[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                        [H.A.S.C. No. 117-42]

                                HEARING

                                   ON

                   NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

                          FOR FISCAL YEAR 2022

                                  AND

              OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS

                               BEFORE THE

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING

                                   ON

                    FISCAL YEAR 2022 BUDGET REQUEST

        FOR NUCLEAR FORCES AND ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES

                               __________

                              HEARING HELD
                             JUNE 10, 2021


                                     
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
46-865                     WASHINGTON : 2022                     
          
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------                                        
  


                    SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

                    JIM COOPER, Tennessee, Chairman

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island      MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
JOHN GARAMENDI, California           JOE WILSON, South Carolina
SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts          DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California, Vice  MO BROOKS, Alabama
    Chair                            ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
RO KHANNA, California                SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
JOSEPH D. MORELLE, New York          LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
JIMMY PANETTA, California            MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
STEVEN HORSFORD, Nevada

               Grant Schneider, Professional Staff Member
                 Ryan Tully, Professional Staff Member
                           Zach Taylor, Clerk
                            
                            
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

              STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Cooper, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Tennessee, Chairman, 
  Subcommittee on Strategic Forces...............................     1
Turner, Hon. Michael R., a Representative from Ohio, Ranking 
  Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces.......................     1

                               WITNESSES

Dalton, Melissa, Acting Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, 
  and Capabilities, U.S. Department of Defense...................     2
Dawkins, Lt Gen James C., Jr., USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff for 
  Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration, U.S. Air Force...     7
Verdon, Charles P., Acting Administrator, National Nuclear 
  Security Administration........................................     4
Wolfe, VADM Johnny R., Jr., USN, Director, Strategic Systems 
  Programs, U.S. Navy............................................     6

                                APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

    Cooper, Hon. Jim.............................................    33
    Dalton, Melissa..............................................    36
    Dawkins, Lt Gen James C., Jr.................................    70
    Turner, Hon. Michael R.......................................    34
    Verdon, Charles P............................................    46
    Wolfe, VADM Johnny R., Jr....................................    57

Documents Submitted for the Record:

    [There were no Documents submitted.]

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

    [The information was not available at the time of printing.]

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

    Ms. Cheney...................................................    90
    Mr. Langevin.................................................    83
    Mr. Moulton..................................................    88
    Ms. Stefanik.................................................    89
    Mr. Turner...................................................    84
    
    
 FISCAL YEAR 2022 BUDGET REQUEST FOR NUCLEAR FORCES AND ATOMIC ENERGY 
                           DEFENSE ACTIVITIES

                              ----------                              

                  House of Representatives,
                       Committee on Armed Services,
                          Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                           Washington, DC, Thursday, June 10, 2021.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:03 a.m., via 
Webex, Hon. Jim Cooper (chairman of the subcommittee) 
presiding.

  OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JIM COOPER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
     TENNESSEE, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

    Mr. Cooper. The hearing will come to order. I would like to 
begin by thanking our distinguished panel of witnesses for 
testifying today. We look forward to hearing from each of you. 
First, Ms. Melissa Dalton, the Acting Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities; Dr. Charlie 
Verdon, the Acting NNSA [National Nuclear Security 
Administration] Administrator; Vice Admiral Johnny Wolfe, 
Director of U.S. Navy Strategic Systems Programs; and 
Lieutenant General James Dawkins, U.S. Air Force Deputy Chief 
of Staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration.
    In reading through your testimonies, we are reminded that 
the work of this subcommittee is probably the most important, 
technical, and consequential of any committee in the House. I 
would also like to point out the astonishing continuity over 
recent years in funding and support of the triad and nuclear 
programs. Seldom do you see this level of bipartisanship in 
modern-day Washington, but I am glad that it is occurring in 
our number one defense priority.
    I ask unanimous consent that the remainder of my opening 
statement will be inserted in the record and I turn over the 
opening statement to my colleague, Ranking Member Mr. Turner.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Cooper can be found in the 
Appendix on page 33.]

  STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL R. TURNER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
     OHIO, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

    Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your 
holding this hearing and I appreciate your bipartisan 
commitment to these topics. I too will ask that my statement be 
entered into the record, and I am going to summarize a few of 
the points.
    But, one, I know, obviously, we are under a great deal of 
pressure having gotten the budget so late, so I am very 
concerned about the effects of a CR [continuing resolution] and 
I am looking for the witnesses to discuss what that might be. 
Certainly, in the nuclear enterprise and the nuclear 
modernization, the effects of a CR are felt much more strongly. 
I also want to point out that Congress has the ability to 
change this, not just by getting our work done but because the 
fiscal year is statutory not constitutional. And we should 
probably change this. It could pick up at least 3 months a year 
for the Department of Defense if we made the fiscal year the 
calendar year.
    I am disappointed in the top line in the President's 
budget. It does not keep up with inflation as we look to those 
of our adversaries--China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran--that 
are modernizing. I think that there is a lot that we need to be 
focusing on and we are going to certainly be in a resources 
crunch. There has been a lot of bipartisan work as you have 
said, Mr. Chairman, on all the issues that fall under our 
committee.
    I am very concerned and I think we are all shocked to have 
heard the news of the Acting Secretary of the Navy appearing to 
take action to zero out the sea-launched cruise missile. This 
is something that is incredibly important. We just saw in the 
news also that the Secretary of Defense and the Chief of Staff, 
apparently, were not informed. We know that the Nuclear Posture 
Review isn't underway, and yet we have the first steps towards 
actions that would be unilateral disarmament.
    And, of course, even for those who wish to reduce nuclear 
forces, the best way to accomplish that is through arms control 
and you can't achieve arms control if you unilaterally give 
away assets that could be both beneficial to deterrence and/or 
beneficial to negotiations. I am looking forward to our 
witnesses today to discuss their thoughts on that breaking 
news.
    With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back and the rest of my 
statement will be entered into the record.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Turner can be found in the 
Appendix on page 34.]
    Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman.
    The first witness, Ms. Dalton.

 STATEMENT OF MELISSA DALTON, ACTING SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR 
 STRATEGY, PLANS, AND CAPABILITIES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

    Ms. Dalton. Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member Turner, and 
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the 
opportunity to testify today. May I request permission to 
submit my written statement for the record and provide brief 
opening remarks?
    Mr. Cooper. Without objection, so ordered.
    Ms. Dalton. Thank you. As I described to the subcommittee 
in April, the United States today faces a complex global threat 
environment characterized by increasingly sophisticated and 
militarily capable strategic competitors, destabilizing 
regional dynamics, and accelerating technological changes that 
pose significant dangers.
    China is rapidly becoming more capable and assertive, and 
concerns regarding its nuclear modernization and expansion are 
increasing. Russia's comprehensive modernization of its nuclear 
capabilities, over 80 percent complete, includes the addition 
of new dual-capable systems that threaten the United States and 
its allies and partners. We are confronted with multifaceted 
deterrence challenges across domains from both competitors, 
which add increased escalation risks, all making deterrence 
more challenging. And strategic risks emanating from both North 
Korea and Iran add significant complications to the strategic 
threat picture.
    For these reasons, nuclear deterrence remains the 
Department's highest priority mission, but more is needed to 
confront these growing, multifaceted threats. That is why 
Secretary Austin has directed a National Defense Strategy 
focusing on integrated deterrence, an effort to address threats 
and opportunities across conventional, cyber, space, hybrid, 
information, and nuclear domains.
    With regard to nuclear deterrence, our nuclear forces 
remain essential to ensure no adversary believes it can ever 
employ nuclear weapons for any reason, under any circumstances, 
against the United States or our allies and partners without 
risking devastating consequences. That is why the nuclear triad 
remains the bedrock of our strategic deterrence, but we must 
modernize our aging capabilities to ensure a credible deterrent 
for the future.
    The President's fiscal year 2022 budget submission supports 
our efforts to modernize the nuclear triad. It funds all 
critical DOD [Department of Defense] nuclear modernization 
requirements, helping to ensure that modern replacements will 
be available before aging systems reach the end of their 
extended service lives. The fiscal year 2022 budget request for 
nuclear forces is $27.7 billion. This includes $15.6 billion to 
sustain and operate our current nuclear forces, and $12.1 
billion for recapitalization programs.
    This modernization effort is at a critical juncture given 
our aging platforms. As Secretary Austin has stated, U.S. 
nuclear weapons have been extended far beyond their original 
service lives and the tipping point where we must 
simultaneously overhaul these forces is now here. Updating and 
overhauling our Nation's nuclear forces is a critical national 
security priority. Even as we continue with nuclear 
modernization, we will continually review ongoing programs to 
assess their performance, schedule, risks, and projected costs. 
The Department will always seek to balance the best capability 
with the most cost-effective solution.
    Our pending review of nuclear policy and posture, which 
will be nested under the National Defense Strategy, will ensure 
that we have the right capabilities to meet our priorities now 
and in the future. The review will allow us to examine our 
nuclear posture and policy with an eye towards acting on 
direction in the administration's Interim National Security 
Strategic Guidance that the United States takes steps to reduce 
the role of nuclear weapons in our National Security Strategy 
while ensuring our strategic deterrent remains safe, secure, 
and effective, and that our extended deterrence commitments to 
our allies remains strong and credible.
    In so doing, our review will focus on the vital interests 
of the United States and our allies and partners. It will be 
informed by current and projected global security environment, 
trends, threats posed by potential adversaries and the 
capabilities of the United States and our allies and partners 
to address those threats; the roles of nuclear weapons; a 
strategy to reduce those roles and the impacts of policy, 
posture, and capabilities on strategic stability; and the risks 
of miscalculation.
    Consultation with allies will be a core component of this 
review and we have begun engaging with allies to ensure that 
their views are heard and understood before reaching any 
conclusions. Unique to this review and consistent with the 
interim guidance, preserving strategic stability will be a 
significant area of analysis in the review. Steps in this 
respect have already started with the extension of the New 
START [Strategic Arms Reduction] Treaty, and further analysis 
based on the President's priorities will occur as our strategic 
reviews proceed. We look forward to keeping Congress informed 
as we conduct these reviews.
    Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by thanking this subcommittee 
for its previous support for nuclear deterrence and the 
opportunity to testify. I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Dalton can be found in the 
Appendix on page 36.]
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you very much, Ms. Dalton.
    Every witness statement will be inserted for the record by 
unanimous consent, so I will ask you gentlemen to limit your 
remarks, as Ms. Dalton did excellently, to about 5 minutes.
    The next witness will be Dr. Verdon.

STATEMENT OF CHARLES P. VERDON, ACTING ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL 
                NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

    Dr. Verdon. Thank you.
    Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member Turner, and members of the 
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. 
On behalf of our entire national security enterprise workforce, 
I express our appreciation for this subcommittee's strong 
bipartisan support for NNSA's nuclear security missions as 
demonstrated most recently in fiscal year 2021 National Defense 
Authorization Act, and fiscal year 2021 budget for the 
Department of Energy.
    We meet today against the backdrop of a world marked by 
growing security challenges. China and Russia are modernizing 
their nuclear arsenal, investing significant resources in 
delivery platforms that have made clear that nuclear weapons 
will be a vital element to their statecraft. At the same time, 
the risk for proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons 
of mass destruction pose profound and existential dangers.
    Recognizing these global security challenges, the 
President's fiscal year 2022 budget request for $19.7 billion 
for NNSA reflects support for the three enduring missions for 
which Congress charged the NNSA in 2000: ensuring the safety, 
security, and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear stockpile; 
reducing the threat of nuclear proliferation and nuclear 
terrorism around the world; and providing nuclear propulsion 
for the U.S. Navy's fleet of aircraft carriers and submarines 
that is critical to the U.S. national security and our allies.
    [Inaudible.]
    Dr. Verdon. [continuing]. Stockpile. Our alignment and 
synchronization----
    [Inaudible.]
    Dr. Verdon. [continuing]. To improve. The fiscal year 2022 
budget request enables NNSA to execute its nuclear warhead and 
infrastructure modernization efforts begun under the Obama/
Biden administration. The administration is beginning to 
undertake a formal review of efforts to modernize our nuclear 
deterrent to include DOD delivery platforms, the nuclear 
weapons required under those platforms, and the NNSA 
infrastructure needed to produce and maintain those weapons.
    Regardless of the review's specific findings, so long as we 
retain a nuclear arsenal we must have the infrastructure, 
science, technology, and engineering to produce and maintain 
the nuclear weapons stockpile. Unfortunately, the NNSA's 
production infrastructure has atrophied considerably, both in 
terms of the physical infrastructure and the capabilities 
needed within those facilities. Continued recapitalization is 
imperative. The potential impacts to the U.S. deterrent if not 
addressed are no longer over the horizon.
    Of particular importance is reestablishing the capability 
to manufacture plutonium pits. This capability is needed to 
address risks due to plutonium aging, degrading warhead 
performance, improve warhead safety and security, and provide 
the ability to respond to evolving threats to the U.S. nuclear 
deterrent. We fully recognize that the potential impacts of 
plutonium aging on warhead performance are uncertain at this 
time. Plutonium didn't exist--at least we didn't know about 
it--until, you know, before 1940, and simply has not been in 
existence on the planet long enough to have concrete data on 
how our pits will behave when they are approaching a century 
old.
    Given this, it is an assessment of our best technical 
experts in the weapons program, the three NNSA laboratory 
directors, and independent experts like the JASONs, that the 
risk is just too high not to have the capability to manufacture 
plutonium pits at a rate sufficient to refresh the stockpile's 
pits before they exceed 80 to 100 years in age.
    In addition to our mission to ensure the continued 
effectiveness of the nuclear stockpile, nonproliferation also 
remains an important and growing priority. The NNSA's Defense 
Office of Nuclear Nonproliferation is critical to implementing 
the President's call to lock down fissile material and 
radiological materials around the world. The fiscal year 2022 
budget request enables NNSA's Defense Office of Nuclear 
Nonproliferation to continue to work worldwide with our 
partners to prevent state and non-state actors from developing 
nuclear weapons or acquiring materials usable in nuclear 
weapons.
    With regards to our third mission of providing nuclear 
propulsion for the U.S. Navy, the Office of Naval Reactors 
remains at the forefront of technological developments in naval 
propulsion by advancing new technologies and improvements in 
naval reactor performance. This preeminence provides the U.S. 
Navy with a commanding edge in naval warfighting capabilities 
and the fiscal year 2022 budget request enables NNSA's Office 
of Naval Reactors to continue their programs which are so vital 
to the security of our Nation and the allies.
    In closing, despite the challenges posed by COVID 
[coronavirus] pandemic, I am pleased to report that the NNSA 
did not miss a single major milestone or DOD requirement. This 
achievement is a testament to the professionalism in NNSA's 
world-class workforce, the leadership of our sites, and their 
commitment to national security. In fact, I am happy to report 
that as we speak today, the system first production unit for 
the W88 Alt [Alteration] 370 is being assembled at Pantex. So I 
thank you again for the strong support of this committee and 
the opportunity to testify before you today and I stand ready 
to answer any questions you may have.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Verdon can be found in the 
Appendix on page 46.]
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you very much, Dr. Verdon. Now we will 
hear from Vice Admiral Johnny Wolfe.

    STATEMENT OF VADM JOHNNY R. WOLFE, JR., USN, DIRECTOR, 
             STRATEGIC SYSTEMS PROGRAMS, U.S. NAVY

    Admiral Wolfe. Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member Turner, and 
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the 
opportunity to testify. I would like to thank this subcommittee 
for its continued support of the Navy's nuclear deterrent 
mission. As you heard from Admiral Richard, Commander, U.S. 
Strategic Command, nuclear deterrence underwrites every U.S. 
military operation and capability on the globe and serves as 
the backstop for both our national defense and the defense of 
our allies.
    The Nation's nuclear triad of intercontinental ballistic 
missiles, strategic bombers, and ballistic missile submarines 
serves as the bedrock of our ability to deter major power 
conflict, assure our allies and partners, achieve U.S. 
objectives should deterrence fail, and hedge against an 
uncertain future. The Navy has provided unwavering and singular 
mission-focused support to the sea-based leg of the triad for 
over six decades.
    We must sustain today's deterrent while modernizing for the 
future. This falls into four concurrent lines of effort. First, 
we must maintain the current D5LE [D5 Life Extension] missile 
inventory and provide the necessary operational support to 
sustain Ohio-class submarines through their service lives. This 
is being accomplished through an update to all of our 
subsystems. All of our life extension efforts remain on track 
and our current program will support the deployment of all 
existing warheads. We must also recapitalize our strategic 
weapons facilities to continue to support and sustain SSP 
[Strategic Systems Programs] and operations that enable our 
continuous at-sea presence.
    Second, we must continue to work with our partners at PEO 
[Program Executive Office] Columbia to ensure that the 
transition between Ohio-class and Columbia-class submarines 
stays on schedule. For SSP, this requires a seamless transition 
of the current D5LE weapons system and missile inventory onto 
the new Columbia class. During this time of transition, we will 
ensure that the Navy's portion of the nuclear triad remains 
credible by introducing the W93 Mark 7 to rebalance the 
stockpile of W76 and W88s and meet STRATCOM [United States 
Strategic Command] requirements.
    Third, it is imperative that we start the work on a future 
missile and corresponding weapons systems now. This next 
generation of the current D5LE missile, a missile in service 
since 1989 and boasting a remarkable history of 182 successful 
flight tests is called D5LE2. D5LE2 will yield multiple 
benefits in missile performance to include extending its 
service life. D5LE2 is required to completely outload our 
Columbia-class SSBNs and ensure that Trident remains credible 
in the face of a dynamic threat environment. A D5LE2 missile 
must be developed, tested, and produced with a lead time 
sufficient to deploy on Columbia-class Hull 9 in fiscal year 
2039. It will then be backfitted for the first eight hulls of 
the class.
    Lastly, one of the greatest advantages the United States 
has is its alliances and partnerships. As the U.S. project 
officer for the Polaris Sales Agreement, I will continue to 
support the U.K.'s [United Kingdom's] sovereign deterrent for 
today's Vanguard-class submarines and their successor, the 
Dreadnought-class. For decades, U.S. policy has recognized that 
the independent British nuclear deterrent adds to global 
stability. Under the 1958 Mutual Defense Agreement and the 1962 
Polaris Sales Agreement, the United States has provided 
assistance and material consistent with international law to 
the U.K. deterrent program. Without this assistance, the cost 
and schedule risk to maintain the U.K.'s independent deterrent 
would rise significantly, thus creating additional challenges 
for the U.K. in sustaining its nuclear contribution to NATO 
[North Atlantic Treaty Organization] alongside the U.S.
    None of these four lines of effort are possible without 
investment in our people, our infrastructure, and our 
industrial base. Military, civilian, government, and 
contractor, the men and women of SSP are working hard to 
deliver a safe, secure, and effective strategic weapons system 
today that will serve us well into the latter half of the 
century. They remain my number one priority in order to ensure 
continued program success. Nuclear modernization will take time 
to complete, so work towards these ends must start now and 
cannot be delayed. It is only through your continued support 
that the Department's top modernization priorities can be 
achieved.
    As the 14th director, it is my highest honor to represent 
the men and women of SSP comprising approximately of 1,700 
sailors, 1,000 Marines, 300 coastguardsmen, and over 1,300 
civilians and over 2,000 contractor personnel. It is my most 
critical goal to ensure they are poised to execute the mission 
with the same well of success, passion, and rigor both today 
and tomorrow as they have since our program inception in 1955.
    Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on behalf of 
the men and women who make deterrence of major power conflict 
their life's work. I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Admiral Wolfe can be found in 
the Appendix on page 57.]
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Admiral Wolfe. And now we will hear 
from Lieutenant General James Dawkins.

 STATEMENT OF LT GEN JAMES C. DAWKINS, JR., USAF, DEPUTY CHIEF 
OF STAFF FOR STRATEGIC DETERRENCE AND NUCLEAR INTEGRATION, U.S. 
                           AIR FORCE

    General Dawkins. Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member Turner, 
and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for 
inviting me to appear before you today to represent the 
dedicated men and women of the Air Force's nuclear enterprise. 
Along with my teammates here at the table, the airmen of the 
United States Air Force remain committed and work tirelessly to 
continuously provide the Nation a safe, secure, effective, and 
credible nuclear deterrent. This commitment has become even 
more significant given the age of our systems and the nature of 
the current security environment.
    The first time in our Nation's history we are on a 
trajectory to face two nuclear-capable, strategic peer 
adversaries. Russia has multiple types of nonstrategic nuclear 
weapons deployed or in research and development including 
short- and close-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and 
anti-ship missiles. Three of Russia's novel strategic systems 
and its nonstrategic nuclear weapons are not subject to the New 
START treaty's limits or verification regime. The People's 
Republic of China [PRC], as our principal pacing threat, is 
nearing completion of its own nuclear triad and will likely at 
least double their nuclear stockpile this decade. The pace of 
the PRC's weapons development is very concerning.
    The U.S. nuclear triad remains the primary military means 
by which the Department of Defense provides deterrence against 
existential threats to our homeland and allies. The triad has 
remained the force posture of choice for each President and 
Congress since the 1960s. The flexible options it provides the 
President complicates an adversary's decision calculus should 
they wish to pursue aggression against the United States or our 
allies. However, the triad is showing its age as many of its 
weapon systems and infrastructure date back to the early 1960s. 
The President's fiscal year 2022 budget fully funds our 
modernization efforts to provide the necessary improvements to 
counter our potential adversaries' increasing capabilities.
    The Air Force continues to achieve significant progress in 
our modernization programs to include the Ground-Based 
Strategic Deterrent [GBSD], Long-Range Standoff Weapon [LRSO], 
and B-21 Raider. The GBSD is leveraging cutting-edge digital 
engineering and has met every major milestone of the past 5 
years. The Long-Range Standoff cruise missile and the B-21 are 
also on schedule. The B-52 modernization efforts are on track 
ensuring the aircraft remains relevant through the 2050s. In 
partnership with the United States Space Force, our nuclear 
command, control, and communication system remains secure and 
effective as we modernize capabilities ensuring future 
connectivity for leadership and strategic forces in an 
increasingly challenging cyber environment.
    The Air Force is committed to providing stable requirements 
and delivering these modernized weapons system programs on time 
and on budget. However, we can't do this alone and we ask for 
the continued support of the Congress to give stable 
authorization and appropriation across both the Department of 
Defense and the National Nuclear Security Administration 
enterprise. We owe this not only to our Nation, but also to our 
airmen who are in some cases manning the same missile sites and 
flying the same aircraft as their grandparents did. Yet we 
demand and, in fact, depend on our success against threats that 
are far more lethal and sophisticated than their grandparents 
could have imagined to accomplish a mission that is vital to 
our Nation's security and survival. I thank the committee for 
your advocacy and I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of General Dawkins can be found in 
the Appendix on page 70.]
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you, General Dawkins. I appreciate the 
testimony of all the witnesses. I am grateful for your 
expertise and your patriotism.
    All members will be limited to 5 minutes in questioning to 
more evenly distribute the questioning, and if there is time 
perhaps, we can do a second round. I will start off and have a 
question or two for Ms. Dalton.
    You characterize in your testimony that Russia has already 
80 percent recapitalized their nuclear forces. What percentage 
of completion or recapitalization would you put on our--
America?
    Ms. Dalton. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, again for 
having the opportunity to testify. On balance, I would have to 
get back to you in terms of relative percentage of the U.S. 
program, but I can tell you that as the Secretary has stated, 
we are at a critical point of being relatively behind and the 
need to modernize and recapitalize across all three legs of the 
triad.
    So the investments that are made in the fiscal year 2022 
budget submission do seek to modernize for the GBSD or the 
Columbia-class and for LRSO, and these are critical 
capabilities to ensure that we can keep pace with the 
challenges before us, principally China. And your question 
pivoted directly off of Russia, but I think, you know, the 
intelligence records suggest that China's nuclear modernization 
is accelerating at a very concerning rate. So as we proceed 
with our Nuclear Posture Review, we are going to be closely 
looking at both of those threat factors to help inform upcoming 
programmatic decisions.
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you. I was about to turn to China, which 
seems to be, what, doubling or more their nuclear capabilities, 
plus they have road-mobile or underground or other advantages 
that we lack. And I believe they are not constrained by any 
treaty, right? We at least have the New START extension with 
Russia but that does not apply to China.
    General Dawkins, you mentioned that there are three novel 
Russian nuclear systems that are not covered by New START. 
Could you remind us what those are?
    General Dawkins. Yes, sir. There is the underwater--the 
submarine with a nuclear-armed torpedo, a very large system 
there meant as, I guess, a weapon of vengeance to come up on 
our coast and detonate. Very hard to defend against, of course. 
There is a nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed cruise missile that 
they have that again, not to have--they are under development 
on these systems, I am sorry. Under development on these 
systems that they would be able to use and, of course, they 
could certainly deliver, and then--and they are very difficult 
to defend against those cruise missiles.
    And the third one is--I am failing to remember. I can take 
that for the record. But I know they have got a host of other 
systems they are using and the small nuclear weapons that they 
have put on some of their air defenses and other things, sir.
    [The information referred to was not available at the time 
of printing.]
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you. Those are my questions. I will turn 
it over now to the ranking member.
    Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In my opening 
statement, I referenced the news making of the Acting Secretary 
of the Navy with respect to taking a step for the cancellation 
of the sea-launched cruise missile, a missile that both General 
Hyten and Admiral Richard have openly spoken as fans of. We 
know that Secretary of Defense and the Chief of Staff have both 
reported in the news that they were unaware of this action and 
were not consulted. Admiral Richard said that he heard about it 
on the news.
    Admiral Wolfe, can you tell me what you know of this action 
and if you could also then in your answer, in addition to what 
is happening over at the Pentagon with the sea-launched cruise 
missile that has had this subcommittee and committee's support, 
can you tell us about, you know, what Russia's programs are and 
what their sea-launched cruise missiles are capable of? Because 
certainly we need to take into consideration what our 
adversaries are doing whenever we take a step to review our own 
commitment to our own systems. Admiral.
    Admiral Wolfe. Yes, sir. Thank you for the question, sir. 
So I had read the SECNAV [Secretary of the Navy] memo. I had 
not--I was not privy to it before it was actually signed. But 
my understanding is for the SECNAV it was part of a deliberate 
process to start the dialogue for building the next POM 
[Program Objective Memorandum]. I would point out, however, 
sir, nuclear modernization for the program of record for D5LE2, 
for Columbia, for TACAMO [Take Charge and Move Out], for our 
portion of the air is solid and it will continue and should 
continue to be fully funded to all of the estimates. I would 
also point out that in starting that dialogue, he does point 
out that it is not a decision. It is meant to get the dialogue 
started. And, of course----
    Mr. Turner. Well, I have got to tell you just to insert, it 
is a hell of a way to start a dialogue is to call for the 
canceling. But go ahead. You were going to talk about our 
adversaries, because I do have limited time.
    Admiral Wolfe. Yes, sir. Understand. Yes, and from an 
adversary perspective, I think what General Dawkins talked 
about and what we all know is as Russia continues to look at 
how they can build some of these what they call tactical 
nuclear capabilities, certainly cruise missiles are a big part 
of that. Because I believe that they look at that as an 
advantage that they can even in some of their dialogue on 
escalating to deescalating that provides a significant 
advantage to them.
    Mr. Turner. Thank you.
    Ms. Dalton, you know, this announcement in the news comes 
just on the precursor of the President sitting down with Putin. 
I believe that unilateral disarmament is certainly, you know, 
as a policy, idiotic because we don't have a support for our 
deterrence and certainly we have no bargaining chips when we 
meet with our adversaries. Doesn't this weaken President Biden 
as he goes to sit down with Putin and say, ``Hey, we should 
start more arms control negotiations,'' where his own staff are 
talking about unilaterally stopping programs that are both 
important to our deterrence and may be the subject of arms 
control negotiations?
    Ms. Dalton.
    Ms. Dalton. Representative Turner, in the President's 
budget request for fiscal year 2022 from a policy perspective, 
the Department had intended to provide a modest amount of 
funding for SLCM [sea-launched cruise missile] and plans to 
revalidate that requirement in the course of the Nuclear 
Posture Review [NPR]. That is still our intent to look closely 
at this program in the NPR. And I would say in terms of the 
administration's approach to our arms control negotiations we 
do not support unilateral disarmament, but we----
    Mr. Turner. Well, this point that you made here, so the 
Nuclear Posture Review, has it commenced?
    Ms. Dalton. It is on the cusp of commencing, sir, so it 
is----
    Mr. Turner. It hasn't even commenced, but yet you have 
people in the chain of the administration already targeting 
systems for canceling. Isn't that--I mean isn't the Nuclear 
Posture Review supposed to be like adversary risks-driven, 
capabilities-driven? How is it that one system could be singled 
out when you haven't even begun the Nuclear Posture Review?
    Ms. Dalton. Sir, it is our intent to look closely at the 
SLCM program within the context of the Nuclear Posture Review 
and make programmatic decisions for fiscal year 2023 based upon 
that objective analysis.
    Mr. Turner. Ms. Dalton, when you were before us before, the 
last time, we were talking about there were some proposals that 
people had tried to latch onto for Minuteman life extension 
programs that were--it was known as like the ``best 200.'' You 
said that you don't have an ongoing study, you are just 
updating previous studies. We don't have a copy of the previous 
best 200 study that was completed at the end of the Obama 
administration. Would you commit to providing that to the 
committee?
    Ms. Dalton. Happy to follow up with that, sir.
    Mr. Turner. Okay. If you could get that to us this week, we 
would appreciate it. We are coming back next week, as you know, 
and it would be very timely for us to be able to look at it.
    General Dawkins, you have indicated that the Ground-Based 
Strategic Deterrent is $38 billion less than the Minuteman III 
life extension program. Could you elaborate on that? It keeps 
coming up as a discussion item. Not only are we gaining with 
the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent additional capabilities, 
but it is clear from your understanding that it is both the 
most cost-effective path, correct?
    General Dawkins. Yes, sir. Thank you for the question. And 
that is true, sir. The GBSD, from the minute that--or from the 
time we did the analysis of alternatives back in 2014, it was 
shown to be more cost effective than life-extending the 
Minuteman III over the course of the entire weapons system out 
to 2075. That $5 billion difference back then in 2014 has since 
grown to $38 billion now. So again, it is $38 billion more 
expensive to life-extend the Minuteman III. This is primarily--
yes, sir.
    Mr. Turner. No, I was going to jump to my last question to 
go to Dr. Verdon. Real quickly, you have given us in classified 
session the justification for ensuring that we needed both Los 
Alamos and Savannah River in order to be able to hit our 80 
plutonium pits. What can you tell us in open session of the 
need for the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility?
    Dr. Verdon. So again, we would say all of our analysis 
still indicates that the two-site solution that we identified 
is the most susceptive in terms of both capacity, schedule, and 
cost way for us to implement and meet the 80 pits per year. 
When we look at the schedule, when we look at the cost, it 
still comes out to be the most effective way for us to 
implement and to achieve that requirement is to take advantage 
of both the existing facilities at Los Alamos and at Savannah 
River to implement pit production.
    Mr. Turner. And you are not able to just do it all at Los 
Alamos, correct?
    Dr. Verdon. Doing it, no. It would require building a whole 
new facility at Los Alamos to be able to do it. PF-4 is not 
large enough.
    Mr. Turner. Thank you.
    I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman. The next questioner will 
be Mr. Langevin.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our 
witnesses for their testimony today. Let me begin with this. 
The President's budget request included an additional $700 
million for the Columbia above the expected fiscal year 2021 
estimates due to an updated cost estimate assessment and a 
program evaluation review.
    Vice Admiral Wolfe, do you believe this assessment is 
accurate and that the funding in the budget is adequate?
    Admiral Wolfe. Yes, sir. Thanks for the question. So I did 
talk to Admiral Pappano from PEO Columbia and yes, sir, based 
on the CAPE [Director of Cost Assessment and Program 
Evaluation] estimate that was completed in August of 2020, 
which is what the new estimate and the reason for the increase 
in request for this fiscal year, it is consistent with 
everything that the Navy has seen that what the CAPE has done 
and we have funded to that CAPE estimate. So yes, sir. We 
believe it is accurate.
    Mr. Langevin. Very good. Thank you.
    Dr. Verdon, so I have been interested for some time now in 
developing low-enriched uranium fuel for submarine propulsion. 
In doing so would prevent us from having to restart production 
of weapons-grade uranium and it also can't be stolen for that 
purpose. I wanted to ask for the record, will NNSA continue to 
support effort to study the viability of this critical 
nonproliferation effort should additional funding be made 
available?
    Dr. Verdon. We are committed to this and continue to look 
at that. We are still working with the administration to 
balance the requirements of both the nonproliferation 
requirements and also the Navy's operational requirements. So 
that still continues to be a study but we are continuing to 
look at what are the technical feasibilities of doing it, but 
the broader administration is taking a hard look also at the 
balance of the nonproliferation goals against the Navy's 
operational requirements as well.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you. Thank you.
    Vice Admiral Wolfe, in your testimony you mentioned that we 
can no longer wait to invest in critical workforce skills and 
in complex technologies. What types of programs should Congress 
be encouraging?
    Admiral Wolfe. Yes, sir. I think with what we do with our 
workforce, looking at the critical technologies, things like 
rad-hard [radiation hardening] and those that are very unique 
to what General Dawkins' organization and what we do, I think 
we very much put a premium on education and programs that 
encourage our folks to continue their education as well as to 
hone their skills for these critical programs.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you. I--again, we need to focus heavily 
on a workforce development especially where we have significant 
gaps. It is in our national interest to address those gaps 
sooner rather than later.
    The final question I had for General Dawkins. Are your NC3 
[nuclear command, control, and communication] modernization 
efforts meeting their scheduled performance and budget metrics?
    General Dawkins. Yes, sir. For the most part they are. We 
have got--I could go into an acronym soup here, but some of the 
new systems to replace our current systems that provide 
advanced high-frequency capability to our missile sites and 
several other upgrades are again on time and tracking well. 
There have been some systems that are producing the learning of 
the crew force, if you will, that we are getting our 
requirements correct and ensuring that those are going to be on 
track for the future. But for the most part, sir, we feel that 
we are in a good place but this will take renewed focus or a 
constant focus to ensure that we don't get behind.
    Mr. Langevin. Okay. Well, this is something that we are 
going to continue to track. We look forward to staying in touch 
with you on that topic. Those are the questions I had for this 
point. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Langevin.
    Now, Mr. Wilson.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Chairman Jim Cooper and Ranking 
Member Mike Turner, for the bipartisan cooperation on putting 
together this very important hearing and we appreciate each one 
of the witnesses.
    And Administrator Verdon, according to the President's 
budget, the Critical Decision 1 [CD1], the Savannah River 
Plutonium Processing Facility is expected to be released 
sometime this month of June. And is that timeline still 
accurate, and if so, will that create the first credible cost 
and schedule baseline and does the President's budget match 
what was revealed through the NNSA's initial review of the 
paperwork?
    Dr. Verdon. So yes, sir. We are still on track to 
accomplish the CD1 approval requests before the Deputy 
Secretary and by the middle of this month. And, indeed, the 
fiscal year 2022 budget request has the funding in there 
necessary that if we get the approval to do the work to 
progress towards Critical Decision 2 to continue to mature the 
design.
    Mr. Wilson. Well, thank you very much. And as you well 
know, NNSA is so well thought of at Savannah River Site. We 
wish you the best of success.
    Additionally, Administrator, I appreciate your opening 
comments. I appreciate the very pithy and positive statements 
by Congressman Mike Turner all the way from Dayton, Ohio. And 
the questioning and restating of the Department of Energy 
Secretary Jennifer Granholm; the NNSA nominee, Jill Hrugy; U.S. 
Strategic Command commander Admiral Charles Richard--all are on 
record supporting the two-sites solution. This shows clear 
bipartisan support from among the administrations.
    Moving forward, what do you see is the biggest risk to 
delay in achieving 80 pits per year by 2030? Is it the funding? 
Should this be addressed in future budget requests?
    Dr. Verdon. It will be--yes. It will be, what the funding 
that will be required will be, you know, one of the key 
factors, and then it is also how we manage the supply chain 
getting the critical equipment in, in a timely fashion. And we 
are beginning to work that issue as we speak to work with 
vendors to try to make sure we can optimize that between both 
the Savannah River requirements and the Los Alamos 
requirements. But certainly identifying the right funding 
profile that will--that can be, you know, afforded by the 
Nation will be one of the key factors.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much.
    And, General Dawkins, numerous studies have shown a one-
site pit production solution is cost prohibitive and does not 
provide the basic resiliency necessary for our nuclear 
infrastructure which is so crucial as we have discussed to have 
the deterrence to maintain peace through strength. From a 
defense perspective, what are the consequences to the 
credibility of our nuclear deterrence limiting pit production 
to one site production?
    General Dawkins. Sir, thank you for the question. And 
having served at NNSA several years ago, I know that they are 
challenged with the infrastructure that they have. We work very 
closely. We work also with the Nuclear Weapons Council within 
NNSA to ensure that the plans that we have are executable. I 
think we would--and across the Department, speaking for the 
Department--would be challenged to continue with all of our 
modernization programs out into the future. It would be 
difficult with a single site. Again, I am not the expert on 
that. Dr. Verdon, I could defer. I will defer to him, but I 
know that our Nation needs to be able to produce pits and 
having everything in one location might be, you know, it might 
be more strategically valuable to have a couple.
    Mr. Wilson. Well, we actually--Savannah River Site looks 
forward to working collaboratively with Los Alamos and to 
achieve pit production which is so critical since many of the 
pits are 60 years or older. And so we have got to modernize, 
and I want to back you up and work with Chairman Cooper and 
Ranking Member Turner.
    And, finally, a question for Secretary Dalton, and that is 
the Biden administration has expressed its intent to develop 
its own Nuclear Posture Review indicating a change in U.S. 
nuclear policy. What parts of the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review 
does the administration plan to change and what is the timeline 
for delivery?
    Ms. Dalton. Thank you for the question. So we are just 
beginning the Nuclear Posture Review and we will be conducting 
that as I noted nested within the National Defense Strategy. 
Statutorily, we are required to deliver to Congress the NDS in 
January of 2022, so we are aiming for a similar timeline for 
the completion of the NPR. But as noted in my last honor to 
testify before you all, I am happy to come up and brief you on 
some of our emergent findings of the NPR as we proceed this 
summer.
    And in terms of the review of declaratory policy, that is 
obviously a Presidential-level decision. And so even as the 
Department progresses in its work on specific DOD aspects of 
nuclear posture, we will also be engaged in an interagency 
process to review the nuclear policy implications. But our 
North Star, to begin with, is the Interim National Security 
Strategic Guidance which indicates that this administration 
will take steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our 
National Security Strategy while upholding our extended 
deterrence commitments to allies and partners and ensuring a 
safe, effective, and secure nuclear deterrent.
    Mr. Wilson. Well, we look forward to working with you. I am 
confident about our Savannah. I now yield back.
    Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman.
    Now Mr. Moulton is recognized.
    Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank 
everybody for coming here today and participating in this 
discussion and my colleagues on the committee because this 
couldn't be a more important topic.
    Secretary Dalton, I would like to start with you. 
Hypersonic weapons, we have talked a lot about them recently, 
and they have the potential to be highly destabilizing, 
particularly if we pursue them blindly in a tit-for-tat with 
PRC or Russian development without carefully developing the 
operational concepts for their use. On the other hand, 
conventional hypersonic missiles could certainly change our 
adversaries' calculus in a way that reduces our reliance on 
nuclear weapons for strategic stability.
    So, Ms. Dalton, do you believe we have a clear vision for 
how we integrate hypersonic capabilities into the U.S. arsenal 
in a way that deters rather than potentially increases the risk 
of a nuclear response?
    Ms. Dalton. Thank you, Representative Moulton. It is a 
great question and I think this is why the Secretary has 
encouraged us in the course of the NDS to look at, 
holistically, at an integrated deterrence so we are not looking 
at any one domain or system in a silo. So, you know, to take 
the specific mention of hypersonic missiles, this 
administration is proceeding with investments in that 
capability because we think it is important to be able to keep 
pace with key challengers such as China and Russia to be able 
to respond with speed and at distance.
    But as we are developing these capabilities, as you 
mentioned the importance of concepts of operations, we are 
doing a lot of leg work behind the scenes in classified 
channels to ensure that as we are developing out this 
capability we are doing so responsibly, and at present are only 
making investments in a conventional capability when it comes 
to hypersonic missiles. But this will be among the capabilities 
that we are looking at through this frame of integrated 
deterrence so that we can account for potential escalation 
risks as we look across different scenarios involving, 
particularly, China and Russia.
    Mr. Moulton. Madam Secretary, if I may say, integrated 
deterrence and some other things you have said are music to my 
ears and hopefully to the ears of others on the committee. But 
in a lot of ways you have succeeded in saying a lot of good 
things without answering the question. It seems pretty clear 
that we don't have a strategy. And while it must be developed 
in classified terms, I understand that, it also needs to be 
clearly communicated to our adversaries which can't be entirely 
classified. So I look forward to hearing more about how you 
develop this. We have to have these operational concepts made 
clear before we spend billions of dollars on taxpayer money to 
develop weapons that we may not need or could actually make our 
strategic situation worse.
    Let me move, if I may, to General Dawkins and Admiral 
Wolfe. Thank you both very much for your calls. We discussed on 
the phone in our extended conversations the importance of not 
only developing a highly technically qualified workforce, but 
retaining them. And I am anxious to hear how you measure your 
progress. What we are doing today is clearly not adequate. We 
are losing too much talent and it is going out the door quicker 
than we can count. How are you actually measuring your progress 
in better training, retaining, attracting, and retaining 
personnel?
    General Dawkins. Representative, thank you for that 
question. And that is something that is foremost on our mind 
particularly as we get, or going into the bow wave of 
modernization where all of these programs are ramping up. 
Whether it is finding workforce inside the Air Force itself or 
out in the industrial complex, that is something that OSD 
[Office of the Secretary of Defense] tracks closely that we 
track in the Nuclear Weapons Council and the Air Force is 
focused on that as well.
    The way we track that is we do keep track of where--of our 
ability to hire. That is, you know, at times challenging 
because of the nature of the work we do and security 
clearances, but we do work with local universities. For 
instance, out with the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrence out at 
Utah, they work with local universities and other places to 
recruit these folks and bring them in and then offer the 
incentives that they can to actually retain them. And the 
broader Air Force----
    Mr. Moulton. I am afraid I am just about out of time and 
Chairman Cooper is quite strict with us as he should be. But if 
you could just take this for the record and share with us some 
of the statistics, the ways that you actually track this so we 
can see measurable progress on these fronts that would be very 
helpful.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman.
    Mr. Lamborn.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Can you hear me okay?
    Mr. Cooper. Yes.
    Mr. Lamborn. Okay, thank you.
    Admiral Wolfe, I have a question for you, a background 
question about the sea-launched cruise missile, but first I 
just want to make a comment about the Acting Secretary's 
unilateral decision. It appears to me that he has gone rogue 
and I don't say that lightly. It appears to me that he has gone 
rogue because the people above him and the people below him are 
denying any knowledge of this decision and seem to be 
disavowing the decision. And, secondly, it comes at a horrible 
time. It really does damage to President Biden's position vis-
a-vis Mr. Putin and these upcoming discussions, so the timing 
could not be any worse.
    But back to you, Admiral Wolfe. For background, what kind 
of capability does it give the United States and our strategic 
posture to be able to have the capability and flexibility that 
a sea-launched cruise missile provides?
    Admiral Wolfe. Sir, at a very high level I can answer that. 
I really believe that Admiral Richard could really give you in 
a classified setting what the real capabilities. But what I 
would tell you is, it gives--if you think about deterrence, it 
gives you another decision tool for the President and for 
STRATCOM. And what it really does is it causes yet another 
calculus thought that the adversary has to have before they 
think that we would have to use something bigger than a sea-
launched cruise missile. So it does provide many options to 
continue this deterrent thought process.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you so much.
    General Dawkins, I have a couple of questions for you. I am 
going to focus in on the MILCON [military construction] 
projects that are intended to be accomplished out at Vandenberg 
Air Force Base and for software at Hill Air Force Base in 
support of GBSD. If those MILCON projects were not funded in 
this year's NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] and 
appropriation bills, how much would that set back the GBSD 
program and how detrimental would that be?
    General Dawkins. Sir, thank you for the question. And as 
you are aware, the Vandenberg Space Base, Space Force Base is 
where we do our testing. We typically do four, what we call a 
``Glory Trip,'' ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] 
launch testings each year. As we transition to GBSD, our first 
test, our first flight for the GBSD missile will be 1 December 
of 2023. I know that they need to get to start that work out 
there at Vandenberg in order to facilitate this test. I would 
like to take it for the record though to get you the exact 
impacts if we do not get the full funding in the MILCON or it 
slips. But I do know there will be impacts, sir.
    Mr. Lamborn. And those would be negative impacts.
    General Dawkins. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Lamborn. Okay, thank you.
    Changing gears, General Dawkins, I would like to hear you 
respond to something that Admiral Richard pointed out. He said 
that if we ever reduce the number of ICBMs or, God forbid, 
remove the leg of that triad completely that that would, 
``solve a critical problem for China.'' So could you elaborate 
on what he was referring to about China's calculus if we 
degrade the ability of our land-based leg of the triad?
    General Dawkins. Yes, sir. So without ICBMs, we quickly 
will turn China into a peer adversary. And so when we look at 
how the ICBM force is a ready and responsive force and most 
responsive of the legs of the triad, it provides a pretty--it 
enhances strategic stability by providing a great deterrent 
against an adversary, because they know that if they were to do 
us, mean to do us harm as a nation, it would have to be a 
fairly large attack for them to do that.
    And, in fact, they would be attacking the homeland and that 
would--that in and of itself enhances deterrence and will make 
them or any central adversary perhaps take a step back and go, 
``do we really want to commit to a large-scale attack against 
the United States homeland?''
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. And how serious of a problem is it 
for us to not have any kind of treaty or any kind of 
verification or knowledge of what China is doing with its 
tunnel system, with its ability combined with mobile launchers 
to hide the existence of and the number of ICBMs that they 
might have?
    General Dawkins. So, sir, I am a big believer in arms 
control treaties that are verifiable and executable or 
enforceable. You know, a lot of our treaties are based on 
simply numbers and I think it is important also to look to 
capabilities as an important part of that as well.
    Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman.
    Mr. Panetta.
    Mr. Panetta. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your 
understanding in getting me in to ask questions.
    Just real quick, Ms. Dalton, obviously, thanks. Thanks to 
all the witnesses for being here and thank you for your 
service. But, Ms. Dalton, when does the administration plan to 
complete its Nuclear Posture Review and when will it begin and 
what exactly will it entail going forward?
    Ms. Dalton. Thank you, Representative Panetta, for the 
question. So as I mentioned in my opening remarks, the NPR will 
be nested within the National Defense Strategy and we are just 
commencing the NPR leg, if you will, of the strategic reviews. 
We plan to structure it in such a way that there will be 
decision off-ramps as we get into the end of the POM build and 
into the PBR [President's budget request] season such that, you 
know, the objective analysis that we do in the NPR can feed 
into programmatic decisions that are relevant for the fiscal 
year 2023-27 FYDP [Future Years Defense Program].
    In terms of what we plan to cover in the NPR, as noted 
earlier there will be a look at declaratory policy which we 
will do in concert with the interagency. There will be a 
thorough assessment of the security environment. Many things 
have changed since the last time there was a Democratic 
administration in power that we will need to be cognizant of 
and we will look to define based on the integrated deterrence 
frame, which I know is still in development and, you know, we 
will be able to say more on as we move forward how that relates 
to thinking about the use of strategic forces like nuclear 
weapons in that deterrence construct. And then as I noted, the 
specific implications then for programs and modernization. So 
in brief, those are the areas for examination.
    Mr. Panetta. Okay. In regards to that and in regards to the 
nuclear command and control modernization, do you believe that 
there will be a review in regards to the sole launch authority 
of the President?
    Ms. Dalton. So I know that that is a question that has come 
up in some of the early consultations that we have had with 
outside groups and we are committed to taking input from all 
stakeholders across the nuclear committee to help inform our 
review.
    Mr. Panetta. And that will include this subcommittee right 
here?
    Ms. Dalton. Yes, absolutely.
    Mr. Panetta. Outstanding. Great. Thank you. I appreciate 
that and look forward to working with you.
    Mr. Chairman, thank you. I yield back.
    Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman.
    Mr. Waltz.
    Mr. Waltz.
    Mr. Waltz. Thank you. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And 
thank you. Thank you to all of our witnesses.
    General Dawkins, yes, I think there is kind of a common 
criticism or belief out there that ICBMs are on a ``hair 
trigger alert.'' Can you tell us about the redundancies built 
into the launch system as well as how they are actually 
targeted out in the open ocean and how those are built in to 
assuage some of those concerns?
    General Dawkins. Yes, Representative, thank you for the 
question. So that is a misnomer. While the ICBMs are ready and 
responsive and we do have crew members, two crew members down 
there in the launch control centers awaiting a Presidential 
order, it requires an order from the President to be 
transmitted through our NC3 systems down to the crew members 
and for them to decode any of those orders they get, ensure 
that they are verifiably from the President and otherwise.
    As far as the process goes, the President, if necessary, if 
we are under attack of some sort, the President has--we have a 
means to bring the President into a conference, the Department 
of Defense does, and Joint Staff, to ensure, and he can also 
bring all of his senior advisors across the national security 
complex, and any ones that he wants into this conference to 
discuss how to respond. It is a very measured process. And then 
the President can decide whether he wants to respond with 
nuclear weapons or choose something else.
    The great thing about the triad is the President does not 
have to use the ICBMs because we have a survivable leg in the 
submarine-launched ballistic missile capability. So that is an 
example of the great attributes that the triad brings. So the 
President does not have to launch on attack or launch on 
warning, he can wait and gather more information before he has 
to make a decision, because he has a submarine force.
    Mr. Waltz. Great, thank you. And that leads me to my next 
question. This committee heard testimony from Admiral Richard 
that if the ICBM leg of the triad was allowed to atrophy 
further that he would need to put bombers and refuelers back on 
alert. Do you have a sense--and this is for any of the 
witnesses--of how much that would cost? And is it safe to 
assume that this cost was not factored into the $38 billion in 
savings by choosing the GBSD over Minuteman III life extension?
    General Dawkins. Representative, that was not a factor in 
the cost of any of the studies in analysis. We don't have an 
analysis right now that says how much extra that cost will be. 
I call it a transfer cost. If you do something with one leg of 
the triad, you may have transfer costs associated with it if 
you transfer other missions to the remaining two legs. With the 
bomber force, because we have not been on alert since the early 
1990s when we were pulled off of alert and we had hundreds and 
hundreds of bombers, actually, you know, able to be on alert, 
we would have to do a couple of things. We would have to buy 
more bombers, we believe, buy more tankers. We would have to 
get more infrastructure and, of course, bring in more people to 
be able to sustain that capability, the alert capability.
    Just as concerning is how we would--if we didn't have that 
extra capability, we would detract from our ability to do our 
conventional missions with these dual-role bombers, the B-1 and 
the B-52 and soon to be the B-21 and the B-52. So again, it 
would be a drain on resources that we would also use, or we 
also use today for other combatant commanders.
    Mr. Waltz. Thank you. And I don't know, does anyone else 
have anything to add on that if we allowed the ICBM to atrophy, 
the burden that that puts on the other two legs, cost and 
impact on readiness?
    Admiral Wolfe. Yes, sir. This is Admiral Wolfe. So I would 
tell you from a Navy perspective, as Admiral Richard looks at 
what he needs to achieve in support of the President, there is 
a possibility that that could call on the Navy to pick up more 
of that mission. And I would tell you today, with the platforms 
that we have got and the assets we have got, that would be 
almost impossible. In the future, that would potentially 
require you to build more Columbia-class submarines. That would 
potentially cause us to build more assets and look at how we 
could work with our partners at NNSA to then provide the 
adequate number of warheads that would go on there. So I would 
say there would be a huge downstream impact even to the United 
States Navy.
    Mr. Waltz. So less ICBMs, more bombers, more subs. Is that 
just--not to oversimplify, but that is essentially what we 
would be facing to keep the same capability, the same deterrent 
capability.
    Admiral Wolfe. I would just add the word ``potentially,'' 
sir. Potentially that could be the outcome.
    Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield my time.
    Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman.
    Mr. Khanna.
    Mr. Khanna. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to 
everyone here for your service and testifying.
    On April 3rd, 2019, Lieutenant General Richard Clark, who I 
know you know, then the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Strategic Deterrence, noted that we have one more opportunity 
to extend Minuteman III. I would like to understand why that 
option of extending it one more time is not a good option and 
why that hasn't been explored.
    General Dawkins. Thank you, Representative Khanna, and 
thank you for the question. So I am familiar with the statement 
from 2 years ago. I think it is important whenever we discuss 
life-extending the system or GBSD, we understand that we are 
talking about a total system replacement. General Clark was 
talking about a subcomponent of just the missile itself, and 
the missile itself has several key subcomponents. There is 330-
plus parts in it, but there are about 4 subcomponents that 
actually have to be modernized or life-extended as well, and we 
needed to have made those decisions on some of those key ones 
several years ago back in 2015.
    Now what he was talking about was just a single-stage 
booster and it has three, and he said there would be--that we 
might be able to repour the propellant one more time. What we 
have found whenever we have repoured the propellant, and 
basically you take the booster and you ream the propeller out, 
bring it out, you extend the wall of the booster--result in a 
50 percent rate. So just doing that we would not have enough 
boosters to even contribute to the other stages of the missile 
that would have to be replaced at great expense. One example is 
the propulsion system rocket engine. We needed to have started 
that program back in 2016. That was roughly almost a $7 billion 
project back then, and I don't know what it is grown to now.
    Mr. Khanna. I respect that as your service and your 
expertise. I guess my question is, has there been a 
comprehensive study on how much it would cost and what it would 
require to extend Minuteman in a cost-benefit analysis between 
that choice and the GBSD system?
    General Dawkins. Yes, sir. There have been several studies 
and the foundation of one is the analysis of alternatives from 
2014. It looked at life-extending Minuteman III versus GBSD and 
a few other options as well, and it was determined that at the 
time, the Obama administration, that we would forego life 
extension because it was more expensive. At the time, $5 
billion more expensive over the lifetime of a system to do a 
Minuteman III life extension versus going with a system 
replacement.
    Mr. Khanna. Now that was premised, I know there was 
something that you submitted premised on 400 deployed ICBMs by 
2075. President Reagan would probably roll over in his grave if 
he thought we would have that many ICBMs by then when his 
vision was to end the nuclear arms race. How was 400 chosen?
    General Dawkins. 400 was again decided under the New START 
treaty. When we signed up to the New START treaty back in 2010, 
the Obama administration, at the time, determined the best way 
to meet the requirements of the treaty was to reduce from 450 
to 400 ICBMs and then----
    Mr. Khanna. I understood that, but how do we know that we 
are going to need that many? And I guess, getting to 
Representative Waltz's question, isn't it true just 
strategically that the ICBMs are a much easier target for an 
adversary to take out than the submarine for the Air Force, and 
so has there been an analysis whether strategically--we may be 
better off, actually, having more submarine than Air Force 
capacity going in the future.
    Ms. Dalton. Representative Khanna, thank you so much for 
all of these excellent questions. In the course of the NPR, we 
are going to be taking a hard look at what is required to 
maintain a safe, effective, and secure nuclear deterrent while 
also attempting to be fiscally responsible given the cost of 
these programs. So based on the analysis that General Dawkins 
has referenced, we will be interrogating that analysis with the 
types of questions that you are asking to ensure that we have 
the right balance across the triad.
    Mr. Khanna. Well, I think it just is very important. And 
also, you know, I know you have talked about the capacity being 
improved by the GBSD as opposed to Minuteman, but it is not 
clear. What is the vulnerability of the Minuteman? Are there 
things that we couldn't do right now? Are we vulnerable in ways 
that would be improved by the GBSD or, because they say it 
gives us better targeting?
    The other question and, frankly, being from Silicon Valley 
with cyberattacks is whether we would be better off being in an 
analog system than going to a digital system. I mean couldn't 
the digital system make us more at risk to an adversary in an 
age of cyber warfare? You know, I obviously have deep 
admiration and respect for all of your patriotism. I know you 
are trying to do what is right for our country. I would just 
ask that, you know, if we could have more of an analysis on 
some of these questions as alternatives it will help better 
understand and help us make more informed decisions.
    Mr. Cooper. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. DesJarlais.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to talk 
about infrastructure for just a minute.
    Mr. Verdon, Y-12 National Security Complex is one of the 
most important national security assets not only in Chairman 
Cooper and my home State of Tennessee, but in the entire 
country. However, if you were to look at the state of disrepair 
at some of the facilities, you wouldn't know it. We cannot 
modernize our nuclear arsenal without having the necessary 
infrastructure in place to undertake those programs.
    In the fiscal year 2018 NDAA, my colleagues and I worked in 
this committee to help address this issue by creating the 
Infrastructure Modernization Initiative as well as broader 
minor construction authorities to help remedy these problems at 
NNSA. While both appear to have been successful in making some 
progress, it is abundantly clear that more work still needs to 
be done not only at Y-12 but across the nuclear security 
enterprise.
    So my question for you, is the $20 million minor 
construction threshold that you are all operating with adequate 
to accomplish desired modernization efforts or does that number 
deserve a second look in light of the inflation and increased 
construction costs?
    Dr. Verdon. So I would say that based on those last points 
you brought up that we should take a look at it again, because 
certainly when you did give us an increase it was beneficial, 
but because of all those things you just cited that benefit is 
being eroded relatively quickly. So looking at increasing that 
would certainly be a benefit for us.
    Dr. DesJarlais. All right. Any idea on what kind of number?
    Dr. Verdon. So we were looking at something on the order of 
even going up to 30 or up to 40, for that would be for the 
types of projects that we would like to be able to move out and 
address quickly, based on what we are seeing for costs of 
increased labor and concrete and lumber and steel would be the 
kind of the range we would be looking at.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay, thank you.
    For General Dawkins and perhaps Ms. Dalton, if we have time 
for both of you both to answer on this next question. Many on 
this committee, myself included, have concerns about the Biden 
administration's Nuclear Posture Review and what it may look 
like particularly as it pertains to a sole purpose policy. In 
the past, President Biden has expressed support for a sole 
purpose doctrine and I am concerned that he may turn his 
personal stance into U.S. policy. Those concerns are also 
shared by many of our allies like Poland, Japan, the Republic 
of Korea who rely heavily on our extended deterrence and 
assurance. Admiral Richards, commander of our strategic forces, 
has stated that the sole purpose doctrine would be detrimental 
to our alliances and our goal of nuclear nonproliferation.
    So, first, will this administration consult with our allies 
before making such consequential change to U.S. policy? And 
second, in your discussions with the decision makers on this 
issue, do you believe that they are fully aware of the 
consequences the adoption of a sole purpose policy would have 
on our alliances and our nuclear nonproliferation?
    Ms. Dalton. Thank you for the question. We are absolutely 
committed to robust, early and often, consultations with our 
allies and partners as we embark on these strategic reviews. In 
fact, we have already begun those consultations. I will say 
that with the release of the Interim National Security 
Strategic Guidance that also prompted a number of questions 
from allies and partners in terms of the line on reducing the 
role, or taking steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons. 
But, of course, the next part of that is while upholding our 
extended deterrence commitments to our allies and partners.
    It is one of the top priorities of this administration to 
revitalize our alliances and partnerships. So as we move 
forward, we will be working in lockstep with our allies and 
partners to understand their threat perceptions, their 
asymmetry of interests when it comes to China and Russia, what 
their comparative advantages are when looking more broadly at 
deterrence to include where they may also be making nuclear 
contributions, but also as that relates to conventional means 
as well in cyber and space. And so we are absolutely committed 
to working this in lockstep and that will be a key priority in 
determining the way forward on our declaratory policy.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. General Dawkins, about 40 seconds 
left to chime in.
    General Dawkins. Sir, I defer to what Ms. Dalton said that 
I believe that all this will be looked at in the NPR, and I 
know that the allies want to be involved in the process as well 
and that what we provide for extended deterrence is the reason. 
And so again, I think the review will address all of those 
things. Thank you.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. Well, I thank all of our witnesses 
today. And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman.
    Let's see. Now we will hear from--who is next? Mr. Morelle. 
Thank you.
    Mr. Morelle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity 
to be here and thank you to all our witnesses. In particular 
it's been good to have conversations with both Admiral Wilson 
and General Dawkins and I appreciate that. But I also hope 
that, Dr. Verdon, that you still have many friends in the 
Rochester area.
    I want to just talk a little bit about my district which is 
home, in Rochester, New York, which is home to the Laboratory 
for Laser Energetics at the University of Rochester. It is a 
key part of NNSA's inertial confinement fusion [ICF] program, 
which is a critical component of the Stockpile Stewardship 
Program, to maintain a safe, secure and effective nuclear 
deterrent. And I am glad to have the opportunity right now to 
just discuss the fiscal year 2022 budget and, Dr. Verdon, maybe 
I can start with you.
    For nearly two decades, we have not seen major 
infrastructure investment in any of the three complementary ICF 
facilities. Meanwhile, China and Russia are building modern 
facilities intended to rival or exceed U.S. capabilities. So 
can you share, does NNSA have a plan to address research 
infrastructure using the ICF sites?
    Dr. Verdon. So we are indeed beginning to--we have just 
started to look at that. And part of the reviews we had for 
2020 in the JASON's review was to begin to lay the foundation 
of how we should move forward into the future in the area, the 
very important area of inertial confinement fusion, and part of 
that was with the focus on helping us identify what potential 
future facilities in those areas might look like or what they 
should be. So that is certainly, you know, it is in our 
process. We are starting that process now and, but the goal 
will be to identify what are the future capabilities or 
upgrades that would be needed in those areas.
    Mr. Morelle. That is encouraging. Do you have a sense of 
what the timeline will be for that, Doctor?
    Dr. Verdon. So the reports, we are just digesting some of 
the conclusions of the reports now so it would probably be--it 
is probably going to still be, you know, a few years before we 
kind of go through it in quite a bit of detail, but we are 
beginning to gather information, as I say, about what people 
are thinking. But we are also trying to push the system to make 
sure we are not just thinking near term but as you say looking 
for the future--what do we really need for the long term?
    Mr. Morelle. Right. Aside from the facilities question, the 
ICF research is a critical component to the Stockpile 
Stewardship Program. So both the NNSA's ICF 2020 report and the 
review by the JASON Defense Advisory Panel provide specific 
recommendations to strengthen the capability. Are the current 
requested funding levels by the administration sufficient to 
fully implement these recommendations?
    Dr. Verdon. We assess that they are, you know, that we are 
supporting the program that we need to conduct in this area. 
And so we believe that particularly the 2022 budget does 
support what we need to do in this area.
    Mr. Morelle. Well, recent budgets have focused on a NNSA 
production complex, yet I think it is NNSA science and 
technology and engineering capabilities and the associated 
expert workforce that underpin our confidence in the safety, 
security, and reliability of the nuclear deterrence. So do you 
agree that NNSA needs to maintain world lead in scientific 
capabilities and workforce, and again does the budget request, 
which contains significant cuts to several ST&E [science, 
technology, and engineering] areas from fiscal year 2021 
levels, sufficiently prioritize those needs?
    Dr. Verdon. It is always a risk-benefit, you know, calculus 
that we are constantly doing, but we believe that the funding 
that we put forward for 2022 supports the highest priority 
programs in that area. And, you know, we are even upgrading 
some additional capabilities in the science area to include 
exascale computing and enhanced capabilities of some critical 
experiments in Nevada. So we are doing--adding new capabilities 
to address existing gaps.
    So again, we are trying to make sure we balance, you know, 
all the requirements across the entire Stewardship Program, but 
we certainly support that the science area remains key. It 
underpins just about every decision we make.
    Mr. Morelle. Well, I appreciate that. I am obviously going 
to be a fierce advocate for this in our conversations over the 
next several weeks.
    And, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate very much the time and the 
opportunity to have this conversation and I yield back the 
balance of my time.
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you so much, Mr. Morelle. I appreciate 
that.
    Mr. Garamendi.
    We seem to be having technical difficulties.
    Mr. Garamendi. To say the least.
    Mr. Cooper. Now we can hear you. Now we can hear you.
    Mr. Garamendi. Okay. I am late to the meeting. I am having 
trouble with AT&T with whom I seem to be carrying on a long, 
long in duration fight. But thank you very much.
    I want to follow up on questions that Mr. Khanna had posed 
to General Dawkins. Specifically, what I want to get into is 
the Minuteman III, the life extension of it. General Dawkins, 
under the present plan, it appears as though the Minuteman III 
will remain as one of the two ICBM systems for the next minimum 
of 15 years, probably closer to 20 years. Is that true that 
there will be actually two types of missiles being used over 
the next 20 years?
    General Dawkins. Congressman, thank you for the question. 
And I am not tracking two missiles, I am only tracking the 
single Minuteman III missile. There are two warheads though 
that go on top of the missile, the W87-0, right now, for the 
Minuteman III, as well as the 78.
    Mr. Garamendi. That is a good piece of information, but I 
was actually talking about your present plan is to have the 
Minuteman III in the silos, operative, as well as the GBSD as 
the transition takes place. If that is correct then the 
Minuteman III is good for at least the next 15, probably closer 
to 20 years, as the GBSD comes on line. Therefore, the argument 
that the Minuteman III cannot be extended seems to be, to be 
incorrect.
    Also with regard to the cost, the cost differential that 
you spoke to a few moments ago is really based on the next 75 
years and extending the Minuteman III over and over again 
during that period of time, while the GBSD would be--the 
Minuteman III would be in place, as I just suggested, with the 
GBSD during the transition period, and then the GBSD would go 
forward and it too would have to be life-extended over that 75-
year period of time. Is that correct?
    General Dawkins. Congressman, we have to keep the Minuteman 
III going until the last GBSD is put in place. So the plan 
right now is in 2027 to field the first GBSD. As that first one 
goes in, a Minuteman III system comes out and we will harvest 
the parts from that Minuteman III as well as all the 
infrastructure that supports it to feed back into the supply 
system to continue the remaining missiles to keep them on line 
until 2036 when we will have the final GBSD in place. So it is 
a just-in-time--go ahead, sir.
    Mr. Garamendi. Well, so the fact is that the Minuteman III 
is being life-extended. You are using the harvesting technique, 
which is one way of doing it; the other is to acquire the 
necessary parts and pieces to keep the Minuteman III in place.
    My second series of questions go to the cost. The current 
estimate of the cost of the GBSD system over the next decade, 
that is the decade of the 2020s, is somewhere north of $80 
billion. What is the anticipated cost in the next decade, that 
is the decade of the 2030s?
    General Dawkins. Sir, I don't have that broken down by 
decade. I do know that over the life of the GBSD program, it is 
right now that is out from 2026, if you will, out to 2075, that 
was the timeframe that we were using, out to 2075, that it is 
somewhere in the number of $264 billion for the total lifetime 
cost, that is, of GBSD.
    Mr. Garamendi. I think it is very interesting and 
questionable of whether you use a 55-year time horizon here to 
estimate cost in the system. I will let that go at that point.
    I want to turn very quickly to--well, we don't have time 
for that. The issue of command and control and the analog 
versus digital needs very, very careful attention. I will be 
out of time here. I am going to pursue this issue more 
completely to completely understand this phase-in, phase-out 
just-in-time and the fact that the Minuteman III is actually 
going to be life-extended for at least the next, probably the 
next 15, more likely the next 20 years. So with that, I yield 
back.
    Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman. I want to thank all the 
members for participating. These remote hearings are not always 
easy, but I appreciate your participation especially when there 
are technical issues. I would like to close the hearing with 
this final question for Dr. Verdon.
    Dr. Verdon, based on current estimates and planning, will 
the NNSA be able to meet the 80 pit requirement by 2030 as 
required by law?
    Dr. Verdon. So based on our latest information, we assess 
that meeting the 2030, particularly at Savannah River, is not 
going to be achievable. It will be, right now, our estimate 
will be between 2032 and 2035 based on our current conceptual--
our Critical Decision 1 information.
    Mr. Cooper. So that is even using Los Alamos and Savannah 
River?
    Dr. Verdon. Los Alamos we still have high confidence of 
achieving 30 pits a year by 2026. It is what we learned in 
putting the, you know, 30 percent design complete on Savannah 
River and being able to work closely with the vendors and 
starting to engage them on the details of the design that we 
identified that the Savannah River, getting Savannah River to 
produce more reserve pits by 2030 just doesn't look achievable 
at this time.
    Mr. Cooper. Is there any other way to do it faster?
    Dr. Verdon. Not that we have identified, because again a 
lot of what we are starting to see is the long poles in the 
tent is just ordering the long-lead equipment through the 
vendors and then also just the amount of dollars that you can 
execute in any given year is also limited. That you could, you 
know, you could postulate you could do it, but the amount of 
dollars would be a difficult program. So that is why we are 
thinking we are trying to work out both technically and just 
what we can execute at.
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you.
    Does the ranking member have a final question at all?
    Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. No. I think we have 
covered it all and I appreciate the information we have 
received today. It is certainly very helpful.
    Mr. Cooper. I thank our distinguished witnesses. The 
hearing is now adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 12:29 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
     
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                            A P P E N D I X

                             June 10, 2021
      
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              PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                             June 10, 2021

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              QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                             June 10, 2021

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                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN

    Mr. Langevin. In your testimony regarding LEU research, you 
indicated that the NNSA is continuing to look at the viability of LEU. 
However, you also said that one of the main hurdles will be balancing 
non-proliferation requirements with the Navy's operational requirements 
while you work with the administration on this issue. If in the end, 
the R&D program does not validate acceptable LEU fuel density and 
higher assay fuel must be substituted to achieve a life-of-ship core, 
what is the technical and performance risk of designing next-generation 
vessels to accept a core sized for an aggressive LEU design?
    Dr. Verdon. The technical and performance risk of designing next-
generation vessels to accept a core sized for an aggressive low-
enriched uranium (LEU) design is high. As discussed in DOE/NNSA's 2016 
report to Congress, Conceptual Research and Development Plan for Low-
Enriched Uranium Naval Fuel, naval reactor plants must be compact to be 
cost-effective. The size of a submarine directly affects the power 
required to propel the ship. The reactor core must fit within the space 
and weight constraints of a warship, leaving room for weapons and crew, 
while still being powerful enough to drive the ship at tactical speeds 
for engagement or rapid transit to an operating area while carrying 
sufficient fuel to last for decades. Decades of technological 
advancements with highly enriched uranium (HEU) have enabled life-of-
ship cores for Navy submarines, including the COLUMBIA-Class, each of 
which will serve in excess of 40 years without the need for refueling. 
The replacement of HEU with LEU reduces the energy in the uranium fuel 
by more than a factor of four. Implementation of LEU is a major 
technical challenge, and is expected to result in ships that are less 
capable militarily, more expensive, and that require at least one 
refueling over the life of the first ship class to use LEU fuel, 
regardless of reactor size. If refueling were reintroduced, force 
structure requirements and costs would increase. An example of the 
costs associated with refueling impacts on force structure requirements 
can be shown with the COLUMBIA Class SSBN. This submarine will not 
require a mid-life refueling because it is designed with a 40-year 
life-of-ship core. Introducing such a need for mid-life refueling in 
the COLUMBIA Class would require the strategic deterrent mission to be 
accomplished with more ships (14 versus 12), significantly increasing 
acquisition and lifecycle costs by over $40 billion dollars. We do not 
deem it practical to work on designs of naval vessels around an 
unproven advanced LEU fuel concept, nor to accurately project the 
effects of an advanced LEU fuel, because neither the ship performance 
requirements nor the fuel technology needed are established. However, 
even without working on a design, we assess that attempting to design a 
ship to accommodate sufficient LEU for potential life-of-ship operation 
would lead to a larger submarine diameter and/or length. Developing a 
new ship capable of later acceptance of an LEU reactor core would 
involve insertion of substantial margin--resulting in increased hull 
size--that would be difficult to estimate and costly to implement.
    Mr. Langevin. For both the carrier and submarine applications, what 
is the estimated impact on the vessel performance and dimensions of 
using LEU fuel, assuming a full power core sized for life-of-ship, 
under range of plausible LEU fuel densities that might be validated by 
an aggressive R&D program? At what point in the Navy's planning process 
must these decisions be made?
    Dr. Verdon. As discussed in DOE/NNSA's 2016 report to Congress, 
Conceptual Research and Development Plan for Low-Enriched Uranium Naval 
Fuel, an advanced LEU fuel system concept might satisfy performance 
requirements for an aircraft carrier without affecting the number of 
refuelings (current NIMITZ and FORD class carriers require one mid-life 
refueling), though at higher acquisition cost. The conceptual plan for 
an advanced LEU fuel design would include manufacturing and testing 
that would span 15 years and, based on cost estimates in the 2016 
Report to Congress, require at least $1 billion in fiscal year (FY) 
2016 dollars to establish whether the fuel is viable for use in a naval 
reactor design. Subsequent funding would be needed to mature this 
conceptual plan and bring it to reality. Assuming successful fuel 
system validation and aggressive parallel engineering and manufacturing 
development, the estimated cost to deploy an advanced LEU fuel system 
in submarines and aircraft carriers is in excess of $20 billion. Not 
included in this estimate are additional significant costs associated 
with (1) additional operating and support costs at shipyard facilities, 
(2) increases in manufacturing costs of advanced fuel, and (3) the 
increase in force structure that may be required to offset the loss in 
operational availability of submarines undergoing refueling overhauls. 
For submarines, the reactor plant must be very compact to be militarily 
effective. The reactor core must fit within the space and weight 
constraints of a warship, leave room for weapons and crew, be powerful 
enough to drive the ship at tactical speeds for engagement or rapid 
transit, and carry sufficient fuel to last for decades. An LEU-based 
fuel capable of meeting modern U.S. Navy submarine requirements has not 
been established, and, therefore we do not deem it practical to work on 
designs of naval vessels around an unproven advanced LEU fuel concept. 
The Navy would not consider a newly-designed reactor core using LEU 
until a new fuel system could be developed and shown to be effective in 
a prototypical environment. Decades of technological advancements with 
HEU have enabled life-of-ship cores for Navy submarines, including the 
COLUMBIA-Class, each of which will serve in excess of 40 years. The 
replacement of HEU with LEU reduces the energy in the uranium fuel by 
more than a factor of four. Implementation of LEU is a major technical 
challenge, and is expected to result in ships that are less capable 
militarily, more expensive, and that require at least one refueling 
over the life of the first ship class to use LEU fuel, regardless of 
reactor size. If refueling were reintroduced, force structure 
requirements and costs would increase. For example, introducing such a 
need for mid-life refueling in the COLUMBIA Class would require the 
strategic deterrent mission to be accomplished with more ships (14 
versus 12), significantly increasing acquisition and lifecycle costs by 
over $40 billion dollars.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER
    Mr. Turner. When can we expect to see the SLCM-N AOA? Despite the 
Acting SECNAV memo on the FY2023 PRB the committee requests to be 
briefed on the AOA at the earliest possible date.
    Ms. Dalton. The Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) was conducted by the 
U.S. Navy and is now complete. I will refer you to our Navy colleagues 
who I understand are prepared to brief the Committee on the classified 
results of the AOA in the near future. While we are aware of the Acting 
Secretary of the Navy memo you reference, the submarine-launched cruise 
missile--nuclear (SLCM-N) program will be examined during the upcoming 
review of U.S. nuclear posture and policy.
    Mr. Turner. When you provided testimony before the SASC last month, 
it was stated that GBSD will be $38 billion less than a Minuteman III 
LEP. Could you please specifically outline what went into those numbers 
and what was excluded, so that the committee can have confidence it was 
an apples-to-apples comparison?
    General Dawkins. The Department of the Air Force estimated the cost 
of a Minuteman III (MM III) Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) to 
2075 as $302B. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost Assessment 
and Program Evaluation estimated in their Milestone B Independent Cost 
Assessment for the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) that GBSD 
will cost $264B to 2075, $38B less than the MM III SLEP estimate. The 
MM III SLEP estimate includes replacement efforts for booster, 
guidance, post-boost, ground system, and command and control elements. 
Both estimates include required Research, Development, Test and 
Evaluation; Procurement; Military Construction; Military Personnel; and 
Operation and Sustainment costs. Neither estimate includes any fuze or 
warhead modernization; including this cost would add $24B to each 
estimate. Finally, neither the MM III SLEP estimate nor the GBSD 
estimate include costs for the deactivation, demilitarization, and 
disposal of the MM III.
    Mr. Turner. Earlier this year this committee heard testimony from 
Admiral Richard that if the ICBM leg of the triad is allowed to atrophy 
further, he'll need to put bombers and refuelers back on alert. How 
much would this cost?
    General Dawkins. Cost estimates to put bombers and tankers back on 
alert are not fully mature at this time, as this course of action is 
not necessary given the current nuclear triad construct. However, 
United States Strategic Command provided a rough cost estimate of 
returning bombers to alert in its April 2021 ``Potential Delays to 
Nuclear Modernization'' Report to Congress, to which the Air Force 
contributed. While this document is classified and cannot be quoted in 
this unclassified response, returning bombers to a continuous alert 
posture would require major infrastructure improvements, as well as 
increased security and manning requirements. Additionally, returning 
bombers and tankers to alert status would negatively impact 
conventional readiness by reducing the availability for Bomber Task 
Force missions, which are currently in high demand by Combatant 
Commanders. Finally, returning bombers to alert would likely drive 
requirements for additional new tanker and bomber aircraft and 
associated manning in order to support Strategic Command's deterrent 
mission requirements as well as other day-to-day conventional 
requirements.
    Mr. Turner. GBSD will not only be a cost saver but will also 
provide an upgraded capability over the MMIII. Can you please explain 
this upgraded capability and how it will better allow you to address 
the Russian and Chinese threat?
    General Dawkins. Our potential adversaries are rapidly advancing 
both their offensive and defensive capabilities. The currently fielded 
Minuteman III ICBM was designed in an era when the cyber-domain did not 
exist and anti-ballistic missile capabilities were in their infancy. 
The Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) will not only provide an 
increase in survivability and accuracy, but will be safer, more secure, 
more reliable, and offer enhanced operational flexibility. GBSD 
utilizes model-based systems engineering, a Modular Open Systems 
Architecture and a modular system interface allowing technology 
insertions at a lower cost and implementation at the speed of 
relevance. These methodologies will enable the weapon system to quickly 
adapt to and counter new, emerging, and currently unforeseen threats 
while reducing operations and sustainment costs throughout its 
lifecycle. As a full system recapitalization effort, GBSD will address 
the complete spectrum of current and future threats in the realms of 
electronic, electromagnetic pulse, antiballistic missile, cyber, and 
nuclear pre/trans/post attack environments. The Air Force welcomes the 
opportunity to provide the Committee further details in a classified 
setting.
    Mr. Turner. Isn't it true that GBSD will have safety upgrades? Can 
you please explain what these are and why they're important?
    General Dawkins. Like the currently fielded Minuteman III (MM III), 
Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) will contain positive control 
measures to prevent the deliberate pre-arming, arming, launching, or 
release of nuclear weapons, except upon execution of the President's 
orders. Compared to MM III, GBSD will drastically reduce human 
proximity to the weapon by limiting the need to access and/or transport 
the missile for routine maintenance. GBSD missile components are being 
designed for greater time spans between routine maintenance, reducing 
exposure while increasing physical security, weapon surety, and safety. 
Additionally, GBSD will include positive physical measures against 
unauthorized access through a combination of enhanced entry and access 
measures, as well as administrative, technical, and cyber security 
provisions to protect access to sensitive areas and materials.
    Mr. Turner. The FY22 request included a modest increase in the 
request for LRSO. Can you please explain how this increase was arrived 
at and how it will be spent?
    General Dawkins. The FY22 increase in LRSO Research, Development, 
Test, and Evaluation from the FY21 President's Budget is primarily due 
to an accelerated Engineering and Manufacturing (EMD) contract award in 
July 2021 instead of February 2022. Pivoting to a sole source vendor 
enabled EMD acceleration based on Raytheon's maturity of design. The 
FY22 increase accounts for maintaining manning levels constant across 
all of FY22 in order to smooth the transition between the Technology 
Maturation and Risk Reduction phase and EMD ($30M/month x 5 months = 
$150M). Additionally, the increase accounts for procuring hardware for 
testing not originally planned in FY22, such as radiation hardening 
testing ($42M), and inclusion of performance incentive fees ($21.5M) as 
identified in the Acquisition Strategy (AS). Other prime contract cost 
drivers include updated costs for conducting flight tests ($5M) to 
begin clearing the B-52 envelope with a design of experiments approach, 
and an increase due to Digital Engineering efforts ($3M), which will 
provide greater insight into the design as required with the AS.
    Government costs include warhead hardware purchases ($18M) through 
the National Nuclear Security Administration, which are required to 
maintain the synchronization with the warhead development effort. 
Government costs also include range costs and survivability ground 
tests ($10.8M).
    Mr. Turner. Can you please articulate for the committee the 
capability LRSO will provide over the current ALCM?
    General Dawkins. The AGM-86B Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) was 
first fielded in 1982 and was designed for a 10-year service life 
against air defenses of that era. Now 29 years past its designed 
service life, the LRSO is needed to replace the ALCM. The need for LRSO 
is partially driven by ALCM's over-extended service life, however, the 
true driver for LRSO is to ensure that a penetrating nuclear cruise 
missile capability is retained given the rapidly advancing adversary 
integrated air defense system capabilities. The LRSO will impose higher 
costs on adversaries' air defenses, requiring large investments and 
advances in detection, tracking, command-and-control, and area defenses 
to challenge each LRSO.
    The Air Force welcomes the opportunity to provide the Committee 
further details in a classified setting.
    Mr. Turner. Is there potential for the USN to leverage the USAF 
LRSO program for SLCM-N?
    General Dawkins. Yes, there is potential for the Navy to leverage 
the Air Force's Long Range Standoff Weapon (LRSO) program for the Sea-
Launched Cruise Missile-Nuclear (SLCM-N). LRSO and its associated 
warhead are part of the Navy's SLCM-N Analysis of Alternatives (AoA). 
The Navy's TRIDENT II Life Extension 2 (D5LE2) and the Air Force's 
Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) programs have forged a strong 
relationship, using an Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition & 
Sustainment Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), and information is 
shared between the programs regularly. If SLCM-N becomes a program of 
record, the MOU construct developed for D5LE2 and GBSD could be 
utilized as a model to create a similar relationship for LRSO and SLCM-
N.
    Mr. Turner. I'd like to express my appreciation that full funding 
was included to achieve the military requirement of producing 80 
plutonium pits per year by 2030. This is specifically $475 million for 
the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility (SRPPF) and $350 
million for Los Alamos Plutonium Facility 4 (LAPF-4). Can you please 
describe in detail just how much more expensive it would be to do all 
80 pits per year at LANL?
    Dr. Verdon. Producing all 80 pits per year at Los Alamos National 
Laboratory (LANL) would involve greater risks than NNSA's current two 
site strategy for plutonium pit production and would have higher 
acquisition costs. The additional acquisition expense of producing all 
pits at LANL is driven by the need to construct a new nuclear facility 
at Los Alamos, rather than repurposing a nuclear facility that already 
exists at the Savannah River Site. In terms of mission risk, a 
Congressionally-mandated independent study conducted by the Institute 
for Defense Analysis (IDA) concluded that producing 80 pits per year at 
LANL was a ``very high risk'' approach. Section 3120(c) of the Fiscal 
Year (FY) 2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) directed NNSA 
to provide a detailed plan for designing and carrying out the entire 80 
pit per year (ppy) production mission at LANL. As part of the 2018 
Plutonium Pit Production Engineering Assessment (EA), a team of subject 
matter experts and Enterprise Construction Management Services 
contractors evaluated pre-conceptual design drawings for an option to 
achieve 80 ppy in LANL's Plutonium Facility 4 (PF-4) in tandem with new 
production module construction. The Department of Energy (DOE) and the 
Department of Defense (DOD) affirmed the EA conclusion that a strategy 
to produce 80 ppy at LANL in PF-4 or newly constructed production 
modules had the highest risk of all options examined, and installation 
of additional equipment in PF-4 to achieve 80 ppy could disrupt ongoing 
operations to achieve 30 ppy. DOE/NNSA concurs with the risks 
identified by the EA and IDA studies regarding the use of PF-4 to 
achieve 80 ppy. In addition, PF-4 is currently the only U.S. facility 
capable of pit production and other missions, and the facility will 
reach its assumed 50-year design life before 2030. Although DOE/NNSA 
continues to invest in facility sustainment projects to extend the life 
of the facility and reduce public, safety, and operational risks, any 
long-term commitment to achieve and sustain 80 ppy at LANL would 
require additional production capacity in a new nuclear facility. 
Beyond the additional acquisition cost and risk associated with an 
investment to produce more than 30 ppy at LANL, there is a potential 
production risk associated with concentrating all pit production in a 
single location. Two geographically separated plutonium pit production 
facilities bolsters resilience from external threats and hazards and 
enables flexibility to mitigate impacts of shutdowns, incidents, or 
other factors that may suspend operations at a single site.
    Mr. Turner. Can you please outline NNSA's track record for meeting 
CD-1 cost estimates since 2012 with specific examples of projects that 
have come in both under and over budget from CD-1 to CD-4.
    Dr. Verdon. Since the beginning of Fiscal Year 2012, NNSA has 
approved Critical Decision (CD)-1 for and completed six (6) projects or 
subprojects. All projects were completed under budget (i.e. below their 
CD-2 baseline cost estimates). Comparing the CD-2 Total Project Cost 
(TPC) to the estimated cost at CD-4 (or final closeout cost where 
available), the 6 projects had a collective underrun of $159 million 
(27%). The table below includes information about the six projects, 
including the top end of the cost range approved at CD-1. It should be 
noted that the two projects that finished above the top end of their 
CD-1 range started as general plant projects (GPP) and as such were 
managed outside of the DOE O 413.3B process. They reached CD-1 and 
established their cost range before nearly all of the reforms in place 
today were initiated.
    Mr. Turner. Do you have everything you need in this budget to bring 
the W88, W80-4, W87-1, and the W93 in on-time and on-budget.
    Dr. Verdon. Yes, the FY 2022 President's Budget Request provides 
NNSA the necessary resources to meet the timelines and requirements 
associated with these programs.
    Mr. Turner. Some have argued that there are too many single points 
of failure in the NNSA complex. What are some single points of failure 
that give the you most concern?
    Dr. Verdon. While DOE/NNSA's priorities are modernizing the weapons 
complex and executing all programs of record, there are sub-tasks 
critical to meeting these requirements that are single points of 
failure. These sub-tasks are Canned Subassemblies and plutonium pit 
production; if we fail to manufacture or assemble these critical 
components we will be forced to implement mitigation strategies which 
challenge our ability to maintain the nation's nuclear deterrent while 
enhancing the safety, security, and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear 
weapons stockpile. Single-point infrastructure failures create undue 
mission risk. DOE/NNSA's aged, fragile production and testing 
facilities are reliant on safety systems and utilities that require 
increased maintenance and upgrades to avoid shutdowns. DOE/NNSA is in 
the process of replacing the Y-12 National Security Complex's obsolete 
Criticality Accident Alarm Systems and is preparing to install a 
secondary electrical feed at the Pantex Plant to provide backup power 
to the site's data nerve center. Sufficient manufacturing space at the 
Kansas City National Security Campus is a significant risk which we are 
addressing through short-term leases and longer-term real property 
acquisition. Investment is needed in PF-4's fire suppression water 
loop, which is a major safety system for pits, to eliminate a high-
risk, single-point failure. Additionally, failing building systems must 
be replaced at Sandia National Laboratories' Building 894, which is the 
sole producer of power components for the enterprise, until the Power 
Sources Capability is operational. Fully funded maintenance and 
extended life programs help mitigate the risk of single-point failures, 
but even the best maintained systems require major replacement 
decisions every 15-20 years. For timely and unexpected infrastructure 
failures, minor construction projects are vital for a quick response. 
Additionally, aged, high-risk facilities carry significant risks to 
sites and surrounding populations. Aggressive risk reduction programs 
to prepare these facilities for demolition as soon as possible is 
extremely important to addressing some of our most concerning 
infrastructure challenges.
    Mr. Turner. Where in the NNSA FY2022 budget are we accepting the 
greatest risk.
    Dr. Verdon. By letter dated August 16, 2021, the Administrator 
certified that the FY 2022 President's Budget Request for NNSA of $19.7 
billion is sufficient, and there are no unfunded priorities that would 
preclude NNSA from meeting FY 2022 Department of Defense requirements 
or FY 2022 internal NNSA deliverables.
    Mr. Turner. We've heard Secretary Granholm and Dr. Hruby state that 
they fully support the two-site solution for pit production. Can you 
please articulate the importance of resiliency in the system? Has COVID 
played into your resiliency calculation?
    Dr. Verdon. The need for a capability to produce 80 pits per year 
was identified by the Secretaries of Defense and Energy in 2008 and has 
been echoed through multiple administrations. Our Nation is at a point 
where we can no longer accept the risk of a single-point failure in the 
ability to produce pits needed to meet the military requirements. 
Having two geographically separated plutonium pit production facilities 
supports resilience from external threats and hazards and enables 
flexibility to mitigate impacts of shutdowns, incidents, or other 
factors that may suspend operations at a single site. These conclusions 
were supported by a Congressionally-mandated independent study 
conducted by the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA), which found that 
using Los Alamos National Laboratory as the sole production site for 
the full 80 pits per year was a ``very high risk'' approach. 
Disruptions to global supply chains caused by the COVID pandemic both 
illustrated and underscored the need for robust and resilient 
manufacturing capabilities in vital production sectors. Plutonium pit 
production is a vital manufacturing sector for national security 
missions.
    Mr. Turner. How will LANL and SRS work together to ensure lessons 
learned at one site are shared at the other?
    Dr. Verdon. The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and the 
Savannah River Site (SRS) have been actively sharing lessons learned 
since the Nuclear Weapons Council endorsed DOE/NNSA's two-site strategy 
for pit production in 2018. The Preliminary Project Execution Plans 
(PPEPs) for both the Los Alamos Pit Production Project (LAP4) and the 
Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility (SRPPF) state that DOE/
NNSA and DOE field offices--including the Los Alamos Field Office (NA-
LA), Savannah River Field Office (NA-SR), Lawrence Livermore Field 
Office (NA-LL), and the Carlsbad Site Office--will provide inputs to 
the overall requirements and project execution activities. The SRPPF 
PPEP specifically states that: ``During conceptual design and CD-1 
development, the SRPPF team sought out and used all available lessons 
learned for similar nuclear projects, to ensure that decisions are made 
using knowledge gained from past projects and innovative approaches and 
good work practices can be incorporated into the SRPPF Project.'' This 
process will continue with the preliminary and final design and the CD-
2 development, especially coordination with the LAP4. In addition, 
Senior Management Teams (SMTs) are led by NNSA's Office of Production 
Modernization and are comprised of Senior Executive Service members 
from NNSA's Office of Acquisition and Project Management, NA-LA, NA-SR, 
and support offices, including but not limited to nuclear safety, 
security, and the Chief Information Officer for both projects. The SMTs 
for both the LAP4 and SRPPF projects provide another opportunity to 
ensure lessons learned at one site are shared at the other. LANL, the 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and Sandia National 
Laboratories are collaborating to support SRPPF, with Integrated 
Project Teams (IPTs) that maintain a high level of awareness of the 
project to ensure integration between the work at each site. LANL has 
established a single associate lab director organization responsible 
for plutonium delivery which allows for a single point of coordination 
and integration. DOE/NNSA has also provided incentives in the Corporate 
Performance and Evaluation Plan for contractors at these sites to 
coordinate, integrate, and execute both projects at LANL and SRS in the 
most advantageous manner in support of the overall mission. In addition 
to routine collaboration on activities involving manufacturing process 
design, equipment selection, technology readiness assessments, nuclear 
and criticality safety strategies, and pit production workforce 
development initiatives, LANL and SRS have established a formal 
Knowledge Transfer Program. Under the auspices of the Knowledge 
Transfer Program, personnel from SRS relocate temporarily to work and 
train in LANL's Plutonium Facility-4, performing actual pit production 
operations. Continued expansion of the Knowledge Transfer Program is 
vital to the success of NNSA's two site strategy for plutonium pit 
production.
    Mr. Turner. Can you please sum up your understanding of Russian 
nuclear-capable SLCMs.
    Admiral Wolfe. Congressman, thanks very much for your interest in 
this area. I can't adequately answer your question in this venue, but I 
will work with your staff to provide you a more comprehensive response 
via classified channels.
    Mr. Turner. Is there potential for the USN to leverage the USAF 
LRSO program for SLCM-N?
    Admiral Wolfe. Yes, there is certainly potential for the USN to 
leverage the USAF LRSO program for SLCM-N. The USAF LRSO and its 
associated warhead are part of the SLCM-N Analysis of Alternatives 
(AoA). The USN's TRIDENT II Life Extension 2 (D5LE2) and the USAF's 
Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) programs have forged a strong 
relationship and we share information between the programs (technical 
exchanges, hardware, testing, etc) regularly.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MOULTON
    Mr. Moulton. On the importance of recruiting, developing, and 
retaining a highly technical workforce, how do you measure your 
progress in recruiting and retention? We are losing too much talent 
today. Can you please share some of the statistics and the ways you 
track this so we can see measurable progress?
    General Dawkins. The Air Force carefully monitors recruiting goals 
and retention metrics to ensure we have a sufficient force of highly 
skilled and experienced Airmen to support the National Defense 
Strategy. Additionally, some of the additional authorities granted to 
my position as one of the six cross-functional authorities in the Air 
Force enable me to gain additional insight into all career fields 
supporting the Air Force nuclear enterprise and the ability to provide 
feedback into the overall Air Force process. Furthermore, the Air Force 
is developing a continuous assessment capability of the nuclear 
enterprise as part of the Nuclear Mission Assessment (NMA), which was 
established by the Fiscal Year 2016 National Defense Authorization Act. 
The overall vision of the NMA is a continuous, comprehensive, data-
driven assessment capability to provide insights and trend analysis of 
underlying issues within the nuclear enterprise to senior leaders and 
decision makers. The analysis model being developed with our 
partnership with Johns Hopkins University's Applied Physics Laboratory 
will incorporate human capital metrics such as retention rates to 
better address the health of those career fields within the nuclear 
enterprise. The Air Force as a whole achieved its FY20 recruiting goals 
of 26,398 regular component Enlisted (100% of goal) and regular 
Officers of 4,553 (100% of goal). We also met our Air National Guard 
combined officer and enlisted goal by recruiting 11,620 members (108% 
of goal), and our Reserve combined officer and enlisted goal of 7,000 
(100% of goal). Additionally, the Air Force is on target to reach our 
FY21 recruiting goals. While we are doing well in recruiting, we 
understand there is a growing competition for talent and expect the 
recruiting environment to become more challenging. As important as 
recruiting is, retention within our high-tech force is equally 
important. While the Air Force is experiencing unprecedented high 
retention rates in both the enlisted and officer corps, the aggregate 
success may hide areas with retention challenges. To help improve these 
retention challenges, the Air Force continues to offer targeted 
monetary incentives as well as non-monetary incentives focused on 
quality of life and quality of service programs.
    Mr. Moulton. On the importance of recruiting, developing, and 
retaining a highly technical workforce, how do you measure your 
progress in recruiting and retention? We are losing too much talent 
today. Can you please share some of the statistics and the ways you 
track this so we can see measurable progress?
    Admiral Wolfe. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. STEFANIK
    Ms. Stefanik. The FY2022 President's Budget requests $640,684,000 
for Naval Reactors Development (NRD), which focuses on research and 
development to ensure the current and future fleet is the most 
advanced, well-maintained, and capable nuclear fleet in the world. 
Which technologies are NRD working on to maintain our nuclear force's 
capability overmatch over our great power adversaries in China and 
Russia?
    Dr. Verdon. Naval Reactors Development (NRD) funds the development 
of advances in the unique nuclear propulsion technical capability that 
the Navy relies on to operate, build, and maintain nuclear-powered 
ships. Included in this line is funding that enables the Naval Nuclear 
Propulsion Program to manage operations of the current fleet, perform 
analysis of current reactor performance, and support construction of 
nuclear-powered warships. The FY 2022 budget request also increases 
investment in the research and development of new technologies, 
including those intended to support the Navy timeline for SSN(X). 
Investment in mid- to long-term advanced research and development has 
been deferred over the past decade to support major recapitalization 
efforts across the Program. The increase in NRD in FY 2022 will support 
the following efforts:
      Performing cutting-edge research to develop new 
technologies and manufacturing methods that significantly improve the 
capability, effectiveness, performance, and cost of future naval 
nuclear propulsion plants to maintain our strategic maritime 
superiority. Examples include added focus on:
          Advanced instrumentation and control technology and 
        equipment: Current digital control and power management 
        equipment is becoming obsolete and will need to be replaced. 
        Naval Reactors is working with commercial industry on 
        replacements that take up less space, run cooler and with less 
        power, enable more effective use of electrical power in the 
        ship, are more secure against cyber-attack, costs less and can 
        efficiently acquire and process a broad range of plant data.
          Plant Data and Automation: Advanced sensors, 
        artificial intelligence, and data analytics are being pursued 
        to automate current manual data collection, and process that 
        data into information that gives the operator a clearer picture 
        of plant status, with goals to simplify operation, enable 
        confident condition-based maintenance, increase ship 
        operational availability and ease the burden on our sailors.
          Core manufacturing development: Naval Reactors has 
        started an effort to change how we manufacture reactor cores, 
        with technology that promises to provide a more capable reactor 
        for the next ship, while also allowing that reactor to be 
        smaller and cost less. The new approach employs advanced, high 
        precision robotics and machine learning methods for automated 
        in-process inspection that can quickly find and correct 
        potential production process issues much earlier than is 
        possible today, reducing our fabrication costs and risks.
          Component manufacturing technologies: Naval Reactors 
        sees practical potential for using certain advanced 
        manufacturing approaches in building major plant components. 
        These advanced capabilities include hot-isostatic pressing and 
        metal additive manufacturing, and based on industry experience, 
        promise to delivery propulsion plant components at reduced cost 
        and schedule, in addition to enabling performance-enhancing 
        designs with unique or complex geometries. These advanced 
        manufacturing approaches can supplement, or in some cases 
        replace, traditional forging and casting methods, some of which 
        have changed little since World War II.
      Developing technology for reactor plant components that 
will provide substantial improvements in quieting capability and 
performance for future submarines. There is real potential to make a 
meaningful improvement to submarine stealth. Achieving an improvement 
involves work in reactor technology areas using existing specialized 
laboratory test facilities and state of the art flow and heat transfer 
computer methods, as well as targeted improvements to key reactor plant 
components.
      Recapitalizing facilities and equipment for inspecting 
and characterizing naval spent nuclear fuel; efforts that have the 
potential to provide increased operating capability of nuclear 
submarines and aircraft carriers.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. CHENEY
    Ms. Cheney. The nominee for NNSA Administrator recently testified 
in her confirmation hearing that it was longstanding U.S. policy that 
any enriched uranium used for national security applications, such as 
for NNSA's tritium program, must be fully ``unobligated''--that is, 
mined, converted, and enriched in the United States, using U.S. 
technologies. Do you agree with that position?
    Dr. Verdon. Yes. Under longstanding U.S. policy and international 
agreements, peaceful use obligations are imparted on uranium processed 
by certain foreign technologies or transferred under a 123 Agreement. 
DOE/NNSA maintains that these peaceful use obligations restrict the 
material from being used for tritium production and therefore 
unobligated material must be used for this mission.
    Ms. Cheney. While not a national security mission, the Office of 
Nuclear Energy is under a congressional mandate from Section 2001 of 
the Energy Act of 2020 to be able to provide a new type of nuclear 
fuel--high assay, low enriched uranium (HALEU)--to the commercial 
advanced reactor industry no later than 2026. Currently the only 
commercial producer of this specialty material is Russia. Shouldn't 
NNSA be working to support the Office of Nuclear Energy in meeting 
their commercial HALEU needs, so as to use American-produced HALEU 
rather than material imported from a strategic adversary?
    Dr. Verdon. Yes. DOE/NNSA's Office of Defense Nuclear 
Nonproliferation is working closely with the Office of Nuclear Energy 
to identify HALEU within the DOE complex that can be used to support 
near-term commercial advanced reactor industry needs. Some of these 
inventories will require processing into a form that can meet 
industry's needs. While there is not enough HALEU available within the 
DOE/NNSA complex to meet all of industry's anticipated near-term needs, 
NNSA is committed to making available as much HALEU as possible for 
advanced reactors without negatively impacting existing national 
security and nonproliferation programs.
    Ms. Cheney. Why did NNSA not include funding for the uranium 
reserve in its FY22 request?
    Dr. Verdon. NNSA did not request funding in FY 2022 for two 
reasons. First, the Uranium Reserve program was originally proposed as 
a program to support civilian nuclear industry and not defense needs. 
DOE/NNSA has sufficient quantities of unobligated uranium to sustain 
defense missions through the early 2040s. Second, funds appropriated in 
FY 2021 will be executed in FY 2022.

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