[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                         [H.A.S.C. No. 117-76]

                                HEARING

                                   ON

                   NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

                          FOR FISCAL YEAR 2023

                                  AND

              OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS

                               BEFORE THE

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION
                               __________

          SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS

                                   ON

                      REVIEW DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

                     STRATEGY, POLICY, AND PROGRAMS

    FOR COUNTERING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION FOR FISCAL YEAR 2023
                               __________

                              HEARING HELD
                             APRIL 1, 2022

                                     
                 [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                               __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
                    
48-628                     WASHINGTON : 2023    



          SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS

                    RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona, Chairman

RICK LARSEN, Washington              TRENT KELLY, Mississippi
JIM COOPER, Tennessee                DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts    AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey           SAM GRAVES, Missouri
JIMMY PANETTA, California            DON BACON, Nebraska
STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida, Vice   LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
    Chair                            C. SCOTT FRANKLIN, Florida
Vacancy

                Shannon Green, Professional Staff Member
               Patrick Nevins, Professional Staff Member
                           Will Braden, Clerk

                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

              STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Gallego, Hon. Ruben, a Representative from Arizona, Chairman, 
  Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations............     1
Kelly, Hon. Trent, a Representative from Mississippi, Ranking 
  Member, Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations....     3

                               WITNESSES

Green, VADM Collin P., USN, Deputy Commander, U.S. Special 
  Operations Command.............................................     6
Plumb, John F., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy..     5
Rosenblum, Deborah G., Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
  Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs.............     3
Williams, Rhys M., Acting Director, Defense Threat Reduction 
  Agency, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and 
  Sustainment....................................................     7

                                APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

    Gallego, Hon. Ruben..........................................    25
    Green, VADM Collin P.........................................    51
    Plumb, John F................................................    37
    Rosenblum, Deborah G.........................................    27
    Williams, Rhys M.............................................    62

Documents Submitted for the Record:

    [There were no Documents submitted.]

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

    [There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

    Mr. Scott....................................................    75

                 REVIEW DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STRATEGY,

  POLICY, AND PROGRAMS FOR COUNTERING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION FOR 
                            FISCAL YEAR 2023

                              ----------                              

                  House of Representatives,
                       Committee on Armed Services,
       Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations,
                             Washington, DC, Friday, April 1, 2022.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:01 a.m., in 
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ruben Gallego 
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RUBEN GALLEGO, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
  ARIZONA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL 
                           OPERATIONS

    Mr. Gallego. Welcome to the Subcommittee on Intelligence 
and Special Operations, countering weapons of mass destruction 
FY23 [fiscal year 2023] budget hearing.
    I am going to read a mandatory statement for our digital 
participants.
    Members who are joining remotely must be visible onscreen 
for the purpose of identity verification, establishing and 
maintaining a quorum, participating in the proceeding, and 
voting. Those members must continue to use the software 
platform's video while in attendance, unless they experience 
connectivity issues or other technical problems that render 
them unable to participate on camera.
    If a member experiences technical difficulties, they should 
contact the committee staff for assistance.
    Video members' participation will be broadcast in the room 
via the television and internet feeds.
    Members participating remotely must seek recognition 
verbally, and they are asked to mute their microphones when 
they are not speaking. Members who are participating remotely 
are reminded to keep the software platform's video function on 
the entire time they attend the proceeding.
    Members may leave and rejoin the proceeding. If members 
depart for a short while for reasons other than joining a 
different proceeding, they should leave the video function on. 
If members will be absent for a significant period or depart to 
join a different proceeding, they should exit the software 
platform entirely, and then rejoin it if they return. Members 
may use the software platform's chat feature to communicate 
with staff regarding technical or logistical support issues 
only.
    Finally, I have designated a committee staff member to, if 
necessary, mute unrecognized members' microphones to cancel any 
inadvertent background noise that may disrupt the proceedings.
    Good morning. I want to thank our witnesses for joining us 
today.
    Dr. Deborah Rosenblum, Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Threats; Dr. John Plumb, 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy; Vice Admiral 
Collin Green, Deputy Commander, U.S. Special Operations 
Command; and Dr. Rhys--I apologize if I said that incorrectly--
Williams, Acting Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency. We 
appreciate your leadership and service to the Nation at this 
critical time in global security.
    The erosion of international norms regarding the use of 
chemical and biological weapons, coupled with emerging 
technology that creates the ability to weaponize synthetic 
drugs, requires us to think about weapons of mass destruction 
[WMDs] in new ways.
    While the United States is in full compliance with its 
obligations under both the Biological Weapons Convention and 
the Chemical Weapons Convention, Russia and North Korea, 
according to the Department of State's 2021 Compliance Report, 
both maintain offensive biological weapons programs, and both 
have used such weapons against political opponents with near 
impunity.
    Vladimir Putin uses WMDs and the threat of WMDs to inflict 
terror on populations, as is happening right now in Ukraine and 
Europe. Russia is promoting dangerous disinformation, which 
falsely claims that the U.S. is secretly developing biological 
weapons in a Ukrainian laboratory. This effort appears to be 
part of Putin's plan to keep the door open to employing 
Russia's own illegal biological or chemical weapons in Ukraine 
through a false-flag operation.
    Today, I am interested in our witnesses assessing how the 
fundamental changes to the security environment in Europe are 
altering how we think about and plan to deter, detect, and 
mitigate threats from WMDs, and to what extent this planning is 
reflected in DOD's budget request.
    I am also interested in hearing about the progress towards 
the destruction of the remaining stockpile of lethal chemical 
agents and munitions, as required by the Chemical Weapons 
Convention deadline, September 30th, and the congressionally 
mandated deadline of December 31st. I know the Department has 
been working tirelessly to ensure those obligations are met.
    Dr. Rosenblum and Dr. Plumb, I understand you are holding 
the first-ever biodefense posture review. I appreciate the 
critical work you are doing in this area and look forward to 
hearing how the review is proceeding.
    Finally, it is essential that we understand how all this 
connects to the budget request. I am pleased to see healthy 
increases across this portfolio, especially the Cooperative 
Threat Reduction Program which, contrary to Putin's false 
propaganda, has been instrumental in dismantling weapons of 
mass destruction, and the Chemical and Biological Defense 
Program with investments in vaccines and therapeutics.
    I look forward to the discussion, and will now recognize 
Ranking Member Kelly for his opening remarks.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Gallego can be found in the 
Appendix on page 25.]

     STATEMENT OF HON. TRENT KELLY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
 MISSISSIPPI, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND 
                       SPECIAL OPERATIONS

    Mr. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your opening 
remarks and your leadership in organizing this morning's 
posture hearing.
    Today, we will hear from four experts across the countering 
weapons of mass destruction portfolio. And I want to thank each 
of you personally for meeting with me earlier this week and in-
depth briefings, some in the SCIF [secure compartmented 
information facility], some open source. But I really 
appreciate that, and I think it will really facilitate this 
hearing.
    I am eager to get an update on the progress of the 
Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives program, especially the 
activities at the Pueblo Chemical Agent-Destruction Pilot 
Plant. This subcommittee is keenly interested in the 
certification of the Static Detonation Chamber and ensuring the 
activities stay on schedule.
    With regards to the threat environment, I look forward to 
getting an update on the capabilities of our adversaries, to 
include the usual bad actors of China, Russia, Iran, and North 
Korea, as well as the various terrorist organizations and 
networks.
    The ongoing Russian aggression in Ukraine continues to 
cause worry about the use of WMDs in the region, especially 
looking at their past history and some of the false-flag 
operations that they have conducted recently and in the past.
    Finally, I continue to be concerned about how the Biden 
administration's budget will affect our overall counter weapons 
of mass destruction preparedness. The ongoing use and threat of 
these weapons illuminate the direness of this problem. Failing 
to properly invest in these resources will have great 
consequences.
    I want to thank our witnesses in advance for their time 
today. I look forward to continuing the work with our counter 
WMD experts during the 117th Congress to ensure we are 
appropriately postured to meet and defeat the threats shaped by 
weapons of mass destruction.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Ranking Member Kelly.
    We will now hear from witnesses, then move to the question-
and-answer period.
    Dr. Rosenblum, you are now recognized.

   STATEMENT OF DEBORAH G. ROSENBLUM, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF 
 DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS

    Ms. Rosenblum. Thank you very much. Chairman Gallego, 
Ranking Member Kelly, and distinguished members of the 
subcommittee, it is truly a privilege to testify before you 
today on behalf of the Department of Defense.
    As the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, 
Chemical, and Biologic Defense Programs, I am responsible, in 
close coordination with my fellow witnesses, for ensuring that 
the United States maintains its enduring technical advantages 
when countering weapons of mass destruction.
    In recent years, our adversaries have demonstrated the 
potential for chemical and biological weapons to achieve a 
broad range of effects--from small-scale assassinations to 
large population-scale effect. These offensive tools could also 
weaken and displace defensive forces, thereby, allowing 
adversaries to seize infrastructure, territory, or achieve a 
strategic advantage against the United States and our allies.
    At the same time, different sciences and technologies are 
converging to create revolutionary capabilities with 
transformative benefits to our society, but it also opens the 
door to the potential nefarious uses. This is uniquely true for 
chemical and biological threats. For example, engineered 
biologic weapons could be designed to evade our existing 
physical and medical defenses by making subtle changes.
    As a result, our deterrent and defensive postures must 
prepare for, and respond to, a broad spectrum of biological 
threats, whether naturally occurring, accidental, or 
deliberate. We can no longer rely on a static list of 
traditional agents to develop countermeasures against. 
Furthermore, the Department cannot presume that we will be able 
to provide the warfighter advanced warning or accurate pinpoint 
biological and chemical agent detection.
    Faced with these challenges, we must change the way we do 
business by strengthening the Department's defensive 
capabilities through bolder acquisition approaches, while also 
using our inherent science and technology advantages. The 
Department seeks to modernize and strengthen the U.S. deterrent 
and defensive capabilities to ensure the joint force can fight 
and win in WMD-contested environments.
    As the Department proposes a significant increase in 
chemical and biological defense across the FYDP [Future Years 
Defense Program], I would like to share three examples of how 
the Department will seek to deliver novel capabilities for the 
warfighter.
    First, because emerging biologic threats can circumvent 
traditional concepts of detection, we need to change the 
paradigm by integrating all available sensors and data 
collection as a network of networks to identify changes within 
the environment, rather than waiting for the onset of symptoms 
in our warfighter.
    Second, we must explore the concept of defending from 
within through preventive and post-exposure medical 
countermeasures.
    Third, we are working to enhance protection, while reducing 
the burden to our warfighter, by replacing heavy, bulky, and 
extremely hot individual protective equipment with novel types 
of materials and responsive technologies to create a next-
generation protection.
    As I testify today about our adversaries' chemical weapons 
capabilities, I am proud to report we have destroyed 98 percent 
of chemical agents from the United States chemical weapon 
stockpile, and we are on track to complete the destruction of 
the entire United States legacy chemical weapons stockpile by 
the planned completion date of September 2023.
    On behalf of the Department, I would like to thank each of 
you for your continued partnership and support to strengthen 
our WMD deterrence and defensive capabilities. The threat we 
face today cannot be understated.
    I look forward to answering your questions in the later 
session. Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Rosenblum can be found in 
the Appendix on page 27.]
    Mr. Gallego. And now, we would like to hear from Dr. Plumb.

STATEMENT OF JOHN F. PLUMB, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR 
                          SPACE POLICY

    Dr. Plumb. Thank you, Chairman Gallego, Ranking Member 
Kelly, members of the subcommittee. I, too, am honored to 
testify on the Department of Defense's countering weapons of 
mass destruction efforts today.
    The Department's CWMD mission is to dissuade, deter, and, 
when necessary, defeat actors of concern who threaten or use 
weapons of mass destruction against the U.S. and our interests. 
Mission success requires the expertise and collaboration across 
many DOD [Department of Defense] components, close coordination 
within the interagency and Congress, and strong international 
alliances and partnerships.
    Today, Russia's unlawful invasion of Ukraine underscores 
the importance of the CWMD mission. In a period of just a few 
weeks, we have seen the threat of nuclear weapons use; we have 
seen attacks on Ukrainian nuclear power plants; and we have 
seen an extensive Russian disinformation campaign on chemical 
and biological weapons development in Ukraine--pure lies. That 
is most likely a troubling pretext for possible Russian use of 
these weapons themselves.
    The DOD leverages its unique tools and expertise in support 
of a whole-of-government approach to mitigate the risk of 
global WMD proliferation and adversary pursuit of these 
advancements. Examples include supporting global norms under 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; remaining postured to 
conduct WMD interdictions and preparing our partners to do so; 
and implementing U.N. [United Nations] sanctions to impede 
illicit North Korean trade.
    The Department's Cooperative Threat Reduction [CTR] 
Program, which has evolved over the past 3 decades and works 
with more than 30 partner nations, is an important and proven 
tool to reduce the risk of WMD-related threats and prevent 
proliferation across the CBRN [chemical, biological, 
radiological, and nuclear] spectrum.
    And I would like to thank Congress, and this subcommittee 
in particular, for its continued support of the CTR 
[Cooperative Threat Reduction] program. This support has paid 
dividends to the U.S. and global security for over 30 years, 
and there is more to be done. I am pleased to note that the 
President's budget request for the CTR program is $342 million 
for fiscal year 2023.
    The Department continues to strengthen the capability of 
the joint force and our allies and partners to operate in 
chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear, and 
contaminated environments. We strive for increased 
interoperability and we encourage our partners and allies to 
share the collective burden of CBRN defense.
    But CBRN defense requires resources, and that is why the 
Department is seeking $630 million across the FYDP to help 
bolster EUCOM's [U.S. European Command's] CBRN defense 
capabilities and equipment. And interestingly--and I think a 
point worth making--is this budget request originated before 
Russia invaded Ukraine, but that crisis further highlights that 
EUCOM CBRN defense is a priority and we have to address it.
    Making investments to counter a shifting threat environment 
requires sound policy, and sound policy requires an 
understanding of where things stand. So, the Department--myself 
and Assistant Secretary Rosenblum--are undertaking our first-
ever Biodefense Posture Review this year. This review will 
guide our biodefense-related activities and investments to 
support force protection, research and development, capability 
acquisition, and the required DOD expertise across the spectrum 
of biological threats.
    And this year, the Department will also begin refreshing 
our CWMD strategy. That strategy will be informed by the bio 
posture review, as well as the National Defense Strategy, the 
Secretary of Defense's guidance, and our assessment of the 
shifting threat environment.
    So, thank you again for the opportunity to testify today, 
for your continued support of the Department's CWMD mission, 
and I look forward to our discussion.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Plumb can be found in the 
Appendix on page 37.]
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you.
    I now recognize Vice Admiral Green.

STATEMENT OF VADM COLLIN P. GREEN, USN, DEPUTY COMMANDER, U.S. 
                   SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

    Admiral Green. Good morning, Chairman Gallego, Ranking 
Member Kelly, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for 
the opportunity to represent the United States Special 
Operations Command [USSOCOM] today.
    On behalf of General Clarke, it is my privilege to join Dr. 
John Plumb, Ms. Deborah Rosenblum, and Dr. Rhys Williams at 
this hearing, and look forward to discussing how we work 
together to address some of the most critical national security 
challenges facing our country, our allies, and our partners.
    Weapons of mass destruction are a complex, transregional 
problem that continues to present a direct threat to U.S. and 
allied interests and requires the application of specialized 
expertise and authorities across the whole of government. I 
welcome discussion related to USSOCOM's role as the Defense 
Department's coordinating authority for counter-WMD; the unique 
challenges we face; the work we have done against both current 
and future WMD threats; and our priorities for the coming year.
    Over the past year, in concert with our partners within the 
Department and across the interagency, we contributed to the 
development of the National Defense and National Military 
Strategies; enhanced joint force resiliency through an 
implementation of WMD-focused ready assessments; improved 
global exercise and training by incorporating realistic 
nuclear, chemical, and biological threats into scenarios; and 
improved integration and information-sharing with the 
interagency, as well as our allies and partners.
    However, as Dr. Plumb and Ms. Rosenblum said, Russia's 
unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, and the potential use of 
weapons of mass destruction, demands a sense of urgency in 
making deterrent and defensive investments. To that end, next 
year, in coordination with our partners in OSD [Office of the 
Secretary of Defense], the Joint Staff, and the interagency, we 
will continue to advance joint force readiness; produce 
actionable CWMD assessments; and make recommendations for 
improvement, where needed.
    We will ensure the Department's plans address the evolving 
WMD threats. We will continue to accelerate information-sharing 
through close coordination with the intelligence community, and 
we will coordinate CWMD equities into globally integrated 
operations, activities, and investments.
    General Clarke and I would like to thank the members of 
this subcommittee for their support of this urgent national 
security priority. It is a privilege to work together with our 
colleagues to keep our country and allies safe from the threat 
of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. We look forward 
to our continued collaboration with them, with Members of 
Congress, with our interagency and international partners, to 
ensure our safety and readiness now and into the future.
    Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Admiral Green can be found in 
the Appendix on page 51.]
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you.
    Now, we have Dr. Williams.

STATEMENT OF RHYS M. WILLIAMS, ACTING DIRECTOR, DEFENSE THREAT 
 REDUCTION AGENCY, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION 
                        AND SUSTAINMENT

    Dr. Williams. Chairman Gallego, Ranking Member Kelly, and 
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the 
invitation to testify today.
    This committee and its members have long provided 
outstanding support to the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, 
also known as DTRA. I look forward to offering you an update on 
our vital work in countering and deterring weapons of mass 
destruction and emerging threats.
    On behalf of the over 2,200 military and civilians, I am 
proud to appear today alongside Ms. Deborah Rosenblum, 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and 
Biological Defense Programs; Dr. John Plumb, Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Space Policy; and Vice Admiral Green, 
Deputy Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command.
    There are few greater challenges to U.S. national interests 
than those posed by weapons of mass destruction and emerging 
threats. DTRA takes pride in providing the technological, the 
operational, and intellectual capacity within the Department to 
meet these challenges. Our world-class workforce and 
unparalleled professional network, access, and credibility give 
us an unmatched advantage in enabling the Department of 
Defense, the U.S. Government, and international partners to 
detect, deter, and defeat weapons of mass destruction and 
emerging threats in all theaters.
    As both a defense agency and a combat support agency, and 
the principal counter weapons of mass destruction organization 
within the Defense Department, we serve as the linchpin between 
the Department's counter-WMD strategies and its practitioners. 
Through Ms. Rosenblum and Dr. Plumb, and their subordinate 
components, the agency receives guidance, priorities, and 
oversight in the areas of nuclear matters, chemical and 
biological defense, threat reduction, and arms control.
    At the same time, we support U.S. Special Operations 
Command role as the coordinating authority for counter weapons 
of mass destruction and work very closely with Vice Admiral 
Green's staff, as well as those of the other combatant 
commands--providing strategic, operational, and tactical 
planning and expertise, as well as embedded support of material 
and non-material counter weapons of mass destruction solutions.
    These dual roles provide a synergy that is key to the 
successful execution of our counter-WMD mission that supports 
the National Defense Strategy's vision of integrated 
deterrence. The work that we plan, program, and execute on 
behalf of the Department and its stakeholders ensures a safe, 
secure, reliable, and effective nuclear deterrent; enables the 
joint force allies and partners to compete and win against 
adversaries. The National Defense Strategy highlights both of 
these lines of effort, as key enablers for integrated 
deterrence.
    DTRA is postured and ready to support Secretary Austin's 
goal of developing, combining, and coordinating the 
Department's strengths to maximum effect. In pursuit of this 
goal, we play a key role across the counter-WMD community.
    So, on behalf of DTRA's dedicated workforce, I thank you 
for your continued support of our critical work in safeguarding 
the lives and the interests of the United States, our allies, 
and our partners abroad.
    Thank you for your time today and the invitation to 
participate. And I look forward to your questions. Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Williams can be found in the 
Appendix on page 62.]
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you.
    And I apologize for the construction. I am assuming it is 
contractors and not the Russians trying to drill in to listen 
to what is happening here.
    We are going to move to our question period.
    Dr. Rosenblum, we can start with you, and then move to 
anyone else who would like to comment.
    Russia's misinformation-disinformation campaigns touch on 
all three main categories of WMD--biological, chemical, and 
nuclear. How do we frame our efforts in ways that account for 
the likelihood that Russia will probably continue this 
behavior?
    Ms. Rosenblum. Thank you, Chairman, for that question.
    The Department remains very concerned about the ability to 
get accurate and transparent information out to the U.S. 
public, as well as, certainly, our allies and the rest of the 
world. So, one of the things that the Department has been 
doing--and this is particularly related to the public health 
laboratories in Ukraine that is being, tragically, used by the 
Russians as a potential for a false-flag operation--from the 
White House on down to the Department of Defense, as well as 
Department of State, as well as all of the vehicles that we 
have to be able to communicate accurate information out about 
this, and the work that has been underway, I can say to you, 
unequivocally, there are no offensive biologic weapons in the 
Ukraine laboratories that the United States has been involved 
with.
    Mr. Gallego. Without a doubt.
    Anyone else want to take the question or a crack at that?
    [No response.]
    Moving on then, Dr. Williams, the Cooperative Threat 
Reduction Program has unique authorities, like commingling 
funds from other nations for urgent threat reduction needs. Is 
CTR exercising these authorities actively? And can you share 
any recent examples?
    Dr. Williams. Thank you for that question, sir.
    Yes, sir, as you noted, the Cooperative Threat Reduction 
Program does have unique authorities within title 50, 
specifically. We do commingle funds that come in from other 
organizations. As a matter of fact, a recent amount of funding 
has come in from the United Kingdom for work in these 
particular areas.
    We have a very active program, as was said earlier, in over 
30 countries. Last year alone, we had 70 engagements across the 
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, across all areas of 
responsibility in the combatant commands, closely coordinated, 
obviously, with Dr. Plumb and his office, where we receive 
those policy determinations on where to work within the agency.
    So, sir, it is a very active program, and it is one that, 
as Dr. Plumb said, has paid incredible dividends over the 30 
years that we have been working with this program. As a matter 
of fact, this year, we celebrated the 30th anniversary. It was 
a major milestone for the program.
    Thank you for the question, sir.
    Mr. Gallego. And to follow up, DTRA is focused on 
countering and deterring weapons of mass destruction. I am 
interested in hearing about the more advanced capabilities in 
countering and detecting chemical and biological threats, and 
specifically, actions you have taken to support what is 
happening in Ukraine. And obviously, if some of that has to 
stay during the classified briefing, we can do that, but 
anything that can be shared publicly would also be good to 
know.
    Dr. Williams. Thank you. Thank you for that question, sir.
    The agency is the science and technology portion of the 
Chemical and Biological Defense Program. It is operated under 
Ms. Rosenblum's authorities, as the Assistant Secretary for 
Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense.
    We work very closely, also, with the Army's Joint Program 
Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense to provide 
cutting-edge capabilities for the joint force, as well as in 
close coordination with our partners and allies as well--
everything from leading-edge detectors, capabilities to weave 
together new data in new ways. As Ms. Rosenblum said, data is a 
place where we can spend a considerable amount of time in terms 
of activities.
    And in terms of our activities in support of U.S. European 
Command, sir, in terms of those activities, we have had almost 
200 requests for support from not only European Command, but 
across the DOD and interagency.
    Sir, as you know, we run the 24/7/365 technical reachback 
capability that does modeling across the chem-bio-nuclear 
spectrum. And because of that, we have been asked questions 
that range from, if something was to happen to a Ukrainian 
nuclear power plant, where would the plume go, and across the 
board. It is something we actively are monitoring now, sir, and 
I am happy to answer a few more specifics in the closed 
session.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Doctor.
    I now yield to Ranking Member Kelly.
    Mr. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And as the Department balances the shift in resources 
between counter-VEO [violent extremist organizations] and great 
power competition, what are the most significant capability or 
resource and vulnerabilities to the countering weapons of mass 
destruction mission? Any of you all can take that, and if 
anybody needs to follow, you can.
    Admiral Green. Yes, Congressman, thank you for the 
question.
    So, as the coordinating authority, USSOCOM establishes a 
collaborative fora to understand the threat, identify gaps, and 
make recommendations. So, to your point, I think, much like any 
state or non-state actor, these pathways, understanding the 
pathways and understanding what runs through them, whether it 
is transnational organized crime, counterterrorism, or CWMD, I 
think we have got to collectively leverage our access and 
placement, our authorities, across the interagency, as well as 
DOD, but, more importantly, our allies and partners, to 
understand the threat left of bang.
    So, I think we are doing that well with regard to how we 
understand the threat. I would also say that the Secretary, 
rightfully, directed that we integrate CWMD into planning, 
resourcing, modernizing, and then, more importantly, training 
and exercising holistically. It is not just about money; it is 
about the holistic effort to get after it.
    Mr. Kelly. And I am just hoping to follow up. If there are 
any gaps or vulnerabilities in either resources or funding, I 
hope that you all--and I understand we probably can't answer 
that.
    And I think, Dr. Rosenblum, you were going to say 
something.
    Ms. Rosenblum. Yes, thank you very much, Ranking Member.
    What I was going to add--and I think we can get into much 
greater detail on the classified side of it--but, from looking 
at closing the gaps that we have across the WMD spectrum and 
the investments, the main thing that we are pivoting from is 
concerns that it would be a non-state actor who would be using 
those to, then, really looking at state-based threats and the 
depth of the science and technology that they have available to 
them. And we can get into greater detail in terms of the 
specificity, but that is a dramatic pivot from a threat 
perspective.
    Mr. Kelly. Thank you.
    And then, in the PB submissions, the Presidential budget 
submissions for FY21 and '22, the Department drastically cut 
funds to the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. Each time, 
Congress has reinstated this fund. Why is it important, Dr. 
Rosenblum, to fully fund this program?
    Ms. Rosenblum. The Cooperative Threat Program provides and 
plays a critical role in ensuring that our allies and partners, 
who we will operate on any kind of joint battlefield, has 
capabilities that are commensurate with those of the United 
States, so that we can work with them seamlessly. And that goes 
kind of a range of gamuts of things that we are doing 
throughout the world. But that is fundamentally the key purpose 
of that program and why it remains so vital to us.
    And as my colleague, Dr. Plumb--and I will ask him to 
elaborate on this--mentioned, that in the FY23 request, that 
there is a significant increase in that, as the administration 
recognizes the importance of this program.
    Mr. Kelly. Thank you, and you answered my question. I just 
want to make sure we understand the importance of fully funding 
that, and even the increase.
    Given the increased use of chemical weapons in Syria and 
the asymmetric use of nerve agents by North Korea and Russia, 
what can we do to deter further use of chemical or biological 
weapons? What are we doing to ensure that the international 
norms against the use of these weapons is not eroded? And what 
can we do to develop new standards to deal with the emerging 
chemical and biological threats? And that is for any of you.
    Dr. Plumb. Thanks, Congressman Kelly. It is an important 
question.
    And I think the crisis in Ukraine and the blatant threats, 
really, by Russia of potential use of chemical and biological 
weapons, is opening everyone's eyes to how much of a problem 
this is. The deterrence issue is a challenge for this 
administration. I think the fact that the White House has used 
the megaphone of the United States of America to call this out 
is an important deterrent, right?
    I think we have been able to--and it is not just the 
administration side; it is working with the Congress, too--
rally the entire NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] 
alliance to kind of align against this, is useful. There is 
always this question of who, at least in the case of Russia, 
who is Putin really trying to communicate to? If he is trying 
to communicate with us, that is one thing. If he is trying to 
communicate with his own people, that is a different problem. 
So, we have this communication conflict that we really need to 
work on.
    On a readiness side, there is some argument to be made that 
better readiness and better training, as the admiral spoke to, 
helps deter. I don't personally believe it is--you know it is 
necessary, but not sufficient. But the more ready we are to 
engage in a zone like that, then perhaps the higher the 
threshold is for its use.
    Mr. Kelly. And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Gallego. Representative Larsen.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    I have several questions that I know are going to have to 
be answered later. But I will ask them anyway to use my 5 
minutes, you know, because maybe there is a clue.
    First off, for Admiral, as we look at strategic competition 
and this issue of WMD, and the role of SOF [special operations 
forces], are there specific areas where your coordinating 
authorities are needing to change or are there specific roles 
that you are seeking to change within the special operations 
community to meet that strategic competition WMD response?
    Admiral Green. Yes, thanks for the question.
    You know, I think this is a wake-up call with regard to 
CWMD, much like CT [counterterrorism] was. So, I think the 
coordinating authority and the work that we have done here with 
my colleagues to recognize this threat, to plan for it, like I 
said, to modernize, and then, to train and exercise, frankly, 
you know, it is a holistic approach.
    But, from a special operations perspective, we bring 
capabilities to understand that threat, but so do the 
interagency, so do our allies and partners. So, I think it is 
all-hands-on-deck type of approach to understand this threat. 
It is a whole-of-population, it is a whole-of-government. I 
know those are cliches, but I really believe that this threat 
is serious enough, and I think this fora with the coordinating 
authority has brought recognition to it. And with money and, 
again, those other facets of how you get after it are critical.
    But I do believe special operations provides unique 
capabilities, but it can't be only a military understanding 
piece. There is a role for, again, allies and partners.
    Mr. Larsen. Yes. Well, on that point--and this might be for 
later--but, for any of you, what role will U.S. forces play in 
NATO's recent CBRN defense element that was activated in EUCOM? 
Can anyone answer that here? Okay, I will ask Dr. Rosenblum.
    I am sorry, I am making a mistake of 22 years; I know I 
have to ask a specific question to a specific----
    Ms. Rosenblum. No, no, no, absolutely. I would like to take 
that one for the record to get back to you.
    Mr. Larsen. Okay. Can you get back to me by noon?
    [Laughter.]
    Ms. Rosenblum. Sure.
    [Laughter.]
    Mr. Larsen. Okay. Got it.
    Oh, yes, Dr. Plumb, I am on the Aviation Subcommittee as 
well. And so, we are tangentially involved in this discussion 
about debris management, because we regulate the airspace from 
the ground until a rocket gets to space, and then, it gets into 
space.
    And I noted in your preparation, I think in your 
confirmation hearing, you had some discussion with the SASC 
[Senate Armed Services Committee] about the traffic debris 
management issue. Can you update us on where that is now? And 
is it a drag, right, because it is not resolved yet?
    Dr. Plumb. So, thanks, Congressman.
    In the SASC hearing on that, I was asked about the Office 
of Space Commerce and the need to--so, this is outside of FAA 
[Federal Aviation Administration]. This is actually a Commerce 
piece. Obviously, FAA has it on the way up and down----
    Mr. Larsen. Right.
    Dr. Plumb [continuing]. Which is also important.
    But the budget request is on the order of, I think, I want 
to say somewhere around $85 to $88 million, which is the right 
number. I had confirmed that since. So, I think that funding 
Office [of] Space Commerce at the right amount is going to give 
them that chance to get up-to-speed. Because you really have to 
fund not just an office, but you have got to get folks trained. 
You have got to get the software going. And so, there is, I 
think, a 3-year plan to kind of get it up and running. And I 
think we are where we need to be, which was not true last year. 
So, I think this is a good-news story.
    Mr. Larsen. Okay. And that is good to know. Again, as you 
said, what goes up does, in fact, sometimes come down.
    Dr. Plumb. Very often.
    Mr. Larsen. And the FAA needs to clear the airspace if it 
is coming down in places that----
    Dr. Plumb. Yes, and I think, just to pull on that for a 
second, I do know there is more work to be done on that as 
well. And I think there is some regulation space for that that 
we could talk about offline, if you would like.
    Mr. Larsen [presiding]. Yes, sure. Okay. Great.
    I am going to end there, and I will yield back the 
remainder of my time, and call on Mr. Scott, recognize Mr. 
Scott. He is off? Then, who would be next on that other side?
    Representative Bacon for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Bacon. It is always good to be ready. Thank you, Mr. 
Chair.
    And thanks to all four of you for being here today.
    I have five questions. So, if I can't get through them, I 
hope I can get something on the second round here.
    But my first question is for Honorable Ms. Rosenblum. How 
would you say our strategy or doctrine has to change with two 
near-peer powers with nuclear weapons? We are used to one major 
power. Now we are headed in the direction of two. How do you 
see this changing our doctrine or strategy?
    Ms. Rosenblum. So, on that question, Mr. Congressman, I 
would like to take that more in the classified section.
    Mr. Bacon. Okay.
    Ms. Rosenblum. There is something that the nuclear posture 
review that I know has been released to Congress on a 
classified basis goes into that. I am happy to answer that 
question on that.
    But it certainly is something publicly that we have spoken 
about that is going to require the level of refinement and 
change to the strategy and to the doctrine----
    Mr. Bacon. Yes.
    Ms. Rosenblum [continuing]. Because the rate of 
escalation--sorry. The rate at which the Chinese are moving 
ahead with the modernization of their nuclear program is 
dramatic and unprecedented, and particularly across all legs of 
the triad, and will require a rethinking on that.
    Mr. Bacon. Instead of playing a two-person chess game, now 
we have three people playing chess on the same board.
    Ms. Rosenblum. Understood.
    Mr. Bacon. So, it changes it.
    Dr. Williams, a quick question for you. How would have 
having the Open Skies aircraft made an impact to DTRA and to 
our U.S. military leading up to Ukraine and after?
    Dr. Williams. Sir, I would say that the Open Skies process 
was one that was useful for the U.S. That said, obviously, the 
administration made the determination to end that. DTRA was the 
execution agency for the Open Skies mission, sir, and we are 
following the administration's priorities.
    Mr. Bacon. Understood. But would it have provided some 
useful information leading up to the invasion of Ukraine?
    Dr. Williams. I would just say, sir, all information is 
useful.
    Mr. Bacon. Thank you.
    It would be my position that it cost us not having this 
airframe leading up to the invasion, and I think we could have 
used it after the invasion as well.
    Back to Ms. Rosenblum, would you say the administration is 
fully committed to a full recap of the triad?
    Ms. Rosenblum. Yes, Mr. Congressman, I can answer that in 
open session. It is absolutely committed to the 
recapitalization of the triad, as well as the nuclear command 
and control that goes with that, along with the Department of 
Energy infrastructure and all of their facilities that are 
required to make all of the warheads associated with the 
modernization.
    Mr. Bacon. That is great news, and I think you will have 
bipartisan support on that.
    I heard this week from a COCOM [combatant command] 
commander saying there was a need for low-yield nuclear 
weapons, or that it gave the commanders more options. As you 
know, Russia has invested heavily in this area and they have 
the escalate to de-escalate strategy. What is the 
administration's position on low-yield nuclear weapons?
    Dr. Plumb. If it is all right, Congressman, I will take 
that.
    Mr. Bacon. Sure.
    Dr. Plumb. So, first of all, I am aware of the comments you 
are referencing. I will say the W76----
    Mr. Larsen. If you could just get closer to the microphone?
    Dr. Plumb. I am sorry, is that better, Congressman?
    Mr. Bacon. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Larsen. Yes, thanks.
    Dr. Plumb. Okay. The W76-2, which is a low-yield warhead 
for a submarine-launched ballistic missile, remains deployed. 
So, that program continues. And so, from a deterrence 
standpoint of the ability to posture with a low-yield weapon, I 
think that covers that particular question. Of course, cards on 
the table, the SLCM-N, the submarine-launched cruise missile, 
which would be a tactical nuclear weapon by definition, that 
has been zeroed-out. And I think reasonable people can disagree 
if this is a thing that we should continue or not. But the 
modernization of the entire triad is firmly cemented in the 
budget and the NPR [Nuclear Posture Review], and the 
continuation of the W76-2 as well.
    Mr. Bacon. Thank you.
    I will just close with a comment. It was something I had 
the honor of talking about yesterday.
    We started about a 2-year process to do a surge capacity 
for pandemic bioweapons, have the surge capacity in the United 
States. And the military, or the DOD, in partnership with 
Health and Human Services, picked five sites, Omaha being one. 
It would be my request that the Department continue to fund 
this, put it in their budget request. The community is looking 
forward to partnering with DOD and HHS [U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services] on this effort.
    And with that, I yield back. Thank you.
    Mr. Gallego [presiding]. Representative Sherrill.
    Ms. Sherrill. Thank you.
    As the coordinating authority, Admiral Green, what 
recommendations are you providing to the Secretary of Defense 
regarding best modernizing the Department's ability to prepare 
and respond to the current threat, given Russia's previous use 
of chemical weapons in Syria and the threat of chemical weapons 
use and biological weapons use in Ukraine?
    Admiral Green. Yes, thanks, Congresswoman, for the 
question.
    So, my boss submits an annual assessment to the SECDEF 
[Secretary of Defense] through the Chairman. And the two things 
that he cited were we need to aggressively increase our 
capability and capacity to counter WMD, and that we needed to 
prevent the strategic surprise, which was to focus 
cooperatively on understanding the intel threat.
    But, with regard to modernization, I think we have got to 
leverage the authorities that you gave us, the Small Business 
Innovation Research, other transactional authorities, and 
middle-tier acquisition, to get after and partner with industry 
on things that can improve and modernize not only personal 
protective equipment, but detection and monitoring. And I 
think, as Ms. Rosenblum mentioned, we are getting after that. 
But I do believe we need to address that; we need to leverage 
those authorities a little bit more aggressively, and again, 
partner with industry on how we increase capability and 
capacity.
    Ms. Sherrill. Thank you.
    And we spoke briefly about the CWMD senior leader seminars 
[SLS] that you are conducting with combatant commanders and, 
also, about the effectiveness of such seminars with preparing 
combatant commanders to address WMD threats from great power 
competitors in each theater. Are there common significant gaps 
that these seminars have identified across multiple combatant 
commands? And in your opinion, how can the Department modernize 
its WMD threat posture, and what steps can Congress take to 
move these modernization efforts along?
    Admiral Green. Yes, thanks for that question.
    And I think the most significant thing that this panel did 
in the last year is these senior leader seminars. We had one 
for EUCOM in February of 2021, and we just had one for 
INDOPACOM [U.S. Indo-Pacific Command] with Admiral Aquilino. 
And they were well attended by my colleagues here, as well as 
the interagency and our partners and allies.
    And I think that the key piece of those senior leader 
seminars was it war-gamed the vulnerabilities that we may have 
with regard to our plans, our resourcing, and frankly, again, 
our training and exercises. So, I think those were an 
invaluable product of these stakeholders here that you have 
before you today. And we will continue to do those.
    Specifically, the EUCOM one was done a year ago. And 
fortuitously, that has prepared us better for what we are 
dealing with today currently. And EUCOM implemented an 
implementation plan to get after some of the things that they 
needed to do, that they did do from then to now, with regard to 
those broader five things that I talked about that make us 
better postured today.
    But the SLS is a great venue that the coordinating 
authority, and again, my panel members, have implemented.
    Thank you.
    Ms. Sherrill. Thank you, and I look forward to getting into 
some more details in the closed session.
    With that, I yield back.
    Mr. Gallego. Representative Franklin.
    Mr. Franklin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And I appreciate our witnesses being here today.
    As a former naval aviator that spent more time than I care 
to remember in MOPP [mission oriented protective posture] gear, 
and now here in Congress reading about the threat and 
understanding how significant it is, I used to always--the 
value in those exercises to me was just praying to God that it 
never happened. But you all don't have that luxury. You have 
got to deal with it, and it is a very real threat that I fear 
too often is back-burnered. It doesn't get the attention it 
needs. And I know that is not the only things that you have on 
your plates, but it is vitally important. And if it ever 
happens, it will probably be one of the worst things that has 
ever happened to the United States.
    But I do have a couple of questions. And, Admiral Green, 
you and I have had some conversations about the authorities and 
helping me understand how all of this shakes out, because it is 
a very complex problem set.
    But I understand SOCOM's coordinating authority on the 
front end. I am curious, though, who would be the coordinating 
authority in an actual event after the fact?
    Admiral Green. Well, the coordinating authority does not 
command; it doesn't convene. It recommends.
    Mr. Franklin. I understand. On your end, it is preparation 
of coordinating the operational plans. It is helping with the 
strategies. But if all that fails and we find ourselves with an 
actual event, who is, then, responsible? Because it seems very 
complex to me as to who takes charge then.
    Admiral Green. Yes, I would say simply it is the combatant 
commanders. I mean, they execute the campaigning day-in and 
day-out, and they own the contingency plans and the OPLANs 
[operations plans]. As we speak, General Wolters owns the EUCOM 
AOR [area of responsibility].
    So, this venue, the coordinating authority simply tries to 
support an understanding of the threat, identifying resourcing 
gaps, and then making recommendations across policy and force 
provider issues. But, ultimately, it is the combatant 
commanders.
    Mr. Franklin. Right. So, if we had a contaminated 
environment, obviously the COCOM is going to have to execute 
the battle plan and keep going forward, but how do we go 
about--who coordinates the mitigation efforts to allow them to 
continue to move forward? And whoever might want to answer 
that. It is just I have a hard time understanding how it 
unfolds after the fact.
    Ms. Rosenblum. So, that would be done, actually, on the 
ground operationally, but by the joint force right there. So, 
if you were to have a contaminated environment on, say, a 
logistics or a flow-through base that the United States or its 
allies were using, and were they to be contaminated, the forces 
immediately there on the base would be dealing with the--excuse 
me--to decontaminate--I apologize--that area and the equipment, 
in order for the force to be able to continue to proceed with 
its mission.
    Mr. Franklin. Okay. We saw with great success, I think, 
during this COVID [coronavirus disease] pandemic, with 
Operation Warp Speed, what DOD, in collaboration with DHS 
[Department of Homeland Security], has been able to do. I am 
interested to know what lessons we have learned from that; how 
we are going to perpetuate that going forward, so that we can 
be prepared for future things.
    And then, also, as we deal with adversaries like Russia and 
China, where the companies are either state-owned, or at least 
sponsored, and there is that collaborative effort just by 
design of how their governments function, they are working 
together in a lot of cross-purpose-type technologies. How are 
we, and how could we better, work with not only our other 
government agencies, like DHS, but on the civilian side with 
our pharmaceutical companies, with our biomedical research? 
What are we doing to get better at that?
    Dr. Plumb. Thanks, Congressman.
    On the first part of your question about how the pandemic 
has given us some lessons learned, I think on the highest level 
the takeaway is the Department can't afford to think about 
biothreats as a nation-state battlefield weapon, and has to 
include pandemic preparedness, as well as specific agent design 
preparedness. And so, the bio posture review that we are 
undertaking, Biodefense Posture Review, is looking at this from 
a whole spectrum, to include that part. And I think that is a 
big lesson that we have all--I don't know if it is learned or 
relearned.
    Ms. Rosenblum. Yes, what I would just add to that, 
Congressman, is on the research, development, and acquisition 
side, one of the things that we are beginning to pivot away 
from is the focus on a singular agent, but, rather, the reality 
is that we are going to have to have more broad-spectrum kinds 
of both drugs as well as vaccines. And our continuous 
consultation, certainly, with the pharmaceutical industry is 
helping us with that. And I can go into further detail in the 
closed session as well.
    Mr. Franklin. Right. Thank you. And I yield back.
    Mr. Gallego. Representative Murphy.
    Mrs. Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And thank you to everyone for being here with us. I look 
forward to the closed session as well.
    But I will just start with Admiral Green. Can you talk a 
little bit about how you are leveraging American innovation and 
small businesses to help assist in the mission of countering 
weapons of mass destruction? And what particular tools have 
enabled you to leverage that innovation and work with small 
businesses?
    Admiral Green. Yes, thanks for the question, and thanks for 
the conversation in your office.
    I mentioned we have leveraged those authorities, I think, 
more effectively in the CT world, in the counterterrorism 
world. And they are there, and we need to aggressively work 
with industry and leverage those authorities when it comes to 
this problem set.
    I would say that we have done some work with personal 
protective equipment that I can get into more detail in the 
classified session, but that is one example of where I think we 
have worked with industry to increase our capability and to 
harden our operators.
    I think Ms. Rosenblum--I think another area where I think 
it has a lot of promise is we have had an outside-in approach 
to protecting the operator--and I think she mentioned a little 
bit of an inside-out where we can protect with proven and 
tested pharmaceuticals to protect the operator. But I think 
those are areas where we can advance as well.
    But I acknowledge that we have got to get a little bit more 
aggressive with the authorities that you have given us and to 
seek modernization in partnership with industry.
    Ms. Rosenblum. If I may, Congresswoman, just to add that, 
working with small business is a very high priority for the 
administration, and we are very aware of the barriers to entry 
that that presents. And this is an area that we are trying to 
focus on, what the demand signal is from the Department, better 
understood by small business, and ways to more effectively 
integrate them into the advances that we are making to 
modernize against the whole WMD landscape.
    Mrs. Murphy. Great. Thank you for that.
    You know, Admiral Green, I know that pathway defeat or 
collecting intelligence on the supply chains used to develop 
the new WMDs is a critical part of SOCOM's CWMD mission. Are 
the ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] 
capabilities you need for successful pathway defeat sufficient? 
Are there specific deficits that we could address? And do you 
have the authorities you need to collect the necessary 
intelligence to complete your mission?
    Admiral Green. Yes, again, thanks for that question, and I 
appreciate the dialog I had in your office, because I have 
thought about it since we had that discussion.
    I think there is never enough ISR, but I think we have got 
to look at ISR, and my boss, frankly, he is looking at next-
generation ISR and it involves open-source data, space, and 
cyber. And we may need to move away from reluctance on iron in 
airframes. But I think we have got to get creative.
    But I also think our allies and partners, you know, they 
need to harden themselves, and us included, with regard to 
research that our near-peer competitors do, whether it is 
intellectual rights or whether it is supply chains. So, I think 
ISR is a broad term, but I think we all play a part, and our 
allies and partners really can help with that.
    And we had a Five Eyes session in the last SLS which was 
extremely productive to listen to their thoughts and how we may 
be able to share intelligence better with them, so that we have 
a global look at this.
    Mrs. Murphy. And maybe, Ms. Rosenblum, you can follow up on 
that and talk a little bit about how you are coordinating with 
allies and partners on both understanding and countering WMD 
threats.
    Ms. Rosenblum. Yes, thank you very much, Congresswoman, for 
that followup.
    In the research, development, and acquisition area, we have 
a number of bilateral working groups that we have, particularly 
with the Canadians, the U.K. [United Kingdom], as well as 
Australia, to not only understand where they are with their 
science and technology, and as well as advanced development 
programs, but also where some of their areas of concern are, so 
that we are able to address that from a procurement, materiel, 
medical countermeasures approach.
    Mrs. Murphy. Thank you very much, and I yield back.
    Mr. Gallego. Representative Lamborn.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Secretary Rosenblum, I am going to ask you in a minute 
about the Wuhan Virological Institute in China. But, first, let 
me quote three sentences from your written statement.
    ``The Department of State's April 2021 Compliance Report 
voiced grave concerns about China, Iran, North Korea, and 
Russia's compliance with the Biological Weapons and Toxins 
Convention. The report assessed that both North Korea and 
Russia have offensive biological weapons programs. 
Additionally, the activities of China and Iran raise concerns 
about compliance. Chinese publications have described biology 
and biotechnology as a new domain of warfare and cite the 
aspiration to make China the world leader in genetic 
engineering, precision medicine, and brain sciences, among 
other scientific disciplines.''
    So, we have heard so much from different directions about 
the Wuhan Virological Institute. Was that any part of the 
Chinese effort, as you quote, to become preeminent in what they 
view as a possible new domain of warfare, biology and 
biotechnology?
    Ms. Rosenblum. Yes, thank you very much, Congressman, for 
that question.
    My statement was oriented on their approach much more 
broadly than what they may or may not be doing in Wuhan 
Institute. They have a premier biotechnology economy that they 
are continuing to grow openly and commercially with investments 
both in the United States as well as globally. So, my comments 
were not restricted just to what may or may not be going on in 
Wuhan.
    Mr. Lamborn. Okay. To drill down on that just a little bit 
more, though, I have heard reports that they were engaged in 
gain-of-function research, which, to me, I don't see any good 
that can come out of that. It takes viruses and makes them more 
transmissible or more deadly. Do you have any view or comment 
on that?
    Ms. Rosenblum. You know, with respect to whether gain-of-
function research, which I am, in general, very familiar with 
in terms of its role in vaccines, related to Wuhan, I would 
want to take that as a question for the record.
    One other thing that I would like to explore is that there 
have been some concerns or questions about whether DTRA funding 
or other funding at the Department of Defense was used in 
support of the Wuhan Institute. And we took a hard look at 
that, and to my knowledge, there was no DOD funding provided to 
Wuhan Institute.
    Mr. Lamborn. Okay. I am glad to clarify that.
    And lastly, are you involved in any other research 
concerning the possible connection of the origins of COVID to 
the Wuhan Virological Institute?
    Ms. Rosenblum. I am not.
    Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Admiral Green, I would like to ask you a 
question on a different subject. As you know, the 
administration has decided to cancel and defund the nuclear 
capabilities, including the SLCM-N and the B83. Do you agree 
with that decision? Do you think that that was in accordance 
with your best military advice?
    Admiral Green. I will ask one of my colleagues to 
potentially comment on that. I am not familiar. I can take it 
for the record.
    Mr. Lamborn. Okay. I guess, in SOCOM, maybe that wasn't 
your--I mean, these are Navy; one of those was a Navy program, 
but I thought, with your SOCOM role, you may or may not have 
familiarity with that.
    So, with that, given the fact that you have said that, I 
won't pursue any more on that issue.
    And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Gallego. Well, thank you very much.
    Votes are about to be called right now, or at least in the 
next 10 minutes. So, what I propose, unless there are any other 
questions, is that we close this formal session, and then, we 
restart in the classified session after votes are called.
    Thanks then. Thank you, and thank you to the witnesses.
    [Whereupon, at 10:59 a.m., the subcommittee proceeded in 
closed session.]



      
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                            A P P E N D I X

                             April 1, 2022

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              PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                             April 1, 2022

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              QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                             April 1, 2022

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                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT

    Mr. Scott. Should fentanyl be considered a weapon of mass 
destruction?
    Ms. Rosenblum. As the senior advisor and technical expert to the 
Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense for chemical and biological 
defense, my job is to provide the capabilities to ensure the Joint 
Service can deter or fight and win in a chemical or biologically-
contaminated environment. The Department of Defense (DOD) considers 
pharmaceuticals such as fentanyl and its derivatives to be therapeutic 
drugs with legitimate medical uses when prescribed appropriately by 
medical authorities. However, an actor's misuse of a pharmaceutical 
chemical to threaten the lives and well-being of groups of humans is 
what makes fentanyl and other pharmaceutical-based agents (PBAs) a 
potential chemical weapons concern and a concern that DOD takes very 
seriously. The chemicals themselves are not inherently weapons of mass 
destruction, but actors can use them in ways that make them a chemical 
weapon. Regardless of whether it's considered a weapon of mass 
destruction or not, DOD is working to ensure the Joint Force can fight 
and win should a PBA be used near or against U.S. service members. To 
do so, the Department is committed to providing an integrated and 
layered defensive system that includes the understand, protect, and 
mitigate portfolios. The DOD Chemical and Biological Defense Program 
(CBDP) program is working to better understand the PBA threat and DOD's 
ability to detect and mitigate PBA usage. The program is incorporating 
PBA-detection algorithms into detectors such as the Aerosol & Vapor 
Chemical Agent Detector, a man-portable system. Our PBA medical program 
includes evaluating FDA-approved drugs for operational use and 
developing novel medical countermeasures (MCMs) to enhance the 
protection and/or operational utility for the Warfighter. The Rapid 
Opioid Countermeasure System (ROCS) is a higher concentration Naloxone 
formulation DOD developed for use in an autoinjector. This will allow 
warfighters with no medical expertise to self-administer Naloxone if 
they are exposed to fentanyl or other PBAs that can be treated with 
Naloxone. In February 28, 2022, the FDA-approved the ROCS autoinjector 
and they were subsequently deployed to U.S. forces as part of the 
response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
    Mr. Scott. Should fentanyl be considered a weapon of mass 
destruction?
    Dr. Plumb. DOD considers pharmaceuticals such as fentanyl and its 
derivatives to be therapeutic drugs, which if prescribed appropriately 
by medical authorities have legitimate medical uses. However, 
pharmaceuticals could be weaponized and developed into a 
pharmaceutical-based agent (PBA), which the Department of Defense (DOD) 
takes seriously. There is concern that certain foreign governments are 
pursuing so-called incapacitating agents under the guise of riot 
control agents or medical research. We believe such activities 
undermine the international norm against chemical weapons use, and DOD 
supports efforts, such as those at the Organization for the Prohibition 
of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), to create practical and normative barriers 
to impede the emergence of future threats.
    Mr. Scott. Should fentanyl be considered a weapon of mass 
destruction?
    Admiral Green. Fentanyl and its analogues are legitimate 
pharmaceuticals which if prescribed appropriately by medical 
authorities have legitimate medical uses. The Conference of States 
Parties of the CWC recently passed a decision that found that the 
aerosolized use of Central Nervous System Acting Chemicals (CNSACs), 
which would include chemicals such as fentanyl, was found inconsistent 
with the law enforcement exemption as a purpose not prohibited under 
the CWC. This means a majority of CWC-signatory nations now acknowledge 
that fentanyl and other CNSACs have properties that are dangerous when 
used outside a medical environment. They are also different than 
traditional riot control agents (RCAs)--with some having toxicities 
comparable to lethal nerve agents. DOD is concerned certain nation-
state adversaries are pursuing PBAs as part of their offensive chemical 
warfare programs. The DOD requires preparedness to defend against any 
form of chemical weapon, regardless of toxicity, being developed, 
stockpiled, or used in a way intended to cause harm to humans, which 
can include fentanyls. Additionally, the DOD notes any explicit 
designation of fentanyl as a WMD has implications for numerous other 
U.S. Government agencies given fentanyl's use as both a legitimate 
pharmaceutical and illicit drug, and encourages consideration of these 
implications in any policy decisions.
    Mr. Scott. Is far forward, rapid, portable infection detection' a 
priority for our warfighters? If so, what resources are needed to 
accelerate this important program?
    Dr. Williams. DTRA engages in efforts to develop far forward, 
rapid, and portable infection diagnostic systems through executing the 
funding and mission for the Chemical and Biological Defense Program 
(CBDP) Science and Technology efforts. Through the CBDP science and 
technology funds, DTRA is investing in transformative wearable 
technologies to monitor and assess physiological changes within the 
Joint Force. Quickly identifying if a warfighter has been infected by a 
known or unknown biological hazard greatly enhances our ability to 
rapidly provide tailored medical countermeasures to prevent or reduce 
the onset of physiological effects as well as alert other forces to 
avoid or decontaminate the location where a hazard has been detected. 
As the science advances, we gain a more nuanced understanding of how 
physiological markers are changed by diseases and exposure to 
biological hazards. Wearable technologies could both alert when a 
biological hazard exists in the environment and identify if a service 
member has become infected up to 48 hours prior to the onset of 
symptoms. This type of early infection-warning system offers the 
warfighter a distinct advantage. These wearable technologies would also 
unencumber the warfighter by reducing the logistical burden of carrying 
and using agent-specific detection and diagnostic systems. The 
additional funding DTRA received through the CBDP to support the 
Department's biodefense mission is sufficient and will help accelerate 
efforts to provide the joint force with far forward diagnostic 
capabilities, enhance our ability to provide tailorable medical 
countermeasures, and alert decision makers to prevent further 
contamination.
    Mr. Scott. How is DTRA supporting small business R&D in point-of-
care, rapid pathogen detection for warfighters?
    Dr. Williams. DTRA participates in and advertises applied research 
needs through the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) and Small 
Business Technology Transfer (STTR) Programs. In the past, some SBIR/
STTR awards have addressed pathogen detection for the warfighter. DTRA 
also uses contracting mechanisms such as Other Transaction Authority 
(OTA) solicitations and Broad Agency Announcements (BAA) through which 
small businesses can propose and compete for funding and awards.
    Mr. Scott. Should fentanyl be considered a weapon of mass 
destruction?
    Dr. Williams. The DOD considers pharmaceuticals such as fentanyl 
and its derivatives to be therapeutic drugs, which if prescribed 
appropriately by medical authorities have legitimate medical uses. 
However, DTRA recognizes that fentanyl could be weaponized and 
developed into a pharmaceutical-based agent (PBA), and this informs the 
execution of our mission. DTRA supports research into the detection, 
impacts, and mitigation of fentanyl exposure to ensure our warfighters 
are able to execute their missions effectively and safely. These 
efforts include the evaluation of the magnitude, duration, and 
operational implications of both indoor and outdoor utilizations of 
fentanyl as an incapacitant. The effectiveness of current protective 
equipment has been validated along with an FDA-approved medical 
countermeasure in such concentrations that are relevant and life-saving 
in a battlefield environment. While DTRA efforts have focused on 
mitigating the effects of weaponized pharmaceutical-based agents (PBA) 
such as fentanyl, we also recognize fentanyl's legitimate medical and 
therapeutic uses.

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