[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                     ENSURING EQUITABLE DELIVERY OF
                    DISASTER BENEFITS TO VULNERABLE
                      COMMUNITIES AND PEOPLES: AN
                     EXAMINATION OF GAO'S FINDINGS
                         ON THE CDBG-DR PROGRAM

=======================================================================

                            VIRTUAL HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                       SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
                           AND INVESTIGATIONS

                                 OF THE

                    COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES

                     U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                            JANUARY 19, 2022

                               __________

       Printed for the use of the Committee on Financial Services

                           Serial No. 117-65
                           
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                              __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
47-103 PDF                 WASHINGTON : 2022                     
          
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------   

                 HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES

                 MAXINE WATERS, California, Chairwoman

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York         PATRICK McHENRY, North Carolina, 
NYDIA M. VELAZQUEZ, New York             Ranking Member
BRAD SHERMAN, California             FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York           BILL POSEY, Florida
DAVID SCOTT, Georgia                 BLAINE LUETKEMEYER, Missouri
AL GREEN, Texas                      BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan
EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri            ANN WAGNER, Missouri
ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado              ANDY BARR, Kentucky
JIM A. HIMES, Connecticut            ROGER WILLIAMS, Texas
BILL FOSTER, Illinois                FRENCH HILL, Arkansas
JOYCE BEATTY, Ohio                   TOM EMMER, Minnesota
JUAN VARGAS, California              LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
JOSH GOTTHEIMER, New Jersey          BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia
VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas              ALEXANDER X. MOONEY, West Virginia
AL LAWSON, Florida                   WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio
MICHAEL SAN NICOLAS, Guam            TED BUDD, North Carolina
CINDY AXNE, Iowa                     DAVID KUSTOFF, Tennessee
SEAN CASTEN, Illinois                TREY HOLLINGSWORTH, Indiana
AYANNA PRESSLEY, Massachusetts       ANTHONY GONZALEZ, Ohio
RITCHIE TORRES, New York             JOHN ROSE, Tennessee
STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts      BRYAN STEIL, Wisconsin
ALMA ADAMS, North Carolina           LANCE GOODEN, Texas
RASHIDA TLAIB, Michigan              WILLIAM TIMMONS, South Carolina
MADELEINE DEAN, Pennsylvania         VAN TAYLOR, Texas
ALEXANDRIA OCASIO-CORTEZ, New York   PETE SESSIONS, Texas
JESUS ``CHUY'' GARCIA, Illinois
SYLVIA GARCIA, Texas
NIKEMA WILLIAMS, Georgia
JAKE AUCHINCLOSS, Massachusetts

                   Charla Ouertatani, Staff Director
              Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations

                        AL GREEN, Texas Chairman

EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri            TOM EMMER, Minnesota, Ranking 
ALMA ADAMS, North Carolina               Member
RASHIDA TLAIB, Michigan              BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia
JESUS ``CHUY'' GARCIA, Illinois      ALEXANDER X. MOONEY, West Virginia
SYLVIA GARCIA, Texas                 DAVID KUSTOFF, Tennessee
NIKEMA WILLIAMS, Georgia, Vice       WILLIAM TIMMONS, South Carolina, 
    Chair                                Vice Ranking Member
                            
                            
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
Hearing held on:
    January 19, 2022.............................................     1
Appendix:
    January 19, 2022.............................................    31

                               WITNESSES
                      Wednesday, January 19, 2022

Begg, Stephen M., Deputy Inspector General, Office of Inspector 
  General, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)    11
Calhoun-Palay, Chrishelle, Director, Houston Organizing Movement 
  for Equity (HOME) Coalition....................................     8
Garcia-Diaz, Daniel, Managing Director, Financial Markets and 
  Community Investment, U.S. Government Accountability Office 
  (GAO)..........................................................     5
Morris, Andreanecia, Executive Director, HousingNOLA.............    10
Yentel, Diane, President and CEO, National Low Income Housing 
  Coalition (NLIHC)..............................................     6

                                APPENDIX

Prepared statements:
    Begg, Stephen M..............................................    32
    Calhoun-Palay................................................    47
    Garcia-Diaz..................................................    52
    Morris, Andreanecia..........................................    68
    Yentel, Diane................................................    79

              Additional Material Submitted for the Record

Green, Hon. Al:
    GAO report GAO-22-104452, ``Disaster Recovery--Better Data 
      Are Needed to Ensure HUD Block Grant Funds Reach Vulnerable 
      Populations,'' dated November 2021.........................    99
    Highlights summary of GAO report GAO-22-104452, ``Disaster 
      Recovery--Better Data Are Needed to Ensure HUD Block Grant 
      Funds Reach Vulnerable Populations,'' dated November 2021..   164
    H.R. 4707, the Reforming Disaster Recovery Act...............   165
    HUD letter of disapproval for the Texas General Land Office's 
      (GLO's) State Community Development Block Grant Mitigation 
      Action Plan................................................   217

 
                      ENSURING EQUITABLE DELIVERY
                        OF DISASTER BENEFITS TO
                       VULNERABLE COMMUNITIES AND
                    PEOPLES: AN EXAMINATION OF GAO'S
                    FINDINGS ON THE CDBG-DR PROGRAM

                              ----------                              


                      Wednesday, January 19, 2022

             U.S. House of Representatives,
                          Subcommittee on Oversight
                                and Investigations,
                           Committee on Financial Services,
                                                   Washington, D.C.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., 
via Webex, Hon. Al Green [chairman of the subcommittee] 
presiding.
    Members present: Representatives Green, Cleaver, Adams, 
Tlaib, Garcia of Illinois, Garcia of Texas, Williams of 
Georgia; Emmer, Loudermilk, Kustoff, and Timmons.
    Chairman Green. The Oversight and Investigations 
Subcommittee will come to order.
    Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare a 
recess of the subcommittee at any time. Also, without 
objection, Members of the full Financial Services Committee who 
are not Members of this subcommittee are authorized to 
participate in today's hearing.
    As a reminder, I ask all Members to keep themselves muted 
when they are not being recognized by the Chair, to minimize 
disturbances while Members are asking questions of our 
witnesses. The staff has been instructed not to mute Members, 
except when a Member is not being recognized by the Chair and 
there is inadvertent background noise.
    Members are reminded that all House rules related to order 
and decorum apply to this remote hearing. Members are also 
reminded that they may participate in only one remote 
proceeding at a time. If you are participating in today's 
hearing, please keep your camera on, and if you choose to 
attend a different remote proceeding, please turn your camera 
off. Members wishing to be recognized during the hearing, 
please identify yourself by name to facilitate recognition by 
the Chair.
    Members are reminded that your questions and answers are 
limited to 5 minutes. To elaborate just a bit, I do ask that 
you please try to get your answer as well as your question in 
within the 5 minutes. You should be able to see a timer on your 
screen that will indicate how much time you have left, and a 
chime will sound at the end of your time.
    The title of today's hearing is, ``Ensuring Equitable 
Delivery of Disaster Benefits to Vulnerable Communities and 
Peoples: An Examination of GAO's Findings on the CDBG-DR 
Program.''
    I will now recognize myself for 3 minutes to give an 
opening statement.
    In 2020, Chairwoman Waters and I tasked the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO), with assessing the degree to which 
Federal disaster recovery resources were meeting the unique 
needs and challenges of vulnerable populations in the wake of 
natural disasters.
    Vulnerable populations too often include high-poverty 
areas, racial minorities, persons with limited English 
proficiency, persons with disabilities, and the elderly.
    In their report, the Government Accountability Office 
recommends that, going forward, HUD should collect, analyze, 
and publish demographic data from CDBG-DR grantees on 
vulnerable populations who apply for assistance, as well as 
those who receive it.
    It is important to note that data collection necessitates 
cooperation from grantees, such as the State of Texas. Texas 
was awarded more than $4 billion for Hurricane Harvey relief, 
with nearly half still unspent due to the State's action plan 
being incomplete, as indicated in HUD's January 7, 2022, letter 
to the Deputy Land Commissioner for the State of Texas.
    In the 116th Congress, Congresswoman Ann Wagner and I 
introduced legislation which not only addresses data 
collection, but also codifies and streamlines the data 
collection process as it relates to disaster relief. This 
legislation passed the House in the 116th Congress, and the 
latest iteration of the legislation is pending before the House 
and the Senate.
    This concludes my opening statement.
    At this time, without objection, I would like to place the 
following documents in the record: H.R. 4707, the Reforming 
Disaster Recovery Act; the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development letter of disapproval for the Texas GLO's State 
Community Development Block Grant Mitigation Action Plan; GAO 
Report Number GAO-22-104452 entitled, ``Disaster Recovery: 
Better Data are Needed to Ensure HUD Block Grant Funds Reach 
Vulnerable Populations''; and GAO highlights summary of report 
GAO-22-104452, ``Disaster Recovery: Better Data are Needed to 
Ensure HUD Block Grant Funds Reach Vulnerable Populations.''
    I now recognize the ranking member of the subcommittee, the 
gentleman from Minnesota, Mr. Emmer, for 5 minutes for an 
opening statement.
    Mr. Emmer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you 
holding this hearing today. And I thank our witnesses for 
appearing before this subcommittee. I look forward to their 
testimony.
    The Community Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery 
(CDBG-DR) Program is one of several ways that Congress and the 
Federal Government assist in the local disaster recovery 
process. It is supposed to swiftly meet the needs of our most 
vulnerable communities and help small businesses recover from 
the most severe natural disasters. It is also supposed to 
provide targeted relief so that affected communities can 
rebuild homes and infrastructure, and affected businesses can 
reopen and support their communities.
    But instead, the program has a history of waste, fraud, and 
abuse. Time and time again, we see examples of grantees 
misusing disaster recovery money for purposes outside the scope 
of approved action plans, or we see bureaucratic gridlock in 
distributing funds appropriately, or we even see appropriated 
funds remaining unspent even decades after a disaster.
    For these reasons, it has become apparent to this 
subcommittee that the Community Development Block Grant 
Disaster Recovery Program fails in its objective to address the 
unmet needs of the most targeted vulnerable communities. That 
is a problem.
    Why is this the case? How can we eliminate waste, fraud, 
and abuse within the Community Development Block Grant Disaster 
Recovery Program so that funds reach those who need them most?
    I look forward to hearing from our witnesses and 
investigating this topic today. And I applaud my colleagues, 
Chairman Green and Representative Wagner, for their continued 
work to protect this program from waste, fraud, and abuse.
    When disasters strike, aid must be delivered as effectively 
and efficiently as possible. This can only be achieved through 
proper oversight of the program. I am proud that this committee 
shares this priority.
    However, some of my colleagues propose to fix the program 
by appropriating money in advance of a disaster, rather than 
waiting to see if there are unmet needs after agencies like the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers provide immediate relief. That is a bad 
idea.
    Natural disasters vary in size, severity, and occurrence. 
For this reason, we should not subject the Community 
Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery Program to annual 
congressional appropriations. This would be a less-than-
responsible and preemptive use of taxpayer dollars, and it 
could result in a misjustice to the vulnerable communities that 
the assistance is designed to support.
    As we will explore in this hearing, communities are 
currently left without a clear understanding of where to turn 
and how to properly access the Community Development Block 
Grant Disaster Recovery funds. If responsibly codified, this 
program will establish a clear, streamlined structure so that 
all parties involved in distributing relief to communities 
understand the process and the guidelines.
    The Department of Housing and Urban Development's Office of 
Inspector General has spent years conducting audits and 
investigations of this program, revealing the potential for 
mismanagement and the possibility of waste, fraud, and abuse. 
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) recently completed a 
report investigating this program's effectiveness at reaching 
the most vulnerable populations.
    I look forward to the witnesses' testimony so we can 
further our efforts to protect vulnerable communities in times 
of disaster, increase transparency, and establish the proper 
structure and oversight so that funds can be swiftly 
distributed.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back the remainder of 
my time.
    Chairman Green. Thank you, Mr. Emmer, for your very kind 
words. And the gentleman yields back.
    The Chair now recognizes the Vice Chair of the 
subcommittee, the gentlewoman from Georgia, Ms. Williams, for 1 
minute.
    Ms. Williams of Georgia. Thank you so much, Chairman Green.
    My home City of Atlanta, unfortunately, has the largest 
racial wealth gap in the country. On this committee, a big part 
of our job is making investments that help close that racial 
wealth gap. At the same time, though, it is our responsibility 
to guard those most-marginalized against shocks that could 
further widen the racial wealth gap. That is why today, I look 
forward to the conversation about ensuring that disaster relief 
is accessible to members of vulnerable populations.
    For my district, natural disasters aren't just an abstract 
concern. My home county, Fulton County, is currently tied for 
first place as the most tornado-prone county in the State of 
Georgia.
    I will especially never forget the half-billion dollars' 
worth of damage a 2008 tornado did to metropolitan Atlanta. And 
I will never forget the 500-year flood in 2009 that resulted in 
10 deaths and another half-billion dollars in damage.
    My constituents have seen, and will see again, natural 
disasters. It is our job to make sure that our government is 
prepared to help all of the people get back on their feet, and 
that no disaster takes us backwards when it comes to closing 
the racial wealth gap.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.
    Chairman Green. Thank you, Madam Vice Chair. The 
gentlelady's time has expired.
    I will now welcome each of our witnesses, and I am pleased 
to introduce our panel.
    Daniel Garcia-Diaz is the Managing Director for Financial 
Markets and Community Investment at the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office. Welcome.
    Diane Yentel is the President and CEO of the National Low 
Income Housing Coalition. Welcome.
    Chrishelle Calhoun-Palay is the Director of the Texas-based 
HOME Coalition. Welcome to you, as well.
    Andreanecia Morris is the Executive Director of 
HousingNOLA. Welcome.
    And Stephen Begg is the Deputy Inspector General of the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development's Office of 
Inspector General. Welcome to you, as well.
    I welcome all of you.
    Witnesses are reminded that your oral testimony will be 
limited to 5 minutes. You should be able to see a timer on your 
screen that indicates how much time you have left, and a chime 
will go off at the end of your time. I would ask that you be 
mindful of the timer, and quickly wrap up your testimony if you 
hear the chime, so that we can be respectful of both the 
witnesses' and the subcommittee members' time.
    And without objection, your written statements will be made 
a part of the record.
    Once the witnesses finish their testimony, each Member will 
have 5 minutes to ask questions.
    Mr. Garcia-Diaz, you are now recognized for 5 minutes to 
give an oral presentation of your testimony.

 STATEMENT OF DANIEL GARCIA-DIAZ, MANAGING DIRECTOR, FINANCIAL 
       MARKETS AND COMMUNITY INVESTMENT, U.S. GOVERNMENT 
                  ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO)

    Mr. Garcia-Diaz. Thank you.
    Chairman Green, Ranking Member Emmer, and members of the 
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on GAO's 
recent report on how CDBG-DR serves vulnerable populations.
    Our work confirms that certain populations face steep 
challenges in accessing help. CDBG-DR is focused on those who 
are poor or of modest means, but some populations face 
additional hurdles in getting help, for example, the elderly or 
disabled may need transportation or reasonable accommodations. 
Disaster victims may not have access to the internet or may not 
be proficient in English to understand available resources. 
From an agency perspective, even identifying people in need can 
be challenging.
    Now, once disaster victims have been located or seek help, 
extensive documentation requirements can be difficult to comply 
with. One of the tricky parts of this work was settling on a 
definition of, ``vulnerable population.'' HUD has not always 
been clear about the term. We examined Federal Register notices 
since 2013, and the term has been evolving throughout that 
time.
    Our recent report describes efforts by grantees to develop 
outreach plans for such populations and offer special services. 
However, many that we spoke with at all levels expressed 
concerns about the lack of clarity around the term. In response 
to our report, HUD pledged to better define this in future 
Federal Register notices. This would certainly be a step in the 
right direction. And we certainly hope that the CDBG office 
includes its Office of Fair Housing as well as other critical 
stakeholders in its deliberations.
    However, even if vulnerable populations are better defined 
in the future, we remain concerned that HUD does not currently 
collect the data that it needs to fully assess how well the 
program is addressing unmet needs. For instance, HUD only 
requires that grantees report on those who receive assistance, 
not those who apply, even though the grantees collect the 
information on both applicants and recipients.
    We recommended that HUD gather, analyze, and make public 
additional data on both applicants and recipients across a 
range of demographic characteristics. HUD stated that it would 
work on this recommendations as part of an ongoing effort being 
led by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to improve the 
Federal Government's ability to assess whether programs have 
full and equal participation by all eligible individuals.
    In its response to our report, HUD also noted that such 
changes could require resources/investments as well as 
consideration of privacy concerns, although its response did 
not detail what resources would be needed.
    We urge HUD to take steps to implement our recommendation, 
given the size and importance of the program and disaster 
recovery.
    Mr. Chairman, while the focus of this hearing is on how 
CDBG-DR serves vulnerable populations, we think the issues we 
found in our recent report are indicative of the bigger 
challenge with the Federal approach to disaster recovery. After 
each disaster, individual Federal Register notices have been 
developed and grantee action plans must be submitted and 
reviewed. This is time-consuming and paperwork-intensive, and 
it can also incentivize grantees to be more reactive rather 
than proactive in their disaster planning.
    GAO has previously recommended that Congress consider 
permanently authorizing the CDBG-DR Program or some similar 
program to address the needs unmet by FEMA, insurance, or other 
resources, rather than continue to authorize it as a series of 
supplemental appropriations that HUD administers through ad hoc 
notices.
    As you know, the current structure of CDBG-DR has 
contributed to delays in making funding available. Further, 
grantee capacity challenges in administering extraordinary 
large grant amounts have added to the delays.
    We must keep in mind that these funding delays and grantee 
capacity issues directly and disproportionately affect 
vulnerable populations. A permanent program could help 
meaningfully speed up the front end of this process and 
encourage more pre-disaster planning to prevent back-end 
delays.
    As potential reform options of CDBG-DR are weighed, three 
critical questions need to be considered. First, how does CDBG-
DR fit into the broader set of Federal programs? HUD's efforts 
don't exist in a vacuum. The current structure creates too many 
layers and too many players and creates confusion for 
applicants.
    Second, and unrelated, what is the underlying purpose of 
CDBG-DR? This is where Congress could give specific guidance 
and introduce accountability and transparency so that no part 
of disaster-affected communities is overlooked by CDBG-DR.
    And third, how will the capacity challenges in 
administering the program be addressed at the Federal, State, 
and local levels? Funneling money into organizations is risky 
if they do not have the capacity to manage it well. Building 
capacity at the grantee level, especially prior to a major 
disaster, is essential.
    Mr. Chairman, we at GAO have work underway to help the 
Congress understand these fundamental challenges, and we look 
forward to assisting the committee in its oversight and reform 
efforts going forward.
    This concludes my remarks, and I would be happy to answer 
any questions you may have.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Garcia-Diaz can be found on 
page 52 of the appendix.]
    Chairman Green. Thank you, Mr. Garcia-Diaz.
    Ms. Yentel, you are now recognized for 5 minutes to give an 
oral presentation of your testimony.

  STATEMENT OF DIANE YENTEL, PRESIDENT AND CEO, NATIONAL LOW 
                INCOME HOUSING COALITION (NLIHC)

    Ms. Yentel. Thank you.
    Chairman Green, Ranking Member Emmer, and members of the 
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on 
ways to ensure that our nation's disaster rebuilding and 
mitigation efforts address the unique and often overlooked 
needs of the lowest-income and most-marginalized survivors, 
including people of color, people with disabilities, people 
experiencing homelessness, and others.
    NLIHC has worked on disaster housing recovery issues for 
nearly 2 decades, and from this experience we have found that 
America's disaster housing recovery system is fundamentally 
broken and in need of major reform. It is a system that does 
not address the unique needs of the lowest-income and most-
marginalized people and the communities in which they live, and 
as a result, it consistently leaves them behind in recovery and 
rebuilding efforts and makes their communities less resilient 
to future disasters.
    The CDBG-DR and CDBG mitigation programs are vital recovery 
tools that provide States and communities with flexible, long-
term recovery and mitigation resources needed to rebuild 
affordable housing and infrastructure after a disaster and to 
prevent future harm. Too often, however, these resources reach 
communities much too slowly, and they are diverted away from 
the people and communities with the greatest needs, for whom 
the programs were designed to serve.
    My written testimony provides multiple examples from 
disaster after disaster of how CDBG-DR recovery efforts tend to 
prioritize homeowners, who are more likely to be White, over 
renters, who are predominantly Black and Brown. In doing so, 
disaster recovery exacerbates racial wealth disparities and 
pushes more low-income renters of color into long-term housing 
instability and, in worst cases, homelessness.
    While Black and Brown communities are often located in 
areas at higher risk of disaster with less resilient 
infrastructure to protect residents from harm, long-term 
recovery resources tend to go to White communities that face 
fewer risks. Rather than dismantling racial segregation that is 
the direct result of intentional Federal, State, and local 
policy, rebuilding efforts tend to entrench racial disparities 
and inequities.
    In my written testimony, I outline key barriers to 
equitable and comprehensive disaster housing recovery and our 
recommendations on how to reform CDBG-DR, to ensure that these 
resources are deployed quickly, equitably, and effectively.
    Many of our recommendations are aligned with those made by 
the GAO in its recent report. NLIHC agrees with the GAO's 
recommendations related to increasing data transparency and 
equity. To better assess whether CDBG-DR funds are effectively 
reaching survivors with the greatest needs, HUD and grantees 
must collect, analyze, and make public key demographic data on 
the race, ethnicity, disability status, language preference, 
and other characteristics of program applicants and 
beneficiaries. Data transparency and an increased focus on 
equity must be central to any efforts to reform the CDBG-DR 
Program, and HUD should implement these changes immediately.
    NLIHC also supports GAO's recommendation that Congress 
permanently authorize the CDBG-DR Program. The Reforming 
Disaster Recovery Act would provide important safeguards and 
tools to help ensure that Federal disaster recovery efforts 
reach all impacted households, including the lowest-income and 
most-marginalized people.
    The bill would quickly target resources to those with the 
greatest needs by requiring funds to be spent proportionally 
between homeowners and renters, based on need, and by keeping 
in place the requirement that at least 70 percent of funds 
benefit low- and moderate-income survivors.
    The bill would prioritize data transparency and oversight 
by requiring HUD to create a public-facing dashboard 
summarizing how funds are being spent, requiring public input, 
and directing grantees to provide more details on how they 
would use the funds to serve the lowest-income survivors.
    The bill would protect civil rights and fair housing by 
requiring that the funds be administered in compliance with 
fair housing and civil rights laws, and requiring HUD to 
release information publicly regarding disaster recovery 
efforts, disaggregated by race, geography, and all protected 
classes. And the bill would encourage mitigation and 
resiliency.
    Our country must reform existing disaster housing recovery 
systems to ensure that affordable housing investments and 
Federal disaster recovery resources reach all impacted 
households. The Reforming Disaster Recovery Act would allow for 
important progress towards these goals and should be advanced 
and quickly enacted by Congress.
    Thank you again for the opportunity to testify. I look 
forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Yentel can be found on page 
79 of the appendix.]
    Chairman Green. Thank you very much, Ms. Yentel.
    Ms. Calhoun-Palay, you are now recognized for 5 minutes to 
give an oral presentation of your testimony.

   STATEMENT OF CHRISHELLE CALHOUN-PALAY, DIRECTOR, HOUSTON 
        ORGANIZING MOVEMENT FOR EQUITY (HOME) COALITION

    Ms. Calhoun-Palay. Good morning. On behalf of the Houston 
Organizing Movement for Equity (HOME), thank you, Chairman 
Green, Ranking Member Emmer, and members of the subcommittee, 
for the opportunity to testify today.
    I am Chrishelle Calhoun-Palay, Coalition Director of HOME, 
which was created in response to Hurricane Harvey in Houston, 
Texas. HOME is a coalition of organizations that advocate for a 
just and equitable recovery.
    It has been 4 years since Hurricane Harvey, and the HOME 
Coalition continues working on behalf of families who still 
have not recovered. Harvey may have been natural in its 
formation, but even after the water dried up and the volunteers 
were fatigued, its aftermath continues to linger for people 
with fewer resources.
    And I don't speak rhetorically or anecdotally. Not only 
have I been involved in disaster recovery advocacy for over 10 
years, but I also reside and am raising a family in one of the 
most flood-prone and disaster-impacted neighborhoods in 
Houston: Kashmere Gardens.
    Low-income survivors are forced to navigate complicated 
recovery assistance programs like FEMA, HUD, and SBA. And while 
each agency offers assistance programs open to everyone, no 
single agency has the sole responsibility and mission to assist 
low-income survivors.
    Households who are dependent on assistance must exercise 
extreme patience and remain in hazardous living conditions as 
they await a long approval process for program design and 
implementation. Households are also urged to apply for FEMA 
assistance, but fewer than half of applicants were granted 
assistance after Hurricane Harvey. And families have the 
ability to appeal the denials, but this just adds to the wait 
time for help. Those with financial means to cover immediate 
costs will be well on their way to recovery, while those 
without may be stuck for months or even years.
    Some homeowners who apply for home repairs through the 
city, county, or State are also still waiting. Following the 
State takeover of the program, those who applied for assistance 
from the city or the county were given the option to transfer 
to the State repair program. Some applicants were instructed to 
reapply while others were assured that they had been approved. 
And almost a year since the transition, many homeowners today 
still don't have clear answers.
    Tenants have also had their fair share of challenges in 
receiving adequate assistance in response to Hurricane Harvey. 
They have largely been left out of the funding allocation or 
programming.
    A dedicated single agency must be established to address 
the needs of low-income survivors through the entire course of 
disaster response and recovery. The City of Houston spent only 
1.8 percent of its $1.2 billion suballocation, causing massive 
delays in assistance for community members who needed it most, 
and this fact alone demonstrates the need for intentional 
agency collaboration and reliance on the lessons learned to 
inform program planning and ensure that preexisting capacity 
exists.
    There is no reason that all recovery efforts should start 
from scratch every single time. A shift in a positive direction 
is possible, with the consideration of the following 
recommendations: take an immediate first step by holding a 
joint hearing with witnesses from both FEMA and HUD to explore 
gaps and opportunities for coordination between agencies to 
serve low-income and marginalized communities; require grantees 
to prioritize racial and social equity, using a metric focused 
on the number of people or housing units protected, instead of 
the current cost-benefit analysis; and adopt general standards 
to guide disaster recovery and mitigation efforts that center 
on a community's basic human rights.
    Storm survivors should have the right to stay and return 
home to neighborhoods that have adequate storm protection. They 
should have the right to choose whether and where they want to 
relocate. They should have the right to equal treatment. Every 
neighborhood, regardless of race, ethnicity, economic status, 
or disability, must be provided equitable levels of quality 
flood protection and equal access to essential public 
infrastructure. And they should have a right to have a say; 
survivors must help design the recovery, know where they are in 
the process, and be empowered to speak and be heard in the 
language that best suits them.
    For a complete list of recommendations and observations, I 
encourage you to refer to my written testimony.
    Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today, and I 
look forward to your questions and working with you to address 
these longstanding issues of equitable delivery of disaster 
benefits.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Calhoun-Palay can be found 
on page 47 of the appendix.]
    Chairman Green. Thank you, Ms. Calhoun-Palay.
    Ms. Morris, you are now recognized for 5 minutes to give an 
oral presentation of your testimony.

     STATEMENT OF ANDREANECIA MORRIS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 
                          HOUSINGNOLA

    Ms. Morris. Good morning, Chairman Green. Thank you. Thank 
you all for having me here today and inviting me to this 
hearing to speak on this issue that drives so much of the work 
of the organization that I have been a part of over the last 16 
years.
    Unfortunately, we in Louisiana are experts on these 
programs, as we far too often find ourselves in the path of a 
storm, both literal and figurative. And it feels as if we are 
constantly recovering from a natural disaster, yet we never 
seem to reach full recovery before the next disaster strikes.
    New Orleans, in particular, has long struggled with the 
challenges to provide for its most vulnerable residents, 
especially when attention turns towards the next disaster.
    Hurricane Katrina's floodwaters 16 years ago required 
billions of private and public dollars to make the City 
livable. Redevelopment efforts increased the amount of quality 
housing, but also drove up prices and dramatically increased 
housing insecurity.
    Is displacement an inevitable byproduct of this kind of 
investment? Do the necessary and needed changes and 
improvements after a major catastrophe have to increase 
instability? I do not believe that needs to be the case. Still, 
the failure to plan for these outcomes and aggressively 
mitigate these issues is a pattern we are doomed to repeat 
again and again.
    In New Orleans, we are continuing to struggle to secure 
safe, decent, and affordable housing for all, while dealing 
with the confounding contradiction that there are thousands of 
overpriced vacant homes, thousands of blighted, unused 
properties, and vacant and underdeveloped land.
    While housing insecurity and the lack of stable housing or 
shelter was a challenge before the most recent crisis, the 
pandemic, it is now a key issue that is going to make COVID 
recovery even harder to accomplish.
    The connection between housing and community were lessons I 
thought we had learned during Hurricane Katrina, but those 
lessons have not been incorporated in our response to crisis 
after crisis.
    The resources pour in and billions are used to rebuild a 
community, but the programs often fail to account for the needs 
of the vulnerable and the most hard hit after that crisis. In 
New Orleans, this has led to homeowners, African-American 
homeowners in particular, being unable to build wealth, and now 
finding themselves 33 percent of the community cost burden, 
renters struggling to remain within housing limits, while 
housing costs continue to rise and wages are stagnant.
    After Hurricane Katrina, the City lost 100,000 African 
Americans who have not been able to return. This kind of 
systemic displacement is the result of a lack of living-wage 
jobs and our City's failure to center on the needs of the most 
vulnerable.
    Most recently, the COVID-19 pandemic and Hurricane Ida have 
once again tested the resilience of our City systems and 
exposed ongoing challenges to our housing stock, our economy, 
and our infrastructure. In hindsight, it is clear that recovery 
efforts need to center on the needs of the most vulnerable, not 
the squeakiest wheel.
    Yet, we do not meet the real needs of our communities using 
clear and quantifiable metrics that assess the needs of the 
most vulnerable. This pattern of behavior has left us with 
weakened infrastructure and little capacity to actually become 
resilient. Instead, the people of Louisiana exist in a forced 
reality of living with less, simply because State and local 
governments don't center on the needs of its people.
    Despite this pattern, the unprecedented influx of 
investment in our State that is pending could afford us another 
opportunity, another chance to make improvements, but we must 
heed the testimony of my fellow panelists today and make 
necessary improvements to these programs.
    A disaster, unfortunately, provides one more opportunity 
for traditionally marginalized participants to gain access to 
policymakers and advocate for policy proposals. Here in 
Louisiana, we have done that, and we have attempted to redefine 
the resiliency and quantify the needs of the people of 
Louisiana and demand that their issues be made front and 
center.
    The time is now for public partners and private entities to 
work together to make strategic investments. Our communities 
cannot continue to survive this way. The standard for success 
is simple: It must be whether or not a community is made 
better.
    Thank you for having me today on this incredibly timely 
topic, and I look forward to further conversations about this.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Morris can be found on page 
68 of the appendix.]
    Chairman Green. Thank you very much, Ms. Morris.
    Mr. Begg, you are now recognized for 5 minutes to give an 
oral presentation of your testimony.

STATEMENT OF STEPHEN M. BEGG, DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL, OFFICE 
  OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN 
                       DEVELOPMENT (HUD)

    Mr. Begg. Chairman Green, Ranking Member Emmer, and members 
of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify 
about our disaster oversight work. It is my honor to represent 
the dedicated professionals of the HUD Office of Inspector 
General (OIG).
    I would like to take a moment to express, on behalf of the 
entire OIG staff, our deepest condolences for the tragic loss 
of life caused by the recent fires in Philadelphia and in New 
York City. We are keeping the families affected in both Cities 
in our hearts and prayers, and our office is closely monitoring 
the developments in those incidents.
    We appreciate the chance to assist this subcommittee in its 
oversight of HUD's disaster programs as it examines GAO's 
recent report assessing HUD's delivery of disaster recovery 
assistance to vulnerable populations.
    Our office has identified several key opportunities to 
improve HUD's disaster programs, most notably through 
codification. Both the OIG and the GAO have recommended for 
several years that the CDBG-DR Program be codified to provide a 
more consistent framework for administering disaster 
assistance. We thank this subcommittee and its staff for its 
bipartisan efforts to advance legislation in that regard.
    Codification will not eliminate the challenges HUD and its 
grantees face, but we believe that it would help disaster 
assistance reach victims sooner and produce better outcomes for 
them. HUD's current process of establishing program 
requirements through Federal Register notices takes months and, 
in extreme cases, years.
    Establishing a permanent framework of requirements would 
reduce the time it takes HUD to make funding available to 
grantees. It would also provide clarity and consistency for 
grantees about core requirements, which would allow them to 
plan and design programs more quickly and efficiently after a 
disaster occurs.
    We have also found that disagreements between grantees and 
their subrecipients over program requirements can delay the 
offering of assistance to victims. As the GAO report notes, 
funding delays often mean vulnerable populations with limited 
resources continue living in damaged or compromised homes while 
waiting for an opportunity to request assistance.
    Streamlining HUD's process and standardizing requirements 
could also help grantees build capacity to administer disaster 
grants that are massive in size and scope. Our work has 
identified that grantees can become overwhelmed early in the 
process, as they lack the staff needed to stand up systems, 
design programs, and develop the policies needed to administer 
grants in accordance with HUD's requirements.
    These challenges increase the risk that grantees will not 
make the best use of funding. Capacity limitations can result 
in grantees being slow to gain approval to implement and offer 
programs to victims, and to complete projects.
    The GAO report highlighted that capacity limitations often 
result in grantees struggling to reach the most vulnerable 
members of communities. Additionally, grantees with limited 
capacity are more likely to use funds for ineligible activities 
or to be unable to detect and prevent fraud. Losing dollars to 
fraud or waste reduces the number of disaster victims that 
HUD's programs can assist.
    HUD must also remain vigilant in helping its grantees 
overcome spending challenges and holding them accountable. We 
recently reported that HUD had several tools available to 
identify and track slow-spending disaster grantees. We found, 
however, that HUD does not require grantees to address their 
slow spending pace or resolve compliance issues until the time 
the grant is closed.
    We recommended that HUD require its grantees to resolve 
these issues in a more timely manner. It is important that HUD 
and its grantees take action earlier in the grant cycle to 
prevent important disaster assistance funding from being left 
on the table at the time of grant closeout.
    For several years, we have stressed the need for HUD to 
continue building its own capacity to oversee disaster 
grantees, and we commend HUD's recent efforts to increase staff 
dedicated to disaster oversight. It is important that HUD 
staffing and technology keep pace with increases in the amount 
of disaster funding and the number of grantees it oversees.
    Looking forward, our office remains committed to helping 
HUD achieve its strategic objective to support effectiveness 
and accountability in long-term disaster recovery. We believe 
codification is an important step towards achieving that 
objective.
    Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our disaster 
oversight work today. I look forward to answering your 
questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Begg can be found on page 32 
of the appendix.
    Chairman Green. Thank you for your testimony.
    At this time, the gentlewoman from North Carolina, Ms. 
Adams, is recognized for 5 minutes for questions.
    Ms. Adams. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also thank Chairwoman 
Waters for holding this hearing. And to our witnesses, thank 
you for your testimony.
    When we discussed the need for Congress to finally codify 
CDBG back in July of last year, our witnesses painted a 
compelling picture. We heard about how States couldn't 
adequately prepare for disaster recovery, because they didn't 
know how much emergency funding would flow to them. We heard 
that it took longer than it otherwise would have for HUD to get 
time-sensitive dollars out the door to communities in need. And 
we heard that different communities were not treated equitably, 
all because we haven't acted proactively.
    Ms. Yentel, in your testimony you describe the impact that 
disasters have on a region's housing stock. Can you share those 
findings with us now, and can you explain why it is critical 
that CDBG-DR dollars are used to support affordable housing?
    Ms. Yentel. Yes, Congresswoman. Thank you for the question. 
Most communities have a severe shortage of homes that are 
affordable to the lowest-income people even before disaster 
strikes. Nationally, for every 10 of the lowest-income renter 
households, there are fewer than 4 apartments that are 
affordable and available to them.
    Then, the disasters exacerbate these already-severe 
shortages of affordable rental homes. And it has devastating 
consequences for the lowest-income people, puts them at risk of 
displacement, evictions, and a worst case is homelessness.
    One of the consequences after disasters is that the price 
for rent often increases dramatically. It is from a combination 
of the rapid loss in available housing stock due to the 
disaster itself, and, at the same time, the increased demand, 
because displaced renters and homeowners need new apartments. 
And sometimes, it is simply price gouging by local landlords.
    For example, there were some ZIP Codes in Houston where 
rents increased by 50 percent after Hurricane Harvey, and these 
kind of rapid increases, clearly, the lowest-income people 
can't afford and they end up being displaced as a result.
    And also, affordable and accessible homes are most often 
located in areas that are most vulnerable to disasters, and the 
housing itself is more vulnerable. It is older. It is in poor 
condition. It is located in flood zones, and it is less likely 
to be rebuilt after the disaster strikes.
    Ms. Adams. Yes, ma'am. Thank you. I have another question 
for you. I am pleased to be here to discuss GAO's report, since 
it confirms so many of the recommendations made by your 
organization.
    Can you discuss how Chairman Green's legislation, H.R. 
4707, would help eliminate the barriers that prevent the most-
impacted and lowest-income survivors of disasters from 
achieving an equitable recovery?
    Ms. Yentel. Yes. There are many ways that the Reforming 
Disaster Recovery Act could make recovery more equitable and 
prioritize and center the needs of the lowest-income and the 
most-marginalized survivors.
    First off, just permanently authorizing the program would 
have a tremendous positive impact in that the money could get 
out faster. Congress and HUD wouldn't have to rewrite the rule 
every time a disaster strikes, so the money could get to 
communities faster.
    Communities would be required to prioritize the use of the 
funds for the lowest-income people. They would be required to 
prioritize the needs of people with the most severe needs. They 
would be required to have proportionality, in other words, to 
ensure that the funds go equally to affordable housing, to 
economic revitalization, and to infrastructure. Very often, 
communities prioritize infrastructure or economic 
revitalization over affordable housing, despite housing needs 
being the clearest and the most severe.
    It would also require really robust public consultation, so 
that local communities could have a say in how these resources 
are used and how they get prioritized. And it would make some 
important changes to prevent displacement and prevent 
relocation, wherever possible.
    Ms. Adams. Thank you very much.
    I think I am out of time, Mr. Chairman, so I yield back.
    Ms. Yentel. Thank you.
    Chairman Green. The gentlelady's time had not expired. You 
had about 15 seconds left.
    Ms. Adams. Oh, okay. Well, I am going to yield back to you 
the 15 seconds. Thank you. And thank you to our witnesses.
    Chairman Green. Thank you.
    At this time, the Chair will recognize the ranking member 
of the subcommittee, the gentleman from Minnesota, Mr. Emmer, 
for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Emmer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Department of Housing and Urban Development's Inspector 
General has identified and referred for prosecution several 
cases of fraud and abuse in the Community Development Block 
Grant Disaster Recovery Program, including public corruption, 
embezzlement, bid rigging, bribery, and kickback schemes. More 
broadly, there is a rich history of States using CDBG-DR funds 
for purposes that have no nexus to the original disaster.
    Mr. Begg, I understand your office has made a number of 
criminal referrals for fraud related to the CDBG-DR funds over 
the years. Can you share with us generally how those tend to be 
uncovered and prosecuted?
    Mr. Begg. Thank you for the question, Ranking Member Emmer. 
Our office relies on whistleblowers frequently to uncover 
instances of fraud, waste, and abuse, and we receive many of 
the leads on those cases through our hotline. And we also work 
closely with HUD's Office of Community Planning and 
Development, and grantees, to train them on ways that they can 
identify and detect fraud, waste, and abuse and ways that they 
can train their staff to make referrals to us of allegations of 
fraud.
    We generally rely on program participants and the general 
public to help us identify those cases, and we work with our 
partners at the Department of Justice to see that they are 
appropriately prosecuted.
    Mr. Emmer. Excellent. Thank you.
    Billions of dollars appropriated for prior disasters remain 
unspent today, including money appropriated for the 9/11 
attacks, for Superstorm Sandy in 2012, and for storm damage in 
Mississippi back in 2008. But the data is clear: CDBG-DR funds 
tend to remain unspent for years and years after HUD sends the 
funds to States.
    Mr. Begg, do you think having a pot of Federal money 
sitting there for years and years is an invitation for fraud?
    Mr. Begg. Yes. The longer that money remains available, the 
more likely it is that it is going to be used for ineligible 
activities and it is susceptible to fraud, waste, and abuse.
    That is why it is important for HUD to remain diligent in 
its oversight and monitoring of slow-spender grantees. And as 
we reported earlier this month, it is important for HUD to work 
with them to help them resolve their capacity issues and the 
root causes of why they are not spending funds more timely, so 
that money is not left on the table towards the end of the 
grant cycle, when it is susceptible to rushed expenditures that 
may be indicative of waste or fraudulent activity.
    Mr. Emmer. Right. For example, the money from way back in 
the early years of this century. As a State becomes further 
removed from the original disaster in terms of time, and these 
large sums of money remain unspent, does it become more 
difficult for your office--and maybe not even your office. 
Let's concentrate on those that the money has been delivered to 
in the specific States. Does it become more difficult for even 
them to identify legitimate purposes for the money?
    Mr. Begg. That is certainly possible. Another issue that we 
have identified is that those seeking assistance may also be 
confused as you get further and further away from a disaster 
event as to how to navigate HUD's programs in seeking 
assistance.
    For example, we recently identified that Texas disaster 
recipients did not know or may have been unaware of the fact 
that they were eligible for money from Hurricane Ike and 
Hurricane Harvey. So, the further away you get from a disaster, 
and the longer it takes for those in need to request 
assistance, the more likely it is that they will be unclear as 
to what is available to them.
    Mr. Emmer. Thank you, Mr. Begg. I know we just have a few 
seconds left. If you can--and maybe I will follow up with you 
after this hearing--can you describe how codifying the program 
and including some guardrails and some oversight mechanisms 
might address some of these vulnerabilities your office has 
identified?
    Mr. Begg. Absolutely. The main benefit that we see to 
codification is two-pronged: increasing the timeliness of the 
funding reaching grantees and then those in need--I see the 
time has expired.
    Mr. Emmer. I will follow up with you. Thank you, Mr. Begg.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Begg. Thank you.
    Chairman Green. Thank you. The gentleman's time has 
expired.
    The Chair will now recognize the gentlewoman from Texas, 
Ms. Garcia, for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Garcia of Texas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you 
so much for bringing forth this hearing and these great 
witnesses. And I especially, of course, want to welcome Ms. 
Calhoun-Palay from Houston to the United States Congress.
    Mr. Chairman, this grant program provides essential 
assistance for communities deeply hurt by natural disaster, 
especially as noted in our Houston area, which I represent.
    In the case of natural disasters, timing is critical. The 
previous witness mentioned that timing is critical, how quickly 
we can get the help to the people who need it. Every day 
following a catastrophic event is a day that families go 
without food, without water, without shelter, without 
transportation, and without their basic livelihood.
    What is concerning to me is that, currently, the Community 
Development Block Grant Program is not fully authorized in 
statute, so it is subject to the changing tides of local 
politics. It is not held to a consistent standard at the 
national level and, thus, it is vulnerable to changes in 
rulemaking in grantee action plans.
    Although grantees are expected to comport with CDBG 
national objectives, this can differ by year and by the 
rulemaking put into place. As a result, there are 
vulnerabilities that result from basic turnover in Government 
Administrations that can allow grantees' programs to falter in 
carrying out their duties.
    It is critical that we support and reinforce this program 
through permanent authorization and full enforcement of data 
collection, so that we can accurately perceive how these funds 
are being used.
    In Houston, for example, following the 2015 flooding, the 
Disaster Recovery Program provided the City of Houston with a 
direct allocation funding that did not have to go through our 
State Government. As a result, the funding was allocated 
swiftly to projects rebuilding the Houston communities that 
were hit the hardest.
    In contrast, the newly-created Disaster Mitigation Fund, 
which was created in direct response to Hurricane Harvey, was 
not a direct allocation to our area that was hit by the 
hurricane. Instead, the funding went through the State, which 
has not yet to provide any of that $4.3 billion in Federal 
taxpayer money to either the City of Houston or Harris County.
    In addition to allocating the funds to multiple other 
jurisdictions while excluding the 2 largest communities hit by 
the hurricane, the State used the maximum allowable funds of 5 
percent for administrative costs--5 percent--which resulted in 
$215 million going to the State government. Now, this $215 
million, Mr. Chairman, is more than the entire payroll of the 
Houston Astros. That is how much the State kept.
    I highlight this because it is profoundly concerning that 
these programs are not reaching the intended recipients who 
were most impacted by the hurricanes. We must find a way to get 
the money to those intended, those most in need swiftly, 
because people do suffer. Poor people become poorer.
    Additionally, there is never enough data collected at the 
Federal level, so it is always difficult to assess what has 
really happened. So, we must codify the disaster relief 
programs, but we must also work with HUD to access the 
communities that these programs were designed to work for.
    My first question is for Mr. Garcia-Diaz. Mr. Garcia-Diaz, 
in your testimony, you provided several cases for how this 
program can better target underserved populations, including 
data collection. You stated that while grantees can and do 
collect data, we are not collecting the data of those who 
apply, only of those who receive.
    Can you elaborate, please, on this point, and what else we 
should be doing so that we can get better information on the 
cultural and language barriers related to vulnerable 
populations, especially those with limited English?
    Mr. Garcia-Diaz. Thank you for your question, Congresswoman 
Garcia.
    That is absolutely right. Data, especially if you are 
dealing with vulnerable populations, you need to know something 
about who they are and what their situation is like. And 
particularly, if you want to make sure that the program is 
addressing their needs, you need good data both--and we 
emphasize this in the report--on the applicant side as well as 
the beneficiary side.
    And the reason we emphasize applicant data, which is 
something HUD does not collect at all, is that you need to know 
who is making it through and who is not making it through. And 
that is a critical part of holding the grantees and HUD itself 
accountable that they are delivering assistance to the neediest 
population. And data is fundamental to that.
    Ms. Garcia of Texas. Thank you.
    Very quickly, and I know I am running out of time, Ms. 
Yentel, could you elaborate any more on how we can better reach 
our limited English proficiency applicants?
    Ms. Yentel. Sure. Yes, if I have the time I would be happy 
to.
    For limited English proficiency applicants, HUD guidance 
directs grantees to ensure that disaster recovery activities 
meet language access requirements, but often communities don't. 
Puerto Rico is one of the most egregious examples after 
Hurricane Maria, where Spanish is the predominant language on 
the island, but the CDBG-DR materials were in English, and only 
after significant pushback were they translated to Spanish, and 
there were multiple errors within it.
    HUD requires that there be language access, but they could 
do more in terms of oversight and ensuring that actually 
happens. And HUD could also learn a lot from Treasury and the 
implementation of the emergency rental assistance programs, 
where successful grantees partnered with community-based 
organizations to reach marginalized communities, including 
those for whom English is their second language.
    Ms. Garcia of Texas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 
I have run out of time.
    Chairman Green. The gentlelady's time has long since 
expired.
    The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. 
Loudermilk, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Loudermilk. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    First, let me kind of continue on with what Mr. Emmer had 
started to ask about, and that is the absence of a permanent 
law or permanent statute for the CDBG-DR Program.
    The absence of a permanent law governing the program means 
that when Congress activates the program after a natural 
disaster, which we have had plenty of recently, the parameters 
of the program have to be established on an ad hoc basis, and 
HUD must continue rulemaking every time new funds are 
allocated. Of course, this is going to lead to inefficiencies 
and delays with getting the funds distributed.
    Mr. Begg, you had started to touch on some of these issues 
but, unfortunately, ran out of time. Can you describe the 
problems that result from the lack of a permanent statute with 
this program, and how enacting a statute to govern the program 
would help address those problems, and anything else that you 
would like to discuss that Mr. Emmer had asked?
    Mr. Begg. Certainly. Thank you for the question.
    As I mentioned previously, codification of the program 
could help streamline HUD's allocation process. We reported in 
April of 2021 that HUD engaged in lengthy negotiations with the 
Office of Management and Budget about program requirements that 
would be included in the Federal Register notices for the 2017 
disasters, which produced significant delays in making the 
announcements in the Federal Register notice which, in turn, 
prevented grantees from finalizing and submitting action plans. 
And that, in turn, delayed HUD and the grantees from entering 
into grant agreements which would give them access to the 
funding.
    Streamlining HUD's process through codification, we think 
is an important step in speeding up disbursement of disaster 
recovery, but providing permanent authorization for the program 
would also clarify requirements for grantees so that they can 
plan earlier and for future disasters so that they can 
implement programs disaster over disaster rather than waiting 
for HUD to announce specific waivers that really kind of keep 
them in gridlock while they are trying to figure out how to 
design programs for their communities in need.
    Mr. Loudermilk. Thank you. So, we could still implement a 
codified law giving guidance, but leave flexibility for the 
uniqueness of the disaster in a particular area?
    Mr. Begg. That is correct. There is always going to be a 
need for flexibility at the local level, and our office 
understands what we have identified as the need for clarity and 
consistency up front so that grantees and HUD can be in step on 
the plans, and then the actions and milestones needed to result 
in getting money down to the ground level at the local level 
where the flexibility can really be designed to benefit the 
individuals and vulnerable populations in need.
    Mr. Loudermilk. Okay. Thank you.
    Mr. Garcia-Diaz, could you also comment on the problems of 
not having this program codified or the lack of legislation on 
it and what could be resolved if we had it?
    Mr. Garcia-Diaz. Yes. Thank you for the question. I think 
codification helps make CDBG-DR a real program, subject to all 
of the requirements that all programs are expected to follow, 
including the requirements regarding fraud risk management.
    Of course, DR is subject to those requirements as is, but 
the more that the program is permanent, the more that everyone 
knows what the expectations are going forward and after a 
disaster. That is going to allow for preparation to occur not 
only at HUD, but also at the grantee level, because they know 
what to expect, and they know that there is enough stability in 
the program that they can start thinking ahead about the future 
disasters and what they need to do to be positioned to best 
distribute those funds efficiently and effectively to these 
populations who sorely need the help, but also protect taxpayer 
interests here, and ensure that the right people are getting 
the funding and eligible people are getting the funding.
    Mr. Loudermilk. Thank you. And while I have you, as you 
know, we need to balance the need to reduce waste with the need 
to distribute funds quickly. In the short amount of time I 
have, what changes do we need to make to ensure that funds are 
used for the intended purpose but are also distributed timely?
    Mr. Garcia-Diaz. I think we have to build capacity both at 
HUD and at the grantee level to accomplish that. Speed and 
proper use of funds don't overlap completely. They can often 
diverge. And so, there is that risk, and we want to manage that 
and we need [inaudible] to do that.
    Mr. Loudermilk. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    Chairman Green. Your time has expired. Thank you.
    The gentlewoman from Michigan, Ms. Tlaib, is recognized for 
5 minutes.
    Ms. Tlaib. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I really appreciate us 
holding this hearing. I have seen firsthand how disasters like 
flooding can devastate our communities and the inequities in 
how those communities access and qualify for disaster relief. 
We can continue to fund various programs, but implementation is 
so critically important, especially in communities like mine.
    One of the most immediate and devastating impacts of 
disaster is always housing affordability for low-income 
residents.
    Ms. Yentel, the organization you work for has been really 
critical in exposing some of the broken systems that are in 
place and some of the needs and policy changes to make sure we 
address those. You testified that recovery and mitigation 
efforts typically favor higher-income, predominantly White 
communities. And markets across our country are already 
squeezed because of a lack of housing supply. Disasters often 
cause dramatic spikes in rental prices, leading to 
displacements, evictions, and homelessness.
    We also know that nearly one-third of federally-assisted 
housing stock is located in areas with a relatively high risk 
of negative impacts from natural hazards and so forth. Many of 
us call these front-line communities of the climate crisis.
    Ms. Yentel, can you describe how natural disasters and 
inadequate disaster relief can displace low-income communities 
and communities of color, and really talk about what we can do 
as a legislative body to address that?
    Ms. Yentel. Sure. You touched on some very important issues 
around how low-income people are most likely to live in 
communities that are hardest hit by disasters, and they are 
most likely to live in housing that isn't built to withstand 
the storm itself, so they are vulnerable in multiple layers 
from the disasters.
    They are least likely to have the resources needed to 
evacuate prior to the disaster, they are least likely to have 
the resources or the social network to help them recover during 
the disaster, and they are most likely to be left behind in the 
recovery unless there is very focused advocacy and legislation 
that requires the prioritization of their needs in recovery.
    When affordable housing stock is lost in disasters, it is 
virtually never recovered to the same degree that it was pre-
disaster. And as I shared earlier, pre-disaster, most 
communities have a severe shortage of homes that are affordable 
to the lowest-income people. So, when we are losing affordable 
housing stock that is affordable to those lowest-income people, 
and communities are not prioritizing the repair and 
reconstruction of those affordable homes, then there is 
permanent displacement of the lowest-income people, who are 
predominantly people of color, Black and Brown people.
    And one way this plays out as well is how these disaster 
resources are targeted. Time after time, disaster after 
disaster, we see that limited resources that Congress 
appropriates to communities after disasters are targeted 
towards higher-income homeowners who are predominantly White, 
at the expense of lower-income renters who are predominantly 
Black.
    Ms. Tlaib. Ms. Yentel, I do want to have some time, because 
I want to get to some specifics around this, because flooding 
was a huge, huge issue. Some of my residents' homes were 
flooded up to 4 times.
    This is to all of the witnesses on the panel. I am curious 
to hear this. As flood plains have shifted with climate change, 
and extreme weather events become more common, should funding 
and authorization of CDBG-DR also include updated flood 
mapping?
    The other question is, how should localities balance the 
need to build communities in more resilient, less flood-prone 
areas without disbursing the full of affordable housing? I want 
to hear from everyone on the panel about this.
    Again, flood mapping is something that has been on my mind 
and wanting to see if we should be really laser-focused on that 
to try to shift some of those resources, again, to those 
impacted the most. Is there anybody on the panel who can talk 
about that?
    Mr. Garcia-Diaz. I can. Just quickly, GAO has done some 
work, and we can get back to you with more details on FEMA's 
progress in improving their mapping capabilities. That is an 
area that has been of concern for us, and it has a lot of 
knock-on effect on every other program that seeks to either 
build affordable housing or recover it after a disaster.
    So, we can share some information there, but government 
decisions on funding should be based on the best available data 
and analysis in FEMA, and particularly the National Flood 
Insurance Program (NFIP), which is responsible for that.
    Ms. Tlaib. I am so sorry we didn't have a chance to hear 
from the others. Thank you so much. And if you do have an 
answer and want to submit it to the committee, I would welcome 
that.
    Thank you.
    Chairman Green. The gentlelady's time has expired, and the 
Chair will ask the witnesses to respond to the gentlelady's 
questions in writing.
    The Chair will now recognize the gentleman from Tennessee, 
Mr. Kustoff, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Kustoff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you and the 
ranking member for calling today's hearing, and I also thank 
all of the witnesses who are appearing virtually today.
    Mr. Begg, can you talk about the waiver process or the 
CDBG-DR grantees? How are waivers granted, if you will? And, I 
guess, and without asking this as a leading question, are the 
waivers granted on an inconsistent basis?
    Mr. Begg. Thank you for that question. In general, waivers 
are granted for--HUD has the authority to grant waivers from 
the traditional CDBG framework, which generally applies to 
CDBG-DR and CDBG funding.
    And the Secretary has discretion, when appropriate, to 
waive requirements or create alternative requirements that 
would benefit particular funding streams. And, in certain 
instances, grantees have the authority to make certain waivers 
of their own program requirements.
    We haven't examined the consistency of those waivers across 
the portfolio, necessarily, but one thing that we have seen is 
that the waivers can create confusion at times and lack of 
clarity for grantees.
    In one instance recently, we identified a scenario where 
the City of Houston was seeking a waiver of program 
requirements from the Texas General Land Office (GLO) regarding 
the rebuilding specifications for homes. And GLO ultimately 
denied the waiver, but they spent a lot of time disagreeing 
with the City of Houston about whether it was appropriate, 
because if they granted that waiver to the City of Houston, it 
might produce an inequitable result for other cities and 
counties across their State in the distribution of the 
Hurricane Harvey relief funds.
    So, the waiver process is designed to get at the 
flexibility issue we discussed earlier, but it does come with 
risks and it needs to be managed and assessed.
    Mr. Kustoff. I do appreciate that answer. And I think what 
you just said, that regardless of who the HUD Secretary is, 
whomever he or she is, if a waiver is granted, there are no 
clear guidelines as to the parameters of the waiver or waivers. 
Is that right?
    Mr. Begg. There are certain aspects of the program that 
can't be waived, like fair housing and environmental reviews, 
but in large part, there are many options for waivers 
consistent with what you said.
    Mr. Kustoff. Yes. During your questioning or the 
questioning of everybody this morning, there has been a great 
deal of talk about codification that Chairman Green and 
Congresswoman Wagner have worked on, and others. Does the 
waiver process beg for some direction in terms of codification? 
In other words, should there be codifications about what lanes, 
avenues, directions the waivers can be granted by the HUD 
Secretary?
    Mr. Begg. Waivers ultimately are a policy call for Congress 
and the HUD Secretary and leadership to make. Our office's role 
is generally to look at whether the waivers and the program 
execution is achieving goals effectively and efficiently.
    And so, to the extent that waivers continue to be part of 
the process for CDBG-DR program execution, what we would focus 
on is looking at ensuring that those waivers work, and they 
produce the intended effective outcomes for the individuals in 
need.
    Mr. Kustoff. If there was abuse in the waivers, somewhere 
in the process or after the waiver was granted, your office 
would investigate, right?
    Mr. Begg. Absolutely.
    Mr. Kustoff. In terms of making your work easier, if you 
were waving a magic wand and were working on codification, what 
are some of the parameters that you would look to codify?
    Mr. Begg. As I mentioned earlier, streamlining HUD's 
allocation process is a critical component. And in Chairman 
Green's bill, one benefit we see is the enhanced deadlines that 
are in place to ensure that HUD and its grantees are moving 
through the various gates of announcing allocations, reviewing 
and approving action plans, and then entering grant agreements.
    Mr. Kustoff. Thank you very much. I yield back.
    Chairman Green. The gentleman yields back.
    The gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Garcia, is recognized for 
5 minutes.
    Mr. Garcia of Illinois. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I 
thank you and the ranking member for holding this important 
hearing on the CDBG-DR program, and I thank our witnesses for 
joining us today.
    At a time when disasters seem more and more frequent, CDBG-
DR oversight is, unfortunately, an extremely important topic. 
The devastating events that have taken place in Puerto Rico in 
the last few years, from Hurricane Maria to the devastating 
earthquakes, have affected me personally, along with many of my 
constituents in Chicago. I traveled to the island to look at 
recovery efforts, and I don't have to tell you that it has been 
slow going. Challenges in the CDBG-DR allocation process are no 
small part of it.
    Ms. Yentel, in your testimony, you highlighted some of the 
challenges that Puerto Ricans have faced with CDBG-DR funds 
after Hurricane Maria. It is serious stuff. One CDBG-funded 
program only released housing resources in English, only 
translating them after protests. Many homeowners in flood 
plains have not been able to get help at all, leaving them 
vulnerable to displacement, and small, local construction 
companies have been left out of contracts. And it feels like 
Puerto Rico has been left behind time and time again.
    Ms. Yentel, do you think that HUD is sensitive to the needs 
of Puerto Rico and its recovery? And do you think that the 
GAO's recommendations for the CDBG-DR program will meaningfully 
improve disaster relief efforts on the island?
    Ms. Yentel. I do think it will. It would make a significant 
difference for people who were harmed by Hurricane Maria, and 
for people who may be harmed by future disasters. Puerto Rico 
is an especially egregious example of how disaster recovery and 
rebuilding don't work for the lowest-income people when local 
communities, especially, are often shut out of the conversation 
about how these resources should be used.
    Those local communities and impacted people should be 
leading the conversations about how resources should be used, 
about how questions of relocation should be considered. And, 
certainly, at the very least, materials about available 
resources should be made available in the relevant language to 
the communities, and none of that has been true in Puerto Rico.
    Advocates and impacted people have fought their way to the 
table and have been able to make some improvements to the 
programs, but it shouldn't be that hard. It shouldn't take that 
level of effort. It should be automatically built into the 
system that communities have a say in how these resources are 
used.
    And one of the improvements that this bill would do is to 
require really robust community consultation, and especially 
consultation with communities that are most impacted by the 
disaster.
    Mr. Garcia of Illinois. For my first question, would that 
be a yes or a no on the sensitivity of HUD to their needs?
    Ms. Yentel. In terms of the sensitivity of HUD, yes. 
Unfortunately, it has been a political question. The previous 
Administration created many unnecessary obstacles and blocks to 
even getting the money to the island. This Administration has a 
different approach and is prioritizing the needs of Puerto 
Ricans and being much more sensitive to their needs.
    Mr. Garcia of Illinois. Thank you for that.
    Mr. Begg, the GAO's report found that vulnerable people 
face obstacles to accessing relief through the CDBG-DR program. 
That is troubling for my community, being hit by a natural 
disaster, or for any community, but it is especially troubling 
in Puerto Rico where English is not the primary language, and 
the average incomes are lower than they are in the continental 
U.S. and more people live in informal housing.
    Can you discuss what steps HUD can take to deliver relief 
to the people of Puerto Rico specifically?
    Mr. Begg. Thank you for the question. The steps that HUD 
can take to assist Puerto Rico are similar to the steps that it 
can take to assist all grantees. Technical assistance and 
oversight and monitoring of progress in the grant is critical 
from the HUD perspective to ensure that when grantees are 
facing challenges, either in reaching their communities or in 
executing their programs or establishing them as a threshold 
matter, it is important that HUD step in and do what it can 
through technical assistance to make sure that the grantees 
have everything they need from HUD to be successful.
    Mr. Garcia of Illinois. Thank you very much.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Chairman Green. The gentleman yields back.
    The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Timmons, is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Timmons. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to begin 
by thanking you for your work with Congresswoman Wagner to 
reform the CDBG-DR and ultimately help the communities across 
our country who have suffered from natural disasters, whether 
hurricanes, tornadoes, floods, or wildfires.
    When these disasters strike, the communities that are least 
able to properly recover often end up being the hardest hit. 
When functioning properly, the CDBG-DR program can provide 
invaluable support to low- and moderate-income communities 
reeling from devastating natural disasters.
    But knowing this, it is critical that this program be 
transparent and accountable to ensure the taxpayer dollars that 
fund this critical program are directed to the right people and 
only spent on appropriate disaster recovery-related needs. And, 
of course, the program must be quick and efficient in 
responding to the various disasters that will inevitably come.
    Mr. Begg, your report showed that fraud prevention is 
something that needs to be addressed for CDBG-DR, and I know 
that we have been discussing codification a lot today, but I am 
curious, do you think that if Chairman Green and Congresswoman 
Wagner's bill to codify the program were to become law, it 
would be easier for HUD to identify and prevent fraud? And 
would codifying the law help with the staffing capacity issue 
identified in the report?
    Mr. Begg. Thank you, Congressman, for that question. We 
certainly believe that codification is an important step 
towards eliminating opportunities for fraud, waste, and abuse. 
But as I mentioned in my opening statement, it is not a cure-
all for all of the problems that grantees and HUD face.
    In successfully executing disaster recovery assistance 
programs, preventing improper payments and reducing the 
opportunities for fraud is something our office has stressed 
over the years. In our recent top management challenges report, 
we identified fraud risk management as a top challenge for HUD 
across the Department, but specifically within disaster 
recovery. And our colleagues at GAO last year published a 
report examining the steps that HUD has taken to assess fraud 
risks in the DR program specifically.
    We believe that HUD's action on those recommendations from 
the GAO to comprehensively assess fraud risk within the DR 
program is a key step in identifying and understanding fraud 
risk so that the Department and its grantees are in a position 
to mitigate and prevent that fraud.
    Mr. Timmons. Sure. Thank you for that. Also, would a 
streamlined rulemaking process help reduce fraud as well?
    Mr. Begg. Yes. We think so. We think it could help, 
certainly. As I mentioned earlier, the longer that funds sit 
out there, and they are not spent to address unmet disaster 
recovery needs, the more likely it is that they could be used 
for ineligible purposes, and that opens the door to potential 
fraud.
    Mr. Timmons. Sure. Thank you. Lastly, I want to focus on 
how this program needs to be streamlined and become more 
efficient, which is obviously something codifying the program 
would help with. When disaster strikes, this type of relief 
needs to get out the door as quickly as possible while still 
maintaining the security and integrity of the program.
    Mr. Begg, again, where in the CDBG-DR program can we cut 
red tape while still allowing the program to remain flexible so 
it can successfully respond to the various natural disasters we 
deal with in our country?
    Mr. Begg. One area that we have highlighted frequently is 
consistency around the core requirements of the programs. 
Generally, the programs are designed to do a handful of things, 
and by permanently authorizing the program statutes and 
requiring HUD to establish permanent regulations outlining 
program requirements, we think that will help grantees focus 
and plan better so that they don't engage in endless 
disagreement or endless pursuit of perfection in their program 
design, and they can start implementing around the core 
simplified requirements in the regulations.
    Mr. Timmons. Sure. Thank you for that. I will end with, I 
think the burdensome Federal Register notice process seems to 
be a good place to start. It has to be really tough for 
grantees when there are so many changes to the original 
requirements, and we need to really make it very transparent, 
what we are expecting from them, so we can be efficient with 
this program.
    I really appreciate you being here virtually, and with 
that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you.
    Chairman Green. The gentleman yields back. The Chair now 
recognizes the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Cleaver, for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Cleaver. Mr. Chairman, thank you. The CDBG-DR is 
extremely important, and I had to deal with it for about 20 
years when I was in municipal government. And one of the 
problems that we had in Missouri, in Kansas City, after a 
couple of 500-year floods that occurred over about 3 years, the 
whole--the issue of trying to get it dealt with when it is not 
permanently authorized.
    I am not sure what the historical reason is for not doing 
the permanent authorization, but I am familiar with the fact 
that we don't need delays in the midst of a disaster, where we 
have to get Presidential or Congressional authorization. And it 
just delays what the government can do, and it creates 
frustration. And I am wondering if there is anyone who has any 
reason why it should not be permanently authorized, because 
otherwise, it is going to be very difficult for me to ever see 
this as something that is okay. Anybody else? So, everybody 
agrees with me that we need it to be permanently authorized?
    Mr. Garcia-Diaz. GAO has made a recommendation to Congress 
to consider making the program permanent. We think there are 
very compelling reasons for doing so, and I don't think the 
status quo is really acceptable going forward given the size, 
scale, and frequencies of these disasters.
    Mr. Cleaver. I wish I could go back in history to find out 
why, and maybe even if we found out why, it still doesn't make 
sense, but it is something that I am hoping we can do.
    The Chair of the subcommittee, Chairman Green, and I have 
had some discussions about this because we are taking a pretty 
in-depth look at the CDBG program, period. And one of the 
things that we have talked about is hopefully, we can get this 
program, this CDBG which is not a very complicated piece of 
legislation, including the DR program. So, I appreciate your 
comments.
    Are there any programs in the Federal Government that any 
of you know of, that can respond quickly? What is the fastest 
program we have to respond to a disaster? Anybody?
    Ms. Morris. Obviously, those are the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) programs. Those programs are on the 
ground immediately, and there has to be conversation about 
integrating those programs with the CDBG-DR more effectively, 
and more impactfully.
    And one thing I would say, Congressman Cleaver, is that 
while I certainly do not object to the notion of codification 
of the CDBG-DR, I would like to add that we need to also see 
reform, and we need to see reform that centers on the needs of 
the most vulnerable. We have talked a lot today about fraud and 
waste management, and what we seem to be losing the thread on 
is the people who are left behind. If funds are misappropriated 
by contractors and used for other things, that increases the 
number of people who are left behind.
    And the notion of fraud and waste management or 
mismanagement is often used to disenfranchise the most 
vulnerable. In the name of checking boxes and making sure that 
all the Is are dotted and the Ts are crossed, the most 
vulnerable are often ignored in these programs, and that is 
something that must be said.
    So, while I appreciate and agree wholeheartedly that these 
funds must be managed appropriately, we must also be careful 
about continuing to stigmatize the people who desperately need 
these programs, when we say fraud and mismanagement permeates 
these programs. We have to be clear that it is often by 
administrators and contractors who are hired by grantees, not 
the recipients themselves.
    Mr. Cleaver. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Green. The gentleman's time has expired.
    The Chair will now recognize the Vice Chair of the 
subcommittee, Ms. Williams, for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Williams of Georgia. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    In Atlanta, there are only 29 affordable and available 
housing units for every 100 extremely low-income renter 
households. As we have already heard today, any disaster can 
further stress the shortage that we have in my district and 
across the country. Not only do we have to invest in our long-
term affordable rental housing stock now, but we also have to 
be sure that we take the same approach when disaster strikes.
    Ms. Yentel, in your testimony, you mentioned that HUD has 
the authority to reject State action plans that favor 
homeowners over renters. What else can HUD do proactively to 
ensure that the plans that come to them equitably provide 
disaster relief for renters?
    Ms. Yentel. I would say one of the most important things 
that they could do right now, that is part of the GAO's 
recommendations to them, is to require of themselves and 
grantees more data transparency, to collect information on who 
is applying, and the demographics of who is applying, and who 
is or is not getting resources, who is being accepted and who 
is being denied.
    I think just in having that kind of data transparency, it 
will become very clear what people on the ground and people who 
have been doing this work for a long time know, which is that 
there are significant disparities in who receives resources, 
disparities between lower- and higher-income people, and 
disparities between people of color and communities of color 
and White communities. So, that data transparency is really 
essential.
    Ms. Williams of Georgia. Ms. Yentel, after a disaster, 
rebuilding apartments and homes is critical to ensuring those 
most impacted have a place to live and don't see their wealth 
permanently impacted. As we make investments to rebuild 
communities, we have the opportunity not only to prevent a 
widening racial wealth gap but also to reinvest funds back into 
impacted communities and people.
    How can HUD make sure that the money invested in local 
recovery more often goes to local businesses and creates local 
jobs? How would this help ensure recovery efforts or credits to 
closing the racial wealth gap in a place like Atlanta, which 
leads the country?
    Ms. Yentel. Yes. It is a very important point because a lot 
of times, these resources go to contractors to run the 
programs, and these contractors often are not grounded in the 
communities that are impacted. They are out of State, they are 
out of the city, and they are profiting from the administration 
of these programs.
    And many times, they are doing it well--sometimes, I will 
say. There are also egregious examples where they are doing it 
poorly, and yet, get rehired after future disasters. But most 
importantly, it is not creating the local infrastructure to be 
able to respond to disasters in the future.
    These kinds of significant resources going to communities 
can not only serve the primary purpose of rebuilding apartments 
and making homes affordable for the lowest-income people where 
homes have been destroyed, but they can also create local jobs 
and create local expertise. Then, that community has more and 
better capacity to respond to future disasters.
    And that is a place where HUD can do more, and they have 
been, of late, doing more in this Administration to really look 
more closely at State and local action plans and how they are 
using CDBG.
    And as with the case in Texas, just recently, going back 
and saying, we are not going to accept this action plan until 
you do more to ensure that these resources are going to the 
communities instead of the people who have the greatest needs.
    Ms. Williams of Georgia. And, Ms. Yentel, I am sorry to 
make it feel like you are in the hot seat, but in your 
testimony, you also emphasized the importance of sharing data 
on disaster recovery with academic and research institutions so 
we can continue to understand equity issues in disaster 
recovery and identify potential solutions, one of my priorities 
here on this subcommittee.
    What current barriers remain to working with colleges and 
universities on this effort? And how can we prioritize 
partnerships with institutions such as Historically Black 
Colleges and Universities (HBCUs) that are well-positioned to 
do this type of research?
    Ms. Yentel. Again, yes, it is so important, and it comes 
back to the importance of data transparency. And, certainly, 
there is some data that can't be released publicly because of 
concerns around privacy, but there are ways to mitigate those 
concerns, especially when sharing data with academic 
institutions.
    And it is critically important. There is very little data 
available nationally despite the number of disasters that are 
occurring and despite the increased frequency. There is little 
data that is available about who is impacted, how they are 
harmed, how there are racial and other disparities, and who is 
assisted and who is not, and that kind of data sharing is 
essential.
    There should be public transparency, and there should be 
greater data shared with academic institutions to provide this 
kind of analysis, and provide it to Members of Congress so that 
we are ensuring that public policy meets local needs.
    Ms. Williams of Georgia. Thank you, Ms. Yentel, and thank 
you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    Chairman Green. The gentlelady's time has expired.
    The Chair now yields himself 5 minutes for questions. Let 
me start by thanking all of the Members, and I especially have 
to thank Mrs. Wagner for her Herculean efforts in helping. Mrs. 
Wagner, if you are listening, I want you to know that I 
appreciate greatly all that you have done, as well as the Chair 
of the Full Committee, Chairwoman Waters.
    In Texas, we have what may be considered unique 
circumstances. Hurricane Harvey hit Houston in 2017, and we 
appropriated funds, and we still have funds that have not been 
utilized. Someone spoke of slow-spenders earlier. Mr. Begg, I 
am concerned about slow spending. I want to know from you, has 
there ever been a clawback, or what typically is done when the 
slow-spender becomes a no-spender. Mr. Begg, if you would, 
please?
    Mr. Begg. Thank you for the question, Mr. Chairman. I was 
having a little difficulty hearing you, but I just want to 
confirm that you were asking about what happens when slow-
spenders are identified as no-spenders in terms of clawing back 
grant funding?
    Chairman Green. Yes, sir. That is correct, and I am sorry 
about the volume.
    Mr. Begg. No problem.
    In our recent review of HUD's oversight of slow-spending 
disaster recovery grantees, what we have seen is that HUD 
actually has metrics built into its disaster recovery grant 
reporting system to identify at various stages of the grant 
whether grantees are meeting their expenditure targets and 
whether they are on pace to expend on a monthly basis the 
dollars that they need to to exhaust the grant before closeout.
    One concern we have is that when some of those red flags in 
the system show that grantees are no-spenders for 6, 12, 24 
months, HUD does not require the grantees to address those 
flags until the time of grant closeout. The risk there, from 
our perspective, is that a no-spending grantee could continue 
not using funding until the grant closeout, and money would be 
left on the table that HUD would then have to recapture, and it 
wouldn't be available to go to the communities and individuals 
in need.
    Chairman Green. Thank you.
    For the benefit of persons in Houston who may be tuning in, 
let me ask Ms. Yentel, would you explain why we understand it 
is important for us to spend timely? And I would also like to 
get Ms. Calhoun-Palay to respond as well as Ms. Yentel. So, if 
you would be brief, that would be helpful.
    Ms. Yentel?
    Ms. Yentel. I am so sorry, Congressman. I didn't quite hear 
the question, but maybe Ms. Calhoun-Palay did, and she could 
start off.
    Chairman Green. I am speaking at my volume level higher 
than I have been speaking. The question is explain, if you 
would, why it is so important for the dollars to be spent 
timely. People in Houston would like to know that we understand 
this process and why it is so important.
    We will start with you, Ms. Calhoun-Palay, if you would?
    Ms. Calhoun-Palay. Sure. The importance of timely spending 
of these funds is directly linked to the folks who are most in 
need of repairs and recovery. So, what is happening on an 
ongoing basis, and even to this day, is that as applicants are 
waiting for responses, they are having to jump through hoops, 
and there is an ongoing cycle of having to resubmit paperwork 
before the actual application gets approved and gets funded.
    What happens in the meantime is that homeowners are sitting 
in black mold, continuing to sit in homes that have leaky 
roofs, and are just waiting.
    And in some cases, the guidance has been so ambiguous and 
vague where some homeowners have started to try to recover on 
their own. And then once they are approved, they are hearing 
that they are approved, they are told that they must stop. They 
must stop the ongoing construction in their homes or repairs in 
their homes so that the city or whatever agency can come 
forward and complete those repairs.
    The waiting game has a hazardous impact on actual 
homeowners who are just waiting. So, that is one of the reasons 
why it is timely--or so important that spending timelines are 
really quick.
    Chairman Green. My time is about to expire. Thank you.
    Let me just end with this. I am going to look at 
legislation to see whether the funds can be [inaudible] the 
State to perform the function of appropriating the funds within 
the State.
    Having said this, my time has expired. And, again, we would 
like to thank each of the witnesses for their testimony and for 
committing the time and resources to share their expertise with 
the subcommittee. Their testimony today will help to advance 
the important work of this subcommittee and of the Congress.
    The Chair notes that some Members may have additional 
questions for these witnesses, which they may wish to submit in 
writing. Without objection, the hearing record will remain open 
for 5 legislative days for Members to submit written questions 
to these witnesses and to place their responses in the record. 
Also, without objection, Members will have 5 legislative days 
to submit extraneous materials to the Chair for inclusion in 
the record.
    This hearing is adjourned. Thank you, one and all.
    [Whereupon, at 11:43 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

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