[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



                         [H.A.S.C. No. 117-47]

                                HEARING

                                   ON

                   NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

                          FOR FISCAL YEAR 2022

                                  AND

              OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS

                               BEFORE THE

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

         SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES HEARING

                                   ON

                         DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

   FISCAL YEAR 2022 BUDGET REQUEST FOR SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES

                               __________

                              HEARING HELD
                             JUNE 17, 2021

                                     
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 

                               __________

                                
                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
48-533                    WASHINGTON : 2023                    
          
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------     

             SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES

                  JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut, Chairman

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island      ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia
JIM COOPER, Tennessee                VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri
DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey          SAM GRAVES, Missouri
ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland           TRENT KELLY, Mississippi
FILEMON VELA, Texas                  MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine, Vice Chair   JIM BANKS, Indiana
ELAINE G. LURIA, Virginia            JACK BERGMAN, Michigan
SARA JACOBS, California              JERRY L. CARL, Alabama

              Phil MacNaughton, Professional Staff Member
               David Sienicki, Professional Staff Member
                           Sean Falvey, Clerk
                           
                           C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

              STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Courtney, Hon. Joe, a Representative from Connecticut, Chairman, 
  Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces.................     1
Wittman, Hon. Robert J., a Representative from Virginia, Ranking 
  Member, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces.........     3

                               WITNESSES

Stefany, Frederick J., Acting Assistant Secretary of the Navy for 
  Research, Development and Acquisition, Department of the Navy; 
  VADM James W. Kilby, USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for 
  Warfighting Requirements and Capabilities, Department of the 
  Navy; and LtGen Eric M. Smith, USMC, Commanding General, Marine 
  Corps Combat Development Command, and Deputy Commandant for 
  Combat Development and Integration, Headquarters, U.S. Marine 
  Corps..........................................................     5

                                APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

    Courtney, Hon. Joe...........................................    41
    Stefany, Frederick J., joint with VADM James W. Kilby and 
      LtGen Eric M. Smith........................................    46
    Wittman, Hon. Robert J.......................................    44

Documents Submitted for the Record:

    [There were no Documents submitted.]

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

    [The information was not available at the time of printing.]

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

    Mr. Langevin.................................................    85


DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY FISCAL YEAR 2022 BUDGET REQUEST FOR SEAPOWER AND 
                           PROJECTION FORCES

                              ----------                              

                  House of Representatives,
                       Committee on Armed Services,
            Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces,
                           Washington, DC, Thursday, June 17, 2021.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:20 a.m., in 
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Joe Courtney 
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOE COURTNEY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
CONNECTICUT, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION 
                             FORCES

    Mr. Courtney. Good morning.
    The subcommittee is now in session and meets this morning 
to hear testimony from the Department of the Navy on the fiscal 
year 2022 budget.
    We have one member who is joining us remotely, Mr. Langevin 
up in Rhode Island, and I think he knows the drill in terms of 
announcing himself and waiting to ensure that the audio is 
picked up. So I think I am going to skip the ``FedEx'' 
statement at the beginning here.
    So before us today to discuss the Navy's request for fiscal 
year 2022, we have three witnesses who are no strangers to our 
subcommittee.
    We welcome you all back this morning.
    Acting Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, 
Development and Acquisition, Mr. Jay Stefany; Deputy Chief of 
Naval Operations for Warfighting Requirements and Capabilities, 
Vice Admiral James Kilby; and Commanding General, Marine Corps 
Combat Development Command, Lieutenant General Eric Smith.
    Thank you all again for joining us this morning.
    The 2022 budget for the platforms and capabilities under 
our panel's jurisdiction cover a wide range of priorities on 
and below the seas and will be a critical component of the 2022 
fiscal budget and the National Defense Authorization Act 
[NDAA].
    I think it is always important as we get started to know 
the past in order to understand the present, and I want to take 
a moment to review the journey that we took last year with the 
Navy's fiscal year 2021 budget.
    As the Congressional Research Service [CRS] reported last 
April, the prior administration sent Congress a $19.9 billion 
shipbuilding budget that requested an 18 percent cut from the 
previous year and in its Future Years Defense Plan, the FYDP, 
that accompanied the budget, projected a shipbuilding budget 
for fiscal year 2022 of only $21.1 billion.
    Just to use that as a metric, the budget that was submitted 
this year on May 28, 2021, by the administration, it actually 
is $22.6 billion, which is 7 percent higher than last year's 
budget submission.
    And I share this not as a partisan statement. To the 
contrary, that record is a reminder that this subcommittee last 
year, as in prior years, has been an independent body that even 
with constrained top lines like the one we are wrestling with 
this year has revised Navy budgets.
    That, in fact, is our constitutional duty. Article I, 
section 8, clause 13 clearly states that it is Congress that 
has the authority to provide and maintain a Navy. And last year 
we exercised that power when we rejected the proposed cut of a 
Virginia-class submarine and enacted a final shipbuilding 
budget of $23.2 billion, well above the $19 billion request and 
actually still above this year's request from the 
administration.
    So just like last year, we have a tough job ahead of us. 
This budget has some positive elements, and it has some issues 
that we have to solve.
    As I told the Acting Secretary of the Navy and CNO [Chief 
of Naval Operations] 2 days ago, the absence of a Future Years 
Defense Plan and a 30-year shipbuilding plan adds a higher 
degree of difficulty to our work.
    And in the absence of those multiyear documents, I want to 
say to our witnesses at the outset today that my colleagues and 
staff expect and know we will receive clear testimony and 
follow-up answers to questions, which will be many, in the 
compressed schedule that we face.
    Shipbuilding and ship maintenance, as we all know, is a 
long game, and the decisions we make today will have longer 
lasting consequences than many other parts of the Defense 
Department's budget.
    As I said, there are some positive elements in the budget 
submission. In contrast to recent budgets over the last few 
years, the Navy's budget plan strongly supports our undersea 
fleet. The budget before us includes stable, two-per-year 
production cadence for the Virginia-class submarine program and 
continued investment in the Navy's number one acquisition 
program--namely, the Columbia-class ballistic submarine 
program--and also long overdue private sector submarine 
maintenance projects.
    Together, this budget makes the strongest investment in the 
stability and growth of our undersea capabilities and 
industrial base since the 1980s.
    As Admiral Gilday forcefully testified on Tuesday this 
week, our undersea advantage over both China and Russia is our 
most powerful tool of deterrence, and we cannot let the size of 
that fleet falter. This budget accomplishes that goal.
    That said, I remain concerned about some other specific 
changes and trade-offs reflected in the budget. Once again, our 
panel is tasked with making sense of an unexpected cut in 
steady rate production of the DDG-51-class destroyer program. I 
am deeply concerned that sudden course change will disrupt the 
stability of the industrial base, undermines confidence in 
multiyear procurement agreements, and threatens our ability to 
meet our defense strategy.
    At the same time, the budget proposes an increase in ship 
retirements, nearly double the number of new ship construction 
proposed, including an increase in the retirement of cruisers 
planned for modernization.
    Cruiser modernization is an issue which this subcommittee 
has grappled with for many, many years. I hope our witnesses 
today will provide more detailed insight into the analysis 
behind this proposal and how it fits into the Navy's overall 
efforts to meet its operational requirements.
    Whatever the ultimate goal of the size of our fleet, the 
basic fundamentals of successful shipbuilding remain the same: 
stable and predictable requirements that industry can plan 
towards and rely on, steady rate production that facilitates 
effective workforce development and cost reduction, and 
underlying long-term strategy that the Navy, Congress, and 
industry can work from.
    Unfortunately, too many recent budgets have fallen short of 
some of these fundamentals only to rely on Congress to fill the 
gaps. This is the second year in a row, under two different 
administrations, that the Navy has presented a budget that 
removes a planned major combatant vessel only to list it as 
their number one unfunded requirement. That is not a trend that 
any of us here on this committee relishes or wants to see 
becoming the new normal, and this would be the third year.
    Our subcommittee has a well-earned record for bipartisan 
scrutiny of shipbuilding budgets to provide this continuity and 
insight, regardless of which party holds the White House. I am 
confident that we will act again this year in a similar way and 
ensure that we make prudent and needed adjustments to build on 
the final proposal.
    With that, I turn to my good friend and ranking member from 
Virginia, Mr. Rob Wittman, for opening remarks that he may 
have.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Courtney can be found in the 
Appendix on page 41.]

  STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT J. WITTMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
    VIRGINIA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND 
                       PROJECTION FORCES

    Mr. Wittman. Well, thank you, Chairman Courtney. Again, 
thanks for your leadership and for your staunch direction in 
what we need to pursue as far as shipbuilding.
    I want to thank our three witnesses for joining us today.
    Gentlemen, if we are truly sincere about preparing for a 
maritime conflict with a great power, we should all grade 
President Biden's Navy budget as unacceptable. I give it a D-
minus. With proposing eight battle force ships, of which two 
are tugboats, we are going backwards, not forwards. This is not 
the proper attempt to deter a global conflict.
    I think what is most perplexing to me is the lack of vision 
and the desire by senior Biden officials to mark time while the 
lethargic Biden Secretary of the Navy nomination process 
continues. We are already 6 months into this administration. We 
are only informed this week of the administration's intent to 
nominate a Secretary of the Navy.
    It has been said that Emperor Nero fiddled while Rome 
burned. In this case, President Biden is fiddling while the 
Navy is metaphorically burning. We have no strategic direction, 
no plan to dissuade China, and no budget to adequately prepare 
for maritime conflict. The administration has even refused to 
deliver a 5-year budget plan and a 30-year shipbuilding plan on 
time, as required by law.
    Secretary Hicks recently indicated that this budget request 
was developed with a clear-eyed approach on how to deter 
military aggression when it comes to China. I am not sure what 
she was looking at, but it is clear that she overlooked the 
Navy.
    While the administration is fiddling, the budget request is 
recommending that we divest 15 battle force ships, including 7 
cruisers. The seven cruisers alone have more missile capacity 
than the entire British fleet.
    I want to say that again: Those seven cruisers alone have 
more missile capacity than the entire British fleet.
    We have already spent hundreds of millions of dollars on 
ensuring these cruisers are returned to the fleet, yet now we 
find we are going to retire them.
    While this administration is fiddling, the administration 
indicates they cannot afford a second destroyer, a critical 
platform to deter maritime conflict. And while we are retiring 
other surface combatants, we are saying we are going to 
exacerbate that by now not building an additional destroyer.
    While this administration is fiddling, the budget 
underfunds critical investments in Tomahawk missiles, 
heavyweight torpedoes, and sonobuoys.
    While this administration is fiddling and stymied with 
inaction, the Navy is prepared to give up on over $700 million 
in smart acquisition savings available by procuring four 
amphibious ships.
    President Trump established a maritime conflict as a key 
budget priority and prepared a plan to deliver this capability. 
President Trump's plan envisioned discrete cuts throughout the 
defense budget to fund 12 battle force ships he proposed for 
construction in fiscal year 2022.
    The Biden administration arrives, wants to take more time 
to study the future maritime conflict, and throws out the 
tremendous work done by our witnesses today.
    Undoubtedly, the Biden team will reach the same conclusion 
as their predecessors--or maybe they already have reached their 
own conclusions and are now building an assessment tailored to 
prove the current conditions correct.
    Frankly, this is a waste of time and not only is 
unacceptable, but is dangerous and imperils our national 
security.
    It is time to stop fiddling. We need to be visionary and to 
allow the industrial base to rightsize to deliver efficiently 
for our national security needs. We need to be steely-eyed in 
dissuading conflict and delivering adequate resources to enable 
this plan. And we need to be brave enough to balance cross-
service resources to deliver credible power relevant to the 
future conflict.
    We have so much work on this budget request to make it even 
mildly prepared for dissuading future conflict, and I look 
forward to working with my colleagues to correct this dangerous 
naval trajectory.
    Finally, I want to be clear: I do not lay any of this blame 
at the feet of our witnesses today or by the stellar leadership 
of our subcommittee chairman or by any member of this 
committee. Every single one of you has been focused on what we 
need as a Nation to do what is necessary to deter conflict.
    I believe that everyone are great Americans who are in a 
difficult position of defending a lackluster budget developed 
in part by folks who have never had to testify before this 
subcommittee.
    Again, I appreciate the chairman for holding this important 
hearing, and I yield back the balance of my time.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Wittman can be found in the 
Appendix on page 44.]
    Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Wittman.
    And we will now turn to the witnesses.
    It is my understanding, Mr. Stefany, you are going to 
provide a statement for the three witnesses. Is that correct?
    Mr. Stefany. Yes, sir, one statement for all three of us.
    Mr. Courtney. Great. Well, the floor is yours.

 STATEMENT OF FREDERICK J. STEFANY, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY 
    OF THE NAVY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION, 
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY; VADM JAMES W. KILBY, USN, DEPUTY CHIEF 
     OF NAVAL OPERATIONS FOR WARFIGHTING REQUIREMENTS AND 
CAPABILITIES, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY; AND LTGEN ERIC M. SMITH, 
   USMC, COMMANDING GENERAL, MARINE CORPS COMBAT DEVELOPMENT 
   COMMAND, AND DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR COMBAT DEVELOPMENT AND 
          INTEGRATION, HEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS

    Mr. Stefany. And thank you, Representative Wittman, for the 
comments for the three of us. We appreciate that.
    Chairman Courtney, Ranking Member Wittman, distinguished 
members of the subcommittee, on behalf of myself, Vice Admiral 
Kilby, Lieutenant General Smith, we thank you for the 
opportunity to appear before you today to address the 
Department of Navy's fiscal year 2022 budget request for 
seapower capabilities.
    We would like to thank this subcommittee for your 
leadership and support for the Navy and the Marine Corps 
programs that support our forward-deployed naval forces.
    As a maritime Nation, our economic prosperity and security 
are linked to the world's oceans. The Navy and Marine Corps 
team are the Nation's maritime force, forward deployed each and 
every day, protecting the vital interests of our Nation, 
supporting our allies and partners, and providing a credible 
and visible deterrent to our strategic competitors.
    Our goal is to prevent conflict. But should deterrence 
fail, we are ready to answer the call to fight and to win.
    In the year-plus since the COVID-19 pandemic hit the United 
States, our Navy-Marine Corps team and our industry partners 
have delivered 7 new ships, with 3 more deliveries planned for 
later this year, as well as over 100 boats, crafts, and 
vehicles, and maintaining our current fleet.
    We have awarded the frigate design since last time we met 
with you, and we have under construction the first of the 
Columbia-class SSBN [nuclear ballistic missile] submarines, a 
truly heroic effort across our entire acquisition and 
sustainment community in very trying times. And I want to 
recognize all members of the community.
    The Department of the Navy's 2022 budget balances the 
readiness, capabilities, capacity, and people to advance key 
Department priorities. As Secretary Austin highlighted in his 
recent testimony to the Appropriations Committee, the budget 
also reflects difficult funding decisions necessary to ensure 
we have the right mix of capabilities the Nation needs most and 
supports investment in a modern future force that can deliver 
integrated, all-domain naval power.
    While difficult decisions were required, I would like to 
highlight some of the areas we were able to increase our 
investment in the fiscal year 2022 budget request.
    The Department's top priority is recapitalization of the 
Navy's portion of the nuclear triad; then meeting readiness 
needs to field a credible, non-nuclear deterrent ready to fight 
tonight; followed by investments in modernizing our force for 
tomorrow's fleet; and then finally, building the capacity of 
the Navy, congruent with the budget controls. This ensures that 
we do not create a hollow force while sustainably growing the 
fleet.
    To that end, we continue to fully fund our number one 
procurement program, the Columbia submarine, to the independent 
cost estimate, which will ensure our timely delivery of all 
ships in the class to meet STRATCOM's [U.S. Strategic 
Command's] requirements.
    We are also investing in land-based test facilities for the 
frigate and for our unmanned surface vessel programs, and we 
are requesting advanced procurement funding to smooth the ramp-
up of construction to two frigates per year, just outside of 
this year.
    Although a different mix of ships, this budget does propose 
the same number of ships as last year and supports the 
capability required to enable distributed maritime operations.
    To ensure we have a whole force, the fiscal year 2022 
budget invests additional funding in ship and aviation 
maintenance, and you will see an increase in our funding for 
SIOP [Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program], the 
shipyard optimization modeling and planning efforts, that will 
lead to major SIOP projects in the near future.
    With a focus on developing a Navy force capable of 
distributed maritime operations, as outlined in our CNO's 
Navigation Plan and the Commandant's Force Design, this budget 
provides the necessary R&D [research and development] 
investments to start development of new capabilities with our 
industry partners, such as the follow-on to the Virginia-class 
attack submarine, the next-generation tactical aircraft, and 
the future large surface combatant. It also increases our 
development efforts that we started previously on hypersonic 
and directed energy weapons.
    Finally, the budget invests in key enablers to support 
distributed operations, such as Project Overmatch, which is a 
seamless network that will leverage demonstrated progress in 
command and control in all domains and facilitate the manned 
and unmanned teaming required for future warfare.
    We thank you for the opportunity to appear before your 
subcommittee today and for the strong support that this 
subcommittee has always provided to our sailors and our 
Marines.
    And with that, we look forward to your questions. Thank 
you.
    [The joint prepared statement of Mr. Stefany, Admiral 
Kilby, and General Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 
46.]
    Mr. Courtney. Great. Well, thank you, Mr. Stefany. And, 
again, I am going to ask just one or two questions and make 
sure the other members get a chance to participate fully.
    Admiral Kilby, as is obvious, the proposal to decommission 
seven cruisers, as in the past year--as I said, this is not our 
first rodeo in terms of dealing with this issue on the 
subcommittee--is something that has obviously resulted in a lot 
of pushback and commentary.
    When the budget came out, within a couple of days, as is 
normal, the unfunded priorities list came over from the Navy, 
as did all the other branches. To me, it was noticeable that, 
on the one hand, restoring the DDG was number one on the list, 
but there was nothing in that unfunded priorities list [UPL] 
regarding restoring the cruisers.
    And I was wondering if you could just kind of give us an 
explanation of just the thinking behind the decommissioning 
proposal, particularly in terms of the question of missile tube 
capability.
    What does that mean in terms of air defense command for the 
cruisers' role in terms of accompanying our carriers and where 
the DDG construction process sort of fits into that, and 
whether we are creating a gap? I mean, that is fundamentally 
the question I think we have to figure out here in terms of 
that proposal.
    Admiral Kilby. Yes, sir.
    Short answer, we are not creating a gap for the function of 
the air and missile defense commander. We have looked at that 
and mapped it out, and we will continue to pace the arrival of 
Flight III, which will assume that responsibility for our 
strike groups because of the capabilities it brings to the 
cruisers.
    To me, it is more than just VLS [vertical launching system] 
cells. It is what is the sensor that a ship brings, what are 
the capabilities of that combat system, and what is the 
confidence and reliability we have in that hull to get 
underway.
    In 2017, I was the strike group commander for the Carl 
Vinson strike group. My air and missile defense command ship 
was the Lake Champlain.
    She missed roughly one-third of the deployment because of 
maintenance things, not because her radar was down, not because 
her combat system wasn't capable, not because she didn't have a 
full magazine, but she had tank top cracking that required her 
to get that fixed to be safely underway.
    Vella Gulf missed a month of her previous deployment and 
has missed 2\1/2\ months of her current deployment.
    So all of that, in my mind, has to go into the mix when we 
factor the availability and reliability of those ships. Those 
missile tubes will only count if they are underway alongside 
the carrier.
    Mr. Courtney. Thank you.
    So, again, you are going back to the air defense command. 
In terms of the analysis that you conducted, I mean, you are 
obviously sort of feathering in the new DDG-51s with the new 
radars in terms of making sure that that function is going to 
be covered. Is that correct?
    Admiral Kilby. Yes, sir, that is correct. That will have 
the latest combat system, which is Aegis Baseline 10. It will 
have the Air and Missile Defense Radar, which is a much more 
capable and less maintenance-intensive radar than the SPY 
radar. And that is a natural fit for where the threat is going 
and what we want that air and missile defense commander to do 
for that strike group.
    It will be commanded by a captain, not a commander. Our 
destroyers now are commanded by commanders, and that is 
generally their first command unless they had O-4 [lieutenant 
commander] command. And our air and missile defense command 
ships are captained by a captain, so that is their second 
command or their major command. So they bring an experience set 
and a crew that has been trained and is more senior to execute 
that function.
    I don't want to dismiss the value of 122 missile cells or 
an Aegis cruiser. I am an Aegis cruiser guy. I have done four 
of my six ships on Aegis cruisers. I love them. But our average 
age of our cruisers is 32 years. They were built for 30 years. 
Four of our ships are over 34 years.
    So I am really trying to look at the most valuable ship 
that we can fund, the most valuable program within our budget 
to make our force equal across all functions--air, surface, and 
subsurface--to align to the threats as we see them, sir.
    Mr. Courtney. And speaking of budget, so if, again, there 
was a decision made at the Appropriations Committee or HASC 
[House Armed Services Committee] to restore the cruisers that 
you are proposing to decommission, that carries a price tag 
with it.
    Can you sort of walk us through what that would result in, 
in terms of having to find offsets in a constrained budget?
    Admiral Kilby. Yes, sir. So trying to keep a complex 
problem simple.
    If we were to retain the seven cruisers that are in the 
budget to be decommissioned in 2022--that is five from previous 
budget and Hue City and Anzio in this budget--it would be 
roughly $5 billion across the FYDP.
    If we were to retain those ships for 2 years, all seven 
ships, that is roughly $2.78 billion.
    The cost to modernize Hue City and Anzio alone is $1.5 
billion, approximately.
    So that is the rough breakdown of figures for those ships.
    Mr. Courtney. Great.
    Well, thank you. I know there is going to be probably a lot 
more discussion this morning on that issue.
    And with that, I will turn it over to my friend, Mr. 
Wittman.
    Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I want to start with Secretary Stefany.
    Am I correct that the law does require a 30-year 
shipbuilding plan and a 5-year defense plan?
    Mr. Stefany. Yes, sir, you are.
    Mr. Wittman. Okay. Then I am just curious as to why 
President Biden hasn't provided that to us at this point?
    Mr. Stefany. Yes, sir. I can tell you this on the two parts 
you brought up.
    Part one, the 5-year future defense plan, that that is the 
direction we have gotten from the Department, that we are not 
to provide. I cannot tell you why, the logic there.
    On the 30-year shipbuilding plan, we do plan to still 
provide that to you. My understanding is the final signature, 
or chops, on it were yesterday. And my hope would be tomorrow, 
maybe Monday at the latest, you will get that plan, sir.
    Mr. Wittman. I think it is unfortunate and regrettable that 
we won't get a Future Years Defense Plan.
    Mr. Stefany. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Wittman. Vice Admiral Kilby, Admiral Davidson indicated 
earlier this year that he thought that conflict with China 
would occur, instead of in the 2030s, probably within the next 
6 years.
    If Congress were to support the retirement of 15 battle 
force ships in fiscal year 2022, is this going to hurt or help 
our ability to deter this conflict that is seeming to be sooner 
than later?
    Admiral Kilby. On the surface, I would just say the air and 
missile defense commander role from cruisers is covered. For 
the 15 battle force ships, more is better, obviously, as long 
as we can count and be confident that those ships will be 
underway with us. So that is my one caveat there.
    I have questions about the cruiser, and that is why we put 
them in the budget as laid in today.
    Mr. Wittman. And if there are issues about availabilities, 
it seems like to me the big issue there is maintenance 
availabilities. So we have shipyards that need to be getting 
ships in and out on time. So it seems like to me it shouldn't 
be retiring old ships, it should be maintaining the ones that 
we have got in order to have that availability.
    Let me do this. I want to ask you on some things on cruiser 
retirement.
    How many missile tubes are provided by the seven cruisers 
the administration is proposing to decommission?
    Admiral Kilby. It is 122 missile cells per ship, sir, so 
times 7. I will do the math, but it is roughly----
    Mr. Wittman. 910.
    Admiral Kilby [continuing]. 910.
    Mr. Wittman. Got you.
    Admiral Kilby. Thank you, sir.
    Mr. Wittman. Sure.
    What percentage of the Navy's entire surface fires are 
provided by those seven cruisers.
    Admiral Kilby. A large percentage of those ships, sir.
    Mr. Wittman. Got you.
    All right. How many large unmanned surface vessels are 
required to replace the strike capacity offered by the seven 
cruisers? And what is the timeframe to deliver the replacement 
capability?
    Admiral Kilby. I would say, at a rough estimate, double the 
number of large unmanned surface vessels [LUSVs] in our current 
instantiation, because they are going to have 64 cells, so it 
would be double that.
    And the timeline is yet to be determined, because we have 
got to go through the confidence, as we have talked about in 
previous hearings, to field that capability. So that is land-
based testing, all of the things we need to do to be confident 
in that search. So it won't be in the timeline that these 
cruisers could serve.
    Mr. Wittman. So 28 LUSVs and a long period of time. I think 
the best case scenario--best case, if everything goes according 
to plan--probably 15 years.
    Admiral Kilby. Sir, just to clarify.
    Mr. Wittman. Yes.
    Admiral Kilby. I think if it is 7 cruisers, it is 14 LUSVs.
    Mr. Wittman. Fourteen LUSVs.
    Admiral Kilby. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Wittman. Okay. All right.
    How much money has been invested in the last 5 years in 
these cruisers to extend their service life?
    Admiral Kilby. A significant amount of money, and it is 
costing more than we thought it would be.
    Mr. Wittman. Okay.
    Admiral Kilby. So initially it was $2.4 billion, but, 
again, we are adding a lot of money to do that, sir.
    Mr. Wittman. Got you.
    Are we able to provide sufficient cruisers and destroyers 
to the combatant commanders today to meet their OPLANs 
[operation plans] while retiring the seven cruisers? And is 
that going to help or hurt our ability to project power?
    Admiral Kilby. I believe we are providing the number--let 
me be clear. The combatant commanders want more than the Navy 
has to give them.
    Mr. Wittman. Sure.
    Admiral Kilby. I don't want to be Pollyannish about that.
    We are providing manned strike groups to meet the demand 
signal as apportioned by our global force management cycle to 
satisfy our combatant commanders.
    Mr. Wittman. Very good.
    Lieutenant General Smith, my first question to you is 
simple. Is the amphibious force forcible entry capability today 
what is needed as a joint force to defeat China?
    General Smith. Sir, if I understand the question, is it 
still a requirement for the joint force?
    Mr. Wittman. Uh-huh.
    General Smith. Absolutely, sir. JFEO, joint forcible entry 
operation, absolutely vital to the combatant commander, yes, 
sir.
    Mr. Wittman. Do you see this as a needed capability into 
the next decade?
    General Smith. Absolutely, yes, sir.
    Mr. Wittman. We all know the backbone of the force is being 
able to generate two MEB, or two Marine expeditionary brigade, 
lift. The administration appears ready to walk away from that, 
to have that forcible entry capability and the supporting 
infrastructure. Some projections have our amphibious fleet down 
to 26 ships.
    Tell me, what is the Commandant's red line as far as the 
bottom line for total number of amphibious force ships?
    General Smith. Sir, straight answer up front is the 
requirement, based on a study that Admiral Kilby, my friend 
Jim, and I did together, was you need 31 traditional amphibious 
ships in the appropriate mix, which is 10 big decks--LHA/LHD 
[landing helicopter assault]/[landing helicopter dock]--and 21 
LSD [dock landing ship]/LPD [landing platform dock].
    The low end of that study is 28, and the difference in 
those 3 is that you pass--there is additional risk in arrival 
times. Added into that, sir, is 35 light amphibious warships. 
And that includes, sir, that is based on a single MEB, Marine 
expeditionary brigade, forcible entry.
    Mr. Wittman. Yes.
    General Smith. And our expeditionary units that are out 
always, and our forward-deployed naval force in Japan.
    Mr. Wittman. Last question. Do you believe that it is 
essential and critical that the contract for the one LHD and 
the three LPDs be executed? And if it is not, do you believe 
that creates unacceptable risk for the Marine Corps?
    General Smith. Sir, I do believe that the multiship is a 
good thing. It saves dollars and it ensures that those 
amphibious ships, which in the case of the big deck amphibs, 
sir, are strategic assets, are available for the combatant 
commander. Otherwise, sir, we are passing risk on to the 
combatant commanders.
    Mr. Wittman. Very good.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Wittman.
    Now up next is Mr. Langevin, who is joining us from Rhode 
Island.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Can you hear me 
okay?
    Mr. Courtney. Loud and clear.
    Mr. Langevin. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I want to thank our witnesses for their testimony today and 
for your service to our Nation.
    I will start with this for Mr. Stefany.
    So a Navy memo recently revealed that the Navy may have to 
choose between funding a new destroyer, attack submarine, or 
fighter jet in the future.
    Mr. Stefany, how would funding the Columbia-class submarine 
through the National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund improve that 
situation?
    Mr. Stefany. Yes, sir.
    The short answer is, if the funding came out of the Navy 
and had to go into that fund, then it doesn't change anything. 
But if it was a separate funding source that would go into that 
National Sea-Based Fund, then, obviously, we would have more 
resources in the Navy to fund those three major upgrade 
programs that we need to do for the warfighters.
    Mr. Langevin. I certainly think that is the direction we 
need to go, and I agree not taking it just out of the Navy, it 
is got to be new money.
    Admiral Kilby, so we are looking for ways to boost our 
missile launching capability on ships. Considering the railgun 
can deepen a ship's magazine and allow the Navy to shift more 
resources to offense, has the Navy considered how the railgun 
can help with this problem?
    Admiral Kilby. Yes, sir. We have worked mightily since 2005 
to bring the railgun to fruition. So far it has not proved to 
be what we want to continue to invest in.
    There is a challenge technologically there. It certainly 
has great promise if we could close the fire control loop in a 
meaningful way and use it as an anti-ship missile defense 
piece. That is complex right now, and we don't believe there is 
a path to do that now.
    Certainly, the concept of an electromagnetic railgun is 
very virtuous because it allows me at a cheaper level to do as 
you suggest, reserve my VLS launching capacity with my high-end 
missiles for offense and I can defend my ship with a cheaper, 
more renewable magazine.
    But there are a couple of complex technological things I 
have to do, other than close the fire control loop, and that is 
satisfy and solve the energy storage problem, as well as the 
barrel wear on the electromagnetic railgun, to make it an 
enduring capability for our ships.
    Mr. Langevin. Well, I will just point out that I think that 
some of the alternatives that you are considering are just as 
challenging and costly as well. I think it is a mistake to be 
abandoning railgun.
    Admiral Kilby, using currently available air defense 
weapons, how well could Navy ships defend against a large 
number of missiles and UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles]? And 
what side has the cost advantage?
    Admiral Kilby. Right now, sir, because of the way the 
threat is advancing, we have to use very expensive missiles 
like the SM [Standard Missile]-6, and we are developing an SM-2 
Block III Charlie, which is an active seeker, SM-6-like, that 
is required for those advanced threats. So that is an expensive 
way to attrite the adversary.
    The CNO, in his CNO NAVPLAN [Navigation Plan], charged us 
to get after directed energy in particular--I call that 
[inaudible] defense for that ship--so I can better and with 
more confidence defend that ship and reserve that magazine for 
other things.
    But there are challenges, as you point out, with directed 
energy, and we have got to work our way through those 
challenges to have a laser with enough power to provide anti-
ship cruise missile defense, as well as electronic warfare and 
point defense systems.
    So it is a family of systems to create this capability you 
suggest to build confidence and not use those high-end weapons. 
But we are at the wrong end of the cost curve with our most 
expensive weapons, sir.
    Mr. Langevin. Agreed.
    Before my time runs out, Mr. Stefany, your written 
testimony mentions that the Navy is investing in cyber 
protection in this PB [President's budget]. But it looks like 
the major cyber accounts have relatively flat funding. Where 
are you making these investments?
    Mr. Stefany. Sir, I will need to get the specific line 
items back to you. But it is really in the process of 
certifying what we call the CMMC [Cybersecurity Maturity Model 
Certification] process and investing in our industrial base 
with them and getting them certified to be able to meet our 
cyber requirements.
    Mr. Langevin. Okay. I would ask for a written, more 
detailed response because I am not seeing it.
    Mr. Stefany. Yeah. Happy to do that, sir.
    [The information referred to was not available at the time 
of printing.]
    Mr. Langevin. I yield back.
    Mr. Courtney. Great. Thank you, Jim.
    Next up is Mr. Gallagher from Wisconsin.
    Mr. Gallagher. Admiral Kilby, the budget plans to reduce 
Navy Active and Reserve end strength by 2,529 sailors, if I am 
correct. That is a big reduction in a short period of time. 
What is the plan for end strength over the FYDP?
    Admiral Kilby. So I think we pace our end strength with our 
platform requirement, sir. So that is a manning generation to 
drive that. So in general we are, I think, going to see a 
slight increase, but right now it is level based on what you 
laid out here and the demand signal for those sailors.
    But we need to invest in the pipe to make those sailors, so 
if we can, in fact, grow our Navy, we can receive those sailors 
and train them and send them to our ships. So there is a cost 
to do that as well, and I think we are in a position to do 
that.
    Mr. Gallagher. Well, just so I understand this whole FYDP 
situation, Mr. Stefany, did you suggest you are not going to 
give us a FYDP at all or just for the time being?
    Mr. Stefany. The direction we have for 2022 is not at all. 
The first FYDP will be with the 2023 budget that will come over 
in the February timeframe.
    Mr. Gallagher. How does that work, though? I mean, if we 
passed a law in 1989, when I was 5 years old, that says you 
have to provide us with a FYDP, and then you don't provide us 
with a FYDP, you are saying the direction you have been given 
is to break the law and not provide a FYDP. It just seems like 
an odd thing.
    Mr. Stefany. I guess I can't answer the logic. It came down 
to us that way, sir.
    Mr. Gallagher. Well, I would hope--I mean, if nothing else, 
please go back to the building and suggest it would be nice if 
we got a FYDP as quickly as possible. It would help us analyze 
a lot of these things, I think. But I will move on from the 
FYDP, ``F up,'' as it were, and move on to the frigate.
    You mentioned the frigate in your comments. I think we all 
want it delivered on time and on budget. I understand the need 
for combat systems changes, but given that the plan was a 
proven design, I asked the same question of the CNO: Will you 
commit to, in your capacity, minimizing changes to existing 
hull and machinery on that platform?
    Mr. Stefany. Yes, absolutely, sir. That is part of the 
acquisition strategy, minimize change--actually eliminate 
change--if we can, and deliver 10 ships. The 10 ships in our 
contract are all identical, sir.
    Mr. Gallagher. And then I will just go across the board 
here.
    Former INDOPACOM [U.S. Indo-Pacific Command] Commander 
Admiral Davidson suggested in open testimony to Congress 
recently that he is concerned about a potential PLA [People's 
Liberation Army] invasion of Taiwan within the next 6 years. So 
not in 20 years, not in 10 years, but within the next 6 years.
    I will just start with Admiral Kilby and go sort of from 
left to right, my left to right.
    Do you share Admiral Davidson's concern?
    Admiral Kilby. I do share his concern. But I am also 
looking towards the future, because I don't have a crystal ball 
and I don't know when that conflict is going to occur.
    So I want to transition the force, I want to invest in 
technologies that are going to pace the adversary and have a 
capable Navy going forward, which requires some research and 
development now in order to match what we are seeing from an 
intelligence perspective.
    Mr. Gallagher. Mr. Stefany.
    Mr. Stefany. Yes. As soon as 6 years? Certainly agree with 
that and share that view.
    And to Admiral Kilby's point, we have to find that sweet 
spot of investing and making sure that our current fleet will 
still be very viable 5, 6, 7 years from now, sir.
    Mr. Gallagher. And General Smith.
    General Smith. Sir, I agree with that assessment. But I 
would also add our job is to fight tonight.
    Mr. Gallagher. Yeah.
    General Smith. Or tomorrow morning. So I am always looking 
as if tomorrow morning is the fight.
    Mr. Gallagher. Well, I think the concern here is that the 
Davidson window is closing. Every day we sort of punt on 
fielding a deterrence by denial posture, in the first island 
chain in particular, but in INDOPACOM more generally, is a day 
where we lose time and where the PLA, and the PLA Navy [PLAN] 
in particular, gain an advantage.
    So I just would encourage you in communicating with us to--
I mean, let's figure out how we can operate on a 2025 timeline, 
not a 2045 timeline going forward.
    FYDP is a 5-year defense plan, the acronym, if I am 
remembering correctly. Another thing the FYDP would help with 
is planning on a 5-year time horizon.
    So thank you. I yield my 15 seconds.
    Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Gallagher.
    I would just note that these statutory requirements for 
multiyear plans, sometimes they are more honored in the breach 
than in the observance.
    The first year of the last administration, we ran into the 
same absence of a FYDP. And as the nuns who taught me said, two 
wrongs don't make a right. I think it is really--particularly 
when we are talking about transition type of plans, is that you 
have got to have more than a 1-year set of headlights.
    And so hopefully maybe we can follow up, as we did last 
year, in terms of the absence of a 30-year plan to really just 
say there is a reason why that is in law and that it is really 
to help everybody.
    So, in any case, with that little speech, I will now yield 
to Mr. Golden.
    Mr. Golden. Thank you.
    This past December, Congress passed the fiscal year 2021 
NDAA, which included section 21, I know you are familiar with, 
which says that the Secretary of the Navy may not deviate from 
the large surface combatant requirements, including the 2016 
Navy Force Structure Assessment, until the Secretary certifies 
in writing that the Navy can mitigate the reduction in multi-
mission large surface combatant requirements, including anti-
air and ballistic missile defense capabilities, due to having a 
reduced number of DDG-51 destroyers with the advanced SPY-6 
[radar].
    It also requires a report on the detrimental impacts to the 
large surface combatant industrial base and a plan to mitigate 
such impacts if the fiscal year 2021 Future Years Defense 
Program is implemented as proposed, a review of the benefits to 
the Navy fleet of the SPY-6 radar aboard the DDG Flight III, as 
well as an analysis of impacts to the warfighting capabilities 
of the fleet should the number of such destroyers be reduced.
    I have your certification here, sir. You provide the 
certification without any explanation whatsoever on how the 
Navy will mitigate the impact of the reduction to anti-air and 
ballistic missile defense capabilities. It is almost as if it 
is a cut-and-paste of the certification requirement from the 
bill itself under a new award document with a signature at the 
end.
    In the accompanying report, the Navy says it does not 
foresee negative impacts to the large surface combatant 
industrial base.
    I am telling you today that it will have a negative impact.
    You mentioned the backlog. Any backlog at Bath Iron Works 
was on its way to being gone until a very recent COVID outbreak 
at the yard earlier this year. You know our shipbuilders have 
been building ships for the Navy during this pandemic, putting 
themselves at risk, and they are proud to do that for our 
Nation's sailors. They are proud of our sailors.
    Bath Iron Works will be on pace to produce two DDG-51 
Flight III per year by the end of this year. This backlog 
referenced to justify this reduction won't even exist by the 
end of this Congress.
    BIW has been hiring thousands of young shipbuilders each 
year because the Navy has been driving them to hit the 2-year 
mark. So this cut looks like you have been driving them towards 
a cliff that leads to layoffs, about 500 layoffs, and that is a 
negative impact.
    You did discuss the benefit of the SPY-6 coming online. In 
regards to providing an analysis of impacts to the warfighting 
capability of the fleet should the number of destroyers be 
reduced, you didn't address it.
    The most recent defense appropriation noted that the 
committee believes that the lack of a predictable, stable 
acquisition strategy for large surface combatants undercuts 
naval maritime superiority and injects risk into the industrial 
base.
    The committee provided an additional advanced procurement 
amount for an additional DDG Flight III destroyer in fiscal 
year 2022. Collectively, these provisions communicated 
congressional intent that the Navy reverse its negative 
procurement trend of the DDG Flight III and strongly 
recommended a three-ship procurement in this fiscal year.
    Last December, the Navy gave us a late shipbuilding plan, 
saying it would procure two DDG-51 Flight IIIs in fiscal year 
2022. The ink is barely dry on the paper and we have received 
this budget request for just one.
    We can't even count on 6 months of consistency, one of 
several reasons why Congress is concerned about the 
shipbuilding industrial base and our naval superiority.
    This proposed budget puts the large surface combatant 
workforce at risk at a time when we should be developing it to 
fill the gap of a bathtub effect caused by prior boom and bust 
budgets. This puts the future DDG(X) [Next Generation Guided-
Missile Destroyer] workforce at risk and will have a negative 
impact on the ability of the Navy to deliver capabilities 
necessary to meet its operational needs by the end of this 
decade.
    I think that this is a failure bearing national security 
implications.
    Admiral Kilby, the Navy recommends the decommissioning of 
the Ticonderoga cruisers while simultaneously slowing and 
reducing the acquisition of the DDG-51 Flight III with its new 
combat system, SPY-6 radar, and the ability to house and 
perform the role of air and missile defense at a higher level.
    Your first Flight III with the SPY-6 radar arrives in 2025. 
You are cutting a ship to be delivered in 2027. The math is 
concerning.
    How can we afford such an early reduction of this new radar 
capability on the Flight III?
    Admiral Kilby. Sir, the decision to not procure the Flight 
III is an affordability decision. It is not anything else. It 
is a high regret for the Navy. As indicated, it is number one 
on our UPL. The benefits of an AMDR [Air and Missile Defense 
Radar] are undeniable, as I tried to lay out in an earlier 
response. We have to have that radar.
    Mr. Golden. Thank you, I agree.
    Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Jared.
    Next up is Mr. Carl. The floor is yours.
    Mr. Carl. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you, Ranking Member Wittman.
    And thank you, gentlemen, for coming back and sharing your 
thoughts and your wisdom with us. I learn so much in these 
meetings. As a freshman, that is important.
    Vice Admiral, this committee has heard all about the impact 
of the Chinese soft power, as it is referred to, going around 
the world, especially in South America in our own backyard.
    Now we see the Chinese with a COVID vaccine which is not 
reliable but being distributed through the region.
    Thankfully, our government, we have agreed to donate 
roughly 500 million doses to countries around the world.
    Now, the two medical ships that we have that we rely most 
on are the, if I have this correct--correct me if I am wrong--
is USNS [U.S. Naval Ship] Mercy and Comfort, and we spend about 
$100 million a year just in maintenance on those two. And I 
also understand that they are converted oil tankers. Is that 
correct?
    Admiral Kilby. That is correct, sir.
    Mr. Carl. And they are extremely slow, extremely slow.
    My question to you, sir, is this. Could a smaller, faster, 
more agile medical ship be used by the Navy to help distribute 
this vaccine this very day and combat these Chinese soft powers 
that are taking place around the world?
    Admiral Kilby. Thanks for the question, sir.
    So in previous committees we have talked about increasing 
our logistical base for our ships to support distributed 
maritime operations, which is our operating concept. And at a 
high level, that means I am going to distribute my force more 
than I have in the past in order to create dilemmas for our 
adversaries.
    Incumbent on that is increasing our ability to handle our 
ships if we take damage. So one of those concepts is this thing 
called Role 2 care, and we are working to instantiate it on an 
EPF [expeditionary fast transport] platform, and that wouldn't 
have all the capability of Mercy or Comfort, which is Role 3 
care, but it would be able to extract a higher density or 
number of casualties should we need to, and that includes 
sailors and Marines.
    So to me, we are going to need to increase our ability to 
do that from a force design perspective and look at replacing 
the Mercy and Comfort with another surrogate capability 
potentially that could provide that Role 3 care in the future.
    Mr. Carl. Could we use it right now down in Central and 
South America getting in and out of the shallow waters?
    Admiral Kilby. I believe we could, sir.
    Mr. Carl. Thank you.
    I yield my time back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Carl.
    Next up is Mrs. Luria.
    Mrs. Luria. Well, thank you.
    And I am going to make a slight change today. I am actually 
going to focus on the Marine Corps first and have a question, 
General, about the expeditionary advanced base operations, the 
EABO.
    I am very intrigued by this concept and where the concept 
came from. Could you provide some insight? Was this a 
capability that USINDOPACOM requested? In other words, did 
INDOPACOM say, ``We need to come up with an island-hopping 
strategy to achieve the following goals''? Did it come from the 
Joint Staff? Was it generated from a bright young officer 
within the Marine Corps?
    Can you give me a little bit of background on how you 
developed this strategy?
    General Smith. Yes, ma'am, I can. It is actually a little 
bit of all of the above.
    INDOPACOM clearly has indicated they need the ability to--
well, it started truly with our distributed maritime 
operations.
    If you are going to enable our fleet commanders and do sea 
denial--which is what we do, that is who we are as a naval 
force--that is a piece of it. How do you contest the sea from 
the shore? That is one of the genesis or part of the genesis.
    INDOPACOM clearly has a need for us to do distributed 
maritime operations. And I can tell you that EABO, 
expeditionary advanced base operations, was going on--General 
Berger has emphasized it--it was going on even before.
    When General Berger was in my seat and I was in III MEF 
[Marine Expeditionary Force], we were doing long-range raids, 
long-range seizures of terrain for a short period of time to 
refuel F-35Bs and do strike. We were doing that under a guy 
named Colonel ``Bams'' Brodie, an F-18 pilot, who was the 31st 
MEU [Marine Expeditionary Unit] commander back 4 years ago.
    So it is a combination of all of the above, ma'am.
    Mrs. Luria. Well, thank you for that insight.
    And did you establish a timeframe, like, ``We want to 
achieve this capability by a certain time and on a certain 
scale''?
    General Smith. Yes, ma'am. What we know is that the 
Commandant's direction to me is that by 2023 I have to provide 
an initial operating capability to Lieutenant General Steven 
Rudder, who is the commander of Marine Forces Pacific, all 
stop. By 2023 that initial capability is in his hands or I have 
failed.
    Mrs. Luria. Thank you.
    And so to me it sounds like you developed a strategy, and 
from that strategy you then came up with requirements--these 
are the things the Marine Corps would need in order to 
accomplish that and with the timeline. And out of that 
ultimately resulted in the request in the budget that we are 
seeing because your request reflects the things that will allow 
you to achieve this strategy and this new type of operations.
    Would you say that that is correct?
    General Smith. Ma'am, correct statement; concept, and then 
you get down to the specifics of specific requirements to meet 
that concept which supports that strategy, yes, ma'am.
    Mrs. Luria. Okay. Well, I appreciate you clarifying that.
    And I know that we are going to do a second round, so I 
might not get through the next part in this first round. But, 
Admiral Kilby, I was going to shift to you.
    Just to start the scene setter here, in 2005 the PLAN had 
216 ships to our 291, so that was an advantage of 75. Fast 
forward to 2020, they have 333 ships to our 296. That is an 
advantage of 37. So, in fact, that is a swing of 112 ships in 
this 4-year period. And people say that China and the PLAN is a 
pacing threat. Well, when I hear pacing, I think like a pace 
car, we are keeping up with them.
    Would you assess, are we keeping up with them today? Is 
that still an accurate term, to call them a pacing threat?
    Admiral Kilby. They are a pacing threat. I would say 
shortly we are not keeping up with them.
    Mrs. Luria. Well, thank you.
    And I wanted to next highlight the fact that another thing 
I have said is that I think we lost a generation of 
shipbuilding.
    In 2007's Navy budget submission you wrote that new 
platforms, such as CVN-21 [Gerald R. Ford-class aircraft 
carrier], DDG(X), CG(X) [Next Generation Cruiser], LCS 
[littoral combat ship], Virginia-class SSN [attack submarine], 
LPD-17, LHA(R), and the MPS [maritime prepositioning ship] 
family of ships, will comprise our next generation of battle 
force ships.
    So of those eight classes of ships, half have either been 
failures or abandoned. We did not pursue the CG(X). We find 
ourselves today with cruisers that are over 30 years in age, 
which could severely impact our O&M [operation and maintenance] 
budget.
    And because the LCS is not fully mission capable and we got 
rid of the frigate--we are just now starting to replace the 
frigate--the same is also true for the DDG--for the DD(X).
    So for the past 20 years, we have lost a generation of 
building these surface combatants.
    And I think I will dovetail off what Mr. Gallagher said. In 
Congress what we want is a plan. And moreover what we want is 
to stop overstating and underdelivering. So every budget we 
have a plan. Every 30-year shipbuilding plan is, in my 
assessment, not really a 30-year shipbuilding plan because 
years 1 to 5 are constantly changing.
    So I am really running out of time, and I think I will 
pause until the next round of questions to continue my next 
line.
    Mr. Courtney. Actually, if, Admiral, you want to quickly 
respond or do you want to reserve on the second round to that?
    Admiral Kilby. I acknowledge Rep. Luria's statements. She 
is accurate. I feel the force design for the future will set us 
up for a better path.
    FFG(X) [Next Generation Guided Missile Frigate] is not a 
revolutionary ship. It has got all of many common elements that 
are on our platforms today. It will have a smaller AMDR radar.
    So I think, while I acknowledge what you said about LCS and 
the Zumwalt class, we are on a path to not have so many new 
technologies on new platforms.
    DDG(X) is going to take the combat system from the Flight 
III and put it on a ship that has got margin and reserve to 
grow into the future. So it is not such a tremendous leap.
    I am not trying to ignore what happened in the past. I 
acknowledge what you said. But the force designs have more 
smaller surface combatants, frigates, which are roughly 
equivalent in combat power, not in magazine capability, to a 
Flight IIA. It is an important part of distributed maritime 
operations. And to create a DDG(X) that has got the reserve to 
add some of the things that Representative Langevin intimated I 
think is equally important.
    Mrs. Luria. Well, Admiral Kilby, thank you for that.
    Mr. Courtney. We will continue. We will continue.
    Mrs. Luria. Yes. I yield back.
    Mr. Courtney. Great.
    Mr. Brown, the floor is yours.
    Mr. Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate you 
convening this meeting.
    I want to thank all of our panelists for presenting and 
making yourself available to answer questions.
    I, too, want to pick up a little bit on something that Mr. 
Gallagher mentioned. He referenced his birth year of 1984. I 
just wanted to point out that is the year that I graduated 
college. But I also want to acknowledge that since that time he 
has far surpassed me in terms of acquiring and accumulating 
academic degrees.
    So with that out of the way, let me turn to the business at 
hand.
    So we consistently hear about the rising threats presented 
by China and the increasing significance, global significance, 
of INDOPACOM. Last year, the U.S. Navy deployed two MQ-4C 
Tritons to Guam as part of an early operational capability, and 
it is my understanding that initial reports were positive.
    My question for you, Admiral Kilby, can you discuss the 
benefits that Triton has been providing in its Western Pacific 
operations and its alignment to the future maritime 
surveillance needs in INDOPACOM more broadly?
    Admiral Kilby. Yes, sir.
    So Triton is providing benefit from an ISR [intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance] perspective. We want to get 
to an increased capability on that platform, which is called 
IFC-4 [Integrated Functional Capability-4] or multi-int 
[intelligence], and that allows me to do things that I can with 
an EP-3 [aircraft] now, in addition to what we are seeing from 
the Triton now.
    So our budget focuses on delivering that capability, that 
multi-int capability, which is some additional SIGINT [signals 
intelligence] capabilities and other things which will make 
that ship even more capable.
    But as we talked about in March at the unmanned campaign 
hearing, this development of this hybrid force of which the MQ-
4 is a part of that is building confidence in understanding our 
ability to execute these unmanned platforms.
    So I think the capability is undeniable. It is beneficial. 
And it is especially beneficial in a Phase Zero operation, 
where I am trying to maintain SA, or situational awareness, on 
greater areas of the ocean.
    Mr. Brown. Well, thank you.
    Mr. Stefany, given Admiral Kilby's previous statements and 
his statement today, and in light of the increasing need for 
maritime capabilities, what was the rationale for the break in 
Triton production in this budget? And how is the Navy 
mitigating potential disruptions to the supply chain?
    Mr. Stefany. Yes, sir.
    So the break in this year's budget was to allow the new 
capability that Admiral Kilby mentioned, that IFC-4, to get 
fully developed so we can install it in the aircraft coming off 
the line at Northrop Grumman, you know, have the new capability 
right in those aircraft as they come off the line.
    There are 10 aircraft that have been funded, that are under 
contract, that are in various stages of being built. And so 
taking a pause for a year would allow us to get those aircraft 
to have the new capability in them as they come off the line.
    As long as we restart in 2023, I do not believe there will 
be a large impact on the production line at Northrop Grumman.
    So that is part of our 2023 deliberation, is how many and 
what kind of profile going forward we will be budgeting for in 
2023 and out, sir.
    Mr. Brown. And just a quick follow-up.
    So I appreciate your assessment that you don't think there 
will be a large or major disruption in the supply chain. But it 
seems like implicit in what you are saying is that there will 
be a disruption.
    Is there anything that the Navy has considered, anything 
that the Navy is doing to mitigate impacts, albeit small, as 
you are suggesting, to the supply chain?
    Mr. Stefany. Sir, I do not know the specifics. Our program 
manager is working every day with the company on that. But I 
can get you some specifics on the lower level things we are 
working on in the supply chain for you, sir.
    Mr. Brown. Great. I appreciate that.
    Mr. Chairman, I will yield back the 23 seconds remaining of 
my time.
    Mr. Courtney. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Brown.
    Next up is Ms. Jacobs from California.
    Ms. Jacobs. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    And thank you all for being here.
    My first question is for Admiral Kilby.
    I represent San Diego, and my background is in foreign 
policy and national security, so I think our maritime mission 
is incredibly important. And I echo my colleagues' calls for a 
plan, and I will look forward to reading it when you will 
provide it.
    But I specifically wanted to follow up on my colleague 
Congresswoman Luria's questions around shipbuilding. As she 
said, we have seen a lot of delays, we have seen a lot of 
failures.
    And I am wondering what the larger systemwide problem is 
and why shipbuilding has proven so challenging for the Navy, 
and, more importantly in my mind, what lessons we have learned 
that we can apply to new programs, especially, if they get to 
be proven unmanned vessels, which the Navy plans to make a 
significant part of the future fleet growth as we move forward 
so we don't continue to have these same challenges.
    Admiral Kilby. Thanks, ma'am. I will start and I will ask 
Secretary Stefany to add on to anything that I don't cover 
adequately. Part of the answer--I want to go back to what I 
discussed briefly with Rep. Luria is that we make our designs a 
little more simple.
    Just a quick history lesson. When we created the Aegis-
class cruiser, we used a Spruance-class hull, and we introduced 
a new combat system and superstructure on that ship. Shortly 
thereafter, we introduced a new hull for the Arleigh Burke 
destroyer, which has proven to be remarkably successful, our 
most successful shipbuilding plan and shipbuilding class in the 
history of the United States Navy. But we didn't change the 
combat system. We took the combat system and evolved some 
sensors, but we really focused on a new plant, a new ship, a 
new hull form. And we are trying to return to that logic, and I 
will just dovetail that to Flight III as I discussed. We want 
to take the combat system from a Flight III destroyer, and 
introduce it into a DDG(X) hull. So I think that will help us 
because we are not introducing so many new things at once.
    To the frigate program, we are taking a proven hull design, 
and we are putting largely government-furnished equipment on 
that hull to achieve that capability. So I think those types of 
things are more executable perhaps than a new class with an 
exquisite new propulsion system and a new combat system.
    So I will just ask Secretary Stefany to join in that 
conversation. Before I yield, though, we talked in an unmanned 
hearing in March about redundancy and simplicity to achieve 
something. So, it could be for an unmanned surface vessel, I 
increase the number of engines I have to achieve that 
reliability as opposed to creating a new propulsion system for 
that ship. That might be a more reasonable path for us to 
pursue.
    Sir.
    Mr. Stefany. Thanks, Jim. I appreciate that.
    So a couple other items, ma'am. Completing the design, 
having it very mature before we start construction. In previous 
programs, some of the ones that we have not done well on, we 
have started--you know, 20, 30 percent on design and then 
moving out. We are trying to get into that 70, 80 percent 
complete before we start building. Evolutionary, try to build 
off what we already know. Commercial, where we can, use a 
commercial product or a commercial design, has really paid off 
for us in the past. So those are some of the practices we are 
trying to incorporate in the ships--in the unmanned craft as we 
go forward
    Ms. Jacobs. Well, thank you. And just on the unmanned, I 
remain concerned about the COLREGs [Collision Regulations], but 
we can go into that at another time.
    I will turn quickly to General Smith. I, earlier this week, 
talked with Sergeant Major Black and asked him about force 
design. I know we have gone over it a lot already in this 
hearing, but I wanted to ask, in particular, how the Marine 
Corps plans to navigate the fact that we need to be able to 
project force now with the fact that we need to be able to face 
challenges in the Pacific area in the future and how you are 
balancing those real and ongoing current threats with the 
future investments that we need to make?
    General Smith. Yes, ma'am. Very briefly, I would echo what 
my shipmate, Jim Kilby, said earlier that there is near-term 
risk that we are investing in some longer-term capabilities 
that we must have against a pacing threat we don't have now. In 
order to generate the resources for that, we divest of things 
that we cannot get to the fight immediately. So in all candor, 
ma'am, what happens is, you have to have those Marine 
expeditionary units. That is your fight tonight forward-
deployed force. The ARG MEUs, the amphibious ready groups, 
Marine expeditionary units that are forward deployed, those 
three-ship units that are out there. Navy-Marine teams ready to 
do humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and to strike if 
required.
    That is your mitigation factor, and in all candor, it is 
done on the back of a bunch of young lance corporals and a 
bunch of young sailors. That is who is absorbing the risk right 
now until we get where we have to go.
    Ms. Jacobs. Thank you. And in my last 2 seconds, I will 
just say that my office and I remain concerned about the cuts 
to the naval audit unit that I know came up in the full 
committee hearing, but Mr. Chair, I will yield back.
    Mr. Courtney. Great. Well, thank you, Ms. Jacobs. So now we 
have completed the first run-through. We are going to do a 
second round. And, again, thank you to the witnesses for your 
patience.
    Mr. Stefany, just to sort of follow up the question and 
maybe Admiral Kilby you can join in in terms of how we sort of 
overcome the problems of the past, which, again, I think 
everyone is being very upfront and, you know, no one is trying 
to deny that there has been issues in the past.
    I mean, I would say one of the most impressive examples of 
lessons learned is the Columbia program, you know. As of last 
year, the design completion was over 85 percent and, I mean, 
they are cutting steel, and they are starting to do prototypes, 
but in terms of, you know, when full production begins, 
comparing Columbia to the last SSBN program, the Ohio, the 
design completion was about 20 percent.
    Again, I live in Connecticut. I talk to the folks in the 
yard. I hear the stories. I mean, they had major problems back 
then. And we, again, I think are in a much better place with 
the design completion, again, as we are on the eve of 
construction. We have also--there are some new technologies in 
the Columbia. There is going to be a life-of-ship reactor, 
which is going to mean no refuelings for this program, which is 
a real cost saver for the taxpayer, and more efficiency that is 
going to be included with that and there is an electric 
propulsor system, which is new.
    On the other hand, there is a lot of lessons learned from 
Virginia which are being incorporated into Columbia. So we are 
not reinventing the wheel in terms of every aspect of the 
submarine. I don't know if you wanted to just sort of talk 
about that because I do think--frankly, we have to do this. The 
timing for replacement of Ohio is knife edge, and the cost 
requires us to pursue every efficiency possible.
    Mr. Stefany. Yes, sir. Couple of points. Columbia, our goal 
was 83 percent design complete before we started construction, 
and you point out we had 85 percent, right, so we had a goal 
that we had never actually achieved before, and we exceeded it, 
and put the effort in in Columbia to make sure that we held 
that till we started building the ship.
    Some of the prototyping, some of the unique features to 
make the ships more affordable in the overall life, we actually 
prototyped--construction prototyped those before we actually 
put them into the design of the ship itself. So I think that 
will pay off going forward.
    Some of the things like--like you mentioned Virginia, sir, 
one of the things we did learn is we had some life-of-the-ship 
components that we did not test beforehand and we are finding 
out they aren't really lasting the life of those Virginia 
submarines. So we are actually proving out that our--if we have 
a new idea, or a new way of sustaining the vessel, that we want 
to prove it out first. So those are some key things.
    To Rep. Gallagher, don't change anything once we start. 
That is another key to Columbia. We are holding tight and not 
making changes now that we have started construction. So those 
are just some of the major lessons we have learned to not 
repeat past sins, so to speak, sir.
    Mr. Courtney. Great. And I would note that this 
subcommittee participated in this process when we created the 
National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund [NSBDF], which, again, much 
to our exasperation, has not been fully embraced by the 
Pentagon. Nonetheless, the multiyear authorities which NSBDF 
includes, again, I think, we have seen from both Congressional 
Budget Office and CRS [Congressional Research Service], 
impressive feedback about efficiencies in savings that those 
authorities have allowed.
    And it is my understanding we are going to, maybe, take up 
some more this year in the budget to, again, keep the good 
momentum moving forward. Is that correct?
    Mr. Stefany. Yes, sir. We absolutely appreciate those 
authorities. It does--administratively, getting the money into 
the fund is a problem, but once it is in there, we are taking 
advantage of those authorities. Thank you.
    Mr. Courtney. Well, we are on standby to help move that and 
fix that issue. Real quick on sealift, you know, the budget 
talked a bit about sort of opportunities for more used vessels 
that can help deal with what I think everyone on this 
subcommittee agrees is, you know, a concerning aging fleet that 
is out there right now. You know, we have not gotten actually 
that analysis, and I really would ask that the Navy, please, 
share us with that.
    I would also note that, you know, again, this subcommittee 
sort of led the way in terms of the National Security Multi-
Mission Vessel construction program, which is now happening in 
Philadelphia, which is using sort of a different contracting 
model, which we think is going to be a real potential exciting 
opportunity to, again, fix some of the problems that Mrs. Luria 
talked about in terms of, you know, just the clunkiness of our 
acquisition programs, and I see that as transferable to 
sealift.
    So can you talk about what is the Navy's view of new-build 
sealift?
    Mr. Stefany. So I will start with that last point first and 
work backwards, sir. I was actually with the Shipbuilders 
Council of America yesterday and talked about that very point 
of can we buy ships like a commercial company would buy ships 
and not buy through the normal FAR [Federal Acquisition 
Regulation]-type regulations. That would streamline the 
process, save a lot of money, and if it is a commercial ship 
anyway, which is what sealift would be, why not do that?
    So I am committed to at least look in and see if that is a 
possibility for whatever new we buy. As far as the used, we are 
buying, as you are aware, two from last year and then this 
year's budget proposes five more used ships for the Ready 
Reserve Force, and we will be using--we are using that same 
concept for buying those through the Maritime Administration 
that, of course, they used to buy the ships you are talking 
about up in Philly shipyard. So that having a commercial entity 
go out and buy those used ships and convert them to U.S. 
standards and then deliver them back to us.
    As far as the overall study, I will have to ask Admiral 
Kilby to let you know where that analysis is, sir.
    Admiral Kilby. Yeah. We will just take that for action to 
get you that report, sir.
    Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Admiral.
    Mr. Wittman.
    Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Vice Admiral Kilby, I want to go to you, and today is the 
anniversary of the collision involving USS Fitzgerald and the 
loss of seven sailors. And it still continues to haunt me today 
where there was lack of leadership on the part of a number of 
folks in Navy leadership, on folks in the surface warfare 
community. And I still don't believe that we are at the point 
where we have adequately addressed all of the issues that were 
identified with that.
    In fact, I want to go to the GAO [Government Accountability 
Office] report that came out earlier this month where they 
said, their words, it said: Sailors are not receiving adequate 
sleep. And they further stated: Sailors' fatigue poses a 
considerable risk to the safe and effective operation of Navy 
ships.
    In fact, just today, the GAO issued a report that said: By 
a factor of four to one, SWOs [surface warfare officers] 
believe specialized career paths would better prepare them for 
their duties than the current generalist path. The SWO 
community is screaming for change.
    Tell me, what is the Navy going to do in relation to those 
calls and the continued need, I believe, to address issues 
within the surface warfare community?
    Admiral Kilby. Yes, sir. First off, we all share your 
feelings about Fitzgerald and McCain. I was in Hawaii coming 
back from deployment when ships that were left behind for my 
strike group were called to support Fitzgerald. We have done a 
lot of work, we feel, to professionalize and increase our 
mariner skill training. Some of those investments are still 
underway in Norfolk and San Diego, and will prove to be 
sufficient.
    I think the initial data that we are seeing for our 
training is proving to be sufficient as far as JOOD [junior 
officer of the deck] training and OOD [officer of the deck] 
training. And that goes all the way up to the chain of command 
where there are sailors, or officers, who previously had 
screened for a command, did not make it through the 
shiphandling trainer, and were removed from the command bank. 
So to me those are all significant, positive steps.
    I can't speak for the study, but I just can tell you on my 
personal experience, I have never been in the same department 
twice--engineering, combat systems, operations. So I have 
worked in every department except supply. And in the balance, 
my own personal opinion for me is, it prepared me to be a 
better commanding officer. Now, I am not saying that is the 
answer; I am just telling you that is my experience.
    So we will have to go review the proposal here and 
understand the impact on our training and our system, but I 
wanted to share my own personal anecdote, because when I was 
initial commanding officer, that is new to me. I am new to 
being the captain. And when people are coming and making 
reports, I had some context because I had worked in those 
departments and I thought it prepared me better. So I think 
that is probably on the other side of the ledger from the 
proposals here.
    I don't understand, or I don't have experience in exposure 
to the data that says a factor of four to one says that we 
should be specialists. So I need to take a look up on that and 
come back to you.
    Mr. Wittman. I think that is incredibly important. I think 
there are a whole litany of issues that need to be addressed--
career path, retention, very specifically female SWO officer 
retention. Also, reciprocity as far as SWO training and what it 
can relate to as somebody separates or retires, especially SCTW 
[Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for 
Seafarers] certification, so somebody can go into the merchant 
mariner realm. And when we talk about the Ready Reserve fleet, 
you know, one of the issues is not just ships; it is mariners 
to run those ships. I think all those things are critically 
important to consider.
    Secretary Stefany, can you tell me, what is the penalty 
associated with not entering into a production contract for the 
second destroyer in fiscal year 2022?
    Mr. Stefany. Yes, sir. The contract, multiyear contract we 
have in place has a penalty of $33 million in either contracts, 
whether it is Bath or Ingalls, it would be a $33 million 
penalty for what we call breaking that multiyear contract, sir.
    Mr. Wittman. So not only will we be I think damaging the 
workforce as Mr. Golden pointed out, but also we will be 
suffering a penalty, a monetary penalty, where those dollars 
could be used, I think, in a much, much better way rather than 
paying a penalty.
    Mr. Stefany. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Wittman. Let me ask this on the amphibious ship buy. 
What is the anticipated savings by executing the block buy with 
the LHD and the three LPDs?
    Mr. Stefany. So we just recently finished negotiations with 
the shipyard Ingalls and the saving is about 7.1 percent, or 
around $700 million, sir.
    Mr. Wittman. One last question. The Commandant has 
suggested a light amphibious warfare ship to provide the 
opportunity for the Marine Corps to execute the Commandant's 
Planning Guidance and what he wants is a smaller ship, 
something that can move around. The debate has always been 
should it be built to a military standard, should it be built 
to a commercial ship standard?
    Can you tell me what does the Navy believe about this? Do 
you believe it should be built to a combat ship standard or a 
commercial ship standard?
    Mr. Stefany. Sir, is that question for me?
    Mr. Wittman. Yeah. I want you and then Lieutenant General 
Smith and Vice Admiral Kilby.
    Mr. Stefany. Okay. I believe the other point the Commandant 
wanted was an affordable ship as well, so I think a commercial 
standards with specific Navy features is the way we need to go 
for this ship, and what those features are needs to be worked 
out with the Marine Corps.
    Mr. Wittman. Very good.
    General Smith.
    General Smith. Sir, very briefly, Admiral Kilby and I sit 
on the requirements evaluation team for that [inaudible]. So we 
are in lockstep. There is zero daylight between Jim and myself 
on that. It needs to be something that is, as Secretary Stefany 
said, affordable, so we can get it in numbers, and it has to be 
something that looks like everything else that is out there. 
You need to protect the cargo, meaning the Marines and the 
sailors that are on it for a limited period of time in order to 
be able to evacuate them.
    That is the purpose of that ship. I know that is not a 
loved sentiment, but that cargo is precious to us, so it has to 
go off, but it has to be affordable in large numbers, sir, and 
it has to look like everything else. And I would pass to my 
shipmate.
    Admiral Kilby. I am in agreement with Eric. My 
recollection, sir, may be imperfect here is that the law was 
born from the INFSA [Integrated Naval Force Structure 
Assessment] study the Navy and the Marine Corps did when we 
were responding to force design, which was acknowledgement that 
we needed a different platform to support the EAB 
[expeditionary advanced base] concept.
    So--but Eric's right. We have been lockstep on this. My 
analogy, though trite, is if I am buying F-150 truck, I want to 
buy a custom truck; I don't want to buy an Eddie Bauer truck. 
Because if I take the Eddie Bauer off road, I might damage it, 
but the custom is built to do that and that is what I wanted--
how I want to treat this amphibious warship, because I need to 
support those Marines.
    Similarly, I need to look at survivability, which could be 
let's make sure that that ship if, regrettably, if it takes 
damage, I can get the most important cargo off that ship, which 
is the Marines and sailors that are on it.
    So that is all going into the mix, as well as what does 
that ship look like. So there is a lot of conversation now as 
Eric and I get together with the Marine and Navy team to kind 
of refine the top-level requirements to understand what we need 
the ship to do.
    Mr. Wittman. Very good. Thank you, Vice Admiral Kilby.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Wittman.
    Next up is Mr. Golden.
    Mr. Golden. Thank you. I guess I will give this one to both 
of you, and bear with me because I am kind of thinking it 
through. You know, up at Bath Iron Works, I have spent a lot of 
time up there getting to know the workers, touring that yard, 
and learning about the past several years.
    One of the difficulties I think up there has been the DDG-
1000 [Zumwalt-class guided-missile destroyer], which I know you 
are very familiar with. They put a lot of work into changing 
the way they did things, changing the way they built things, 
reorganizing the yard, learning some new skills or how to do 
them a little bit differently, and even acquiring new tools to 
do the work with.
    They devoted a big part of their experienced workforce to 
that while hiring younger guys who were kind of staying on the 
Flight like IIA, and then all of a sudden the whole thing gets 
a big change package on them and disrupts the whole thing, and 
now they got to move these guys back. They got to reorganize 
their yard again. Really threw them for a loop and all over a 
weapon system, essentially, that hasn't--we don't have one or, 
therefore, a mission set with the Zumwalt.
    I see that the Navy now has an acquisition out to try and 
get a hypersonic on these ships, and I assume that the Navy is 
finding that they bring some unique capabilities, some good 
capabilities.
    So, one, how are we going to get something good out of 
these three Zumwalts? But secondly, what are you going to learn 
from it as you think about the DDG(X) and talking about the 
DDG(X)? Why don't you feel like you already have a hull? 
Perhaps the deck is a problem. You can scrap that. You got a 
big hull that you can pack a lot of power into. You have got an 
integrated power system and you are looking at putting 
hypersonics on it.
    How can we ensure that this doesn't happen again, so that 
when you do make the move to the DDG(X), we don't see this kind 
of back and forth, but, rather, get a successful change?
    Admiral Kilby. So I will start and then ask Secretary 
Stefany to come in. One, an important point is, this 
introduction of CPS [Conventional Prompt Strike] on DDG-1000, 
right, that ship has the capacity to allow us to introduce that 
weapon system, and not only that, its design of the launching 
system is virtually the same as the Virginia-class submarine. 
So we will get a benefit by installing that on DDG-1000, a two-
fold benefit.
    One, we will take that ship that, as you point out, was 
designed with another weapon system that didn't prove to be 
fruitful for us, and we are repurposing it for an effect that I 
think is significant, especially in the Pacific AOR [area of 
responsibility]. And, we will reduce risk on our way to install 
that capability on the Virginia class. So I think that is, 
first and foremost, important to get all we can out of those 
ships.
    Second point, we are doing a lot of work and have been 
doing a lot of work at Carderock, and some of the staff members 
have been exposed to that work, and DDG-1000 hulls or variants 
of those hulls are in the mix to make sure we get the right 
hull form to do what we need to do.
    As you point out, Rep. Golden, one of the key tenets is 
this integrated power system, which will allow us to install 
some of the weapon systems Rep. Langevin referred to, right? So 
I am now having not an electrical distribution system and a 
propulsion system, but a single system that gives me margin to 
do that in the future.
    So I don't think it is all gone away. I think that is all 
in the mix and we are considering all those options.
    So, Secretary Stefany.
    Mr. Stefany. On DDG-1000, I will point out that that ship 
was a whole new hull form, a whole new propulsion plant, and 
had 10 technologies that we had never done before that were 
being brought into that ship. So the lesson learned from there 
is, as Admiral Kilby has mentioned before for DDG(X) or 
whatever comes after DDG-51, we will not put them all in one, 
not have a new hull form or new propulsion plant and a whole 
new combat system all at once, but we will evolve and keep, at 
least initially for the first few hulls, the combat system the 
same and then evolve to the new combat system needs of the 
future that the current DDG-51 just can't accommodate because 
of power. And, so, a stepped approach is how we are, I believe, 
we are going to keep the cost and the risk within----
    Mr. Golden. Let me just say, we're proud of the work that 
the shipbuilders did, they got it done. You know, I guess, part 
of what I am interested in is, what can we do productively 
working together, this committee and the Navy and both of the 
yards, to figure out in advance what are we going to put on 
this thing for weapons systems and make sure that it is a 
successful transition? I hope that is a conversation that we 
can have.
    Mr. Stefany. So I think the best part is to get both 
companies with us in the conversation up front on day one and, 
I believe, both the companies are now involved and that is the 
most important thing for us to do.
    Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Golden.
    Mr. Gallagher.
    Mr. Gallagher. I think we had a really--for the navalists 
on the committee, we have had a really interesting week. And if 
I could attempt to summarize, well, at least what I have 
learned, it seems like, particularly with the testimony we had 
2 days ago and what really came out in Representative Luria's 
questioning to the CNO and others was, since at least 2004 we 
have been playing this sort of divest-to-invest game, or making 
this argument that, well, we are going to buy future capability 
even though we can't really make the math work for present 
capacity. And so on the committee--and I have only been here 5 
years--kind of feel a little bit like, you know, Charlie Brown 
and you guys are Lucy with the football and we keep getting it 
pulled out from under us and putting all our eggs in the basket 
of some sort of future, magical third offset thing is going to 
solve all our problems for us. But now we are starting to see 
all these signals from the environment, right?
    You know, the PLA has a bigger battle force navy than we 
have, right? They are being more aggressive. They just had a 
historic number of aircraft threaten Taiwan. And now we find 
ourselves in what I have called the Davidson window struggling 
with this tradeoff between the capacity demands of the present 
and sort of the promise of future capability. And I think to 
the extent you are hearing frustration on the committee, that 
is really it. And if we are operating on a 6-year time 
horizon--it is actually not just a matter, Lieutenant General 
Smith, of being able to fight now, it is what are we doing now 
to deter that fight from happening, to prevent the worst-case 
scenario. And it is useful to plan against the Taiwan scenario, 
because it is, in some ways, the most dangerous course of 
action.
    So, recognizing we are not going to solve this problem 
right now, and that we are just at the beginning of this 
conversation, I would just be curious--and I will pick on the 
Marine Corps because I am a Marine--what is the Marine Corps 
doing now, today, to deter the PLA from attempting an invasion 
of Taiwan? What are we doing to get into the OODA [observe, 
orient, decide, act] loop of all the generals and the admirals 
and the party officials that are looking at that and thinking, 
you know, in a couple weeks, we got the 100th anniversary of 
the founding of the party, America seems divided, Russians seem 
to have gotten away with invading a country, this might 
actually be a pretty good time to test limits. What are we 
doing today to deter?
    General Smith. Sir, what III MEF, III Marine Expeditionary 
Force, Lieutenant General Clardy would tell you is we are out 
there every single day with 31st MEU and III Marine 
Expeditionary Force. So it's 20,000 Marines west of the date 
line, 27,000, give or take, in the Pacific. And to your--
exercising, demonstrating, reassuring allies and partners. To 
your point about the divest/invest, I hear you, sir, that----
    Mr. Courtney. Is your microphone on?
    General Smith. How is that, sir?
    Mr. Courtney. That's much better.
    General Smith. So, sir, General Clardy and III MEF is 
absolutely out there exercising, demonstrating daily, allies 
and partners, using those 27,000 Marines in the Pacific, again, 
20,000 west of the date line.
    To your point, sir, about we have to get there, the things 
that we are trying to invest in now, sir, are done; they are 
proven. The MQ-9 Reaper with pods on it that enable you to pass 
data across the expansive Pacific, done. We own that--two 
systems now. The Naval Strike Missile fired off the back of a 
Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, done; successfully tested in the 
last few months. The Organic Precision Fires-Mounted where we 
are able to kill moving vehicles, in this hearing I will say in 
excess of 80 kilometers, in replacement for the tank, done; 
five for five test shots. So those things are available now, 
sir. Now, it is just a matter of getting them at scale through 
production into the hands of the warfighter.
    Mr. Gallagher. How critical would your concept of a light 
amphibious warship be to that deterrence by denial posture? How 
would it support the Marine littoral regiments?
    General Smith. Sure. Vital, sir, because we are, in fact, 
the deterrence force along with our forward-deployed naval 
partners. We are the conventional deterrent. That light 
amphibious warship provides ambiguity for us; i.e., sir, when 
there is limited, unambiguous warning from an adversary, those 
vessels can go with those assets I just described and get--
because they are beachable--anywhere in 4 days throughout that 
region, and now you have to respect those small 75 Marine units 
to enable distributed maritime operations. Those things are 
vital, sir.
    Mr. Gallagher. Yeah. So I guess I will just close by 
saying, I understand we have to think long term and we have to 
make smart long-term investments, and think about future 
capability, but I just think we are--and I am not suggesting I 
have the answer, but I think we are going to need to get real 
creative real fast in terms of fixing our problem within the 
Davidson window, and deterring what could be a disastrous 
situation that would completely destroy our deterrent posture 
globally, not just in the first island chain, but globally.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Courtney. Great. Thank you, Mr. Gallagher.
    Mrs. Luria.
    Mrs. Luria. Well, thank you and I will start by echoing Mr. 
Gallagher's sentiment. I have said it many times. I think when 
you have a Battle Force 2025, because of this immediate 
concern, threat deterrent that we need in the Pacific, and, you 
know, very encouraged by the idea of the LAWs [light amphibious 
warships]. I think that the idea that we came up with the idea 
for a capability that can bring the fight forward, can go after 
some of the vulnerabilities of the Chinese in the theater is 
very important, and I want to, a little bit in the weeds, go 
back to try to understand, again, the genesis of this.
    Quite simply, is there a document that was generated? Is 
there a process by which PACOM [U.S. Indo-Pacific Command] and/
or the Joint Staff translated this requirement forward in order 
to then lead to the acquisition process and, i.e., the requests 
that you have in this budget? How do we do more of this? What 
process is there that allows us to quickly operationalize a 
concept to actually delivery?
    General Smith. Very briefly, because I know your time is 
short. Our previous Commandant, General Neller, said this is 
what we are going to do. He issued out a document that said, 
begin to do this. Our Marine Corps Warfighting Lab issued a 
tentative manual for expeditionary advanced base operations. 
That is out now for review. Start with this and modify it. But 
the demand signal, really, ma'am, does come--nothing in a 
formal document, but it comes in our daily interactions with 
INDOPACOM through Marine Forces Pacific. It comes through those 
headquarters and say that COCOM [combatant command] has 
delivered a demand signal, what can you do for me?
    Mrs. Luria. So the demand signal through the GFM process, 
the global force management process, or future capabilities? 
How is the combatant commander, how is Admiral Davidson, now 
Admiral Aquilino, communicating to you as the services that are 
going to acquire capabilities that are requested through this 
budget, how is that being communicated into a process where 
that actually results in us buying something new, like the LAWs 
in order to help in the theater?
    General Smith. That certainly, ma'am, comes through their 
prioritized lists of things that they care about, they wish to 
have. It also just comes through literally, ma'am, daily 
interactions from the service components that are part of 
INDOPACOM saying this is what my boss just referenced; rather 
than wait on a formal process, I need this. Then the service 
chief with his title 10 authority says, this is what I want you 
to go look at and we take off looking for that. And in our case 
I think we found it.
    Mrs. Luria. Okay. Well, thank you for that feedback and 
perhaps an additional conversation I can continue with your 
staff. So I just was, again, thinking about what the combatant 
commander wants, needs, demands, and over the course of 
preparing for this week's multiple hearings, I noticed in the 
2006 budget submission, it was stated that the fleet response 
plan construct was going to go from 24 months to 27 months and 
out of that, that would generate six carrier strike groups 
within 30 days, and two additional carrier strike groups within 
60 days. So that would be a six-plus-two construct. And that 
was as recent as 2006.
    And then the next year, it said six carrier strike groups 
in 30 days and one additional CSG [carrier strike group] with 
an additional 60 days, so we got to six plus one. And in 2010, 
it was just referred to multiple CSGs in the timeline, and at 
that point we went from 27 to 32 months. We got to a three plus 
two. Now we are at 36 months and it is arguable, you know, what 
carrier strike group presence we could generate in the Pacific 
within the timeline we would need for the TPFDD [Time Phased 
Force Deployment Data].
    So we just continue to say that all of these things we are 
doing are getting after this problem, but if you just look at 
this history, this is 15 years of timeframe where we have 
reduced our operating cycle time, we have reduced our 
capability to provide our major assets, like carrier strike 
groups, on station in the Western Pacific to meet a potential 
conflict there.
    And so I just thought wrapping this up and wrapping up kind 
of a week of Navy hearings, you know, every single time through 
this we keep hearing that there are going to be benefits, we 
are going to do things, we are going to change things, we are 
going to divest to invest, but we never see those benefits 
materialize.
    In fact, this is 15 years of actually seeing less force 
generation possible to deal with this conflict, and no one ever 
goes back and says, ``Hey, you said this would fix the problem, 
but it didn't.'' So just kind of wanted to wrap up the time I 
have today by saying, you know, that that is just what I am 
trying to do. I am just trying to point out that, you know, 
many courses of time before I or anyone on this dais was here, 
it feels as though the Navy has continued to come forward with 
these similar claims, and it is not very compelling, this 
divest-to-invest strategy.
    And I know that my time is expired.
    And I will yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Courtney. Actually, I mean, we are really at the tail 
end. If any of the witnesses wanted to respond to that, we have 
got time.
    Admiral Kilby. Yeah. I acknowledge, Rep. Luria, your 
points, and all the work you did to lay that out. A couple of 
comments. Admiral Davidson, when he was Fleet Forces Command, 
really his predecessor, Admiral Gortney, created OFRP 
[Optimized Fleet Response Plan], instantiated it, and then 
distributed maritime operations, which is a way to get after 
this threat. And I would say that the--my view of the Navy is 
we have been focused on China since the 2008-2009 timeframe 
with the inset--the inception of the DF-21.
    So the things that we have invested in, like an SM-6IB, 
like a maritime strike Tomahawk, might not be there if we 
hadn't had that foresight of several years ago to get after 
that so we can deliver those weapons by the 2025, 2026 
timeframe, because it takes a long time to make a new weapon 
system. And those are significant and really focused on that 
adversary. But your point is well taken.
    I guess I would harken back to we have got to be--my belief 
is, this is a Kilby belief, we've got to be disciplined on the 
use of our Navy. So when we do request for forces, and we use 
up carriers and extend them, we are dipping into that well and 
we are paying--we are using today's resource not husbanding it 
tomorrow because we are shortening the maintenance 
availabilities, we are compressing things.
    So we have to be clear-headed and clear-minded about that 
with the assets we have. The goal of this budget was to create 
the most impactful force we could within the budget we had. And 
so I don't want to come off as viewing cruisers as not 
valuable. They are valuable. In the decision process we made to 
try to maintain those investments on those capabilities, we had 
to make some very hard choices. And in that is the nonfunding 
of the DDG--Flight III DDG in 2022.
    So I think you bring up a lot of great points, ma'am, and 
we have got to continue this understanding of got to fund 
Columbia, which is expensive to do it right, to get to all the 
performance you laid out, Rep. Courtney. We have got to fund 
readiness, because if we don't have a ready force, we don't 
have a force. And that includes the maintenance, the training, 
the supply, all those elements that make it up.
    And then the capabilities are equally important, and then 
capacity is also a part of that, because capacity and 
capability equal lethality. So it is complex. But I think you 
bring up great points, and we, in this budget, try to create 
the most impactful mix, the most valuable mix given the 
resources we had.
    Mr. Courtney. Great. Well, thank you for that very 
thoughtful exchange, but, again, we get the final word when we 
do the markup. So we look forward to continuing this 
discussion. What is that? To be continued.
    Mr. Golden actually made one last request to have a quick 
question, I think to Lieutenant General Smith; then I think we 
are going to wrap it up here.
    Mr. Golden, the floor is yours.
    Mr. Golden. Thank you to the chair and ranking member for 
graciously entertaining me and to all three of you as well. I 
am sure everyone is anxious to get going, and I got to get 3 
miles in before I get back to the district.
    So I just wanted to talk a little bit more about some of 
what you were talking about with Representative Luria, General. 
You were talking about sea denial capability as part of this 
redesign and I have also heard you and the Commandant talk 
about reconnaissance being the eyes and ears, the sensing 
capabilities that you are looking to bring forward.
    When you think about sea denial capabilities in this 
redesign, is that something that you really see as, like, the 
reconnaissance, the eyes and the ears in support of sea denial 
activities carried out by the Navy, or is that actually also an 
offensive capability that you are looking to bring?
    General Smith. Sir, it is both.
    Mr. Golden. So, for example, seizing a strategically 
important shipping lane and locking it down?
    General Smith. Sir, absolutely.
    Mr. Golden. Containing an adversary inside of a cordoned 
area?
    General Smith. Yes, sir. And most importantly, sir, as that 
inside force who can sense and make sense, because we are 
there. We see it with our reconnaissance assets. I can pass 
that data back to Navy ships, to passing F-35As. I can pass 
that to anyone who has long-range precision fires, and I can 
act on it myself with those precision fires that I bring with 
me. So it is both of those things, sir.
    And, frankly, sir, the deterrent piece, when I am there 
with an ally and partner who now understands I have got 
capability to deter that adversary in war, probably a little 
tighter relationship in peacetime.
    Mr. Golden. Yep. Absolutely. Forgive me if I am asking the 
wrong question. I don't know that there is a right answer, but 
as you think about all of this, would you say that the 
cornerstone of your ability to conduct this mission that has 
been envisioned is the squad, the platoon, the company, or the 
battalion?
    General Smith. Not a trite statement, it is the Marine. It 
is always the individual Marine. And it is the training and the 
recruitment of the right individuals, the training of them, the 
fostering, the mentoring, the coaching, the teaching, so that 
they will do what you did, sir, in Afghanistan, and go into 
harm's way willingly, but it is the individual Marine, sir.
    Mr. Golden. So down at the squad level?
    General Smith. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Golden. Just a few more quick questions. Just wanted to 
make sure myself and also the committee and the Appropriations 
Committee understand just as you are looking at fiscal year 
2023, and that guidance, that requirement you have been given 
by the Commandant, I know you won't let him down. What in this 
budget is important not just for fiscal year 2023, but for the 
next big step that you have to take in this redesign?
    General Smith. Sir, the thing that we actually, that we 
must have, we have to have the long-range precision fires 
because of the long lead time of those missile systems, both 
the Naval Strike Missile and the Tomahawks. People down in 
Tucson at Raytheon are busting their backsides fighting through 
COVID. We cannot--we can't offer time to the adversary. If you 
wait till we are finished and then begin to procure, you are 
giving them a 2-year gift, and we can't do it.
    Mr. Golden. You need funding for it.
    So you have talked about the Reaper, the missile, the 
precision fires. I know you are looking for mobility, the 
amphib ship. Don't give me the Marines make do with less answer 
and [inaudible] need to think outside the box, but what is the 
next thing that is out there? What keeps you up at night that 
you wish you had if we could give you everything?
    General Smith. Sir, here is what keeps me up at night, and 
I hate to say this, sir, it is not a thing; it is a prospect. 
It is the prospect of a humanitarian assistance disaster 
relief, for example, happening in that region where I used to 
command--Indonesia, Bangladesh, the Philippines--and the first 
thing that arrives is a Chinese amphib, not a United States 
amphib with Marines and sailors aboard. That is what keeps me 
up at night, sir.
    Mr. Golden. You want the amphib. I will just say--and we 
don't have to work it all out right now, obviously, but I would 
be interested to, you know, talk more about it--what keeps me 
up at night is I think about the squad or the company out there 
or the individual Marine doing a mission like this out on an 
island in a strait taking on a pretty big mission. It is comms 
[communications]. You know, the infantryman always laughs about 
comms. It always goes wrong. It is always the reason why things 
don't go according to plan. So do you have the comms capability 
on both sides, Navy and Marines, to go out there and carry this 
out? Do you have what you need right now? And if you do, have 
you tested it out and do you know that it works?
    General Smith. We have some, sir, but it is not sufficient 
when an adversary--a pacing adversary decides to enter into the 
jamming and the deception game. We do have a pretty robust 
package, sir, and that is one of the elements of our force 
design package. And I will pass to Admiral Kilby. We do have 
some pretty robust resilient comms, sir, but they are not 
enough against a pacing threat and we are trying to double down 
to harden them and to make them more resilient when we are 
knocked off of the larger grid so we have a joint force 
maritime component command communications network.
    And with your forbearance, I would pass to my shipmate for 
what the Navy has invested heavily in.
    Admiral Kilby. Couple quick comments. One, the value of a 
naval service is that we can be mobile, and we can create our 
own network from a strike group, or an ESG [expeditionary 
strike group], or a SAG [surface action group], if we have an 
elevated platform and a comms relay. So that is a value 
proposition that we should recognize.
    The second piece is this thing called Project Overmatch. So 
that is using technology today in a different manner to make 
our comms more robust and resilient, and that is a significant 
effort for the Navy.
    So you will see that burgeoning in 2022, but more robustly 
in the future and it is a key to not only the Navy, but the 
unmanned portion of the Navy in the future that we get that 
right.
    Mr. Golden. Thank you, gentlemen. I would just say, please, 
think about that, invest in it, and make sure you ask for what 
you need. The comms is key.
    Mr. Courtney. Great. Well, thank you, Mr. Golden. So I 
think we have done our two rounds. Again, I want to thank the 
witnesses for your patience and look forward to working with 
you in the future.
    And with no further ado, this subcommittee is adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 1:02 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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                            A P P E N D I X

                             June 17, 2021
     
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              PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                             June 17, 2021

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              QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                             June 17, 2021

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                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN

    Mr. Langevin. I'm very happy with how enthusiastically the Navy has 
embraced directed energy in the future with the upcoming Directed 
Energy Campaign Plan and future ship classes getting designed to 
accommodate the technology. Looking at the current fleet, I saw the 
HELIOS on the unfunded priority list. What is the Navy doing to field 
directed energy systems today? When will we see a budget that 
prioritizes the fielding of high energy lasers in quantities that are 
relevant to the fight? Before my time runs out, Mr. Stefany, your 
written testimony mentions that the Navy is investing against cyber 
protection in this PB, but it looks like the major cyber accounts have 
relatively flat funding. Where are you making these investments?
    Mr. Stefany. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]

                                  [all]