[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                     
 
                         [H.A.S.C. No. 117-26]

                     THE AAV MISHAP INVESTIGATION:

                       HOW TO BUILD A CULTURE OF

                      SAFETY TO AVOID PREVENTABLE

                           TRAINING ACCIDENTS

                               __________

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                       SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS

                                 OF THE

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                              HEARING HELD

                              MAY 3, 2021

                                     

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]





                          ______

             U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 
48-486                  WASHINGTON : 2022 

                                     
  


                       SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS

                  JOHN GARAMENDI, California, Chairman

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut            DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
JACKIE SPEIER, California            JOE WILSON, South Carolina
JASON CROW, Colorado                 AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan, Vice       JACK BERGMAN, Michigan
    Chair                            MIKE JOHNSON, Louisiana
JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine               MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee
ELAINE G. LURIA, Virginia            LISA C. McCLAIN, Michigan
KAIALI'I KAHELE, Hawaii              BLAKE D. MOORE, Utah
MARILYN STRICKLAND, Washington

               Melanie Harris, Professional Staff Member
                 Ian Bennitt, Professional Staff Member
                           Sean Falvey, Clerk
                           
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

              STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Garamendi, Hon. John, a Representative from California, Chairman, 
  Subcommittee on Readiness......................................     1
Lamborn, Hon. Doug, a Representative from Colorado, Ranking 
  Member, Subcommittee on Readiness..............................     2

                               WITNESSES

Kitchener, VADM Roy I., USN, Commander, Naval Surface Forces.....    20
Olson, MajGen Gregg P., USMC, Assistant Deputy Commandant for 
  Plans, Policies, Operations, United States Marine Corps........    21
Ostrovsky, Peter, Father of Marine LCpl Jack-Ryan Ostrovsky......     5
Thomas, Gen Gary L., USMC, Assistant Commandant of the Marine 
  Corps..........................................................    19
Vienna, Peter, Father of Navy Corpsman Christopher ``Bobby'' Gnem     3

                                APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

    Kitchener, VADM Roy I........................................    73
    Ostrovsky, Peter.............................................    54
    Thomas, Gen Gary L...........................................    61
    Vienna, Peter................................................    47

Documents Submitted for the Record:

    [There were no Documents submitted.]

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

    [The information was not available at the time of printing.]

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

    [There were no Questions submitted post hearing.]
    
                     THE AAV MISHAP INVESTIGATION:

    HOW TO BUILD A CULTURE OF SAFETY TO AVOID PREVENTABLE TRAINING 
                               ACCIDENTS

                              ----------                              

                  House of Representatives,
                       Committee on Armed Services,
                                 Subcommittee on Readiness,
                               Washington, DC, Monday, May 3, 2021.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:02 a.m., via 
Webex, Hon. John Garamendi (chairman of the subcommittee) 
presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN GARAMENDI, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
        CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS

    Mr. Garamendi. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. I call 
to order this hearing of the Readiness Subcommittee of the 
House Armed Services Committee. First, some administrative and 
technical notes.
    I ask unanimous consent that nonsubcommittee members be 
allowed to participate in today's briefing after all 
subcommittee members have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
Is there any objection?
    Without objection, nonsubcommittee members will be 
recognized at the appropriate time for 5 minutes.
    I also ask unanimous consent that noncommittee members, if 
any, be allowed to participate in today's hearing after all 
committee members have had an opportunity to ask questions. Is 
there any objection?
    Hearing none, without objection, noncommittee members will 
be recognized at the appropriate time for 5 minutes. And that 
will be Mr. Levin in the second and Seth Moulton in the first.
    Members are reminded that they must be visible on screen 
within the software platform for the purposes of identity 
verification. Members must continue to use the software 
platform's video function while attending the hearing unless 
they experience connectivity issues or other technical problems 
that render the members unable to fully participate on camera. 
If you experience technical difficulties, please contact the 
committee staff.
    When you are recognized, the video will be broadcast via 
television and internet feeds. You will be recognized as normal 
for questions, but if you want to speak at another time, you 
can interrupt and seek verbal recognition.
    Please mute your microphone when you are not speaking and 
remember to unmute prior to speaking. Please be aware that 
there is a slight lag between when you start speaking and when 
the camera shot switches to you.
    Please remember to keep the software platform's video 
function on for the entirety of the time you are attending this 
hearing.
    If you leave for a short period for reasons other than 
joining a different proceeding, please leave your video 
function on.
    If you are leaving to join a different proceeding or will 
be absent for a significant period of time, you should exit the 
software platform entirely and then rejoin if you return.
    Please be advised that I have designated a committee staff 
member to mute unrecognized members' microphones, if necessary. 
Please use the platform's chat function to communicate with the 
staff regarding technical or logistical support issues.
    Finally, there is a 5-minute countdown clock on the 
software platform's display, usually in the upper right-hand 
corner. I will remind you, if necessary, when your time is up.
    Now, with these administrative tasks out of the way, I 
would like to focus our attention on the hearing at hand. I 
will reserve the majority of my opening remarks for the second 
panel.
    In our first panel, we will hear from the parents of two of 
the nine young Americans who died on July 30. Those nine young 
men volunteered to serve their country. They died because of a 
fully preventable training accident and a total disregard for 
their safety.
    This tragedy should never have happened. It resulted from a 
cascading series of failures, all of which were preventable.
    I can think of no better way to begin this hearing than to 
take a moment to honor their memory.
    I am going to read the names of the eight Marines and one 
sailor that we lost, and then I would ask for a moment of 
silence.
    First, Private First Class Bryan J. Baltierra, Lance 
Corporal Marco A. Barranco, Private First Class Evan A. Bath, 
Navy Hospital Corpsman Third Class Christopher Gnem, Lance 
Corporal Jack-Ryan Ostrovsky, Lance Corporal Guillermo S. 
Perez, Corporal Wesley A. Rodd, Lance Corporal Chase D. 
Sweetwood, and Corporal Cesar A. Villanueva.
    And now, in their memory and in their honor, a moment of 
silence.
    [Moment of silence.]
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you.
    I will now turn to Mr. Lamborn for any opening remarks he 
may have.

STATEMENT OF HON. DOUG LAMBORN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM COLORADO, 
           RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS

    Mr. Lamborn. Mr. Chairman, thank you for honoring the 
memory of these nine exemplary young men who wanted to serve 
our country. Thank you for doing that.
    It is sad that we have to be here today and to have the 
parents of these young men appear before us. And I am hopeful, 
and I am working hard with you, Mr. Chairman, to make sure that 
this doesn't have to happen again and we have to have a similar 
kind of hearing in the future.
    So these young men just wanted to serve our country. It is 
fitting that we honor their memory. It is also fitting that we 
get to the bottom of whatever the causes were behind this, 
including holding accountable anyone who needs to be held 
accountable.
    And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back to you.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Lamborn.
    I would like now to welcome and thank our witnesses. First, 
Mr. Peter Vienna, the father of Navy Hospital Corpsman Third 
Class Christopher Gnem. And secondly, Mr. Peter Ostrovsky, the 
father of [Lance Corporal] Jack Ostrovsky, United States Marine 
Corps.
    Mr. Vienna, if you would like to start.
    Hit your mute button, please.
    You are good to go.

STATEMENT OF PETER VIENNA, FATHER OF NAVY CORPSMAN CHRISTOPHER 
                         ``BOBBY'' GNEM

    Mr. Vienna. Good morning, esteemed members of the House 
subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to speak about our 
son, Christopher ``Doc'' Gnem. His family and friends called 
him Bobby.
    I wish you could also see and hear from my wife today. She 
has chosen to allow me to speak on her behalf because she would 
be unable to do so without breaking down. I can tell you this: 
Her raw emotion and the effect she would have on this panel 
would be deeply moving.
    I believe all nine mothers should be heard, because today 
we are not only mourning our son, but also we mourn the eight 
other families that are navigating through this pain.
    Nancy became a single mother when Bob was still an infant. 
She struggled to give him and his two sisters the best possible 
life she could. I came into their lives when Bobby was 14 years 
old. What I witnessed was the most incredible mother-son 
relationship. The two of them literally lived for each other.
    Bobby was a natural athlete, excelling in judo and jujitsu, 
never once losing a match. As a high school student athlete, he 
played football and basketball, voted team captain as well as 
most inspirational on his varsity basketball team. In both 
basketball and jujitsu, he volunteered his free time to mentor 
the younger boys. He was truly a sensei and coach's dream.
    He was the best of us, the favorite of his grandparents, 
aunts, uncles, and all of his cousins who looked up to him as a 
role model. I can say without prejudice that Bobby touched more 
lives positively in his 22 years than most people do in a 
lifetime.
    Bobby, along with eight others are dead now, and here is 
just a short list of some of the reasons given in the 
investigation.
    Forty-year-old AAVs [assault amphibious vehicles] designed 
without safety in mind that came off the ``dead-line,'' end of 
life, deemed ``not seaworthy,'' should never even have been put 
back in the water.
    No real safety boat for this training exercise. Both Marine 
and Navy's own policy states two safety boats for every six 
AAVs in the water. There were 13 that day.
    No emergency egress training. They knew they were sinking 
for quite some time, yet they were found with their full body 
armor still on, some even with their helmets and rifles still 
strapped to their body. They obviously had no idea what to do.
    No radio contact or eyes on the AAVs. Our boy's boat was 
sinking for 45 minutes while chasing the Somerset that was 
traveling away and conducting helicopter exercises.
    All 23 gallons of transmission fluid were lost on the trip 
to the island. Only 6 gallons were available to replace it, yet 
that AAV was sent back into the water to try and reach the 
Somerset.
    An AAV crew that did not follow its own emergency SOPs 
[standard operating procedures]. Had they done so, the AAV 
still would have sunk but not with our boys in it. I point that 
back at leadership's failed duty to properly train and certify 
that crew, just another result of a terrible lack of readiness.
    His mother, his surviving sisters, Jasmine and Jade, and 
his fiancee Savannah, who received her surprise engagement ring 
in a box 7 months after he was killed, have not been able to 
accept this loss, especially now knowing how incredibly 
preventable it was.
    Losing her only son has broken my wife. She is suffering 
both mentally and physically. For me, well, frankly, for the 
last 9 months I have been on suicide watch. I had no control 
over losing my son, but I refuse to lose my wife.
    I also refuse to call what happened on July 30 a 
``mishap,'' the definition of which is an ``unlucky accident.'' 
We have all seen that nightmare of an investigation, so we know 
that what actually occurred was a predictable outcome resulting 
from the reckless disregard for human life by a command that 
ignored its own safety standards and operational procedures, 
putting mission above the young lives they were supposed to 
protect.
    Not a combat mission, this was just training. And if I hear 
one more time, ``We have to train like we fight,'' I think my 
head will explode, because for decades now it has been true 
that every year the military loses more lives in training than 
they do in combat.
    Before I go any further, I wish to say for the record that 
even after all the recklessness and gross negligence that took 
our only son, my wife and I are still not anti-military. On the 
contrary, we believe we owe it to our son to do what we can to 
effect the change that leads to a better, stronger, and safer 
military. We actually want to help.
    I repeat, what happened on July 30 was no ``mishap.'' It 
was yet another example of what should be expected under any 
institution that is allowed to self-police and self-punish, 
allowed to deflect blame away from those at the top, all while 
hiding behind an antiquated law that protects it from the 
accountability of answering legally to those that it recklessly 
harms.
    No possibility for a day in court, resulting in our troops 
becoming second-class citizens the moment they swear in. Yes, I 
am speaking of the Feres Doctrine. And I would argue that its 
existence is what will continue to foster this culture across 
all the military branches where medical malpractice, sexual 
assault, and training deaths that far outpace combat deaths 
will continue to plague our precious troops and the civilian 
families that love them.
    To the Marine and Navy command [inaudible] our sons down, 
as well as the subcommittee members questioning them today, my 
wife wants me to ask this: What if your son or daughter was on 
that AAV?
    Our son will never come home. Look, how do we keep other 
families from suffering this unbearable pain? Please don't 
allow our nine sons to die in vain.
    Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Vienna can be found in the 
Appendix on page 47.]
    Mr. Garamendi. Mr. Vienna, thank you very much for your 
testimony, and we certainly attempt to understand the depth of 
your sorrow.
    I would like now to turn to Peter Ostrovsky.
    Peter.

            STATEMENT OF PETER OSTROVSKY, FATHER OF

                MARINE LCPL JACK-RYAN OSTROVSKY

    Mr. Ostrovsky. Chairman Garamendi, Ranking Member Lamborn, 
and distinguished members of the Subcommittee on Readiness and 
noncommittee members, on behalf of my entire family, thank you 
for the opportunity to speak with you about our fallen son, 
Jack-Ryan Ostrovsky, who was a lance corporal and 20 years old 
when he drowned with eight other Marines and a Navy corpsman 
during a preventable AAV incident off of San Clemente Island, 
California.
    Our son, Jack-Ryan, and his fraternal twin brother, Samuel, 
were born prematurely at 26 weeks and were hospitalized for 
2\1/2\ months in the neonatal intensive care unit, along with 
another month in a local hospital nursery, before they came 
home to us. They were both fighters from the get-go.
    My wife, Lynn Ostrovsky, gave up her career as a flight 
attendant with a major airline to be a stay-at-home mom. I am a 
retired Federal law enforcement officer who dedicated 31 years 
of my professional life to service with the Treasury Department 
and the Department of Homeland Security.
    As a teenager, Jack-Ryan was a very loving boy. He loved 
swimming, mountain biking, hiking, snowboarding, marksmanship 
training, and military history.
    A year after graduating from high school, and after we 
moved as a family to Bend, Oregon, Jack-Ryan decided to enlist 
in the Marine Corps. He told us that he wanted to serve his 
country and do things that he could not do in the civilian 
world. He wanted to start at the bottom as a grunt and become a 
Marine Corps rifleman.
    Jack-Ryan loved being a Marine, and we loved that he loved 
being a Marine. With only 13 months of service, he was already 
talking about reenlisting and his dream of pursuing a billet in 
special operations and making the military his lifelong career.
    We will always be proud of Jack-Ryan. He followed in the 
footsteps of his great-grandfather, Bill Fischman, who served 
in the Navy, and his grandfather, Jack Fischman, who served in 
the Army, along with becoming the first Ostrovsky to serve in 
the U.S. military.
    His commanding officer described Jack-Ryan as a future 
leader and a standout who would seek out fellow Marines that 
were struggling and offer them a kind word and a smile.
    A week before the AAV incident, Jack-Ryan told me about his 
concerns with the AAVs and that, ``They sink all the time.'' It 
was hard for me to believe that statement, but now I know there 
was more to the story that was the basis for his concern.
    The loss of Jack-Ryan has destroyed our family's future 
plans. Jack-Ryan was supposed to be the next leader of our 
family, who was going to create his own legacy of success 
through his military career. We were looking forward to 
watching Jack-Ryan build a family of his own and blessing us 
with grandchildren. Jack-Ryan was also supposed to look after 
his brother Samuel, who has suffered from a life-long 
educational disability.
    When the Marine Corps briefed Lynn and I on the results of 
the investigation, we were shocked and disappointed by the top-
down recklessness, gross negligence, and lack of duty of care 
for our son and all of the Marines and sailors in his AAV 
company.
    While reviewing the investigation report, many issues stood 
out to me that are a cause for concern and questions, namely:
    Why were dead-lined AAVs, deemed to be in poor condition 
and not seaworthy, assigned to a unit that would be deployed as 
America's maritime response force?
    Why did my son's AAV company not initiate any of the 
relevant prerequisite egress training which would have better 
prepared him and the others for such an emergency?
    Why did the pre-exercise confirmation briefing and its 
sections of risk to mission and risk to force not mention any 
of the waterborne risks associated with utilizing AAVs that 
were in poor condition and embarking Marines that were not 
adequately trained?
    But yet, the only identified risk was assessed to be 
``unlikely to occur'' and was that there could be ``a casualty 
to the assault force during embarkation/debarkation 
operations'' on San Clemente Island and onboard the USS 
Somerset.
    As an experienced Federal investigator who has planned, 
conducted, and approved many high-risk law enforcement 
operations, the lack of detail in the briefing tells me one of 
two things: Either it was intentional as an alleged cover-up 
for the lack of readiness, or the exercise planners were not 
qualified to appropriately assess risk, or perhaps both.
    In my opinion, the entire AAV company was placed at extreme 
risk due to poor equipment, inadequate training, and a poorly 
coordinated and monitored unsafe training exercise.
    We expect that the Marine Corps and Navy hold accountable, 
from top down, all those who are responsible for this 
preventable catastrophic incident, through all of the means 
that are available at their disposal, and with transparency.
    We also expect that U.S. military systems of accountability 
and liability be modernized as a way to ensure that every day, 
moving forward, military officers fully appreciate and know the 
realities of their burden of command, so that there is no place 
for recklessness and gross negligence in the U.S. Marine Corps 
and the U.S. Navy.
    Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Ostrovsky can be found in 
the Appendix on page 54.]
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you very much.
    I want to express my deep appreciation and sympathy to our 
two presenters. In your presentation, you not only spoke to the 
loss that you have had, but you also spoke to the challenge 
that the Marine Corps has to create a culture of safety.
    I am going to forgo my own questions and would ask my 
colleagues to keep their questions short. And really, I want to 
get as quickly as possible to the issues that our two witnesses 
have presented--the problems that the Marine Corps and the Navy 
exhibited in this tragedy.
    However, the gavel sheet is as follows. I am going to 
withhold my questions. Mr. Lamborn, Mr. Courtney, Mr. Wilson, 
and then back to Ms. Speier, in that order.
    So, Mr. Lamborn, I turn to you.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And to the two fathers and any of the other parents who are 
also in this hearing, obviously, your two sons were among our 
Nation's finest. There is no question about that.
    And we owe it to you to get to the bottom of this so that 
you could take solace in the fact that the end result of this 
will be that these kinds of accidents will be more prevented in 
the future than would have otherwise been the case. And there 
is some solace in that.
    I will just ask one very brief question per what you just 
said, Mr. Chairman.
    Do either of you have a comment on the lines of 
communication that you had with the Marine Corps after the 
incident up until today, any comments that would be helpful to 
us to know about? And you will have to unmute your computer.
    Mr. Vienna. Speaking to that direct question, I can tell 
you that we have filed some complaints about some of the things 
that we experienced working with the Casualty Office, through 
our Navy Casualty Office.
    I would just suggest that in the future they take a look at 
what kind of aptitude a person would have that is going to be 
assigned to walking a family through this type of madness. I 
have expressed those concerns, and I believe they are starting 
to be handled. I won't go into detail.
    But also, with an investigation like this, we are talking 
about finding out that your son has passed away, starting to 
get--and not hearing anything back other than, ``Yeah, we don't 
know what to tell you. The water was [inaudible] that day and 
it just started taking on water and it sunk very rapidly.'' 
That is basically the story we got.
    And then bits and pieces started to come out where there 
are questions, but there are 9 months of silence from the other 
side. It is maddening for a family.
    And then to have them show up at your home 9 months later 
and drop a 2,000-page report in your lap and tell you that they 
are sorry and then leave you to navigate that and these nine 
families to navigate that after the fact was very difficult.
    And I can tell you that we pretty much relived it. It is as 
if, going through being notified, that your son was killed 
twice. But now, with the second time, there is the confusion 
and anger and this drive to try to fix it.
    So that is kind of where we are left. This investigation 
took quite some time.
    And I don't doubt that the gentlemen that came, the colonel 
and the lieutenant colonel that came to our house, were sincere 
and wanted to help. In fact, the colonel that came and 
presented to us told us that one of the reasons he was chosen 
was he was going to be leading [inaudible] and he needed to 
learn. That is great.
    They proceeded to tell us about what they were going to do 
to fix these specific problems. And my answer was this: Thank 
you. I am glad you are going to try to fix these specific 
problems. But what about all the other mishaps? What about all 
the shoddy equipment? What about all the other nontraining that 
is received and terrible decisions that are made? How are you 
going to fix that?
    The reality is this issue is a cultural issue. It is a 
nonsafety cultural issue within the Marines and, obviously, 
partly in the Navy as well. I think it goes across all military 
branches.
    Mr. Garamendi. Mr. Vienna, that is precisely what this 
hearing is going to try to accomplish.
    Mr. Vienna. Thank you.
    Mr. Lamborn. Mr. Ostrovsky, I don't know if you have 
anything to add.
    Mr. Garamendi. You may answer the question.
    Mr. Ostrovsky. Yes, I do.
    Our experience was different. Our casualty assistance calls 
officer, who is a Marine first sergeant from the Reserve Center 
in Springfield, Oregon, did a great job. I think he is a highly 
seasoned and qualified Marine, very empathetic, very sensitive 
to our needs. So we did have a positive experience with him. So 
we do appreciate that.
    But we do recognize that that job is hard. I am sure it is. 
For the first sergeant that we worked with, it was the first 
time that he had to do a casualty assistance call, and he did a 
great job. So we very much appreciate him and everything that 
he has done for us.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you.
    Mr. Courtney.
    Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I just want to 
join you and Doug in thanking our two witnesses this morning.
    And I just want to share how much I appreciate the powerful 
testimony that you presented this morning and I think 
challenged all of us on this subcommittee and full Committee of 
Armed Services to do more, in terms of action.
    I would just want to share with you that, unfortunately, 
this has not been the first time that this subcommittee has 
experienced a hearing like this. And I chair the Seapower 
Subcommittee. We jointly did the investigation and followup in 
the wake of the McCain and Fitzgerald collisions that took 
place in [2017]. There were at least a half dozen hearings 
which occurred in the wake of that.
    And I want you to know that as a result of that, there 
actually were structural statutory changes that were made in 
terms of the surface fleet deployment system. We put safety 
measures, safety brakes into the law.
    Again, Senator John McCain, it was actually one of his 
final milestone moments when he chaired the Senate Armed 
Services Committee, and we worked together on the conference 
committee. We put 17--excuse me, it was almost 50--statutory 
changes in terms of just the way decisions were handled, in 
terms of deploying ships for sailors that were not certified 
and fully trained up, and equipment that was not ready. It did 
not extend to the type of deployments that we are discussing 
here today.
    But I want you to know that we actually have the ability to 
make real change in terms of the National Defense Authorization 
Act [NDAA]. And I know Chairman Garamendi and Doug and 
certainly in Seapower [Subcommittee], we are going to do 
everything in our power to make sure that these hearings and 
your testimony actually is going to result in real action, 
tangible action, in the wake.
    And I just want to just finally note that, Mr. Vienna, 
pointing to the Feres Doctrine, thank you for raising that 
issue. I think that is an antiquated part of the law that goes 
back to a Supreme Court decision in the 1950s, which really 
needs to be updated and modernized, as Mr. Ostrovsky said.
    I mean, we need to really as lawmakers make some real 
modifications and changes to the system to reflect the 
complexity of the technology and, frankly, some of the overuse 
of outdated equipment.
    So thank you to both of you.
    And with that, Mr. Chairman, I would yield back.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Courtney.
    Mr. Wilson.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Chairman John Garamendi and Ranking 
Member Doug Lamborn, for convening this extraordinarily 
important hearing. And I am just so grateful that we have the 
witnesses before us today.
    I want to thank you, both of you, Mr. Vienna and Mr. 
Ostrovsky. Your testimony is heartfelt, and what a tribute to 
your sons, and your families should be so proud. I am grateful 
for both of you being here today and with your families. And no 
service member should have a similar example of loss of life as 
we have heard today.
    As the father of four sons who have served in the Armed 
Forces--one is still in the Navy right now--I particularly 
identify with what has occurred. And then I want to assure you 
that I look forward to working with Chairman Garamendi, with 
the ranking member, Doug Lamborn, on whatever we can do to 
assist you.
    In fact, sadly, I have had personal loss in the military. A 
former congressional staff member of mine, Marine Lieutenant 
Colonel Trane McCloud, tragically was killed in an accident in 
Iraq in 2006. And then, in 1978--it still has affected our 
family--my late brother-in-law, Marine Captain Tim Dusenbury, 
was killed in a helicopter accident in Greece.
    And with that, a question for Mr. Vienna and then Mr. 
Ostrovsky. And it really is parallel to what Ranking Member 
Lamborn has asked.
    But were there shortfalls in the information provided to 
you? And I know, Mr. Ostrovsky, that you indicated that there 
should have been more transparency.
    But on the notification to you, the backup for the 
arrangements for the funerals, the notification to every family 
person possible, were there shortfalls?
    And then is there anything--again, this is so bipartisan--
whatever we can do to address it.
    Beginning with Mr. Vienna.
    Mr. Garamendi. Mr. Vienna, you have to unmute. You are 
still muted, sir.
    Mr. Vienna. Hello?
    Mr. Garamendi. Good to go.
    Mr. Vienna. Okay, thank you. I apologize. I am pressing 
over and over again the mute button/unmute button, and it is 
just not working well for me.
    I am trying to understand the question in regards to our 
notification and funeral arrangements and those kind of things. 
They go directly to some of the issues that we did have with 
our CACO [casualty assistance calls officer] situation.
    For example, we had planned the funeral for Saturday. We 
were told his body would arrive 4 days prior to that from 
Dover. It didn't come until that day, so we had at the last 
minute, had to change our funeral plans, move them back a day. 
And we had 650 people at the ceremony. It was extremely 
difficult.
    Also, they could not seem to coordinate flights to try to 
make the memorial in San Diego, and we were, in the end, we 
were going to miss it. There was just no way, because it was 
also the same day that our son's body was supposed to be 
arriving now from Dover that evening, and the funeral was the 
next morning. It was chaotic.
    And we ended up having a--there was someone with money here 
in our community that heard about it and ended up flying us 
there on his private jet in order to get to San Diego, attend 
the memorial of all nine boys, which I am so glad we didn't 
miss, and fly us back in time to then go to San Francisco 
Airport with our son and have that procession ceremony.
    We didn't get him into the funeral home until midnight, and 
the very next morning we had to do the funeral. So it was very 
rushed, and it was due to ineptitude in being able to get these 
schedules squared away for us.
    So I believe that is what the question was. I don't want to 
go on a tangent about these issues. I wanted to--fixing what 
happened so that other----
    Mr. Garamendi. If I might, Mr. Vienna, thank you very much.
    Mr. Wilson, your time has expired.
    Mr. Wilson. As I conclude, I would like to thank Mr. 
Vienna. That was specific, and we need to address those.
    Thank you. And I yield back.
    Mr. Garamendi. These questions that we have received from 
the members and the responses indicate that there is a series 
of issues that need to be dealt with, with regard to family 
notification, and we will get into those in detail.
    I am going to now turn to Ms. Speier, who actually heads up 
the [Military] Personnel Subcommittee. And this particular 
problem is an issue that I know she wants to deal with.
    So, Ms. Speier, if you would.
    Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and to Ranking Member 
Lamborn.
    Let me just say to you, Mr. Vienna and Mr. Ostrovsky, we 
have had extensive conversations. Your testimony today shows 
the palpable pain that you have endured.
    And I agree with you, we can no longer use the term 
``mishap.'' I don't care if it has been the term used 
historically. It is offensive to the families who lose their 
children because of either dereliction of duty or gross 
negligence or because it is an accident. It is, in fact, not a 
mishap.
    And to your point, Mr. Vienna, you know that we have made 
some changes. The Feres Doctrine is not law. It is a Supreme 
Court decision on which we have relied on. We should do more 
than we have done, although we have provided, over the course 
of 10 years, $400 million to deal with claims by service 
members who are victims of medical malpractice at medical 
facilities.
    I think we need to expand that to deal with gross 
negligence in situations like this. And we will have to discuss 
this as part of the NDAA. There is a hefty price tag that comes 
with it, of course, but the lives that are lost are real lives.
    So I want to thank you both for your extraordinary 
testimony. We are not going to rest until people are held 
accountable and that we can make sure that this kind of conduct 
is not tolerated, because it was conduct at the highest levels 
that allowed these AAVs to be deployed.
    Mr. Ostrovsky, I would just like to give you the floor to 
add any other recommendations that you would like to make sure 
that we deal with as it relates to these casualty officers and 
their interactions with the families.
    Mr. Ostrovsky. My comment with regard to transparency 
relates to the fact that when the press release came out that 
the MEU [Marine Expeditionary Unit] commander was relieved, 
which was the day before we received our briefing on the 
results of the investigation, that press release mentioned that 
administrative and other action was taken against 10 others 
that were found to have some kind of responsibility, yet it 
didn't tell us what kind of action was taken.
    So when you use that term ``administrative action'' without 
any detail, it makes you wonder what is the real action. And I 
understand that you can't name names, the Privacy Act. I was a 
Federal employee myself for quite some time, so I am familiar 
with that.
    But at least I think it would be helpful to the families to 
know the type of administrative action that was taken, because 
it could be anywhere from a day off without pay to months off 
without pay or reduction of rank or whatever. So I think it 
would be helpful in the future to have some more detail as to 
the type of action without naming names.
    Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Ostrovsky.
    I think it is also important for us to appreciate that when 
persons are ostensibly fired, they are not really fired as we 
think of it in civilian society. They are transferred. And I 
think we have to take a hard look at whether or not we want 
people in leadership in some other unit who have made the 
decisions they made in circumstances like this.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you very much, Ms. Speier.
    The gavel order is as follows: Mr. Bergman, Ms. Slotkin, 
Mr. Johnson, and then it would be Mr. Levin.
    Mr. Bergman.
    Mr. Bergman. Good morning, everyone. You notice I am flying 
the Marine colors behind me here. It is a small way to express 
my feelings of your loss.
    There are no good casualty officer calls. In my time in 
command, we did too many of them. But I can just say to you, I 
don't care what side of the aisle our members are on on this 
committee, we will take an attitude of holding everyone 
accountable, including ourselves. There are no free passes 
here. And there is no excuse for bypassing safety when it is in 
a training environment.
    And I will just end it with that, because that is what I 
believe. And I know many of my colleagues here on the committee 
believe the same thing. We will do everything that we can to 
ensure that this does not happen again.
    With that, I yield back.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Bergman. You always remind me 
not to mention your past service in the military, so I won't do 
that. But you certainly understand.
    Ms. Slotkin.
    Ms. Slotkin. Good morning, everyone.
    You know, unlike some of my peers, this is the first time I 
have actually been in a hearing where we have heard from 
parents of folks who have been lost. And I have a stepdaughter 
in the Army, so your testimony was extremely relatable and 
powerful. And I am so, so sorry for your loss.
    I guess my question is, on the accountability side, maybe 
starting with Mr. Ostrovsky, what was the official reason the 
Navy--I am sorry, the Marines, said to you in this large report 
that you both received for the reason why the craft was allowed 
out when not being certified for seaworthiness? What was the 
official answer to that?
    Mr. Ostrovsky. I think, as I recall, if I recall the 
details of the report, is just that it was a matter of 
assignment of the equipment. There was assignment of equipment 
in poor condition, equipment that was dead-lined.
    You know, the other side of it is the lack of training. Not 
even initiating the appropriate relevant training is the cause.
    And I would say that one thing to say is that when you look 
at gross negligence and recklessness by a military officer, 
there is nowhere in a military manual or training that conducts 
recklessness or gross negligence. And I would say that when 
somebody behaves in that fashion, they are outside of the scope 
of their duties, and they should bear that responsibility or 
that liability for being outside of the scope of their duties.
    Now, whether the U.S. military wants to somehow indemnify 
them or take that liability on, but that liability exists. They 
are outside of the scope of their duties. There is no way that 
it can be said, especially in a training environment, that that 
kind of behavior is acceptable.
    And I am sure there are many military officers that would 
echo what I am saying in saying that it is not to be tolerated. 
It is substandard.
    Ms. Slotkin. Yes. Mr. Chairman, I would just say that is 
something I know I personally don't know enough about, but I 
think might be worthwhile looking at is sort of the 
responsibilities of someone when they are acting outside the 
scope of their responsibilities. I know it is a topic we talk 
about on other issues, but I certainly would be interested.
    And, Mr. Vienna, you said that you were here because you 
wanted to make sure this didn't happen to other families, and I 
appreciate that.
    Can you tell me what the Marines said to you about what 
they were going to do to make sure such mistakes don't happen 
in the future? Did they give any sort of positive action they 
were going to take?
    And just remember to unmute.
    Mr. Garamendi. Mr. Vienna, you are still muted.
    [Problems with mic.]
    Mr. Vienna. So in talking about some of the exact issues, 
one thing that they had pointed out was they were no longer 
going to have the AAV commanders making decisions to splash, 
that that should come from a platoon commander or an AAV 
platoon commander higher up. You know, some very specific 
things that were going to change. Safety boats would now be 
absolutely in the water. Things like that.
    But what is disheartening to me is there was an article 
that came out by a retired colonel, Walt Yates. He just retired 
about a year ago. And I spoke with him for about an hour and a 
half yesterday. And he alerted us that on August 15, 2017, 
there was a similar mishap--well, not a similar mishap. It was 
a helicopter accident, where it crashed off the side of one of 
the ships, fell into the water. And the reasons given for the 
three deaths in that investigation was lack of training, lack 
of egress training.
    That is in 2017. Those parents went through the same thing 
we are going through. They were told that their sons or 
daughters would have survived had they only gotten the proper 
training. We are now at 3 years, 4 years later, and we are 
still in the exact same position that we were before.
    And what it boils down to and the reason why this really 
goes all the way up to the top is that where that comes from is 
really money. It is budget acquisitions. It is the people up at 
the very top, and I am talking about the assistant commandant 
level, that decides what does and doesn't make the budget.
    What ends up happening is lethality gets chosen over 
safety.
    Mr. Garamendi. Mr. Vienna.
    Mr. Vienna. Yes.
    Mr. Garamendi. Mr. Vienna, excuse me.
    I am going to have to take a little bit of control of this. 
We are now nearly 50 minutes into the 2 hours that we have 
available for our hearing. And I know that there are at least 
five more members of the committee that would like to ask 
questions.
    I would ask my committee members and others to not seek the 
same answer again. The questions that Ms. Slotkin, you asked, 
we want to specifically ask, as Mr. Vienna just said, the 
assistant commandant that question: Why, after all of these 
years, after all of these accidents, the Marine Corps is still 
not properly training its men and women.
    So, Ms. Slotkin, your time has expired.
    Mr. Vienna, thank you very much for your comments.
    I am instructed that all members have the opportunity to 
ask questions. If the question has already been asked, then 
please move on to another question.
    The gavel order is Mr. Golden, Mr. Moore, Ms. Strickland, 
Mr. Moulton, Mr. Levin. And I will assiduously follow the 5-
minute clock and interrupt as necessary. So thank you very 
much.
    Mr. Golden. Mr. Golden, you are on. Mr. Golden. We will 
come back to you, Mr. Golden.
    Mr. Moore. Mr. Moore, you are up. Hello, Mr. Moore.
    We will return to Mr. Golden and Mr. Moore should they come 
back on.
    Ms. Strickland, it is your 5 minutes.
    Ms. Strickland. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    To Mr. Vienna and Mr. Ostrovsky, I just want to express my 
deepest sympathies. And there is nothing like losing a child, 
especially when they have signed up to serve our country. So I 
am very sorry for your loss.
    There was something that Ms. Speier said earlier that 
really struck me, and it is the way we use the term ``mishap.'' 
And as we talk about moving forward, I want to make sure that 
we take a look at the term ``mishap,'' because to me it 
trivializes what has happened to these young people.
    With that said, very briefly, I have a question for each of 
the gentlemen who just testified.
    There are a lot of things that we need to do better--
accountability, investing in equipment, keeping it up to date. 
But if there was one thing that we could do as far as 
legislation goes or making an investment, what would you like 
to see us do to help give you some solace and rectify this 
issue so that other families don't suffer?
    Mr. Vienna.
    Mr. Vienna. Am I unmuted?
    Ms. Strickland. I can hear you.
    Mr. Vienna. Okay, great.
    I would say carve out something within the Feres Doctrine 
that doesn't allow gross negligence.
    In a situation like this, where there were as many issues 
as there were, we can't call it anything other than gross 
negligence.
    And when it reaches that level, you don't want to have 
these little lawsuits here and there for frivolous things. I 
understand that. But in a situation like this, there needs to 
be accountability.
    And without accountability, this is just going to continue, 
and we will be watching in 3 or 4 years another hearing about 
lack of training and shoddy equipment and all these things. It 
is just going to recycle itself.
    Ms. Strickland. Thank you, sir.
    Mr. Ostrovsky.
    Mr. Ostrovsky. Yes, I would seem to agree with Mr. Vienna.
    I think the importance of modernizing the system of 
accountability and liability is that on the front end, military 
officers will comport themselves appropriately if they know on 
the back end, if they do something outside of their scope, they 
will be held liable.
    So it is really all about the front end, so that this never 
happens again, we don't find ourself in these situations.
    Thank you.
    Ms. Strickland. Thank you, gentlemen. And, again, my 
deepest sympathies.
    Mr. Chair, I yield back.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Ms. Strickland.
    The gavel order has been modified a little bit here. So if 
the members would--here is the new order: Mr. Johnson, Mr. 
Kahele, Mr. Moulton, Mr. Levin.
    Mr. Johnson, you are up. My apologies for skipping over you 
a moment ago. Mr. Johnson.
    Mr. Johnson. It is fine, Mr. Chairman. I am going to yield 
to allow more time so we move on. Thank you.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Johnson.
    Mr. Kahele. Please unmute, Mr. Kahele. You are up.
    Mr. Kahele. Same here, Mr. Chair. Thank you so much. Aloha 
from Hawaii----
    Mr. Garamendi. I am afraid you just remuted yourself. You 
are good.
    Mr. Kahele. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Aloha from Hawaii.
    And I just want to thank both of you testifying today for 
your cooperation.
    But I will yield my time to the others that I know have 
questions that they have. Thank you, Chairman.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Kahele.
    Mr. Moulton.
    Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Gentlemen, I can't imagine your loss. And I am deeply 
affected by your testimony here this morning. I know it is not 
easy, so thank you very much for coming and sharing it with the 
committee.
    As a Marine veteran of 1st Battalion, 4th Marines, this is 
a situation that I know well. I spent a lot of time in an AAV, 
including in waterborne operations. That is how we got into 
Baghdad in 2003. I can tell you we sat on the roof, because we 
were afraid it would sink.
    So there is a lot of work here to do. And as a Marine 
veteran, as a veteran of AAV operations and of MEU operations, 
I can promise you that I will do everything I can to get to the 
bottom of it.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Moulton. Indeed, we will lean 
on you for your expertise and experience as we deal with these 
issues.
    Mr. Levin.
    Mr. Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you, members of 
the subcommittee, for allowing me to waive on.
    I also wanted to say thank you to Mr. Vienna and Mr. 
Ostrovsky just for being here today under these incredibly 
difficult circumstances. Thanks for being here on behalf of 
your sons, your families, and the other families who are 
suffering in the aftermath of this tragedy.
    It is incredible to see your strength on behalf of your 
sons as you tell their story and as you work to effect change 
so that no parent has to go through your experience in the 
future.
    I am here today because I proudly represent the service 
members and their families at Camp Pendleton. If you have ever 
been to our region, to North County, San Diego, or to South 
Orange County, you know how much the base and the men and the 
women who serve there mean to our region.
    Our Marines and sailors define us. They define our 
communities. They come from all across our country to answer 
the call of service and to protect our Nation, our values, and 
our way of life. And the fact that they do it right down the 
street, that makes us incredibly proud.
    Many service members, as you also know, stay in our area 
when they transition back to civilian life and they make our 
communities stronger. And it makes me incredibly sad hearing 
about your sons and reading about the other Marines we lost to 
think about the pillars of the community that they would have 
been. And I know our communities would have wanted to have them 
stay here in San Diego.
    So I am so sorry for your losses. Your sons were 
inspirations. Their legacies continue to be. And, with that in 
mind, I know that my colleagues, and myself included, we are 
going to do all we can to uncover the facts of this tragedy to 
ensure it is not repeated.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Levin.
    I want to give a very special thank you to our two 
witnesses today. These are two of the nine families that have 
lost their sons in this accident. And so for the Baltierra 
family, the Barranco family, the Bath family, the Perez family, 
the Rodd family, the Sweetwood family, and the Villanueva 
family, our sympathy goes out to you. Our prayers go out to all 
of the families who have suffered so much.
    The testimony we receive today gives us the direction and 
the desire to get at this problem. There is clearly a safety 
culture issue within the Marine Corps--and, unfortunately, we 
also find it in other services.
    This committee will work diligently with the other 
subcommittees to address the issues that have been raised here, 
the issues of notification when there is a loss, the issues of 
responsibility, as has been highlighted here several times.
    And we are now going to recess this panel, and we will take 
a 5-minute break. And we will bring the Marine Corps Assistant 
Commandant to join us and the Navy C--and the Navy admirals to 
join us in the second.
    So with that, this panel is recessed. We will return in 
about 5 minutes. And so if the membership would stand by as we 
change out here.
    Thank you very much once again to our two witnesses, Peter 
and Mr. Vienna. Thank you so very much for joining us.
    With that, we are in recess.
    [Recess.]
    Mr. Garamendi. We are back on the record with panel two of 
today's hearing. I understand that we have been able to get an 
extra half-hour here, so we will go until 1:30.
    As I have stated before and it bears repeating, the tragic 
events of 30 July 2020 were preventable. As I reread the 
investigation in preparation for this hearing, I was once again 
gripped by the sense of dread associated with reading the 
details of the multiple systemic failures that led to the loss 
of nine service members in the prime of their life.
    The Marine Corps failed--failed to adequately maintain the 
material readiness of the AAV fleet. The Navy and the Marine 
Corps totally failed to ensure that personnel were adequately 
trained to ensure that this exercise could be performed safely.
    The Navy and the Marine Corps failed to effectively 
integrate with each other to ensure that roles and 
responsibilities were adequately or even minimally understood, 
and that there was someone--someone with sufficient seniority 
who was paying attention, monitoring the changing events, and 
constantly conducting and updating the risk management, the 
safety or the lack of safety.
    The Navy and the Marine Corps totally failed to understand 
and to flag that after two decades of focusing on land-based 
combat the proficiency for amphibious operations may have been 
lost, may have atrophied, and that personnel needed additional 
training to conduct the exercise safely.
    The leadership of the Navy and Marine Corps totally failed 
to account for the potential problems that COVID-19 would have 
on readiness of these units. They were so desperate, as they 
showed us, as they said in hearings, formal hearings, that not 
to worry, we have overcome the impacts of COVID and our 
readiness is not diminished. Gentlemen, that was not true, as 
tragically shown in this incident.
    What is most upsetting to me is the failure of the Surface 
Navy and the Marine Corps to develop a culture of safety that 
would empower junior service members to alert the chain of 
command when there is a breach of safety protocols, to be 
heard, to not be ignored. We don't have to invent that culture. 
It does exist. It does exist in Naval Aviation and the Naval 
Reactors community. That culture needs to be in every part of 
both the Navy and the Marine Corps, and indeed the other 
services as well.
    The Navy and Marine Corps leadership must make a decision. 
They must decide to not allow the status quo to continue. The 9 
members of the Marine Corps--the 8 members in the Marine Corps 
and 1 member of the Navy that were lost were not the first; 
indeed, the Marine Corps has lost 60 Marines in training 
accidents in just the last 5 years, 60 in 5 years, and more 
than 130 in the previous 10 years.
    There is an eerie echo here of the Marine Corps hymn. These 
losses have been in the air, on the land and sea. As Mr. 
Courtney said in his earlier statement, the Surface Navy is 
still struggling to adopt sustained cultural changes in the 
wake of the loss of 17 sailors on the USS McCain and 
Fitzgerald. We have passed laws, we have provided money, and 
these tragedies continue.
    We have honored these nine members of our military with 
appropriate funerals and services. But I will say this, the 
only way to really honor their loss is that the Marine Corps 
and the Navy develop a culture of safety. This is not war; this 
is training. This subcommittee, and indeed the full committee, 
demands better.
    I know that there are additional investigations underway, 
command investigations, and we will get to those with a 
subsequent hearing, and we will be focusing on the events 
specific to this tragedy and to what the Navy and the Marine 
Corps are doing to prevent it from happening again.
    With that, I turn to my colleague and ranking member, Mr. 
Lamborn, for his opening statement.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having this 
hearing. Thank you for our witnesses for being here.
    I am going to keep this short so we can get into your 
testimony and the give-and-take with questions afterwards in 
the limited time that we have, but I want to know in a broad 
sense, what is the Marine Corps doing to foster a better safety 
environment. Obviously, there were a number of issues of things 
that went wrong in this particular incident.
    And, more specifically, I want to know what is happening 
with the proficiency for amphibious landings. Amphibious 
landings obviously were not a priority in our Iraq and 
Afghanistan conflicts in recent years, but with a pivot toward 
the Pacific it absolutely becomes a priority.
    So I want to know about that in particular and with AAVs. 
You know, why are AAVs so decrepit and so poorly maintained? Do 
we need to buy new ones? Are they not being maintained in a 
good state of readiness? What is the issue there? So those are 
the things I want to hear about when we go through our 
testimony.
    With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Garamendi. I will introduce our witnesses, and 
following their testimony, we will go through the normal gavel 
order of questions.
    Joining us today is General Gary Thomas, Assistant 
Commandant of the Marine Corps; Vice Admiral Roy Kitchener, 
Commander of Naval Surface Forces; and Major General Gregg 
Olson, Assistant Deputy Commandant, Plans, Policies, and 
Operations, Headquarters United States Marine Corps. Gentlemen, 
your formal testimony will be put in the hearing record.
    Mr. Thomas, General Thomas, would you please proceed.

STATEMENT OF GEN GARY L. THOMAS, USMC, ASSISTANT COMMANDANT OF 
                        THE MARINE CORPS

    General Thomas. Chairman Garamendi, Ranking Member Lamborn, 
and distinguished members of this subcommittee, thank you for 
the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the 
sinking of an assault amphibious vehicle on July 30, 2020, and 
how the Marine Corps can improve its safety culture. Today, 
Vice Admiral Kitchener, Major General Olson, and I are prepared 
to answer questions about what happened, what we have learned, 
and what we are doing to enact change.
    First and foremost, the sinking of this AAV and the deaths 
of eight Marines and one sailor were preventable, preventable 
in so many ways, but we failed. We failed these brave young 
men. The testimony that we just heard from the families 
represented here today is heartbreaking. We also mourn their 
loss and extend our deepest sympathy to their loved ones. 
Though it is little comfort to the families, we will honor 
their memory by taking the necessary actions to prevent a 
tragedy like this from ever happening again. We owe this to 
these service members and their families.
    The command investigation provided sufficient detail about 
the direct causes of the AAV's sinking. However, I believe 
there is more that we can learn about how this incident 
occurred and how to prevent similar tragedies in the future. I 
have directed a general officer to conduct a follow-on 
investigation into the forming of the Marine Expeditionary 
Unit, including training and readiness oversight up to the 
Marine Expeditionary Force level. This investigation is in 
progress, and we will provide the findings to this subcommittee 
after Headquarters Marine Corps review.
    We will also seek the counsel of a blue-ribbon panel of 
outside experts so that we can capitalize on the generations of 
amphibious experience that resides outside of our ranks. It is 
a Navy-Marine Corps imperative to train to standard for 
amphibious operations. Future operating concepts and the lives 
of our Marines and sailors demand that we increase our common 
understanding of the requirements for operations from the sea.
    To date, 11 Marines have been or will be held accountable 
for their respective roles in this tragedy in accordance with 
applicable law and regulations. Some of these accountability 
actions are ongoing, including boards to consider separation 
from the service. We make decisions regarding accountability 
based on an individual's responsibilities and their performance 
of duties. An individual's rank neither obligates nor excuses 
them from accountability. As we learn more about this tragedy, 
we will take additional measures as appropriate.
    More broadly, the Marine Corps recognizes that our historic 
ground and aviation accident trends must change course. Over 
the past few years, we have improved our safety reporting 
mechanisms, our information sharing and safety management 
practices.
    As a result of these and other efforts, we are seeing a 
reduction in vehicle rollovers, and from 2019 to 2021, we saw 
our lowest aviation flight mishap rate on record. However, the 
2020 sinking of this AAV and other recent accidents make it 
clear that the Marine Corps safety culture must improve and 
that Marines at all levels must make better risk decisions.
    Every Marine must be empowered to assess risk and speak up 
when they see something unsafe. Commanders must provide the 
necessary oversight to mitigate risk and stop operations when 
the risk is too high. Commanders must also develop command 
climates that value and reward hazard reporting.
    At an institutional level, we must provide the guidance and 
resources that support good decision-making. We also have to 
manage operational tempo so that our Marines and sailors have 
the opportunity to complete necessary training in a safe and 
productive manner.
    We are committed to providing the leadership and resources 
to make these changes. We appreciate your oversight and 
continued support as we learn from our past and make lasting 
changes to our safety culture. We look forward to answering 
your questions.
    [The prepared statement of General Thomas can be found in 
the Appendix on page 61.]
    Mr. Garamendi. General, thank you very much.
    I now turn to Vice Admiral Kitchener, Commander of Naval 
Surface Forces.

   STATEMENT OF VADM ROY I. KITCHENER, USN, COMMANDER, NAVAL 
                         SURFACE FORCES

    Admiral Kitchener. Good morning, Chairman Garamendi, 
Ranking Member Lamborn, and distinguished members of the 
Readiness Subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to testify 
today.
    I too want to begin by expressing my personal condolences 
to the families of our fallen Marines and sailor who served 
their country with pride and honor. This devastating loss 
underscores the very dangerous work our sailors and Marines 
perform each day in our All-Volunteer Force, and it once again 
reminds us of our solemn obligation to provide each service 
member an environment where risk is being properly managed. We 
are committed as a Navy-Marine Corps team to ensure that events 
such as this does not happen again.
    I just listened to the testimony of Mr. Vienna and Mr. 
Ostrovsky about their personal loss and poor experience with 
the casualty assistant calls officer, or CACO, process. I spoke 
with Mr. and Mrs. Vienna before. Incredibly grateful that they 
were willing to share their experience with me. I am deeply 
saddened that the Navy CACO process did not work as it should 
have for this grieving family. I have reached out to my 
counterparts who oversee the CACO process, and they are 
reviewing what happened with the Viennas as well as any 
improvements that may result.
    The Navy is committed to understanding not only how our 
actions may have contributed to this tragedy but also how we 
can better support families in the future. And I say that not 
only as a commander but also as a father of four, three of whom 
are serving in the military, including one enlisted Marine at 
Camp Pendleton.
    Immediately following the tragic events on 30 July, the 
Navy and Marine Corps implemented a safety pause of AAV 
operations. The Navy has not resumed waterborne AAV operations 
and will not do so until we are satisfied that all necessary 
policies, procedures, and risk mitigation measures are in 
place. Additionally, all commanding officers and well-deck 
teams will be trained to these new requirements and will have 
reviewed the specific lessons learned before AAVs embark a Navy 
ship.
    The Marine Corps investigation discovered inconsistencies 
in the Navy and Marine Corps operating procedures and policies 
for waterborne AAV operations. I am working deliberately and 
urgently with my Marine Corps counterpart to look across the 
full range of Navy-Marine Corps integrated operations to ensure 
that our operating procedures are aligned, including a joint 
policy on the use of safety boats and clear lines of 
authorities during training evolutions. We are committed as a 
Navy-Marine Corps team to put sailors and Marines--to not put 
sailors and Marines at risk while we examine our integrated 
policies and procedures.
    While the Navy fully supports the finding and 
recommendations of the Marine Corps investigation, the Marine 
Corps investigation did not fully address Navy actions on this 
fatal day. We are accountable as an organization and must fully 
address whether Navy action or inaction contributed to the 
incident and what changes to practice and policy we must make 
to recommencing waterborne AAV operations.
    Accordingly, we initiated our own command investigation 
with a team of 16 Navy, Marine Corps, and civilian subject 
matter experts in areas such as planning, Navy and Marine Corps 
integration and training, and operational safety. Our 
investigation is expected to be completed within 30 days.
    Professional seamanship is the standard with no exception. 
We owe that to the Marines and sailors in our care. It is in 
our culture to critically evaluate, then make and effectively 
implement necessary changes. Although we operate in a dangerous 
and demanding environment and will never be able to eliminate 
all risk, you have my word that we will, with great speed, 
provide you, the American people, and our Navy-Marine Corps 
team, with our critical assessment of our current procedures 
and our plan to best mitigate risk as we move forward with 
integrated amphibious operations to ensure this never happens 
again.
    On behalf of all sailors, their families, and our Navy 
civilians, I thank you for your continued support and look 
forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Admiral Kitchener can be found 
in the Appendix on page 73.]
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Admiral.
    I now turn to Major General Gregg Olson, Assistant Deputy 
Commandant, Plans, Policies, Operations.

  STATEMENT OF MAJGEN GREGG P. OLSON, USMC, ASSISTANT DEPUTY 
   COMMANDANT FOR PLANS, POLICIES, OPERATIONS, UNITED STATES 
                          MARINE CORPS

    General Olson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Ranking 
Member, and other distinguished members of the subcommittee. As 
I make ready to answer your questions, let me note my deep 
sadness regarding this preventable tragedy. I have years of 
experience with amphibious assault vehicles, including my first 
tour as a 20-something lieutenant. I can put myself in the 
place of these young men who were counting on others to keep 
them safe.
    I have done my underwater egress training, and I know the 
fear and disorientation that results when you are rapidly 
submerged. I also know the value of the training in saving 
lives. Every time I review the details of this tragedy, I am 
struck by its senselessness. My heart goes out to the families 
of the young men who died, and I especially appreciate the 
bravery of the two witnesses who testified in the previous 
panel.
    As I answer your questions, please do not mistake my 
matter-of-fact tone for any lack of empathy. I am simply trying 
to keep my emotions in check. I look forward to your questions.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, General.
    I have a document dated March 26, 2021, and it is signed by 
General Thomas. It speaks to the issues at hand and to what the 
Marine Corps is specifically doing to address the tragedy and 
the failures that occurred in this incident.
    Point number eight, General Thomas, you said the loss of 
these eight Marines and one sailor was a preventable tragedy. 
You went on to say, we mourn the loss of their lives and share 
their families' enduring grief. The Marines and sailors who 
died made the ultimate sacrifice while serving their fellow 
Marines and the Nation will never be forgotten.
    General Thomas, those words need to be followed up by 
action. You have laid out seven specific actions that the 
Marine Corps intends to take. In our communication prior to 
this hearing, I told you that the construction industry in the 
United States has instituted a safety officer always on site, 
always there to review and with a whistle to stop the 
construction activity if something is not safe.
    I recommended to you that the Navy should consider such a 
safety officer on all risky operations. As I look at the seven 
recommendations that you have made, I don't see an opportunity 
in any of those for someone to blow the whistle and call 
timeout. Clearly, that could and should have happened in this 
tragedy, but it didn't.
    I want to hear from you how you can assure us that the 
issues of safety will be paramount in exercises. General 
Thomas, what assurances can you give us that your seven 
recommendations will lead to someone having the power to blow 
the whistle and stopping the exercise until safety can be 
assured?
    General Thomas. Thank you, Chairman. The first thing that I 
would say is that--and you have alluded to this, this is, our 
safety culture has got to improve. All Marines need to 
understand that a safety culture or a culture of excellence is 
integral to mission success.
    I share your view on making sure we have adequate 
oversight, and we are looking at adding additional safety 
specialists at the right place to ensure that our exercises are 
as safe as they possibly can be. That, in addition to safety 
protocols, are the types of things that are required to get our 
safety culture where it needs to be.
    I would point out that no one person is able to see all the 
intricacies of an exercise, and so equally as important as to 
having the right people with oversight is to, as you alluded 
to, Chairman, empowering Marines to stand up or speak up when 
they see something that is unsafe and for them to be heard, and 
then for leaders at all levels to provide necessary oversight 
to mitigate risk and then to stop operations when that risk is 
too high.
    I would tell you, Chairman, that in all the exercises that 
we do across the Marine Corps every day, every exercise at some 
point Marines are standing up and pausing operations, and that 
is exactly what we need to do in this case, which is where we 
failed in this particular exercise. But we are taking a hard 
look at that, Chairman, and we will keep this committee 
informed as we go forward.
    Mr. Garamendi. I am going to forgo additional questions. I 
suspect most of the questions will be asked by my colleagues 
that I would have asked, so I am going to turn it over to Mr. 
Lamborn. But before I do, I think the number is 137 Marines 
that died in various accidents, training accidents over the 
last decade, 60 in the last 5 years.
    Mr. Lamborn, it is your turn, 5 minutes.
    Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Garamendi. Excuse me, Mr. Lamborn, you are now 
recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Can you hear me okay?
    Mr. Garamendi. Yes, please, go ahead.
    Mr. Lamborn. And, Mike Johnson, you may want to mute, Mike 
Johnson.
    Okay. General or Admiral, whoever wants to take this 
question, obviously there were some real deficiencies with the 
training regime that was in place that were not followed or 
should have been followed, shouldn't have been in place. But 
also when it comes to the equipment and the AAVs in particular, 
it seemed like it was a disaster waiting to happen.
    These AAVs were taking on water, the bilge pumps weren't 
able to keep up, the batteries weren't sufficient. There were a 
lot of specific things that were wrong with these AAVs, and a 
subsequent inspection found that many of them failed. I believe 
the majority, once they were inspected, failed inspection and 
should not be used.
    So what will the Marine Corps do with the need for better 
AAVs in the future? This is something our subcommittee, besides 
the training aspect, is going to want to look at. So what is 
the best insight you can give us on how to get to a better 
state where we have AAVs that are good for training and 
actually good in actual conflict? Thank you.
    General Thomas. Congressman, I will start and then I will 
turn it over to General Olson. But let me be clear, the AAV 
platoon should have received vehicles in a higher state of 
material readiness than they did. These are old vehicles, but 
they are broadly well understood of what is required to keep 
them up, although we have learned some things since the mishap 
that General Olson will describe. But we will--I assure you, we 
will fully resource any requirement to keep this vehicle in a 
high state of material readiness until its sundown in 2026.
    Let me turn it over to General Olson for any additional 
fill-in.
    General Olson. Ranking Member Lamborn, you are 100 percent 
correct, sir. These vehicles were delivered in, as the 
investigating officer notes, horrible condition. Twelve of the 
thirteen were inoperable on the 20th of April. All should have 
been ready for both land and water operations.
    The AAV platoon mechanics, augmented by three mechanics 
from the parent battalion, did return them to condition code 
for land operations in time for a land-only mechanized rate 
course. By the time they got onboard ship, they had been 
returned to what we thought was waterborne capable.
    What we found in our subsequent inspections, after safety 
review's message came out on the 31st of July, was that we had 
a problem across the fleet with our watertight integrity. Some 
54 percent of the vehicles that were inspected had failures in 
the watertight integrity of their plenum doors. That is the 
large intakes on the front that permit air to come in and out 
of an engine that is underwater. Eighteen percent had cargo 
hatches that were leaking in excess of what they should have 
been, and fully 50 percent had inoperable emergency escape 
lighting systems. There were other discrepancies as well.
    None of those vehicles are permitted back into the water 
until they are returned to operable condition. The watertight 
integrity testing regime has been instantiated into our 
technical manuals and into our technical instructions. We had 
not been inspecting to the level of detail necessary to 
determine these discrepancies.
    As Chairman Garamendi noted, it may have been that 20 years 
of land-road operations have caused us to lose some of our 
amphibious edge. To that end, we are moving out on a detailed 
watertight integrity regime that will ensure that no vehicle 
goes in the water without being watertight and integral.
    You are correct about the bilge pumps. There are bilge 
pumps on every AAV that can expel water at a rate far greater 
than typically enters. AAVs leak, but the 400-some-odd gallons 
per minute that they can pump over the side should have been 
sufficient in this case; in this case, it was not. The vehicle 
had far greater mechanical degradation than we knew of.
    And when the transmission failed, the hydraulic bilge pumps 
failed. When the transmission failed, the engine went to idle 
and ceased charging the batteries. And then when the engine 
compartment itself filled with water, the generator failed, and 
effectively, the vehicle was without power.
    We know we have things to fix, and we know we have a glide 
slope to 2026 when the amphibious combat vehicle [ACV] will be 
fully operationally capable. In the meantime, we will continue 
to sustain and fund the AAV fleet, to include finishing off the 
return to condition code alpha [RCCA], to think about sending a 
vehicle back for depot-level maintenance and its return to you 
in like-new condition.
    While even though inspections of the RCCA vehicles learned 
that we have a watertight integrity issue that must be 
addressed, we will make these vehicles watertight, and we will 
not put them in the water unless they are so.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the 
balance of my time.
    Mr. Garamendi. The gavel order is Courtney and Wilson and 
then we will have additional. I note Representative Moulton, 
when he spoke earlier and talked of his own experience with the 
AAV and their rocky situations, that he and his colleagues sat 
on top fearing being unable to get out if they had to, if they 
were inside. We will come to you, Mr. Moulton, a little later, 
and I suspect you will want to talk about that.
    Mr. Courtney.
    Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the 
witnesses.
    Admiral Kitchener, in 2017, we had the two collisions in 
the Indo-Pacific region, Fitzgerald and McCain. And after that, 
CNO [Chief of Naval Operations] Richardson ordered a complete 
comprehensive review, and that was in addition to all the 
normal investigations which we have already heard about this 
morning for this incident.
    And, but the point of the comprehensive review was really 
to look at structural changes in terms of the whole decision-
making for sending large surface ships out in the Pacific 
region where, again, the operations commander was kind of 
overruling or, you know, just overriding any concerns regarding 
training certifications, ship readiness. And clearly, there was 
this string of completely unacceptable accidents and loss of 
life that was identified as flowing from it.
    Again, the CR, the comprehensive review, ended up with a 
large number of recommendations. You described a command-level 
report that is in the works right now that we are going to get 
back within the next 30 days or so. Is that what that is 
looking at? Is that looking, again, not just at the specifics 
of who is responsible but really the structural system that is 
in place in terms of sending AAVs out that really are not safe?
    Admiral Kitchener. Representative Courtney, thank you for 
the question. The Navy cooperated fully with the Marine Corps 
and the investigation and provided access to, you know, 
records, logs, and many witnesses. And when we reviewed the 
investigation we agreed with the fundamental conclusion that is 
there were no causal factors attributable to the Navy. However, 
what we did find left a few questions unanswered. And what we 
are--so we decided to open our own investigation to understand, 
you know, what actions and decisions that Navy personnel made 
that day could have contributed to the tragedy and then what 
policies and practices may be required and must be improved.
    So we stood up a team of 16 people that is made up of Navy, 
Marine Corps, and civilian personnel, and we specifically asked 
them to look at the actions of the personnel that day and the 
planning and the approval and the execution of the operation. 
Additionally, we asked them to look at the communications 
between Navy and Marine Corps personnel prior to, during, and 
in the aftermath of the incident.
    We also asked them to look at a number of--assess the 
impact of a number of conditions that day that may have been 
contributing factors. You know, for example, the sea state in 
the morning and the sea state in the afternoon; the operation, 
the use--the policies and use of safety boats and who was 
making those decisions; and, finally, we asked them to look at 
the command-and-control structure, and was there a rigid one in 
place that clearly delineated authorities. Was it [inaudible] 
geared to [inaudible] during the operation.
    You know, as from the McCain and Fitzgerald incidents, we 
have worked very hard at our safety culture, and we expect and 
encourage all sailors to have a questioning attitude, to expect 
to find conditions that require and to also make sure that they 
act on unsafe conditions and not ignore them. And it is up to 
us as leaders to create that environment that facilitates that 
action.
    Mr. Courtney. Well, thank you, Admiral. You know, I would 
just note though that the CR did come back and identify real 
weaknesses in the existing system after McCain and ways that we 
could structurally and by law actually prevent that. And as I 
mentioned earlier today, I mean, Congress actually adopted that 
and now that is actually in law.
    And I think we have actually seen some progress in terms of 
not having, you know, sailors untrained and uncertified, again, 
on large surface fleet ships. And hopefully that is what I 
think--I am speaking for myself at Seapower and I am sure other 
members, that is what we want in terms of getting specific 
problems here.
    Because as the chairman said, this is just happening too 
frequently, and that says that there is something more than 
just, you know, kind of, you know, trust us, we will take care 
of this. We have really got to look at the structure of command 
and control and decision-making. And Congress needs to step in 
and, like we did with McCain and Fitzgerald, make real changes.
    With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Courtney.
    The gavel order is as follows: Mr. Johnson and Ms. Speier 
in that order. Mr. Wilson will return, and I will come back to 
him when he returns.
    Mr. Johnson, you are up.
    Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it very 
much and thank the generals for their time. And this is an 
important hearing. We did hear that heart-wrenching testimony 
earlier, and it is so disturbing to all of us.
    Let me just get right to a couple of questions. I apologize 
if some of this has been answered already in previous 
statements or questions. My internet has been a little 
intermittent today.
    But we know that we had multiple mishap--I know the term we 
are having concerns with as well, but mishap investigations 
have revealed that unit leadership properly reported on 
training and material deficiencies, but we have these reports 
that they were ignored or even later relieved.
    How are you remedying this? Let me ask this, General 
Thomas, I guess, how are you remedying this and empowering 
commanders to highlight deficiencies and escalate concerns 
without facing punitive action? And then, secondly, how should 
a leader that raises these types of issues within their chain 
of command proceed when that chain of command is not responsive 
enough to ensure mission success and safety?
    General Thomas. Thank you, Congressman. I think you are 
getting right to the culture, you know, issue. Again, I would 
just start by, you know, some of the things we are--we have got 
to instantiate with our leaders is the importance that they 
have in terms of oversight, identifying risk, and stopping 
operations, and then actually rewarding that. We are now, you 
know, incorporating some of that into our commander training, 
new commander training.
    But we also have to create the environment where if someone 
raises the alarm within the chain of command or even just a 
junior Marine, that is exactly what we want them to do, and we 
have to figure out ways to reward those Marines who are 
taking--we would say, again, that is part of mission success.
    I mean, obviously, you know, when you have a tragedy like 
this, it is a failure from beginning to end. If we can, you 
know, with our education system, our reporting systems create 
an environment where people are comfortable, I think we will 
make a lot of headway towards the safety culture that we need.
    Mr. Johnson. I appreciate that response. One of the 
questions we have is, would there perhaps be value in 
developing an independent safety process inside DOD for leaders 
to raise those issues, and is that something you all have 
considered so far?
    General Thomas. You know, I am a fan of, you know, 
independent, you know, views just because of the ability to 
provide eyes-on that perhaps an organization may be missing. 
That is something that came out of one of the commission's 
safety reports. We do have a mechanism within DOD, a joint that 
has been probably more dormant than it had--should have been 
over the past few years. That may be something that we could 
use going forward to instantiate some of the things that you 
just described, Congressman.
    Mr. Johnson. It makes sense. I mean, from a layperson's 
viewpoint, that is just, to us it seems kind of commonsense. 
But let me ask you one more question. Mishap investigations, as 
we know, often produce lengthy lists of recommendations for 
actions.
    So what is your process for ensuring that those changes are 
actually incorporated in the service's policy and doctrine?
    General Thomas. We have an oversight panel led by a flag 
officer looking at all the recommendations and then having 
individuals, you know, come back and brief on the progress it 
has made until that progress is--until, you know, that action 
is actually complete.
    Part of that process, by the way, includes coming back to 
the subcommittee and describing, here is the action plan and 
here is the progress that we are making until action complete.
    Mr. Johnson. I appreciate that. We take that responsibility 
seriously, and I am grateful for that cooperation and your 
acknowledgment of that.
    So with that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Johnson.
    General Thomas, you correctly said that, in your March 26 
memo, the eight things and then the subsets. And indeed we will 
come back to you in due course, probably 6 months or so, and 
say, is it actually happening? Are you actually doing these 
things? The other part of this, and this has been mentioned in 
your opening testimony, General Thomas, and that is the issue 
of accountability. We will probably hear more about that.
    I am now going to turn to Ms. Speier for your questions.
    Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you, all, for your presentations this afternoon.
    General Thomas, you used the word ``preventable,'' that 
this was a preventable set of circumstances. Major General 
Olson, you said it was ``senseless.'' General Thomas and 
General Olson, do you both recognize that this was also 
reckless? General Thomas.
    General Thomas. Congresswoman, I think that some of the 
actions taken were reckless, yes.
    Ms. Speier. Major General Olson.
    General Olson. Ma'am, I was surprised at how cavalier some 
of the actions were. I would say that some of them rose to 
recklessness.
    Ms. Speier. Would you support us providing compensation to 
the families for reckless or gross negligence? General Thomas.
    General Thomas. Ma'am, I will have to take that one for the 
record, because it is a policy issue. This is something that we 
would come back to you with based on response from the--along 
with our leaders at Office of Secretary of Defense.
    [The information referred to was not available at the time 
of printing.]
    Ms. Speier. All right. Major General Olson, yes or no?
    General Olson. Ma'am, I would have to associate myself with 
the assistant commandant's remarks. I don't know enough about 
the issue to speak authoritatively.
    Ms. Speier. All right. Vice Admiral Kitchener. Actually, 
you are muted. I am going to move on. I think you are probably 
going to say the same thing as your colleagues.
    Who made the decision--who was responsible for the 
readiness of the MEU?
    General Thomas. Congresswoman, I will, you know, give you a 
broader view and let General Olson fill in. But the Marine 
Expeditionary Unit is a composite unit, and before it forms, 
comes together--normally 6 months prior to deployment--those 
are separate units, and there is an individual that has 
responsibility for the readiness of those individual units, 
nominally the division. Once the MEU comes together, the MEU 
has--the commander has responsibility for the readiness and the 
MEF [Marine Expeditionary Force] has oversight responsibility.
    General Olson, would you like to add something to that?
    Ms. Speier. I want a name.
    General Olson. Elaborating briefly, ma'am, the commander of 
1st Marine Division at the time would have been responsible for 
the initial readiness of the division units forming the ground 
combat element, as would the wing commander be responsible for 
the aviation units, and the Marine Logistics Group commander be 
responsible for the logistics units that composited together to 
form the subordinate elements of the 15th Marine Expeditionary 
Unit.
    Ms. Speier. So that was General Castellvi, correct?
    General Thomas. General Castellvi was the division 
commander at the time, yes, ma'am.
    Ms. Speier. All right. And he was found responsible for a 
lack of training. No action was taken against him, and up until 
last week he was, in fact, the inspector general for the Marine 
Corps, correct?
    General Thomas. That is correct.
    Ms. Speier. And he is now on administrative leave, I 
believe?
    General Thomas. He has been suspended from his duties, that 
is correct.
    Ms. Speier. Okay. Who made the decision to deploy the AAVs 
that were in a lot designated as too broken to operate?
    General Thomas. General Olson.
    General Olson. That would have been the former commander, 
lieutenant colonel board-slated commander of the 3rd Assault 
Amphibian Battalion.
    Ms. Speier. And who was that?
    General Olson. Ma'am, I don't have his name at my 
fingertips.
    Ms. Speier. Okay. Would you provide that to the committee?
    General Olson. Yes, ma'am.
    [The information referred to was not available at the time 
of printing.]
    Ms. Speier. And you said--you have said to us a number of 
times that eight people were fired in that chain of command, 
but as we all know, firing in the military is not the same term 
as it is in civilian status. So they were all transferred, but 
they are still in the military. Is that correct?
    General Thomas. Ma'am, I will take that one. So it is 
actually 11, and the majority of those 11 are being considered 
for separation from the service and some have had lesser 
discipline taken against them.
    I would just point out that one of those being held 
accountable suffered drowning injuries. One of those being held 
accountable, you know, dove into the water to rescue one of the 
Marines that came to the surface. All of those Marines have 
suffered traumatic stress injuries, and, of course, as you 
know, they have to live with the decisions that they made that 
led to this incident.
    Ms. Speier. I understand that. But if you go through the 
list of problems with these AAVs, they make your head spin. It 
was egregious behavior, and maybe we should be talking to some 
of those who have been, quote, fired to find out where the 
pressure was coming from that required them to move forward 
with this exercise.
    Four of the AAVs were inoperable once they were on the 
island. I mean, this was a deathtrap in which we put these 
service members, nine of whom are now dead.
    With that, I yield back.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Ms. Speier. We will probably have 
a second round of questions and so for the--for my colleagues, 
you should prepare for that.
    The gavel order is as follows: Mr. Golden, Mr. Moulton, and 
Mr. Levin. Our Republican colleagues are welcome to come back 
on to the screen if they would like to, and we will intersperse 
them.
    Mr. Golden.
    Mr. Golden. Thank you, Mr. Chair. You got me all right 
here?
    Mr. Garamendi. Yes. Please proceed.
    Mr. Golden. Very good.
    A couple of questions for our Marines on the panel. I think 
one of the--I think the ranking member really started down this 
line of questioning. One of the biggest concerns was the 
inoperability and just general unpreparedness of the AAVs. The 
Marine Corps job is to be ready to fight, fight today really.
    This committee often has a conversation with the Marine 
Corps ongoing about what you need for the future, but what 
about readiness today? And, in particular, as the Marine Corps 
is pivoting back to a real focus on amphibious operations, I am 
very concerned about the status of these AAVs for the next 5 
years.
    Would you say with confidence, either one of you, that this 
committee is fully aware of what the Marine Corps needs to 
ensure the operability and general readiness of the AAV fleet 
in the United States Marine Corps?
    General Thomas. Congressman, I will begin. I am not sure if 
the committee is fully aware of what we are doing to ensure 
that the AAV is fully ready until it is sundowned in 2026, and 
we look forward to working with the committee on those things.
    I would tell you that one of the things that we are 
learning about this mishap is how we are actually reporting 
readiness. You know, the metrics that we are using, I think, in 
some cases, indicated a higher state of readiness across the 
fleet than was actually warranted, and I think General Olson 
can speak to that.
    I think the other thing that we have learned is--based on 
this tragedy is that the--there were things as the AAV aged 
that made the previous inspection regime no longer, you know, 
appropriate, and that is something that we are going to have to 
pay attention to going forward. But I would say, broadly----
    Mr. Golden. Let me just--if I could just jump in, I just 
want to really stress the importance that this committee knows 
what is necessary to make sure that you are in a state of 
readiness for amphibious operations as an organization.
    Don't let it be for lack of communicating. It is always 
admirable--you know, I was a Marine, sir. We always say with 
pride that we make do with less, which is a great culture to 
have on the battlefield, but in terms of this communication and 
congressional oversight, I think it can be a real danger and an 
impediment.
    The Marine Corps I know is interested in accountability in 
this instance, and I have full, you know, faith that that is 
going to move forward with these investigations and that we 
will get answers and the right steps will be taken. But what I 
want to know is that the Marine Corps is prepared to 
communicate to Congress what it needs and not think that it is 
limited in making the hard ask for what is necessary from the 
Nation to ensure that our Marines are safe, that our sailors 
are safe, but just as importantly, this is a readiness issue. 
Are you ready for the fight, and is the equipment in place that 
you need?
    One thing that really jumps out at me is what looks like a 
lack of communications operability. The fact that one thing 
pointed out is that no one noticed safety boats in the water--
not in the water, failed to notice the distress flag. Why 
wasn't there comms? You know, is there a lack of communications 
readiness between the Marine Corps and the Navy, between our 
AAVs and the ships that carry them? I am very concerned about 
that. Have we given you the equipment that you need to carry 
out this mission successfully is what I am trying to ask.
    General Olson. I will take that, if I might.
    General Thomas. Go ahead.
    General Olson. One of the upgrades that is being done to 
the remaining fleet of the AAVs that will carry it through to 
2026 is an upgrade to the radio suite, both for operability 
reasons and also for compatibility reasons with the cryptologic 
requirements moving forward.
    Another place where communications failed in this tragedy 
was inside the AAV itself. All of our AAVs that will remain in 
service to 2026 will be getting an internal communications 
modification as well. A third modification is to a backup 
battery power system for the emergency egress lighting system. 
And then a fourth is to put an up-gunned weapon station on it 
that is the same remote weapon station as will be on the 
amphibious combat vehicle.
    We are confident the funding profile for the AAV line and 
our ability to both cannibalize AAVs that are being taken out 
of service for usable parts or selectively interchange between 
AAVs that remain in service for usable parts will carry this 
vehicle--in combination with the return to condition code alpha 
depot-level effort--carry this vehicle to 2026 when the ACV is 
fully operational.
    Mr. Golden. I see that I am out of time. Thank you, Mr. 
Chairman.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Golden. We are going to 
follow up on what Mr. General Olson just said about 
reconditioning and the maintenance of this. I would point out 
to my committee members that it is going to come down to where 
is the money going to be spent.
    And the Readiness Subcommittee has had serious concerns 
throughout all of the departments about money being spent on 
new, bright, shiny equipment and while not maintaining the 
existing equipment. So we will be following up on all of the 
equipment that is being used throughout, certainly in the 
Marine Corps and also the other services.
    With that, I will turn to--I don't see our Republican 
colleagues returning at this moment, so, Mr. Moulton followed 
by Mr. Gallego and then Mr. Levin. Mr. Moulton, you are on.
    Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Can you hear me okay?
    Mr. Garamendi. Yes.
    Mr. Moulton. And let me just begin by reaffirming or 
seconding your last remark. I remember sitting on the deck of 
an amphibious ship off the coast of Kuwait before the Iraq 
invasion and loading ammunition into our rifles that was dated 
1967 and 1968 for the Vietnam war.
    So we can find countless examples across the services of 
places where we have not invested in the basic requirements for 
front-line troops, those men and women in the infantry, while 
we have no problem spending hundreds of millions of dollars on 
lots of F-35s that can't even reach China. So there is a lot to 
be discussed there in the broader committee.
    Gentlemen, the mech [mechanized] raid, of course, is one of 
several ways that you can get Marines to shore and, 
operationally, it is only approved for low-threat environments.
    General Thomas, in your written testimony, you state that 
amphibious operations is one of our core capabilities and 
future operational concepts demand we increase our common 
understanding of the requirements of operations from the sea.
    But, General, as you know, the last major amphibious 
invasion, my company's invasion of Baghdad aside, took place at 
Inchon during the Korean war. Seventy years later, on 30 July 
2020, what future operational concept were these Marines 
training for? Were these Marines risking their lives for 
something that, realistically, we aren't going to ever do?
    General Thomas. Congressman, I would just offer, you know, 
this: If you look at our new concepts, Expeditionary Advanced 
Base Operations [EABO], particularly in the Indo-Pacific, and 
the requirement to seize key maritime terrain, I would argue 
that movement of forces over the surface will continue to be an 
enduring mission. Not the only one. Some by air, of course, as 
you well know and you have experienced during your time with 
the Marine Corps. But it continues to be an important mechanism 
that we will have to use, you know, to execute Expeditionary 
Advanced Base Operations.
    Now, the conditions are going to have to be set 
differently, because of the threats, et cetera. But just 
because of the size of forces and the equipment that we would 
need to move, you know, move ashore, that is going to still be 
an important function for us.
    Mr. Moulton. Well, I just hope we are carefully considering 
that. And I can certainly imagine myself as a commander, given 
the reputation for AAVs in the Marine Corps for at least the 
last 20 years that I have known, I would certainly be reluctant 
to put Marines in them if I had other options available, 
literally almost any other option available. So I think we need 
to carefully consider that as we look at our capital 
requirements going forward.
    Vice Admiral Kitchener, a similar question to you. You 
articulated concerns in your written testimony that have led 
you to curtail waterborne operations. Are you also 
investigating whether or not AAV operations are relevant in 
future operating environments, and when can we expect to hear 
the results of those findings?
    Admiral Kitchener. Congressman, thank you for the question. 
First, we are looking, with our Marine Corps colleagues, at the 
planning documents that we have and our documents that oversee 
AAV operations, and we are making sure we are aligned there.
    I would echo General Thomas' answers to the question, 
where, on an EABO concept and in the fighting scheme of 
maneuver in the Western Pacific, there is still a need for that 
capability to move large pieces of equipment and seizing that 
terrain and controlling SLOCs [sea lines of communication] on 
some of the--within the first island chain out there. So I do 
see value as we move ahead and incorporate the new ACVs into 
the fleet.
    And additionally, we will continue to work as one team in 
making sure we are, you know, aligned on those policies and how 
we are going to employ those assets.
    Mr. Moulton. My next question is about accountability. 
Historically, the Marine Corps has a culture of instinctively 
relieving everyone after a mishap or a disaster without parsing 
individual command responsibilities. And I think there was an 
attempt to do this in the report. I read it thoroughly.
    But I have to say, I am heartened to know that the Marine 
Corps is looking at division responsibilities, because there 
clearly was some oversight there that should have happened. 
Whether in regards to COVID training timelines or basic 
oversight of this AAV battalion, clearly some things were 
missed.
    Mr. Chairman, with that, I yield back. And I have further 
questions if we come back around.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Moulton. Your question goes 
to the larger policy issues, Mr. Moulton. I know that 
Commandant Berger looks forward to an opportunity to explain to 
the full committee the Marine Corps strategies for the future.
    And embedded in your question--or embedded in his testimony 
should be answers to the questions that you raised, which are 
fundamental to our work overseeing and providing the necessary 
programs and money to carry out that mission.
    I am now going to turn to--here is the gavel order that we 
have: Mr. Gallego and then Mr. Levin.
    Mr. Gallego, you are on.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Chairman.
    You know, I actually spent 7 months living on AAVs. In the 
great scheme of things, somehow the Marine Corps thought the 
best way to transport men around Iraq was to shove us into 
AAVs. They were deathtraps. We knew they were deathtraps. 
Because of that, I think, in total, we lost 18 Marines to IED 
[improvised explosive device] strikes in Iraq.
    And, you know, the joke in the Marine Corps, especially 
among leadership, is, ``How many Marines can you fit into an 
AAV? Always one more.'' And that certainly was the situation 
why so many of my brothers died, because there was always one 
more we could fit in there. We were jammed. We were packed, 
packed with ammo, and certainly, you know, set in a very 
dangerous, precarious situation.
    What disturbs me, is that with this report, was that there 
was warning signs, and warning signs were missed. One of the 
things that I remember when I was enlisted in the Marine Corps, 
I was told if I ever saw something that was endangering, 
especially in terms of any exercises, that I could call for an 
immediate stop and there would be no, you know, ramifications 
for that, even though I was just a lance corporal. Well, 
clearly that is not true. And I think that is what happened 
here.
    So, General Thomas, one of the things I want to get an 
assurance from you on is that you are going to work to change 
that culture, right? Things happen in war. People die. I have 
seen it, been there. But the worst thing that can ever happen, 
especially to our family members, is that when our men and 
women die because of recklessness, because of a Marine Corps 
attitude that we have to be tough and we have to be rough 
during training, because that is the culture, when we should be 
focusing on the actual training exercises, not on establishing 
this culture of, you know, of just cruelty, Spartan-like 
cruelty, which does not in the end create, in my opinion, 
deterrence or readiness.
    So, General Thomas, do you see that people actually 
understand what happened and how this is actually going to--
because we can update the AAV all we want, but it is, you know, 
really, you know, dumb muscle usage instead of actually, you 
know, brainpower and management that will end up getting more 
men and women killed in these types of training exercises.
    General Thomas. Congressman, I would agree with you in 
terms of your points regarding the safety culture. That is 
exactly what we are trying to get after.
    And then your experience of, you know, when you were 
serving and how you felt like you could, you know, raise a 
concern and be listened to, that is something that we have got 
to inculcate across the entire Marine Corps. I would argue, 
sir, that in many of our exercises that occurs every day, but 
clearly it didn't happen in this case. So it shows that we have 
got a lot of work to do.
    The other thing that I would say is that when we talk about 
culture and, you know, Marine Corps culture--and many of the 
members are familiar with that--is that a safety culture and a 
culture of mission accomplishment are not mutually exclusive. 
As a matter of fact, a safety culture is integral to mission 
success.
    And that is what leaders--that is what we are sharing with 
our leaders in leaders courses now, and that is what we have 
got to get all the way down to the deck-plate level.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, General.
    And, Vice Admiral, when I was I think a young PFC [private 
first class], I actually did a helo dump training, where they 
would put us in a helo and throw us underwater, you know, with 
gear, to train us to get out in case we ever, you know, had a 
helo operation that, you know, hit water.
    I couldn't find that in the report. Maybe I just missed it. 
Was there, you know, that type of training for these men on the 
AAV prior to actually even entering, you know, water that is 
moving around in not a very controlled environment, like a dump 
tank so they know how to get out, what to do, how not to panic, 
things of that nature?
    General Thomas. Congressman, if I may.
    Mr. Gallego. Yes.
    General Thomas. I will take that one if I can. That 
training does exist. That is part of the underwater egress 
training. However, the embark troops on this particular 
vehicle----
    Mr. Gallego. Did not do it.
    General Thomas [continuing]. Were only partially trained 
and did not do that. They should have done that, and they 
should have never participated in the exercise, having not 
completed that training.
    General Olson, would you add anything to that?
    General Olson. Sir, I would not. I would say that we can 
put 240 people through underwater egress training a week at 
Camp Pendleton, and that is almost 10,000 a year if we use the 
device to its full capabilities. The capability was there. 
These Marines were not trained in it.
    Mr. Gallego. Well, I think that, you know, for future, if 
we are going to keep the AAV platform, then we also need to 
invest in the training side of it and maybe add more dunk tanks 
in order for them to do this, or else we are going to have this 
situation. Because in there and, you know, trying to get out of 
the hatch in an emergent situation--and I have had to do that--
with all your gear on is a horrifying experience on men. And I 
can't imagine what happens when water is coming in. And God 
bless those men and their families.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back my time.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Gallego.
    I now turn to Mr. Levin.
    Mr. Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General Thomas, I have some questions similar to those 
explored earlier. Given the conclusions of the initial Marine 
Corps investigation and the decision last year to suspend all 
AAV waterborne operations, pending a review that included 
equipment, and the concerns with these vehicles being pretty 
obvious, are AAVs currently in use at this time to train or 
support the mission?
    And I ask because your written testimony describes AAV 
operations at Camp Pendleton last month, but it wasn't entirely 
clear to me in your earlier response.
    General Thomas. Congressman, the resumption of AAV 
waterborne operations had resumed, with strict limits. There 
are no ship-to-shore or shore-to-ship, and they are only AAV 
crews for proficiency training.
    I think General Olson can provide some additional detail.
    General Olson. The assistant commandant is correct. We have 
more gates to cross before we are prepared to return. As was 
noted previously, we need to make sure that our doctrine, 
techniques, and procedures are 100 percent aligned between the 
Navy and Marine Corps team before we can safely return to water 
operations.
    Right now, we are training crews to regain proficiency that 
they have lost over the last year, but they are not training 
with passengers in the back.
    Mr. Levin. Thank you. In your testimony, you write that 
additional inspections with new criteria for hull watertight 
integrity, bilge pump function, and emergency egress lighting 
systems have been ordered.
    Have the new inspection criteria had an impact on AAV use? 
For example, were the vehicles that Major General Olson 
described as no longer allowed in the water because they leak 
in use prior to the new inspections criteria?
    General Olson. ACMC [Assistant Commandant of the Marine 
Corps], I will take that.
    Sir, they were up until the 31st of July. Then none were 
being allowed in the water until such time as we understood 
what the overall material condition of the fleet was. What we 
found is that we had excessive leakage. We want to get that 
leakage down to about 18 gallons an hour, which is the standard 
that we believe is safe for operations.
    The pumps onboard the vehicles can expel 400 gallons an 
hour, so there is a great margin of safety that can be 
achieved. We know that the through-hull penetrations for the 
suspension and some other places in the AAV, some water is 
going to come in, but we expect it to be a minimal amount of 
water and that the pumps will able to expel it at a far greater 
rate than it could come in.
    Just on a note from a previous question, the amphibious 
combat vehicle is a different hull form and does not share many 
of the through-hull penetrations that the AAV itself does. It 
also has no plenums, which is the greatest source of our 
leakage.
    Mr. Levin. General Thomas, I understand the Marine Corps 
canceled the AAV survivability upgrade in 2018, instead opting 
to go all-in on replacing the AAV with the ACV. That program 
involved upgrading AAVs with a new engine and transmission.
    The investigation into this incident found transmissions 
failure impacted the bilge pumps. So how would you reconcile 
the July 2020 disaster with the decision to cancel the program 
to replace AAV transmissions; and were any steps taken to 
ensure the vehicles would remain safe, given the awareness that 
they were in need of upgrades?
    General Thomas. Congressman, the mechanism that was to keep 
the vehicles safe or up to speed was through depot repair, the 
so-called RCCA vehicles, returned to code condition alpha.
    Regarding the transmission, and I would defer to General 
Olson on this, but, you know, there have been no significant 
problems identified with the transmission. It is true that this 
particular vehicle had a loose, you know, drain line, which 
allowed the oil to leak out of the transmission and eventually 
cause the engine, you know, to--or the system to stop working. 
I do not believe that that is a systemic issue that has been 
identified.
    General Olson, can you clarify?
    General Olson. ACMC, I recommend we take the remainder of 
that for the record and have PM [Program Manager] AAV explain 
in detail.
    My understanding, it was the mechanical failure of this 
individual transmission due to the loose drain line that 
permitted the transmission oil to leak out, not the failure of 
the transmission itself but the fact that there was no oil in 
the transmission. But may we please take that for the record 
and come back with additional detail.
    [The information referred to was not available at the time 
of printing.]
    Mr. Levin. Sure. And I am running short of time and I have 
one final question. I understand the Marine Corps has 
contracted BAE Systems for production of the ACV and that 18 of 
those vehicles were delivered in November of 2020, with the 
intent of fully replacing the AAV by 2028.
    General Thomas, what training is currently happening across 
the fleet to allow Marines to familiarize themselves with this 
new equipment?
    General Thomas. Congressman, as you know, the ACV has been 
introduced there in Camp Pendleton, with an appropriate 
training program and certainly incorporating all the lessons 
learned from this tragedy.
    Mr. Levin. Thank you, General.
    I am out of time, so I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you very much, Mr. Levin.
    We now have a second round. We have very, very little time.
    On the gavel order, Garamendi, Lamborn, Golden, Johnson, in 
that order. I am going to just make a quick statement and then 
not ask a question.
    This goes to Vice Admiral Kitchener. The Navy's role in 
this is very significant and definitely led to the tragedy. You 
have a command investigation underway. When that is completed, 
I am certain you will pass it over to us. I would anticipate a 
followup hearing on all of this sometime this year, probably in 
the late summer or into the fall. That will depend upon two 
investigations that are now in process, a command investigation 
in the Marine Corps and similarly in the Navy.
    So, with that, I simply note the Navy's dereliction in this 
process. My words. We will see what the investigation comes 
forward.
    Mr. Lamborn.
    Mr. Lamborn. Mr. Chairman, I am going to follow your 
example. I don't have any more questions. The committee has 
done an excellent job of probing into all the details. I think 
our work is cut out for us to monitor how this goes forward.
    The equipment and the training failures that we saw, that 
those have to all be rectified. And we are going to be dogging 
this very closely.
    I also want to say, the Marines on our subcommittee and 
full committee are amazing contributors to this overall 
understanding and getting to the bottom of this. Jack Bergman, 
Ruben Gallego, Jared Golden, and Seth Moulton, I think are all 
wonderful additions who help us get to the bottom of this.
    So I just want to note that for the record. And I yield 
back to you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Garamendi. Point very, very well made. We are 
definitely enhanced by the experience of our members.
    Mr. Golden, speaking of experience, have at it.
    Mr. Golden. Thank you. I just had a point I wanted to make, 
and I guess also it would be a question as well for General 
Thomas and Major General Olson.
    When I was serving, I was in the 3rd Battalion 6th Marines 
and in the infantry unit, and there were times when we made 
decisions as a team, as a unit, to forgo certain equipment 
requirements.
    You know, I guess I would describe in Afghanistan, being a 
small unit operating remotely in the mountains, we often made a 
decision to run patrol slick without our SAPI [Small Arms 
Protective Insert] plates, confident that speed was a safety 
measure in and of itself. Some Marines perhaps lost their lives 
as a result of a lack of SAPI plates, but I think we also felt 
quite confident as a unit that we were making the right 
decision.
    There have been other experiences in training where I saw 
at the unit level, the squad level, or the platoon level, 
decisions made about what type of equipment to go with or not 
go with, which may have been contrary to what the book may have 
said.
    One thing that I noted in this investigation was discussion 
about Marines being found having gotten out of the AAV 
successfully, still sadly losing their lives, being found in 
their battle gear, which prevented the flotation devices from 
being able to rescue them. Some discussion that had they been 
deployed at the surface it might have worked, but they were not 
in that situation.
    I am just curious. Has there been any discussion in the 
investigation about what type of changes might need to be made 
in the culture to ensure that decisions could be made about 
what type of gear to deploy in? I know I personally would not 
have been confident in an AAV taking on water to leave my SAPI 
plate and gear on and, you know, would have been looking for 
the flexibility to remove that.
    So what lessons has the Marine Corps learned? Certainly, 
the idea is that if you are going to be doing an amphibious 
assault, you want the very best gear, but sometimes there are, 
you know, tradeoffs that need to be made.
    So what can you tell me about what the Marine Corps is 
learning as a result of the information you have gathered from 
the investigation?
    General Thomas. Congressman, we continue to review what 
specific gear would be the most efficient to aid in the, you 
know, safe egress of troops leaving an AAV. And I will let 
General Olson, you know, go into more detail.
    What I would also say is that, as has already been 
discussed, this vehicle slowly took on water for 45 minutes. If 
the crew had only had the embarked troops egress in a more 
timely fashion, whether they had everything on, their flotation 
device was more than sufficient to keep them afloat. That 
doesn't address your question, which is a good one, is that 
sometimes less is more, and we are taking a hard look at that.
    General Olson.
    General Olson. Sir, I have got very little to add to that. 
The body armor is provided with a quick release. One of the 
things that we will examine is the interaction between the body 
armor and the life preserver unit, just to make sure that 
nothing is impeded. But we are going forward in a deliberate 
egress working group regarding how we get out of our armored 
vehicles, depending on what kit we are wearing.
    What I would note is that over the years we have gone to a 
standard of you wear your protective gear inside vehicles 
because of things like rollovers, where that body armor 
actually shields you and prevents torso injuries, much as your 
helmet does. So everything is a compromise. But water and flak 
jackets may not be a good mix, and we need to take a very close 
look at that.
    Mr. Golden. Thank you.
    Gentlemen, I appreciate your time today and the 
thoroughness of the investigation.
    And I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for the hearing.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Golden.
    I will note that because two of the AAVs, maybe three, were 
found to be inoperable, they were left on the beach and the 
personnel that was in those were added to the other AAVs. Some 
of those personnel did not have life jackets as they returned 
to the ship. So once again, fundamental safety was ignored.
    I am going to now turn to Mr. Johnson.
    Mr. Johnson, are you still with us?
    Mr. Moulton for a quick third round.
    Mr. Moulton. Just a second round for me, Mr. Chairman, but 
thank you very much.
    Just a few quick points. First of all, gentlemen, I 
obviously have some serious concerns here about how this all 
happened. I also understand the importance of hard training.
    And a story that this brings to mind is my own experience 
of training in Kuwait in anticipation of our second deployment 
to Iraq, when we were brought to a shoot house and I was the 
only platoon commander who brought his Marines through that 
shoot house completely on NVGs [night vision goggles]. It was 
considered a very risky thing to do. I felt we were prepared 
for it. But I have no doubt that there would be a hearing like 
this or at least a significant investigation if one of my 
Marines had been killed in that training. Many people would be 
inclined to say Lieutenant Moulton was taking risks with 
training that were not necessary because this wasn't Iraq, it 
was Kuwait.
    But just a few weeks later, we found ourselves in the 
situation where enemy RPG [rocket-propelled grenade] gunners 
were shooting at Marines inside of a building because they had 
white-light flashlights on. And I was very proud that my 
platoon, at least, was safe from that threat, because we were 
confident using our NVGs in an actual combat environment.
    So it is critical to me that we get to the bottom of this 
investigation to understand what happened here. It is also 
critical that we don't become a Marine Corps that is afraid of 
hard training, that is afraid of taking risks in training. It 
is a constant balancing act.
    We have to ask questions like is this operation even 
realistic to justify the risk that we are going to take? And 
that is the leading question I had, the leadoff question I had 
for all of you. I am not sure in this case, a waterborne 
mechanized raid, that it is. But we do need to do hard training 
and it will entail risk.
    The second thing I want to say is that we need to improve 
the culture of being able to question authority. And this is 
something that my colleague Mr. Gallego focused on. I am not 
sure that that culture exists in the Marine Corps today. And a 
recent trip that I made to IOC [Infantry Officer Course]--which 
might appropriately be renamed OCS [Officer Candidate School] 
part two, based on what I saw--confirmed to me that this is not 
the style of leadership that is being inculcated in our junior 
infantry officers. I think that is something that we need to 
look at very carefully.
    The commandant himself is questioning assumptions, and I 
have praised him publicly all the time for doing that. We need 
to ensure that that same culture is encouraged among our junior 
leaders. That when we do that and when we talk about how to 
have accountability at the end of the day, we also have to be 
wary of having a zero defect mentality.
    This is another thing I have seen in the Marine Corps, 
where whatever happens, a ton of people get relieved. We don't 
actually get to the bottom of what really happened and we are 
not thoughtful about where that accountability lies. If you 
take that approach, then you are not going to have thoughtful 
leaders, thoughtful leaders who know how to take risks in 
training that are appropriate, who know how to balance risks 
with the realism of the operation that they are training for, 
and ultimately who are going to be willing to question 
authority themselves.
    So this is tough. This is hard. And I recognize that you 
are the ones in the fight. You are the ones who have to do this 
hard work going forward. It is going to be our job to ensure 
accountability, not just for these families, although I cannot 
imagine their loss, but also for every Marine who will come 
after them.
    The Marine Corps must be the Nation's premier fighting 
force. We can't become a Marine Corps that only cares about 
safety. But we also have to be smart about how we get there.
    So, gentlemen, thank you very much for all your work. And, 
Mr. Chairman, thank you for your indulgence of my questions 
today.
    Mr. Garamendi. Mr. Moulton, you could not have said it 
better. And I will not repeat it, but I will certainly take 
your testimony. We will write it up and we will put it on a 
placard for all to see.
    Mr. Levin, your final.
    Mr. Levin. No further questions at this time, Mr. Chairman. 
I appreciate our witnesses being here with us today.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you very much. Mr. Lamborn, if you 
would like to make some closing remarks, I will make mine 
following yours and we will adjourn.
    Mr. Lamborn. I will just briefly say, Mr. Chairman, I am 
glad we had this hearing. There have been some really 
penetrating questions asked by each of the members of the 
subcommittee and others who joined us.
    And I think that we are on a good path to at least get to 
the bottom of what happened with the training failures and the 
equipment failures and, even broader, the accountability issues 
that are raised in an incident like this.
    So we have our work cut out for us to track this in the 
next months ahead, and we are going to do that, because we owe 
it to our men and women in uniform and those who were lost in 
this horrific accident 9 months ago that they have the best 
training and equipment possible. And I will work with you, Mr. 
Chairman, and other members of the committee to make sure we 
get that done.
    And with those who are serving us in the Marines and Navy, 
I thank you for your service, but we are going to have to work 
hard to overcome this.
    Thank you so much. I yield back.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Lamborn.
    I am going to close with where we started, and that is the 
tragedy itself, the loss of life, the effect on the families, 
their losses, and the sadness that exists. And it is obvious 
that is not just with the families, it is with the Marines 
themselves and the units who lost their partners in this 
accident.
    Unfortunately, we do far too many hearings on accidents and 
tragedies. Mr. Courtney spoke to those. We have also done our 
own hearings with regard to land-based accidents. And I suspect 
that we will do this again. But I would hope that when we have 
an accident in the future that we will not find the kind of 
derelictions and problems that occurred in this tragedy.
    So, with that, General Thomas and General Olson, I will 
circle back on this in several months and review the work that 
has been done, not only with this accident but with the issues 
of maintenance, with the issues of accountability, and with the 
very difficult balance that Mr. Moulton has brought to our 
attention in his closing comments: Safety and the necessity to 
have realistic exercises. So we will go back through all that 
again.
    Admiral Kitchener, you have been mostly on the side here. 
We will review your report when it is available. And I suspect 
that we will find that there are also very serious derelictions 
in the U.S. Navy part of this participation in this accident 
and the accountability going forward.
    We will continue to review these. I want to assure the 
military, in this case the Navy and the Marine Corps, that this 
subcommittee is profoundly concerned about the readiness, the 
maintenance of equipment, whether that is a ship at sea or it 
is an AAV or any other piece of equipment.
    We do understand the need to bring on new equipment, but it 
is the responsibility of this committee that the existing 
equipment of all types be properly maintained and be available 
when needed and be in full working order, along with the 
training that goes with that particular piece of equipment.
    And so, with that, this hearing is adjourned. I thank you 
all for your participation. We are adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 1:34 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]



      
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