[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                     
 
                         [H.A.S.C. No. 117-31]

                        AN UPDATE ON AFGHANISTAN

                               __________

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                              HEARING HELD

                              MAY 12, 2021


                                     
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]




                          ______

             U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 
 47-819              WASHINGTON : 2022 



                                     
                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                    One Hundred Seventeenth Congress

                    ADAM SMITH, Washington, Chairman

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island      MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
RICK LARSEN, Washington              JOE WILSON, South Carolina
JIM COOPER, Tennessee                MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut            DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
JOHN GARAMENDI, California           ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia
JACKIE SPEIER, California            VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri
DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey          AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona               MO BROOKS, Alabama
SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts          SAM GRAVES, Missouri
SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California        ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland,          SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
RO KHANNA, California                TRENT KELLY, Mississippi
WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts    MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
FILEMON VELA, Texas                  MATT GAETZ, Florida
ANDY KIM, New Jersey                 DON BACON, Nebraska
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania       JIM BANKS, Indiana
JASON CROW, Colorado                 LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan             JACK BERGMAN, Michigan
MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey           MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
VERONICA ESCOBAR, Texas              MIKE JOHNSON, Louisiana
JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine               MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee
ELAINE G. LURIA, Virginia, Vice      STEPHANIE I. BICE, Oklahoma
    Chair                            C. SCOTT FRANKLIN, Florida
JOSEPH D. MORELLE, New York          LISA C. McCLAIN, Michigan
SARA JACOBS, California              RONNY JACKSON, Texas
KAIALI'I KAHELE, Hawaii              JERRY L. CARL, Alabama
MARILYN STRICKLAND, Washington       BLAKE D. MOORE, Utah
MARC A. VEASEY, Texas                PAT FALLON, Texas
JIMMY PANETTA, California
STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida
Vacancy

                     Paul Arcangeli, Staff Director
               Will T. Johnson, Professional Staff Member
               Michael Kirlin, Professional Staff Member
                      Natalie de Benedetti, Clerk
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

              STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Ranking Member, 
  Committee on Armed Services....................................     3
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Chairman, 
  Committee on Armed Services....................................     1

                               WITNESSES

Helvey, David F., Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-
  Pacific Affairs, Department of Defense, and BGen Matthew G. 
  Trollinger, USMC, Deputy Director for Politico-Military 
  Affairs, Joint Staff, J5.......................................     5

                                APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

    Helvey, David F., joint with BGen Matthew G. Trollinger......    51

Documents Submitted for the Record:

    [There were no Documents submitted.]

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

    Ms. Speier...................................................    59

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

    Ms. Houlahan.................................................    64
    Dr. Jackson..................................................    63
    Mrs. McClain.................................................    64
    Mr. Moore....................................................    63
    Mr. Morelle..................................................    64
    Mr. Waltz....................................................    65
                        AN UPDATE ON AFGHANISTAN

                              ----------                              

                          House of Representatives,
                               Committee on Armed Services,
                           Washington, DC, Wednesday, May 12, 2021.
    The committee met, pursuant to call, at 11:01 a.m., in room 
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Adam Smith (chairman 
of the committee) presiding.

  OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
       WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

    The Chairman. I call the committee to order. We have our 
full committee hearing this morning as an update on 
Afghanistan.
    We have two witnesses with us, Mr. David Helvey, who is the 
Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Indo-Pacific 
region, and Brigadier General Matthew Trollinger, who is the 
Deputy Director for Political and Military Affairs on the Joint 
Staff.
    Once again, we are having a hybrid hearing, which means we 
have some members who will be participating remotely, and we 
have a fascinating set of rules here that lays out how that 
works, which I read before each committee hearing.
    So here we go again. Members who are joining remotely must 
be visible on screen for the purposes of identity verification, 
establishing and maintaining a quorum, participating in the 
proceeding, and voting.
    Those members must continue to use the software platform's 
video function while in attendance unless they experience 
connectivity issues or other technical problems that render 
them unable to participate on camera.
    If a member experiences technical difficulties, they should 
contact committee staff for assistance. Video of members' 
participation will be broadcast in the room and via the 
television/internet feeds. Members participating remotely must 
seek recognition verbally and they are asked to mute their 
microphones when they are not speaking.
    Members who are participating remotely are reminded to keep 
the software platform video function on the entire time they 
attend the proceeding. Members may leave and rejoin the 
proceeding.
    If members depart for a short while for reasons other than 
joining a different proceeding, they should leave the video 
function on. If members will be absent for a significant period 
or depart to join a different proceeding, they should exit the 
software platform entirely and then rejoin it if they return.
    Members may use the software platform's chat feature to 
communicate with staff regarding technical or logistical 
support issues only.
    Finally, I have designated a committee staff member to, if 
necessary, mute unrecognized members' microphones to cancel any 
inadvertent background noise that may disrupt the proceeding.
    Thank you. As mentioned, we are here today to discuss--I am 
sorry, Mr. Lamborn, you have a question?
    Mr. Lamborn. Yeah. Along those lines, Mr. Chairman, is it 
okay in committee if we follow--and I assume it is from your 
appearance--but we follow the rule that's now in effect in the 
Chamber that we can have our mask off while we are speaking?
    The Chairman. Yes. It does make it easier to understand, 
and the guidance now seems to be that that is within the 
reasonable risk area. So yes.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Anyway, we are back to talk about Afghanistan. Obviously, a 
lot can be said about the history, where we are at.
    But the main purpose of the hearing this morning, having 
heard the President's decision to pull out by early September 
from Afghanistan in coordination with our NATO [North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization] allies, who will also be pulling their 
forces out, members are most interested in how that is going to 
happen.
    What is the process and, you know, how are we working with 
our allies to carry out that? And then what is our strategy, 
going forward?
    Because while we will not have a military presence in 
Afghanistan, Afghanistan will still--Afghanistan and that 
region will still be of great concern to us in terms of 
national security and stability. So we are curious what the 
plans are in terms of how we meet that challenge in the--in the 
environment, going forward.
    And I think it also would be appropriate during this 
hearing to give some sort of lessons learned in terms of the 
last 20 years. It has without question been a difficult and 
controversial fight.
    I think it's important that we understand what we learned 
along the way, what went right, what went wrong, how we can 
avoid the--well, avoid might be an overly confident statement--
how we can, basically, better deal with these challenges, going 
forward.
    And I will say, for the record, that I support the 
President's decision. It is not an easy decision. It is not a 
win-win-win decision where everything is going to be fine.
    It was, I believe, merely the best decision out of a series 
of bad options. We have for 20 years tried to bring stability 
to Afghanistan, and at the end of the day, I, for one, never 
questioned what we were doing there.
    There were two very obvious things that we were doing 
there. One, we were trying to stop transnational terrorist 
groups from, again, being able to gain enough footing to attack 
us as they did on 9/11 from Afghanistan, where they--where they 
planned a good portion of the 9/11 attacks.
    They took advantage of ungoverned spaces, they took 
advantage of the Taliban giving them safe haven, and we all saw 
the terrible price that we paid for that.
    There is no question that working to try and prevent that 
from happening in the future made sense.
    And the second thing that we were trying to do there was 
out of the very logical assumption that if we had a stable 
government in Afghanistan, it would be less likely that those 
calamitous events that we all saw would happen again. So what 
were the things we could do in working with the Afghan people 
and in working with the various interests in that region to 
achieve that.
    And that is what we've been attempting to do. It has proven 
to be beyond what we could, you know, simply accomplish through 
sheer force of will or, certainly, through our military.
    And I want to make perfectly clear that while I say that I 
support the President's decision, I do so in a very clear-eyed 
manner. Things are going to be bad in Afghanistan. There is no 
question about that.
    But one of the lessons that I hope we've learned is the 
limitations on our ability as a nation and certainly as a 
military to impose better outcomes on other countries.
    Afghanistan is not the only place in the world where 
horrible things are happening to the people who live there. 
Just off the top of my head, I think of Syria, Myanmar, Yemen, 
a number of--you know, Somalia, Libya, DRC [Democratic Republic 
of the Congo]. And could we, if we marshalled all of our 
resources as a country, used our military, go in there and 
conceivably make things better?
    Maybe. We don't have the breadth to do that, first of all, 
and second of all, I hope we've learned that even if we did, 
there are limitations on what an outside country can impose 
upon another country. There just are.
    You know, a number of the Afghan people that don't support 
the Taliban probably are also troubled by our presence and by 
some of the impact of that presence. When you fight a war, you 
know, you are not going to just hit the enemy.
    There will be civilian casualties no matter what. How much 
does that affect--you know, make it more difficult to get a 
stable government in Afghanistan versus the benefit of us 
bringing greater security, and that's a very difficult thing to 
balance out.
    But what I hope we've learned is that it is far, far more 
problematic than it may first appear. We cannot simply show up 
with a lot of might and a lot of money and a lot of good will 
and fix the problems that exist in the world, and there is an 
awful price to pay for us and also, in many cases, for the--for 
the country in question in trying.
    I hope we learn how to balance that, as we go forward. But 
as I said at the outset, up front what we want to hear is 
what's the plan, going forward? How do we most safely get our 
troops out of Afghanistan and how do we, you know, go forward 
in terms of dealing with the interests that we still have in 
the region?
    With that, I will yield to the ranking member for his 
opening statement.

 STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA, 
          RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

    Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    It's now been a month since President Biden announced that 
he was unconditionally withdrawing U.S. troops from Afghanistan 
by September the 11th.
    I believe it's the responsibility of this committee to 
examine the implications of President Biden's decision, both 
for our national security interests in the region and for our 
security interests here at home.
    I want to be crystal clear. I have significant concerns 
about President Biden's decision. Major questions remain about 
how we withdraw, what political arrangement is left following 
our departure.
    Since May 1st, Taliban has been crystal clear about their 
intentions. They've launched a new offensive targeting 
coalition forces, Afghan soldiers, and innocent civilians. On 
Saturday, the Taliban bombed a girls' school in Kabul, killing 
over 50 people, most of them young girls.
    Make no mistake, they will fight until they control that 
country again, and when they do, what assurance do we have it 
won't become a safe haven for terrorists again?
    We know that al-Qaida and other terrorist groups remain 
present in Afghanistan and continue to have close ties with the 
Taliban, especially at the local level. The President assures 
us that he will maintain a, quote, ``over-the-horizon,'' close 
quote, capability to suppress threats, but to date hasn't 
explained what that means.
    There's no agreement in place with any of Afghanistan's 
neighbors to host coalition forces. So without any U.S. troops 
in the region, how will we gather intelligence and conduct the 
operations necessary to thwart these terrorist groups?
    We cannot afford to allow Afghanistan to have a blind spot 
again. There must be a detailed plan, and I expect the 
administration to explain to us before he completely withdraws 
from Afghanistan.
    Like every member of this committee, I want this war to 
end. I want to bring our troops home safely as quickly as 
possible. But none of us want another 9/11.
    So we need to understand how the President plans to defeat 
these threats to our homeland before they reach our shores 
again.
    Mr. Helvey, I expect an explanation from you today of how 
the President intends to do just that.
    And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you very much. I was remiss in my 
remarks. It is worth pointing out that this is--this is also 
President Biden carrying out President Trump's plan. In fact, 
President Trump's plan was to have us out 2 weeks ago now or a 
week and a half ago. So this is a bipartisan effort here as 
we--as we look, you know, where we are, going forward, and 
there was a bipartisan decision between two Presidents to reach 
the conclusion that we did.
    With that, I yield to Mr. Helvey for his opening statement.

  STATEMENT OF DAVID F. HELVEY, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF 
 DEFENSE FOR INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, AND 
BGEN MATTHEW G. TROLLINGER, USMC, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR POLITICO-
               MILITARY AFFAIRS, JOINT STAFF, J5

    Mr. Helvey. Good morning, Chairman Smith, Ranking Member 
Rogers, and members of this committee.
    Thank you for the opportunity to provide an update on the 
withdrawal of remaining U.S. forces from Afghanistan. I 
appreciate your and this committee's continued interest in this 
matter.
    I want to begin this morning by condemning the deadly 
explosion that took place Saturday evening near a girls' high 
school in a predominantly Shi'a neighborhood in Kabul. While no 
group has claimed responsibility for the attack, it bears 
resemblance to past attacks by ISIS-K [Islamic State of Iraq 
and Syria-Khorasan].
    This horrific event highlights the importance of our 
continued support to our Afghan partners as they combat 
terrorist threats across Afghanistan.
    Turning now to the President's decision, following a 
rigorous review, the President determined that the best path 
forward to advance American interests is by ending the United 
States military involvement in the war in Afghanistan.
    Accordingly, and as directed by the President on April 
14th, the Department began an orderly withdrawal of United 
States forces by May 1st and has plans to have all U.S. forces 
out of the country by September.
    This is the amount of time that we've determined will be 
necessary to bring our forces and those of our coalition 
partners home safely, and to retrograde, transfer, or dispose 
of responsibly equipment and other property.
    As part of the interagency review of United States policy 
in Afghanistan, the administration assessed that the threat 
from violent extremist organizations against the United States 
now emanating from Afghanistan can be addressed without a 
persistent United States military presence in that country.
    At the same time, we'll work closely with the Afghan 
National Defense and Security Forces, or ANDSF, and with our 
allies and our partners to maintain counterterrorism 
capabilities in the region sufficient to ensure that 
Afghanistan cannot again become a safe haven for terrorists who 
would threaten our security.
    In this context and in coordination with our Afghan and 
international partners, we are working to reposition our 
counterterrorism capabilities including by retaining assets in 
the region to prevent the emergence of a terrorist threat 
against the United States homeland from Afghanistan and to hold 
the Taliban to its commitments to ensure that al-Qaida does not 
once again gain a foothold.
    And we will refine our counterterrorism strategy to monitor 
and disrupt terrorist threats to our homeland and our interests 
in a way that corresponds to the dispersed threat landscape 
that we face today.
    Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank Congress and this 
committee specifically for its continued support for the 
Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, or ASFF.
    This is the mechanism through which the United States 
provides the majority of funding necessary to sustain the ANDSF 
and its combat operations while developing the ANDSF into an 
effective and independent force capable of securing 
Afghanistan, protecting the Afghan people, and contributing to 
regional security.
    As Secretary [of Defense] Austin has said, we'll continue 
funding key capabilities such as Afghan Air Force and Special 
Mission Wing, we'll continue paying salaries for the Afghan 
Security Forces, and we'll continue delivering certain critical 
military supplies.
    Now, we are developing mechanisms to provide appropriate 
oversight for the use of these funds, most of which will 
continue to be executed through DOD [Department of Defense] 
contracts, and have engaged in discussions with congressional 
staff on how best to do this with efficiency and with 
accountability.
    Although we are withdrawing U.S. forces from Afghanistan, 
we are standing squarely with our Afghan partners and 
redoubling our diplomatic efforts to achieve a lasting peace.
    Afghan forces are performing heroically against a 
relentless adversary. The Afghan army takes heavy losses daily 
but they remain in the fight, and they're an institution of 
which the Afghan people can be proud.
    Mr. Chairman, the Department supports the ongoing 
diplomatic efforts to achieve a negotiated political settlement 
with the Afghan people, which the Afghan people themselves 
endorse, and we'll continue working with our colleagues at the 
State Department to ensure that we take care of those Afghans 
and their families who have helped us over the last two 
decades, most notably, Afghan employees of the Department of 
Defense.
    And we'll provide sufficient support to the Department of 
State to maintain the important diplomatic mission that they 
will continue after the DOD departure.
    In closing, I want to thank, again, the members of this 
committee for your continued support to all those who have 
served in Afghanistan. I thank you for the opportunity to brief 
you this morning, and I look forward to taking your questions.
    [The joint prepared statement of Mr. Helvey and General 
Trollinger can be found in the Appendix on page 51.]
    The Chairman. Thank you. General, do you have an opening 
statement?
    General Trollinger. No, sir, I do not.
    The Chairman. Okay. Thank you.
    I think that the big question--and I've heard, you know, 
Mr. Rogers reference in his comment--is what do we do now, and 
I think, you know, the truth is there's no direct easy answer 
and it's hard to know, given that we have been postured in that 
region around having substantial forces in Afghanistan, that 
has been our primary plan to contain the terrorist threat 
there.
    So you can't really know for sure what's going to come 
next. It depends on negotiations with the neighbors. It depends 
on how a lot of things play out.
    But the amount of guidance that you could give us on sort 
of what your vision is for containing that terrorist threat 
once we are out, I think, is the big question that's on 
people's minds.
    Now, I will point out that there's terrorist threats all 
over the place, and most of the intel [intelligence] experts 
that I talk to now say that the primary transnational terrorist 
threats are coming now from the Middle East and Africa.
    So we've got resources dedicated to dealing with that 
there. Just because there's a small threat doesn't mean that we 
have to have a massive response to it. But even within that 
context, Mr. Helvey, what is your vision right now for what, 
you know, transnational terrorist containment looks like in 
South Asia post-September when we're--when our troops are out?
    Mr. Helvey. Mr. Chairman, thank you for that question.
    In the first--in the first instance, I would say that the 
priority that we are placing right now is how to manage the 
drawdown and the retrograde in a safe and orderly way. And so 
we are continuing to do the detailed planning there.
    The Chairman. I understand that. That's not my question. 
Others can ask about that if they want. My question is, once we 
are gone, what is the vision for how we contain the terrorist 
threat in South Asia?
    Mr. Helvey. And in response to your direct question then, 
Mr. Chairman, I think the best way to think about it is to--is 
to consider how we manage that based on three concentric 
circles.
    You know, in the--in the most innermost ring is what we 
have in Afghanistan and the work that we would continue to do 
through a diplomatic presence with our Afghan partners to be 
able to help to manage and mitigate the threat of terrorism 
that can emanate from Afghanistan.
    So there is a function of continuing to work with a willing 
and capable partner in Afghanistan, and that'll remain a major 
part of our effort there and our focus.
    The second ring deals with how we address it, you know, 
with a regional military presence. We have substantial 
capability in the Middle East in the Gulf, and those 
capabilities are not abating. We'll still have the ability to 
prosecute terrorism from positions around the region.
    We do have to look at areas that are closer in to 
Afghanistan, and those are negotiations and discussions that 
are ongoing. I would be reluctant to get into details in terms 
of where and who in an open session.
    The Chairman. Sure.
    Mr. Helvey. But looking at what that footprint is going to 
be like within the region is going to be an important part of 
the equation.
    And then the third--the third ring is globally and how we 
manage transnational threats globally, and I would--I would 
offer that we've learned a lot over the past 20 years in how to 
address transnational terrorist threats, and we've developed 
means across the government and as a nation and with our allies 
and our partners to cooperatively address and mitigate and 
reduce the danger of terrorist threats against the United 
States.
    I mean, you know that every time you take a commercial 
flight or open a bank account, there's lots of things that 
we've been able to do across the government to better 
understand, characterize, and prosecute those terrorist 
threats.
    And so those three rings have to be working in concert in a 
coordinated way. But that's how we look to address the 
terrorist threats at this time.
    The Chairman. Thank you. I just have three final comments 
before I turn it over to Mr. Rogers.
    Number one, that was a really good answer. We need to hear 
that more, because I think a lot of members are a little 
puzzled in terms of, you know, what's the plan. There is, in 
fact, a plan. There are some things that we could do. It's good 
to hear that.
    Second, on the classified thing, I should have mentioned 
this up front. At 2 o'clock in the CVC [Capitol Visitor Center] 
we'll be continuing this hearing in a classified setting so we 
can get into those other details.
    And the last thing, and no need to comment on this, but it 
is really important that the DOD support expansion of the 
Special Immigrant Visas for our partners in Afghanistan who 
want to come back to this country.
    We are way under--well, what's the word I am looking for 
here? We have more people who want them than we have them for, 
and I, more than anybody, am aware of the difficulties of 
finding the mandatory money and how that works.
    But I think it is an obligation that we should make sure 
that we uphold and find ways to expand that program. That's 
just--you know, I've said no comment necessary. I just wanted 
to put that plug out there.
    And Mr. Rogers is recognized.
    Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The chairman was correct earlier when he made the point 
that Biden administration's policy to withdraw from Afghanistan 
is following up on the previous administration's. The big 
difference is the previous administration's was conditions 
based. This is unconditional withdrawal, which brings me to the 
Taliban in Afghanistan.
    General, the Taliban has a history of not being trustworthy 
in their negotiations to meet the conditions for us to 
withdraw. Do you trust the Taliban to adhere to any of the 
commitments they're making now to get us to withdraw?
    General Trollinger. Sir, I don't want to get into 
hypotheticals in terms of----
    The Chairman. We are having a hard time hearing you there. 
Could you pull the microphone, like, in front of your face?
    Mr. Rogers. There you go.
    General Trollinger. Hear me okay now?
    Mr. Rogers. Yeah.
    General Trollinger. I don't want to get into hypotheticals 
on what may or may not transpire over the next several months 
as we continue to pursue a successful----
    Mr. Rogers. But my question is do you trust the Taliban to 
adhere to any agreement? Just a yes or no.
    General Trollinger. I think the Taliban is capable of 
adhering to agreements if they choose to. They're capable of 
doing just that.
    Mr. Rogers. Okay. Let me ask this, and I want to follow up 
with Mr. Helvey. You heard my opening statement. I made 
reference to the President saying that we were going to have 
over-the-horizon capabilities.
    I don't know what that means. I want specificity about 
basing in the region. I can't imagine Russia and China allowing 
any of the ``stans'' to have U.S. base capability in those--in 
that region.
    Why would we leave Bagram when we don't have an alternative 
closer than UAE [United Arab Emirates]? So give me--
specifically, what does over-the-horizon capabilities mean with 
regard to basing so we can conduct ISRs [intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance]?
    Mr. Helvey. Well, sir, you know, as indicated to the--to 
the chairman, there are some--there are some details which I 
think are best left in a classified session. But for the 
purposes of----
    Mr. Rogers. Are we going to have a classified session, Mr. 
Chairman?
    The Chairman. Yeah, I made that announcement a minute ago, 
2 o'clock.
    Mr. Rogers. I am sorry. Okay, good.
    Mr. Helvey. For the purposes of an open session, I think 
it's important to say that we do want to maintain a regional 
counterterrorism capacity, and as I indicated, we do have 
significant capabilities resident within the Middle East, 
within the Persian Gulf region.
    But we want to explore those options and we are doing so to 
be able to maintain both military and intelligence assets in 
the region so that we are going to be in a position to identify 
threats as they emerge and prosecute those.
    We have to maintain what's called access, basing, and 
overflight, and those are the--those are the discussions that 
we are having. And it is a very difficult neighborhood, sir, as 
you pointed out, which is why we want to have some--we want to 
be able to work very carefully, quietly, but efficiently with 
our partners to make sure that we have the types of 
capabilities that are there to address the threats that we and 
our allies and our partners may face from transnational 
terrorist groups.
    Mr. Rogers. Okay. Is it your intent that this withdrawal 
will not be completed until those plans are nailed down for 
basing?
    Mr. Helvey. It is our intent to work swiftly along both 
lines of effort to ensure that we have a safe, orderly, and 
responsible withdrawal, and at the same time working very 
closely with our intelligence and State Department colleagues 
and partners to ensure that we have the arrangements in place 
to address the terrorist threats that may emerge in the future 
from Afghanistan. But there----
    Mr. Rogers. As a recovering attorney, that was very 
lawyerly. I am looking for a yeah, we don't intend to leave 
until we got a base.
    Mr. Helvey. The two--the two planning efforts are in 
parallel, but they're not--they're not linked.
    Mr. Rogers. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    The Chairman. Mr. Langevin is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Oh, sorry. I always like to point out before I ask 
questions, if we get down to the end, 5 minutes is 5 minutes. 
So if you're answering the question, please try to wrap up at 
the 5-minute point or I will have to interrupt you to move on 
to the next questioner.
    So thank you. With that, Mr. Langevin.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our 
witnesses for being here today. Mr. Helvey, thank you for your 
testimony.
    To begin with, you know, the chairman may very well be 
right that this is the statement, who said it, this is the--
maybe the best of a lot of bad options. I guess we won't know 
that perhaps for several years.
    But I have a couple of comments before I get to questions. 
I have to say, for the record, that I do have concerns about 
how this withdrawal decision was made and I am very worried 
about al-Qaida reconstituting and how the Taliban treat women 
and minorities.
    And this administration is also required to communicate 
with Congress before withdrawing and, quite frankly, we have 
not received a satisfactory report of the situation.
    So with that, Mr. Helvey, the Afghan Study Group recently 
said that terrorist groups could reconstitute in 18 to 36 
months after our withdrawal. That is, of course, during 
President Biden's first term.
    If that happened and the Afghan National Government asked 
us for help, what would we do? How do we plan on handling that?
    Your microphone.
    Mr. Helvey. I am sorry. Well, sir, I would be reluctant to 
get into a hypothetical, like, if--you know, what we would do 
in those circumstances.
    But what I can say is what we are planning for. We do have 
a bilateral security agreement with Afghanistan--with the 
Afghan government, and that does not change. So we will 
continue working with our Afghan partners to be able to address 
terrorist threats as they emerge and to be able to, if needed, 
to defeat those terrorist threats before they can levy an 
attack against the United States or our allies or our 
interests.
    So that is the plan, and that's what we are working to be 
able to accomplish. But I can't get into specifics about what 
the President may or may not do at some--at some point in the 
future.
    Mr. Langevin. You know, I understand not wanting to answer 
hypotheticals. This is, certainly, within the realm of 
likelihood, and so I would hope that at least now can you tell 
me have you been at least wargaming this out, planning it out, 
so that you have a range of options to choose from and you 
would--you would know which one to choose, which is going to be 
best given the situation, at least?
    Mr. Helvey. We are planning for all options, and the intent 
would be to be in a position to make recommendations to the 
Secretary and to the President on how to prosecute threats to 
the United States.
    Mr. Langevin. Mr. Helvey, the Special Inspector General for 
Afghanistan Reconstruction Fund found significant corruption 
brought on by our security and development aid. The President 
has said that we aren't going to stop or reduce our foreign 
aid.
    So to what extent has our--to what extent has our billions 
of dollars in aid, much of which fell into the hands of 
warlords and criminals, threatened Afghan stability and 
delegitimized the government that we are trying to work with? 
And if the Taliban strengthen or form a power-sharing 
government with the national government, will they become 
formally involved in distributing U.S. aid and have we thought 
about the implications of that?
    Mr. Helvey. Well, sir, I think, as you have highlighted, 
there has been a long history of our engagement in Afghanistan 
and we have learned lessons as we've gone.
    So we've tried to develop the means to be able to more 
effectively deliver that aid and to be able to do it reliably 
with the types of controls and oversight that's necessary to 
ensure that the resources go to the people that it's intended 
to go to and it serves as a stabilizing effect in the country 
by having a willing and capable partner.
    Understanding your question on what happens in the future, 
if the Taliban were to join a power-sharing arrangement, and 
it's an ``if,'' we would have to look at how we would be able 
to accomplish that--accomplish continued delivery of that type 
of assistance to the ANDSF and make sure that Congress 
continues to be comfortable with the oversight mechanisms and 
we're in full compliance with the law.
    Mr. Langevin. That's going to be critically important, 
going forward. We are already concerned about the amount of 
fraud and waste that has occurred as a result of corruption. We 
need to double down if we are not going to have a military 
presence there, especially to make sure that those aid dollars 
are going where they're intended and not be diverted for 
corrupt purposes.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance of my 
time.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Wilson is recognized for 5 minutes.
    You with us there, Joe?
    Mr. Wilson. Hey, yeah, I sure am. Hey. Thank you very much, 
Mr. Chairman, and thank you for the witnesses being here today.
    Mr. Helvey, what is the role of the Department in the 
intra-Afghan negotiations considering that the Taliban are 
fanatical totalitarians? There is significant concern that the 
societal gains made in the last 20 years may be undone.
    What can the Department do to ensure these gains remain, 
especially as girls and women are being targeted?
    Mr. Helvey. Well, sir, the role of the Department of 
Defense in the negotiations has been to play a supporting role. 
We've supported our State Department colleagues under 
Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad's lead as the Special 
Representative for Afghan Reconciliation. And, you know, our 
role has been to support his efforts and to support, you know, 
the Afghan government's efforts by providing support and 
assistance to them as they are trying to provide for security 
in the country.
    In terms of--in terms of how to be able to preserve those 
gains, we do wish to see those gains preserved. They've been 
difficult to come by and hard fought and hard won, and, indeed, 
Afghanistan has made significant progress in advancing human 
rights and opportunities, in particular for women and girls, 
over the past 20 years.
    The encourage--pardon me, the courage and enduring 
importance of Afghan women and their contributions to progress 
in society are remarkable and apparent.
    I think it's important that we make clear and continue to 
make clear that the protection of these gains over the past 20 
years is going to be a critical metric for Afghanistan's future 
acceptance by the international community.
    Our international partners are also very much committed to 
that effort. We need to remain aware that our departure does 
create new risks for human rights in general in Afghanistan, 
and that's something that we are cognizant of and attentive to.
    Part of the effort is to make sure that we can hold the 
Afghan Taliban to account to the extent possible----
    Mr. Wilson. And, hey, Mr. Secretary, hey----
    Mr. Helvey [continuing]. And part of that is by the 
legitimacy--sorry.
    Mr. Wilson. Mr. Secretary, again, thank you. Hey, again, I 
appreciate it very much, but I am very concerned. The progress 
that Americans have made and our allies to really help the 
people of Afghanistan, thank you for citing that.
    And, General, have there been any direct attacks by Taliban 
on U.S. forces since May 1st of 2021, and what about on the 
Afghan people? And, of course, with the heinous murder of 
dozens of girls in Kabul over the weekend, how do you 
differentiate murder by the Taliban, murder by ISIS [Islamic 
State of Iraq and Syria], murder by al-Qaida?
    And I sincerely believe that we should defeat the 
terrorists overseas or they will, again, commit mass murder of 
American families. I appreciate the chairman, Mike McCaul, 
Ambassador Ryan Crocker were correct in their op-ed in the New 
York Times on May the 4th.
    And so back, again, have there been any attacks since May 
the 1st?
    General Trollinger. Sir, there have not been any attacks by 
the Taliban against U.S. or coalition forces since May the 1st.
    Mr. Wilson. And, General, in regard to that, how in the 
world do you differentiate Taliban, ISIS, al-Qaida, and it's 
inconceivable the attack on girls at the girls' school over the 
weekend, the dozens that were slaughtered. Gosh, there has got 
to be a way that--the bottom line is that I am really concerned 
that we are turning the country over to people who have every 
intent to develop an ability to come back and attack the United 
States.
    Another concern I have, and this would be, General, the 
terrorism threat will not end with the withdrawal, and I am 
concerned that we are leaving ourselves with no infrastructure 
or counterterrorism abilities.
    And we should never forget that the murderous attacks of 
September the 11th, 2001, of innocent Americans were conducted 
by a cave in Afghanistan. How do we stop this? How do we 
protect the American people, General?
    General Trollinger. Well, as Mr. Helvey indicated, we are 
in the midst of continuous planning--prudent planning to get 
after how best to make a seamless transition for the 
capabilities that we have currently in Afghanistan that will 
come out of Afghanistan, but where best to position those so 
that we can address our overarching objective in preventing 
Afghanistan from being a safe haven for terrorists.
    Mr. Wilson. Well, General, again, I have faith in you and I 
am really grateful that my youngest son served for a year as an 
engineer in Afghanistan, and I appreciate his service in the 
South Carolina Army National Guard. Served there for a year, 
the 218th Brigade. We want the best for the people of 
Afghanistan and to protect American families at home.
    I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Larsen is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I would like to yield my 
time to Mr. Crow.
    Mr. Crow. Thank you, Mr. Larsen and Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Helvey, General Trollinger, thank you for the testimony 
today.
    As an Army Ranger and as a paratrooper, I served both in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. In both places, I worked very closely 
with local Iraqis and Afghani interpreters, contractors, and 
others without whom I may not be here today and without whom we 
could not have accomplished our mission and done our work.
    I am going to tell the story very briefly about a man named 
Mohammad, who spent the last 12 years helping U.S. forces in 
Afghanistan. Mohammad had applied for a Special Immigrant Visa 
in 2010. He was denied repeatedly. Delays stopped the visa from 
being processed.
    In January 27th of this year, Mohammad was driving to work 
with his 10-year-old son when a Taliban vehicle stopped in 
front of him, assassins jumped out, and gunned him down in 
front of his son.
    All the while those assassins yelled out, quote, ``Where 
are the American forces to save you? Where are their 
helicopters? Where are their airplanes? You helped them for a 
decade. Where are they now?'' end quote.
    Mohammad is dead. Couple of weeks later his oldest son 
received this death threat from the Taliban. He and many others 
like him will soon die unless we act.
    General McKenzie recently said that if directed to do so, 
the Department of Defense could successfully conduct an 
evacuation of at-risk populations out of the country.
    Mr. Helvey, do you agree with this assessment?
    Mr. Helvey. If directed to do so, we could.
    Mr. Crow. Who is the interagency lead for this issue, Mr. 
Helvey?
    Mr. Helvey. We are working with the--with the inner--
through the interagency process to look at the different 
options. There are different authorities, as you know, to 
address this.
    Mr. Crow. Is there an interagency lead, Mr. Helvey?
    Mr. Helvey. I would believe State Department would be the 
lead.
    Mr. Crow. Do you believe or do you know?
    Mr. Helvey. I believe--I believe that State Department 
would be the lead for that.
    Mr. Crow. You don't know for sure?
    Mr. Helvey. I do not know for sure. Depends on what we are 
talking about. If we are----
    Mr. Crow. Mr. Helvey, we are several weeks into this 
drawdown. We have no time left. There are lives of 
Afghanistanis, our partners, people that we have an obligation 
to, not just a moral obligation but a national security 
obligation, and you don't know who the interagency lead is?
    Mr. Helvey. For the Special Immigrant Visa [SIV] program, 
the State Department's the lead, although, as you know, a lot 
of times the quotas are addressed through the National Defense 
Authorization Act.
    The mechanisms by which those Afghans could depart could 
depend on the different circumstances. But State Department is 
the lead for the SIV----
    Mr. Crow. Mr. Helvey, would the establishment of an 
interagency task force help expedite this process?
    Mr. Helvey. I believe it would. We are working with the 
National Security Council to work through these issues, having 
interagency meetings multiple times a week to address this 
specific question.
    Mr. Crow. What does DOD need from Congress to help those 
over 18,000 Afghans who have applied for a Special Immigrant 
Visa who are waiting on us right now?
    Mr. Helvey. One of the things we would like to work in, and 
I do support the chairman's, you know, suggestion of increasing 
resources for the Special Immigrant Visa program, if--I know 
that this is a very--a time-intensive effort, but, certainly, 
increasing the quotas would be--would be a tremendous help and 
making sure they have the resources.
    Mr. Crow. Thank you, Mr. Helvey. I would like--thank you, 
Mr. Helvey.
    I would like to yield the rest of my time to Ms. Slotkin.
    Ms. Slotkin. So I just want to pick up a conversation that 
I was having with the Secretary of State and Secretary of 
Defense when they came and briefed us on the plan. I don't 
think there's a ton of debate on generally wanting to get out 
of Afghanistan, between Democrats and Republicans, between 
American citizens.
    But the question is how do we know if something has been 
tripped that should require us to go back if, for instance, 
there was another attack being planned, if there was the full 
collapse of the state.
    So what are the trip wires the Department of Defense has 
that you will provide to the White House and others to identify 
whether we are creeping back into that dangerous state?
    Mr. Helvey. Well, I think the key thing is to have, you 
know, persistence--persistent intelligence to be able to 
understand how the security situation in Afghanistan is 
evolving and how--if and how terrorist threats are beginning to 
reemerge.
    Ms. Slotkin. I will just say from my experience working on 
ISIS and the fact that we had--we did have some intelligence 
that ISIS was taking over major swaths of the country.
    But because we, as an interagency, didn't have clear trip 
wires that sort of went red when we crossed over those in 
places like Iraq and Syria, we weren't able to muster the 
interagency energy to go back in for quite some time.
    So I would just encourage, at the end of my time here, some 
very specific trip wires that we evaluate here as a committee. 
Thanks very much.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Turner is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Gentleman, I feel sorry for you today, and I feel sorry for 
you because you're being asked very specific questions about 
how you're going to do things that you have described to us 
that you're going to do from an audience that's incredibly 
skeptical, that doesn't believe that you can do them.
    Because, generally, it's pretty well known that you're not 
going to be able to fight the counterterrorism mission because 
of just basic logistics after leaving Afghanistan, that the 
Taliban have not agreed in any binding way not to overthrow the 
Afghan government, and the Afghan National Forces are very 
compromised and are going to find it very difficult to try to 
hold Afghan territory.
    And which takes me to follow on with Representative 
Slotkin's question where she was asking for trip wires. What I 
am going to ask you is, since you are planning and since just 
about everybody on this committee believes you're going to have 
to go back in because of the hasty withdrawal that is 
occurring, not just what trip wires are you doing but also what 
planning are you doing?
    We are leaving infrastructure. We are leaving facilities. 
To what extent are you working with the Afghan National 
Government to work on facility logistical planning to 
accommodate instances where you do have to go back?
    Either of you.
    Mr. Helvey. As indicated, sir, we are doing detailed 
planning for all outcomes and options. As we are conducting the 
retrograde and withdrawal, we are turning over facilities to 
our Afghan partners.
    We are also looking to continue providing the support and 
assistance to the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces 
so that we do, indeed, retain a willing and capable partner.
    I think that is going to be one of the essential elements 
in how we'll be able to continue monitoring and prosecuting 
terrorists----
    Mr. Turner. Willing and capable partner for your need, 
because you mentioned that there's a bilateral agreement 
between the United States and Afghanistan, willing and able to 
partner for you to be able to return, go back in with 
operations and, hopefully, come back out.
    Mr. Helvey. I want to----
    Mr. Turner. That's my question. Return.
    Mr. Helvey. I want to be clear that whether or not we 
return is a decision that the President would----
    Mr. Turner. Oh, I understand that. My question to you, 
though, is one of planning, which is what your presentation is 
supposed to be about.
    To what extent are you, with these facilities and with the 
Afghan partners, working on the issue of logistics so that on 
the need that due to those bilateral agreements you cited that 
you have to go back in to assist, that the facilities can 
accommodate your return and your operations?
    Mr. Helvey. We are working all those--all those options 
on----
    Mr. Turner. Great. So it's on your to-do list?
    Mr. Helvey. It is on the to-do list.
    Mr. Turner. Great. Wonderful.
    Next question. One of the concerns that people have is the 
fact that the exit, although as I described it as hasty, is 
ongoing with the U.S., it is also ongoing with our partners, 
especially our NATO partners.
    Since they have critical functions upon their exit, they 
could diminish the overall security situation for either U.S. 
personnel or other allied personnel. To what extent are you 
coordinating the operations of our allies as it relates to the 
security as people are exiting?
    Mr. Helvey. We are coordinating intensively and closely 
with our allies and coalition partners to facilitate the 
withdrawal. That is absolutely something that we are----
    Mr. Turner. Coordination is easier to say than to do. You 
know, there are a number of people who believe that there's 
concern that there are even coalition partners that are leaving 
that have critical functions for which there is no one who's 
backfilling. You are aware that there are those concerns, are 
you not?
    Mr. Helvey. We are aware of those concerns, and part of our 
task is to ensure that we can--we can ensure that there's, A, 
no gaps, and B, that we can, you know, help facilitate a 
coordinated withdrawal of U.S. and allied forces.
    As we say with our NATO partners, we went in together, 
we'll adjust together, and we'll depart together.
    Mr. Turner. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    The Chairman. Mr. Courtney.
    Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just, again, want 
to echo my support for your comments regarding the Special 
Immigrant Visa program, as well as Mr. Crow.
    I think, again, if it requires our committee to move with 
some type of enabling legislation maybe ahead of NDAA [National 
Defense Authorization Act] I think, frankly, you know, that's 
our responsibility.
    The Chairman. And I am sorry. I can explain that. I will 
pause the gentleman's time here for a second, and I should 
explain this more clearly.
    The Special Immigrant Visa program requires mandatory 
spending, and this is the fight we have every year. And the 
rules, as they're written, require us to--you can't just--you 
have to find the--we have to cut something else in order to 
fund mandatory spending.
    Okay. So every visa costs a certain amount of money and 
every year we go searching for mandatory money. Mandatory money 
is not easy to find. Mandatory money, it's complicated, but 
it's not--you can't just cut a plane, whatever.
    Now, it is an option and an option that I think we need to 
consider, that we can just waive that requirement and we can 
just spend the money, and we have done that over the course of 
the last few years to the tune of billions of dollars, 
including on Mr. Wilson's widows tax, as they call it.
    And if I am being perfectly honest with you, to get to the 
numbers that we all want to get to, which is, I think, there's 
18,000 pending at the moment and we only have authorization--I 
am going to get the numbers slightly wrong--for, like, 7,000, 
maybe--if we are going to get there, we are going to have to 
waive that requirement.
    We are not going to find the money to accommodate all of 
the Special Immigrant Visas that are needed. I would bet on 
that. Maybe I will be proven wrong. So if we are really 
dedicated and committed to doing that, that is what we, on a 
bipartisan basis, are going to have to do.
    So I apologize, but I wanted to make sure that was clear.
    Mr. Courtney. No, I think that's really helpful and I 
think, frankly, it's kind of our marching orders. I would take 
it that way.
    So and--so, again, I would like to spend a few minutes 
though, Mr. Helvey, just talking about the exit, okay, because 
I think it's important to remember that the agreement with the 
Taliban that this government executed in February of 2020 we 
had a troop level at that point of about 15,000 soldiers in 
Afghanistan.
    By the time the President was sworn into office in January, 
the exit had already been underway. I mean, the troop levels 
were about 2,500 in January. I mean, is that correct? I just 
want to make sure, you know, people have a little more context 
here in terms of the withdrawal.
    Mr. Helvey. That is correct.
    Mr. Courtney. So in terms of the review that was conducted, 
you know, by the Defense Department and the State Department, 
you know, I guess the--and part of the agreement, by the way, 
in February was that during this withdrawal period the Taliban 
agreed to not attack U.S. troops.
    Is that correct?
    Mr. Helvey. That is correct.
    Mr. Courtney. And again, I mean, it wasn't maybe squeaky 
clean perfect but, certainly, the casualty rates were 
significantly stable during that time period.
    If the President had made the choice to say, well, you know 
what, we are going to--we are going to, you know, set aside the 
agreement or, you know, make a different decision, 2,500 troops 
at--you know, last--this past month, I mean, there would have 
had to have been, I think, actually a need to bring more troops 
in if we were going to, basically, say the agreement has been 
breached and, you know, whatever terms of nonaggression or 
nonattacks would also be set aside as well, right.
    I mean, the troop level at 2,500 is not sufficient to, you 
know, carry out a mission against the Taliban, which would have 
been effective. I mean, I think that's almost common sense, 
isn't it?
    Mr. Helvey. Well, sir, I think that the 2,500 troop level, 
on the advice of the commanders we had a capability, a very 
lethal capability, to protect the force, to continue providing 
our support to our Afghan National Defense and Security Forces 
partners and also to work in concert with our NATO partners, 
who had a greater military presence than the U.S. on its own to 
be able to execute the missions that we had in Afghanistan, 
which was counterterrorism and train, advise, and assist of our 
Afghan partners. That was the capability that we had at 2,500.
    Mr. Courtney. But, certainly, you know, the context of the 
agreement, which was that the Taliban would agree to leave--to 
lay off U.S. troops from February 2020, you know, up until 
2021, I mean, if we had set aside the agreement, that 
environment would have changed.
    I mean, I just--it just seems like you can't have it both 
ways. If we, you know, decided to keep troops there and expect 
compliance with that provision of the prior agreement regarding 
nonaggression against U.S. troops.
    Mr. Helvey. In response to your question, we would assume 
that if we backed out of the agreement then yes, the Taliban 
would not be obligated to comply with its terms of the 
agreement, which was to not attack U.S. or coalition forces, 
which they did not.
    Mr. Courtney. Right. So regarding, you know, just 
continuing support for the Afghan military, again, you 
mentioned in your testimony the Afghan Security Forces Fund, 
which, again, looking at last year's OCO [Overseas Contingency 
Operations] account, that was about $4 billion that was 
appropriated for that account.
    Is that correct?
    Mr. Helvey. About $3.8 billion, but yeah.
    Mr. Courtney. And so do you see that sort of same level of 
funding, moving forward?
    Mr. Helvey. We are going to require significant funds, you 
know, going forward to continue supporting the ANDSF. I think 
this year it might be a little bit less. But the--yes, keeping 
the funding for our partners, in particular, for salaries, 
supplies, and support to the Afghan Air Force and Special 
Mission Wing is going to be critical and that's what the ASFF 
accomplishes.
    Mr. Courtney. So, and again, while we are on the subject, 
the OCO--I mean, again, the funding--the direct funding for 
U.S. forces in Afghanistan, presumably, you know, will no 
longer be required. That was at about $14 billion in last 
year's OCO. Is that correct?
    Mr. Helvey. I don't have the specifics in front of me, sir.
    Mr. Courtney. Okay. Again, that's the CRS [Congressional 
Research Service] report, which was--that was the number that 
was allocated. With that, I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you. I just want to emphasize the point 
that Mr. Courtney made. You know, the Taliban agreed not to 
attack us. If they--on May 1st if we said, you know what, we 
are not going to abide by the agreement, we are sticking 
around, I don't think there's anyone in this committee who 
would believe that the Taliban would not have started attacking 
us at that point and I don't think there's anyone in the 
military who believes that our forces, as they're currently 
structured, as they were structured over the course of the last 
year to deal with an environment where the Taliban were not 
attacking us, that when they decided to attack us that that 
force structure was going to work. Nobody can possibly believe 
that.
    And I just want to make sure members of the committee 
understand that's the choice. I would love to have an option 
where we protect all the Afghan people and it works. Love to 
have that option.
    But the option we have is to send more U.S. and coalition 
troops to Afghanistan to, once again, full scale fight the 
Taliban. So I am very concerned about what's going to happen to 
the Afghan people.
    But we, as members of this committee, have to understand 
that if the President had made that different decision, our 
constituents would once again be dying in Afghanistan. Members 
who are serving in the military right now would be asked to go 
back over there, and their families would have to realize that 
there would be dead and injured coming back.
    And then could we tell those people, yeah, but a year from 
now it's going to be better, 2 years from now it's going to be 
better, 5 years from now it's going to be better? You know, 
your sacrifice will make a difference. Could we tell them that?
    I could not. You cannot tell me that after 20 years, that 
doing the same thing for another 1, 2, 5, or 10 would have 
changed that. So we would have been asking people to die to not 
accomplish anything. That's a really tough thing to do.
    As I said, there's no easy answer here. But let's not 
pretend that there's some magical choice whereby we protect 
everyone in Afghanistan and it doesn't cost us dearly. That's 
what I hope members will think about as we as we go through 
this.
    Mr. Lamborn is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And I understand what you were just saying, but I hope that 
the result of all this, especially the way it's being done in a 
hasty manner, doesn't lead anyone who sacrificed life and limb 
and their surviving families to think that it was in vain. I 
hope that that is not the result of the outcome of this.
    I am concerned about the geopolitical aspects. But my 
biggest concern is for those who sacrificed so much, and I am 
concerned that we might be going in that direction.
    Mr. Helvey, I know we are going to talk more at 2 o'clock 
in the classified session about agreements for over-the-horizon 
options, and the ranking member was asking about that.
    I, too, have huge questions over what that looks like. 
Afghanistan is a landlocked country 300 miles from the Arabian 
Sea. It would require overflights, if you have a sea-based 
over-the-horizon option, over Iran or Pakistan. The first is 
impossible and the second is problematic. There are seven or 
eight countries that border Afghanistan.
    I will get to the dispute here in a second. But one of 
those is Iran. One of those is China. I don't think any 
agreements with those two countries are going to be 
forthcoming.
    There's a disputed border with India claiming it and 
Pakistan denying it to Afghanistan, but I don't know if we have 
an agreement with India in any case for basing in that part 
of--proximity to Afghanistan.
    And then that leaves Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and 
Tajikistan. So of all those countries, and I am not asking you 
to divulge anything classified, but as of today is there any 
agreement with any of those seven or eight countries for basing 
that we have that would give us an over-the-horizon option?
    Mr. Helvey. We do not have an agreement with any of those 
countries. But as I indicated in my response to a previous 
question, you know, we are--we are working all the different 
options that we have in concert with our State Department and 
intelligence community colleagues to establish the types of 
arrangements that give us the access, basing, and overflight 
necessary to address the terrorism threats.
    Mr. Lamborn. And as--and Mr. Crow was referring to the 
horrific killing of a loyal translator that was serving the 
U.S. interests, and we were there and weren't able to stop it.
    How, being hundreds of miles away at best, are we going to 
be able to stop so many things that could happen in a--in a 
bloodbath scenario?
    Mr. Helvey. If I could answer just with two statements.
    One, we do have a special responsibility to support and 
protect those that supported and protected us for these past 20 
years, and we need to work with our interagency colleagues and 
with the Congress to make sure that we have the resources and 
the capabilities to do just that.
    I think the second part of it and a larger part of it is 
that the best way to provide for security and stability for the 
Afghan people is to see a negotiated peace agreement between 
the warring sides, and we will continue to support the effort 
for the Afghan people themselves to sit and determine their own 
fate, determine their own future.
    Mr. Lamborn. Now, along that line, the ranking member asked 
General Trollinger if the Taliban have entered into any 
agreements, and I believe his answer was they are capable of 
entering into an agreement.
    But I think we have to admit though they might be capable 
they haven't yet done so in a way that, not just for American 
forces but for a comprehensive settlement, would hold water. 
Isn't that true?
    Mr. Helvey. They've started inter-Afghan negotiations but 
there has not been a political settlement that's emerged from 
it.
    Mr. Lamborn. And I guess my last question is--and I think 
it was unfortunate to choose 9/11 as the withdrawal date. Won't 
the Taliban just declare victory? Whether it's true or not or 
justified or not, aren't they going to declare victory on 9/11?
    Mr. Helvey. I will leave it to the Taliban to decide what 
they want to say and how they want to do it. Our job is to 
provide for a safe, orderly, and responsible withdrawal of our 
forces consistent with the direction that the President has 
given us.
    Mr. Lamborn. I agree we don't want to speak and can't speak 
for them. But I don't want to give them an opportunity for an 
unforced error on our part.
    With that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Ms. Speier is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And to our presenters 
today, I just want to associate myself with all the comments 
made by my colleagues about protecting those who have been 
there protecting us, and I fear that the NDAA is too late; if 
we have to wait for the NDAA to provide the funding, that we 
will have jeopardized many lives.
    I am curious, Mr. Chairman, if temporary protective status 
would allow us to bring these individuals to the United States 
without the mandatory spending. If you could answer that. Do 
you know the answer to that?
    The Chairman. That is an immigration thing. I am pretty 
sure you're correct. I don't know the ins and outs of the 
temporary protective status rules.
    But we will explore that as an option. In our bailiwick, 
the Special Immigrant Visa program is what we have. So we will 
explore other options as well.
    Ms. Speier. Thank you.
    General Trollinger, what is the value of the equipment and 
weapons we have in Afghanistan right now?
    General Trollinger. Ma'am, I don't have a specific number 
for you at this time.
    Ms. Speier. Could you provide that to the committee 
subsequently?
    General Trollinger. Yes, ma'am. I will.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 59.]
    Ms. Speier. And what is your intentions about destroying 
weapons, equipment, and facilities?
    General Trollinger. As part of our safe, orderly, and 
coordinated withdrawal from Afghanistan, we will be 
retrograding people, equipment, and turning over to GIRoA 
[Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan] specific 
equipment, and then we will also be turning over to Defense 
Logistics Agency specific equipment that will need to be 
destroyed.
    Ms. Speier. All right, and you will give us a list of that 
as well?
    General Trollinger. Yes, ma'am.
    Ms. Speier. What kind of military presence is necessary to 
protect our diplomatic and technical assistance mission in 
Afghanistan after withdrawal?
    General Trollinger. I am sorry. Could you repeat the 
question?
    Ms. Speier. What kind of military presence is necessary to 
protect our diplomatic and technical assistance mission in 
Afghanistan after withdrawal, presuming that we still have an 
embassy there?
    General Trollinger. Assuming that we maintain a diplomatic 
presence, we can expect to see a military presence that will 
provide an adequate security apparatus to protect the 
diplomatic mission. That planning is ongoing at this time. But 
there's been no decision made on what that would look like.
    Ms. Speier. All right. You know, we have kept our part of 
this peace agreement that was created by then President Trump, 
who always criticized a date certain for somehow telegraphing 
what our steps would be. The Taliban has not kept its part of 
the deal.
    How can the Department of Defense and the State Department 
bring pressure to bear to ensure that the Taliban meets its 
obligations under the agreement?
    Mr. Helvey. Ma'am, I think that, you know, we can address 
that in a number of different ways. First, you know, as I 
indicated, you know, we will maintain the capability to provide 
for, you know, defense of our forces as we conduct the 
retrograde and to be able to hold the Taliban accountable for 
its commitments to end its support to al-Qaida.
    So that is not--that is not going away. We are looking at 
what the--what the specifics in terms of a over-the-horizon 
presence will be. But that's the--that's the President's intent 
is to maintain the capability to do that, to defend American 
interests and those of our allies.
    So that is--that is something that we have a lethal force 
in the region. We have a capable force in the region to 
accomplish that.
    I think a second part of it kind of extends beyond the 
military realm and that is, you know, the Taliban's own desire 
for international recognition and a sense of legitimacy and to 
provide additional assistance to the country in the future. And 
so that part of it is also the pressure.
    Ms. Speier. Okay, excuse--I have--okay. Thank you.
    I have one last question for General Trollinger. You 
indicated that ISIS was responsible for this heinous crime this 
weekend where over 80 people died at the school.
    How do you know that and how do we not know that ISIS is 
now a proxy for the Taliban?
    General Trollinger. Ma'am, I did not indicate that they 
were responsible for that.
    Ms. Speier. I thought I heard that in your testimony. If 
not, I stand corrected.
    General Trollinger. No, ma'am. No, ma'am.
    Ms. Speier. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Could you clarify that point, Mr. 
Helvey?
    Mr. Helvey. I said in my opening statement that no party 
has claimed responsibility for the attack. However, it bears a 
resemblance to the types of attacks that we've seen previously 
from ISIS-K.
    The Chairman. Yeah. Okay. Thank you.
    Mr. Wittman is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Helvey, I want to go to you. I believe that we are 
really in a catch-22 situation in Afghanistan with what we see 
before us. Economists would call it a death spiral. Here we 
are, having to provide continual military and financial support 
to the government in Kabul.
    When we do that, it undermines their legitimacy with the 
Afghan people. So in order to shore them up, we provide more 
resources, more military support, further weakening their 
standing with the Afghan people.
    As you can see, it goes back and forth, back and forth. We 
saw exactly the same thing transpire in Vietnam. We also see 
ourselves in a position where there is not the will to 
decisively and forcefully eradicate the Taliban. It's just not 
there.
    I've been there multiple times. I understand, you know, we 
try to straddle that element of getting Afghan to a point where 
it can self-sustain both economically, from a governance 
standpoint. It's been extraordinarily difficult, if not on the 
verge of impossible.
    Let me ask this. In a scenario that we would continue to 
support the government in Kabul, would anything be different in 
5 years or in 10 years, and where would the Afghan government 
be under those situations, let's say, in the long term?
    Could they sustain? Where would it be? So to look at the 
other scenario--now that we are getting out, look at the other 
scenario. If we continued that, would anything be different?
    Mr. Helvey. Well, sir, you know, I think from a--you know, 
from a Department of Defense perspective, right, you know, I 
think the best thing, the best outcome, would be a peaceful 
settlement between the warring parties in Afghanistan.
    That is the mechanism--that would be the mechanism by which 
the security situation would improve. That would be the 
mechanism by which, you know, the economy would be able to 
continue growing and that would also be the mechanism by which 
we could have even greater confidence that, you know, 
Afghanistan would not, again, become a safe haven for 
terrorists who would attack us or our allies or our partners.
    So that's the focus and that is what we will continue to 
support and continue to encourage.
    Now, in terms of the role that our assistance provides, I 
would say that the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces 
have improved. They are the ones that are doing the bulk of the 
fighting. They're also the ones that are doing the bulk of the 
dying in Afghanistan.
    In particular, the improvements that we've been able to see 
in the Afghan Air Forces and Special Mission Wing, I think, are 
significant and noteworthy, and that's been a direct result of 
the assistance that we've provided.
    And that would be one of the--one of those areas, not the 
exclusive one but one of those areas that we would look to 
continue providing our Afghan partners through this process and 
after our withdrawal.
    Mr. Wittman. So as we continue on in that effort and we are 
providing some level of counterterrorism mission there in 
Afghanistan, and we are going to be at long distances so it's 
going to be difficult to respond in ways that would be of 
immediate support to Afghan forces there or to immediately 
respond to those particular issues, to me, it points to the 
things that we've seen that are weaknesses throughout the area.
    There are certain things, you're right, that the Afghan 
armed forces can do. There are other things that they really 
can't do or don't do that well.
    One of the things we know that is critical in their battle 
against the Taliban or other destabilizing forces that try to 
insert themselves into Afghanistan is the element of air 
support and being able to support their forces on the ground.
    Do the Afghan armed forces know that as we pull out and as 
we--as we move out at longer distances away that there's not 
going to be that air support there? That they're going to be 
saddled with providing that close air support? Are they aware 
of that and how do you see them faring?
    And you talk about, yeah, they're doing well, but I think 
they're only doing well in certain areas. So what happens when 
we have that subtraction of our support there and what the 
Afghan armed forces can do?
    Mr. Helvey. We will continue providing the support to the 
extent--to the extent that we can and to do so safely. The 
Afghan Air Force is one of those areas that has improved 
considerably and will----
    Mr. Wittman. Can they be an effective fighting force with 
the current air opportunities that they have?
    Mr. Helvey. I would have to defer to my Joint Staff 
colleague for a military assessment of their capability. But I 
don't----
    Mr. Wittman. General Trollinger, I have about 10 seconds.
    General Trollinger. They are absolutely a capable fighting 
force.
    Mr. Wittman. And do they have capable air support?
    General Trollinger. They do currently have capable air 
support.
    Mr. Wittman. Okay. Very good. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Moulton is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Can you hear me okay?
    The Chairman. Yeah, we've got you. Go ahead.
    Mr. Moulton. It's clear that we will not win the war in 
Afghanistan. But there are still many disastrous ways that we 
can lose.
    The terrorists can come back. Girls can be banned from 
school. We may not have the bases that we need to prosecute 
affairs in the region.
    The Trump administration set us on a withdrawal timeline 
for this month, and it's clear from the testimony this morning 
that they laid out no clear plans for how that would actually 
be accomplished.
    But irrespective of the Trump administration's failures, 
this responsibility is now squarely on the shoulders of the 
Biden administration.
    Can you tell us, Mr. Helvey, how your scenario planning is 
going as you conduct war games for how this will be carried out 
in the mere 122 days you have between now and September 11th?
    Are you gaining more confidence in the plan or are these 
war games exposing additional concerns that you will have to 
address?
    Mr. Helvey. Sir, I think--I think a good answer is saying 
both. I mean, the more--the more planning we do, the more 
assessment we do, the more confidence we can have in our plan.
    At the same time, part of the point of doing assessments 
and planning is to identify potential blind spots, potential 
vulnerabilities, so that we can work to put in the mitigations 
to address those and close those.
    So we are doing those detailed plans. We have more work to 
do and that's--but that's what the Department of Defense does 
and that's what we do extremely well.
    So, again, a, perhaps, a long-winded answer to a short 
question. But yes, we are both gaining confidence and, you 
know, identifying areas where we can improve as we go forward.
    Mr. Moulton. In your judgment, do we have enough time? I 
served in the Department of Defense but at a much lower level 
than you.
    But as a Marine commander on the ground in Iraq, I 
certainly learned that you don't want to go into an operation 
without a plan, and if it looks like your plan is not going to 
work then you explore options to take more time to get it right 
before you conduct an operation.
    Do you think we are going to be--we are going to find 
ourselves in that scenario?
    Mr. Helvey. Well, sir, you know, the planning did not begin 
on April 14th. We've been conducting planning for this 
circumstance for some time prior to that. I think it had been 
previously raised in a previous question.
    You know, the--you know, with the signing of the U.S.-
Taliban peace agreement last February, you know, the planning 
for the withdrawal began, and that is something that we have 
been working very closely with our Joint Staff colleagues, 
USCENTCOM [U.S. Central Command] colleagues, and our Resolute 
Support/Operation Freedom's Sentinel colleagues on how to do 
that.
    Mr. Moulton. Mr. Helvey, if I may interrupt.
    Mr. Helvey, if I may interrupt. My question is, are you 
prepared to extend the timeline if the planning exposes 
vulnerabilities that cannot be addressed by September 11th?
    Mr. Helvey. You know, I think we are looking at a lot of 
different--a lot of different options on how we can do that. 
But I am not--and I am not--I wouldn't be in a position today 
to tell you what those options--you know, how those options may 
interface with a timeline for withdrawing.
    I mean, the President's direction to the Department has 
been--has been clear and we are developing plans to be able to 
meet his intent to do so safely and orderly and responsibly.
    Mr. Moulton. My colleague, Ms. Slotkin, from her experience 
in DOD had talked about the importance of having trip lines 
that will identify when we need to take action to, God forbid, 
have to go back into Afghanistan, which I think would be the 
worst result.
    Look, I want to bring the troops home as much as anyone, 
but the worst thing to do would be to bring them home and then 
have to send them back in to refight battles they've already 
won, because we withdrew too quickly.
    I would also suggest that you need to have trip wires in 
your planning between now and September 11th to say if we have 
not done things like establish these bases, if we do not have 
clear plans for how we do address the terrorist threat from 
over the horizon, going forward.
    If we cannot explain to Congress, let alone to our own 
troops, how we are going to protect our diplomats and continue 
to support the Afghan government, then you're going to have to 
delay this timeline.
    Mr. Helvey, do you have any comment?
    Mr. Helvey. Thank you. We are--we are doing planning for 
each of those--each of those areas and each of the plans looks 
at what the different conditions are to how to--to how to meet 
the objective.
    The Chairman. I am sorry, but the gentleman's time has 
expired.
    Mrs. Hartzler is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    This is a sober hearing. It's a sober moment in our 
Nation's history as we look at the situation in Afghanistan, 
and I wanted to reiterate what my colleague from Colorado said, 
that we want to applaud and commemorate and thank all of our 
service members who have fought over these past 20 years on 
behalf of freedom, on behalf of us after what happened in 
September 11th that originated from Afghanistan. And their 
sacrifice has not been in vain.
    We are thankful that we have not had another attack on our 
homeland like we saw on the horrific September 11th, because of 
their bravery, because of their courage, and because of their 
dedication to this cause of freedom, and I just wanted to 
recognize and thank everyone who has been fighting and who has 
continued to fight, and their service and sacrifice.
    Yet, at the same time, we are at this moment, and I am 
concerned about what happens afterwards and, certainly, I 
wanted to start with the situation with the women--Afghanistan 
women.
    I had a chance to go to Afghanistan, as many of you know, 
and several of us have, and met with women in parliament who 
are having the opportunity to contribute to a new country that 
is able to taste and--that opportunity for freedom.
    And they said to me, Representative, please don't leave. If 
the Americans leave, I am on a hit list with the Taliban. I 
will be dead within 10 days.
    And I am very concerned about that. I got to visit a school 
where Afghani little girls had an opportunity to have education 
for the first time, and the spark of hope in their eyes was 
inspiring.
    So I want to ask Mr. Helvey and Brigadier General 
Trollinger what does the future of Afghan women look like 
without U.S. troops and how will women be protected in 
Afghanistan?
    Mr. Helvey. Ma'am, thank you for your--for your question 
and thank you as well for your statement of appreciation for 
all the service in Afghanistan for these past 20 years.
    With respect to what happens, you know, fundamentally, this 
is a question that the Afghan people themselves, you know, need 
to be able to answer and solve.
    You know, we also want to see the gains preserved over the 
past 20 years. I've been in, you know, meetings much like what 
you have had and heard the same comments.
    We have an obligation to assist and to help, and we need to 
do that. We also need to encourage the Afghan government and 
the Taliban and all the parties, quite frankly, to, you know, 
be able to sit and establish a peace agreement that the Afghan 
people can support, you know, and that is--that's what our 
focus is.
    But that--I mean, that's not--that's not something--I mean, 
we are there--we went there to address the terrorist threat 
that you talked about and, you know, bring those that attacked 
us on 9/11 to justice, and we've been able to accomplish that.
    You know, the President made a determination that the best 
way to protect American interests in Afghanistan, but also our 
interests in terms of protecting the homeland does not require 
a persistent military presence there.
    But the United States is not abandoning Afghanistan. We 
will maintain a diplomatic presence there, maintain an embassy 
there and the Department of Defense will continue doing what we 
can do, you know, through an embassy presence to be able to 
support our partners and, as I've indicated, address the 
terrorist threats that, you know, if and as they emerge.
    Mrs. Hartzler. So from earlier answers to other questions, 
you have said that there will be the State Department, embassy 
there, and there will be a military force left there in order--
that's adequate to protect it, to protect our diplomats.
    You said that you have got a plan to divest the equipment, 
figuring out how much of the equipment is coming home, how much 
is going to be given to Afghan Security Forces, how much is 
just going to be destroyed. I am going to be very interested in 
that plan and seeing it.
    But in your testimony, you also say that a lot of the money 
that we are going to continue to send to the Special Mission 
Wing, Afghan Air Force, the Afghan Security Forces, is going to 
be overseen and executed by a DOD contract.
    So I know I've only got a few seconds. How many DOD 
contractors, Americans, are we still going to have on the 
ground to oversee these other missions?
    Mr. Helvey. We still have planning underway for what that 
diplomatic presence will look like. But we will try to do as 
much of that over the horizon as possible.
    The Chairman. And that will have to be--the gentlelady's 
time has expired. You might want to get us that answer because 
I think people are very interested in the contracts. If you can 
get it back to the committee, for the record, that would be 
helpful.
    [The information referred to was not available at the time 
of printing.]
    The Chairman. Mr. Brown is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 
convening this very important hearing.
    So when the President announced to the country that we are 
withdrawing troops from Afghanistan, he said, and I am going to 
quote, ``Since we were attacked, we went to war with clear 
goals. We achieved those objectives. Bin Laden is dead and al-
Qaida is degraded in Afghanistan and it's time to end the 
forever war.''
    And, Mr. Helvey, you just, in response to the last 
question, stated and certainly suggested that we've 
accomplished the goal of preventing terrorist attacks against 
the United States emanating from Afghanistan.
    We hear a lot about the over-the-horizon response or 
capability with no detail. I could contemplate cruise missiles. 
I can contemplate the introduction of special forces, 
conventional forces.
    As the chairman mentioned, there's no miracle solution or 
option, and any one of those over-the-horizon operations could, 
certainly, lead to the loss of further life of further, you 
know, U.S. service members.
    So my question is, what implications does this decision 
have in terms of the 2001 AUMF [Authorization for Use of 
Military Force] as it pertains to Afghanistan? It seems like 
the purposes of the AUMF have been accomplished as it pertains 
to Afghanistan.
    That's why we are pulling out. That was the rationale. 
That's what you just commented. And it would seem to me then if 
there were over-the-horizon operations, that the administration 
would need to, under most circumstances, come back to Congress 
seeking authorization, unless any one of the exemptions 
applied.
    Could you comment about this decision and the implications 
for the 2001 AUMF?
    Mr. Helvey. I may--I may have to get that back in a written 
statement. But I don't believe there are direct implications of 
this decision in the 2001 authorization of use of military 
forces. But I will endeavor to provide a response in written 
form after this--after this hearing.
    [The information referred to was not available at the time 
of printing.]
    Mr. Brown. And, you know, and I appreciate that and--
because when I hear over-the-horizon capability, I know it's 
not a forever war in terms of having boots on the ground.
    But the notion that any one of us could wake up tomorrow 
and know that we've reintroduced U.S. forces after a--almost a 
declaration from the President that we've accomplished our 
goals--we don't anticipate, at this point, future terrorist 
attacks against the United States from Afghanistan--I would 
think that if they were to arise, if they were to emerge, that 
would be a classic case of coming to Congress and asking for 
authorization absent some, you know, self-defense rationale.
    But I appreciate if you could take that for the record, 
provide a more detailed, elaborate, and comprehensive response 
and with that, please, whether or not the administration 
intends to use its authority under 10 U.S.C. [United States 
Code] 127(e), which is support, of course, to the Afghan 
government in pursuit of terrorism when special operators would 
otherwise be authorized to be engaged. So if you could also 
include that in your response, I would appreciate it.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    [The information referred to was not available at the time 
of printing.]
    The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Scott is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And I would like to just follow up on what my friend and 
colleague, Mr. Brown, mentioned. It was a 2001 AUMF. It's now 
2021, and I do think that while this isn't for these gentlemen, 
we, as Congress, have got to have a broader discussion on AUMFs 
and the War Powers Act.
    And while some of that will not occur in this committee, I 
do think that when we agree to send America's men and women 
into a conflict that we need to have a public debate and a 
public vote and an explanation for the United States citizens 
of why we are doing what we are doing, and that we should not 
be operating under a legal authority that was granted over two 
decades ago when many of the people that are going over there 
were not even born yet.
    I have one other question. This would go for the staff. I 
would like to know what the budgetary cost and monetary 
figures, obviously, is of a Special Immigrant Visa and I would 
like to know how that cost is calculated. And I would like for 
us to find the solution sooner rather than later to make sure 
that we are able to get those Special Immigrant Visas issued 
for the people that have helped our U.S. troops and our U.S. 
mission in Afghanistan.
    With that, you mentioned that one of the key aspects of how 
we were going to do things, Mr. Helvey, was persistent 
intelligence. You may not be able to answer that in this forum, 
but I do not understand how we have persistent intelligence if 
we only have a diplomatic mission with very limited military 
support. They're only enough to provide security, and we do not 
have the authority at this stage to base in any of the 
surrounding areas.
    Can you explain your definition of persistent intelligence 
and how we intend to accomplish that?
    Mr. Helvey. Sir, thank you for that question.
    I do think that would be something that would be better 
left to the closed--the closed session.
    Mr. Scott. Okay. I will accept that.
    The Wall Street Journal last week stated that our European 
allies are pushing the U.S. to delay its withdrawal from 
Afghanistan. I am extremely concerned about delaying it and the 
consequences of the delay.
    But the article claims that Turkey, which has secured the 
airport in Kabul for years, has told the U.S. and NATO that its 
troops may leave as well, and there's speculation that this 
will cause other Western countries to close their embassies and 
reduce diplomatic contingents.
    Is there a coordinated effort between our partners at the 
diplomatic level of how we are going to provide security 
together or is this something that every country is undertaking 
on its own?
    And what would the implications for somebody like a Turkey 
pulling out and no longer providing security at that airport 
have for the diplomatic missions?
    Mr. Helvey. Sir, we are having pretty active consultations 
in coordination with our allies and our partners. That is 
something the State Department is leading.
    The Department of Defense is, certainly, in support of that 
and--but we are--we are talking about what a future, you know, 
diplomatic presence would be and how we may be able to, you 
know, either singly or collectively be able to provide for 
security for that diplomatic presence.
    Mr. Scott. Do you believe that the Wall Street Journal 
article is accurate? Is Turkey considering withdrawing their 
security forces from securing the airport?
    Mr. Helvey. I have to admit I did not read the Wall Street 
Journal article. But I would say that we are in consultations 
with Turkey about what their intentions are.
    Mr. Scott. Okay.
    Mr. Chairman, I will yield the remainder of my time. You 
were not here when I asked the question about the individual 
costs from a budgetary standpoint about the Special Immigrant 
Visa and how it is calculated, but that's something that I 
would be interested in seeing, and I think that there would be 
broad support for finding a way to fund Special Immigrant 
Visas. But interested in what they cost in the budget and how 
that's calculated.
    With that, I yield.
    The Chairman. Thank you, and we--I know we have bipartisan 
support for trying to find a solution here and we will work to 
find that solution.
    Mr. Kim is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Kim. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that.
    Mr. Helvey, I wanted to follow up on something I heard you 
mention in response to a previous question. You mentioned that 
we would be providing continued training support during the 
withdrawal and after the withdrawal, and I guess I just wanted 
a clarification.
    After the withdrawal, what would the training support look 
like to the Afghan forces? Was that something you're 
envisioning in-country? Is that uniform? Is that contractors?
    I am just trying to get a little bit more of a sense of 
what that training support looks like.
    Mr. Helvey. We, obviously--I am sorry, I won't say 
obviously.
    We are--thank you for that question--we are still doing, 
you know, planning on how we would be able to provide, you 
know, the type of support that's necessary, you know, from a 
over-the-horizon posture.
    And I don't want to get into the specific details, you 
know, here. I could talk a little bit more in a closed session 
about what some of those options are. But, you know, that 
support can be provided through any--you know, a number of 
ways.
    You know, some of that can be done via, you know, 
teleconferences and other types of connections, something that 
we've all kind of learned about, unfortunately, during this 
pandemic.
    Mr. Kim. One thing we had done in Iraq after the withdrawal 
there initially was an Office of Security Cooperation that was 
kind of under a diplomatic presence but still allowed for some 
trainers to be there.
    Is that something that's on the table? Is that something 
that's been actively considered?
    Mr. Helvey. As indicated, we are still looking at what 
the--what the options for a diplomatic presence would be. But 
as you have highlighted, there are cases, Iraq being one, where 
we've been able to do that type of stuff through a security 
cooperation office that's based out of an embassy.
    So we are looking at the different models that we can--we 
can employ and how to be able to accomplish that. What would be 
done through a security assistance office, what could be done 
over the horizon--those are things that we are working on.
    Mr. Kim. Okay. So in a previous conversation, you and I 
had--I had mentioned to you questions about overflight 
privileges within Afghanistan, that we've talked about it in 
terms of the complexities, in terms of a potential regional 
platform.
    But I just want to clarify. I believe, if I remember 
correctly, you had mentioned to me that we still would have, 
after a withdrawal agreement, to be able to have overflight 
privileges for ISR and other capabilities in Afghanistan.
    Is that correct? And if so, what was the--what was the 
agreement that you said was still active such that that would 
be allowed?
    Mr. Helvey. We do retain the bilateral security agreement 
that we have with the government of the Islamic Republic of----
    Mr. Kim. And that's the 2014 security and defense 
cooperation agreement that you're referring to?
    Mr. Helvey. Yes, sir. The BSA [bilateral security 
agreement]. I mean, we----
    Mr. Kim. Has there been any discussion at all in--with the 
Afghans or are we hearing at all from the Taliban or others 
that they are seeking to end that agreement with the withdrawal 
of our forces? Or has that not been raised at all in any 
context?
    Like, should we be concerned that that agreement can be 
terminated? I am looking here. They've been terminated 
unilaterally upon notice from one side. So I am just wondering 
is that a concern that we have?
    Mr. Helvey. I think we will continue having our 
conversations with the Afghan government. But to the extent 
that I am aware, you know, the intention by both parties--the 
United States and the government in Kabul--would be to retain 
that security agreement, going forward.
    I can't speak to, you know, what conversations have been 
had with the Taliban. We are not talking to the Taliban about 
that because, you know, the government of Afghanistan sits in 
Kabul.
    Mr. Kim. Okay. Well, look, so from our standpoint, we have 
no, at this point, interest or activity to try to renegotiate 
that. We're--our posture is to just try to allow that agreement 
to continue. Is that correct?
    Mr. Helvey. That's my understanding. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Kim. Yeah. I guess a question then is if--you know, 
this is a wide, you know, very widespread, and I certainly want 
to make sure we, you know, maintain overflight privileges. I 
think ISR and those capabilities are incredibly important to 
countering a potential terrorist threat.
    But I am looking through this document. It's very far-
reaching in terms of what is still going to be allowable then 
in terms of our bilateral agreements.
    So I guess a question. I am just trying to understand the 
left and right limits of what the Defense Department 
understands that they are capable of doing still.
    Does the agreement being active mean that we would also 
consider potential U.S. Special Forces raids on the ground in 
Afghanistan as something that is still allowable under the 
President's decision?
    I am trying to understand if that is still something that 
you think is allowable, given that this agreement still exists?
    Mr. Helvey. I wouldn't want to speculate on that nor would 
I want to get into any hypothetical options we may want to--we 
may want to----
    Mr. Kim. But the President has not explicitly said that his 
decision excludes the potential for U.S. Special Forces raids 
on the ground in Afghanistan after September 11th this year?
    Mr. Helvey. No.
    Mr. Kim. Okay. Thank you, Chairman. I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Before I recognize Mr. Gaetz, we 
are--my plan is to stop at 1:15, give people a little bit of a 
break before we then reconvene at 2:00 for the classified 
portion of this briefing.
    With that, Mr. Gaetz is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Gaetz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding 
this important hearing.
    I am a frequent and fervent critic of the Biden 
administration on most things, but when it comes to President 
Biden's approach to Afghanistan, I want to offer sincere 
uncouched praise.
    I am glad that President Biden wants to end the war in 
Afghanistan. And let me be clear, I have no confidence in the 
functional capability of the Afghan government because they are 
deeply corrupt. I have no confidence in the Taliban because 
they lie and kill.
    I also have no confidence that extended U.S. troop 
deployments to Afghanistan will solve the core problem in 
Afghanistan, which is that their government is corrupt, they 
have not endeared themselves to their constituency, and there's 
not really an appetite to rid the country of the Taliban.
    In that light, I want to make sure that in these hearings 
and in our follow-on discussions that we support President 
Biden in his endeavor to be withdrawn by September 11th.
    I saw a statement recently from CENTCOM that said that 
about 12 percent of the work had been completed to achieve 
President Biden's objective, and I wanted to ask you, sir, what 
is your level of confidence that we will, in fact, meet the 
benchmark wisely set by President Biden?
    Mr. Helvey. We do have planning that's underway that is 
intended to enable a safe, orderly, and coordinated withdrawal 
along the timeline that the President gave us.
    Mr. Gaetz. Is the 12 percent number correct, by your 
assessment?
    Mr. Helvey. I don't want to provide a specific number 
because that percentage may or may not fluctuate on any given 
day. I understand that United States Central Command has 
committed to providing, you know, an update, I think, on a 
weekly basis and, you know, I would--I mean, that probably is 
going to be different today than it was last time that number 
was offered.
    Mr. Gaetz. And, General Trollinger, when we reduced our 
presence in Iraq but we engaged in this process wherein a lot 
of military infrastructure paid for by the U.S. taxpayer was 
given to the Iraqi government, subsequently, we saw many of 
those same tanks spray painted black, under the control of 
ISIS, in the battle deep in the fight.
    What are the lessons that we've learned from Iraq and how 
can we ensure that as we complete President Biden's wise 
withdrawal from Afghanistan that U.S. military infrastructure 
and equipment does not fall into the hands of the Taliban or 
other extremists in Afghanistan?
    General Trollinger. I think, as we conduct our orderly 
withdrawal from Afghanistan, we are taking a hard look at the 
things that we can transfer to the--to the government of 
Afghanistan and to the ANDSF that they can use to provide 
security to the country.
    I think the--in terms of infrastructure, we can pass that 
off to them. They're able to fall in on that. They're able to 
use the myriad other equipment and supplies that we are able to 
hand off to them in a manner such that it will enable them to 
take the fight to the Taliban if and when they need to.
    Mr. Gaetz. And you could understand my concern is that the 
Afghanistan government might be the Taliban at some period of 
time subsequent to our withdrawal, because I don't have 
confidence that the Afghan government will prevail over the 
Taliban following our withdrawal.
    And that is not a reason to stay. I believe it is just a 
reality, and so your answer drilled down into the usefulness of 
U.S. military equipment to the Afghanistan government.
    But what are the factors of the analysis when it comes to 
the likelihood that that equipment could fall in the hands of 
the Taliban or other extremists?
    General Trollinger. I am not going to speak to 
hypotheticals. I think there's a range of possibilities.
    Mr. Gaetz. No. No. It's not a hypothetical. It's--tell me 
about the decision tree when you look at a piece of equipment. 
You have said the principal analysis is whether the Afghan 
government will deem it useful.
    I guess I only have a few seconds left, but is there a 
secondary analysis that will be done? Not a hypothetical, but a 
contemporary analysis regarding the risk that that equipment 
could be in the hands of extremists?
    General Trollinger. I think the analysis in terms of the 
risk is taken at the outset before the decision is made of what 
to transfer to the ANDSF, to the government, and what to 
retrograde and destroy.
    Mr. Gaetz. I am very interested in that. I think Mrs. 
Hartzler made a point about it.
    And so, Mr. Chairman, I want to echo your call for the 
committee to have the contracts regarding our withdrawal and 
regarding, specifically, what will happen to the equipment.
    And I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Ms. Houlahan is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Houlahan. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to 
everybody, all of the witnesses here. I want to start by 
associating myself with about a half a dozen people who asked, 
I think, really important questions about safety and security 
of women and girls in Afghanistan----
    The Chairman. Hey, Chrissy, your--I don't know where your 
mic is at but we are not picking--we hear you but----
    Ms. Houlahan. Let me see if that's--is that better, sir?
    The Chairman. Yeah. That is a whole lot better. Yes, thank 
you.
    Ms. Houlahan. Excellent. So I will start over again.
    I just want to associate myself with the remarks of the 
half a dozen members of our committee that were concerned 
appropriately with the safety of women and girls in 
Afghanistan, continue to be concerned about that.
    But I feel as though that's been covered, and so my 
question is for Mr. Helvey. Chairman Milley has said that the 
U.S. will continue to provide financial support to the Afghan 
Security Forces, and I know that Mr. Courtney--Representative 
Courtney was asking about this as well.
    What does that look like? If you could kind of elaborate 
more on that. What exactly are we or would we be funding and 
how does that cost kind of compare to what it was or is when 
our troops are in Afghanistan?
    Mr. Helvey. Thank you--thank you for that question.
    Yeah, I think there, there are three basic classes of 
activities that we would want to continue, you know, supporting 
and funding through the Afghan Security Forces Fund. The first 
is to be able to maintain payment of salaries of the Afghan 
Security Forces.
    The second is to continue providing certain types of 
supplies and equipment to the Afghan National Defense and 
Security Forces, and the third is to--is to enable continued 
operations and function of the Afghan Air Force and Afghan 
Special Mission Wing.
    So those are the three basic classes of activities that 
we've looked to be able to continue through the ASFF resources.
    And as I indicated, we are looking at what those options 
are, doing the detailed and prudent planning, to be able to 
provide for that through--you know, whether it's over-the-
horizon means or distant means, relies on, you know, much less 
of a large footprint in Afghanistan, one that, you know, could 
include, perhaps, something that's done in tandem with the 
security cooperation office in the embassy.
    One of the things that is going to be critical, as we look 
at this, is the conversations that we have up here and that we 
have with our congressional oversight to ensure that we are 
providing the type of--the right type of oversight and 
management controls of those resources to ensure that we remain 
in full compliance with the law.
    But, certainly, those are the three areas that we see as 
being--as being important to continue.
    Ms. Houlahan. And how do you, if you can, anticipate what 
the, you know, relevant costs will be in comparison to when 
troops were or currently are in Afghanistan?
    Is there--is it a one-to-one correspondence? Is it cheaper? 
What do you anticipate, if you can?
    Mr. Helvey. I think we are looking at, you know, resourcing 
through the--through the 2022 budget submission. I don't want 
to kind of get ahead of that. I mean, obviously, if there are 
ways that we can realize, you know, cost savings as we do it, 
you know, we will.
    But I--you know, in terms of salary, the salaries, for 
example, would not diminish with a smaller U.S., you know, 
military presence, similar with, you know, some of the supplies 
and support for maintenance for the air force.
    So I--you know, I don't want to, you know, kind of get 
ahead of a budget process in terms of what the number looks 
like. But I would say that it will require substantial 
resources to continue to be able to accomplish those three 
aspects of the--of the ASFF profile, for lack of a better term, 
going forward.
    Ms. Houlahan. And with the remains of my time, I was 
wondering if you could comment a little bit on our relationship 
with our NATO allies, as they are also making decisions about 
whether or not to withdraw.
    Do you think that this will affect our relationship with 
our NATO allies, our decision to withdraw from Afghanistan?
    Mr. Helvey. Well, this is a decision that we--that we 
undertook together with NATO. In fact, you know, on April 14th, 
Secretary Austin was at NATO, and we've engaged in 
conversations and consultations with our NATO partners through 
this process.
    And as I indicated in response to a previous question, we 
came into Afghanistan with NATO. We came in together. We've 
adjusted our presence together and we will leave together.
    This is an important commitment that we have. Just as our 
NATO allies stood by us in our time of need, we will do this 
together and those consultations are absolutely critical. 
They're ongoing and they'll continue to go on.
    Ms. Houlahan. Thank you, sir. With my last 15 seconds, do 
you anticipate that our soldiers will be redeployed or will be 
coming back to CONUS [continental United States]? What do you 
anticipate to be where they're headed next?
    Mr. Helvey. I think I would have to leave that to the 
closed session because I am not entirely sure where they will 
all go. So----
    The Chairman. All right. We will take that in closed 
session. The gentlelady's time has expired.
    Ms. Houlahan. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Mr. Waltz is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Do you hear me okay?
    The Chairman. Yes, we can.
    Mr. Waltz. Thank you. And, Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to 
comment on some of your earlier remarks, and I think you're 
absolutely right about our accountability to our constituents.
    In terms of future casualties, I think it's important to 
recognize that before 2020, before we entered the agreement, we 
lost 17 soldiers in Afghanistan due to combat deaths.
    The Army alone lost 20 in training accidents, much less the 
losses of the Navy, with the collisions and other types of 
accidents. So I think we need to take--continue to take a hard 
look at what our measure of success here, if it is avoiding 
casualties or if it's protecting the homeland.
    I don't think anyone's suggesting that we stop training or 
stop operations because we are sustaining casualties along 
those lines.
    But I do think we also are going to be accountable to our 
constituents and I think we are going to be accountable the 
next time we have an attack like Pulse Nightclub or San 
Bernardino, the truck attacks in New York.
    And to Mr. Moulton's point, we are going to be accountable 
if we lose additional soldiers fighting our way back in, if the 
intelligence community is correct that al-Qaida fully intends 
to resurge in the wake of a Taliban resurgence.
    Mr. Helvey--and for the committee, I want to be on the 
record here--we have, and I am glad you agree that we have a 
moral obligation, as you stated in your testimony, to take care 
of those who have stood with us in extremism.
    We need to get those people out, and I want to hear--I want 
you to hear that from me loud and clear. Mr. Crow told his 
story. We--all of us who have served there have them.
    One of my interpreters was executed along with members of 
his family simply for having documentation that he needed to 
get the SIV visa. So we need to evacuate them out.
    This processing, this 14-step process that the State 
Department has, I agree, you need to set up a task force and 
address this bureaucratic issue.
    But all of that can be done if we get these folks, these 
interpreters, civil society leaders, politicians, school 
teachers, that have stood with us--if we get them to Doha, Al 
Udeid, other bases. Is there anything preventing you from 
evacuating these individuals, and then we can deal with the 
appropriate vetting, processing, Congress' authorization? 
What's preventing you from doing that?
    Mr. Helvey. I think--you know, I think that the focus that 
we have is on, you know, supporting a peaceful outcome in 
Afghanistan. We are continuing to work with our Afghan partners 
and our Afghan partners are----
    Mr. Waltz. Mr. Helvey, I am sorry. I appreciate that. But I 
can tell you these folks--these people who have stood with us 
are being hunted down as we speak. They are being executed. 
Their families' lives are on the line. And I believe that when 
that last soldier goes wheels up, we have, essentially, handed 
them a death sentence.
    So we have between now and when those last C-17 flights 
leave Bagram Airbase to get these folks out. And, you know, 
General Milley has said he expects a thousand C-17 flights, 
much of it with equipment.
    Are you--where would you prioritize these people that stood 
with us versus some equipment? I would hope that you would 
prioritize these people more so.
    It's not just a moral issue. It's a national security issue 
for the message that we are sending. And if we do have to go 
back in, who's going to stand with us again?
    Mr. Helvey. We are working with our interagency partners to 
look at the different tools and the resources and the 
mechanisms to support those folks----
    Mr. Waltz. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Helvey. No, thank you. I 
mean, I want to be clear. We need an evacuation plan and time 
is of the essence.
    The other piece here, you mentioned in your testimony and I 
think you agree the Afghan National Security Forces are 
critical to the future, critical future of Afghan security and, 
therefore, the homeland security.
    President Ghani said in 2019 he anticipates his security 
forces can hold 6 months without full U.S. support, including 
financial support.
    I have real questions of whether this committee and this 
Congress will continue to appropriate billions of dollars with 
a power-sharing agreement with the Taliban, number one, and 
then number two, without appropriate oversight of those 
dollars.
    And since we will have no one left but those in the 
embassy, how do you plan, and in the interest of time, please 
submit for the record how you plan to oversee those dollars.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    [The information referred to was not available at the time 
of printing.]
    The Chairman. Thank you. Ms. Escobar is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Ms. Escobar. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
    And, Mr. Chairman and to our panelists today, I want to 
thank you all for this important conversation. I think it's 
clear and that there is wide bipartisan support for helping our 
partners and ensuring that they have access to what they need 
to be evacuated and so that we can keep our promises.
    There's also wide bipartisan support on ensuring that we 
protect women and girls in Afghanistan, and so I hope that 
those two opportunities that we have to act swiftly and 
urgently that we do everything possible to ensure that we do 
keep those promises.
    Gentlemen, the United States has at its disposal a host of 
tools and resources available for addressing legitimate 
security concerns, including those posed by violent extremist 
groups.
    With the withdrawal of our troops from Afghanistan, can you 
share with us some of the nonmilitarized initiatives and tools 
DOD will be using to continue advancing our interests in peace 
and security in Afghanistan?
    Mr. Helvey. Well, thank you for that question. We'll, 
obviously, be working, you know, closely with our interagency, 
you know, colleagues and counterparts to be able to work with 
our Afghan partners.
    I am not--I mean, there are--there are things that the 
Department of Defense has and things that the Department of 
Defense does, you know, that can help to support security.
    We've talked about some of that in terms of continuing to 
provide resources to the Afghan National Defense and Security 
Forces. I think that's a critical component to ensure that 
we've got a willing and capable partner there.
    But also, there's other tools and resources that the U.S.--
like the U.S. Agency for International Development would have, 
State Department would have, again, our other interagency 
partners, and we will play the role that the Department of 
Defense has played historically, which is being a supporting 
element, working very closely with those agencies and 
departments in what they're doing in terms of advice or 
assistance through other development projects.
    A lot of this is going to hinge on the security environment 
in Afghanistan. A lot of this is going to hinge on, you know, 
our partnership with the government in Kabul.
    But I would--I would prefer to let those departments and 
agencies kind of speak to, you know, the tools and resources 
and mechanisms that they have.
    Ms. Escobar. Thank you. I appreciate that.
    Since the U.S. diplomatic deal was initially signed in 
February 2020, the Taliban has escalated its attacks on Afghan 
forces and civilian deaths have spiked with women being the 
primary targets, and we've heard colleagues on both sides of 
the aisle express concern about that.
    Has the Department made any special demands that extend 
protections for women during any of these and any other ongoing 
peace negotiation and communications?
    Mr. Helvey. Obviously, the safety and security of all 
Afghans but, in particular, Afghan women and children, is an 
important consideration for us.
    I would have to defer to State Department and Ambassador 
Khalilzad specifically to talk about what specific demands or 
conversations he's had with the Taliban as, you know, the State 
Department and Ambassador Khalilzad has been--has been doing 
those negotiations.
    Ms. Escobar. Okay. Thank you.
    When we've previously withdrawn or reduced U.S. military 
presence from countries, for example, in Iraq--one of my 
colleagues mentioned that--our withdrawals have contributed to 
political instability.
    And since the U.S. withdrawal, Iraq has faced an unsettling 
rise in civil unrest and it's experiencing political power 
struggles.
    How do we ensure that our withdrawal leaves a better legacy 
with security and stability? And I know there's only 30 seconds 
left. So if you wouldn't mind, just very quickly.
    Mr. Helvey. Yeah. I think, you know, a key--and I will just 
come back to this because I've indicated in a couple of 
responses--the key really is supporting, you know, the Afghan 
government and the Afghan people themselves in helping to 
establish a durable political settlement in Afghanistan.
    That is the way to best achieve those outcomes, and, you 
know, we are withdrawing our forces. We are committed to doing 
it in a safe, orderly, and coordinated way. But, fundamentally, 
it's going to be the Afghan people themselves that determine 
their future.
    Ms. Escobar. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    The Chairman. Thank you. The gentlewoman's time has 
expired.
    Ms. Bice is recognized.
    Mrs. Bice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this important 
hearing.
    As it's been discussed previously, our Nation has been at 
war in Afghanistan for nearly two decades. Our service members 
have served bravely and valiantly in this conflict and it's 
denied our Nation's adversaries the terrorists' safe haven that 
Afghanistan once was.
    We are now on the precipice of a full and complete 
withdrawal, and while I would like to see that happen, I have 
concerns that the Afghan government may crumble in our absence.
    A recent example of this similar situation was U.S. forces 
being withdrawn from Iraq in 2011. Just a few years after our 
complete withdrawal, the Iraqi army nearly crumbled in the face 
of ISIS, and U.S. forces were deployed back to Iraq and 
continue to serve to this day.
    So I offer this as an example of my perspective and 
highlight we should be thoughtful in this approach. It would be 
a shame to see the democratic Afghan government fall and the 
region reemerge as a safe haven for terrorists.
    My first question to both witnesses, can either of you give 
me a sense of how much of the land mass of Afghanistan the 
Taliban currently has operational control over and are there 
any areas that are notable strongholds of the Taliban?
    Mr. Helvey. I will ask my Joint Staff colleague to address 
that.
    General Trollinger. I think--if you don't mind, I would 
like to take that maybe to the closed session.
    Mrs. Bice. Got it. Well, let me follow up then. General, in 
the testimony, you noted that the administration is planning to 
reposition U.S. counterterrorism forces in the region to be 
able to respond quickly should the need arise.
    Afghanistan is geographically isolated and is surrounded by 
nations that are less friendly to the U.S., as has been 
mentioned earlier.
    What challenges would our Nation face if the need to take 
action against Afghanistan were to arise following the complete 
withdrawal?
    Mr. Helvey. I am sorry. Which witness did you direct that 
to?
    Mrs. Bice. I am sorry. General--it was directed to General.
    General Trollinger. I would ask you to repeat that, please. 
I didn't hear the question.
    Mrs. Bice. Sure. You noted that the administration is 
planning to reposition U.S. counterterrorism forces in the 
region to respond quickly should the need arise. But 
Afghanistan is geographically isolated and surrounded by 
nations that are less friendly to the United States.
    What challenges would our Nation face if the need to take 
action against Afghanistan were to arise following the complete 
withdrawal?
    General Trollinger. Again, I think we can talk about that a 
little bit more in detail in our closed session. However, 
clearly, we'll face greater challenges than we currently do 
with the forces that we have on the ground in Afghanistan 
currently.
    Mrs. Bice. Thank you for that. And how feasible would it be 
for the U.S. to rapidly take decisive action in Afghanistan 
following our complete withdrawal?
    General Trollinger. I think it's feasible that they react 
very quickly if the situation warrants.
    Mrs. Bice. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield 
back.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Ms. Luria is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mrs. Luria. Thank you, and thank you, gentlemen, for 
testifying today.
    I want to reiterate some concerns that my colleagues have 
spoken of previously during the hearing about our withdrawal 
and the situation that will result from a rapid withdrawal and 
the potential threats to our homeland.
    And next, I wanted to pivot to perhaps the picture that 
hangs behind me on the wall here in my office. You know, 
immediately following the announcement of the time of the 
withdrawal by September 11th one of the first questions that 
was asked in open source media and the press is where's the 
aircraft carrier, which is frequently the question anywhere in 
the world.
    And I wonder if you could comment on the longevity, your 
plans on how long you think it will be necessary to maintain an 
aircraft carrier presence in the AOR [area of responsibility] 
and in support of the withdrawal or even post-withdrawal for 
our presence in the region.
    And then, Mr. Helvey, if you could also comment, as I 
understand you cover the whole Indo-Pacific, on what impact 
keeping a continuous carrier presence in the Gulf will have on, 
you know, the needs that we have in other areas of the world, 
specifically countering Chinese activity in the Western Pacific 
and South China Sea.
    General Trollinger. With regard to your question about the 
added capability in the region to support our withdrawal, I 
think that will be considered iteratively such that once the 
conditions are such that it's not a requirement then it would--
it would be able to leave the theater.
    Mrs. Luria. So can you explain iterative to me? Like, when 
is it not a requirement? What else are we going to have in 
theater?
    It's been referenced multiple times by my colleagues that, 
you know, air bases, you know, land-based positions from which 
to operate within the region are limited as an overflight 
consideration. So what are those criteria you're looking for 
that would make you say that, yes, we could withdraw the 
carrier, ultimately?
    General Trollinger. Looking forward, I won't consider 
hypotheticals. But, again, I think there's a range of 
circumstances, a range of options, that could be considered, 
and all those would go into the decision making that would 
determine what resources remain in theater and what wouldn't.
    Mrs. Luria. So, General, multiple times today you and your 
colleague have said that you wouldn't consider hypotheticals. 
But is considering hypotheticals not the planning process?
    Don't we have COAs--courses of action--different things 
that could result from different things that we can't control, 
i.e., maybe the other parties involved in this and then how 
they will react with different courses of action?
    So with those hypotheticals, are you saying we don't have 
plans for those things? It's a little unclear.
    General Trollinger. I would say we absolutely considered 
all these variables in coming up with plans, and I would call 
them contingency plans for a certain set of potential outcomes.
    Thank you.
    Mrs. Luria. Thank you, General.
    Mr. Helvey, can you comment on the impact on carrier 
presence within the whole INDOPACOM [U.S. Indo-Pacific Command] 
area based off having a carrier dedicated to supporting the 
withdrawal from Afghanistan?
    Mr. Helvey. Thank you for that question. And yeah, I mean, 
just in terms of hypothetical, I mean, I think, yeah, there's a 
hypothetical issue and then there's also, you know, not getting 
ahead of decisions that haven't been made by the Secretary in 
terms of how to allocate certain forces.
    In terms of, you know, implications for aircraft carrier 
presence, you know, we do have more than one and clearly, you 
know, I think we need to be able to have a global force that's 
arrayed to be able to accomplish the global missions and 
requirements that are levied against the Department.
    And part of the iterative process that General Trollinger 
was talking about is reviewing what those requirements are, 
reviewing the needs of the different combatant commands, 
evaluating those requirements----
    Mrs. Luria. I am sorry, but our time is limited on this 
topic and what I would say is, yes, I am aware that we have 
more than one. We have 11, and we struggle to even maintain, 
you know, our 2.0 presence globally.
    And, you know, according to both the outgoing and incoming 
USINDOPACOM Commander Admiral Aquilino, you know, they need 
more carrier presence in the Western Pacific and South China 
Sea and in areas to contend with China's actions.
    So, you know, since this is your area, are you satisfied 
with the amount of presence that we've had and are you 
concerned at all with the demand that's being drawn on the 
carrier force due to this support of the withdrawal from 
Afghanistan?
    Mr. Helvey. I am satisfied with the decisions that the 
Secretary has made in how to allocate the forces. I mean, look, 
if you think about, you know, what we need to be able to do to 
be able to maintain our presence in the Indo-Pacific, yes, 
having an additional, you know, maritime presence, you know, 
whether it's through aircraft carriers or through other surface 
combatants, that is important.
    That presence matters. It allows us to maintain deterrence 
of aggression and assurance of our allies and our partners and 
to make sure that we maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific.
    So those decisions have to be made through the----
    The Chairman. I apologize. The gentlelady's time has 
expired. As it stands right now, we are unlikely to get to 
everybody who's still here by 1:15. So if we could, you know, 
do our best to move as quickly as possible I will get to as 
many people as we can.
    Mr. Bacon is recognized for 5 minutes and then Mr. Golden 
will be after Mr. Bacon, and then we are pretty close to time, 
depending on how this goes.
    Mr. Bacon, you're recognized.
    Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and I appreciate you 
having this hearing. Thank you both for being here today.
    I do want to make a comment about something that Mr. 
Chairman said earlier, that we have bipartisan support for this 
withdrawal based on the current administration and the previous 
administration.
    I want to point out, too, we've had bipartisan deep 
concerns as well. Even 2 years ago, I was concerned about the 
SIVs, trying to get them back home, because no doubt when the 
Taliban, wherever they're at, if they take over the country 
they're going to hunt and kill these interpreters and their 
families. We have a moral obligation to have a plan.
    They also had concerns in the previous administration where 
we were negotiating with the Taliban without the Afghan 
government there. I thought that was a disgrace to treat our 
allies in that way.
    So there's been bipartisan concerns. We've heard it today 
as well. I want to commend Mr. Rogers, too, for his comments 
last month on the Afghanistan withdrawal. Having a hasty 
undertaking is a mistake that will not be in the interests of 
our national security.
    It may seem politically advantageous to get a deal done. 
The reality is that the Taliban's recent violence shows that 
they perceive this as a full-fledged capitulation.
    As I stated before, I've always been skeptical about a 
hasty withdrawal based on a calendar versus--and not on a 
conditions-based philosophy.
    A lot of folks don't realize we only have 2,500 troops 
there. A lot of folks back home think we still have, like, 
100,000. We have 2.5 percent of that, and I found that this was 
an affordable way to help keep the government in power to 
suppress the Taliban working with the Afghan government.
    What I am concerned is we pull these forces out, the cost 
of returning if al-Qaida get a safe haven under the Taliban 
again will be much higher in blood and treasure.
    And so I think this puts us at risk in the long run. So my 
first question, in 2011 we withdrew from Iraq and then ISIS 
filled that void. Is there a risk that this could happen here 
in Afghanistan as well, Mr. Helvey?
    Mr. Helvey. There is a risk that if we withdraw, or when we 
withdraw, that international terrorist groups like ISIS could 
emerge and strengthen in Afghanistan, and part of our planning 
is to try to reduce and mitigate that risk and reduce the 
threat to the homeland that those groups may pose to us.
    Mr. Bacon. You know, the thought is if we have a small 
presence it's cheaper in the long run than have to do what we 
did in Iraq following the 2011 withdrawal, and so that's my 
primary concern.
    It sounds to me like we have your commitment to advocate 
for an interagency lead for the SIVs.
    Mr. Helvey. Yes, I mean--I mean, an interagency process 
with a designated lead.
    Mr. Bacon. And it seems to me we have a deep--a big 
obligation to ensure we get this right, and it sounds to me 
like we have your commitment to ensure that we have an airborne 
ISR capability over Afghanistan when this is all done?
    Mr. Helvey. I did not commit future military forces. But I 
indicated that we intend to continue the bilateral security 
agreement that we have with the government of Afghanistan and 
continue to work with our Afghan partners to be able to provide 
the type of ISR that we think will be--will be necessary to 
monitor and assess terrorist threats.
    Mr. Bacon. If we withdraw and don't have airborne ISR 
capability over Afghanistan, I think it's a failure. We are 
setting ourselves up for a failure. So I hope we--it's got to 
be a requirement, in my view.
    And finally, I just want to ask, are we confident that 
Taliban have broken their alliance with al-Qaida?
    Mr. Helvey. Can I address that in the--in the closed 
session?
    Mr. Bacon. Okay. Sure, if that--if you think it's 
classified, we'll do so. That's the concern. These folks come 
in in a year or 2 years, 3 years, and we got a safe haven for 
al-Qaida again, we'll be back to a 9/11 scenario.
    So with that, I appreciate both of you. Thanks for being 
here.
    Mr. Chair, I yield back.
    The Chairman. I appreciate that. And Mr. Bacon, I just--
part of the reason that we've been able to have the 2,500 
troops there is because we had a cease fire with the Taliban, 
okay, and that cease fire expired on May 1st.
    So I think when we are trying to calculate, yes, if we 
could--if we could cut a deal with the Taliban and have an 
ongoing cease fire where they wouldn't attack us, that changes 
the equation.
    That's a piece that as we are trying to figure out what the 
right decision here is, I hope--I hope we have adequate respect 
for, that absent that cease fire it changes the equation and I 
don't think 2,500 troops would cut it if they were attacking us 
and that's part of what we are trying to balance here.
    But you're right on the visas, and I--from this hearing, it 
doesn't sound like we have a sufficient plan to protect those 
people.
    I would urge--and so I got to get to someone else--so just 
for the record, the DOD needs to do some work on whether it's a 
temporary protective status, whether it's upping the visas. It 
has to be a higher priority in these next 4 or 5 months as we--
as we head to September.
    And with that, Mr. Golden is recognized.
    Mr. Golden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Can you hear me all 
right?
    The Chairman. Yes, we got you.
    Mr. Golden. Thank you. Appreciate it, and I appreciate 
the----
    The Chairman. Just one thing. I wonder if you--to speak up 
because it's a little quieter than normal. So just make sure 
you're enunciating clearly. But we do hear you.
    Mr. Golden. Certainly, and if you're having a hard time, 
just don't hesitate to interrupt. I don't have too many 
questions. A lot of what I've heard has already answered many 
of the questions I came with today.
    But I did want to just comment that listening to the 
conversation has, at times, been a little frustrating and must 
be disheartening for some of our allies. At times it has seemed 
that many of our colleagues have predetermined the outcome of 
Afghanistan [audio interference] and then some people have 
already reached the conclusion the Taliban will continue some 
kind of sure military victory on the battlefield.
    I want to give the opportunity to General Trollinger for 
that as to what he believes what the current situation is. What 
are the capabilities of the Afghan military and Afghan 
government to hold its own on the battlefield?
    I know you can't speak with any certainty. There's no such 
thing as a guarantee on the battlefield. But if properly 
resourced by the United States even without troops on the 
ground, do you believe that the Afghan military can perform?
    General Trollinger. Yes, I do believe that the Afghan 
military can perform. They're a capable fighting force. They 
have sound ground forces, air forces, special operation forces 
there. They're a capable military force.
    Mr. Golden. Thank you for that. And I don't know if this 
question is best for the general or for the assistant 
secretary. But I know that the secretary commented that he 
believes the best way and the administration believes the best 
way to preserve the gains that have been made in the past 20 
years would be to help support the achievement of a peace 
settlement.
    But in the absence of such an agreement, is it the position 
of the administration to stand by the Afghan government?
    Mr. Helvey. Yes, we do intend to stand by the Afghan 
government and, you know, one of the things that we've talked 
about this morning is, you know, continuing to provide support 
and assistance to the Afghan forces that are partnering with 
us, but also, you know, fighting to preserve stability and 
bring about peace in their country.
    Mr. Golden. I know you're unlikely to speak to any number, 
but in the President's budget request, then, the administration 
is going to request the funding necessary, that it believes is 
necessary, to support the Afghan government on the battlefield 
in the years ahead?
    Mr. Helvey. I don't want to get ahead of the budget 
submission. But yes, we would, you know, envision putting in 
continued funding for the ASFF program in particular, and we 
would certainly request support from the Congress for that.
    Mr. Golden. Thank you very much. That's really all I was 
looking for.
    You know, I guess, just in closing, Mr. Chair, I would say 
one of the lessons of 9/11 to me was some of the hesitancy of 
previous administrations many years ago to strike terrorists 
anywhere in the world in order to protect American security.
    I think we've learned that lesson. I think we've advanced 
our technologies significantly since the 1990s, early 2000s, to 
advance these capabilities of the United States of America to 
defend this country and to bring the fight to our enemy without 
being engaged indefinitely on the ground in countries around 
the world such as in Afghanistan.
    I don't doubt the commitment of the Biden administration 
against the terrorist threat and I would hope that they are 
committed, as all previous administrations have been, to taking 
the steps necessary and striking when we need to to protect 
against a terrorist threat. I know the last administration did 
it with Soleimani. I believe that we preserve the capability, 
going forward.
    So I just want to thank the general, thank our troops 
serving around the world, and look forward to working with this 
committee to make sure that we can continue to support the 
mission in Afghanistan with or without troops on the ground.
    The Chairman. Thank you very much. Just to really emphasize 
the one point that's come up throughout this hearing is I think 
there's considerable concern about, you know, partners in 
Afghanistan, particularly interpreters and people who have 
worked directly with us who want to get out.
    You know, if the number is 18,000, that's a number that we 
ought to be able to find a way to accommodate, and as I said a 
couple times now, I think it's really important, certainly, the 
Department of Defense but the State Department and whole of 
government really sort of moves that up on the priority list to 
go--to go forward to try and find a way to help the people who 
have helped us.
    Now, I will point out, and this is important, that before 
we showed up the Taliban were running roughshod over the 
country and killing a whole lot of people before we even got 
there.
    So to the extent that people are planting the idea that 
somehow our presence created this problem, I don't think that's 
accurate, as we, you know, saw the history of the Taliban 
throughout the 1990s, you know, leading up to when we went in 
in 2001, and I think the record is clear.
    We have tried to help the Afghan people. But there are--
there are limits on what we can accomplish and I hope we'll 
understand and respect that effort and the men and women who 
gave their lives and were otherwise, you know, significantly 
impacted by that effort, and that we respect and honor that 
effort, going forward.
    With that, Mr. Rogers, do you have anything for the good of 
the order?
    Mr. Rogers. Yeah, and I completely agree with everything 
the chairman just said. Also, it kind of leads me into how I 
want to wrap this up before we go into a classified hearing.
    What we've heard today is when it comes to basing, when it 
comes to the visas for these people who have helped us, when it 
comes to training the Afghan forces, going forward, we are 
hearing ``we are working on it.''
    I am of the opinion this should have been resolved before 
you announced you were leaving. I am hoping that when we get in 
the classified setting we are going to get more clarity that 
gives me comfort, that we are working on it means a whole lot 
more than we are working on it.
    But before we consummate this withdrawal, we need to have 
it worked out and have these things resolved because these are 
all very important things that we need to know before we get 
completely out of there.
    And with that, Mr. Chairman, I thank you. I look forward to 
the classified briefing.
    The Chairman. Completely agree, and with that, we are 
adjourned and we'll see you in about 45 minutes.
    [Whereupon, at 1:17 p.m., the committee proceeded in closed 
session.]



      
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                            A P P E N D I X

                              May 12, 2021

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              PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                              May 12, 2021

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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
      
    

      
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              WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING

                              THE HEARING

                              May 12, 2021

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              RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER

    General Trollinger. The Department of Defense does not track the 
value of equipment in Afghanistan at any one time as this data point 
constantly fluctuates. In total, the Department of Defense has 
identified over 25,000 pieces of theater provided equipment (TPE) for 
turn-in to the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) for destruction. Over 90 
percent of the equipment identified for destruction is non-rolling 
stock (e.g. small computers, printers, office furniture, base/life 
support items) that is in generally poor condition or not wanted by 
either the Afghan government or the U.S. Embassy. As of May 19, 2021, 
8,000 TPE items have been turned over to DLA for disposition. The 
Department of Defense has identified over $300 million in equipment and 
structures to be transferred to the Afghan government via the Foreign 
Excess Property and Foreign Excess Real Property Programs. As of May 
19, the Department of Defense had transferred approximately $50 million 
of such items to the Afghan government. In addition, DOD has 
transferred a small amount of military equipment to the Afghan 
government either as excess defense articles (EDA) or as sales from 
stock using the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund. This included 35 EDA 
MRAPs, 15 other EDA military vehicles, about $4 million of ammunition, 
several hundred small arms and small quantities of other items.   [See 
page 21.]



      
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              QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                              May 12, 2021

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                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. JACKSON

    Dr. Jackson. General Trollinger, what would be viable options for 
us to consider if we were to maintain a small footprint in Afghanistan 
and were those alternatives discussed? For example, what if we pull out 
of everywhere in country but maintain a limited unit at Bagram to 
conduct counterterrorism operations and gather intel while serving as a 
potential quick reaction force to allow us to launch operations should 
we need to do so? Also, are we prepared to reposition assets back to 
any of these potential sites in country in the future should the 
conditions merit it, and what would the costs associated be?
    General Trollinger. After a rigorous review of the way forward in 
Afghanistan, President Biden determined that the best path forward to 
advance American interests is by ending the U.S. military involvement 
there. As announced by the Administration on April 14, we began an 
orderly withdrawal on May 1 and plan to have all U.S. forces out of the 
country within a few months, before the 20th anniversary of 9/11. The 
review included a discussion of all options for a residual presence and 
the President decided that the United States would maintain only the 
U.S. Embassy in Kabul. The President also announced that the only 
remaining military presence in Afghanistan will be the force required 
to protect our diplomatic presence. The safety and security of our 
personnel is our top priority. We are in the process of planning and 
consultating with allies and partners on the shape and nature of that 
ongoing diplomatic presence to ensure our diplomats in Afghanistan have 
what they need to fulfill their important and enduring mission. 
Additionally, we will maintain a regional counterterrorism capability, 
with military and intelligence assets, that can counter the re-
emergence of terrorist threats in Afghanistan. We also plan to press 
the Taliban to meet their commitments under the U.S.-Taliban Agreement.
    Dr. Jackson. General Trollinger, what is your assessment of the 
Afghan National Defense and Security Forces' (ANDSF) capacity to 
conduct counterterrorism operations and provide security to the Afghan 
people after a complete troop withdrawal? Also, would the repositioning 
of assets in the CENTCOM AOR impact our ongoing CT missions that we are 
conducting in other parts of the Middle East?
    General Trollinger. The Afghan National Defense and Security Forces 
(ANDSF) have the capacity to conduct counterterrorism operations and 
provide security after a U.S. withdrawal but will continue to rely on 
DOD security assistance. DOD has requested $3.3 billion for the FY2022 
Afghanistan Security Forces Fund; fully funding this request--which 
accounts for three-fourths of the entire annual cost of the ANDSF--will 
provide critical support to sustain their combat operations, such as 
aircraft and vehicle maintenance, procurement and delivery of supplies, 
and soldier salaries for ANDSR personnel. We will maintain a regional 
counterterrorism capacity, with military and intelligence assets, that 
can counter the re-emergence of terrorist threats in Afghanistan.
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MOORE
    Mr. Moore. In previous testimony to this committee we have been 
told that ``while we will not stay involved in Afghanistan militarily, 
we will continue to support the government of Afghanistan and keep 
providing assistance to the ANDSF.'' Can you please elaborate what that 
assistance will look like and do you think it will be enough to 
maintain the hard-earned progress made over the last 19 years?
    Mr. Helvey. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
    Mr. Moore. Our goal has long been to leave Afghanistan capable of 
providing for its own security and sovereignty. Do you feel the 
timeline established by the Biden administration allows this goal to be 
accomplished? If not, how much longer might a military presence be 
necessary?
    Mr. Helvey. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
    Mr. Moore. What does the Taliban's behavior following the February 
29th Agreement demonstrate about the potential trajectory of its 
relationship with al-Qaida following the U.S. withdrawal?
    General Trollinger. We continue to call on the Taliban to honor all 
the commitments it made in the U.S.-Taliban Agreement, including its 
promise to prohibit its members, other individuals or groups, including 
al-Qa'ida, to use the soil of Afghanistan to threaten the security of 
the United States and its allies. The United States will not rely on 
the Taliban to guard against a resurgence of terrorist activity in 
Afghanistan and will maintain a regional counter-terrorism capability 
to respond to any new threat. The Taliban is aware that their future 
legitimacy and relations with the United States and international 
community require, at least, adherence to their commitments in the 
U.S.-Taliban agreement.
                                 ______
                                 
                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. McCLAIN
    Mrs. McClain. What confidence do you personally have that the 
Afghan government can actually support itself when we complete our 
withdrawal in September?
    Do you actually trust the Taliban to uphold a peace agreement? 
Every time they feel ``slighted'' they begin committing acts of 
violence around the country.
    If we pull out, and the Taliban refuse to accept a power-sharing 
agreement, how would the situation play out? Can you take me through 
what happens to Afghanistan and the rest of the region?
    Mr. Helvey. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
                                 ______
                                 
                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. HOULAHAN
    Ms. Houlahan. I understand that the Combined Security Transition 
Command--Afghanistan (CSTC-A) funds and administers diesel fuel 
contracts for the ANDSF, but it plans to change the policy so U.S. 
funding is provided directly to the Afghan government and allow the 
Afghan government to administer contracts. With the withdrawal of 
forces this fall, will this contract change or will CSTC-A continue and 
begin the transition of the diesel fuel contracts from off-budget 
(CSTC-A funded and administered) to on-budget (CSTC-A funded and Afghan 
government administered)?
    Mr. Helvey. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
    Ms. Houlahan. I understand that the Combined Security Transition 
Command--Afghanistan (CSTC-A) funds and administers diesel fuel 
contracts for the ANDSF, but it plans to change the policy so U.S. 
funding is provided directly to the Afghan government and allow the 
Afghan government to administer contracts. With the withdrawal of 
forces this fall, will this contract change or will CSTC-A continue and 
begin the transition of the diesel fuel contracts from off-budget 
(CSTC-A funded and administered) to on-budget (CSTC-A funded and Afghan 
government administered)?
    General Trollinger. As a matter of policy, DOD would not support 
giving DOD funds (ASFF) to the Afghan government to procure fuel using 
its own contracts. The plan CSTC-A has developed with the Afghan 
government is to implement a phased transition to shift responsibility 
for fuel procurement to the Afghan government using their own funds by 
the end of FY 2022.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MORELLE
    Mr. Morelle. What has the U.S. done throughout negotiations, and 
what support will remain, to ensure that women's rights are not eroded 
as a peace agreement between the Taliban and the Afghan Government is 
pursued, and the U.S. ends its military mission in Afghanistan?
    Mr. Helvey. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
    Mr. Morelle. What has the U.S. done throughout negotiations, and 
what support will remain, to ensure that women's rights are not eroded 
as a peace agreement between the Taliban and the Afghan Government is 
pursued, and the U.S. ends its military mission in Afghanistan?
    General Trollinger. Since 2001, Afghanistan has made significant 
progress in advancing the rights of women and girls to contribute to 
all aspects of Afghan society. The United States intends to continue 
support for Afghan women and girls to help maintain progress including 
through continued development assistance and continued support for 
Afghan women serving in the Afghan security forces. We have made clear 
to the Taliban that protection of the gains made over the past 20 years 
is essential for Afghanistan's future acceptance by the international 
community and continued international assistance. Our international 
partners are also committed to this effort.
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WALTZ
    Mr. Waltz. Given the rapid nature of the Afghanistan withdrawal and 
the amount of historical data from 20 years of conflict, how is the 
Joint Staff coordinating the removal and retention of the data across 
branches and commands? To that end, how will the Joint Staff ensure 
archiving, accessibility, and standardization of data from Afghanistan 
across the myriad of defense information systems? Are there other 
conflicts, where the United States has rapidly withdrew troops, that 
the Department of Defense can use as a model for retention, removal, 
and archiving of data? There is a real possibility that the United 
States military will return to Afghanistan and it would be a tragedy if 
we lost the immense data and intelligence that we have accrued over the 
past two decades.
    General Trollinger. The Department of Defense is acutely aware of 
the value of information and intelligence collected and compiled on 
Afghanistan over the last 20 years of military engagement in 
Afghanistan. The Department will follow all relevant Congressional and 
regulatory requirements for the archiving and retention of that data. 
Furthermore, we intend to use collected Afghanistan data to support 
continuing U.S. engagement with Afghanistan, including the regional 
counterterrorism mission, diplomatic engagement, and continued support 
to Afghan security forces.