[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



                         [H.A.S.C. No. 117-89]

                                HEARING

                                   ON

                   NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

                          FOR FISCAL YEAR 2023

                                  AND

              OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS

                               BEFORE THE

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                      SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR 
                          AND LAND FORCES HEARING

                                   ON

                      FISCAL YEAR 2023 MARINE CORPS 
                          MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS

                               __________

                              HEARING HELD
                              MAY 13, 2022


                                     
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 

                                __________

                                
                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
48-526                     WASHINGTON : 2023                    
          
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            SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES

                 DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey, Chairman

RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona               VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri
SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California        MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland           ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia
MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey, Vice     SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
    Chair                            MATT GAETZ, Florida
KAIALI'I KAHELE, Hawaii              DON BACON, Nebraska
MARC A. VEASEY, Texas                MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee
STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida         RONNY JACKSON, Texas
STEVEN HORSFORD, Nevada

                 Bill Sutey, Professional Staff Member
                Kelly Repair, Professional Staff Member
                           Payson Ruhl, Clerk
                           
                           C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

              STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Hartzler, Hon. Vicky, a Representative from Missouri, Ranking 
  Member, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces...........     2
Norcross, Hon. Donald, a Representative from New Jersey, 
  Chairman, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces.........     1

                               WITNESSES

Stefany, Frederick J., Principal Civilian Deputy, Assistant 
  Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and 
  Acquisition; LtGen Mark R. Wise, USMC, Deputy Commandant for 
  Aviation, U.S. Marine Corps; and LtGen Karsten S. Heckl, USMC, 
  Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 
  and Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration, 
  U.S. Marine Corps..............................................     4

                                APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

    Norcross, Hon. Donald........................................    27
    Stefany, Frederick J., joint with LtGen Mark R. Wise and 
      LtGen Karsten S. Heckl.....................................    29

Documents Submitted for the Record:

    [There were no Documents submitted.]

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

    Mrs. Hartzler................................................    47
    Dr. Jackson..................................................    47

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

    Dr. Jackson..................................................    51
          FISCAL YEAR 2023 MARINE CORPS MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS

                              ----------                              

                  House of Representatives,
                       Committee on Armed Services,
              Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces,
                              Washington, DC, Friday, May 13, 2022.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:01 a.m., in 
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Donald Norcross 
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

  OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD NORCROSS, A REPRESENTATIVE 
  FROM NEW JERSEY, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND 
                          LAND FORCES

    Mr. Norcross. Good morning and welcome to what is our 
second subcommittee hearing reviewing the Department's fiscal 
year 2023 budget request.
    But, before I continue, I need to review the protocols for 
all members remotely joining the hearing. Members participating 
must be visible onscreen for the purposes of identity 
verification, establishing and maintaining a quorum, 
participating in the proceedings, and voting. Members must 
continue to use the software platform's video function the 
entire time while in attendance, unless they experience 
connectivity issues or other technical problems that render 
them unable to participate on camera. If a member is 
experiencing technical difficulties, they should contact the 
committee staff for assistance.
    With that, I would like to turn to my opening remarks. As I 
mentioned, we believe we have until 11:00, maybe quarter of, 
but we are going to stretch that out as far as we can. We 
appreciate you working with us.
    So, first of all, today, I would like to welcome Mr. Jay 
Stefany, Principal Civilian Deputy, Assistant Secretary of the 
Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition; Lieutenant 
General Wise, Deputy Commandant for Aviation; and Lieutenant 
General Heckl, Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat 
Development Command, and Deputy Commandant for Combat 
Development and Integration.
    Thank you for being with us today, and I look forward to 
this discussion.
    It is important that we acknowledge the context of this 
year's Marine Corps modernization budget request. Three years 
ago, the Commandant of the Corps embarked on a significant 
orientation intended to better align the Corps with national 
security challenges posed by the realities of today and 
tomorrow. And certainly, anybody who is reading any of the 
defense news, plenty to be said about that.
    But over these 3 years, Congress has found the Marine Corps 
modernization strategy generally relevant, stable, affordable, 
and achievable. And accordingly, we have demonstrated our 
support.
    However, modernization is not without challenges or risk. 
There are programs within and outside the jurisdiction of this 
subcommittee that certainly merit continued scrutiny. In 
today's hearing, we will specifically focus on rotary aviation 
and ground systems, which across the Marine Corps program 
appear generally in good shape.
    We are particularly interested to hear from our witnesses 
assessments and impacts on the Department's equipment and 
munitions drawdown in support of the conflict in Ukraine.
    We also look forward to hearing their thoughts on 
modernization management, their use of new acquisition 
authorities intended to accelerate research and development, 
and the acquisition process.
    And finally, we look forward to hearing updates on specific 
programs, such as the CH-53K; the ACV, the Amphibious Combat 
Vehicle; and tactical network; the long-range anti-ship fires; 
and air defense.
    There is much to cover, and certainly, we would like to 
yield to my partner here on Tactical Air and Land from 
Missouri.
    Mrs. Hartzler. Missouri.
    [Laughter.]
    Mr. Norcross. I am a Jersey guy. It says Missouri here. We 
are going with that.
    But Vicky Hartzler.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Norcross can be found in the 
Appendix on page 27.]

    STATEMENT OF HON. VICKY HARTZLER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
MISSOURI, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND 
                             FORCES

    Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I would like to, first of all, thank our witnesses for 
being here today and for your dedicated service to our country.
    Three years ago, Commandant Berger introduced Force Design 
2030, a plan to radically and aggressively redesign and 
modernize the Marine Corps into a lighter, more lethal fighting 
force, better equipped and more capable to deter and defeat 
current and future peer adversary threats.
    One of the most commendable aspects of the Marine Corps' 
plan was that the Marine Corps proposed paying for and 
resourcing the majority of this change from within. The Marine 
Corps has continued to deliver on their promise to transition 
from older platforms to newer, more capable systems in a 
stable, affordable, and achievable way. The majority of Marine 
Corps programs have remained on time, on track, and on budget, 
and this has not been lost on Congress.
    I look forward to a robust conversation with our witnesses 
about the current status of the Marine Corps' 2030 Force Design 
development and implementation, and the critical defense 
programs necessary to yield the Marines with the capabilities 
and capacities for success.
    Thus far, Congress, and specifically this committee, has 
demonstrated our support for this program and the strategy that 
the Commandant has placed in front of us. I commend the Marine 
Corps leadership for their dedication and their hard work to 
continuously reassess modernization investment priorities and 
reallocate already limited resources to fund the development 
and procurement of essential defense requirements and 
capabilities necessary to build a more lethal defense force.
    As we discuss the future modernization of Marine Corps' 
ground and rotary programs, I would like the witnesses to 
identify what risks the Marine Corps is accepting in the short 
term in order to keep planned modernization programs affordable 
and on course to meet the mid- to long-term defense 
requirements of creating a more lethal, resilient, and agile 
force able to compete, deter, and win against future threats 
from both peer competitors and rogue actors.
    I am also interested in the Marine Corps' assessment of how 
a flat topline and the resulting imposition of cuts and 
decreases to lower-priority programs and investment accounts 
affect the health and stability of your modernization strategy, 
as well as the industrial base that supports it.
    Lastly, the fiscal year 2023 defense budget request did not 
factor in Russia's invasion of Ukraine or the ongoing response 
by the United States and our allies to provide vehicles, 
munitions, missiles, and other military equipment to Ukrainian 
forces in support of their fight against Russia. Today, I hope 
that our witnesses can inform us on how these missile and 
equipment transfers have affected U.S. stockpiles and whether 
you are getting what you need through the various supplemental 
appropriations to fund these operations, replace vehicle and 
equipment transfers, and replenish depleted munition 
stockpiles.
    If there are additional funding or authorizations we can 
provide in the fiscal year 2023 NDAA [National Defense 
Authorization Act] and budget to get after replenishing some of 
these replenishments now, and avoid the need to continue 
funding supplemental through 2023 to restore your depleted 
capabilities, we need to be having this critical discussion 
now.
    So, I thank the chairman for organizing this important and 
timely hearing, and I yield back.
    Mr. Norcross. Thank you.
    And again, I just want to mention that what you have been 
doing with the limited funds and redirection of those items 
that are of the highest priority is not lost on this committee, 
and what you are doing is much appreciated. Not to suggest that 
there aren't things that are of concern, but I think, 
generally, we are heading in a very good direction. I think you 
will hear that, speaking for myself, but, generally, we 
certainly believe this.
    So, Mr. Stefany, great to have you back here, and your 
statement, please.

 STATEMENT OF FREDERICK J. STEFANY, PRINCIPAL CIVILIAN DEPUTY, 
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND 
 ACQUISITION; LTGEN MARK R. WISE, USMC, DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR 
AVIATION, U.S. MARINE CORPS; AND LTGEN KARSTEN S. HECKL, USMC, 
 COMMANDING GENERAL, MARINE CORPS COMBAT DEVELOPMENT COMMAND, 
 AND DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR COMBAT DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION, 
                       U.S. MARINE CORPS

    Mr. Stefany. Yes, thank you, sir, and I thank you for that 
comment.
    Chairman Norcross, Ranking Member Hartzler, distinguished 
members of the subcommittee, on behalf of myself, Lieutenant 
General Heckl, and Lieutenant General Wise, thank you for the 
opportunity to appear before you today to speak to the 
Department of Navy's fiscal year 2023 budget request for Marine 
Corps modernization.
    During this hearing, you will hear that the Marine Corps 
has undertaken an aggressive modernization of its warfighting 
programs over the last 5 years--sorry--3 years. Lieutenant 
Generals Heckl and Wise are going to explain why this 
modernization was required, while emphasizing that the 
fundamental mission of the Marine Corps--to be the most ready 
when the Nation is least ready--has not changed. The Marine 
Corps will continue to serve as a force in readiness, prepared 
to answer the Nation's call whenever and wherever that may be 
around the globe.
    As we watch the events unfold in Ukraine, it is clear that 
warfare is changing. Small, distributed formations with 
powerful and precision lethality, using advanced intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms, loitering 
munitions, and anti-armor fires have proven to be very 
effective in combat operations. It is evidence we cannot stand 
still. The Marine Corps Force Design initiative recognizes this 
new reality, focusing on more capable intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance [ISR] platforms, and smaller 
systems for our ground formations.
    Additionally, the Marine Corps is investing in the research 
and development of its future loitering munition, which we call 
Organic Precision Fires. We are using middle tier acquisition 
authorities for this program and other Force Design programs 
that will allow us to rapidly develop fieldable prototypes and 
demonstrate new capabilities, speeding the delivery of those 
capabilities to the Marines.
    The Marine Corps' top priority remains the Navy/Marine 
Corps Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System, or NMESIS, a 
ground-based, anti-ship missile system. We have successfully 
conducted two tests of NMESIS, most recently in August 2021, 
and are currently conducting developmental and operational 
assessment events for that system. I believe NMESIS will have 
an immediate effect in the operational environment when it is 
deployed in 2023.
    The fiscal year 2023 budget request continues the pattern 
of investing in successful programs that will make a difference 
in future conflicts. This includes the Ground/Air Task-Oriented 
Radar which is currently supporting NATO [North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization] operations; the Amphibious Combat Vehicle, which 
has just met its benchmarks for mobility, protection, and 
safety, and will deploy with Marine platoons later this year; 
and the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, the modern ground vehicle 
that will replace legacy Humvees over the next several years.
    The Marine Corps' forward posture is reliant on ground, 
aviation, and surface mobility. Rotary-wing platforms such as 
the CH-53K and the H-1 play critical roles within Force Design, 
providing lethality, maneuverability, targeting, flexibility, 
and persistent sustainment. We have completed operational 
testing of the CH-53K heavy-lift helicopter and last month 
declared initial operational capability, or IOC, of that 
aircraft.
    The fiscal year 2023 budget includes a request for block 
buy authority for fiscal year 2023 and 2024 aircraft 
production, with a projected savings of $150 million over 
purchasing the aircraft 1 year at a time.
    We have also reached IOC for the VH-92A Presidential 
Helicopter Program in the last year and are starting the White 
House commissioning efforts.
    The success of the Navy-Marine Corps team to be ready to 
answer the Nation's call is rooted in being forward-deployed. 
This readiness provides options and decision space for our 
senior leaders, such as yourself. The Navy-Marine Corps forward 
presence also helps incidents from becoming a crisis, or a 
crisis from becoming a conflict.
    We are confident that the programs in our Marine Corps 
portfolio are achievable, affordable, and will make our Marines 
more successful.
    Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today 
and for your strong support of Marine Corps modernization. We 
look forward to your questions.
    [The joint prepared statement of Mr. Stefany, General Wise, 
and General Heckl can be found in the Appendix on page 29.]
    Mr. Norcross. Thank you.
    Lieutenant General Wise, you are now recognized.
    Mr. Stefany. Sir, that was one statement for all three of 
us. Sorry about that.
    Mr. Norcross. So, repeat the same, right?
    Mr. Stefany. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Norcross. I am all in. I am all in.
    Thank you for your statements. We had read them, and 
certainly, this gives us more time for questions, which is 
certainly on top of that.
    You started one of your statements talking about Ukraine 
and what we have been witnessing and the impact particularly of 
the Javelins, and the Stinger to a lesser extent, at least in 
this area. Given the performance--and that is a tough word to 
suggest in the Russians' vehicles in Ukraine--the assessment of 
what you are witnessing, both the lack of protection in some 
ways of the armor of Russia and the ability for Ukraine to use 
the missiles, particularly the Javelin, to literally decimate 
much of that armor, the Marine Corps' assessment of that; what 
impact it might have on our existing fleet of vehicles, and the 
future?
    So, Lieutenant General Heckl and Wise, if you could comment 
on that?
    General Heckl. Yes, sir. Thank you for the question.
    And I want to just echo real quick, sir, Mr. Stefany's 
comment about the continued support from this committee and the 
subcommittees. I mean, it has just been tremendous. So, from 
the Commandant, thank you.
    So, sir, I think, first of all, we exercise caution to draw 
conclusions too early with what we are seeing in Ukraine 
currently, but we are very, very cautiously and closely 
monitoring events, and certainly, as it would apply to the 
Navy-Marine Corps team.
    I think one of the things to consider about just as an 
overarching to kind of frame the discussion, the Russian 
tactics, techniques, and procedures, TTPs, they have employed 
simply don't--it seems like they are not there, right? So, we 
use combined arms. So, there is an inherent amount of 
protection and safety in the way we employ our forces as a 
combined arms MAGTF, Marine Air-Ground Task Force.
    Specifically to the weapons system, sir, obviously, I 
believe our Nation makes some of the best gear on the planet. I 
don't think it; I know it. And it proves itself time and time 
again--all the way from the mujahideen throwing the Soviets out 
of Afghanistan. You know, they said there was no change in 
ideology, no change in tactics. There was Stinger. So, that is 
a case from history, and I think we are bearing it out again.
    I think the armor issue, the character of warfare is 
changing quickly in front of us. And I think we are seeing 
where just putting yourself, wrapping yourself in a bunch of 
armor that requires a lot of fuel and a lot of sustainment 
isn't necessarily going to make you safe and make you effective 
on the battlefield.
    General Wise. Sir, I think, also, what I would add is the 
distributed nature of how the Ukrainians are operating and the 
benefits that I've seen from operating in that manner is very 
insightful and instructive, and it is the direction the Marine 
Corps is going to kind of validate in some ways some of the 
approaches that we have taken there from the aviation side, 
ISR-wise.
    As you talk, much like the Commandant does often, about 
sense and make sense, and how that allows you to be more 
effective in the battlespace, I think we are seeing some of 
that from those operations as well, which flows directly across 
to the armor and the Javelin, being able to do that targeting 
activity upfront.
    So, many good lessons. I would also say, equally, there is 
a couple of--we just need to make sure we learn the right 
lessons. In other words, what countereffect are the Russians 
using, or not, out there? So, that we make sure we put 
resilient systems out there that can survive in any 
battlespace, sir.
    Mr. Norcross. Thank you.
    I want to stay just for a moment with this line and what we 
are learning from Ukraine. And we are shipping a tremendous 
amount of systems and weapons, in addition to the humanitarian 
aid, over to Ukraine. And the Marines have been part of that 
drawdown.
    So, what I want to ask is, from your perspective, that 
assessment of risk of what we are sending versus what we have 
available to us, both from an operational capabilities, but 
also in terms of what we are shipping, what do we need to have 
available to us; in other words, the resupply. In particular, 
because of the change in your operating concept--what was the 
last number? Five thousand five hundred Javelins, and that is a 
rough number, have been provided. It didn't split up where they 
are coming from. What the impact is on the Marine Corps?
    Mr. Stefany. Sir, I think most of those weapons would be in 
General Heckl's area.
    So, General.
    General Heckl. Yes, sir.
    So, sir, we've--the Marine Corps has supplied--first, to 
Mrs. Hartzler's comment about the--when this budget request, as 
you alluded to, was not constructed with the supply to the 
Ukrainians in mind. So, that is an issue; you are exactly 
right.
    Second, and then, third, we have provided approximately a 
thousand Javelin missile systems and approximately a thousand 
Stinger missile systems to Ukraine. And they are absolutely 
critical to be resupplied for us.
    And I would look to Mr. Stefany if there is any industrial 
base concerns.
    Mr. Stefany. Yes, sir. So, the other question you had in 
the opening was supplementals. And that first very small 
supplemental, I think $3.4 billion--not enough, right? 
Obviously, not enough to to resupply. So, we look forward to 
both your committee and the larger Congress on the larger 
funding effort for the supplemental. But we do have a little 
bit of money, and we are starting to recharge that line right 
now, sir.
    Mr. Norcross. Thank you.
    Obviously, you are waiting eagerly for the latest to pass 
through the other House and get that moving. But, certainly, 
there is nothing unique to the Marines' Javelins and Stingers 
that isn't facing the other services.
    I just want to shift over a little bit to the CH-53Ks, 
which are moving along, and talk about the brownout issue. And, 
Lieutenant General Wise, we have read a lot about it; we have 
heard a lot about it. There has been some mitigation and 
changes made along the lines. Can you tell us where you are 
now, and going forward, the risk that we are looking at in the 
present configuration?
    General Wise. Sir, thank you for the question.
    On the 53K--okay, I think the light is just a little dim. 
Sorry about that.
    Sir, for the 53K, the initial assessment was very early in 
the test process. And so, I would answer it in two ways because 
we address it from multiple different angles.
    The 53K, when we start the test events, we start at the 
very heart of the envelope and we work out. And so, the initial 
test events are very limited. So, things like, you know, time 
limitations within a certain environment. And then, we know 
that the envelope will go beyond that, but we test it in 
tranches out from there to validate the fact that we got the 
envelope right.
    So, some of the limitations were based on those initial 
envelope limitations. What we have found since then is a couple 
of things on the equipment side. One is the diagnostic 
capability of this airframe is spectacular, meaning the pilot 
could actually get a real-time engine performance capability 
readout to make real-time decisions on how the engines are 
performing, regardless of the environment, but it includes the 
brownout conditions. So, that is part of it. It's actually been 
expanding the envelope much wider than those initial 
assessments indicated.
    The other side, too, is the automation on the airframe. 
Because the automation is designed to allow a pilot to get that 
airframe into even the worst brownout conditions and on the 
ground safely and minimize its time in that particulate matter, 
which also really negates the issues we have with, potential 
issues you might have with the brownout conditions.
    So far, since then, we have actually demonstrated in the 
worst brownout conditions that that aircraft has performed for 
21 minutes in the worst brownout conditions with zero 
degradation of the engines. So, it kind of points back to the 
initial test parameters can be taken in the wrong way. We 
purposely limit it until we prove ourselves correct as we go 
out. But it has been performing brilliantly. But there are 
multiple systems onboard that make that airplane the safest one 
out there.
    Mr. Norcross. Thank you.
    Let me shift over for Mr. Stefany. When we talk about 
acquisition, quite often, what are we doing right; what we are 
doing wrong. But, on this one, you have asked for the block buy 
authority rather than a multiyear. Can you explain to us why 
the block buy versus a multiyear at this point?
    Mr. Stefany. Yes, sir. So, a multiyear is still in our 
plan. Our plan is, after the block buy, 2-year block buy, to do 
a 5-year multiyear procurement after that. The reason we are 
not doing it now right off the bat is the criteria that is in 
statute to be able to have a proven design, proven 
manufacturing, enough data to give the CAPE [Cost Assessment 
and Program Evaluation], so they can make an independent 
estimate.
    We did not have all that at the beginning of the process 
for this budget cycle. So, we decided this budget cycle and 
next, we will get that data out of Sikorsky, and then we will 
be able to provide it to you and to the CAPE to do that 
analysis for a multiyear starting, a 5-year multiyear starting 
2 years from now.
    So, it was more we just didn't have the data to be able to 
justify it at this point in time.
    Mr. Norcross. But the authority is, obviously, so you can 
accelerate and give to your subs and the supply chain that this 
is coming?
    Mr. Stefany. Yes. So, the part that we really wanted, the 
supply chain, the block buy takes care of a big part of that, 
right? We can go buy 2 years' worth of equipment at once; get 
the supply chain spun up. So that when we do the 5-year 
multiyear, they are up to full speed.
    Mr. Norcross. Incredibly important, coming off the 
pandemic.
    With that, I turn to Ranking Member Mrs. Hartzler.
    Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you.
    To kind of build on the conversation we have already had, 
back to the depleted stocks and the supplementals that have 
been through. If the Senate approves the bill that was passed 
in the House, is that going to be adequate, or are you going to 
need more in the fiscal year 2023 NDAA?
    Mr. Stefany. So, ma'am, for what we know right now and what 
we project, that would be adequate. Now, again, what the war 
continues on and there are more requests for drawdown material, 
it could, obviously, change over time. But right now we believe 
that is sufficient for what we can project going forward.
    Mrs. Hartzler. Okay. Well, please keep us posted on that.
    And as it relates to the industrial base, this situation in 
the Ukraine, and the ensuing global allied mobilization provide 
support by way of equipment and munitions has shone a light on 
some serious issues existing with our industrial base and 
supply chain. So, how are you working with partners in the 
military industrial base and supply chains to mitigate and fix 
these issues?
    Mr. Stefany. Yes, ma'am. So, very close partnership of 
Stinger and Javelin, obviously, are made with our partners in 
the Army and the Air Force. And we are working with--,together 
with industry. Recognizing something like Javelin is a little 
more modern, that production line is able to scale easier. 
Stingers, we are going to have to go back, and probably if not 
need more--probably not more authority, but we may need more 
industrial base money to kind of get them up to a high enough 
production level they can restock us in time. So, that is an 
effort we are working with the Army, and we will certainly come 
back to this committee, once we get those results.
    Mrs. Hartzler. When do you anticipate that to be?
    Mr. Stefany. Ma'am, I don't have a date. I will take that 
for the record, to get you that.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 47.]
    Mrs. Hartzler. Yes, because we need this answer yesterday 
really.
    Mr. Stefany. Yes. Okay.
    Mrs. Hartzler. I mean, you know, so we can produce the 
Stingers again or shift to another munition that maybe another 
country even has perfected that same capability.
    Is there any changes that need to be made in our current 
Defense acquisition sustainment strategies to get over these 
problems of long lead times, parts and workforce shortfalls, 
and material obsolescence?
    Mr. Stefany. No, I think between the authorities we already 
have, as well as Defense Production Act-type authorities, I 
think we have the authorities we need. We now need to finish 
the assessment of where the biggest risks are, and then start 
moving out on addressing those.
    Mrs. Hartzler. Okay. Yes, as soon as possible, obviously.
    Mr. Stefany. Yes, ma'am.
    Mrs. Hartzler. And then, as far as the CH-53K, I am really 
glad to hear about the problem--I mean the solution, it seems 
like, with the brownout concerns to 21 minutes without any 
degradation at all. That is encouraging.
    But the CH-53K, from its start, though, has had per-unit 
cost concerns. So, I wanted to ask about that. Because it 
currently costs as much, if not more, per aircraft than the 
per-unit cost of a Joint Strike Fighter. So, can you explain 
why this is?
    General Wise. Ma'am, thank you for the question.
    For the 53K, we continue to realize cost reductions in the 
acquisition lots. The last two were the lowest two so far, and 
each of them came down a level each. And those--the costs for 
the most recent 53Ks, if you look at it at the same 
measurements that we use for the F-35, it's actually lower, 
considerably----
    Mrs. Hartzler. How much is it now?
    General Wise. The last lot was negotiated at $93.7 million 
per copy. If you use the same metric for the 35, depending on 
which variant, it is approximately $117 to $107, so depending 
on the variant.
    Mrs. Hartzler. So, how are you working with them to bring 
down costs?
    General Wise. Yes, ma'am. So, we actually work it in 
multiple angles. Part of it is with the program office to drive 
cost out of the actual process, as well as with the vendor at 
Sikorsky and Lockheed Martin. But there are other things that 
are helping us.
    One is Congress' generosity for the addition of two 
additional airframes in the last two lots per lot. So, that was 
four additional airframes, helps drive down the cost through 
quantity buy.
    Recently, on the international side, the Israelis committed 
to purchase 12 aircraft, with an option for 6 more. It looks 
very good that they will go down that road. There are 
additional opportunities starting to show up for the 53K. I 
know it will be part of the Berlin Air Show this year. So, 
looking at more opportunities to drive down costs through 
quantity buy as well. So, approaching it from multiple angles, 
not just manufacturing, but allowing their learning curve to 
come up and produce in a more effective manner.
    Mrs. Hartzler. Okay. Let's switch to another platform, the 
NMESIS. You mentioned that in your opening statement, and it 
does sound like a very exciting, very helpful platform. Can you 
provide us more information, though, on what this system is and 
the advanced capabilities it brings to the fight?
    General Heckl. I'm ``on'' now; here we go. Okay. Yes, 
ma'am, glad to, and thanks for the question.
    NMESIS is another one of the programs kind of alluded to by 
yourself and the chairman as far as things going right for us. 
The Navy/Marine Corps Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System is 
our number one modernization priority for the Commandant.
    The system consists of two Naval Strike Missiles, which we 
work in partnership with our Navy brothers and sisters. And it 
is fired from the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle chassis. And we 
have had a lot of success.
    And as Mr. Stefany alluded to, it has been employed 
multiple times, and as recently as the end of April. Doing 
envelope expansion, we had very successful shots over the 
course of 3 days. So, the weapon system continues to perform. 
And quite frankly, from August of 2021, during large-scale 
exercise, we actually fired two Naval Strike Missiles against a 
maritime target. Both had very successful launch, flight, and 
impacts. So, we are very, very pleased with that. And at this 
level, the classification level, the range, we are very pleased 
with the range as well. So, going forward, we are looking 
forward to fielding the system and getting it out to the fleet 
as soon as we possibly can.
    Mrs. Hartzler. When do you anticipate that fielding? I 
mean, it just sounds like a great capability.
    General Heckl. End of fiscal year 2023, ma'am, is when it 
will start.
    Mrs. Hartzler. How many?
    General Heckl. I think we are getting out--I would have to 
take it. I don't know the exact number, ma'am. Let me take that 
for the record. I will get back to you on a specific number.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 47.]
    Mrs. Hartzler. Okay. Great.
    I have a couple more, maybe if we have a second round, but 
I will yield back.
    Mr. Norcross. Ms. Sherrill, you are now recognized.
    Ms. Sherrill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    First, I would like to just compliment the Army and Marine 
Corps on resourcing initiatives to improve the form, fit, and 
function for female soldiers and Marines in their PPE [personal 
protective equipment] gear. That has long been a concern of 
mine. And I encourage you to continue in those efforts.
    Mr. Stefany, we just heard from General Heckl the 
battlefield is changing rapidly. In a recent hearing with the 
Commandant, General Berger stated that he wanted to give the 
enemy multiple problems on the battlefield to solve.
    The new Force Design for the Marine Corps is to acquire and 
field indirect fire systems with increased range, accuracy, 
long-range precision fires that can service both maritime and 
ground targets. What, if any, cannon artillery platforms is the 
Marine Corps looking at to meet this need?
    Mr. Stefany. Ma'am, I would like to defer that one to 
General Heckl on that platform.
    General Heckl. Yes. Yes, ma'am. So, thanks for the 
question. You specifically asked what about cannon artillery?
    Ms. Sherrill. Yes.
    General Heckl. Okay. So, as you know, ma'am, the Commandant 
has said from the start of Force Design that, as we experiment 
and within our campaign of learning, which forms the analytical 
rigor that underpins every decision we make in Force Design, we 
will make changes. The Commandant made a change. We were 
initially going to draw down to 5 batteries of 777 155 
millimeter artillery. We are now going to go to seven, but we 
are also increasing those batteries from six tubes to eight. We 
will have four on the West, three on the East.
    Did that answer the question?
    Ms. Sherrill. That answers the question of what you are 
looking at now. Because, surely, the bulk air missile batteries 
with long occupation times and a large geographic signature, 
will put the MRL [Marine Littoral Regiment] at risk. And so, I 
am wondering if the Marines have explored adding some of the 
long-range precision fires currently under research and 
development as a way to allow the Marine commanders long-range 
fires without sacrificing survivability and maneuverability.
    General Heckl. You betcha, ma'am, and you are absolutely 
right. The towed cannon artillery on the battlefield is very 
susceptible, absolutely.
    You may or may not know we have HIMARS [High Mobility 
Artillery Rocket System] currently within our inventory, and we 
are working very closely with the Army. Obviously, the Marine 
Corps is not really big enough to pursue programs on our own. 
So, we always seek out sister services to work with. It makes 
it more affordable. And so, we are doing that with the Army.
    We are going down the route. As you know, or may not know, 
HIMARS eventually will turn into the MLRS, Multiple Launch 
Rocket System, family of munitions, which will include GMLRS 
[Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System], ATACMS [Army Tactical 
Missile System], and eventually, PrSM [Precision Strike 
Missile] missile, which is going to be a phenomenal capability, 
which will do both land and surface targets.
    Did that get at it, ma'am?
    Ms. Sherrill. Yes. Thank you.
    And stepping away a bit from the need to service targets, I 
would like to talk about how the MLR will sustain itself with 
missile platforms being bulky and presenting significant 
challenges for commanders hoping to maintain a basic load of 
ammunition for their formations in a contested environment.
    Does the Marine Corps have a solution for conducting ship-
to-shore resupply of the bulky missile platforms? And when it 
comes to combat logistics, I know every bit of space on a 
truck, ship, aircraft matters, especially when delivering all 
classes of supply to littoral regiments. Do you feel that the 
Marines will face a challenge in resupplying the bulk missile 
systems throughout the theater?
    General Heckl. Ma'am, great. You're just firing one great 
question after another.
    Obviously, right now, ma'am, within Force Design, I will 
tell you that logistics in a contested environment is our 
pacing effort right now. It is absolutely our pacing effort. We 
are laser-focused on it and getting after it down at my 
command, particularly within the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab 
and the Capabilities Development Directorate. So, we are all 
over it.
    It is always--logistics, anybody that tells you otherwise, 
logistics is always a challenge, and it can never be emphasized 
enough in preparation. I will simply tell you the strength of 
the Marine Corps, the MAGTF, which a Marine littoral regiment 
is simply a form of a MAGTF. It is tailored for a specific 
theater and a specific threat. But we have--the organic lift we 
have within the MAGTF, both air and surface, is one of our 
greatest strengths.
    So, for instance, NMESIS is fully internally transportable 
in a 53K. We have demonstrated it. I mean within a KC-130J. We 
have demonstrated it multiple times.
    And as you also know, we are standing up a fourth Active 
Duty VMGR KC-130J squadron with 16 aircraft going to Hawaii 
specifically to provide additional organic lift within the 
Indo-Pacific.
    And that brings me to the LAW, the Light Amphibious 
Warship. The surface connectors, ma'am, will be absolutely 
critical. And just to keep it short here, the important aspect 
of a LAW--or Landing Ship Medium really is its appropriate 
name--is the fact that it is a shore-to-shore connector.
    So, again, what you are seeing play out in Ukraine, big 
signatures of any type, whether it is logistics or anywhere in 
the electromagnetic spectrum, you know, trails of fuel trucks 
to refuel armor, those are signatures and they are targetable 
and they become vulnerabilities. So, the shore-to-shore 
connector capability of the LAW is critical. We don't require 
ports. We don't require big, 12,000-foot runways. We do things 
from an austere perspective.
    Did that answer it, ma'am?
    Ms. Sherrill. Well, thank you. Yes. Thank you very much, 
General. And my time has expired, but I will say, maybe for my 
oversight responsibilities, I should come test some of those 
53Ks for you guys. So, maybe one of these days. Thanks.
    And I yield back.
    Mr. Norcross. Thank you.
    Mr. Wittman, you are now recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Stefany, Lieutenant General Heckl, Lieutenant General 
Wise, thanks so much for joining us.
    General Heckl, let me ask about the Commandant's guidance. 
He talks about lightening the force, especially when it comes 
to combat and transportation. He also talks about it being 
theater-agnostic, to make sure we can operate in the INDOPACOM 
[U.S. Indo-Pacific Command], but also have the ability to cross 
over into the European theater, wherever we are needed, is to 
make sure that lightening the force is able to do that.
    The update 2022 I think really refines the testing that you 
all have done to really get that concept down, down to where it 
needs to be. Can you give us a little more insight about that 
whole concept of lightening the force? Where you are with the 
testing of this with Marines in the field; figuring this out, 
and where you are today? I know you have made a number of 
adjustments with the size of battalions, the number of MV-22s, 
the number of artillery pieces. Can you tell us a little bit 
about how you have that in the Commandant's Planning Guidance, 
and how that really allows you to achieve the National Defense 
Strategy?
    General Heckl. So, sir, again, great question. I know you 
and I have talked before, sir.
    So, lightening any force simply makes it more agile and 
flexible.
    Mr. Wittman. Yes.
    General Heckl. And therefore, creates a certain dynamic 
component of that force. And I think we are seeing that play 
out in Ukraine right now real time, right? So, we are seeing 
widely dispersed, well-equipped, lethal, precision munitions, 
and then, the ability to move. So, let me give you examples to 
kind of back into the question previous.
    We have demonstrated multiple times how we can load NMESIS 
on the KC-130, land--and remember, a KC-130 doesn't necessarily 
require an airfield, right? It can land in austere 
environments. It has to be prepped, but it can still land. We 
do it pretty regularly.
    The weapon system offloads, fire capsule launches, the 
missile reloads, and gets back in the aircraft and is gone 
before the missile actually impacts the target. That is the 
kind of dynamic I am talking about.
    Mr. Wittman. Yes.
    General Heckl. So, lightening any force is going to make 
that easier to do.
    And I will also say that, with the ubiquity of sensors 
right now, particularly in the Indo-Pacific, if you can be seen 
and you are a worthy target--meaning the cost of position and 
am I going to expend an expensive weapon system--you can be 
hit. So, we are getting after signature management in all ways, 
and it is kind of back to the future a little bit, right?
    We are doing camo netting. We now have companies that we 
are on contract with that have netting that can go over 
vehicles, as well as people, that reduce and eliminate IR 
[infrared] signature, eliminate visual. It is pretty 
impressive. So, that technology has advanced as well.
    So, the lighter the better from every perspective. The 
lighter means less sustainment. You are a less needy force, 
which means I am reducing the signature.
    Did that get after it, sir?
    Mr. Wittman. Yes.
    General Heckl. It's a big question. I could go on all day, 
and I don't want to eat up all the time.
    Mr. Wittman. No, no, that is spot-on.
    Let me ask to look at today's situation. And that is, as 
you are looking at lightening the force, one of the challenges 
that gets thrown at you is what is happening now with munitions 
that are going out the door, both Javelin and Stinger, as we 
have heard. And listen, we understand what needs to be done 
with the industrial base to resupply, those sorts of things.
    But I think the more important and immediate question is, 
what does the Marine Corps do in the meantime as a mitigation? 
So, as these weapons stores are going down, what happens if 
something occurs between now and the time that we resupply? And 
what can Congress do to help you in that mitigation strategy?
    General Heckl. Well, sir, I think--and Mr. Stefany may have 
something to say here--I am not super familiar with how the 
industrial base is postured and what capability--you know, like 
in World War II, rolling 16 B-17s off line a day, Boeing did.
    But I will simply say there are ways to mitigate risk. A 
big part of that, sir, is the continued deterrence that is 
referenced in the National Defense Strategy.
    Mr. Wittman. Uh-hum.
    General Heckl. You know, if you look at the whole spectrum 
of things, the desire is to never get to the right side, right? 
We want to avoid actual kinetic operations.
    Mr. Wittman. Okay.
    General Heckl. The threshold of violence may be breached 
every now and then, as we compete and we deter, but the point 
is to deter----
    Mr. Wittman. Right.
    General Heckl [continuing]. To avoid getting to a situation 
where the levels of our stores are a concern, right? So, for a 
Marine, that means being forward----
    Mr. Wittman. Yes.
    General Heckl [continuing]. Being forward, being present 
with our allies and partners. And I think, quite frankly, sir, 
there is a lot of strength in our allies and partners who 
utilize similar weapon systems, and I think we need to play to 
that advantage, too.
    Sir, I don't know if you have any comments about industrial 
base.
    Mr. Wittman. Mr. Stefany.
    Mr. Stefany. No, I would just add that the Marine Corps has 
not reached a place where they cannot support the forward-
deployed Marines, right? We haven't got there, and we will 
certainly talk--the Commandant, I am sure, will come and talk 
to you before we get to that place. So, it is not like we have 
given away all of our missiles.
    Mr. Wittman. Right.
    Mr. Stefany. We still have plenty of them for the forward-
deployed Marines.
    General Heckl. And, sir, has you know, we track very 
carefully and closely the training status of our units.
    Mr. Wittman. Yes.
    General Heckl. Because those same weapon systems have to be 
used. Our Marines have to fire them on a periodic basis to 
maintain their readiness and proficiency.
    Mr. Wittman. That is great. Thanks. Listen, I think it is 
incredibly important for us to know well ahead of time. 
Because, as you know, the ability to resupply right now has 
atrophied, and that is a risk in and of itself.
    General Heckl. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    Mr. Norcross. Mr. Bacon, you are now recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Bacon. Thank you.
    I appreciate you gentlemen being here and for your 
leadership.
    I wanted to ask you about long-range strike capabilities. I 
know the Marines are investing in it, so are the Army. A little 
more challenging in the Pacific theater, though, because you 
have basing concerns.
    General Heckl. Yes.
    Mr. Bacon. And so, my question would be, how do you 
envision this working in the Pacific theater? And I say that 
because I know the Air Force has got the B-21. They are going 
to have standoff weapons. The Navy will have ship-borne 
capabilities. So, is this a real viable forward for the 
Marines, Army, and the basing issues? How do we deal with it?
    Thank you.
    General Heckl. So, a great question.
    And as you know, NMESIS is one of our systems. The other 
one is long-range precision fires, which is the Tomahawk. 
Again, we share that with the Navy, right?
    So, an incredibly long-range weapon. We have demonstrated 
that weapon system firing off of one of our platforms, ground-
based, and we are very happy with it.
    We have yet to determine, going forward--it is a larger 
missile system than the Navy Strike Missile and the NMESIS. So, 
again, from my concern as a requirements guy for the Marine 
Corps, I get concerned when I see things that are big and 
heavy, read signature; difficult to resupply, signature. The 
ground-based Tomahawk, and by the way, it is launched out of a 
Mark 41 Vertical Launch System, which is similar, looks similar 
to other ones. So, there is opportunities there, as we go 
forward, leave at that. So, yes, sir, we have that capability. 
It is very viable.
    Now, your concern about access, right, with allies and 
partners. Absolutely, sir. I mean, one of the things, the 
difference is, the Marine Littoral Regiment and the Multi-
Domain Task Force that the Army is fielding. The Multi-Domain 
Task Force the Army is fielding and MLR are complementary in 
nature. MLR is smaller, a little more nimble, organic lift, 
expeditionary. The MDTF, is a little bit bigger, but has bigger 
punch and farther punch.
    It will be up to allies and partners to determine what they 
are going to allow in, right? But I think, from my perspective 
as a Marine--and we have units from I MEF [Marine Expeditionary 
Force] and, you know, III MEF, the Third Marine Expeditionary 
Force lives inside the WEZ [weapons engagement zone] day-in and 
day-out. And we work with allies and partners. So, we are 
really dependent on what they allow in.
    But, to your point, you know, a big missile system might 
not be something they would be--or they may be a little bit 
concerned about it.
    Mr. Bacon. I worry about the access, though. I would think 
those blend of capabilities between the Air Force, Navy, Army, 
and Marines is best. But if you don't have the basing 
abilities----
    General Heckl. That is right.
    Mr. Bacon [continuing]. That is the concern I have. Maybe 
in Europe and the Middle East, there is other--more 
opportunities.
    I want to ask you, is there a priority weapon that we need 
to have replenished for the Marines? What is your number one 
and number two things that the Marines need replenished?
    General Heckl. Sir, I would tell you right now the 
Commandant's number one issue is--not pertaining to this--but 
is amphibious ships to be forward-deployed. Weapon system-wise, 
our number one priority is the NMESIS, sir.
    Mr. Bacon. For dealing with Ukraine, was there certain 
weapons that the Marines had to send over that we need to be 
focused on for replenishment?
    General Heckl. Well, the Javelin and the Stinger.
    Mr. Bacon. The Javelins primarily? Okay. I know we touched 
on it a little bit. So, that would be your priority?
    General Heckl. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Bacon. Okay. One of the things, I felt like we could 
have done it quicker in this Ukraine fight is provided the 
capabilities of tanks 20, 30, 40 miles behind the lines. We are 
starting to see that. We see other countries that have some 
really good capabilities that Ukraine is using right now.
    What would be your advice here on how we could be--I guess 
these are still our capabilities. You know, our remote piloted 
aircraft, for example. I feel like we are hindered by our rule 
set. Other countries are filling that capability. Do you see 
the same issue? Hope that follows.
    General Heckl. So, sir, I think--and I don't know if 
[inaudible] wants to chime in here, as you mentioned UAVs 
[unmanned aerial vehicles]. You know, I did a couple of years 
with NATO as a brand-new one-star, Strike Force NATO in Lisbon. 
I spent a good bit of time on the Mount Whitney and doing 
exercises.
    I think--from our perspective, I think whatever we do, I 
think working within the NATO construct and our NATO partners, 
that I think we can contribute more. I don't disagree with you. 
You always--hindsight, you always wish you could have moved 
faster, right?
    So, I don't know if you have any more to----
    Mr. Stefany. We do have restrictions on UAVs, UASs 
[unmanned aerial systems], as you know, sir, that slows us 
down.
    On the surface, though, I think we could have that 
conversation of unmanned surface-type things we are doing in a 
different forum that are not as slow as those are going.
    Mr. Bacon. Okay. This is the RPA [remotely piloted 
aircraft] area. The other countries are moving within our 
circle much faster, and I feel like we are losing an 
opportunity to provide our great weapons in that case.
    But I am running out of time. So, I will yield back. I 
thank you for your time.
    Mr. Norcross. Thank you.
    Dr. Jackson, you are now recognized for 5 minutes.
    Dr. Jackson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; thank you, Ranking 
Member Hartzler, for holding this hearing today.
    Thank you to our distinguished guests for being here.
    I know this is a TAL [Tactical Air and Land Forces 
Subcommittee] hearing, we are here to discuss modernization 
strategies and programs such as rotary aviation and ground 
systems. However, I briefly want to touch on the importance of 
modernization for the medical community, as an aside here.
    As we constantly look for cost savings and ways to 
modernize our systems, there seems to be a trend of looking 
towards making cuts on the medical side to support the needs of 
the line side. Most recently, we saw the Medical Officer [TMO] 
of the Marine Corps position get cut, which is a decision that 
I wholeheartedly disagree with. A mistake like cutting the TMO 
sets us further back in our modernization efforts and could 
potentially cause irreparable damage to our medical readiness.
    I understand that having the latest aircraft and weapons 
systems is extremely important, but that doesn't matter if we 
forget to care about our people. If we are forced to compete 
and win in the Indo-Pacific, having appropriate leadership and 
accountability in the medical community is going to be 
paramount for our success. So, as we modernize our military, I 
would strongly encourage the Department of the Navy leadership 
to reconsider the decision and reinstate the TMO.
    That said, I want to shift gears now and talk about some of 
the modernization efforts included in this year's budget 
request. On Wednesday, the full committee heard testimony from 
General Berger that I was impressed with on the modernization 
efforts being undertaken by the Marine Corps to adapt to the 
needs of the Indo-Pacific theater.
    One thing that General Berger mentioned was the need for 
Congress to provide funding for the V-22 nacelle improvement. 
General Wise, I appreciated you telling this committee a few 
weeks ago that you share the same feelings that we have in the 
need to ensure that we modernize our V-22 fleet and increase 
the platform's overall readiness.
    In the unfunded priorities list submitted to Congress, 
nearly $75 million was requested for nacelle improvement. These 
documents also show a commitment from the Marines to continue 
this vital program in future years. Modernizing our V-22 is not 
something that we can wait on. It is something that we need to 
get started on now.
    As you know, the workforce in Amarillo, where I represent, 
has risen to the occasion of completing the Air Force's nacelle 
improvement process ahead of schedule. There is no doubt in my 
mind that this would be the case for the MV-22 nacelle 
improvement program as well.
    In the written submission to the committee, when asked, 
``Do you know of any factors that have the potential to hinder 
execution of additional funds for this item in FY 23?'', the 
answer was very clearly stated as no. All of this leads me to 
wonder if the amount requested on the unfunded priorities list 
is enough. That is a question. Or if Congress needs to consider 
an even larger amount to ensure that we can dominate any future 
conflict.
    My question. If additional work can be accommodated by the 
workforce conducting nacelle improvement, we should increase 
the rate at which this work is done. General Wise, would the 
Marines be able to accelerate the nacelle improvement program 
further if additional funds were appropriated over the amount 
requested in the unfunded priorities list?
    General Wise. Sir, great question.
    And as we mentioned before, we are very laser-focused on 
making sure there is no break in that line and that we continue 
that nacelle improvement. We have already laid in money, as you 
know, through fiscal year 2023 for the long lead to ensure that 
it starts right at the back side of the Air Force upgrades to 
keep that going.
    As far as accelerating, I believe the line does have the 
capacity to accelerate. We would also have to balance that with 
aircraft off the line to make sure we had an optimum 
sequencing, so the rest of the readiness of the fleet to deploy 
is balanced. So, that part, I would have to take for the record 
as far as how could we accelerate it further in order to make 
sure we still have adequate capacity for deployments and still 
maximize the line.
    But, certainly, are very interested in the program because 
it does offer so many readiness perks for us, of course.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 47.]
    Dr. Jackson. Yes, sir, I agree with that. And I have had 
the opportunity to go out to Bell and look at these things when 
they tear them apart, when they are doing them. And some of 
them look fairly good, and some of them look like they really 
need a lot of work. And so, I would like to see us do that as 
soon as possible.
    On a bipartisan basis, many members of the committee have 
agreed that the President's budget request does not give us the 
resources that we need. I do anticipate that we will need to 
provide additional funding to account for the inadequate budget 
that we received.
    General Wise, one more question. I would like to ask you 
another question related to the V-22. As we looked at the need 
to compete and win in the Indo-Pacific in, potentially, just a 
few years, what are the capability gaps that we would face, if 
we didn't have an adequate level of readiness for our V-22 
fleet? And are there any other platforms that would be able to 
accomplish this mission instead?
    General Wise. So, the V-22 is extraordinarily capable, as 
you know, just because of the speed, the battlefield tempo it 
develops. There is still nothing else that can do it that way.
    Can we lift folks, I mean assault support, with 53 [CH-53], 
with other platforms? Can you do those missions? You can, not 
at the speed, and speed is very, very important. So, it does 
fill a unique capability, and that something that we need to 
make sure that we maximize readiness to have those assets 
forward when we need them.
    Dr. Jackson. Thank you, sir. I think my time is up here, 
but I just wanted to also say I have a third question I will 
submit for the record. It is related to the Army's Future 
Vertical Lift and where the Marines are looking, if they are 
looking at what the Army is doing. Because I hope that we go 
down that path at the Marine Corps as well.
    Thank you, sir.
    Mr. Norcross. Thank you.
    Just to note they have called votes, but there are at least 
one question that Vicky and I have. Do you have another? Okay. 
And I will let Vicky jump in here.
    Let's talk about the Humvees. Obviously, we are moving 
towards the JLTV [Joint Light Tactical Vehicle]. But it is no 
surprise to anybody in this room, many of the accidents have 
taken the lives of our young service men and women. And the 
mitigation that has been going on, you are well aware of that. 
Yet, there is nothing in this year's request in terms of 
mitigating that.
    Can you explain to us why you have elected not to include 
any of the safety upgrades, General Heckl?
    General Heckl. Absolutely, sir.
    So, the Marine Corps is all in on JLTV, and we are not 
retaining the Humvee. So, we are going to get out of the Humvee 
business, period. So, the faster we can do that, the better.
    The JLTV has proven itself to be a really solid weapon 
system. It is more safe, more capable, more survivable from 
every perspective. It has a lot of safety features that are 
inherent.
    And by the way, sir, some of the older lot Humvees that we 
have you can't even upgrade. And we have very carefully 
identified the best of breed and the worst of breed. We are 
getting rid of the worst as quickly as we can. The older 
vehicles are in worse shape.
    But the JLTV has, as you know, the anti-lock braking 
system. It has electronic steering control, all the things that 
contribute to a lower mishap rate all the way around--things 
such as rollovers.
    So, again, I think we have fielded approximately 2,500 of 
them, and our AAO [approved acquisition objective] is 12,500. 
And we are just moving out as quickly as we can, sir. That's 
our whole--so as you know, I think there is 413 in this request 
and there are some on the unfunded priorities list. So, the 
faster we can go with JLTV, the faster we can replace Humvee.
    Mr. Norcross. We agree with you with the JLTV. It is a 
great vehicle. But at today's estimate, we are talking about 
2031 before we get rid of those--mitigation, getting rid of 
those that can't be retrofitted, obviously. That is a long 
time, and this is a serious issue that we know how to fix at a 
relatively low cost. And it is something that we believe is 
extremely important. And nobody likes to throw good money after 
a bad system, but 2031 is a long time off.
    And I will just defer to Mrs. Hartzler for any additional 
comments.
    Mrs. Hartzler. Just a quick follow-up. It was my impression 
that in this budget the JLTV is on the unfunded priorities 
list, that there is none. So, you just said there is 413 
requested?
    General Heckl. I am pretty sure we have 413 vehicles in 
this budget request, yes, ma'am.
    Mrs. Hartzler. Okay. Thank you.
    Mr. Norcross. Mr. Wittman.
    Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General Wise, I just wanted to talk a little bit. We talked 
a lot about the platforms, but the most important part of that 
platform is the pilot. And I wanted to get your thoughts on 
rotary-wing pilot retention and recruitment into the future. It 
looks like to me, at the company level between third and eighth 
year, those pilots become more and more of a challenge to be 
able to keep. Give us your perspective on what the Marine Corps 
is doing, and needs to do, to make sure we retain those pilots, 
which we are going to need in the years to come.
    General Wise. Yes, sir, thank you for the question.
    So, obviously, we track very closely all of our pilot 
retention issues. There are some areas that are very complex 
and challenging right now, as we know. And we attack those from 
multiple different directions.
    So, some of it is making sure the accession piece is 
adequate. But the big thing, which I think really gets more 
towards the question, is the retention side of the house. So, 
some of that is looking at bonuses. We have got a range of 
bonuses, depending on the platform, in order to provide some 
enticement.
    I would tell you, from a very personal perspective, when I 
was being looked at for retention in the early years, that, 
though enticing and nice it was not the sole thing that kept 
me. Because what really comes into play--and I think most would 
agree with me--is that right command climate, selecting the 
right people to provide that atmosphere that people want to 
come to work every day; they want to be part of something like 
that. So, we are very focused there as well.
    The other good piece of it is being very tied in closely 
with my counterparts in the Naval Aviation Enterprise, 
specifically, CNATRA, so Chief of Naval Aviation Training, and 
watching those pipelines to make sure, as they go through, that 
we are meeting our requirements for those pilots.
    For instance, we are a few short this year, but, of course, 
the year is only about half over. So, it will fluctuate a 
little bit towards the end, but we watch them so closely 
because we don't want to get behind. In most communities, we 
are actually considered healthy, which is 85 percent or above, 
in the rotary-wing community. I would not say that is true 
across the board. There are plenty of challenges to go around. 
But, that one, we stay very glued to. We are relatively healthy 
right now in that regard.
    Mr. Norcross. Mr. Veasey, you are now recognized.
    Mr. Veasey. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
    General Wise, I wanted to ask you a question. Now that each 
Service is orienting its modernization strategy and priorities 
on some variation of multi-domain operations, how does the V-22 
fit into this and any future tilt-rotor platforms?
    General Wise. Sir, thank you for the question.
    Looking at really distributed operations, widely 
distributed operations, particularly, as we look at the 
Pacific, the V-22 is, for us, very uniquely capable, not just 
because of the fact that it can deliver sustainment to anywhere 
or people, but it is the speed at which it can do that. It has 
demonstrated over and over, since it started combat deployments 
in 2007, that it is uniquely capable to do things that no other 
platform can do.
    So, the tilt-rotor side I think is demonstrated across all 
the services, as we have seen it take in the Navy and Air Force 
Special Operations. Everyone is seeing the value of that 
platform. The Japanese have come onboard as well.
    So, as far as future of tilt-rotor and other 
opportunities--and there was a question earlier having to do 
with Future Vertical Lift, and how the Marine Corps is really 
expanding its view of some of the capabilities that have been 
developed through that program--that would suggest that some of 
the tilt-rotor and, potentially, unmanned capabilities to 
further expand our ability and capacity to sustain forces in 
widely distributed environments, there is huge potential in 
that area moving forward.
    So, we are working very closely with all the vendors, the 
Army, the Air Force, and the Navy, through what we are now 
calling ``a family of systems'' within the Future Vertical Lift 
to address those specific additional capacity requirements.
    Mr. Veasey. What about the tilt-rotor industrial base and 
the rotary-wing aviation industrial base? What is like just 
your kind of overall assessment of that right now?
    General Wise. For the industrial base, I would probably let 
Mr. Stefany talk to that one.
    Mr. Veasey. Yes, please.
    General Wise. I am happy to follow up, though, with 
anything you would like.
    Mr. Veasey. Yes, please. Thank you.
    Mr. Stefany. Yes, I think it is we are kind of in a--you 
know, certain lines coming to an end. And Army is first, but 
Future Vertical Lift is the future, and we have this kind of 
gap in the middle, right? That is why the nacelle program was 
potentially a very good way of filling that void to keep the 
workforce hot, as first the Army, then the Navy and Marine 
Corps make our selections for Future Vertical Lift.
    We are looking at both major aircraft suppliers and engine 
suppliers, the whole group, to try to make sure we are doing it 
smartly with our Air Force and Army counterparts.
    Mr. Veasey. What do you think are the biggest challenges? 
You know, as you look at that base, what do you think are some 
of the biggest challenges that we are going to have to be able 
to overcome to keep moving forward?
    Mr. Stefany. Yes, sir. I think, as we go, well, just the 
skilled workers, right? Being able to get the right skilled 
mechanics in the right area. It is maybe not as appealing a 
career field as maybe it was 10 or 20 years ago. And so, 
getting the right skills or the right workforce, not losing 
them in places like Amarillo, but, also, other parts of the 
country, making sure we, as a nation, are keeping those blue-
collar skills active and a choice career for our younger folks.
    Mr. Veasey. Yes. Yes, absolutely. Yes, we are definitely 
seeing a lot of that in the Dallas-Fort Worth area.
    Thank you very much. I appreciate your answers.
    And I will turn it back over to the chairman.
    Mr. Norcross. Thank you.
    And to our witnesses, very much appreciate it.
    Votes have been called. So, this is perfect timing.
    And very much appreciate the testimony, and certainly, 
answering those questions.
    We are adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 11:03 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]     
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                            A P P E N D I X

                              May 13, 2022
      
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              PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                              May 13, 2022

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[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

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              WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING

                              THE HEARING

                              May 13, 2022

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           RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. HARTZLER

    Mr. Stefany. As the Primary Inventory Control Activity for Stinger, 
the Army is currently in contract negotiations with Raytheon to expand 
capacity of the Stinger production line and procure additional test 
equipment. No additional support is needed to accomplish this critical 
expansion. In addition, the Army has contracted for the replenishment 
of Stinger missiles that were recently provided to support the 
Ukrainian conflict efforts. With raw material on hand, Raytheon will be 
able to replenish the Marine Corps' 1000 missiles, but delivery will 
not begin until FY25 based upon limited part availability and long-lead 
items. The current USMC inventory of Stinger missiles will be capable 
of sustaining the USMC War Reserve Munition Requirement and live fire 
training requirements through FY24. Beginning in FY25, the USMC will 
need to balance the need for live fire training with recently fielded 
simulation-based training.   [See page 9.]
    General Heckl. The Marine Corps will begin fielding the Navy Marine 
Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS) to Medium Missile 
(MMSL) Batteries starting in (FY) 2023. The fielding plan calls for 
incrementally fielding up to 14 batteries across the Marine Corps by 
FY2030.
    A Medium Missile Battery at full capacity will have up to 18 
launchers. The Marine Corps' acquisition objective for launchers is 
261, which will support 18 NMESIS per operational battery. This 
acquisition objective will also provide systems for additional training 
and sustainment.   [See page 11.]
                                 ______
                                 
             RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY DR. JACKSON
    General Wise. Maximum capacity for Nacelle Improvements kit 
production and installations at Bell is 36 per year in the first year 
of execution. 36 Installs a year would represent a higher risk of 
execution in the first year of installations on MV-22B aircraft due to 
the adaptation of the installation team to the MV-22B. Based on prior 
experience with commencing a significant modification program, 
executing 30 installs in the first year of execution represents a lower 
execution risk to the program and enables the MV-22B community to ramp 
to a higher rate in following years. Lead time for the components of a 
Nacelle Improvements Kit is 22 months from contract award to delivery.
    The FY23 budget includes 9 NI kits, which are planned to be 
installed at the completion of the CV-22 NI install program, currently 
scheduled for late FY24. The FY23 Unfunded Priority List (UPL) included 
an additional 15 NI kits, for a total of 24 NI Kits; which balanced 
program affordability with execution. 30 Kits is the optimum 
installation quantity the MV-22 Fleet can support in the first year of 
execution. Since submission of the UPL, the program learned of a Bell-
Boeing $1.2M NI Kit unit cost increase. The cost of an installed 
Nacelle Improvements Modification is $6.9M per aircraft ($5.48M for the 
kit and $1.42M for the install). The total required for procurement of 
30 NI kits is $164.4M. The cost for the installs of these kits in FY25 
will be: $42.6M.   [See page 18.]    
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              QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                              May 13, 2022

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                   QUESTION SUBMITTED BY DR. JACKSON

    Dr. Jackson. While the entire Department of Defense remains focused 
on modernization, each of the services are undergoing various unique 
lines of effort as well.
    The Army's Future Vertical Lift Cross Functional Team is 
aggressively looking to modernize much of their rotary platforms.
    One example is the Future Long Range Assault Aircraft which will 
eventually replace all of the Army's Black Hawk helicopters.
    As the Army has worked through its hurdles in fielding this new 
platform, I feel like there is much to learn.
    General Wise, could you speak to the development of future rotary 
aircraft for the Marine Corps and if the Marines are taking lessons 
learned from the Army's Future Vertical Lift major acquisition 
programs?
    General Wise. USMC future vertical lift development pivoted from 
pursuing the Attack Utility Replacement Aircraft to a Vertical Takeoff 
and Landing (VTOL) Family of Systems (FoS) as the Service redirected 
its focus under the 38th Commandant's Planning Guidance and Force 
Design 2030. HQMC Aviation and Combat Development & Integration are 
currently conducting a modified capabilities-based assessment of the 
current USMC vertical lift inventory to identify gaps operating in 
support of Expeditionary Advanced Bases Operations (EABO). This gap 
analysis will serve as a foundational study, informing the development 
of an Initial Capability Document (ICD) to support a VTOL FoS 
portfolio. Multiple Capability Development Documents will be derived 
from the ICD to develop vertical lift capabilities within the VTOL FoS 
portfolio. The USMC VTOL FoS portfolio will take a capabilities-based 
approach versus a platform-based approach. The USMC VTOL FoS is a 
member of the OSD FVL Joint Council of Colonel (JCoC). The OSD FVL JCoC 
is a forum that allows each service to provide monthly updates, 
collaboration, and sharing of information regarding their specific 
service's FVL efforts. HQMC is closely monitoring sister service FVL 
efforts, such as the Army's analysis of alternatives for its FARA 
aircraft and their approach to accelerated acquisitions programs. The 
USMC VTOL FoS will continue to maintain its dialogue amongst the joint 
FVL efforts as it develops a capability-based portfolio.

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