[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                     

                         [H.A.S.C. No. 117-19]
 
                         DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

                       INSPECTOR GENERAL AND THE

                      SERVICES INSPECTORS GENERAL:

       ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT

                               __________

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                   SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY PERSONNEL

                                 OF THE

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                              HEARING HELD

                             APRIL 15, 2021

                                     
                                     
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]





                         ______

             U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 
48-341          WASHINGTON : 2022                                     
  


                   SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY PERSONNEL

                 JACKIE SPEIER, California, Chairwoman

ANDY KIM, New Jersey                 JIM BANKS, Indiana
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania       STEPHANIE I. BICE, Oklahoma
VERONICA ESCOBAR, Texas, Vice Chair  LISA C. McCLAIN, Michigan
SARA JACOBS, California              RONNY JACKSON, Texas
MARILYN STRICKLAND, Washington       JERRY L. CARL, Alabama
MARC A. VEASEY, Texas                PAT FALLON, Texas

                        Hannah Kaufman, Counsel
                       Forrest McConnell, Counsel
                           Sidney Faix, Clerk
                           
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

              STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Banks, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Indiana, Ranking Member, 
  Subcommittee on Military Personnel.............................     2
Speier, Hon. Jackie, a Representative from California, 
  Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Military Personnel.................     1

                               WITNESSES

Castellvi, MajGen Robert F., USMC, Inspector General of the 
  Marine Corps...................................................    18
Heddell, Gordon S., Former Inspector General of the Department of 
  Defense........................................................     3
O'Donnell, Sean, Acting Inspector General of the Department of 
  Defense........................................................    12
Said, Lt Gen Sami D., USAF, Inspector General of the Air Force...    16
Smith, LTG Leslie C., USA, Inspector General of the Army.........    14
Smithberger, Mandy, Director of the Center for Defense 
  Information, Project on Government Oversight...................     5
Snyder, VADM Richard P., USN, Naval Inspector General............    17

                                APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

    Castellvi, MajGen Robert F...................................    95
    Heddell, Gordon S............................................    41
    O'Donnell, Sean..............................................    70
    Said, Lt Gen Sami D..........................................    82
    Smith, LTG Leslie C..........................................    76
    Smithberger, Mandy...........................................    55
    Snyder, VADM Richard P.......................................    88
    Speier, Hon. Jackie..........................................    39

Documents Submitted for the Record:

    [There were no Documents submitted.]

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

    Ms. Speier...................................................   103

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

    Mr. Brown....................................................   134
    Dr. Jackson..................................................   134
    Mrs. McClain.................................................   133
    Mr. Moore....................................................   134
    Ms. Speier...................................................   111
    
                DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL

                  AND THE SERVICES INSPECTORS GENERAL:

       ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT

                              ----------                              

                  House of Representatives,
                       Committee on Armed Services,
                        Subcommittee on Military Personnel,
                          Washington, DC, Thursday, April 15, 2021.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 4:00 p.m., in 
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jackie Speier 
(chairwoman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JACKIE SPEIER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
   CALIFORNIA, CHAIRWOMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY PERSONNEL

    Ms. Speier. And it is now 4:00, so I am going to call the 
Subcommittee on Military Personnel to order. I want to welcome 
everyone to this hybrid hearing on the roles and 
responsibilities of the Department of Defense IG [Inspector 
General] and the service inspectors general.
    Today we will have two panels. The first panel includes Mr. 
Gordon Heddell, who served as the Department of Defense IG from 
2008 to 2011. He also served as IG for the Department of Labor 
and has extensive experience in this area.
    Ms. Mandy Smithberger of the Project on Government 
Oversight is our second person to testify about considerations 
for improving the DOD [Department of Defense] and service IGs. 
For full disclosure, she was a wonderful member of my staff 
about 8 years ago, and it is nice to see you again.
    In the second panel we will hear testimony from Mr. Sean 
O'Donnell, Acting DOD IG, and the military services' IG. While 
we understand the DOD IG and the service IGs have different 
roles, responsibility, and authority than other executive 
agency IGs, I think it is important we examine them closely and 
make sure that they have the independence, training, staffing, 
and resources to provide proper oversight.
    I am concerned about this issue because there has been too 
many recent examples where the service IGs appeared to be 
asleep at the wheel, lacked independence, and whose 
responsibilities under service regulations requires 
confidential advisers of the commander--requires them to be 
confidential advisers of the commander.
    From the findings of the FORSCOM [U.S. Army Forces Command] 
IG inspection at Fort Hood that suggested all was fine with the 
SHARP [Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention] 
program there, despite ample evidence that they were not in 
compliance with the DOD policy let alone having an effective 
program; to the lagging investigations into the medical care of 
Private First Class Del Barba; to the failure of Navy IGs to 
report sexual harassment allegations against the senior 
executive to the DOD IG as they are required to, and enabling a 
serial offender to victimize several more Navy civilian 
employees and retire with full pension with no accountability--
there is mounting evidence of a disturbing trend across the IGs 
of which these are just a few examples.
    Besides the authorities, it is imperative we examine the 
true independence of the IGs across the Department and 
services. It is unclear to me how someone who works for the 
commander, who by regulation is supposed to act as the 
commander's, quote, ``eyes and ears,'' unquote, and buy into 
that commander's leadership philosophy, can also remain 
impartial when investigating allegations within their own 
command, especially when those allegations involve retaliation 
for making a protected disclosure.
    The last time that the service IGs testified before the 
subcommittee in 2018, the Army inspector general made negative 
comments about whistleblowers, which was stunning to me. If the 
individuals who are charged with investigating whistleblower 
reprisal complaints are prejudiced against them to begin with, 
we have no hope of protecting brave service members and 
civilians who have come forward to protect wrong--to protect 
the American taxpayer and call out wrongdoing.
    I also think we need to better understand how DOD and the 
services work together when complaints come in. After all, if a 
person sends their complaint to the DOD Inspector General 
hotline but then the DOD IG passes it to the services to 
investigate, it seems like we are setting up a false 
expectation of confidentiality for complainants.
    Is DOD telling complainants up front that their reports are 
being shared with the service IGs who may report to the very 
commanders who are the subject of the complaint? What is done 
to protect complainants and ensure a quality investigation that 
meets a high standard? How is retaliation not the end result, 
therefore discouraging service members from coming forward?
    I look forward to digging into this critical set of issues 
today. And with that, I turn it over to Ranking Member Banks 
for his opening statement.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Speier can be found in the 
Appendix on page 39.]

  STATEMENT OF HON. JIM BANKS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM INDIANA, 
       RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY PERSONNEL

    Mr. Banks. Thank you, Madam Chair. I also want to welcome 
our witnesses on both panels.
    Today's hearing is an important step in building our 
members' awareness of the role of inspectors general and the 
role that they play within the Department of Defense and in the 
services. Oversight is also an important role played by 
Congress. In fact, one of the first times the House of 
Representatives investigated the military was in 1792, due to 
the defeat of General Arthur Sinclaire, on the Indiana/Ohio 
border. I figured I would take the opportunity to selfishly 
work in some Indiana history for all of you.
    Like the oversight and investigation responsibilities of 
Congress, all of the inspectors general here today play a vital 
role in overseeing, investigating, and preventing fraud, waste, 
and abuse, and mismanagement across the Department and the 
services.
    They have been challenged by investigations, audits, and 
evaluations that have run the gamut of issues from major 
acquisition programs to material readiness to issues involving 
good order and discipline, all requiring inspector general 
organizations that are agile and independent. They also require 
personnel with a requisite training, experiences, and knowledge 
to get after the issues and provide recommendations that will 
inform their organizations and Congress.
    On panel one, I would like to understand any 
recommendations that you may have for the Department of Defense 
and service IGs on improving their training and education. I am 
also interested in your thoughts on whether you think 
independence is an issue for any or all of these IG 
organizations.
    For our panel two witnesses, I am interested in the 
manning, training, and equipping of your organizations. Do you 
have the personnel resources you need to effectively execute 
your missions? I am also concerned about the results of the 
audits, evaluations, and investigations and whether or not they 
are often focused on outputs or outcomes. I would like to 
understand your thoughts on how we can change that. Again, 
thank you for your attendance.
    With that, Madam Chair, I yield back.
    Ms. Speier. I thank the gentleman for his remarks.
    We will now move to our first panel. Mr. Gordon Heddell, 
who is the former inspector general of the Department of 
Defense, followed by Ms. Mandy Smithberger, director for the 
Center for Defense Information, Project on Government 
Oversight. Thank you both for being here today and for your 
participation.
    Mr. Heddell.

STATEMENT OF GORDON S. HEDDELL, FORMER INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE 
                     DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

    Mr. Heddell. Chairwoman Speier, Ranking Member Banks, and 
esteemed members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me 
to testify today. I am disturbed by the independence or the 
lack of independence of our military component inspectors 
general and a command structure that has allowed harassment, 
assault, and a flagrant disregard by leadership for the Sexual 
Harassment/
Assault Response and Prevention Program known as SHARP.
    There is no place in the Armed Forces of the United States 
for bias, discrimination, harassment, assault, or retaliation. 
Simply stating that we have a zero-tolerance policy will not 
make it so. The core strength of our Armed Forces has always 
been in its leadership and the men and women who follow that 
leadership. Inequities, however, in the way our military 
handles harassment and assault investigations are gnawing away 
at the very fabric of that strength.
    While working with the TIGs, the inspectors general, of 
each of the military services, I found them to be men and women 
of very high character. I would be surprised if that were not 
still true today. Army regulation AR 20-1, the Inspector 
General Act duties and procedures regulations, prescribes the 
responsibility and policy for the selection and duties of 
inspectors general throughout the Army. It is, in effect, the 
Army IG's bible.
    However, as I reviewed AR 20-1, I was surprised by 
statements in the regulation concerning the relationship that 
is supposed to exist between the commander and component IGs. 
Some examples: component IGs only work for their commanders; 
they are the conscience of their commanders; they must 
understand the commander's personality; they must be the 
commander's confidant and serve as confidential adviser to the 
commander; they must work through the chain of command.
    There is nothing unusual or improper about a good 
relationship or respect for the chain of command. What concerns 
me, however, is that we are talking about the policies and 
procedures that govern military inspectors general, people who 
are supposed to be independent.
    The regulation appears to tacitly imply a reverence for the 
commander that is inappropriate for an inspector general. I 
believe there are things that the military services can learn 
from the Inspector General Act. There is no mention or 
requirement in the Act that the inspector general be the 
Secretary's conscience, that the IG understand the Secretary's 
personality, or that the IG work through a chain of command.
    The IG Act does not mince words. It addresses the issue of 
independence head on, stating that the head of the 
establishment shall not prevent or prohibit the inspector 
general from completing any audit or investigation. The concept 
of independence is manifested throughout the IG Act. Lack of 
independence or even a perceived lack of independence is 
antithetical to congressional intent.
    I recommend to the military service departments that they, 
number one, require component IGs to promptly report 
particularly serious or flagrant problems, abuses, or 
deficiencies directly to the respective TIG; number two, 
establish policies stating clearly that no one has the 
authority to alter IG reports; number three, a central Office 
of Inspector General Legal Counsel should be established for 
the purpose of providing dedicated legal services to support 
component IGs and no one else; number four, component IGs must 
have timely access to all agency records; number five, 
component IG assignments should not be considered collateral 
duty.
    The position of component IG as it stands now is not a 
career path but a stopover on the way to something else. I 
recommend that component IG nominees successfully undergo 
training at an IG academy, a state-of-the-art academy, and when 
successfully completed, certified graduates be appointed to the 
rank of warrant officer.
    For the good order and discipline of our military services, 
I think the time is long overdue. We must provide state-of-the-
art training and the appropriate tools to our component IGs. We 
must make harassment, assault, and retaliation things of the 
past. We must do this now once and for all. Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Heddell can be found in the 
Appendix on page 41.]
    Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Heddell.
    Ms. Smithberger.

  STATEMENT OF MANDY SMITHBERGER, DIRECTOR OF THE CENTER FOR 
      DEFENSE INFORMATION, PROJECT ON GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT

    Ms. Smithberger. Thank you, Chairwoman Speier, Ranking 
Member Banks, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you again 
for inviting me to testify today. I want to thank the 
subcommittee for taking the time to look at whether our 
inspector general system is meeting our country's needs. In 
particular, I am very encouraged to hear that there is already 
going to be a focus on two important issues: protecting the 
independence of inspectors general and their investigations, 
and having meaningful protections for whistleblowers and 
survivors who come forward.
    As Mr. Heddell mentioned, our Federal watchdogs perform an 
essential role in rooting out waste, fraud, and abuse. One of 
their most important responsibilities is their role 
investigating whistleblower reprisal complaints. However, POGO 
[Project on Government Oversight] and government oversight 
entities have repeatedly raised concerns that the system for 
protecting military whistleblowers against retaliation is 
insufficient.
    The DOD IG system can seem unusually complex. The various 
roles of the service and the Department and component IGs are 
complementary but slightly different. And to people who are 
turning to the IG system for help, those differences can be 
pretty confusing, particularly when they go to the DOD IG 
hotline.
    The DOD IG is a civilian, statutory inspector general and 
is supposed to be independent from the Department. I think 
there are a couple of things about the statutory IGs that we 
want to keep in mind for independence. They have subpoena 
powers, they have audit functions, and they are also uniquely 
dual-hatted, reporting both to Congress and to their agency 
head.
    In recent years, Congress has strengthened these IGs, most 
notably by providing each one with their own general counsel 
and requiring the President to provide congressional 
notification and justification for their removal and transfer.
    Service and component IGs have less independence, and when 
it comes to particularly sensitive investigations like a 
whistleblower reprisal complaint, we sometimes have concerns 
that that undermines their ability to effectively do their job. 
At the component IG level, a Department of Justice inspector 
general review found that those offices often struggle to 
maintain adequate staff and experience because the offices 
compete for resources for military components engaged in 
military actions around the world. The same review found fully 
staffing field IG offices is a lower priority than staffing 
other service branch components.
    As Congresswoman Speier mentioned, in most cases, DOD IG 
hands retaliation allegations over to local or command IGs who 
have the least amount of independence and experience in 
handling what are often highly complex investigations. We have 
worked with whistleblowers who return to that hotline only to 
be unpleasantly surprised that their complaint was referred to 
a service or component IG. Those referrals can feel like being 
thrown into the lion's den, including potentially exposing 
whistleblowers to additional retaliation.
    Despite a number of reforms, the outcomes for 
whistleblowers still look like a system unlikely to protect 
truth tellers. DOD semiannual reports to Congress show the vast 
majority of reprisal claims are not investigated and only a 
handful of those investigated are substantiated. Even when 
reprisal claims are substantiated, those who retaliate are 
rarely punished.
    Remedies for whistleblowers are also elusive, with the vast 
majority waiting years for any remedy, if they receive one at 
all. Most whistleblowers give up or they end up fighting for 
years to get their own records corrected.
    I would be remiss to not note that DOD IG has lacked a 
permanent leader for over 5 years. This fundamentally 
undermines the foundation of the Department's inspector general 
system. Not having a permanent leader, especially for a long 
period of time, compromises the office's credibility, its 
independence, its management, and its strategic direction.
    There are a number of other areas of oversights and reforms 
that can strengthen both their IG and whistleblower protection 
system.
    First, Congress must revise the burdens of proof for 
military whistleblowers. The odds are stacked against 
servicemember whistleblowers. For civilians, the burden of 
proof to show a personnel action was warranted and therefore 
not retaliatory rests on agency officials. For members of the 
military, the reverse is true. And service members must prove 
that they were illegally retaliated against by showing there 
was no other reasonable explanation for the adverse personnel 
action they experienced.
    Second, we urge the subcommittee to review whether service 
and component IGs have the legal support that they need.
    Third, Congress must look at or should consider expanding 
alternative dispute resolution options for the military to help 
provide expedient relief.
    Fourth, all IGs must do more outreach to the public and 
Congress about their work, including publishing their reports 
in a timely manner, proactively releasing information to the 
public that is going to be released anyway under a Freedom of 
Information Act request, and announcing upcoming projects that 
aren't law enforcement sensitive.
    Finally, I hope the service IGs will complete 
implementation of measures to protect the confidentiality of 
sources. We all count on inspectors general to warn commanders, 
senior leaders, Congress, and the public about problems. Their 
ability to do so depends on effectively working with 
whistleblowers. When individuals come forward, usually at great 
personal and professional risk, they must be effectively 
protected. The perceived and real failures of the system must 
be addressed.
    Thank you again, and I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Smithberger can be found in 
the Appendix on page 55.]
    Ms. Speier. Thank you. Thank you both for your testimony.
    I would like to ask unanimous consent that non-subcommittee 
members be allowed to participate in today's briefing, after 
all the subcommittee members have had an opportunity to ask 
questions. Is there any objection?
    Hearing none, so ordered.
    All right. So I am going to forgo asking my questions until 
the end of the panel, so I offer Ranking Member Banks the 
opportunity now to pursue his questioning.
    Mr. Banks. All right. Thank you, Madam Chair, for that.
    As I mentioned in my opening statement, I would like to 
understand from both of you whether you have any 
recommendations regarding how DOD and the services train and 
educate their IGs. Also, do you think they have what they need 
in terms of resources to execute their mission?
    Ms. Smithberger, we will start with you.
    Ms. Smithberger. Thank you for the question. I think I am 
going to defer to Mr. Heddell a little bit more on some of the 
training though. More training is always welcome, and I know 
DOD IG has been doing a lot to try and enhance that training, 
but I think something else to look at is for some of these 
investigations where independence is really important for some 
of those investigations, I wonder in some of these cases if the 
DOD IG should be retaining more of those investigations than 
they are currently and giving DOD IG more of those resources.
    As you know, the problem with training, if people are, you 
know, circulating in and out of these service and component 
IGs, is that this is not going to be part of their long-term 
career field and so there is diminishing returns, while if we 
have a civilian component that has this expertise, I think that 
is probably a better investment in the long term.
    Mr. Banks. Mr. Heddell.
    Ms. Speier. Turn your mike on, please. Thank you.
    Mr. Heddell. Yes, ma'am. The Inspector General Act, I 
believe, is a really good perhaps role model for all IGs. And I 
think one of the huge concerns that I see is that the component 
IG skills and the way they do their work, well-meaning, I am 
sure, in many--most respects, has not evolved over the years to 
be better than it could be.
    It has--where the inspectors general, the Federal 
inspectors general, DOD IG, for instance, over the years, 
because of the wisdom of Congress, the initial IG Act of 1978 
has been amended and improved and has made the inspector 
general a stronger, more capable, more talented and determined 
and an independent inspector general.
    If that had not occurred, I would say that today that the 
DOD IG and other Federal IGs would be impotent and the whole 
concept of IG in Federal Government would be a failure, but it 
isn't a failure. Today our IGs are among the most skilled and 
exceptional executives in government.
    The same I cannot say is true in terms of our component 
IGs. They are basically passing through. They do a 36-month 
rotation into their assignments, generally. In my opinion, it 
takes a lot longer than that to develop the kind of knowledge 
and commitment and the allegiance to what is right within the 
ranks of the military.
    And so just about the time that I think that they are 
really getting their sea legs, they are moving on to another 
non-IG assignment. One of the implications of that is that it 
reduces the number of mentors that would be around to be 
helpful.
    Number two, this idea of component IGs, several thousand--2 
or 3 thousand of them, it needs to become a profession. It is 
not, in my opinion, viewed as a profession. There needs to be 
very sophisticated state-of-the-art training academy.
    And I believe that individuals who are nominated to become 
component inspectors general should go through the academy and 
they should be required to pass and then certified. And once 
they are certified I believe that they should attain--be 
appointed to the rank of warrant officer.
    I have nothing against noncommissioned officers. They are 
the backbone of our military in many, many ways. But as an 
inspector general, I think we have to start at a higher level, 
and we have to work from there. It has to become a profession.
    The issue, the biggest issue facing the component IGs is 
independence. We have to give these component IGs the backbone 
and the confidence to do their work, and not worry about what 
their commander says. I really believe that there is too much 
emphasis on the chain of command, that the component IG is 
required to go through his or her commander.
    Now, I have great respect having been in the military for 
the chain of command, but it doesn't work, in my opinion, when 
it comes to inspectors general. Their chain of command must be 
directly from them to the respective TIG. Now, that would cause 
a lot of headaches under the structure today for the TIGs to 
take that kind of, you know, intimate control of the situation, 
but I think that is necessary.
    We have reached a point with respect to assault, 
harassment, retaliation, all of these things are undermining. 
When I was in the military, and I am sure it is true today, the 
central thought among rank-and-file members is that the 
military takes care of its own. Well, I am sure they still 
believe in that, and I am sure to a great extent they do, but 
that is not happening. There are too many people----
    Mr. Banks. I appreciate that, sir, a lot of really great 
comments. And with that, Madam Chairman, I yield back.
    Ms. Speier. All right. Thank you.
    I think what we are going to do now is recess for about--I 
am sorry. We are not going to recess. We are going to suspend 
for about, I guess, 20 minutes. Actually, wait a minute. Maybe 
what we will do is go to Ms. Escobar for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Escobar. Okay. Perfect. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Mr. Heddell, I want to pick up where you just left off, 
because I am very curious about where you were headed with your 
comments with regard to the challenges around chain of command, 
trying to remove oneself from conflict of interest, and the 
added challenge with the component IGs that rotate out.
    What do you think, if you had to reenvision the component 
IGs--and actually, this is a question for both of our 
panelists. If you had to reenvision this, what would the best 
practices be and what would it look like?
    Mr. Heddell. You know, I think a very good--I am speaking 
as a former Army aviator, and so I sort of use that as my role 
model here in that training is what is going to make inspectors 
general at the component level really competent and dedicated 
and able, and who buy in to the concept that everyone deserves 
protection. When they can't get it, it undermines the order and 
discipline of the military. And that is not happening.
    So training is the first thing, and I think there needs to 
be an academy, a real, true-life academy that is focused 
entirely on inspectors general at the component level. And they 
need to be--those nominees that go to that academy need to pass 
the course and be certified. If they are not certified, they 
don't become inspectors general.
    If they are certified, as I said earlier, I think they 
should be appointed warrant officer rank. It is a professional 
rank and it--and I think it raises the whole idea of inspectors 
general at the component level to a profession. And rotating 
people out after 36 months to something that is not related, 
they have no commitment.
    And, frankly, I do think that when they know they are going 
to be rotated out to a non-IG position, they may be thinking 
about how am I going to be received when I go to the non-IG 
world? I think we have to remove any concerns that an IG might 
have that somehow they are going to be treated differently 
because they were an IG.
    The other thing is the chain of command. There is far too 
much emphasis in the Army Regulation 20-1 for the reverence 
that a component IG must show to the commander. There are too 
many approvals that the commander must provide that really it 
should be the TIGs providing.
    An example, if a component IG is doing--sees that he has 
got a criminal investigation on his hands, but of course he or 
she does not have the law enforcement authority to conduct that 
criminal investigation, they are required to go to their 
commander and then it is up to the commander to decide whether 
to ask, in the Army's case, the CID [Criminal Investigation 
Division] to open an investigation. They may or they may not, 
depending on the facts, but the component IG is really--he is 
dependent on what that decision is. I think that decision, when 
it comes to criminal investigations, should be made with the 
TIG.
    The other thing, I think there is a real problem with 
respect to legal counsel. The TIGs have their own legal 
counsel, I believe, but the component IGs have to submit a 
request for advice. And they don't know what kind of a lawyer 
or attorney they are going to get, and they don't know whether 
that attorney, whether his or her loyalties go to the commander 
or to someone else.
    We need a commitment that component IGs have a committed 
legal counsel that will support them. These are the kinds of 
things that will create independence on the part of the IG, it 
will create confidence, and it will create confidence by the 
people that are retaliated against, who are harassed, who are 
assaulted, because right now, if I am a person that is a victim 
of harassment, and I read AR-20, I would have to really think 
twice before I would go to the component IG. It is----
    Ms. Escobar. Mr. Heddell, I am so sorry, we are out of 
time. Thank you for your response.
    Madam Chair, I yield back.
    Ms. Speier. Thank you, Ms. Escobar.
    We will now suspend for 20 minutes and return. Again, our 
apologies. This is the nature of our vote today, so we will 
reconvene then in 20 minutes. Thank you.
    [Recess.]
    Ms. Speier. We will now reconvene the Military Personnel 
Subcommittee. Mr. Fallon, you are next. You are recognized for 
5 minutes. Mr. Fallon? Can someone contact Mr. Fallon so he 
knows that he is up?
    All right. I see Ms. Strickland is with us. Ms. Strickland, 
you are recognized for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Strickland. Thank you, Madam Chair. So one of the 
issues that I am especially interested in is diversity, equity, 
inclusion [DEI] within the Department. And under the leadership 
of Congressman Brown in the last session, the NDAA included 
several provisions related to diversity.
    So as I think about, you know, the conversation about the 
inspectors general, do you believe that we are sufficiently 
independent in order to ensure that this topic, specifically, 
will be investigated the way it should? And then are there 
other areas within the DEI sphere that you can explore and 
investigate?
    Mr. Heddell. Is that question for me? I am sorry.
    Ms. Strickland. Yes, actually the question is for both of 
you.
    Mr. Heddell. Oh. Well, I will take that first.
    Ms. Strickland. Okay.
    Mr. Heddell. I think the problem is that at the component 
IG level, the issue of independence is a problem. And that 
needs to be addressed by a variety of suggestions, 
recommendations. The biggest one, I think, is simply training 
and then in making the component IG a profession that that 
person would go on throughout their career and be an inspector 
general, and it would be a commitment lifelong.
    Ms. Smithberger. Thank you for the question. I think in 
addition to independence, if you just look generally at command 
climate issues. When you look at the Department of Defense 
Inspector Generals in my annual report, it is pretty striking 
how many instances there are of people being retaliated against 
because they have tried to use the EEO [Equal Employment 
Opportunity] system. So I think that it is a significant 
challenge.
    I know that we are adding to the capacity of the Department 
of Defense Inspector General to work on these issues, but you 
know, this is a significant challenge for the force. That 
independence is extremely important that, you know, obviously 
goes to climate as well.
    Ms. Strickland. Great. Thank you very much. I yield back, 
Madam Chair.
    Ms. Speier. The gentlelady yields back. Is Mrs. Bice 
available or Mr. Brown? Mr. Fallon? Mrs. Bice? Mr. Brown? Mr. 
Kim? Any of those members nearby? We are happy to have them ask 
their questions.
    While we wait for them, I will pursue my line of 
questioning. In your testimony--let me just get to it first.
    In your testimony, Mr. Heddell, you referenced that the 
regulations suggest the IGs provide commanders with 
undocumented informal verbal reports, which is a recipe, as you 
put, for suspicion and uncertainty about their independence. I 
don't recall if you
in your list of improvements if you recommended that these be 
made.
    Mr. Heddell. Now, in the interest of time, the 5-minute 
requirement, I did not list that. But it is an important one, 
because nothing that an inspector general does should be 
informal. Advice should not be informal. It should all be 
documented. And that again goes back, Chairwoman Speier, to the 
idea that IG--component IGs have a certain--are expected to 
have a certain loyalty to their commander, and that they can 
have these private off-the-record conversations when they 
shouldn't happen like that.
    I am not saying that all conversations have to be formal 
when you are dealing with a commander. I am saying that these 
are conversations about their work and about their 
investigations and oversight. As I read the regulation, that 
that is what the commander expects. That they will, as the 
regulation said, circulate among the personnel and observe, 
make observations for the commander, and discuss those 
informally with him or her and undocumented. And so, I just see 
that as a very serious problem in the regulation.
    Ms. Speier. Well, I concur with you on that. And I was 
surprised to see that that is the recommended method.
    Ms. Smithberger, you had referenced this Alternative 
Dispute Resolution Program that would be helpful, is 
operational where at the present time?
    Ms. Smithberger. So, currently, it is operational both at 
the Office of Special Counsel and the Department of Defense 
Inspector General. And I just on your previous question, one of 
the reasons that we think it would be really helpful for the 
service IGs, in particular, to announce their upcoming work is 
that we want to make sure that those investigations become 
investigations and reports and not just conversations from one 
commander to another commander. So that helps to hold everyone 
accountable.
    Ms. Speier. So you are saying with the Dispute Resolution 
Program is presently with the DOD IG. Is that what you said?
    Ms. Smithberger. Correct.
    Ms. Speier. And you are recommending that it be made 
available at the service level as well, is that correct?
    Ms. Smithberger. Either at the service level or as part of 
DOD IG; it is not currently available to military service 
members.
    Ms. Speier. So who is it being used by?
    Ms. Smithberger. Civilians.
    Ms. Speier. I see. Okay. And do you have any data on that 
in how it is working?
    Ms. Smithberger. We do. It is included in semiannual 
reports, but I am happy to provide more for the record.
    Ms. Speier. Okay. If you would do that for the record, that 
would be helpful. Thank you.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 103.]
    Ms. Speier. Let's see. I think that is all the questions I 
have. I really very much appreciate your testimony today. It is 
very helpful for us to be able to hear from those who have 
served, those who evaluate. Maybe just one last question.
    It appears in Ms. Smithberger's testimony, you indicated 
that--if I can find it. You referenced the 2019 Roll Call story 
that found that only 1 of the 350 officials that the IGs 
determined had retaliated against whistleblowers was fired. So 
I am presuming from that that there were 350 cases that were 
brought by whistleblowers in which they confirmed that there 
was retaliation, but only one of those officers was fired. Is 
that correct?
    Ms. Smithberger. That is correct.
    Ms. Speier. Is that alarming to either of you?
    Ms. Smithberger. I think it sends the signal that 
retaliation is tolerated and is an inconvenience at most.
    Ms. Speier. Mr. Heddell.
    Mr. Heddell. It is alarming, but I don't think that it is 
unusual in terms of statistics over the last 10, maybe even 15 
years. Maybe even while I was an inspector general. And it is 
alarming. But I don't think it is unusual. So much has gone 
unreported. And so much that is reported that is investigated--
I will say it is under-investigated, that is the term I would 
use, meaning that you don't see many substantiations. And I 
think the statistics alone tell you that there is a concern.
    Ms. Speier. All right. Thank you very much. My time has 
expired. Your presentations are complete. I don't believe we 
have any other members who wish to be heard. So thank you very 
much. We will change out our panelists.
    All right. We welcome our second panel which includes Mr. 
Sean O'Donnell, the Acting Inspector General for the Department 
of Defense; Lieutenant General Leslie Smith; Lieutenant General 
Sami Said; Vice Admiral Richard Snyder; and Major General 
Robert Castellvi.
    All right. Each witness will provide a brief statement, and 
each member will have the opportunity to question the witnesses 
for 5 minutes. We ask that our witnesses summarize their 
testimony in 5 minutes. Your written statements will be made 
part of the record.
    We are now going to start with the Acting Inspector General 
of the Department of Defense, and the confirmed Inspector 
General of the Department of--no, the EPA [Environmental 
Protection Agency], is that correct?
    Mr. O'Donnell. Yes, ma'am.
    Ms. Speier. Mr. O'Donnell, you are recognized.

 STATEMENT OF SEAN O'DONNELL, ACTING INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE 
                     DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

    Mr. O'Donnell. Good afternoon, Chairwoman Speier, Ranking 
Member Banks, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for 
inviting me to discuss the roles and responsibilities of the 
inspectors general of the Department of Defense and the 
military services.
    In January 2020, I was sworn in as the Inspector General of 
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. And since April 2020, 
I have served concurrently as the Acting Inspector General with 
the Department of Defense.
    Today, I am here representing the Department of Defense 
Office of Inspector General. Through the IG Act, Congress 
established the DOD OIG as an independent and objective unit to 
prevent and detect waste, fraud, and abuse in DOD programs and 
operations; to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness 
of those programs and operations; and to help ensure ethical 
conduct throughout the DOD.
    Perhaps the most important hallmark of the DOD OIG is its 
independence. This independence ensures the objectivity of our 
work and safeguards our operations against efforts to influence 
or obstruct. Congress has protected our independence by, among 
other things, placing the IG under the general supervision of 
the Secretary of Defense, meaning the Secretary cannot not 
direct or prevent the work of the DOD OIG unless such a 
prohibition is necessary to preserve national security. In 
addition, Congress also requires that the DOD OIG receive 
timely access to all documents and other information available 
to the Department.
    The DOD OIG employs approximately 1,750 dedicated oversight 
professionals. We are responsible for, among other things, one 
of the largest financial statement audits in history, 
evaluating highly complex and highly classified DOD programs, 
evaluating high, excuse me, investigating billions of dollars 
in potential fraud.
    To put our overall work into perspective, in fiscal year 
2020 the DOD OIG issued 138 audit and evaluation reports, 
contributed to criminal recoveries of $2.69 billion, conducted 
35 administrative investigations, and oversaw 499 senior 
official or retaliation investigations completed by the 
military services and the defense agency OIGs.
    We do all this despite having a proportionately smaller 
staff than other Federal IGs. As a point of comparison, the 
larger Federal OIGs typically have a ratio of departmental 
staff to OIG staff of between 50 to 1 and 200 to 1. The DOD OIG 
ratio is closer to 1,700 to 1.
    The DOD OIG is not alone in ensuring robust oversight of 
the DOD. We are part of what we call the Defense Oversight 
Community, which includes the four military service IGs, the 
military criminal investigative organizations, the service 
auditors general, and the defense agency IGs. The IG Act 
recognizes the important role of this community by among other 
things requiring that the DOD OIG give particular regard to the 
community's work with an eye toward avoiding duplication and 
ensuring coordination and cooperation.
    To this end, I chair the Defense Council on Integrity and 
Efficiency, which brings our community together through various 
committees and working groups. In addition, I meet quarterly 
with the service IGs to discuss common issues.
    One of the most significant ways in which we interact with 
the Department of Defense is through the DOD Hotline. We offer 
the DOD Hotline as a confidential, reliable means to report 
without fear of reprisal, allegations of fraud, mismanagement, 
or misconduct that involve DOD personnel and operations. Last 
year, the DOD Hotline received approximately 16,000 contacts. 
This volume often requires the DOD OIG to refer hotline 
contacts to an appropriate entity within the Defense Oversight 
Community.
    For senior official misconduct allegations, we will 
generally assume responsibility for conducting investigations 
against three- and four-star generals and flag officers, 
Presidential appointees, and Senior Executive Service members 
in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Similarly, we will 
generally refer misconduct against one- and two-star general 
and flag officers and SES members within a service to the 
corresponding service IG.
    With respect to whistleblower retaliation allegations, the 
DOD OIG handles complaints involving DOD contractors and other 
select employees, security clearances, and sexual assaults. We 
will generally refer whistleblower retaliation allegations 
involving military service members to their respective service 
IG.
    Even when we refer a contact to another entity, we retain 
oversight responsibility. As such, we require that the 
receiving entity conduct an inquiry according to quality 
standards that ensure independence and objectivity. For most 
referrals, we also require that the receiving entity submit a 
written report to the DOD OIG for oversight. If we determine 
that the report does not meet our quality standards, we will 
return the report to resolve the deficiency.
    We engage the Defense Oversight Community in other ways, 
too. Most notably and relevant to this committee is our 
continuing implementation of our oversight and diversity 
inclusion in the DOD and the handling of supremacist and 
extremist criminal gangs in the Armed Forces as required by 
section 554.
    Finally, we also undertake quality assurance reviews of the 
service IGs' administrative investigations. In closing, 
overseeing increasingly complex DOD programs and operations, as 
well as hotline and other complaints requires the best staff, 
training, and resources, not only for the DOD OIG, but also for 
the service IGs and the broader Defense Oversight Community.
    Thank you for the opportunity to testify this afternoon, 
and I look forward to answering your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. O'Donnell can be found in 
the Appendix on page 70.]
    Ms. Speier. Thank you, Inspector General. We will now hear 
from Lieutenant General Leslie Smith, the Inspector General of 
the Army.

STATEMENT OF LTG LESLIE C. SMITH, USA, INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE 
                              ARMY

    General Smith. Chairwoman Speier, Ranking Member Banks, and 
distinguished members of the Military Personnel Subcommittee, 
good afternoon.
    I am Lieutenant General Leslie C. Smith, the Army's 
Inspector General. Thank you for the privilege of appearing 
before you today to speak about the Army Inspector General 
system and how we function to assist soldiers, Army civilians, 
and family members. On behalf of the Acting Secretary of the 
Army, Honorable Mr. Whitley, and Army Chief of Staff General 
McConville, thank you for support to the military.
    We exist for one thing: To help ensure the readiness of our 
Army. Since the creation of the U.S. Army Inspector General 
System 243 years ago, inspectors generals have been charged to 
inspect, observe, train, and report misconduct. This duty has 
evolved to our four key functions: inspections, assistance, 
investigations, and training.
    At the Department of the Army, I am independent, and I 
report directly to the Secretary of the Army. However, in 
accordance with title 10, U.S. Code, I am charged by law to 
fully cooperate with the Department of Defense Inspector 
General. And we achieve this cooperation by resolving 
allegations of whistleblower reprisal, DOD Hotline, and Army 
senior official misconduct all under the direct oversight of 
the Department of Defense.
    Under the Department of Army level, we conduct independent 
inspections of systemic issues and also resolve allegations of 
misconduct, fraud, waste, and abuse. We will refer other 
allegations that represent criminal misconduct to Army's 
Criminal Investigation Command, and discrimination cases to 
Equal Opportunity Offices.
    Additionally, we provide policy, training, and assistance 
to Army IGs worldwide. We also provide trend analysis and 
impartial advice to Army senior leaders in all components. For 
example, our Inspections Directorate is in direct support of 
the Army's focus on countering harmful behaviors. This effort 
includes behaviors such as sexual assault, sexual harassment, 
discrimination, and extremism, among others. Also, being 
independent affords us the ability to understand the scope and 
challenges the Army faced in the privatized housing crisis and 
to recommend solutions to Army senior leaders. We were able to 
quickly shift our assets to deploy to 73 locations across the 
United States to get a strategic look at the problem.
    Across our Army, we have 1,441 inspectors general and 208 
IG offices. We train each of these IGs through our Inspector 
General School certified by me and the Secretary of the Army, 
with additional advanced courses and continued education to 
produce effective IGs. And in this capacity, these field IGs 
meet the readiness goals of those field commanders. All Army 
IGs work within the parameters of our guiding regulation. That 
means they are responsible to their respective commanders, or 
responsive to me and Secretary of the Army.
    Every Army IG takes an oath to uphold the standards of the 
Army without prejudice or partiality, even when the Army may be 
the problem. These words represent a tall order and one that 
all IGs take very seriously. If an IG falls short of this 
standard, I take it very seriously. And I have the authority 
revoke their credentials. While I don't enjoy this requirement, 
I have taken steps to revoke several IG credentials, both 
military and civilian. We occupy a position of public trust, 
and we must never violate that trust.
    In closing, Army IGs and the Inspector General Agency are 
both independent and integrated. We are independent and provide 
credible impartial oversight. We are also integrated, serving 
vertically and laterally as the eyes, ears, voice, and 
conscience of our commanders in the field, helping preserve the 
Army's readiness through our four critical functions: 
inspections, assistance, investigations, and training.
    I look forward to your questions. Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of General Smith can be found in 
the Appendix on page 76.]
    Ms. Speier. Thank you, Inspector General. Next, we will 
hear from Lieutenant General Sami Said, Inspector General for 
the Air Force.

 STATEMENT OF LT GEN SAMI D. SAID, USAF, INSPECTOR GENERAL OF 
                         THE AIR FORCE

    General Said. Chairwoman Speier, Ranking Member Banks, 
committee members, thank you for the opportunity to appear 
before you today, along with my colleagues, to discuss our 
roles and responsibilities as service IGs. I am mindful of the 
limited time today and the number of witnesses, so I will keep 
my comments very brief.
    We provided the committee with detailed information on the 
roles and responsibilities of the Department of the Air Force 
Inspector General. So I will avoid covering such information in 
any detail, but let me offer a few points to frame the 
dialogue.
    Generally, the Department of the Air Force IG is charged 
with independently assessing, through investigations, 
inspections and reviews, the readiness, efficiency, and 
discipline of the Department of the Air Force, which includes 
both the Air Force and the Space Force.
    To empower full independence, the Department of the Air 
Force IG and its subordinate organizations reside within the 
secretariat chain. And the inspector general reports directly 
to the Secretary of the Air Force. All authorities of the 
Department of the Air Force IG and all organizations within 
directly emanate from the Secretary of the Air Force through 
the Air Force IG.
    At the Department of the Air Force level, the IG 
organization is composed of three field operating agencies and 
four directorates, all serving both the Air Force and the Space 
Force. Below the Department of the Air Force level, we have 
inspector general presence at 186 installations, supporting 
both our major commands in the Air Force and our field commands 
in the Space Force.
    IGs below the Department of the Air Force level support and 
report to their chain of command. However, the Department of 
the Air Force IG retains oversight of their inspections and 
their investigations.
    DAF-IG also issues the policies that govern the field IGs' 
responsibilities and missions and provides training for all 
inspector generals in the Department of Air Force. Across the 
Department, we have 2,620 airmen and guardians performing IG 
duties, of which 1,880 are military, and 740 are civilians. 
Total funded billets, though, for the mission stand at 1,886.
    The mix of civilians and military is very important to us. 
Our military IGs offer experience, but also critically 
important currency in the issues they are charged to inspect 
and to investigate. Our civilian IGs bring a wealth of 
experience and provide helpful continuity.
    Our partnership in collaboration with all our sister 
service IGs and DOD IG is, in my view, exceptionally good. We 
receive very helpful and healthy oversight from DOD IG, and 
across the services we share lessons learned and best practices 
with each other. We fully cooperate with DOD IG and have well-
established oversight and handoff guidelines that are common to 
all of us that work well.
    Independence of the IG at all levels is highly respected 
and cherished and protected within the Department of the Air 
Force. This element of independence is critical to executing 
the mission at all levels.
    Although field IGs report to their chain of command, the 
results of their inspections and investigations are 
independent, and oversighted at multiple levels. If any IG 
experiences undue influence, they will upchannel their concerns 
to their next higher level in the IG chain all the way up to 
DAF-IG. All IGs serve under common standards of conduct.
    In terms of overall capacity and resourcing, we have 
generally received appropriate support and priority. However, 
as with other organizations, we have some capacity shortfalls 
primarily at the installation level which we are working to 
address.
    Again, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you 
today. I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of General Said can be found in the 
Appendix on page 82.]
    Ms. Speier. Thank you, Lieutenant General. Next, we will 
hear from Vice Admiral Richard Snyder, Inspector General for 
the Navy.

   STATEMENT OF VADM RICHARD P. SNYDER, USN, NAVAL INSPECTOR 
                            GENERAL

    Admiral Snyder. Chairwoman Speier, Ranking Member Banks, 
and Military Personnel Subcommittee members, thank you very 
much for having us here today to discuss the roles, 
responsibilities, and authorities of the services' inspectors 
general.
    As the Naval Inspector General, my office and duties are 
established by statutes, specifically, 10 U.S. Code section 
8020. I report directly to the Secretary of the Navy and have 
the authority to inspect, investigate, and/or inquire into any 
and all matters affecting the discipline or the military 
efficiency of the Department of the Navy.
    I am the senior administrative investigative official in 
the Department of the Navy, and the principal advisor to the 
Secretary, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of 
the Marine Corps on all matters concerning inspections and 
investigations. I am the inspector general for both the 
Department of the Navy and the Navy as a service.
    The Office of the Naval Inspector General [NAVIG] ensures 
an independent and objective evaluation of all complaints 
within NAVIG's purview, with the exception of complaints 
retained by Department of Defense IG. We conduct periodic 
inspections of commands and regions to assess program 
compliance, program effectiveness, and risk to the Department 
of the Navy. We also have an intelligence oversight 
responsibility.
    Findings of our investigations and inspections are provided 
to the chain of command for action deemed appropriate. We are 
not involved in criminal investigations nor audits, as my 
office is separate and distinct from the Naval Criminal 
Investigative Service and the Naval Audit Service.
    The Navy IG enterprise is large, consisting of 27 echelon 
II, 66 echelon III, 49 echelon IV, and 2 echelon V command IGs 
who report administratively to me for policy and oversight, and 
report operationally to their respective echelon commander for 
most command-level matters. This structure provides the 
supported commander a valuable command-level resource for 
executing their duties of command. Each of our IG offices has 
both an investigation and inspection function.
    Because we have a large worldwide enterprise with 
considerable activity, we have taken steps to ensure 
consistency and effectiveness throughout the enterprise. I 
expect every IG, regardless of where they are within the 
enterprise, to perform their roles in a fair, impartial, and 
independent manner. My office is responsible for providing 
policy guidance, training, and professional oversight to that 
end. IG offices at more senior echelons provide additional 
oversight and may perform IG functions should there be any 
concern about capability, fairness, or impartiality.
    We are required by statute to cooperate with the Department 
of Defense Office of the Inspector General. In particular, our 
senior official cases and military whistleblower reprisal cases 
are worked closely with our legal staff and are reviewed by the 
Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General for 
quality, accuracy, and oversight approval.
    Cases are sometimes referred from the Department of Defense 
Office of the Inspector General to my office, and from my 
office to lower echelon Navy IG offices for information only or 
for appropriate action. Action referrals require a feedback 
report to the referring office for review and oversight.
    During my almost 3-year tenure as the Naval Inspector 
General, I witnessed a team of Navy IG professionals dedicated 
to performing accurate, fair, and neutral investigations and 
assessments. Our goal is to provide timely, accurate, and 
meaningful information to enable Navy warfighting readiness and 
support to our sailors, Navy civilians, and their families.
    Chairwoman Speier, Ranking Member Banks, and Military 
Personnel Subcommittee members, thank you for your continued 
support of the Navy and our people, and I look forward to your 
questions.
    [The prepared statement of Admiral Snyder can be found in 
the Appendix on page 88.]
    Ms. Speier. Thank you, Inspector General.
    Next, we are going to hear from Major General Robert 
Castellvi, Inspector General of the Marine Corps.

   STATEMENT OF MAJGEN ROBERT F. CASTELLVI, USMC, INSPECTOR 
                  GENERAL OF THE MARINE CORPS

    General Castellvi. Chairwoman Speier, Ranking Member Banks, 
subcommittee members, thank you for the warm welcome and the 
opportunity to appear before you today along with my colleagues 
to discuss the roles and responsibilities as service inspectors 
general.
    As the Inspector General of the Marine Corps [IGMC], I am 
the senior investigative official within the Marine Corps, and 
I support the Secretary of the Navy and the Commandant of the 
Marine Corps to promote institutional effectiveness, 
efficiency, discipline, ethics and integrity, and combat 
readiness.
    I am the principal advisor to the Commandant on all matters 
concerning inspections and investigations. And I communicate 
directly and independently to the Secretary of the Navy, the 
Department of Defense Inspector General, and the Naval 
Inspector General on all Marine Corps matters.
    My staff and I perform this vital role through impartial 
and independent inspections, assessments, inquiries, 
administrative investigations, and we do it without influence, 
pressure, or coercion. I report our findings to the Secretary 
of the Navy and the Commandant.
    Since assuming this position less than a year ago, not 
once, I mean that, not once, have I ever felt any pressure or 
influence from either one of them or their staffs. We proudly 
refer to ourselves as the standard bearers of our corps--the 
place you go to get the answer to what rights should look like.
    But my team is supplemented by 41 command inspectors 
general [CIGs], some of the finest officers I have met, many of 
them, either in person or virtually, and they are assigned to 
every general officer command across the Marine Corps. The 
command IGs work directly for their commander and serve as a 
functional extension. I call them a connecting file within the 
enterprise to me and my team at IGMC. They provide the 
commander the same support my office provides the Commandant 
within the authorities of the individual commander.
    It is important to know that they are not out there on 
their own. My office plays a key role providing training, 
support, oversight, and really mentorship, and I vet their 
selection for these local command IGs, and we inspect them to 
ensure their independence, their compliance with applicable 
regulations.
    Although the level of authority and the sphere of influence 
varies, all IGs have the same fundamental duties that includes 
conducting inspections and providing assistance, and 
responsibility to investigate allegations of fraud, waste, and 
abuse of authority. Statute dictates our cooperation with the 
DOD IG and provides oversight on all our work on senior 
official and military whistleblower reprisal cases.
    The DOD IG reviews our work for quality, thoroughness, and 
accuracy for these cases, as well as any cases they refer to 
us. Following their review, the findings of our investigations 
and inquiries are provided to Marine Corps leadership for 
appropriate action.
    The relationship between DOD IG and IGMC is very similar to 
the relationship between our office and our local IGs. Each 
commander enjoys the benefit of an IG to manage local issues, 
conduct local inspections, investigate local matters, and keep 
a pulse on the things that affect the morale and discipline and 
climate of the unit. Whereas IGMC serves as the eye and ears of 
the Commandant--we spend about 50 percent of our time on the 
road--Command IGs serve as the eyes and ears of their 
individual commander.
    Chairwoman Speier, Ranking Member Banks, and Military 
Personnel Subcommittee members, thank you for your continued 
support to IGMC and your Corps of Marines. I look forward to 
your questions.
    [The prepared statement of General Castellvi can be found 
in the Appendix on page 95.]
    Ms. Speier. Thank you, Inspector General. Thank you all for 
your presentations. I am now going to offer the ranking member 
5 minutes to ask his questions.
    Mr. Banks. Thank you, Madam Chair. I wonder for each of you 
if you can let us know as you adapt to meet today's mission if 
you are considering any organization or personnel changes? 
Let's start down here at this end of the table.
    General Castellvi. Yes, sir. We have looked at a 
reorganization of our office, and that has taken place over 
this last several months. I told the Commandant when I first 
took over, that I needed about 2 months to understand where we 
could find some better efficiencies and provide some better 
oversight. I felt that there were some things like timeliness 
of our investigations that needed to be improved.
    I thought there needed to be some better checks and 
balances within our own office. We needed to strengthen some of 
the roles, for example the Chief of Staff and our 
investigators. So I am pleased to say that that has been an 
effective look, and I am ready to put that in place this coming 
up summer with some personnel changes.
    Admiral Snyder. Yeah, Ranking Member, for the Navy side, 
really three things I would focus on. We've had an ongoing 
effort to take what I refer more of an enterprise approach to 
the way we do business. You heard about the various echelons. 
And my goal has been to bring us together and not stovepipe by 
command or by echelon. And so we put several things in place to 
try and work things better as an enterprise, because that is 
how we are going to get things done.
    Just recently, we brought up some of the investigators from 
the lower echelon who had less workload than us, we brought 
them onto our staff on an assignment temporarily to help us 
out. That was enabled by the virtual environment we are in now, 
which is that second area that we are looking to take advantage 
of. Both in the way we work and the way we inspect. Our 
inspections were done almost exclusively in person. We have 
been able to leverage the virtual environment to help that now.
    And then, lastly, looking at processes. You know, our 
caseload continues to go up. And we can certainly continue to 
put more people to that problem, but there is also an 
opportunity with process improvement.
    General Said. Ranking Member, I think you asked about 
organization change, as in moving the boxes on the wiring 
diagram. We don't have any major reorganization initiatives 
underway, but we have a few process initiatives underway. How 
to better inspect, what to inspect, how to improve timeliness; 
those are process issues, but not reorganizational issues.
    General Smith. Thank you, Ranking Member. I think for us we 
really are looking hard at the military-civilian mix, not only 
at the Department of the Army level but also at the subordinate 
IGs. I think the other aspects that we have learned from recent 
things are increasing the number of surveys that we execute and 
the analytics that we use to look at the details of those, 
because that helps us to give a better view for the Secretary 
and then the subordinate commanders.
    And then, lastly, is the oversight. At my level especially, 
my impact of making sure that the subordinate IGs understand 
the significance and importance of timeliness and responding to 
those allegations. That is the most important.
    Mr. Banks. Lieutenant General Smith, we will stick with 
you, when was the last time that you updated or refreshed your 
training or education program?
    General Smith. It is after every course it is updated. So 
that 3-week course that's at the Inspector General School at 
Fort Belvoir, we do an analysis of each one of those classes. 
Even through the virtual form which we continue to execute, we 
strongly look at those courses. And as we speak----
    Mr. Banks. Please. Go ahead.
    General Said. Ranking Member, same. We get feedback after 
every course, and we adjust the course material based on the 
feedback. We also cross-check what our sister services are 
teaching, and we get the best practices from them, similarly 
with DOD IG.
    Mr. Banks. Admiral.
    Admiral Snyder. We've really had a sea change in the last 
year. We have been forced to go virtual, and we took that 
opportunity to also revamp what we are teaching. We added a 
course, NAVIG 101. And we have also brought in training 
professionals to assist our IG professionals in delivering that 
training.
    Mr. Banks. Major General.
    General Castellvi. We too had to go virtual, and we also 
found that we had a gap. We needed to develop very quickly an 
online, an IGMC 101 version as a bridging solution until we can 
get an MTT [mobile team training] online. And because we were 
watching some rookie mistakes being made by brand-new command 
IGs that just needed a little bit more mentoring, needed to get 
trained earlier rather than later.
    And with the COVID environment that we were in, we found 
ourselves needing to make sure that we had a bridging solution. 
And we have unveiled it.
    Mr. Banks. Got it. Madam Chair, I yield back.
    Ms. Speier. I thank the gentleman.
    Vice Chair Escobar, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Escobar. Thank you so much, Madam Chair, and many 
thanks to our panelists. I have a question, actually, about the 
command IGs. If you all wouldn't mind, each one of you sharing 
with me, from your perspective if you could describe the 
relationship between command IGs and your service and the 
commanders. And I am wondering if you have any recommendations 
or thoughts on how we can ensure absolute independence, 
objectivity, lack of conflict of interest in that relationship 
or in the work that the command IGs do?
    So whoever would like to go first.
    General Smith. Thank you, Representative. So the command 
IG's relationship with the commander is twofold. They are 
responsible to the commander but responsive to me. So what that 
means is we have oversight of everything that they do. So they 
work with the commander to work the actions that are local, but 
every one of the cases that are worked, we have electronic 
views that we can see what the level of work they do and how 
that is being executed.
    And I will just tell you we keep the independence because 
of the oversight that we have. Every quarter, I review the top 
cases that are in our viewpoint sometimes are lagging to find 
out where we are, how we can improve those.
    Thank you.
    General Said. Representative Escobar, the same for us. At 
the installation level, which is the lowest level where we have 
IG functions, they are a critical tool to our commanders, 
because they have two roles. They are doing what we call 
complaints resolution, and they are hearing the complaints and 
the concerns of our airmen and guardians, and they are 
attempting to deal with them on behalf of the commander. And we 
can talk more about that if you would like.
    They are also helping the commander assess their internal 
readiness, their ability to deploy and employ, right? They are 
not providing the grade for the readiness at the installation 
level; that is being conducted at a higher level.
    They are--similar to the Army, their independence is tight, 
because although they report to the chain of command, I have 
oversight of them in terms of the guidance that is given to 
them of how they execute, the training that they get, the 
authority to overturn their investigations and their 
inspections, and the ability to reach down if we sense any 
undue influence.
    Admiral Snyder. Congresswoman, for us, we have quite a few 
civilians in the down-echelon IG offices in large--in fact, a 
large number are non-headquarters IG folks are civilians. At 
those larger commands, our echelon II commands, frequently you 
will have the IG and the deputy IG will be--one will be a 
civilian, one will be a military.
    So we have the continuity and the experience of the 
civilian folks in the command IGs, but then we have the 
operational experience and the military awareness of those 
military IGs.
    Like everyone else has mentioned, that oversight piece is 
very important to us. Those IGs know that they can, but frankly 
must, move up to a higher echelon if what they have either 
feels inappropriate or unable to be handled at their level.
    And then, lastly, it is my relationship with those 
commanders as well. I have complete authority and obligation to 
reach out to those commanders if anything is brought to my 
attention that is inappropriate on their behalf. And I expect 
them to do the same with me if the IGs aren't doing what they 
expect them to do.
    General Castellvi. I think we have a similar model, and I 
think it works for us. We have a military and civilian mix. In 
most cases, it is the military that we have as the CIG with an 
experienced civilian that is providing that continuity.
    And I heard in the previous panel about the talk about 
putting a warrant officer in there. I am not going to tell you, 
in ours--what works for us is just having experienced 
lieutenant colonel and colonel command IGs that actually have 
the credibility, the credibility to be able to walk, to be able 
to represent that commander and inspect and adjudicate and 
understand the independence and be able to walk to another 
commander and say, hey, you have got a serious issue here, and 
I know because I have been in your shoes.
    So it is important for us for the currency we believe to 
have those IGs to have credibility. But we have to make sure, 
we have to make sure that we have them appropriately trained. 
And I brief every commander's course. We brief them and train 
them in our quarterly symposiums. And that is the key. If you 
train them appropriately and emphasize their importance and 
their independence, make sure that the general officers that 
they work for and the commanders they work for understand the 
importance of that independence. And this works as a good 
model.
    Ms. Escobar. Thank you all so much. I very much appreciate 
it.
    I am out of time. Madam Chair, I yield back.
    Ms. Speier. I thank the gentlelady. Mrs. Bice is recognized 
for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. Bice. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you, gentlemen for 
your service and for being with us this afternoon.
    My first question is to Mr. O'Donnell. Did I hear correctly 
that you are Acting IG for DOD as well as IG for the EPA?
    Mr. O'Donnell. Yes, ma'am.
    Mrs. Bice. So that seems like a rather large undertaking to 
be able to manage both of those. Is that sort of a temporary 
situation?
    Mr. O'Donnell. As the title indicates, Acting, yes. It is 
temporary. It is a handful, but both offices I am blessed with 
really competent staff and committed professionals.
    Mrs. Bice. Thank you. Okay. It was mentioned earlier that 
the IG, the IG position, I think, it is for the services is for 
36 months. Do you all feel like that that maybe impedes the 
opportunity to learn and train, and maybe that timeframe needs 
to be reevaluated?
    General Smith. Thank you for the question. The position is 
actually for 46 months or 4 years. So the--48 months. I think 
the--it gives you the credibility as you select the commander 
with operational background similar to the comments that we 
heard earlier that they know they are the commanders, but they 
understand who they work for.
    It is clear that I work for the Secretary of the Army and 
all know that, and that is where my loyalties lie. And now our 
job is to make sure we understand the issues and concerns that 
subordinate commanders may have, but also those IGs, because we 
have had inspectors general work for us before. We bring both 
of that knowledge of having the experience with commanders and 
also having had IGs work for us before.
    General Said. And very similarly so, experience, currency 
both are important. And as you heard from the opening 
statement, we have a mix of both military IGs and civilian IGs. 
On the military side, they are rotating at a higher rate than 
the civilians. The civilians provide exceptional experience and 
continuity. On the military side, we need recency and currency 
in the issues that the IGs are inspecting and/or investigating. 
For instance, we do nuclear inspections. We do inspections of 
readiness. And currency in what you are inspecting is 
critically important. Having done that mission set 10 years ago 
is very different than having just come out of an operational 
command. And having executed that mission, you know what the 
latest and greatest tactics, techniques, and procedures that 
are relevant. Therefore, your inspections and your results are 
more accurate.
    So you need that credibility with the recency, and that is 
what the military brings to the mix. Yes, they rotate at a 
higher rate, but there is a good balance between the two.
    Admiral Snyder. Congresswoman, I will just add. I am sorry. 
Just a couple of things I would add. Most of our military folks 
are in the inspections branch or division, and so that currency 
is important. And, yes, they do rotate more frequently. Many of 
our civilians have been around for a very long time.
    For me, in particular, typically a 36-month tour, my deputy 
is a civilian deputy who has been there before I got there, and 
hopefully will be there for a long time. And my chief of staff 
is a civilian who has decades of experience at Navy IG.
    So, the last thing I will add is I didn't think I had been 
an IG before either. But what I have learned is going out and 
identifying standards, assessing performance to those 
standards, and making recommendations to make the organization 
better, it is what we have done our whole career and that is 
what we do as IGs.
    General Castellvi. Congresswoman, I will just reinforce my 
colleagues real quickly in some of the key things that I think 
are common that we all feel are important here: it's 
credibility, it's experience, and it's currency.
    So if you have that continuity with the key civilians you 
have as your deputy--I have one that has been in that billet 
for 7 or 8 years now, and he is a retired colonel before that. 
Brings a great depth of experience. What he lacks is that 
currency of what is happening in the Fleet Marine Force at this 
time, having not had a more recent command or command 
experience out there.
    So I think we have a very good mix, I think. Our 
inspections team is headed across the entire headquarters 
Marine Corps of subject matter experts, a good number of those 
are civilians. So it is a decent mix, and I think it seems to 
work.
    Mrs. Bice. Thank you, gentlemen. And my time has expired. 
So I will yield back to Chair Speier.
    Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mrs. Bice.
    Mr. Jackson is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Dr. Jackson. Thank you, Chairwoman, I appreciate it. And 
thank you to the witnesses for being here today.
    After 25 years of Active Duty service to my country and 
retiring as a flag officer in the United States Navy, I know 
what it means to sacrifice and to serve my country. I served 
under three different Presidents in the White House Medical 
Unit, including 8 years in President Barack Obama's tenure when 
I was promoted to admiral. It was not important to me whether 
the President I was serving was a Republican or Democrat.
    I, of course, am a Republican, but I was not concerned 
whether my patient or the person I served was a Republican or a 
Democrat. I was going to do the best of my job to the best of 
my ability.
    During that time in the military, I served alongside a 
diverse group of sailors, soldiers, airmen, and Marines. When I 
was deployed to Iraq to lead a resuscitative medicine team in 
efforts on the battlefield to combat serious injuries on the 
battlefield, I didn't care of a person's gender, their sexual 
orientation, their political views, their race, or who they 
were. I fought alongside them, and I fought to save their 
lives. I did what I needed to do, plain and simple.
    There were thousands before me, there will be thousands 
after me that serve this country honorably. And we all do it to 
protect one thing, the United States of America.
    Unfortunately, right before our eyes, everything is being 
politicized, including what is supposed to be a nonpartisan 
Department of Defense. I am frustrated and deeply disappointed 
that the organization that I dedicated my life to and that my 
family has dedicated their life to is falling victim to what I 
consider to be woke culture.
    President Biden has requested that we cut spending for the 
Department of Defense and has proposed a top-line number that 
does not keep up with inflation and definitely does not support 
the 3 to 5 percent growth the National Defense Strategy calls 
for. Additionally, he requested that the Department of Defense 
fund social initiatives and promote the New Green Deal. This 
will, in fact, force the Department of Defense to make 
difficult decisions to cut key programs that could protect our 
country in an effort to promote what I consider a political 
agenda.
    What are a few things that the Biden administration is 
pressing that is a lower priority for the Department of Defense 
than the New Green Deal and the social incentives? Number one, 
countering biological threats, modernizing our military, and 
taking care of our military families.
    It truly troubles me how deeply political things have 
gotten and how this administration appears to be weaponizing 
and politicizing organizations like the Department of Defense 
to advance their agenda.
    My first question, as part of this in recent cases 
undermanning, inadequate staffing, and poor training have 
opened the door for the DOD IG to follow political bias instead 
of due process. In these cases, the DOD IG predetermines a 
conclusion that they want to reach. And due to a lack of staff, 
sometimes inadequate training, and sometimes misguided 
political motivations, they inevitably reach their 
predetermined conclusions regardless of what they find. I have 
concerns about the IG's ability to reach these determinations 
if the investigators are under-qualified and under-educated.
    Mr. O'Donnell I believe is on.
    Mr. O'Donnell. Yes sir.
    Dr. Jackson. Mr. O'Donnell, could you please describe for 
the subcommittee the challenges faced by the IG that are caused 
by manning shortfalls, by lack of training and education, and 
sometimes by misguided political motivations as the office 
attempts to work through what is supposed to be a nonpartisan 
process.
    Mr. O'Donnell. Thank you for opportunity to answer that 
question. Pursuant to the IG Act, one of the requirements for 
someone to be an inspector general is that they be chosen 
without regard to their partisanship. I am the current IG at 
the Environmental Protection Agency--in that regard, I was 
chosen and confirmed by the Senate without regard to 
partisanship. And in everything I do, there is an objectivity 
as required by the Inspector General Act with respect to how we 
investigate, whether that is at the EPA or at the Department of 
Defense.
    I find that my colleagues at the Department of Defense are 
some of the best trained, most thorough, dedicated 
professionals that I have worked with. I have never once 
encountered a situation where one of my staff have had a 
predetermined decision and mustered the facts in support of 
that. Quite the contrary, their thoroughness in collecting 
evidence and sorting through the evidence and in forming an 
opinion is the model for what I think is the entire IG 
community.
    And so in that regard, Representative Jackson, I think that 
I am very confident in our ability to, in the work that we 
undertake, to do it thoroughly and professionally. Obviously, 
resources are a challenge. As I said, we are much smaller 
relative to the size of the Department than other OIGs, and 
that is why we rely on the Defense Oversight Community. But 
with what we have and what we do, I think you won't find a 
finer OIG in the IG community.
    Dr. Jackson. Thank you. I appreciate that. I think that you 
are going to be on the lookout to make sure that this doesn't 
happen. I think that, you know, this is my opinion, and I have 
served in the military, 25 years in Active Duty, and 4 years in 
the Reserves. And I think there is an impression out there that 
a lot of times the IG approaches investigations with a 
predetermined conclusion at the beginning of the investigation.
    And I think that some people sometimes feel like--and this 
is Active Duty members speaking to me about this on a regular 
basis, even since I have been a Member of Congress, obviously--
that they feel like the due process is not completely there. So 
I would just say that that is a concern. I think----
    Ms. Speier. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Dr. Jackson. Thank you. I yield back my time.
    Ms. Speier. All right. Ms. Jacobs, you will be first when 
we return. We are going to suspend for, I guess, what, 20 
minutes and then return and continue the hearing.
    Thank you all. Again, I apologize that we have to go 
through this, but it is what we have to do presently. Thank 
you.
    [Recess.]
    Ms. Speier. The Military Personnel Subcommittee will 
reconvene. I think our next colleague who was going to ask 
questions was going to be Ms. Jacobs, but I don't see her here 
yet.
    Ms. Jacobs. I am here, Madam Chair.
    Ms. Speier. There you are, okay. Ms. Jacobs, you are 
recognized for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Jacobs. Well, thank you so much, Madam Chair.
    So I would like to ask a question to the DOD IG first, and 
that is that despite sustained attention on the issue of sexual 
assault in the military by both Congress and the DOD, reports 
have continued to rise over the past decade.
    The Fort Hood Independent Review Committee report issued in 
November of 2020 found that implementation of sexual assault 
prevention response efforts at the installation was ineffective 
and that the Army Sexual Harassment Assault Response and 
Prevention Program is structurally flawed.
    Why are current efforts to prevent and respond to sexual 
assault in the military falling short, and how can DOD take a 
more effective approach? In particular, how can the DOD IG and 
the services work better together and increase interoperability 
to combat this issue?
    Mr. O'Donnell. Representative Jacobs, thank you for that 
question. I would say, first, if you look at the body of work 
that we have done particularly recently, you will see that we 
have done a pretty good body of work here looking at sexual 
response results--sexual assault responses at the Military 
Academy, the service academies. We presently have ongoing work 
dealing with the special victims counsel, so this is an 
important issue for us.
    And then to amplify that, in the last NDAA, we were 
instructed to form a deputy IG position whose responsibility 
would be overseeing, among other things, the DOD's 
implementation of diversity and inclusion, which I have taken 
to include these issues that you raised, which have to do with 
sexual harassment, sexual assault. These are very important 
because they do serve as an impediment for morale, for 
recruitment.
    I just can't imagine the message it sends to mothers and 
fathers when they send their children, their teenagers to 
serve. And so this is something absolutely we are taking 
seriously, and with this new position that we have been given 
through the Congress, we will be, I think, expanding that work. 
And one of the mandates of section 554 that you gave us was 
closer coordination with the Department of Defense but also 
with the service IGs.
    Ms. Jacobs. Well, thank you. And thank you for 
acknowledging that. I hear from many military parents in my 
district about how fearful they are to be sending their, you 
know, young children, teenagers into the armed services, 
especially their daughters.
    And a followup question, are service members assigned to 
service IGs ever rotated out in the middle of an investigation, 
since we know that was a problem that was found at Fort Hood 
with the Army CIG? And I was wondering if the same problem 
happens with other service IGs.
    General Smith. Ma'am, thanks for the question. For us, the 
important aspect is that we use the database, the IG database, 
so that means every case that is worked is in this system. So 
as that system is updated, they take that information, and even 
if an IG rotates, it is referred back and checked on to the 
others. Also, I have ultimate oversight on each one of those 
cases, so I have the responsibility to make sure every case is 
done and done to the standard as it needs to be.
    General Said. Representative Jacobs, to your specific 
question, it is highly unusual for us in the Department of the 
Air Force that an IG initiates an investigation and then in the 
middle of it suspends and hands off to somebody else. It does 
happen. It is infrequent. It is carefully handed off, and as my 
colleague here said, regardless of a handoff or not, the 
oversight is consistent.
    Admiral Snyder. Yeah, Congresswoman, for the sake of time, 
same thing on the Navy side. It may happen occasionally, but 
there is a very good handover, constant tracking of that case, 
and then oversight at my level.
    General Castellvi. Congresswoman Jacobs, it is very rare 
that it happens, although it did happen during this last year 
since I have been on deck with an investigator that came down 
with COVID, and that happens. You have got to have, I think, a 
good checks and balance, and you have to have a good case 
management system. I think we have a good one right now, so we 
are monitoring that when it happens, and if we have to turn 
somebody over, we do, but it is very rare.
    Ms. Jacobs. All right. Well, thank you all for your 
responses, and thank you for your service to our country.
    And, Madam Chair, I will yield back the remainder of my 
time.
    Ms. Speier. I thank the gentlewoman for her questions.
    Are there any other members seeking to be recognized?
    Okay. Hearing none, then I am going to ask my questions and 
that will probably bring our hearing to a close. I would like 
for you to write these numbers down: Department of Defense, 
1,750; Army, 1,441; Air Force 1,886; Navy, 2,620. I don't have 
a number for the Marine Corps. How many staff does the IG have 
in the Marine Corps?
    General Castellvi. Ma'am, presently, I have got about 41 on 
my staff, and then I extend about another 30 that are 
inspectors that I pull in. That is just within my headquarters, 
ma'am.
    Ms. Speier. Well, within the Marine Corps, the number of 
inspectors general that you have is how many?
    General Castellvi. Total, including our CIGs, I will say, 
it is probably somewhere in the 200 to 300 level, ma'am, but I 
would have to get back to you on the exact number.
    Ms. Speier. Would you please get back to us?
    General Castellvi. Yes, ma'am.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 106.]
    Ms. Speier. Okay. And let's talk about the caseload. How 
many contacts do each of you receive? Department of Defense?
    Mr. O'Donnell. Yeah. As I said in my opening statement, I 
think last year we, on our hotline, received 16,000 contacts 
approximately.
    Ms. Speier. Okay. Army?
    General Smith. I think the assistance area is about 55,000 
and 60,000 assistance cases.
    Ms. Speier. Fifty-five and sixty. What do you mean by 
assistance cases?
    General Smith. So those are cases where personnel asks for 
information, and we consider those as contacts also.
    Ms. Speier. Well, how many are complaints that are being 
filed?
    General Smith. The average complaint is about 7,000 cases, 
ma'am.
    Ms. Speier. 7,000?
    General Smith. Yes, Representative Speier.
    Ms. Speier. Air Force.
    General Said. Chairwoman, over the last 3 years, we 
averaged 11,103----
    Ms. Speier. Per year or----
    General Said. Per year, assistance requests from the IG.
    Ms. Speier. Navy.
    Admiral Snyder. Yes. Last year, it was about 6,600 contacts 
or cases.
    Ms. Speier. Marine Corps?
    General Castellvi. Last year it was just over 2,000. I 
would say half of those were assistance cases, so maybe half of 
those were contacts or complaints.
    Ms. Speier. So 1,000?
    General Castellvi. Yes, ma'am.
    Ms. Speier. All right. What this suggests to me is that the 
DOD IG is woefully understaffed, and, in fact, when you have 
the Air Force and the Navy with more staff than the DOD 
Inspector General, I would suggest we have a problem.
    So I guess my first question is to you. What do you believe 
is the appropriate number for the Department of Defense?
    Mr. O'Donnell.
    Mr. O'Donnell. Yes, thank you, Madam Chairwoman. That is a 
difficult question in part because it is when do we need them, 
how can we get them and bring them in. Do we need more? 
Absolutely. We need more because of the amount of mandatory 
work that we are doing required by Congress, which accounts for 
about 50 percent of our work, and then there is the 
discretionary work that we do which diminishes, and then also 
there is the work that comes from requests from the Hill.
    So difficult for me to quantify. Happy to discuss this 
more. I know that we are currently looking to expand our 
workforce so that we can deal with section 554, continue to do 
the work on the CARES Act, but, yes, I absolutely agree, we 
could use more resources, we could use more manpower.
    Ms. Speier. All right. So Inspector General O'Donnell, 
would you provide to the committee some working number that we 
can look at as part of the NDAA, because these numbers are all 
out of whack, the way I look at them. You know, the largest 
number is the Navy and, next to the Marine Corps, the lowest 
number of complaints that are filed.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 103.]
    Ms. Speier. I noticed the Air Force has 740 civilians and 
the Navy has 740 civilians. I presume those civilians work 
within that office for long periods of time. What is the 
average length of time that a civilian works within each of 
your offices?
    Lieutenant General Said.
    General Said. Chairwoman, I don't know the exact number, 
certainly much longer than our military members that rotate at 
a continuing cycle, but we will get back to the committee with 
the average duration. It is pretty extensive. They tend to stay 
for a while, become subject matter experts and provide 
continuity.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 104.]
    Ms. Speier. Right, it makes sense. I mean----
    General Said. It does. Ma'am, can I just offer one thing?
    Ms. Speier. Yes.
    General Said. So the workload, when we said 11,103 assists 
or requests for assists from the IG, that is just on the 
investigation side, right, because as we said before, we have 
to do inspections of every single unit----
    Ms. Speier. No, I understand that.
    General Said [continuing]. For readiness on a recurring 
basis, and that is a huge workload in itself.
    Ms. Speier. I understand that. In fact, one of the things 
I--Members of Congress look at inspectors general as 
independent offices. When we look throughout the Federal 
Government, IGs are independent. They have subpoena power. They 
have, you know, remarkable responsibilities and the ability to 
audit.
    To call the component IGs in particular IGs is a misnomer, 
and even in your roles, because part of your function has 
nothing to do with really the investigative function that we 
look at, the auditing function that we look at, the waste, 
fraud, and abuse function that we look at when we think of IGs, 
you may even be misnamed. But I do think that is what is 
creating part of our concern.
    So where did we leave off? You were giving me--I think, 
Lieutenant General Said, you were telling me that you were 
going to get back to me on the average length of time for those 
who are civilians.
    And, Admiral Snyder?
    Admiral Snyder. Yes, Chairwoman. I show that we have 495 
civilian positions throughout the Navy IG enterprise, and I 
will have to take that for the record as well, ma'am, for the 
average length of service.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 106.]
    Ms. Speier. All right. So, Lieutenant General Smith, you 
indicated that in part of your review you have just fired two 
IGs. Is that correct?
    General Smith. No, ma'am, more than just two. So we have 
averaged, last year, of the 55 cases that, there were about 20 
that were fired. And it is not just command IGs. It is at every 
level. So if there are allegations, we have a professional 
reliability branch that they come in, it is a separate 
investigation. We have oversight. And they get due process, but 
if they don't follow what the requirements are, they lose their 
credentials, both military and civilian.
    Ms. Speier. We are talking about IGs.
    General Smith. That is correct, ma'am.
    Ms. Speier. So you have fired, what was the number again?
    General Smith. This year, it was 20 IGs out of the 55 
allegations that were there.
    Ms. Speier. Okay. How about for you, Lieutenant General 
Said?
    General Said. Ma'am, I will have to get back to you with 
the exact number. I haven't fired anybody. I have de-
credentialed. We take somebody out of an IG position if they 
don't perform to the level that we expect them to, if they have 
a conflict of interest, or if they become the subject of an 
investigation that is substantiated. They don't have any 
credibility at that point so we automatically remove them. So I 
will get back to you with a specific number. It is an automatic 
de-credentialing instead of a so-called firing.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 104.]
    Ms. Speier. So where do they go then?
    General Said. Depending on the severity of the issue, they 
might actually totally be discharged from the Air Force if it 
is really severe. If it is--because the standards are so high 
to be the IG, they might be able to serve elsewhere because the 
severity of what was substantiated is acceptable to maybe with 
some mentoring to continue service, but certainly not in the 
IG. They would lose automatic credibility.
    Ms. Speier. All right. So you will get us those numbers.
    Admiral Snyder.
    Admiral Snyder. I have not fired anybody. We are in the 
process of, like the Army has set up, establishing a 
professional conduct review board to be able to specifically 
look at any concerns we have with the IG professionals.
    Ms. Speier. So how many have you removed from the IG 
position they hold?
    Admiral Snyder. I have not removed any.
    Ms. Speier. You have not removed anyone?
    Admiral Snyder. No.
    Ms. Speier. All right.
    General Castellvi. Ma'am, of the 41 that we have, I have 
not fired any of them.
    Ms. Speier. All right.
    General Castellvi. Not yet. We--again, I think we have a 
pretty good vetting process. We have denied a few from being 
brought on as CIGs, because we did not think or at least feel 
that they were the proper quality, but we have not had a firing 
yet.
    General Smith. So, Chairwoman Speier, I would like to 
clarify one thing. So when we are talking about IGs, it is more 
than just the lieutenant colonel or colonel command IG. We are 
talking about subordinate IGs.
    Ms. Speier. I understand.
    General Smith. Yes, ma'am.
    Ms. Speier. All right. To you, Lieutenant General Smith, 
the FORSCOM IG went to Fort Hood and came back and reported, I 
presume to General Garrett, that everything was terrific, if 
you recall. Maybe he didn't use the word ``terrific,'' but he 
basically signed off, did a checklist, said, yes, everything is 
appropriate.
    We then had the Secretary of the Army stand up an 
independent committee. We have had a number of hearings with 
them here. They came back with a very critical report with 70 
recommendations and underscored that the IG did an inadequate 
job. That is frankly what has piqued our interest in looking at 
the IG function generally, because we have a certain perception 
of what an IG is, and it would appear that it is, you know, 
very different in application. So what happened to that IG?
    General Smith. Well, that IG, ma'am, is still in position. 
We have looked at learning from that mission from thereby, 
first, assisting the Fort Hood Independent Review team by 
providing them information. We have studied each one of those 
cases and expanded our survey pieces, which I think was a 
problem area from that of not talking to enough people, not 
making sure that we had the right breakdown for the numbers of 
organizations of people that we talk to and the right gender of 
people.
    Ms. Speier. Lieutenant General, excuse me, but he failed. 
He absolutely failed in his job. He talked to very few people, 
he came back with the wrong assessment, he was criticized by 
this independent review committee, and he is still in his 
position.
    General Smith. Chairman Speier, I think that the key thing 
is that we are a learning organization, and there is areas that 
we can improve in that organization. I have spent time with 
that IG and others to make sure that we have done better.
    Ms. Speier. You know, if I am a doctor and I perform a 
surgery inappropriately, if I create malpractice, I don't get 
to practice medicine anymore. I think that was investigative 
malpractice, and for that individual to still be in that 
position--I am not suggesting he be fired. I am suggesting he 
doesn't belong in that position, and that is part of the 
problem. We need to professionalize these component IGs and 
make them independent, or they are not going to provide the 
value that we expect from them.
    General Smith. Chairwoman----
    Ms. Speier. How is a component IG promoted? Who makes that 
call?
    General Smith. Chairwoman Speier, that is done by a central 
selection board, so it is not their commanders on the ground 
that select them based off their overall background and their 
ability to move to the next level.
    Ms. Speier. All right. I have just a couple more questions, 
and I thank the ranking member for hanging in here. How are 
each of these component IGs selected?
    General Smith. So, Chairwoman Speier, I select each one. We 
review with their background with their previous OERs [Officer 
Evaluation Reports], and there is an interview process. After 
they are selected they go through that 3-week extensive school, 
and we have periodic check-ins with them to make sure that they 
are executing their tasks to standards.
    Ms. Speier. And they serve in that capacity, did you say, 
for 4 years?
    General Smith. It is up to 4 years.
    Ms. Speier. Could be as little as 2?
    General Smith. It could be as little as 2, but it varies 
based off the time. But the key aspect----
    Ms. Speier. Have you considered hiring any civilians, like 
the Navy and Air Force does?
    General Smith. We do. Many of the deputies in the command 
component, as in Forces Command, have deputies or civilians 
that also work on the teams and there are civilian IGs.
    Ms. Speier. But they are not IGs?
    General Smith. They are IGs and they support----
    Ms. Speier. Okay. So how many IGs do you have that are 
civilians?
    General Smith. 427, ma'am.
    Ms. Speier. You have 427 IGs that are permanent?
    General Smith. That are civilian IGs, that is correct.
    Ms. Speier. That are civilian IGs?
    General Smith. Right. It is in the documents that we 
provided, I think, to your--earlier in the week.
    Ms. Speier. Okay. I guess we missed that. All right.
    General Said.
    General Said. Chairwoman Speier, so central assignment 
board is typical in the Air Force, So our IGs are selected 
through that process. There are specific standards and specific 
insight into the type of person we are assigning to that 
position, so we are pretty selective of who ends up in the IG 
positions.
    Admiral Snyder. For the civilian IGs, they go through the 
civilian hiring process so they have to meet certain standards 
in order to be qualified and eligible. A selection panel is 
then convened. Many times someone from my staff--this is at the 
command level, but someone from my staff oftentimes will sit on 
that selection panel. When they have a proposed candidate it 
comes back to my office for vetting, and I have to provide my 
concurrence for that proposed hiree before they are hired.
    On the military side, it comes from the personnel system. 
We get an advanced copy of their record, and once again, I must 
approve their assignment as the IG.
    Ms. Speier. General Castellvi.
    General Castellvi. Yes, ma'am. For the civilian hires, the 
civilian hiring process, we do sit on those boards up at IG 
Marine Corps, and it is a collaborative process with the local 
commanders as well. Our Manpower and Reserve Affairs assigns 
officers to the commands. We vet those individuals working 
along with those commanders to make sure that we have the right 
Marines, officers serving as CIGs.
    Ms. Speier. All right. AR 20-1, you heard the former 
Inspector General Heddell talk about this. I still can't get 
my--you all said that you are all independent. I presume that 
you believe that all your component IGs are independent, but 
you have an AR-20 that says the Army IGs work only for their 
commanders, they are the conscience of their commanders, that 
all IGs must understand their commander's expectations, 
standards, visions, and personality. They are the confidant of 
the commander.
    So I want you to think about this. I am not going to even 
ask you to answer it now. I would like for you to give us some 
written response.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 107.]
    Ms. Speier. I don't know how that squares with being 
independent, and I am deeply troubled that we have a system 
here that for the most part does not provide the kind of 
oversight that we need.
    The only time that sexual assault was mentioned was not by 
any of you. It was mentioned by a colleague. And yet, sexual 
assault and retaliation associated with sexual assault and 
sexual harassment is the big elephant in the room. It was 
former Inspector General Heddell who said that that was a 
serious issue, that inspectors general should be looking at.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on pages 103-106.]
    Ms. Speier. So I am going to close with that.
    I am not going to make a big deal about this, but, Major 
General Castellvi, I met yesterday with family members of the 
AAV [assault amphibious vehicle] in which you were in charge 
of, and the deaths of those nine Marines. And I must say, it is 
a very painful thing for all of us, but I don't quite 
understand how someone gets elevated to the position of an 
inspector general after being in charge of that particular 
disaster.
    So with that, we will stand adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 6:28 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]



      
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                            A P P E N D I X

                             April 15, 2021

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              PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                             April 15, 2021

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              WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING

                              THE HEARING

                             April 15, 2021

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             RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER

    Ms. Smithberger. The Department of Defense Inspector General has 
resolved over 140 cases through its Alternative Dispute Resolution 
(ADR) program since October 2017.\1\ The DOD IG's semiannual reports 
also include how many cases are pending in the ADR process, Congress 
might require the inspector general to also report how many cases were 
referred to ADR during the same period. For comparison purposes, the 
Office of Special Counsel's ADR program reported high rates of 
settlements for completed mediation rates, see the chart below from 
their 2019 fiscal year report to Congress:\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Department of Defense Inspector General, Semiannual Report to 
the Congress October 1, 2019 through March 31, 2020, ii. https://
media.defense.gov/2020/Jul/30/2002467835/-1/-1/1/
SAR_MAR_2020_BOOK%20V5%20SIGNED_ FINAL_20200730_508.PDF; Department of 
Defense Inspector General, Semiannual Report to the Congress: April 1, 
2020 through September 30, 2020, 58. https://media.defense.gov/2020/
Nov/30/2002542685/-1/-1/1/DOD%20OIG%20SEMI
ANNUAL%20REPORT%20TO%20THE%20CONGRESS%20APRIL%201,%202020 %20TO%20SE 
PTEMBER%2030,%202020.PDF
    \2\ Office of Special Counsel, Annual Report to Congress for Fiscal 
Year 2019, 24. https://osc.gov/Documents/Resources/
Congressional%20Matters/Annual%20Reports%20to%20Congress/
FY%202019%20Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress.pdf

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    .epsAttorneys representing whistleblowers before both the 
Department of Defense Inspector General and the Office of Special 
Counsel have told us the processes are pretty similar, but that there 
is continued need to educate whistleblowers about the availability of 
these programs as an option. Generally the perception is that ADR is 
very effective for helping whistleblowers find timely and meaningful 
resolutions to their concerns. While not always practical, these 
programs are most effective when whistleblowers can be helped 
confidentially without their name being released.   [See page 11.]
    Mr. O'Donnell. Although the DOD OIG is the largest Federal OIG, we 
are among the smallest when compared to the budget of the department we 
oversee. Similarly, we are disproportionally smaller when compared to 
other large Federal OIGs. During my opening statement, I underscored 
that other larger Federal OIGs typically have a ratio of department 
staff to OIG staff of between 50 to 1 and 200 to 1. The DOD OIG ratio 
is closer to about 1,700 to 1. Accordingly, we evaluate our current and 
future resource requirements regularly. For example, as identified in 
Question 42, we are refining our resource needs to enable us to conduct 
all sexual assault- and sexual harassment-related reprisal 
investigations. In addition, the DOD OIG is working to determine the 
organization, structure, staffing, and funding required to support the 
execution of section 554. We will submit a report detailing this 
information by June 30, 2021, as required by section 554. We will 
continue to work with the Committee and others to further define these 
and other needs as necessary.   [See page 29.]
    Mr. O'Donnell. We take matters of sexual harassment and assault 
seriously. Since FY 2016, at the suggestion of the Judicial Proceedings 
Panel, the DOD OIG has retained control of all whistleblower reprisal 
complaints within the DOD that allege reprisal for reporting or 
preparing to report a sexual assault, being perceived as reporting or 
preparing to report a sexual assault, or assisting someone in reporting 
or preparing to report a sexual assault. Although the DOD's anti-
retaliation strategy is limited to military members reporting a sexual 
assault, the DOD OIG reviews all reprisal complaints, including 
civilians and employees of DOD contractors, subcontractors, grantees, 
subgrantees, and personal services contractors who report sexual 
assault.   [See page 33.]
    General Smith. The current average time in civilian federal service 
of an Army IG is 11 years. It is important to note that these numbers 
do not reflect other IG or IG-like experiences. Approximately 90% of 
Army IGs are prior service and some Army IGs have previous military IG 
service, civilian IG service with the DOD or our Sister Services, or IG 
service with other Federal Departments. Still others have IG-like 
experience, such as auditors or as criminal investigators. Based on 
2020 demographics, the IG workforce is senior with 78% of the IG 
civilian workforce at 50+ years old and the percentage went up to 97% 
for those 40+ years old.
    Most Army IGs are in the OPM Job Series: 1801, but many require 
specialized education, training, and experience and so are in the 
applicable OPM Job Series (e.g., 2210 for Cyber Security).
    The Inspector General is also the Functional Chief of the Army IG 
Career Program (CP55), to which all Army civilian IGs belong. This 
program provides support and resources for workforce professional 
development.   [See page 29.]
    General Smith. By law, specifically Title 10, United States Code, 
Section 7020, TIG works directly for the Secretary of the Army, who 
directs TIG ``(1) to inquire into and report upon the discipline, 
efficiency, and economy of the Army; and (2) perform any other duties 
prescribed by the Secretary or the Chief of Staff'' (10 USC 7020(b)). 
However, TIG works directly for the Secretary of the Army on the 
Secretariat Staff, and is responsive to the Chief of Staff of the Army. 
In this sense, the Army Inspector General is more independent than 
those who work directly for the Chief of Staff of the Army. The 
Inspector General ensures that only the highest quality Army officers, 
NCOs, and Civilians from all components serve as an Inspector General 
through a vetting process. TIG also develops the policy and doctrine 
they must follow while also training and qualifying them to implement 
that policy and doctrine. TIG also oversees the Army IG system's force 
structure, which even field commanders cannot alter without TIG's 
approval. In other words, a field commander cannot disband the local IG 
office to avoid scrutiny. And when the IG's Commander selects the IG to 
investigate an allegation of impropriety, only TIG can terminate the 
Investigation once it has started. TIG also has investigative oversight 
for selected cases of significant Army interest, and TIG has the 
authority to alter findings if someone (a subject or suspect, for 
instance) requests reconsideration. In short, no one can tamper with 
the IG system to limit an IG's ability to inspect, assists, train, or 
investigate. The IG-Commander relationship is not one of reverence but 
one designed for the practical enhancement of Army readiness.   [See 
page 33.]
    General Said. Across the DAF, we have 607 credentialed civilian 
IGs. The average experience of civilian IGs is 7.08 years. Their 
average duration in current IG positions is 4.65 years.   [See page 
29.]
    General Said. Over the last 3 years, we have de-credentialed or 
prevented from assuming IG duties, 17 airmen.   [See page 30.]
    General Said. Independence of the IG at all levels is highly 
respected, cherished, and protected within the DAF. This element of 
independence is critical to executing the mission, at all levels. 
Although field IGs report to their chain of command, the results of 
their inspections and investigations are independent and oversighted at 
multiple levels. If any IG experiences undue influence, they will up-
channel their concerns to the next, higher level in the IG chain, all 
the way up to DAF-IG. All IGs serve under common standards of conduct.
    The DAF-IG system is grounded in independence and objectivity at 
every level. As such, we do not believe changes are necessary to ensure 
IGs are able to thoroughly and accurately perform their duties, 
investigations, and inspections with full independence.
    INDEPENDENCE OF FIELD INSPECTORS GENERAL--DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR 
FORCE 
    1. The investigation and inspection standards, policies and 
guidelines that all IGs, regardless of level, operate under, are 
directed by the Department of the Air Force IG.
    2. The training provided to IGs is governed by the Department of 
the Air Force IG.
    3. While field IGs report to their chain of command, the 
conclusions of their investigations and inspection are not influenced 
by the chain of command.
    4. If field IGs experience any undue influence they must report 
such unacceptable influence to the next level IG and all the way up to 
the Department of the Air Force IG.
    5. Investigations conducted by installation level IGs are 
oversighted by the next level IG, Department of the Air Force IG and 
DOD-IG as well.
    6. Installation IGs cannot conduct investigations in which their 
chain of command is conflicted, directly or indirectly. Such cases must 
be referred to the next-level IG outside the organization. All such 
cases are oversighted by the installation's higher-headquarters IG.
    7. Installation IGs do not conduct formal inspections of their own 
organizations to assess readiness, compliance, climate . . . . Such 
inspections are conducted by the next level IG that is totally 
independent of the installation commander and does not report to them. 
Such inspections are subject to oversight by the Department of the Air 
Force IG.
    8. All inspections by any level IG across the Department of the Air 
Force are subject to oversight by the Department of the Air Force IG.
    9. Department of the Air Force IG may overturn lower-level 
investigations and inspection results.
    10. Nuclear inspections are oversighted by the Department of the 
Air Force IG and Defense Threat Reduction Agency.
    11. Any IG not adhering to the common standards of conduct directed 
by the Department of the Air Force IG, including the critical element 
of independence, will be de-credentialed as an IG and removed from that 
position. We have de-credentialed and removed IGs, but not for 
violation of the independence standard.
    12. The requirement for independence by all IGs is ingrained into 
Department of the Air Force IG training and policies. Direct quotes 
from DAF-IG policies and training are pasted below.
    Examples of DAF-IG Policy Emphasizing Independence
    AFI 90-301IC-1, Page 13 Paragraph 1.2.3.
        ``All IGs must maintain a clear distinction between being an 
        extension of the commander and their duty to serve as fair, 
        impartial, and objective fact-finders and problem solvers. They 
        must be sufficiently independent so those complainants 
        requesting IG help will continue to do so, even when they feel 
        the commander may be the problem. Commanders must support this 
        clear distinction for their IGs to be effective.''
    AFI 90-201, 1.3.4 A
        ``DAF/IG has statutory authority and responsibility to conduct 
        inspections and investigations which must guarantee 
        independence, instill confidence in the system, and be free of 
        any appearance of undue influence.''
    Examples of DAF-IG Training Material Emphasizing Independence
      ``The ``Independence'' standard specifically covers our 
requirement for impartiality and to guard against threats that my erode 
impartiality. Some of those threats include; self-interest, bias, undue 
influence, and organizational structure (Chain of Command) threat.''
      ``To sustain a credible Department of the Air Force IG 
system:
        --By conducting independent impartial professional inspections 
        and reporting on all matters affecting readiness, discipline, 
        efficiency and economy
        --By conducting responsive complaint resolution, 
        investigations, and programs characterized by objectivity, 
        integrity and impartiality''
      ``Investigating Officers must be impartial, unbiased, 
objective, thorough, and available''
      ``Investigating Officers (IO) must be independent and at 
least one level removed from subjects or complainants
      Ethics, Independence, and Confidentiality
        --``Objectivity imposes the obligation to be impartial, 
        intellectually honest, and free of conflicts of interest.''
        --``Independence is a critical element of objectivity. Without 
        independence, both in fact and in appearance, objectivity is 
        impaired.''   [See page 33.]
    Admiral Snyder. According to the results of a recent data call, the 
average length of Inspector General (IG) service under the Department 
of the Navy for civilians is 7 years. However, IG professionals in the 
Navy often come to the Navy with IG experience from the Department of 
Defense Office of the Inspector General, other military Service IG 
offices, and other IG offices. The average length of all IG service for 
civilians is 9.25 years.   [See page 30.]
    Admiral Snyder. While Army Regulation 20-1 applies to the Army 
Inspector General, the activities of the Naval Inspector General are 
governed by Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5430.57H, titled 
``Mission and Functions of the Naval Inspector General.'' The 
instruction states ``The NAVIG, NAVINSGEN, and the NAVIG Enterprise 
provide independent, objective, and professional inspections, 
assessments, inquiries, research and evaluation, investigations, 
oversight, and advice on any and all matters of importance to the DON. 
The NAVIG Enterprise operates without command influence, pressure, 
coercion, or fear of reprisal.'' Additionally, Article 0310 of the U.S. 
Navy Regulations, which describes the composition of the Office of the 
Secretary of the Navy, designates the Naval Inspector General as a 
staff assistant within that office.
    Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5430.57H further asserts:
      The Navy Enterprise IGs work operationally for their 
commanders and administratively for the Naval Inspector General. When 
carrying out their IG functional duties, they are subject to all Naval 
Inspector General policies, instructions, and guidance.
      A commander with an IG is required to direct appropriate 
inspections and investigations by their respective Command IGs, 
however, any inspection or investigation conducted by Navy IG 
Enterprise personnel, such as Command IGs, will be conducted consistent 
with professional standards established by the Naval Inspector General.
      The Naval Inspector General shall oversee all IG 
functions and report to the Secretary of the Navy on all IG high 
visibility matters to include, but not limited to, sexual assault and 
harassment, extremism, and reprisal. The Naval Inspector General 
reviews these matters and treats them with the utmost seriousness and 
importance.
    Additionally, the Office of the Naval Inspector General takes the 
following steps to ensure independence:
      The Office of the Naval Inspector General manages and 
provides oversight of Navy hotline cases and investigations; if there 
is a conflict, real or perceived, the matter is referred to the 
Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General the Inspector 
General of the Marine Corps, in consultation with the Office of the 
General Counsel.
      The Office of the Naval Inspector General refers hotline 
complaints to one IG level above the subject's command to avoid 
conflicts of interest, real or perceived.
      The Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General 
conducts or provides oversight of all Navy military whistleblower 
reprisal cases and all Navy senior official IG cases per Department of 
Defense and Secretary of the Navy Instruction.
      The Office of the Naval Inspector General is in the final 
stages of establishing a Professional Responsibility Council to review 
allegations of professional misconduct by Navy IG Enterprise personnel, 
such as conduct that undermines the integrity or independence 
reasonably expected of the position.
      Instructions require the entry of all subjects' names 
into the Naval Inspector General Hotline Tracking System to avoid the 
perception of prejudgment.
      The Office of the Naval Inspector General conducts 
hotline quality standard reviews of hotline cases and investigations 
throughout the investigative process and at case closure.
      Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and 
Efficiency guidelines regarding impartiality are taught and applied to 
the conduct and review of all inquiries.   [See page 33.]
    General Castellvi. In the Marine Corps IG community (IGMC personnel 
and all CIGs):
      Total number of USMC IG personnel O/H = 201
      Officers = 34
      Enlisted = 99
      DOD Civilians = 68     [See page 28.]
    General Castellvi. Independence: Marine Corps Order 5040.36J w/
Admin Change 1 states that ``CIGs are directly responsible to, and 
limited by, their commander's scope of authority. A CIG is a functional 
extension of the IGMC, serving a vital, supporting role in the Marine 
Corps Inspection Program. The relationship between the IGMC and CIGs 
allows direct and expeditious processing of IG-related tasks between 
the two entities.''
    The CIG reports directly to either the commander or to the deputy 
commander and is the principal advisor to the commander on all 
inspection results, identified trends, and IG investigation matters. 
Although the CIG reports to the commander, the Marine Corps Order also 
includes safeguards to ensure objectivity and independence. As well, 
IGMC oversees and inspects the work of each CIG. Every investigation 
and hotline case is reviewed by the Marine Corps IG to ensure quality 
standards, which include objectivity and independence, are met. Because 
each case is put into a central IGMC system, and complaints are made 
directly to this system, CIGs cannot delete a case or complaint once it 
is made. IGMC has oversight of CIG cases in this system, and provides 
frequent spot-checks and reviews to ensure cases are handled 
appropriately. This is captured in the order as follows:
    ``Commander[s] must establish a Hotline Program for the direct 
receipt of complaints. All Hotline Programs established pursuant to 
this order shall be considered part of the IG network; shall be subject 
to oversight, monitoring, and review by IGMC; and shall adhere to the 
requirements set forth in references (e), (h), (i), (j), and this 
Order.''
    As well, the Marine Corps Order directs the following, which allows 
CIGs to remove themselves from a case if they feel compromised or 
pressured towards a certain outcome:
    ``When a Marine Corps organization performing IG functions 
determines it inappropriate to inquire into a matter due to the 
existence or appearance of a conflict of interest, bias, prejudice, or 
other circumstance that may place the independence or impartiality of 
the inquiry in doubt, it shall refer the matter to the next higher 
office in the chain of command with a CIG.''
    While no system is perfect, IGMC conducts frequent inspections and 
has not found any evidence that commanders attempt to limit the 
objectivity and independence of the CIG. The CIGs are in close and 
constant contact with IGMC personnel, and have open access to IGMC 
personnel for any concerns. As well, for all personnel, civilian and 
military, have various non-IG related forms of redress available if 
they feel there is reprisal, retaliation, or pressure from a commander 
for a certain outcome, and civilian personnel are protected under the 
Merit System and Office of Personnel Management regulations.
    Sexual Assault Reprisal: Because of the special training required 
to investigate reprisal related to sexual assault, the DOD Office of 
the IG requires Service IGs to forward complaints of reprisal related 
to sexual assaults to the DOD for investigation. When any Marine Corps 
IG receives a complaint of reprisal related to sexual assault, whether 
from the victim or someone trying to help a victim, they forward the 
complaint to IGMC, who immediately forwards the complaint to DOD. All 
complaints are routed via IGMC for tracking and trend analysis. In 
2019, IGMC received and sent eight complaints of sexual assault/
harassment related reprisal to DOD, and in 2020 IGMC received and sent 
three complaints of sexual assault/harassment related reprisal to DOD. 
DOD declined investigation on all 11 complaints.   [See page 33.]

?

      
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              QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                             April 15, 2021

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                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER

    Ms. Speier. What was your total appropriated budget for FY20 and 
FY21? What were your budget requests for these years?
    Mr. O'Donnell. In FY 2020, the DOD OIG requested $387,753,000, 
including $24,254,000 of Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding. 
Congress appropriated and the DOD OIG received a total of $407,753,000. 
This amount included $20,000,000 in Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and 
Economic Security (CARES) Act funding for pandemic-related oversight, 
and $24,254,000 for oversight of OCOs. In FY 2021, the DOD OIG 
requested $395,508,000, including $24,069,000 of OCO funding. Congress 
appropriated and the DOD OIG received a total of $407,500,859. This 
amount included $7,900,000 of unexpended CARES Act funding carried 
forward from FY 2020, $4,000,000 for pandemic-related oversight, and 
$24,069,000 for oversight of OCOs.
    Ms. Speier. How many personnel do you have, and what is the 
breakdown between enlisted personnel, officers, and DOD civilian 
employees and contractors?
    Mr. O'Donnell. As of April 24, 2021, the DOD OIG had 1,727 civilian 
employees. In addition, 21 military members (20 commissioned officers 
and 1 enlisted member) and 141 contractors work for the DOD OIG.
    Ms. Speier. How many contacts do you receive per year? Of those 
contacts, can you please categorize as follows:
    --Requests for inspections
    --Requests for administrative investigations
    --Whistleblower Complaints
    --Other (and please identify as regulation question, or other 
request for assistance)
    How many command inspections do you conduct per year? How many 
administrative investigations do you conduct each year?
    Mr. O'Donnell. In FY 2020, the DOD OIG received 15,724 contacts 
through the DOD Hotline. The DOD OIG does not track contacts by the 
categories requested. The DOD OIG conducted 35 administrative 
investigations during FY 2020, including 5 senior official 
investigations and 30 whistleblower reprisal investigations. In 
addition, the DOD OIG conducted oversight of 1,281 administrative 
investigations, including 120 senior official investigations and 1,161 
whistleblower reprisal investigations.
    Ms. Speier. For administrative investigations, what steps do you 
take to ensure independence throughout the process?
    Mr. O'Donnell. The DOD OIG was created by the Inspector General Act 
of 1978, as amended, as an independent and objective office within the 
DOD with the authority to, among other things, conduct and supervise 
investigations. The work of the DOD OIG is guided by the professional 
standards promulgated by the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity 
and Efficiency (CIGIE), which requires among other things, that in all 
matters relating to investigative work, the DOD OIG must be free--in 
fact and in appearance--from impairments to independence. These CIGIE 
standards also require that the DOD OIG be organizationally 
independent, and that the DOD OIG must maintain an independent 
attitude. For example, it is the policy of the DOD OIG that any DOD OIG 
staff member who may have a real or perceived conflict of interest in 
the outcome of a case they are working on must consult with their 
supervisor to determine whether the staff member should be recused. To 
ensure independence of its administrative investigations, the DOD OIG 
requires multiple levels of review for its reports of investigations 
(ROIs), including supervisors, senior managers, a quality assurance 
reviewer, and the Office of General Counsel. As part of its oversight 
responsibilities, the DOD OIG requires that the administrative 
investigations it refers to DOD Components remain independent. To this 
end, the DOD OIG has promulgated DOD Instruction 7050.01, ``DOD Hotline 
Program.'' This DOD-wide instruction requires that any administrative 
investigation resulting from a DOD OIG referral must adhere to quality 
standards, including those promulgated by CIGIE. To ensure the 
independence of an administrative investigation referred to DOD 
Components, the DOD OIG continually evaluates whether the receiving 
Component is impartial. If, at any time, the DOD OIG determines that 
the Component lacks impartiality, the DOD OIG refers the matter to 
another Component that is at least one level higher in the 
organization.
    Ms. Speier. How do you decide whether to make the results of an 
investigation public and what format do you use (i.e. website, news 
release)? Of the investigations that were completed in FY19 and FY20, 
how many reports of investigation were made public, at least in 
redacted form?
    How do you share information with the public about upcoming work?
    Mr. O'Donnell. The DOD OIG's policy is, to the fullest extent 
possible, to be open and transparent about the DOD OIG's performance of 
its statutory duties. To this end, the DOD OIG will generally release 
the results of administrative investigations that were substantiated. 
To release information, either proactively or in response to a Freedom 
of Information Act (FOIA) request, the DOD OIG evaluates whether the 
public interest in disclosure outweighs any protectable privacy 
interest. When national security interests or the privacy interests of 
one or more individuals outweigh the public's interest in the content 
of an administrative investigation's final ROI, the DOD OIG's policy is 
to not proactively release the report. In those instances, the DOD OIG 
includes a summary of the report in its Semiannual Report to the 
Congress and may also include a summary in its monthly newsletter and 
on its public website. The DOD OIG's memorandum, ``Proactive Release 
under DOD OIG Privacy Act System of Records Notice,'' is available 
here: https://www.dodig.mil/Portals/48/Documents/Policy/
ProactiveReleaseRecordsNotice.pdf?ver=2017-04-30-201108-967
    In FYs 2019 and 2020, the DOD OIG published 10 final ROIs and 2 
investigative summaries on its public website. The DOD OIG also 
published three final ROIs in response to FOIA requests. The DOD OIG 
shares information about upcoming work by publishing project 
announcements and a monthly newsletter on its public website.
    Ms. Speier. Since 2012, of more than 8,000 reprisal complaints made 
to the DOD or Service IGs, only 273 were substantiated. Why are so few 
reprisal allegations substantiated?
    Mr. O'Donnell. The DOD OIG conducts each of its whistleblower 
reprisal investigations consistent with the law, gathering all of the 
relevant evidence, weighing that evidence based on the statutory 
standard of proof, and reaching factually-supported conclusions. For 
many reprisal allegations, the evidence is insufficient to meet the 
statutory standard of proof. In addition, many reprisal allegations are 
resolved through the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) process, 
which are not counted among substantiated cases. The ADR process is an 
alternative to formal administrative investigations to address 
whistleblower reprisal complaints. The DOD OIG offers ADR to both 
civilian and military complainants. To date, 176 Defense contractor and 
civilian reprisal complaints and 2 military reprisal complaints have 
been resolved through ADR.
    Ms. Speier. How is training for IG staff conducted? What training 
is offered on investigations, in particular, and what is the duration 
of the training? Is training conducted in house or by a third-party 
agency or organization? Is training the same for all personnel, or does 
it vary by rank/grade and civilian or military status?
    Mr. O'Donnell. Training for IG staff is conducted in myriad ways, 
including through instructor-led training, virtual classrooms, or by 
the DOD OIG Training, Education, and Development Division or external 
third-party vendor. For administrative investigations, the DOD OIG 
provides training on statutes and policies, complaint-intake 
evaluation, investigative planning, interview techniques, evidence 
analysis, and report writing. The Federal Law Enforcement Training 
Center also provides DOD OIG staff training on administrative 
investigations. The average annual duration of administrative-
investigation training is between 3 and 4 days. The DOD OIG's required 
training for administrative investigators is the same for all 
investigators and does not vary based on rank, grade, or military 
status. DOD OIG staff also offer training to DOD Components on how to 
conduct reprisal and senior official investigations, as well as a 
Hotline course. For example, the DOD OIG developed the DOD Joint IG 
Program for individuals serving as an IG or working for an IG within a 
joint DOD command, such as a Combatant Command or a defense agency. 
These courses enable the DOD OIG to work with other oversight entities 
within the DOD to strengthen the Defense Oversight Community.
    Ms. Speier. How does the DOD IG decide which hotline complaints to 
investigate itself, and which to refer to the service IGs to 
investigate? Does the DOD IG make referrals to the service IGs due to 
capacity concerns? Are such referrals disclosed to the complainant? 
What oversight does the DOD IG conduct of the Service IGs when the 
Service IGs take over investigation of hotline complaints?
    Mr. O'Donnell. The DOD OIG generally takes investigative 
responsibility for allegations of misconduct by three and four-star 
general and flag officers, presidential appointees, and Senior 
Executive Service (SES) members in the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense. The DOD OIG will generally refer responsibility for 
allegations of misconduct by one and two-star general and flag 
officers, and SES members within a DOD Component to the corresponding 
IG and retain oversight responsibility of the resulting ROI. The DOD 
OIG has sole authority to investigate complaints under sections 1587 
and 2409, title 10, United States Code (U.S.C.), and Presidential 
Policy Directive 19, part B. In addition, the DOD OIG retains or 
assumes from the Component IGs, reprisal complaints related to 
reporting a sexual assault. The DOD OIG and Service IGs are authorized 
to receive and handle whistleblower reprisal or restriction complaints 
under the Military Whistleblower Protection Act, 10 U.S.C. 1034. If a 
Service IG handles a whistleblower reprisal or restriction complaint, 
the Military Whistleblower Protection Act requires the DOD OIG to 
oversight the investigation and approve the closing of the case.
    Yes, the DOD OIG refers some of the approximately 16,000 contacts 
it receives each year to the Service IGs.
    Yes, the DOD OIG discloses referrals to the Service IGs through the 
DOD Hotline website and the complaint form, which states that a 
complaint may be referred to a DOD Component for inquiry. If the 
complainant consents to disclosing their identity, the complaint will 
be referred with their name. If they do not consent, their name is 
redacted.
    The DOD OIG retains oversight responsibility when it refers a 
complaint to another entity. Under DOD Directive 5505.06, 
``Investigations by DOD Components,'' DOD Components are required to 
provide the DOD OIG the final ROI for review, and are also required to 
provide a written report on disciplinary or administrative actions 
taken as a result of substantiated investigations. As such, the DOD OIG 
requires that the receiving entity conduct the inquiry according to 
quality standards that ensure independence and objectivity. If the DOD 
OIG determines that the report is deficient, the reporting entity must 
resolve the deficiency and resubmit the report. This oversight ensures 
that the DOD Component conducted the inquiry in accordance with Quality 
Standards for Hotlines established in DOD Instruction 7050.01, ``DOD 
Hotline Program.''
    Ms. Speier. If there are case the DOD IG would prefer to retain but 
cannot as a result of limited capacity, what additional resources would 
the DOD IG need to investigate those cases?
    Mr. O'Donnell. The DOD OIG prefers to retain and conduct both 
sexual assault and sexual harassment-related reprisal investigations. 
Presently, the DOD OIG is resourced to conduct only sexual assault-
related cases. To also conduct sexual harassment-related reprisal 
investigations, the DOD OIG will require additional resources. With 
regard to its senior official misconduct caseload, the DOD OIG 
generally takes investigative responsibility for alleged misconduct by 
three and four-star general and flag officers, presidential appointees, 
and SES members in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. If the DOD 
OIG broadened this group of covered individuals to also include one and 
two-star general and flag officers, and Component SES civilian 
personnel, the DOD OIG would require substantially more resources. We 
will continue to work with the Committee and others to further define 
these and other needs as necessary.
    Ms. Speier. If the DOD IG had additional resources, what would be 
the highest priorities for the use of those resources?
    Mr. O'Donnell. The DOD OIG evaluates its current and future 
resource requirements throughout the year based on a number of factors 
including DOD OIG equities contained in the annual National Defense 
Authorization Act (e.g., Sec. 554), recurring statutory reporting 
requirements, specific requests from Congress and our own regular 
oversight planning. Our annual Management Challenges and Oversight Plan 
publications highlight our priority areas of oversight. These 
publications are available on the DOD OIG's public website at the 
following links: (https://www.dodig.mil/Reports/Top-DOD-Management-
Challenges/ and https://www.dodig
.mil/Reports/Oversight-Plan/). We will continue to work with the 
Committee and others to further define these and other needs as 
necessary.
    Ms. Speier. Has DOD IG increased visibility of substantiated 
misconduct for senior officials? If so, how?
    Mr. O'Donnell. Yes. In June 2016, the DOD OIG amended its proactive 
release policy for administrative investigations with updated guidance 
on factors to consider when determining whether to make a proactive 
release of information. The previous policy was not to publicly post 
final ROIs unless the DOD OIG received three FOIA requests. Under the 
revised policy, to release information, either proactively or in 
response to a FOIA request, the DOD OIG evaluates whether the public 
interest in disclosure outweighs any protectable privacy interest. When 
national security interests or the privacy interests of one or more 
individuals outweigh the public's interest in the content of a final 
ROI, the DOD OIG's policy is to not proactively release the report. In 
those instances, the DOD OIG includes a summary of the report in its 
Semiannual Report to the Congress and may also include a summary in its 
monthly newsletter on its public website. The DOD OIG's memorandum, 
``Proactive Release under DOD OIG Privacy Act System of Records 
Notice,'' is available at the following link: https://www.dodig.mil/
Portals/48/Documents/Policy/ProactiveRelease
RecordsNotice.pdf?ver=2017-04-30-201108-967
    Ms. Speier. What was your total appropriated budget for FY20 and 
FY21? What were your budget requests for these years?
    General Smith. The information provided only includes the budget of 
the Department of the Army Inspector General (IG) Office, not inspector 
general field offices. The budgets for these offices are managed by 
their respective commands.
    The DAIG budget covers 5 key areas: Payroll, TIG Travel, 
Inspection/Oversight mission travel, The Inspector General School 
Operations, and the IG Network/IG Case Management Systems/Databases.
    There are three important notes for context:
    1. COVID19 has had a significant impact on the DAIG and the budget 
for both FY20 and FY21 as resident IG School classes were replaced with 
virtual training and travel in support of our Inspection and Oversight 
mission were curtailed and, where possible, replaced with virtual 
inspections. This resulted in a return of unused funds in FY20 and 
impacted the size of the DAIG budget in FY21.
    2. The budget of the DAIG historically is very dynamic and funding 
requirements can change significantly in the year of execution 
depending on changing Army priorities and emerging requirements. The 
Army has consistently and fully supported the mission. When more 
funding is needed to execute an IG mission the Army has provided the 
necessary funding. Also the Army has historically funded the DAIG 
payroll to support a 100% civilian fill rate goal.
    3. Our military IGs are paid from a central account and the funding 
for this is not reflected in our budget. Army Senior Leadership, 
including the leadership of the US Army Reserves and National Guard, 
has historically sustained the DAIG at the highest manning priority.
    The requested information follows below
    FY20 Budget Request: $21M
    Total Appropriated Budget: $21M
    Note: During this year, the DAIG only executed $18.6M and returned 
$2.4M due to the impacts of COVID19 on IG Operations
    FY21 Budget Request: $19.5M
    Total Appropriated Budget: $18.2M
    Note: This year's reduced budget reflects the impacts of COVID19. 
There is no anticipated funding shortfall this year and we anticipate 
returning to a pre-COVID19 budget levels in FY22.
    Ms. Speier. How many personnel do you have, and what is the 
breakdown between enlisted personnel, officers, and DOD civilian 
employees and contractors?
    General Smith. Based on the Annual IG Force Management Report, 
dated 1 October 2020, the Army IG structure has:
    1014 Military IGs (527 Officers, 10 Warrant Officers, 477 Enlisted)
    427 Department of the Army Civilians
    There are no IG Contractors as IG work is considered inherently 
governmental in nature
    Ms. Speier. How many contacts do you receive per year? Of those 
contacts, can you please categorize as follows:
    --Requests for inspections
    --Requests for administrative investigations
    --Whistleblower Complaints
    --Other (and please identify as regulation question, or other 
request for assistance)
    How many command inspections do you conduct per year? How many 
administrative investigations do you conduct each year?
    General Smith.
      Inspectors General received 2,483 Senior Official 
allegations in FY18-20 (closed cases). This resulted in 54 allegations 
substantiated by Inspectors General. (2%) Of the 2,483 Senior Official 
allegations closed in FY18-FY20, there were 152 allegations of 
statutory reprisal; 2 of these allegations we substantiated (less than 
1%)
      Inspectors General received 9,274 Non-Senior Official 
allegations in FY18-20 (closed cases) and 4,342 allegations were 
referred to commanders for further action. This resulted in 1,645 total 
substantiated allegations. (out of 13,616 total allegation = 12.1%) In 
addition, Army Inspectors General actioned 74,035 Requests for 
Assistance and 50,756 Information Requests during the same time period.
      Of the 9,274 Non-Senior Official allegations closed in 
FY18-FY20, there were 2,881 allegations of statutory reprisal; 63 of 
these allegations were substantiated (2%).
      In FY20, Department of the Army Inspectors General 
completed 18 systemic inspections, 70 compliance inspections, and 6 
data calls. In addition, visited 96 CONUS and 24 OCONUS sites making 
contact with 7874 people. Field IGs conduct their own inspections based 
on the Organizational Inspection Program method taught at the Inspector 
General School. This is mandated for battalion-level and above.
      As of April 28, 2021, for FY21, Department of the Army 
Inspectors General completed 2 systemic inspections, 30 compliance 
inspections, and 4 Data calls. In addition, DAIG personnel visited 24 
CONUS and 0 OCONUS sites making contact with 2,528 people.
    Ms. Speier. For administrative investigations, what steps do you 
take to ensure independence throughout the process?
    General Smith.
      The Inspector General (TIG) retains oversight of all Army 
1,441 IGs who are organized into 208 offices (93 Active Component, 67 
U.S. Army Reserve, and 28 U.S. Army National Guard).
      Field IGs work directly for the commander of their 
assigned unit or organization but within the parameters (policy 
guidance, personnel selection, training, and oversight) established by 
TIG and his staff.
      A field IG is responsible to his or her commander, but 
responsive to TIG and the needs of the Secretary of the Army and the 
Army Chief of Staff.
      All IGs within the Army IG enterprise, regardless of 
location of assignment, must abide by Army Regulation 20-1 (Inspector 
General Activities and Procedures), pertaining to conduct of assistance 
inquiries, investigative inquiries, and investigations, as well as 
personal conduct.
      If TIG loses confidence in an Army IG's ability, he can 
and will immediately suspend their IG credentials. If, after proper due 
process, he is still of this opinion, he will revoke their credentials 
and remove the inspector general from their position of trust.
      IGs work under the authority of TIG. If there is an 
allegation against an IG, the command either directs the investigation 
or TIG can authorize a higher echelon IG conduct the investigation. 
However, IG investigations are typically not used for negative action 
unless TIG approves. A command investigation allows for the possibility 
of a negative administrative action. A DAIG team provides oversight of 
every investigation against Army IGs, and provides information for 
TIG's final determination.
      DAIG maintains oversight on Field IG cases through IGARS 
and case back-briefs. Every week, TIG receives updates on various cases 
of senior leader interest. Every month, he reviews the oldest cases 
across the enterprise and those of senior leader interest. Every 
quarter, he hosts a forum where command inspectors general (CIGs) 
update him directly on their oldest 50 cases and he provides 
assistance, as required. These CIGs brief any obstacles to completing 
investigations. CIGs also know they have an open door to contact TIG 
concerning investigations, inspections, or significant personnel 
matters.
      DODIG conducts oversight on whistleblower reprisal and 
senior official cases.
    Ms. Speier. How do you decide whether to make the results of an 
investigation public and what format do you use (i.e. website, news 
release)? Of the investigations that were completed in FY19 and FY20, 
how many reports of investigation were made public, at least in 
redacted form?
    How do you share information with the public about upcoming work?
    General Smith. The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 
Sec. 552, provides the statutory framework for the Agency's decisions 
whether to make the results of Army Inspector General (IG) 
investigations public. Army IG investigations may be released to the 
public via the Army's FOIA Library (available at https://
www.rmda.army.mil/readingroom/), or through the Army Public Affairs 
Office. Investigations may also be released directly to individual 
members of the public via written correspondence. Of the 191 Senior 
Official investigations that were completed in FY19 and FY20, DAIG made 
3 public. The Army Inspector General Agency generally does not share 
information with the public about planned or ongoing work.
    Ms. Speier. Since 2012, of more than 8,000 reprisal complaints made 
to the DOD or Service IGs, only 273 were substantiated. Why are so few 
reprisal allegations substantiated?
    General Smith.
      Overall, the relatively low FY 18-20 whistleblower 
reprisal substantiation rates can be primarily be attributed to the 
following factors:
        1) The key elements and variables of a whistleblower reprisal 
        allegation are not clearly understood by many complainants.
        2) In the majority of whistleblower reprisal investigations the 
        Army conducts, the preponderance of evidence reveals no 
        connection between a protected communication and the alleged 
        personnel action.
        3) While not perfect, Army commanders and leaders are committed 
        to the professional Army Ethic that requires promoting a 
        positive environment, taking care of Soldiers and civilians, 
        developing disciplined and cohesive units, and maintaining 
        readiness.
      In FY18-FY20, we completed investigations into 2,881 
allegations of statutory reprisal that were presented to inspectors 
general; 63 of these allegations were substantiated (2%).
      DODIG conducts oversight of every whistleblower reprisal 
case conducted by Army IGs. Army IG whistleblower reprisal cases only 
close after a DODIG review of the evidence and analysis, and approval 
of the Army IG's findings.
    Ms. Speier. How is training for IG staff conducted? What training 
is offered on investigations, in particular, and what is the duration 
of the training? Is training conducted in house or by a third-party 
agency or organization? Is training the same for all personnel, or does 
it vary by rank/grade and civilian or military status?
    General Smith.
      All detailed Army IGs from all three Components (Active, 
Reserve, National Guard) (including DA civilians) are trained and 
certified by The Inspector General School (TIGS). This school is 
accredited by the American Council on Education and the U.S. Army 
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). The Inspector General School 
Basic Course is three weeks in duration, with one week dedicated to 
investigations. This training is conducted by a combination of military 
and civilian staff and faculty with a requirement for all primary 
instructors to have field IG experience prior to being selected to the 
billet. All instructors also go through a three phase, 90-day 
certification process, to include attending an external Instructor 
Training certification course executed by TRADOC, before they are 
deemed fully certified to instruct at TIGS.
      TIGS curriculum is constantly evolving to ensure that we 
remain relevant to the needs of the Army and the Nation. This evolution 
is governed by a disciplined series of course reviews, faculty reviews, 
and constant communication with IGs in the field.
      All Army IGs have access to Army Regulation 20-1 
(Inspector General Activities and Procedures), along with five separate 
doctrinal guides. The combination of this policy and associated 
doctrine governs how IGs in the field execute all four of their IG 
functions; Inspections, Assistance, Investigations, and Teaching and 
Training. As with our curriculum, Army IG doctrinal guides are 
frequently updated to meet the changing requirements of the Army.
      Senior Army Inspectors General can attend the TIGS IG 
Advanced Course to further refine their skills and knowledge of IG 
processes. Additionally, DA civilian IGs are required to attend TIGS 
Advanced Course every five years as a part of functional training for 
all 1801-series personnel.
      All Army IGs can access a variety of TIGS produced 
instructional videos detailing IG procedures and techniques as well as 
interactive simulation software of how to conduct IG investigative 
interviews, to include a version specific to Whistleblower Reprisal 
cases.
    Ms. Speier. What standards do you use for inspections and 
investigations? Do you, for example, follow either the Silver Book or 
Blue Book standards promulgated by the Council of the Inspectors 
General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE)? Or CIGIE's 2011 standards 
for conducting investigations? Or other standards, and which ones? What 
quality assurance efforts have you implemented to make sure any 
standards are met? Do you require staff to document compliance?
    General Smith. The U.S. Army Inspector General system developed 
more than 20 years ago clear standards and processes for the conduct of 
IG Inspections and IG Investigations. These standards and processes 
directly reflected--and in most cases exceeded--the standards 
established by the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and 
Efficiency (CIGIE). These standards and processes exist in the form of 
doctrinal guides developed as an adjunct to Army IG policy prescribed 
in Army Regulation 20-1.
    The Army IG system, defined in paragraph 1-7 of Army Regulation 20-
1, charges general officer Commanders in the field to use their 
assigned IGs to focus their inspectors general inspection efforts on 
systemic issues affecting the readiness of the command. Systemic issues 
represent a pattern of non-compliance among multiple Army 
organizations, usually within a specific Army command. The IG, as a 
type ``systems analyst,'' looks for these patterns and then recommends 
inspection topics (focusing on these systemic issues) to the Commander, 
who will approve the topics based upon the readiness needs of the 
entire command. The Commander, as an expert in the field of his or her 
command, selects these inspection topics independently and within the 
goals he or she intends to achieve regarding the command's readiness. 
These IG Inspections are not merely compliance inspections but instead 
are top-to-bottom assessments of major Army functions, systems, or 
programs that are not functioning appropriately within the command and 
are therefore a risk to mission readiness. IGs assigned to Commanders 
throughout the various echelons of command are in a unique position to 
identify where those lapses exist and to steer their Commanders toward 
the problem areas. The IG's independence in this case comes from the 
fact that the Commander empowers the IG by signing an Inspection 
Directive, which in turn affords the IG the authority to carry out the 
inspection without external influence from anyone in the command.
    The Army IG Inspections Process, outlined in The Inspections Guide 
and updated annually, is a detailed roadmap for how an Army IG will 
inspect a systemic issue. The process has three phases and 17 discrete 
steps that have fully integrated, and in many cases exceeded, the seven 
standards set forth in the Quality Standards for Inspections and 
Evaluations published by CIGIE. Most importantly, Army IGs inspect 
independently without external influence on behalf of the Commander and 
within the Commander's authority. Additionally, Army IGs are qualified 
to conduct IG inspections by graduating the Army IG Basic Course after 
The Inspector General vets them and approves them for IG duty. The 
planning of an IG inspection is extensive and resembles in detail the 
Military Decision-Making Process used to plan combat operations.
    Quality control of IG Inspection Reports occurs in multiple ways. 
First, the report must route through the Commander for approval before 
submission. Next, Command IGs are required to send a listing of 
approved, completed IG Inspection Reports up through their higher Army 
Command (ACOM), Army Service Component Command (ASCC), or Direct-
Reporting Unit (DRU) for subsequent transmittal to DAIG. DAIG's 
Inspections Directorate reviews selected reports from the scores of 
inspections conducted each year to check on quality standards and 
relevance to broader Army systemic issues. DAIG's Inspections 
Directorate also makes all DAIG-level Inspection Reports available to 
Army IGs on the Inspector General Network as examples. Lastly, DAIG 
conducts Staff Assistance Visits with all ACOMs, ASCCs, and DRUs in 
order to review the quality of assistance case work; the quality of 
Reports of Investigation; and the quality of Inspection Reports.
    Army IGs conduct IG Investigations in much the same way as they 
conduct Inspections--by following the The Assistance and Investigations 
Guide, which is updated annually. It details a 16-step investigations 
process, which is a subset of the larger Inspector General Action 
Process used for both the Assistance and Investigations functions. This 
detailed process, like the Inspections Process, fully integrates all 
aspects of CIGIE's investigatory standards.
    Investigations is the function performed least often by Army IGs, 
because the IG's Commander has other options to resolve allegations of 
impropriety. IGs normally refer allegations to Commanders throughout 
the command for resolution, but the IG must follow-up to ensure that 
the subordinate command resolved the matter properly and that the 
resulting product was of high quality as well as legally and logically 
sufficient. IGs also do not investigate serious criminal misconduct; 
instead, IGs refer those allegations to the Army's Criminal 
Investigations Division (CID). IGs must refer all allegations of sexual 
assault to CID and allegations of sexual harassment to the local Victim 
Advocate and/or the local Sexual Assault Response Coordinator. Serious 
criminal matters are not appropriate for IG action because other 
established avenues of redress are available along with individuals 
specially trained to handle these matters.
    As trained and qualified investigators, IGs primarily conduct 
administrative investigations, and usually only when the matter is 
sensitive in nature and requires discretion. There is one exception: by 
law (10USC1034), IGs must investigate allegations of Whistleblower 
Reprisal, which Army IGs investigate under the auspices of DOD IG. In 
turn, DOD IG provides extensive quality control of the final report. 
The IG's investigatory independence from the command rests in the fact 
that after a general officer Commander initiates an IG Investigation, 
only The Inspector General of the Army can terminate it. Therefore, no 
one in the command can place undue influence on the local Command IG 
and push that IG to terminate an ongoing IG investigation.
    Ms. Speier. Do you think changes are needed to ensure that the 
Command IGs truly can feel free to operate independently and 
objectively? For example, who decides what inspections and 
investigations to perform--the IG or the commander? Can an IG pursue an 
investigation that a commander opposes?
    General Smith. Regarding Inspections:
      As outlined in AR 20-1, inspectors general will use a 
deliberate process to identify, evaluate, and set priorities for 
potential inspections of systemic and other issues for approval by the 
directing authority and inclusion in the Organizational Inspection 
Program (IG inspections are but one of three types of inspections 
incorporated into this program; the other two are Command Inspections 
and Staff Inspections). IGs should reasonably expect to complete at 
least four inspections of systemic issues a year, but the size of the 
IG staff section and the commander's priorities will ultimately 
determine the number of inspections conducted.
      Detailed doctrinal guidelines for preparing, executing, 
and completing IG inspections appear in The Inspections Guide, one of 
the two primary guides linking our policy to our doctrine. The process, 
as outlined in The Inspections Guide, represents IG doctrine and it is 
authoritative in nature; IGs may shape, tailor, and adapt the 
techniques and steps to meet the commander's guidance and needs, while 
still preserving the integrity of the IG inspections process across the 
Army.
    Regarding Investigations:
      IAW AR 20-1, the investigation is the IG function that 
provides the commander/directing authority another means through which 
to resolve allegations of impropriety. The primary purpose of IG 
investigations and investigative inquiries is to resolve allegations of 
impropriety. IGs may investigate violations of policy, regulation, or 
law; mismanagement; unethical behavior; fraud; or misconduct. However, 
IGs will provide the command the opportunity to resolve allegations 
within command channels. Therefore, IGs will refer all command-
appropriate allegations to the command in accordance with guidance from 
the directing authority or, if criminal in nature, to CID. Directing 
authorities should opt for an IG investigation or investigative inquiry 
when extreme discretion is necessary or when the command investigation 
is not likely to be efficient or effective. Once an IG initiates an 
investigation or investigative inquiry, the IG will complete the entire 
investigative action to determine if the allegations are 
``substantiated'' or ``not substantiated'' and if any issues are 
``founded'' or ``unfounded''.
      TIG has emphasized, and AR 20-1 specifies, findings for 
investigations must be supported by the evidence.
      WBR and HL investigations are provisionally approved by 
commanders and Directing Authorities, but actually reviewed by DAIG and 
ultimately approved by DODIG.
      DAIG maintains investigative oversight for select cases 
of significant interest to provide Army Senior Leader oversight over 
the cases
      AR 20-1 and The Assistance and Investigations Guide 
describes detailed procedures for IGs to request assistance or 
reconsideration from higher commanders, and even higher level IGs, when 
there are disagreements about the findings of cases.
      At the DAIG level, we can disagree, amend, and/or 
overturn the findings of down-trace cases where DAIG has been 
designated as the Office of Record (OOR) as long as facts support this 
decision and we obtain a favorable legal review at the DAIG level.
    Ms. Speier. Who/how is legal advice provided to the Service IGs? 
Who/how is legal advice provided to Component IGs?
    General Smith. The Inspector General (TIG), US Army, receives legal 
advice from legal advisors assigned to the Department of the Army 
Inspector General (DAIG). TIG's legal office consists of a senior legal 
advisor, a deputy legal advisor, and other attorneys who provide a wide 
spectrum of advice on issues including, but not limited to, Ethics, 
Investigations, FOIA and the Privacy Act, and General Administrative 
Law issues. Army component IGs (i.e., IGs assigned to Army Commands and 
subordinate units, or to Army National Guard or US Army Reserve units) 
receive legal advice, especially regarding the conduct of 
investigations and assistance cases, primarily from their command's 
supporting legal office (typically an Office of the Staff Judge 
Advocate (OSJA)). The SJA and the OSJA's attorneys are Command IGs' 
immediate legal advisors. On occasion, Command IGs of Army units 
receive legal advice from DAIG's legal office, especially where 
interpretation of Army IG policies and procedures, as contained in Army 
regulations or policy documents, is at issue.
    Ms. Speier. What kind of training does your Service provide 
Commanders about their relationship with their respective IG (for 
example, command, installation, etc.)?
    General Smith.
      The Inspector General and The Inspector General SGM 
execute senior leader training for all individuals selected for General 
Officers during several leadership programs (Basic, Commander, 
Advanced). This training is focused on the role of Inspectors General, 
current trend analysis, and how the IG can enable readiness and 
warfighting capability.
      The DAIG Analysis and Inspections Follow-Up Office (AIFO) 
also produces a Senior Official Front Office Exportable Training 
Package that is designed as a collective training event intended to 
train Senior Officials and their personal/support staffs to avoid 
potential ethical pitfalls.
      The Inspector General and The Inspector General SGM, as 
well as select members of the DAIG staff (primarily senior COL's and 
Senior Enlisted Advisors) conduct monthly engagements with officers and 
senior NCO's who have been selected for battalion and brigade level 
command positions. This occurs either in-person or virtually during the 
second week of the Battalion/Brigade Pre-Command Course (PCC), a DA 
mandatory training event for all command-select senior leaders managed 
by the US Army TRADOC. Much like the senior leader training provided at 
the Capstone program, this both large and small group discussion 
focused on role of Inspectors General, current trend analysis, and 
explaining how the IG can enable readiness and warfighting capability.
      Many installations also incorporate the IG office into 
their own Company Commander/First Sergeant Courses, newcomer's briefs, 
and other key events linked to their camp, post, or station. As a part 
of the Teach and Train function, Command IGs routinely execute periodic 
office calls with brigade and battalion leadership teams to discuss 
trend analysis, root causes, and organizational mitigation measures.
    Ms. Speier. How do you implement lessons learned with other 
oversight roles?
    General Smith.
    1) Sharing lessons learned with other Services IGs: The Quarterly 
Service IG Meetings provide an opportunity for TIG to share issues and 
lesions learned with other Service IGs. TIG collaborates with other 
Service IGs with various topics of inspections amongst the other 
Services.
    2) Sharing lessons learned with other Army oversight entities: We 
do share information with other oversight entities. For example, we 
collaborate with the Army Audit Agency in support of each other's 
initiatives and share inspection plans and results as needed.
    3) Sharing lessons learned with DODIG. There is a constant two-way 
dialog between the United States Army Inspector General Agency and 
DODIG reference allegations with shared jurisdiction (e.g., 
Whistleblower Reprisal, DOD Hot Line, and Senior Official 
Investigations). Lessons learned are shared informally on a daily basis 
and formally through Army IG attendance at DODIG Whistleblower Reprisal 
Training classes and conferences. TIG also attends a meeting with other 
Service IGs hosted by DODIG. This forum also discusses lessons learned.
    4) Sharing lessons learned with Army Commanders. The Inspector 
General uses a variety of strategic communication products to 
communicate with key leaders in the field. The United States Army 
Inspector General Annual Report (see FY 19 report attached), the 
Company Leaders Inspector General Handbook Template (see attached FY 18 
template attached), Inspector General Updates (see attached IG Update: 
Appearance and Grooming Standards template) and the Senior Leader 
Exportable training package (copy attached) and the All these products 
are designed to inform leaders at all levels of the issue that Army IGs 
commonly encounter and provide tips on how to avoid such misconduct in 
the future
    Ms. Speier. What was your total appropriated budget for FY20 and 
FY21? What were your budget requests for these years?
    General Said. The DAF-IG enterprise-wide budget numbers, when 
aggregated, were approximately as follows:
    FY20: $31M requested and $24M appropriated
    FY21: $33M requested and $22M appropriated
    Ms. Speier. How many personnel do you have, and what is the 
breakdown between enlisted personnel, officers, and DOD civilian 
employees and contractors?
    General Said. Across the DAF we have 2,620 airmen and guardians 
performing IG duties, of which 1,880 are military and 740 are 
civilians. On the uniformed military side, 1089 are enlisted and 791 
are officers. Total funded billets however stand at 1,886. The mix of 
civilians and military is important to us. Our military IGs offer 
experience, but also critically important currency in the issues 
they're charged to inspect or investigate. Our civilian IGs bring a 
wealth of experience and provide helpful continuity.
    Ms. Speier. How many contacts do you receive per year? Of those 
contacts, can you please categorize as follows:
    --Requests for inspections
    --Requests for administrative investigations
    --Whistleblower Complaints
    --Other (and please identify as regulation question, or other 
request for assistance)
    How many command inspections do you conduct per year? How many 
administrative investigations do you conduct each year?
    General Said. Over the past 3 years we have received an average of 
11,103 contacts per year. Those contacts were comprised of requests for 
assistance, referrals to another unit or agency as necessary, 
whistleblower complaints, and senior official complaints. The vast 
majority of these contacts are requests for assistance (65%) or 
referrals (15%).
        The average number of whistleblower and senior official 
        complaints over the past 3 years has been 504 per year.
        Of the 504 whistleblower and senior official complaints 
        received each year, an average of 143 each year resulted in a 
        formal investigation, while the remainder were resolved during 
        our rigorous complaint analysis/preliminary inquiry phase.
        Over the last three years, total number of DAF investigations 
        resulting from IG complaints averaged approximately 353 cases 
        per year.
        DAF-IGs are responsible for conducting administrative 
        whistleblower investigations, both reprisal and restriction, as 
        well as senior official investigations. Over the past 3 years 
        we have conducted an average of 143 of these investigations 
        each year.
        Importantly, DAF-IG also conducts a variety of comprehensive 
        independent reviews of matters such as the Racial Disparity 
        Review, contracted military housing, unauthorized use of RC-26 
        aircraft during civil unrest, and others.
        DAF-IG monitors retaliation of whistleblowers by ensuring every 
        complainant that comes to the IG to report potential 
        retaliation/reprisal is briefed (educated) on the specific 
        protections within the Military Whistleblower Protection 
        program, and we advise them to contact the IG in the future if 
        any adverse actions are taken against them (or suspected) as 
        result of the member's whistleblower complaint--IAW 10 USC 
        1034, DODD 7050.06, and AFI 90-301.
    IG inspections are driven by AFI 90-201, DOD policy, or law rather 
than ``requests for inspections.'' Over the past 3 years we have 
conducted an average of 6,864 inspections per year. These activities 
include Unit Effectiveness Inspections (primarily focused on readiness 
to meet wartime taskings, compliance, and unit climate) for our field 
and operational units; Management Inspections for a variety of 
intermediate, MAJCOM/FIELDCOM, and DAF headquarters functions; Special 
Access Program inspections; Nuclear Surety Inspections; Medical 
Inspections; Wounded, Ill, and Injured Facility Inspections; Cemetery 
Inspections; Radioactive Material Permit Inspections; ``By-law'' 
Inspections such as--Combating Trafficking in Persons, Federal Voting 
Assistance Program, Personnel Accountability, Suicide Prevention 
Program, Transition Assistance Program, Equal Opportunity, Sexual 
Assault Prevention & Response Program, Intelligence Oversight; and 
others.
    Ms. Speier. For administrative investigations, what steps do you 
take to ensure independence throughout the process? [QFR #23, for 
cross-reference.]
    General Said. Independence of the IG at all levels is highly 
respected, cherished, and protected within the DAF. This element of 
independence is critical to executing the mission, at all levels. 
Although field IGs report to their chain of command, the results of 
their inspections and investigations are independent and oversighted at 
multiple levels. If any IG experiences undue influence, they will up-
channel their concerns to the next, higher level in the IG chain, all 
the way up to DAF-IG. All IGs serve under common standards of conduct.
    INDEPENDENCE OF FIELD INSPECTORS GENERAL--DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR 
FORCE
    1. The investigation and inspection standards, policies and 
guidelines that all IGs, regardless of level, operate under, are 
directed by the Department of the Air Force IG (DAF-IG).
    2. The training provided to IGs is governed by the DAF-IG.
    3. While field IGs report to their chain of command, the 
conclusions of their investigations and inspection are not influenced 
by the chain of command.
    4. If field IGs experience any undue influence they must report 
such unacceptable influence to the next level IG and all the way up to 
the DAF-IG.
    5. Investigations conducted by installation level IGs are 
oversighted by the next level IG, DAF-IG and DOD-IG as well.
    6. Installation IGs cannot conduct investigations in which their 
chain of command is conflicted, directly or indirectly. Such cases must 
be referred to the next-level IG outside the organization. All such 
cases are oversighted by the installation's higher-headquarters IG.
    7. Installation IGs do not conduct formal inspections of their own 
organizations to assess readiness, compliance, climate . . . .. Such 
inspections are conducted by the next level IG that is totally 
independent of the installation commander and does not report to them. 
Such inspections are subject to oversight by the DAF-IG.
    8. All inspections by any level IG across the Department of the Air 
Force are subject to oversight by the DAF-IG.
    9. DAF-IG may overturn lower-level investigations and inspection 
results.
    10. Nuclear inspections are oversighted by the DAF-IG and Defense 
Threat Reduction Agency.
    11. Any IG not adhering to the common standards of conduct directed 
by the DAF-IG, including the critical element of independence, will be 
de-credentialed as an IG and removed from that position. We have de-
credentialed and removed IGs, but not for violations of the 
independence standard.
    12. The requirement for independence by all IGs is ingrained into 
DAF-IG training and policies. Direct quotes from DAF-IG policies and 
training are pasted below.
    Examples of DAF-IG Policy Emphasizing Independence 
    AFI 90-301IC-1, Page 13 Paragraph 1.2.3.
      ``All IGs must maintain a clear distinction between being 
an extension of the commander and their duty to serve as fair, 
impartial, and objective fact-finders and problem solvers. They must be 
sufficiently independent so those complainants requesting IG help will 
continue to do so, even when they feel the commander may be the 
problem. Commanders must support this clear distinction for their IGs 
to be effective.''
    AFI 90-201, 1.3.4 A
      ``DAF-IG has statutory authority and responsibility to 
conduct inspections and investigations which must guarantee 
independence, instill confidence in the system, and be free of any 
appearance of undue influence.''
    Examples of DAF-IG Training Material Emphasizing Independence
      ``The ``Independence'' standard specifically covers our 
requirement for impartiality and to guard against threats that my erode 
impartiality. Some of those threats include; self-interest, bias, undue 
influence, and organizational structure (Chain of Command) threat.''
      ``To sustain a credible Department of the Air Force IG 
system:
        o By conducting independent impartial professional inspections 
        and reporting on all matters affecting readiness, discipline, 
        efficiency and economy
        o By conducting responsive complaint resolution, 
        investigations, and programs characterized by objectivity, 
        integrity and impartiality''
      ``Investigating Officers must be impartial, unbiased, 
objective, thorough, and available''
      ``Investigating Officers (IO) must be independent and at 
least one level removed from subjects or complainants''
      ``Ethics, Independence, and Confidentiality
        o Objectivity imposes the obligation to be impartial, 
        intellectually honest, and free of conflicts of interest.
        o Independence is a critical element of objectivity. Without 
        independence, both in fact and in appearance, objectivity is 
        impaired.''
    Ms. Speier. How do you decide whether to make the results of an 
investigation public and what format do you use (i.e. website, news 
release)? Of the investigations that were completed in FY19 and FY20, 
how many reports of investigation were made public, at least in 
redacted form?
    How do you share information with the public about upcoming work?
    How do you decide whether to make the results of an investigation 
public and what format do you use (i.e., website, news release)? Of the 
investigations that were completed in FY19 and FY20, how many reports 
of investigation were made public, at least in redacted form?
    General Said. IG investigations generally involve allegations 
related or personal matters, conduct, and/or performance. As such, they 
often are governed by the Privacy Act. Hence, investigations are made 
available in redacted form when requested under the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA). We recognize and diligently work the balance 
between the public's right to know the results of IG investigations 
versus personal privacy and appreciate more disclosure is appropriate 
and necessary when investigations involve senior officials, general 
officers, and members of the Senior Executive Service than those 
involving more junior members. Investigations that have been requested 
by multiple parties under the FOIA are posted to the DAF FOIA Reading 
Room website.
    Other IG work such as our 2020 Racial Disparity Review are made 
available to the public via the DAF website.
    Finally, we routinely share information with DOD-IG to support 
their congressional and public reporting requirements related to 
investigations.
    How do you share information with the public about upcoming work? 
Information regarding upcoming work such as our 2020 Racial Disparity 
Review, privatized housing review, and ongoing Disparity Review is made 
available, when appropriate, through the DAF website, via DAF Public 
Affairs, and direct messaging to airmen and guardians.
    Ms. Speier. Since 2012, of more than 8,000 reprisal complaints made 
to the DOD or Service IGs, only 273 were substantiated. Why are so few 
reprisal allegations substantiated?
    General Said. Every reprisal complaint received by DAF-IG is 
thoroughly reviewed, addressed, and resolved in accordance with the law 
as well as DOD and DAF policy. As it relates to ``so few reprisal 
allegations being substantiated,'' we find that many complainants use 
the term reprisal without a full understanding what reprisal 
technically entails. Frequently, when reprisal complaints don't meet 
the elements present in the law for reprisal to exist, reprisal itself 
may be not substantiated. However, in these cases another violation 
such as abuse of authority may exist, which results in the allegation 
being re-characterized and investigated as such. Whether a complaint 
relates to reprisal, abuse of authority, or another allegation of 
wrongdoing, the outcome of each case is driven by its specifics facts 
and evidence, and determinations as to whether a complaint is 
substantiated or not substantiated are made using the preponderance of 
the evidence standard. DAF-IG findings in reprisal and restriction 
investigations undergo multiple IG and legal reviews before they are 
provided to DOD-IG for final approval. Likewise, DOD-IG provides 
oversight reviews of all our senior official investigations.
    Ms. Speier. How is training for IG staff conducted? What training 
is offered on investigations, in particular, and what is the duration 
of the training? Is training conducted in house or by a third-party 
agency or organization? Is training the same for all personnel, or does 
it vary by rank/grade and civilian or military status?
    General Said. For Complaints Resolution and Investigations: 
Inspector General Training Course-Complaints Resolution (IGTC-Q) is 
required for all officer, enlisted and civilians (regardless of rank or 
grade) to become a Department of the Air Force complaints resolution 
investigator. Training is conducted by DAF-IG and other agency subject 
matter experts. The IGTC-Q course duration is 5 days. Training also 
occurs during the quarterly (DAF-wide) DAF-IG scheduled video 
teleconference meetings (DCS or Zoom). DAF-IG also hosts and conducts 
an annual World Wide training conference. In addition to initial 
training, all DAF-IG complaints resolution and investigations personnel 
are required to receive refresher training every 3 years.
    For Inspections: The Inspector General Training Course-Inspections 
(IGTC-I) is a three to five day course taught by either military or 
government civilian instructors. The course teaches the fundamentals of 
inspections at Wing/Delta and MAJCOM/FIELDCOM levels and is centered 
around the CIGIE Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation for 
Inspectors General. IGTC-I is taught at the Department of the Air Force 
Inspection Agency (DAFIA), at Kirtland AFB, New Mexico. Before COVID, 
the courses were taught in-residence, but due to COVID restrictions, 
all courses are currently taught virtually. To significantly enhance 
focus on exercise planning and warfighting readiness, DAF-IG added the 
Readiness Exercise Advanced Planning, Evaluation and Reporting (REAPER) 
course in 2017; also taught by DAFIA. Additionally, DAFIA provides the 
Nuclear Surety Inspector Course, to address DAF-specific Nuclear 
Inspection requirements in conjunction with Defense Threat Reduction 
Agency's Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspector Course. Training is the 
same for all students irrespective of rank/grade or military/civilian 
status. Finally, DAFIA participates in IG summits, workshops and 
seminars, and provides IG cross-tell messages focused on current IG 
inspections policy, processes, and lessons learned.
    Ms. Speier. Have you implemented the GAO recommendations from 2019 
to better protect the identity of whistleblowers? If not, when will you 
implement these recommendations, and why has implementation been 
delayed?
    General Said. Yes. The Automated Case Tracking System (ACTS) 
upgrade in November 2020 enhanced the protection of privacy for 
whistleblowers and complies with the GAO recommendations. Specifically, 
the upgrade imposed stricter case accessibility limits by organization 
to ensure non-DAF organizations using ACTS cannot see DAF cases (and 
vice versa) or cases outside their own organization. It added a flag on 
cases to display whether a complainant has consented to release of 
their identity outside of the IG. The upgrade enabled access 
restrictions for cases that posed a conflict of interest for IGs (e.g., 
when a complaint is about an IG). And, it imposed a 10 year retention 
date for cases that were discarded to ensure all entries into ACTS are 
accounted for.
    Ms. Speier. What standards do you use for inspections and 
investigations? Do you, for example, follow either the Silver Book or 
Blue Book standards promulgated by the Council of the Inspectors 
General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE)? Or CIGIE's 2011 standards 
for conducting investigations? Or other standards, and which ones? What 
quality assurance efforts have you implemented to make sure any 
standards are met? Do you require staff to document compliance?
    General Said. For Complaints Resolution and Investigations: IG 
investigations are governed by Air Force Instruction 90-301, 
``Inspector General Complaints Resolution'' and are conducted IAW CIGIE 
Quality Standards, compliance is mandatory. Those standards are 
provided below, and DAF-IG investigation findings undergo multiple IG 
and legal reviews before they are provided to DOD-IG for final 
approval.
    QUALIFICATIONS: Either a Qualified IG IO or an IG trained IO 
conduct IG Investigations
    INDEPENDENCE: Investigative organization must be free from 
impairments to independence; must be organizationally independent; and 
must maintain an independent attitude.
    DUE PROFESSIONAL CARE: Due professional care must be used in 
conducting investigations and in preparing related reports.
    PLANNING: Organizational and case-specific priorities must be 
established and objectives developed to ensure that individual case 
tasks are performed efficiently and effectively.
    EXECUTING INVESTIGATIONS: Investigations must be conducted in a 
timely, efficient, thorough, and objective manner.
    REPORTING: Reports must thoroughly address all relevant aspects of 
the investigation and be accurate, clear, complete, concise, logically 
organized, timely, and objective.
    MANAGING INVESTIGATIVE INFORMATION: Investigative data must be 
stored in a manner that allows effective retrieval, reference, and 
analysis, and protection (ACTS).
    For Inspections: DAF-IG inspections are currently conducted IAW Air 
Force Instruction 90-201 ``The Air Force Inspection System'' and 
December 2020 ``CIGIE Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation'' 
(Blue Book). Quality assurance measures are inherent to the DAF 
Inspection System through its Oversight Inspection construct. 
Inspections and inspectors at one level are periodically observed by 
the next higher command echelon. For example, the Department of the Air 
Force Inspection Agency IG inspectors conduct nuclear and non-nuclear 
oversight inspections on MAJCOM/FIELDCOM IGs, while MAJCOM/FIELDCOM IGs 
provide oversight of their subordinate Wing/Delta IGs. All formal 
inspections at the Wing/Delta level and above require a formal report 
to be placed into central repository utilized by the DAF-IG enterprise. 
The DAF Inspection System specifically and deliberately follows the 
prescribed ``CIGIE Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation'' 
(Blue Book) listed here:
    INDEPENDENCE: Ensures that inspectors, inspection organizations, 
and their reports are impartial and without bias in both fact and 
appearance.
    COMPETENCE: Ensures that the personnel conducting an inspection 
collectively have the knowledge, skills, abilities, and experience 
necessary to conduct the inspection
    PLANNING: Ensures that inspectors give attention to the selection 
of an inspection's subject matter and the preparation necessary to 
conduct each inspection
    EVIDENCE COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS: Ensures that evidence collected 
and analyzed is focused on the inspection objectives and supports the 
findings, conclusion, and recommendations.
    REPORTING: Ensures the clear communication of inspection results to 
those charged with governance, appropriate officials of the inspected 
entity, other officials charged with oversight of the inspected entity, 
and, when appropriate, the general public. Inspection reports document 
factual data accurately, fairly, and objectively, and present findings, 
conclusions, and recommendations in a persuasive manner.
    FOLLOW UP: Ensures that recommendation follow-up is a shared 
responsibility between the inspection organization and management 
officials in the inspected entity. Corrective action taken by 
management is essential to improving the effectiveness and efficiency 
of government operations.
    QUALITY CONTROL: Ensures that inspectors and inspection 
organizations are following Blue Book standards.
    Ms. Speier. Do you think changes are needed to ensure that the 
Command IGs truly can feel free to operate independently and 
objectively? For example, who decides what inspections and 
investigations to perform--the IG or the commander? Can an IG pursue an 
investigation that a commander opposes?
    General Said. Independence of the IG at all levels is highly 
respected, cherished, and protected within the DAF. This element of 
independence is critical to executing the mission at all levels. 
Although field IGs report to their chain of command, the results of 
their inspections and investigations are independent and oversighted at 
multiple levels. If any IG experiences undue influence, they will up-
channel their concerns to the next, higher level in the IG chain, all 
the way up to DAF-IG. All IGs serve under common standards of conduct.
    The DAF-IG system is grounded in independence and objectivity at 
every level. As such, we do not believe changes are necessary to ensure 
IGs are able to thoroughly and accurately perform their duties, 
investigations, and inspections, while maintaining full-independence. 
Please see the answer to QFR #23 above for more information.
    Yes, an IG may pursue an investigation that a commander opposes. 
And, if an IG is pressured by a commander as it relates to the 
performance of IG duties and responsibilities, that IG must report the 
issue to his or her IG functional chain all the way up to DAF-IG.
    Ms. Speier. Who/how is legal advice provided to the Service IGs? 
Who/how is legal advice provided to Component IGs?
    General Said. At the DAF-IG level, the Department of the Air Force 
Judge Advocate General (DAF/JA) assigns and embeds a number of 
dedicated attorneys to DAF-IG. These attorneys are focused solely on IG 
matters.
    Our Major/Field Command and installation-level IG offices are 
supported by their respective Staff Judge Advocate offices at each 
command and location. Those legal offices assign attorneys to IG 
matters as a part of an individual attorney's portfolio. An attorney is 
assigned to provide legal assistance to each IG investigating officer 
for investigations. And, a different attorney is assigned to complete a 
separate legal sufficiency review at the completion of each IG 
investigation.
    Ms. Speier. What kind of training does your Service provide 
Commanders about their relationship with their respective IG (for 
example, command, installation, etc.)?
    General Said. For Complaints Resolution and Investigations: DAF-IG 
educates all in-bound Wing/Delta and Group commanders of the IG roles 
and responsibilities during the commander's course at Maxwell AFB. In 
addition, AFI 90-301 requires that IGs at all levels ``Educate Air 
Force members, commanders, and civilian leadership regarding rights of 
and protection for those contacting an IG.''
    For Inspections: The DAF provides its newly-assigned Wing/Delta and 
Group Commanders training covering a wide spectrum of issues to aid 
them in serving successfully in these critical position. In terms of 
Inspectors General relationships, DAF-IG provides a 90 minute block of 
instruction to each group during this 5-day commanders' training 
course. This IG-related instruction covers Wing/Delta and Group 
commander responsibilities, lessons learned, benchmark programs, and 
the commander's role with IGs as these offices conduct independent 
investigations as well as compliance and readiness inspections. 
Additionally, we update this curriculum with pertinent updates gleaned 
from recent investigations and inspections.
    Ms. Speier. How do you implement lessons learned with other 
oversight roles?
    General Said. In the context of complaints resolution and 
investigations, lessons learned are shared with our sister services and 
also cascaded down through the DAF-IG enterprise during our quarterly 
(DAF-wide) DAF-IG scheduled video teleconference meetings. 
Additionally, we conduct an annual World Wide training conference. DAF-
IG also utilizes Notices to All IGs or NOTIGs to quickly react to 
necessary policy and guidance changes or to share substantive trends.
    Lessons learned from inspections are shared by our Department of 
the Air Force Inspection Agency (DAFIA). DAFIA collaborates laterally 
with the other services and also provides the DAF-IG enterprise a 
constant flow of information garnered from inspection lessons learned 
and benchmarks via a variety of venues and processes. Foremost is 
providing all MAJCOM/FIELDCOM and Wing/Delta IGs pertinent information 
on issues found during inspections. This information, in both 
classified and unclassified mediums, covers a wide spectrum of 
functional areas to include the DAF medical community, nuclear 
enterprise, and operational units in the Air Force and Space Force. 
Additionally, lessons learned from inspection execution are folded back 
into updates to our IG training curriculum to aid in improved 
inspection tools, techniques and procedures. Finally, DAFIA leads 
inspection process review groups attended by MAJCOM/FIELDCOM IGs, Air 
Staff, and USSF Staff that are designed to articulate lessons learned 
and benchmarks and convert these into needed policy upgrades.
    Ms. Speier. What was your total appropriated budget for FY20 and 
FY21? What were your budget requests for these years?
    Admiral Snyder. The total appropriated budget for the Office of the 
Naval Inspector General fiscal year 2020 actual amount is $9,079,000; 
$1,150,000 for support and $7,929,000 for pay. The total enacted amount 
for FY21 is $14,147; $3,281,000 for support and $10,866,000 for pay. 
The budget request for FY20 was $10,281,000 and FY21 was $15,573,000.
    Ms. Speier. How many personnel do you have, and what is the 
breakdown between enlisted personnel, officers, and DOD civilian 
employees and contractors?
    Admiral Snyder. The Office of the Naval Inspector General, which 
serves as the headquarters for the Navy Inspector General Enterprise, 
has a total of 113 personnel onboard. This includes 22 enlisted 
personnel, 33 officers, 58 Department of Defense civilians, and 0 
contractors. The Office of the Naval Inspector General's reserve unit 
has an additional 20 Selected Reserve officers that provide part-time 
support at the headquarters. The Navy Inspector General Enterprise is 
made up of an additional 473 personnel onboard. According to the 
results of a recent data call, this consists of about 1 percent 
enlisted personnel, 8 percent officers, 90 percent Department of 
Defense civilians, and 1 percent contractors.
    Ms. Speier. How many contacts do you receive per year? Of those 
contacts, can you please categorize as follows:
    --Requests for inspections
    --Requests for administrative investigations
    --Whistleblower Complaints
    --Other (and please identify as regulation question, or other 
request for assistance)
    How many command inspections do you conduct per year? How many 
administrative investigations do you conduct each year?
    During calendar years 2018, 2019, and 2020, the Office of the Naval 
Inspector General opened 17,001 cases in the Naval Inspector General 
Hotline Tracking System, for an average of 5,667 cases per year. From 
2018 to 2020, the Office of the Naval Inspector General received or 
conducted the following (the below numbers are totals over the three 
years):
      4 requests for inspection
      17 command inspections and area assessments
      1,038 investigations (693 full investigations and 345 
preliminary inquiries)
      460 military whistleblower reprisal cases (Navy)
      5,258 assistance cases
      5,987 referral cases
    Ms. Speier. For administrative investigations, what steps do you 
take to ensure independence throughout the process?
    Admiral Snyder.
      The Office of the Naval Inspector General manages and 
provides oversight of Navy hotline cases and investigations; if there 
is a conflict, real or perceived, the matter is referred to the 
Department of Defense Office of Inspector General or the Inspector 
General of the Marine Corps, in consultation with the Office of the 
General Counsel.
      The Office of the Naval Inspector General refers hotline 
complaints to one inspector general level above the subject's command 
to avoid conflicts of interest, real or perceived.
      The Department of Defense Office of Inspector General 
conducts or provides oversight of all Navy military whistleblower 
reprisal cases and all Navy senior official inspector general cases per 
Department of Defense and Secretary of the Navy instruction.
      The Office of the Naval Inspector General is in the final 
stages of establishing a Professional Responsibility Council to review 
allegations of professional misconduct by Navy Inspector General 
Enterprise personnel, such as conduct that undermines the integrity or 
independence reasonably expected of the position.
      Instructions require the entry of all subjects' names 
into the Naval Inspector General Hotline Tracking System to avoid the 
perception of prejudgment.
      The Office of the Naval Inspector General conducts 
hotline quality standard reviews of hotline cases and investigations 
throughout the investigative process and at case closure.
      Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and 
Efficiency guidelines regarding impartiality are taught and applied to 
the conduct and review of all inquiries.
    Ms. Speier. How do you decide whether to make the results of an 
investigation public and what format do you use (i.e. website, news 
release)? Of the investigations that were completed in FY19 and FY20, 
how many reports of investigation were made public, at least in 
redacted form?
    How do you share information with the public about upcoming work?
    Admiral Snyder. The Office of the Naval Inspector General releases 
reports in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act, Title 5, 
United States Code, Section 552. The Freedom of Information Act states 
that an agency shall make available for public inspection all records 
that the agency determines have become or are likely to become the 
subject of subsequent requests, or records that have been requested 
three or more times. Additionally, the Secretary of the Navy 
instruction on the Freedom of Information Act, SECNAVINST 5720.42G, 
interprets the Freedom of Information Act to require posting of any 
records that have been requested three times. The Department of the 
Navy further recommends, but does not require, the proactive posting of 
materials that have been requested once to eliminate the need for 
tracking number of requests. No reports of investigation completed 
during fiscal year 2019 were posted. One report of investigation 
completed during fiscal year 2020 was posted. When an investigation, 
command inspection, or area assessment is released to the public, the 
document is posted in the Freedom of Information Act Reading Room on 
the Office of the Naval Inspector General's website. The Office of the 
Naval Inspector General does not generally make public its upcoming 
work, but it does provide Navy leadership an inspection schedule for 
the next three years every year.
    Ms. Speier. Since 2012, of more than 8,000 reprisal complaints made 
to the DOD or Service IGs, only 273 were substantiated. Why are so few 
reprisal allegations substantiated?
    Admiral Snyder. Many reprisal allegations are not substantiated 
because they do not meet the statutory requirements of a reprisal 
action. Other forms of retaliation that do not meet the statutory 
reprisal requirements are handled as hotline complaints and potential 
violations of Navy policy.
    Ms. Speier. How is training for IG staff conducted? What training 
is offered on investigations, in particular, and what is the duration 
of the training? Is training conducted in house or by a third-party 
agency or organization? Is training the same for all personnel, or does 
it vary by rank/grade and civilian or military status?
    Admiral Snyder. The Office of the Naval Inspector General conducts 
hotline and military whistleblower reprisal training for staff and 
enterprise inspector general personnel. All training was previously 
delivered in-person but is currently conducted virtually by the Office 
of the Naval Inspector General's Training and Certification Division 
via Microsoft Teams and Blackboard Collaborate. While under revision/
update, the current methodology for training Navy IG personnel is:
          Attend NAVIG 101, a 16-hour training course that is 
        an introduction to inspector general business.
          Attend NAVIG 201, a 32-hour training course that 
        focuses on basic hotline investigator skills including 
        investigations and case management.
          Attend NAVIG 202, a 32-hour training course that 
        provides the basic foundation for military whistleblower 
        reprisal.
          Further inspector general training to be followed up 
        with ``proficiency'' certification and credentialing managed 
        and/or overseen by the inspector general chain of command.
      The Department of Defense Office of Inspector General 
provides military whistleblower reprisal training to all reprisal 
investigators.
      The Office of the Naval Inspector General Hotline Intake, 
Case Management, and Quality Unit provides hands-on training for 
enterprise personnel.
      The Office of the Naval Inspector General has recently 
taken steps for enterprise investigators to be temporarily detailed to 
the Office of the Naval Inspector General for Hotline Intake and Case 
Management for approximately one month for hands-on training.
      Navy Inspector General Enterprise personnel are trained 
on hotline quality standards, hotline processes, hotline 
investigations, report writing, and the Naval Inspector General Hotline 
Tracking System during Quality Assurance Reviews, Quality Assurance 
Assists, and Quality Assurance Validation Reviews.
      New Office of the Naval Inspector General hotline 
investigators are provided hands-on hotline training on all hotline 
processes within their first 30 days onboard.
      The Training and Certification Division has developed a 
schedule for in-service training. In-service trainings are specific, 
investigative topics that are taught by subject matter experts in order 
to assist in closing any investigative deficiency gaps in the 
enterprise. These events normally occur on a monthly basis and are 
attended by an average of 80 inspectors general from across the 
enterprise.
      The Office of the Naval Inspector General standardized 
training is provided to all personnel regardless of rank or grade as 
inspectors general are required to acquire the same skills for 
consistency.
    Ms. Speier. Have you implemented the GAO recommendations from 2019 
to better protect the identity of whistleblowers? If not, when will you 
implement these recommendations, and why has implementation been 
delayed?
    Admiral Snyder. Yes.
    Ms. Speier. What standards do you use for inspections and 
investigations? Do you, for example, follow either the Silver Book or 
Blue Book standards promulgated by the Council of the Inspectors 
General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE)? Or CIGIE's 2011 standards 
for conducting investigations? Or other standards, and which ones? What 
quality assurance efforts have you implemented to make sure any 
standards are met? Do you require staff to document compliance?
    Admiral Snyder.
      Governing policies for executing DON IG investigations 
include the following:
          Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and 
        Efficiency Quality Standards for Inspections and Evaluations 
        (Blue Book)
          Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and 
        Efficiency Quality Standards for Investigations
          Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and 
        Efficiency Hotline Best Practices
          Association of Inspectors General Principles and 
        Standards for Offices of Inspector General (Green Book)
          Department of Defense Directive 5505.06, 
        ``Investigation of Allegations against Senior DOD Officials''
          Department of Defense Directive 7050.01, ``The DOD 
        Hotline Program''
          Department of Defense Directive 7050.06, ``Military 
        Whistleblower Protection''
          Department of Defense guide titled, ``Guide to 
        Investigating Military Whistleblower Reprisal and Restriction 
        Complaints''
          Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5370.5C, ``DON 
        Hotline Program''
          Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5430.57H, ``Mission 
        and Functions of the Naval Inspector General''
          Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5800.12C, 
        ``Investigation of Allegations Made against Senior Officials of 
        the Department of the Navy''
          Naval Inspector General Investigations Manual
      Command inspections and area assessments in the Navy 
Inspector General Enterprise utilize the Office of the Naval Inspector 
General Enterprise Inspection Manual.
      Navy Inspector General Enterprise personnel are trained 
on hotline quality standards, hotline processes, hotline 
investigations, report writing, and the Naval Inspector General Hotline 
Tracking System during Quality Assurance Reviews, Quality Assurance 
Assists, and Quality Assurance Validation Reviews. Quality Assurance 
Reviews and Quality Assurance Validation Reviews are conducted to 
ensure compliance with regulatory guidance.
          Quality Assurance Reviews are conducted once every 
        two years.
          Quality Assurance Validation Reviews are conducted as 
        required.
      Hotline Quality Investigation and Case Review are 
conducted on every case prior to closure to ensure compliance with 
regulatory guidance.
      Quality reviews are conducted on all whistleblower 
reprisal investigations prior to closure.
      Substantiated investigations and case dispositions in 
certain other cases (e.g., senior officials or military whistleblower 
reprisal investigations) receive a legal sufficiency review from a 
Department of the Navy attorney.
      Staff are required to document compliance in the Naval 
Inspector General Hotline Tracking System, and in reports of review to 
commands. The reports of review are kept for future reference.
      Subject matter experts that serve as Inspection Team 
members sign a non-disclosure agreement in which they acknowledge the 
required Ethical Standards of Conduct for an inspection.
    Ms. Speier. Do you think changes are needed to ensure that the 
Command IGs truly can feel free to operate independently and 
objectively? For example, who decides what inspections and 
investigations to perform--the IG or the commander? Can an IG pursue an 
investigation that a commander opposes?
    Admiral Snyder. Changes are not necessary to ensure Command 
Inspectors General can operate independently and objectively. The 
Office of the Inspector General conducts continuous training and 
oversight of Command Inspectors General and has guidance in place to 
ensure independence and impartiality throughout the execution of 
inspections and investigations by Command Inspectors General. 
Additionally, the administrative relationship between the Naval 
Inspector General and Command Inspectors General enables oversight of 
the Command Inspectors General to ensure they are able to execute their 
roles in an independent and objective manner. Inspections and 
investigations can be directed by either the Command Inspector General 
or the commander, but only the commander can authorize investigations 
on matters outside of inspector general business. Command Inspectors 
General can pursue an investigation that a commander opposes with the 
support and assistance of the Office of the Naval Inspector General.
    Ms. Speier. Who/how is legal advice provided to the Service IGs? 
Who/how is legal advice provided to Component IGs?
    Admiral Snyder. The Office of the Naval Inspector General has two 
military attorneys from the Navy's Judge Advocate General Corps and 
three civilian attorneys from the Navy Office of the General Counsel on 
staff. In addition to traditional legal practice areas such as ethics, 
fiscal law, military justice, and civilian personnel law, these 
attorneys also work closely with investigation and inspection teams to 
ensure that the correct legal standards are applied and products are 
legally sufficient. These attorneys mainly provide legal advice to the 
headquarters staff but are available to the rest of the enterprise for 
reachback on inspector general matters. For most legal support, 
enterprise inspectors general are encouraged to work with their local 
legal counsel. These may be Judge Advocate General Corps and/or Office 
of the General Counsel attorneys, depending on the command or office.
    Ms. Speier. What kind of training does your Service provide 
Commanders about their relationship with their respective IG (for 
example, command, installation, etc.)?
    Admiral Snyder. Commanders and senior enlisted leaders in the Navy 
attend the Navy Leadership and Ethics Center prior to assuming duties 
as a commander, executive officer, or senior enlisted leader. The Naval 
Inspector General meets with attendees from every Prospective Major 
Command Leadership Course, Command Leadership Course, Executive Officer 
Leadership Course, and Command Master Chief/Chief of the Boat Course, 
either in-person or virtually, to educate them on the duties of 
inspectors general and their relationship with Command Inspectors 
General and the Office of the Naval Inspector General. The Naval 
Inspector General also speaks with Navy flag officers and Senior 
Executive Service personnel at the New Flag and Senior Executive 
Training Symposium, the Intermediate Flag and Senior Executive Training 
Symposium, the Advanced Flag and Senior Executive Training Symposium, 
and the Navy Flag Officer and Senior Executives Symposium. Commanders 
and other inspector general professionals can attend the NAVIG 101 
foundations course. This 2-day orientation discusses the relationship 
and connections between the Naval Inspector General and the enterprise 
as well as who, how, and the importance of the Navy Inspector General 
Enterprise's mission. During command inspections and area assessments, 
the Naval Inspector General meets with commanders and reiterates the 
importance of their inspector general mission and their relationship 
with their Command Inspector General.
    Ms. Speier. How do you implement lessons learned with other 
oversight roles?
    Admiral Snyder. The Office of the Naval Inspector General 
implements lessons learned in several ways including engagements with 
Navy leaders, inspector general professionals, and commands via the 
following:
      Membership in the Navy Senior Management Council
      Regular meetings with the Under Secretary of the Navy and 
the Vice Chief of Naval Operations
      Navy Secretariat Orientation Seminars
      Posting command inspection reports
      Case studies analyzed at the annual Navy Inspector 
General Enterprise Symposium
      Bi-weekly virtual town halls with the Navy Inspector 
General Enterprise
      The Office of the Naval Inspector General training course 
revisions
    Ms. Speier. What was your total appropriated budget for FY20 and 
FY21? What were your budget requests for these years?
    General Castellvi. The Office of the Inspector General of the 
Marine Corps (IGMC) total appropriated budget for both fiscal years 
2020 and 2021 is $3,309,000. The Department of the Navy, Assistant for 
Administration allocates appropriated funds for civilian pay, travel, 
and support (materials). A breakdown of both years is as follows:
      FY20 appropriated budget was $1,674,000.
      FY21 appropriated budget is $1,935,000.
    In addition, the Commandant of the Marine Corps authorized the IGMC 
to task any organization within the Marine Corps to provide Subject 
Matter Experts, as temporary assistant inspector Generals (TAIGs), to 
assist the IGMC Inspections Division in the performance of its mission 
and functions; primarily travel support to carryout comprehensive unit 
inspections. The IGMC provides costs associated with such support, with 
the exception of travel time compensation. IGMC funding requirements 
for TAIGs is estimated and requested though Headquarters Marine Corps, 
Administration and Resource Management Fiscal Branch, from the Deputy 
Commandant for Programs and Resources through the annual Program 
Objective Memorandum. The IGMC did not prepare formal budget requests, 
throughout Future Years Defense Plans, in support of its mission.
    Ms. Speier. How many personnel do you have, and what is the 
breakdown between enlisted personnel, officers, and DOD civilian 
employees and contractors?
    General Castellvi. In the Office of the Inspector General of the 
Marine Corps (IGMC):
      Total number of Marine Corps inspectors general (IGs) 
personnel on-hand (O/H) = 31
      Officers = 13
      Enlisted = 7
      DOD Civilians = 11
    In the Marine Corps IG community (IGMC personnel and all command 
inspectors general (CIGs)):
      Total number of Marine Corps IG personnel O/H = 201
      Officers = 34
      Enlisted = 99
      DOD Civilians = 68
    Ms. Speier. How many contacts do you receive per year? Of those 
contacts, can you please categorize as follows:
    --Requests for inspections
    --Requests for administrative investigations
    --Whistleblower Complaints
    --Other (and please identify as regulation question, or other 
request for assistance)
    How many command inspections do you conduct per year? How many 
administrative investigations do you conduct each year?
    How many contacts do you receive per year? For the 12-month period 
ending 16 April, Marine Corps inspectors general received 2173 contact. 
Of those 2173 contacts, 978 contacts were received by IGMC, and 1195 
were received by subordinate Command Inspectors General.
    General Castellvi. In 2019, the Marine Corps received 1,812 
contacts; in 2020, the Marine Corps received 2,060 contacts. Of the 
2,020 contacts, 13 percent were related to implementation of COVID 
force protection measures.
    Of those contacts, can you please categorize as follows:
    Requests for inspections: 0. Marine Corps IGs establish an 
inspection schedule to ensure each command is inspected on a regular 
basis. Each commander uses his or her own IG for any ah-hoc 
inspections, in addition to the scheduled inspections.
    Requests for administrative investigations: The Marine Corps does 
not track/record whether the contact requested an investigation. Each 
contact is analyzed to determine whether an actual investigation is 
warranted (does the contact address a matter that violates any order, 
rule, law, or policy?). If the complaint alleges a violation of an 
order, rule, law, or policy, an initial inquiry is done to determine 
whether there is information that was not known to the contact that 
precludes investigation. In 2018, Marine Corps IGs conducted 98 
investigations; in 2019, there were 51 investigations and in 2020, 
there were 47 investigations.
    Whistleblower Complaints: In 2019, Marine Corps IGs received 77 
complaints of military whistleblower reprisal; 12 of those complaints 
met prima facie for investigation under 10 USC 1034; 1 investigation 
substantiated reprisal.
    In 2020, Marine Corps IGs received 51 complaints of military 
whistleblower reprisal; 8 of those complaints met prima facie for 
investigation under 10 USC 1034; 1 investigation substantiated 
reprisal.
    Other (and please identify as regulation question, or other request 
for assistance): The Marine Corps initially categorizes all contacts as 
Assistance Cases. Marine Corps IGs sub-classify cases as Fraud/Waste/
Abuse of Authority/Mismanagement (FWAM); Congressional Inquiries; 
Dependent/Quality of Life Issues; Freedom of Information Act Requests; 
Misconduct; Reprisal; and Non-IG (anything else that is not reprisal, 
senior official related, or FWAM). Some examples of non-IG matters are 
requests to correct records, cancellation, or modification of military 
permanent change of station orders, notification of scams, civilian 
hiring practices, voter issues, awards processing, and civil matters 
(neighbor disputes; off-base landlord issues; non-military harassment 
not on a military installation, etc.).
    In 2019, Marine Corps IG received 1745 non-whistleblower reprisal 
contacts.
    In 2020, Marine Corps Inspectors General received 2012 non-
whistleblower reprisal contacts.
    How many administrative investigations do you conduct each year? In 
2018, Marine Corps Inspectors General conducted 98 investigations; in 
2019, there were 51 investigations and in 2020, there were 47 
investigations.
    Ms. Speier. For administrative investigations, what steps do you 
take to ensure independence throughout the process?
    General Castellvi. IGMC takes a proactive approach to independence. 
Commanders receive education about the IGs, the IGs' role, and the 
commanders' relationship with the IGs. Throughout this training, IGMC 
stresses the importance of independence and objectivity. IGMC also 
trains the IGs, and stresses that they have a direct line to all 
personnel in the IGMC office, to include the IGMC, if they feel they 
need support or guidance in navigating a case or an issue.
    For cases that IGMC tasks to a CIGs for investigation, IGMC is the 
directing authority and has supervision and review responsibilities for 
the case. The end report of investigation must demonstrate independence 
and objectivity, as well as completeness and thoroughness, before IGMC 
will approve the report.
    For all cases received by the CIG, IGMC reviews the reports of 
investigation as part of the IGMC oversight and inspection process.
    Ms. Speier. How do you decide whether to make the results of an 
investigation public and what format do you use (i.e. website, news 
release)? Of the investigations that were completed in FY19 and FY20, 
how many reports of investigation were made public, at least in 
redacted form?
    How do you share information with the public about upcoming work?
    General Castellvi. IGMC shares the results of investigations, in 
accordance with the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), when they are 
requested. In 2019 and 2020, IGMC responded to 21 and 15 FOIA requests, 
respectively. The information released in response to FOIA is released 
directly to the requesting individual.
    How do you share information with the public about upcoming work? 
IGMC does not publically share information about upcoming work. 
Inspections in the Marine Corps are generally short/no-notice, and 
sharing information publically would inhibit the IG's ability to get an 
``any-day'' look at a unit. As a matter of course, to protect the 
investigative process and the privacy and rights of all complainants, 
witnesses, and subjects, IGMC does not discuss investigations until 
they are complete. For these same reasons, the IG does not publically 
announce their commencement.
    Ms. Speier. Since 2012, of more than 8,000 reprisal complaints made 
to the DOD or Service IGs, only 273 were substantiated. Why are so few 
reprisal allegations substantiated?
    General Castellvi. Many reprisal complaints that meet prima facie 
under 10 U.S.C. Section 1034 fail to demonstrate a direct correlation 
between the protected communication and the personnel action taken. For 
example, a complainant will make a protected communication, and shortly 
thereafter receive an unfavorable personnel action, but upon 
examination, it is apparent that the personnel action was a valid, 
reasonable response to something other than the protected 
communication.
    An IGMC investigator interviews every reprisal complainant. During 
this recorded and transcribed interview, the complainant is given an 
opportunity to fully explain his or her case, and provide information 
that was not included in the original complaint. As well, the 
investigator will ask questions to ensure full understanding of the 
issues at hand, and seek clarifying documenting when appropriate. After 
this interview, a preliminary inquiry of records, and occasionally 
additional interviews with witnesses is made. After the inquiry, IGMC 
notifies Department of Defense (DOD) of its recommendation to 
investigate or dismiss the case because there is no indication of a 
correlation between the protected communication and personnel action. 
IGMC must get DOD approval to close a reprisal case. The complainant 
receives a copy of the completed report of investigation, regardless of 
finding, if the IGMC completes and investigation.
    In 2019, the Marine Corps received 77 reprisal complaints. Of those 
77 complaints, 12 required an investigation to determine whether or not 
there was a direct correlation between the protected communication and 
the personnel action. Only 1 of the 12 cases that met criteria for a 
full investigation found a direct correlation between the protected 
communication and personnel action.
    In 2020, the Marine Corps received 51 reprisal complaints. Of those 
51 complaints, 8 required an investigation to determine whether or not 
there was a direct correlation between the protected communication and 
the personnel action. Only one of the eight cases that met criteria for 
a full investigation found a direct correlation between the protected 
communication and personnel action.
    Common reasons that cases fail to go to investigation or 
substantiate are misconduct of the complainant that led to the 
personnel action; no evidence that the person taking the personnel 
action knew of the protected communication; the personnel action was 
required by a higher regulation and was non-discretionary; and 
evaluations that are lower than a complainant desires when an 
established pattern of performance existed well before the protected 
communication.
    Ms. Speier. How is training for IG staff conducted? What training 
is offered on investigations, in particular, and what is the duration 
of the training? Is training conducted in house or by a third-party 
agency or organization? Is training the same for all personnel, or does 
it vary by rank/grade and civilian or military status?
    General Castellvi. Training for IG staff is conducted in-house and 
via third party, and the same training is offered to all personnel.
    Historically, in-house training was conducted by mobile training 
teams. COVID-19 restrictions challenged IGMC's in-house training 
efforts, but recognizing the need to keep the IG community engaged and 
up-to-date, IGMC instituted quarterly teleconferences and ad-hoc 
computer-based training. Additionally, IGMC has almost completed the 
development and implementation of two online IG courses. One of these 
courses will serve as a certification course. IGMC will resume in-
person training in the near future.
    Certification as a Marine Corps IG requires completion of an IGMC 
mobile training team (MTT) course; the DOD IG Joint IG Course; the 
Association of Inspectors General Inspectors General Course; the 
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center IG Course, or another Service's 
inspector general training course. All IGs are required to complete 80 
hours of job-related training every two years to remain current, and 
attend a Marine Corps training event or symposium once every two years.
    The DOD IG is currently offering its joint IG course virtually. The 
two-week course allows the student to receive IG accreditation upon 
completion. Class size is currently increasing in an attempt to catch 
up from time lost during the pandemic.
    IGMC's MTTs are three to four days of in-person lecture, 
discussion, practical application, and evaluation on all core IG 
topics. While all topics are covered, the focus is on Council of the 
Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) Blue Book 
standards and their application to assistance and investigations.
    To preserve the integrity of the investigative process and the 
independence of the command IG, IGMC conducts all senior official 
investigations and all investigations concerning whistleblower 
reprisal. Investigators receive on-going in-house training as policies 
and procedures related to investigations change.
    Ms. Speier. Have you implemented the GAO recommendations from 2019 
to better protect the identity of whistleblowers? If not, when will you 
implement these recommendations, and why has implementation been 
delayed?
    General Castellvi. Yes. IGMC made case management system 
enhancements during the 1st quarter of calendar year 2020 and 
implemented a new case management system, the Inspector General Case 
Action Manager (IGCAM). The IGCAM has an option to restrict access of 
identifying information about confidential complainants to any 
subordinate organization below the level that received the complaint.
    Even if a contact does not request confidentiality, by default, 
IGMC will protect his or her identify as much as possible by not 
releasing any information beyond that which is required to address the 
contacts concern.
    As well, IGMC has adopted a report-writing style to minimize the 
use of the names of complainants and witnesses when possible.
    Ms. Speier. What standards do you use for inspections and 
investigations? Do you, for example, follow either the Silver Book or 
Blue Book standards promulgated by the Council of the Inspectors 
General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE)? Or CIGIE's 2011 standards 
for conducting investigations? Or other standards, and which ones? What 
quality assurance efforts have you implemented to make sure any 
standards are met? Do you require staff to document compliance?
    General Castellvi. Standards: Marine Corps IGs use CIGIE's Blue 
Book Standards: Quality Standards for Inspections and Evaluation, for 
all inspections and investigations.
    Quality Assurance and Compliance:
    Inspections: IGMC inspects all command inspectors general adherence 
to CIGIE standards during IGMC inspections and provides the commanders 
with a report on the findings of the inspections. IGMC makes a detailed 
follow-up report within 30 days of the inspection, and requires a 
corrective action plan within another 30 days. Any non-mission capable 
command receives another inspection after a short period of time given 
to correct deficiencies.
    IGMC employs subject matter experts (SME) to conduct inspections. 
Following the initial inspection, the lead inspector reviews the SME's 
adherence to CIGIE standards; following the lead inspector's review, 
the director of inspections reviews the report for final approval.
    Investigations: IGMC conducts all whistleblower reprisal and all 
senior official investigations to ensure independence. Investigators 
self-certify their work, which is reviewed by in-house counsel for 
legal sufficiency before final review and approval by the IG. Once IGMC 
approves an investigation, the report and all supporting documents are 
sent to DOD for final oversight and review. Throughout the process, 
from investigator to final DOD approval, reports are measured against 
CIGIE standards.
    For all other investigations, the investigator self-certifies 
compliance with CIGIE standards and the report is reviewed by an 
attorney for legal sufficiency. IGMC does a final review of all cases 
referred to the local IG. For cases received at the command level, IGMC 
review is made via the inspection process.
    Ms. Speier. Do you think changes are needed to ensure that the 
Command IGs truly can feel free to operate independently and 
objectively? For example, who decides what inspections and 
investigations to perform--the IG or the commander? Can an IG pursue an 
investigation that a commander opposes?
    General Castellvi. IGMC recognizes that there is room for conflict, 
or the appearance of conflicts, based upon the fact that CIGs work for 
the commanders. A solid relationship between the commander and the IG 
is imperative, and should be mutually beneficial. We are open to 
considering any suggestions or recommendations to strengthen the 
authorities of the IGs in a way that fully integrates them into the 
command and staff team as an independent advisor to the commander, 
without inhibiting the commanders' ability to maintain good order and 
discipline.
    IGMC's efforts to create independence and objectivity focus on 
education of the IGs and the commanders of the role of each, the value 
of one to the other, and the vital importance of independence and 
oversight.
    The IGMC case management system has a complainant/contact directly 
into the system design. This ensures all contacts are put into the 
system, and nothing is lost or misplaced. IGMC has visibility and 
oversight of everything in the system, and whether via direct review of 
a case, or during an inspection, reviews the CIG's work for all quality 
standards, to include independence and objectivity.
    Most importantly, all IGs know they can come directly to any member 
of the IGMC staff for assistance if they feel their independence or 
objectivity is at risk, or if they feel they are being pushed to act 
against their best judgement. Should this occur, IGMC will remove the 
case in question from the local command and assign it to a higher 
headquarters or to someone within IGMC.
    While commanders have some discretion on inspections, IGMC mandates 
the minimum inspection requirements, not the commander. The commander 
has discretion on exact timing and anything beyond the IGMC established 
minimum inspections, but IGMC sets the baseline requirement and reviews 
all inspections, and also inspects the inspectors in the execution of 
their duties.
    Ms. Speier. Who/how is legal advice provided to the Service IGs? 
Who/how is legal advice provided to Component IGs?
    General Castellvi. IGMC obtains independent legal advice from a 
civilian attorney assigned to the IGMC. IGMC Counsel provides 
comprehensive legal advice in all areas under the cognizance of IGMC, 
including administrative investigations. To maintain independence, 
IGMC's counsel reports to the Counsel for the Commandant of the Marine 
Corps (CMC) (CL), who reports to the Department of the Navy Office of 
the General Counsel.
    Component IGs receive legal advice from the command staff judge 
advocate and/or CL counsel assigned to the geographic command. 
Component IGs are also free to contact IGMC Counsel to discuss any and 
all IG matters or concerns.
    Ms. Speier. What kind of training does your Service provide 
Commanders about their relationship with their respective IG (for 
example, command, installation, etc.)?
    General Castellvi. The IGMC presents an introductory class to all 
O-5 and O-6 Marines selected for command. Additionally, the IGMC 
teaches all newly selected/promoted brigadier generals about the IGs, 
and the commanders' relationship with their IGs.
    During inspections, the IGMC will meet with the commanders in the 
local inspection area and provide necessary guidance or information 
related to IG matters and the commanders' relationship with the IGs.
    During inspections, the IGMC or his representative will speak with 
the commander about his or her inspection program, make recommendations 
to improve things, and note any identified gaps in the relationship 
between the commander and the IG.
    On an ad-hoc basis, IGMC will speak at the general officer 
symposiums, held twice each year, to discuss any relevant IG trends or 
observations.
    Ms. Speier. How do you implement lessons learned with other 
oversight roles?
    General Castellvi. IGMC provides quarterly updates with the CMC on 
trends observed and challenges across the Marine Corps, as identified 
by inspections, investigations, and assistance cases.
    IGMC also shares information and trends associated with inspection 
results with the deputy commandants responsible for the various 
inspected programs. These trends serve to identify trouble spots, or 
areas where orders and directives are unclear or require a standard 
that is unobtainable with current resources.
    IGMC conducts in- and out-briefs for each inspection, where the 
inspection team discusses what they have seen across the Marine Corps 
and to share lessons learned and best practices. During out-briefs, the 
inspection team discusses all findings and discrepancies, and helps to 
identify the root-cause of non-compliance or poor execution. From this 
information, the commander can decide where to enhance training or 
provide additional resources.
    At all training opportunities for commanders and IGs, the IGMC 
shares best practices and lessons learned so that all may benefit.
    Ms. Speier. Did the Marine Corps IG interview the widow of Chai 
Suthammanont in its investigation of the death of Mr. Suthammanont at 
Marine Corps Base Quantico? If not, why not?
    When will the Marine Corps IG release the report investigating the 
death of Chai Suthammanont or create a publicly releasable document 
that details the results of the investigation into the death of Chai 
Suthammanont?
    Is the report on Chai Suthammanont's death a product of the Marine 
Corps Office Inspector General? If not, which agency owns this report?
    Does the Marine Corp Inspector General serve as counsel for the 
Marine Corps?
    Did the Marine Corps IG interview the widow of Chai Suthammanont in 
its investigation of the death of Mr. Suthammanont at Marine Corps Base 
Quantico? If not, why not?
    General Castellvi. The IGMC did not investigate the death of Mr. 
Suthammanont.
    When will the Marine Corps IG release the report investigating the 
death of Chai Suthammanont or create a publicly releasable document 
that details the results of the investigation into the death of Chai 
Suthammanont? The IGMC did not investigate the death of Mr. 
Suthammanont and thus has no report to release.
    Is the report on Chai Suthammanont's death a product of the Marine 
Corps Office Inspector General? If not, which agency owns this report? 
The IGMC did not investigate the death of Mr. Suthammanont. The 
Commander, Marine Corps Installations National Capital Region owns the 
report on Mr. Suthammanont's death.
    Does the Marine Corp Inspector General serve as counsel for the 
Marine Corps? The IGMC provides information to Marine Corps leaders to 
inform their decisions. The IGMC informs leadership of trends, 
identified deficiencies and problems, and resource shortfalls. When 
appropriate, IGMC will identify potential solutions and challenges. 
However, the IGMC would not be considered counsel for the Marine Corps.
                                 ______
                                 
                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. McCLAIN
    Mrs. McClain.As you conduct an investigation into the space command 
basing decision, are you working with Air Force IG Sami D. Said on 
examining the mission readiness impacts of moving personnel that are 
successfully accomplishing the mission at Peterson AFB? I am concerned 
the Air Force decision to move the command from Colorado Springs will 
make it difficult to retain critical personnel with expertise in space 
operations considering the command has been at Peterson for nearly two 
years. There is precedence in losing civilian employees declining to 
relocate when a mission has been moved.''
    Mr. O'Donnell. Yes, the DOD OIG is working with relevant Air Force 
organizations and personnel, including personnel from the Air Force 
IG's office, as part of the DOD OIG's evaluation of the Air Force 
selection process for the permanent location of the U.S. Space Command 
headquarters. The project announcement is available on the DOD OIG's 
public website at the following link: https://media.defense.gov/2021/
Feb/19/2002585712/-1/-1/1/D2021-DEV0SO-0099.000_
REDACTED.PDF
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. JACKSON
    Dr. Jackson. Mr. O'Donnell, in an instance where a whistleblower 
does not request anonymity, can you tell me whether the DOD OIG 
contacts or interviews the whistleblower, assuming they have presented 
a credible allegation?
    Mr. O'Donnell. Yes, the DOD OIG generally contacts whistleblowers 
who do not request anonymity for additional information when their 
complaints do not contain sufficient details to determine appropriate 
action on the complaint. In addition, whistleblowers may be interviewed 
as part of a subsequent audit, evaluation, or investigation. [Question 
#4, for cross-reference.]
    Dr. Jackson. Over the past five years, how many instances occurred 
when the DOD IG elected not to interview or contact a whistleblower to 
follow-up on allegations of potential waste, fraud and abuse submitted 
to its Hotline? If there are any, can you please provide me with 
detailed information regarding the rationale for that decision or those 
decisions?
    Mr. O'Donnell. As discussed in response to Question 4, the DOD OIG 
generally contacts whistleblowers who do not request anonymity for 
additional information when their complaints do not contain sufficient 
details to determine appropriate action on the complaint. However, the 
DOD OIG does not track the rate at which whistleblowers are interviewed 
to provide additional details or as part of subsequent audits, 
evaluations, or investigations.
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BROWN
    Mr. Brown. You noted in your testimony that you look ``forward to 
working with the Service IGs in the implementation of our oversight of 
diversity and inclusion in the DOD and the handling of supremacist, 
extremist, and criminal gang activity in the Armed Forces, as required 
by section 554 of the FY 2021 National Defense Authorization Act.'' How 
are you intending to use the new DOD IG to address extremism in the 
Department and racial, gender, and ethnic disparities? Can you please 
describe who is involved in establishing the roles and responsibilities 
for the Deputy IG for D&I and the decision-making processes involved?
    Mr. O'Donnell. The DOD OIG will use the new Deputy Inspector 
General (DIG) in a manner consistent with applicable laws, including 
section 554 of the FY 2021 National Defense Authorization Act and the 
Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. The DOD OIG is working to 
determine the organization, structure, staffing, and funding required 
to support the execution of those duties and responsibilities. The DOD 
OIG will submit a report detailing this information by June 30, 2021, 
as required by section 554.
    Mr. Brown. The FY21 NDAA requires that the DOD IG submits to HASC/
SASC a report describing the Deputy IG for D&I's roles, 
responsibilities, organization, and additional administrative details 
180 days after enactment, which is June 30, 2021. Is your office on 
track to meet this due date? Besides the report that you are required 
to issue to Congress, where else will you publish the roles and 
responsibilities for the Deputy IG for D&I?
    Mr. O'Donnell. Yes, the DOD OIG is on track to submit a report 
describing the new DIG's roles and responsibilities, and organization, 
including structure and staffing, by June 30, 2021, as required section 
554 of the FY21 NDAA. The roles and responsibilities of the new DIG are 
published on the DOD OIG's public website at the following link: 
https://www.dodig.mil/About/Organization/
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MOORE
    Mr. Moore. I deeply respect the role whistleblowers play in 
providing transparency and accountability; they shed light on 
wrongdoing that would otherwise go untouched. I realize that the 
Hotline may receive many submissions which on their face do not merit 
follow-up for example due to lack of substantive evidence or personal 
bias. But setting those aside, what standard to you use in determining 
who receives follow-up, including an interview and review of submitted 
materials?
    Mr. O'Donnell. Specifically, if a whistleblower timely submitted 
multiple evidentiary submissions, including hundreds of pages of legal 
and factual analyses, relevant to an investigation that the DOD Office 
of Inspector General was at that time conducting, and if that 
whistleblower made multiple offers to meet, would it not be standard 
practice to interview the whistleblower?
    The DOD OIG conducts a thorough and independent review of each 
complaint it receives, in accordance with CIGIE and DOD standards. In 
many cases, a whistleblower or complainant provides a full description 
of the information in their possession along with the names of 
witnesses or documents that contain direct evidence of the matter under 
review. The DOD OIG fully reviews the information contained in the 
whistleblower's or complainant's complaint to determine whether and 
what additional information might be needed to further review the 
complaint. For example, in a case where the whistleblower or 
complainant provides hundreds of pages of legal and factual analysis, 
it is not necessary to collect additional information when that 
complainant is not a percipient witness, but rather an aggregator of 
publicly available information. Another example might be where other 
Government entities, including administrative or law enforcement 
entities, have already interviewed the non-percipient witness.
    Mr. Moore. I recognize that every Inspector General does its best 
to ensure that its reports are accurate upon publication. I also 
realize that from time-to-time mistakes are made; that is why the 
Government Auditing Standards and DOD OIG policy provide guidance for 
the correction of inaccuracies identified after the issuance of and OIG 
report.
    My question is what if there is an error or inadequate evidence 
supporting one or more statements in a published OIG report. Where is 
Congress or even members of the public to go if an IG is unwilling to 
look at the matter or have an independent review done to get the issues 
reviewed independently?
    Mr. O'Donnell. I take seriously questions or concerns raised by the 
Congress or the public regarding the accuracy of a published report. As 
such, I am always willing to review those questions and give them all 
due consideration. I have the authority to withdraw or amend a final 
report that I determine to be inaccurate or not supported by competent 
evidence, and I have not hesitated to do so under the appropriate 
circumstances. This is a very rare occurrence, and when it does happen, 
pursuant to law, policy, and practice, we address it publicly. Should 
Congress or members of the public have concerns that the contents of a 
published DOD OIG report are erroneous, they may always address such 
concerns to me.