. Right now, we're working very closely in line 
with the Taiwan Relations Act to ensure that they're getting 
the asymmetric capabilities that they need that are really 
tailored to the threat that they face, a threat that as we know 
and as the Chinese keep trying to remind us, is growing each 
day. Thank you.
    Mr. Bacon. Thank you. Again, anti-shipping and anti-air 
capabilities seemed to be the coin of the realm for what the 
Taiwanese would need as well.
    So with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back, and thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Keating is recognized for 5 
minutes, and he's virtual.
    Bill? Mr. Keating.
    [No response.]
    The Chairman. He does not appear to be responding. Mr. 
Keating?
    [No response.]
    The Chairman. All right. Mr. Crow is recognized while we 
try to get a hold of Bill.
    Mr. Crow. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to both of 
you for coming. This has been a very productive and 
illuminating discussion and I appreciate your approach to these 
things.
    To kind of expand the discussion out a little bit, you 
know, we have these various alliances in different forms and 
structures. The EU [European Union] appears to be stepping up 
and looking more seriously at taking on a more military role, 
which, of course, has been a subject of discussion for some 
time.
    Obviously, we have NATO. We have the Quad. We have AUKUS. 
We have these formal and less formal relationships. What do we 
need in Asia and INDOPACOM and do we need something more formal 
for those that don't fall within Quad, don't fall within AUKUS, 
to engage them more substantively?
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you very much, Congressman. And just to 
tie to your first piece on the EU, I think what we have seen 
them doing is pretty notable vis-a-vis Ukraine, and to the 
extent we can ever get more European capacity and capability 
that is a good thing wherever it is.
    On the Indo-Pacific, I think two pieces really stand out, 
outside of AUKUS, of course. One is how we can better knit 
together Southeast Asia. A lot of that work--obviously, ASEAN 
[Association of Southeast Asian Nations] is really important in 
that, and I would say we're seeing with our Southeast Asian 
partners increasing concern about the changing threat picture.
    The other piece is that Quad in Asia, so how we're better 
able to bring together those countries. We have these really 
strong bilateral alliances there, as you know.
    Any effort we can bring to get them all to cooperate in a 
multilateral fashion is better, and I think--I'm optimistic 
then when we are sitting here 5 years from now we'll have a 
really positive story to paint on the progress of these 
alliances and, in particular, on the investments of a lot of 
these countries in their militaries, which is, on the whole, on 
a really positive trajectory.
    Mr. Crow. Thank you. And, Ms. Lewis, I have a slightly 
different question for you that I wanted you to lead on, and 
Dr. Karlin spoke about this earlier.
    But a critical part of our value proposition here and what 
really differentiates us is the fact that we do look at anti-
corruption. We tie in humanitarian aid, foreign aid, which 
really, I think, is a huge value added.
    Yet, that remains very compartmented, right, and very 
siloed within the U.S. Government. It is very slow. It's not 
always tied together. Do we need different authorities?
    Do we need to restructure the way State Department and DOD 
work together with USAID and others to be fast, to be nimble, 
and to really bring that value added in the way that we need to 
in the 21st century?
    Ms. Lewis. Well, thank you for that question because I 
think it gives us an opportunity to talk about the future and 
where we want to go. I think at this point and in this moment 
what we need to do is to continue the good work we're doing and 
expand on it.
    And I mentioned security sector governance a few minutes 
ago and I think this is actually a very good example of where 
the different pieces of the government come together and it 
really hits on the points that you're talking about.
    So if we're working in a country, we want to be able to be 
sure that, for example, that as USAID is working on--with 
ministries of defense on things like rule of law that, 
concurrently, we are also in our training working with the 
ministry of defense on making sure that there's training 
provided on things like international law, the law of war, 
preventing civilian casualties, human rights; and then at the 
same time as we do our training through our International 
Military Education and Training program that those are being 
reinforced as we deepen and strengthen our ties.
    So, for me, it isn't an authorities question. It's really, 
are we doing that effective coordination, working with each 
other. I think right now the coordination is good. We can 
always continue to improve it, and would be happy to continue 
this conversation with you.
    Mr. Crow. I guess--I appreciate what you said about the 
authorities, right. The authority exists. You can do it. But as 
we all know, culture, parochialism within the executive branch, 
other issues, prevent that from happening.
    So, I guess, for the record--you know, we're running low on 
time here--but it'd be really good for us to know, as 
legislators, whether there are things that we can proactively 
do that would help you all with that mind set shift, that 
cultural shift, that's really necessary to achieve that, 
because this is, like, a huge cruise ship, right, and turning 
it around or changing direction, obviously, very hard for you 
all.
    We want to be a partner in that and we want to help you, 
and if there's things that we can do proactively and 
legislatively or from an appropriations perspective to 
accomplish that, I know there's a bunch of us who'd be very 
interested in helping.
    I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 81.]
    The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Moore is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Moore. Thank you, Chairman, Ranking Member. I the join 
the chorus of my colleagues emphasizing the relevance and 
importance of this critical hearing. Thank you for being here.
    Our NATO alliance faces the greatest geopolitical crisis in 
nearly two decades. I don't think I'm overstating that. China 
continually bullies neighbors on the Indo-Pacific. Our 
adversaries' nefarious activities spread beyond their borders 
as Russia and China seek to expand influence both here and at 
home--at home and abroad.
    Right now, more than ever, the United States must 
aggressively initiate, cultivate, and expand partnerships and 
alliances. It's crucial to both of your roles and in the DOD to 
be able to do that.
    With very few exceptions, when given the choice potential 
allies will choose the United States as their preferred partner 
over peer competition. Having just recently returned from 
Israel, that's never more apparent than their appreciation and 
willingness to engage in our--in partnerships with us.
    They--many allies have even had a dialogue and they've 
voiced the desire to purchase more equipment and expressed 
frustration at how long the process takes.
    So a question for either or both of you to respond. Beyond 
the reforms mandated by the fiscal year 2017 NDAA [National 
Defense Authorization Act], how can we accelerate security 
assistance to qualified nations, considering our new 
geopolitical reality?
    Ms. Lewis. Congressman, thank you for the question.
    And, first of all, I'd like to say I fully agree with what 
you started with, at the moment that we're in in time and the 
importance of focusing both on Russia and China and our 
alliances that we need to strengthen and deepen them as we work 
on that.
    In terms of your question on speeding up the process, 
really, I look at this as a four-legged stool. We usually say 
three-legged but in this case four-legged stool.
    We start working with our partners at the Department of 
Defense who really have to engage in a complicated technical 
process with the countries and the companies involved--if there 
are companies involved--on the exact details and exactly what 
capabilities this partner may need, and that does take some 
time.
    It is important work. These are very sophisticated systems 
that we are providing to other countries.
    Then it comes to the State Department where we provide a 
view from--a review from a foreign policy perspective, which, 
generally, we're able to move relatively quickly, depending on 
the challenges.
    And then we come to Congress and you also are a partner in 
the--moving these forward. And then, finally, we have the 
companies that are producing the defense articles.
    I will say that one challenge we're facing right now is 
that, unfortunately, due to COVID [coronavirus disease], a 
number of our countries are facing challenges on production 
timelines.
    I know that's something that I've been in regular 
conversations with them about as they're trying to improve that 
and get these incredibly important capabilities out to our 
partners, allies, and friends.
    That is something we also need to continue to work on in 
terms of shortening the timeframe and moving forward. Thank 
you.
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you very much, Congressman. I absolutely 
concur with all of Assistant Secretary Lewis' great points in 
terms of our efforts to try to speed this up. I think in doing 
so it's also really important that we make sure we're not just 
taking kind of an Excel spreadsheet approach to our assistance 
and, in particular, that we are taking a meaningful effort to 
understand what impact are our programs having.
    Are they meeting the objectives, operational and/or 
strategic, that we have outlined. So we're really trying hard 
to measure that and that is not least thanks to Congress 
putting it into the 2017 NDAA that you had cited, sir.
    Mr. Moore. That [inaudible] very well into my next 
question. The question is, to what extent do you feel our 
approach has met its intended goal, and particularly about 
counterterrorism?
    The DOD made a decision to expand beyond legacy security 
assistance authorities, like foreign military sales, and pursue 
comprehensive partnerships to train and equip foreign partners. 
To what extent do you feel these have been effective? Is there 
an area of improvement here?
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you very much. You're absolutely right 
that we have really seen a shift, particularly in the post-9/11 
era, in how we have thought about security assistance, and on 
the whole, I think a lot of these efforts have been really 
quite effective where we have seen a number of our allies and 
partners help deal with terrorist threats around the world and 
doing so in appropriate ways, doing so in ways that are 
upholding the rule of law and following human rights.
    So I think that has been an important innovation, as one 
might call it, in our approach to security assistance. And I 
think we have also been able to see, particularly as, say, you 
know, the ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] threat 
metastasizes across Africa, it's been important that these 
relationships continue to evolve so that we're working with 
partners to ensure we're all understanding how the threat 
network is changing and how we can most effectively continue to 
get after it because, unfortunately, it does not appear that--
--
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired. I 
apologize.
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Mr. Keating, we're going to give you one more 
shot. Are you with us? I see that smile. There we go.
    Mr. Keating. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. You are--you are recognized for 5 minutes. Go 
ahead.
    Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I'd like to thank 
the witnesses for their work in coordination with our allies 
and partners, which brings me to an important question, I 
think.
    What is the extent of your coordination and cooperation in 
regard to trade and other agencies, particularly the areas of 
the supply chain?
    We're seeing now in Russia with export controls--we will 
see the devastating effect it will have not only on their 
economy as a whole but also on their security and their 
military.
    In the same time, we have seen with the pandemic the 
effects of supply chain shortages to our country. So with your 
two departments, are we also coordinating on issues of trade 
and the supply chain? Could you comment on the extent to which 
you're doing that?
    Ms. Lewis. Thank you for that question and, actually, this 
just came up in the previous question, and I think you're right 
that we really are at a unique time both in terms of the 
question of the supply chain due to COVID but then also the 
issues that you raised that we're going to see related to the 
Russia context.
    We have been in close contact, particularly with the 
companies that we work very, very closely with, on their supply 
chain issues as it relates to COVID.
    As I'm sure you're aware, defense articles are incredibly 
complicated, sophisticated, and it takes a lot of work to 
produce them, and we need to work closely with the supply chain 
to make sure that that's working effectively.
    So the short answer to your question is yes, we have been 
in touch with the companies. Obviously, we're in touch with the 
other departments when relevant to see if there's anything they 
can do to be helpful.
    I do think this is going to continue to be an ongoing 
challenge, even as the companies work hard to get the situation 
moving more quickly.
    Mr. Keating. Yeah. I think--at all--are you doing anything 
with the Commerce Department at all in that regard? Because I 
see the need to integrate this more because our weapons are 
relying on semiconductor chips, other technological material.
    So without those kind of securities, you know, it poses a 
great threat to our assets. So are you in contact with those 
agencies directly or would you anticipate making that more 
meaningful in the future?
    Ms. Lewis. I know that the State Department is regularly in 
contact with the Department of Commerce on a whole range of 
issues, including depending where they fall weapon sales, and 
we will continue to do so.
    I think it is--you raise a very important issue and we will 
make sure that we continue to coordinate with them and even 
expand that coordination.
    Mr. Keating. Lastly, too, I'd just like, on the record, 
given all the comments I've heard in the last few days from 
Members of Congress, one interruption to the supply chain, one 
part of our security is dealing with the climate change issue--
you know, increased instability, the effects of migration, the 
infrastructure damage.
    Look at Tyndall Air Force [Base] and the devastating damage 
there in Florida, as well as Camp Lejeune, the threats to Guam 
and the Marshall Islands. I could go all around the world with 
this.
    Can you just comment on the importance of partnering with 
our allies and friends on the issue of climate change? It is, 
indeed, a security issue. Would you comment on that?
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you very much, Congressman. It is 
absolutely one that we are watching closely, whether it is 
seeing how climate change is affecting the security environment 
for our allies or our partners or our competitors. But also, as 
you're noted in--noting in citing Tyndall Air Force Base, it 
also affects our own forces in particular and their ability to 
maneuver.
    So it is something we look at closely and that we regularly 
engage in discussions with our closest allies and partners. 
Thank you.
    Mr. Keating. I mean, lastly, it's quite obvious we can't do 
this alone, an issue like that, and that's, indeed, should be a 
priority for our engagement with our allies and partners.
    With that, Mr. Chairman, I'll yield back, with time left.
    The Chairman. Thank you very much.
    Mr. Green is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Dr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I really appreciate you 
putting this hearing together and for the opportunity to 
discuss alliances and partnerships around the world.
    Given the incredible events--heinous events--of the past 
week unfolding in Ukraine, I'm proud to be joining with my 
colleagues to work on developing our response to Vladimir 
Putin's naked greed and aggression.
    In order to do that, though, America must have clear and 
united response to this invasion of a sister democracy. During 
my recent visit to Ukraine and discussion with Polish and 
Baltic allies at NATO headquarters en route to Kyiv, military 
and civilian leaders alike directly linked a lack of American 
leadership in Afghanistan to Putin's misguided attempt to test 
the West's resolve, and I'll quote one of those NATO 
representatives who said, ``Where we are today is because of 
weakness in August.'' We all knew what he meant. American 
leadership is indispensable.
    It's crystal clear. President Biden's failure to send 
timely lethal aid in the past year, though, has been a 
continuation of that weakness.
    American leadership is essential, leading and engaging with 
our partners around the world. The stair-stepped approach to 
sanctions implementation has only emboldened Putin. It's time 
for genuine resolve.
    America cannot tolerate an iron curtain falling upon the 
people of Eastern Europe for a second time in our living 
memory. The torch of freedom that burned so brightly under 
American, British, and NATO leadership just four decades ago 
must not be allowed to go out.
    We must join the Ukrainian people in our boldness, our 
determination to face down any threat to our freedoms and 
interests around the world. We must reclaim our heritage of 
standing firm with friends against tyranny. We must lead.
    Vladimir Putin thought he was claiming the mantle of Peter 
the Great in rebuilding a Russian Empire. But as the Ukrainian 
people have shown him to be, he is nothing more than a petty 
tyrant. His attempts to conquer and subjugate the proud people 
of Ukraine, divide the West, and supplant American leadership 
around the world have failed.
    From the streets of Kyiv to the smallest villages in 
Ukraine, patriots are standing up against this invasion. NATO 
and our freedom-loving partners around the globe are more 
united than in decades, and the world is rejecting the 
leadership of autocrats in Russia and China.
    I look forward to hearing more from you guys as we further 
support and add our cooperation in historical alliances and 
NATO and develop stronger bonds of friendship with our allies 
in the Western Hemisphere and Indo-Pacific, such as India, to 
prevent any further escalations from the tyrants plaguing our 
world.
    My first question is about, specifically, India, and what 
are we doing to help persuade India regarding the S-400 and 
parts that they're purchasing for the aircraft they bought from 
Russia, specifically?
    Ms. Lewis. First, I really want to thank you, I think, for 
your comments on Ukraine and, particularly, recognizing the 
fight that the Ukrainians are literally carrying out as we 
speak.
    Dr. Green. Pretty awesome.
    Ms. Lewis. It is. It is extraordinary, and I think also 
what you mentioned about the world more united than we have 
seen in decades, and I think that is a tribute to our allies 
and partners and, frankly, to the Ukrainians themselves.
    But to get to your more specific question, we have been 
working closely with India, as you know. Had regular 
conversations about them--with them about the Russian 
purchases, and we are looking to create a whole relationship 
with them where they are looking towards us as they move 
forward with additional purchases.
    And I think as we also look at things like the Quad and the 
deepening relationships that we're having there, that will help 
move us forward with them. I really believe that this--
particularly as they see the threat from China right now, I 
think it has really helped move them forward in understanding 
the need to shift this relationship.
    Dr. Green. If I could jump in there, though, I have a 
particular interest in India just because I think the 
geopolitics of the world they're just so incredibly important. 
I appreciate Secretary Blinken, especially, in the efforts he's 
made with the Quad.
    But I'm seeing posts--I follow political leaders in India 
and I'm seeing posts like, can we trust America? Look what they 
did in Afghanistan. These are elected officials in India's 
government.
    So, I mean, what options are we giving them for 
alternatives to Russian stuff and how are we communicating to 
them that we're reliable?
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you very much, Congressman. It's an issue 
that like you, I think, is a real priority.
    In fact, about two decades ago, my first Pentagon job was 
being the India desk officer under President Bush and that's 
when we really shifted to this dramatically different 
relationship, which, as you know, was geostrategically 
important and has----
    The Chairman. And I apologize. We're going to have to cut 
it off there. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Dr. Green. Perhaps in writing then.
    Dr. Karlin. I'd be delighted. Thank you.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 82.]
    Dr. Green. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    The Chairman. Ms. Slotkin is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Slotkin. Thank you. Thanks for being here. And for 
those who don't know, happy paczki day. That's a big holiday in 
Michigan. I have paczkis over here for anyone who wants them. 
It's like a Polish jelly doughnut that we all celebrate with.
    So--okay. They're over here, guys.
    [Laughter.]
    Ms. Slotkin. Okay. So I guess, you know, what is going on 
between Russia and Ukraine is so incredibly unbelievable to 
watch, both the Russian decision and calculus to do this, the 
Ukrainian resistance, which is formidable, and then the way 
that it has galvanized the international community.
    And I will say that over multiple administrations, Democrat 
and Republican, we have tried to minimize, basically since the 
Cold War, friction with Putin and with Russia in the hopes that 
it wouldn't exacerbate a problem--it wouldn't inspire 
retribution for the Russians.
    And I guess I just feel like that era is over, that all of 
our attempts to minimize friction didn't mean anything and he 
went ahead and made this move, and I think it's a sea change 
for how both the Defense Department and the State Department 
should think about our presence in Europe, our assistance to 
Europe.
    And so I guess I just want to clarify a couple of things. 
What is the official administration position on letting in 
countries like Kosovo, Bosnia, potentially, Georgia, Finland, 
and Sweden into NATO? Very quickly.
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you. Couldn't agree more, Congresswoman, 
that we're in a different ball game right now and we all need 
to step back and assess that.
    I would say regarding new members of NATO, there's not kind 
of an effort to fast-track folks. But there is an effort to 
work with those who are interested and who meet the necessary 
requirements.
    Ms. Slotkin. Right. I know. But that's been our process 
before, and I would offer that if the answers that we're 
getting--and I say this as someone who was in your exact 
positions testifying in front of this committee in 2014 when 
they put little green men into Eastern Ukraine.
    If we are using the same metrics and same assessments from 
before this conflict as we will be afterwards, then we're not--
we're missing the moment here, and I'd ask you to come back to 
this committee maybe in another month's time and just tell us 
how you've changed your thinking.
    And I would strongly advocate that we seriously consider a 
different approach to letting folks into NATO and not slow roll 
those who we're just trying to drag out, and I've done it 
myself.
    Number two, the build-up in the Baltics. Couldn't agree 
more with my colleagues who have talked about putting more 
force in right now, and I guess I would just make that as a 
point as opposed to a question, that we need to be doing more 
and, obviously, China is watching everything that we do.
    But I know we're right in the middle of this. It's still a 
very fresh and new event. But for any administration to go 
through this, we have to completely reevaluate deterrence and 
how we reestablish it and I'd ask that we have folks come back 
to the committee to present on that.
    On the assistance, we get really confusing messages about 
what is being provided and when by not just us but also our 
allies. We were told in a briefing yesterday that EU members 
were providing aircraft. Now we're seeing online that no one's 
providing aircraft.
    If you all could come up with a routine where we would get 
maybe a regular update, just something that a staffer could put 
together, so we know what's true and what's not true, and the 
final mile of making sure that assistance gets in the hands of 
the Ukrainians, not just shipped and it sits somewhere but it 
gets there, because we know that's going to be more 
complicated.
    I guess, lastly, I was wondering if someone could give us 
your sense of how this plays out in Ukraine over the next week 
and a half. I know that's not your specialty.
    But we're in the middle of this crisis. People are 
watching. Can you tell us what you think is going to happen? We 
heard it privately but I'd like to say publicly--hear publicly 
what the Defense Department thinks is going to happen over the 
next week and a half.
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you. And we can absolutely look at 
getting you those materials that you requested on the aid. I 
would just say our European allies are doing so much that folks 
are working on, on keeping track of it--so thank you for that--
over this next week and a half.
    I think what we have seen is the Ukrainian military is 
fighting so incredibly hard. I mean, the political will they 
have demonstrated is extraordinary, and I think that we have 
seen it has been a lot more and a lot harder than Putin and his 
military would have expected.
    I would continue to expect that they will do all they can. 
Assistance, as you know, is flowing to them and I think that 
they will try to continue to push back this invasion to the 
extent possible.
    Unfortunately, as you probably saw this morning, in 
particular, we have seen that the Russian military is 
prioritizing just increasingly horrific approaches, in 
particular, indiscriminate bombing. Thank you.
    Ms. Slotkin. I would just say you have an absolutely unique 
moment where the U.S. Congress has bipartisan agreement on 
giving you what you need and we're not getting an ask. Ask us 
for things and we will help----
    The Chairman. And I'm sorry, the gentlelady's time has 
expired, and I think that is a very reasonable request to get 
that very focused ask for what it is you want us to do.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 82.]
    The Chairman. Mr. Lamborn is recognized.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Right now there is sitting in the docket here in our House 
business a $6.5 billion dollar aid package for Ukraine. Two and 
a half billion of that is humanitarian. And yet, we're not 
doing anything.
    What I've heard is that we're going to wait a week and deal 
with it in a week from now. In the next week, aren't there 
civilians who are going to be dying in Ukraine?
    Aren't their soldiers who are taking up arms who are going 
to die? Isn't there property that's going to be destroyed? 
Isn't there going to be hunger in Ukraine? Why in the world can 
we wait a week to deal with this?
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you very much, Congressman. In 
particular, I would say that we have been pushing a lot of 
assistance to Ukraine and to its military and are looking very 
closely at the humanitarian situation in particular, and we 
look forward to cooperating as much as possible over these 
coming days and weeks on this situation.
    Mr. Lamborn. Ms. Slotkin is exactly right. There's 
bipartisan support. We could have passed this last night on a 
voice vote. It's wrong for us to wait a week to do this. Do you 
have any influence?
    Can you talk to anybody and say, let's bring this up 
today--let's get this going? There are people dying in Ukraine 
right now. There's a 40-mile convoy of Russian tanks and armor 
going to Kyiv.
    Ms. Lewis. Congressman, I think you raise a very important 
point about the urgency of the current situation, and while, 
obviously, I can't comment on specific legislation or timing 
here, I can tell you that at the State Department and the 
Defense Department we are committed to moving forward 
expeditiously.
    As you may know, over the past year we have provided a 
billion dollars of assistance to Ukraine on the security side, 
additional on the humanitarian side, and just over the past 6 
months we have used three Presidential Drawdown Authorities, 
which is this ability that we have to move items from the 
Defense Department to Ukraine, including the largest package 
ever in the history of the United States, which is the most 
recent one we did of $350 million, and we will continue to do 
so.
    Mr. Lamborn. Well, I would like you both to go back and 
tell people at the White House that they need to do something 
to get our leadership off the dime. They're doing nothing here 
in the House. We could be sending this money to Ukraine, and 
people are literally dying and will die in the next week 
needlessly.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Back to you.
    The Chairman. Thank you. I will say lest someone gets the 
wrong idea, while, certainly, you know, the House can pass what 
it's passed, there is a ton of money that is flowing out of the 
United States of America right now to help the people of 
Ukraine.
    Fortunately, as we all know, it does not require 
congressional action to do all of that. In fact, part of the 
brief yesterday was the administration explaining that they 
were using executive action to send weapons and to send 
humanitarian aid to Ukraine.
    So it is completely wrong to say that we're doing nothing. 
I mean, it's not even in the neighborhood of being true. We're 
doing a lot. However----
    Mr. Lamborn. Mr. Chairman, no one said we're doing nothing.
    The Chairman. Sir, I thought that's exactly what you said 
just a second ago.
    Mr. Lamborn. No. I said there's a $6.5 billion package 
that----
    The Chairman. Well, reclaiming my----
    Mr. Lamborn.--we're doing nothing on and we could be 
passing it.
    The Chairman. Reclaiming my time. And you did, at one 
point, said--and said we're sitting here doing nothing. You 
were referring to Congress. I grant that. But Congress is part 
of the whole large picture here and we have given money to the 
administration. They are doing that.
    Now, we can look at it and see are there things that the 
administration can't do on the executive side that requires us 
to then approve more money, and I get that's perfectly fine and 
we need to look at that and do that.
    But I just want to make perfectly clear to anyone watching 
this, the United States Government writ large in the last 
couple of weeks is sending money, is sending weapons, is 
sending arms. You were in the brief yesterday when you heard 
that.
    So let's be clear on that, that that is happening. And now, 
you know, Congress needs to look at whether or not we need to 
send more money, whether or not we need to give them authority 
to do that, and that's, perhaps, why we're waiting to make sure 
that we do this right.
    But while we're waiting to pass congressional legislation, 
it is not the case that nothing is happening. It is happening. 
If nothing was happening, then I would be right there with you 
to say we got to pass it yesterday. It's a matter of combining 
those things. I just want to make sure we understand that.
    Ms. Sherrill is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Sherrill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Ms. Lewis, as the chairman said at the opening of this, we 
do security and defense aid better than anyone in the world 
here in the United States, and so what I'm wondering is where 
do we stand on development aid?
    Not everybody wants a new F-18. Some states want a new road 
or bridge, and we have really seen China capitalize on that.
    And as Dr. Karlin stated, they've done that in a way that 
we are really diametrically opposed to. So if the prevalence--
if the pervasive nature of Chinese influence and infrastructure 
is anything to go by, we seem to be losing ground in countries 
across the world, including not just across Africa but in 
Europe and South America, to China.
    What can we do specifically to begin to rectify this?
    Ms. Lewis. Well, thank you very much for the question, and 
I think the question of how we compete with China across the 
world is really at top of mind, and I also want to commend you 
because I think you're raising it's not just in the region.
    It's how we're competing across the world. So while my 
piece of the State Department handles the security assistance, 
which is what you mentioned, in terms of providing arms 
transfers and security assistance to the ministries of defense, 
and training as well, we do work hand in glove with USAID and 
other pieces of the State Department which are focused closely 
on the issues that you raise.
    And I think, as you point out, China has really focused in 
their Belt and Road Initiative on things like building 
infrastructure. I would note that countries often end up in a 
terrible debt cycle from that, which is truly disturbing, and 
not in their long-term interest or, frankly, in the interest of 
our foreign policy.
    So I think we have to--from my piece of the State 
Department, we have to work together and one of the things that 
I've been talking about here is something that I've been very 
focused on, which is security sector governance and I think it 
gets to a little bit of what you're talking about.
    When we're working with countries, we need to make sure 
that we're working on infrastructure but that we're also 
working on justice, making sure they are complying with 
international law, that they're taking care of their own 
citizens.
    I think that bringing those American values as well to our 
assistance is critically important. Would be happy to work with 
you and your team as we continue to look at ways to do this 
better and to expand our work across the world.
    Ms. Sherrill. Thank you. And also, as we look forward to 
supplying Ukraine with defense aid, do we have plans in place 
to ensure that as Russia encircles different areas as the 
invasion continues, we still have supply lines open to get that 
aid to our Ukrainian friends?
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you very much. We're looking absolutely 
hard at that. As the conflict continues, we want to ensure that 
all of the good materiel that they need is getting into their 
hands. So I can assure you that that's a real priority.
    Ms. Sherrill. Thank you, and I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Mrs. Bice is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mrs. Bice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the hearing today 
and thank you for our witnesses.
    Like my colleagues on this committee, I have been closely 
monitoring Russia's ongoing, unprovoked invasion of Ukraine 
over the past few days as it continues to worsen significantly 
overnight.
    Putin's widespread assault against an innocent country is 
an atrocious act which has jeopardized the stability of Europe 
and peace across the globe.
    I'm glad to see the U.S.-imposed sanctions are starting to 
have real impacts on Russia as the ruble hit a record low and 
the key interest rates have more than doubled overnight.
    But more must be done. The Ukrainian people are fiercely 
defending their homeland and we should take every action to 
ensure they have the tools needed to withstand this violent 
attack and I look forward to working with my colleagues on the 
committee to do that very thing.
    A couple of--a couple of things I want to throw out here. 
First of all, Ms. Lewis, can you talk about the State 
Department's efforts to help stem our allies' collective 
imports of Russian oil and gas?
    Ms. Lewis. First of all, thank you for the question, and, 
again, wholeheartedly agree with your opening comments about 
what's happening inside Ukraine, particularly today.
    While I don't actually work on the question of oil and gas 
myself, I do know that the State Department and in coordination 
with other departments is working on that across the board and 
looking at a whole range of options there.
    I'm happy to take that back and provide you with more 
information.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 82.]
    Mrs. Bice. Okay. Thank you. I want to follow up with, you 
know, certainly, regional partnerships are incredibly important 
and to prevent Chinese aggression what are we doing 
specifically to help in that area to stem the potential issue 
that could--we could be facing with Taiwan?
    Looking at countries like Vietnam, the Philippines, Japan, 
South Korea, Australia, how are we working together with them 
to create some sort of partnership or alliance should China 
pose a threat to Taiwan in the future?
    Ms. Lewis. Thank you very much. It's an issue that 
absolutely we are profoundly concerned about. So there are a 
couple pieces.
    One piece, of course, is just our support to Taiwan--$18 
billion since 2017 or so--and really helping ensure that the 
materiel they're buying is tied to the asymmetric approach that 
we think is probably best for them to take, given the threat.
    With all of the countries you mentioned, we're putting 
forth a ton of effort to strengthen their military, its 
capacity and its capability. We're looking hard at our force 
posture in Japan and Australia, those two that you cited. We 
have been making some good steps on that.
    So there's the bilateral piece and then, of course, 
multilaterally. To the extent that we can try to tie East Asia 
tighter together with Australia, that's an important step.
    You had mentioned the Philippines--so I would say Southeast 
Asia, as well, where--just to call it the Philippines for a 
moment--we're seeing some really positive progress on the human 
rights front with their military, which is pretty heartening. 
Thank you.
    Mrs. Bice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    The Chairman. Ms. Escobar is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Escobar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to our 
witnesses for your work and for your testimony at this hearing.
    Our hearts are with the Ukrainian people, who are literally 
fighting for their lives, their country, and their values, and 
who are living through a nightmare because of an unprovoked 
attack by Vladimir Putin.
    We have been horrified by the war crimes as well as the 
unfolding humanitarian crisis. I want to begin by expressing my 
immense gratitude to President Biden for doing the hard work of 
rebuilding critical alliances, for rallying NATO, ensuring that 
we had a strong coalition of support for Ukraine.
    After the prior administration alienated our allies and 
gave cover to our enemies, it was no doubt a difficult task to 
unite our friends once again. I'm proud that the United States 
currently has an administration committed to the transatlantic 
relationship and to leading the globe in defense of democracy 
with strength and integrity.
    I also, for our witnesses, I want to echo what my 
colleague, Representative Slotkin, mentioned in her advocacy 
for a different approach to letting countries into NATO. We 
need that different approach immediately and we, indeed, need 
to meet this moment with urgency.
    I have the honor and privilege of representing El Paso, 
Texas, which is home to Fort Bliss, America's second largest 
military installation and largest joint mobilization force 
generation installation in the Army.
    The U.S. and her allies must continue to rally against the 
threats that we're seeing across the globe and work cohesively 
to deter and defend one another against aggression from 
adversaries.
    For Ms. Lewis, I want to kind of shift the focus a little 
bit more broadly. Many of the biggest purchasers of U.S. 
weapons, like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Turkey, the Philippines, 
also tend to be willing to violate human rights and disperse 
weapons to groups not friendly to the United States.
    I'd like to know how are human rights factored into U.S. 
policies on arms sales and other forms of security assistance, 
and what is the State Department doing to strengthen its 
ability to evaluate risks in weapons transfers?
    Ms. Lewis. First of all, I also appreciate your opening 
comments on Ukraine and the serious situation that they are 
facing today.
    To turn to the question on human rights--and this is a 
critical question for us at the State Department--I think, as 
you know, the President has said that he wants to make human 
rights at the center of our foreign policy and that means that 
when we work with partners, friends, and allies where there may 
be concerns about human rights that I believe we both need to 
strengthen and deepen those relationships and, at the same 
time, raise those concerns.
    In terms of how we specifically work on human rights, you 
may be aware that we are currently working on the updates to 
our conventional arms transfer policy, which is the policy that 
governs across the interagency all of our work in this area. 
And I think when that does come out you will see a renewed 
focus on human rights as part of that policy. So I think that's 
step one.
    In addition, in terms of the State Department, we really 
work hand in glove with our colleagues at the Bureau--the DRL 
Bureau [Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor], which is 
the bureau in charge of human rights, to make sure that as we 
look at these arms transfers, human rights is taken into 
account and considered.
    Finally, in addition, as we work with our partners in terms 
of our education--military education and training programs, we 
also have specific programs designed to help with civilian 
casualty mitigation, and then we work in conjunction with a 
whole wide range of programs from the State Department and 
USAID on human rights writ large.
    Ms. Escobar. Thank you.
    Dr. Karlin, I have a question for you but I'm out of time.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Jackson is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Dr. Jackson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 
Rogers, and thank you to our witnesses for being here today.
    NATO is a partnership which is vital to deterring 
aggression and responding when dictators and terrorists bring 
evil to this world. I just returned from the Munich Security 
Conference, and it's clear to me that our allies do not see us 
as the leaders that we have traditionally been.
    The weapons and resources that we're providing are 
important, but we need to strengthen these partnerships and 
continue to invest properly in critical NATO training, like the 
Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training Program, which is hosted in 
my district at Sheppard Air Force Base.
    In 2017, President Trump took action to restore NATO to 
being the global force for good that it once was. He forced 
delinquent members to start paying their dues, ultimately 
accounting to hundreds of billions of dollars in helping NATO 
prepare for aggression like we are currently seeing from 
Russia.
    Ukraine's defense of its sovereign territory has been 
admirable and inspiring. Yet many don't realize that it was the 
Trump administration that helped Ukraine to prepare for this.
    Under President Trump, security assistance and defense 
articles were sent to Ukraine to give them the capability to 
defend themselves and that is exactly what they are doing as we 
speak.
    Prior to last year, our allies knew the United States had 
their back. But now I'm concerned that we are losing that trust 
and confidence of these same allies.
    When I was at the Munich Security Conference, we had some 
very candid conversations with many of our strongest allies, 
trying to reassure them that the United States would not leave 
them behind.
    Dr. Karlin and Ms. Lewis, what have you been hearing from 
our allies and partners about whether or not they can trust the 
United States to be a leader on the global stage and is there 
anything more that we can be doing to reassure our partners?
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you very much, Congressman, and thank you 
for your focus on this issue. I really appreciate your initial 
comments about speaking with our allies. I think we have spent 
a lot of time with our allies.
    In fact, I noted earlier that, particularly over the last 3 
months as we have seen this intelligence, I don't think a day 
has gone by where there hasn't been an ally or partner 
discussion on this topic with the Department of Defense or the 
Department of State.
    And I think we have seen that come to fruition. We have 
seen allied unity, which seems pretty--almost unprecedented, if 
not actually unprecedented. We have also seen allies giving a 
lot of support to Ukraine and to one another.
    So it seems to me that we are at a special moment for the 
alliance and a special moment for leadership and I think we 
want to do all we can to encourage that because, at the end of 
the day, we're just so much more effective when we can be 
together. Thank you.
    Ms. Lewis. Well, first of all, I fully support Dr. Karlin's 
comments and I really appreciate what you raised in terms of 
NATO and the importance of NATO at this critical moment.
    I think, from my perspective as the Assistant Secretary for 
the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, on a daily basis--
minute-to-minute basis--often overnight, we are literally 
working with our partners to make sure that the vital equipment 
and defense items that Ukraine needs, that it is getting those 
items.
    I have to tell you, I--you know, certainly, in my time here 
I have never seen NATO and Europeans come together, and like, 
as I said, we are--one of the tools that we have in our toolbox 
is something called--it sounds like a technical term, but it's 
very important--it's third party transfers.
    What this means is if the United States has provided a 
system to another country and they want to transfer it to a 
third country, they have to ask first, which is a good thing. 
But in this case, we have been literally flooded with the 
Europeans coming to us and saying, we have this, we know the 
Ukrainians need it, can you move quickly to make that happen. I 
think it's extraordinary.
    Dr. Jackson. Thank you, Ms. Lewis. I'm going to 
[inaudible]--because I have one more thing I want to throw in 
there--it's a little bit of a plug for my district, to be 
honest with you.
    But the Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training Program is in my 
district in the world's only internationally manned and managed 
pilot training program. Fifty percent of all U.S. Air Force 
pilots come from this program, and partner nations such as 
Belgium, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, and Norway send all 
of their fighter pilots through this training program in 
Wichita Falls.
    We need to make sure--I mean, it's really important that 
we're given the resources and the weapons that we need, but we 
need to make sure that we are investing and prioritizing NATO 
training as well and, specifically, these NATO pilots that 
we're training for potential war with Russia or China. It would 
be a mistake, I think, not to take opportunity to try to 
prioritize some of this training as well.
    Dr. Karlin, what is the value of the Euro-NATO Joint Jet 
Pilot Training Programs to the Department of Defense and in 
what ways does DOD seek to expand and build on this program, 
moving forward?
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you very much, Congressman. While I can't 
speak to this specific program, what I can tell you is you're 
hitting all of the key issues that are vital to NATO--how are 
we training one another, how are we working on interoperability 
so that we can do exercises together and so, God forbid, if we 
have to deal with a contingency we can do so together.
    Dr. Jackson. Thank you. I believe my time is up. I yield 
back. Thank you both.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Khanna is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Khanna. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for 
convening this hearing and thank you for your leadership in 
Munich and working with the speaker and the administration to 
rally our NATO allies in a strong response to Putin's invasion, 
unconscionable aggression, and now reports of war crimes.
    I wanted to focus on the Wagner Group, which has laid, 
according to some reports, the groundwork for Russia's 
reinvasion of Ukraine. It's a brutal group, as many of you 
know, and has been identified by the Treasury Department as a 
designated Russian Ministry of Defense proxy force.
    There's been reports that it's done Russia's bidding in 
Syria, Libya, and parts of Africa. I'd like to hear from both 
of the witnesses on what the Pentagon and the State Department 
know about the logistics chains that support the Wagner Group.
    Are they involved at all right now in Ukraine, and what is 
being done about addressing the Wagner Group?
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you very much, Congressman, for bringing 
up this important issue.
    I think we have seen efforts by the Wagner Group in various 
places and they have been profoundly worrisome. I think you put 
it quite well in your opening statement in terms of their 
relationships and their focus.
    In this forum, I don't believe I can speak about some of 
the operational efforts that they have undertaken. But I'd be 
more than willing to do so separately.
    Suffice to say--I think it is safe to say that they do not 
have the security and stability of various regions as their top 
priority.
    Ms. Lewis. If I may add----
    Mr. Khanna. Please.
    Ms. Lewis [continuing]. And I'm very glad that we're 
getting to have a conversation about the Wagner Group here in 
this forum, and I think when we look at what they have done 
across the globe--and I am very concerned, particularly in 
Africa, as they really are exploiting insecurity as a catalyst 
and they're using that destabilization in very, very dangerous 
ways.
    I believe that the Russian government considers chaos as a 
strategic asset and it raises the costs of the involvement for 
strategic competitors.
    So I think you are right to be focused on this topic. We 
continue to be focused on it around the world, and happy to 
continue the conversation with you, as Dr. Karlin said, on more 
specifics in another setting.
    Mr. Khanna. I appreciate that. Are any of our allies 
supporting the Wagner Group that we know of or are we making 
every effort to make sure that anyone we're allied with or 
selling weapons to is not in any way aiding the Wagner Group?
    Dr. Karlin. Congressman, I can't say offhand that any are 
coming to mind. But we can take that back and look into it. I 
think, on the whole, most of our allies and partners have seen 
this group for what it is.
    Mr. Khanna. Okay. If you could just make sure that--I mean, 
I don't want to throw out any names and reporting and cast an 
aspersion that may not be true. But there've been some reports 
that some of our partners may be supporting some of these 
groups, and if you could just make sure that the United States 
should make clear, obviously, anyone we're submitting--shipping 
arms to should not in any way be linked to the Wagner Group and 
I assume that's U.S. policy. Is that correct?
    Dr. Karlin. Congressman, we could absolutely take that back 
and get you a response--a written response--on that one. As I 
said, I'm not familiar with any allies.
    We can look at partners as well. And if we are seeing it, 
frankly, then we'll want to highlight it to them since we do 
not see this as a group that foments stability or security. 
Thank you.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 81.]
    Mr. Khanna. Thank you very much. I appreciate both 
witnesses and, I guess, would, you know, reiterate my concern 
on this group's activity, their blatant violation of human 
rights and say that I am very supportive of the Department of 
State and Department of Defense doing anything possible to stop 
them and make sure that they're not getting funding or arms.
    Mr. Chair, I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Banks is recognized.
    Mr. Banks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Dr. Karlin, Germany's reliance on Nord Stream 2 hindered 
their response to support Ukraine. It took a military invasion, 
a threat of a nuclear attack, and persistent calls from allies 
for Germany to support Ukraine with a thousand anti-tank 
weapons and 500 surface-to-air missiles.
    Dr. Karlin, why was Germany hesitant to defend a sovereign 
nation from invasion that's just 400 miles away from their own 
border?
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you very much, Congressman.
    While I can't speak to the thinking in Berlin, what I can 
say is that we have seen an extraordinary change by Germany's 
government in recent days.
    They, as you probably know, had a law that they wouldn't 
support countries in active conflict. That has completely 
changed. We have been pushing them for a very long time to 
invest more in their military.
    That is completely changing. Indeed, the trajectory that 
Germany is currently on, given these recent events, is 
extraordinary and I think it will have outsized effects for 
European security. Thank you.
    Mr. Banks. Thank you. Should the U.S. change our military-
to-military relationship with Germany after they hesitated to 
act against Russian aggression or if they--if we see a pattern 
of this in the future?
    Dr. Karlin. Congressman, I think we would want to take a 
broader look at our relationship. Germany, for example, also 
hosts tens of thousands of U.S. troops and plays an important 
role in European security in other ways. I think, particularly, 
given the steps that we have seen, this is a crucial 
relationship. It's crucial not just for European security, 
frankly, but for global security. Thank you.
    Mr. Banks. Thank you.
    Ms. Lewis, the U.K., Poland, Estonia, Latvia, the Czech 
Republic, the Netherlands, Belgium--they all committed weapons 
and equipment to Ukraine before Germany did. Why do you think 
Germany waited so long to send weapons to Ukraine?
    Ms. Lewis. Again, first of all, thank you for the question.
    And as Dr. Karlin said, I can't speak to the exact mind set 
there, but I do want to take a moment to note what you 
mentioned here, which is the extraordinary effort we have seen 
across Europe and now, obviously, including Germany.
    I think, as I mentioned before, the part of the State 
Department I work in we oversee those transfers from--of U.S.-
origin equipment from one country to another, and I think 
across the board this has been an extraordinary effort and 
we're happy to continue to work with all of the countries who 
are close by and able to provide Ukraine with what it needs.
    Mr. Banks. So no thoughts or no discussions at the State 
Department about why Germany followed instead of leading the 
rest of these countries?
    Ms. Lewis. I'm not aware of any discussions.
    Mr. Banks. Okay.
    Ms. Lewis, Germany is Russia's largest trading partner in 
Europe. Six thousand German companies do business in Russia. Is 
it time for us to rethink our alliance to ensure that our 
allies share our national security goals?
    For instance, should we consider an alliance of democracies 
that share a strong desire to counter Russia and China?
    Ms. Lewis. Well, I think that, across the board, we do have 
partners and allies and friends and alliances where we are 
working together to counter Russia. To take a step back out of 
the space that I work in particularly, which is related to 
security assistance, we have seen Europe coming together really 
in an unprecedented way, with sanctions, looking at, as I just 
discussed, arms transfers, condemnation of Russia's actions, 
and I think we need to continue to work with all of them to 
make sure that we work--we move forward hand in glove.
    I think us being united is really what, in some ways, 
Russia fears most and I think that is the message that we need 
to carry forward.
    Mr. Banks. All right. Thank you.
    Dr. Karlin, at a Center for New American Security forum 
last December, you said, quote, ``Our thinking on deterrence 
has declined a bit,'' end quote, since the 1990s after the 
Soviet Union disintegrated, you were referring to.
    In light of the conflict with Ukraine, I'm concerned that 
the Biden administration isn't taking deterrence seriously 
enough. How are we supporting and improving Taiwan's military 
to ensure that we are not--that they are not the next target 
for an invasion?
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you very much, Congressman. I would just 
say post-Cold War and post-9/11, I do think we didn't focus on 
deterrence as much. Secretary Austin's emphasis on integrated 
deterrence I think is pushing us in a slightly different place, 
and I think Taiwan is a perfect example.
    As you know, we are cooperating very closely in line with 
the Taiwan Relations Act to help Taiwan build its military with 
defensive capabilities, and in particular to do so with the 
asymmetric capabilities they need to counter what is 
unfortunately an ever growing threat. Thank you.
    Mr. Banks. Thank you. I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Ms. Jacobs is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Ms. Jacobs. Well, thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to 
our witnesses. I want to note that a couple of my colleagues 
have raised the issue of respecting human rights in our 
security assistance and making sure that it aligns with our 
values, including you, Mr. Chair, and I wanted to follow up on 
a couple of specific programs.
    In particular, I'm concerned that there are certain 
security cooperation authorities that are not subject to Leahy 
vetting, like section 127(e) and 1202 programs.
    So, Assistant Secretary Karlin, could you clarify whether 
either of these programs are currently subject to Leahy 
vetting?
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you very much for raising this, 
Congresswoman. We absolutely prioritize Leahy vetting. My 
understanding is that ensuring that our partners are following 
human rights is a key priority in everything that we do.
    So while I cannot speak at this moment as to whether or not 
Leahy vetting exactly applies, I can promise you that we are 
looking at how and in what ways our partners and allies are 
appropriately following human rights.
    And if they're violating them, then that means we need to 
have a relook and have a different kind of conversation. And if 
there are any specifics that you'd like me to take back, I'm 
more than willing to do so either now or, of course, 
separately.
    Ms. Jacobs. Perfect. Well, I will look forward to working 
with you to get in writing some more clarification on that 
question of Leahy vetting and those two programs, and how we're 
making sure we're not providing security assistance to units 
that are committing gross human rights violations.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 83.]
    Ms. Jacobs. I want to turn now to the Sahel. We have seen a 
proliferation of coups over the past year, almost all of which 
have involved militaries that have been trained by the United 
States including Mali, Guinea, and Burkina Faso.
    How has the development impacted State and DOD thinking on 
who we provide security assistance to? Many of these countries 
had issues with human rights violations in the past, 
particularly in Burkina Faso and Mali, and lacked robust 
security sector governance and democratic progress. That made 
this kind of challenge predictable.
    In fact, when I worked at the State Department five or so 
years ago, we were working on security sector governance in 
some of these countries because we knew it was a problem.
    So what signals are we sending about our values when we 
provide security assistance, despite these challenges, and what 
does this say about our stabilization and good governance 
efforts in the region, more broadly?
    What tools are underutilized to better address these 
challenges, and how do we make sure, moving forward, our 
security assistance is leading towards what we want, which is 
secure and democratically governed and human rights abiding 
governments?
    Ms. Lewis. Well, thank you for the question.
    And I am very committed and I think it's important that you 
raise this question of security sector governance, and I think 
you're right, that as we work with countries we need to make 
sure that we're looking at this across the board whether it 
comes to human rights, whether it comes to making sure that--
and I keep coming back to this but I think it's important--that 
procurement systems are set up in ways that keep corruption 
from happening.
    And so I think across the board we need to do that in every 
country we're working in. I think you raise legitimate concerns 
about what's going on in Africa.
    We are watching that very, very closely, and we always want 
to be promoting democracy and making sure that any training 
that happens in our programs supports that effort. And I would 
be happy to continue to work with you as we continue to look at 
these questions.
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you very much for raising this really 
important issue. I think the end state you outline of our goals 
of the security cooperation is exactly right--secure, 
democratically governed.
    I wholly align myself with Assistant Secretary Lewis' 
comments, and I would say the examples you cited are profoundly 
worrisome and when we see those occur, we do need to 
immediately step back and study why that did occur. Oftentimes, 
of course, it's due to kind of much bigger political reasons 
within a country.
    But, ultimately, that doesn't really provide a country with 
more security or stability. Thank you.
    Ms. Jacobs. Well, thank you, and I will look forward to 
working with you both on making sure that we are having a 
coherent, cohesive strategy on our security sector programs, 
especially in Africa, to make sure that we're not perpetuating 
and feeding into these challenges and adverse incentive 
structures for these governments that we're partnering with.
    And with that, Mr. Chair, I'll yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Horsford.
    Mr. Horsford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to our 
witnesses for testifying today.
    In the past weeks, we have seen the vital role alliances 
play in effectively countering and responding to the 
destabilizing actions of rogue states like Russia. We have also 
seen the extraordinary value of long-term capacity building 
with our partners through the deployment of advisors and 
regular multilateral training events.
    The training U.S. advisors have provided to our Ukrainian 
allies over the past years have made them a far more lethal 
fighting force, and added unique capabilities to their armed 
forces, such as the effective employment of Javelin missiles.
    I believe these types of training missions and military-to-
military partnerships are foundational to strong and resilient 
alliances and are also one of the most cost effective mission 
sets conducted by the Department of Defense.
    As the Department continues to address the pacing threat of 
China in the Indo-Pacific, I hope that these exercises and 
missions will receive the attention and funding they deserve. 
U.S. Army Pacific is well positioned to build and maintain 
strong relationships with strategically vital nations in the 
Indo-Pacific through exercises like Pacific Pathways.
    These exercises are mutually beneficial. They benefit the 
host nation militarily, economically, and diplomatically, and 
also allow the United States and allied nations to place combat 
power forward to deter aggression.
    Secretary Karlin, how do exercises like Pacific Pathways 
allow the joint force to build capacity and trust with partners 
in the Indo-Pacific, counter China's influence, and preposition 
forces to deter China's--Chinese aggression against Taiwan?
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you very much, Congressman, and I just 
want to say how much I appreciate your emphasis on training and 
exercises. I think, oftentimes, when we speak about security 
cooperation folks focus on the materiel piece.
    But as you absolutely note, the training is crucial to 
ensure they know how to use the materiel, but also the 
exercises and those are really helpful for a couple of reasons.
    First of all, they're really good for our forces. They have 
our forces test things out.
    Second of all, they're useful for interoperability, helping 
us figure out with our allies and partners who does what, how 
do we do that.
    And third of all, I would emphasize, they're pretty useful 
for deterrence and reassurance. You highlighted China. I think 
it is quite clear that China is watching these exercises.
    They watch when they grow in sophistication and, in 
particular, they watch when our allies and partners grow ever 
more capable. Thank you.
    Mr. Horsford. So how would increased funding for these 
exercises contribute to U.S. strategic objectives in the Indo-
Pacific?
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you very much. Looking at resources, of 
course, it would really matter how they get best distributed. I 
could imagine that certain exercises could be made larger or 
other countries could perhaps be invited into them or they 
might be longer.
    I'd probably want to look at kind of how and in what ways 
those are used. But as you underscore, exercises are really 
critical both to our partners' capacity and also to our own. 
Thank you.
    Mr. Horsford. Thank you.
    With the reduction of forces in Central Command following 
the end of our mission in Afghanistan, I'm curious if 
regionally aligned forces like the 3rd Security Force 
Assistance Brigade could be better applied to U.S. strategic 
objectives in the Indo-Pacific.
    Again, Secretary Karlin, as part of the Global Posture 
Review, how has the Department reprioritized these specialized 
partner-building forces to increase capacity in the Indo-
Pacific?
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you very much, Congressman.
    The security force assistance brigades [SFABs] are pretty 
new. They were only started a couple years ago, and I think we 
have seen them really have an outsized effect in various 
regions.
    I think, particularly going forward, we need to think about 
where they're best placed and how they can best rotate. But I 
would say offhand, we have seen them in Africa play a helpful 
role.
    I have to assume that, as you say, the Indo-Pacific is one 
as well. So it's really a matter of looking at kind of all the 
tools in our toolkit.
    But these SFABs, they've been a really positive innovation 
by the U.S. Army. Thank you.
    Mr. Horsford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Panetta is recognized.
    Mr. Panetta. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you both to 
the witnesses for being here, obviously, talking about the 
important topics of our allies but also the way we work with 
our allies in order to deal with the situations at hand, be it 
in Ukraine or be it with China.
    I want to hit on my California colleague's questions on the 
Wagner Group. I think that's very fascinating, to be honest 
with you. Especially what's going on in Mali and the fact that 
it was Mali where they had Operation Barkhane and the French 
were in there, as well as 15,000 Blue Helmets of the United 
Nations were there as well.
    Unfortunately, the French have decided to leave based on 
the fact that Mali has decided to, I guess, contract with the 
Wagner Group for certain security purposes. I set that up with 
that, basically, talking about hybrid warfare and how we are 
working with our allies in dealing with hybrid warfare, 
basically, before we have to send troops in.
    And so if you could just give us an overview of the 
resources that we are doing in working with our allies to 
counter hybrid warfare but also the challenges.
    Do our allies have some of the technology, some of the 
capacity, to deal with those types of challenges that we're 
dealing with when it comes to hybrid warfare?
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you very much, Congressman.
    I share your profound concerns about the Wagner Group, and 
as the French are relooking their role across the Sahel, we're 
really working closely with them to understand how and in what 
ways we're understanding the terrorist threat there.
    I'm really happy that you brought up hybrid or gray-zone 
warfare. Unfortunately, we've seen a lot of examples of it over 
the last few years, and in terms of allied cooperation, I think 
the most important piece is, frankly, how we counter 
disinformation.
    That's important because it sort of has the first-level 
impact of how we understand the threat and how they understand 
the threat.
    You know, what we have seen, I think, masterfully over 
these last few months is that Russia has really not been able 
to flood the system with effective disinformation because each 
time they try to do so we and our allies are immediately 
pushing information about here's what's happening, here's who's 
doing it.
    When we can have that common threat picture it just makes 
it a lot easier for us to then deal with these hybrid 
challenges.
    Mr. Panetta. So, basically, countering it with the truth is 
what you're saying?
    Dr. Karlin. A thousand percent, and countering it early and 
countering it often. So that as we saw, I think, in 2014, the 
Russians managed to shape the narrative and seep in a lot of 
doubt about what was going on. That made it hard for the U.S. 
response. It made it hard for our allied response.
    And I think part of what we see is so different with 2022's 
tragedy in Ukraine compared to 2014 is that there is zero doubt 
about what happened and who is to blame for what happened, and 
I think that's helped result in just this unprecedented effort 
of allied unity and response.
    Mr. Panetta. Next level beyond disinformation, what would 
it be?
    Dr. Karlin. Beyond disinformation--I think another way of 
dealing with gray-zone or hybrid conflict is really showing how 
our militaries can cooperate and, in particular, actually, per 
the earlier question, in terms of exercises.
    So gray-zone is an attempt to kind of hit just below the 
threshold to test us out or to test our allies and partners 
out, and to the extent our competitors see, say, through our 
exercises that those efforts aren't actually going to work, 
that they are not going to achieve their objectives, then 
they're going to be a whole lot less likely to try them.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Panetta. Great. Great. Thank you, Doctor. Thank you. 
Mr.--I could stretch this out.
    [Laughter.]
    Mr. Panetta. I yield back.
    Mr. Kim [presiding]. Thank you. The gentleman yields back.
    I'm going to recognize myself for 5 minutes.
    Dr. Karlin, I wanted to just kind of start by asking you 
how do you think we're doing when it comes to allies and 
partners? You know, what kind of grade do you give ourselves 
now?
    Just trying to get a sense of your baseline, because I was 
looking through your testimony, thinking through what it is we 
can improve. But I'm just curious where you think we're 
starting from right now.
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you very much, Congressman Kim.
    I'm a little bit of a hard grader so I would probably give 
us a B+ or so. In particular, I think we have made a lot of 
important changes in how we do security cooperation. A lot of 
that is tied, frankly, to Congress--to the 2017 National 
Defense Authorization Act, which forced us to cooperate a whole 
lot deeper--Department of State, Department of Defense.
    It really streamlined a patchwork of authorities and, above 
all, it really pushed us to do meaningful assessment, 
monitoring, and evaluation. So we don't just focus on inputs 
and outputs but are we meeting our operational and strategic 
objectives.
    So I think we're on a very positive trajectory compared to 
where I might say we are 5, 10, 15 years ago. Thank you.
    Mr. Kim. Now, you know, you rightfully pointed out that, 
obviously, two of the biggest challenges that we face, going 
forward, one China, one Russia, right now we're obviously faced 
with this global challenge when it comes to Russia.
    We have seen NATO and our European partners really step up 
in big ways. But I'm curious how you would assess our allies 
and partners in the Indo-Pacific. What has been their response 
to what we have seen with Russia?
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you very much, Congressman, and Assistant 
Secretary Lewis may wish to add to this.
    In particular, I would say, our Indo-Pacific allies and 
partners and China are watching this very, very closely. 
They're watching the steps that we take and they're also 
watching just the extraordinary unprecedented steps that a lot 
of our European allies are taking.
    What I've seen, in particular, among our Asian allies and 
partners is a real focus on the economic piece and how they can 
be helpful on that front vis-a-vis the Russia conflict. Thank 
you.
    Ms. Lewis. And, really, I just would add that I agree with 
Dr. Karlin. I do think, as we look at our partners in Asia and 
allies and partners and friends, that they have seen the united 
front against Russian aggression.
    I think that sends a very clear message. I think that what 
we are consistently hearing is that they are strongly in 
support of what NATO, Europe, and the United States are doing.
    Mr. Kim. Would you say that the response by our allies and 
partners in the Indo-Pacific has been equivalent to what we 
have seen from our European partners?
    Ms. Lewis. I don't want to sort of measure one or the 
other. I think our European partners are literally physically 
closer and so are able to respond in real time in the ways that 
folks who are further away----
    Mr. Kim. Many of our Asia-Pacific partners are very close 
to Russia as well.
    Ms. Lewis. That's true. They're closer--I am thinking more 
specifically in terms of the role that I play, which is that we 
work on these third party transfers where we're able to help 
make sure that equipment--U.S.-origin equipment--that's inside 
other countries in Europe is able to be transferred to Ukraine.
    Mr. Kim. The reason I just kind of mentioned this is that 
I'm trying to get a sense of how things would play out, you 
know, if we were to see a crisis emerge much more squarely 
within the Indo-Pacific.
    I think we have seen NATO, who's an organization that's 
been tested, an organization that's had its mission changed a 
couple of times.
    But, obviously, we have a much more kind of diffuse 
situation in the Indo-Pacific in terms of different types of 
structures that are there.
    So I guess my question to you is when we--if we were to see 
something much more squarely in the Indo-Pacific, whether 
that's about China in the future, how confident are you that we 
would see our partners there step up and to the level that we 
might be seeing with the Europeans right now?
    I'm just kind of curious what your assessment of that level 
of health is of that partnership.
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you very much for that. I think what we 
have seen is a strengthening of our allies and partners across 
the Indo-Pacific in recent years, and also with our Europeans. 
So just two examples I'd quickly offer are AUKUS and then the 
Indo-Pacific Quad.
    I think as China has engaged in increasingly problematic 
behavior, they're all growing closer together and growing 
increasingly worried.
    So I think we're on a very positive trajectory to recognize 
and then to deal with this growing challenge. I will, at least, 
be very curious to watch how, as this conflict further unfolds 
in Europe, our Indo-Pacific allies and partners--what lessons 
are they taking from it.
    I think Assistant Secretary Lewis was spot on when she said 
they see the power of unity and how effective it is. Thank you.
    Mr. Kim. Great. Thank you so much. I'm going to hand it 
over to Congresswoman Chrissy Houlahan for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Houlahan. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I appreciate you guys 
hanging in there. I've been out and in and you've had to be 
there the entire time.
    I have so many questions that I actually don't know where 
to start. One of my questions has to do with Article 5 and it 
has to do with cyber incursions, and what defines a triggering 
mechanism in terms of cyber incursions, assuming attribution, 
where we would assume that we were defending NATO allies, 
either ourselves or otherwise.
    I'm watching the news go by and I'm seeing that there's all 
kinds of shenanigans going on in the cyberspace, some of them 
coming from industry, to be honest, and what--I worry because I 
understand that we have pretty emphatically said there will be 
no boots on the ground and there will be no American response.
    But I do feel as though we're in a different world now with 
cyber issues and want to understand if there's been a great 
deal of thought put to what that would look like, what would be 
the triggering mechanism for that.
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you very much for raising this. And I 
would just broadly say NATO has made great strides in thinking 
about the cyber domain and thinking about how and in what ways 
escalation differs in that domain and how it can play off of 
others.
    And I think it was just under a year or so ago that NATO 
effectively said, we have got to think about cyber the way we 
are thinking about those other domains.
    So I can assure you that is a very hot topic of 
conversation and I think, unfortunately, we're getting some 
case studies to test out what that will really look like. But 
at a minimum, what is really nice compared to 5, 10 years ago 
is there is some profound focus here on it and a desire by a 
lot of our NATO allies to invest in cyber capabilities, cyber 
resilience.
    Assistant Secretary Lewis may want to add to that a little 
bit.
    Ms. Lewis. No. Look, I agree 100 percent with what Dr. 
Karlin said, and I do appreciate you raising the issue because 
this is one that may--unfortunately, may be before us shortly.
    I do think there have been a lot of discussions about what 
is the best way to evaluate this, moving forward. I also think 
that as the Department of Defense continues to focus on hybrid 
warfare it's not only a relevant question related to NATO and 
Article 5, but really, as we look across the world and for 
ourselves as well, I have been pleased so far that we have been 
able to come up with good answers with our allies and partners.
    But we're going to continue to need to work on those 
definitions and responses.
    Ms. Houlahan. Yeah, and I think that what worries me is 
that we don't have a plan. We'll know it when we see. It's 
going to become sort of a case study in action, as near as I 
can tell, when we have to make decisions, I think, on the fly 
about what merits some sort of threat to us or to our allies, 
and that concerns me.
    This activation of the NATO Response Force is kind of 
related in the sense that it's a profound, pivotal moment in 
our history. And speaking about case studies, is there a plan 
to make sure that we're documenting and capturing the lessons 
that we're learning from this activation and possible 
employment of this response? And are we making sure that we can 
learn lessons--historic lessons--from what's happening right 
now?
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you very much for raising this point. 
NATO is actually in the throes of building its strategic 
concept for future contingencies, and as they are doing that, 
which happens on a quite rare basis, they're absolutely going 
to look at what's occurring now--the activation, as you noted, 
which is just incredibly important, and trying to understand 
what effect has that had, what's gone well, what do we need to 
improve on for the future. Thank you.
    Ms. Houlahan. My other questions have to do with INDOPACOM 
and China, and I was hoping to ask if you feel as though with 
all of the movement that's going on in the European theater if 
you're at all worried about readiness in INDOPACOM.
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you very much. As you know, we can't just 
keep our eye on one theater and so we're not. In fact, the Navy 
just did a freedom of navigation operation quite recently in 
the Indo-Pacific, in the last few days or so.
    So we are absolutely trying to ensure that the kind of 
geopolitical challenge that we see China has continued to have 
is one that we are focusing on while also very much accounting 
for the profound sea change, I think, challenge that we're 
seeing from Russia.
    Ms. Houlahan. Ms. Lewis.
    Ms. Lewis. Yeah, agree, and I think one of the real 
challenges we have is keeping--dealing with Russia but at the 
same time keeping our eye on what's going on with China.
    I know we have had a robust discussion of Taiwan, but just 
emphasizing that, once again, you know, under the guidance of 
the Taiwan Relations Act we are making sure that they're 
prepared as well and have focused on security assistance to 
them that makes them prepared from an asymmetric perspective.
    Ms. Houlahan. I think I've run out of time. I appreciate 
that, and I yield back to the chair. Thank you.
    Mr. Kim. Thank you, Congresswoman, for self-regulating your 
time there. Thank you.
    [Laughter.]
    Mr. Kim. I'm going to turn it over to Congresswoman 
Stephanie Murphy. Over to you.
    Mrs. Murphy. Thanks so much, Mr. Chair.
    Dr. Karlin, I know that section 333 of title 10 provides 
primary authority to the Department to train and equip partners 
to build the capacity of military forces in nine specific 
areas.
    And I serve on the subcommittee that oversees Special Ops 
Command and, as you may know, one of SOCOM's [U.S. Special 
Operations Command's] core activities is the military 
information support operations.
    Can you help me understand if MISO is covered under one of 
these nine areas and, if so, how are we using section 333 to 
build partner capacity in MISO?
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you very much for raising this issue. I 
cannot right now speak to MISO being included in this but I 
pledge to come back to you as soon as possible in writing on 
that exact issue.
    I would just say, writ large, the way in which we engage in 
MISO has to be responsible, not least to ensure that it is 
effective.
    Mrs. Murphy. I think I would really appreciate the response 
on that. I think the SOCOM--the special ops community has been 
using MISO to some great effect and, really, some interesting 
innovations, and especially as we look at how information is a 
key part of how our adversaries engage in conflict it will be 
important for us to better build this capacity and have 
partners and allies who also have the ability to conduct MISO.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 83.]
    Mrs. Murphy. Ms. Lewis, you know, I'm a Member of Congress 
from Florida and so I'm particularly interested in security 
cooperation with countries in the Western Hemisphere.
    Can you tell me a bit more about our security cooperation 
activities in Latin America and the Caribbean? Which partner 
nation forces are we training and equipping, and more broadly, 
how would you judge the efficacy of our efforts in building 
capacity in this AOR [area of responsibility]?
    Ms. Lewis. Well, thank you very much for the question. I 
had a real focus on Latin America early in my career and so I'm 
always happy to get to discuss it again in this format. I think 
the--we have provided security assistance to the region over 
many years.
    I think most recently we have focused very much on 
Colombia. I'm sure you've been aware of, really, the 
transformation that happened in Colombia, to a great extent, 
obviously, a real tribute to the Colombians themselves, who 
were dealing with an incredibly difficult insurgency in their 
own country, a drug war at the same time.
    And so I think that is always at top of mind in terms of 
continuing our support for them, moving forward. And then 
throughout the rest of the region we have a whole range of 
programs.
    There are some countries where, due to the situation in 
their--with their current government, we're not able to work 
with them anymore. But we look to build and strengthen that 
partnership throughout the region. And happy to continue 
working with you and your staff as you focus on this from your 
perspective in Florida.
    Mrs. Murphy. And do you think that our partnership capacity 
building and our presence in the region has had an impact on 
our ability to position for great power competition in the 
region?
    Ms. Lewis. You know, I'm actually very glad you raised 
this. I was lucky enough to just get--meet with our SOUTHCOM 
[U.S. Southern Command] commander, who's extraordinary, and 
she's very focused on this question.
    I think that we often--when we think specifically about 
China, we often think about, you know, the Indo-Pacific and 
sometimes we think about Africa, but I think it's very 
important that we need to look at what's happening there as 
well.
    My view is it's not just a question of security cooperation 
or security assistance or how we're postured, but it is also 
the relationships that we need to develop in that region. I 
think, as we have talked about, China often uses small 
investments to get big leverage.
    My view is that they often do that in ways that, really, 
actually are detrimental to the countries that they're 
purporting to assist or help. And so I think this needs to be a 
renewed area of focus in the Western Hemisphere, as we move 
forward, and I know that across the interagency we are 
committed to doing that.
    Mrs. Murphy. Thank you.
    And, Mr. Chair, I yield back. And I'll note that I'm one-
upping Ms. Houlahan by yielding back 30 seconds.
    [Laughter.]
    Mr. Kim. Thank you. Thank you. We appreciate it greatly. 
I'm told not to get too comfortable in this chair, so we'll 
keep this going.
    I'm going to turn it over to Congresswoman Speier.
    Over to you for 5 minutes.
    [No response.]
    Mr. Kim. Congresswoman Speier, can you hear us?
    Ms. Speier. I can't. Let me just see.
    Mr. Kim. We can hear you know.
    Ms. Speier. You can hear me? Okay. Great.
    Thank you both for your outstanding presentations this 
morning.
    I'd like to ask Dr. Karlin a question. First of all, let me 
say how impressed I am with your credentials, with your time 
you've spent in five different administrations and defense 
work. So your work is really very valuable.
    I'm concerned about the security cooperation agreements 
that we have because, on the one hand, it is intended to convey 
our values, our priorities, and our foreign policy objectives 
to both allies and adversaries.
    Between 2018 and 2020, the country of Azerbaijan received 
$120 million dollars in section 333 partner capacity building 
funds despite its authoritarian government and armed aggression 
towards its democratic neighbor, Armenia. In contrast, Armenia 
received zero dollars during that same period.
    So, Secretary Karlin, you testified that the Department 
seeks to, quote, ``cultivate security partners who can 
appropriately and effectively be regional security anchors, 
especially during crisis.''
    Given the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh in which Azerbaijan 
initiated it and it cost thousands of lives and hundreds of 
thousands of people being displaced, I mean, I don't think 
anyone could argue that Azerbaijan has lived up to that ideal.
    So has that war in 2020 caused the Department to reevaluate 
whether Azerbaijan is a worthy partner of the U.S. and if not, 
why not?
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you very much for your opening remarks 
and for your kind words.
    I'll offer some thoughts and Assistant Secretary Lewis may 
wish to add a bit as well on this one. But, in particular, that 
conflict you cite is--it was indeed a horrific one and it is 
one that we have looked closely at, I would say not only given 
what our partners have been involved with but also because of 
how that conflict played out and, in particular, it's a real 
case study in drone warfare.
    When we are having--when we have these security cooperation 
relationships it is really important that we closely monitor 
how and in what ways such assistance is being used and then we 
have very frank conversations with our partners if we think 
that that is not being used in appropriate or effective ways.
    Let me turn to Assistant Secretary Lewis, who I think may 
want to add a bit on this one. Thank you.
    Ms. Lewis. Yes. And thank you, Dr. Karlin, and thank you 
for the question. I'd certainly echo the comments that she 
made.
    When it comes to the State Department side of the house, we 
don't actually provide foreign military financing to either 
country, but we are providing assistance on conventional 
weapons destruction, which we do so equally, as you may be 
aware.
    That's because that program is specifically designed to 
prevent civilians from being killed or injured by conventional 
weapons.
    And so we--that is the program we have continued.
    Ms. Speier. Well, I guess I'm still not following whether 
or not there's been any repercussions to Azerbaijan as a result 
of their aggression to Armenia.
    They used Turkey and their drones to create havoc and 
injury and killings in the region, and I'm not--I guess I'm not 
hearing from you that there's been any penalty for that.
    Ms. Lewis. I think--first of all, I very much appreciate 
the concerns that you're raising about what happened during 
that conflict, and I think the State Department has been 
following those very closely.
    I think in terms of the specific programs that we work on 
here, we aren't providing any foreign military funding--excuse 
me, any more--any foreign military financing to Azerbaijan.
    And so in this case, the only program that we have 
continuing there is the one for conventional weapons 
destruction.
    Ms. Speier. So, Dr. Karlin, what kind of repercussions have 
they endured as a result of their actions, since they've 
received $120 million dollars from the U.S. Government?
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you very much for highlighting this, 
Congresswoman.
    If it would be possible, might I suggest that I submit to 
you a written statement with more detail on this specific one 
to ensure that we're really meeting the intent of your 
important question?
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 81.]
    Ms. Speier. All right. I appreciate that. Thank you. I 
yield back.
    Dr. Karlin. Thank you.
    Mr. Kim. Great. Thank you.
    Well, look, we're going to start to wrap up here. Before I 
do so, I ask unanimous consent that the statement of 
Representative Meeks be included in the record.
    Hearing none, it is so ordered.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 75.]
    Mr. Kim. I just want to say thank you so very much for 
taking the time to talk with us. I know there's a lot going on 
right now that you all are responding to.
    But I think it was very helpful for us to be able to have 
this chance to be able to take a step back and look forward in 
terms of where we're trying to get towards what objectives 
we're trying to achieve.
    I know you have other conversations up on the Hill that you 
need to get to so I will let you go.
    We are so adjourned. Thank you everyone.
    [Whereupon, at 12:52 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

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              WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING

                              THE HEARING

                             March 1, 2022

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              RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER

    Dr. Karlin. The outbreak of intensive fighting in 2020 underscored 
the continuing need to avoid providing offensive or potentially 
destabilizing weaponry to either side. The Administration has 
consistently called for both Armenia and Azerbaijan to show restraint 
and to find comprehensive solutions to all outstanding issues. The 
Department of Defense carefully assesses its bilateral security 
cooperation with Azerbaijan to ensure that it will not hamper efforts 
to negotiate a peaceful settlement between Armenia and Azerbaijan and 
will not be used for offensive purposes against Armenia. Azerbaijan has 
been a dependable security partner with regard to counterterrorism and 
our operations in Afghanistan. Improving Azerbaijan's maritime and 
border security is in our national interest because Azerbaijan's 
borders with Iran and the Caspian Sea are areas of concern for 
potential movement of terrorists, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 
and other illegal trafficking. [See page 58.]
                                 ______
                                 
              RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. KHANNA
    Dr. Karlin. The Department of Defense does not supply weapons or 
other military equipment through security cooperation programs or 
direct sales to any country where the Wagner Group is operating at the 
behest of the host government. In our engagements with allies and 
partners, we make every effort to ensure that they understand the risks 
of working with Russia in general, and the Wagner Group specifically, 
and we make clear that engaging with or supporting Wagner puts the 
defense relationship in jeopardy.   [See page 45.]
                                 ______
                                 
               RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. CROW
    Ms. Lewis. The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM) 
appreciates the Committee's offer to help and Representative Crow's 
observations on the value of a holistic approach to security sector 
assistance (SSA) that integrates broader efforts to counter corruption 
and enhance civilian security through improved access to justice, 
democratic governance, human rights, accountability, the inclusion of 
women and civil society, and humanitarian assistance. As we have 
learned from Afghanistan and Iraq: security sector governance (SSG) is 
not just a moral concern but directly affects our partners' military 
capabilities and performance. PM is exploring ways we can 
operationalize a governance-centered approach with DOD, including 
breaking down stovepipes, identifying new opportunities for 
institutional capacity-building, and developing a common operating 
picture of the risks posed by weak governance and elite capture of the 
security sector.
    While ``joint formulation'' is the gold standard, the Department is 
significantly outmatched by DOD when it comes to staffing and 
resources. Despite managing roughly the same share of SSA, DOD's 
Security Cooperation workforce is more than 20,000 strong, versus 
State's pol-mil workforce in the low hundreds. This mismatch is 
arguably the chief limiting factor in our ability to ensure SSA's 
alignment with foreign policy outcomes.
    Beyond staffing, one of the biggest changes that could help us is 
the authority to fund domestic personal services contractors with 
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) 
funds to enable more direct management and improve oversight of SSA, 
rather than relying largely on DOD as our implementer, which could 
achieve significant cost-savings and accelerate implementation. As we 
continue to develop a cadre of State SSA experts serving overseas, 
legislative relief could also enable State to assign non-military 
personnel (e.g., political officers) to priority embassy Offices of 
Security Cooperation currently staffed by military officers reporting 
to the geographic combatant commander.
    Russia's invasion of Ukraine has shown us we can deliver military 
assistance quickly in a crisis with existing authorities (e.g., 
Presidential Drawdown Authority). However, we believe legislative 
reform would help make SSA more responsive to foreign policy goals, 
including democracy, rights, and governance. We also hope to work with 
Congress to request SSA appropriations on a more regional, global, and/
or functional basis, with fewer directives. We appreciate the FY 2022 
Omnibus had fewer FMF earmarks. Past bilateral directives have limited 
our ability to respond to emerging priorities and to promote 
competition among program proposals. They also risk creating inertia in 
SSA programming regionally-focused FMF programs like the Countering 
Russian Influence Fund allow Congress to maintain meaningful oversight 
of SSA while allowing the Department greater flexibility to address 
evolving priorities and fund the highest-quality programming proposals. 
  [See page 30.]
                                 ______
                                 
             RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. SLOTKIN
    Dr. Karlin. Since August 2021, the United States has committed more 
than $2.3 billion in security assistance to support the Ukrainian Armed 
Forces, with President Biden approving the latest $300 million security 
assistance package on April 1, 2022. The Biden Administration is fully 
committed to helping Ukraine defend itself against continued Russian 
aggression and, working closely with Congress, is providing 
unprecedented levels of assistance.
    To date, at least 30 of our Allies and partners around the world 
have answered the call to support Ukraine, providing critical 
assistance. The Department of Defense, through U.S. European Command, 
continually works with our Allies and partners to ensure that we are 
providing the right systems and equipment for the Ukrainians and that 
our assistance reaches Ukraine in the most expedient ways possible; the 
systems the Ukrainians are currently using are having a great effect 
against the invading Russian forces. We will continue to consult 
closely with Ukraine's Ministry of Defense to ensure our assistance 
meets Ukraine's needs. We will also continue to coordinate with our 
Allies and partners to assist Ukraine's people and its Armed Forces in 
defending their sovereignty and territorial integrity.
    We thank Congress for its unwavering commitment to the people of 
Ukraine and for your continued support of the Department of Defense.   
[See page 37.]
                                 ______
                                 
              RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY DR. GREEN
    Dr. Karlin. The whole of the U.S. Government is continuing to 
engage India at the highest levels to underscore the importance of a 
strong collective response to condemn Russia's invasion of Ukraine, 
including to call for an immediate Russian withdrawal and ceasefire. We 
have seen an evolution in India's public message, including following a 
Quad Leaders' call several weeks ago. Prime Minister Modi has also 
spoken with both President Putin and President Zelensky multiple times 
since the launch of Russia's invasion to encourage an end to the 
fighting. Along with our colleagues at the State Department, we will 
continue to engage India on these issues and urge India to leverage its 
relationship with Russia in a constructive way.
    As two of the world's largest democracies, the United States and 
India share a commitment to ensuring that the Indo-Pacific region stays 
on a path toward freedom. Our defense cooperation with India, which has 
made significant strides over the past decade, remains critical to 
sustaining a favorable balance of power in the region. As we watch 
closely Russia's deepening strategic ties with the People's Republic of 
China (PRC), we will continue to work closely with India and maintain 
open channels of communication on how this nexus threatens our shared 
interests.
    We have urged India--as we do with all of our allies and partners--
to avoid transactions with Russia and to continue diversifying away 
from its procurement of Russian arms. I remain encouraged by India's 
diversification of defense equipment over the past decade, including 
the over $20 billion of U.S.-origin defense equipment it has purchased 
since 2008. The Department of State is the lead on all Countering 
America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (Public Law 115-44) 
(CAATSA) matters, and waivers are considered a case-by-case basis.   
[See page 35.]
                                 ______
                                 
              RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MRS. BICE
    Ms. Lewis. While the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs does not 
work specifically on the issue related to imports of Russian oil and 
gas, the State Department is advancing efforts to accelerate Europe's 
diversification of energy supplies away from Russia and to secure the 
world from Putin's attempts to weaponize Russian oil and gas exports. 
Given the importance of natural gas in Europe's energy mix, the United 
States has engaged major producers at home and around the world to 
support temporarily surging natural gas output and to allocate these 
volumes to European buyers. U.S. liquified natural gas exports to 
Europe during January nearly doubled compared to the average in late 
2021. The State Department is engaging major buyers and suppliers to 
ensure flexibility in existing contracts and manage storage to enable 
diversion to Europe.   [See page 40.]
                                 ______
                                 
              RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. JACOBS
    Ms. Lewis. As a general matter, we understand section 127e programs 
are not subject to DOD Leahy vetting requirements because the 
activities are operational in nature, rather than U.S.-provided 
training or assistance. We understand however, section 127e, programs 
and their associated members undergo extensive vetting through an 
established process that involves DOD human rights vetting and 
counterintelligence (CI) screening of every recipient of section 127e, 
support. We defer to DOD for the details of their vetting process.   
[See page 48.]
                                 ______
                                 
             RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MRS. MURPHY
    Dr. Karlin. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) has 
notified one MISO-related program under Section 333 for Mongolia. MISO 
could be considered for more capacity building under Section 333 in the 
counterterrorism mission area.
    With every Section 333 program, human rights and rule of law 
training and complementary institutional capacity building is required 
by law. This aids in the responsible absorption, sustainment, and 
employment of training or equipment provided to foreign partners by the 
United States.
    Various DOD entities audit the effectiveness of their programs. 
Specifically, for Section 333, DSCA conducts monitoring and evaluation 
during and after program implementation to ensure effectiveness and 
compliance with U.S. regulations.   [See page 55.]

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              QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                             March 1, 2022

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                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER

    Ms. Speier. How extensive is U.S. end-use monitoring in security 
cooperation, and what is the Department's response if units trained and 
equipped by the U.S. misuse equipment, especially in regard to security 
cooperation frameworks as large and complex as what we had in 
Afghanistan?
    Dr. Karlin. Partner end-use monitoring (EUM) commitments for all 
security cooperation assistance are required by Section 505 of the 
Foreign Assistance Act (22 U.S.C. Sec. 2314). In the context of U.S. 
grant assistance, the U.S. Government concludes bilateral Section 505 
agreements to establish the legally required EUM commitments. All 
partner nations (PNs) obtaining defense articles pursuant to these 
authorities are required to provide end-use assurances and to provide 
physical protection and storage of military equipment, to the same 
standards as the U.S. Government.
    The Golden Sentry Program, managed by the Defense Security 
Cooperation Agency (DSCA), is tasked with monitoring our PN's 
compliance with these requirements. The Department of Defense (DOD) 
does not determine whether to investigate potential violations, but 
forwards information regarding potential violations to the Department 
of State (DOS). DOS is responsible for investigating potential misuse 
of U.S.-provided defense articles, information, or services.
    The EUM Program is segregated into two parts, Routine End-Use 
Monitoring (REUM) and Enhanced End-Use Monitoring (EEUM). Items subject 
to REUM do not contain sophisticated U.S. technology. These items may 
include ammunition, standard firearms, protective vests/helmets, 
vehicles, and supplies. Items subject to EEUM are those that the 
Military Services, interagency technology release approval process, or 
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy have determined 
require additional physical security and accountability assurances due 
to advanced technology features. These items include certain missiles, 
guided munitions, night vision devices, communications security 
(COMSEC) equipment and EEUM-designated unmanned aerial systems (UAS) 
platforms.
    Routine items are inventoried prior to shipment, upon arrival at 
the PN's location, and further inventory tracking is done by general 
observations in conjunction with other security cooperation functions 
after delivery. Items subject to EEUM are inventoried prior to shipment 
and again upon arrival at the PN's location. From that point on, the 
Golden Sentry Program is required to conduct annual ``serial number'' 
inventories and physical security inspections of storage sites 
containing EEUM-designated equipment. This inventory is conducted by 
the Security Cooperation Officer (SCO) located in country and verified 
by DSCA via the Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP) or 
during EUM compliance assessment visits.
    Any potential unauthorized third-party transfer or potential 
``misuse'' violations are immediately reported to DOS for action. DOS 
may request DSCA gather additional factual information concerning 
alleged misuse or unauthorized third-party transfer. DOS may also opt 
to communicate directly with the PN to investigate circumstances around 
the potential violation, and work towards incident closure. Potential 
EUM concerns are typically resolved with the PN's voluntary cooperation 
to address U.S. government concerns or deficiencies.
    In Afghanistan, as in any war zone, DOD's ability to conduct end-
use monitoring of DOD-funded equipment was constrained by poor security 
conditions, which prevented U.S. forces' ability to visit specific 
storage locations. EUM requirements were considered when the U.S. 
Government approved the release of those items to the PN. DOD transfers 
to the Afghan forces were mostly limited to REUM items. The only items 
requiring EEUM were night vision devices, laser guidance systems, and 
Rapid Aerostat Initial Deployment (RAID) tower computers and 
components. DOD mitigated the risk of loss and misuse of EEUM items by 
providing them only to the elite Afghan special forces and aviation 
units that had U.S. advisory support.
    Ms. Speier. What lessons can the Department share from the collapse 
of the Afghan Security Forces, despite our two decade security 
cooperation partnership? Can these lessons be incorporated into our 
security assistance implementation going forward?
    Dr. Karlin. The Department of Defense (DOD) will support the 
efforts of the commission Congress established in Section 1094 of the 
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2022, 
which ``shall conduct a thorough study of all matters relating to 
combat operations, reconstruction and security force assistance 
activities, intelligence activities, and diplomatic activities of the 
United States pertaining to [sic] Afghanistan during the period 
beginning June 1, 2001, and ending August 30, 2021.'' In addition, DOD 
has directed an After Action Review of DOD operations in Afghanistan 
for the period between the February 2020 U.S-Taliban Agreement and U.S. 
forces' withdrawal in August 2021. Also, in compliance with Section 
1323, ``Study of Certain Security Cooperation Programs,'' of the NDAA 
for FY 2022, DOD is contracting with a Federally Funded Research and 
Development Center (FFRDC) for a comprehensive assessment of the 
strategic and operational lessons collected from the war in Afghanistan 
that can be applied to existing and future security cooperation (SC) 
programs.
    Without detailing specifics that would pre-judge the findings and 
recommendations of these reviews, DOD's experience in conducting SC in 
Afghanistan reinforced the importance of conducting rigorous 
assessment, monitoring, and evaluation (AM&E) of SC activities to 
include baseline assessments, design documents, and regular evaluation. 
DOD has already begun to implement these best practices to align with 
requirements in 10 U.S.C. 383 (Section 383). These lessons are outlined 
in an independent evaluation of the Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) 
program, which the Department will release on opendefense.gov in 
accordance with Section 383.
    DOD's and NATO's efforts with the Afghan National Defense and 
Security Forces (ANDSF) were unique in many respects, and there may be 
limitations on the applicability of lessons learned to other SC 
activities. In particular, in Afghanistan, DOD supported all components 
of partner ground, air, and police forces that were engaged in 
sustained combat operations; combat losses of personnel and equipment 
had to be continually resupplied to maintain a basic fighting 
capability while DOD simultaneously implemented long-term capacity 
building efforts. Other DOD SC activities are more narrowly tailored, 
and with limited exceptions are focused on building select capacity and 
capability rather than sustaining combat operations of a partner 
nation's entire security force.
    Ms. Speier. Assistant Secretary Lewis, how does this close 
coordination that we are seeing with our allies and partners regarding 
Ukraine provide us with a comparative advantage over our adversaries, 
and Russia in particular?
    Ms. Lewis. The close coordination among the extensive group of our 
allies and partners not only demonstrates a commitment to support 
Ukraine, but also shows the overwhelming opposition to Russia's blatant 
aggression and its attempt to circumvent the international rules-based 
order. The combined diplomatic, intelligence, military, economic, and 
humanitarian support to Ukraine clearly disadvantages Russia and re-
affirms the relevance and effectiveness of the shared values among the 
United States and its allies.
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                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT
    Mr. Scott. If better resourced in terms of funding, people, and 
platforms, how can the U.S. Coast Guard play a greater role in theater 
security cooperation?
    Dr. Karlin. The United States interfaces regularly with the 
maritime security forces of partner nations, particularly in the U.S. 
Indo-Pacific Command, U.S. Africa Command, and U.S. Southern Command 
areas of responsibility. These interactions can and do involve critical 
capacity building efforts and efforts to improve partners' ability to 
perform maritime domain awareness and interdiction, when necessary. The 
Coast Guard plays an important role in these interactions and will 
continue to do so.
    Mr. Scott. The National Guard's State Partnership Program is a 
highly successful program in my view. What recommendations do you have 
for NGB to improve this highly successful program?
    Dr. Karlin. We agree wholeheartedly and we share your enthusiasm 
for the State Partnership Program (SPP). On April 1, DOD released 
findings from an independent strategic evaluation on opendefense.gov 
covering SPP's outcomes from 2014-2019. This assessment, monitoring, 
and evaluation effort meets the requirements of 10 U.S.C. Sec. 383 for 
the Secretary of Defense to make available evaluation findings for the 
public to increase transparency and accountability for security 
cooperation programs. The Department is considering recommendations and 
lessons learned from this evaluation, to include assessing the capacity 
for new SPPs, and how much growth the SPP can handle annually while 
sustaining existing partnerships. Additionally, the Department is 
developing projections and priorities for program growth, plans for 
aligning appropriate State National Guards to pair with forecasted 
growth, and frameworks to leverage the SPP as a unique and specialized 
security cooperation program. Finally, the Department is continuing to 
improve the quality of the security cooperation workforce to ensure it 
has the capacity to perform its mission including the ability to 
leverage the SPP with other authorities to achieve DOD objectives. The 
Department continues to implement our Security Cooperation Workforce 
Certification Program, pursuant to 10 U.S.C. Sec. 384.
    Mr. Scott. The delay in approving requests for weapons for our 
allies and partners has caused some angst among our Allies and 
Partners. Should there be a new crisis type Foreign Military Sales 
(FMS) mechanism where Allies and Partners are able to quickly procure 
equipment from the U.S. for Ukraine assistance or to quickly equip in 
the light of crisis? So far there is no such a mechanism.
    Dr. Karlin. We have demonstrated tremendous responsiveness to the 
crisis in Ukraine. We have done this by providing more than $2.3 
billion in security assistance to Ukraine, including more than $1.6 
billion since Russia's further invasion. Partners and allies have also 
provided a considerable amount of aid to Ukraine. Much of the urgent 
assistance was provided from DOD stocks using Presidential Drawdown 
Authority (PDA) or from partner and ally inventory, neither of which is 
sustainable for the long-term. As a result, the Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Office of the Under Secretary 
of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, under the direction of the 
Deputy Secretary, are working to identify opportunities to increase 
production capacity, create a steady demand to suppliers, and build a 
reserve of critical munitions.
    Mr. Scott. How can the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps enhance 
their maritime security cooperation workforce and formalize operations 
in this domain so that the Navy and Marine Corps can develop the 
partnerships they need to deter and defeat great power adversaries?
    Dr. Karlin. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2017 directed the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) to create 
a professional workforce development program and career paths for the 
thousands of DOD civilian and military employees supporting security 
cooperation programs and activities. Since then, DSCA has elevated 
security cooperation as a profession through the Security Cooperation 
Workforce Certification Program and has provided the DOD security 
cooperation workforce the education and training it needs to help the 
DOD strengthen alliances and build partnerships using our security 
cooperation toolkit. As of April 4, 2022, the Department of the Navy 
reported to DSCA 2,125 positions in the security cooperation workforce 
with 1,958 of those positions currently filled, of which 183 are U.S. 
Marine Corps personnel. Security Cooperation Workforce members perform 
a broad range of security cooperation functions: working directly with 
partners in the Department's U.S. Embassy presence in Security 
Cooperation Offices around the world, serving on Combatant Command 
staffs as advisors and planners, and serving within the Department of 
the Navy security cooperation implementing organizations as Foreign 
Military Sales case and training planners.
    However, the Department of the Navy and the U.S. Marine Corps also 
leverage tactical or operational personnel or forces to conduct 
security cooperation activities and to serve in various other 
capacities. I would defer to my colleagues in both the Department of 
the Navy and the U.S. Marine Corps to speak to how they have 
operationalized maritime security efforts.
    Mr. Scott. What plans, if any, do you have to streamline the 
technology security and foreign disclosure (TS&FD) policy and 
international agreement process?
    Dr. Karlin. We are working to ensure technology and information 
release decisions both align to the National Defense Strategy and the 
need to protect the U.S. warfighter's technological edge. We also have 
streamlined the technology security and foreign disclosure process by 
establishing anticipatory disclosure policies for new technologies. 
This allows us to provide the necessary weapons systems to our partners 
in a timelier manner, due to the ``technology release pre-approval'' 
being in place in advance of request. The Department continues to 
improve training and education associated with international 
agreements, including through Defense Acquisition University programs.
    Mr. Scott. Should the State Department and Defense Department make 
it a goal to send personnel to each War College operated by the Armed 
Forces of our allies and partners? What allied and partner war colleges 
presently have no U.S. students?
    Dr. Karlin. Although I defer to my colleagues in the Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness for matters 
related to enrollment and participation in partner War Colleges, 
interoperability is an important goal for U.S. alliances and 
partnerships, and engagement and interactions at the career-level, 
whether military-to-military exchanges, or liaison agreements, foster 
the best outcomes with regard to the ability of the U.S. military to 
work hand-in-hand with partner military forces to achieve long-term 
outcomes with regard to security and partnership.
    Mr. Scott. What is the role of military history when it comes to 
engagement with Allies and Partners? What enhancements to military 
history are needed to increase the role it plays in theater security 
cooperation?
    Dr. Karlin. Military history is an essential component of military 
education and training. Military history is a part of how we enable 
partner military forces to foster regional and global security, 
especially in contested environments. The Department seeks to impart 
knowledge and lessons from history in our community and with our 
partners.
    Mr. Scott. If better resourced in terms of funding, people, and 
platforms, how can the U.S. Coast Guard play a greater role in theater 
security cooperation?
    Ms. Lewis. Theater Security Cooperation is a critically important 
part of the military strategy of the United States that supports mutual 
security interests of the U.S. and its partners, develops partners' 
capabilities in multinational operations. While I would defer to U.S. 
Coast Guard (USCG) headquarters to more fully address specific matters 
of resourcing, the USCG, like other uniformed services, plays a 
significant role in security cooperation by their participation in 
multinational exercises, subject matter expert exchanges, making port 
visits, and other activities that help to enhance partners' 
capabilities.
    Mr. Scott. The National Guard's State Partnership Program is a 
highly successful program in my view. What recommendations do you have 
for NGB to improve this highly successful program?
    Ms. Lewis. We share your enthusiasm for the State Partnership 
Program (SPP). The Department of State's formal role in the program is 
limited to providing the Secretary's concurrence with new partnerships 
and with quarterly activities that incorporate security forces or 
disaster and emergency response governmental organizations. However, we 
are in constant communication with DOD counterparts on SPP activities. 
With DOD, we foresee future SPP partnerships focused on critical 
regions such as the Indo-Pacific and engagements better aligned with 
State-funded security assistance activities. We will continue to 
consult with the National Guard Bureau as it considers future 
partnerships and at which embassies to place bilateral affairs 
officers.
    Mr. Scott. The delay in approving requests for weapons for our 
allies and partners has caused some angst among our Allies and 
Partners. Should there be a new crisis type Foreign Military Sales 
(FMS) mechanism where Allies and Partners are able to quickly procure 
equipment from the U.S. for Ukraine assistance or to quickly equip in 
the light of crisis? So far there is no such a mechanism.
    Ms. Lewis. The Department is working closely with the Department of 
Defense to ensure FMS cases are processed promptly and effectively, 
including addressing changes to the DOD processes. Cooperation with DOD 
is vital, because FMS uses DOD's contract procurement system. 95% of 
all FMS transactions the State Department considers are approved within 
48 hours. In about 5% of cases, significant foreign policy issues may 
require additional consideration by the Department and Congress. In 
some cases, delays in production for in-demand systems after FMS case 
approval also set back delivery timelines.
    However, as demonstrated in the context of Ukraine, there are other 
mechanisms, such as the Presidential Drawdown Authority and Third-Party 
Transfers of U.S.-origin equipment from other partners, which can 
enable quick provision of urgently needed defense articles to allies 
and partners. The articles, in these cases, are in stock and often 
immediately available for delivery. Additionally, partners have the 
choice to purchase some types of military systems via the Direct 
Commercial Sales process, in which the Department authorizes U.S. 
industry to sell directly to foreign purchasers who may have unique 
requirements outside of DOD's procurement needs.
    Mr. Scott. How can the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps enhance 
their maritime security cooperation workforce and formalize operations 
in this domain so that the Navy and Marine Corps can develop the 
partnerships they need to deter and defeat great power adversaries?
    Ms. Lewis. The stability and security of the U.S. and partner 
nations relies upon each party's ability to work together to confront 
common security challenges. While I would defer to the U.S. Navy and 
Marine Corps headquarters to speak to their ongoing efforts to enhance 
their maritime domain security cooperation workforce, I would note that 
continuous execution of military exercises, port visits, subject matter 
expert exchanges, and real-world operations are certainly key 
components to such an endeavor.
    Mr. Scott. What plans, if any, do you have to streamline the 
technology security and foreign disclosure (TS&FD) policy and 
international agreement process?
    Ms. Lewis. The TS&FD process is intended to preserve the U.S. 
technological edge and protect critical technology. The Department 
continues to believe this is a priority and is working with the 
Department of Defense to find ways to streamline the TS&FD without 
compromising technology security. The Department is examining options 
to increase funding resources to address critical needs to keep pace 
with emerging threats and technologies as well as looking into other 
areas where improvements can be made.
    Mr. Scott. Should the State Department and Defense Department make 
it a goal to send personnel to each War College operated by the Armed 
Forces of our allies and partners? What allied and partner war colleges 
presently have no U.S. students?
    Ms. Lewis. While the Department of State does send State personnel 
to U.S. War and Staff Colleges, we do not send State personnel to 
foreign war colleges.
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GAETZ
    Mr. Gaetz. What specific vetting procedures are in place to ensure 
military foreign exchange program students do not pose a threat to the 
people of the United States? What changes, if any, were made to these 
vetting procedures after the 2019 terrorist attack on NAS Pensacola? 
What policies, procedures, and methods are in place to ensure the home 
nation of military foreign exchange program students are properly 
vetting their own people before sending them to the United States?
    Dr. Karlin. A. Fiscal Year 2021, which was enacted partly in 
response to the 2019 terrorist attack on NAS Pensacola, DOD implemented 
biographic and biometric vetting for international military students 
(IMS) seeking unescorted physical access (known as ``credentialed 
recurring access (CRA),'') to a DOD installation or facility in the 
United States in association with training or education lasting more 
than 14 days, as well as for accompanying family members (AFM) who 
accompany them to the United States during that training or education. 
As required by Section 1090, DOD also has procedures in place to 
biographically vet certain immediate family members of both IMS and AFM 
regardless of whether they accompany the IMS or AFM to the United 
States. These procedures largely align with the vetting procedures of 
U.S. Service members and civilians traveling to a Defense base. The 
vetting of IMS and AFM generally occurs prior to their travel to the 
United States, and is automatically repeated every 90 days through a 
``continuous review'' process while in the United States for training 
on a DOD installation.
    To accomplish the biographic vetting, DOD reuses the information 
already collected by the Department of State (DOS) for the A-2 visa 
application, where one is needed, avoiding duplicative collection by 
both DOD and DOS. DOD supplements this information with additional data 
to improve the accuracy, thoroughness, and efficiency of the vetting. 
Vetting is conducted against DOD, DOS, Intelligence Community, 
Department of Homeland Security, and Department of Justice/Federal 
Bureau of Investigation data holdings. DOD notifies DOS of any IMS or 
AFM denied through this vetting process.
    B. Immediately following the attack, DOD reviewed its security 
policies and procedures regarding foreign nationals attending military 
education and training on DOD installations and facilities in the 
United States. In addition to the policies focused on international 
military students (IMS), the review also accounted for family members 
that may accompany the student to the United States.
    After that review, DOD began to strengthen IMS vetting to better 
align it with the vetting DOD applies to its own personnel. In early 
2020, DOD began applying the Expedited Screening Protocol (ESP) vetting 
process to certain subsets of the IMS populations.
    In December 2020 the then-Acting USD(I&S) signed out procedures 
expanding the ESP vetting process to nearly all IMS and AFM. These 
procedures were implemented through a multi-tranche process starting in 
April 2021 and reaching full implementation in April 2022. Although 
this vetting is to determine the IMS's (or AFM's) fitness for 
credentialed (unescorted) recurring access to DOD installations in the 
United States rather than their eligibility for a visa or for admission 
to the United States, DOD notifies DOS and DHS of IMS and AFM denials 
to inform their decisions as well.
    This DOD security vetting applies to foreign military nationals who 
are selected, nominated, or accepted for training or education at a DOD 
installation or facility in the United States lasting longer than 14 
days, and the family members accompanying them to the United States, 
who will receive CRA to those locations. Personnel from Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom are exempt by law if they 
have a security clearance which is reciprocally accepted by the United 
States.
    In addition to the vetting-related security enhancements, DOD also 
took several other steps to strengthen security policies related to 
IMS:
    1. Limited Access: IMS and AFM are limited to accessing only the 
installations and facilities directly associated with the education or 
training or necessary for those IMS and AFM to access authorized 
benefits.
    2. Privately-Owned Firearms Prohibition: IMS/AFM sign an agreement 
that they will not transport, possess, store or use privately-owned 
firearms and non-official ammunition in the United States during their 
training.
    3. Insider Threat Program: IMS receive Insider Threat training upon 
arrival at the DOD schoolhouse where they will be based, and are 
incorporated into DOD's Counter-Insider Threat program.
    4. Conduct Expectations Commitment: IMS sign an agreement that they 
and their AFM will comply with Expectations of Conduct established by 
U.S. military base/installation and U.S. civilian authorities.
    5. Travel Reporting: IMS are required to notify their schoolhouse 
of any international travel and any non-duty domestic travel more than 
250 miles from the training location.
    C. In early 2020, when the Department informed partners and allies 
about the creation of the DOD Security Vetting process, it emphasized 
that partners and allies should conduct thorough screening of their 
candidate students before nominating them for training or education in 
the United States. When possible, DOD works with our interagency 
partners to develop releasable notifications regarding IMS or AFM we 
deny through DOD security vetting. This helps our allies and partners 
improve their security posture by identifying potential risks in their 
populations.
    Mr. Gaetz. What specific vetting procedures are in place to ensure 
military foreign exchange program students do not pose a threat to the 
people of the United States? What changes, if any, were made to these 
vetting procedures after the 2019 terrorist attack on NAS Pensacola? 
What policies, procedures, and methods are in place to ensure the home 
nation of military foreign exchange program students are properly 
vetting their own people before sending them to the United States?
    Ms. Lewis. Following the terrorist attack, Congress passed Section 
1090 of the FY 2021 National Defense Authorization Action. As a result, 
the Department of Defense established and executed a vetting program 
for all International Military Students (IMS) attending training in the 
United States, and their accompanying family members (AFM). The 
Department of State works closely with DOD to complete this vetting, in 
addition to the standard suite of screening and vetting we conduct on 
all visa applicants prior to adjudication and throughout the validity 
of an applicant's visa.
    Vetting of IMS and AFM includes:
    1. Security Vetting: An initial security vetting of IMS and their 
AFM through the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency's 
(DCSA) Expedited Screening Center (ESC).
          This vetting occurs prior to their arrival in the 
        United States and is required before IMS are issued an 
        Invitational Travel Order (ITO).
          This vetting is conducted based on information from:
              detailed biographic and biometric information 
            collected from the IMS and AFM and
              the information they provide through their 
            Department of State visa application (or the appropriate 
            substitute if no visa is issued).
    2. Continuous Review (CR): While the IMS/AFM retain CRA, re-vetting 
occurs every 90 days through an ESC process referred to as ``Continuous 
Review.''
    3. Publicly Available Electronic Information (PAEI) Monitoring: As 
part of CR, IMS/AFM have their publicly available electronic 
information monitored. IMS/AFM sign a document prior to arrival in the 
U.S. acknowledging that this will occur.
    4. Privately-Owned Firearms: IMS/AFM sign an agreement that they 
will not transport, possess, store or use privately-owned firearms and 
non-official ammunition in the U.S.
    5. Conduct Expectations: IMS sign an agreement that they and their 
AFM will comply with Expectations of Conduct established by U.S. 
military base/installation and U.S. civilian authorities.
    6. Insider Threat Training: IMS receive Insider Threat Training 
upon arrival at the DOD schoolhouse where they will be based.
    7. Travel Reporting: IMS are required to report to the DOD 
Schoolhouse if they will travel outside a 250-mile radius from their 
official location on personal travel the is not on their ITO. In 
additional to the partner nation's own internal security vetting, we 
will continue to rely on the IMS vetting process to ensure DOD bases 
and facilities are protected.
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WALTZ
    Mr. Waltz. What is the administration doing to detect and intercept 
Iranian weapon shipments to the Houthis? How many U.S. intercepts of 
Iranian-origin weapons heading to Yemen occurred in 2021 compared to 
the previous two years?
    Dr. Karlin. DOD supports efforts to address the unlawful transport 
of weapons from Iran to the Houthis in Yemen, in accordance with UN 
Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2216, which prohibits the supply, 
sale, or transfer of weapons to the Houthis. As part of standard 
maritime security operations conducted consistent with international 
law, U.S. Navy visit, board, search, and seizure teams have discovered 
and seized illicit weapons intended for the Houthis. The number of 
these interceptions has remained relatively consistent from 2019 
through 2021.
    Mr. Waltz. Are the United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and UAE 
sharing technical information on Iranian weapons, especially the 
rockets, missiles, and drones that Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis 
each operate?
    Dr. Karlin. The United States shares relevant information about 
Iranian weapons with our partners.
    Mr. Waltz. What is the administration doing to detect and intercept 
Iranian weapon shipments to the Houthis? How many U.S. intercepts of 
Iranian-origin weapons heading to Yemen occurred in 2021 compared to 
the previous two years?
    Ms. Lewis. The United States remains committed to using an array of 
tools to prevent and disrupt Iranian weapons-related procurement and 
shipments, including shipments to the Houthis. The United States 
designated targets involved in Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods 
Force (IRGC-QF) funding of the Houthis in multiple rounds of sanctions 
in June 2021 and February 2022, for example.
    In May and December 2021, the U.S. Navy and partner forces 
interdicted dhows carrying Iran-origin weapons intended for the 
Houthis, including hundreds of heavy machine guns and sniper rifles, 
dozens of advanced, Russian-made anti-tank guided missiles, several 
hundred rocket-propelled grenade launchers and optical sights for 
weapons, and thousands of assault rifles. In 2019, the United States 
intercepted a dhow bound for the Houthis in Yemen that contained 
sophisticated components of anti-ship cruise missiles, land attack 
cruise missiles, air defense missiles, and anti-tank missiles from 
Iran. And in 2020, U.S. and partner forces intercepted two dhows 
containing Iranian weapons bound for the Houthis in Yemen.
    Mr. Waltz. Are the United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and UAE 
sharing technical information on Iranian weapons, especially the 
rockets, missiles, and drones that Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis 
each operate?
    Ms. Lewis. Yes. The Administration would be happy to provide more 
detail on this matter in a classified setting.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. JACKSON
    Dr. Jackson. A challenge that the Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot 
Training Program faces is helping a foreign service member's spouse 
move with them to the United States and provide adequate employment for 
the spouse. Is there anything that DOD or the State Department can do 
to improve this process? Further, are there any authorities lacking 
that would help improve this process?
    Dr. Karlin. The ability of a NATO service member's spouse to work 
is byproduct of their visa type (as determined by the Department of 
State (DOS)), immigration status, and whether there is a reciprocal 
work agreement with their country. NATO's Allied Command Transformation 
(ACT) in Norfolk is in the best position to work with DOS and other 
federal entities to identify the rules or regulations that impact NATO 
spouses.
    Dr. Jackson. A challenge that the Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot 
Training Program faces is helping a foreign service member's spouse 
move with them to the United States and provide adequate employment for 
the spouse. Is there anything that DOD or the State Department can do 
to improve this process? Further, are there any authorities lacking 
that would help improve this process?
    Ms. Lewis. Employment opportunities for the spouses of foreign 
military members who are present in the United States is an important 
issue, and we hear similar concerns from U.S. military servicemember's 
spouses stationed overseas. We work closely with our NATO Allies and 
the Department of Defense to address the issue of spouse employment, 
whether they are foreign military spouses who may be located in Wichita 
County, Texas or U.S. military spouses stationed in Europe. In 
particular, we work closely with the Department of Defense on any 
issues related to implementation of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement 
(SOFA) where it impacts spouse employment. We would like for foreign 
military dependents to be afforded the same opportunities as U.S. 
military dependents located abroad.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KAHELE
    Mr. Kahele. Dr. Karlin, in your opening remarks, you stated ``The 
Department of Defense has also instituted a robust strategic evaluation 
agenda focused on making public key findings, conclusions, and 
recommendations. We are working every day to find ways to quantify, 
interpret, and evaluate return on investment with our security 
cooperation dollars. Currently, strategic evaluations span the 
effectiveness of maritime security, institutional capacity building, 
the State Partnership Program, the Counter-ISIL Train and Equip (CTEF), 
and State's International Professional Military Education. How are you 
measuring these programs' success?
    Dr. Karlin. DOD considers a number of factors when evaluating 
security cooperation (SC) effectiveness. Although these factors can 
vary depending upon the country, SC activity, context, and evaluation 
objective, some common factors include how well the SC activity 
contributes to objectives at both the strategic and operational levels, 
what DOD planning or execution factors contributed to these outcomes, 
and what partner nation factors may have contributed to these outcomes.
    For example, in measuring the success of our maritime SC 
initiatives, evaluators focused on measures related to partners' 
capacity and capability to conduct maritime operations, including 
partners' use and maintenance of vessels and associated equipment and 
Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) equipment; sustainment plans and 
execution; response times to maritime incidents; the development of a 
National Maritime Strategy; and the political will to commit resources 
and personnel to improving maritime security. Evaluators also focused 
on more strategic measures such as how SC affected partner 
relationships with the United States and changes in the security 
environment during the evaluation period.
    Mr. Kahele. Dr. Karlin, it was a pleasure to meet you at the Reagan 
National Defense Forum last December. I sent you a letter last month 
about the upcoming NDS and look forward to your feedback.
    As you stated in your testimony, the forthcoming NDS will emphasize 
how DOD will strengthen alliances and partnerships to advance national 
security through integrated deterrence. I completely agree that the 
full spectrum of views should be considered when the NDS is being 
drafted. For example, stakeholders ranging from the Missile Defense 
Agency to the Department of Energy should be at the policy-making table 
to provide strategic clarity on our nation's missile defense 
infrastructure and energy security.
    Would you please share your thoughts on how there can be more 
strategic clarity on our nation's missile defense infrastructure in 
support of homeland defense? As a member representing Hawai'i's second 
congressional district, I think there is a lot of confusion over the 
future of the Homeland Defense Radar-Hawaii. For the past two fiscal 
years under Presidents Donald Trump and Joe Biden, the Department of 
Defense has zeroed out the HDR-H in the President's budget proposal. 
For this upcoming fiscal year, I understand that it will likely be 
zeroed out again. This is one example where organizations outside (MDA) 
AND within DOD (INDOPACOM, OSD, CAPE) need to get on the same page. In 
my opinion, there is clearly an increasing threat posed by North 
Korea's development of intercontinental ballistic missiles and nuclear 
missiles, and whether it is from the NORTHCOM Commander or the MDA 
Director, everyone says that the HDR-H is the best-programmed solution 
to enable a credible, in-depth, under layer defense for our forces in 
Hawai'i.
    Will you please share your thoughts on how there can be more 
strategic clarity on our nation's missile defense infrastructure?
    Dr. Karlin. The Department remains committed to ensuring Hawaii's 
continued protection from long-range missile threats, and the defense 
of Hawaii remains a high priority mission for the Department.
    The Department recently initiated a broader study on the defense of 
Hawaii and will assess options to address the evolving threat. This 
analysis is intended to inform potential investment options for future 
budget cycles.
    The Homeland Defense Radar-Hawaii (HDR-H) was conceived to work in 
tandem with the Long Range Discrimination Radar and the Pacific Radar, 
the latter of which no longer has a viable path forward. Additionally, 
the cancellation of the Redesigned Kill Vehicle gave rise to plans for 
the Next Generation Interceptor, which can enhance the defense of 
Hawaii even in the absence of HDR-H.
    Mr. Kahele. For the last several years Congress has supported 
``tactically responsive space launch'' as one key element of a more 
responsive and resilient space architecture. The idea is to be able to 
rapidly launch and deploy space systems on operational timelines or in 
a time of crisis, much like the other military services deploy rapid 
air, sea, and land-based combat capability; this serves as both a 
deterrent to adversary action against our space systems, and as an 
operational advantage in the event conflict extends to space. Our 
international NATO partners are leaning in on responsive space. For 
example, the Netherlands just called out responsive space in its new 
space defense strategy: the UK is looking at responsive launch 
capabilities from its soil, as are the Australians, and the Dutch. The 
Germans have stood up a ``Responsive Space Cluster Competence Center,'' 
and NATO is looking into responsive space capabilities. Meanwhile, the 
United States has talked at length about deepening our cooperation with 
partners and allies in the national security space domain.
    Dr. Karlin, how does the administration intend to enable and 
facilitate joint NATO responsive space missions leveraging allied 
investments in launch infrastructure and commercially-developed turnkey 
satellite missions?
    Dr. Karlin. The Department of Defense continues to explore and 
leverage opportunities for enhanced space cooperation with NATO Allies 
and partner nations. NATO military space operations depend on NATO 
members' sovereign military space resources, such as provision of 
satellite communications bandwidth, which NATO purchases from the 
United States and other NATO members. Although NATO does not own space 
assets, it is in the process of integrating space into its operational 
planning, where it will be able to account for the responsive launch 
capabilities and other space infrastructure of NATO members that it may 
be able to leverage.
    Mr. Kahele. Ms. Lewis, as a guardsman and the co-chair of the 
National Guard and Reserve Caucus, I am a strong advocate of the State 
Partnership Program. I spoke with the Hawaii TAG a couple weeks ago, 
and I was told that General Hokanson is envisioning a five-State 
engagement with Taiwan. Do you have an update on the status of this 
program and can you comment on the importance of creating this State 
Partnership with Taiwan?
    Ms. Lewis. We share your enthusiasm for the National Guard Bureau 
State Partnership Program (SPP). While no formal partnership exists 
between any state's National Guard component and Taiwan, the program is 
expanding upon engagements between multiple states' National Guard 
components and Taiwan's armed forces that have already proven 
successful. The lack of a formal partnership does not hinder SPP's 
ability to bring to bear unique National Guard component capabilities 
and units from all 54 state and territories. We expect the newly 
created All-Out Defense Mobilization Agency to benefit from exchanges 
with and exposure to the best selection of units and capabilities our 
citizen-soldiers and airmen can share with Taiwan.

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