[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                     
 
                         [H.A.S.C. No. 117-15]

                       SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

                          CULTURE AND CLIMATE:

                        THE FUTURE OF THE FORCE

                               __________

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

          SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS

                                 OF THE

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                              HEARING HELD

                             MARCH 26, 2021

                                     
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 




                           ______

             U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 
47-367          WASHINGTON : 2022                                      
  


          SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS

                    RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona, Chairman

RICK LARSEN, Washington              TRENT KELLY, Mississippi
JIM COOPER, Tennessee                AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts    SAM GRAVES, Missouri
FILEMON VELA, Texas                  DON BACON, Nebraska
MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey           LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
JIMMY PANETTA, California            MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida, Vice   C. SCOTT FRANKLIN, Florida
    Chair

               Jessica Carroll, Professional Staff Member
               Patrick Nevins, Professional Staff Member
                           Zach Taylor, Clerk
                           
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

              STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Gallego. Hon. Ruben, a Representative from Arizona, Chairman, 
  Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations............     1
Kelly, Hon. Trent, a Representative from Mississippi, Ranking 
  Member, Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations....     4

                               WITNESSES

Germano, Kate, LtCol (Ret.), United States Marine Corps..........    12
Mitchell, Mark E., Former Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense 
  for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict..............     5
Nagata, LTG Michael K., USA (Ret.), Senior Vice President and 
  Strategic Advisor, CACI International, Inc.....................     9
Robinson, Linda, Director, Center for Middle East Public Policy, 
  and Senior International/Defense Researcher, RAND Corporation..     7

                                APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

    Germano, LtCol Kate..........................................    84
    Kelly, Hon. Trent............................................    45
    Mitchell, Mark E.............................................    47
    Nagata, LTG Michael K........................................    75
    Robinson, Linda..............................................    61

Documents Submitted for the Record:

    [There were no Documents submitted.]

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

    [There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

    Mr. Gallego..................................................   101
 SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES CULTURE AND CLIMATE: THE FUTURE OF THE FORCE

                              ----------                              

                  House of Representatives,
                       Committee on Armed Services,
       Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations,
                            Washington, DC, Friday, March 26, 2021.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:02 a.m., via 
Webex, Hon. Ruben Gallego (chairman of the subcommittee) 
presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RUBEN GALLEGO, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
  ARIZONA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL 
                           OPERATIONS

    Mr. Gallego. Welcome, everybody. Thank you for being here 
to our Intelligence and Special Operations Subcommittee.
    Before we get going, since we are conducting this over 
Webex, I will have to do a declaration.
    Members who are joining remotely must be visible on screen 
for the purposes of identity verification, establishing and 
maintaining a quorum, participating in the proceeding, and 
voting.
    Those members must continue to use the software platform's 
video function while in attendance, unless they experience 
connectivity issues or other technical problems that render 
them unable to participate on camera. If a member experiences 
technical difficulties, they should contact the committee staff 
for assistance.
    Video of members' participation will be broadcast in the 
room and via the television/internet feeds. Members 
participating remotely must seek recognition verbally, and they 
are asked to mute their microphones when they are not speaking.
    Members who are participating remotely are reminded to keep 
the software platform's video function on the entire time they 
attend the proceeding.
    Members may leave and rejoin the proceeding. If members 
depart for a short while for reasons other than joining a 
different proceeding, they should leave the video function on. 
If members will be absent for a significant period or depart to 
join a different proceeding, they should exit the software 
platform entirely and then rejoin if they return.
    Members may use the software platform's chat feature to 
communicate with staff regarding technical or logistical 
support issues only.
    Finally, I have designated a committee staff member to, if 
necessary, mute unrecognized members' microphones to cancel any 
inadvertent background noise that may disrupt the proceeding.
    How are we doing in terms of our Republicans colleagues 
getting on? Have we got more on yet?
    Staff. Currently right now it looks like we have got 
Ranking Member Kelly and Mr. Waltz's new link going out now.
    Mr. Gallego. Okay. Let me just ask for--oh, we will just do 
UC [unanimous consent] for nonmembers of HASC [House Armed 
Services Committee].
    I ask unanimous consent that noncommittee members, if any, 
be allowed to participate in today's hearing after all 
committee members have had an opportunity to ask questions.
    Is there an objection?
    Mr. Kelly. I just ask that the members who are not signed 
on now that are attending, Austin Scott and Michael Waltz, be 
considered on time for the hearing.
    Mr. Gallego. Absolutely.
    Without objection, noncommittee members will be recognized 
at the appropriate times for 5 minutes.
    Representative Kelly, do you want us just to wait for your 
members or do you want to just get going with my opening 
comments and your opening comments?
    Mr. Kelly. We can go on with opening comments. I just saw 
Scott and Franklin just signed in. So, obviously, I have got 
members signing in. We can start with the opening statements.
    Mr. Gallego. Let's start opening statements from us. And 
then if we don't have a sufficient amount of your members, we 
will wait before we go to our witnesses. Our members don't 
really need to hear from us.
    Excellent.
    Well, thank you, everyone, for being here. I might have a 
little weird lighting. It is actually just morning here in 
Arizona, and my office/front bedroom faces east. So the sun may 
make me look a little weird with some of the shadows. So I 
apologize for that.
    I call to order this hearing of the Intelligence and 
Special Operations Subcommittee on ``Special Operations Forces 
Culture and Climate: The Future of the Force.''
    Our special operations forces [SOF] are built on a history 
rich with ingenuity, agility, and tenacity. The reputation of 
our elite warriors is renowned globally, prioritized for 
partnership, and feared by our adversaries.
    Sustaining the responsibilities delegated by the Department 
of Defense, U.S. Special Operations Command [SOCOM] serves as 
the coordinating authority for three critical missions: 
countering weapons of mass destruction; web-based Military 
Information Support Operations, MISO; and countering violent 
extremist organizations, CVEO.
    Now, after two decades of high operational tempo 
deployments to Iraq, Afghanistan, the Arabian Peninsula, and 
Africa, our special operations forces are at a crossroads. In 
2014, former Preservation of the Force and Family [POTFF] 
Director, U.S. Navy Captain Thomas Chaby, stated, and I quote, 
``After 13 years of battle, we assess that our force is frayed 
and there is really no end to where we are right now.''
    That was 7 years ago. And even with the looming May 1 
deadline to consider force posture in Afghanistan, we are still 
sending SOF to fight in our longest war. And as SOCOM Commander 
General Clarke stated, SOF will be the last to leave.
    In today's security environment, SOCOM must balance the 
countering violent extremist mission with another clear and 
present danger: the great power competition. Our most creative 
and agile forces are uniquely poised to significantly 
contribute in this fight but must be postured, resourced, and 
balanced to do so.
    Given that SOF units do much to protect us, we must make 
sure that we do right by them as well. We must continue to 
support their force abroad, but, most importantly, at home.
    The toll of high deployment-to-dwell ratio has put 
physical, emotional, and social burdens on our force, which I 
fear we do not yet fully understand. SOCOM's Preservation of 
the Force and Family provides resources for the force to heal 
and grow, but that must be supported by the larger Department 
and Congress.
    Further, as we move to rebalance the force, I firmly 
believe that SOCOM requires a diverse force with an array of 
skills, able to conduct the range of operations involved in 
confronting the great powers.
    Earlier this month, USSOCOM released its first-ever 
strategic plan for diversity and inclusion. This is an 
important step for the command in recognizing the intrinsic 
benefits of a tolerant force replete with diverse thinking, 
problem-solving skills, and unique capabilities.
    Unfortunately, the absence of diversity in SOF is not a new 
issue, as highlighted in a 1999 RAND study on ``Barriers to 
Minority Participation in Special Operations Forces.''
    As ASD [Assistant Secretary of Defense] Maier and General 
Clarke work together on implementation of the diversity and 
inclusion plan, I am interested in the perspectives of this 
group, of our panelists, on how the SOF community can attract 
and retain a diverse workforce amidst such sweeping cultural 
change.
    So today I look forward to hearing from our panel of 
outside experts about their unique experiences and viewpoints 
on the direction and future of our special operations forces.
    Now let me introduce our four witnesses.
    Mr. Mark Mitchell, former Acting Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict.
    Ms. Linda Robinson, director for the Center for Middle East 
Policy and senior international/defense researcher for RAND.
    Lieutenant General Mike Nagata, retired, United States 
Army.
    And Lieutenant Colonel Kate Germano--and I apologize if I 
didn't say that correctly--retired, United States Marine Corps. 
Oorah.
    Thanks to such a diverse and thoughtful group of experts. 
We look forward to your commentary.
    I will now turn to Ranking Member Kelly for any opening 
remarks.
    Mr. Kelly. Thank you, Chairman.
    I am trying to multitask here.
    Mr. Gallego. Take your time, Trent. Just take your time. We 
still want some more members, more of your members to log on, 
too.
    Mr. Kelly. Yeah, I was sending Austin the link.

     STATEMENT OF HON. TRENT KELLY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
 MISSISSIPPI, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND 
                       SPECIAL OPERATIONS

    Mr. Kelly. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your opening remarks 
today and your leadership in organizing this meeting. It is a 
very important hearing.
    Today we will hear from four experts across the private 
sector for discussion on the culture and climate of our special 
operations forces, also known as SOF.
    We have further broken this topic into three main buckets: 
the state of the force, the health of the force, and the future 
of the force.
    Indeed, there are many challenges that our special 
operators face today and this subcommittee must better 
understand in order to conduct our oversight duties.
    From the integration of women into the force to deploy-and-
dwell ratios to mental health, this hearing will illuminate 
current challenges and offer recommendations on how to make 
special operations forces more effective.
    I will focus my comments and subsequent questions on the 
third bucket of the hearing, the future of the force.
    Our special operators have done a tremendous job with their 
counterterrorism mission over the last 20-plus years. As we 
continue to hear about China's malign activities and rapid 
military growth, we need to ensure SOF is ready for the future 
fight.
    That includes things like language training and other 
training that directly relate to combating great power 
competition adversaries. Furthermore, it necessitates the 
proper structure and authorities to conduct the SOF mission.
    I will highlight two recent areas of interest from this 
committee.
    A New York Times article on March 3 described a policy 
change by the Biden administration that placed greater 
restrictions on drone strikes and raids conducted outside 
conventional battlefield zones like Iraq, Afghanistan, and 
Syria. Previously authorized by ground commanders, these 
operations now require White House approval.
    I am concerned about the onerous increase in approval 
authority for which these counterterrorism tactics are vital. 
As testament to the effects this policy change has created on 
the use of their strikes and raids, AFRICOM [U.S. Africa 
Command] reported six strikes were conducted from 1 to 19 
January of this year and, to my knowledge, zero have taken 
place since.
    Authorities can be delegated to leaders closer to the fight 
with specific parameters, both in breadth, duration, or 
tactical mission. I completely understand the need to ensure 
appropriate controls are in place for conducting military 
operations, but I worry that this policy restricts special 
oerations' ability to conduct necessary actions in a timely 
manner for the counterterrorism fight.
    On March 3, members of this subcommittee sent a letter to 
Secretary of Defense Austin expressing our concerns about 
potential changes to the Assistant Secretary of Defense's role 
for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, the ASD(SO/
LIC) for short.
    The fiscal year 2017 NDAA [National Defense Authorization 
Act] outlined required changes for this position. These changes 
were further substantiated in a memo from then Acting Secretary 
of Defense Chris Miller on November 18 of last year.
    The elevation of ASD(SO/LIC)'s role as a direct report to 
the Secretary of Defense is crucial to ensure that SOF has a 
civilian leader shaping policy and advocating on their behalf. 
Empowering this role with the appropriate authority is a 
priority of this subcommittee.
    I am interested to hear our witnesses' views on the role of 
the ASD(SO/LIC), the use of raids and strikes in areas like 
AFRICOM, and ensuring our SOF community is prepared to fight 
and win in a near-peer global power conflict.
    I think we need to focus on diversity, both cultural and 
sexual, throughout to make sure that our special operators look 
and are able to perform the missions of the future.
    I want to thank our witnesses in advance for their time 
today. I look forward to the continued work with our private 
sector experts in the 117th Congress to ensure we are 
appropriately postured to meet and defeat the myriad of global 
threats.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I yield back.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Kelly can be found in the 
Appendix on page 45.]
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Mr. Kelly.
    Do we have a--I just want to make sure we have a 
substantial amount of your members that have logged on and that 
have wanted to log on, too, obviously.
    Staff. At this time we have got Representatives Scott, 
Waltz, and Franklin.
    Mr. Gallego. Trent, what do you feel? Do you want us to 
wait a little longer just to let your----
    Mr. Kelly. We are good, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Gallego. Say again?
    Mr. Kelly. We are good, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Gallego. You are good? Okay. Great.
    And I now turn to our panelists. I just lost my notes on 
here. I believe we have first was it Mr. Mitchell to speak?
    Shannon, is that right?
    Staff. That is accurate, sir.
    Mr. Gallego. Yes.
    Mr. Mitchell, can you please open with your 5-minute 
statement?

    STATEMENT OF MARK E. MITCHELL, FORMER ACTING ASSISTANT 
 SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW-INTENSITY 
                            CONFLICT

    Mr. Mitchell. Yes. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking 
Member Kelly, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. 
Thanks for the opportunity to participate in this hearing 
today.
    I want to start off by recognizing the extraordinary 
contributions and sacrifices of our special operations forces, 
especially over the last 20 years. They are without question 
the best in the world.
    Day in, day out they carry burdens that few will ever know 
about, much less fully understand. And, importantly, the vast 
majority of them carry out those difficult missions with 
profound humility, discipline, and integrity.
    And for their service, their valor, their professionalism, 
and the burdens borne by their families, we have much for which 
we can and should be grateful.
    And I also want to take the opportunity to thank this 
committee and Congress as a whole for their continued support 
of the POTFF initiative and hope that will be sustained.
    Nevertheless, if our SOF are to be employed successfully in 
global competition with China, significant changes will need to 
be made. The world is changing rapidly, and the challenges that 
we face today and tomorrow are substantially different from the 
challenges that SOF has effectively tackled over the last two 
decades.
    Our SOF are today a force optimized for direct action, in 
support of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. While these 
threats are not going away, direct action capabilities are of 
limited use in areas of competition short of armed conflict 
where by definition lethal military force is not authorized.
    To be clear, the United States must be able to fight and 
win a war with any adversary. That is the reason that we have 
the Department of Defense.
    But deterrence and competition are not synonymous. The 
former is about our adversaries' assessment of our 
capabilities, will, and intent, and the latter is about a third 
party's evaluation of the advantages and strength of a 
relationship with us in comparison to a competitor like China.
    Ultimately, this competition is about relationships 
developed and sustained through voluntary affinity and mutual 
benefit, rather than economic, political, or military coercion.
    And an excessive focus on deterrence or high-end conflict 
and lethality miss the equally important requirement for 
competition. In my humble opinion, it represents a failure to 
understand the totality of the CCP's [Chinese Communist 
Party's] unrestricted warfare and a deficit of strategic 
thinking in the Department.
    Irregular warfare conducted in support of broader, whole-
of-government political warfare strategy is indispensable for 
competition, and SOF provides an effective and extremely 
economical tool for it, especially when well-integrated with 
other elements of national power.
    But to do so, we must better capitalize on the full 
potential of human capital present in these United States, and 
this demands changes in the structure and culture of our SOF.
    The leadership in the SOF enterprise, both civilian and 
military, must question their assumptions about missions, force 
structure, modernization, and concept of operation.
    In simple terms, they must be as daring and creative at the 
strategic level as our small units are at the tactical level.
    The first SOF truth is that ``Humans are more important 
than hardware.'' To prepare for tomorrow's challenges, SOCOM 
must be willing to challenge and adapt the commando culture 
that currently dominates in the force.
    Their recently published diversity and inclusion strategy 
is an important first step, but it is not enough. I would also 
note that it was not signed by ASD(SO/LIC).
    So I think, first and foremost, SOCOM and its components 
need to consider adding new military occupation specialties to 
ensure the right advanced technical skills are resident in the 
force.
    Secondly, they must create more and better opportunities 
for women to contribute, opportunities as fully fledged 
operators, but those which do not require them to be commandos.
    Thirdly, SOCOM must undertake a concerted and well-
resourced effort to recruit first- and second-generation 
Americans with native language and cultural sensitivities.
    Our history is replete with extraordinary contributions by 
immigrants. And to the degree which we fail to recognize and 
welcome others like them with open arms, we are failing 
ourselves and our Nation.
    Finally, SOCOM must recommit to an experimental force to 
test new organizations and employment concepts for irregular 
warfare.
    Sadly, I am not confident these changes will happen without 
strong and empowered civilian control and leadership from 
ASD(SO/LIC), and that won't happen if ASD(SO/LIC) is returned 
to serfdom in OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] Policy 
or if Secretary Austin does not empower ASD(SO/LIC).
    I listened yesterday with great interest to your Senate 
colleagues' hearing with ASD(SO/LIC) Chris Maier and General 
Clarke. It was informative but troubling. I was dismayed to 
once again hear a SOCOM commander emphasize his status as a 
combatant commander, while reducing ASD(SO/LIC)'s role to that 
of an advocate for SOCOM.
    To me, this represents a rejection of the administrative 
chain of command defined in title 10. I can't for the life of 
me ever recall hearing the CNO [Chief of Naval Operations] 
stating that a key role for the Secretary of the Navy is to be 
an advocate.
    An advocate is many things--a backer, a booster, a 
champion--but that is a fundamentally different relationship--
in fact, an inverted relationship--from the concept of a chain 
of command, even an administrative one.
    Mere advocacy is a cheap and ineffective substitute for 
authority, direction, and control, especially regarding the 
strategy for the future of this vital national capability.
    When it comes to the legislation passed and signed into law 
regarding civilian control and oversight, accept no 
substitutes, insist on full implementation, and please do not 
accept anything less.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Mitchell can be found in the 
Appendix on page 47.]
    Mr. Gallego. And thank you, Mr. Mitchell.
    Ms. Robinson, you are on for 5 minutes.

 STATEMENT OF LINDA ROBINSON, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR MIDDLE EAST 
  PUBLIC POLICY, AND SENIOR INTERNATIONAL/DEFENSE RESEARCHER, 
                        RAND CORPORATION

    Ms. Robinson. Thank you. Chairman Gallego, Ranking Member 
Kelly, and members, thank you for the opportunity to share my 
views on the state of special operations forces. I am honored 
to be here with friends and colleagues.
    I have devoted much of the last 21 years to research and 
analysis on this topic, including years of field work with SOF 
on five continents, in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, the 
Philippines, Latin America, and Europe.
    I have served in government as Chair of the Army War 
College Board and on the National Defense University Board to 
advise on professional military education and leader 
development.
    I will summarize briefly my written statement for the 
record.
    Special operations forces are unique, valuable, and a 
scarce asset for the Nation's security. It is vital, given 
their small numbers, to think carefully about their development 
and employment.
    We are at an inflection point as the strategic environment 
has changed. Efforts to rebalance the force for new missions 
and reset from 20 years of intensive counterterrorism are 
ongoing.
    Systemic issues require urgent attention, primary among 
them the need to expand diversity and inclusion.
    Strengthening civilian oversight, as Congress has mandated, 
can help with all of these issues.
    To ensure the health of the force and the highest ethical 
culture, it is imperative to meet the deployment-to-dwell ratio 
as soon as possible and to address all incidents of misconduct 
and criminal behavior in accordance with the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice.
    Fifteen months ago, SOCOM Commander General Clarke issued a 
comprehensive review. The review found that the high 
operational tempo was responsible for some of these failings 
and attributed them, in part, to a culture that emphasized 
deployment and operational prowess.
    As I recommended in a 2013 report, SOCOM itself must 
prioritize institutional over operational matters. SOCOM is a 
functional combatant command, but its primary responsibility is 
to organize, train, and equip the force, which is then employed 
by the geographic combatant commands.
    I will be happy to say more about the rebalancing of SOF 
roles and missions in our dialogue. I offer here two 
overarching points.
    Continued effort to rightsize the counterterrorism mission 
is required to free up the force for use in more strategic 
ways. Counterterrorism strategy itself should evolve to 
prioritize greater reliance on allies and partners and to 
address the pipeline into extremism, as decapitation and 
network suppression have, at best, temporary effect.
    I note the ranking member's comments about the guidance for 
strikes and will be happy to offer my views in our dialogue.
    Second, great power competition requires SOF to work more 
closely with the rest of the joint force and with the 
interagency partners. SOF has important roles, given the extent 
to which adversaries are using irregular and gray zone tactics.
    To play those roles, SOF requires new capabilities to 
communicate, detect, and respond to cyber and electronic 
attack, as well as greater effort and investment in information 
operations.
    Diversity and inclusion have rightly become a focus for the 
entire joint force. It is integral to SOF mission success to 
have a diverse force with the skills and knowledge to work 
among the world's populations.
    RAND, as noted, documented the shortfalls and barriers in a 
1999 study. Improvements have been marginal since then.
    I would add that, in 2001, the commanding general of 
Special Forces stressed to me the importance of having women in 
the force. Today there are three women who have earned the 
Green Beret, two of them still in language training.
    This is not where the force should be. Women have been 
selected and promoted in Air Force Special Operations, in 
Psychological Operations, and Civil Affairs. But significant 
barriers and cultural resistance remain.
    A 2016 study found that 85 percent of special operators 
surveyed were opposed to letting women into their specialties, 
and 71 percent opposed having women in their units.
    I would be happy to offer my thoughts about remedial 
measures for recruitment, selection, and promotion. I note that 
U.S. Special Operations Command issued a plan in March, and I 
would urge that the command develop specific metrics and 
targets for progress and for promotions to be tied to 
performance in meeting them.
    I would like to finish by addressing the issue of civilian 
oversight, which Congress again strengthened in the latest NDAA 
in section 901 in order to enable the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense to perform its statutory roles, overseeing both policy 
and resources.
    This is an important step to ensure civilian control over 
the force and the complex issues it involves. The legislation 
requires a direct report status for the Assistant Secretary to 
the Secretary of Defense for the purpose of fulfilling the 
service-like roles. That has now been done.
    It is not enough for SO/LIC to be, quote, ``in the room.'' 
With the Secretary's support, SO/LIC should ensure SOF 
requirements are identified and met.
    Regarding the statutory role for oversight of policy, which 
includes formulation of strategy for the employment of the 
force, this needs to be closely orchestrated with the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Policy, in my view, precisely because 
more than ever SOF needs to work as part of the whole.
    Thank you very much. I welcome your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Robinson can be found in the 
Appendix on page 61.]
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Ms. Robinson.
    And now I would like to turn to Mr. Nagata.

  STATEMENT OF LTG MICHAEL K. NAGATA, USA (RET.), SENIOR VICE 
   PRESIDENT AND STRATEGIC ADVISOR, CACI INTERNATIONAL, INC.

    General Nagata. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Good morning to all of you. I am honored to participate in 
today's hearing. My remarks today predictably are based on my 
more than three decades of service in special operations 
forces.
    On the topic of diversity and inclusion as they relate to 
special operations, my perspective is based on having been one 
of the very few Asian-American officers to rise to flag rank 
during a special operations career. I wish to provide two 
suggestions.
    First, over my own career I was responsible for the 
recruiting, assessment, selection, and training of future SOF 
personnel on two occasions, once as the commander of the Army 
Special Forces Qualification Course and, second, as a commander 
of a special mission unit. I learned from those experiences the 
difficulty we had and probably still have in attracting a more 
diverse volunteer population.
    Perhaps counterintuitively for some observers, I recall 
that our greatest challenge was not the pass/fail rate among 
diverse volunteers, but rather identifying larger numbers of 
suitable diverse candidates that either wanted or could be 
persuaded to volunteer.
    In my view, there is a significant shortage of scientific 
research into the question of whether there are important 
differences between what attracts a more diverse population to 
volunteer for the grueling experience of SOF assessment and 
selection, compared to what attracts our traditional 
demographic mix.
    Said more simply, in 1984, when First Lieutenant Mike 
Nagata began the Special Forces Qualification Course, I 
remember being only one of two Asian-American volunteers. 
Today, I still do not know why.
    Second, I often hear discussions over the need for more SOF 
personnel that are conversant with the cultures and languages 
of our near-peer adversaries, one recent example being a lament 
I heard over why, in an era where our greatest challenge is 
China, we do not have more SOF that can speak Chinese.
    While I certainly consider that an important question, I 
believe it is too narrow. We must remember that much of today's 
great power competition is essentially a contest between the 
United States and countries like China or Russia over strategic 
influence with other nations, communities, ethnic groups, and 
the like, that are neither Russian, Chinese, or American.
    In such cases, SOF's success will have less to do with 
understanding Russian, Chinese, or any other near-peer 
competitor's culture or language and far more to do with SOF's 
ability to have deep understanding and language compatibility 
with African, Middle Eastern, South Asian, Pacific Island and 
Archipelago, or European and even Western Hemisphere cultures 
and countries that we are today competing to preserve or 
strengthen our influence with against our foes.
    Regarding the health of SOF, I wish to emphasize two 
related realities.
    First, SOF's well-being and durability requires a constant 
balancing act between antagonistic impulses. Said differently, 
the maintenance of the health of this force is a lot like 
trying to balance an egg on one end. Only constant effort and 
attention will prevent it from falling in any particular 
direction.
    By way of personal example, during my own career, I was 
repetitively deployed for many months, even years at a time, 
typically in harm's way. The strain on me personally and, just 
as importantly, the strain this created for my family has left 
scars that I still live with.
    But, on the other hand, I and thousands like me volunteered 
for SOF and remained for a career in SOF because I yearned to 
do these very things. The strains and stresses of those 
missions not only made me stronger, better, and more effective 
than I could have ever been otherwise, they created friendships 
and outlooks that have enriched and continue to enrich every 
day of my life.
    Do I regret the costs and damage that my long absences 
created? Yes, I do. But if I could turn back the hands of time 
and could significantly alter my trajectory, would I? 
Paradoxically, the answer is mostly no, and I might have 
decided to pursue a different career path if that trajectory 
had been different.
    Second, there is an important problem that undermines the 
search for ways to ensure the health of SOF. It may surprise 
you, but here also is a profound absence of real empirical, 
long-term research on what the effects of deployments, 
prolonged combat, exposure to blast and trauma, family 
separation, and so on are for SOF.
    I know many would argue there is substantial research on 
all these topics for the U.S. military broadly, but I believe 
almost none of that is significant to the experience of SOF and 
therefore cannot take into account the very different aspects 
of SOF culture, the nature of our deployments and operating 
environments, and the consequences of physical and 
psychological stresses amidst these differences.
    If I am correct on this assertion, then we are probably 
today in a classic logic trap--that one cannot solve a problem 
if one is unable to understand that problem.
    Finally, on the future of SOF, I frequently hear in 
Washington, DC, these days how SOF must, quote, ``pivot,'' 
unquote, away from counterterrorism in the interest of doing 
more in the arena of great power competition. I understand the 
impulse that drives such assertions, but I think they are at 
best misleading and at worst possibly wrong.
    The main reason is because we are witnessing a growing 
convergence between our near-peer adversaries and organizations 
that can be characterized as terrorists or extremists or at 
least non-state but increasingly powerful and militarily 
capability actors.
    I will give you one example. A few years ago in the Ukraine 
and Crimea, Russian ethnic separatists demonstrated the ability 
to employ First World military and intelligence technology, 
sophisticated air defense systems, and highly effective cyber 
operations in cooperation and in concert with the Russian 
Government's efforts, including the ``little green men'' we all 
know today were Russian military forces.
    Proxy warfare is as old as mankind because it has always 
been convenient for nations or kingdoms to have someone else do 
their bleeding and dying for them. In today's world of rapidly 
advancing technologies whose costs are falling so quickly that 
anyone with a credit card may have them, the attractiveness of 
such non-state or terrorist actors as proxy tools is proving 
irresistible.
    Consequently, America should expect that challenging a 
near-peer competitor will also bring us into confrontations 
with those proxies, including terrorists and extremists, that 
will again require many of the skills that SOF developed in the 
counterterrorism arena.
    In closing, I wish to say thank you for allowing me the 
chance to contribute to today's hearing. I look forward to your 
questions.
    [The prepared statement of General Nagata can be found in 
the Appendix on page 75.]
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Mr. Nagata.
    And next we have Lieutenant Colonel Germano.

 STATEMENT OF KATE GERMANO, LTCOL (RET.), UNITED STATES MARINE 
                             CORPS

    Colonel Germano. Thank you, Chairman Gallego, Ranking 
Member Kelly, and members of the subcommittee, for inviting me 
to testify.
    I am honored to be with you today to discuss diversity, 
equity, and inclusion in special operations and our military 
writ large.
    Diversity, equity, and inclusion represent a really 
interesting paradox for the military. For as much as the 
programs are reviled by the average servicemen, they are 
perhaps the very concepts and practices that could enable the 
force to succeed in meeting the complex challenges of the 21st 
century.
    But as General C.Q. Brown, the first African American to 
lead the U.S. Air Force, recently told CBS News, when it comes 
to advancement in the military, including selection for special 
operations roles, ``ducks pick ducks.''
    Now, I never thought I would use the phrase ``ducks pick 
ducks'' while testifying to Congress, but it neatly sums up how 
the human brain influences both the preference for sameness in 
our ranks and resistance to change.
    Today, the military is experiencing a critical shortage of 
qualified young men for enlistment and commissioning. At the 
very same time, public trust in the military is on the decline 
for the first time in decades, down from 70 percent in 2018 to 
just 56 percent today, according to a recent poll by the Ronald 
Reagan Institute.
    Negative stories about racism and discrimination, sexual 
harassment and assault, and retaliation against those who 
report wrongdoing are prominent in news coverage of the 
military. These stories have no doubt impacted public 
perception and the willingness of young men and women to join 
the services.
    Because of their strategic implications for recruiting and 
retention, these are not issues that can continue to fester 
below the surface. The culture of the military and its approach 
to diversity, equity, and inclusion must change.
    As one expert notes about why organizations fail, ``Active 
inertia is an organization's tendency to follow established 
patterns of behavior, even in response to dramatic 
environmental shifts.'' Think the definition of insanity.
    The transition of our military from two decades of 
counterinsurgency operations to preparing for great powers 
conflict, while also responding to nation-state threats, 
represents just such a dramatic environmental shift.
    If winning wars is what we expect of our military leaders, 
increasing diversity, equity, and inclusion among the ranks and 
branches of service must be viewed as a leadership function and 
not a ``nice to have'' or check in the block.
    Meeting these complex challenges will require not only 
cognitive diversity, but also the unique talents, experiences, 
and abilities of men and women from different backgrounds, 
ethnicities, and cultures at every level of the military, 
including Special Operations Command.
    There are three diversity and health of the force issues 
military leaders must face head on to increase the public 
trust, build a sustainable force, and meet the imperatives the 
Secretary of Defense established in his recent message to the 
force.
    First, military leaders must acknowledge that expanding 
minority membership at all levels of the military has both 
strategic and emotional implications, and they must tailor 
diversity, equity, and inclusion strategy, education, and 
training efforts accordingly.
    Military leaders must understand facts don't drive human 
behavior. Emotions do. Neuroscience research demonstrates that 
making diversity a compliance issue triggers a threat state in 
the brain, activates bias, and potentially increases 
discrimination, harassment, and retaliation.
    Diversity strategies and education must therefore be 
grounded in an understanding of the brain science of change and 
the feelings of grief, loss, skepticism, and anger many 
servicemen have as a result of our emphasis on diversity, 
equity, and inclusion.
    Make no mistake, this is a highly emotional issue for many 
servicemen today, particularly in the more insular cultures 
like the Special Forces and Marine Corps.
    Leaders should not only acknowledge the emotions involved, 
but emphasize that becoming a more diverse, inclusive, and 
equitable force actually brings the military closer to the idea 
of being a meritocracy, which today is something the 
organization can only aspire to.
    Second, the Department of Defense should invest in 
independent, comprehensive military and special operations 
specific research to clearly identify how diversity contributes 
to a more lethal and capable force.
    Up to this point the military has relied primarily on case 
studies from private industry, like the tech and financial 
sectors, to provide rationale on how diversity makes the force 
stronger, and it has not convinced the average serviceman.
    Little, if any, independent research has been conducted to 
quantify how diversity makes for a more lethal force or 
enhances the ability of the force to achieve success in global 
operations.
    This is a critical issue. Without military-specific case 
studies laying out the operational advantages women and other 
minorities bring to the fight, it will be difficult to reduce 
skepticism and instill faith in the hearts and minds of those 
who serve that becoming a more diverse, equitable, and 
inclusive force is not only fair, but essential to our 
abilities to win future battles.
    Finally, senior leaders must resolve existing gaps in 
strategic plans to overcome diversity inertia. Notably, the 
plan for Special Operations Command lacks any mention of the 
word ``equity.'' And since equity is about leveling the playing 
field for everyone through the identification and removal of 
systemic barriers to service--whether policies, equipment, 
practices, or behaviors--equity must be included as a bedrock 
pillar of all military diversity plans.
    Additionally, strategic diversity and recruiting plans must 
include actual diversity targets based on war plan requirements 
and projected operational needs, as well as clear direction on 
who is responsible for achieving them.
    It is time to give diversity, equity, and inclusion in the 
military more than lip service. Our failure to do so will no 
doubt mean that ducks will continue to pick ducks for 
opportunity and advancement and potentially jeopardize our 
national defense in the future.
    Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today, and I 
would be happy to take your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Colonel Germano can be found in 
the Appendix on page 84.]
    Mr. Gallego. Great. Thank you.
    Thank you for all of our witnesses.
    Now we are going to move into the question portion of the 
testimony. And just a reminder. We will limit our questions to 
5 minutes per person. And then we will move in alternating 
manner from Republican member to Democratic member.
    Give me one second, please. I am trying to catch up with my 
own notes here, and I have a crying baby in the background.
    Start with Mr. Mitchell.
    Mr. Mitchell, given your former position as ASD(SO/LIC), in 
what ways can civilian oversight positively impact the future 
of special operations forces?
    Mr. Mitchell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I think, first of all, resourcing is the number one area 
that it can positively impact it. But I think also it goes to 
strategy. And as I noted in my opening remarks, the strategy 
that was signed on diversity and inclusion did not include 
ASD(SO/LIC) and there are a number of other areas that belong 
in civilian control.
    I would note also yesterday that General Clarke, when he 
was asked about some of the changes that he had made and what 
his priorities were, he said more ISR [intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance] and lethality. And I felt 
like, okay, I don't necessarily know that that is the right--I 
would differ with him on whether that is the right answer 
moving forward for SO/LIC.
    So I think that control over the resources is an important 
part of that civilian leadership. The staff at SO/LIC doesn't 
have the resources. The Secretary for Special Operations is 
about 40 people, whereas SOCOM has about 2,000 people on its 
staff. It is just a huge mismatch.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Mr. Mitchell.
    Ms. Robinson, what do you believe are the greatest 
operational imperatives for SOF as the Department and 
government focus on strategic competitions? Do you believe 
there is an undue focus on capabilities rather than building 
critical skills and tradecraft of the force?
    Ms. Robinson. Thank you, Chairman.
    I believe that we have to focus, as has been mentioned, on 
the critical language and cultural skills. They require a great 
investment of time. And they are necessary not just for the new 
missions of great power competition, but legacy missions. And 
we have been very focused in the Middle East/South Asia region 
operationally for the last 20 years.
    As I mentioned, I think there is a huge requirement to give 
more thought, as well as more investment, to what the SOF role 
is in information operations.
    I would note that even though USSOCOM has stood up the 
Joint MISO WebOps Center, it only has five Active Duty civil--
PSYOP [psychological operations] officers assigned to it. And 
this is the kind of shortfall of material and human capability 
that I think indicates, as Mark said, a continued focus on the 
kinetic rather than the nonkinetic attributes and contributions 
that SOF can make.
    Our study, ``Modern Political Warfare,'' showed a huge 
panoply of adversary tactics that need to be met not 
kinetically, but nonkinetically, and together with other 
elements of national power, State Department and others.
    So I think this for me is really the focus, because great 
power competition encompasses the irregular warfare spectrum.
    That is not to say SOF doesn't need to be prepared to 
conduct high-end conflict, and there are specific technical 
deficits that our last 2 years of work have shown, particularly 
in the EW [electronic warfare] and cyber field. There are 
notable requirements there. But I would just emphasize the 
nonkinetic as a real area for focus.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Ms. Robinson.
    Lieutenant General Nagata, while I appreciate your 
perspectives regarding CT [counterterrorism] forces and their 
use, I do want to hear your expanded thoughts on how we 
continue to hear that counterterrorism is synonymous with great 
power competition. Do you think that is an accurate assertion? 
Why or why not? And do you think the force is culturally 
postured to support this strategic competition?
    General Nagata. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I would not say that they are synonymous, but I do believe 
they strongly overlap. And for those commentators or policy 
officials that believe SOF or SOCOM need to do less in the 
counterterrorism arena, I think that reality will disabuse them 
of that notion because terrorists simply will not be ignored.
    But getting back to your question. The overlap is, as I 
tried to say in my prepared remarks, the arena of influence. 
Our near-peer adversaries are using everything from cyber 
operations to irregular warfare activities to extremist 
activities to economic activities and beyond to shape what 
countries and populations around the world believe in ways that 
are antagonistic to the interests of the United States.
    In fact, in my view, the United States is currently losing 
the strategic contest for influence globally against too many 
of our near-peer adversaries.
    The proper role of special operations forces harkens all 
the way back to the foundation, the founding of most of the 
special operations forces that are in existence today.
    I particularly come from the Army Special Forces or Green 
Beret community. We were created in the 1960s for this very 
purpose of assisting local populations with a threat that 
threatened to overwhelm them. And this is as much a challenge 
of influence activity as it is a challenge of military 
conflict.
    So that is the overlap. And in my opinion--I want to 
associate myself with some of the remarks of Mr. Mitchell 
earlier--the overemphasis that I believe we are placing right 
now on being prepared for a high-intensity conflict with these 
near-peer adversaries--and I certainly vote we be ready for 
that--but I think there is so much emphasis on that, we are 
inadequately preparing ourselves--and this would include 
special operations forces--for the contest over strategic 
influence, which I personally believe will define the next 
generation of national security challenges of the United 
States.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Lieutenant General.
    I now move to Ranking Member Kelly.
    Mr. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I want to go back to--and, General Nagata, this is for you, 
because I think you understand probably command relationships 
better than anybody in the room from a military perspective, 
which is what I understand it as.
    I see ASD(SO/LIC) as being a dotted line, not a direct 
line. I think we are talking about control. Control is not a 
dotted line. Control is advise. They are reported to. They help 
make decisions.
    And I noticed Mr. Mitchell used the Secretary of the Navy 
and, let's say, the PACOM [U.S. Indo-Pacific Command] 
commander. Well, the PACOM commander does not answer to the 
Secretary of the Navy. He may be in his rating chain in some 
form, but he is administrative control [ADCON].
    Listen, ASD Maier is a great guy, doing a great job, and I 
think he gets it. But it does not need to be a direct command 
relationship. It needs to be ADCON or general support or 
general support reinforcing. It does not need to be TACON 
[tactical] control or OPCON [operational] control of our 
special operators.
    That SOCOM commander needs to be direct to the Department 
of Defense, the Secretary of Defense.
    Do you agree with that, General Nagata?
    General Nagata. Sir, I agree with much of it. On the other 
parts of what you just said, I don't think I so much disagree 
as I think that I have a somewhat different take. But let me 
try to be a little more specific.
    First of all, in my view, when ASD(SO/LIC) was originally 
created as a part of the Nunn-Cohen Amendment many years ago 
that I am sure you and your fellow members are very familiar 
with, no one at the time envisioned what would have happened to 
USSOCOM as a command or SOF as a community in the ensuing 
decades.
    The size, the prominence, the capabilities, the strategic 
importance and the relevance of special operations forces are 
far beyond anything I think the original authors of the Nunn-
Cohen Amendment ever imagined.
    On the one hand, SOCOM and the SOF community have grown 
commensurate with that rise in prominence and importance. ASD 
(SO/LIC) has remained essentially static.
    So the ability of ASD(SO/LIC), in my judgment--I did two 
tours in the Pentagon, one for the Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and, second, as the 
Deputy Director for Special Operations and Counterterrorism on 
the Joint Staff--what I believe I saw was a growing inability 
of people like Chris Maier--who is a personal friend of mine 
and, I totally agree with you, is a fantastic officer--but the 
growing inability of people like him to keep pace with the 
growing prominence and importance of special operations and, 
most importantly, this is my view, the two single most 
important functions of ASD(SO/LIC), which I personally believe 
they cannot do today in the way they are either configured, 
staffed, or given authority: effective DOD [Department of 
Defense] policy oversight of U.S. special operations forces and 
effective U.S. DOD policy support for USSOCOM and special 
operations forces.
    But it is that growing mismatch of how SOF has changed and 
ASD(SO/LIC) has not.
    Sorry. I didn't mean to interrupt you.
    Mr. Kelly. No, no. I want to get to another question, and I 
want to talk about the drone strikes and where that capability 
is.
    I am an engineer also by trade. So I understand when we had 
FASCAM [Family of Scatterable Mines], okay, you didn't delegate 
that authority down to platoon leaders. You didn't even 
delegate it down many times to brigade level. You had 
restrictions on when you could do that.
    Do you think it is a great policy to maintain that, all 
that at the highest level, or to use strategic ways to make 
sure that we delegate the proper authorities to the proper 
level of command in the use of those strikes based on area of 
operation, tactical threat, the personal leadership abilities 
of the commander in that area? Do you think that is a way to 
control that?
    And please be short on the answer because I have one more 
question.
    General Nagata. Certainly.
    The short answer is, just like Mr. Mitchell, I am sure he 
is thinking about this, I have seen this movie before where 
there is a desire to constrain kinetic and lethal operations 
abroad, and so the decision to elevate the decisionmaking 
authority ensues.
    Two, actually three things, in my judgment, always flow 
from this.
    Number one, the policymaker ends up being disappointing, 
because what the combatant commands that are trying to chase 
these dangerous targets will do is simply go find more 
intelligence to justify the operation and inevitably it will be 
conducted anyways.
    Number two, it does create an enormous work burden for both 
the combatant command, that desires SOF to do the strike, and 
for the special operators that have to find and fix the target. 
So they do a lot more work for basically the same activity that 
they will end up doing anyways.
    And, thirdly, this is a psychological issue. I believe one 
of the unintended negative consequences of these decisions is 
it inadvertently conveys a lack of confidence and trust in the 
judgment of the four-star combatant command, his component 
commanders, and the SOF commander on the ground or on the 
field.
    Over.
    Mr. Kelly. I agree. Targets of opportunity do not re-
present themselves. They are a one-time deal and timeliness is 
effective. And I think we have to have [inaudible].
    Finally, I want to talk a little bit about a great unit 
that trained at Camp Shelby, Mississippi, the 442nd Regimental 
Combat Team, Japanese Americans, the most decorated unit in 
American history, who faced many of the challenges that our 
special operations community.
    We didn't want to include them in our military. Their 
families were in internment camps. And we wouldn't send them to 
Japan, to the Pacific to fight, we sent them to Europe. And 
they showed us their love for this country by being the most 
decorated history in the history of all of our annals.
    I think we have to do not like that. What I think we have 
to do is very targeted, to target for recruitment women, 
minorities. I think our SOCOM, and I think this is where 
ASD(SO/LIC).
    What do we need to accomplish the missions of this great 
Nation? What does that framework need to look like? Does that 
need to be men, women, Asians, African? It doesn't matter, the 
areas that are most important. And then I think we have to 
recruit very hard to do that.
    But I also think that takes time. It does not happen 
overnight. Because if we rush it, what we do is put unqualified 
people who fail.
    And what I want to do is have gates, recruitment gates, 
qualification gates, that are tracked over a long period of 
time to make sure that we have a force that leads to a lethal 
force that we need, which includes diversity, and that is 
culture and women.
    Do you agree with that, General Nagata?
    General Nagata. I do. I will be very quick since I know we 
need to move on to other speakers here.
    But, number one, I had two uncles in the 442nd Regimental 
Combat Team, and both of them told me personally the reason 
they joined was they felt they were determined to prove the 
loyalty of Japanese-American citizens because that loyalty was 
in considerable public doubt at the time.
    Getting to this question of today's recruiting challenges, 
as I said in my prepared remarks, I don't think we understand 
right now, because there has really been no adequate research 
about what causes someone from a diverse background or culture 
to volunteer to serve in special operations forces.
    Lots of opinion and anecdote on this, but opinions aren't 
research. We need research on this question: What motivates or 
fails to motivate someone to volunteer for SOF?
    And I will say, finally, I have learned this from someone 
who used to run an assessment selection program for me, there 
are, like, 10 things that have to happen, 10 gates that 
somebody has to get through and the organization has to get 
through for someone to serve successfully in SOF.
    And he said--I was a colonel at the time--he said, 
``Colonel Nagata, of these 12 steps, 11 of them, if we screw up 
any of them, I can recover from that. There is one thing I 
cannot recover from: bad recruiting.''
    So I will leave that for your consideration.
    Mr. Kelly. Thank you, General Nagata.
    And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Ranking Member Kelly.
    Who do we have first? [Inaudible] Larsen?
    Mr. Larsen. Yeah, thanks, Chair.
    So I want to begin with a question for General Nagata and 
then to Ms. Germano.
    Ms. Germano, just quickly, is that the title you prefer for 
this hearing, or should I call you colonel?
    Colonel Germano. Sure. Ms. Germano is fine.
    Mr. Larsen. Ms. Germano. Great. Thank you.
    So, General Nagata, back to the ranking member's question 
about not wanting to, like, recruit too quickly or change too 
quickly.
    I agree. So why didn't we start in 1984, when you, 
yourself, recognized you were one of two Asian Americans and we 
could have had a 37-year runway to fix this problem? And now do 
we have to wait another 37 years, because we recognize it as a 
problem again?
    It seems to me like the opposite of moving too quickly is 
moving way too slowly, which is exactly what we are doing.
    Can you, General, in two sentences tell me why not in 1984?
    General Nagata. In 1984, SOF was declining. In fact, when I 
reported in for the qualification course, I was warned that I 
was joining a special forces community that was going to be 
disbanded by the Department of Defense. So I don't think 
anybody cared, frankly.
    Mr. Larsen. Okay. So kind of somewhat unique.
    So let me move now to 2021, Ms. Germano, and refer back to 
General Nagata's point, a really good one. We have opinion. We 
have thoughts. We don't have the research to identify 
necessarily why we can't get a more diverse force.
    So what do you know? What can you help us understand? What 
are the first steps we need to take to move towards that?
    Colonel Germano. Well, thank you for the question, 
Representative.
    I think, first and foremost, I had two tours on duty with 
recruiters, once on the executive operations officer side, and 
then on the other tour I was actually in charge of one of the 
largest recruiting stations in the Nation. And so I know 
firsthand what it takes for these Marines to go out and find 
young kids who not only have the propensity to join, but who 
believe there is a place for them in the service.
    And I think one of the problems that we experience in 
recruiting is that on the officer side we tend to track 
diversity much more closely. When officer recruiting missions 
are assigned on a monthly basis, they are actually broken out 
by gender and they are actually broken out by racial 
categories.
    On the enlisted side, while we track that data in terms of 
when people join the service and that data gets computed into 
the system, we don't actually have missions that are actually 
broken out by diversity.
    So there is a big challenge in saying, well, we need to 
increase the diversity of the force for innovation and agility 
and other reasons, and yet we don't have any mechanisms to hold 
people accountable for making that happen.
    So I really think that that is part of the broader problem 
when it comes to this issue of increasing diversity in the 
force.
    And then the other part is, part of the reason that we 
don't see larger numbers of diverse kids being recruited is 
partly because of the makeup of the force that we have now. If 
the force is predominantly White and male, we are going to see 
a lag in other groups joining the service because kids look at 
the recruiter and they are like, ``Well, I don't know if there 
is a place for me.''
    So I would say it is compounded by not only what the kids 
read in the media, it is compounded by what the force looks 
like today. And then it is also compounded by the fact that we 
don't track who is coming in when it's not mentioned.
    Mr. Larsen. Okay.
    Mr. Chair, I don't see a clock anywhere, and I don't know 
how much time I have left. Do you have an estimate of my time, 
Mr. Chair?
    Mr. Gallego. Shannon?
    Staff. Sir, you have got about a minute and a half left.
    Mr. Larsen. Okay. Thanks.
    My next question is for Mr. Mitchell, and this gets into--
this actually relates to diversity and recruitment. And Ms. 
Robinson addressed this a little bit. It has to do with the 
structure of SOF forces, the teams that are put together.
    And I know you have some ideas about how the nature of--the 
composition of those teams should change in order to address 
some of these issues about new capabilities.
    And I wrote down a term, and I don't know if SOF is guilty 
of this, but I wrote down ``capability lock.'' They are locked 
in their current set of abilities and not able to make changes 
organizationally to add additional capabilities.
    I wonder if you can kind of relate those two issues.
    Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. Thanks for that question.
    I would associate myself with my good friend, General 
Nagata, on this, is that there is a static approach to it, and 
I think all bureaucracies kind of have a hard time changing.
    And as I mentioned in my opening remarks, USSOCOM, General 
Thomas had committed to an experimental force. That was quietly 
shelved by General Clarke.
    And I think a rigorous experimentation, looking at not only 
new technologies but new personnel skills. The 2lst century 
economy has created all kinds of new skills. And I think it is 
important for us to bring in people with new skills and figure 
out how we incorporate them on the battlefield.
    And it is not simply enough to say, well, we have got some 
people here at headquarters, that we can reach back. We need to 
be able to put these people at the tactical edge, out there on 
the missions.
    And we are not going to get there unless we do that 
fundamental reassessment of our missions and what we expect of 
our force and are willing to take creative risks, and we can do 
that with an experimentation force.
    Mr. Larsen. That is probably my minute and a half. I would 
just probably note, if we were able to do that, we might be 
able to broaden the attractiveness in recruitment.
    Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Representative Larsen.
    Now we will move to Representative Scott.
    Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I just want to mention this, first and foremost. I mean, 
all of us that are Members are responsible for making 
recommendations to the academy [inaudible] graduating class for 
the academies, that is probably what the leadership is going to 
look like in the military within the next--in the next 20 
years.
    And so interested in any comments on how we get more 
minority participation at the academy level, because, candidly, 
that is where the leadership is going to come from for the most 
part.
    I know, General Nagata, you went to Georgia State, which is 
in my home State. Great school.
    But I have several people that are of Indian heritage and 
Asian heritage, but I have very little minority participation 
when it comes to requesting a slot into the academies.
    So any thoughts on that particular issue and how we fix 
that? Because that is what our force structure is going to look 
like in the future at the command level.
    General Nagata, you want to take that?
    General Nagata. Yes, sir. Thank you.
    I completely agree that there needs to be more emphasis on 
all three of the forms of commissioning. So that would be the 
military academies, ROTC [Reserve Officers' Training Corps], 
and then every service has its own version of what I went to. I 
went to Officer Candidate School. It is the smallest producer 
of commissioned officers in the Army, but it is still 
significant.
    So all three need greater emphasis, but the nature of the 
emphasis is what matters. People will chase what they believe 
has an incentive that they want.
    And that is just not--I am not just talking about the 
recruits themselves. I am talking about the mechanism that Kate 
Germano used to serve within, the mechanisms the services have 
to identify and recruit more diverse populations.
    When is the last time--I am asking this rhetorically--when 
is the last time a recruiting official inside the Department of 
Defense was promoted because they successfully recruited a more 
diverse population? And when was the last time somebody was not 
promoted because they failed to recruit a more diverse 
population?
    That is only one example of the incentives I am talking 
about; people will do what they believe is in their best 
interest. If more people in DOD believe it is in their best 
interest to recruit more and bring in more diverse officers or 
enlisted personnel, it will absolutely happen. Right now that 
is not the case.
    Mr. Scott. Well, I guess my follow-up would be, I can't 
nominate somebody that doesn't apply for the nomination. And 
that is where--I mean, even when we have gone to principals and 
said, ``Hey, I need minorities who are good athletes, who have 
A's, and we have got scholarships for them.''
    And to be candid with you, the people in the school system 
just freeze up, and there is nothing--if you are targeting 
someone to help them, it is different than targeting somebody 
to hurt them, and we have just got to be able to have some more 
candid conversation, I think, around these issues in the public 
if we are going to get there.
    So for Mark Mitchell----
    General Nagata. Could I respond?
    Mr. Scott. Yes, sir.
    General Nagata. I will be very brief.
    I am going to repeat something I said in my prepared 
remarks. I think if you go looking for how much actual research 
there is on why or why not diverse candidates apply for 
military service, I think you will be as shocked as I was how 
little actual research there is.
    This topic is loaded with personal opinion, but that is not 
the same thing as research.
    Mr. Scott. That is right. That is right.
    Mr. Mitchell, in your testimony you suggest adding new 
military occupational specialties to ensure the right technical 
skills are resident in the SOF forces.
    Could you identify which specific occupational specialties 
you recommend adding and how they are essential to great power 
competition?
    Mr. Mitchell. Sure. Thank you for your question.
    I first want to just say my daughter is a senior at West 
Point getting ready to graduate this year. And I think the 
opportunities come, maybe think about going around the schools 
and going directly to the communities and the diasporas and 
making a pitch to them.
    On the issue of the SOF skills, I don't have a list, but I 
know there are things like artificial intelligence and machine 
learning that are important in the environment today, and it is 
not sufficient to take somebody who has not been through a 
rigorous assessment, selection, and training and to bolt them 
onto a team, because I think that adds undue risk.
    So I would look for USSOCOM and its components to create 
technical specialties for these operators, again, whether it is 
cyber, a SOF cyber operator who can be at the edge of the 
battlefield and it is not an additional duty on top of his 
weapons training in Army Special Forces, or something else; 
somebody who is specifically trained to do those kind of 
technical skills at the edge of the battlefield.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Mr. Scott.
    Mr. Scott. Thank you, Chairman.
    Mr. Gallego. Not a problem.
    The next round of questions goes to Representative Keating.
    Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I would like to thank the witnesses.
    I have two questions. Number one to Mr. Nagata.
    I was interested if you could go a little further on 
developing your opening remarks. I thought they were quite 
telling when you were talking about the importance of diversity 
and culture when it comes not just to our adversaries but where 
you deploy, the environment around where you are deployed, and 
how important that is to our success overall. If you could 
expand on that, I would appreciate it.
    General Nagata. Thank you, sir. I will try to come at this 
in two ways, but very briefly.
    First of all--and this does connect with the strain and 
stress on the force, but I am going to say it anyways because 
it is so important.
    The exposure in complex foreign environments is vital to 
developing the skills necessary for the kinds of contests of 
influence that permeate great power competition. This entire 
thing is a tug of war of U.S. influence versus our adversaries' 
influence over the countries, the nations, the populations that 
each of us are vying for the affection of. The more special 
operations forces can live and operate within those 
environments, the more effective they will be.
    It is one thing to learn a language at a language training 
lab in the United States. It is quite another thing to learn 
that language in the neighborhood where that is what everybody 
speaks.
    Now, of course, as soon as I say that, people say, ``Oh, 
more family separation.'' Well, here is the question that I 
don't think we have adequately wrestled with. Why, at least for 
noncombat deployments, why can't families go? Why can't 
families go to incentivize special operations personnel staying 
longer in these environments, to become more culturally 
linguistically capable, and thereby become better competitors 
against Russian, Chinese, or other actors that probably won't 
do that? That is one example.
    The second one--and, again, I will be brief for the sake of 
time--is that this is going to require special operations 
forces to invest more heavily in things that have nothing to do 
with weapons training. And I am going to use language training 
specifically.
    Whether it is abroad or at home, I think it is long past 
time for language proficiency to be a promotion requirement, 
not a ``nice to have.'' If you are going to get promoted, you 
have to demonstrate proficiency in a foreign language.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Keating. I think that the example you gave with Crimea 
and Ukraine demonstrates that as well.
    And thank you for your service.
    And I think this is an important issue. We are severely at 
a deficiency in that regard.
    A quick question, Ms. Germano, if I may.
    In terms of an issue that I have been dealing with for a 
number of years, as well as members of this committee have been 
dealing with, in terms of inclusion, could you comment on the 
status of women's health resources and how that can be 
problematic in the SOF environment?
    Colonel Germano. Thank you for the question.
    I think that that is actually related to both inclusion and 
equity.
    So we still find that there are barriers to women's service 
because of the equipment that they have to wear. And this is 
really the first year that we are seeing combat equipment be 
tailored to the female form. So I would say that it is maybe 
less of an inclusion issue and more of a long-term issue 
related to equity there.
    There is still a lot of work that needs to be done. I mean, 
I just heard a horror story about a woman who was actually 
jumping out of an aircraft with her breast pump so that she 
could immediately go to a vehicle and prepare for a meal for 
her child.
    So these are still issues both from a cultural perspective 
and then also [inaudible] perspective. We need to understand 
that these are just physiological medical issues. They are 
related to the health of the force, not specifically to the 
health of women.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Keating. I agree. Thank you so much for that.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Thank you for your service, ma'am.
    Colonel Germano. Thank you.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Mr. Keating.
    Our next person up is Mr. Waltz for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Waltz. Yeah. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    First, I just want to start with a comment. I want to 
associate myself with the comments from General Nagata, 
particularly in the language training. As an Army Special 
Forces officer, that is critical to what we do.
    I would be interested in his thoughts, but perhaps at 
another time, in expanding that training, at least through the 
SOF force, because the Navy, Air Force, and others do not have 
that training.
    I do want to make a broader point, and before I get into my 
questions, really for my colleagues. But also, Linda, it is 
great to see you again.
    I am hearing a lot of kind of zero-sum discussion on 
counterterrorism versus great power competition, the shift of 
the force, realigning the force, rightsizing the force.
    And I feel very strongly that participating in 
counterterrorism is often allowing us access and placement for 
great power competition. We have seen that in the Philippines 
where we have an ongoing counterterrorism force and Philippine 
officials are repeatedly telling us that the only reason that 
we still have a foothold in the Philippines at all, where 
obviously great power competition is at its height, is because 
of the counterterrorism assistance we are providing them.
    We have seen it in Kenya. We just saw it, actually a great 
example, in Mozambique, where the government first went to the 
Chinese, then went to the Russians, went to the Wagner Group, 
and a mercenary group.
    None of that worked. And now they are working with our 
Green Berets, who now have access and placement to understand 
what the Chinese and Russians are doing there, but it is 
because of that counterterrorism mission.
    So I think we need to be very careful about that kind of 
zero-sum mentality.
    Linda, my first question is for you. I keyed in on a 
statement where you said three women have received a Green 
Beret, but it is not where the force should be.
    So my first question, do you agree with the Army's move 
towards gender-neutral physical standards where they, I think--
and I will just tell you where I am--very rightly said to be a 
Green Beret or a Ranger or an infantryman requires a different 
level of physicality than to be a supply clerk or to be a pilot 
or to be a cyber warrior, and did away with gender standards, 
male and female, and made it more tailored towards the 
standards that the job required.
    And I will tell you, from my perspective, for me this 
discussion is about standards, not gender, race, religion, or 
creed, because that is what combat requires. I pushed for 
female engagement teams because there was a need on the 
battlefield. I pushed--actually just passed legislation helping 
with maternity uniforms. I think that was just discussed.
    But my concern is that, on the one hand, we make all of 
these areas accessible--and I think that is absolutely right--
but then a few years later we start questioning, well, why do 
we only have certain numbers in the force?
    So, one, do you agree with the gender-neutral standard 
physicality? And then my next question is, how many women have 
applied through the Special Forces course?
    Ms. Robinson. Thank you very much, Mike. Representative 
Waltz, it is great to see you, and I appreciate the question.
    And I do believe gender-neutral standards are important, 
and standards need to be high, because that is the essence of 
what special operations forces require. And people have 
mentioned the 1999 RAND study, which I did not participate in, 
but it is notable that there were a number of barriers 
identified regarding test scores, swimming requirements, and 
lack of role models.
    And I think there are a lot of subtle barriers that remain 
that can be addressed without lowering standards, which was one 
of the concerns expressed by those in the 2016 study, as well 
as effect on unit cohesion.
    But I think training and socialization to prepare 
candidates to be successful can help more candidates meet those 
standards.
    And then----
    Mr. Waltz. Linda?
    Ms. Robinson. Yes.
    Mr. Waltz. So you disagree with the decision then that the 
Army just made where they are now reversing course and going 
back to male and female physical standards?
    And one of the reasons was because they said, well, in the 
combat arms, obviously, that affects your ability to promote 
and your ability to rise and your ability to have access. And 
now they are getting a lot of pressure that having one standard 
is now discriminatory.
    So it seems to me some groups are talking out of both sides 
of their mouth here. On the one hand, allow full access and the 
standards matter, they shouldn't be lowered, we shouldn't have 
tokenism; but when we don't have a certain number to get 
through, then we are having to--you know, there is a lot of 
pressure on the Army to now reverse course, and they have 
actually just made the decision to reverse course.
    So now we are going to have male and female standards for 
the infantry, for Special Forces, for artillery, and last I 
checked, enemies' bullets don't care. Carrying that guy to the 
helicopter doesn't care. The artillery round doesn't care. It 
is a standard.
    Mr. Gallego. Mr. Waltz----
    Mr. Waltz. So do you agree with that move then?
    Mr. Gallego. We have to cut that short. If you want to do a 
yes/no answer or a maybe.
    Ms. Robinson. Yes. And I would be happy to follow up. Thank 
you.
    Mr. Gallego. We will also conduct a second round of 
questions for those members that have further questions.
    Mr. Waltz. Great. Thanks.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Mr. Waltz. Appreciate it.
    Next we are turning this over to Representative--Vice 
Chair, I should say--Stephanie Murphy.
    Mrs. Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And thank you to our witnesses today.
    I wanted to kind of pull the thread a little bit on what 
General Nagata said around the idea that a lot of the conflict 
is in the gray zone, and even looking at what SOCOM has done in 
setting up info ops, sort of a fusion center for that, and 
elevating those capabilities.
    I used to work in OSD Policy in SO/LIC, SOCT [Special 
Operations and Combating Terrorism], and then I was out at the 
Pacific Command in the J3 [Operations Directorate]. And at that 
time there was this sort of distinction between white SOF and 
black SOF. And white SOF tends to have the skill set that we 
are talking about in the info ops space, in that kind of--you 
know, it is our MISOs. It is our folks who are trained that 
way.
    But back in the early 2000s there was quite a bit of 
discrimination, maybe, or prejudice, that white SOF wasn't 
really SOF.
    One, can you talk to me a bit about whether that culture 
has changed around that? And if it hasn't, does it impact your 
ability to grow that capability? And how can we change that 
cultural lens in order to encourage recruitment and retainment 
in that area?
    General Nagata. Thank you very much. This is such an 
enormous topic, but I will try to be brief.
    A little unusual. If you take my career in special 
operations, cut it literally in half, half of my time was in--I 
actually don't like these terms, but I will use them--black 
SOF, the other in white SOF. So I have seen it from both sides.
    I would argue that right after 9/11, not just special 
operations, but the whole U.S. military's obvious priority was 
capturing and killing terrorists. We then learned over time 
that capturing and killing terrorists is great if we are trying 
to save people's lives, but it actually doesn't do a thing to 
reduce the volume of terrorism that we are having to deal with.
    And so over time I watched the SOF community suddenly start 
remembering, oh, yeah, these other skills we have, in 
psychological operations, in information operations, in local 
capacity building, in being better at interacting with other 
departments and agencies of the U.S. Government, like USAID 
[United States Agency for International Development], like 
State Department, the intelligence community, those are just as 
important as our ability to kill or capture terrorists.
    So it reminds me of what Churchill said about Americans: We 
will always do the right thing after we exhaust every other 
alternative.
    So I think there has been a reawakening in the SOF 
community, now that we are in great power competition, now that 
increasingly we are seeing this as a war of influence, where 
occasionally we will need to use bullets and bombs, but more 
frequently we will have to solve very complex problems that do 
not involve the use of physical force.
    So things like the WebOpsCenter, things like our 
psychological operations organizations, other things that we 
can train our SOF operators on will become increasingly 
important that have nothing to do with using physical force.
    But, frankly, is there still a tug of war between the 
kinetic and nonkinetic sides of SOF? Sure, there is, and 
perhaps there always will be. But the bias clearly needs to be 
on anything that helps us engage in a war of influence.
    Mrs. Murphy. And so to follow on to that, a lot of the way 
in which you can drive the Department and the services into 
making certain missions priorities is through appropriations 
and resources.
    Do you feel like the allocation of resources is appropriate 
for the direction in which the special ops should be going in?
    General Nagata. No. And I will give you two reasons why. 
One is an example. This is specific to counterterrorism, but it 
is pretty much true for everything.
    My last position, I was the Director of Strategy at the 
National Counterterrorism Center. I did an annual review of 
what we euphemistically called the counterterrorism budget of 
the United States. There really is no such thing, as I am sure 
you are aware. But we did the best we could at analyzing where 
money went when it came to counterterrorism.
    I doubt you will be surprised to know that well over 90 
percent of all annual appropriations for counterterrorism 
activities go towards the use of physical force against 
terrorists and 1 percent or less goes to anything that might 
relate to nonkinetic approaches to counterterrorism.
    And that is not the same thing as great power competition, 
but I will bet any empirical analysis of where money is going 
for great power competition would probably show you a very 
similar disproportionate distribution.
    Finally, so long as documents, very important documents, 
like the National Defense Strategy, and just rhetoric coming 
out of U.S. Government and DOD policymakers emphasize words 
like ``get more lethal,'' they are inadvertently undermining 
investments that don't involve bombs and bullets.
    Mrs. Murphy. Thank you.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Representative Murphy.
    Now moving on to Representative Franklin.
    Mr. Franklin. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you. I really appreciate the testimony of the 
witnesses this morning. As a new member of the committee, this 
is really helping me expand my understanding, particularly 
around the area of ASD(SO/LIC).
    And I guess my first question will be for Mr. Mitchell.
    Regarding ASD(SO/LIC), since you have held this role, what 
should this committee be considering in the form of oversight 
regarding the structures and authorities for that role going 
forward? You have talked about this a little bit, but I would 
love for you to expand on that a little bit more.
    Mr. Mitchell. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Franklin, for that.
    I think the committee should focus on, first of all, the 
relationship that ASD(SO/LIC) actually does have with the 
Secretary in enforcing the law, that it cannot be interfered 
with and there's administrative duties as opposed to the 
operational role.
    And I think the other piece is the resourcing of ASD(SO/
LIC). As I mentioned earlier, they have only got a staff of 
about 40. They are growing it.
    But over time, they need to add the specialists that can 
help them address all of the core civilian functions that they 
deal with. And that is acquisition, auditing, the Comptroller, 
information management, the Inspector General, leg 
[legislative] affairs, public affairs, research and 
development.
    Those are all inherently civilian-led functions that 
currently, if truth be told, are controlled by the SOCOM 
commander in this enterprise and really need to be transferred 
to the direct control of ASD(SO/LIC).
    Mr. Franklin. Okay. Thank you.
    General Nagata, you had mentioned that our special 
operations forces are inadequately preparing for great power 
competition. You cited a couple of ways we could be doing 
things better, such as language training, recruitment policies 
and procedures.
    Could you expand on that a little more? Are there areas, 
other areas, that you think we could be doing a better job of 
preparing for great power competition?
    General Nagata. Thank you.
    I did not intend to convey that SOF is unprepared. I do 
think it could be better prepared.
    Part of this is inhibited by what I have already talked 
about. There is so much emphasis on getting ready for a high-
end conflict in the Department of Defense that it inadvertently 
reduces the incentive for SOCOM and special operations forces 
to either sustain or increase their investments in nonkinetic 
solutions, capacity building, things that don't involve direct 
combat, because the noise that is drumming in everybody's ears 
is get more lethal.
    But perhaps more practically, I think it is time for 
another review of the authorities by which combatant commanders 
and the SOCOM commander can deploy forces abroad. In the last 
20 years, most of the new authorities have been exclusively for 
counterterrorism purposes, and there is nothing wrong with 
that, because counterterrorism was such a priority at the time. 
Some of that is fungible for the kinds of deployments that are 
needed now.
    But it begs the question, if we need to send special 
operations personnel to a part of the world where there is no 
declared terrorist threat, but there is an enormous struggle 
over American influence in that part of the world that we may 
not be winning--in many cases we are not winning those 
contests--are there existing authorities, is there existing 
funding to undergird the deployment and the operations and the 
maintenance of a substantial special operations effort in that 
part of the world?
    I would argue in large measure I think it would require all 
of the DOD lawyers to go scrambling to figure out how they 
could take legacy counterterrorism authorities and somehow 
twist them to comport with great power competition. I think it 
is time to look for perhaps a new batch of authorities.
    Mr. Franklin. Thank you.
    You had mentioned--when we were talking about the stress 
and strain on the force, that had me thinking down a different 
line. And there may not be enough time to fully dive into this, 
and I can submit it later for a deeper response from everyone 
on the panel. I would really love your opinions.
    But I was a 26-year operator, not Special Forces, but a 
naval aviator, and it is just part of the military culture and 
ethos that you just suck it up and get things done. I mean, 
that is part of what makes it such a special job.
    And sometimes we are our own worst enemies, that we don't 
push back when probably we should, and that is part of the 
bravado culture. But I am also tired of burying friends of 
mine, as I have had a number of friends who have committed 
suicide after leaving their service.
    I agree with you that this is not going to be a pivot 
situation. It is not a CT ``or'' great power competition. It is 
going to be an ``and.'' And the burden is going to be on the 
troops to suck it up and get the job done.
    What can we be doing from an oversight role to help our 
Active Duty forces help themselves? When it comes to support 
for mental counseling, I liked your--the thought was an 
interesting one about having families deploy in a noncombat 
situation. But I would love to get yours' and others' thoughts 
on how we can be better supporting our Active Duty forces in 
that regard.
    General Nagata. Sir, I will be very brief. Two suggestions.
    One, I think we should examine the distribution and the 
density of psychological professional support inside special 
operations forces. In the community I grew up, there was lots 
of psychological support in some units; in others very little.
    The entire force needs more psychological professional 
support so that the commanders, as they are making hard choices 
about when to deploy people, how long to deploy people, there 
is a psychological professional at their side giving them 
advice about the intangible nonphysical stress on the force, 
which, in my judgment, is in many ways more dangerous than the 
physical strain on the force.
    The second one is about how at the policy level, at the 
policy level, and this I think dovetails nicely into the 
conversations about ASD(SO/LIC) and the things it needs to be 
able to do that it can't----
    Mr. Gallego. General Nagata, please wrap up.
    General Nagata. ASD(SO/LIC) needs to be able to fund 
research.
    Mr. Gallego. There you go. That is a good one.
    Okay. Perfect.
    Thank you, General Nagata.
    Thank you, Representative Franklin.
    We are going to move now to Representative Bacon.
    Mr. Bacon. Thank you. I appreciate that, Mr. Chair.
    And I thank our panelists.
    I have just got a couple of comments because most of my 
questions were already asked. But this debate a little bit on 
how much should Special Forces be focusing on near-peer 
competitors [audio malfunction] National Defense Strategy, I 
think is right with the near-peer competitor focus.
    Our Special Forces needs to be the champion or the premier 
capability against counterterror. We are still going to need 
that capability. And so they should be the experts on that, in 
my view.
    Secondly, when we are talking about culture, we have got to 
be careful we don't throw the baby out with the bathwater here. 
We want warrior culture. We want people with indomitable 
spirit. Not to say we can't have refinements, not to say people 
don't need to seek support after continuous deployments.
    But the fact is we want warriors. We want people who have a 
high confidence they are going to win on the battlefield there.
    And I say that as someone, I have had two different 
deployments with the Special Forces, though I was on the 
conventional side, and I also did information operations. But I 
was so impressed with the team.
    My one area of question is, there is no doubt that the 
OPSTEMPO [operations tempo] and the continuous combat 
deployments have a strain. Are we seeing this OPSTEMPO get 
better? Is it starting to go down? My sense is that it is, but 
I am not sure that is really the case.
    And I will just yield to anybody who may have some 
information on that.
    Thank you.
    Ms. Robinson. I can address that.
    The OPTEMPO has indeed improved. Fifteen percent decline in 
deployments was the official SOCOM figure, but they have not 
yet reached the desired deployment-to-dwell ratio of 1:2, much 
less to 1:3. So there is, I think, demonstrable evidence that 
the force is still being overdeployed.
    And I just want to take this moment to acknowledge, I in no 
way would disagree that counterterrorism is a critical and core 
mission for SOF. It is simply the rebalance, in my view, is not 
sufficient.
    And I also think throughout the last 20 years we have 
overemphasized the tactical direct action aspect rather than 
trying to affect the pipeline and trying to affect the long 
term. And some of our signal successes have been, I will note, 
building the counterterrorism service in Iraq, which actually 
fought most of the counter-ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and 
Syria] fight.
    So I am an advocate for strategic use of our force and 
finding allies and partners and building them to take on much 
of these lesser roles.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Bacon. I would have to agree with you on that one. We 
can train our allies to do many of these missions. That is a 
force multiplier. So you have got my vote on that one.
    Anybody else?
    Mr. Mitchell. Good morning, Representative Bacon.
    I would just like to add here, I had a long discussion with 
a good friend of mine in 5th [Special Forces] Group the other 
day. And first of all, their POTFF, the way they have 
integrated all of their abilities there, I think is a great 
model. I would encourage the committee to go take a look at 
that.
    And on the issue of deployability, General Nagata touched 
on this, and I think it is important to remember, men and women 
go into our communities, in the SOF community, because they 
want to be actively engaged.
    So my own experience as a commander in the community and 
then as ASD(SO/LIC) is that a 1:2 is probably about right. I 
think when we get to 1:3, we really start to kind of lose our 
edge of what we need to stay engaged downrange.
    So I think there is no denying it has gotten better. People 
are looking for predictability and sustainability.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Bacon. I thank you.
    I yield back, Mr. Chair.
    Mr. Gallego. Next to Chairman Takano.
    Mr. Takano. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman Gallego, for 
inviting me to this hearing. And as chairman of the House 
Veterans' Affairs Committee, I believe we really do have to 
work together to support all veterans who have worn the uniform 
of our great Nation, including women, racial and ethnic 
minorities, Native Americans, and members of the LGBT [lesbian, 
gay, bisexual, transgender] community.
    Today's service members are tomorrow's veterans, and in the 
case of the Reserve and National Guard, some are both.
    Now, understanding today's challenges will help us support 
the veterans community in years to come.
    My first questions are for General Nagata.
    In your testimony, your testimony notes that there is a 
shortage of longitudinal research on the specific impacts of 
the effects of deployments, prolonged combat exposure to blasts 
and trauma, family separation, and so on, as related to SOF.
    My first question. Mental health and suicide prevention are 
among my top priorities, and based on your observation in 30 
years in the SOF community, how would you characterize the 
impact of high operational tempo in the mental health of SOF 
operators and enablers?
    General Nagata. Thank you, sir.
    Obviously, not being an expert in this field, all I can 
tell you is that I am convinced that the strain and stresses of 
particularly the last two decades have had lasting, in some 
cases devastating, mental health and psychological impacts on 
too many of my brethren over the last 20 years.
    I, myself, have some psychological issues because of some 
of the strains and stresses in my career. I have learned to 
live with them.
    Number one, I should have been more aggressive in seeking 
help, and, frankly, there should have been more help available. 
A lot of that has gotten better over the years, but I still 
don't think it is where it needs to be.
    But, much more importantly, going back to your reference to 
my prepared remarks, there are a lot of people who believe that 
because there is a fair amount of research about the U.S. 
military broadly and the impact of war, that special operations 
forces are, therefore, covered. They are not covered.
    Special operations forces operate differently. We have a 
different culture. As a general rule, we have a higher 
deployment rate. We get involved in situations that nobody else 
in the Department gets involved in.
    So I will just reiterate my original argument. There needs 
to be SOF-specific research on the impact of everything from 
deployment tempo to the effects of blast and trauma and 
everything in between if we are to be more effective in helping 
people like I once was.
    Mr. Takano. Sir, General, do you think that there are 
additional factors, such as the threat or experience of 
military sexual trauma, that also might be of concern for women 
who served in SOF?
    General Nagata. Yes, there are, because there are females 
that serve in special operations commands around the world. 
They are just as vulnerable to the kinds of misbehavior and 
mistreatment that females can be vulnerable to anywhere else in 
the force.
    I am unaware of any studies or scientific research into 
whether it is disproportionate in SOF, but I have personally 
witnessed females being mistreated in special operations 
forces. I have had to take Uniform Code of Military Justice 
action against such perpetrators.
    Mr. Takano. Can you tell me how you think the Department of 
Veterans Affairs might be leveraged to assist with the 
longitudinal research that you have alluded to?
    General Nagata. Two ways.
    One is, I suspect, I am not familiar with the data holdings 
of the Veterans Affairs Administration, but I would imagine 
they have abundant data that could contribute to such research.
    But secondly, frankly, sir, over the course of my career, 
the number of times I had reason to care about what the 
Veterans Administration was doing for myself and my operators 
was almost zero, and it shouldn't be that way.
    Perhaps that was partially my fault. Maybe I should have 
been conducting greater outreach. But I cannot actually ever 
remember a conversation in my career where the Veterans 
Administration's roles, missions, or contributions figured 
prominently, and it shouldn't be that way.
    Mr. Takano. Well, thank you for that.
    Lieutenant Colonel Germano, your testimony highlights the 
impact of emotions, not facts, on resistance to the integration 
of women into SOF elements. Even though women like Virginia 
Hall were part of SOF in its earlier days, when it was known as 
the Office of Strategic Services, the inertia remains.
    How can that resistance contribute to gender-based 
violence, such as sexual harassment and assault? And how can 
that resistance be overcome?
    Colonel Germano. Thank you for the question. And I 
appreciate your mentioning the historical figure there.
    I think that that is a really interesting point in that the 
individual that you brought up is a pioneer, and virtually 
every other woman who has followed her into the special 
operations community has been a pioneer. So there is a lack of 
density in the community when it comes to how we are bringing 
individuals who are not of the majority group.
    So I think that part of this issue is about solving the 
recruiting problem, and then part of this issue is about the 
culture in and of itself.
    When we think of resistance to change, it is all emotion 
driven. And so there is a lot of anger. There is a lot of 
skepticism. There are a lot of feelings of perceived loss if we 
broaden the aperture for bringing in people who don't fit the 
dominant group.
    We have to be willing to address those emotions first on, 
first by normalizing them and saying it is understandable that 
you may feel these things. And then there needs to be some 
semblance of justification to not only why it is important to 
make the change, but also how bringing in additional people who 
don't look like the majority group will actually make the group 
stronger.
    And that goes to my point about needing tangible studies 
that demonstrate why bringing in nondominant-group members make 
the force more lethal and more operationally competent.
    I hope that answered that question.
    Mr. Takano. Thank you so much.
    Mr. Mitchell, while you were at the Pentagon, how did the 
Preservation of the Force----
    Mr. Gallego. I apologize, Chair Takano, your 5 minutes are 
up. But we are going to do second rounds. And so if you stick 
around, I am sure not everyone is going to have a second 
question and you could continue with any questions you want.
    Mr. Takano. Sure. Thank you, Chairman Gallego. And if I can 
come back, I will do that. Otherwise, I will submit it for the 
record.
    Mr. Gallego. Okay. Thank you, Chairman. I really appreciate 
it.
    So we are going to go to second rounds, and I am going to 
start the rotation again.
    I think I would like in general to have a general question 
to the panel of what is the advantage of a more diverse SOF 
that is more reflective of America in race, ethnicity, and 
gender, and why is this important and what we gain from this in 
the global fight.
    And the reason I am asking this is because what I want to 
make sure people understand is we want diversity because we 
think that makes us more effective, not for the sake of 
diversity.
    And I think that is something that we need to communicate 
out there because I think there is a lot of misinformation 
where somehow we are asking for diversity because we somehow 
want to be more progressive.
    Can I start with Germano? Could you start and give us your 
opinion?
    Colonel Germano. Yes. And I appreciate you making the 
distinction.
    And I want to start off by saying that is really where a 
lot of the resistance comes from, this general perception by 
the majority of the military public that we are just doing this 
to check the block.
    And so this idea that we don't have any real studies that 
quantify how minorities make us a stronger force is a real 
linchpin to the potential success of not only the force in the 
future, but also diversity, equity, and inclusion efforts.
    The only way to reduce doubt and skepticism is by 
addressing the doubts and skepticism, that's the emotional 
aspect, but then also being able to provide facts, saying, 
look, these are the individuals who have these skills that are 
then contributing to the operational mission.
    And right now we don't have that. We are trying to take 
civilian studies and case studies from the finance and tech 
sectors, for example, and apply what makes them successful to 
the military, and it is comparing apples to oranges.
    So I hope that helped.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you.
    Mr. Mitchell.
    Mr. Mitchell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I would harken back to General Nagata's comments earlier 
and my own remarks. This is a global competition that we are 
in.
    And populations are also mobile. In the Middle East, you 
find large populations from Asia, from the Philippines, from 
Sri Lanka, from Bangladesh. And that is all over the world.
    We have this great human capital here. And in the 
furtherance of operational effectiveness, looking at global 
competition and building influence, that is why we need these 
men and women with native cultural and language skills.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you.
    Ms. Robinson.
    Ms. Robinson. I would just note that women make up half the 
population, yes, so we really need to ensure their ability to 
connect. And we saw with the use of the FETs [female engagement 
teams] as mentioned, these cultural support teams, having women 
in the formation were of great value.
    And just simply the language and cultural understanding to 
operate across the world is just a direct requirement for a 
more diverse force.
    And I would like to say I think the issue of standards can 
really be something of a shibboleth. We need to address the 
barriers that have been identified, and recruitment and 
retention should be part of special operations forces' 
priority.
    So once you get a more diverse force, you need to work to 
keep it and to promote it.
    Mr. Gallego. Great.
    And, General Nagata.
    General Nagata. Thank you, sir.
    I mentioned in my prepared remarks I have been responsible 
for two different assessment selection courses in SOF, and in 
both instances the maxim that we held to was our job was not to 
produce the world's greatest door kickers, although door 
kicking is involved.
    Our highest responsibility was to develop the world's 
greatest problem solvers. And there is no more wicked problem 
today than great power competition, and a lot of it will not 
involve shooting anybody, but it will require outcompeting 
everybody.
    So one of the oldest truths about problem solving is the 
more homogeneous your team is for solving the problem, the less 
likely you are to find the solution. The more heterogeneous 
your team is, the more likely you are to solve the problem.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Mr. Nagata.
    And now I will turn to Ranking Member Kelly for a second 
round of questions.
    Mr. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And I want to start with--and I am going to use a new 
movie, ``The Liberator,'' which I watched, about the 
Thunderbird Division at Anzio and other places.
    But in one part at the end of the movie, Felix Sparks is 
talking to General Patton, and General Patton gives his 40 
years of experience and all of the theaters and wars that he 
has been involved in, and he says, ``My days in actual combat 
are less than yours.'' And Felix Sparks' were consecutive.
    General Nagata, you understand what I am talking about. 
Psychological teams at the point nearest to the actual action 
is required and necessary. I know that from personal 
experience, whether you want it as a combat soldier or not.
    And I will tell you, all combat experiences are not the 
same. And I would say the professional operators and the amount 
and intensity of the conflicts that they are involved is much 
different.
    So I agree that we need psychological warriors in the 
formation with them at all times, and I also think that we need 
to research them specifically.
    I want to go to my next point, and some of these you may 
have to take for the record. But we have the Tuskegee Airmen, 
we have the 442nd Regimental Combat Team, we have African 
Americans which were segregated in World War II and World War 
I, which led to now the integration of the forces. But that is 
not the right solution, so I am not saying that.
    But what ideas or what ways can we do it the right way this 
time when we are inclusive of women or people who are different 
and diverse? How can we as a DOD, how can we specially address 
this problem?
    And then the second question is, is what tools and metrics 
and gates can we use to have truly measurable results on the 
impact that these things are having in changing the force?
    And I teach this to kids all the time, our young soldiers 
or young staffers, and I tell them, ``Choose your mentors 
well.''
    But I think we need to have a program where our mentors are 
focused and forced to choose their proteges well, and they need 
to be diverse to make sure that they have ownership in their 
successes.
    And if you guys can answer that.
    And, Ruben, just cut me off when time is up.
    Mr. Gallego. You got it.
    You want to start? Why don't we start with Ms. Robinson.
    Ms. Robinson. Yes. Thank you.
    I think this is a critically important point. And I think 
that while SOF recruits primarily from the services, it also 
has direct accession as well. And I think it is critically 
important that SOF do more in partnership with the services to 
recruit a diverse candidate pool.
    Retired members of the community from diverse backgrounds 
should be engaged to help with this recruitment. More funding 
for recruitment at Historically Black Colleges and Universities 
can help encourage people, thus recruited, to branch into SOF 
fields.
    So it is a panoply of efforts across the recruitment 
spectrum.
    And then, as I mentioned, I think it is very important for 
senior leaders to be vocal and visible on this front and send a 
clear message that diversity is a priority; and, similarly, 
responding to incidences of bias or hazing.
    This has to require a swift and uniform response, and I 
think it has been--there is still a cultural bias, as I 
mentioned, mentioning the statistics earlier, and the 
leadership of the SOF community has to embrace this as the top 
priority.
    And I would note, I think that having the Secretary of 
Defense in the leadership role on this, he has been very clear, 
and he, himself, is modeling some of the needed behaviors.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Kelly. Hey, Ruben, if I can reclaim? I have one more I 
would like.
    Mr. Gallego. Yes.
    Mr. Kelly. And, really, guys, I really want you to submit 
for the record ideas on this.
    But my second thing is, are we measuring the right 
attributes for our special forces warriors or our warriors in 
general, regardless of which service they are in? You know, the 
CT test or armed combat physical test, are we measuring the 
things that really matter?
    Because, let me tell you, a 110-pound person cannot drag me 
off the battlefield. I weigh 220 pounds. So I don't care 
whether they are male, female, Asian, it does not matter, the 
physical impossibility.
    But are we measuring the right things to make sure that we 
have combat effectiveness? And are we using the right tools?
    I think we are using an antiquated system of what it means 
to be a warrior in order. Because let me tell you what it 
takes. It takes physical endurance. It takes mental toughness. 
It takes stamina. It takes the ability not to quit. Those 
things are not measurable in push-ups or sit-ups or a 2-mile 
run, but all those things also go into measurement.
    So I would also be interested in what units of measurement 
should we be able to use right now to truly test the combat 
readiness of our warriors?
    Mr. Gallego. We are about less than a minute for that.
    Who would you like that question to go to, Representative 
Kelly?
    Mr. Kelly. General Nagata, because I think from his thing 
he may have the best answer on that.
    Mr. Gallego. Okay. General Nagata.
    General Nagata. Thank you.
    This is going to sound like a biased answer because I come 
from the special operations community. But my personal opinion 
is if there is any force in the Department of Defense who gets 
it more right than wrong when it comes to what are we trying to 
select for, what are we looking for, it is the special 
operations community.
    In my view, the two most important examples of this are--
one I have already mentioned. Much of our development program 
is based on giving people a problem that actually can't be 
solved, there is no right answer, but they never quit. As long 
as they never quit, they are the right cut of cloth for us. It 
is when they start quitting that we realize, nope, you can't be 
a special operator.
    The second one is a desire, a natural propensity for being 
in complexity. Most people, if given a choice between being in 
a simple environment or a complex environment, will always 
choose the simple environment. The best people we select in 
SOF, they go the other way: Oh, that is more complex, let me in 
there.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Mr. Nagata.
    Now we will move on to Representative Larsen.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    And my next set of questions are first for Ms. Germano on 
this issue that Ranking Member Kelly brought up about combat 
effectiveness. And this can apply to anyone, but I want Ms. 
Germano to answer it first because it seems that the definition 
of combat is changing as well. It is very different than it was 
20 years ago when we were literally kicking down doors in 
Afghanistan and Iraq.
    So if it is changing, how can that be put into the 
organization so that the training and standards match what kind 
of combat we are going to expect from SOF?
    And then next, does that not open the aperture for any 
number of other kinds of folks to be interested in being part 
of SOF?
    So a very loaded question. There is only one answer, but go 
ahead and answer it.
    Colonel Germano. Yes or no, yes or no, yes or no.
    It is an interesting predicament because we can't predict 
what is going to happen in the future, but what we can do is we 
can take past data and past types of conflict to assess what 
skills are most needed.
    And I think that one of the areas where we have missed the 
boat in terms of recruiting efforts, specifically for Special 
Forces, but also largely for the military in general, is that 
we don't take operational plans and the risks that we are 
assessing as potential imminent conflicts, we don't translate 
those down into recruiting goals and metrics.
    So I think that there is a lot of work to be done to 
connect the dots between the two, because, as was mentioned 
earlier, there is a really long tooth to tail to get kids in 
the pipeline and actually qualified to speak a language and do 
all those other things.
    So I think really this idea about predicting which 
conflicts are going to happen and then what skills people will 
need to be successful, that has to be connected back to 
recruiting, and there has to be growth in terms of how our 
recruiting force in general looks at who the best candidates 
are to fit those needs.
    There are a lot of assumptions, there are a lot of 
assumptions that go into recruiting kids, and there are a lot 
of stereotypes that are in the minds of the recruiters who are 
approaching kids to join the service.
    So when we think about propensity to serve, that is not 
really a scientific term, and it is loaded because that is all 
influenced by the stereotypes and biases that the recruiting 
force has. So we need to work on that as well.
    Mr. Larsen. As a follow-up, let's fast forward 10 years, 
let's say 10 years, and instead of two or three women in the 
Green Berets, it is a much larger number, and many more women 
across all of the special operators.
    Today, would they have the support network to even serve? 
And what kind of changes do we need to make to personnel 
policy, to family leave, to childcare within the military to 
actually be supportive?
    Because I am sure that we have done the same thing for all 
the men in the special operations forces over the last 40 
years. That is, address some of the needs. Not all of them. 
Clearly, that is why we have POTFF.
    But we would need to make those changes, but those don't 
even--those don't exist now at all. I mean, we are not doing 
anything to support this. Even if we were able to recruit, we 
are not doing much of anything to help support inclusion. And 
we ought to, it seems.
    Colonel Germano. As I mentioned a little bit earlier, this 
goes back to not only how we are bringing people into the 
pipeline, but how we look at diversity as an actual force 
multiplier.
    When I was in the Marine Corps, for example, I can't tell 
you the number of times I would have--obviously, the smallest 
service with the fewest women--I would have male Marines send 
me their female Marines to talk about things like uniform 
regulations and conduct in the barracks.
    We need to rethink how we think about inclusion. Those are 
leadership issues. They are not leadership by a woman to a 
woman issue. I would never have turned away a male Marine to 
talk about leadership or any other type of disciplinary or 
good-of-the-force issue.
    So we really need to get past this idea of we need to have 
a certain number of women in a unit before we can assign more 
women there. We need to understand the value that diverse 
members bring to these organizations, and we need to embrace 
that.
    And then we need to hold people accountable for doing the 
leadership things rather than thinking we can ship people off 
to other women so that they can deal with the women's issues.
    I hope that touched on that question.
    Mr. Larsen. It does, and that is fine.
    And I would yield back to the chairman, but he is probably 
taking his dog for a walk.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you.
    Now let's go to Representative Scott.
    Mr. Scott. I want to say one thing, Chairman Takano 
mentioned this, on the veteran suicide. And I hope everybody on 
this committee will recognize how the Tax Code works against 
our people that are hurt in combat.
    And I did not realize this until a few years ago when I was 
taking a young man, who had lost both of his legs to an IED 
[improvised explosive device], hunting.
    And he said, ``Yeah, I tried to go back to work, but if I 
work more than X number of hours, I lose my Social Security 
benefits. So I actually have more money if I don't work.''
    And our special operators, whether it is black or white 
operations, are high-performance individuals. And when you take 
somebody like that and you force them to sit at home because of 
the Tax Code, not having a way to take care of their family, 
that is a problem. And I think that is where some of the 
suicides come from.
    And so maybe we can work together with the Ways and Means 
Committee to try to fix some of those problems so our people 
who are combat-wounded total and permanent [disability] can go 
to work without having less money at the end of the month.
    One of the things that was mentioned--and I think it was 
Ms. Germano that mentioned the perception of the United States 
military and how our faithful rating has come down over the 
last several years.
    And my question gets to what we see in the media with 
regard to the military. And when I say ``media,'' I don't just 
mean the news, I mean the entertainment industry as well, and 
then what we see from other countries in the gray area of 
warfare, the social misinformation that is out there on the 
internet.
    What role do you think the entertainment industry is having 
on the perception of the United States military? And what role 
do you think our foreign adversaries with social media are 
having?
    Colonel Germano. That is a really interesting question. I 
will tell you, just if I were to Google the number of movies 
about combat women, women in the services who are combat 
veterans, I could probably think of three and find three.
    The majority of coverage related to women and women 
veterans has to do with sexual assault. And so I think--I am 
not downplaying the issue. It is a significant issue for both 
men and women. But I think the way women are portrayed in the 
media can lend itself to a viewpoint that women are not 
warriors, and nothing could be further from the truth.
    Misinformation plays a role in how our service members 
think about women and other minorities in the military. They 
are reading this stuff on Facebook. They are seeing photos and 
memes.
    So they are just as influenced and susceptible as the 
average American in terms of our adversaries exploiting the 
issues, the negative issues, related to having disciplinary 
issues or, for example, sexual assault.
    Our service men and women are active on social media. They 
are seeing that stuff. They are influenced by it. It is a 
problem.
    Mr. Scott. I had a general suggest to me that I watch the 
documentary ``Social Dilemma'' and it was pretty eye-opening. 
And I think that it is a problem not just in our troops or 
younger people, I think it is a problem all over the United 
States with how much screen time people get.
    And I guess what I was getting at, ma'am, I consider Ebola 
one of the greatest things, the stamping out of it. That was 
the United States military that we sent to another country to 
stamp out Ebola. You don't ever see anything about that on the 
news. I guess it is not entertaining for the entertainment 
industry.
    But basically if you are watching something that comes out 
of Hollywood, it is basically a group of special operators 
kicking down a door. And for the most part--and I don't know 
how to say this other than to say it--for the most part it is 
White men kicking down a door and killing people that are from 
the Middle East.
    And that is not the perception that we want of the United 
States military. But if that is what Hollywood puts out over 
and over and over again, then it becomes significantly harder 
for us to overcome that as the perception of the United States 
military.
    But I appreciate all of you, and I hope you will pay 
attention to what I said on the Tax Code with regard to 
military suicide because that is a very serious problem for our 
people that are combat-wounded total and permanent.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Representative Scott.
    Now Representative Brown.
    Representative Brown? I thought we had him on earlier.
    Representative Larsen then. Do you have more questions?
    Mr. Larsen. I have no further questions, Mr. Chair.
    Mr. Gallego. Representative Murphy.
    Sorry about putting people on the spot. Feel free to say 
no
    Okay. Let's go to Representative Takano.
    I think you had a follow-up that you wanted to finish.
    Alrighty then. I am striking out here. And that is fine. I 
feel like we are getting a lot done.
    What about Representative Franklin? Do you have any follow-
ups?
    As we say in the Marine Corps, any last rounds?
    Okay.
    And I see that Takano is back on.
    Chairman Takano, did you have a follow-up question?
    Not sure he can hear us.
    Okay. Well, pretty sure then I am going to close this 
hearing.
    Thank you, everyone, for your time. I apologize that I was 
getting attacked by a black bear here this whole time and a 
little distracting. But I really feel this was a really great 
opportunity for us to learn.
    And I hope you will submit some suggestions for the record. 
I think Ranking Member Kelly and myself and the members are 
always looking to see how we can improve, and especially with 
the NDAA coming up, seeing if we can do anything there.
    So thank you again.
    Ms. Robinson. Thank you so much for the opportunity.
    [Whereupon, at 1:09 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]



      
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                            A P P E N D I X

                             March 26, 2021

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              PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                             March 26, 2021

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              QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                             March 26, 2021

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                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GALLEGO

    Mr. Gallego. While you were at the Pentagon, how did the 
Preservation of the Force and Family program extend to those who were 
no longer in the special operations community, such as SOF enablers who 
had returned to the conventional force, or veterans?
    Mr. Mitchell. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
    Mr. Gallego. The House Veterans Affairs Committee is currently 
conducting an investigation into the prevalence of white supremacy in 
the veteran community. What questions should we specifically be asking 
regarding current and former members of the special operations 
community?
    Mr. Mitchell. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
    Mr. Gallego. The House Veterans Affairs Committee is currently 
conducting an investigation into the prevalence of white supremacy in 
the veteran community. What questions should we specifically be asking 
regarding current and former members of the special operations 
community?
    Ms. Robinson. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
    Mr. Gallego. I recently introduced the ``Commission on LGBTQ 
Servicemembers and Veterans Act'', which would establish a commission 
to investigate the historic and ongoing impacts of discriminatory 
military policies and practices on LGBTQ service members and veterans. 
For Dr. Robinson--what obstacles do you believe exist for LGBTQ SOF 
operators and enablers?
    Ms. Robinson. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
    Mr. Gallego. The House Veterans Affairs Committee is currently 
conducting an investigation into the prevalence of white supremacy in 
the veteran community. What questions should we specifically be asking 
regarding current and former members of the special operations 
community?
    General Nagata. Regrettably, I am compelled to reply that the 
formulation of effective questions to illuminate the scope, nature, and 
volume of ``white supremacy'' in the US Military is directly inhibited 
by the absence of a common or consensus definition across the US 
Government over how to define this form of ethnic/racial supremacy. 
Without a commonly agreed upon definition, I believe the formulation of 
effective and reliable questions is today not achievable. During my 
three years as the Director for Strategic Operational Planning at the 
National Counterterrorism Center, I focused heavily on seeking to 
understand the growing problem of domestic violent extremism in 
American society. Violent white supremacy was always prominent within 
such efforts, but I was also struck by the absence of consensus, among 
Federal, State, and Local leaders, as well as among our Citizens, 
regarding what constitutes ``white supremacy''? And if we cannot 
commonly define it, I do not believe it possible to sufficiently 
understand its origins or trajectory. Most importantly, I doubt we can 
substantially reduce this phenomenon without this common/consensus 
understanding. Also, though Armed Services do not consistently succeed 
in recruiting adequately across all elements of American society, it is 
still reasonable to assume that, given domestic extremism increases in 
the US general population for several decades, it has also grown within 
DOD, and this probably applies US Special Operations Forces. However, 
there is also a large strategic deficit of genuine scholarship or 
empirical research devoted to illuminating the exact nature, volume, 
incidence, or trends of such extremism within DOD, above and beyond 
whether we have a consensus definition of a movement such as ``white 
supremacy''. I urge the Subcommittee to consider how best to resource 
and foster the scholarship and research necessary to address the 
foregoing. Also, as the Congress and DOD work to improve the military's 
ability to identify those that are unacceptable for service in our 
Military because of association with violent extremism, I recommend 
this Subcommittee also ensure that DOD develops, and is adequately 
resourced for, new forms of Training and Education designed to prevent 
a recurrence of this problem in the future.
    Mr. Gallego. The House Veterans Affairs Committee is currently 
conducting an investigation into the prevalence of white supremacy in 
the veteran community. What questions should we specifically be asking 
regarding current and former members of the special operations 
community?
    Ms. Germano. Thank you for your question, Chairman. The issue of 
white supremacy and extremism in the military is concerning, but I have 
faith in Secretary Austin's leadership and ability to address this 
issue since the Department of Defense is a known and definable 
ecosystem with multiple layers of leadership and a system of 
accountability (e.g. Uniform Code of Military Justice). The veteran 
community is an entirely different matter. At +18 million strong, 
geographically distributed, and unaccountable, extremism in the veteran 
community is a much larger and more challenging problem to address. To 
answer your specific question, I'd recommend addressing the issue 
beginning with the 48 large, legacy, membership-based 501.c.19 veteran 
service organizations and the 14 large other veteran service 
organizations and military associations and ask them the following 
questions:
     1.  As a Congressionally-chartered Veteran Service Organization or 
other veteran service organization or military association, what was 
your organization's public response to the January 6, 2001 
insurrection?
     2.  What action strategies has your organization deployed since 
January 6 to communicate with your members about the event?
     3.  In light of the rise of extremism and anti-democracy efforts 
in America, what expectations has your organization communicated to 
your members about their duties to support the Constitution as engaged 
citizens?
     4.  What expectations does your organization have for members in 
terms of their duties as engaged citizens following their military 
service?
     5.  Have any of your members been arrested in connection with the 
January 6 attack on the Capitol of the United States?
     6.  If so, how many?
     7.  If so, what action has your organization taken?
     8.  What is your organization doing to support Department of 
Defense efforts to address extremism in the military?
     9  What is your organization doing to address extremism or 
extremist views within your membership?
    10.  What is your organization doing to address extremist views 
within the broader veteran community?
    11.  What should Congressionally chartered 501.c.19 veteran service 
organizations be doing to counter extremist and anti-democracy views in 
American society?
    12.  What is your organization doing to help veterans--especially 
recently transitioned veterans--understand their continued duty to 
support the Constitution as engaged citizens?
    13.  What is your organization doing to promote civic literacy--
especially with children in grades K-12?
    While the number of veterans arrested in connection with the 
January 6 insurrection is regressing to the norm, the fact that any 
veterans participated is cause for concern. I believe the discussion 
around how many veterans participated or how many per capita 
participated is a red herring. It only takes one Timothy McVeigh or one 
Lee Harvey Oswald to change the course of American history in a 
negative way. I strongly recommend the committee engage with the 
standing VSOs, ensure their public positions on extremism are made 
clear and on the record, and partner with them to improve norms and 
expectations within the veteran community nation-wide.