[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]




 
  OVERSIGHT OF THE JANUARY 6TH CAPITOL ATTACK: ONGOING REVIEW OF THE 
      UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE INSPECTOR GENERAL FLASH REPORTS

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                           COMMITTEE ON HOUSE
                             ADMINISTRATION
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                           FEBRUARY 17, 2022

                               __________

      Printed for the use of the Committee on House Administration
      
      
      
      
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                       Available on the Internet:
         http://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-administration
                   COMMITTEE ON HOUSE ADMINISTRATION
                   
                   
                   
                        ______                       


             U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 
47-775                WASHINGTON : 2022 
                    
                   
                   
                   

                  ZOE LOFGREN, California, Chairperson
JAMIE RASKIN, Maryland               RODNEY DAVIS, Illinois,
G. K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina      Ranking Member
PETE AGUILAR, California             BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia
MARY GAY SCANLON, Pennsylvania       BRYAN STEIL, Wisconsin
TERESA LEGER FERNANDEZ, New Mexico
                                CONTENTS

                              ----------                              

                           FEBRUARY 17, 2022

                                                                   Page
Oversight of the January 6th Capitol Attack: Ongoing Review of 
  the United States Capitol Police Inspector General Flash 
  Reports........................................................     1

                           OPENING STATEMENTS

Chairperson Zoe Lofgren..........................................     1
    Prepared statement of Chairperson Lofgren....................     4
Hon. Rodney L. Davis, Ranking Member.............................     6
    Prepared statement of Mr. Davis..............................     8

                               WITNESSES

Hon. Michael A. Bolton, Inspector General, United States Capitol 
  Police.........................................................    11
    Prepared statement of Mr. Bolton.............................    14
Daniel Schuman, Policy Director, Demand Progress Education Fund..    18
    Prepared statement of Mr. Schuman............................    20

                        QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

Hon. Michael A. Bolton, Inspector General, United States Capitol 
  Police, responses..............................................    45
Daniel Schuman, Policy Director, Demand Progress Education Fund, 
  responses......................................................    56

                       SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD

September 1, 2021, Ida A. Brudnick, Architect of the Capitol: 
  Evolution and Implementation of the Appointment Procedure, 
  submission.....................................................    63
February 11, 2021, Demand Progress, Recommendations for the 
  FY2022 Appropriations Security Supplemental, submission........    81
February 2022, Government Accountability Office, The Capitol 
  Police Need Clearer Emergency Procedures and a Comprehensive 
  Security Risk Assessment Process, submission...................    90
February 2017, Government Accountability Office, Fully 
  Incorporating Leading Governance Practices Would Help Enhance 
  Accountability, Transparency, and External Communication, 
  submission.....................................................   158
February 22, 2021, The Intercept, FBI Seized Congressional 
  Cellphone Records Related to Capitol Attack, submission........   216
January 9, 2021, Washington Monthly, Daniel Schuman and Amelia 
  Strauss, A Primer on the Capitol Police: What We Know From Two 
  Years of Research, submission..................................   221
December 9, 2021, Politico, Lawyer: Capitol Police whistleblowers 
  face retaliation, submission...................................   225


  OVERSIGHT OF THE JANUARY 6TH CAPITOL ATTACK: ONGOING REVIEW OF THE 
      UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE INSPECTOR GENERAL FLASH REPORTS

                              ----------                              


                      THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 17, 2022

                  House of Representatives,
                         Committee on House Administration,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 3:01 p.m., via 
Webex, Hon. Zoe Lofgren [Chairperson of the Committee] 
presiding.
    Present: Representatives Lofgren, Raskin, Butterfield, 
Aguilar, Scanlon, Leger Fernandez, Davis, Loudermilk, and 
Steil.
    Staff Present: Jamie Fleet, Democratic Staff Director; 
Khalil Abboud, Deputy Democratic Staff Director; Sean Jones, 
Legislative Clerk and Professional Staff; Peter Whippy, 
Communications Director; Daniel Taylor, General Counsel; Eddie 
Flaherty, Chief Clerk; Aaron LaSure, Professional Staff; Becky 
Cornell, Chief of Staff, Rep. Aguilar; Tim Monahan, Minority 
Staff Director; Caleb Hays, Minority General Counsel and Deputy 
Staff Director; Gineen Bresso, Minority Special Counsel; Nick 
Crocker, Minority Deputy Staff Director; and Rachel Collins, 
Minority Professional Staff.
    The Chairperson. The Committee on House Administration will 
come to order, a quorum being present.
    I want to say hello to everyone. As we begin, I want to 
note that we are holding this hearing in compliance with the 
regulations for Remote Committee Proceedings pursuant to House 
Resolution 8.
    Generally, we ask Committee Members and witnesses to keep 
their microphones muted when not speaking to limit background 
noise. Members will need to unmute themselves when seeking 
recognition or when recognized for their five minutes of 
questions. Witnesses also need to mute themselves and will have 
to unmute when they give their testimony or answer questions.
    The rules require that Members always keep their cameras on 
at all times, and also the rules prohibit Members from 
participating in more than one remote hearing at the same time.
    At this time, I ask unanimous consent that all Members have 
five legislative days in which to revise and extend their 
remarks and have any written statements be made part of the 
record and, without objection, that is so ordered.
    I also ask unanimous consent the chair be authorized to 
declare a recess of the Committee at any point, and, without 
objection, that is ordered.
    Today's hearing represents both a culmination and a 
continuation. First, this is a culmination of the admirable 
work performed by Inspector General Michael Bolton and his team 
regarding the U.S. Capitol Police Department's preparation for 
and response to the January 6th Capitol attack.
    The focus of today's hearing is the final four flash 
reports in the series of eight flash reports released by 
Inspector General Bolton. All eight of these flash reports 
reveal systematic deficiencies throughout the U.S. Capitol 
Police Department in the areas of training, planning, policies, 
and procedures, intelligence, communication, and leadership, 
and culture.
    Three of the four flash reports that are the focus of 
today's hearing reveal these same deficiencies across the 
department's Command and Coordination Bureau, Hazardous 
Incident Response Division, and K-9 Unit and Dignitary 
Protection Division.
    In these flash reports, we learn of the general lack of 
coordination and communication between these units and the 
Department's operational leadership, outdated and in some cases 
nonexistent emergency management policies and procedures, and a 
lack of personnel and equipment that made it difficult for 
these units to accomplish their missions. We also learn of the 
frustration officers within the Department feel with the lack 
of direction from the Department's chain of command, a lack of 
preparedness, and a lack of confidence in the Department's 
command and control system, among other things.
    The final flash report in this series is a comprehensive 
review of the Department's progress in implementing the 
recommendations put forth in the seven previous flash reports 
and the 1-6 Task Force Capitol Security Review. From this flash 
report, we learn the Department has only implemented 29 percent 
of the recommendations made by the Department Inspector General 
and only a portion of those made by the 1-6 Task Force.
    In addition to being a culmination of the Inspector 
General's first phase of work on this topic, this hearing is 
also a continuation. The Inspector General and his team will 
continue their work homing in to focus and follow up on issues 
their flash reports have revealed.
    Likewise, this Committee will continue its oversight of the 
Capitol Police and its performance in response to the 
catastrophic and traumatic events of January 6th. This hearing 
will be the sixth that this Committee has held directly related 
to January 6th, and that does not include the oversight hearing 
we held on the Capitol Police Board.
    This hearing offers an opportunity to not only consider 
where we go from here but to reflect upon the falsehoods and 
dangerous rhetoric that brought us here in the first place. We 
can't forget that what we saw on January 6th was started by a 
lie, a lie from a disgruntled former President and repeated by 
many in the media and across the aisle, that the safest and 
most secure election in American history was stolen and that 
its results were illegitimate. Motivated by that lie, violent 
insurrectionists wielding weapons and restraints stormed the 
Capitol, intending to do harm to those who work in this place 
and to disrupt, if not destroy, the democratic process.
    Yes, the focus of today's hearing is the U.S. Capitol 
Police and the many deficiencies that prevented the Department 
from adequately planning for and responding to the violence 
that occurred on January 6th. It is impossible to overstate the 
importance of that discourse, and it is appropriate that this 
Committee has taken the lead in facilitating that discourse. 
However, a fire cannot start without a spark, and we would be 
doing a disservice to ourselves and to the American people if 
we do not here now and always acknowledge the spark that lit 
the fire we witnessed on January 6th.
    To be clear, as I have said at our previous hearings, 
although today's focus is on the performance of the Capitol 
Police before and during the attack, the attack was motivated 
and carried out by others, and our important and necessary 
review of the Department's performance as an institution and 
its leadership does not diminish the courage and valor of the 
men and women who fought so bravely to defend the Capitol and 
the Constitution on that January 6th. More than 140 law 
enforcement officers were injured that day, many grievously. 
Some have not been able to return to full duty because of their 
injuries. We have a responsibility to those brave officers and 
to the public to conduct thorough oversight to ensure that they 
have the right training, equipment, leadership to do their jobs 
safely and to return to their families each day.
    With that, I would now like to recognize our Ranking 
Member, Mr. Davis, for any comments he may like to make.
    [The statement of The Chairperson follows:]
    
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    Mr. Davis. Thank you, Madam Chairperson.
    Thanks to our witnesses, Mr. Bolton, and Mr. Schuman, for 
joining us today. I look forward to continuing our past 
hearings' discussions on the dire need for the increased 
transparency and accountability by Speaker Pelosi, the Capitol 
Police Board, leadership, and Capitol security overall.
    Mr. Bolton, this week you received a letter from Republican 
Members of this Committee addressing numerous concerns that 
Members have that we have raised regarding practices and clear 
breaches of trust by Capitol Police leadership: the 
magnetometers outside of the Chamber that serve no security 
purpose and address no known internal threat, the incident in 
November when officers entered a Member's office, took photos 
of legislative planning materials, and subsequently opened an 
investigation into that office's legislative work, and others.
    Even beyond the increased scrutiny of Members, Politico 
reported last month that the Capitol Police's Intelligence 
Division is now conducting extensive background checks on 
Americans visiting their Representatives. Capitol Police's 
leadership and their response to these instances of gross 
misconduct and clear threats on American civil liberties, as 
well as the Department's leadership failure to implement the 
majority of the Inspector General's recommendations, have done 
little to rebuild trust within the congressional community.
    It is imperative that the Inspector General's Office 
continue to investigate the intelligence failures in the 
buildup to January 6th. Over the past year, it has become clear 
that Democratic leadership has abdicated its security oversight 
responsibilities, choosing not to learn lessons from the 1998 
attack, the tragic 2011 shooting in Arizona, or the attack on 
my friends and I at a baseball field down the road from here in 
2017.
    Mr. Bolton's office has made numerous recommendations to 
Capitol Police leadership to improve the security posture at 
the Capitol. It is imperative that the full number of security 
recommendations be implemented quickly and with the cooperation 
of both Capitol Police leadership and the Capitol Police Board.
    Just today, the Government Accountability Office released a 
report on lack of security preparedness by Capitol Police 
leadership and the Capitol Police Board on January 6th, for 
which I ask unanimous consent to enter into the record, Madam 
Chairperson.
    The Chairperson. Without objection, so ordered.
    Mr. Davis. The GAO found that the U.S. Capitol Police's 
planning for January 6, 2021, did not reflect the potential for 
extreme violence aimed at the Capitol and did not include 
contingencies for support from other agencies.
    Of course, the Republican Members of this Committee have 
been driving home this point for over a year now. Why was the 
Capitol security apparatus so unprepared? Part of the answer to 
that question is also addressed by the GAO, which explains that 
the Capitol Police Board oversees the Capitol Police.
    As we know, the Capitol Police Board is made up of 
political appointees answerable to congressional leadership, 
including Speaker Pelosi, no matter how many times she tries to 
duck her responsibility in the press. GAO's report tells us 
that while the Capitol Police make security recommendations, it 
does not have the authority to implement them without Board 
approval, and the Board has no process in place to do review 
and approve such recommendations.
    The GAO concludes, without a comprehensive documented 
process to assess and mitigate risks, there is no assurance 
that the Capitol Police and the Board are not overlooking 
potential security risks. In other words, even after decades of 
attacks, the Capitol is no better prepared today than it was on 
January 6th. And that failure rests squarely on the shoulders 
of Speaker Pelosi, Capitol Police leadership, and the Capitol 
Police Board.
    I am thankful that the Chairperson has called this 
important hearing because Americans and Members alike deserve 
answers. I hope today provides an opportunity for Mr. Bolton to 
give assurances that his office will investigate these matters 
vigorously.
    Our men and women who are in the Capitol Police, they place 
their lives on the line every day, as the protectors of 
Congress. Their mission is vital for Congress to continue 
functioning on behalf of the American people. But that mission 
is undermined when the leadership of the Capitol security 
apparatus chooses to enact policies that are potentially 
politically motivated or infringe on the civil liberties of 
those who work in and visit our Nation's Capitol.
    Let me remind everyone on this call and on this hearing 
today that neither Mr. Loudermilk nor I would likely be here 
alive without the brave Capitol Police officers who ran toward 
gunfire so that we could run away from gunfire. We owe those 
heroes our lives. It is the leadership that needs to be held 
accountable for the decisions that they must follow and live 
with in their daily operations and their daily workday.
    I hope Mr. Bolton understands the gravity of the situation 
at hand. I know he works directly for the Capitol Police Board, 
but, Mr. Bolton, we hope you will commit to keeping all Members 
of this Committee informed of your investigations as they 
unfold.
    Madam Chairperson, I yield back.
    [The statement of Mr. Davis follows:]
    
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    The Chairperson. The gentleman yields back.
    I just, before recognizing our Inspector General, would 
note for the record that, on January 6, 2020, the Capitol 
Police Board was made up of the Sergeant at Arms of the House 
and Senate and the Architect of the Capitol; the Architect 
appointed by President Trump, the Sergeant in the Senate by 
Mitch McConnell, and the Sergeant in the House by John Boehner. 
The leadership of the Senate was Mitch McConnell and, of 
course, Speaker Pelosi in the House.
    I now have the immense pleasure of introducing our 
witnesses. Inspector General Michael A. Bolton, of course, is 
no stranger to this Committee, having testified before us 
several times about his office's previous flash reports. 
Inspector General Bolton assumed this role in January 2019. 
Prior to this role, he served as Acting Inspector General and 
Assistant Inspector General for investigations, beginning in 
August 2006. We are grateful to Inspector General Bolton for 
his presence here today and for his long career in public 
service.
    Inspector General Bolton is joined by Daniel Schuman of 
Demand Progress, an organization that advocates for government 
transparency, accountability, ethics, and reform. Among other 
topics, Mr. Schuman has studied and written about the U.S. 
Capitol Police for several years, including before the January 
6th attack.
    He also created the First Branch Forecast, a website that 
contains in-depth research on Congress and produces a weekly 
newsletter. Mr. Schuman has testified before Congress several 
times, but this is the first time he is testifying before this 
Committee. We welcome him and thank him for his shared interest 
in improving the Legislative Branch.
    I will remind the witnesses that their entire written 
statements will be made part of the record and that the record 
will remain open for at least five additional days for material 
to be submitted. We ask that you summarize your testimony in 
five minutes.
    Inspector General Bolton, it is my pleasure to recognize 
you first for your testimony.

  STATEMENTS OF MICHAEL A. BOLTON, INSPECTOR GENERAL, UNITED 
 STATES CAPITOL POLICE, WASHINGTON, D.C.; AND DANIEL SCHUMAN, 
        POLICY DIRECTOR, DEMAND PROGRESS EDUCATION FUND.

                 STATEMENT OF MICHAEL A. BOLTON

    Mr. Bolton. Thank you. Good afternoon, Chairperson Lofgren, 
Ranking Member Davis, and distinguished Members of the 
Committee. Thank you for this opportunity to appear before you, 
the Committee on House Administration, to discuss our review of 
events in regard to the Capitol Police Department operation, 
programs, policies that were in effect during January 6, 2021.
    I would like to extend my appreciation to the Committee for 
holding this hearing and the important work that this Committee 
continues to do to make the Capitol complex safe and secure.
    I would also like to take the time to extend and recognize 
the outstanding efforts and work done by my staff in the Office 
of the Inspector General. Through their collective efforts and 
skills, we have produced eight flash reports outlining areas of 
improvement for the Department, resulting in 104 
recommendations. Our last and final flash report is a summary 
of the status of the recommendations we have made and security 
improvements that the Department has made since January 6th.
    Although the Department has addressed some of our 
recommendations and has made security improvements throughout 
the Capitol complex, much work still needs to be addressed in 
relation to training, intelligence, cultural change, and 
operational planning. We have issued that final flash report 
outlining the status of our recommendations.
    During my testimony with the Senate Rules Committee on 
December 7th of 2021, I stated that the Department had closed 
30 of my recommendations. Since that time, the Department has 
closed an additional nine recommendations, for a total of 39.
    During--from my last hearing, we have issued three 
additional flash reports, not including the final one. Those 
included areas of the department such as Command and 
Coordination Bureau, Hazardous Incident Response Division, K-9 
Unit, and, finally, Dignitary Protection Division and Human 
Capital.
    Our fifth flash report is designed to communicate 
deficiencies within the Department's Command and Coordination 
Bureau. Additionally, to gain a perspective on department-wide 
command and control challenges on January 6th, we contacted 86 
Capitol Police officers and completed interviews with 36 of 
them, who agreed to be interviewed. We also reviewed 49 after-
action reports by the officers and employees that were 
completed.
    Based on our interviews with the officers and review of the 
after-action reports, we identified department-wide command and 
control deficiencies related to information sharing, chain-of-
command directions, communication, preparedness, training, 
leadership development, emergency response procedures, and law 
enforcement coordination.
    Our sixth flash report was designed to communicate 
deficiencies within the department's Hazardous Incident 
Response Division and the K-9 Unit. Deficiencies include a lack 
of adequate department guidance for both the Incident Response 
Division and the K-9 Unit. The Department did not always comply 
with guidance related to K-9 operations or training, did not 
always ensure K-9 policies and procedures were up to date. A 
lack of K-9-related training or operational experience required 
for officials and formal guidance for emergency procedures, as 
well as inadequate hazardous device response guidance, could 
have hampered the efficiency of the K-9 Unit.
    Our seventh flash report was designed to communicate any 
deficiencies within the Department's Dignitary Protection 
Division and Human Capital. The Dignitary Protection Division 
contributed toward the Department's mission through proper 
planning and successfully evacuating individuals under its 
protection during the events of January 6th. However, DPD 
incurred authorization issues with staging evacuation vehicles. 
Additionally, DPD's training program lacked a dedicated 
training staff, facilities, and weapon systems training 
integration.
    Capitol Police could not provide documentation supporting 
that it implemented department-wide leave restrictions or 
cancellations or that it issued department-wide messages for 
recalls to duty.
    Our eighth and final flash report is a summary of the 
status of 104 recommendations and security improvements made by 
the Department. Although the Department did make several 
changes updating their policy and procedures, additional 
training for CDU units and the hiring of a subject matter 
expert in the planning and coordination of large events or 
high-profile demonstrations, the Department still has more work 
to achieve the goal of making the Capitol complex safe and 
secure. Out of the 200 security enhancements that the 
Department has provided to the OIG, only 61 of those items have 
supporting documentation to support those enhancements that 
have occurred. Some other security enhancements the Department 
has instituted has been additional intelligence briefings 
provided to the rank-and-file as well as to the Department 
leadership.
    The Department still lacks an overall training 
infrastructure to meet the needs of the Department, the level 
of intelligence gathering and expertise needed and an overall 
cultural change needed to move the Department into a protective 
agency as opposed to a traditional police Department.
    In conclusion, the Department is comprised of extraordinary 
men and women who are dedicated to protecting our democracy, 
putting their own lives in harm's way in order for Congress to 
exercise their constitutional duties in a safe and open manner. 
It is our duty to honor those officers who have given their 
lives but also ensuring the safety for all those working and 
visiting the Capitol complex by making hard changes within the 
Department.
    Finally, I would like to thank not only this Committee but 
the Senate Rules Committee and the Select Committee to 
Investigate the January 6th Attack for their continuing support 
of my office and the work they have done in protecting 
democracy so that events such as January 6th never happen 
again.
    Thank you for this opportunity to appear before you today, 
and I will be very happy to answer any questions the Committee 
may have at this time.
    [The statement of Mr. Bolton follows:]
    
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    The Chairperson. Thank you so much, Mr. Bolton.
    We will now ask Mr. Schuman to give his testimony to us in 
five minutes.

                  STATEMENT OF DANIEL SCHUMAN

    Mr. Schuman. Thank you. Chairperson Lofgren, Ranking Member 
Davis, and Members of the Committee on House Administration, 
thank you for the opportunity to testify.
    Over the last fourteen months, the Capitol Police Inspector 
General has provided its expert analysis of the Capitol 
Police's operations, programs, and policies in effect on 
January 6th. My intent is to draw your attention to two things 
not addressed in the IG's flash reports: First, the structural 
limitations that narrow and limit the scope of the IG's 
findings; and second, the structural flaws that undermine 
oversight of the Capitol Police itself.
    The Office of the Inspector General should be fully 
independent of the Capitol Police chief and of the Capitol 
Police Board. It is not. The Capitol Police Board appoints the 
IG. The Board includes the Capitol Police chief as an ex 
officio member. The Board exercises general oversight over the 
IG. The Board is not subject to investigation by the IG, and 
the Board operates in near total secrecy.
    Let me illustrate how this is a problem. The Board 
reportedly has directed the Inspector General in a nonpublic 
letter to never publish IG reports. By comparison, it is 
routine practice for Federal IGs to publish their reports 
because this empowers accountability to Congress, civil 
society, and the public. The Board reportedly acts unanimously, 
so any member can secretly block a change in policy that would 
permit the release of IG reports.
    In addition to full independence, the IG should be 
empowered to investigate the Board and to publicly report its 
findings to Members and to the public. We can only wonder 
whether there are preexisting IG recommendations unheeded by 
the Capitol Police that could have made a difference on January 
6th.
    Disclosure policy should go beyond IG reports. The Capitol 
Police should routinely disclose the agency's budget 
justifications, semiannual statement of disbursements, arrest 
data, prosecution rate for threats against Members, Office of 
Professional Responsibility discipline data and minutes from 
its board meetings.
    In addition, there should be a civilian oversight board 
composed of stakeholders from across Capitol Hill, and there 
should be a process by which the public can request Capitol 
Police records. These structural limitations narrow the range 
of information available to the IG and to overseers and limit 
the IG's ability to make recommendations to you.
    Let me now address the structural limitations that 
undermine oversight of the Capitol Police. I say this, of 
course, right as my computer monitor has decided to stop 
functioning. Here we go. Sorry about that.
    Only a short while ago, the former acting Capitol Police 
chief testified that she reported to leadership, not to the 
committees of jurisdiction. In addition, recently one member of 
the Capitol Police Board who was appointed by one Chamber 
declined to testify in person in hearings conducted by the 
other.
    These examples illustrate a fundamental problem with the 
Capitol Police leadership. They do not fully respect the 
jurisdiction of the oversight committees. The GAO shared these 
concerns in its 2017 report. I wish I had, but I don't have a 
clever recommendation on how to address this problem. 
Certainly, all members of the Capitol Police Board, should you 
choose to retain such a body, must routinely testify as a group 
before the Oversight and Appropriations Committees. Their 
understanding of their roles and duty to report must be 
adjusted accordingly.
    We recommend the hiring of full-time congressional staff 
with law enforcement expertise to help oversee the Capitol 
Police. Such personnel should be provided as Committee staff to 
overseers and appropriators and funded out of the Capitol 
Police budget. The majority of House Administration already has 
implemented this recommendation.
    Each day increases the likelihood of another attack on the 
Capitol, and yet recent proposals made by the Capitol Police 
and members of its Board regarding new security programs raise 
important civil liberties concerns without addressing the 
fundamental Capitol security questions.
    We are not comfortable with new surveillance activities 
without real reform at the top that can keep police activities 
within appropriate boundaries. Our government must be open to 
the people and safe for conducting the business of democracy. 
For that to happen, we must address the structural failures 
inherent in oversight of the Capitol Police.
    Thank you so much for the opportunity to testify. I look 
forward to your questions.
    [The statement of Mr. Schuman follows:]
    
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    The Chairperson. Thank you, Mr. Schuman, and Inspector 
General Bolton. We appreciate your testimony.
    Now is the time when Members can ask their questions. I 
will turn first to the Ranking Member, Mr. Davis, for questions 
that he may have.
    Mr. Davis. Thank you, Madam Chairperson.
    My first question, Mr. Bolton--again, thanks for being here 
today. I want to start by thanking you and your team for the 
hard work you put into these reports. We have now had numerous 
hearings and meetings to speak about these reports, and your 
office has always been responsive to our questions and 
concerns.
    I want to ask you a few quick questions because we only 
have five minutes. So short answers or I am going to ask to 
reclaim my time.
    In your testimony, you explain that you asked over eighty 
officers to speak with your office about January 6th, but only 
about 36 of them have completed an interview. Now, these 
officers weren't obligated to speak with you, but would you 
consider that to be a normal response rate for an 
investigation?
    Mr. Bolton. For police officers, I would say that is about 
a normal rate. They are under no obligation because they 
weren't a subject of an investigation. We were just soliciting 
their information. Some just may not have had the time to be 
able to speak with us or for whatever reason, but they weren't 
compelled to talk to us.
    Mr. Davis. Okay. Well, fewer than fifty percent of officers 
responding raises concerns that the Department has a broader 
cultural issue of reluctance to speak up. Are officers 
concerned that speaking with your office might lead to 
retaliation?
    Mr. Bolton. They shouldn't whatsoever. We always make sure 
that they have the understanding that they would be protected. 
And, basically, and especially in this type of review, we don't 
utilize their names in our report. It is just as an officer. We 
don't even identify where they are, whether it be Senate 
division, House division, or wherever.
    Mr. Davis. Okay. Well, thank you, sir. Thanks again for 
your work and the work of your entire team there at the IG's 
office.
    Mr. Schuman, thanks for joining us here today, especially 
on such short notice. As you are aware, we are here to discuss 
the oversight of the Capitol Police. We also know that the 
Inspector General's role is limited to only Capitol Police. As 
he mentioned repeatedly during our hearings last year, he does 
not have oversight authority of the Capitol Police Board. The 
Capitol Police Board, as you mentioned and as we mentioned, is 
made up of three political appointees and the chief of police 
as an ex officio member. The Board holds an unusual amount of 
responsibility for campus security decisions.
    Can you help us to understand why this structure hinders 
transparency? Go a little bit beyond your opening comments.
    Mr. Schuman. So, there are a number of factors, some of 
which are already in the record. One, of course, is people have 
a lot of confusion about who is making the decision. Is it the 
board? Is it the chief? Sometimes the chief is in the board 
meetings as an ex officio member.
    There is not the release of the minutes of the proceedings 
before the board. The GAO has indicated that folks who served 
on the Capitol Police Board and the Capitol Police chief are 
confused about who they report to, who their overseers are, and 
that the staff for the relevant committees of jurisdiction 
didn't feel like they were being kept in the loop with respect 
to decisions being made by the Capitol Police Board.
    The Architect of the Capitol in his testimony I think back 
in May said that there needs to be more transparency and 
accountability in the board, that things are overclassified, 
that they are not made available, and conversations can't 
happen with other folks, including staff and elsewhere, that 
there is a lack of dedicated staff. GAO has faulted the board 
for who has access to the Board's manual procedures, that it 
wasn't routinely being provided to members of the committees of 
jurisdiction.
    And, ultimately, the Capitol Police and the Capitol Police 
Board are not taking Congress' direction. Congress has said to 
the IG or requested of the IG that the report should be made 
publicly available and told the Capitol Police to create a 
FOIA-like process. There have been other directives regarding 
arrest information, and the Capitol Police has not implemented 
those recommendations. All of this suggests that the Capitol 
Police is not able to listen in the way that it needs to the 
directions coming from Congress.
    There are also other structural problems in the way that 
not all members of the Capitol Police Board adequately report 
to all Members of Congress. We saw that in what I referenced 
before with respect to the Sergeant at Arms of the Senate being 
unwilling to testify in person before the House. I could go on, 
but I don't want to take up all your time. So, I am happy to 
keep talking about this.
    Mr. Davis. Thank you.
    Madam Chairperson, I ask unanimous consent to insert into 
the record the 2017 GAO report on the Capitol Police Board.
    The Chairperson. Without objection so ordered.
    Mr. Davis. Mr. Schuman, you know, I know you are familiar 
with this report, and just do you consider the Capitol Police 
Board to be accountable and transparent? I think we know your 
answer.
    Mr. Schuman. No. Not only they are not accountable and 
transparent, but I also think they are the least accountable 
and transparent body that I have ever run across in the Federal 
Government. I have worked a lot with the national intelligence 
agencies, so that says a lot.
    Mr. Davis. Well, I appreciate your comments today.
    I know that I am running out of time so, Madam Chairperson, 
I am going to end by asking unanimous consent to insert into 
the record a Washington Monthly article written by Mr. Schuman 
and Amelia Strauss from January 9, 2021, titled ``A Primer on 
the Capitol Police: What We Know From Two Years of Research.''
    The Chairperson. Without objection, that will be entered 
into the record.
    Mr. Davis. Thank you. I yield back, and thanks to the 
witnesses.
    The Chairperson. The gentleman yields back.
    Mr. Raskin is recognized for five minutes.
    Mr. Raskin. Thank you very much, Madam Chairperson.
    Mr. Bolton, was the Department able to provide 
documentation to you that personnel at the rank of Sergeant 
through Inspector and the civilians in a supporting role 
attended periodic in-service training coordinated by the 
Command and Coordination Bureau, as is required by a directive 
of the Department?
    Mr. Bolton. No. That was one of the issues that they could 
not provide us with the documentation on, many of the training. 
And that will end up being brought up again in our Training 
Services Bureau review, which you all will be getting sometime 
in mid-March.
    Mr. Raskin. So, who has been responsible for the training 
of the Department's sworn and civilian personnel, both before 
and after January 6th?
    Mr. Bolton. Well, on paper, technically, that would be the 
Chief's responsibility, obviously, being the Chief. But that 
would come under whoever is in charge of the Training Services 
Bureau. But, again, my report or review is going to show you 
that it is so disconnected, there is no one source to track all 
this training and to ensure that it is being done.
    Mr. Raskin. So, just to follow through on that point, was 
it the Capitol Police Board that was ultimately responsible, or 
would you say it was so fragmented and fractured that nobody 
was responsible?
    Mr. Bolton. It is fragmented, but certainly it would be the 
Chief of Police, not the board. It would certainly be the 
Chief's responsibility to make sure that all training is being 
completed.
    Mr. Raskin. Okay. In your review of the K-9 Unit, you found 
that in fiscal year 2018 through 2020, K-9 officers failed to 
complete either basic radiation pager training or the refresher 
radiation pager training. In 2019, 10 K-9 officers did not 
complete their radiation pager training, and one officer did 
not complete any training at all between fiscal year 2018 and 
fiscal year 2020.
    Does the failure to train K-9 officers affect the security 
of the Capitol complex, and how severe--was that a factor on 
January 6th?
    Mr. Bolton. I wouldn't say it was a factor on January 6th, 
but it certainly could be a factor on the overall security and 
posture for the Capitol and providing the security within the 
Capitol complex. We can't make the link saying that that was a 
factor in January 6th, but certainly, as the overall day-to-day 
operations, it can become a factor.
    Mr. Raskin. Who is ultimately responsible for making sure 
that the mandatory K-9 training takes place?
    Mr. Bolton. Ultimately, again, it would come down, being 
the chief as the head of the agency, it would be ultimately his 
responsibility.
    Mr. Raskin. You found that the monthly sixteeen hours of 
maintenance training required for K-9 officers were not being 
completed. Specifically, you found that, quote, none of the K-9 
officers had completed all sixteen hours of monthly maintenance 
training during the sample month of December 2020.
    Could this failure to train result in a K-9 Unit failing to 
be able to detect a possible IED or other hazardous material 
being brought onto the Capitol complex?
    Mr. Bolton. It certainly could provide that vulnerability, 
not being able to properly detect those devices or even a vapor 
weight dog. So, certainly, it could degrade your level of 
confidence.
    Mr. Raskin. Okay. You also found the Department's Dignitary 
Protection Division training program is self-managed and 
comprised of instructors with collateral duties as active DPD 
officers.
    What are the deficiencies and dangers of having a self-
managed training program, and how does that compare to the best 
practice standard?
    Mr. Bolton. The best practice standard is completely 
separate, that that training would be conducted by 
nonoperational individuals, although they have a subject matter 
expertise in it.
    But, by allowing your own internal folks in the sense of 
operational, one, training can slip through because they have 
other duties that they are going to be completing. So training 
is not going to be a top priority for them completing because 
they are doing the other duties.
    And it doesn't allow for that separation of duties where 
you are assured that that training is being completed and it is 
correct, and it is mission-driven.
    Mr. Raskin. Okay. Now, the big picture, Mr. Bolton, because 
all of us as Members and I think a lot of the staff know 
members of the Capitol Police force. We are impressed by their 
heroism, their sacrifice, both of which were demonstrated on 
January 6th, when they literally put their lives on to save--
put their lives on the line to save our lives, to save 
Congress, the Vice President's life, the peaceful transfer of 
power. And yet there is a disconnect between their commitment 
and passion and a number of these problems in the management of 
the force.
    How would you explain to somebody just looking at this from 
the outside what has gone wrong here?
    Mr. Bolton. I think it goes back to initially my first 
hearing before this Committee, it is a cultural change where we 
need to quit thinking of ourselves as a police department, that 
we are going out and policing, that we are a protective agency, 
that our number one duty and our mission in all training, no 
matter what it is, is going to be driven by that mission of 
protection. And that way, what little hours we get in training, 
because those are difficult--operational needs are extreme 
right now--but that training must be mission-driven 
specifically.
    Mr. Raskin. Thank you. I yield back, Madam Chairperson.
    The Chairperson. The gentleman yields back.
    The gentleman from Georgia is recognized for five minutes.
    Mr. Loudermilk. Well, thank you, Madam Chairperson.
    I am going to start my questions today with Mr. Schuman.
    Mr. Schuman, I am sure you are aware, as most everyone is, 
that one of our colleagues in the House of Representatives has 
raised serious concerns about Capitol Police officers recently 
improperly entering his office and taking photos of legislative 
planning material and then launching an investigation into his 
staff because of that.
    Now, this Member is a former sheriff, and understanding he 
comes from the law enforcement community and being a sheriff, 
he would understand lawful and unlawful search and seizure. He 
has also been an outspoken critic of the Capitol Police 
leadership.
    Now, while Mr. Bolton and his team are investigating this 
matter, can you describe for this Committee some of the 
abnormal and unexpected behavior of security officials toward 
the Capitol Hill community?
    Mr. Schuman. Thank you, sir. So, I can't speak, obviously, 
to this particular matter, but there have been a number of 
other circumstances of unusual behavior by the Capitol Police. 
For example, in 2019, there was an officer who left his gun 
unattended in the men's room. This had happened three times 
previously I think in 2017. There was reporting of police 
officers shoving reporters in the Senate basement and trying to 
stop reporters from talking to and walking alongside Senators.
    In our research, we have identified--so Inspector General 
Bolton was talking to sort of a protective approach like that 
newer model, but the Capitol Police spend a lot of time 
arresting people for things like smoking pot on their porch 
five blocks from the Capitol or going to Union Station and 
helping to move unhoused people from Union Station, which is 
not something that one would expect of the security force 
focused on protecting the Capitol.
    There was the incident two years ago I think now where 
there was--they couldn't determine whether a plane was heading 
to the Capitol Building, and they kept everything on an orange 
lockdown or whatever the color is for half an hour.
    There were reports that the Capitol Police had killed 
reporters. And then, of course, there have been more recent 
circumstances. I think one officer was accused of keeping a 
copy of the ``Protocols of the Elders of Zion'' at his post, 
which is an anti-Semitic tract created by Czarist Russians at 
the beginning of the last century. And, of course, there was 
the police officer who recently tried to help one of the folks 
involved on January 6th avoid arrest. These are all 
inappropriate behaviors that we have seen from the Capitol 
Police that suggest significant problems inside.
    Mr. Loudermilk. Now, in any of those instances, was there 
ever accountability for their actions?
    Mr. Schuman. So, in a couple of them. I believe that the 
officer who helped one of the people who attacked on January 
6th, I think he was fired. I think he was ultimately 
terminated. He may have just been suspended. I think there was 
a consequence for the person who had the ``Protocols of the 
Elders of Zion.''
    In the other circumstances, we know that there was 
retaliation against officers who, for example, shared 
information about the police officer, one of the police 
officers who left his gun in the men's room, but I am not aware 
of other steps that would be taken. That information is not 
routinely released to the public, so it is difficult to discern 
what, if any, remedial actions have occurred.
    I should add, though, that when you read the ongoing 
litigation brought by Capitol Police officers and when you talk 
to the Capitol Police union chief, they seem to suggest that 
there is a real distinction between the folks at the senior end 
of the leadership and the rank and file, in terms of how they 
are treated and how discipline is meted out.
    It is difficult to discern what that looks like from where 
I sit, unfortunately, without access to those records.
    Mr. Loudermilk. So how can we better hold the Capitol 
Police leadership accountable in these types of situations or 
to assure they are not abusing their power like has been 
recently alleged?
    Mr. Schuman. So, I think there are a couple things you 
could do. One is you can increase the oversight of the Capitol 
Police Inspector General and to make him and his office fully 
independent in all the ways that my written testimony describes 
at voluminous length that I am sure was great fun to read.
    I would also suggest that the Capitol Police Board and the 
Capitol Police chief structure don't make any sense. The lack 
of transparency and accountability to you, to the press, the 
public, to the people on Capitol Hill all indicate significant 
problems with the way things are managed.
    As far as we can tell, there seems to be, you know, a 
network of a handful of folks at the top of the Capitol Police 
leadership who kind of protect each other. And this is 
something that we can't have if we want to protect the 
Congress. I can--sorry, sir. I will let you go ahead.
    Mr. Loudermilk. Okay. One last quick question: It may not 
be quick but answer however you can. But, you know, when it 
comes to January 6th, we have been told that the executive 
branch had sought to get certain data from Members of Congress, 
cell phone data, metadata, et cetera. This is concerning as 
well. I think you have raised concerns about that data.
    Can you touch on those concerns here for the record?
    Mr. Schuman. Yes. I will be brief, considering the time. 
So, to go and gather the information about Members of Congress 
and other folks on Capitol Hill on January 6th, it seems likely 
that a warrant was applied for and obtained.
    The question that I have is, how did they screen out the 
people who were not connected to this? Did they go and sort of 
do a dragnet look on a previous date as a way of filtering out 
these individuals? That is one possibility. Did they do so 
through a warrant? These folks were not connected to what went 
on.
    So, there are questions about how that was done. Were they 
gathering cell phone and other metadata about the individuals, 
the journalists, the visitors, the lobbyists, the family 
members, and the Members of Congress with their personal 
devices? How that was done, the mechanism that this filtering 
happened is concerning.
    Now, it could be that they purchased this information and 
basically did an end run around the Fourth Amendment, which is 
why there is legislation to address that sort of issue, but we 
can't tell.
    We know there is a long history of the executive branch 
keeping an eye on the general public and Members of Congress. 
We saw that with the CIA and the Torture Memo on the Senate 
side. So, it is concerning. More information needs to be 
disclosed here about what happened.
    Mr. Loudermilk. All right. Thank you, Mr. Schuman. I am out 
of time.
    Madam Chairperson, as I yield, I ask unanimous consent to 
insert in the record a February 22, 2021, article from The 
Intercept titled ``FBI Seized Congressional Cell Phone Records 
Related to Capitol Attack.''
    The Chairperson. Without objection, that will be entered 
into the record.
    Mr. Loudermilk. I yield back.
    The Chairperson. Mr. Butterfield is now recognized for five 
minutes.
    Mr. Butterfield. Thank you, Madam Chairperson, for 
convening this very important hearing this afternoon.
    And thank you to the two witnesses for your testimony. It 
is good to see all my colleagues today, and I hope all of you 
are well.
    Let me just continue with Mr. Schuman just for a second if 
I can.
    Mr. Schuman, you may recall, you may know this, you may not 
know it, but prior to January 6th, there was erected down at 
Independence and Washington Street a huge tower. It looked like 
some type of cellular tower. Are you familiar with that? Is 
this information that you can share with us if you know what 
that tower was intended to do?
    Mr. Schuman. No, sir, I don't know.
    Mr. Butterfield. All right. Well, let me stay with the 
intelligence line of questioning.
    Mr. Bolton, what is the importance of Department personnel 
understanding what intelligence is and how to act on 
information appropriately? In other words, what is the 
importance of understanding intelligence information?
    Mr. Bolton. First and foremost, you need a well-trained 
force to understand intelligence and to be able to compile that 
intelligence to look at your potential threat assessment.
    Given the fact there are so many protectees, based on we 
call all Members both on the House and Senate side as a 
protectee. Whenever you go off this campus, there is a gap in 
security because you are not going to have an individual detail 
on you.
    So, it is incumbent upon the Capitol Police to be able to 
reach out to their resources, whether it be local authorities, 
the local congressional staff in that district, and try to be 
able to assess what are the threats out there.
    Generally, if you look at, especially with some of the 
recent ones, whether it be the ball field shooting that Mr. 
Davis alluded to and the Arizona with Ms. Giffords, there were 
signs that were missed. There were social media signs that were 
missed that we could have--again, it is Monday morning 
quarterbacking, but those are the type of things that we need 
to be aware of to properly protect the Members of Congress.
    Mr. Butterfield. Since January 6th, has the Department 
initiated any intelligence training, even just basic 
intelligence training to educate the sworn personnel?
    Mr. Bolton. They have made strides. They have hired 
additional analysts. Some of them I believe are still in 
training. They should be finished up this month. They have been 
conducting intelligence briefings more at the roll calls for 
the individual officers. So, there is an educational process. I 
would like to see more of it as far as teaching more in the 
basic school on what the officers should be looking for and to 
be able to understand what the intelligence means.
    Mr. Butterfield. What are the benefits of mandating 
personnel to be able to obtain and maintain a security 
clearance, from a security perspective?
    Mr. Bolton. Well, first, what you are doing when you are 
making your force--now, I am strictly talking about the Capitol 
Police, sworn and civilian, if you are sworn with top secret 
clearance and you are civilian with at least a minimum of a 
secret clearance.
    You are elevating and raising the bar of your expectation 
of your employees on and off duty. They recognize that there 
are certain expectations, whether it be here on campus--you 
must be apolitical on and off duty--that is simply as it is--as 
a Capitol Police officer.
    It also provides a layer of protection against insider 
threat within the Capitol Police. Just recently, I think there 
was an article about a lieutenant within the Metropolitan 
Police with certain allegiance that are causing--raising 
questions.
    So, it is very important to have that, but also allows the 
officers to move about from one position to another without 
having to, whether it be the SCIF or some other position within 
the Capitol Police, if everybody has a top secret clearance.
    Mr. Butterfield. Thank you.
    Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back.
    The Chairperson. The gentleman yields back.
    Mr. Steil is recognized for five minutes.
    Mr. Steil. Thank you very much, Chairperson Lofgren.
    Speaker Pelosi has politicized and centralized control of 
the security in the United States Capitol. This can be seen 
through the implementation of fines for not wearing a mask on 
the House Floor. It can be seen through metal detectors to 
enter the House Chamber. It can be seen through the extended 
closure to the public of the United States Capitol and the 
People's House.
    Unfortunately, it appears that this trend of politicization 
is getting worse. This isn't about the rank-and-file members of 
the Capitol Police, who we all support. This is about 
leadership. There have been concerning reports from the Capitol 
Police Intelligence Division investigating members of the 
public who are meeting with their elected Representatives. 
There are also allegations that USCP is even investigating a 
lawmaker and photographing their office. It was discussed 
earlier.
    Let me be clear: I support the men and women of the Capitol 
Police, but many are feeling that Speaker Pelosi is using the 
Capitol Police as just another political tool in Washington. We 
cannot let this stand. It cannot continue.
    Mr. Bolton, in Chief Manger's reply to my letter regarding 
the published report about Capitol Police reviewing citizens 
meeting with their Members of Congress, she requested you to 
investigate the reports, as it relates to the Intelligence 
Division.
    Have you begun this investigation, and do you have any 
updates for us at this time?
    Mr. Bolton. I wouldn't be--yes, we have begun on both 
counts of the open-source review as well as Congressman Nehls' 
request.
    I can't give you an update at this time. It is ongoing. So, 
I will hold any information until we have completed our 
investigation. But they are a top priority for my office, and 
we are working diligently to get those reviews completed.
    Mr. Steil. I appreciate your efforts in this regard. Maybe 
you can answer this question: Let me break them down. One as it 
regards the oversight of citizens meeting with their Members of 
Congress. Are you receiving full cooperation or are you meeting 
any resistance?
    Mr. Bolton. We are receiving full cooperation from the 
Department.
    Mr. Steil. Okay. And then as it relates to the 
investigation of a Member of Congress who has alleged that 
individuals from Capitol Police came in, photographed evidence, 
that investigation you noted is ongoing.
    Are you receiving any resistance during that investigation, 
or are you receiving cooperation?
    Mr. Bolton. We are receiving full cooperation at this time.
    Mr. Steil. That is positive to hear. I, along with my 
colleagues, look forward to reviewing your full report and hope 
that we can have a hearing when those reports become available.
    Let me continue with you, Mr. Bolton. One of the new 
policies put in place during the extended closure of the 
People's House, the United States Capitol, is that if a group 
of people or group of individuals want to meet with a lawmaker, 
the office must send their names in ahead of time so that they 
can enter the building.
    Mr. Bolton, in your opinion, is there a security purpose or 
need for this type of closure?
    Mr. Bolton. Well, it depends on what you are speaking. I 
think--now, that may be outside of my immediate purview, that 
those names are being submitted to the House Sergeant at Arms. 
So that is not within my purview of that.
    And that probably will be captured, at least we will have a 
better understanding to answer your question once we have 
completed our review of the open-source issue. So that right 
now, I wouldn't be able to answer that completely for you.
    Mr. Steil. Understood. Mr. Schuman, do you believe that 
such a procedure would chill free speech and limit individuals' 
opportunities to meet and speak with their Member of Congress?
    Mr. Schuman. Well, it sounds like the underlying question 
is whether the Capitol complex should be closed, which you are 
raising as--am I understanding you correctly, sir?
    Mr. Steil. Yes. The fact that for a citizen to meet with 
their Member of Congress in a congressional office, the name of 
that individual needs to be submitted and recorded by Capitol 
Security.
    Mr. Schuman. So, I would suspect that that probably has a 
chilling effect on some folks who would wish to come and meet 
in person in the Capitol, although there are alternate venues 
that are available to do so. I think that----
    Mr. Steil. Only because we are limited on time here, Mr. 
Schuman, let me continue with you.
    The Sergeant at Arms, Mr. Walker, has mentioned in recent 
testimony that he is exploring implementing an insider threat 
program. Are you aware of any similar type of program ever 
being implemented before in the United States Capitol?
    Mr. Schuman. Not in the Capitol, no, sir.
    Mr. Steil. Are there particular concerns with such an 
implementation that you would have in the United States 
Capitol, in the Legislative Branch?
    Mr. Schuman. Yes. If implemented badly, like we saw, for 
example, recently with the Department of Commerce, an insider 
threat program could basically spin out of control. The 
concern----
    Mr. Steil. I appreciate your concern. You highlight my 
concern.
    So, Madam Chairperson, here is my concern: The security 
apparatus of the United States Capitol I think is continuing to 
be politicized by Speaker Pelosi. There are a lot of questions. 
We are having a good conversation here. All of us support the 
men and women of the Capitol Police, but we are challenged by 
some of the leadership decisions we are seeing here in the 
United States Capitol.
    I appreciate you holding today's hearing. I hope we have 
more of these in the near future.
    The Chairperson. The gentleman yields back.
    Mr. Aguilar is recognized for five minutes.
    Mr. Aguilar. Thanks, Madam Chairperson.
    Thanks to our witnesses for being here and for 
participating.
    Let me try to get--you are being asked a lot of questions 
outside of your topic, Mr. Bolton. Let me try to get us back on 
topic.
    You talk about in your testimony the 104 recommendations 
that you provided and where they are within the queue. 
Specifically, I guess, you know, from a top level, what is 
needed to implement those recommendations? Do we need more 
time? Do we need more leadership? Do we need a change in policy 
direction?
    You know, what do you feel to go from thirty to fifty, from 
fifty to seventy, ultimately to get to all 109 recommendations, 
what is going to be the most effective tool that we can use?
    Mr. Bolton. Now, some of the recommendations are long term. 
For instance, training. What we are recommending and what you 
will see in our subsequent report is an investment in training. 
It is going to be a large investment. It is going to take the 
committees, appropriations, and also a will for the Department 
to make this type of change.
    Some of the changes we could still be making now, like I 
said, in the cultural change, focusing on the type of training 
that we can do now. We need a system, and we are going to 
recommend some of these, that any and all training has got to 
be mission-directed. It has got to be set forth of, why you are 
doing that training? In other words, you have a lesson plan; 
you have objectives; and you have your expected results or 
outcomes for that training.
    We just don't do training for the sake of saying, oh, we 
are doing training. We also need to make sure that training is 
a continuous form. Now, in other words, we are just going to 
satisfy the IG and the Committee, and we are going to conduct 
this training X, and as soon as everybody is happy with that, 
then we are going to go back to not doing the training.
    So we got to make sure we put into place the policies, 
procedures, the continuing business practice of conducting that 
training and making these other changes that are going to be 
different. Some are long term, some are short term, but the 
department is making some strides, and they have formed some 
committees within the working groups--I should call them 
working groups--to address the recommendations.
    Mr. Aguilar. Do those working groups have deliverables, 
timetables, milestones that they are under?
    Mr. Bolton. That would be something that you would have to 
ask the chief. I don't set--I wouldn't be able to set those 
timetables for them. It is really whatever the chief has set 
for those folks.
    Mr. Aguilar. You talked about the chief ultimately being 
responsible, the Training Bureau underneath the chief. It seems 
like within the training category, the most basic thing you can 
do is to just track who is being trained in what. You note that 
there are some deficiencies there.
    Specifically, did you identify a critical deficiency with 
the Department failing to have a mandatory leadership and 
development training program?
    Mr. Bolton. Well, incidentally, some of the portion, we 
have also entered a review of career progression and rotational 
policy for the department. So we will be having that report to 
you forthcoming as well within the next month or so.
    So we are looking into that career progression. That has 
been an issue, at least what we felt, that you are not training 
your future leaders. And part of that is not having a 
rotational policy. That is basically nonexistent within this 
department. We are going to be recommending that they do have a 
rotational policy.
    Mr. Aguilar. Can you talk a little bit more about what that 
would look like? What do you mean by rotational policy?
    Mr. Bolton. Whenever in any of these specialty units, 
whether it be K-9, CERT, DPD, Dignitary Protection Division, 
you cannot have an individual officer spending fifteen years 
out of their eighteen years in that particular field. You are 
doing a disservice to the officer, and you are doing a 
disservice to the Department, which is the most important thing 
is what is best for the Department.
    You need to have that skill set that they have enhanced 
training, whether it be CERT, K-9, DPD, back into the field. 
One, you have a more experienced, a higher trained level 
individual back into the field, and you are giving your 
opportunity for your younger officers to have that opportunity 
to get into that specialized training.
    So now you are building a leadership, that they have these 
different skills throughout the Department. You need--they 
can't spend their entire career sitting in the SCIF or in the 
House division or in the Senate division. You need to have a 
mandatory training. The Department can come up with four years, 
five years, whatever. They can model after certain other 
Federal agencies, where you are given one dog, and once that 
dog is retired then you are moved out of that K-9 section and 
another individual will take your place and get that kind of 
training. So you are building your leaders as well, because 
they have that knowledge, skills, and abilities.
    Mr. Aguilar. The balance to that is not losing that 
institutional knowledge, right? So having the good framework, 
having the good program, moving people through to experience 
different skill sets while having that institutional knowledge 
to make the group run, because the downside is, if someone just 
walks into a system and it is a broken unit, that doesn't do 
them service as well.
    So I appreciate it. Thanks for the conversation, Director 
Bolton, and we look forward to continuing to read those 
records.
    I yield back, Madam Chairperson.
    The Chairperson. The gentleman yields back.
    Ms. Scanlon is recognized for five minutes.
    Ms. Scanlon. Thank you, Chairperson Lofgren.
    You know, throughout our oversight series here with the 
IG's investigation, we have had several specific disturbing 
trends that have been identified--lack of training, inadequate 
resources, planning, and leadership, absence of clear 
communication by that leadership to rank-and-file officers. 
They are all deeply troubling patterns that seem to impact most 
of the department's agencies and divisions.
    Most worrying to me is the lack of an acceptable 
centralized and dedicated plan for the January 6 events and the 
absence of a process for developing similar plans for future 
events.
    It is particularly concerning with some of our Republican 
colleagues continuing to embrace falsehoods and conspiracy 
theories to cast doubt on the legitimacy of the 2020 election 
and other such colleagues encouraging far-right extremists to 
bring more antigovernment protests to the Capitol. So it is 
obvious that the Capitol Police must have the capacity to 
prepare and execute plans of action to meet ongoing threats of 
violence and disruption of government functions on or near the 
Capitol complex.
    So, Inspector General Bolton, I found your July 30 report 
very troubling with respect to what appear to be gross 
deficiencies in command and coordination, which seriously 
impacted the ability of the Capitol Police to plan for and meet 
large-scale events.
    Can you provide us with, you know, kind of a state-of-today 
assessment of whether that ability has improved? And what are 
the most important tasks that need to be accomplished to meet 
the next large-event challenge?
    Mr. Bolton. I think if we look at the two most recent 
large-scale events that the Capitol Police encountered: The 
previous one that happened in September, they were very well-
planned. As you probably have read, they did go out and hire a 
subject matter expert that was very well-trained and versed in 
large-event planning. You saw the big difference by the 
planning with the--our Federal law enforcement partners, as 
well as our local and State, as well as also with the National 
Guard.
    So you--we have seen that, and it has happened twice now 
where they have had large events, and they have gone out--they 
have shown their ability to be able to plan for those large 
events.
    The only thing I would, you know, caution is let's make 
sure it doesn't go by the wayside, it continues, like I said it 
before--and people are probably tired of me hearing or hearing 
me say it--a continuous business practice. It is, regardless of 
who is the chief, regardless of who is the Deputy Chief, these 
are the steps that we are going to take. If we lose the 
individuals that they hired and he or she decides to retire, 
the next person can step right into their shoes and continue on 
with the process, so we are not reinventing the wheel.
    Again, that kind of goes back to having that cultural 
change and having a strong foundation of training, a Training 
Services Bureau that is strong. Basically, as I have said 
before, that is your train, and they are pulling the Department 
along. So, as long as you have a strong train, that is your 
foundation and your main engine train, it is going to pull the 
Department along and keep them up to date and keep them moving 
forward.
    Ms. Scanlon. Okay. I just wanted to inquire a little bit 
into your report on dignitary protection and human capital. And 
you quite rightly noted that the folks who are on the Floor in 
the Capitol, you know, despite the lack of resources and 
training, et cetera, really just performed heroically. I wasn't 
there in the Capitol that day. I was in my office across the 
street.
    Who is responsible for ensuring protection of the officers 
across the street? Is that the Dignitary Protection Division, 
or is that someone else?
    Mr. Bolton. If it is in your office, that is going be the 
individual officers that are assigned to that building, whether 
they are here in Longworth or the other, Cannon, or any other. 
Those are the officers. They now also they should be 
incorporating, making sure your staff and yourself know in case 
of an emergency what you are going to do and communicate, well, 
maybe you just need to stay in place, shelter in place. There 
needs to be that communication with the individual officers 
that are assigned to that building.
    Ms. Scanlon. Okay. We had a little bit of a flip on this 
conversation, you know, some criticism about the practice of 
identifying visitors to the Capitol. Do you know--you have been 
with the Secret Service. Right? Are visitors to the White House 
identified?
    Mr. Bolton. Well, that--you know, coming from the Secret 
Service, yes.
    Ms. Scanlon. Okay.
    Mr. Bolton. The Secret Service does a complete background 
check and everything before someone comes to visit.
    Ms. Scanlon. I mean, in fact, that is in a way to chill 
those who might want to visit for violence or other nefarious 
purposes. Right?
    Mr. Bolton. Well, it is to make sure we know exactly who is 
coming to visit the President or Vice President, that we are 
aware. You can also--sometimes it is situational awareness as 
well.
    Ms. Scanlon. I submit that it is basically the practice in 
every major office building in this country at this point. So, 
I don't see a problem with us having to identify who comes into 
congressional offices.
    I see my time has expired. I would yield back. Thank you.
    The Chairperson. The gentlelady from New Mexico is 
recognized for five minutes.
    Ms. Leger Fernandez. Thank you very much, Madam Chairperson 
Lofgren. And, once again, thank you for holding this important 
hearing.
    Inspector General Bolton, it is nice to see you again. You 
noted that the Department has only closed--your written 
testimony was 39 of the inspector general's recommendations, 
and you said they have closed some additional ones. But of the 
outstanding recommendations, what do you believe is among the 
most critical and urgent?
    Mr. Bolton. That is a tough one. They are all critical in a 
sense. I think it is the moving, beefing up our intelligence 
capabilities, having a solid Training Services Bureau. It also 
is that cultural change. Those are the important things, 
although you will say, well, I didn't see the ``cultural 
change'' in any recommendation. I think the recommendations, if 
you look at them at a whole, you will see us pushing the 
department into that direction.
    Ms. Leger Fernandez. Right. Because it is like, as 
everybody, as we have heard from the questioning, as they move 
forward in terms of understanding the roles everybody else is 
playing, as they understand, move from one position to another 
and, therefore, understand that they are all working together 
on this, for the security of the Capitol.
    So it has been, you know, over a year since that harrowing 
attack on our Capitol by Trump supporters seeking to stop the 
constitutional counting of the electoral college votes. You 
discussed earlier that there was good planning by the Capitol 
Police for a large event last fall.
    At this moment, though, are you confident that the Capitol 
Police is prepared for an attack similar to what happened on 
January 6? Is the planning sufficient at this time? If not, 
what must we do to get there?
    Mr. Bolton. I believe their planning is sufficient at this 
time. There are so many factors in what could or couldn't 
happen in that, but right now feel confident in that at least 
they have the planning down. They had enough resources in the 
last couple of large events that they have been able to handle.
    So, again, it is--they are moving forward. So I am 
confident at least in their planning stages and operational 
plans and getting the word out to their officers. They are in a 
much better position than they were over a year ago.
    Ms. Leger Fernandez. Well, I am glad to hear there is 
progress, even though there is so much work that we need to do.
    Mr. Schuman, I really appreciated your remarks about the 
importance of public access at the Capitol. You know, one of 
the things that make the Legislative Branch special is that we 
are always accessible, must be accessible to our constituents 
and the public. As noted earlier, there are things that don't 
necessarily stop us being accessible because we could always 
meet elsewhere. And, identifying who you are meeting with is, 
as noted, something that is done in almost every building you 
go into after 9/11.
    I wanted to follow up on your recommendation about making 
the Capitol Police OIG independent of the Board. Are there 
other authorities Congress should provide to the inspector 
general to increase its effectiveness?
    Mr. Schuman. That is an excellent question. So certainly 
independence, the ability to get answers from the Capitol 
Police Board and to inquire into its records would probably be 
something that would make a lot of sense. There is probably a 
number of documents that the Capitol Police, the Capitol Police 
Board routinely manage that the IG can get if requested, but 
there may be value in having them routinely made available to 
facilitate access.
    I would have to think more on it, but those--that is where 
I would start.
    Ms. Leger Fernandez. Right. If documents are being provided 
on a regular basis, then there is an understanding that there 
is going to be a review and that itself might improve.
    If I have time, I wanted to quickly go back to you, 
Inspector General Bolton. In one of the interviews on--
regarding command and coordination, one of the officers said 
everyone forgot how to do their job. We should look at our 
leaders. Do they have the skill set? If they don't have it, 
they need to go get it.
    Did your review identify a departmentwide codified 
leadership training and development program that they are 
getting now? Or is that one of the recommendations that still 
needs to be worked on, the important recommendations?
    Mr. Bolton. I think that is one of the things that they are 
still working on. I will have--we are actually going back and, 
as I mentioned earlier, that we are doing a career progression 
and rotational policy review. We should--we are just about 
wrapping that up ourselves. So we will be able to issue that 
report soon. Then I will answer more of your questions. But 
they still have work to do in that career progression and 
training their future leaders.
    Ms. Leger Fernandez. Well, thank you.
    Madam Chair, my time is up. And I yield back.
    The Chairperson. The gentlelady yields back.
    I will recognize myself for just some final thoughts for 
five minutes.
    First, I wanted to just note the comments made by some 
members that the Capitol Police had broken into Congressman 
Nehls' office. This allegation, there is nothing more serious 
than an allegation like that. Any Member of Congress would be 
very concerned. I should note for the record the police chief 
has denied it. I want to reassure myself, Mr. Bolton, that you 
are investigating this so we can make sure that we know the 
truth of what happened. Is that correct?
    Mr. Bolton. That is correct, yes, ma'am.
    The Chairperson. Okay. Good. We will look forward to that 
report.
    In terms of the insider threat program that has been 
mentioned, in January, the House Sergeant at Arms testified 
before the Leg Branch Committee on Appropriations that the 
insider threat program was really for the House Sergeant at 
Arms' office, not for a congressional community at large, not 
Members. I understand you are looking at this as well. Is that 
correct, Mr. Bolton?
    Mr. Bolton. Not as in relation to the House Sergeant at 
Arms. Our focus is on the open-source issue of utilizing any 
type of databanks or----
    The Chairperson. Okay.
    Mr. Bolton [continuing]. The like, those things, but 
nothing as far as--not with the House Sergeant at Arms and his 
insider threat program which would be for his staff only.
    The Chairperson. All right. We will look forward to that 
report as well.
    I just wanted to note, in terms of the House buildings 
being open, one of the issues that we have not mentioned which 
is the pandemic. Throughout this entire pandemic, the House has 
100 percent followed the guidance of the Attending Physician. 
We continue to do so today. And that is an important element of 
what is going on here.
    Now, I have just a couple of quick questions if I may. Mr. 
Bolton, you have made several recommendations, and you have 
done good--you and your team have done good work, absolutely, 
but not all of them have been implemented. And my question for 
you is I am sure you are talking to the chief, doing 
assessments on where they are and the like.
    Have these recommendations not been accomplished because 
the chief disagrees with them, because they don't have 
resources, or because they just haven't gotten them done yet? 
What is your judgment?
    Mr. Bolton. I think it is a variety of reasons. Some, 
obviously, some of our recommendations do require additional 
resources, whether it be manpower or additional appropriated 
funds. So there are those--those are what I would classify as 
the long-term recommendations.
    There are a few recommendations that I think the chief and 
I are in discussions that he may not totally agree upon. We 
continue--we have met twice since earlier this year. So we 
continue to go through a dialogue so we have an open dialogue 
and to work through those recommendations that they either have 
questions about or not quite fully understanding where we are 
trying to get to.
    So, there is a variety of reasons for that, but they are at 
least working towards getting those recommendations closed.
    The Chairperson. Okay. Now the Department has stated 
publicly that it has changed the way it processes intelligence. 
And, for example, they have grown their intelligence staff from 
14 to 32. They now require all staff to get and maintain top 
secret clearance. They have implemented new performance 
standards for intelligence analysts, new training, reorganize 
the command structure, addressed increased threats to Members 
by additional protection at offsite sites where Members are 
frequently present during sessions. On the other hand, they 
have yet to fill the intelligence and interagency coordination 
Division Director's position with a qualified individual.
    You say that we have 34 recommendations outlining 
deficiencies. How do those recommendations relate to what they 
have already accomplished?
    Mr. Bolton. Some, like I said, some of the recommendations 
that we did make is that hiring additional analysts, getting 
those analysts trained, and continuous training. They have 
implemented that. They have put those--they have updated their 
policies and procedures.
    I agree with you. I am hoping that they do hire a director 
here soon.
    Also, one of our recommendations was that--has been 
implemented--was moving intelligence into a division level, as 
opposed to the current bureau level. We want to see it as a 
standalone within the department and elevated to a higher level 
than what it is currently now.
    The Chairperson. Okay.
    You know, Mr. Bolton and Mr. Schuman, I really appreciate 
your testimony today. As I mentioned at the beginning of this 
hearing, we are going to keep this record open so that, if 
Members may have additional questions, they are going to direct 
them to you. We would ask that, in that case, you give us your 
answers as soon as you possibly can.
    I would note, Mr. Schuman, that it has been helpful to get 
your testimony. We have thought a lot about how to structure 
governance of the Capitol Police. We have had our GAO report 
but, obviously, it takes consensus between the House and 
Senate. I think the Board structure was--it has been in place 
for quite some time. It was intended to prevent the 
politicization of Capitol Police, which is an admirable goal 
and yet has resulted in something that is not particularly 
accountable to the public.
    So, your thoughts and comments are greatly appreciated, as 
is our Inspector General, who is always welcome here.
    I would like to thank the witnesses. As I said, we will 
keep the hearing record open. As we have all had a chance to 
ask our questions, this hearing will now be without objection, 
adjourned with thanks to all the Members and witnesses.
    [Whereupon, at 4:18 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
    
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