[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                         [H.A.S.C. No. 117-79]

                                HEARING

                                   ON

                   NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

                          FOR FISCAL YEAR 2023

                                  AND

              OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS

                               BEFORE THE

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION
                               __________

                SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING

                                   ON

   FISCAL YEAR 2023 STRATEGIC FORCES NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE PROGRAMS
                               __________

                              HEARING HELD
                             APRIl 6, 2022
                                                          
                                     
                  [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                               __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
                    
48-343                     WASHINGTON : 2023     


                    SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

                    JIM COOPER, Tennessee, Chairman

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island      DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
JOHN GARAMENDI, California           MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts          JOE WILSON, South Carolina
SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California, Vice  MO BROOKS, Alabama
    Chair                            ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
RO KHANNA, California                SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
JOSEPH D. MORELLE, New York          LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
JIMMY PANETTA, California            MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
STEVEN HORSFORD, Nevada

                Maria Vastola, Professional Staff Member
               Whitney Verett, Professional Staff Member
                           Will Braden, Clerk


                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

              STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Cooper, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Tennessee, Chairman, 
  Subcommittee on Strategic Forces...............................     1
Lamborn, Hon. Doug, a Representative from Colorado, Ranking 
  Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces.......................     2

                               WITNESSES

Guetlein, Lt Gen Michael A., USSF, Commander, U.S. Space System 
  Command........................................................     6
Ludwigson, Jon, Director, Contracting and National Security 
  Acquisitions, U.S. Government Accountability Office............     9
Plumb, Hon. John F., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space 
  Policy, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 
  U.S. Department of Defense.....................................     3
Scolese, Christopher J., Director, National Reconnaissance Office     5
Wilkerson, Tonya P., Deputy Director, National Geospatial-
  Intelligence Agency............................................     7

                                APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

    Cooper, Hon. Jim.............................................    23
    Guetlein, Lt Gen Michael A...................................    39
    Ludwigson, Jon...............................................    52
    Plumb, Hon. John F...........................................    24
    Scolese, Christopher J.......................................    32
    Wilkerson, Tonya P...........................................    46

Documents Submitted for the Record:

    [There were no Documents submitted.]

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

    [There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

    Mr. Lamborn..................................................    73
    Mr. Morelle..................................................    74


   FISCAL YEAR 2023 STRATEGIC FORCES NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE PROGRAMS

                              ----------                              

                  House of Representatives,
                       Committee on Armed Services,
                          Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                          Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 6, 2022.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:03 p.m., in 
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jim Cooper 
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

  OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JIM COOPER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
     TENNESSEE, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

    Mr. Cooper. The hearing will come to order. First, I would 
like to apologize to my colleagues and the witnesses. I am at 
the Space Symposium in Colorado. So I feel like I am 
experiencing almost a weeklong space hearing.
    I would like to welcome the extraordinary witnesses we have 
today: Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy, Dr. 
John Plumb; Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, Dr. 
Christopher Scolese; Commander of Space Systems Command, 
Lieutenant General Michael Guetlein; Deputy Director of the 
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, Ms. Tonya Wilkerson; 
GAO [U.S. Government Accountability Office] Director of 
Contracting and National Security Acquisitions, Mr. Jon 
Ludwigson.
    We are honored to have this level of expertise with the 
Department and the intelligence community testifying today on 
one of the most important topics that we will cover in this 
Congress and we are always glad to have our friends from GAO.
    Both Dr. Plumb and Lieutenant General Guetlein are joining 
us today in new positions which highlight the shift within the 
Department and focus on space policy and acquisition. We look 
forward to the Senate moving forward with the nomination of Mr. 
Frank Calvelli to fill the role of Assistant Secretary of the 
Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration to further this 
important emphasis. I hope the Senate will move quickly on 
that.
    Given what we have witnessed in space by our adversaries 
this year, including a destructive and irresponsible anti-
satellite test conducted by Russia, and China's demonstration 
of the ability to grapple another satellite and pull it out of 
orbit, we cannot be too bold or aggressive in demonstrating our 
intent and ability to defend our assets in space.
    The President's budget is the first time we have seen a 
shift toward more resilient and robust space architecture. 
Further, the request by the President for development and 
procurement of satellite capabilities in fiscal year 2023 is 
$27.6 billion, the largest for these types of programs that we 
have ever seen and a more than 25 percent increase from last 
year's request. I am very encouraged by these numbers and 
perhaps the fact that the Department of Defense has finally 
come to see what we have been trying to highlight for the last 
several years: that space is no longer a benign domain. We must 
be prepared to defend our assets on orbit and maintain the 
ability to use space in support of global combatant commanders.
    While I do have optimism that the tide is turning in our 
direction, or perhaps we should say orbits are coming closer to 
what we would like to see, we are shifting toward greater 
recognition of the critical role of space in our daily lives. 
Every citizen in the planet should be aware of that.
    I am also faced with the reality that there still seem to 
be far more offices within the Pentagon that can say no to 
space procurement than can say yes. And across the space 
acquisition community, there is a continued reticence to 
change.
    We have come a long way, but there is still much work to 
do. We have the opportunity to make real change by an 
acquisition culture that has been mired in cost overruns, 
schedule delays, and delivery capabilities that are not 
adequately survivable against increasingly significant threats.
    I would like to turn now to the ranking member, Mr. 
Lamborn, who I just saw a day or two ago here in Colorado, for 
any opening remarks that he may have.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Cooper can be found in the 
Appendix on page 23.]

STATEMENT OF HON. DOUG LAMBORN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM COLORADO, 
        RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I can appreciate your 
wanting to spend as much time as you can in Colorado Springs. 
It was great seeing you Monday at the Space Symposium, and I 
would also like to extend a warm welcome to our panel of 
witnesses here today. Thank you all for your service to our 
Nation.
    I have to say that Chairman Cooper is the smartest one of 
us all, because he is there in Colorado Springs at the Space 
Symposium, while we are all stuck here in DC.
    I want to particularly welcome Dr. Plumb and Lieutenant 
General Guetlein to their new positions as was mentioned a 
minute ago. I am excited to finally see that these space 
positions are being filled out with permanent folks. We have a 
lot of work to do and our adversaries are moving quickly to 
blunt the national security advantages we enjoy because of our 
space systems.
    The threats we see from China and Russia have only 
increased since we had this hearing last year. China has 
demonstrated on orbit the ability to grapple with another 
satellite and drag it into another orbit. Russia has 
demonstrated a ground-launched, anti-satellite weapon against 
one of its own satellites, resulting in a dangerous field of 
debris that the world is still dealing with. These are just the 
public examples of China and Russia pushing for dominance in 
space. Their efforts are especially concerning when considering 
the provocative actions they are taking in other domains.
    Top of mind for all of us is Russia's unprovoked invasion 
of Ukraine that has resulted in the indiscriminate deaths of 
thousands of civilians. These are the actions of countries that 
only respond to hard power. In space that means not only 
increasing resiliency of future systems, but also having a plan 
to defend our space assets currently on orbit.
    Let us speak plainly. China and Russia have already 
weaponized space. The question left to us is what are we going 
to do about it? More than 10,000 military and civilian space 
professionals from around the world are gathered in Colorado 
Springs this week, the epicenter of global space operations. 
These experts are trying to answer that question for us and 
they need our policy support.
    I would love to hear from you all today how we are planning 
to get to this resilient architecture. How are you all working 
together to make sure that we have a whole-of-government 
approach when it comes to national security space? How are we 
designing deterrence for space in the hope of maintaining 
peace?
    I hope you are thinking about it differently than we have 
in the past, including how demonstrated rapid reconstruction 
and reusable space vehicles could support deterrence. But hope 
is not a plan and it is time to move beyond hope.
    I was pleased to see that the new National Defense Strategy 
continues to highlight the importance of space as a warfighting 
domain. We must move past these strategy documents though into 
programs of record, get systems on orbit, and take 
responsibility for the area of space we depend on so greatly.
    With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back and I look forward to 
our discussion.
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Lamborn. Our first witness will 
be Dr. Plumb.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. PLUMB, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
FOR SPACE POLICY, OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR 
               POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

    Dr. Plumb. Thank you, Chairman Cooper. I thank you, Ranking 
Member Lamborn, members of the subcommittee. Thanks for the 
opportunity to testify today on national security space 
programs.
    As your first-ever Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space 
Policy, I am responsible by law for the overall supervision of 
the policy of the Department of Defense [DOD] for space 
warfighting. And I am committed to continuing the close 
partnership between DOD and the Congress on advancing our 
national security space interests.
    As the chairman said, space plays a critical role in 
American security, prosperity, and our way of life. It 
contributes to our national security by enabling and supporting 
the entire joint force; our service members on land, at sea, 
and in the air rely on space every single day to defend the 
Nation.
    Space capabilities provide indications and warning of 
emerging threats and attacks. They deliver the position, 
navigation, and timing signals that support rapid and precise 
global power projection. Space systems generate intelligence on 
operationally relevant timelines, and allow national decision 
makers to anticipate risks and to control or deescalate crises.
    Space also enables those same decision makers to command 
and control forces in multiple theaters around the globe. And 
space is once again capturing the imagination of a new 
generation of Americans. This can inspire more students to 
pursue careers in the STEM [science, technology, engineering, 
and math] disciplines, paying dividends to our national economy 
and national security in the future.
    Secretary Austin has made clear that China is the 
Department's pacing challenge and this holds true in space as 
it does in other domains. The U.S. developed our space 
architecture in an era when space was more or less a sanctuary. 
In contrast, over the past decade, China has dramatically 
increased its quantity and quality of space and counterspace 
systems in order to develop and field a wartime space 
architecture. This requires the United States to consider new 
approaches to ensuring our own use of space including 
developing more proliferated and therefore more resilient 
constellations of our own.
    Russia also remains a key space competitor. They are 
developing, testing, and fielding counterspace weapons to 
target U.S. and allied satellites. And as the ranking member 
just noted, Russia conducted a destructive test of a direct-
ascent ASAT [anti-satellite] missile in November of last year. 
This created more than 1,500 pieces of trackable debris, 
hundreds of thousands of smaller pieces, all of which pose a 
threat to safe space operations in low Earth orbit. This 
behavior is unbefitting of a spacefaring nation.
    In contrast, the Department of Defense is committed to 
promoting standards and norms of responsible behavior to ensure 
the space domain remains secure, stable, and accessible. As the 
Deputy Secretary of Defense stated at the December National 
Space Council meeting, the Department would like to see all 
nations agree to refrain from anti-satellite weapons testing 
that creates debris.
    I just want to touch on the budget for a second. DOD's 
fiscal year 2023 national security space budget does provide 
the $27.6 billion in vital space capabilities that were 
mentioned. This includes $4.7 billion to fund a transition to a 
new and resilient missile warning and missile track 
architecture; $1.8 billion to fund the procurement of two GPS 
[Global Positioning System] 3 follow-on satellites and to 
continue testing and integration of Military GPS User 
Equipment; $1.6 billion to develop secure, survivable, and jam-
resistant SATCOM [satellite communications] capabilities; and 
$1.6 billion to procure six national security space launches.
    Just to wrap up, the threats facing the United States in 
space and from space continue to grow in both quantity and 
capability. The President's budget request takes that into 
account. Countering those threats requires that we continue the 
longstanding bipartisan cooperation between the Department of 
Defense and the Congress. I personally am committed to 
sustaining those efforts and I am honored to work with the 
committee to do so. Thank you and I look forward to your 
questions.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Plumb can be found in the 
Appendix on page 24.]
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you very much, Dr. Plumb. Now we will 
hear from Dr. Scolese.

    STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER J. SCOLESE, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL 
                     RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

    Dr. Scolese. Good afternoon, Chairman Cooper, Ranking 
Member Lamborn, and members of the subcommittee. It is a great 
honor to represent the people of the National Reconnaissance 
Office [NRO] and share the efforts to deliver critical 
information to policy makers, warfighters, and a half million 
users we serve every day.
    For more than 60 years, the vision of the NRO has been to 
see it, hear it, sense it. We have built an amazing advantage 
in space, developing, acquiring, launching, and operating 
satellites that collect and deliver the best intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance data on the planet. Yet I can 
tell you it is an unprecedented time for the NRO.
    The pace of technology is accelerating, creating 
opportunities for both governments and private sector. 
Satellites are being launched in record numbers. Our 
competitors, especially China and Russia, are trying to 
challenge our advantage in space, dedicating money, manpower, 
and resources including newer, better weapons and anti-
satellite technology. Simply put, it is imperative that we 
protect our assets and expand our competitive edge.
    The United States has never before been more reliant on our 
capabilities in space. Our national security and our modern way 
of life depend on it. Our imagery has proven invaluable to 
government agencies and commercial users that track everything 
from natural disasters to crop production to climate change.
    Of course, what is most important to our national security 
and the work of the subcommittee is the support we provide to 
the Department of Defense and the intelligence community. The 
NRO provides accurate, timely intelligence to warfighters and 
policy makers. We monitor what is happening globally, even in 
hostile territories and terrain that would not be accessible by 
any other way to support the analytic and policy community. 
This informs strategy and prevents miscalculation.
    NRO capabilities provide customers with global and regional 
capacity and assured access. This helps them to maintain a 
strategic advantage against near-peer competitors. It also 
helps them focus on ways to counter rogue regimes and regional 
and transnational threats. We are developing systems faster, 
launching 17 payloads into orbit over the last 2 years. We are 
leveraging commercial technologies and fielding systems in as 
little as 18 months. Those systems are returning immediate 
dividends, providing awareness in real-world crisis events. 
With innovative and streamlined contracting approaches, we are 
moving faster in our acquisition processes with both 
traditional industry and new entrants into the marketplace.
    To accelerate and focus our progress, earlier this year we 
refreshed the NRO's strategic priorities. These updates reflect 
the new challenges we face in space and the shifting strategic 
environment. The five priorities that guide our mission 
including growing an empowered, engaged, and inclusive work 
force; innovating faster to stay ahead of our competitors; 
delivering responsible and agile ISR [intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance]; bolstering resiliency; and 
cultivating mission-enhancing partnerships. Additional details 
on these are provided in my statement for the record.
    Mr. Chairman, the NRO is at a pivotal moment. For 60 years, 
America's dominance in space was largely unchallenged. That is 
not the case anymore. Space has quickly turned from peaceful to 
competitive and has the potential to become conflicted. The 
future depends on our ability to protect our assets and stay 
ahead of our competitors. In short, it depends on our ability 
to innovate and continue to attract highly motivated and 
capable people. Using these five priorities as our guide, I am 
confident the NRO is up to the challenge to do whatever is 
necessary and all that is possible. We will continue to deliver 
on our NRO motto: super et altra, above and beyond. Thank you 
for your continued support.
    Chairman Cooper, I would especially like to express my 
appreciation for your ongoing leadership in space-based 
national security and for your advocacy of the NRO over the 
years. I welcome the subcommittee's questions. Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Scolese can be found in the 
Appendix on page 32.]
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you so much, Dr. Scolese. We will now 
hear from Lieutenant General Guetlein.

STATEMENT OF LT GEN MICHAEL A. GUETLEIN, USSF, COMMANDER, U.S. 
                      SPACE SYSTEM COMMAND

    General Guetlein. Good afternoon, Chairman Cooper, Ranking 
Member Lamborn, and members of the committee. On behalf of the 
Secretary of the Air Force, the Honorable Frank Kendall, III, 
and General John W. ``Jay'' Raymond, the Chief of Space 
Operations, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on 
the Department of the Air Force's national security space 
programs.
    It is an honor to appear before you and to testify 
alongside these esteemed space professionals. As Secretary 
Kendall and General Raymond have stated and as highlighted by 
Chairman Cooper and Ranking Member Lamborn and the witnesses 
that have gone before me today, our adversaries are committed 
to disrupting our strategic advantage in space during crisis 
and in conflict. We cannot afford to wait. We must be prepared 
and we must act now.
    As the Space Force field command charged with supplying 
space-enabled capabilities like position, navigation, and 
timing, satellite communications, missile warning, and command 
and control to the joint force, we have aggressively taken 
steps to address acquisition challenges while building 
resilient architectures of tomorrow and delivering the critical 
capabilities of today. We are rapidly ushering in a new era of 
space acquisition.
    In the 8 months since our inception, we have coupled the 
agility of the Rapid Capabilities Office with the flat, agile 
organizational structure of the National Reconnaissance Office, 
and the systems engineering rigor of the Missile Defense 
Agency. By doing this, we built Space Systems Command on the 
best practices from across the national space acquisition 
enterprise. We've adopted an ``exploit what we have,'' ``buy 
what we can,'' and ``build only what we must'' approach to 
acquisitions.
    By exercising unity of effort across the space enterprise 
through building and leveraging partnerships with other 
government agencies, industry, academia, the civil community, 
and our allies, we are able to build in resiliency into the 
space enterprise and build a deterrent network that transcends 
national borders and bolsters American security and prosperity.
    As the major acquisition arm of the Space Force, we are 
partnered with the new Office of the Assistant Secretary of the 
Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration, to employ a 
new acquisition paradigm that promises to cut years off the 
front end of the traditional acquisition cycle. This efficiency 
will only improve as the Space Force moves forward with our 
digital transformation. This transformation will deliver wins 
of increasing magnitude, delivering better capabilities sooner, 
and will evolve the Space Force into the world's first digital 
service.
    While we aren't there yet, we have made several 
improvements across the command and across the space enterprise 
that are already bringing successes for tomorrow's fight while 
delivering capabilities today. The entire Space Force, and 
especially Space Systems Command, are laser focused on 
countering the rising space threat and we are dedicated to 
protecting our joint maritime, land, and air forces.
    I want to thank the committee for their steadfast support 
and their devotion to progress as evidenced by your continued 
challenge to the Space Force and to the Department of the Air 
Force to lead these improvements. We are deeply committed to 
the success of all national security space programs and 
securing our Nation's vital interests. And I look forward to 
answering your questions today. Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of General Guetlein can be found in 
the Appendix on page 39.]
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you so much, General. We will now hear 
from Ms. Wilkerson.

  STATEMENT OF TONYA P. WILKERSON, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, NATIONAL 
                 GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

    Ms. Wilkerson. Good afternoon, Chairman Cooper, Ranking 
Member Lamborn, and distinguished members of the subcommittee.
    The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency [NGA] is the 
Nation's primary provider of geospatial intelligence, or 
GEOINT, which is the use of imagery and geospatial information 
to describe and depict features, activities, and locations on 
and about the Earth. We helped decision makers, warfighters, 
and first responders visualize and understand what is happening 
at a particular place at a particular time. Each of these 
partners rely on us to show the way, literally, to get them 
from point A to point B, help illuminate options, inform 
decisions, and carry out actions with precision.
    Indeed, GEOINT has been a central element of our Nation's 
understanding of the Russia-Ukraine crisis. I have some 
additional materials to discuss in the closed session, but 
would note here that NGA is closely monitoring events in 
Ukraine while we provide partners across the globe access to 
numerous sources of intelligence, including commercial space-
based imagery.
    Beyond current events, NGA and our predecessor 
organizations have a long history of supporting our Nation's 
space intelligence needs and activities. Earth's orbit is no 
longer a benign environment and the threat to U.S. national 
security interests from foreign space powers is real and 
growing. Our adversaries are not standing still and neither is 
NGA.
    In order to expand our GEOINT advantage in all realms, 
including space, NGA is focused on our people, partnerships, 
and preparation for the missions of today and tomorrow. First, 
people. We are increasing our investments and developing our 
tradecraft and training and expert workforce across the 
community to perform analysis on space issues. For instance, 
NGA established a program in 2021 to teach fundamentals of 
space and counterspace analysis to students across DOD, IC 
[intelligence community], and allied partners.
    Second, partnerships. NGA continues to expand our 
partnerships with the U.S. Government, industry, and allied 
partners. Within the space domain, NRO is our lead partner in 
advancing space-based GEOINT capabilities including the 
acquisition of pixels from new commercial sources.
    In direct support of the space intelligence mission, NGA 
has long maintained support teams at the National Air and Space 
Intelligence Center and the Missiles and Space Intelligence 
Center. More recently, we established a support team at 
SPACECOM [U.S. Space Command] in 2019 and one for U.S. Space 
Force in November of 2021. These embedded teams substantially 
deepen the level of collaboration between the organizations.
    Finally, our mission. Space is vitally important to NGA's 
mission. It is the environment in which the sensors that 
provide much of our GEOINT data operate. Our adversaries and 
peer competitors have the means to deny us that resource, so 
NGA remains committed to supporting our warfighters in space.
    Additionally, NGA is the global leader in providing 
geosciences data and support for positioning, navigation, and 
timing. Everything that depends on knowing exactly where and 
when something is on or around the Earth uses this unique form 
of GEOINT. As such, NGA is focused on ensuring the integrity 
and resiliency of these capabilities.
    In conclusion, NGA continues to evolve our space 
intelligence mission to meet current and future needs. We 
remain focused on protecting U.S. national security interests 
in the space domain to deter, protect, and defeat our 
adversaries in space. Thank you and I look forward to answering 
your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Wilkerson can be found in 
the Appendix on page 46.]
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you very much, Ms. Wilkerson.
    Now we will hear from Mr. Ludwigson.

STATEMENT OF JON LUDWIGSON, DIRECTOR, CONTRACTING AND NATIONAL 
  SECURITY ACQUISITIONS, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

    Mr. Ludwigson. Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member Lamborn, and 
members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to 
discuss GAO's work examining DOD's national security space 
programs.
    Space has long provided the ultimate high ground and the 
U.S. has made broad use of it. DOD developed space systems that 
provide communication, facilitate real-time global insights, 
and other key capabilities. Those capabilities provided the 
U.S. with decades of advantages.
    However, we live in a challenging and competitive world. 
Space systems operate in a difficult environment and at the 
leading edge of the possible. As such, space assets do not last 
forever and systems risk being overcome by technology advances. 
Our potential adversaries have also taken note of our space-
based capabilities and made clear that they intend to hold our 
assets at risk and use space for their own purposes. As a 
result, Congress faces important questions about how to 
recapitalize capabilities, add new ones, and address risks to 
our space systems, all of this in the face of short timeframes, 
difficult technical challenges, and limited budgets.
    Over the years, GAO has reviewed DOD's development of 
numerous space systems. Often, we found that the new systems 
took longer and cost more than expected and sometimes fell 
short of planned capabilities.
    My written statement provides an update on several programs 
including our September 2021 report on the Next-Generation OPIR 
[Overhead Persistent Infrared] program that identified steps 
aimed at accelerating the program, but found, among other 
things, that the program faced significant technical and 
management challenges which could make it difficult to meet its 
aggressive schedule and DOD did not make the schedule risks 
clear in its reporting. These kinds of aggressive schedules 
mirror themes from our past work.
    Also, our September 2021 report on the MUOS [Mobile User 
Objective System] program found that DOD was not using the full 
capabilities of the new system with satellites on orbit, the 
full constellation for over 5 years, in large part due to a 
lack of compatible user terminals. This left the services 
relying on the oversubscribed legacy capability which faces 
near-term risks of losing the satellites that support it. We 
also found that the Department had not begun to plan for the 
eventual replacement of MUOS. Again, the lack of alignment 
between segments and late planning have been themes of our past 
work.
    Looking ahead, DOD faces several broad challenges and 
opportunities for developing and fielding space systems and we 
are examining some of them. First, DOD has made progress in the 
standup of Space Force, the first new service in decades having 
already moved thousands of military and civilian personnel, 
created new organizations and lines of authority, among other 
accomplishments. As we noted last year, the standup of the 
Space Force could help address the challenges that we have 
highlighted in the past, including divided leadership, but 
could also present growing pains if not managed well. We remain 
watchful, but encouraged with the progress.
    Second, the world has borne witness to the rapid rise of a 
commercial space industry. This rise creates complications, but 
also provides opportunities. The dramatic increase of 
satellites on orbit has increased the need to track and 
understand the movements of these objects and to take steps to 
mitigate risks as needed. Of particular note, the rising use of 
low Earth orbit by commercial companies comes as DOD plans to 
enhance its use of this orbit. However, the burgeoning 
commercial industry provides more options for DOD to procure 
commercial data and services to complement DOD's or in place of 
DOD developing its own systems. We are examining opportunities 
and challenges DOD faces on this front.
    Third, our potential adversaries have demonstrated their 
capability to target objects in space. Recognizing that our 
space-based capabilities are at risk has prompted the 
Department to develop new tools to monitor for threats and 
other tools for operating in this rapidly changing threat 
environment. We are examining those efforts.
    Finally, balancing efforts to enhance acquisition 
authorities to improve outcomes while ensuring opportunities 
for effective oversight remains important. Clearly, we support 
DOD's efforts to enhance its record on space acquisitions. 
However, some will point to paperwork as the cause of the slow 
process. I reprise my call to follow our leading practices and 
preserve what I call the first principles behind the paperwork 
to build strong programs and the ability to oversee them. Space 
systems are surely important to DOD's mission, but going fast 
cannot be the only goal. Congress must have the opportunity for 
meaningful oversight. We continue to examine acquisition reform 
and related proposals, as well as monitoring programs using 
these approaches.
    Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member Lamborn, this concludes my 
statement. I would be happy to answer any questions the 
subcommittee members may have.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Ludwigson can be found in 
the Appendix on page 52.]
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Ludwigson. I would like to thank 
all of the witnesses and I would like to ask my colleagues to 
try to fit this public session in before we have votes on the 
floor. I am not sure how much time we have, but if every member 
could respect the short overall period of time, that would 
help. I wish I could join you for the closed session. 
Unfortunately, I will not be able to.
    My only question for the panel would be for Ms. Wilkerson. 
I know you are going to talk about this more in closed session, 
but what can you say in public session about the war in Ukraine 
and the spectacular use of imagery that we see on television 
almost every night, whether from the government or from 
private, commercial services that are displaying such things as 
the atrocities in Bucha, things like that that really, even if 
you see it on the screen, it is just hard to believe. But 
having so many sources of verification has made this war unlike 
any other.
    Ms. Wilkerson.
    Ms. Wilkerson. Thank you for the question, Chairman. We are 
certainly focused on the Russia-Ukraine crisis. As I noted, we 
are monitoring the situation very closely and we are sharing 
intelligence with partner nations that are engaged in joint 
missions to address the Ukraine crisis.
    We are providing the breadth, and leveraging the breadth of 
imagery that is available to us, not only from a national 
perspective, but also from commercial.
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you so much. The first questioner on the 
member side will be Mr. Lamborn.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I have two 
questions and then we can keep moving along here.
    Lieutenant General Guetlein, how are we improving the 
resilience of our systems and what role does disaggregation 
play in strengthening our architectures?
    General Guetlein. Thank you, Congressman. That is a great 
question. Resiliency is actually critical to guaranteeing the 
capability that is going to be there in a crisis or in a 
conflict. Resiliency, however, is not a one-time buy. It is a 
lifetime for the system and it comes in many, many different 
flavors. Part of that is through redundancy, disaggregation, 
proliferation, hybrid architectures, a mix of organic, allied, 
and commercial systems. Disaggregation is absolutely critical 
to going forward. We started off putting an enormous amount of 
capability on one satellite because launch vehicles cost so 
much. That was during a time of peace. We can no longer do 
that.
    So going forward, we have to disaggregate those 
capabilities to make sure that they can survive and that it is 
not just one target for the adversary. Over.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. And for you and Dr. Plumb, a study 
released last year that was commissioned by the Space Force 
Defense Innovation Unit and Air Force Research Laboratory found 
that China has cornered and is now dominating the global space 
market. The report recommends that the United States develop 
new market-enhancing tools to enhance and grow American 
commercial space activities.
    What policies and new capabilities do you plan to advocate 
for in order to promote a more dynamic domestic space 
marketplace and where are these reflected in this year's budget 
request?
    General Guetlein. As you talk about the commercial market, 
there is an enormous amount of benefit that comes with 
commercial, as well as some cautionary tales.
    First of all, what we have done within the Space Force, is 
we stood up the SSC [Space Systems Command] Front Door. So we 
have provided a one-stop shop for all of our commercial 
partners whether that be a small start-up business or all the 
way to our primes so that they now have one number, one email 
address, one website to go to and that we will paint the path 
to opportunities, depending on what they are offering to bring 
to the table.
    As far as what we have invested, space domain awareness is 
continuing to grow. We spent $135 million in space domain 
awareness in the past 4 years. The SATCOM arena, that is our 
biggest investment area and we spent $2.43 billion just over 
the last 2 years investing in commercial SATCOM. A satellite 
command and control is a new emerging area and we invested $22 
million in there last year. The next emerging one is going to 
be ISR and we are just starting to do studies to determine how 
much ISR we can buy from space and we are actually going to do 
a reverse industry data, ask industry what they can bring to 
the table in that domain. Over.
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Lamborn.
    Mr. Lamborn. Wait--Dr. Plumb was going to finish answering 
that.
    Mr. Cooper. Okay. Go ahead, Dr. Plumb.
    Dr. Plumb. I just would add one other piece I think that I 
am interested in at least is the ``range of the future'' and 
making sure that we are not constrained by launch constraints 
to make sure we can fully enable our commercial and DOD market.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you. Mr. Moulton.
    Mr. Moulton. Mr. Chair, I am going to defer my questions to 
the classified session.
    Mr. Cooper. Okay. Then Mr. Brooks.
    Ms. Vastola. Sir, he has left the Webex. So next would be 
Mr. DesJarlais.
    Mr. Cooper. Mr. Carbajal.
    Mr. Carbajal. I think Mr. DesJarlais is before me.
    Mr. Cooper. Okay. Mr. DesJarlais then.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you. I guess this would be for Dr. 
Plumb, Scolese, or General Guetlein. We've heard a lot about 
tactically responsive space. What timeliness constitutes 
tactically responsive and how does that timeliness match the 
current ability of the NSSL [National Security Space Launch] 
providers to launch satellites into orbit?
    General Guetlein. Thank you, Congressman. So tactically 
responsive space doesn't really have a specific timeline. It is 
mission focused. Currently, the Secretary of the Air Force has 
seven operational imperatives or studies that he has ongoing. 
One of those is the space order of battle. Under the space 
order of battle, we are working to determine which type of 
capabilities need to be responsive and what type of timelines, 
and if they can be gap fillers or if they have to be long-
range, long-term solutions.
    NSSL was not designed for tactically responsive space. It 
was designed to get our national assets in orbit. Those 
national assets typically take a long time to develop. They 
take a lot of national treasure to build and therefore they 
require a much more methodic mission assurance process that is 
not conducive to tactically responsive space.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Do you feel comfortable with our quick 
launch capability if needed today or in the near future?
    General Guetlein. Sir, there is numerous small launch 
providers that are just starting to emerge. I believe within 
the next 24 months we will have that ability as a nation.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Where are the primary launch sites located 
and how many do we have?
    General Guetlein. Our primary launch sites are Vandenberg, 
California, on the west coast and Cape Canaveral on the east 
coast.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Is there any concern that in an all-out war 
scenario China or Russia could target these sites and hinder 
our launch, space launch capability, especially in light of the 
hypersonic glide advancements?
    General Guetlein. Yes, sir. That is a concern of ours every 
day. We are currently, at the request of Congress, submitting 
the range of the future congressional report. That 
congressional report outlines many areas of investment and 
infrastructure and resiliency to ensure that our space launch 
bases will be there in a time of conflict or crisis.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Shifting quickly to OPIR, to what extent is 
there a backup plan to provide missile warning if the first 
Block 0 satellite for the Next-Generation Overhead Persistent 
Infrared system cannot be launched by fiscal year 2025?
    General Guetlein. Yes, sir. The current constellation of 
OPIR satellites is healthy. We currently have one more to 
launch, GEO-5, was just brought into operations a couple months 
ago. It is doing exceptionally well. GEO-6 is currently on the 
ground in storage. We can launch it at any moment as needed. So 
that constellation is extremely healthy. And we just started 
the missile warning, missile track, missile defense force 
design which will get after resilient missile warning, missile 
track, missile defense architecture for the future.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Does the current budget request, if funded, 
provide sufficient resources for the Block 0 program and to 
meet the schedule and performance goals?
    General Guetlein. Yes, sir. It does.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. I think we have a fair amount of time 
before votes, probably a half hour, 45 minutes; but I will 
wait. I will yield.
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. DesJarlais. Mr. Carbajal.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Guetlein, an 
inspector general report published in January audited the 
Department's maintenance of space launch equipment and 
facilities. It found that the ranges too often did not have 
spare parts for mission-critical range item components and were 
forced to search for spare parts on commercial websites such as 
eBay.
    As the Space Force reported in 2021, the U.S. commercial 
launch industry is on the cusp of a 60 to 100 percent increase 
in launch rates over the next 5 years. So we need to address 
the identified range infrastructure and maintenance needs now.
    How will the range of future initiative address--range of 
the future initiative address the sustainment shortcomings to 
meet the expected increased demand?
    General Guetlein. Sir, thank you for that question. 
Maintaining our ranges is a national asset and guaranteeing 
assured access to space is absolutely critical for us to 
maintain the space resiliency. Going forward, the current 
launch ranges were built in the 1960s. That infrastructure was 
built for a government-only customer. Since then, the pace of 
commercial change has not matched--been matched by the amounts 
nor the types of reimbursement leading to a drain on 
sustainment and modification funds. Remedy is better rules and 
authorities, not more U.S. Government dollars.
    Under the range of the future, what we are asking for is a 
change to the way we approach our architecture, our 
infrastructure, our operational practices, and our spaceports, 
as well as recommending a few changes to the national law that 
would enable us to better invest in our ranges.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. Mr. Ludwigson, one aspect GAO has 
been reviewing, and this subcommittee is tracking, is how the 
standup and organization of the Space Force will address 
longstanding concerns that space acquisition leadership is 
fragmented.
    Can you highlight the progress the Space Force has made in 
this past year in addressing this concern and where the Space 
Force is still struggling with making progress?
    Mr. Ludwigson. Thank you, sir. As you may recall, in 2016, 
we raised concerns about fragmentation. This is the report that 
spoke to the 60 organizations that were involved in 
constituting a space acquisition, that could be involved in a 
space acquisition.
    The standup of the Space Force was, I think, in some ways 
responsive to the concerns we raised. The consolidation that 
happens as part of the standup of the Space Force addresses a 
good number of our concerns. We haven't done a detailed 
examination on all of the progress that has been made, but 
certainly bringing together of many of the entities of those 60 
was significant progress from our standpoint. But there is 
still going to be communications that are necessary with NRO, 
some of the services, and other entities in order to make sure 
that the sort of end-to-end capability that is part of that--
the space capability, a variety of space capabilities comes to 
fruition.
    Mr. Carbajal. On a grade A through F, how would you grade 
the progress on addressing that fragmentation?
    Mr. Ludwigson. I think that we are heartened with the 
progress that has been made. I think I have had some really 
good conversations with----
    Mr. Carbajal. No A through F. Not just heartened.
    Mr. Ludwigson. I am heartened. I would say that----
    Mr. Carbajal. All right, that is good.
    Mr. Ludwigson. They are a B striving for an A.
    Mr. Carbajal. It is good to strive, but it is also good to 
know where we are at, and you are not telling me. So thank you.
    Ms. Wilkerson and Dr. Scolese. We have seen the tremendous 
benefit to open source satellite imaging throughout Russia's 
unprovoked war in Ukraine through tracking Russian troop 
movements to documenting horrific war crimes.
    How are you both working with allied and partner nations to 
ensure sustained access and utilization of satellite imagery 
during crisis situations?
    Ms. Wilkerson. Thank you for the question. So from an NGA 
perspective we are implementing tasking and collection 
strategies that look to ensure that we are maximizing the 
number of relevant images that are collected for analysis. We 
are certainly working with partner nations as well to ensure 
that that information is shared across partner nations as well 
as security organizations that are involved in this joint 
mission.
    Dr. Scolese. And I would just add that we work very closely 
with NGA to make sure that with the commercial imagery 
contracts that we have that we are making sure that they are 
looking at the right things and providing the information that 
is needed so that we can distribute it.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. I yield back.
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Carbajal. Mr. Garamendi.
    Mr. Garamendi. I will save my questions for the classified.
    Mr. Cooper. Mr. DesJarlais, did you want to ask some more 
questions or Mr. Langevin, I see you on the screen there. 
Sorry.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our 
witnesses for their testimony today. If I could for Dr. Plumb 
and General Guetlein, so to continue to be a global leader when 
it comes to new and innovative technologies, it would behoove 
us to think not about acquiring planes and satellites that 
happen to run software, but rather that we are acquiring 
software that just so happens to run on a plane or a satellite. 
So this is an argument that I have been really strong in making 
that we need to put software first and hardware as a secondary 
as opposed to what we do right now. And we have to prioritize 
acquiring and developing new and innovative software 
effectively.
    So to both of you, what efforts are underway to overcome 
the barriers of acquiring new and innovative software?
    General Guetlein. Thank you, Congressman. So in the 
software arena, we have stood up what we call Kobayashi Maru 
which is our DevSecOps [development, security, and operations] 
environment. It is built on the leading-edge principles that we 
are learning from the other software factories like Kessel Run.
    In addition to that, we are building out the Guardians to 
every Guardian to learn how to be a programmer, so that we can 
rapidly update and upgrade our systems along the way in near 
real time without having to rely on a lengthy development 
cycle.
    On the fragmentation part, I would say we have been 
embracing the partnerships of our international allies and our 
commercial partners. We stood up the International Affairs 
Office which currently has 15 different partnerships and we've 
done the same thing with commercial. And under the Joint All-
Domain Command and Control [JADC2] and the Air Force's version 
of ABMS [Advanced Battle Management System], it all becomes 
about how to better integrate and network the capabilities that 
we have and that is going to come through software first, 
hardware second, and that is actually going to drive the way we 
fight in the future.
    Mr. Langevin. Very good. I am glad you addressed the JADC2 
part of it, because that was going to be a part of my followup. 
Okay, if we could go to Dr. Plumb or Mr. Ludwigson, do either 
of you have anything to offer?
    Dr. Plumb. Congressman, I think that the general covered it 
pretty well. I'll just say related to, in fact, the hearing 
from yesterday, a similar issue about acquisition and making 
sure that innovative solutions are able to get into DOD 
programs and I think--I actually do believe Space System 
Command in particular is working really hard on that, so I 
think we are in the right trend line.
    Mr. Langevin. So let me ask, to Dr. Plumb or Lieutenant 
General Guetlein, obviously, it is extremely critical to our 
national security that our space systems and capabilities 
integrate best cybersecurity practices.
    So how would you characterize our cyber posture when it 
comes to our space-based systems and platforms?
    General, maybe start with you.
    General Guetlein. Sorry. Our cyber capabilities today are 
fledgling. They are just really starting to pick up. We have 
invested about $11 billion in this President's budget to get 
after cyber defense. Within the Space Force we have fielded a 
set of new capabilities for cyber defense that are both in band 
and out of band. And we stood up a brand new cyber defense team 
that primarily right now is protecting and defending the SBIRS 
[Space-Based Infrared System] weapon system. We are 
proliferating that model across the rest of the Space Force to 
get after the mission systems, but we still have a ways to go.
    Dr. Plumb. If it is all right, sir, just to add, I think 
space and cybersecurity are very important to my portfolio, in 
particular. It's a thing I have been thinking a lot about. I 
think early cybersecurity for satellites was just based on I 
have a wall, a perimeter, and you can't get through. And I 
think the right way to approach cybersecurity for space systems 
is we need defense in depth. You basically have to assume there 
may be untoward actors in your systems and how do you make sure 
that you are tracking that not just in an outer shell, but all 
the way through your systems.
    Mr. Langevin. Very good. Well, I know my time is about to 
expire, so I will stop there. But it is absolutely critical 
that we bake in cybersecurity measures from the inception of 
our systems and platforms so that we don't have to layer it on 
top later. So thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Langevin. It is my understanding 
that Mr. DesJarlais will go next and it is also my 
understanding that they have moved up votes, so the intent 
would be after Mr. DesJarlais to adjourn the hearing and then 
have the classified session start after votes have completed on 
the floor.
    So if that is all right with my colleagues, we will hear 
from Mr. DesJarlais.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you, Chairman. For the panel, 
throughout and even prior to the invasion of Ukraine, we saw 
Russia successfully utilize jamming to degrade GPS capabilities 
throughout the region. How has Russia been utilizing its 
jamming capabilities against Ukraine and have they been 
utilizing them against any U.S. assets?
    Dr. Plumb. Congressman, I think we would like to punt that 
to the classified session.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. Fair enough. Let's see. Dr. Plumb or 
General Guetlein, we have seen China's impressive ability to 
blur the lines between benign space capabilities and those that 
may have utility as counterspace weapons, the most recent 
example being China's SJ-21 satellite that has engaged in some 
maneuvers that have raised some red flags.
    How do you assess these Chinese space threats and how is 
the Department interacting with these capabilities?
    Dr. Plumb. So I will take a first shot there, Congressman. 
I will just say SJ-21 and other capabilities China has put in 
space or keeps on the ground, there are some dual-use 
situations there where you could say these are weapons or these 
are civilian or civil service or some type of maintenance 
situation. These are problematic. I think this is where one, we 
need to be eyes wide open on the threat that China poses and I 
know this committee and this panel is fully aware of that.
    And second, it does speak to the need for some beginning 
towards developing norms of behavior in space. Just related to 
this, I have heard that the Russians at one time wanted to 
claim that the robotic arm attached to the space shuttle was a 
weapon because it could grapple a satellite. So you can see 
that this is a conversation that really requires bringing folks 
to the table and trying to understand and have correct behavior 
so we know when it is weaponized.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Mr. Scolese, we will finish with you, I 
guess. In February, you issued a warning for commercial and 
government satellites, urging satellite operators to ensure 
that your systems are secure and that they are watching them 
very closely.
    Can you share with the committee what prompted you to issue 
this warning and have we seen any aggressive actions toward 
U.S. Government or commercial satellites since this warning?
    Dr. Scolese. Sir, I am not sure I am familiar with that. I 
do recall at a conference I was asked if we should be prepared, 
and I said yes, it is much better to be prepared than to be 
surprised. But I did not issue any official warnings.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay, sorry about that. I will be after my 
staffer. What does your collaboration--your collaboration with 
General Nakasone look like in assessing and combating cyber 
threats or is that not you either?
    Dr. Scolese. Well, we certainly work with him, obviously at 
Cyber Command and NSA [National Security Agency]. He provides 
us with a lot of information that all of us use in securing our 
systems.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. Might be a good place to stop.
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. DesJarlais. Do any of my 
colleagues have an urgent question they would like to bring up 
in open session?
    If not, then the subcommittee will recess for votes and 
will resume in closed session after votes have been completed. 
I would like to thank all of the witnesses and my colleagues. 
It is a very important subject matter and I am glad that we are 
covering it. Thank you so much. The subcommittee is recessed.
    [Whereupon, at 2:54 p.m., the subcommittee proceeded to 
closed session.]



      
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                            A P P E N D I X

                             April 6, 2022

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              PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                             April 6, 2022

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              QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                             April 6, 2022

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                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN

    Mr. Lamborn. Your written testimony states ``it is imperative that 
we protect our assets and our competitive edge.'' What are the combined 
efforts NRO is working with USSF to fulfill this imperative, and what 
are the expected timelines for having these programs operational?
    Dr. Scolese. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
    Mr. Lamborn. How does the NRO's acquisition process and force 
design align with the investment priorities expressed by the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Space Policy? What investment priorities and 
policies are lacking that we need to advance space domain awareness and 
defense of our assets?
    Dr. Scolese. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
    Mr. Lamborn. How does the SSC process and the service's acquisition 
and force design align with the investment priorities expressed by 
ASD(Space): Missile Warning, GPS Enterprise, SATCOM, and Launch 
Enterprise? What are the investment priorities and policies lacking 
that we need to advance space domain awareness and defense of our 
assets?
    General Guetlein. Space Systems Command (SSC) employs the Space 
Systems Integration Office and Program Integration Council to inform 
the Department of the Air Force and Department of Defense investment 
priorities with the service's acquisition and Force Design processes. 
The strategy is a three-pronged approach. The first element is to 
``exploit what we have.'' For example, with the FY23 President's Budget 
(PB), we bolster current capabilities with targeted investments in GPS, 
SATCOM, Launch, Space Domain Awareness, and data exploitation, which 
provides performance improvements for the joint warfighter. The second 
is ``buy/partner where we can.'' In this budget request, the Department 
expands joint warfighter SATCOM capabilities by leveraging commercial 
and allied opportunities to expand our existing and planned enterprise. 
The final part of the approach is to ``build what we must.'' In the 
FY23 PB, we begin the development and procurement of the ``Resilient by 
Design'' Missile Warning/Missile Track space architectures to ensure 
the nation's ability to identify and fight through any adversary 
threats. We are concurrently investing in command, control, and cyber 
capabilities to enable effects and respond to natural and man-made 
threats in, through, and from space on operationally and tactically 
relevant timelines.
    Mr. Lamborn. Does the SWAC to PIC to SAC to SAE model allow for 
adequate input from the joint requirements process, and how are we 
ensuring that space systems are still being designed and acquired to 
support joint forces and integrate into joint architectural needs? Does 
the System of Systems Integrator have the knowledge and resources 
available to ensure integration extends throughout the joint force?
    General Guetlein. Yes, the USSF's ``Force Design to Program 
Execution'' process provides input from the joint community, and the 
System of Systems Integrator at SSC has the knowledge and resources 
available to ensure integration extends throughout the Joint Force. The 
USSF requirements development process still operates within the 
oversight of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, Department of 
the Air Force, and other DoD processes. The SWAC Force Design solicits 
inputs from the various stakeholders to ensure the analysis reflects 
the best understanding of the joint requirements to respond to current 
and emerging threats. After the Force Design is complete, the USSF 
Chief Strategy and Resourcing Officer (CSRO) is responsible for 
ensuring requirements are developed and vetted through the joint 
process. The CSRO is also responsible for providing an interactive 
feedback loop to allow adjustments as the Force Designs for capability 
areas evolve. The SSC Space Systems Integration Office then focuses on 
achieving unity of effort with other space acquisition agencies via the 
Program Integration Council to fund and synchronize capability 
development and fielding. Additionally, at SSC, the recently 
established Warfighting Integration Office embeds SSC members in the 
Combatant Commands, participates in wargaming, and addresses warfighter 
capability gaps. Finally, the Space Acquisition Council has many 
members from the Joint Community who ensure the integration of the 
joint architectural needs.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. MORELLE
    Mr. Morelle. Thank you for your testimony and time. We appreciate 
the insight you provided on the efforts of NGA. Question. Commercial 
satellites are reshaping the collection of geospatial intelligence and 
have been effective in tracking the Russian Federation's invasion of 
Ukraine. The commercial constellations have not only brought additional 
sources of intelligence to the IC, but has also presented the events of 
war to the public in way that has never been seen before. It's a new 
phenomenon. Are you able to elaborate on the pros and cons/perhaps 
risks associated with commercial companies participating in space like 
this? Thank you in advance for your time.
    Ms. Wilkerson. As you note, commercial geospatial intelligence 
(GEOINT) provides additional collection opportunities for regions where 
maximum coverage is essential. Commercial GEOINT also gives the U.S. 
Government the ability to share imagery and key observations with a 
wide range of stakeholders at the speed of need. As a result, we are 
finding that commercial GEOINT provides the public with information 
that was previously challenging to communicate and illustrate. One 
notable benefit of independent commercial reporting is that it is much 
more difficult for our adversaries to claim that the atrocities 
depicted in the reporting are U.S. Government or allied propaganda. 
This is not to say that commercial geospatial companies do not bring 
some risk to the equation. The USG's ability to govern actions by 
privately held corporations is limited. Therefore, foreign adversaries 
have many options for accessing commercial imagery on the foreign 
market. Furthermore, there is a potential for them to use proxies to 
also gain access to U.S. imagery which may provide them with more 
detailed information. Under all circumstances, the USG also necessarily 
[remainder of the answer was not available at the time of printing].

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