[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


 
                        
                        [H.A.S.C. No. 117-92]

                                HEARING

                                   ON

                   NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

                          FOR FISCAL YEAR 2023

                                  AND

              OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS

                               BEFORE THE

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

         SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES HEARING

                                   ON

                         DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

   FISCAL YEAR 2023 BUDGET REQUEST FOR SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES

                               __________

                              HEARING HELD
                              MAY 18, 2022

                                     
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                               __________

                                
                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
48-496                     WASHINGTON : 2023                    
          
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------     

             SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES

                  JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut, Chairman

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island      ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia
JIM COOPER, Tennessee                VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri
DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey          SAM GRAVES, Missouri
ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland           TRENT KELLY, Mississippi
JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine, Vice Chair   MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
ELAINE G. LURIA, Virginia            JIM BANKS, Indiana
SARA JACOBS, California              JACK BERGMAN, Michigan
SYLVIA GARCIA, Texas                 JERRY L. CARL, Alabama

               James Vallario, Professional Staff Member
               David Sienicki, Professional Staff Member
                          Naajidah Khan, Clerk
                            
                            
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

              STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Courtney, Hon. Joe, a Representative from Connecticut, Chairman, 
  Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces.................     1

                               WITNESSES

Stefany, Frederick J., Performing the Duties of Assistant 
  Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and 
  Acquisition; VADM Scott Conn, USN, Deputy Chief of Naval 
  Operations, Warfighting Requirements and Capabilities; and 
  LtGen Karsten S. Heckl, USMC, Deputy Commandant of the Marine 
  Corps, Combat Development and Integration......................     2

                                APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

    Courtney, Hon. Joe...........................................    31
    Stefany, Frederick J., joint with VADM Scott Conn and LtGen 
      Karsten S. Heckl...........................................    36
    Wittman, Hon. Robert J., a Representative from Virginia, 
      Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection 
      Forces.....................................................    34

Documents Submitted for the Record:

    [There were no Documents submitted.]

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

    [The information was not available at the time of printing.]

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

    Mr. Bergman..................................................    75
    Mr. Wittman..................................................    75


DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY FISCAL YEAR 2023 BUDGET REQUEST FOR SEAPOWER AND 
                           PROJECTION FORCES

                              ----------                              

                  House of Representatives,
                       Committee on Armed Services,
            Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces,
                           Washington, DC, Wednesday, May 18, 2022.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 8:00 a.m., via 
Webex, Hon. Joe Courtney (chairman of the subcommittee) 
presiding.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOE COURTNEY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
CONNECTICUT, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION 
                             FORCES

    Mr. Courtney. Ladies and gentlemen, I call to order this 
morning's meeting on the Seapower and Projection Forces 
Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee.
    Just again, to do the quick administrative and technical 
notes, members are reminded that they must be visible on screen 
with the software platform for the purpose of identity 
verification. Members must continue to use the software 
platform's video function while attending the hearing unless 
they experience connectivity issues or other technical problems 
that render the member unable to fully participate on camera. 
If you experience technical difficulties, please contact 
committee staff for assistance.
    When you are recognized, video will be broadcast via 
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for questions, but if you want to speak out at another time, 
you must seek recognition verbally.
    Please mute your microphone when you are not speaking and 
remember to unmute prior to speaking. If you are leaving to 
join a different proceeding or will be absent for a significant 
period of time, you should exit the software platform entirely 
and then rejoin if you return.
    Please be advised I have designated a committee staff 
member to mute unrecognized members' microphones if necessary. 
Please use the platform's chat feature to communicate with 
staff regarding technical or logistical support issues. 
Finally, [you will] see a 5-minute countdown clock on your 
platform display. I will remind you when your time is up.
    So, first of all, I want to thank the members for--and we 
will get bonus points for the early start this morning. Again, 
the way the floor schedule is operating, we just figured this 
would be the best opportunity to have uninterrupted opportunity 
to have an exchange with the subcommittee.
    And, again, in the interest of time, myself and the ranking 
member have agreed to waive opening statements. We will submit 
our statements in writing for the record. And, again, I want to 
thank all the members who are here today for joining us at this 
early hour.
    With that, I will yield to Mr. Wittman, the ranking member.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Courtney can be found in the 
Appendix on page 31.]
    Mr. Wittman. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I really 
appreciate your leadership. I want to thank our witnesses for 
joining us today.
    I have 8 pages of opening statement. I really wanted to 
read that, but I think I am the only one in the room that 
really wants that.
    So with that, I will turn it back to you, and we will be 
ready to get underway.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Wittman can be found in the 
Appendix on page 34.]
    Mr. Courtney. Thank you.
    Mr. Stefany, it is my understanding you are going to do a 
joint statement for all the great witnesses we have here this 
morning. Is that correct?
    Mr. Stefany. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Courtney. Okay. You may proceed.

  STATEMENT OF FREDERICK J. STEFANY, PERFORMING THE DUTIES OF 
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND 
   ACQUISITION; VADM SCOTT CONN, USN, DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL 
  OPERATIONS, WARFIGHTING REQUIREMENTS AND CAPABILITIES; AND 
 LTGEN KARSTEN S. HECKL, USMC, DEPUTY COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE 
           CORPS, COMBAT DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION

    Mr. Stefany. Thank you.
    Chairman Courtney, Ranking Member Wittman, distinguished 
members of the subcommittee, on behalf of myself, Vice Admiral 
Conn, and Lieutenant General Heckl, we thank you for the 
opportunity to appear before you today to talk about the 
Department of Navy's fiscal year 2023 seapower capabilities 
request. We would like to thank this subcommittee for your 
leadership and your support of the programs that support our 
forward deployed naval forces.
    The past year has been highlighted by a number of 
significant firsts for us as we provide new capabilities to the 
fleet. This year we achieved the initial operational 
capability, or IOC, of the USS Gerald Ford, and she is now 
preparing for her first deployment. We completed operational 
testing of the CH-53K heavy lift helicopter, and just last 
month declared IOC of that capability. We also accomplished the 
first refueling of operational aircraft from an unmanned air 
vehicle, in this case, the MQ-25 prototype aircraft. And the 
Navy took delivery of two prototype unmanned surface vessels 
from the DOD's [Department of Defense's] Strategic Capabilities 
Office, while the Marine Corps took delivery of their first 
prototype long-range, unmanned surface vessel.
    The Department of Navy's fiscal year 2023 budget is guided 
by SECNAV's [Secretary of the Navy's] enduring priorities of 
strengthening maritime superiority in defense of our Nation, 
empowering our people, and strengthening strategic 
partnerships. It implements the Chief of Naval Operation's 
Navigation Plan to expand our fleet capabilities for 
distributed operations while building upon the Commandant of 
the Marine Corps Force Design 2030 to rapidly modernize the 
expeditionary posture of the Marine Corps.
    Consistent with recent budget requests, this budget 
prioritizes the Navy's contribution to the national strategic 
deterrent while balancing readiness for the fight tonight, new 
capabilities for the future fight, and capacity across the near 
and long term.
    The fiscal year 2023 budget continues investment in more 
lethal network capabilities integrated with the joint force to 
address both pacing and acute threats.
    As reflected in the Department's 30-year shipbuilding plan, 
this budget requests over $27 billion for shipbuilding 
programs, more than $5 billion above the fiscal year 2022 
request, and includes 51 new-construction ships across the FYDP 
[Future Years Defense Program].
    This budget also invests in 96 aircraft in fiscal year 
2023, including command and control, airlift, and unmanned 
aircraft, and 420 aircraft across the FYDP.
    The budget includes funding for Marine Corps Force Design 
priorities for equipment modernization in the areas of 
precision fires, resilient communication, and mobility 
platforms to optimize the force for naval expeditionary warfare 
in the maritime littorals.
    To ensure we can maintain the forces we have now while 
building the forces we need in the future, the budget increases 
ship maintenance funding and expands the OPN [Other 
Procurement, Navy] maintenance pilot to cover 25 private 
contracted availabilities on both the east and west coasts, 
with a funding of $1.2 billion.
    The budget continues a once-in-a-century investment in 
recapitalization of our national ship repair infrastructure as 
part of our Ship--Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program, 
or SIOP, with a significant increase in funding in fiscal year 
2023 that is sustained across the FYDP.
    Finally, with the focus on developing a fully capable 
future naval force, this budget invests a record $24 billion in 
research and development [R&D] priorities. It continues early 
investment in our next-generation submarine and our next-
generation large surface combatant and includes continued 
development and testing of hypersonic weapons and unmanned 
vessel technologies.
    This budget also proposes increased R&D investments in 
directed energy weapons, autonomy, artificial intelligence, and 
the initial instantiation of Project Overmatch.
    Again, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you 
and your subcommittee today, and for the strong support this 
subcommittee has always provided to our Marines and our 
sailors.
    We look forward to your questions.
    [The joint prepared statement of Mr. Stefany, Admiral Conn, 
and General Heckl can be found in the Appendix on page 36.]
    Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Stefany.
    And, again, I have two questions, and, again, I think a lot 
of members obviously are bursting and straining at the leash to 
ask a number of others.
    You know, in the wake of COVID [coronavirus disease] in 
terms of ship construction across the board, it is all about 
trying to recover schedule because, again, there just--there is 
no question there was impact. But one issue which I think the 
Navy has, you know, created some schedule risk was the change 
in policy for unusual hazardous risk indemnification, which, 
again, there is just no question the Navy changed its policy in 
the last administration in terms of how--you know, who bears 
the cost in terms of indemnification.
    Last NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] we included, 
in the NDAA, a request to the Secretary of Defense to review 
procedures and standardization. And a report to the committee 
on their findings on this issue that was due on March 27th--
and, again, we have been notified that--we were notified on 
March 15th that that is not coming until the end of July. 
Again, this was from the Department of Defense, the request.
    There is a problem here, which is that, you know, this 
issue is coming to a head very quickly, and it is going to 
start creating more schedule risk if we don't get, I think, a 
resolution to the problem. I don't think the private industry 
has been dragging its feet. They have found insurance coverage 
that is the maximum allowed in the market, $2 billion of 
coverage, which I think is certainly a good-faith effort.
    And, you know, again, I just think if you can help us in 
terms of getting that report done ASAP [as soon as possible], 
and getting this issue resolved, I think it is going to 
eliminate a schedule risk problem which, again, I think 
everybody agrees is something that we have to address to get, 
whether it is surface ship construction, submarines, you name 
it, back on track.
    And maybe if you could just respond to that issue because, 
again, it did emanate from the Department of the Navy 
initially.
    Mr. Stefany. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. Two parts. One is, 
yes, we are aware of the Department of Defense effort to 
respond. They are working with the Air Force, the Army, and the 
Navy across the board, and that July date that you mention is 
what I understand we are working to as a group. The Secretary 
of Defense owns the report, and we will go back to them and 
make sure they know the urgency of getting the report done.
    On the more specific Navy issue, sir, we had a blanket--I 
will call it a blanket identification policy for nuclear either 
propulsion or nuclear weapons, and the previous--as you pointed 
out, previous SECNAV has made--has, I would say, changed that 
policy to have anything that is not a nuclear propulsion system 
or nuclear weapon come through in a case basis and be able to 
describe, before indemnification would be put in place, the 
specific case and the specific concerns and the specific risks 
that would apply.
    And so, we talked to our industry counterparts. We have two 
of those in right now, one of them from a company that you 
recognize, and we are going through that process of identifying 
those specific risks that would be above a normal insurance 
policy, and we will take those to the Secretary of the Navy.
    So my point for you is we are working those, even without 
the report from DOD going on.
    Mr. Courtney. Well, thank you.
    Again, this is not certainly a one specific yard issue. It 
is in other parts of the shipbuilding's industrial base. And, 
again, I think--I am just sort of throwing it out there that as 
we get closer to NDAA markup, you know, we are not going to 
just sort of let this issue kind of fester until after July. We 
need to get a clarity to this, [inaudible] whether or not we 
have to legislate on it again.
    Mr. Stefany. Sir, as I think as you know, the previous 
legislation has--when a request has come in, there is a clock, 
a time limit when we, the Navy, have to respond to those 
specific requests, which will be before that timeline. So we 
will certainly be working with you, sir.
    Mr. Courtney. I appreciate that.
    One other question again, and I will yield to Mr. Wittman, 
is the Navy's current acquisition strategy for sealift relies 
heavily on procurement and conversion of used sealift vessels. 
The global market, which obviously is a very dynamic and fast-
changing market, I think today looks a lot different than it 
did a few years ago when the Navy sort of laid out this 
strategy for recapitalizing sealift.
    When was the last used sealift market analysis done?
    Mr. Stefany. Sorry, I don't actually have the data on that. 
I believe it was around 2 years ago, but I will have to get you 
for the record when we did the last market survey, sir.
    [The information referred to was not available at the time 
of printing.]
    Mr. Courtney. Well, again, before we are prepared to 
rubber-stamp, you know, just continuing with the used sealift 
strategy and continuing to defer new construction, we need to 
get, you know, some clarity on that point because, again, this 
is not something that--there is high interest I think, in the 
committee, on both sides, to, you know, find out more about the 
used sealift market before we just totally relinquish new 
construction as a way of trying to address an issue which is 
quite critical.
    And I will get off my soapbox at that point there. And I'll 
yield to Mr. Wittman.
    Mr. Wittman. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I agree with 
your observations fully on that. And, gentlemen, I want to 
thank you so much for joining us.
    Lieutenant General Heckl, I want to start with you. In your 
best professional military judgment, what are the consequences 
associated with supporting the 24 amphibious ship level that is 
being projected by the administration? And what, in your best 
professional military judgment, should be the floor for the 
number of amphibious ships in our fleet?
    General Heckl. Sir, thanks for the question.
    I will start with--as the requirements officer for the 
Marine Corps, I will start with the requirement. Our absolute 
bare minimum requirement for traditional L-Class amphibious 
warships is 31, and that is composed of 10 larger deck LHA/LHD 
class and 21 smaller LPD/LSD-type class ships.
    The fact, sir, that ships are being decommissioned faster 
than they are being procured and delivered and employed, the 
simple fact is that under this plan, we will go to a number of 
24 amphibs in the next 3 to 5 years. What that translates to 
for us is risk, which is always any military person's--one of 
the prime concerns.
    So while I believe that we will be able to likely provide 
the appropriate support to the Indo-Pacific theater, I think we 
will have to take risk in other areas, like CENTCOM [U.S. 
Central Command], AFRICOM [U.S. Africa Command], EUCOM [U.S. 
European Command]. I don't think there is any way to avoid it.
    But at the end of the day, sir, as you well know--and we 
were kind of discussing here before the subcommittee kicked 
off--you know, the Marine expeditionary units [MEUs] embarked 
aboard amphibious ready groups are very highly in demand. Over 
the last decade, we have evacuated embassies in Libya and 
Yemen. We have reinforced the embassy in Iraq. We have rescued 
a downed Air Force pilot in Libya, and put artillery ashore to 
kill ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] in Syria. And then 
most recently, the MEU that was first on the ground in 
Afghanistan to assist with the evacuation.
    So these things, at the end of the day, one of the most in-
demand assets by combatant commanders, so it is going to 
represent risk, sir, if we go below 31.
    Mr. Wittman. Very good. Thank you, Lieutenant General 
Heckl.
    Mr. Stefany, I want to look at destroyers. Does the budget 
request include 10 destroyers for the next 5 years? And looking 
at what the administration is proposing as far as putting 
destroyers under contract, does a contract for nine destroyers 
allow the administration latitude to reduce destroyers in the 
future? Because the budget request is for 10, the proposal is 
to put 9 under contract. So can you give us an idea about a 10-
ship multiyear versus a 9-ship multiyear? Is there some savings 
that occurs with that? Why the 10 in budget request and then 
going to 9 under contract? There just seems to be an 
inconsistency there.
    Mr. Stefany. Yes, sir. So, first, I'll confirm that the 
budget for the next 5 years has 2 per year, 10 total destroyers 
for the next 5 years. And the legislative proposal that is on 
its way over, not to you yet, will have nine firm in the 
multiyear, plus one option year, and that will provide 
flexibility, as you point out, for the administration.
    As things go forward, if there is another COVID event or 
world events change to allow potentially only 9 of those 10 
ships to be bought, potentially, it provides that flexibility.
    At the cost--there is a cost to that, right--a 10-ship 
multiyear will save us more money than a 9-ship will. The delta 
cost is not overly large, but that is a decision that the 
Department has made of value versus flexibility, sir.
    Mr. Wittman. Okay. Very good. It just seems like in the 
face of what we need, fewer ships or being able to take out 
ships is not the direction we need to be going.
    One last question, Mr. Chairman, and then I will yield 
back.
    Vice Admiral Conn, in your best professional military 
judgment, does the reduction of over 1,000 missile tubes in our 
Surface Navy, which is about 10 percent reduction, does that 
constitute an acceptable risk to the Navy?
    Admiral Conn. My best military advice would be, there is 
risk associated with that reduction. That assumes we can get 
the ships underway and [inaudible] operate them. I think when 
we have this conversation, I understand it is a topic that 
everybody is concerned with, we have to look broadly. The 
United States Navy, we fight from the seabed to space; our 
submarines, our surface ships, and aviation. And having the 
ability to pose multi-access, multi-domain operational dilemmas 
against an adversary is where we are focused on. There is 
reduction in the VLS [vertical launching system] cells, and it 
is a risk/reward versus what is it going to take to get those 
VLS cells real, forward, versus what other investments do we 
need to make that delivers a more capable, more lethal Navy in 
the future.
    Mr. Wittman. In your best professional military judgment, 
does that, then, in turn, reduce our ability to project power 
through our Navy-Marine Corps team?
    Admiral Conn. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Wittman. Okay. Very good.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Wittman.
    The chair recognizes Mr. Golden.
    Mr. Golden. Thank you.
    I am going to follow up a little bit on the questioning 
about the DDG 51 [guided-missile destroyer], specifically, the 
multiyear procurement. So, I understand what you are saying 
about the flexibility with nine plus one. But, you know, there 
is another element at play here where the Navy is often coming 
to the shipyards, specifically Bath Iron Works, I have been 
there for some of these discussions, or even sitting before 
this committee, and talking about a desire to see these two 
yards get to a place where they can do three ships per year.
    In fact, just last week, Admiral Gilday sat before the full 
committee and stated that the Navy has what he called an 
aspirational goal for the industrial base to get to three DDG 
ships per year in regards to their capacity to build. And I am 
sure some of that has to do with a little bit of overlap 
between the Flight III and DDG(X) kicking in as well, which is 
out there a few years, but it is not that far away. It takes 
quite a while to develop skilled shipbuilders, Secretary.
    So I am just curious, again, about this signal that you 
send with the nine plus one. The FYDP says 10 DDGs. That is 
pretty much, you know, where the shipyards are right now. Now, 
nine would suggest that maybe one of these yards wouldn't even 
have enough work to maintain the production rate that they have 
right now, which is kind of a negative signal, which that is 
where the mismatch is. Because you are saying we want you to 
get to three out there in the near-term future. It is really 
not that far off. And yet, a multiyear procurement like this 
seems to, you know, just go in the complete opposite direction.
    So I am just curious, how did the Pentagon get to this 9-
plus-1 proposal, as opposed to the one they had last time which 
was 10 plus 5? And, ultimately, I think you did 12 DDGs over 
that 5-year period.
    Mr. Stefany. So let me point out that the current approach 
for the next multiyear is very similar to the last one. We will 
actually have an additional option this year to go up to 
potentially 15 ships just like the last multiyear did if the 
Department decides to fund a third ship in any of the years 
going forward. But I think there is just--as you will remember 
in the last multiyear, we ended up funding 9 and then 
ultimately 10, but--on the multiyear.
    So I think the administration and the Department would like 
to keep that flexibility if things do not go as well as we 
aspire to. If they do, then the option for a third one in each 
year is there.
    Mr. Golden. Thank you.
    Lieutenant General, I wanted to talk a little bit about the 
Force Design 2030. General Berger sat in your seat. I am sure 
used a lot of what he learned when he was at Combat Development 
and Integration to inform a lot of his guidance to the Marine 
Corps as he came in and took over as Commandant.
    There have been some critics that have said that now, 
several years into implementation of the Commandant's intent, 
that the Marine Corps hasn't been flexible, you know, hasn't 
been listening to feedback. I would be surprised if that were 
entirely true, but I wanted to give you the opportunity to talk 
to us a little bit about what you are seeing out there? What is 
the Marine Corps learning as they are trying to implement Force 
Design 2030? And how best can Congress support the Marine Corps 
in making these moves?
    General Heckl. Well, sir, first, thanks for the question.
    And I would start off with just kind of what Mr. Stefany 
did earlier, thanking the subcommittee and Congress as a whole 
for the support that they have provided to the Commandant and 
to the Marine Corps as we have stepped off on this Force 
Design.
    So in my billet as the Deputy Commandant for Combat 
Development and Integration, I oversee the process that many 
say doesn't exist. It has existed. It exists now and has been 
used extensively over the course of the last almost 3 years. We 
have a rigorous campaign of learning, and the campaign of 
learning has existed at CD&I for the better part of 5 years. 
This is not a new construct, but it is where we use wargaming 
analysis, studies, experimentation, and feedback.
    One of the big processes we have used in Force Design has 
been something called IPTs, Integrated Planning Teams. And this 
included--a majority of the members of these IPTs are from the 
fleet to provide direct feedback. And now, sir, we are in phase 
3 of Force Design where we are doing aggressive 
experimentation. We are getting pieces of gear and equipment, 
and the way we have structured the units out in the fleet, and 
then we are getting feedback.
    So we are going to continue doing this, and we have 
listened. The Commandant has iterated, for instance, we were 
going to go down to five cannon batteries, which was misquoted 
yesterday at CSIS [Center for Strategic and International 
Studies]. We are going to seven cannon batteries--four west, 
three east--and we are also increasing the number of artillery 
pieces in those batteries from six to eight. So--and with the 
VMM [medium tilt-rotor squadron], we actually increased; we 
went from 14 to 16. So we are listening, sir.
    Mr. Golden. Thank you, General.
    General Heckl. Sir.
    Mr. Courtney. The chair now recognizes General Bergman.
    Mr. Bergman. Good morning, gentlemen.
    Let's talk about LCSs [littoral combat ships]. Of the 
Freedom class, the proposal, what is the youngest ship when it 
was commissioned? What was the final cost? And what is the 
sustainment cost savings of that ship?
    Admiral Conn. Thank you, sir.
    In terms of the LCS ships, I think the youngest ship will 
be 3 years. I can get the actual date. That would be St. Louis, 
LCS 19. In terms of the cost of savings, we focus on the cost 
to buy back, what would it take to buy all of those ships back, 
and it would be about $4.2 billion in the FYDP, that we would 
have to come up with other ways to pay those bills, whether it 
be----
    Mr. Bergman. So you took that $4.2 billion and put it 
somewhere else?
    Admiral Conn. We used the $4.2 [billion] savings and 
applied it to high-end capability that would deliver, in some 
cases, inside the FYDP.
    Mr. Bergman. Okay.
    Admiral Conn. That it is the opportunity that that 
divestment----
    Mr. Bergman. So $4.2 billion. Okay.
    Of the LCSs that are being retained, what is the mission 
for those in the future? Has it changed? Is it moving forward 
the same, whatever?
    Admiral Conn. Freedom class was part of the ASW package, 
the anti-submarine warfare package. That capability has failed 
in tests, and CNO has testified he is not willing to put 
another dollar into that program to be able--to have a ship 
that cannot find a high-end submarine in a high-end fight. And 
that was, again, one of the reasons why we made a divestment.
    Mr. Bergman. Okay. If ASW is not the mission for it--tried, 
failed, just didn't work--has there been any evaluations? 
Because I remember about 3 or 4 years ago, Admiral Faller, who 
was SOUTHCOM [U.S. Southern Command], testified here that in 
the Caribbean, in that SOUTHCOM AOR [area of responsibility], 
that there was a mission set for the LCS. Has that changed?
    Admiral Conn. No, sir. And as the 3rd Fleet commander, we 
had LCS doing drug ops [operations] with the Coast Guard down 
in South America.
    Mr. Bergman. Okay. Was there any discussion before deciding 
to decommission the ships to refit them for any other missions 
that maybe we don't know about? I mean, is there any other 
emerging missions when you think about INDOPACOM [U.S. Indo-
Pacific Command], when you think about SOUTHCOM, when you think 
about Horn of Africa, other things, you know, obviously 
survivability, the ability to fight? Is there a robust history, 
discussion of what went through that maybe some of us who read 
that kind of stuff could read?
    Admiral Conn. Sir, you mentioned INDOPACOM, and that is the 
exact lens that we looked at, and it is not that the LCS, 
regardless of the class, have no military value. It is they 
have less military value. And based on the resources that we 
had, we had some hard decisions to make, and that was one of 
those recommendations at this point.
    Mr. Bergman. Okay. Let's switch topics for a second to the 
Navy Reserve. Since 2001, the Navy has cut Reserve combat 
aviation squadrons from 23 to 5, I think is what the math says. 
The fiscal year 2023 proposal, in that proposal the Navy, 
again, is going to eliminate Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron 85.
    Is it the Navy's intent to eliminate all Navy Reserve 
aviation, or maybe just maintain, you know, the 737s, or 
whatever, to fly, you know, goods and people around? Or, I 
mean, are we just--is the Navy in its total force just looking 
to reduce the overall Reserve numbers across the board, just 
aviation being the one here?
    Admiral Conn. No, sir, we are not trying to eliminate the 
Reserve Force from aviation perspective. In fact, the Reserve 
Force flies our C-130Ts right now, and we have--I think there 
is an unfunded requirement request for C-130Js to begin 
recapitalizing those assets for that important mission, 
particularly in the INDOPACOM AOR. Our Reserves fly adversary 
missions for training, our fleet replacement squadrons and our 
fleet squadrons, and that is an important mission, having been 
an avid--adversary pilot twice in my career.
    So there is a piece and an important role that the 
[inaudible] Reserves will play, but based on top funding levels 
and priorities within the Navy, I think that is reflective of 
what you are saying.
    Mr. Bergman. Is there--and my time is about to expire, but 
at some point, it would be nice to see the cost of maintaining 
a squadron on Active Duty and the cost of maintaining a Reserve 
squadron, and how those two numbers match.
    With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Courtney. Thank you, General.
    The chair now recognizes Congresswoman Luria.
    Mrs. Luria. Thank you.
    And, Admiral Conn, on May 12th before the Senate Armed 
Services Committee, Senator Tuberville recently said this 
quote, and he said: ``I wanted to commend something the Navy 
does exceptionally well, accountability.''
    He went on to ask: ``Why is the Navy's culture of holding 
senior officers accountable more important in maintaining 
standards and performance?''
    And then in response, Admiral Gilday very emphatically 
said: ``More importantly, there is the expectation that our 
sailors have that we hold their seniors accountable.''
    So in the accountability section of the command 
investigation into the Bonhomme Richard fire, it cited that the 
action or inaction by 17 individuals listed in the report, 
quote, ``directly led to the loss of the ship.'' Additionally, 
the action or inaction of 17 additional individuals listed in 
the report, quote, ``contributed to the loss of the ship.'' 
Among these 34 officers listed, there are five flag officers 
who contributed to the loss of the ship.
    What accountability actions have been taken against these 
five flag officers named in the report?
    Admiral Conn. I am very familiar with that report, being 
that I signed it, and as the investigating officer, I made 
recommendations up to the Pacific Fleet commander who turned 
out to be the centralized disposition authority for the 
accountability actions.
    The results of that are with the Secretary of the Navy, and 
it would be improper for me to give any specifics because I am 
not sure he has made his final determination.
    Mrs. Luria. So if I understand correctly, there are 
recommendations that have been made with regard to this, but 
they have not gone through the final approval with the 
Secretary?
    Admiral Conn. I will say that there are decision been made, 
there is actions been taken, and there are other decisions to 
be made.
    Mrs. Luria. So as far as what has been publicly announced 
and known to this date, the only person who has been held 
accountable for the loss of a capital warship so far is an E-1. 
When the report clearly says that 17 individuals were directly 
responsible, 17 additional individuals contributed to the loss 
who are significantly more senior and experienced than the 
junior E-1 sailor, do you think that the public has the right 
to know who is being held accountable?
    Admiral Conn. I think the Navy is always transparent in 
accountability across the board. I will say as the 
investigating officer, the list that I proposed forward was not 
a list of people to punish. It was a list of people that need 
to go through due course and a formal adjudication process. It 
was not my job to make any adjudications decisions at my level. 
It was my responsibility to elevate people into a formal 
adjudication process, and that is exactly what was done.
    Mrs. Luria. Well, thank you. And I will look forward to 
following and tracking the results of that report.
    Admiral Conn. Yes, ma'am.
    Mrs. Luria. And to tie that back into this budget hearing, 
obviously we have the loss of a capital ship. And I would like 
to shift now to Lieutenant General Heckl, because we have 
already discussed the number of amphibs across the fleet. I 
also know in this budget request, you have pushed LHA 10 out to 
2031.
    Lieutenant General Heckl, can you comment on the impact of 
that specific prolongation between building LHA 9 and 10? And 
then also, Mr. Stefany, because that has an impact on the 
industrial base going back to some of the comments my 
colleagues have made.
    So General Heckl first.
    General Heckl. Yes, ma'am. And to my comments earlier about 
the bare number, obviously, LHA 10 would prove vital in that. 
Right now, between LHA 9 and LHA 10, there is an 11-year gap, 
depending on when you decide it was appropriated. And, 
obviously, that large deck, those--we are returning to well 
decks with the flight deck. It is a very capable platform, very 
important to what we are doing, very important to the Nation's 
crisis response force.
    And I would defer to Mr. Stefany on industrial base.
    Mr. Stefany. Yes, ma'am. For the LHA-type ship, we see 
about a 5-year spacing between ships is ideal from a learning 
perspective and the industrial base. The suppliers staying 
online and being able to produce anything more than that would 
be not just degradation of the ability of the supply base to 
support, but increase the cost, right, as we see reverse 
learning, or negative learning, what we call it.
    So 5 years is ideal. As the General mentioned, the ship now 
is at the 9- or 10-year spacing from LHA 9, so we would see a 
cost increase and an industrial base impact both.
    Mrs. Luria. So you submitted a request--throughout all of 
these hearings--I mean this is 4 years now that Mr. Golden and 
I have gone through these NDAA hearings, and we hear nothing 
other than we need to improve the industrial base, we need to 
have trained workforce, yet you submit a request that you admit 
is more expensive in the long run, and essentially guts the 
workforce as far as building these large-deck amphibious ships.
    Mr. Courtney. We'll--again, at this point--but again, at 
the pace we are going, I think we will have a chance to do 
another round, so----
    Mrs. Luria. My time has expired.
    Mr. Courtney. Next up is Mr. Carl from Alabama.
    Mr. Carl. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman.
    Gentlemen, thank you all for joining us this morning. As 
you well know, it is our job to make sure the Navy is as strong 
as it possibly can be, and I want you all to understand this 
committee, as dysfunctional as it may seem to you, is probably 
the best working committee on the Hill. It is a pleasure to 
serve with these folks, and we do try to help the Navy and work 
together, and that is something that needs to be pointed out.
    Lieutenant Heckl, the commander of the Marine Corps sent a 
letter to our chairman here and Ranking Member Wittman 
expressing his requirements for 31 L-class amphibious ships, 
and I know you spoke on that earlier. You touched on it a 
little bit.
    Can you elaborate more specifically on the LPDs, of how 
these ships, the needs for these ships?
    General Heckl. Sure, sir. And thanks for the question. And, 
again, to your comment about this committee, I mean, I think it 
is quite functional and appreciate all the support again.
    So the LPDs, again, 21 is the bare requirement, in addition 
to the 10 large deck. And I will tell you one of the things 
over my career that we have witnessed happen, so it is fairly 
recent, you know, is the disaggregation of the Marine 
expeditionary unit and amphibious ready groups, right? So they 
will get into an AOR, and the various combatant commanders will 
need them. And one of the real capabilities of these LPDs and 
the LPD Flight II's is their ability to command and control and 
disaggregate.
    We actually have--it is not infrequent that you will have a 
Marine expeditionary unit with three ships in three different 
combatant commanders' AORs at one time, which is pretty 
stunning.
    So the LPDs, sir, I would just simply say from the 
capability of a well deck, a flight deck, the berthing, the 
command and control, the ability to disaggregate, that is 
probably the strongest attribute of the LPDs going forward.
    Mr. Carl. Thank you, sir.
    One more quick question. Does this put the Marine Corps at 
risk, since the Navy plans to retire some ships, to hold onto 
the LPDs buy and to delay the process?
    General Heckl. Sir, are you referring to the LSDs, 
decommissioning the LSDs?
    Mr. Carl. Yes.
    General Heckl. Yes, sir. Obviously, sir, I would support 
anything that is going to give our Marines and our fleet 
commanders more amphibious assets. But, obviously, that is 
going to be--it is within the top-line problem where we have 
priorities. But absolutely, sir, from my perspective, it would 
give the fleet commanders more capability.
    Mr. Carl. Thank you, sir.
    Mr. Chairman, I give my time back.
    Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Carl.
    The chair will now recognize Mr. Norcross, who is joining 
us remotely, and he will be followed by our newest member, 
Congresswoman Garcia.
    Mr. Norcross, the screen is yours.
    Mr. Norcross. Thank you, Chairman.
    Gentleman, good to have you here today.
    Virtually every hearing we have had related to has--the 
question has come up, the war in Ukraine and lessons learned, 
and that is where I want to start off with for both the general 
and vice admiral. We saw the sinking of the Russian flagship.
    What are we learning from that experience and others that 
might impact not necessarily on this immediate budget because, 
obviously, it was created before that happened, but as we look 
forward? Can you give us some insights on items we might have 
learned, or is that not a surprise to you gentlemen?
    So if we could start with the Lieutenant General, please--
or excuse me--the Lieutenant Admiral first.
    General Heckl. Okay. Sir, thanks for the question.
    So I think specific to the sinking of the ship, I think 
what you are seeing is that small distributed lethal forces 
with long-range precision fires can do a lot of damage to 
capital assets. And we have seen that not just with the sinking 
of the ship, but you've seen that with how the Ukrainians have 
been fighting against armor and, quite frankly, with the 
Javelins and the Stingers, how they have been performing the 
anti-air warfare as well.
    So the largest takeaway for me, again, and reinforces where 
we are going with Force Design, is that, again, the distributed 
lethal, well-trained, well-equipped forces can hold a larger, 
heavier, less mobile adversary at great risk.
    Mr. Norcross. But how about from a defense point of view?
    Admiral Conn. I will cover that, sir.
    I think it validates the funds, the appropriations that 
this committee and others have given us towards live virtual 
constructive training at sea. We do some of that in buildings, 
but able to be able to stimulate training from operational 
commanders down to individual level operators, radar set 
controllers, in a realistic, relevant, and recordable 
environment that paces--that replicates the high-end threat, 
whether being targeted by cruise missiles, whether being 
targeted by ballistic missiles, to be able to see that type of 
complex scenario in training before they see it in combat. 
Because if you see something for the first time in combat, you 
will pause, and if you pause, people will die. And we are able 
to replicate those scenarios and making sure our sailors and 
commanding officers have the capability, capacity, and training 
to execute in that type of scenario.
    Mr. Norcross. We haven't been given the full download on 
what happened there, but by your comments, the indication is 
somebody was asleep at the switch, so to speak, on the 
flagship. You are confident that given the capabilities we have 
on most of our high-end ships, we could defend against a 
missile of the type that was sinking the Russian flagship?
    Admiral Conn. Yes, sir. I could look you in the eye and say 
we are adequately prepared and equipped to execute that 
mission.
    Mr. Norcross. Thank you.
    Mr. Stefany, let me shift over here to a question 
concerning how many ships we are going to procure, 
decommission, our ability to maintain these ships. There has 
been a number of questions about sustainment across our 
services, but I want to focus in on our shipbuilding, and we 
have been struggling. This is no surprise. Building a workforce 
doesn't happen overnight. Building a relevant workforce that is 
experienced is even more difficult, and we are well on our way 
to that.
    When we look at what we can do from our in-place 
maintenance, have we looked at contracting with shipyards who 
are only doing commercial work, that perhaps they may be able 
to be pulled over for some of the maintenance on our naval 
vessels to try to bring down that time and that risk?
    Mr. Stefany. Yes, sir. So we actually have looked and 
worked with various commercial-only repair yards. Some, 
frankly, don't want to do business with us, but those that 
have, like, for instance, the old Mare Island Shipyard, we are 
in the process of certifying them to do Navy work. Philadelphia 
Shipyard, we are also looking at starting the process to 
certify them to do Navy work. The certification process is 
different than commercial work.
    So where there is interest on the commercial sector, we are 
taking those steps to bring more companies involved and get 
certified to Navy requirements.
    Mr. Norcross. And for the record, as I am running out of 
time, if you could share with us the reasons why they might not 
want to do work with us at times, maybe we can be helpful in 
trying to----
    Mr. Courtney. We will take that one for the record.
    Mr. Stefany. Yeah, that is a good one for the record, sir.
    [The information referred to was not available at the time 
of printing.]
    Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Norcross.
    We have now just been joined by Congressman Banks from 
Indiana and, again, then he will be followed by Congresswoman 
Garcia.
    Mr. Banks, the floor is yours.
    Mr. Banks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Vice Admiral Conn, the Government Accountability Office 
released a report this month on uncrewed maritime systems, 
specifically on how the Navy should improve its approach to 
maximize early investments. The report made seven 
recommendations.
    Have you read the report, sir?
    Admiral Conn. I have looked over the report, sir, but I 
need to read it in detail.
    Mr. Banks. Okay. So it is probably not fair to ask you if 
you agree with the recommendations of the report?
    Admiral Conn. That would be a good statement, sir.
    Mr. Banks. The committee would appreciate, I would 
appreciate if you could get back with us for the record and, 
after you review the recommendations, let us know where you----
    [The information referred to was not available at the time 
of printing.]
    Admiral Conn. Yes, sir. I can tell you what we are doing, 
but I don't want to take----
    Mr. Banks. Well, let me start with that. What are the 
critical technological challenges that the Navy is facing in 
building the autonomous vessels of the fleet?
    Admiral Conn. So the importance of having land-based test 
sites is very important, and that would be with land--for the 
hydraulic, hull, mechanical, electrical systems which is being 
done for the medium unmanned surface vessel and it will be 
operational in fiscal year 2023, and the large unmanned surface 
vessel will be operational to start testing shortly thereafter.
    And then there is combat integration systems that have to 
be done, sensor perception, and autonomy, the integration of 
all of those combat systems. That is the software development 
that must be done, and we cannot find ourselves in a concurrent 
development of trying to create these artificial intelligent 
use cases, while at the same time as we're building. So that is 
where our focus is now.
    One of those things you can't really see and touch, those 
enablers, that are going to make these unmanned systems real, 
and we have about $432 million in fiscal year 2023 and $2.2 
billion inside this FYDP going exactly to what I just 
described, sir.
    Mr. Banks. Understood. Can you talk a little more about 
what the Navy's strategy is to incorporate artificial 
intelligence and machine learning to unmanned vessels' 
operating systems and regular crewed ships that will command 
and control unmanned vessels?
    Admiral Conn. The Navy has identified an artificial 
intelligence lead for the Navy, and he works at Office of Naval 
Research [ONR], so he has got the lead. I won't go into long 
comments about our NAVPLAN implementation framework, how we 
shoot, maneuver, resupply, and defend enabled by networks, 
unmanned systems, artificial intelligence.
    I will spare you the details there, but artificial 
intelligence is nested in many things that we are doing going 
forward, but we have to change the narrative with ourselves and 
with industry and be disciplined and ask what are the use cases 
that we need artificial intelligence to do? We must be 
specific, instead of I just need AI. No. What do we need the AI 
to do for these capabilities, whether on the sea, undersea, or 
in the air? And that is where we have to drive----
    Mr. Banks. Agreed. But is there a strategy to do that, to 
change that----
    Admiral Conn. Let me take that for the record, sir, and I 
will reach out to ONR, and we will get that back to you.
    [The information referred to was not available at the time 
of printing.]
    Mr. Banks. How is the Navy incorporating the lessons 
learned from the recently stood up, unmanned task force that's 
assigned to the 5th Fleet? And how have their operations 
impacted the procurement plans for unmanned vessels?
    Admiral Conn. The Task Force 59 in 5th Fleet was a follow-
on when I was the 3rd Fleet commander for an integrated battle 
problem where we put in a number of unique unmanned systems 
that were tested in isolation, but we never brought them all 
together in an operationally relevant scenario to tease out the 
value, the warfighting utility, how it moves the [inaudible]. 
Task Force 59 is doing that. It is just not U.S. It is with our 
allies, our partners, because we don't have a monopoly on this 
technology. Task Force 59--I am sorry. The unmanned task force 
is kind of the interlocutor making sure that everybody is 
communicating. But I greatly value getting input from fleet 
operators on some of these prototypes, and what do we need to 
iterate and learn before we decide to scale? And I think that 
is a critical piece to what Task Force 59, as well as REP(MUS) 
[Robotic Experimentation and Prototyping using Maritime 
Unmanned Systems] exercises in 6th Fleet. We just need to 
continue creating those, that type of environments for 
innovation, experimentation, iteration before we scale.
    Mr. Banks. Last question, sir. What is the Navy's strategy 
to establish criteria in evaluating prototype unmanned vessels 
and improve schedules for prototype efforts?
    Admiral Conn. We are trying to accelerate getting 
prototypes into the fleet inside the POM [Program Objective 
Memorandum] cycle, which requires some agility in how we need 
to move money around, in some cases, with your approval. We 
can't just simply wait for some of these prototypes at the pace 
technology is going and be handcuffed to our POM cycles. We 
need to have some flexibility, and we do have some within our 
own.
    Mr. Banks. Have you asked for that authority or that 
flexibility?
    Admiral Conn. I think we have asked for it in the past.
    Jay, Mr. Stefany, I will turn it over to you.
    Mr. Stefany. That is one area that----
    Mr. Courtney. Why don't we follow up on that afterwards. 
Again, we will maybe have some extra time, folks, so maybe we 
can revisit with other member questions.
    Now, it is my pleasure to introduce our newest member to 
the Seapower Committee. We are really pleased that 
Congresswoman Garcia, Sylvia Garcia, has joined our committee 
and looking forward to the contributions that she is going to 
make from her great district in Texas.
    And I now yield to Congresswoman Garcia.
    Ms. Garcia. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And it is great to be 
here.
    And while I am not as well-versed on some of the issues 
that you all have been talking about, I do have some 
familiarity with some of these topics. And I want to start with 
the last one first that Mr. Banks was referring to, and that is 
the unmanned vehicles.
    You know, I come from Houston. NASA [National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration] is really close to my district, and I 
have always opposed unmanned space flight. So convince me today 
why we need to do unmanned vehicles in the military? And what 
does the continued adoption of unmanned vehicles mean for the 
future of the end strength numbers?
    Mr. Stefany. First of all, ma'am, I would like to point out 
that the experimentation we are doing is manned/unmanned 
teaming is what we call it. We do not envision, at least in the 
near term, unmanned vehicles going off and doing combat 
missions on their own. Right? So that human in the loop, 
manned/unmanned teaming is really the main area we are 
exploring right now.
    And the details of it I will turn over to Admiral Conn for 
any details there.
    Admiral Conn. I would say what we need the unmanned systems 
to do--and I completely agree with Mr. Stefany--is that there 
is going to need to be a human in the loop. Particularly when 
we are going to need to provide lethal fires against a target, 
there is going to be a human in that loop. Machines need to 
provide that human with more--I am sorry, ma'am.
    Ms. Garcia. So where are you at in this? I mean, I just 
joined the committee, and I will ask for a briefing from your 
team----
    Admiral Conn. Okay.
    Ms. Garcia [continuing]. To kind of bring me up to date.
    Admiral Conn. At the very broad level, we need unmanned 
systems to be force multipliers, whether in the air, on the 
surface, or undersea. We need unmanned systems that are 
sensors, or nodes in a network to really [inaudible] for 
information, sensors that can create maritime domain awareness, 
that it builds in redundancy to our space-based systems, 
because we don't want to put all of our eggs in that single 
basket.
    Ms. Garcia. Okay. Well, I am not from Missouri, but you are 
going to have to show me----
    Admiral Conn. Yes, ma'am.
    Ms. Garcia [continuing]. In a big way because I am from 
Texas. Okay? We do have a lot of military installations. I grew 
up, sort of sandwiched between Kingsville and Corpus when I was 
growing up, so I have seen Navy and Navy pilots----
    Admiral Conn. I went to Beeville.
    Ms. Garcia. Many, many years, so. But shifting gears a 
little but, I was pleased to read the Commandant's planning 
guide and see a paragraph in the core value section addressing 
sexual assault.
    The continued rise in reported cases leads me to conclude 
that we still do not fully understand the scope and scale of 
the issue despite the best efforts of individual leaders across 
the force.
    Mr. Stefany, I would like to have some confidence that the 
measures the Navy have taken to date are preventing sexual 
assaults. Excuse me. I have got sinus issues going down today.
    What is the Navy doing to prevent sexual assault right now? 
And what additional steps are required for prevention, victim 
protection, legal support, and investigation? And how much 
money is in this budget proposal to fulfill these measures?
    Mr. Stefany. Yes, ma'am. So not--the budget part for that 
effort is not in my area of expertise. I will have to get you 
the answer on the amount of money, but I know this is a very 
high priority for the Secretary of the Navy. He has put an 
advocate on his direct staff to bring all of the Navy-Marine 
Corps efforts together that we have been doing in disparate 
manners.
    And at this point, I think I really would want to turn it 
over to the two service reps for more of a detail on what they 
are doing within each service.
    Ms. Garcia. Okay.
    Mr. Stefany. So, Lieutenant General Heckl, if you want to 
start.
    General Heckl. So, ma'am, in the Marine Corps, as you know, 
the Commandant highlighted it [inaudible] prominently in his 
Force Design, and in his Commandant's Planning Guidance from 3 
years ago. We are not going to have an effective force if 
things like sexual assault, sexual harassment exist within the 
force. So it remains a top priority for the Commandant, and 
he--we will continue to move out on that.
    I will turn it over.
    Ms. Garcia. But what are you all doing with regard to 
prevention, victim protection, legal support, and investigation 
was the question? I mean, I know you all are committed, but 
what are you actually doing?
    General Heckl. Well, ma'am, as you probably know, the 
President's budget we actually got, we are actually putting a 
general officer in charge now, and we are considerably 
increasing--and this is not in my lane, ma'am, but I 
specifically like to talk very specifics, but we are 
considerably beefing up the legal support to all the SAPRO 
[Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office] cases that go 
forward. Those are just two examples that are real time now.
    Admiral Conn, I don't know if you have anything from the 
Navy.
    Admiral Conn. The investments that have been made to 
provide access to care and to counsel for sexual assault 
victims in terms of training people and understanding that that 
type of destructive behavior, illegal behavior, jeopardizes our 
ability to execute our missions from a warfighting perspective. 
Because on a ship, you've got to trust----
    Ms. Garcia. With all due respect, that was rather vague, 
and I look forward to probing this issue more with you when I 
get my briefing at a later date.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Courtney. Great. Thank you, Congresswoman Garcia.
    So we have gone through the first run-through of our 
members. Again, we have got a hard stop at 9:30, so we have got 
a little more time to do another round of questions.
    And I will kick it off by, again, focusing on what Admiral 
Gilday described as the number one acquisition priority of the 
Navy, and actually the Department of Defense, which is 
recapitalizing the Ohio program, the Columbia class. Early June 
we are going to have the keel-laying of the first of the 
Columbia, which is the first of the fleet of SSBNs [ballistic 
missile submarines], in Rhode Island.
    As your document indicates, there is roughly about $6 
billion in this year's budget to finish off the first boat's 
funding and advance procurement for the second boat. And, 
again, as we started at the beginning, you know, schedule is 
everything in terms of trying to keep this on track, as I think 
Admiral and Mr. Stefany know full well.
    The budget is actually fairly striking in terms of the 
investment that is being made into supply chain and workforce, 
which has been around for a few budgets, and that really kind 
of jumped off the page. And I totally support that priority 
that is included in the budget.
    And I also would note that, I think on page 4 or 5 of your 
testimony, Mr. Stefany, you note the fact that the 2015 law 
that we passed, the National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund, has 
generated savings with the multiyear authorities that we gave. 
It is roughly about $1 billion, I think, that has been 
calculated up to 2021, and that is going to continue to grow 
over time.
    So I would ask, number one, just again if you could sort of 
talk about the investments in the sort of upstream industrial 
base components of this program, and also just how you see the 
multiyear authorities in terms of, again, getting costs down 
over time?
    Mr. Stefany. Yes. Thank you, Chairman. I appreciate that 
question.
    So the first part, yes, we appreciate you noticing that we 
put in a special dedicated amount of money for--as we go to one 
Columbia a year and sustained procurement starting in 2026, as 
well as two Virginias a year, a fund of $750 million this year, 
and over $2 billion across the FYDP to do really four things.
    One is improve the facilities at the two big shipbuilders 
to make sure they can have the right facilities to support what 
we call one-plus-two but, more importantly, to work on our 
suppliers, to bring the supplier health up, to really focus 
with the COVID and other things going on, that the suppliers 
are able to be able to support that higher throughput rate; 
outsourcing and actually do strategic outsourcing of parts of 
these submarines to other yards, and get those outsourced yards 
for the less complex parts of the submarines up to speed, and 
new partners, if you will, in the shipbuilding effort. And then 
the last area but probably the most large--or the largest 
funding piece is for workforce development, not just workforce 
development at the shipyards but in other parts of the country 
where skilled labor could exist, but they are not trained in 
how to work on submarines.
    So we have set up pilot programs in the Pennsylvania area, 
Philadelphia area, Danville, Virginia, of course, in the Rhode 
Island-Connecticut area, what we call pipeline programs, and we 
want to expand those to other parts of the country to bring 
highly skilled workforce into the submarine-building areas.
    So those are the four main areas, sir.
    And then as far as the Sea-Based Deterrent Fund and the 
multiyear-like capabilities that are inherent in those 
authorities, we are able to do what we call continuous 
building, continuous construction, where we are able to have 
our suppliers build five, six, seven, eight ship sets' worth of 
whatever they are building in a row as opposed to starting, 
stopping, starting, stopping, starting, stopping. And that 
provides much more efficiency and stability to the suppliers, 
but then also reduces the cost because the workforce learns as 
they go through that process as opposed to starting and 
stopping, sir.
    Mr. Courtney. Great. Well, on behalf of the Seapower 
Subcommittee on the latter point, I would just say you are 
welcome, since that generated and originated in this 
subcommittee back in 2015. And I know Mr. Wittman and others, 
we have been watching that like a hawk ever since. And, again, 
I am actually very bullish on the pipeline model in terms of 
sort of fast pre-apprenticeship, you know, sort of flash-bang 
process to get people with basic levels of welding skills and 
sheet metal so that they can move quicker than the normal 
process that prevailed, you know, prior to the creation of 
those. And, again, I think the investment by the Navy in that 
is quite unique and I think smart to make sure that we keep 
this program on track.
    With that, I will yield to Mr. Wittman.
    Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Stefany, I wanted to ask and get you to confirm that 
the USS Vicksburg, CG 69, and USS Tortuga, LSD 46, are in their 
current maintenance availabilities--and, by the way, they are 
slated to be retired. In their current maintenance 
availabilities, are they at 85 percent completion? And if that 
is indeed the case, I also want to know how much money has been 
expended in their maintenance availabilities to this point?
    Mr. Stefany. Yes, sir. First, confirm that they are in 
their what we call cruiser mod [modernization] or LSD mod 
program, that availability to provide an extension of their 
service life. The cruiser Vicksburg, I think, is in that 85 
percent range; Tortuga, the LSD, might be a little less, but it 
is mostly complete, to your point.
    How much has been spent on those availabilities in the 
cruiser and the LSD, a little different, but in the 2- to $300 
million range, and I can get you the exact amount of money, 
sir, if that is a detail you need
    Mr. Wittman. Is it closer to the 300 or the 200?
    Mr. Stefany. Closer to the 300, sir.
    Mr. Wittman. Gotcha. Yeah. I would like to get those exact 
numbers.
    Vice Admiral Conn, the Navy proposes retiring nine LCS of 
the Freedom-class ships, all of the MQ-8Bs and half of the MQ-
8C Fire Scouts, and two expeditionary sea base ships.
    In your best professional military judgment, will the 
retirement of these various mine countermeasure platforms be 
expanding or reducing the Navy's capacity to do mine 
countermeasure missions?
    Admiral Conn. First of all, we will have 15 LCS ships, Indy 
[Independence] class, to do the mine counter mission. We are on 
track to be able to divest from the legacy systems in fiscal 
year 2025 in 5th Fleet, and fiscal year 2027 in 7th Fleet. From 
the mission packages that we have, we believe that 13--I'm 
sorry, 15 of those Indy class is sufficient to do the mine 
countermeasure mission.I
    Mr. Wittman. Again, the question is, will it increase--will 
retiring those platforms, taking those platforms out of the 
inventory, will it increase or decrease the Navy's mine 
countermeasure mission capacity?
    Admiral Conn. For the Freedom class, they were never going 
to be MCM boats. So it would have no impact.
    Do you have something to add?
    Mr. Stefany. Is your question, sir, the minesweeping ships 
and the minesweeping helicopters coming out of the inventory, 
what that impact----
    Mr. Wittman. Yes, and the expeditionary sea base ships, the 
total----
    Admiral Conn. It will decrease the capability once we get 
rid of the legacy systems.
    Mr. Wittman. Okay. Very good.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Courtney. The chair now recognizes Mr. Golden.
    Mr. Golden. Thank you.
    General Heckl, a little bit more on Force Design 2030. So 
as you know, the Marines have a rich history of operational 
innovation, things like amphibious assault, close air support, 
Marine air/ground task force, adoption of vertical short 
takeoff and landing aircraft, to name just a few operational 
innovations. And, of course, now you are helping to lead the 
Marines in bringing about another one, distributed operations 
alongside the United States Navy.
    You are looking at things like the introduction of a 
precision-strike regime, the ability to influence gray-zone 
activities in the here and now, and then the ability to sustain 
maritime campaigning, and of course, developing capabilities 
like rockets, guided missiles, anti-ship capabilities, talking 
about ranges from, like, 40 kilometers out to like 300, maybe 
even more.
    So of course, Force Design 2030 grows out of the 2018 
National Defense Strategy, and General Neller--it was General 
Neller who said the Marine Corps has to change, and General 
Berger selected to lead this change. Now, some critics have 
said that the Marines are moving too fast. I want to talk a 
little bit about something a lot of us have discussed of late 
in this committee, something called the Davidson window, which 
we are in now through 2027, and get your feedback on how 
important the changes that the Marines are making at this pace 
in helping to address these concerns.
    A lot of people want to talk about this in the space of 
talking about building more ships. I am not knocking that, I 
know it is important. But, you know, something comes to mind 
that the Commandant wrote in announcing the Force Design. He 
said, ``While others may wait for a clearer picture of the 
future operating environment, we will focus our efforts on 
driving change and influencing future operation environmental 
outcomes.''
    How important is what the Marine Corps [is] doing to the 
here and now, General?
    General Heckl. So sir, I think, getting into the gist of 
your question, time represents risk when we are facing a pacing 
threat in the Davidson window. And I will simply say, sir--and 
I think one thing that kind of further illuminates this 
discussion is operations in Ukraine. We are not drawing any 
premature conclusions, but there are certainly lessons to be 
learned and observations to be made.
    I will simply say to your first point, time to me as a 
military individual means risk. We are not moving fast enough. 
So, for people to say that we are going too fast, we are not 
moving fast enough. I believe we have--as you know, in March we 
set up the 3rd Marine Littoral Regiment in Hawaii that is there 
now. We are equipping them. They are going to be getting an 
experimentation in a whole host of areas of Force Design, and 
the point being as we go through and stand up two more MLRs, 
potentially two MLRs in the coming years, we will be forward 
operating, persisting with allies and partners inside the 
Chinese weapons engagement zone and that is gray-zone 
operations. And that is what we are going to be doing.
    So I believe to avoid the Davidson window becoming a 
reality, you have to deter, right? And you have to be there and 
you have to do active campaigning, and that is what we are 
doing.
    Sir, did I get to the question?
    Mr. Golden. Yes. Thank you. I appreciate it.
    I will yield back.
    Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Golden.
    The chair now recognizes Mr. Bergman.
    Mr. Bergman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Stefany and Admiral Conn, this is regarding the FFG 
[guided-missile frigate] program in Marinette, Wisconsin. The 
FYDP reflects two ships in 2024, one in 2025, two in 2026, and 
one in 2027. It appears, though, that the Marinette shipyard 
has excess capacity to build more ships now. And as you know, 
especially in the business world, if you want to get a good 
product at a reduced cost, you keep production lines going, 
keep workers employed, all that, because in the end, you get a 
good product, and the company does well on its bottom line. And 
that's--you know, we need the good products, and we need the 
company rolling.
    Can you walk me through the decision making by the Navy on 
why the plan is to build only one ship in fiscal year 2025 
instead of continuing to build at the capacity of the shipyard?
    Mr. Stefany. Yes, sir. So first of all, we recognize the 
investments that the shipyard--Marinette has put in to expand 
their shipyard, and I know you are aware of it, sir, as well to 
be able to do one and a half and ultimately two frigates a year 
in construction as they step out of LCS program into the 
frigate program.
    So we recognize that, and we want to take advantage of it. 
What you see in the FYDP is what we call the minimum sustaining 
profile--you know, one, two, one, two--which is what we work 
with the shipyard as the minimum amount to use their capacity.
    As far as the decision process on the quantity, I will turn 
it over to Admiral Conn.
    Admiral Conn. Part of that profile was an affordability. 
Plain and simple.
    Mr. Bergman. Was what?
    Admiral Conn. Affordability. Having the resources in 
[inaudible] years to throw. Initially, the initial one was to 
de-risk the program to make sure that we need that boat, that 
ship, on time, and we don't want to over-pressurize; but once 
the contractor demonstrates that they are on plan with 
resources available, we would go to two across the board, or 
perhaps more in the future. But it was pure affordability in 
the outyears going back to a one, once the shipbuilder 
demonstrates they----
    Mr. Bergman. Affordability based on moneys provided?
    Admiral Conn. Top line. Correct.
    Mr. Bergman. Okay. So is the industrial base for 
shipbuilding, where--no matter where they are located in the 
country, if we were, you know, to need to surge more ships 
sooner because of the world situation, is--do you feel that the 
Navy has an accurate assessment of if you needed to surge, 
where you could ramp up, if contracts needed to be let tomorrow 
because of a need? I mean, how quickly could you, you the Navy, 
get things on a higher rate of production?
    Mr. Stefany. Sir, I'll be specific to shipbuilding. In the 
shipbuilding world, I think we have a very good handle on where 
there is capacity in our shipbuilding yards versus full 
capacity. The submarine yards, we cannot add any more, right? 
They are at capacity right now, as is Newport News for the 
aircraft carrier. But our surface shipyards--all of our surface 
shipyards have some capacity that we could quickly take 
advantage of, whether that is on the west coast, Gulf Coast, or 
up in Great Lakes.
    Mr. Bergman. Has there been any studies done by the Navy 
that looks at the current shipbuilding, again, the sites where 
you build ships? Is there, again, in a worst-case scenario if 
we needed to expand the capacity at any of those shipyards, has 
there been any look by the Navy at--and I'm just going to pick 
because it is in Wisconsin, Marinette, at the coastline of Lake 
Michigan, are there any--if they needed to expand that 
operation, has the Navy spent any time looking at the 
coastline, the geography adjacent to any of the shipyards if we 
needed expansion?
    Mr. Stefany. No, sir. I don't think--we have looked at the 
capacity within the shipyards. We have not looked at expanding 
out beyond----
    Mr. Bergman. So you have not looked at the land around it, 
if you will, in a worst--because you could get a workforce 
there, but if you don't have the capacity in which their 
ability to work, you can't--you know, it doesn't make any 
difference how many people you have.
    With that, I yield back, sir.
    Mr. Courtney. Great. Thank you, Mr. Bergman.
    Chair now recognizes Mrs. Luria.
    Mrs. Luria. Thank you.
    And I want to reflect back on some things that Lieutenant 
General Heckl has said about risk during this hearing. You 
know, when we receive this budget proposal every year, we are 
also supposed to receive the Chairman's Risk Assessment. We 
haven't received that this year. It is supposed to be an 
annually produced document. It hasn't been produced each year. 
I have been asking repeatedly because I think that would help 
us inform and understand what you mean by risk.
    Because it's a rather vague term. So Lieutenant General 
Heckl, can you expound a little bit on what you just said the 
risk is with regards to reducing the size of the amphibious 
force?
    General Heckl. Yes, ma'am. The risk for specifically as you 
mentioned, the reduction in amphibs, it simply means that we 
will not be able to have adequate forces forward to respond in 
a timely manner. So the Marine Corps is tasked to be the crisis 
response force for the Nation. The implication of crisis 
response is timely response. So, again, I come back to the 
whole thing, the discussion about time can often represent risk 
that can't be overcome, right?
    So that is, I think, the biggest issue, ma'am, is just not 
being forward and being able to provide timely and capable 
response.
    Mrs. Luria. So I should expect when we finally do see the 
Chairman's Risk Assessment, that it will say something along 
the lines, and I will paraphrase what you just said, that this 
budget request does not propose a force that would give us 
significant forces, amphibious forces, to have a response in a 
timely manner, so not have adequate forces forward to respond 
in a timely manner in a time of crisis or conflict? This budget 
request does not give us adequate forces forward to respond in 
a timely manner in a time of crisis or conflict. Is that what I 
am understanding?
    General Heckl. And ma'am, just to be clear, the Marine 
Corps' concern is the coming years when we go down to 24. It is 
the assessment, my assessment, that at 24, we will likely be 
able to provide adequate capability in the Indo-Pacific, and we 
will be forced to take risks in EUCOM, AFRICOM, and CENTCOM. 
There is no two ways around it.
    Mrs. Luria. Okay. So you said likely be able to in Indo-
Pacific. Where is your hesitation there? Why did you use the 
word ``likely''?
    General Heckl. Based on readiness rates of ships. I am 
always cautious. I will approach from the worst-case scenario 
vice the best case. So that is why I use the word ``likely,'' 
ma'am.
    Mrs. Luria. Well, thank you. And so I would take away from 
this that, you know, the LPD 17 production line was supposed to 
go through, I think, hull number 42. This budget proposal 
wanted to stop at 33. We have already discussed during this 
hearing the prolongation of time between LHA 9 and 10, also the 
LSD's decommissioning.
    And it is curious to me because on the Navy public affairs, 
every day they are literally talking about these very ships 
that we plan on decommissioning as proposed in this budget. 
Every day they are out there doing operations, deployed in 6th 
Fleet, you know, one of them just left Little Creek in my 
district recently on a deployment and they are performing 
important missions for our country.
    But just tell me am I correct, you are requesting to 
decommission these ships in this budget?
    General Heckl. I certainly am not, ma'am. And the LPD was 
going to be truncated at 31 actually. We got advance 
procurement on 32. And as you know, the Commandant has put LPD 
33 as the top of our unfunded priority list for the United 
States Marine Corps.
    Mrs. Luria. Okay. I think this committee has heard that 
loud and clear, and we may go above and beyond that. But I 
think it is important you are using the word ``risk,'' but I 
would hope that in future discussions with this committee you 
can quantify, like what is the risk to our national security. 
And we hope that this will be fully delineated across all 
shipbuilding programs when we do finally receive the Chairman's 
Risk Assessment for this budget. Thank you.
    And I yield back.
    Mr. Courtney. Thank you. I agree with the gentlelady that 
the subcommittee has heard that message loud and clear, and I 
think we are going to move out with our Article 1 Section 8 
authorities under the Constitution to address that when we get 
closer to the mark.
    The chair now recognizes Ms. Garcia.
    Ms. Garcia. Mr. Chairman, thank you, again, for the warm 
welcome. I have no further questions this morning. I am sure I 
will have more after I sit down and visit more with them. Thank 
you.
    Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Ms. Garcia.
    With that, I think we have had two good rounds of 
questions. Again, I really appreciate the early start, which 
again, avoided the musical chairs of floor votes and allowed a 
real flow here today.
    Again, thanks to the witnesses for your flexibility, and 
with that, I will now call this meeting closed.
    [Whereupon, at 9:14 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]      
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                           A P P E N D I X

                              May 18, 2022
     
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              PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                              May 18, 2022

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[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

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              QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                              May 18, 2022

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                   QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN

    Mr. Wittman. Early cost estimates put the Light Amphibious Warship 
at around $100 million per copy. Under the Navy's FY23 budget 
submission, the first LAW would be procured in FY25 at a cost of $247 
million, before dropping to an average cost of about $145 million in 
FY27. While the first ship in any class are usually the most expensive, 
what additional information can be shared about current cost estimates 
for the LAW?
    General Heckl. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BERGMAN
    Mr. Bergman. Was the Navy's 78% reduction of the Reserve aviation 
force based on a risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis and why was 
it not shared with Congress and other stakeholders?
    Mr. Stefany. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
    Mr. Bergman. How does Navy retain highly skilled officers and 
enlisted aviators with limited off-ramps to participate in Reserve 
aviation?
    Mr. Stefany. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
    Mr. Bergman. Was the Navy's 78% reduction of the Reserve aviation 
force based on a risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis and why was 
it not shared with Congress and other stakeholders?
    Admiral Conn. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
    Mr. Bergman. Why is the Navy severely cutting capability in mission 
areas such as special operations and Personnel Recovery/Combat Search 
and Rescue (PR/CSAR)?
    Admiral Conn. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
    Mr. Bergman. How does Navy retain highly skilled officers and 
enlisted aviators with limited off-ramps to participate in Reserve 
aviation?
    Admiral Conn. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]

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