[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
REAUTHORIZATION

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(117-46)

REMOTE HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

__________

APRIL 6, 2022

__________

Printed for the use of the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Available online at: https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-
transportation?path=/browsecommittee/chamber/house/committee/
transportation

__________

U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
48-378 PDF WASHINGTON : 2022

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COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon, Chair
SAM GRAVES, Missouri ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON,
ERIC A. ``RICK'' CRAWFORD, Arkansas District of Columbia
BOB GIBBS, Ohio EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida RICK LARSEN, Washington
THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
RODNEY DAVIS, Illinois ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JOHN KATKO, New York JOHN GARAMENDI, California
BRIAN BABIN, Texas HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
GARRET GRAVES, Louisiana Georgia
DAVID ROUZER, North Carolina ANDRE CARSON, Indiana
MIKE BOST, Illinois DINA TITUS, Nevada
RANDY K. WEBER, Sr., Texas SEAN PATRICK MALONEY, New York
DOUG LaMALFA, California JARED HUFFMAN, California
BRUCE WESTERMAN, Arkansas JULIA BROWNLEY, California
BRIAN J. MAST, Florida FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida
MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin DONALD M. PAYNE, Jr., New Jersey
BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
JENNIFFER GONZALEZ-COLON, MARK DeSAULNIER, California
Puerto Rico STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
TROY BALDERSON, Ohio SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California
PETE STAUBER, Minnesota ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland
TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey
DUSTY JOHNSON, South Dakota GREG STANTON, Arizona
JEFFERSON VAN DREW, New Jersey COLIN Z. ALLRED, Texas
MICHAEL GUEST, Mississippi SHARICE DAVIDS, Kansas, Vice Chair
TROY E. NEHLS, Texas JESUS G. ``CHUY'' GARCIA, Illinois
NANCY MACE, South Carolina ANTONIO DELGADO, New York
NICOLE MALLIOTAKIS, New York CHRIS PAPPAS, New Hampshire
BETH VAN DUYNE, Texas CONOR LAMB, Pennsylvania
CARLOS A. GIMENEZ, Florida SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
MICHELLE STEEL, California JAKE AUCHINCLOSS, Massachusetts
Vacancy CAROLYN BOURDEAUX, Georgia
KAIALI`I KAHELE, Hawaii
MARILYN STRICKLAND, Washington
NIKEMA WILLIAMS, Georgia
MARIE NEWMAN, Illinois
TROY A. CARTER, Louisiana

CONTENTS

Page

Summary of Subject Matter........................................ v

STATEMENTS OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE

Hon. Peter A. DeFazio, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Oregon, and Chair, Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure:
Remarks in memory of Representative Don Young................ 1
Opening statement............................................ 2
Prepared statement........................................... 4
Hon. Sam Graves, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Missouri, and Ranking Member, Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure:
Remarks in memory of Representative Don Young................ 2
Opening statement............................................ 5
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Hon. Eddie Bernice Johnson, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Texas, prepared statement............................. 47

WITNESS

Hon. Jennifer Homendy, Chair, National Transportation Safety
Board, oral statement.......................................... 6
Prepared statement........................................... 7

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD

APPENDIX

Questions to Hon. Jennifer Homendy, Chair, National
Transportation Safety Board, from:
Hon. Eddie Bernice Johnson................................... 53
Hon. Henry C. ``Hank'' Johnson, Jr........................... 58
Hon. Dina Titus.............................................. 61
Hon. Mark DeSaulnier......................................... 62
Hon. Jesus G. ``Chuy'' Garcia................................ 63

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

April 1, 2022

SUMMARY OF SUBJECT MATTER

TO: LMembers of Congress, Committee on Transportation
and Infrastructure
FROM: LStaff, Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure
RE: LHearing on ``National Transportation Safety Board
Reauthorization.''
_______________________________________________________________________

PURPOSE

The Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure will
hold a hearing on Wednesday, April 6, 2022, at 10:00 a.m. ET to
discuss National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB or Board)
reauthorization. The hearing will take place in 2167 Rayburn
House Office Building and via Zoom. The Subcommittee on Coast
Guard and Maritime Transportation recently held a hearing
addressing small vessel safety.\1\ Thus, this hearing will
focus on NTSB's reauthorization proposal and related
transportation safety issues. The Committee will hear testimony
from the Chair of the NTSB, the Honorable Jennifer Homendy.
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\1\ Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation
Hearing, March 21, 2022, ``A Review of Coast Guard Efforts to Improve
Small Passenger Vessel Safety,'' information and videorecording
available at: https://transportation.house.gov/committee-activity/
hearings/a-review-of-coast-guard-efforts-to-improve-small-passenger-
vessel-safety.
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BACKGROUND

INTRODUCTION

The NTSB is an independent federal agency charged by
Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in
the United States and significant accidents in other modes of
transportation--railroad, highway, marine, pipeline, and
commercial space.\2\ The agency establishes the facts and
circumstances and determines the probable cause of the
accidents it investigates, and issues safety recommendations
aimed at preventing future accidents from occurring.\3\ In
addition, it carries out special studies concerning
transportation safety and coordinates the resources of the
federal government and other organizations to assist victims
and their family members impacted by transportation disasters.
It also conducts safety research focused on broader safety
questions and topic areas.\4\
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\2\ NTSB, Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Request, March 28, 2022, at 4,
Available at: https://www.ntsb.gov/about/reports/Documents/
Fiscal%20Year%202023%20Budget%20Request.pdf.
\3\ Id.
\4\ Id.
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The NTSB also serves as the appellate authority for
enforcement actions involving aviation and mariner certificates
issued by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and United
States Coast Guard (Coast Guard), and it also adjudicates
appeals of civil penalty actions taken by the FAA.\5\ The NTSB
was last reauthorized in the FAA Authorization Act of 2018, and
its current authorization expires at the end of this fiscal
year 2022.\6\
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\5\ Id.
\6\ Pub. L. No. 115-254, Division C (2018), Available at: https://
uscode.house.gov/statutes/pl/115/254.pdf.
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HISTORY OF THE NTSB

In 1967, Congress consolidated all transportation agencies
into a new U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) and
established the NTSB as an independent agency placed within the
DOT for administrative purposes.\7\ In creating the NTSB,
Congress envisioned that a single organization with a clearly
defined mission could more effectively promote a higher level
of safety in the transportation system than the individual
modal agencies working separately.\8\ Since 1967, the NTSB has
investigated accidents in the aviation, highway, marine,
pipeline, and railroad modes, as well as accidents related to
the transportation of hazardous materials.
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\7\ The aviation investigation function of the NTSB originated in
the Air Commerce Act of 1926, in which the U.S. Congress charged the
U.S. Department of Commerce with investigating the causes of aircraft
accidents. The aircraft accident responsibility was later given to the
Civil Aeronautics Board's Bureau of Aviation Safety, when it was
created in 1940.
\8\ Senate Report No. 93-1192 (1974), Transportation Safety Act of
1974, at p. 14, Available at https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/
document/0055/12006477.pdf.
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In 1974, Congress reestablished the NTSB as a separate
entity from the DOT.\9\ Because the DOT has broad operational
and regulatory responsibilities that affect the safety,
adequacy, and efficiency of the transportation system, and
transportation accidents may suggest deficiencies in that
system, the NTSB's independence was deemed necessary for proper
oversight.\10\ This allows the NTSB to conduct investigations
and make recommendations from a completely objective and
independent viewpoint.\11\
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\9\ Independent Safety Board Act of 1974, Pub. Law 93-633 (1974).
\10\ Senate Report No. 93-1192 (1974), Transportation Safety Act of
1974, at p. 14-17, Available at https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/
library/document/0055/12006477.pdf.
\11\ CRS, The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB):
Background and Possible Issues for Reauthorization and Oversight,
R44587, Aug. 10, 2016, at 1, Available at https://www.crs.gov/reports/
pdf/R44587.
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In 1996, Congress assigned the NTSB the additional
responsibility of coordinating federal assistance to families
of aviation accident victims. While originally established to
provide assistance following major aviation accidents, the
program has been expanded by Congress to provide assistance in
all modes of transportation on a case-by-case basis. In 2008,
Congress directed NTSB to provide assistance to families of
passengers in fatal rail passenger accidents.\12\
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\12\ Pub. L. No. 110-432, Division A, Title V, Section 501.
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Since its inception, the NTSB has investigated more than
152,000 aviation accidents and thousands of surface
transportation accidents.\13\ NTSB investigators travel
throughout the country and internationally to investigate
significant accidents and develop factual records and safety
recommendations. To date, the NTSB has issued over 15,000
safety recommendations to more than 2,400 recipients.\14\
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\13\ NTSB, Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Request, March 28, 2022, at 7,
Available at: https://www.ntsb.gov/about/reports/Documents/
Fiscal%20Year%202023%20Budget%20Request.pdf.
\14\ Id.
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MOST WANTED LIST

The NTSB's Most Wanted List of Transportation Safety
Improvements highlights safety-critical actions that DOT modal
administrations, the Coast Guard, and others need to take to
help prevent accidents and save lives.\15\
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\15\ NTSB's 2021-2022 Most Wanted List is available at: https://
www.ntsb.gov/Advocacy/mwl/Pages/default.aspx.
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NTSB's Most Wanted List for 2021-2022 includes the
following recommendations, organized by NTSB modal office:
I. LAviation:
LRequire and Verify the Effectiveness of Safety
Management Systems in all Revenue Passenger-Carrying Aviation
Operations
LInstall Crash-Resistant Recorders and Establish
Flight Data Monitoring Programs
II. LHighway:
LImplement a Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate
Speeding-Related Crashes
LProtect Vulnerable Road Users through a Safe
System Approach
LPrevent Alcohol- and Other Drug-Impaired
Driving
LRequire Collision-Avoidance and Connected-
Vehicle Technologies on all Vehicles
LEliminate Distracted Driving
III. LMarine:
LImprove Passenger and Fishing Vessel Safety
IV. LRail, Pipeline, and Hazardous Materials:
LImprove Pipeline Leak Detection and Mitigation
LImprove Rail Worker Safety

More detail on each of these items, including accidents
that illustrate why each change is needed and information about
how long the NTSB has sought the change, can be found on NTSB's
website.\16\
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\16\ Id.
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The National Transportation Safety Board Reauthorization
Act of 2018 included a provision for the U.S. Government
Accountability Office (GAO) to examine NTSB's methodology for
evaluating and selecting recommendations for inclusion in the
Most Wanted List. GAO issued its revised report on March 19,
2020.\17\ The report discusses: (1) NTSB's methodology for
developing its Most Wanted List and (2) how NTSB addressed
statutory requirements and how its methodology aligned with
components for systematic decision-making, among other
objectives. GAO reviewed NTSB documentation for its process of
selecting issues for the Most Wanted List.\18\ GAO also
interviewed NTSB officials to understand the rationale behind
the selection methodology and how the process was applied.\19\
GAO compared the methodology to essential components for
systematic decision-making and the statutory requirement that
NTSB publish a publicly available methodology report that
describes NTSB's consideration of key elements.\20\
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\17\ GAO Report GAO-20-395, ``National Transportation Safety Board:
More Detail Could Increase the Understanding of Selections for the Most
Wanted List of Transportation Safety Improvements'' March 2020,
Available at: https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-20-395.pdf.
\18\ Id.
\19\ Id.
\20\ Id.
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GAO provided two recommendations based on this examination:
1. LThe Chairman of the Board should require the Safety
Recommendation and Communication team to fully document its
evaluations when assessing items to propose for Most Wanted
List consideration; and
2. LThe Chairman of the Board should take steps to publicly
and fully communicate the selection rationale, such as
including why NTSB believes an issue is ``ripe for action'' to
its documentation on its website.\21\
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\21\ Id.

NTSB agreed with both recommendations, and GAO has since
determined that the Board has completed recommendation number
two.\22\ However, the first recommendation is still open, and
GAO reports that as of February 2022, the Board is still in the
process of formally establishing the criteria it uses to
establish the most wanted list.\23\
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\22\ GAO, National Transportation Safety Board: More Detail Could
Increase the Understanding of Selections for the Most Wanted List of
Transportation Safety Improvements [Reissued with revisions on Mar. 19,
2020.], https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-20-395.
\23\ Id.
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COMPLETING INVESTIGATIONS AND REPORTS

Following its investigations, the NTSB issues reports that
detail the accident investigated, identify cause or probable
cause, and often include recommendations. The prompt completion
of these reports informs the public, Congress, regulators, and
the regulated community about transportation safety issues with
an intended goal of preventing reoccurrence. The average length
of time to conclude these investigation reports vary across the
NTSB's offices that investigate accidents in the different
modes. The tables below show the number of reports approved by
the NTSB and the average time it takes to complete these
reports.

Number of Board Approved Accident and Incident Investigation Reports
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RPH
---------------------------------------- All
Report Year Aviation Highway Marine RPH Offices
Hazmat Pipeline Railroad Total Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2016............................ 2 6 2 ........ ........ 3 3 13
2017............................ 4 6 4 ........ 1 8 9 23
2018............................ 3 6 5 ........ ........ 7 7 21
2019............................ 2 6 3 1 2 5 8 19
2020............................ 5 7 6 ........ ........ 5 5 23
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5-year Total.................. 16 31 20 1 3 28 32 99
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Average Time From Event to Release of Board Approved Accident and Incident Investigation Reports
[Months]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RPH
---------------------------------------- All
Report Year Aviation Highway Marine RPH Offices
Hazmat Pipeline Railroad Total Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2016............................ 15.0 20.1 18.5 ........ ........ 18.7 18.7 18.7
2017............................ 21.2 14.1 15.8 ........ 20.5 26.1 25.5 20.1
2018............................ 16.6 20.8 17.9 ........ ........ 22.6 22.6 20.1
2019............................ 24.1 16.0 18.6 19.9 22.5 23.6 22.9 20.2
2020............................ 18.4 19.5 21.0 ........ ........ 28.6 28.6 21.6
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5-year Average (Months)....... 19.1 18.1 18.6 19.9 21.8 24.4 24.1 20.3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Letter from Former NTSB Chair Sumwalt dated April 30, 2021.

NTSB REAUTHORIZATION PROPOSAL

On March 1, 2022, NTSB formally transmitted a
reauthorization proposal to Congress.\24\ The proposal includes
three titles: I. Ensuring Readiness for Our Mission, II.
Enhancing Accountability and Improving Processes and Products,
and III. Strengthening Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and
Accessibility. The five-year bill requests authorization of
appropriations for fiscal years (FY) 2023 through 2027. This
bill would authorize $129.3 million in FY 2023, $145 million
for FY 2024, $155 million for FY 2025, $165 million for FY
2026, and $175 million for FY 2027. The legislative proposal
includes several workforce development initiatives, changes and
clarifications to investigative authorities for railroad and
highway accidents, and changes to recommendation response
requirements for the U.S. Coast Guard, among other items. The
NTSB's full reauthorization proposal and section-by-section
summary are included as appendices to this document.
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\24\ Letter from NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy to Speaker of the
House Nancy Pelosi (Mar. 1, 2022) (on file with Committee).
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COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION

A. HISTORY OF NTSB INVOLVEMENT IN COMMERCIAL SPACE ACCIDENT
INVESTIGATIONS

The NTSB has led or supported commercial space accident
investigations for nearly 30 years and acted as the lead agency
in conducting two major space vehicle investigations. In 1993,
the NTSB investigated the procedural anomaly that occurred
during the launch of an Orbital Sciences Corporation Pegasus
expendable launch vehicle--the launch was canceled by the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) range
safety officer, only to then be reactivated independently by
the Orbital Sciences Corporation (Orbital Sciences) test
coordinator.\25\ In its final report, the NTSB issued 17 safety
recommendations to the Department of Transportation (DOT),
NASA, and Orbital Sciences.\26\ In 2014, the NTSB investigated
the accident of the SpaceShipTwo reusable suborbital spaceplane
that broke up during a rocket-powered test flight, killing the
co-pilot.\27\ The NTSB issued a total of ten recommendations to
the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) Office of
Commercial Space Transportation (AST) and the Commercial
Spaceflight Federation (CSF).\28\
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\25\ NTSB, Commercial Space Launch Incident, Launch Procedure
Anomaly, Orbital Sciences Corporation, Pegasus/SCD-1, Rpt. No. SIR 93/
02 (Washington, DC: NTSB 1993).
\26\ Id.
\27\ NTSB, In-Flight Breakup During Test Flight, Scaled Composites
SpaceShipTwo, N339SS, Near Koehn Dry Lake, CA, Oct. 31, 2014, Rpt. No.
AAR 15/02 (Washington, DC: NTSB 2015).
\28\ Id.
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In addition, the NTSB's Office of Aviation Safety (OAS)
investigators have assisted NASA and Congressional
investigative boards with the investigations of two space
shuttle accident mishaps (1986; 2003) and assisted NASA with
the investigation of the 2004 Genesis Spacecraft reentry
accident.\29\ More recently, NTSB investigators have observed
or taken part in several operator-led mishap investigations,
including the October 2014 Orbital Science ATK Antares engine
failure shortly after liftoff; the June 2015 launch failure of
the Space X CRS-7 mission; the September 2016 pad explosion of
the SpaceX Falcon 9 with the Amos-6 communications satellite;
and the April 2019 SpaceX Dragon explosion that occurred during
a ground test.\30\
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\29\ Joseph M. Sedor, Do We Need An Annex 13 for Commercial Space
Accidents, ISASI Forum 4-7, (Jan.-Mar. 2021).
\30\ Id.; see also Jason Rhian, SpaceX Reveals Cause of Crew Dragon
Explosion, Spaceflight Insider (Jul 15, 2019).
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B. CURRENT STATUTORY AUTHORITY

The NTSB is authorized to investigate any launch or reentry
accidents and other certain incidents through its general
authority under section 1131 of title 49 of the United States
Code, which states that the NTSB shall investigate ``any other
accident related to the transportation of individuals or
property when the Board decides the accident is catastrophic.''
\31\ The phrase ``when the Board decides'' gives the agency
broad discretion to determine which accidents the agency
investigates.\32\ In addition to NTSB's authority to
investigate catastrophic transportation accidents, the statute
also provides the agency with the authority to investigate (1)
accidents involving problems of a recurring character and (2)
accidents where the investigation would carry out specific
authorities explicitly granted to the NTSB.\33\ The NTSB has
also conducted an analysis on Congressional intent, which
supported the forgoing assumption of authority.\34\
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\31\ 49 USC 1131(a)(1)(F).
\32\ Id.
\33\ Id.
\34\ ``The plain meaning of the phrase `related to transportation,'
requires that accidents covered by section F have a rational
relationship to transportation. Congress explicitly has addressed
whether commercial space activity should be considered transportation
when it determined that `space transportation . . . is an important
element of the transportation system of the United States. . . .' 51
U.S.C. Sec. 5090l(a)(8) (emphasis added). The NTSB also notes that the
FAA's [AST], established by 51 U.S.C. Sec. 50921, has promulgated
regulations governing commercial space launches. These regulations set
forth definitions of accidents, incidents, and mishaps, with regard to
launch and reentry vehicles, as well as a set of definitions
specifically governing the regulation of such vehicles. 14 C.F.R. Sec.
401.5. The involvement of the FAA in commercial space launch activities
signifies that vehicles used in commercial space launches fall within
the purview of the FAA's authority during specified periods of time,
either because those activities are `transportation' or because they
are so closely related to transportation that FAA oversight is
necessary. In this regard, the involvement of the FAA's AST is both
logical and reasonable: vehicles involved in commercial space launches
must travel through the national airspace, wherein launches would need
to be coordinated with air transportation systems to avoid interference
with air traffic control as well as other aircraft.'' (See Appendix A
in NTSB, In-Flight Breakup During Test Flight, Scaled Composites
SpaceShipTwo, N339SS, Near Koehn Dry Lake, CA, Oct. 31, 2014, Rpt. No.
AAR 15/02 (Washington, DC: NTSB 2015)).
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C. MEMORANDA OF AGREEMENT AND UNDERSTANDING

In addition to NTSB's statutory authority, there was the
1985 addition of Appendix H (revised: 1999) to the 1975
Reimbursable Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the NTSB and
DOT.\35\ Appendix H established the relationships, notification
procedures, coordination requirements, and reporting
responsibilities of the NTSB and AST in connection with
accident investigations for commercial space launch activities.
Moreover, the MOA delineated that the NTSB would investigate
commercial space launch accidents resulting in: (1) a mishap
when any portion of a commercial space vehicle or payload
impacts outside the expected launch failure crash zone; or (2)
a fatality or serious injury to a person not associated with
the launch activities; or (3) damage greater than $25,000 to
property not associated with the launch activities.\36\ The MOA
also stated that nothing in the agreement should be read to
impair the NTSB's authority to investigate any other commercial
space launch accident which, in the judgement of the Board, is
subject to section 1131(a)(1)(F) of title 49, United States
Code.
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\35\ Reimbursable Mem. of Agreement between the NTSB & DOT,
Appendix H (revised: 1999), available at: https://www.faa.gov/space/
legislation_regulation_guidance/media/mou_space_launch_accidents.pdf.
\36\ Id.
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Finally, in addition to adhering to the terms of the MOAs,
the NTSB's 2004 memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the FAA
and the U.S. Air Force established the relationships among
agencies during space launch accidents and provided a guide to
the exchange of information and participation in accident
investigations.\37\
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\37\ Mem. of Understanding between NTSB, Dept. of AF, & FAA re:
Space Launch Accidents (2004), available at: https://www.faa.gov/space/
legislation_regulation_guidance/media/mou_space_launch_accidents.pdf.
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D. COMMERCIAL SPACE ACCIDENT RULEMAKING

On November 16, 2021, the NTSB issued a notice of proposed
rulemaking (NPRM) regarding commercial space accident
investigations to update and ensure the transparency of the
agency's commercial space safety investigative authority.\38\
In issuing the NPRM, the NTSB noted that----
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\38\ NPRM Codifying NTSB's Commercial Space Safety Investigative
Authority by Creating Subpart F, 86 Fed. Reg. 63324 (proposed Nov. 16,
2021) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. 831) available at: https://
www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/11/16/2021-24766/commercial-
space-investigations.
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(1) Lcommercial space launch is a unique mode of
transportation; and
(2) Lthe unique investigatory procedures needed for
commercial space accidents and incidents are distinct enough
from other modes of transportation to warrant codifying the
differences.\39\
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\39\ Id.

Thus, the NPRM creates a separate Subpart F for Commercial
Space Investigations and addresses notification requirements
following an accident or incident, preservation of wreckage and
records, relationships with other federal agencies, and the
treatment of investigative information, among other things.\40\
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\40\ Id.
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The NTSB maintains that by transitioning and updating the
information from the MOA and MOU to Subpart F, the commercial
space industry will have more clarity on how and when the NTSB
would initiate an investigation of a commercial space mishap.
The NTSB also maintains that while there is very little change
to the procedures themselves, the NPRM finally allows the
commercial space industry the opportunity to provide feedback
on the NTSB investigative process via the rulemaking
process.\41\
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\41\ Letter from Jennifer Homendy, Chair, NTSB, to Rep. Lucas, R.M.
of House Comm. on SST (Dec. 3, 2021) (on file with Cmte Staff).
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E. COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION SAFETY ACT

In the 116th Congress, Aviation Subcommittee Ranking Member
Garret Graves--along with Chair DeFazio, Ranking Member S.
Graves, Chair Larsen, and Representative Davids as original
cosponsors--introduced H.R. 1562, the Commercial Space
Transportation Safety Act of 2019. The bill would have codified
the NTSB's authority to investigate commercial space accidents
into Title 49. Specifically, it amended 49 USC 1131(a)(1) to
clarify the NTSB's ability to investigate commercial space
launch accidents, when accidents involve----
LImpacts outside the hazard-zone;
LFatalities on board the launch vehicle or
otherwise; or
LSubstantial damage not affiliated with the launch
site and away from the launch site.

NTSB AVIATION ACCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS

The NTSB estimates there are approximately 1,750 domestic
aviation accidents and incidents annually it is responsible for
investigating.\42\ As of May 2020, NTSB had investigated over
152,000 aviation accidents and incidents in its history.\43\
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\42\ NTSB, Office of Aviation Safety, available at https://
www.ntsb.gov/about/organization/AS/Pages/office_as.aspx.
\43\ NTSB, Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Request, March 28, 2022, at 7,
Available at: https://www.ntsb.gov/about/reports/Documents/
Fiscal%20Year%202023%20Budget%20Request.pdf.
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On domestic U.S. part 121 airline flights, there has only
been one commercial airline passenger fatality in more than 90
million flights in over a decade.\44\ Prior to that single
passenger fatality in April 2018, the last fatal domestic
commercial airline accident occurred in February 2009, when
Colgan Air Flight 3407 crashed near Buffalo, New York, killing
all 49 onboard and one person on the ground.\45\
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\44\ On April 17, 2018, Southwest Airlines Flight 1380 experienced
an engine failure, resulting in loss of an engine inlet and cowling.
Fragments struck the airplane's fuselage and damaged a cabin window,
killing one passenger onboard. NTSB, Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Request,
May 27, 2021, at 35-36, Available at: https://www.ntsb.gov/about/
reports/Documents/NTSB-fy22-budget-request.pdf.
\45\ Id.
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The NTSB's participation in any foreign accident
investigation is conducted in accordance with the Chicago
Convention of the International Civil Aviation Organization's
(ICAO) Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPS), provided in
Annex 13, which entitles the State of Design and Manufacture of
the aircraft involved in the accident to appoint an accredited
representative to participate in the investigation.\46\ The
NTSB participates in aviation accidents involving any aircraft
operated by or designed, manufactured, or registered to a U.S.
company.\47\ In these cases, ``upon receiving ICAO notification
of the accident or serious incident, the NTSB designates a US-
accredited representative and appoints technical advisors to
carry out the obligations, receive the entitlements, provide
consultation, and receive safety recommendations from the state
of occurrence.'' \48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\46\ NTSB, 2020 Annual Report to Congress, 2021, at 21, Available
at: https://www.ntsb.gov/about/reports/Documents/NTSB-2020-ARC.pdf.
\47\ CRS, The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB):
Background and Possible Issues for Reauthorization and Oversight,
R44587, Aug. 10, 2016, at 3-4, Available at https://www.crs.gov/
reports/pdf/R44587.
\48\ NTSB, 2020 Annual Report to Congress, 2021, at 21, Available
at: https://www.ntsb.gov/about/reports/Documents/NTSB-2020-ARC.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

A. NTSB AVIATION ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION PROCESS

The NTSB's OAS reports to NTSB's Office of the Managing
Director.\49\ The OAS is responsible for:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\49\ NTSB, NTSB Organization, https://www.ntsb.gov/about/
organization/Pages/default.aspx.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. LInvestigating all civil domestic air carrier, commuter,
and air taxi accidents; in-flight collisions; fatal and
nonfatal general aviation accidents; and certain public-use
aircraft accidents,
2. LParticipating in the investigation of major airline
crashes in foreign countries that involve U.S. carriers or
U.S.-manufactured or -designed equipment to fulfill U.S.
obligations under International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) agreements, and
3. LConducting investigations of safety issues that extend
beyond a single accident to examine specific aviation safety
problems from a broader perspective.\50\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\50\ NTSB, Office of Aviation Safety, https://www.ntsb.gov/about/
organization/AS/Pages/office_as.aspx.

The OAS proposes probable causes for domestic aviation
accidents and incidents to the NTSB Board for approval and
works with other NTSB offices to formulate recommendations.\51\
Office of Aviation staff are located throughout the country to
maintain closer proximity to potential aviation accident
sites.\52\ Within the Office of Aviation are the following
divisions: Major Investigations Division, Operational Factors
Division, Aviation Engineering Division, Human Performance/
Survival Factors Division, and the Writing and Editing
Division.\53\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\51\ Id.
\52\ Id.
\53\ NTSB, Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Request, May 27, 2021, at 29-31,
Available at: https://www.ntsb.gov/about/reports/Documents/NTSB-fy22-
budget-request.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

CONCLUSION

The NTSB plays a critically important role in
transportation safety by conducting independent investigations
into the causes and critical factors behind accidents and
issuing recommendations to prevent reoccurrence of accidents.
This hearing will address the NTSB's reauthorization proposal
and other related issues.

WITNESS LIST

LThe Honorable Jennifer Homendy, Chair, National
Transportation Safety Board

Appendix A
[The National Transportation Safety Board Authorization Act of
2022 proposal is retained in committee files and is available
online at https://docs.house.gov/meetings/PW/PW00/20220406/
114601/HMKP-117-PW00-20220406-SD002.pdf]

Appendix B
[The National Transportation Safety Board Authorization Act of
2022 section-by-section analysis is retained in committee files
and is available online at https://docs.house.gov/meetings/PW/
PW00/20220406/114601/HMKP-117-PW00-20220406-SD003.pdf]

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD REAUTHORIZATION

----------

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 6, 2022

House of Representatives,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m. in room
2167 Rayburn House Office Building and via Zoom, Hon. Peter A.
DeFazio (Chair of the committee) presiding.
Members present: Mr. DeFazio, Ms. Norton, Ms. Johnson of
Texas, Mr. Larsen of Washington, Mrs. Napolitano, Mr. Cohen,
Mr. Sires, Mr. Johnson of Georgia, Mr. Huffman, Mr. Payne, Mr.
Lowenthal, Mr. DeSaulnier, Mr. Lynch, Mr. Carbajal, Mr.
Malinowski, Mr. Stanton, Ms. Davids of Kansas, Mr. Garcia of
Illinois, Mr. Delgado, Mr. Lamb, Mr. Auchincloss, Ms.
Bourdeaux, Mr. Kahele, Ms. Strickland, Ms. Williams of Georgia,
Mr. Graves of Missouri, Mr. Crawford, Mr. Massie, Mr. Rodney
Davis of Illinois, Mr. Katko, Dr. Babin, Mr. Graves of
Louisiana, Mr. Weber of Texas, Mr. LaMalfa, Mr. Westerman, Miss
Gonzalez-Colon, Mr. Stauber, Mr. Burchett, Mr. Johnson of South
Dakota, Dr. Van Drew, Mr. Gimenez, and Mrs. Steel.
Mr. DeFazio. The Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure will come to order.
I ask unanimous consent authorizing the chair to declare
recess during the hearing.
And we will now go to my opening statement, which is
somewhere. I read it before. There it is, thank you. OK.
Before we start, I would like to ask for a moment of
silence for our colleague, Don Young, who I served with for 35
years and some-odd months. He was here longer than that. Don
was larger than life. I have got Don Young stories like
everybody else does, with the knife and the--all the other
things. But we became good friends over those years.
We served together on the House Committee on Natural
Resources and then, obviously, on the Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure. He did the last significant
bill originating from this committee on surface transportation
infrastructure, in my opinion, and we have done one since--the
SAFETEA-LU bill, which was a great benefit to the Nation.
He stayed true to his values and the people of Alaska, and
his service was extraordinary. So, we will just observe a
moment of silence.
[A moment of silence is observed.]
Mr. DeFazio. Now, I would like to thank the Chair, National
Transportation Safety Board Chair, Jennifer Homendy, for
appearing before us today. She----
Voice [interrupting]. Stop for a second.
Mr. DeFazio. What?
Voice. You were supposed to call on Sam first.
Mr. DeFazio [to Mr. Graves of Missouri]. Oh, I am so--oh,
sorry, sorry.
OK, well, I moved to another page. OK, Sam.
Mr. Graves of Missouri. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. It was truly
a sad day for the committee when the Dean of the House and our
former chairman passed away.
So, I began my congressional career the same year that Don
took over the committee in 2001. And from day one, he was
always a friend and a mentor to me, and I know he was to so
many of us, obviously, on the committee. And we all know how
fiercely he fought for Alaska, and how fiercely he fought for
the people of Alaska. And we also know just how passionate he
was about this committee, and the work that we do here. And he
never failed to set a tone of bipartisanship to make sure that
the work always got done.
I think that when he had his committee portrait done, he
knew that one day he would be gone, but he would never want any
of us to forget his example. So, he made sure that we were
always able to look right up there, and remember that this
committee is about working together for the good of America's
infrastructure and our, obviously, many modes of
transportation.
But with that, thanks, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
opportunity, and it is the end of an era.
Mr. DeFazio. Thanks. Thanks, Sam. Don does have a unique
portrait.
[Laughter.]
Mr. DeFazio. We will miss him.
So, now I would like to formally thank National
Transportation Safety Board Chair Jennifer Homendy for
appearing before us today. She has sat on this side for many,
many years, and worked on this committee. She was a tireless
advocate for safety, while serving as staff director for the
Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials
from 2004 to 2018.
We went through a lot of struggles in that time. I
particularly remember the issue over the tank cars, which is
mostly solved, but we still get some.
The NTSB is an independent Federal agency responsible for
civil transportation accident investigations. It is charged
with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United
States and through international agreements overseas, and
significant accidents that occur in other modes of
transportation, such as major accidents that involve a
railroad, highway, maritime operation, or pipeline. The agency
establishes the facts and circumstances, determines the
probable cause, and issues safety recommendations aimed at
preventing future accidents, many of which are still pending.
The NTSB was last reauthorized in the FAA Reauthorization
Act of 2018, and its current authorization expires at the end
of this fiscal year. That is why it is important for us to hear
from NTSB today about its reauthorization proposal, and its
challenges and priorities for meeting its safety mission in the
coming years.
Even as the transportation safety sector has expanded--the
size of the U.S. DOT has increased by more than 2,000 employees
over the last 10 years--NTSB has remained at the same staffing
levels. With the caseload at NTSB increasing and many long-
serving NTSB employees near retirement, the agency needs to
attract new talent for the future.
Moreover, as it expands its hiring pool, it must seek to
attract a diverse workforce and prioritize equity, inclusion,
and accessibility.
Another important item addressed in NTSB's reauthorization
is the timeliness of its accident investigation reports. From
2016 to 2020, the average length of time it took NTSB to
investigate an accident across modes crept up from 18.7 months
to 21.6 in 2020. The longer it takes NTSB to analyze and then
issue reports and recommendations, the longer it takes for
other agencies or Congress to implement them. These delays have
potential detrimental impacts on safety.
So, I look forward to hearing from Chair Homendy on what
resources the agency needs, hopefully unconstrained by concerns
at OMB or the White House or anywhere else, straight up what
you need.
I also want to acknowledge the recent crash on March 21,
2022, of the Boeing 737-800 NG operated by China Eastern
Airlines in southern China, killing all 132 passengers and crew
aboard. Obviously, our thoughts and prayers go out to the
victims, their families, and friends.
While we are awaiting details, with the cooperation,
hopefully, of the Chinese Government, I want to hear about the
role that NTSB and other U.S.-based stakeholders may play in
the ongoing investigation. It is a puzzling accident, and we
need to find out what went on with that flight.
An ongoing concern for this committee is the FAA's
implementation of the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and
Accountability Act, ACSAA--acronyms abound--and recommendations
from the NTSB and other investigative authorities following the
737 MAX crashes. While the NTSB was not the lead civil aviation
authority, NTSB did participate and took decisive action by
issuing a series of recommendations to the FAA in September
2019 related to assumptions used in the safety assessment
process and the effects of multiple alerts and indications on
pilot performance. We based several provisions of the aircraft
certification reform legislation on those recommendations.
Now Boeing is seeking certification from the FAA of the 737
MAX 10, which, unlike every other passenger aircraft being
produced in the world today and over quite a number of years,
will not have an advanced flight crew alerting system. It
became the industry standard in 1982, even before I was on this
committee, on every other Airbus and Boeing model, except for
the 737s.
The aircraft certification bill gave the FAA a 2-year grace
period to certify aircraft without the advanced flight crew
alerting system, but that grace period should not be extended.
And I urge the FAA, who might be listening, to take a close
look at the NTSB's recommendations and this committee's
extensive investigations report before completing its
certification.
I look forward to hearing from Chair Homendy on these
issues and others.
I now recognize the ranking member, Sam Graves, for his
opening statement.
[Mr. DeFazio's prepared statement follows:]

Prepared Statement of Hon. Peter A. DeFazio, a Representative in
Congress from the State of Oregon, and Chair, Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure
I would like to thank National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
Chair Jennifer Homendy for appearing before us today. Chair Homendy's
dedication to transportation safety has defined her career. She was a
tireless advocate for safety while serving as the Staff Director of the
T&I Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines and Hazardous Materials from
2004 to 2018. That fierce dedication to improving safety led her to the
NTSB in 2018, and I expect it to shape her tenure as Chair.
The NTSB is an independent federal agency responsible for civil
transportation accident investigation. The NTSB is charged with
investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and
significant accidents that occur on other modes of transportation--such
as major accidents that involve a railroad, highway, maritime
operation, or pipeline. The agency establishes the facts and
circumstances, determines the probable cause, and issues safety
recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents.
The NTSB was last reauthorized in the Federal Aviation
Administration Reauthorization Act of 2018, and its current
authorization expires at the end of this fiscal year. That's why it's
important for us to hear from NTSB today about its reauthorization
proposal, and its challenges and priorities for meeting its safety
mission in the coming years.
Even as the transportation sector has expanded and the size of the
U.S. Department of Transportation has increased by more than 2,000
employees over the last 10 years, NTSB has remained at the same
staffing levels. With the caseload at NTSB increasing and many long-
serving NTSB employees near retirement, the agency must attract talent
for the future. Moreover, as the NTSB expands its hiring pool, it must
seek to attract a more diverse workforce and prioritize diversity,
equity, inclusion, and accessibility.
Another important item addressed in NTSB's reauthorization proposal
is the timeliness of its accident investigation reports. From 2016 to
2020, the average length of time it took NTSB to investigate an
accident across modes crept up from 18.7 months in 2016 to 21.6 months
in 2020. The longer that NTSB takes to issue reports and
recommendations, the longer it takes for other agencies to implement
them--these delays have detrimental impacts on safety. I look forward
to hearing from Chair Homendy about what resources the agency needs to
address these challenges.
Separately, I want to acknowledge the recent crash on March 21,
2022, of a Boeing 737-800 NG operated by China Eastern Airlines in
southern China, killing all 132 passengers and crew aboard. My thoughts
and prayers are with the families and friends of the victims. While we
are still awaiting details on the causes of the crash, I hope to hear
from Chair Homendy about the role NTSB and other U.S.-based
stakeholders may play in the ongoing investigation. We need answers,
and we need to be ready to take action to ensure the global aviation
system is as safe as possible.
An ongoing concern for this committee is the FAA's implementation
of the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act (ACSAA)
and recommendations from the NTSB and other investigative authorities
following the Boeing 737 MAX crashes. While the NTSB was not the lead
civil aviation authority for the investigations of the crashes, NTSB
did participate and took decisive action by issuing a series of
recommendations to the FAA in September 2019 related to assumptions
used in the safety assessment process and the effects of multiple
alerts and indications on pilot performance. We based several
provisions of the aircraft certification legislation on these
recommendations.
Now Boeing is seeking certification from the FAA of the Boeing 737
MAX-10, which will not have an advanced flight crew alerting system--a
system that became an industry standard in 1982 and is on every current
Airbus and Boeing model under production except for the 737s. The
aircraft certification bill gave the FAA a two-year grace period to
certify aircraft without the advanced flight crew alerting system, but
that grace period should not be extended. I urge the FAA to take a
close look at the NTSB's recommendations and this committee's extensive
investigation report before completing its certification.
I look forward to hearing from Chair Homendy on these important
issues. I now recognize Ranking Member Sam Graves for his opening
statement.

Mr. Graves of Missouri. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
to our witness, Chairman Homendy, for being here.
The NTSB plays an important role in ensuring safety across
all modes of transportation. The committee is aware of the
NTSB's reauthorization proposal and appreciates today's
opportunity to discuss it with you.
The Board was last reauthorized with the FAA
reauthorization of 2018, where we made a lot of important
improvements to the agency's organization, how the agency
conducts investigations, and the kind of information provided
to Congress in the agency's annual report and Most Wanted List.
As this committee considers the agency's reauthorization
proposal this year, we should also be looking at how NTSB has
implemented the various requirements of its current
authorization law. I also encourage Members to be thinking
about additional ideas to ensure that the NTSB carries out its
duties in a more efficient and effective manner.
As Chair Homendy knows, the NTSB's backlog of accident
reports and investigations is unacceptable. While I am pleased
that the agency is taking action to address the backlog, we
need to ensure that this kind of issue does not occur again. A
more efficient NTSB will yield timely reports and
recommendations and better equip the transportation sector with
the information that it needs to maintain and improve safety.
So, I look forward to hearing what you have to say on your
priorities, and I look forward to reviewing the NTSB's
reauthorization proposal more closely. Thank you.
[Mr. Graves of Missouri's prepared statement follows:]

Prepared Statement of Hon. Sam Graves, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Missouri, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure
Thank you, Chair DeFazio, and thank you to our witness, National
Transportation Safety Board Chair Jennifer Homendy.
The NTSB plays an important role in ensuring safety across all
modes of transportation. The Committee is aware of the NTSB's
reauthorization proposal and appreciates today's opportunity to discuss
it with the Chair.
The Board was last reauthorized with the Federal Aviation
Administration in 2018, where we made important improvements to the
agency's organization, how the agency conducts investigations, and the
kind of information provided to Congress in the agency's annual report
and Most Wanted List.
As the Committee considers the agency's reauthorization proposal,
we should also be looking at how the NTSB has implemented the various
requirements of its current authorization law. I also encourage Members
to be thinking about additional ideas to ensure the NTSB carries out
its duties in a more efficient and effective manner.
As Chair Homendy knows, the NTSB's backlog of accident reports and
investigations is unacceptable. While I am pleased that the agency is
taking action to address this backlog, we need to ensure that this kind
of issue does not occur again. A more efficient NTSB will yield
timelier reports and recommendations and better equip the
transportation sector with the information it needs to maintain and
improve safety.
I look forward to hearing about Chair Homendy's priorities and to
reviewing the NTSB's submitted proposal more closely.

Mr. Graves of Missouri. Thanks, Chairman.
Mr. DeFazio. I thank the gentleman.
Chair Homendy, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

TESTIMONY OF HON. JENNIFER HOMENDY, CHAIR,
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Ms. Homendy. Thank you, and good morning, Chairman DeFazio,
Ranking Member Graves, and members and staff of the committee.
As Chair of the NTSB, I thank you for the opportunity to appear
before you today in support of our reauthorization request.
I would also like to thank you for being one of the NTSB's
biggest safety champions. Your leadership on transportation
safety is unparalleled, and your support of NTSB
recommendations has brought about significant safety
improvements in the United States and across the globe.
Unfortunately, many of you know our agency because of our
investigations of tragedies that occurred in your districts or
affected your constituents personally, like the duck boat
sinking in Branson, Missouri, and the Amtrak derailment in
DuPont, Washington. I would like to take a moment to remember
those who died or were injured in these and other tragedies
that we have investigated, and offer our deepest sympathies to
the survivors and families we have come to know.
Part of the mission of the NTSB is to support the victims'
families. We give them the only promise we can: that we will
investigate and issue safety recommendations aimed at
preventing similar tragedies, and work vigorously to see that
those safety recommendations are implemented. That is not just
our agency's mission, it is also the mission of our workforce.
We are a small but mighty agency of 404 highly skilled
professionals, and every single one has dedicated their lives
to transportation safety. The people of NTSB are on call around
the clock every day of the year, ready to launch to the scene
of an accident or crash anywhere in the world. Their dedication
to safety ensures that lessons are learned from every tragedy
we investigate.
Our workforce inspires me every day by putting our mission
first. Between the time I was nominated and sworn in as Chair,
I met with staff throughout our agency to listen and learn
about their needs, our successes, and our greatest challenges.
This reauthorization proposal was driven by our workforce. It
addresses their vision for our agency, and we are here today to
advocate for them.
Our reauthorization proposal represents an investment in a
skilled workforce, because it is our people who will ensure the
NTSB is a mission-first agency for years to come. The bill will
support our mission in four ways.
First, it will allow us to begin rightsizing the agency
workforce, which has been stagnant for two decades. We are at
roughly the same number of FTEs as we were in 1998, even as the
demands on our staff rise with increasingly complex
investigations. Our proposal will allow us to fill empty
positions and modestly expand in staffing across all modes and
offices to meet future transportation safety challenges. Quite
simply, we need more people.
But it is not just about headcount. The skills we need for
our future workforce are also important. That leads me to the
second thing our bill will accomplish, which is to provide our
workforce with the training and development needed to keep pace
with the rapid change and technological advancement taking
place in transportation.
For example, we are seeing new vehicles on our roads,
railways, waterways, and in our skies. This includes advanced
air mobility, unmanned aircraft systems, and autonomous vessels
and vehicles. We are also seeing new fuel sources like hydrogen
and lithium-ion batteries, and we are seeing new ways of
transporting people and goods like commercial human
spaceflight. While exciting, each of these advancements
presents unique safety risks, and the NTSB must be--will be--
ready to respond to all of them.
Third, our bill will allow us to procure the equipment and
technology our people need to conduct cutting-edge
investigations in this changing landscape.
Finally, the bill also includes measures to enhance the
agency's accountability and improve our processes and products.
In closing, our reauthorization proposal represents an
investment in a skilled workforce, because it is our people who
will ensure we are ready should your constituents or anyone
else need us in the wake of a transportation tragedy. If we do
these four things with the funds we have requested, we will be
better positioned to serve our vital safety mission today, and
tomorrow will be truly mission-first.
I appreciate your support of the NTSB. Thank you for your
consideration, and thank you so much for your transportation
safety leadership.
[Ms. Homendy's prepared statement follows:]

Prepared Statement of Hon. Jennifer Homendy, Chair,
National Transportation Safety Board
Good morning, Chairman DeFazio, Ranking Member Graves, and members
of the Committee. As Chair of the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB), I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today in
support of our request for reauthorization.
As you know, the NTSB is an independent federal agency charged by
Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United
States and significant events in other modes of transportation--
highway, rail, marine, pipeline, and commercial space. We determine the
probable cause of the events we investigate, and issue safety
recommendations aimed at preventing future occurrences. In addition, we
conduct special transportation safety studies and special
investigations, and coordinate the resources of the federal government
and other organizations to assist victims and their family members who
have been impacted by major transportation disasters. We also serve as
the appellate authority for enforcement actions involving aviation and
mariner certificates issued by the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) and the United States Coast Guard (USCG), and we adjudicate
appeals of civil penalty actions taken by the FAA.
The NTSB is a small agency relative to our federal partners, in
terms of the size of our budget and our workforce, but our impact is
profound. Everyone at the NTSB plays a role in achieving our mission to
make transportation safer. The reauthorization proposal sent to
Congress represents a robust investment in a skilled workforce that
will enhance transportation safety nationwide and across all
transportation modes. Our dynamic workforce includes:
Investigators that go to the scene of an investigation
and those who work in our laboratories;
Family assistance specialists who support victims and
their families;
Writers who develop our reports and help craft our safety
recommendations;
Advocates for our safety recommendations;
Administrative and human resources officers who support
our ability to recruit, retain, and train our workforce and make sure
we acquire and manage our resources responsibly;
Those who keep our technology up-to-date and reliable;
Judges and legal counsel who decide pilots' and mariners'
certification appeals; and
Communications professionals who share the agency's work
with the public and our stakeholders.

Their hard work, professionalism, and dedication is the reason that
the NTSB is regarded as the world's preeminent safety agency, and one
of the best places to work in the federal government.
Even as we have seen tremendous growth and technological
advancements in transportation over the last two decades, the size of
our agency is virtually the same as it was 20 years ago, with
approximately 400 employees. To continue as the world's preeminent
safety agency and complete our investigations and develop
recommendations that advance safety changes without delays, we must
meet the challenges that come with the increasing growth and innovation
in transportation. Therefore, it is critical for the agency to have
additional resources to respond to events without affecting timeliness,
quality, or our independence. Our reauthorization proposal to Congress
includes a request for resources and hiring flexibilities to increase
staffing, including the number of investigators across all modes of
transportation. These resources will allow us to hire professionals
with the required skills, to purchase the equipment necessary for those
skilled professionals to do their jobs, and to invest in crucial staff
training and development. Our workforce is our greatest asset and they
are essential to our mission.
Despite the challenges introduced by the COVID-19 pandemic, over
the past two years we continued our critical work of completing
significant and complex investigations and issuing safety
recommendations to prevent similar tragedies. These completed
investigations were tragedies that occurred in some of your districts
or involved your constituents, such as:
The sinking of an amphibious passenger vessel in Branson,
Missouri;
The crash of Atlas Air Flight 3591 in Trinity Bay, Texas;
A limousine crash in Schoharie, New York;
A dive boat fire near Santa Cruz, California;
A collision between a truck driver and motorcyclists in
Randolph, New Hampshire;
A natural gas-fueled house explosion in Dallas, Texas;
and
A midair collision in Ketchikan, Alaska.

Also in 2020 and 2021, we issued 264 new recommendations and closed
297. Of those closed, 245 (82 percent) were closed acceptably, meaning
that the recommendation recipient took action to implement the safety
recommendation.
Our current investigative workload includes over 1,600 active
investigations in 49 states and Puerto Rico, in addition to supporting
approximately 70 foreign investigations in over 40 countries. The vast
majority of these are aviation accidents being investigated by staff
from our four regional offices. They also include major investigations
such as:
The bridge collapse in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania;
A ship striking a pipeline off of Huntington Beach,
California;
The Washington Metropolitan and Transit Authority
derailment at the Rosslyn station in Arlington, Virginia;
Multiple fatal accidents involving railroad employees;
The United Airlines flight 328 engine incident over
Denver, Colorado;
An Amtrak derailment in Joplin, Montana; and
The Trans Air 810 ditching into the Pacific Ocean near
Honolulu, Hawaii.
Developing a Robust and Resilient Workforce
Our reauthorization proposal represents a strong investment in our
workforce. They must be able to analyze, understand, and respond to the
technological changes that we are seeing in the transportation
industry. This proposal will ensure they can. We greatly appreciate
Congress's continued support for our budget requests; however, our
funding has not kept pace with the need to hire additional
investigative and support staff, to train them, or to make needed
program investments in information technology and enhanced data
capabilities.
While our annual appropriations have increased from $97 million in
fiscal year (FY) 2013 to $121.4 million in FY2022, our staffing levels
have remained about the same. Our fiscal year 2023 request of $129.3
million, however, does not allow us to grow our staff because while our
funding has modestly grown, annual employee pay increases and required
increases in retirement and health insurance benefit contributions have
taken up more than 60 percent of the total appropriations increase. My
hope is that over time, this proposal will authorize sufficient funding
to allow the agency to fill empty positions and to expand our staffing
modestly in order to meet future transportation safety challenges.
The NTSB has a dedicated and mission driven workforce. On the one
hand, we have an experienced and seasoned staff. On the other hand,
many of our employees have spent their careers pursuing transportation
safety, and they are coming to the end of their working years. In fact,
right now, roughly 20 percent of our agency is eligible to retire. In
the first third of this fiscal year, the agency has seen increased
rates of retirement compared to previous years. This year, we have
already seen 11 staff retire. Over the next 5 years, the number of
employees eligible to retire will grow to roughly 41 percent of the
agency.
The goal of our reauthorization proposal is to right-size the
agency over time and to ensure that our employees have the right skill
set. This year, our goal is to grow by about ten percent, increasing
our staffing to roughly 412 full-time equivalent positions in
anticipation of further attrition of the workforce through retirements
or separations, adding roughly 15 people per year through 2027 in
addition to filling the vacancies that will occur. These 75 total
positions do not even fill one-half of the identified needs in our
agency. In fact, our staff identified the need for an additional 192
positions over the next five years.
The NTSB's work requires highly skilled employees with specific
technical expertise and work experience. Once hired, we must train
those employees and continue to offer a competitive salary and
benefits, as well as provide ongoing training in order to retain them.
To that end, over the next 18 months, we are working with the US Office
of Personnel Management to develop a strategic human capital plan to
address the agency's immediate and long-term employment needs based on
trends in the transportation industry; support employee retention and
succession planning; and identify areas in which competency gaps
presently exist. Part of this plan must include efforts to increase the
diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility of the agency workforce
and facilities. Until that plan is in effect, we are requesting the
authority to directly hire certain critical technical personnel and
highly qualified investigators. Our success in developing a robust and
resilient workforce will depend on these efforts as well as increased
resources.
Enhancing Accountability and Improving Processes and Products
When I became Chair in August of 2021, I asked our leadership team
to analyze our agency's risks, where we needed to improve our processes
and products, and where we could enhance our accountability. I also
engaged with a wide variety of stakeholders, including our rank-and-
file staff in headquarters and in the regions, to get their thoughts on
where we stand as an agency, and where they think we need to go.
Numerous changes grew out of that analysis and those conversations
including significant improvements to our ability to close out
investigations. The timeliness of our reports had become a risk but our
ability to complete investigations and issue safety recommendations is
critical to improving transportation safety. Resources are important to
ensure that our investigations are done thoroughly and that our
independence is not compromised. However, the process by which we
complete the investigation also matters. We established a process that
filled open investigative and technical review positions to support the
mission; triaged investigations that were ready for expedited
completion through reassignment; used retired annuitants to broaden the
pool of report reviewers in the short-term while creating a longer-term
solution; enhanced employee performance standards; and developed
quality metrics and a means to track them for all investigations.
We prioritized efforts to reduce workplace risk to our people, such
as implementing a new voluntary safety reporting program and providing
safety training to improve the competencies of the NTSB workforce. And,
something that I am incredibly proud of, our leadership team is working
to finalize a new annual agreement with the State Department to ensure
that if our staff are injured while participating in an international
investigation, they can be evacuated during crisis, including medical
emergencies. Across the agency, we are actively searching for and
mitigating risks. Resources provided under this reauthorization will
support those efforts.
In addition, I discovered that despite a 1986 Executive Order \1\
that directed federal agencies to implement a program for drug testing
certain employees, no program was fully instituted at the NTSB.
Although we are already taking action to address that issue, this
proposal includes a provision directing the agency to implement a drug-
testing program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Executive Order 12564 (https://www.archives.gov/federal-
register/codification/executive-order/12564.html)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Likewise, safety improvements depend on our recommendation
recipients being accountable for responding to and implementing our
safety recommendations. Before 2003, the USCG was required to respond
to NTSB safety recommendations within 90 days and to provide an annual
report to Congress on the regulatory status of each recommendation on
our Most Wanted List. However, when the USCG was transferred from the
US Department of Transportation (DOT) to the newly established US
Department of Homeland Security, it was no longer subject to these
requirements. Our proposal includes a provision that would apply the
same requirements to the USCG that currently apply to the DOT under
Title 49 U.S.C. 1135 for responding to NTSB safety recommendations and
for providing an annual report to Congress on the regulatory status of
each recommendation on the Most Wanted List. The proposal would also
require the NTSB, as part of its annual report to Congress, to identify
each recommendation made to the Secretary of Transportation or the
Commandant of the Coast Guard that was closed in an unacceptable status
in the preceding 12 months. This requirement would provide the
congressional committees of jurisdiction with greater visibility
regarding the Secretary's or the Commandant's inaction to improve
transportation safety.
The proposed bill also includes improvements to our processes and
would:
Ensure that our investigators have timely access to
vehicles and data from accidents and crashes;
Focus our railroad investigation mandate and resources on
those events for which an investigation would provide the most safety
benefits;
Better define our highway investigation authority;
Enhance our support for families of those impacted by
accidents and crashes; and
Ensure that our reports and other written products are
accessible to communities and individuals with limited English
proficiency.
Conclusion
The proposed authorization bill, if enacted, will improve our
ability to carry out our critical safety mission now and in the future;
to recruit, retain, and develop a highly qualified, specialized,
diverse, and inclusive workforce; to prepare the agency for
investigations involving emerging transportation technologies and
systems; and to meet existing needs and future challenges through data-
driven decision-making and cross-office risk management.
Thank you, and I appreciate your support for the NTSB and
transportation safety.

Mr. DeFazio. Amazing, perfectly 5 minutes.
But I do ask unanimous consent that the full testimony of
the Chair be included in the record.
Without objection, so ordered.
We were having a little chat before the hearing, myself and
the Chair and Representative Larsen, so, I am going to defer to
Representative Larsen for the first 5 minutes.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. Thank you, Mr. Chair, I
appreciate that.
As the NTSB continues its support of the investigation in
China, the China Eastern flight is an issue, obviously, of
great importance, because the airplane was built in Washington
State by the great women and men who work on the lines there in
Renton.
And so, I was hoping you could give us an update on, to the
extent that you can, on the investigation, but also maybe talk
a little bit about this point you made about the increasingly
complex systems that you are dealing with, but an increasingly
global conversation we have in aviation, and if there is
anything in the budget that you think we need to think about in
terms of getting your people overseas when they need to be
overseas.
Ms. Homendy. Yes, thank you very much for the question.
On China, we are the state of design and manufacturer, so,
the NTSB appointed a U.S.-accredited representative under Annex
13, and she and two technical advisors from the NTSB, as well
as four technical advisors from Boeing are in China right now.
We have a great working relationship with the Civil
Aviation Administration of China, or CAAC. We have a
longstanding relationship with them. We have worked with them
on other investigations. We have even had cross-training with
them, where our investigators in the past, in 2004, have gone
to China, and they have come here. And so, they have been very
helpful in getting our team overseas, getting visas, and then
making sure that we get a quarantine waiver. And so, that is
going very well on the ground.
And in the meantime, we are working on the repair and
download of the CVR and FDR.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. Do you anticipate a timeline, how
long your folks will need to be in China?
Ms. Homendy. We don't have a set timeline yet, but I am
happy to circle back.
You did ask me about budget needs, and what we may need
going forward.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. Yes.
Ms. Homendy. One thing that we did put in place here, which
I think is tremendous: when I took over as Chair, I encouraged
our leadership to find areas that we need to address risk for
the agency. And Dana Schulze, who is behind me as our managing
director, worked with our special operations senior advisor to
get an agreement in place with the Department of State to make
sure that, if something happens, some sort of crisis, even a
medical crisis occurred, that our folks could be evacuated in
case of emergency. That is something that the agency personnel
has wanted in place since 2013. And now, thanks to the efforts
of the Department of State, we have that in place for this
investigation, and we would like to move that forward annually.
It will require us to put funding aside to hold in an account.
So, that is something that we will need some assistance with.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. Yes, and I understand it is early
in the investigation, and you couldn't answer questions about--
speculate, and we don't want to speculate, anyway. And so, I
appreciate that very much.
If you could move towards the other complexities in the
airspace, with the advent of AAM, FAA maybe certifying the
first eVTOL, let's say within a year, within 2 years, and as
advanced air mobility gets introduced, how is the NTSB
preparing itself for a world of ``The Jetsons,'' if you will?
Ms. Homendy. Yes, well, the NTSB has really been ahead of
others when it comes to preparing for new technologies. In
fact, we have called for new technologies before they ever
existed, going back to 1970, when we called for shutting down
pipelines and putting in valves before those valves ever
existed. And so, we have training for our personnel, of course,
and we have substantial experience.
We will have to change some of our regulations. Right now,
we have an unmanned aircraft system rulemaking in place, where
we will change the definition of what needs to be reported to
the NTSB for accident and incident response.
But as far as your question related to the complexity of
investigations, it is not just the investigation itself, but it
is also the review by a research and engineering team of new
technologies. We have iPads, we have phones, we have new
technologies in aircraft, and new technologies in vehicles and
vessels that we need to make sure that we are able to evaluate.
And part of that is working with new manufacturers and entities
who aren't used to working with the NTSB. And they don't
understand our process. So, that takes some education.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. Yes, thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. DeFazio. I thank the gentleman. Representative Garret
Graves is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr.
Chairman, I want to thank you for having a moment of silence
for our colleague, Mr. Young, who contributed so much to this
committee, and I just want to thank both you and Sam for your
all's kind words and recognition of his service to this body
and to the State of Alaska.
Chair Homendy, welcome back to the committee. Good to see
you again. The last reauthorization bill for NTSB gave you all
the authority to operate UAS, unmanned aircraft systems. And I
understand you are using those to help with accident
investigations. Are you using any drones that were manufactured
in China at this point?
Ms. Homendy. We have seven drones right now, and they are
all manufactured in China, and we have had them for some time.
However, we are now in the process of replacing many that
are ending their life cycle. And so, we are in the process of
purchasing five. That would be since our reauthorization. And
none of those will be made in China.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Great. Thank you. I appreciate
that, and would appreciate you keeping us apprised of that
progress as you work to replace those.
The other thing I want to ask you about is commercial space
accident investigations. As you know, we introduced legislation
with Chairman DeFazio and Chair Larsen and Ranking Member Sam
Graves in regard to NTSB's commercial space transportation
investigation authority, and I am well aware of the notice of
proposed rulemaking that NTSB has issued in this space.
Clearly, you have bipartisan support from this committee
for NTSB to investigate commercial space transportation
accidents.
In regard to the notice of proposed rulemaking, the NPRM
that was issued, a number of comments have been provided, and I
think that there has been some constructive feedback. Many of
them I agree with, and we are going to take some of that into
consideration, because it implicates the approach that we have
taken, as well, in the legislation.
I just wanted to ask, as you work through the comments, and
think about how to tweak the NPRM as it moves to a finalized
rule, if you would please keep us apprised as well, because we
are, as I mentioned, going to continue to work on our
legislative approach, and just want to give you an opportunity
to perhaps respond to the NPRM, respond to any comments, and
then I also anticipate you affirming that you would be willing
to work with us as you all adjudicate the public comments.
Ms. Homendy. Yes, absolutely. And we will work with you and
the committee. And I know that Mr. Babin also has some
concerns. And I would be happy to work with you, as well, of
course, going forward.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. He gave me his proxy.
[Laughter.]
Ms. Homendy. And thank you so much for your leadership on
this issue, and for your assistance. We really appreciate it.
We are aware of the--obviously, going through the comments
right now that have been filed with the notice of proposed
rulemaking. We are in the process now of reaching out to the
industry.
I recently visited, within the past few weeks, SpaceX out
in California. I am going to travel to the other operators to
talk to them. I asked the Commercial Spaceflight Federation to
come in and meet with me and our technical team. We had a good
discussion.
I think it is important that the NTSB sits down with the
operators and talks through some of their concerns, listens to
their concerns, and see where we might be able to address some
of those concerns. And so, there is going to be tremendous
outreach in meeting with them at their operations, at their
facilities, so that I can also appreciate what they are doing,
as well.
But we do have significant experience in this area and are
moving forward. At the same time, I anticipate this won't go to
a final rule. We will have a supplemental proposed rulemaking
at some point, but we aren't rushing to do that.
At the same time, we are going to have conversations with
the Federal Aviation Administration about our memorandum of
understanding to see if we can update that. That dates back
decades, and has not been updated. So, I reached out to the
FAA, had fantastic conversations with them. I reached out to
the Deputy Secretary. We also spoke about that. We will be
sitting down on April 21st to begin those initial
conversations, and I think that will be helpful.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you. In just the remaining
seconds left, I just want to reiterate what the ranking member,
Sam Graves, mentioned in the backlog.
Madam Chair, as you know, it is absolutely critical that
the ultimate investigation reports be released as quickly as
possible, so we can make whatever appropriate changes or
mitigation may be needed to improve safety across all modes of
transportation. So, I want to thank you for your progress, but
also, please keep this on the front burner. It is a critical
issue.
Ms. Homendy. Absolutely.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. I yield back.
Mr. DeFazio. I thank the gentleman. I would now recognize
myself for 5 minutes.
Following up on that last question, is it that accidents
have become particularly more complicated, or--I mean, what is
the principal reason why it is taking longer to put forward
these reports and address whatever needs you might have to
produce them more timely, quickly?
Ms. Homendy. No, great question. It is a combination of
complexity of the investigations, resource needs, and process
that we have to get in place.
I will tell you that our managing director, she will say
her religion is data. She came from the Office of Aviation
Safety. She ran the Office of Aviation Safety. And she is very
focused on collecting data on where this gets hung up. We
learned through that it is not in the investigation phase, it
is in, really, the report writing and review phase. And so, we
needed to change some processes, ensure that we are scaling
investigations appropriately. Not everything is a major
investigation.
And then, at the same time, dedicate appropriate resources
to it. Since I have been on board, we brought on some retired
annuitants, people who used to work for the NTSB, strictly to
go through the backlog. In addition, I will say we looked at
our staffing levels. Our Office of Aviation Safety back in, I
believe 2013, was at 137 people. When I took over, it was down
to 108. Vacancies had not been filled for years. They were
suffering from underinvestment, disinvestment. And so, we need
to change that. We needed to change that across the agency, and
get folks hired because they can't do more with less. And that
is what they were being asked to do.
So, now we are moving that forward. The first meeting I had
was with OPM to figure out how do we get people in the door,
what do we need to change? And now that is all moving forward,
thanks to the folks behind me. They are doing a great deal of
work to get things moving again, and it is very exciting. So,
with all of those improvements, I think we will be able to get
through a great deal.
I will say that, at the beginning of February, our director
of the Office of Aviation Safety had reported that we had 417
mainly field and limited investigations in aviation that were
above 2 years. Today we are down to 213, so, we are making
significant progress. And that was part of what I testified
about at my confirmation hearing. It is critical.
Mr. DeFazio. So, those positions were authorized on a
continuing basis, but they just weren't filled?
Ms. Homendy. They weren't filling them. And that is not
just in the Office of Aviation Safety. It is across the board.
I mean, it is in every single office that we would hover around
high 300s, 400, and we weren't getting through the process of
hiring people. I am not sure why, but now we have procedures in
place. We are hiring a chief human capital officer. I have to
give great credit to OPM, who walked us through how we could
change some things in our processes and procedures to get
people on board.
And it was really asking our staff across the board, when
we put together our authorization request, ``How many people do
you need? What do you need for technology?'' They came back
with a request of 192 additional people they would need for us
to flourish. This reauthorization proposal doesn't represent
that. We would need $250 million to accomplish that.
Mr. DeFazio. Well----
Ms. Homendy [interrupting]. But I will take the $250
million, if you would like to be so generous.
Mr. DeFazio. Well, the committee will mull that over.
Quickly, since my time is about to expire, your so-called
CAROL system, Case Analysis and Reporting Online, my
understanding is that people who are particularly interested in
or want to follow these investigations, that it is not very
user friendly. What are you doing to address that?
Ms. Homendy. Great question, because we agree. It isn't
user friendly. And it was unveiled, I think, too early. And
what we needed to do was meet with the stakeholder community
and see how it was being used, and see how we can improve it.
And we are doing that now. And it is a top priority of our
chief information officer. They are moving forward with changes
to make sure that it is more user friendly.
We did talk about how-to videos, except in the last meeting
we had, I mentioned you shouldn't need a how-to video to find
our investigations. So, hopefully, we are well on our way to
moving forward with improvements so everyone can find the
information that they need.
Mr. DeFazio. Thank you. And now I would recognize
Representative Crawford.
[Pause.]
Mr. DeFazio [to assistant]. He's on the Republican side.
Mr. Crawford. Mr. Chairman, thank you----
Mr. DeFazio [interrupting]. Oh--are you there?
Mr. Crawford. Yes, you got me?
Mr. DeFazio. Yes.
Mr. Crawford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Chair, can you give me an idea of how many----
Mr. DeFazio [interrupting]. Yes, we can't see you for some
reason. Is your camera on?
Mr. Crawford. It is.
Voice. Oh, there, we got him.
Mr. Crawford. Have you got me now?
Mr. DeFazio. Yes, OK. Yes, yes.
Mr. Crawford. OK.
Mr. DeFazio. Go for it.
Mr. Crawford. OK. Madam Chair, thank you. Can you give me
an idea of how many rail-related grade crossing accidents you
investigate in the course of a year, on average?
Ms. Homendy. Thank you very much. We review very few rail-
grade crossing accidents. We certainly review the major ones,
but FRA reviews a majority of the grade crossing accidents.
Mr. Crawford. Is it my understanding--is this correct, that
you are considering reducing that number? Is that true?
Ms. Homendy. Right now, under our highway mandate, there is
some flexibility for our highway investigators which do the
grade crossing accidents to choose which grade crossing
accidents to focus on.
But in our rail mandate, it says we have to do every rail-
grade crossing accident and every trespasser accident, which we
are simply not able to do. Right now, our rail office has 11
investigators to do all fatalities, all serious injuries, all
passenger rail accidents, plus grade crossings, plus trespasser
accidents, and we are not able to accomplish that.
What we do focus on are the ones that have the biggest
safety impact, and we have conducted the larger major grade
crossing accidents and the major trespasser accidents. So, we
do look at each one and decide which one would have the biggest
safety benefit.
Mr. Crawford. So, basically, as has been addressed earlier,
you have got a manpower problem. And is that the biggest
impediment, or is there a calculation that is given with regard
to the value of the investigation?
Does it add to safety by conducting an additional
investigation, or is it mostly attributed to a lack of
manpower?
Ms. Homendy. Well, we do have to make sure that we have the
manpower, but we do ask ourselves four questions in determining
whether to investigate: first, is there national interest;
second, is there an emerging issue, or one that is repeated
that we see that we would want to investigate this accident;
can we make a difference is the third question; and fourth, do
we have the resources?
Mr. Crawford. Can you just kind of walk me through what the
protocol is for investigating with regard to FRA and Amtrak,
and working with those organizations?
Ms. Homendy. Sure. The Federal Railroad Administration is
always a party to our investigations, which means they are part
of our fact-finding in the investigations, as well as Amtrak,
when there is an Amtrak investigation. So, there is close
coordination in the fact-finding portion of the investigation
so that, if there is a safety deficiency, they can address that
immediately.
Mr. Crawford. Does the NTSB investigate freight rail
accidents differently than Amtrak?
Ms. Homendy. Our legislation requires, when there is a
fatality or serious injury, and then we have to do all
passenger rail accidents.
Mr. Crawford. OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will yield the
balance of my time.
Mr. DeFazio. I thank the gentleman.
Eleanor Holmes Norton, chair of the surface transportation
subcommittee, is recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chair Homendy, I have a special interest in this hearing,
because in October, the 7000 series Metro car on the Blue Line
derailed. I know that the NTSB has done inspections of the
entire fleet, and found that at least 20 cars were defective.
WMATA has suspended use of all the 7000 series cars. But that,
of course, has resulted in scaled-back service.
I would be very interested in anything you could tell me
about the status of the NTSB's investigation of this critical
issue.
Ms. Homendy. Thank you for the question, Congresswoman. And
we did speak right after that accident, or the derailments,
occurred. And I really appreciate your leadership on this issue
and, of course, on all safety issues.
Right now, WMATA has contracted with the Transportation
Technology Center in Pueblo, Colorado, to do failure analysis
of the wheel assembly. And I am aware of the actions with
respect to WMATA on pulling cars out of service. That is
something they are working on with the safety commission, not
with the NTSB. We are aware of movement of that, but we are
really focused on the investigation right now, on the failure
analysis of the wheel assembly, and actions that were or were
not taken by WMATA during increasing failures of these wheel
assemblies.
So, we will continue to communicate with you, and
coordinate with you as the investigation goes forward.
Ms. Norton. I would very much appreciate that.
In February, I co-led a letter to Secretary Buttigieg
urging the Department of Transportation to require all highway
traffic safety seats to utilize up-to-date male and female
crash test dummy technology.
You are aware that currently the vehicle safety tests only
utilize male crash dummies in the driver's seats and passenger
seats. And that is despite the fact that women's and men's
bodies are affected differently. And there are real
consequences here: we see that women are 17 percent more likely
to die and 73 percent more likely to be seriously injured in a
vehicle crash than men.
What would be your opinion of recommending that NHTSA
require all safety tests to utilize the most up-to-date female
crash test dummy technology?
Ms. Homendy. Thank you for the question, Congresswoman.
This is especially important, as we see increases in fatalities
and injuries on our roads right now, with nearly 40,000 people
dying annually.
The NTSB doesn't have a recommendation in this area, but
you asked for my opinion. And my opinion is that we should
address that. We should have a crash test--in crash testing,
NHTSA should use not just male, but female dummies when they
are doing crash testing.
Ms. Norton. Why wouldn't the NTSB have a recommendation in
this area?
Ms. Homendy. I am sorry?
Ms. Norton. Why wouldn't the NTSB have a recommendation in
this area?
Ms. Homendy. Our recommendations are normally geared toward
preventing an accident or incident from occurring. And it is
not something that has come up in a specific accident or
incident, but it is something that is on our radar, and
something that we are looking at.
Ms. Norton. I certainly hope you would look at it and make
your views known.
In your testimony you noted that, to satisfy current
staffing needs, the NTSB will need to hire nearly 200 employees
over the next 5 years. In that time, the number of retirement-
eligible employees at the agency will grow to roughly 41
percent. Could you elaborate on the NTSB's strategy to recruit
and train a diverse workforce to fulfill these growing needs?
Ms. Homendy. Yes, and thank you for that----
Mr. DeFazio [interrupting]. The gentlelady's time has
expired, but briefly answer, please.
Ms. Homendy. Yes, thank you for that question. We do have a
strategic human capital plan that we are beginning, a workforce
development plan, a gap analysis. And we do have a strategic
plan to recruit, retain, and hire a diverse and inclusive
workforce that we are now implementing.
Mr. DeFazio. OK, thank you.
Representative Babin?
Dr. Babin. Yes, sir. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
And Chairwoman Homendy, thank you for being here. In
addition to having the pleasure of serving on this esteemed
committee, I also serve as the ranking member of the Science,
Space, and Technology Committee's Space and Aeronautics
Subcommittee, and represent the Johnson Space Center, home to
NASA's human exploration efforts. This gives me a unique
vantage point to assess critical issues across the entire
aerospace horizon.
One issue that has garnered a bit of attention is NTSB's
recent notice of proposed rulemaking for commercial space
accident investigations. Chairwoman Homendy, as you might
recall, I wrote you a letter, along with our Ranking Member
Lucas, to NTSB last November asking for additional information
and documents related to this NPRM. And while we received a
good response in December, which I thank you for, we
unfortunately were not provided with any of the requested
records.
As an ardent advocate for safety in all domains, the
current NPRM raises some concerns and questions that I think
should be addressed. First and foremost is how the NPRM could
potentially impact NTSB's ability to carry out its existing
statutory responsibilities. I worry that the NTSB is already
spread thin, and that expanded authority could undercut the
good work that you perform daily--and we have seen, with just
the last several questioners today, that there is a manpower
issue--and that I am also concerned about whether the expertise
is really there at NTSB to appropriately carry out this very
highly specialized area.
So, with that, I would like to ask for unanimous consent to
add my original letter to the NTSB. Thank you so much.
Mr. DeFazio. Without objection.
Dr. Babin. Yes, sir.
[The information follows:]

Letter of November 18, 2021, from Hon. Frank D. Lucas, Ranking Member,
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, and Hon. Brian Babin,
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, to Hon. Jennifer
Homendy, Chair, National Transportation Safety Board, Submitted for the
Record by Hon. Brian Babin
Congress of the United States,
House of Representatives,
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology,
2321 Rayburn House Office Building,
Washington, DC 20515-6301,
November 18, 2021.
The Honorable Jennifer L. Homendy,
Chair,
National Transportation Safety Board, 490 L'Enfant Plaza, SW,
Washington, DC 20594.
Dear Ms. Homendy:
We write you to seek information regarding the National
Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB) recent Notice of Proposed Rule
Making (NPRM) on Commercial Space Investigations.\1\ NTSB's attempts to
expand its authority would alter the long-standing commercial space
accident investigation process and significantly impact the commercial
space launch industry, U.S. economic competitiveness, scientific
discovery, space exploration, international cooperation, national
security, and safety. The expansion of authorities, alteration of
processes and policies, and the codification of procedures require
appropriate oversight, coordination, review, deliberation, and
approval.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/11/16/2021-
24766/commercial-space-investigations
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology is committed
to ensuring the continued growth and safety of the commercial space
industry. Our Committee has a long history of legislation related to,
and oversight of, space activities. Additionally, we have jurisdiction
over ``[o]uter space, including exploration and control thereof''
(emphasis added).\2\ The Committee was established in response to the
Soviet launch of Sputnik, and wrote not only the Space Act which
established the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA),
but also the Commercial Space Launch Act that established commercial
launch activities. Commercial space activities fall firmly within our
jurisdiction, and our Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee has broad
oversight over the following:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Rules of the House of Representatives, One Hundred Seventeenth
Congress, February 2, 2021; Rule X(1)(p). https://rules.house.gov/
sites/democrats.rules.house.gov/files/117-House-Rules-Clerk.pdf

``All matters relating to astronautical and aeronautical
research and development; national space policy, including
access to space; suborbital access and applications; National
Aeronautics and Space Administration and its contractor and
government-operated labs; space commercialization, including
commercial space activities relating to the Department of
Transportation and the Department of Commerce; exploration and
use of outer space; international space cooperation; the
National Space Council; space applications, space
communications and related matters; Earth remote sensing
policy; civil aviation research, development, and
demonstration; research, development, and demonstration
programs of the Federal Aviation Administration; space law;
other appropriate matters as referred by the Chair; and
relevant oversight'' (emphasis added).\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Rules of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S.
House of Representatives, One Hundred Seventeenth Congress. Rule
VI(b)(4). https://science.house.gov/imo/media/doc/
117th%20Rules%20Final2.pdf

So that we can better understand NTSB's attempts to expand its
authorities and evaluate the impact this might have on the success and
safety of U.S. commercial space activities, we are requesting the
following information:
1) All documents and communications (as defined by attachment A)
related to the development, drafting, and publishing of NTSB's NPRM
titled ``Commercial Space Investigations'' in the Federal Register on
Tuesday, November 16, 2021.
2) All documents and communications related to the memorandum
titled ``SUBJECT: THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD'S AUTHORITY
TO INVESTIGATE COMMERCIAL SPACE LAUNCH ACCIDENTS'' dated July 1, 2015.

Please provide two copies of all documents and communications (one
for the Majority and one for the Minority) by December 3, 2022. Please
contact Mr. Tom Hammond of the Committee minority staff with any
questions related to this inquiry.
Thank you for your consideration of this matter. We are sure we
share the same goals of ensuring safety and U.S. economic
competitiveness and leadership in space. As the Board considers future
actions related space investigations, please avail yourselves to the
Committee and its staff. This would ensure that procedural measures
such as the Congressional Review Act are not necessary.
Sincerely,
Frank Lucas,
Ranking Member.

Brian Babin,
Ranking Member, Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee.

Dr. Babin. In addition to responding to the initial letter
and document request, I would also like to ask you a few more
questions, if I may. If you could keep your answers very, very
short, I would appreciate it. If you can't answer them now, it
is not a problem. But I would appreciate your response for the
record.
Number one, how many staff have the NTSB assigned to
exclusively specialize in space accidents?
Number two, could you please explain the NTSB's request to
investigate not just accidents, but also incidents and
anomalies that happen routinely, almost every single launch
that we have?
Number three, was the NTSB able to coordinate with the
NPRM, and with the Department of Defense, and also the IC, the
intelligence community?
And four, and finally, what is the status of negotiating
the existing MOU with the FAA on commercial accidents?
If you could get those to me, or if you could answer some
of them right now--we have a couple of minutes left--I would
appreciate that.
Ms. Homendy. Sure. With the status of the MOU, as I
mentioned, our first meeting with FAA and with the Office of
the Secretary will be on April 21st. We have been trying to get
the FAA to sit down and talk about our updating our MOU since
2014. I am pleased that we are now going to have that
opportunity to sit down and discuss it, and look forward to
working together on safety, as we do in other modes of--or in
aviation, as well.
With respect to assets and our ability to conduct
investigations, our investigators are not--they aren't walled
off by ``this person is space,'' ``this person is UAS,'' ``this
person is aviation''; they have particular expertise. We will
have aerospace engineers, we have human performance experts. We
have survival factors experts, operations experts.
And so, in total, once we get full staffing in our Office
of Aviation Safety, we will have 132 people in our Office of
Aviation Safety.
Dr. Babin. But what about the number for space, essentially
specializing in space accidents?
Ms. Homendy. As I--we do have a leader, who is our chief
technical officer for space and aerospace technology, and he
has incredible expertise. Right now he runs our Office of Major
Investigations, and has been involved in commercial space and
what the NTSB has done on commercial space for decades. We have
conducted a number of investigations involving commercial space
since 1993.
But with respect to our resources, they are not walled off
by industry. They are in particular areas of expertise. So,
they will do commercial space, and they will do aviation. They
just do them differently.
Dr. Babin. Well, we certainly would appreciate if you could
get those documents to us and those records that we asked for
in the letter, as well as if we could get written answers from
you to these four questions that I just asked. I certainly
would appreciate it, because I am out of time.
Ms. Homendy. Absolutely, absolutely, sir.
Dr. Babin. Thank you.
Ms. Homendy. Thank you.
Dr. Babin. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Ms. Davids of Kansas [presiding]. Thank you, the gentleman
yields back. The Chair now recognizes Congresswoman Napolitano
for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Napolitano. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
Chair Homendy, thank you again for visiting California a
few weeks ago. It was nice seeing you again at the hearing on
Coast Guard safety.
But as cochair of the Mental Health Caucus, I am very
concerned about the mental health trauma endured by the victims
and their families, and the mental well-being of the NTSB
personnel that are constantly dealing with tragedies. Your
proposal discusses improved delivery of family assistance, but
can you discuss in which NTSB--how they address mental health
trauma the victims and their families go through?
And can you discuss what services and training is provided
to all NTSB personnel to deal with their own mental health
stress related to the work?
And how can we assist in these challenges?
Ms. Homendy. Thank you very, very much, Congresswoman. It
was great to see you in California, and I appreciate your
leadership on this issue.
We have a family assistance team that is incredibly
experienced, that deploys to all our major accidents and
certain others that fall under our legislation. And in
addition, we provide training for our personnel that is in the
field on how to deal with families, as well. But that is really
the focus of our family assistance team, which has the
particular expertise.
With respect to--I did want to provide--certainly, going to
accidents and incidents for our personnel has an impact on
their mental health, as well. That is important for the agency.
We do provide an employee assistance program and encourage
folks to utilize that program. We have had, for example,
service animals, compassionate animals for care for mental
health purposes at our accident scenes, and have had personnel
counselors from our EAP program on our more major
investigations.
Mrs. Napolitano. But do you have any contact with the
Department of Health and Human Services to provide any mental
health training to all the NTSB personnel?
Ms. Homendy. We have our own contracts for providing
employee assistance and mental health services for our
personnel, should they choose to utilize that program. And then
we have training for those in the field for dealing with the
families of victims and survivors following a tragedy.
Mrs. Napolitano. My concern is that some of the employees
may be able to spot stress and be able to recommend health
services.
Anyway, Ms. Homendy, are there limitations on NTSB
investigating accidents that happen on private property, such
as rail yards, private intermodal facilities, private airports?
And do you have any concerns about being able to fully
investigate and receive reporting data regarding the accidents
on private property? And what can we do to assist in this?
Ms. Homendy. I am sorry, Congresswoman. I had a little
trouble hearing.
Mrs. Napolitano. On NTSB investigating accidents on private
property.
Ms. Homendy. If you don't mind, Congresswoman, I would like
to get back to you on that for the record, and make sure that I
get the best information to you on that question.
Mrs. Napolitano. Thank you very much, because I hear from
some of the employees of the railroad that they have accidents
on private property that they don't report that we are not
aware of. And I would like to know if that might happen in the
intermodal facilities and private airports.
Ms. Homendy. For accident investigations, whether it is on
public or private property, the ones that are reported to the
National Response Center for railroads, for example, would get
reported to the NTSB. And based on our legislative mandate, we
would deploy resources to conduct those investigations.
Mrs. Napolitano. But would you be able to tell whether they
are on private property or not?
Ms. Homendy. If you don't mind, Congresswoman, I would like
to get back to you on that answer.
Mrs. Napolitano. Thank you very much, and it is nice to see
you again.
I yield back.
Ms. Homendy. It is great to see you again, too. Thank you.
Ms. Davids of Kansas. The gentlewoman yields back. The
Chair now recognizes Congressman Davis for 5 minutes.
Mr. Rodney Davis of Illinois. Hello, Madam Chair. We meet
again. I even got a phonetic pronunciation of your name,
although I don't need it. I wanted to be able to question you
for, now, many months, and really, really hit you with the
hardest hitting questions I possibly can. But you know what?
Today I've got to say thank you. We have been friends for a
while, spent a lot of time together traveling to seven
countries in 8 days. We learned a lot. And I learned a lot
about you. And the person you are is somebody that I consider a
friend.
And I want to say thank you for what you did personally
when we had a pipeline spill in Edwardsville, Illinois. You
texted me to make sure I knew that the NTSB was on the ground,
your team was on the ground. Your updates were phenomenal. You
put together relevant stakeholders with elected officials. I
have heard from Mayor Art Risavy of Edwardsville that his chief
concern moving forward, though, is determining the cause of
that failure so it doesn't happen again.
But I want to say publicly, thank you. And I am not usually
this nice to witnesses in this committee room, but you deserve
it, and your team deserves it, very much so. But the next time,
Madam Chair, you know we are going to have a little more fun, a
little more back and forth.
But if you want to, let the committee know what your team
did there in Edwardsville.
And also, is there anything that we can do to assist in
your investigation?
Ms. Homendy. Well, thank you so much for, certainly, for
those kind words. Having worked on that side for 14 years, it
is much different on this side, I can say.
For Edwardsville, I do have to not only thank the NTSB
team, but also the Marathon Pipe Line team. Shawn Lyon reached
out to me early. We have had numerous conversations. He is a
leader when it comes to pipeline safety and, in fact, invited
us to share some information regarding that investigation at
their info share with the pipeline industry yesterday. Those
are usually closed, more confidential conversations. We were
able to talk about some of our concerns regarding soil
movement, and geological changes, and that impact on pipelines,
and how the industry needs to look at that in their integrity
management and safety management systems.
So, good working relationship, really pleased with that,
and we are going to continue to have discussions and see how I
can be helpful to him in their operation, as well.
Mr. Rodney Davis of Illinois. Did he or anybody on your
team give you any indication of when the investigation of that
particular Edwardsville pipeline burst might be completed?
Ms. Homendy. I have received indication that it would be
next year.
Mr. Rodney Davis of Illinois. Next year? OK, well, I----
Ms. Homendy [interrupting]. But we do have a preliminary
report, which we will make sure to get to your office, and we
will continue to update your office as that moves forward.
Mr. Rodney Davis of Illinois. Well, I appreciate that. And
again, hats off to you and your team and all involved. I
appreciate the job that each of you are doing. I appreciate the
job you are doing.
Ms. Homendy. Thank you.
Mr. Rodney Davis of Illinois. And it is great, again, to
call you a friend, and great to call you Madam Chair, and I
look forward to continuing to work with you.
And lastly, I will just say bravo, and I yield back.
Ms. Homendy. Thank you.
Ms. Davids of Kansas. The gentleman yields back. The Chair
now recognizes Congressman Cohen for 5 minutes.
Mr. Cohen. [Audio malfunction] . . . Madam Chair, and I
thank the chairman and the ranking member for holding this
hearing, and for our esteemed witness, Chair Homendy.
Tennessee--all of the country, but Tennessee as well--had a
great number of motor vehicle crashes and deaths over the
years. It increased, increased, and during COVID it was worse
than ever. Tennessee had a 7-percent increase in traffic
deaths, 1,217 people lost their lives on the road. Bad times.
The National Transportation Safety Board--one time Jim Hall
of Tennessee chaired, I think--a critical role to play in
preventing these crashes. I have championed this Complete
Streets Act, and with Ed Markey in the Senate, and it was--
provide safe and accessible options for multiple travel modes,
including people walking, people bicycling, and other modes of
transportation. And parts of it were in the bipartisan
infrastructure bill, but that didn't make it. Our part didn't
make it, because it was in the House bill and we took the
Senate bill, which was satisfactory but not pleasing.
What is your attitude about the Complete Streets Act and
its effect on traffic safety for pedestrians and bicyclists and
all the different modes of--skateboarding and whatever else
they do now?
Ms. Homendy. Thank you for the question, and I share your
concerns about the increase in crashes and traffic deaths on
our roads, particularly with respect to pedestrians and
bicyclists, which are now at an astounding more than 7,000
nationally, annually. And it is only increasing.
How we build our roads right now is for efficiency and not
for safety, and that has to be the priority.
The NTSB does not have a recommendation focused on Complete
Streets. However, we have issued reports on pedestrian safety,
bicycle safety, and motorcyclist safety, which really talks
about refocusing and incorporating the needs of all road users
in design and planning and infrastructure investment.
Mr. Cohen. Is that the Safe System approach?
Ms. Homendy. That is correct. We do endorse the Safe System
approach. It is on our Most Wanted List of transportation
safety improvements.
Mr. Cohen. But you don't have a discouraging word--or
whatever they say in that song of the West--about Complete
Streets.
Ms. Homendy. We don't have a specific recommendation on
Complete Streets itself. However, we strongly support the Safe
System approach for eliminating fatalities and serious injuries
on our roads.
Mr. Cohen. We always talk about bicycles and safety and
all, and that is important. But we have also got these little--
--
[Audio malfunction.]
Ms. Homendy. Micromobility?
Mr. Cohen. Yes, whatever they rent and go around on
scooters. Has there been--Bird, or whatever they are called,
and a couple of other companies--has there been a large
increase in accidents and deaths because of those being around?
Ms. Homendy. Congressman, I am sorry. I am going to have to
get back to you on the record on fatalities and injuries with
respect to scooters, and specifically micromobility. But we
will circle back on that. There have been increases in
pedestrians and bicyclists, for sure.
Mr. Cohen. Thank you. Do you have any involvement with the
FAA on dealing with the 90-second rule of getting people off of
airplanes in emergencies?
Ms. Homendy. We do have some recommendations on getting
people off aircraft in emergencies, including making sure that
that occurs promptly. And I am happy to provide those
recommendations for the record, as well.
Mr. Cohen. I would love that. We had--2018 I got in our
transportation bill--it might have been the FAA
reauthorization--a study of seat size and pitch, to see if the
continued shrinking of seats and pitch made it less likely that
they could evacuate a plane in the 90 seconds that is required
by law. They were required to do a study.
Mr. Dickson, on his last day before he absconded from
Washington, released the study, which had--nobody in the study
they tested--they said, oh, they could get people off in 90
seconds. There was nobody in the study over 60 years of age,
nobody with a disability, nobody with a child, nobody pregnant,
no pets, nothing like that at all. So, it wasn't representative
of the flying public.
Are you familiar with the completely absurd sample that
they chose to conduct this, and why it took them 3\1/2\ years
to do it?
Ms. Homendy. Sir, I am not familiar with that study, but it
is something I am pleased to look at, and to also look at our
recommendations to see if we have recommendations that would
address that. I don't believe we do, but I will circle back
with you on that.
Mr. Cohen. Thank you, I appreciate it so much. You have got
such a great reputation [inaudible] job, and the FAA totally
bungled this, and I don't know if it was because they didn't
want to get the answers, but you need to have a representative
of the flying public to get a proper test.
And with that, I would yield back the balance of my time,
and thank you for your continuing work that Jim Hall
[inaudible].
Ms. Homendy. Well, if I can add, sir, Jim Hall still calls
me about transportation safety. So, he is sort of an adjunct
part of the NTSB still.
Mr. Cohen. Good. I have [inaudible] for over 40, 50 years.
Great people. Thank you.
Ms. Homendy. Thank you.
Ms. Davids of Kansas. The gentleman yields back. The Chair
now recognizes Mr. Weber for 5 minutes.
Mr. Weber of Texas. And just as you say that the bell
starts ringing. Thank you, Madam Chair, and I appreciate that.
And so, for Chair Homendy, I guess my question is the
NTSB--and I have been on and offline for different reasons
today, so, if this is redundant, forgive me. Why does the NTSB
require direct hire authority to hire accident investigators
and engineers?
Ms. Homendy. Well, right now, our process for onboarding
personnel can take up to 12 months. In the past, it has taken
up to 2 years. And so, we would like the ability, because we
have a highly skilled workforce like other agencies such as the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, to direct hire.
And we would like that direct hire for 3 years, while we pull
together information that is required for the Office of
Personnel Management so that we can apply for direct hire
authority directly to them.
The authority we are requesting would sunset after 3 years,
and I believe that has been provided to other agencies, as
well. So, there is a model for that.
Mr. Weber of Texas. Sure, OK. You said earlier on in your
comments--and I didn't get to hear all of them, I think--that
when you came on board, the agency was down maybe 20 or 30
employees. Does that sound about right?
Ms. Homendy. That was just in the Office of Aviation
Safety. The agency had the ability to hire up to 454, and still
has that, and we were down in the 300s when I took over.
Mr. Weber of Texas. So, in aviation safety----
Ms. Homendy [interrupting]. And today we are at 404, and we
have 13 in the process that have accepted positions and are
awaiting or have chosen hiring dates, and we have 21 already in
the process of hiring right now, in addition to that.
Mr. Weber of Texas. Thanks. So, in the Office of Aviation
Safety, speculations or--do you know why, or why do you suspect
that that office was so low? Why the attrition, turnover? Call
it whatever you want. Why was that particular office so low,
any ideas?
Ms. Homendy. Well, first of all, I will say that most NTSB
employees, if you find one that has worked there for less than
20 years, it would be a miracle. We have people who stay on for
decades and, therefore, we have a pretty high retirement rate.
Right now, 41 percent of our personnel will be retirement
eligible within the next 5 years, and that is pretty
significant.
So, we are going through a workforce development and
planning process right now to ensure succession planning. And I
do want to give credit to that to Ms. Dolline Hatchett, who is
behind me, who is our principal deputy managing director, for
really taking that on, finding efficiencies in our hiring
process, and moving that forward so we can get personnel on
board.
Mr. Weber of Texas. Are they area-specific, those
investigators--west coast, east coast, north, south part of the
United States? How do they get allotted to an accident
investigation?
Ms. Homendy. Right now, we have four regional offices. We
have one in Ashburn, Virginia; one in Denver, Colorado;
Seattle, Washington; and Anchorage, Alaska. We also have
personnel across the United States that are focused on various
aspects, whether it is aviation or in our rail office or in our
highway office or in marine, and so that we are able to deploy
personnel very quickly.
And so, for our hiring needs, it is really across the
board, some at our headquarters and some in the field.
Mr. Weber of Texas. OK, that is good to know. OK. Well, we
appreciate the job you all do. I know it has to be difficult,
heart-wrenching, even heartbreaking at many of these accident
scenes. So, we appreciate that.
And Madam Chairman, I am going to yield back.
Ms. Davids of Kansas. Thank you. Thank you, the gentleman
yields back. And just checking--Mr. Johnson, I think, might
have dropped off the Zoom. OK, it looks like he did.
The Chair will now recognize Mr. Payne, the chairman of the
Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials Subcommittee, for
5 minutes.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Chair Homendy, it is good to see you. And as chairman of
the Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous
Materials, I have a keen interest in ensuring the timely
delivery of the NTSB reports on incident investigations. And
with your expertise as the former staff director of this
subcommittee, I think you would agree with that statement.
There should not be more than a 2-year period between rail
incidents and the NTSB reports. So, I stand ready to work with
the NTSB to help you speed up the report process.
What lessons have you learned since becoming NTSB Chair
about the delay in the rail reports, and how can Congress help
make this process more efficient?
Ms. Homendy. Well, the process is--thank you so much for
the question, sir. The processes to improving our ability to
get out reports--which needs to be done, safety can't be
improved until those reports are out--although I will say
parties to our investigation are aware of information well in
advance of issuance of the reports. From day one, they are part
of the investigation. They get the facts so they can take
immediate action.
With that said, the public needs to know and be aware of
our findings, a probable cause, and our recommendations, and
take action. And so, it is a combination of process
improvements internal to the NTSB, which we are all very
focused on right now. The entire agency is. And resources, we
need additional resources.
In rail, we have 11 investigators in rail. In pipelines and
hazmat, we have six. And so, we need additional resources. And
I will point out that our--again, that our fiscal year 2022
number is $121.4 million. Our request for fiscal year 2023,
which begins our authorization of appropriations request, is
$129.3 million. That entire increase is taken up by a 4.6-
percent pay raise and benefits.
And so, we need the ability to expand beyond that, to grow,
to fill our gaps right now. And that is what we are doing with
a hiring surge. But we do also need to put the process
improvements in place, which our team is very focused on.
Mr. Payne. So, you would say that you are woefully
understaffed in these areas. Is that fair to say?
Ms. Homendy. Our team is top notch. They do a lot with a
little, and they work around the clock. But it does have an
impact. And they will do what they need to do, and continue to
do it because they are very mission-focused. That is the reason
why they stay so long. But they also need us to invest in them.
Otherwise, they get burnt out and they leave.
Mr. Payne. Right.
Ms. Homendy. They need our support, and that is why we are
here requesting that. So, yes, we need your help.
Mr. Payne. OK. As a part of the NTSB authorization
proposal, I am pleased to see an emphasis on recruiting a
diverse workforce from underserved communities. I am in strong
support of this proposal, and believe that tomorrow's workforce
will be comprised of the brightest minds, no matter their zip
code.
Can you elaborate more on the NTSB's proposed actions to
reach underserved communities, and how [inaudible] recruit from
them?
Ms. Homendy. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. First and
foremost, we have two strategic plans that we have implemented
in compliance with the Executive orders that were issued to
increase diversity, equity, accessibility, and inclusion in the
workforce. We are hiring a chief human capital officer. We are
implementing recruitment plans. We are identifying and
deploying strategies to hire and retain a diverse and inclusive
workforce. We are promoting paid internships. We are improving
leadership and development to ensure that our hiring managers
are prepared and best trained to know how to attract and retain
a diverse workforce. And we are also looking at accessibility.
But beyond internal, we are looking external. We are
looking out at communities that we don't normally work with to
outreach and focus with our safety advocacy work so other
communities that we have not traditionally worked with can hear
about the safety issues that we are most concerned about, and
work with them to hear the issues they are also most concerned
about.
In addition to that, we have to work on offering our
products in other languages. Thank you.
Mr. Payne. OK.
Ms. Davids of Kansas. Thank you, the----
Mr. Payne [interrupting]. And I would suggest, if it hasn't
been--but it might have already been thought of--our veterans
[inaudible]----
Ms. Davids of Kansas [interrupting]. The gentleman's time
has expired.
Mr. Payne [continuing]. Might be a good pool to look at.
Thank you, I yield back.
Ms. Davids of Kansas. Thank you. The gentleman yields back.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. LaMalfa for 5 minutes.
Mr. LaMalfa. Thank you, Madam Chair, and good to see you,
Chair Homendy, thank you.
Ms. Homendy. Good to see you, too.
Mr. LaMalfa. Thanks for appearing with us here today. And I
was just hearing about DEI a second ago. Wasn't that being
applied to crash test dummies in a conversation a little bit
ago, or not?
Ms. Homendy. I am sorry?
Mr. LaMalfa. I thought I heard DEI being applied to crash
test dummies here a few minutes ago. Is that true?
[Pause].
Mr. LaMalfa. You don't have to touch that one. Forget that
one.
Ms. Homendy. Thank you.
Mr. LaMalfa. Oh, you never know what you are going to hear.
So, let me ask--before my other questions--what is the
overlap in responsibility on airlines with NTSB and FAA, as far
as passenger comfort, passenger handling, or even rowdy
passengers like we are hearing these days?
And does that enter even into the conversation on mask
mandates and all these things that are causing irritability
with passengers these days?
Ms. Homendy. Yes, thank you for that question. We are only
involved in accidents and incidents----
Mr. LaMalfa [interposing]. Right.
Ms. Homendy [continuing]. And evaluating those. We are not
involved with airline operations, or the work of the FAA
regarding those issues, unless for some reason they come up in
an accident or incident investigation.
Mr. LaMalfa. Yes, OK. I thought that would be good on the
record for people to understand what the clear roles are.
Briefly talking about the budget situation here--and this
is something I've got to ask, since we are stewards of the
taxpayers--so, we are looking at--you mentioned current year,
$124 million?
Ms. Homendy. The current year is $121.4 million.
Mr. LaMalfa. $121 million, OK. And so, we are looking at--
in the proposal here is $129 million in 2023; $145 million in
2024; $155 million in fiscal year 2025; $165 million in 2026;
$175 million in 2027. So, that is a jump, if my numbers are
halfway right, between 2023 through 2027, of about 35 percent.
Is that commensurate with other funding increases you are
seeing in other agencies or other priorities for the Federal
Government?
Ms. Homendy. We have actually gotten more over the years.
We have had much lower increases over the years and, in fact,
we have the same level of full-time equivalent personnel as we
had in 1998. We have had increases in our funding, of course,
but most--70 percent--of our budget goes towards pay and
benefits. And so, we need additional investment, not just in
our workforce, but also IT investments.
We had a mandate in the last reauthorization bill to
develop a multimodal database for accidents and incidents,
something that is critical. But it was unfunded. And so, we did
finance that, and we moved it forward. But we need additional
funding to improve it and then maintain it. We are going to
have to plan for cybersecurity and other contingencies over the
next several years.
Mr. LaMalfa. Will you see enough for this equipment side of
it, not just personnel? Is that going to reflect being able to
upgrade your equipment and technology, then?
Ms. Homendy. This reauthorization proposal is modest. It is
not everything we need. In order to get everything we need that
was submitted as part of the reauthorization effort to the
Office of the Chair and the Managing Director, it would require
an investment of about $250 million, annually. So, this is
modest. It is what we thought would be reasonable that we can
move forward with.
Mr. LaMalfa. OK, I appreciate that. Let me shift gears to
private aircraft and some of the issues there.
Of course, I have a very large rural district, a decent
amount of private aircraft, as well as crop dusters and like
that. Would you talk about any recommendations you might have,
your agency would be looking at on rural aircraft usage,
whether it is something more business-like, like crop dusting,
or general purpose, private aviation, private aircraft? What do
you see as needing to be improved, or a focus for you?
Ms. Homendy. Well, there are definitely improvements in
general aviation with respect to safety and accident rates over
the last several years. We are a little over 1,000 annually in
general aviation accidents, but then it has gone down, which is
significant, in a large part not just from the community, but
our focus on safety and improving safety for general aviation.
I would have to--if you don't mind, I would like to get
back to you with some of our specific recommendations in rural
areas with aircraft and crop dusters. And I am happy to do that
for the record.
Mr. LaMalfa. OK, thank you. That is really important in my
area.
So, how is it, when you have investigations that involve
the State as well as NTSB, what kind of cooperation are you
getting with States? Is it difficult? I kind of get the
impression you have difficulty sometimes with States and
cooperation and sharing of info, et cetera.
Ms. Homendy. Our biggest difficulties occur in highway
safety, especially where we don't have an established
relationship. We try to establish those relationships in
advance, by either the Board members or office staff going out
and developing those relationships with law enforcement. That
is critical, but it can be an issue on the ground.
Our legislative proposal, or our mandate right now, states
that when we conduct a highway investigation, it has to be in
cooperation with the State. In the past, some States, like New
York, have taken that to mean--they have argued that we can't
pursue our safety investigation until they are through their
criminal investigation, which is not accurate, and not in
accordance with our mandate.
Now, fortunately, the courts have ruled against that
position, and in our favor, which has been helpful. But we are
asking for some clarification in our reauthorization proposal
so that we can move forward and clear up any sort of issues.
But we do try to work very closely with the States and with
law enforcement.
Mr. LaMalfa. Yes, it would seem----
Mrs. Napolitano [presiding]. The gentleman's time has
expired.
Mr. LaMalfa [continuing]. [Inaudible] assume they would
already have the relationships, but----
Mrs. Napolitano [interrupting]. The gentleman's time has
expired.
Mr. LaMalfa. Thank you.
Mrs. Napolitano. Mr. Carbajal, the Coast Guard and Maritime
Transportation Subcommittee chair, you are recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Chair Homendy, it is a pleasure to see you again. I
personally want to thank you for coming to Santa Barbara last
month to review the Coast Guard's effort to improve small
passenger vessel safety in response to a number of deadly boat
incidents, including the tragic Conception boat fire in my
district.
I know the NTSB, the National Transportation Safety Board,
has an important role in investigating incidents and issuing
recommendations so similar catastrophes do not occur in the
future. Having seen firsthand how these recommendations can
guide Congress in ensuring the safety of the American people
when traveling in different modes of transportation, I
understand the importance of the NTSB.
As we look towards reauthorizing the NTSB, can you discuss
the types of resources you need from Congress to support your
mission in maybe a little bit more detail than you have done
already?
Ms. Homendy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
holding that hearing and for your work, really, bipartisan
effort over the past few weeks, to move the Don Young Coast
Guard Authorization Act. We really appreciate the bipartisan
effort to move that as you implemented or mandated a number of
NTSB recommendations, including longstanding recommendations
regarding the duck boats, which goes back to 1999 with a
terrible tragedy. And so, we really appreciate your work
supporting the NTSB.
Essentially, the NTSB, we have some policy improvements
that we would like to make. Some of our reauthorization
proposal can be self-implementing, but we are transparent and
want you to know where we are headed. However, we need
resources. We need additional resources with equipment. We need
additional resources in terms of personnel. And we really
appreciate your support over the years.
Our workforce is truly incredible. I am always impressed
with the work that they do with very little, with very little.
And so, as investigations become even more complex, your
support, in terms of resources, would be really appreciated.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Chair Homendy. Another issue that
I am interested in hearing from you is in regard to rail quiet
zones, or the impact that they have had, or not, on rail
safety.
As you might know, many localities have established quiet
zones in their communities. When I was in local government,
this issue would come up from time to time. Has NTSB issued any
safety recommendations around quiet zones to balance noise
pollution and safety?
And what has been the implications, or not, of quiet zone
programs and legislation in the past when it comes to safety?
Ms. Homendy. Yes, thank you for the question. I would have
to go back to our rail personnel and provide that for the
record on what recommendations we might have with respect to
quiet zones.
I know it is a hot topic for the committee, as it is
something I worked on previously when I worked for the
committee. So, I understand how important it is to each of you,
and I am happy to provide that for the record.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. I know it is a balancing act,
trying to provide quiet zones for mitigating noise for
communities, but at the same time, addressing and keeping a
balance with promoting safety. So, it is just an area that I am
always interested in learning more about, because these
continue to be issues in various communities, including my
district. And it is always nice to hear what the pros and cons
are of them, as it relates to safety issues, at least looked
into or considered by NTSB.
Thank you so much for your time.
Madam Chair, I yield back.
Mrs. Napolitano. The gentleman yields. Next we have Mr.
Gimenez. You are recognized, sir.
Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Madam Chair.
And Ms. Homendy, I also noticed that you asked for close to
about a 35-percent increase in the next 5 years for your
agency. You said you have 454, I guess, approved positions in
your agency. You only have 404 right now. Are those 454 FTEs or
FTE equivalents? What are they?
Ms. Homendy. So, the FTEs, we have 412 right now for FTEs.
But what we are doing is overhiring in anticipation of
retirements.
And in the past, since January 1st, we have had 11
retirements already. And as people return to work, because our
agency is now back to work, we expect there will be more.
Mr. Gimenez. By the end of the 5 years, where you are
asking for another $45 million in funding, are you going to be
increasing the number of FTEs?
Ms. Homendy. We will be increasing the number of people on
board, up to where--that would provide us, barring any other
contingencies with--let me get back to you on the exact number
that we would end up with at the end of the 5 years.
Mr. Gimenez. Can you give me----
Ms. Homendy [interrupting]. For the record.
Mr. Gimenez. Can you give me an estimate?
Ms. Homendy. It is about 480.
Mr. Gimenez. 480, OK. In the last 5 years, have you had a
significant increase in the number of investigations that you
have been conducting?
Ms. Homendy. We have had an increase in aviation
investigations, and I would have to look at the investigations
in the other modes, as well.
Mr. Gimenez. Can you give me an estimate of what percentage
increase you have had in investigations?
Ms. Homendy. I would have to get back to you on the record
for that.
Mr. Gimenez. Yes, could you please? I would certainly
appreciate that as we look at your funding request.
Going to commercial space, NTSB conducts investigations on
commercial space issues, accidents, et cetera. Who conducts
investigations on NASA incidents?
Ms. Homendy. On----
Mr. Gimenez [interrupting]. NASA.
Ms. Homendy [continuing]. NASA?
Mr. Gimenez. Yes.
Ms. Homendy. We--I mean, we do have a memorandum of
understanding with NASA to do some investigations at their
request. But we have done commercial and space investigations
since 1993, starting with Pegasus.
Mr. Gimenez. No, I know you do commercial, but who does
NASA? Does NASA--NASA does NASA, is that what they do?
Ms. Homendy. NASA, and we have worked with them, as well.
Mr. Gimenez. All right. Are the procedures for NASA
investigations any different from the ones that you are
proposing for commercial space flight?
Ms. Homendy. I am not familiar with NASA's procedures, but
our procedures are no different than any other investigation
that we already conduct, with respect to the party system, and
working with the operators, and working with the Federal
agencies closely.
Mr. Gimenez. I am hearing that some of the commercial space
operators have issues with some of your rules. So, I guess my
question again is, are your rules concerning investigations
different from what NASA uses to investigate its own issues?
Ms. Homendy. I think the commercial space industry is not
as familiar with the operations of the NTSB, which is why I am
currently meeting with the different operators, so I can
familiarize them with our process. Some are better informed,
and some have worked with us for many years. But we have had 30
years of expertise in this area, and have worked with FAA and
NASA to develop a close working relationship, and with many of
the operators.
Mr. Gimenez. Have you communicated with NASA about your
rules? And are they in favor of those rules, are they in
agreement with those rules?
Ms. Homendy. I can't speak for NASA, but I have spoken with
them. And we participate on a quad chair working group with
NASA, and the Air Force, and FAA, and meet quarterly with them,
and have discussed this and other measures, including our MOU
over the years.
Mr. Gimenez. Are NASA rockets any different than commercial
rockets?
Ms. Homendy. I would have to defer that question to our
investigators.
Mr. Gimenez. OK, thank you very much. I really appreciate
it, thank you.
Ms. Homendy. Thank you.
Mrs. Napolitano. The gentleman yields back. Mr. Malinowski,
you are recognized for 5 minutes, sir.
Mr. Malinowski. Thank you, Madam Chair.
And Madam Chair, welcome, thank you so much. I would like
to use my time today to talk about trucks and trucking and
safety.
Like many of us, I am concerned about the shortage of
truckdrivers in America today, the impact that is having on our
supply chain challenges. We all know there are many reasons for
the shortage, everything from an aging workforce, to a
workforce with high turnover, a job that is hard, a job that
involves time away from family, training certification
requirements, in many cases low pay. But certainly, one of the
reasons for the shortage that I think doesn't get enough
attention is treatment of drivers by management, specifically
the demands that are put on them--some of them, at least--to
continue to drive when they are too tired to do so safely.
As we have done before in this committee, I turned for
support to one of our informal T&I advisers, John Oliver of
HBO, who did a segment on this recently. He told a story of a
truckdriver who was forced to take his mandatory break during
the day, when he couldn't sleep, and forced to drive at night,
when he was obviously too tired to do so. The driver knew this
wasn't right, so, he recorded a conversation that he had with
his dispatchers.
And I wanted to, technology permitting, play that exchange
for us today. So, let's see if this works.
[Video shown.]
Mr. Malinowski. Did you get the gist of that, or was it
hard to--yes.
Ms. Homendy. A little bit hard to hear.
Mr. Malinowski. Yes. He is saying he is not safe to drive
at the moment. They are telling him, just go out, take a walk,
get a cup of coffee. He said I think I am going to hurt
somebody, and they say that we don't have time for that
``bullshit,'' that is not how we work here at K&B.
So, look, it is one anecdote, but we know that NTSB has
looked back at a sample of its major investigations across
various modes of transportation, and found that a full 20
percent of them identified fatigue as a major contributing
factor to accidents. And in the highway-related investigations,
you all found fatigue was present in 40 percent of them.
I know that NTSB first made recommendations to address the
safety risks associated with fatigue 50 years ago, in 1972. So,
my question to you is, are we better off than we were 50 years
ago?
And what are some of the most important outstanding
recommendations from NTSB related to driver fatigue that have
yet to be implemented? Thank you.
Ms. Homendy. Thank you for the question, and I would love--
first, before I answer the question, I would like to get back
to you with our recommendations on fatigue, because we have
many, including for commercial truckdrivers, and it has been on
our Most Wanted List in the past as a serious safety issue that
needs to be addressed.
We do have recommendations on hours of service and
electronic logbooks. We always look at hours of service as part
of any of our investigations, and have found significant
concerns regarding scheduling and the impact of that scheduling
on commercial drivers. So, I am happy to get you specific
recommendations for the record.
Mr. Malinowski. Thank you so much. And in particular,
recommendations that have not yet----
Ms. Homendy [interrupting]. Been implemented.
Mr. Malinowski [continuing]. Been implemented by agencies.
And of course, separately, if you feel that Congress needs to
take additional actions.
Ms. Homendy. Yes, there are many. We will get those to you.
Mr. Malinowski. Thank you so much, and I yield back.
Ms. Homendy. Thank you.
Mrs. Napolitano. The gentleman yields back. We will have
Mrs. Steel, followed by Mr. Stanton and Mr. Burchett.
Mrs. Steel, you are on for 5 minutes.
[No response.]
Mrs. Napolitano. Mr. Burchett, you are on for 5 minutes,
sir.
Mr. Burchett. Thank you, Chairlady.
I suppose you all can tell by my accent I am probably not a
Northeasterner, I am from Knoxville, Tennessee. I am over here,
to your right, ma'am. Right here. You see me? OK, yes, ma'am.
Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Homendy. I was waiting for you to pop up on the screen.
Mr. Burchett. That is all right. I try to do the live, live
action.
Ms. Homendy. I try to do live, too, so.
Mr. Burchett. Yes, ma'am. Well, thank you for being here,
and I want to thank those folks behind you. I know they've got
to just be sitting here in mindless wander this whole time,
having to listen to all this. So, I appreciate you all very
much, too. You all don't get any credit, but you all are
putting up with a lot, just by having to sit here all day. So,
thank you all, as well.
But I have listened to your testimony, and listened to
everybody else, but I guess where I am concerned is that--the
barriers that I think that are entry for folks looking to join
the National Transportation Safety Board workforce. And I am
wondering, is there a skills gap involved with that?
I said I was not educated in the Northeast, I was educated
at the University of Tennessee, and I have a degree in
technological adult education. So, skills seem to be where it
is at right now. And it has been continuously, and it seems to
be even more so now. And I was wondering if you could address
that issue.
Ms. Homendy. Yes, thank you very much. And we do have
plenty of people who apply at the NTSB and want to work for the
NTSB. Part of it is our process in getting people in the door.
And we do have a process or a program in place where we
work with Pathways, which are recent college graduates, to get
them in the door and then train them up to be investigators.
You have a number of great universities, including the
University of Tennessee and Middle Tennessee State University
folks that I have talked to on aerospace and aviation.
And so, I would encourage recent graduates to go to the
Pathways program, because the NTSB and other Federal agencies
utilize them, and try to get them in the door and up to speed
on a lot of our processes.
Mr. Burchett. Thank you. Let me change gears a little bit
on that. I am wondering how many of the National Transportation
Safety Board employees that are in mission-critical or
essential occupations were forced to leave their jobs last year
because of the President's vaccine mandate for Federal workers.
Ms. Homendy. I would like to get back to you for the record
on that number. I don't believe we had anyone leave because of
that, but I want to be sure that I accurately answer that and
provide that for the record.
Mr. Burchett. OK, I would really appreciate that.
One last thing. How do you think the reauthorization
proposal--how do you think it is going to help you recruit
enough skilled workers to fill those positions and avoid future
workforce shortage?
Ms. Homendy. That is a great question. Right now, we are
working with the Office of Personnel Management on a strategic
human capital plan. We are in the process of hiring a chief
human capital officer, as the NTSB has not had one at an SES
level in the past. And we are working on a succession plan and
gap analysis to ensure that we are prepared for the future,
that we are hiring the right personnel.
In addition, we have a training center right now, and are
working to refocus the training center on career development
and investment in training in our workforce to enable our
employees to each have an individual training plan, so that
they have core skills and that they have advanced training as
they continue on throughout their career.
Mr. Burchett. OK. Madam Chair, I am going to yield back the
rest of my time.
But thank you so much for being here and for answering our
questions. I guess I don't share the infatuation that my friend
Rodney Davis does with you, but I am sure, if we spent enough
time, that I would. So, thank you so much, ma'am, for answering
these questions. And if you could please get back to me on that
other one.
Ms. Homendy. I will, thank you, sir.
Mr. Burchett. Thank you so much, ma'am.
Chairlady, I yield back to you.
Mrs. Napolitano. The gentleman yields back----
Mr. Burchett [interrupting]. And I want to note that you
are always very well dressed and exceptionally well dressed,
ma'am.
Mrs. Napolitano. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Burchett. I just want to compliment you on that.
Mrs. Napolitano. Thank you very much, and I must compliment
you on the question about education.
And I have asked at the hearing that we had in Santa
Barbara to give us names of the universities you outreach to,
because we would like to help with the recruitment.
Ms. Homendy. Absolutely.
Mr. Burchett. Chairlady, it doesn't help you in our caucus
if you compliment me. It usually helps if you say something
derogatory towards me I have noticed, so----
Mrs. Napolitano [interrupting]. No way.
Mr. Burchett. Yes, ma'am. Thank you, ma'am.
Mrs. Napolitano. Next we will--the gentleman yields back.
The next Member is Representative Stanton.
You are recognized for 5 minutes, sir.
Mr. Stanton. Thank you very much, Madam Chair, and I want
to welcome Chair Homendy.
I want to thank you and all of the dedicated employees at
the National Transportation Safety Board for your steadfast
commitment to improving the safety of our transportation
system.
The NTSB currently has a number of active investigations in
my home State of Arizona, including the Union Pacific train
derailment, which occurred in my district in 2020. I look
forward to seeing the Board's final report and recommendation,
hopefully later this year.
The NTSB is charged with investigating civil aviation
accidents in the United States, and providing safety
recommendations to prevent future accidents. Black box data
recorders, which capture the voice and data during a flight,
are critical to providing insights into the cause of aircraft
accidents. The current requirement in the United States is for
recorders to record just 2 hours of flight time, meaning
anything over 2 hours is overwritten and not accessible.
Europe, on the other hand, has implemented a requirement for
recorders on commercial aircraft to cover 25 hours. What is
NTSB's position on this issue?
Ms. Homendy. I believe we are supportive of that proposal.
And I would like to get back to you on the record to make sure
it is the right recommendation that I am responding to. But
data recorders are critical. They are critical not just for
accident investigation, but they are critical for the operators
themselves to determine if there are safety deficiencies after
an accident occurs. And that is where the biggest safety
measures can be addressed immediately. So, I appreciate that.
Also, just to respond on the rail accident you mentioned in
Tempe, our rail personnel--I checked with them before coming to
the hearing, and they mentioned that they believe that
investigation will be completed this year.
Mr. Stanton. Thank you very much. Are there instances where
the 2-hour record of data has been insufficient for the NTSB's
needs in the course of investigation?
Ms. Homendy. Congressman, I would like to get back to you
on that question for the record, and check with our Office of
Aviation Safety.
Mr. Stanton. Please do. Thank you very much. And can you
speak to the importance of data collection, and the role it
plays in an investigation and to the NTSB's ability to identify
potentially systemic concerns and mitigate future accidents?
Ms. Homendy. It's very critical to have that information
not just for accident investigation, but, as I said, for the
operator and for the FAA to determine if there are any safety
deficiencies that need to be addressed immediately after an
accident or incident. So, that information is critical.
I will say we have other recommendations, including for
helicopter manufacturers, on crash-resistant recorders, which
we have recommended for numerous years that the FAA has failed
to implement. And so, we reissued those to the manufacturers
themselves to ensure that they are in helicopters to help us
not only in investigations, but identifying safety gaps.
Mr. Stanton. Thank you. I look forward to getting the swift
response to the answers that you weren't able to answer
immediately here today.
And with that, Madam Chair, I yield back.
Mrs. Napolitano. The gentleman yields back, and we have the
next Member.
Miss Gonzalez-Colon, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Miss Gonzalez-Colon. Thank you, Madam Chair. Good morning
to our witness today. I just have a few questions, and one of
them is coming from a Territory.
Sometimes we ask ourselves how long is it going to take for
your office to investigate, or to respond to a maritime issue
or a plane crash in Puerto Rico or more distant Territories
like American Samoa.
Ms. Homendy. Yes, thank you for that question. When we are
notified of an accident, it goes through our response
operations center, and the personnel there are on duty 24 hours
a day and constantly monitoring information that comes in. They
notify our duty officer, and then immediately we begin to
gather information around the accident and incident. When we
are able to deploy, we do have access to the FAA planes out of
National Airport, and then we have other personnel throughout
the United States that can be on the ground fairly quickly.
Miss Gonzalez-Colon. How are investigators stationed to
ensure there is a timely and rapid response in those cases?
Ms. Homendy. We have investigators for all modes of
transportation in various parts of the United States. We have
four regional offices: one in Anchorage; one in Seattle; one in
Ashburn, Virginia; and one in Denver, Colorado. But then we
also have a number of investigators across all modes of
transportation in the NTSB that work throughout the United
States in various States. And so, we do have the ability to
send many of those in advance, even if it is not their mode of
transportation, to be the first person on scene.
Miss Gonzalez-Colon. Thank you. I know your office and the
Coast Guard updated their work MOU in June of last year. I
would love to know your words in terms of how important you
think it is to institutionalize those best practices that have
been developed in the wake of tragedies like El Faro in the
Caribbean area.
Ms. Homendy. I have to say that we have an excellent
working relationship with the United States Coast Guard. That
relationship didn't always exist, but we worked really hard on
both sides to get a close working relationship and develop the
most recent memorandum of understanding. The leadership there
has been phenomenal and partners with us, and we partner with
them on many investigations, and we work closely together.
We were off the coast of Santa Barbara, working together on
the Conception dive boat tragedy which Chair Napolitano had
mentioned, but others as well. And we continue to work
together. I greatly support their efforts. They do a lot with
very little, as does the NTSB.
Miss Gonzalez-Colon. Can you describe briefly the type of
equipment or technology that your office uses, and the one that
you may need that you may not have at this time, just for me to
understand it, and if there is a way that Members of Congress
can do a tour of your district office here.
Ms. Homendy. Yes. Our technology--and I would love to get
you a list, because we do have a long list of our technology
needs. But technology in general, we have more complex
investigations right now. So, we are going to need additional
resources in terms of technological improvements for our
research and engineering staff. That includes--and you have
mentioned a lot on marine safety--that includes in marine
safety.
And just to add, our workforce in marine safety, their
workload has increased eightfold in the past decade, but their
staffing is pretty low. They have 20 staff right now, and 11
investigators just for marine safety.
Miss Gonzalez-Colon. In all the Nation?
Ms. Homendy. Just for marine safety, yes. And they have
requested an additional 17.
And so, as you see, there are needs for the Marine Safety
Office, and across the agency, and across the board.
Miss Gonzalez-Colon. How do you think--I mean, how much has
your workload increased during the last few years? I mean, has
it is been----
Ms. Homendy. Oh, tremendously. And it is changing, because
we have new technologies right now. Whether it is automated
vehicles, driver assistance systems right now that we are
evaluating, or new avionics and aircraft--we are talking about
drone ships now. And so, it is becoming more complex.
And it is not just the technologies in terms of vehicles
and vessels, it is in terms of new fuel sources. So, we had
just done a report and investigation on the impact of lithium-
ion battery fires on emergency responders following high-impact
crashes, and found that there wasn't enough information for
emergency responders, and that NHTSA had to do additional
research. Whenever we are moving towards these new
technologies, whether it is a vehicle or a vessel or a new fuel
source, we have to remember that we are also evaluating and
have to make it a priority to evaluate the safety of those
systems.
Miss Gonzalez-Colon. Thank you.
Mrs. Napolitano. The lady's time has expired.
Miss Gonzalez-Colon. Yes, I yield back.
Mrs. Napolitano. Thank you, she yields back. We have
Representative Garcia, followed by Ms. Williams and Mr.
Lowenthal.
Mr. Garcia, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Garcia of Illinois. Thank you, Madam Chair. And, of
course, I want to thank Chair DeFazio and, of course, thank
you, Chair Homendy, for appearing today.
So, we have made significant progress over the past few
decades in making our transportation system safer, except our
roadways. Fatalities on our roadways actually increased in
recent years. In 2020, 38,824 people died in traffic crashes in
the U.S. This is the highest number since 2007.
I want to highlight a mind-boggling statistic: more
Americans died in car crashes from 2000 to 2019 than the
combined total number of Americans who died in World War I and
World War II.
Speeding is one of the top two causes of traffic crashes.
According to the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, speeding was a contributing factor in 26
percent of all traffic fatalities in 2019. Chair Homendy, most
jurisdictions in the U.S. set speed limits using what is known
as the 85th percentile speed. NTSB has recommended that the
85th percentile speed be phased out. Can you explain what the
85th percentile speed is, and why the NTSB recommends it be
phased out?
Ms. Homendy. Yes, thank you for that question. And speeding
is a significant concern, as 10,000 fatalities on our roads are
attributed to speeding annually.
The 85th percentile is something we focused on in a number
of our investigations, including some of our vulnerable road
user reports. What it means is that States, when they are
evaluating speed limits and the adequacy of speed limits, they
are looking at what 85 percent of the traffic is traveling at,
and then they set the speed limit within 5 miles per hour of
that number.
Frankly, that method for determining and setting speed
limits goes back to the 1950s. So, we are setting speed limits
based on a 1950s-era configuration. What it is not looking at
is how our roads are being used. It doesn't look at pedestrians
or bicyclists or motorcyclists. It just sets it on an arbitrary
number.
And what ends up happening is, over time, speed limits
increase. So, now we have speed limits as high as 85 miles per
hour in the United States, which has a significant impact, even
more impact not just on drivers, but on vulnerable road users.
Mr. Garcia of Illinois. And this recommendation to stop
using the 85th percentile speed to set speed limits applies to
all types of roadways, correct?
Ms. Homendy. That is right. It is not just on interstates.
That 85th percentile applies--it is a one-size-fits-all
approach. It is the engineering rule of thumb in the U.S. right
now, where they are setting speed limits on the highways just
like they are setting speed limits on local roads----
Mr. Garcia of Illinois [interposing]. Yes.
Ms. Homendy [continuing]. Although there has been a move
recently to turn that over to local and municipal jurisdiction,
which is a good thing.
Mr. Garcia of Illinois. Yes, thank you. The NTSB has
recommended that we use instead what is called a Safe System
approach to road safety. This is something that was a prominent
policy in Chairman DeFazio's INVEST Act. Can you explain what a
Safe System approach is to road safety, and why that is the
recommended approach?
Ms. Homendy. Yes. In the past few decades--thank you for
the question. In the past few decades, we have really focused
on education enforcement, which isn't going to get us very far.
We need a comprehensive, holistic approach to address road
safety, and look at how we design our roads, how those roads
are designed for use.
In the past, we have focused on the design of roads--on
efficiency, and getting people from A to B, and not for safety
and how they are being used.
In addition, we need to look at safe vehicles. That is part
of the Safe System approach, and implementing technology on
vehicles that can save lives, like automatic emergency braking
and forward collision warning.
Certainly, we are not saying education and enforcement
isn't part of the holistic approach; it is. But other parts of
the system also are critical and need an equal share of
addressing fatalities and serious injuries on our roads.
Mr. Garcia of Illinois. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Madam Chair, I yield back.
Mrs. Napolitano. The gentleman yields back.
Mr. Stauber, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Stauber. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
I see that the NTSB's Most Wanted List for transportation
and safety improvements--the NTSB includes pipeline leak
mitigation as a priority.
We have all seen the stories and the near tragedies that
involved incidents where pipeline protesters and anti-jobs and
anti-energy activists have gone out to pipelines to cause
damage to the pipeline and the environment they claim to
support. We saw many incidents in my district, when they failed
to stop the Enbridge Line 3 replacement project. Valve-turning
incidents, and even cases of protesters shooting pipelines with
guns are extremely concerning, especially since these very
criminals see little to no jail time.
Ms. Homendy, the NTSB is prioritizing pipeline leak
mitigation. What specifically is the NTSB doing to combat these
violent protesters from committing acts of environmental
terrorism on the pipelines and putting so many people's lives
at risk?
Ms. Homendy. Thank you for the question. When it comes to
criminal activities, the NTSB, if we determine that an accident
or incident is criminal in nature, we have an MOU with the FBI,
and turn over those criminal matters to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
Mr. Stauber. That MOU, does it give the FBI the
jurisdiction to lessen the crime, or reduce the sentence?
Ms. Homendy. The MOU is just geared towards our activities
and our work with the FBI, and when we would turn over criminal
matters, and what resources they would help the NTSB on any of
our investigations.
Mr. Stauber. Would you agree that pipeline protesters and
anti-jobs and anti-energy activists who are doing this to
pipelines put not only themselves, the environment, but the
workers themselves at risk?
Ms. Homendy. It is not an issue I have been focused on, and
I am happy to get back to you on that.
Mr. Stauber. OK, but you are aware of the pipeline
protesters?
Ms. Homendy. I am aware of pipeline protesters, yes.
Mr. Stauber. Which protesting pipelines are you aware of,
then?
Ms. Homendy. There have been numerous ones over the past
several years of protests, including TransCanada Keystone
Pipeline.
Mr. Stauber. Right. How about Enbridge Energy replacement
Line 3? Are you aware of those protesters?
Ms. Homendy. I am aware that there are objections, yes.
Mr. Stauber. Objections or protesters?
Ms. Homendy. Or protesters.
Mr. Stauber. OK. What do you think it costs the local
communities to safeguard, prepare, defend, and charge these
anti-jobs, anti-energy activists? What do you think it costs
the local communities?
Ms. Homendy. I don't know the answer to that, sir.
Mr. Stauber. Is that something that you should consider in
working your MOU with the FBI, if you think it is a serious
enough crime, and do you think it is a serious enough crime?
Ms. Homendy. The NTSB does not have jurisdiction over
criminal matters. We have jurisdiction over accidents and
incidents, as defined in our law.
Mr. Stauber. Is an incident a protester?
Ms. Homendy. If it is criminal in nature, it would not be
under our jurisdiction.
Mr. Stauber. So, what you are saying is the NTSB refers
everything to the FBI.
Ms. Homendy. If it is criminal in nature.
Mr. Stauber. OK. The fact of the matter is--I will share
with you, in case you don't know--Enbridge Line 3 came through
part of our district. We had protesters inside the pipe while
it was being raised. Workers were put in serious jeopardy for
their safety. It taxed the local law enforcement community. In
fact, they had to bring in more law enforcement to secure the
appropriate area.
And I hope that the NTSB, as you go forward, Madam, I hope
that you would look into the fact that the NTSB should weigh in
heavily on these anti-jobs, anti-energy protesters, which are
affecting communities across this Nation.
And with that, I will yield back. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Homendy. Thank you.
Mrs. Napolitano. The gentleman yields back. We have Ms.
Williams of Georgia, followed by Mrs. Steel.
Ms. Williams, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Williams of Georgia. Thank you, Madam Chair.
From travelers using the world's busiest and most efficient
airport to folks getting where they need to go with the
Nation's eighth largest rapid transit system to drivers
navigating our busy roads, now Georgia's Fifth Congressional
District is always on the move. And a lot of people on the move
means a lot of people that we need to keep safe. That is why
the work of the National Transportation Safety Board is so
important, especially in my district.
A small but mighty agency, the Board investigates
transportation accidents and helps prevent future accidents
from happening. To ensure the Board truly serves us is up to
Congress to make sure that we provide it the resources and the
support that it needs. Today I look forward to hearing from
Chair Homendy how we can do that through reauthorization.
Chair Homendy, according to the Board's data, investigating
a highway accident takes an average of 18 months, and
investigating aviation accidents takes an average of 19 months.
In your reauthorization proposal, are there specific resources
or supports that ensure that the Board can provide the most
efficient, thorough assessments possible to guide timely
investigations and subsequent safety recommendations?
Ms. Homendy. Thank you very much for the question, and
thank you for your leadership on safety.
The NTSB is very focused on reducing our backlog of
investigations and improving the timeliness of issuing our
accident reports. Part of that is through dedicating the
appropriate resources, and part of that is through implementing
process improvements, which we have done at the agency.
As far as resources, we need to fill the gaps. Right now,
we have a number of vacancies that we need to fill that have
been, quite frankly, on the books for some time. And we are
working diligently to do that. But then we also need to expand
our resources.
With respect to the timeliness in particular, not only have
we put certain processes in place, but we have added a couple
of personnel, some former employees from the NTSB who are
retired annuitants, who will be solely focused on the backlog
in aviation. We are doing very well on the backlog in other
modes. In some modes, it is non-existent.
So, we are working and making significant improvement, and
would appreciate your consideration of our reauthorization
proposal, which would provide us a modest increase in resources
and personnel, which would help us improve the timeliness of
our accident investigations.
Ms. Williams of Georgia. Thank you. Additionally, the
National Transportation Safety Board's Most Wanted List
recommends protecting vulnerable road users through a Safe
System approach. We have heard witnesses testify in previous
hearings about the Safe System approach as an alternative way
States and localities can address traffic safety.
Could you elaborate on how the Safe System approach
promotes more equitable and effective traffic safety
enforcement?
And how would your reauthorization proposal support this
approach?
Ms. Homendy. The NTSB has on its Most Wanted List of
transportation safety improving the safety of vulnerable road
users through the Safe System approach.
We have issued a number of reports--pedestrian safety,
bicyclist safety, and motorcyclist safety--focused on improving
their safety on our Nation's roads. And within that, we have
hundreds of recommendations that still require implementation,
everything from improving safety on our roads to how they are
designed, how they are built, to ensure that they are built for
the use of all road users, not just vehicles, to looking at
improving the safety of vehicles themselves.
So, we do endorse the Safe System approach and are working
hard to promote that through all our actions at the NTSB.
Ms. Williams of Georgia. Thank you. And in addition to
that, reducing inequalities and creating opportunities for
diversity and inclusion is something that I also take just as
seriously as safety. So, as your agency focuses on diversity,
equity, and inclusion to create a more talented workforce, what
impact would a broader range of perspectives at the agency have
on ensuring potential safety issues are identified and
reported?
Ms. Homendy. Well, with respect to impact, it would be
tremendous. And just so you are aware, part of our core values
is diversity and inclusion. And we have begun to implement two
strategic plans focused on diversity, equity, inclusion, and
accessibility, including retaining, hiring, and attracting a
diverse workforce, which is critical to the NTSB, critical to
our investigation because people who bring different
experiences, different thoughts, and different backgrounds help
in our investigations and in all our work at the NTSB.
Ms. Williams of Georgia. And while I do have more
questions, I am, unfortunately, out of time. So, Madam Chair, I
yield back.
Mrs. Napolitano. The gentlelady yields back. We will
recognize Mrs. Steel, followed by Mr. Lowenthal and Mr. Sires.
Mrs. Steel, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Steel. Thank you very much.
Madam Chairwoman, the National Transportation Safety Board
plays an important role in investigating transportation
accidents. And I want to commend the work that NTSB has done in
my district, especially with the recent fatal helicopter crash
of a Huntington Beach officer, Nicholas Vella.
The NTSB also plays an important role in providing safety
recommendations to Federal and State agencies. Unfortunately,
both alcohol-impaired and drug-impaired driving deaths have
become a common issue in Orange County. As you know, drug-
impaired driving is very difficult to detect, compared to
alcohol-impaired driving. How is the NTSB improving drug
testing protocols, and what are some of the lessons learned
from the past accidents?
Ms. Homendy. Thank you for the question. Ending drug and
alcohol impairment is on our Most Wanted List of transportation
safety improvements. And in fact, we have a pretty
comprehensive report coming out this fall focused on drug-
impaired driving, and we will make sure to brief you on that.
But we have several recommendations, including improving
drug testing, setting a standard to determine impairment, like
we have with alcohol. That is not something the NTSB does. It
is something we recommend, and have issued recommendations both
to the Department of Transportation, and I believe we have also
issued recommendations to the Department of Health and Human
Services, as well.
Mrs. Steel. Thank you very much. With the emerging
transportation technologies, including commercial space,
unmanned aircraft systems, and even autonomous vehicles, how
are you collaborating with the commercial stakeholders in these
transforming sectors in support of NTSB's broader mission of
improving transportation safety?
Ms. Homendy. Thank you for the question. We have tremendous
outreach with the commercial community, whether it is through
speaking with different organizations, visiting their sites, or
speaking at events they have, or participating in workgroups
where we work together on emerging safety issues and discuss
those openly, including what we are seeing in accidents and
incidents and trends in safety and transportation. So, we work
very closely with them.
And then, in our accident investigations, if an operator
is--if something occurred with that operator, the operator more
than likely would be provided party status, which means they
would be part of our fact-finding portion of the investigation.
We would work closely together, and they would be able to
identify safety gaps immediately that they could address.
Mrs. Steel. So, when is the report going to come out, is it
right now that you are going through the process?
Ms. Homendy. I am sorry, it was difficult to hear.
Mrs. Steel. When is this report going to come out that you
are putting all this information together after all these
meetings, are we going to expect it by the end of this year or
the next few months? And some--like a progress report is going
to come out?
Ms. Homendy. With respect--I am sorry, with respect to drug
testing and impairment, or just our work with private entities?
Mrs. Steel. Private entities regarding unmanned aircraft
systems and then autonomous vehicles. And these are actually
creating a lot of accidents, too. Hopefully, not, but
[inaudible] has begun, and is that coming out from your agency
or not?
Ms. Homendy. Well, we work on individual accident
investigations, and we do have certain accident investigations
right now involving urban air mobility, or advanced air
mobility, and involving driver assistance systems. Those
reports--I would have to check on the dates of those reports,
and get back to you for the record for those accident
investigations.
Mrs. Steel. Thank you very much. I yield back.
Mrs. Napolitano. The gentlelady yields back. Mr. Lowenthal,
you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Lowenthal. Thank you, and thank you, Chair Homendy, for
being with us today. I am going to return to a theme that we
have heard frequently during this hearing and this
reauthorization, and that is the theme of why do investigations
and data collection or reporting take so long.
You mentioned in your opening testimony your agency's
ongoing investigation into the ship striking a pipeline off the
coast between Huntington Beach and Long Beach, California. This
incident substantially impacted communities and ecosystems
throughout southern California, including residents of my
district.
And while I understand that many agencies and many people
are investigating this incident, and you cannot comment on the
specifics of this ongoing matter, I would like to emphasize how
important a quick resolution of this process and a timely
report will be to my constituents.
As you are aware, pipeline investigations take an average
of 21.8 months. Oh, and that is the average over the last 5
years. Can you elaborate on what Congress can do and what your
agency can do to reduce this time lag and produce timely and
actionable data more quickly?
Ms. Homendy. Thank you for the question. And for that
specific pipeline accident, we will have our own report, but I
believe the Coast Guard is the lead in that investigation.
With respect to our investigative process, we are looking
at efficiencies. Right now, we have looked at the data, we have
identified areas where we believe have held up the
investigations. It is actually not in the investigative process
many times, but is in the report writing and editing process.
And there are efficiencies taking place in that area.
And we are also dedicating additional resources where we
can, filling gaps in vacancies, making sure they have adequate
resources. I will tell you that, for our pipeline personnel, we
have six pipeline investigators. This one in particular that
you mentioned, regarding the Elly Platform, is being led by our
marine safety team, and they have 11 investigators. So, while
we put forward process improvements in terms of scaling
investigations and making sure we have adequate processes in
place to move forward on investigations, we also need to match
that with additional resources.
And certainly, in marine safety, our accidents profile has
increased eightfold over the last decade, but our investigation
staff has not.
Mr. Lowenthal. So, you are saying that, with the numbers of
people that you have doing the investigation, that the slowdown
in actual reporting is really due to the report writing?
Ms. Homendy. We did collect data, and report writing and
review has taken most of the time. We didn't have--before I was
Chair, we didn't have information on where the holdup was. Our
team behind me really took leadership, and identified where the
areas were that we could improve, including the review. Our
investigation will get done, but then the review process takes
longer than it should, and we need to get those through.
In addition, there is one more area that I do want to
mention that can hold up our investigations, and that has been
when the Coast Guard and others have pursued criminal matters.
It can close off our investigation very quickly, because
witnesses tend to not want to discuss things with us. So, that
can be an increased complexity in our investigations, and has
been happening more and more. And it is something that we are
looking to address and trying to address with our partners in
safety.
Mr. Lowenthal. And just before I yield back, I realize that
you can't comment specifically on this case, but that last
comment that you made about people being reluctant to testify
because of potential criminal matters may be applicable to the
rupture of this pipeline.
So, with that, I yield back.
Mrs. Napolitano. The gentleman yields back. We have Mr.
Sires, Mr. Lynch, and Mr. Auchincloss. Are they available?
[No response.]
Mrs. Napolitano. Well, with that, that concludes our
hearing.
I want to say to Madam Homendy that you are doing a lot
with a little. And the question from Mr. Gimenez substantiating
the reason for a request to increase in budget, be sure we get
that so the committee can review, and congratulations to you
and your staff for the preeminent investigative body that you
have.
This concludes our hearing, as I said. I would like to
thank you for your testimony. It has been very helpful and
informative.
I ask unanimous consent that the record of today's hearing
remain open until such a time as our witness has provided
answers to any questions that may be submitted to her in
writing.
I also ask unanimous consent that the record remain open
for 15 days for any additional comments and information
submitted by Members or the witness to be included in the
record of today's hearing.
And without objection, is so ordered.
The committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:19 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

Submissions for the Record

----------

Prepared Statement of Hon. Eddie Bernice Johnson, a Representative in
Congress from the State of Texas
Thank you, Chairman DeFazio, and Ranking Member Graves, for holding
today's hearing on reauthorizing the National Transportation Safety
Board. I would also like to thank our esteemed panelist for testifying
today.
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) plays a paramount
role in investigating transportation accidents and ensuring that what
we learn from these accidents prevents them from happening again. The
NTSB's proven record of accomplishment adds credibility to every
investigation they are involved in, and their role as a U.S. emissary
in international incidents helps foster diplomacy and cooperation
between nations.
The NTSB recently completed an investigation of a natural gas
explosion in Dallas, Texas, that killed a 12-year-old girl, injured
four others and destroyed three homes. The investigation found that
Atmos Energy Corporation should have acted earlier and could have
prevent this deadly accident.
It also found a need for more oversight from federal, state, and
local agencies. This was a real tragedy for the whole community and
we're anxious to learn what is being done to prevent this from
happening to anyone else.
I look forward to hearing from our witness what additional
resources the National Transportation Safety Board needs to continue
the great work it is doing to improve transportation safety here in the
United States and throughout the world.

Letter of April 20, 2022, from Catherine Chase, President, Advocates
for Highway and Auto Safety, to Hon. Peter A. DeFazio, Chair, and Hon.
Sam Graves, Ranking Member, Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, Submitted for the Record by Hon. Peter A. DeFazio
April 20, 2022.
The Honorable Peter DeFazio, Chair,
The Honorable Sam Graves, Ranking Member,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC 20515.
Dear Chairman DeFazio and Ranking Member Graves:
Thank you for holding the April 6, 2022, hearing, ``National
Transportation Safety Board Reauthorization.'' We respectfully request
that this letter be included in the hearing record.
Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety (Advocates) is a coalition of
public health, safety, law enforcement, and consumer organizations,
insurers and insurance agents that promotes highway and auto safety
through the adoption of federal and state laws, policies and
regulations. Advocates is unique both in its board composition and its
mission of advancing safe vehicles, safe motorists and road users, and
safe roadway environments.
As this Committee is well aware, our nation's roads have become
more dangerous and deadly. In 2020, 38,824 people were killed in
traffic crashes--the highest annual total in more than a decade.
Increased incidence of impaired driving, speeding, and lack of seat
belt use contributed to this spike. Data for the first nine months of
2021 find the horrific rise in traffic fatalities continued, with a 12
percent upsurge over the same period in 2020 and the highest percentage
jump during the first nine months in the recorded history of data in
the Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS). Additionally, nearly
5,000 people were killed and more than 145,000 more were injured in
crashes involving large trucks in 2020. Crashes also impose a
tremendous societal cost estimated to exceed one trillion dollars
annually.
This state of calamity and catastrophe on our roadways makes the
work performed by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) all
the more necessary. The NTSB is an effective and essential agency with
a remarkable 55-year record of advancing transportation safety
including on our nation's roads. Through their expert crash
investigations, safety recommendations, biennial Most Wanted List of
Transportation Safety Improvements (MWL), and other activities, the
NTSB plays a critical role in bringing needed attention to safety
deficiencies and identifying solutions for preventing crashes, saving
lives and reducing injuries. Advocates and many other stakeholders
dedicated to improving transportation safety rely on the NTSB's
leadership and expertise to inform their organizations' agendas and
priorities, and then urge Congress to advance legislation on needed
improvements. It is vital that this agency has sufficient resources to
perform its lifesaving mission. We strongly urge the Committee to
support robust funding, including for necessary staff and expertise as
was requested by the agency, to advance their work.
As NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy discussed during her testimony
before the Committee, the NTSB is increasingly sought to investigate
fatal crashes involving cars equipped with automated driving systems
(ADS) and varying levels of driving automation. These investigations
have and will continue to identify safety deficiencies, determine
contributing causes, and result in recommendations for government and
industry actions to prevent future deadly incidents. As vehicles become
more technologically advanced, the NTSB must have sufficient staff with
highly technical knowledge and skills. ADS and autonomous vehicles
(AVs) are complex ``computers on wheels'' often traveling in
complicated driving environments, and properly assessing their
performance will require appropriately educated and trained personnel.
The public is supportive of the NTSB's unique expertise and critical
role in ensuring the safety of vehicles with ADS. In a 2018 public
opinion poll commissioned by Advocates, 80 percent of respondents
indicated they believed the NTSB investigations will be helpful in
identifying problems and recommending improvements.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ ORC International CARAVAN Public Opinion Poll, Commissioned by
Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety, July 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The NTSB investigations also underscore the need for requirements
for collection of and access to vehicle performance and crash data. To
that end, Advocates continues to urge the U.S. Department of
Transportation (DOT) to issue a Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard
(FMVSS) requiring all vehicles be equipped with event data recorders
(EDRs) to capture all necessary data in a standardized format to
understand and evaluate the safety performance of vehicles, especially
those equipped with an ADS and AVs. If the U.S. DOT does not take this
action, Congress should advance legislation requiring them to do so by
a date certain for issuance of a rule and for compliance. Not only will
this data be essential for the NTSB to carry out its investigative
duties, but it should also be available to leading safety
organizations, researchers and the public.
We once again commend this Committee for its leadership and
dedication to advancing the INVEST in America Act (H.R. 3684), from
which many of the safety advances were included in the Infrastructure
Investment and Jobs Act ((IIJA), Pub. L. 117-58). While Advocates
worked together with Congress to include significant safety provisions,
many of which were rooted in NTSB recommendations, there is still more
work to be done including on outstanding NTSB recommendations. Since
the IIJA enactment, Advocates has been urging the U.S. DOT to act
expeditiously on the safety directives and to treat the provisions as a
``floor'' and not a ``ceiling'' for its end products. We have attached
a list of safety issues, which are aligned with the NTSB MWL,
recommendations and reports.
The safety of all road users relies on the imperative and
influential work of the NTSB. Its mission, which includes ``Making
transportation safer by conducting independent accident
investigations'' and ``advocating safety improvements,'' is
foundational to protecting everyone in and around vehicles of today, as
well as during the transition as vehicles become increasingly
automated. Advocates urges this Committee to authorize the resources
needed to bolster the agency's effectiveness and efficiency. Thank you
again for your safety leadership.
Sincerely,
Catherine Chase,
President, Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety.

cc: Members of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

Attachment
NTSB's Most Wanted List 2021-2022 and
Advocates' Recommendations for Action
The MWL is a prime example of the agency providing a national focus
on persistent and emerging safety issues and solutions which should be
spotlighted and which are supported by their investigations and
research reports. The 2021-2022 MWL identifies five issue areas to
improve highway safety, followed by Advocates' recommendations for
action, including the below, among others:
``Implement a Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Speeding-Related
Crashes''
Why Action is Needed: Excess speed can contribute to both
the frequency and severity of motor vehicle crashes. Speeding is a
leading contributor to traffic crashes, and fatalities in speeding-
related crashes spiked a staggering 17 percent in 2020.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Stewart, T. (2022, March). Overview of motor vehicle crashes in
2020 (Report No. DOT HS 813 266). National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
What Action is Needed:
+ Automated enforcement (AE), the use of speed and red-light
cameras to augment traditional enforcement, is an effective deterrent
against dangerous driving behavior including speeding and is proven to
improve safety. We were encouraged that the IIJA lifted the prohibition
on use of federal funding for AE systems in school and work zones and
urge the Committee to remove the remaining restrictions. Advocates,
along with AAA, Governors Highway Safety Association, the Insurance
Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS), and National Safety Council
published the ``Automated Enforcement Program Checklist'' to signal
support from our organizations and provide practical suggestions for
successful planning, implementing and evaluating of AE programs.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Automated Enforcement Program Checklist, available at https://
saferoads.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/AE-checklist-May-2021.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ U.S. DOT should update guidelines that require use of the
``85th percentile'' in speed limit setting to instead focus on safety.
The 85th percentile speed is the speed at or below 85 percent of the
vehicles on a road are traveling on the day and time that speed is
measured. This speed is then used to set speed limits. This method
ignores evidence obtained by the NTSB and others that people often
drive faster than the speed limit and that average speeds tend to
increase whenever speed limits are raised which leads to an escalation
in repeated speed limit increases.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ IIHS: Speed, IIHS available at https://www.iihs.org/topics/
speed
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ U.S. DOT should complete research on vehicle safety
technologies which hold potential to reduce speeding such as
intelligent speed assistance (ISA). These systems can provide
information to drivers about present speed limits, warn drivers when a
car's speed is above the limit, and discourage speeding.\5\ U.S. DOT
should also complete a rulemaking on speed limiters for commercial
motor vehicles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ European New Car Assessment Programs: Speed assistance systems,
available at: https://www.euroncap.com/en/vehicle-safety/the-ratings-
explained/safety-assist/speed-assistance/
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ Roadway infrastructure changes such as speed humps, road
diets, protected bike lanes, speed reduction zones and other measures,
can help to improve safety by reducing excess speed, better protecting
vulnerable road users (VRUs) and preventing crashes. These changes are
consistent with a Safe System Approach (SSA) to improving roadway
safety infrastructure and we laud the provisions in the IIJA which
incentivize such. We urge the U.S. DOT to encourage states and
localities to take advantage of the funding opportunities in the IIJA
to make their roads safer through infrastructure improvements.
``Protect Vulnerable Road Users through a Safe System Approach''
Why Action is Needed: In 2020, fatalities of pedestrians
and bicyclists reached their highest levels in more than three decades.
NTSB Chair Homendy has championed a SSA and been instrumental in
raising awareness of this comprehensive strategy to improve safety for
all road users and especially VRUs. The SSA is also closely aligned
with Advocates' longstanding mission and approach and our recent work
as a member of the Johns Hopkins Center for Injury Research and Policy
Safe System working group which in 2021 released its Recommendations of
the Safe System Consortium. The SSA anticipates human error as being
unavoidable and injury tolerance as having limitations and seeks to
prevent fatalities by minimizing conflicts and reducing crash forces
when crashes do occur. The SSA can be especially beneficial to VRUs
through its focus on safe speeds and by supporting the adoption of the
identified road safety improvements as well as protected intersections,
accessible sidewalks, leading intervals for signaling, and others.
What Action is Needed:
+ Advanced vehicle safety technologies such as automatic
emergency braking (AEB) that detects and responds to VRUs including
pedestrians and bicyclists should be required as standard equipment on
new vehicles. We urge the U.S. DOT to ensure the final rule for AEB,
which was required by the IIJA, specifies response to these road users
as part of the minimum performance standard.
+ The severity of collisions between VRUs and vehicles can be
reduced by requiring the hood and bumper areas of vehicles to be more
forgiving when crashes do occur. We urge the U.S. DOT to commence and
complete rulemaking with a date certain for compliance.
``Prevent Alcohol- and Other Drug-Impaired Driving''
Why Action is Needed: In 2020, fatalities in alcohol-
impaired driving crashes jumped 14 percent. Drunk driving continues to
account for approximately 30 percent of crash fatalities and has for
over a decade. When drug and alcohol use is combined, known as
``polyuse,'' impairment can be amplified.
What Action is Needed:
+ The IIHS has found that alcohol-detection systems can save
more than 9,000 lives a year if widely deployed.\6\ We urge the U.S.
DOT to meet the deadlines in the IIJA to issue a final rule requiring
advanced impaired driving prevention technology be equipped as standard
on new vehicles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, Alcohol-detection
systems could prevent more than a fourth of U.S. road fatalities (Jul.
23, 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ The NHTSA should undertake research to identify a causal link
between marijuana use, impairment, and crashes; to develop verified
roadside testing technology; and, to develop an impairment standard for
marijuana (noting current research does not support a per se level).
The agency should also continue funding for law enforcement training
programs to detect and prevent impaired driving.
+ Reducing the limit of alcohol and driving to .05 percent blood
alcohol concentration (BAC) is a research-based countermeasure employed
around the world to deter drunk driving. A study, Evaluation of Utah's
.05 BAC Per Se Law, released by NHTSA on February 11, 2022, finds that
Utah experienced a nearly 20 percent drop in traffic fatalities in 2019
(248), the first year that the law was in effect, compared to 2016
(281), the last year before the law was enacted.\7\ Driving at .05
percent BAC or higher is dangerous, and public health researchers,
experts, a coalition of safety advocates and the NTSB agree that state
laws lowering BAC will reduce the horrific toll of deaths and injuries
caused by drunk driving. Advocates urges Congress to revise the Section
405 National Priority Safety Program to create a new highway safety
incentive grant award for states that reduce the BAC limit while
driving to .05 percent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ United States Department of Transportation, NHTSA, Office of
Behavioral Safety Research, Evaluation of Utah's .05 BAC Per Se Law
[Traffic Tech], DOT HS 813 234; February 2022.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
``Require Collision-Avoidance and Connected-Vehicle Technologies on all
Vehicles''
Why Action is Needed: The IIHS has shown that collision-
avoidance systems, also known as advanced driver assistance systems
(ADAS), have remarkable potential to reduce crashes. For example, AEB
can decrease front-to-rear crashes with injuries by 56 percent in
passenger vehicles.\8\ In large trucks, AEB can reduce front-to-rear
crashes by 40 percent.\9\ Notably, motor vehicle crashes are a leading
killer of teenagers in the U.S., and teen drivers are far more likely
than other drivers to be involved in fatal crashes because they lack
driving experience and tend to take greater risks. IIHS research has
found that ``crash avoidance features and teen-specific vehicle
technologies have the potential to prevent or mitigate up to three-
quarters of fatal crashes involving teen drivers.'' \10\ Absent a
minimum performance standard, access to these technologies is
inequitable as consumers may have to purchase a luxury vehicle or
expensive trim model to get the safety features. All families should
have the safest braking systems. Moreover, without a standard there is
no certainty that the technology will perform as needed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ IIHS, Real world benefits of crash avoidance technologies,
available at: https://www.iihs.org/media/259e5bbd-f859-42a7-bd54-
3888f7a2d3ef/e9boUQ/Topics/ADVANCED%20DRIVER
%20ASSISTANCE/IIHS-real-world-CA-benefits.pdf.
\9\ IIHS, Study shows front crash prevention works for large trucks
too, available at: https://www.iihs.org/news/detail/study-shows-front-
crash-prevention-works-for-large-trucks-too
\10\ IIHS, Driving technology promises large safety benefits for
teens, September 2021.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
What Action is Needed:
+ NHTSA should expeditiously issue a final rule requiring all
new vehicles (passenger vehicles, buses, and trucks) to be equipped
with ADAS. The IIJA initiates this process.
+ Connected vehicle technologies, including vehicle-to-vehicle
(V2V), vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I), and vehicle-to-everything
(V2X), can relay information and augment safety benefits. Connected
vehicle technology should be advanced by NHTSA updating and completing
the 2017 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on V2V as well as partnering
with the Federal Highway Administration to study the needs and benefits
of V2I with the goal of V2X.\11\ The IIJA required DOT to expand
research efforts to ensure VRUs will be incorporated into connected
vehicle systems within 180 days and report to Congress not later than
two years. We urge NHTSA to issue the rule on V2V and complete its work
on V2X swiftly.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ 82 FR 3854 (Jan. 12, 2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
``Eliminate Distracted Driving''
Why Action is Needed: Distracted driving is a pervasive,
yet underreported, issue on our nation's roadways. A new public opinion
poll released by Advocates and Selective Insurance Group found that
nearly three-quarters (70 percent) of licensed drivers used a mobile
device while driving for personal reasons in the past 90 days. When
asking those who drive for work, the number was even more alarming with
86 percent reporting mobile device use when driving for work in the
last three months.\12\ Another new poll from Nationwide Insurance found
that 66 percent of drivers believe holding their phone while driving is
dangerous, yet half (51 percent) admitted to doing so.\13\ Distracted
driving may become further exacerbated as vehicles are equipped with
automated driving system features, which still require an attentive and
ready driver to take over the driving task at any time, yet could allow
for driver disengagement, automation complacency or foreseeable misuse.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ The Harris Poll on behalf of Selective Insurance and Advocates
for Highway and Auto Safety, March 2022.
\13\ Nationwide, Survey: 86 percent of drivers support hands-free
legislation, April 15, 2022.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
What Action is Needed:
+ Driver monitoring technology offers a potential technological
countermeasure against distracted driving. The IIJA directed NHTSA to
initiate research on driver monitoring technology within three years
and report to Congress not later than 180 days after the research is
completed, with the discretion to determine if a rulemaking is
required. Advocates urges U.S. DOT to meet this requirement.
+ State laws banning distracting viewing activities, such as
video conferencing, viewing social media and apps behind the wheel, are
needed to deter this dangerous behavior. A new grant opportunity in the
IIJA is intended to encourage states to upgrade their laws to do so. We
urge this Committee and NHTSA to enhance safety incentive grant
programs to assure they are prompting state action as well as providing
states the resources they need for enforcement of such.
NTSB's Investigations Expose Safety Problems and Inform Advocates'
Policy Recommendations on Commercial Motor Vehicle Issues
As the NTSB has been at the forefront of investigating devastating
crashes involving large trucks, motorcoaches, and school buses, its
work has uncovered serious safety lapses and recommended commonsense
actions to prevent such incidents in the future. As a result, Advocates
urges action by Congress and U.S. DOT on the following issues, among
others:
Truck underride guards to prevent a passenger vehicle
from traveling under the rear or side of a trailer and significantly
increase the chances of survival: The IIJA directed NHTSA to update the
standard for rear guards and research side underride guards within one
year. The U.S. DOT should act to meet these deadlines, and if the
agency does not issue a final rule on side underride guards with
deadlines for completion and compliance, Congress should direct them to
do so.
Speed limiters for commercial motor vehicles (CMVs): On
average, over 1,000 lives are lost annually to speeding CMVs. NHTSA and
the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) should partner
and issue a final rule requiring all new CMVs to be equipped with speed
limiting devices and to compel their use in CMVs in which they are
already installed. Speed limiters should be set at speeds no higher
than 65 miles per hour.
Driver training which includes a minimum number of
behind-the-wheel hours, a requirement not currently included in the
Entry-Level Driver Training Rule: The U.S. DOT should amend the rule
for entry level driver training for all commercial driver license (CDL)
candidates to include a minimum number of behind-the-wheel training
hours to ensure that novice drivers receive adequate training before
operating a large truck on public roads.
Oversight of the CMV industry: FMCSA should require that
truck companies be assessed before the commencement of operations and
subject new carriers that accumulate violations to stricter oversight.
Prevention of truck driver fatigue, a major contributor
to truck crashes: The U.S. DOT and Congress should reject special
interest exemptions from hours of service (HOS) rules and the
requirement to utilize electronic logging devices (ELDs) to ensure
compliance. Additionally, drivers should be properly screened for
obstructive sleep apnea (OSA) and receive the medical treatment they
need to prevent fatigue while driving.
Improve bus safety: NHTSA should expeditiously issue the
overdue rule on anti-ejection countermeasures for motorcoaches, as
required by the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-
21, Pub. L. 112-141) which is now eight years past the deadline. Three-
point seat belts, AEB and electronic stability control (ESC) should be
required on school buses. Additionally, research followed by rulemaking
should be undertaken on fire prevention and mitigation, motion-
activated detection systems that can perceive pedestrians located near
the outside of the school bus, seat belt reminder systems, and ``hot
cars'' detection and alert systems for school buses. The FMCSA should
also improve school bus operations including medical fitness and driver
training.

Appendix

----------

Introduction to responses from Hon. Jennifer Homendy, Chair,
National Transportation Safety Board: Thank you again for the
opportunity to discuss our reauthorization proposal. I am pleased to
answer the additional questions posed by Members of the Committee,
below.
Our reauthorization proposal and the budget request that we
outlined for you represent a modest investment to address our agency's
need to meet future transportation safety challenges. The requested
authorized amount of $129.3 million for the first year under our
proposal, which is equal to the president's fiscal year (FY) 2023
budget request, is an increase of $7.9 million above our current
appropriation; however, 92 percent of that increase would be allocated
to the 4.6 percent required salary increase, nonpay inflationary
increases, and other associated costs for personnel to modestly
increase our staffing from 412 to 425 full-time equivalent positions.
We have identified the need for at least $6.2 million in additional
funding for needed programmatic investments. We are, therefore,
requesting an appropriation of $135.5 million for FY 2023.

Questions from Hon. Eddie Bernice Johnson to Hon. Jennifer Homendy,
Chair, National Transportation Safety Board

Question 1. Chairwoman Homendy, following the investigation of the
devastating gas explosion in Dallas, NTSB made 14 recommendations where
improvements could be made to prevent this from happening again. Can
you tell me what progress is being made by Atmos Energy and the
federal, state, and local oversight agencies in implementing these
recommendations?
Answer. Eleven of the 14 recommendations stemming from that
investigation are open. On May 11, 2022, three of the five
recommendations that we made to Atmos Energy Corporation were
classified ``Closed--Acceptable Action.'' In addition, the Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) and the American Gas
Association, Gas Piping Technology Committee (GPTC) have planned
actions to address the recommendations. Unfortunately, to date, we have
not received responses from the Texas Railroad Commission or the Dallas
Fire-Rescue Department (DFR) regarding any actions to address the
recommendations, and we are following up with them. Any assistance that
you could provide to facilitate responses from those agencies would be
appreciated. Below are the recommendations and a summary of each
recipient's planned and completed actions.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Recommendation and
Number Status Planned or
Completed Actions
------------------------------------------------------------------------
P-21-1.......................... Open-- TO PIPELINE AND
Acceptable HAZARDOUS
Alternate MATERIALS SAFETY
Response.......... ADMINISTRATION:
Expand incident
reporting
requirements in
Title 49 Code of
Federal
Regulations Part
191 so that
events that may
meet the
definition of
``incident'' are
immediately
reported to the
National Response
Center [NRC] even
when the source
of the natural
gas has not been
determined.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
P-21-2.......................... Open-- TO THE PIPELINE
Acceptable AND HAZARDOUS
Response.......... MATERIALS SAFETY
ADMINISTRATION:
Evaluate
industry's
implementation of
the gas
distribution
pipeline
integrity
management [DIMP]
requirements and
develop updated
guidance for
improving their
effectiveness.
The evaluation
should
specifically
consider factors
that may increase
the likelihood of
failure such as
age, increase the
overall risk
(including
factors that
simultaneously
increase the
likelihood and
consequence of
failure), and
limit the
effectiveness of
leak management
programs.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
P-21-3.......................... Open-- TO THE PIPELINE
Acceptable AND HAZARDOUS
Response.......... MATERIALS SAFETY
ADMINISTRATION:
Assist the
Railroad
Commission of
Texas in
conducting the
audit recommended
in Safety
Recommendation P-
21-4.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
P-21-4.......................... Open-- TO THE RAILROAD
Await COMMISSION OF
Response.......... TEXAS: With
assistance from
the Pipeline and
Hazardous
Materials Safety
Administration,
conduct a
comprehensive
audit of Atmos
Energy
Corporation's
incident-
reporting
practices;
policies and
procedures for
responding to
leaks, fires,
explosions, and
emergency calls;
and integrity
management
programs.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
P-21-5.......................... Open-- TO THE DALLAS FIRE-
Await RESCUE
Response.......... DEPARTMENT:
Revise the
continuing
education
requirements for
your arson
investigators to
include training
on building fuel
gas systems.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
P-21-6.......................... Open-- TO THE DALLAS FIRE-
Await RESCUE
Response.......... DEPARTMENT:
Revise your
procedures to
require gas
monitoring after
the occurrence of
a gas-related
structure fire or
explosion.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
P-21-7.......................... Open-- TO THE DALLAS FIRE-
Await RESCUE
Response.......... DEPARTMENT:
Develop and
implement a
formal process to
alert appropriate
local, state, and
federal agencies
of potential
systemic safety
issues that
should be
investigated
further.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
P-21-8.......................... Closed-- TO ATMOS ENERGY
Acceptable CORPORATION:
Action............ Provide initial
and recurrent
training to
Dallas Fire-
Rescue Department
arson
investigators and
firefighters on
the local natural
gas distribution
system and
associated
hazards.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
P-21-9.......................... Closed-- TO ATMOS ENERGY
Acceptable CORPORATION:
Action............ Develop and
implement more
rigorous inside
leak
investigation
requirements in
response to fires
and explosions
when gas
involvement
cannot be
excluded,
including clear
guidance on
pressure testing
and inside gas
measurements and
the potential
need to return to
the property
after
firefighters have
departed.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
P-21-10......................... Closed-- TO ATMOS ENERGY
Acceptable CORPORATION:
Action............ Develop a clear
procedure to
coordinate with
local emergency
responders when
investigating all
fires and
explosions that
may be gas
related to
conclusively
determine whether
your system can
be excluded as a
potential
contributor, and
collecting the
necessary
evidence to
support the
conclusion of
your
investigations.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
P-21-11......................... Open-- TO ATMOS ENERGY
Acceptable CORPORATION:
Response.......... Revise your
policies and
procedures for
responding to
leaks, fires,
explosions, and
emergency calls
to address the
challenges caused
by wet weather
conditions. The
revised policies
and procedures
should include:
(1) leak
investigation
methods that are
reliable in wet
weather; (2) leak
investigation
procedures that
assess all viable
gas migration
paths; (3)
criteria for when
to shut down or
isolate gas
distribution
systems and
pressure test
main and service
lines; and (4) an
alternate safe
response such as
evacuation when
reliable leak
investigations
are not possible
due to wet
weather or other
circumstances.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
P-21-12......................... Open-- TO ATMOS ENERGY
Acceptable CORPORATION:
Response.......... Without delay,
assess your
integrity
management
program, paying
particular
attention to the
areas identified
in this
investigation,
and revise the
program to
appropriately
consider: (1)
threats that
degrade a system
over time, and
(2) the increased
risk that can
result from
factors that
simultaneously
increase the
likelihood and
consequence of
failure.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
P-21-13......................... Open-- TO THE GAS PIPING
Acceptable TECHNOLOGY
Response.......... COMMITTEE:
Develop
additional
guidance that
identifies steps
gas distribution
operators can
take to safely
respond to leaks,
fires,
explosions, and
emergency calls,
considering the
limitations due
to wet weather
conditions, that
includes: (1)
criteria for when
to shut down or
isolate gas
distribution
systems, pressure
test main and
service lines,
and begin
evacuations; (2)
leak
investigation
methods that are
reliable in wet
weather, (3)
require an
alternate safe
response, such as
an evacuation
when reliable
leak
investigations
are not possible
due to wet
weather, and (4)
leak
investigations
that assess all
viable gas
migration paths,
including
granular backfill
and crawlspaces.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
P-21-14......................... Open-- TO THE GAS PIPING
Acceptable TECHNOLOGY
Response.......... COMMITTEE:
Develop guidance
that identifies
steps that gas
distribution
operators can
take to ensure
that their gas
distribution
integrity
management
program, at a
minimum,
appropriately
considers: (1)
threats that
degrade a system
over time, and
(2) the increased
risk that can
result from
factors that
simultaneously
increase the
likelihood and
consequence of
failure.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Question 2. Chairwoman Homendy, I'm pleased to hear that you are
making diversity and equity part of your hiring goals. As the
Chairwoman of the Science, Space, and Technology Committee, I know
there are many STEM focused minorities and HBCU students that would be
a perfect fit for jobs at NTSB. Can you describe what steps you're
taking to reach out to minority job candidates?
Answer. The NTSB has developed strategic plans to support and
address presidential Executive Orders (EOs) 13985, Advancing Racial
Equity and Support for Underserved Communities, and 14035, Diversity,
Equity, Inclusion, and Accessibility [DEIA] in the Federal Workforce.
Our strategic plans include focusing on creating increased employment
equity and external stakeholder equity services for individuals
belonging to underserved communities that have historically been denied
such opportunities.
Additionally, we have taken several steps to ensure that diversity
and equity are central to our hiring goals. First, I have designated
the NTSB's director of the Office of Equal Employment Opportunity,
Diversity, and Inclusion (EEODI) as our agency's chief diversity
officer. She has been with our agency since 2000, and during her time
here, she has established proactive policies and customized educational
training programs and barrier analysis studies to ensure inclusion,
fairness, and nondiscrimination in the NTSB's employment services.
Second, the EEODI office is in the process of hiring a DEIA program
manager to support outreach to women, underrepresented groups, and
persons with targeted disabilities. We expect that person to be on
board by the end of summer.
Third, as part of our strategic human capital plan, we are in the
process of hiring a chief human capitol officer (CHCO) to lead
strategic workforce development and implement policies and procedures
to recruit, hire, develop, promote, and retain a workforce with greater
diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility. The CHCO will also
exercise managerial responsibility for all administrative and technical
aspects of the NTSB Human Capital Management and Training Office;
direct human capital policies, procedures, and guidelines; and assure
that the NTSB is well structured to support its mission requirements.
Finally, the agency continues to participate in recruitment and
other outreach activities at several Historically Black Colleges and
Universities, including Morgan State, Howard University, and Elizabeth
City State University, as well as at Hispanic Serving Institutions,
including the University of Central Florida and the University of
Puerto Rico-Mayaguez. We have also partnered with the Chickasaw Nation
for many years to host summer interns through their program. In
addition, our Diversity and Inclusion Advisory Committee is working
with hiring managers and office directors to revise marketing and
outreach plans, including considering strategies to improve outreach to
universities and colleges, that will coincide with proposed paid
student pathway vacancy announcements.

Question 3. Chairwoman Homendy, the NTSB budget request asks for
significant funds to hire additional staff. I know every case is
different, but would these additional staff members allow the NTSB to
expedite their investigations?
Answer. Recently, the NTSB has faced several issues that affected
the timeliness of our reports, such as government shutdowns, global
pandemics, and parallel criminal investigations of accidents that slow
the process of evidence collection. We are actively pursuing ways to
expedite our processes while keeping in mind the time required to
complete thorough and accurate investigations. Our Office of Aviation
Safety is leading the agency effort and has several initiatives
underway. Our focus has been on process improvements, eliminating the
backlog, and adding resources where most needed. For example, we are
now using a data-driven approach to evaluate each step of an
investigation to identify efficiencies and process improvements. That
approach has already improved our report review process and reduced the
review timeline. We are also utilizing that approach to better monitor,
track, and measure progress, make adjustments if projects are delayed,
and hold employees accountable for performance.
Additionally, we have identified staffing shortages as one source
of timeliness issues. The reduction in workforce due to staff
retirements means that there are simply fewer people to accomplish the
same amount of work. This retirement trend is only projected to
increase over the next several years; therefore, as an interim measure
to meet the immediate need, we have hired retired investigators as
reemployed annuitants to provide writing and final report processing
support for certain investigations. We have also streamlined our hiring
process to expedite filling vacancies, to the extent we are able under
current budget constraints.
Support of our reauthorization proposal would allow the NTSB to
hire more staff to meet the expanded need for transportation
investigations, including those related to emerging issue areas. Funds
will also allow us to focus investigations on our aging infrastructure
and to reinforce our current recommendations.

Questions from Hon. Henry C. ``Hank'' Johnson, Jr. to Hon. Jennifer
Homendy, Chair, National Transportation Safety Board

Question 1. Americans are increasingly returning to work in-person
and more often than not, using roads to get there. Consequently, from
January through September 2021, over 30,000 people died in motor
vehicle traffic crashes--an increase of approximately 12 percent from
for the first nine months of 2020, when folks mostly worked from home.
While car crashes impact all of us, the number of Black Americans who
died in such crashes was up 23 percent from 2019, the largest increase
in traffic deaths among racial groups.
Mrs. Homendy, how concerned are you about the disproportionate
impact on Americans of color and what steps is NTSB taking to combat
the rising traffic fatalities among these communities?
Answer. As you mention, data show that communities of color
disproportionately experience higher numbers of transportation-related
injuries and deaths. In fact, last year, Black Americans saw the
largest increase in traffic deaths compared to any other racial group.
One reason for this increase is that infrastructure in historically
low-income and underserved communities does not support safe
transportation for vulnerable road users, such as pedestrians and
bicyclists. We have long stressed the need to improve safety for such
road users. Safe and equitable access to transportation is everyone's
right.
The NTSB's history of conducting multidisciplinary investigations
has taught us that equitable access to safe transportation can be
achieved by prioritizing what is known as a ``Safe System Approach.'' A
Safe System Approach holistically and comprehensively considers human
error and vulnerability to design a transportation system with
redundancies that enhance protection for everyone. This approach
addresses all aspects of traffic safety: road users, vehicles, speeds,
roads, and postcrash care. We believe so strongly in the benefits of a
Safe System Approach that we have included it on our 2021-2022 Most
Wanted List of Transportation Safety Improvements (MWL).
The NTSB is identifying and reaching out to organizations in
underserved communities to expand the reach of our safety messages and
to promote safe systems, not just automotive safety. We are also
working to produce targeted materials in languages other than English
to ensure that everyone can benefit from our safety advocacy and
protect their communities and families. We believe these actions will
facilitate safety improvements and reduce fatalities and serious
injuries from road users in vulnerable communities.

Question 2. Each year, thousands of people are killed and injured
in preventable crashes. That's why last year, in the House-passed
INVEST Act, I authored several provisions including a requirement that
trucks be equipped with life-saving automatic braking systems, which
prevent a collision or decrease its severity in the few seconds before
it occurs. Collision-Avoidance technologies like these can warn the
driver of an upcoming hazard and act if the driver doesn't respond.
Mrs. Homendy, how can we ensure that these potentially lifesaving
technologies are rolled out in vehicles as soon as possible, while
bearing in mind that some cars lack the existing capacity to fully
implement this technology?
Answer. In 2019, almost 2.1 million rear-end crashes occurred on
the nation's highways, resulting in more than 2,300 fatalities and
almost 600,000 injured people. Many of these crashes could have been
mitigated, or possibly even prevented, had rear-end collision-avoidance
technologies been in place. Collision-avoidance technologies,
especially forward collision warning and automatic emergency braking
(AEB) systems, have been shown to reduce crash frequency and severity.
The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety found that equipping
vehicles with these systems could eliminate more than 40 percent of
rear-end crashes involving large trucks and half of the crashes
involving passenger vehicles.
Our 2021-2022 MWL calls for collision-avoidance and connected-
vehicle technology on all vehicles. Our investigations have led to the
issuance of more than 25 recommendations in this area, many of which
have been directed to the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA). Currently, we have recommendations to NHTSA to
develop and apply performance standards and protocols to assess forward
collision avoidance systems in commercial vehicles; to expand test
protocols to forward collision avoidance systems to include higher test
velocities, detection of bicyclist, pedestrians, motorcyclist, and
highway hardware; and to incorporate forward collision avoidance
systems into the New Car Assessment Program (NCAP) rating system for
passenger vehicles and to include those ratings on the Monroney label
(the new car window sticker). Implementing these recommendations would
ensure that life-saving technologies are installed as standard
equipment in commercial trucks. Safety and performance standards give
manufacturers an incentive to improve performance and drive public
demand for crash-avoidance technologies and driver assistance systems.
The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) included a
provision for the US Department of Transportation (DOT) and, by
delegation, NHTSA, to require that all newly manufactured passenger
motor vehicles include forward collision warning, AEB, and lane-keeping
assistance technology. Although regulations require mandatory
compliance and are enforceable, they also require substantial time to
complete; therefore, in addition to regulations, the NCAP can
effectively encourage fleets to adopt AEB technology.
The IIJA also requires the DOT to update the NCAP by establishing
the following:
Performance test criteria for crash-avoidance technology
Criteria for rating vehicles on pedestrian, cyclist, and
other vulnerable road user safety
A roadmap for future updates to the NCAP, including
meetings and feedback from diverse stakeholders interested in vehicle
safety

NHTSA has developed basic testing protocols for forward collision
avoidance systems in passenger vehicles; however, as we stated earlier,
those protocols must be expanded to include more scenarios that better
represent the hazards encountered on roadways. Additionally, the NCAP
does not rate these technologies, and their performance or presence is
not included in the overall 5-star safety rating. The NTSB considers
this slow NCAP expansion to be the primary reason for the underuse of
its potential. We continue to believe in the potential benefits of the
NCAP to encourage the deployment of advanced vehicle technologies and
ensure consumer recognition, demand, and use of these technologies.
However, these benefits require an updated and dynamic NCAP.
The real-world safety benefits of these technologies are projected
to be substantial, but incorporating them into vehicle fleets remains
slow, so any potential lifesaving benefits have not been fully
realized. Although we recognize NHTSA's progress, the goal of including
collision-avoidance and connected-vehicle technology on all vehicles
remains unmet until all these systems are required in all newly
manufactured vehicles with minimum performance standards. In the
interim, consumers must be provided with clear ratings on these safety
technologies when purchasing new vehicles.

Question 3. Each year, the NTSB's Most Wanted List (MWL) highlights
transportation safety improvements needed now to prevent accidents,
reduce injuries, and save lives. While the NTSB can urge, advocate and
educate, it can not always implement these recommendations.
a. Mrs. Homendy, what important NTSB safety recommendations to DOT
are not currently being addressed?
Answer. As you know, the purpose of the MWL is to increase
awareness and encourage adoption of our safety recommendations, which
are the critical safety improvements that industry, labor, government,
and the public must make across all modes of transportation to prevent
accidents and crashes, reduce injuries, and save lives. There are
currently 87 open recommendations to the secretary of transportation
and the DOT modal administrations that are associated with the MWL. On
May 6, 2022, we transmitted our evaluation [https://www.ntsb.gov/news/
Documents/NTSB%20Evaluation%20of%20DOT%202021-22%20MWL%20Final.pdf] of
the DOT's report to Congress regarding the status of its
recommendations. We are encouraged by the potential for progress in
some areas; however, we remain concerned that there is still much work
to be done to implement many recommendations related to the MWL that
are currently in an unacceptable status or where implementation has
been delayed.

b. How can Congress help the NTSB to ensure these safety
recommendations are coordinated between the various federal agencies
involved and implemented as quickly as possible to ensure thee highest
possible safety standards?
Answer. This Committee has been a key player in ensuring that many
of our recommendations have been implemented, achieving key safety
improvements across transportation modes. You have mandated positive
train control, improved marine passenger vessel safety, and passed
numerous requirements implementing a Safe Systems Approach in the IIJA.
We look forward to continuing to work together to ensure that our
safety recommendations are addressed by the recipients; however, DOT
agencies have often told us they cannot take the recommended action on
several issue areas because of congressionally imposed mandates. For
example:
PHMSA asserts that legislation prohibits it from acting
on NTSB recommendations to require automatic or remote shut-off valves
on existing transmission pipelines. Therefore, the new rule only
applies to new pipeline and would not have prevented the tragedies that
the NTSB has investigated in the past, including the gas-fueled fire
and explosion in San Bruno, California. Congress could address this
serious safety gap by requiring pipeline operators to retrofit existing
lines with automatic or remotely controlled valves to ensure the flow
of oil and gas is stopped in cases of ruptures or leaks.
Roadway (rail track) workers are not covered employees
under the hours-of-service law, so the Federal Railroad Administration
(FRA) claims it cannot prescribe hours-of-service requirements for
these employees as we have recommended. Congress could amend the hours-
of-service law or require the FRA to strengthen fatigue countermeasures
for track employees.
The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA)
has indicated it cannot make any progress on implementing our
recommendation regarding screening for and treating obstructive sleep
apnea (OSA) due to restrictions placed on the it by Public Law 113-45.
Congress should revise this law so the FMCSA can address the dangers of
OSA.
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has indicated
that it will not require helicopter air ambulance (HAA) or other Part
135 operators to have flight data monitoring (FDM) programs to analyze
FDM data due to certain statutory protections of voluntarily submitted
information. Although we believe that the FAA can take the recommended
actions, we also believe that Congress should explicitly give the FAA
the authority to require FDM programs.
In our report on the January 2020 multivehicle crash in
Mt. Pleasant, Pennsylvania, we found that DOT leadership is needed to
establish regulatory certainty and resolve critical issues related to
vehicle-to-everything communication protocols; interference from
unlicensed devices, such as those that use wi-fi; and sufficiency of
communication spectrum needed for advanced connected vehicle
applications. Accordingly, we recommended the DOT implement a plan for
nationwide connected vehicle technology deployment that (1) resolves
issues related to interference from unlicensed devices, such as those
that use wi-fi; (2) ensures sufficient spectrum necessary for advanced
connected vehicle applications; and (3) defines communication protocols
to be used in future connected vehicle deployment. However, the DOT
cannot act unilaterally on our recommendation and must coordinate with
the FCC, but division continues to hinder progress on this lifesaving
technology.

We stand ready to provide information and offer any assistance to
Congress in its efforts to improve transportation safety.

Question 4. As the NTSB notes in its most wanted safety
improvements list, connected-vehicle technologies can help mitigate the
severity of crashes or even stop them from occurring in the first
place. Connected vehicles exchange information with highway
infrastructure and other vehicles using safe, interoperable wireless
communications. Networked vehicles are designed to improve traffic
safety and mobility, while minimizing environmental impacts.
Unfortunately, recent regulatory decisions by the Federal
Communications Commission substantially shrank the communication
spectrum dedicated to connected-vehicle technology. As NTSB noted if
this decision to reallocate bandwidth is not reversed, progress on
improving automotive safety may be slowed.
Mrs. Homendy, has the NTSB made any progress in reaching consensus
with the FCC on this bandwidth allocation?
Answer. I have met with FCC Chair Rosenworcel and expressed the
NTSB's strong support for vehicle-to-everything communication. Although
we have not yet seen consensus that would allow for the widespread
adoption of connected-vehicle technology, I remain committed to working
with the FCC to ensure the availability of an appropriate bandwidth for
current and future transportation safety communications.
In our report on the Mt. Pleasant, Pennsylvania, crash, we
concluded that the future deployment of connected vehicle technology is
threatened by the recent FCC regulatory action that you mention. This
action decreases the size of the intelligent transportation system
communication spectrum, allows harmful interference from unlicensed
devices, such as those that use wi-fi, and introduces significant
regulatory uncertainty. We recommended that the FCC implement
appropriate safeguards to protect vehicle-to-everything communications
from harmful interference from such devices. Earlier this year, we
released a video series [https://www.ntsb.gov/Advocacy/safety-topics/
Pages/v2x.aspx] related to our MWL item regarding connected vehicle
technology to help educate and inform people about this issue.

Questions from Hon. Dina Titus to Hon. Jennifer Homendy, Chair,
National Transportation Safety Board

Question 1. We have seen examples in recent years of missing
aircraft and black boxes that are never found, such as with Malaysia
Airlines Flight 370 in 2014. Modern technology allows black boxes to be
connected to the cloud so that in the event of an anomaly in flight the
black box could be capable of offloading its data to the cloud.
Wouldn't it be useful to the NTSB if the data on black box
recorders were cloud connected and recoverable immediately following a
crash?
Answer. In 2014, the NTSB convened a forum on emerging flight data
and locator technology where we discussed these issues. As a result, we
made two recommendations to the FAA regarding transmitting flight data
to ground-based systems; both of these recommendations are classified
``Open--Acceptable Response.''
A-15-1. Require that all aircraft used in extended
overwater operations and operating under Title 14 Code of Federal
Regulations (1) Part 121 or (2) Part 135 that are required to have a
cockpit voice recorder and a flight data recorder, be equipped with a
tamper-resistant method to broadcast to a ground station sufficient
information to establish the location where an aircraft terminates
flight as the result of an accident within 6 nautical miles of the
point of impact.
A-15-3. Require that all newly manufactured aircraft used
in extended overwater operations and operating under Title 14 Code of
Federal Regulations (1) Part 121 or (2) Part 135 that are required to
have a cockpit voice recorder and a flight data recorder, be equipped
with a means to recover, at a minimum, mandatory flight data
parameters; the means of recovery should not require underwater
retrieval. Data should be captured from a triggering event until the
end of the flight and for as long a time period before the triggering
event as possible.

Question 2. On January 26, 2020, a Sikorsky S-76B helicopter
collided with hilly terrain near the city of Calabasas, California. The
pilot and eight passengers (including Kobe Bryant and his daughter)
were fatally injured, and the helicopter was destroyed. Because there
is no requirement, this helicopter was not equipped with a flight data
monitoring (FDM) recorder or cockpit voice recorder. The synopsis from
the NTSB's report recommends that FAA require all Part 121 and 135
operators to install data monitoring programs and retrofit turbine-
powered aircraft with crash-resistant flight recorders to record
cockpit audio and cockpit images.
Could you speak to the need to equip more helicopters with voice
and data recorders and why this is important to help prevent future
tragedies?
Answer. A crash-resistant flight recorder system capable of
capturing audio and images can provide valuable information on the
circumstances of an accident, including the visual cues the pilot saw,
the pilot's actions, or the helicopter's flight track, all of which can
help determine why the accident occurred, possibly enabling us to
identify additional safety issues and develop additional, focused
safety recommendations to prevent similar accidents in the future.
Additionally, flight recorder systems can be used for an FDM program
that collects data during normal operations, then reviews the data to
identify safety issues and allow an operator to develop mitigations
before an accident occurs. It is critical that FDM programs are
required to analyze the data they collect, not just that FDM recorders
should be installed.
We have previously issued safety recommendations to require
recorders on helicopters. On May 6, 2013, we recommended that the FAA
do the following:
A-13-13. Require all existing turbine-powered,
nonexperimental, nonrestricted-category aircraft that are not equipped
with a flight data recorder [FDR] or cockpit voice recorder [CVR] and
are operating under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Parts 91, 121, or
135 to be retrofitted with a crash-resistant flight recorder system.
The crash-resistant flight recorder system should record cockpit audio
and images with a view of the cockpit environment to include as much of
the outside view as possible, and parametric data per aircraft and
system installation, all as specified in Technical Standard Order C197,
``Information Collection and Monitoring Systems.''

Safety Recommendation A-13-13 is on our current MWL under the issue
area, ``Install Crash-Resistant Recorders and Establish Flight Data
Monitoring Programs.''
The types of CVRs and FDRs that are required to be installed on
certain aircraft are designed to stringent crash-survivability
standards. Crash-resistant image recorders are generally less expensive
to purchase and install, lighter weight, and able to record much of the
same information as CVRs and FDRs, as well as additional information
(such as weather and pilot actions) from cockpit images.
In the years since we issued Safety Recommendation A-13-13, we have
reiterated it six times based on our findings from investigations of
other fatal accidents. We have been issuing similar recommendations
since 2000. In 2017, in an effort to help inform FAA's analysis of the
benefits of such a requirement, we identified all accidents in our
database since 2005 that involved turbine-powered, nonexperimental,
nonrestricted-category aircraft and in which flight crewmembers were
killed. There were 185 such accidents, 159 of which involved advanced
aircraft with complex systems, which can be challenging to investigate
when recorded information is lacking. A recent update of the data
review found that, in NTSB investigations of aviation accidents between
2005 and 2020 involving turbine-powered, nonexperimental,
nonrestricted-category aircraft operating under Part 91 or 135 in which
flight crew were killed, 83 percent had no recording equipment
installed.

Question 3. Over 90 percent of transportation fatalities occur on
our roadways, yet the Office of Highway Safety is among the smallest
within NTSB.
How is the Board able to meet its goals for improving safety on the
roads, which is often a multi-faceted issue, with these limited
resources?
Answer. OHS is responsible for investigating the largest proportion
of transportation deaths and injuries. Almost 95 percent of the
nation's transportation deaths occur on our roadways, and fatalities
are on the rise. An estimated 42,915 people died in motor vehicle
crashes in 2021, an increase of 10.5 percent over 2021.
As our second largest modal office (with 18 investigators), OHS
investigates bridge collapses, mass casualties and injuries on public
transportation vehicles, highway-railroad grade crossing collisions,
and crashes that involve new technologies (such as automated vehicles
and alternatively fueled vehicles). The office also investigates
certain other incidents based on initial analysis about how the
conclusions from the investigation may advance safety.
Part of our congressional mandate is to conduct objective, precise
accident investigations and safety studies and advocate for and promote
our safety recommendations. This requires investigators to analyze,
understand, and respond to technological changes in the transportation
industry. To match the growth of highway crashes and fatalities and be
responsive to the increasing complexity of emerging technologies, we
must increase our budget. Our funding has not kept pace with the need
to hire additional investigative and support staff, to train them, or
to make needed program investments in information technology and
enhanced data capabilities. Our reauthorization proposal ensures that
we can accomplish all these things and represents a strong investment
in our workforce. We greatly appreciate Congress's continued support by
providing the NTSB with the requested authorization of appropriations
to ensure mission readiness.

Question from Hon. Mark DeSaulnier to Hon. Jennifer Homendy, Chair,
National Transportation Safety Board

Question 1. As I'm sure you recall, on June 7, 2017, there was a
potentially catastrophic near-miss aircraft incidents in which an Air
Canada flight arriving at San Francisco International Airport (SFO)
lined up and prepared to land on an occupied runway. In response, I met
with dozens of stakeholders, including the NTSB, to develop the Safe
Landings Act, which outlines a comprehensive response to this incident
and addresses some of the safety concerns identified by experts. I
sincerely appreciate the NTSB's support and cooperation through the
drafting. Short of this legislation passing into law, however, what
steps can the NTSB take today to reduce the risk of other near-misses?
Answer. Thank you, Representative DeSaulnier, for your leadership
with the Safe Landings Act following our investigation of the 2017 SFO
incident. Although we are not mandated to investigate aviation safety
incidents, we investigate a number of them each year because they
result in important safety lessons. As you know, the value in
investigating incidents is that they share the same root causes as
accidents that result in injuries and fatalities. If investigated,
these incidents are an opportunity to discover system-wide improvements
and proactively address risks that may, if unaddressed would likely
result in lives lost in the future.
That is why we are also interested in incidents that occur in
emerging industries, such as commercial human spaceflight. To be clear,
our intention is not to investigate every incident; however,
significant incidents that do not result in injuries or fatalities
still represent opportunities for safety lessons and improvements that
will save lives.
With the current level of funding, the NTSB has limited resources
to fully investigate all these incidents, and we must prioritize those
with the greatest effect on public safety. As a result, we may have to
limit the scope and depth of other investigations and potentially miss
some opportunities to advance safety. With the requested funds,
however, we can expand our investigations of critical near-miss
incidents, and thereby identify areas for safety improvements and
inform significant safety legislation, like the Safe Landings Act.

Questions from Hon. Jesus G. ``Chuy'' Garcia to Hon. Jennifer Homendy,
Chair, National Transportation Safety Board

Question 1. For Chair Homendy: For many years, the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) cited a flawed statistic that 94
percent of vehicle crashes are caused by human error. You have been
very critical of NHTSA's use of this flawed statistic and NHTSA
thankfully removed the statistic earlier this year from their website,
in part due to your efforts. Can you:
a. Explain why this commonly cited, but flawed statistic, that 94
percent of vehicle crashes are due to human error is so wrong;
Answer. The statistic that cites that 94 percent of vehicle crashes
as due to human error comes from research that examined the last
failure just prior to a crash event, with a focus on the driver.
Although the research itself indicates that the results were not
intended to be interpreted as the cause of the crash, they are used
incorrectly by many, including NHTSA, many state departments of
transportation, and some in the autonomous vehicle industry. Using this
false and flawed statistic gives the impression that the only person
who can prevent a crash is a driver. That is inaccurate and contrary to
the Safe System Approach on our MWL. For example, speeding, which
killed almost 12,000 people in 2021, can be addressed through the
following:
Changes in road design
Lowering speed limits and granting authority to local
municipalities and cities to lower limits (avoiding the one-size-fits-
all approach to speed limit setting by states)
Eliminating the 85th percentile approach to setting speed
limits (which dates back to the 1950s and just leads to ever-increasing
speed limits)
Mandating vehicle technologies, such as advanced speed
limiters and collision-avoidance systems
Using speed safety cameras that have the effect of
slowing traffic
Increasing enforcement
Educating drivers and passengers
Investing in postcrash care to ensure responders, in the
event of a crash, can save lives

b. Explain the harm that occurs when the federal government's
leading agency on traffic safety uses a flawed statistic that inhibits
efforts to address preventable traffic crashes and fatalities; and
Answer. As a result of misinformation perpetuated by repeating the
94 percent myth, solutions to saving lives on our highways focus on
changing driver behavior, which, though important, is only a single
solution in a complex system. By taking a Safe System Approach, we
focus on understanding the entire system in which these crashes occur--
this means examining the driver plus the roadway environment, including
speeds and weather; the vehicle and its design for both usability and
occupant protection; and the emergency response. This full examination
identifies a broad range of actions and changes that can prevent or
mitigate a crash. Further, the Safe System Approach allows for road
designers, public health officials, lawmakers, vehicle makers,
transportation providers, and communities to find multiple and
redundant solutions to reducing roadway fatalities rather than limiting
our solutions to driver-based ones.

c. Highlight any other statistics that NHTSA currently uses that
should be revised, withdrawn, or given more context.
Answer. We will continue to review other NHTSA statistics to see if
there are any that need to be revised, withdrawn, or given more
context. However, I will take this opportunity to highlight that the
Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) should rescind its guidance to
use the 85th percentile to set speed limits. This is it a guiding
factor used to determine speed that unintentionally results in
dangerous conditions by setting higher and higher speeds. This approach
is deeply flawed because it rests on the fundamental assumption is that
drivers operate at speeds they perceive as safe. This design makes
drivers feel safe traveling at higher speeds, which then increases the
85th percentile. In 2017, we issued a safety study, Reducing Speeding-
Related Crashes Involving Passenger Vehicles [https://www.ntsb.gov/
safety/safety-studies/Pages/DCA15SS002.aspx], which identified concerns
with using the 85th percentile, including that there is not strong
evidence that, within a given traffic flow, the 85th percentile speed
equates to the speed with the lowest crash involvement rate on all road
types, and that unintended consequences of using the 85th percentile
speed for changing speed limits in speed zones include higher operating
speeds and new, higher 85th percentile speeds in the speed zones, as
well as an increase in operating speeds outside the speed zones.
Our study recommended that the FHWA revise its regulations to
strengthen requirements for all speed-engineering studies and remove
the guidance that speed limits in speed zones be within 5 mph of the
85th percentile speed. This issue is on our 2021-2022 MWL.

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