[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                     
 
                         [H.A.S.C. No. 117-36]

                                HEARING

                                   ON

                   NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

                          FOR FISCAL YEAR 2022

                                  AND

              OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS

                               BEFORE THE

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING

                                   ON

    FISCAL YEAR 2022 PRIORITIES FOR NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE PROGRAMS

                               __________

                              HEARING HELD
                              MAY 24, 2021


                                     
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                     
  


                    SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

                    JIM COOPER, Tennessee, Chairman

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island      MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
JOHN GARAMENDI, California           JOE WILSON, South Carolina
SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts          DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California, Vice  MO BROOKS, Alabama
    Chair                            ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
RO KHANNA, California                SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
JOSEPH D. MORELLE, New York          LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
JIMMY PANETTA, California            MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
STEVEN HORSFORD, Nevada

                Maria Vastola, Professional Staff Member
               Whitney Verett, Professional Staff Member
                           Zach Taylor, Clerk
                           
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

              STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Cooper, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Tennessee, Chairman, 
  Subcommittee on Strategic Forces...............................     1
Turner, Hon. Michael R., a Representative from Ohio, Ranking 
  Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces.......................     2

                               WITNESSES

Cleveland, MG Charles H., USA, Associate Director of Operations, 
  National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency........................     7
Hill, John D., Performing the Duties of Assistant Secretary of 
  Defense for Space Policy, U.S. Department of Defense...........     2
Ludwigson, Jon, Director, Contracting and National Security 
  Acquisitions, U.S. Government Accountability Office............     8
Scolese, Christopher J., Director, National Reconnaissance Office     5
Thompson, Gen David D., USSF, Vice Chief of Space Operations, 
  United States Space Force......................................     3

                                APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

    Cleveland, MG Charles H......................................    53
    Cooper, Hon. Jim.............................................    29
    Hill, John D.................................................    32
    Ludwigson, Jon...............................................    59
    Scolese, Christopher J.......................................    47
    Thompson, Gen David D........................................    39
    Turner, Hon. Michael R.......................................    30

Documents Submitted for the Record:

    [There were no Documents submitted.]

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

    [There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

    Dr. DesJarlais...............................................    95
    Mr. Khanna...................................................    96
    Mr. Lamborn..................................................    94
    Mr. Langevin.................................................    87
    Mr. Morelle..................................................   101
    Mr. Turner...................................................    88
    FISCAL YEAR 2022 PRIORITIES FOR NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE PROGRAMS

                              ----------                              

                  House of Representatives,
                       Committee on Armed Services,
                          Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                              Washington, DC, Monday, May 24, 2021.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:03 a.m., via 
Webex, Hon. Jim Cooper (chairman of the subcommittee) 
presiding.

  OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JIM COOPER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
     TENNESSEE, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

    Mr. Cooper. The hearing will come to order.
    This is a meeting of the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces. 
And I would like to thank the distinguished witnesses. First, 
performing the duties of Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Space Policy, Mr. John Hill; the Vice Chief of Space 
Operations, General David Thompson; the Director of the 
National Reconnaissance Office, Dr. Christopher Scolese; 
Associate Director of Operations for the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency, Major General Charles Cleveland; and GAO 
[Government Accountability Office] Director of Contracting and 
National Security Acquisitions, Mr. Jon Ludwigson.
    We are honored to have this level of expertise within the 
Department and intelligence community and to have them testify 
today at the hearing.
    It has been 2 years since this subcommittee has had a 
hearing on space acquisition, and, in my opinion, hardly any 
topic in DOD [Department of Defense] is more important than 
this one. We have seen the overdue establishment of Space 
Force, the reestablishment of Space Command, and public 
acknowledgement of the many threats we face from abroad. I am 
hopeful that the Department will use this opportunity to 
accelerate and improve space acquisition within the Space 
Force.
    General Hyten, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, has pointed out that the next generation of OPIR 
[Overhead Persistent Infrared] is still planning on giving us, 
as he calls it, quote, ``big, juicy targets'' to orbit, instead 
of the more distributed, less vulnerable architecture that we 
could be choosing. And he personally has encountered numerous 
obstacles from DOD to having new and improved architectures. 
So, if the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has 
difficulties, I have difficulties. We have to make sure this 
works.
    I will turn now to my ranking member, Mr. Turner, for any 
opening remarks he has, but I would like to take a point of 
personal privilege. I am wearing my Predators tie. We won in 
double overtime last night. So it is an amazing thing for a 
Nashville-based hockey team to be doing so well again.
    Mr. Turner.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Cooper can be found in the 
Appendix on page 29.]

  STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL R. TURNER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
     OHIO, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

    Mr. Turner. Mr. Chairman, thank you so much, and thank you 
for holding this important hearing.
    I agree with you, this is one of the most important topics, 
perhaps besides nuclear modernization, that we are dealing 
with. We continually hear from General Raymond the issue of the 
provocative actions that China and Russia are taking in space, 
and we know that it is going to take not only our working 
defensively but also in the manner in which we deploy and 
design our architecture. I look forward to hearing from the 
witnesses today as to how they see that evolving.
    Also, since the Biden administration is delivering its 
budget late May, we are going to be dealing, most likely, with 
a CR [continuing resolution]. And I would love to hear from the 
witnesses as to how this may affect their operations, knowing 
that in space so many of the things that we do are single 
projects and that they may be more particularly impacted by CRs 
than other functions.
    With that, I will submit my written statement for the 
record, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Turner can be found in the 
Appendix on page 30.]
    Mr. Cooper. The gentleman's comments are well taken.
    Without objection, any opening statement is accepted for 
the record.
    Let's now hear from our first witness, Mr. Hill.

 STATEMENT OF JOHN D. HILL, PERFORMING THE DUTIES OF ASSISTANT 
   SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPACE POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
                            DEFENSE

    Mr. Hill. Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member Turner, 
distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is an honor to 
testify before you today along with my distinguished 
colleagues.
    You have my written statement. I will summarize it and, 
with your permission, have it placed in the record.
    Mr. Cooper. Without objection, so ordered.
    Mr. Hill. Thank you.
    This subcommittee well understands the importance of space-
based capabilities to our national security in this era of 
destabilizing challenges from Russia and undeniable strategic 
competition with China.
    The increasing threats to those capabilities are also well 
known. As Secretary Austin has testified, the growth of Chinese 
and Russian counterspace capabilities presents the most 
immediate and serious threats to U.S., allied, and partner 
space activities.
    Moreover, Russia and China view space as critical to modern 
warfare and consider the use of counterspace capabilities as 
both a means of reducing U.S. military effectiveness and 
winning future wars.
    As these developments portend, the United States must now 
be prepared for conflict to extend to or even originate in 
space. But, to be clear, such a conflict would not be a space 
war, distinct from terrestrial war, but would, rather, 
represent the extension of traditional armed conflict into the 
space domain of human endeavor.
    Within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Space Policy, we are focused on the integration of strategy, 
policy, plans, and appropriate capabilities to develop a space 
posture that contributes to integrated cross-domain deterrence 
by conveying clearly to competitors and any potential adversary 
the inadvisability of military aggression, including attacks on 
U.S. space capabilities or those of our allies and partners.
    The 2020 Defense Space Strategy, which my office prepared, 
addresses these challenges of deterrence as well as the 
challenges of crisis de-escalation and warfare extending to 
space along four lines of effort.
    First, we are building comprehensive military advantages in 
space. Second, we are integrating space into national, joint, 
and combined operations. Third, we are shaping the strategy 
environment to enhance domain stability and reduce the 
potential for miscalculation. And, fourth, we are enhancing 
space cooperation with our international partners, our 
commercial entities, and our interagency partners.
    Finally, in support of the national security strategic 
guidelines, my office also leads DOD's participation in the 
U.S. Government's space diplomatic initiative, which currently 
center on establishing voluntary, nonbinding standards of 
responsible behavior and on exposing the disingenuous space 
arms control initiatives of Russia and China.
    Mr. Chairman, I am honored to have played a part in the 
collaborative and bipartisan efforts of the executive and 
legislative branches over the past several years to strengthen 
our national security space posture. I look forward to 
continuing to work with Congress, with our interagency 
colleagues, U.S. industry, and our international allies and 
partners to secure the advantages of space for our national 
interests.
    And I look forward to your questions. Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Hill can be found in the 
Appendix on page 32.]
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you, sir.
    Now General Thompson.

 STATEMENT OF GEN DAVID D. THOMPSON, USSF, VICE CHIEF OF SPACE 
             OPERATIONS, UNITED STATES SPACE FORCE

    General Thompson. Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member Turner, 
and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for 
the opportunity to testify today in my capacity as Vice Chief 
of Space Operations, United States Space Force.
    On behalf of the Chief of Space Operations, General Jay 
Raymond, and joined by these outstanding national security 
space leaders on the panel, it is a pleasure to provide you 
details today on the stand-up of the newest U.S. military 
service and inform you of our plans for the coming year.
    I would like to begin by expressing my gratitude to 
Congress for its bipartisan support in establishing the U.S. 
Space Force on December 20, 2019, and your leadership in 
addressing the threats and challenges the Nation faces in 
space.
    Year one of the Space Force's existence has been focused on 
standing up this new service. With purposeful outreach to and 
the collaboration of Congress, U.S. Space Force has made 
tremendous strides in the first year: establishing and 
resourcing the organizational blueprint for the service; moving 
aggressively in the areas of human capital, force design, 
acquisition integration; and providing the foundations to 
establish a truly digital service; all while executing our 
critical space missions around the clock and without fail.
    General Raymond's direction for year two is the integration 
of the Space Force into the joint force, the interagency, and 
with our allies and partners, even as we continue to build out 
the service.
    While we have completed the congressional requirement to 
establish a service within 18 months, build-out of the Space 
Force continues and will take several more years. We have 
established the first field command, Space Operations Command, 
and completed the organizational design of the remaining two, 
Space Systems Command and Space Training and Readiness Command, 
with anticipated stand-up of those two commands later this 
year.
    Space Operations Command is responsible for preparing and 
presenting forces to U.S. Space Command and other combatant 
commands. Space Systems Command will develop and field world-
class space capabilities for our Space Forces and drive agility 
and speed into the acquisition process. And Space Training and 
Readiness Command will recruit, develop, and train guardians to 
protect the high ground of space.
    As part of year two's integration activities, the Space 
Force will place increasing emphasis on strengthening 
relationships with existing partners and establishing 
relationships with new partners. This starts with the 
organizations represented here today. It extends to the other 
services, combatant commands, and our allies and other 
international partners. The United States as a whole, and the 
U.S. Space Force in particular, are much stronger when these 
relationships are strong.
    Next, General Raymond and the entire leadership of the 
Department of the Air Force remain committed and adamant that 
we must increase the pace of space acquisition. Maintaining 
program delivery timelines of the recent past will not outpace 
the threat. We must go faster.
    The Space Force will continue to smartly leverage the 804 
authorities granted by Congress, and we will partner with 
industry and academia to leverage technology and innovation of 
the commercial sector. Our adversaries have recognized the 
importance of such an approach to the national security space. 
In my opinion, the creativity, ingenuity, and innovation of the 
American mind is one of our greatest assets. We must leverage 
that fully in this endeavor.
    Our people, our guardians, are critical to the success of 
the Space Force. We are adapting new and innovative human 
capital and talent management approaches for both civilians and 
military members alike under the authorities granted by 
Congress and with your assistance.
    In addition, the recent release of the ``Vision for a 
Digital Service'' seeks to build the fluency of that workforce 
and prepare and posture them and the service to be more agile 
and innovative in the future.
    Finally, the U.S. Space Force will continue to partner with 
other agencies in the executive branch and Congress to promote 
responsible behavior in space and a secure, stable domain 
accessible to all for peaceful purposes.
    Our service's inception is an unprecedented opportunity. 
Our success today could not have been possible without a 
passionate and energetic group of guardians, a fully committed 
partnership with the Departments of the Air Force and Defense, 
and the support of Congress.
    On behalf of General Raymond, thank you again for this 
opportunity, and I look forward to your questions and concerns 
today.
    [The prepared statement of General Thompson can be found in 
the Appendix on page 39.]
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you so much, General.
    Now we will hear from Dr. Scolese.

    STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER J. SCOLESE, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL 
                     RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

    Dr. Scolese. Good morning, Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member 
Turner, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. I am 
glad to be here with strong partners General ``DT'' Thompson, 
Mr. Hill, Major General Cleveland, and Mr. Ludwigson.
    It is a great honor to represent the people of the National 
Reconnaissance Office [NRO]. Our agency proudly develops, 
acquires, launches, and operates the Nation's reconnaissance 
satellites as a member of both the intelligence community and 
Department of Defense.
    Mr. Chairman, please allow me to share a reflection on our 
past year.
    While addressing the COVID health and safety protocols to 
protect our workforce and families, NRO ensured the mission 
continued to meet our commitments to intelligence analysts, 
warfighters, and policymakers. Due to the incredible efforts of 
our people and partners, I am pleased to report NRO systems 
maintained 100 percent of their capabilities throughout the 
pandemic.
    During a challenging time, we accomplished 6 successful 
launches, delivering 12 payloads to orbit, many with first-ever 
capabilities, the most NRO launches in a single year since 
1984.
    On the business side, we achieved our 12th consecutive 
clean financial audit, a feat of financial management 
excellence unrivaled in the IC [intelligence community]. Last 
year, we also began our NRO Cadre Internship Program, 
establishing a key recruitment element in our workforce 
strategy.
    Turning to today, we are bridging the innovative legacies 
of our past with cutting-edge vision for our future as we 
celebrate our 60th anniversary. Since its inception in 1961, 
NRO has taken quantum leaps in the evolution of overhead 
reconnaissance space and ground systems. Our success can be 
traced to NRO's end-to-end mission responsibility: developing, 
acquiring, launching, and operating mission systems.
    We are a streamlined, flat organization that has a diverse 
workforce with an exceptional mix of skills, perspectives, and 
backgrounds. This enables us to deliver on acquisitions while 
developing next-generation capabilities and systems.
    Adversaries are moving quickly, and so must we. NRO stays 
out front by developing advanced technologies, leveraging 
commercial solutions, strengthening government and 
international partnerships, adapting processes to innovate 
faster, and baking in resilience, from our assets on the ground 
to our systems on orbit.
    Our work with IC, DOD, civil, industry, and academic 
partners enables the U.S. to maintain strategic advantage. NRO 
sensors give analysts and policymakers insights about 
activities in hard-to-reach and denied areas and enable 
indications and warnings. We have close relationships with the 
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency and National Security 
Agency, who task our satellites to provide vital geospatial and 
signals intelligence that underpins the full spectrum of all-
source analysis across the national and military intelligence 
communities.
    Since the stand-up of the U.S. Space Force and U.S. Space 
Command, we have forged strong new relationships to mutually 
coordinate activities that assure that space-based systems that 
the Nation and our allies rely on can operate without 
disruption in an increasingly contested and congested space 
domain.
    Our relationships are important to us. For example, NRO 
Deputy Director Major General Michael Guetlein and I have just 
returned from a 2-week visit to the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command 
in Hawaii and U.S. Forces Korea in South Korea. We met with our 
embedded NRO field representatives in INDOPACOM, U.S. Forces 
Korea, and component command senior leaders to listen to and 
understand their needs, priorities, and requirements of our 
customers.
    During the trip, we gathered actionable feedback, watched 
how NRO data systems and tools are used in theater, and 
addressed future capabilities and collaborative opportunities. 
This engagement hit the mark, and we are already arranging 
follow-on directorate-level engagements.
    By far, NRO's most important asset is its people. Our 
people make all the difference and will lead us to a future 
where we can, as we like to say with a nod to one of our 
founders, Edwin Land, see it all, see it well, see it now, and 
innovate faster.
    Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member Turner, and members of the 
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss NRO's 
unique value and capabilities. I look forward to your 
questions.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Scolese can be found in the 
Appendix on page 47.]
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you very much, Doctor.
    And we will hear from Major General Cleveland.

 STATEMENT OF MG CHARLES H. CLEVELAND, USA, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR 
     OF OPERATIONS, NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

    General Cleveland. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking 
Member Turner, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. 
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to 
share a little bit about NGA's [National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency's] mission in the space domain.
    NGA and our predecessor organizations have a long history 
of supporting our Nation's space activities, and, as an 
organization reliant upon airborne and satellite imagery, we 
have always made a priority of being aware of activities in 
space and near-space.
    At NGA, our efforts are spurred by the same sense of 
urgency that spurred the stand-up of U.S. Space Command. 
Namely, the Earth's orbit is no longer a benign environment, 
and the threat to U.S. national security interests from foreign 
space powers is real and growing.
    Last year, we rolled out the moonshot initiative at NGA, a 
whole-of-agency effort to maintain and expand our GEOINT 
[geospatial intelligence] advantage in all realms, including 
space. We have developed a four-pillar strategy based on 
people, partnerships, and preparation for the missions of today 
and tomorrow.
    The first pillar is people. NGA's workforce has been 
thriving in the space domain for decades. In fact, we helped 
map the Moon for the NASA [National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration] Moon landings in the 1960s and the 1970s. To 
maintain a competitive edge, we are increasing our investments 
in developing our tradecraft and training our workforce for the 
space domain. And to support our people, we are training our 
officers in big data management and analysis and growing our 
artificial intelligence expertise. Over time, this will provide 
a cadre of experts who can execute the warfighter and IC 
requirements and develop the next generation of space GEOINT 
professionals.
    The second pillar is partnerships. NGA continues to 
strengthen our strategic partnerships while building new 
relationships with civilian components of government, with 
industry, and with our allied partners.
    Within the space domain, NRO is our lead partner in 
advancing space GEOINT capabilities, including new commercial 
sources. And our partnership with the U.S. Space Force is 
deepening every day through information-sharing and 
collaboration. We are working with these partners to ensure no 
duplication of effort and to create efficiencies.
    We also maintain embedded personnel through our NGA support 
teams, or NSTs, at DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency] 
headquarters, the National Air and Space Intelligence Center in 
Ohio, and the Missile and Space Intelligence Center in Alabama. 
And, in 2019, NGA established a SPACECOM [United States Space 
Command] NST, and we are continuing to grow the NST as SPACECOM 
becomes fully operational.
    The third pillar is mission today. Space is vitally 
important to NGA's mission. It is the environment in which the 
sensors that provide most of our data operate. We recognize 
that our adversaries and near-peer competitors have the means 
to deny us that resource, and so NGA extends the same level of 
commitment to our warfighters in space, and the recently 
established SPACECOM NST has embedded NGA's unique capabilities 
in the command.
    The final pillar is mission tomorrow. Based on Earth and in 
space, one of the most critical missions NGA performs for the 
Nation is assured positioning, navigation, and timing, what we 
call Assured PNT. This is the foundation for our foundation. 
Everything that depends on knowing exactly where and when 
something is on or about the Earth uses this unique form of 
GEOINT.
    NGA is the global leader in providing the geosciences that 
enable the accuracy and precision of DOD weapons systems, of 
safety and navigation efforts, and of economic and civil 
applications that use capabilities like GPS [Global Positioning 
System] and precision timing. Assured PNT is a mission 
imperative for us, and NGA plans to invest additional resources 
to ensure the integrity and resiliency of these capabilities.
    Finally, I would like to say thanks to this committee for 
its support of NGA's safety of navigation mission. Your support 
helped modernize NGA's authorities and addressed our shift from 
paper to a digital and secure electronic delivery to support 
electronic-based navigation in all domains.
    In conclusion, NGA has reacted aggressively to support 
space and is making progress in the domain. We are realigning 
to protect U.S. national security interests in the space domain 
to deter, protect, and defeat our adversaries in space.
    Thank you, and I look forward to answering your questions.
    [The prepared statement of General Cleveland can be found 
in the Appendix on page 53.]
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you very much, General.
    Now we will hear from Mr. Ludwigson.

STATEMENT OF JON LUDWIGSON, DIRECTOR, CONTRACTING AND NATIONAL 
  SECURITY ACQUISITIONS, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

    Mr. Ludwigson. [Inaudible] I will summarize my written 
statement but submit it for the record.
    DOD's space systems are important to our national security, 
facilitating communications, providing real-time global 
visibility, as well as serving other key roles. For decades, 
these systems provided the U.S. with unparalleled advantages.
    Our past work has highlighted problems with DOD space 
acquisitions, including multibillion-dollar cost overruns, 
multiyear delays, and deferred capabilities. Fortunately, many 
of the programs that led us to these findings are now nearing 
completion. My written statement highlights the status of 
several programs. As you may have noted, many of the 
traditional programs are over budget and delayed, but some are 
not.
    Our recent report also provides some insight. For example, 
our GPS report earlier this year highlighted that, despite 
having satellites capable of broadcasting a jam-resistant GPS 
signal for military users since 2005, DOD remains years away 
from widespread use of it. Similar disconnects between space 
and non-space elements have happened for other space systems.
    I want to emphasize that, while DOD has already deployed 
numerous space-based systems, the space elements do not last 
forever, and systems require periodic updates to continue to 
meet mission needs.
    In addition, some potential adversaries now have the means 
and intentions of holding our space-based capabilities at risk. 
As a result, we face important questions about how to mitigate 
the risks to current space systems, recapitalize our existing 
capabilities, and potentially add new ones.
    Congress and DOD have taken steps aimed at improving 
acquisitions and oversight of space programs. In particular, 
there have been efforts to change acquisition authorities, 
including the creation of middle-tier acquisitions, which aim 
to produce a usable product within 5 years and provide 
administrative relief to do this.
    My written statement highlights five of these programs, 
including two in the next-gen OPIR effort, which we issued a 
nonpublic report on earlier this year.
    There are also efforts to provide acquisition authority 
specific to space programs. We shared our views on a draft Air 
Force proposal earlier this year and expect to do the same for 
a forthcoming DOD proposal.
    In addition, DOD has undertaken a dramatic restructuring 
aimed at consolidating space oversight. The creation of the 
Space Force has captured headlines, but the reorganization 
moved multiple organizations into the Space Force and created 
new ones. Key among these are the new Space Development Agency 
and the Space Rapid Capabilities Office, both tasked with 
quickly developing new systems. Also, the stand-up of U.S. 
Space Command is designed to provide unified control over space 
operations.
    Looking ahead, DOD faces several broad challenges.
    First, the stand-up of the new Space Force and the related 
reorganization may streamline the DOD space enterprise and 
sharpen the focus on the development and operations of space 
systems but brings with it a variety of challenges. Only 2 
years ago, we reported that DOD was unsure how many acquisition 
staff were working on DOD space programs. Moving people and 
organizations and establishing new lines of authority may bring 
growing pains that could distract from their mission if not 
managed well.
    Second, paying for cost overruns for older systems while 
attempting to recapitalize and replace some or all of those 
systems could be challenging. Notably, DOD is developing or 
planning at least 10 space programs in nearly every mission 
area, including communications; missile warning; command and 
control; launch; and position, navigation, and timing.
    Finally, balancing efforts to enhance acquisition 
authorities with ensuring opportunities for effective oversight 
will be important. The record on DOD space acquisitions is 
replete with examples of cost overruns and missed schedules. 
Oftentimes, people point to the ubiquitous paperwork as the 
cause of the slow process. However, I urge the subcommittee to 
consider what I call the first principles behind the paperwork. 
I would argue that we need agreement on a few things. These are 
the first principles to build strong programs and the ability 
to oversee them.
    It is not a given that DOD will repeat its past mistakes. 
We have identified and shared leading practices to improve 
acquisition outcomes, including building strong oversights into 
programs, using data and demonstrable knowledge to anchor 
decisions, empowering program managers to make decisions but 
holding them accountable for their choices, and canceling 
unsuccessful programs. Adopting these leading practices could 
help DOD achieve faster delivery of new capabilities, 
especially if DOD balances new streamlined acquisition 
processes with sufficient oversight to help ensure program 
success.
    Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member Turner, this concludes my 
statement. I would be happy to answer any questions the 
subcommittee members may have.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Ludwigson can be found in 
the Appendix on page 59.]
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you very much. It is always good to hear 
from GAO.
    We will now question the witnesses and try to limit every 
member to 5 minutes so that we can distribute the questions as 
much as possible.
    Let me begin with Mr. Ludwigson. I think it was in 2016, 
there was a report from GAO that said there were some 60 people 
within DOD who had the power to say ``no'' over then-Air Force 
space programs, and most members of the Armed Services 
Committee thought that was way too many naysayers and could be 
one reason for the delay.
    You mentioned that the new Space Force is somewhat 
streamlined. How many naysayers are there today? Are there 
still 60? Has the number gone up or down?
    Mr. Ludwigson. We haven't updated that work at this point. 
But, as you know, the stand-up of Space Force is an ongoing 
process. Components have been moved around. I am not sure that 
the Space Force itself is in its final form.
    As you may recall from that fragmentation report, there 
were a wide number of agencies who were involved in the 
decisionmaking process that went into space acquisitions, and 
not all of those have been moved into Space Force.
    Even if the entities who are not going to move into Space 
Force remain independent, it is going to be important for the 
entities to coordinate their activities, because space is so 
connected, as a couple of the speakers mentioned. Especially in 
the context of multidomain operations, so much of it is 
connected to one another, both at the service level and--Space 
Force and NRO, for example, that is a relationship that is 
going to have to remain very strong.
    Mr. Cooper. I think you and GAO have pointed out that there 
are some, what, 8,000 people involved, in 50 different 
organizations, and it has been kind of hard to even keep up 
with that part of things.
    But I think the overall thrust here is, we need to be able 
to field systems that work and field them faster. I personally 
would love to see them under budget, but it is even more 
important that they be working systems, not like the 2005 
disaster, where you have the capability we haven't been able to 
use, even though the satellite has been up there, ready to use 
it, all that time. Sometimes it is satellite, sometimes it is 
ground stations, sometimes it is--people don't even know what 
it is.
    But, in the effort to get things to move faster, I couldn't 
help but be impressed by the NRO's announcement, even during 
COVID, they were able to have 6 successful launches with 12 
major payloads. That is pretty impressive.
    And I know that is a mature organization, but that is the 
organization that I think most members of the Armed Services 
Committee had in mind when we were thinking about how the Space 
Force should be run--streamlined, flat, plenty of diversity, 
and gets the job done, oftentimes with little fanfare.
    So I know that General Raymond is working hard on this, 
General Thompson, others, but--and I know there are going to be 
inevitable birthing pains, but--and aren't there something like 
10 804 programs going on right now? And I hope they all yield 
great results, because I am certainly feeling the pressure from 
the foreign threats.
    Mr. Hill, your excellent report mentioned that you have 
come up with two theories of deterrence: deterrence by denial 
and also deterrence by cost. Could you flesh those out a little 
bit more? To me, it sounds like one is absolute deterrence, and 
the other is more like situational deterrence. How would you 
describe those?
    Mr. Hill. Chairman Cooper, yes, that was the report that we 
submitted last year to Congress.
    So longstanding deterrence theory, you have always had 
deterrence by denying the benefits of attack, as well as 
deterrence by the potential imposition of unacceptable costs.
    What we are describing in that report is, with respect to 
the space domain--and the focus of the report was supposed to 
be space deterrence--we said, in the space domain, the reliance 
of the United States on space means that adversaries see a 
potential benefit in attacking us in space. And so we have to 
very much focus on the mission assurance that will reduce the 
benefits of attack.
    And what you are focused on is deterring military 
aggression overall. You don't want your adversary to see 
military aggression as an option, as a viable option, for 
pursuing their political objectives.
    So we think that there may be cost imposition in other 
domains. There may certainly be reason to deny someone's use of 
a particularly threatening space capability. But, for the most 
part, the balance on deterrence with respect to space focuses 
on assuring our capabilities, which I think is exactly where 
you are going with your focus on getting our acquisition to 
move faster.
    Mr. Cooper. Well, it sounds like, in plain English, our 
first choice is deterrence by denial, and then, if we can't get 
that, then we impose cost. So that is second-best or third-best 
deterrence, when we might not necessarily be able to eliminate 
any benefit they might get.
    Mr. Hill. Yes. The point, though, I think, on imposing 
costs is, it is always there; it just might be in a different 
domain. This gets to the sense of the cross-domain and 
integrated deterrence.
    Mr. Cooper. Well, certainly, modern warfare reaches many 
domains, and it will certainly always include space, I guess.
    Let me turn now to the ranking member, see what questions 
he has.
    Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I want to share your affinity for GAO. There has been a 
tremendous amount of important legislation and policy changes 
that have come out of GAO reports. I don't have a question for 
Mr. Ludwigson. I just want to comment that he had the best 
summation I have ever heard from GAO: They have some programs 
that are late and over budget; some are not. The good-news part 
of that was the ``some are not'' addition that I appreciated.
    So I have two questions for General Thompson and General 
Cleveland.
    I am going to start with you, General Thompson. General 
Cleveland states in his opening statement that Earth's orbit is 
no longer a benign environment. We have threats from foreign 
nations. It is basically an understanding that space is now 
becoming a warfighting domain.
    Now, Mr. Hill talked about deterrence, which, of course, is 
a more difficult thing to accomplish because, you know, it is 
not just operational that is affecting the assessment by your 
adversary.
    But will you talk about deterrence?
    We talked about redundancy; we talked about resiliency. We 
now see threats to space from the ground, threats to space in 
space. We see in the future maybe threats from the ground from 
space. So, clearly, we must change. We are looking to, you 
know, ways in which we can also rely on commercial access.
    What are the things that you think that we need to be doing 
immediately? And how fast, how quickly can we do them?
    General Thompson.
    General Thompson. So, Representative Turner, thanks so much 
for that. There are a whole host of answers to that question, 
but, certainly, in the interest of time, I will just limit 
myself to two.
    The first is--and probably the most significant gaps and 
limitations we have had are specifically related to the fact 
that space has only recently become a warfighting domain.
    The first is, we don't have a truly operational 
intelligence enterprise for space. We have, for years, done 
great work foundationally. The National Air and Space 
Intelligence Center is one of those centers that is set up 
foundationally, but extending that to our tactical units, our 
operational units, a deep understanding of the capabilities of 
our adversaries in the domain, what their tactics are.
    Training intelligence professionals in that regard to be 
able to do that, that is one of the limitations we have. But we 
are moving out very rapidly.
    I think as you are aware, here in January, we became the 
18th member of the intelligence community. We have put together 
a plan to establish a national space intelligence center. We 
are rapidly building the capability to train our own space-
focused intelligence professionals. And so we are moving out 
aggressively in that regard, but we have a lot of ground to 
cover.
    The second area I will talk about is what I will call the 
test and evaluation enterprise. And that is, we know how to 
test our systems to operate effectively in space against 
natural hazards and for a long period of time. We have never 
had to design and field and operate them in the face of 
threats.
    And so building out a test and evaluation enterprise that 
allows us to, both in modeling and simulation and other means, 
understand that our systems will perform effectively and 
respond effectively in the face of attack and threat is another 
area that we have to move out and quickly. And I think we have 
work to do now and in the future.
    Mr. Turner. Well, General Thompson, I have had this 
conversation with General Raymond. As you indicated, intel 
being one of the most important aspects. One of the things that 
we don't want to do is cannibalize our existing systems. As we 
expand our operations, our capabilities and expertise, we 
certainly don't want to weaken those that we have.
    So I am very concerned at the opportunity for stovepiping 
that might come as we expand those intel operations. So I will 
certainly be looking at that very closely and having that 
conversation with you.
    General Thompson and General Cleveland, General Raymond has 
done a great job in making certain that the information that we 
do have about what our adversaries are doing is declassified. 
This is incredibly important for policymakers to be able to 
have open discussion but also so the general public and our 
allies can see what our adversaries are doing.
    I always point out that our allies' legislative bodies do 
not have access to intelligence information or even a 
Congressional Research Service like we do. Getting information 
out in the public domain actually puts information in the hands 
of those parliaments and legislators.
    I would like each of you to talk about the importance of 
making certain that we declassify this information. We are 
always so worried about means, methods, and techniques, but I 
think we also need to worry about ends, and that is, what are 
our adversaries attempting to do. And by identifying that, we 
can then empower you to fashion responses.
    General Thompson, General Cleveland, if you could talk 
about the issue of declassification.
    General Thompson. Representative Turner, just a few 
comments, and then I will pass it to General Cleveland.
    You are absolutely right in that regard. I think our over-
classification and tendency to over-classify is still a little 
bit of the vestige of the Cold War mindset and the fact that we 
had such incredible and exquisite capabilities that others 
didn't.
    Because of the fact that we now need to operate more 
broadly in coalitions and we need to make sure that our leaders 
and the public are aware of our capabilities, our threats, and 
what we are doing about it, it really does drive the need to 
declassify.
    I will also say that we have made some significant steps in 
that regard; more to go. But I would also say that both the 
National Air and Space Intelligence Center and DIA recently 
published some very, very good unclassified products on the 
threats we face. And they have been more forthcoming in those 
products than we have seen in many years. And I would start 
there as a great means to [inaudible] our friends, our allies, 
the public, and others in terms of the threats that we face.
    I will pass to General Cleveland.
    General Cleveland. Sir, good morning again, and thank you 
for the question. I absolutely agree with the need to be 
publishing at an unclassified level or being prepared to 
declassify as needed.
    I think, whether it is in space or whether it is in the 
broader efforts that we are doing as an agency, it is clear 
that we are, as a Nation, competing in the information 
environment on a daily basis. And we think that at NGA we have 
a huge role and quite a bit to contribute to that.
    In some instances, I think it is an effort to declassify, 
but I think we also need to be focused on how can we publish at 
a level that can be released immediately and enable both 
policymakers and decisionmakers to share that information as 
needed.
    In terms of our partners, of course, we maintain good, 
strong relationships with a number of allied partners. And the 
vast majority of the production that we provide is at a 
releasable level, at our Five Eyes level and at some of the 
other levels.
    And so every step we take is a recognition that we are 
competing in the information environment, and we think that we 
do have a huge role in not only being prepared to declassify as 
needed but also to produce and to collect at an unclassified 
level to support our policymakers.
    Mr. Turner. Last question. Continuing resolutions have a 
tremendous effect on DOD and all of our operations across our 
agencies. Sadly, the fiscal year is statutorily set. Congress 
could move it to December 31, which I think every year would 
save DOD about 3 months of backlog. I have been an advocate for 
that.
    I just wanted to take an opportunity--because I think that 
the area of space is probably even more particularly impacted 
by continuing resolutions--to give anyone who is on our panel 
an opportunity to chime in and to give us some additional 
thought around the evils and the effects to your operations and 
your area of continuing resolutions.
    General Thompson. Representative Turner, General Thompson.
    Just briefly, I would say, from the aspect of space and 
primarily speaking for the Space Force, there is an additional 
effect, for a couple of reasons.
    One is, there has been mention of some of the programs we 
have ongoing, the authorities we are using, but, also, we are 
in the process of starting new programs. I will tell you that, 
while certainly we want folks to maintain their oversight of 
those programs, right now we are in pretty good stead in terms 
of the performance of the programs.
    But because we are trying to start new programs with new 
capabilities specifically focused on defending and protecting 
and other things and because, in fact, some of the changes we 
need to make, some of the mission transfers and some of the 
establishment of new authorities, do require passage of law, we 
are probably more affected than others in a general sense, just 
because of the critical need to begin those programs focused on 
the shortfall of defending and protecting and because we need 
to continue to build out the organizations and the capabilities 
required to act as a service focused on the warfighting domain 
of space.
    Mr. Turner. Anyone else?
    Dr. Scolese. Yeah, I would add to what General Thompson 
said, in saying that it does delay the start of new programs, 
but it also has an impact on what we are doing with continuing 
programs that may delay, also, some of our ability to continue 
those programs on the pace that we had and may require some 
degree of reprogramming before we can go forward.
    Mr. Turner. Mr. Chairman, I saw Mr. Hill reach for the 
microphone. I don't know if we have any time remaining.
    Mr. Hill. Just to underscore what General Thompson said and 
what, really, Ranking Member Turner, what you said as well 
about the problems of continuing resolutions.
    Mr. Turner. Thank you.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Cooper. I thank the ranking member. Points well taken.
    Before I yield to, first, Mr. Carbajal, then Mr. Wilson, 
Mr. Horsford, and Mr. Lamborn, let me point out the obvious, 
that all the growing pains of the Space Force, the various 
tasks that need to be done, were apparently things that the Air 
Force was not doing when they were in charge of this domain. So 
I am thankful that Space Force is doing it, but I am sorry that 
we are having to rebuild what probably should have been built 
before.
    Mr. Carbajal.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    And good morning to everyone. At least it is ``good 
morning'' in California; I know it is about to be lunch out 
there.
    General Thompson, Vandenberg Air Force Base is located in 
my district. In the fiscal year 2021 National Defense 
Authorization Act, I requested a report outlining the 
requirements for sustaining and improving the physical 
infrastructure of space launch ranges.
    The report noted that the diversity of launch providers, 
payload, customers, and weapons-systems testers are at an all-
time high, which often requires infrastructure modifications, 
enhancements, and modernization to meet the mission needs of 
the customers.
    My office has been trying to get additional information 
from the Space Force on a point in the report that states, ``A 
challenge the ranges face is the limitation of commercial 
investment of mutually beneficial projects.'' The report says 
that the Space Force is seeking to address this challenge 
through changes to the commercial space launch cooperation 
statute.
    Can you elaborate, what changes are you considering in this 
area?
    General Thompson. Representative Carbajal, yes, I can. And, 
sir, if I may make a minor point of correction for you. As of 
May 14, Vandenberg Space Force Base is now a part of your 
district. We were able to rename that base on the 14th of May.
    Yes, sir, as you stated--so we believe that launch and, 
absolutely, I think most believe that launch is a national 
security asset, but it is not just a matter of a national 
security asset for launching national security payloads; the 
economic and commercial aspects of launch also have important 
national security implications.
    But the launch enterprise, as we understand it today, is in 
a period of growth and evolution, and we need to adapt some of 
our policies and procedures and processes to adjust.
    Among them is what we call our Range of the Future 
initiative. And what we are doing in that regard is working 
hard to ensure that our Space Force processes for safety, for 
range operations, for support, to protect the public, are not 
inhibitors, first, in the way that launch providers need to 
provide their operations and, also, to reduce the costs that 
they incur when they come to our national launch ranges.
    So the launch Range of the Future initiative seeks to do 
that. And, as you said, part of that effort is to find ways to 
be able to partner with those commercial activities to share 
the cost and, also, if they have specific desires and needs, to 
help upgrade the infrastructure to let them do that.
    We will work with your office and with the OSD [Office of 
the Secretary of Defense] staff to provide you additional 
details in that regard. But it is a request to make some 
adjustments to the way costs are shared, costs are incurred, 
and investments are allowed with the commercial sector.
    Mr. Carbajal. Great. I would appreciate it if your team can 
follow up with my staff.
    General Thompson, just to continue, building off my 
previous question, I understand that ranges annually compete 
for facilities sustainment, restoration, and modernization 
funds to sustain, repair, and construct projects.
    The focus on these efforts is to sustain existing 
infrastructure, rather than growing capability to meet the 
diverse user base of the launch ranges. To the extent the focus 
is to growing capabilities in addition to sustainment, does the 
Space Force require additional funds, or would it require a 
policy change?
    General Thompson. Representative, I think I would refer 
back to the previous question.
    Certainly, modernization and sustainment of our 
infrastructure is a challenge not just on the ranges but across 
the space enterprise. We have 134 locations worldwide, all with 
their own unique challenges. We seek to budget sustainment 
funds at the appropriate level to cover all and attack those 
challenges where the priorities lie.
    As with all activities, more resources to help us work on 
those infrastructure challenges never hurt. I would say, 
adequate resourcing exists, but additional resourcing is 
never--there is always use for additional resources. But that, 
coupled with some of the potential policy changes we talked 
about in the last question, would definitely be helpful.
    Mr. Carbajal. Great.
    And, lastly, no response is needed, but I would be remiss 
if I didn't take this opportunity to urge you to consider 
Vandenberg Space Force Base to be the future home of STARCOM 
[Space Training and Readiness Command].
    So, with that, Mr. Chair, I yield back.
    Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman.
    Now Mr. Wilson.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Chairman Jim Cooper and Ranking 
Member Mike Turner, for coordinating this very important 
hearing today.
    And we are so grateful as to the dedicated personnel that 
we hear who are speaking, and thank you so much for your 
service to our country.
    As a 31-year veteran of the Army National Guard myself and 
a grateful dad of three members of the National Guard, I 
strongly support a Space Force National Guard. And I am 
encouraged by reports that the force is working toward this 
creation. National Guard units have conducted space operations 
for the past 25 years and can provide the same sort of support 
to our space operations that it does to other domains.
    With that, General Thompson, the fiscal year 2021 National 
Defense Authorization Act requires the Department to submit a 
draft plan to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees. 
What is the status of the plan? And what do you need from this 
committee?
    General Thompson. Representative, thanks so much for that 
question.
    I will tell you that, today, before we even talk about the 
future, in the past and today, both the Air National Guard and 
the Air Force Reserve have been critical members and a critical 
part of the space mission for decades, as you noted. Without 
them, we could not execute our full suite of missions today. 
They are an incredibly valuable partner.
    We have taken this opportunity, however, to look at the 
Guard, Reserve, and regular construct and assess whether or not 
there is an approach that we could take that adjusts that for 
the future. We have been working closely with the Office of 
Secretary of Defense. I think we are close to approval of that 
report from the Secretary of Defense and submission to 
Congress.
    I think it does two things. First of all, it relies on 
tried and true and proven capabilities that we have used in the 
past and structures that we have used in the past to great 
effect and we believe will be useful in the future. There is 
also an aspect of it, I think you will see, that increases our 
flexibility, increases our permeability, and allows us to both 
address force structure issues for the Space Force but the 
needs of our guardians over time as well.
    That report is in final stage of coordination and, I 
believe, close to delivery, and we will look forward to working 
with Congress on the implementation of that report when it is 
delivered.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, General. And, again, the 
capabilities of citizen soldiers can be so positive, as you 
know.
    And then, General, you highlight the importance of 
multinational space war games in creating innovative deterrence 
and identifying how our capabilities complement those of our 
allies and vice versa. These exercises, common in other 
warfighting domains, require partners with developed 
operational concepts and commitment to force designs for their 
own space forces.
    What is the current maturity of our allies' space 
capabilities? And are we doing everything we can to coordinate 
them in wargaming and experimentation?
    General Thompson. Yes, sir. So, over the last--I am going 
to say over the last decade, our allies and partners have made 
tremendous gains, tremendous progress.
    One of the things that we have done is, the Schriever 
Wargame that has been in place since around the turn of the 
century, around 2000, we have greatly expanded to include ally 
participation. We include participation at the policy level, at 
the ministerial level, and also in terms of operational 
capabilities, tactics, techniques, and procedures.
    That has done a tremendous amount for them to open up their 
eyes in terms of the threats, in terms of the challenges, and 
specifically the capabilities that they need to provide and 
bring to the table to help us operate more effectively as a 
coalition and a set of nations.
    We continue that activity today. And we are looking at 
increased investment from our Five Eyes partners--the U.K. 
[United Kingdom], Canada, Australia, New Zealand--but also the 
French, the Germans, the Japanese. All are looking to increase 
their investment and capability.
    Mr. Wilson. And that is really encouraging. Also, Korea.
    And, Secretary Hill, commercial satellite companies like 
SpaceX and Blue Origin are poised to introduce thousands of new 
satellites over the next decade. Ensuring appropriate oversight 
of the partnerships with our innovative private industry is a 
careful consideration of the committee.
    What is the Department doing to reduce costs by embracing 
the military-commercial and public-private hybrid acquisition 
approaches to national space security challenges?
    Mr. Hill. Thank you, Congressman.
    Both in the Defense Department and, I think, our colleagues 
from the intelligence community would say is that we are 
focusing on using both the services, the new services that 
commercial space provides, launch area, space-based Earth 
imaging, satellite communications, and, of course, the 
broadband capabilities that you spoke about some of the people 
providing.
    And we are also seeing so much innovation in the way they 
design their architectures. And that is being brought into the 
way we think about how to design our own architectures, giving 
a lot of new opportunities to diversify, add resilience, and 
reduce costs.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Cooper. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Horsford.
    Mr. Horsford. Well, thank you, Chairman Cooper. It is great 
to be here. This is my first meeting for the Strategic Forces 
Subcommittee. And as one of the newest members on HASC [House 
Armed Services Committee], I am looking forward to working with 
all of my colleagues on these important issues.
    Thank you also to our witnesses for testifying today.
    As we know, the purpose of today's hearing is to explore 
national security space activities for the Department of 
Defense, including within the U.S. Space Force.
    I actually had the honor of joining Acting Secretary of the 
Air Force John Roth 2 months ago when he visited Nellis Air 
Force Base, located in my district. During Secretary Roth's 
visit, we were both briefed on our Nation's defense and 
training capabilities, including the Advanced Battle Management 
System [ABMS] and Red Flag exercises.
    Warfighters at Nellis Air Force Base are helping the Air 
Force build a more integrated and lethal force through Advanced 
Battle Management System development, the Air Force's network 
solution to enable rapid decisionmaking that powers Joint All-
Domain Command and Control.
    So, as we modernize our Air Force, we must also find ways 
to process and share data faster than our adversaries. ABMS 
will allow the Air Force to transition its legacy command and 
control infrastructure into joint virtual systems that enable 
all equipment to communicate seamlessly, creating more agile 
and mobile warfighters.
    So, General Thompson, you stated in your testimony that the 
Joint All-Domain Command and Control and ABMS are the most 
important efforts for the joint force to undertake to prepare 
for future conflicts. Can you elaborate on that for us just 
briefly for a moment?
    General Thompson. Yes, sir. Absolutely.
    And, as you described, the future of conflict, we believe, 
is the ability to sense rapidly, take the data that you need, 
formulate it, collate it, fuse it, put it in the proper place 
and format so that, either through machine learning and 
artificial intelligence or the decision of commanders and 
warfighters, that the appropriate action can be taken.
    And we need to be able to do that rapidly, on the matter of 
seconds and minutes. And we need to be able to do it from 
sensors that are in space, in the air, at sea, and on the 
ground, and then apply the appropriate action, whether it 
includes weapons or other capabilities that the joint force 
brings to bear.
    And, as you said, the foundational capability to do that is 
the connectivity between all of those sensors and shooters, the 
ability to share data, the ability to understand what the data 
is and understand who is using it. And, as you said, ABMS is a 
key part of that. A large part of that relay will need to occur 
through space.
    And, in addition, as part of our contribution to both ABMS 
and Joint All-Domain Command and Control, the Space Force's 
primary contribution at this point is through our Unified Data 
Library. That is the data repository that will be the access 
point and the distribution point and the availability point of 
that sensor data, the ability connected to those shooters, and 
then apply machine learning, artificial intelligence, and human 
intervention to connect the information with the right 
decisionmaker, the right action arm, at the right time.
    Mr. Horsford. Thank you very much.
    Also, I just wanted to ask briefly about the DOD space 
acquisition workforce.
    Mr. Ludwigson, you noted that the GAO, which issued a 
report in 2019, examined the acquisition workforce, focused on 
space programs, and there were some troubling findings. Can you 
elaborate on that?
    And, Mr. Hill or General Thompson, what steps has the DOD 
taken to identify the number of acquisition personnel that are 
needed for Space Force?
    Thank you.
    Mr. Ludwigson. We did that work--we actually initiated that 
work before the stand-up of Space Force was formalized and 
planned. And we did it to understand whether the Department 
understood the range of locations and numbers of personnel 
working on space acquisitions.
    As you noted, the findings were that there wasn't good 
understanding of all of the locations and all of the personnel. 
In fact, the Department wasn't able to provide that answer. We 
developed our own methodology and came up with the number of, I 
believe it was 8,100, a couple more. And that was probably a 
low estimate.
    I think it was very helpful that we had done that work. 
With the stand-up of Space Force, it became important to--as 
they start to pull together the personnel, they need to make 
decisions. And so hopefully our work was helpful to the 
Department as they move down that path.
    General Thompson. Yes, sir. It is General Thompson. I will 
add to that.
    Absolutely, the work done by the GAO and Mr. Ludwigson 
regarding identifying some of those factors and concerns has 
helped, first of all, in our design of the acquisition 
organizations and the acquisition approach to Space Force; 
also, in ensuring that we have adequately captured our resource 
needs as we complete the build-out associated with that design.
    The second thing I will add is, not just in terms of the 
acquisition workforce framework that the overall Department of 
Defense is using to increase the flexibility of managing its 
workforce today, we have already also applied some of the 
special authorities of Congress through the acquisition 
demonstration program that is longstanding to adjust the means 
by which we manage that workforce.
    We have found, both in terms of our own analysis but 
others, that the members that are under this management program 
find that it is more rewarding. They feel like they are more 
appropriately recognized for their work and their attitudes 
toward the work they do in the organization area and are 
stronger than others across the force.
    So all of those have combined, I think, to build us a good 
foundation for our acquisition organizations and our 
acquisition workforce going forward.
    Mr. Horsford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    Mr. Cooper. We welcome the gentleman to the subcommittee 
and to the full committee. Appreciate your excellent questions. 
Thank you.
    Mr. Lamborn. I think you are muted.
    Mr. Lamborn. There. Is that better? Okay. Thank you.
    Thanks for having this hearing, Mr. Chairman. I want to 
say, if both of our hockey teams, the Colorado Avalanche and 
the Predators, continue to advance, we might have to place a 
bet on the outcome if they face each other.
    And, Dr. Scolese, I want to congratulate NRO on its 60th 
birthday. NRO has come a long way in 60 years, from dropping 
film from a satellite to be caught by a parachute by an 
airplane. You have come a long way since those days.
    My first question, Dr. Scolese, is: We have heard concerns 
about the number of delivery-on-orbit and delivery-in-orbit 
launches that the NRO has purchased outside of the National 
Security Space Launch program. Can you walk us through why that 
is?
    Dr. Scolese. Yes, sir.
    We typically and principally use the national launch 
services as our principal means of going into space. And 
whenever we don't, we coordinate with the Air Force and now the 
Space Force to determine what the best means for delivery is.
    Typically, when we have not used the national launch 
services, it is because it is typically a small research 
payload that we want to get up either in a unique orbit or on a 
short timeframe. But, as you will look and see, principally we 
use the national launch services for our missions.
    Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you.
    Changing gears, Dr. Scolese, there is a tremendous natural 
symmetry which exists in Colorado Springs between Space Command 
and our uniformed space warfighters on the one hand and the 
many intelligence and three-letter agencies on the other hand.
    This is particularly true in the National Space Defense 
Center [NSDC] there in Colorado Springs, where the Joint Task 
Force-Space Defense conducts can't-fill missions 24 hours a 
day, 7 days a week. And NRO has an even greater presence on 
Buckley Air Force Base, which is an hour away by car.
    So we know from the previous Missile Defense Agency's 
relocation from the capital region to Alabama that it suffered 
an 80 percent attrition from individuals who did not want to 
make that move.
    Will NRO be requiring any of its employees to move if the 
Space Command relocation proceeds to Alabama? And, if so, what 
would an 80 percent attrition do to your workforce and your 
mission?
    Dr. Scolese. Sir, we are located, as you said, on Buckley 
Air Force Base, which is an aero facility there that I wouldn't 
expect to be impacted. I would have to see what the changes 
would be. We do co-staff the NSDC, as you said. But I would 
have to see what that impact would be.
    Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you. We will follow up on that.
    General Thompson, we know that China is pursuing 
counterspace technologies such as satellite jammers, directed-
energy and direct-ascent kinetic weapons. These developments 
will certainly further facilitate the militarization of space 
and could deny the U.S. and our allies access to space during a 
conflict or crisis.
    So, from an organize, train, and equip perspective, General 
Thompson, where should investments be made to our space-based 
capabilities to ensure that we can prevail in a conflict 
against China?
    General Thompson. Representative Lamborn, three quick 
answers to that question, first of all.
    The first is, we have tremendous capabilities up there 
today. In many cases, they weren't designed to operate in a 
contested environment under threat like this. But we are in the 
process now, we have had a multiyear effort now, to build into 
them a limited set of features that allow them to be 
defensible, to help in their own defense. But, also, we are in 
the process right now of developing capabilities to be able to 
defend them against these threats. And that is what I will call 
step number one.
    Step number two is, as we move forward, both as part of our 
design activity, the force design activity we are establishing 
under our new Space Warfighting and Analysis Center, is, by the 
design of the architectures and the integration of those 
systems and capabilities, make them more resilient, make them 
more robust, make them less susceptible to attack and single-
axis attack and make it less of an interesting target for the 
adversary in China to pursue.
    And then the third piece of that and the foundational 
piece, really, in both cases is a much deeper understanding of 
the capabilities of those adversaries in the domain, where they 
are, what their capabilities are, what their tactics are, and, 
both in terms of active defensive capabilities and design, how 
do we best approach them to make sure they are ineffective in 
response.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman.
    Mr. Garamendi.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a very bad 
connection here, so I am going to turn my video off, and 
hopefully it will be better. Okay?
    Gentlemen, thank you very much. Appreciate your work and 
the complexity of the issues before us.
    I want to go to an area which has been much talked about, 
and that is the utilization of commercial satellites of many 
different kinds, how those commercial operations might be 
integrated into the work that you do. In this discussion, 
please consider both the classified and the unclassified work.
    So let's start with General Thompson, and we will go from 
there.
    General Thompson. Representative Garamendi, two answers to 
that question, if I may.
    The first is, we need to understand the services and 
capabilities that commercial providers can give to them, in and 
of themselves, whether it is communications, data relay, or 
remote sensing, and understand how we can most effectively use 
those services and the data they provide.
    We have a commercial partnership office today at both Los 
Angeles Air Force Base as part of the Space and Missile Systems 
Center, soon to be Space Systems Command, as well as a 
commercial SATCOM [satellite communication] office at Fort 
Meade in Maryland. They are expanding their scope not just to 
look at satellite communications but all commercial services. 
And so using that and incorporating that into our force design 
activities is step one.
    Step two is understanding the technologies of those 
commercial companies and how we might adapt them to the 
specific military needs and constellations of the future.
    Now, one of the best approaches and techniques in using 
that is through the Space Development Agency, as they pursue 
their initial capabilities to provide a layer that does space 
data transport associated with the Advanced Battle Management 
System, as they do that for tracking, working with an 
integrated missile warning/missile tracking layer. They take 
military missions, look at these new commercial capabilities, 
the technologies, and operating concepts, and see how we can 
adapt the technology and the approach to specific military 
purposes.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you.
    Mr. Scolese.
    Dr. Scolese. Certainly. In addition to what General 
Thompson said, I would say that the NRO architecture already 
incorporates the commercial capabilities into it. It is either 
replace capabilities so that we can focus on those things that 
only the government can or should do, or it supplements those 
capabilities to provide additional resilience and coverage.
    Further, as General Thompson said, we found great value in 
the commercial capabilities to speed the delivery of systems, 
as they have developed some very capable spacecraft that we can 
go off and use and perhaps adapt to the needs that we may have.
    And then, finally, as was mentioned earlier, they have 
played an incredible role in communications and launch for us.
    So commercial is baked into our current architecture, and 
it is a fundamental portion of our future architecture. And to 
assure that, we continue to work with the commercial providers 
across all domains to see how we can work together. We do that 
in cooperation with our partners, NGA, NSA [National Security 
Agency], the Space Force, to assure that we are working 
together.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you very much.
    General Cleveland.
    General Cleveland. Sir, good morning.
    We really do view commercial imagery, as well as services, 
as absolutely critical to the future of the agency as we move 
forward. We work that, of course, very closely with NRO and 
Director Scolese's team.
    But we really believe right now that this explosion in 
commercial capability, first off, really provides us access 
that we may not otherwise have, so it allows us to look at more 
areas.
    It also does provide, to some large degree, resiliency as 
well. In the event there are issues or challenges, oftentimes 
we can revert to a commercial capability.
    We think it will provide us more persistence. Again, as we 
are able to work with the commercial industry to have more of 
these capabilities up, we think that we will be able to have 
persistence over a broader number of targets.
    And then, finally, that drives for us speed and the ability 
to rapidly get that information into the hands of our 
decisionmakers as well as our warfighters.
    And so, as we look at the broader fabric of sources of 
information and data really coming into our agency, we do think 
that commercial is going to play a significant role and it 
already does play a significant role for us today.
    Mr. Garamendi. Very good.
    My final comment would be for GAO to investigate this and 
make sure that we have all of the opportunities available to 
us.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman.
    And I thank all the members for participating. I know these 
Zoom conferences are not the easiest things to arrange.
    But I most of all want to thank our distinguished witnesses 
and the important work you are doing for our national security. 
I know space isn't sometimes easy to understand or to explain, 
but it is absolutely vital to our national security. So I am 
grateful for your patriotism.
    Thank you, Ranking Member. Appreciate the opportunity to 
work with you. Let's try to keep the committee focused on these 
important issues, and hopefully we can have improved space 
acquisition. That would be a great thing.
    Unless there is another urgent question from members that 
they are unable to submit in writing for the record, then this 
hearing is about to be adjourned. But I don't want to cut 
anybody off who can't signal me any other way other than the 
video screen that they have an urgent question.
    It looks like we are fine, so the hearing is adjourned. 
Thanks.
    [Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]



      
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                            A P P E N D I X

                              May 24, 2021

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              PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                              May 24, 2021

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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
      
 

      
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              QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                              May 24, 2021

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                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN

    Mr. Langevin. The Department is currently undertaking a number of 
initiatives, including Agile pilot programs and DevSecOps pathfinder 
efforts, to achieve more rapid acquisition of DOD software. What is the 
status of these OSD and Space Force pilot efforts?
    Mr. Hill. The Department of Defense is pursuing a number of 
initiatives to achieve more rapid software acquisition. The DOD 
developed the Software Acquisition Pathway, approved in September 2020, 
as a tailor-made pathway enabling modern software development best 
practices within the Adaptive Acquisition Framework. The USSF is 
executing the Space Command and Control (C2) program as a ``DevSecOps 
Pathfinder'' and is now transitioning the program to utilize the 
Software Acquisition Pathway. By using this agile-based delivery model, 
the program can iteratively plan and deliver cyber-resilient 
warfighting capabilities quickly. Thus far, the program has delivered 
nine operationally-accepted applications to the Combined Space 
Operations Center and National Space Defense Center in just over two 
years. The Space C2 program is on track to meet its highest priority 
requirement: the replacement of all Space Defense Operations Center 
functions by the end of FY22.
    Mr. Langevin. I'm extremely excited about the Space Force's focus 
on upskilling its workforce and prioritizing digital literacy through 
the establishment of the Digital University. General Thompson, how does 
the Space Force plan to incentivize Guardians to complete these courses 
and how do you plan to keep Digital University content updated with the 
latest developments in these fast-moving fields?
    General Thompson. In line with our Vision for a Digital Service, 
the U.S. Space Force (USSF) has created a foundational set of courses 
through Digital University that will become a mandatory training 
requirement to establish digital fluency for every Guardian, as well as 
specialty training in coding, networking, software development and 
product management, and other related areas. The specialty training 
will be required for certain duty positions, but available for any and 
all Guardians who wish to pursue increased knowledge and expertise for 
personal or professional reasons. Further incentives derive from 
achievement of commercial badging, certificates, and academic degrees 
earned through Digital University. These achievements will tie into 
personnel systems and can be leveraged by Guardians when pursuing 
positions and unique opportunities like elite software development 
teams.
    In order to keep content current and relevant, Digital University 
partners with world-class commercial vendors and academic institutions. 
Because there are external incentives for these entities to provide up-
to-date and quality educational materials, the USSF takes on the role 
of evaluator and curator instead of content creator. We work closely 
with these entities to inject material more relevant to the USSF into 
already built courses, such as including projects that use data 
collected by space mission units. Any organic material can then be 
focused toward topics specific to USSF needs that can't be found 
elsewhere, making it much more manageable.
    Mr. Langevin. How does the Space Force plan to incorporate directed 
energy weapons in its force design and employment concepts?
    General Thompson. The National Space Policy makes clear that 
unfettered access to and freedom to operate in space remains a vital 
national interest. It further provides that the U.S. Space Force will 
present forces to enable prompt and sustained offensive and defensive 
space operations to defend U.S. national interests. These operations 
can take any number of forms and include all elements of military and 
national power; the Space Force is pursuing multiple approaches and I 
welcome the opportunity to brief you on them at the appropriate level 
of classification. Potential adversaries should be on notice that the 
United States will be ready to respond to any purposeful interference 
with or attacks on U.S. or allied space systems at the chosen time, 
place, manner and domain.
    Mr. Langevin. The Department is currently undertaking a number of 
initiatives, including Agile pilot programs and DevSecOps pathfinder 
efforts, to achieve more rapid acquisition of DOD software. What is the 
status of these OSD and Space Force pilot efforts?
    General Thompson. The Department is pursuing a number of 
initiatives to rapidly deliver more software acquisitions. The DOD 
developed the Software Acquisition Pathway, approved in September 2020, 
as a tailor-made pathway enabling modern software development best 
practices within the Adaptive Acquisition Framework. The USSF is 
executing the Space Command and Control (C2) program, also called 
Kobayashi Maru, as an OSD ``DevSecOps Pathfinder'' and is preparing the 
program to transition to the Software Acquisition Pathway. By using 
this agile-based delivery model, the program can iteratively plan and 
quickly deliver cyber-resilient joint warfighting capabilities; so far, 
the program has delivered nine operationally-accepted applications to 
the Combined Space Operations Center and National Space Defense Center 
in just over 2 years. The ability for the Space C2 program to rapidly 
ingest lessons learned and incorporate changes to processes and 
development priorities are a critical asset to meet the program's 
highest priority requirement of replacing Space Defense Operations 
Center functions.
    Mr. Langevin. I'm concerned about the cybersecurity and 
functionality of our ground stations. Two major projects, GPS and OPIR, 
have ground segments that are behind schedule and over cost. Delaying 
these systems means delaying needed cybersecurity and anti-jamming 
capabilities. As we continue to expand and upgrade our space 
architecture, what is the Space Force doing differently to ensure these 
systems are on schedule and secure?
    General Thompson. GPS and OPIR provide critical mission 
capabilities for the Space Force and the nation. We strive to meet cost 
and schedule expectations to continue to meet warfighter needs and 
remain responsible stewards of taxpayer dollars for these programs. The 
Defensive Cyber Operations for Space (DCO-S) capabilities to detect, 
identify, respond/recover, and protect are ``baked in'' to current 
ground segments such as Future Operationally Resilient Ground Evolution 
(FORGE), Enterprise Ground Services (EGS), and the Next Generation 
Operational Control System (OCX). These ground segment system 
architectures are being designed to operate in a cyber-contested 
environment with modern protection technologies, tools, processes, 
functions, and cyber best practices.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER
    Mr. Turner. The Office of the Secretary of Defense recently 
released a hypersonics roadmap that covered a range of activities to 
related to reusable hypersonic flight, including transport, ISR and 
strike, and responsive space access. According to OSD, these 
technologies are well into development and could reach initial 
operating capability (IOC) in the 2030s. I would like to get your 
perspectives on how these high speed capabilities might be used to 
achieve your current objectives and how they might influence long-term 
changes in strategy.
    What unique equities might IC agencies have when it comes to high 
Mach platforms--whether for ISR collection or for space launch? Do you 
believe any structural changes are needed to ensure that the IC has a 
seat the table in development and planning for operational use of these 
technologies?
    How will high Mach platforms enhance the tactically responsive 
space mission? Do you believe your respective services and agencies are 
properly resourced to pursue development on published timelines? Are 
there any additional resources or authorities this committee might 
provide to support development?
    The commercial sector is currently making an ambitious push to 
develop and field high Mach aircraft in the 2030 timeframe. As you 
know, many of these technologies--from propulsion to materials to test 
facilities--are dual use and could significantly advance DOD efforts to 
field their own aircraft. How is DOD working with NASA to leverage 
these advances? Are there any current restrictions that limit 
cooperation?
    Much of the commercial and defense work on high Mach flight is 
occurring in allied countries. What steps have been taken to explore 
partnership opportunities with allied nations? Are there any 
restrictions--such as export controls--that are limiting valuable 
collaboration?
    Mr. Hill. Hypersonic applications straddle the air and space 
domains. For example, our ability to reconstitute critical space-based 
assets rapidly is constrained, in part, by a limited number of rockets 
operating from a limited number of launch sites. A notional future 
hypersonic aircraft could serve as the first stage of a two-stage-to-
orbit launch system to deliver up to 20,000 pounds of payload to low 
Earth orbit. An aircraft-based approach to space launch would allow for 
flexible runway-reliant basing, safer launch abort capability, and 
improved airspace integration. High-speed and hypersonic aircraft could 
also support replenishment of space-based assets and mission assurance 
efforts in more lethal, non-permissive future environments. 
Additionally, a number of contractors are now providing flexible sub-
sonic air launch options for small and medium satellite payloads to low 
Earth orbit.
    While OSD Policy does not represent the IC, we recognize that, the 
ability to perform penetrating, responsive collection with a highly 
survivable platform could fill key gaps. Those gaps primarily reflect 
ISR needs. Penetrating hypersonic aircraft serving as on-demand 
collection platforms could provide an unpredictable, survivable, and 
responsive alternative or adjunct to more traditional ISR capabilities. 
Additionally, a hypersonic aircraft acting as the first-stage of a two-
stage-to-orbit launch system could provide a responsive space 
reconstitution capability.
    The primary effort, which is currently in the development 
community, encompasses goals and objectives for future DOD and 
Intelligence Community missions, and includes Intelligence Community 
input. While OSD Policy does not represent the IC, we nevertheless look 
forward to continued DOD-IC collaboration as the focus shifts over the 
next decade to operational considerations.
    The Department of Defense does not have requirements for high Mach 
platforms in the tactically responsive space mission. However, as the 
Department identifies space requirements for responsive launch, 
acquisition of these capabilities may have greater significance and 
will be appropriately reflected in the Department's overall space 
strategy and budget. A notional future hypersonic aircraft could serve 
as the first stage of a two-stage-to-orbit launch system to deliver up 
to 20,000 pounds of payload to low earth orbit, though high Mach or 
hypersonic capability is not necessarily required for an air-launched 
capability. An aircraft-based approach to space launch would allow for 
flexible runway-reliant basing, safer launch abort capability, and 
improved airspace integration. High-speed and hypersonic aircraft would 
be reusable, supporting replenishment of space-based assets and mission 
assurance efforts in more lethal, non-permissive future environments.
    DOD has developed and regularly updates a technology roadmap for 
reusable systems in collaboration with the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA). The roadmap includes an ambitious goal of 
developing and demonstrating a reusable hypersonic aircraft by the 
early- to mid-2030's. The basic elements of that roadmap are currently 
funded.
    Recently, there has been a renewed interest in both the public and 
private sector on the utility of hypersonic aircraft for responsive 
point-to-point transportation. Per the national hypersonics roadmap, 
the Department of the Air Force collaborates with the Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering and with NASA 
to develop dual-use technologies for High Mach and Hypersonic Aircraft. 
This strategy includes pursuing key enabling technologies that will 
provide for both commercial and military application of future 
hypersonic reusable systems.
    There are no restrictions that currently limit DOD and NASA 
collaboration on future reusable hypersonic aircraft and the level of 
technology development applicable to both military and civilian 
application. There are limitations on the application of NASA human and 
fiscal capital directly to development of DOD systems; however, those 
limitations do not pose any impediment on either agency to meeting our 
respective needs.
    Governments and industries in many countries are investing in 
research and development to enable future reusable hypersonic aircraft. 
Some of those countries are allies and some are not. DOD is working to 
make sure we fully understand the scope of that work to identify areas 
of mutual benefit and interest with our allied partners and to assess 
the risks of the efforts of our potential adversaries. As we pursue our 
roadmap we are looking for collaborative opportunities with our allies, 
with propulsion being a key area that has potential.
    No, DOD has the necessary authorities to pursue collaboration when 
we determine it is the best approach. Collaborative research, 
development, and production can add programmatic complexity, 
particularly associated with requirements regarding information 
security, intellectual property protection, and claims. However, 
collaboration can also leverage diverse sources of expertise, promote 
common standards and interoperability, and generate net savings as 
partners pool requirements and share fiscal burdens. Over a long 
history of successful collaboration with partners, DOD has shown we are 
able to leverage our authorities and overcome the complexities to 
deliver mutually beneficial outcomes.
    Mr. Turner. The Office of the Secretary of Defense recently 
released a hypersonics roadmap that covered a range of activities to 
related to reusable hypersonic flight, including transport, ISR and 
strike, and responsive space access. According to OSD, these 
technologies are well into development and could reach initial 
operating capability (IOC) in the 2030s. I would like to get your 
perspectives on how these high speed capabilities might be used to 
achieve your current objectives and how they might influence long-term 
changes in strategy.
    What unique equities might IC agencies have when it comes to high 
Mach platforms--whether for ISR collection or for space launch? Do you 
believe any structural changes are needed to ensure that the IC has a 
seat the table in development and planning for operational use of these 
technologies?
    How will high Mach platforms enhance the tactically responsive 
space mission? Do you believe your respective services and agencies are 
properly resourced to pursue development on published timelines? Are 
there any additional resources or authorities this committee might 
provide to support development?
    The commercial sector is currently making an ambitious push to 
develop and field high Mach aircraft in the 2030 timeframe. As you 
know, many of these technologies--from propulsion to materials to test 
facilities--are dual use and could significantly advance DOD efforts to 
field their own aircraft. How is DOD working with NASA to leverage 
these advances? Are there any current restrictions that limit 
cooperation?
    Much of the commercial and defense work on high Mach flight is 
occurring in allied countries. What steps have been taken to explore 
partnership opportunities with allied nations? Are there any 
restrictions--such as export controls--that are limiting valuable 
collaboration?
    General Thompson. The Department of the Air Force, from a military 
service perspective, is unable to answer on behalf of specific 
Intelligence Community (IC) agencies on unique equities for ISR 
collection or space launch on high Mach platforms. The Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) would be best positioned to 
facilitate discussion and insight from IC agencies tasked with 
monitoring and assessing foreign high Mach platforms.
    While I cannot speak authoritatively for the IC or IC agencies, it 
is possible there may not be any structural changes required to ensure 
involvement in the development and planning for operational use of high 
Mach platforms. The current research and development process for high 
Mach platforms is examining multiple mission areas and is already 
facilitating collaboration between engineers, fielding and testing 
organizations, and the intelligence community.
    There has been renewed interest in both the public and private 
sectors for responsive launch; there are many concepts under 
consideration, to include use of hypersonic aircraft as the first stage 
of a two-stage system. The benefits of an aircraft-based space launcher 
include flexible basing and launching locations, and less restrictive 
public safety requirements. The Space Force's Rapid/Agile Launch 
Initiative is currently investigating more responsive launch options.
    I am not able to speak for the IC and their equities, but with 
regard to tactical responsive spacelift--there are many concepts under 
consideration, to include use of hypersonic aircraft as the first stage 
of a two-stage system. While there is no formal program to use 
hypersonics for this purpose, we continue analysis on the costs and 
benefits of such an approach and are working with OSD (R&E) and NASA to 
develop a national strategy for hypersonics. This effort could provide 
technologies to enable the aircraft-based hypersonic space launch by 
2040, should analysis warrant.
    We currently do not need additional resources for hypersonics in 
FY22.
    The Department of the Air Force (DAF) and NASA have worked together 
for many years successfully especially in the science and technology 
arena. There are various ways the DOD and NASA are partnering to 
leverage hypersonics, as was recently detailed in a March 26, 2021 
article in Air Force magazine titled, ``Catching Up on Hypersonics.'' 
These include: Experimenting with a concept called SkyRange, which uses 
unmanned aircraft to clear the hypersonic test space and relay 
telemetry in an effort to accomplish more with the range space already 
available. For high Mach numbers coupled with intense heat, there is 
only one tunnel--a NASA asset--that can create the environment. Also, 
DAF is bringing NASA into Vector Prime, a hypersonic aircraft effort. 
The collaboration with NASA includes sharing facilities and models. On 
the facility side, DAF is bringing in NASA and industry in on a MILCON 
study for national R&D facility specifically for early technology 
readiness level (TRL) needs.
    With the standup of Space Systems Command, the U.S. Space Force 
will be postured to take advantage of commercial developments in 
hypersonic technologies to quickly deliver capabilities. We will seek 
every opportunity to collaborate with private and public partners, 
while also working through appropriate legal and ethical standards of 
conduct. I am not aware of any current restrictions that limit 
cooperation as we move forward. If any restrictions do arise, I will 
work with the Department of the Air Force to ensure we have the 
necessary authorities to enhance cooperation.
    The Department of the Air Force (DAF) is committed to exploring 
opportunities in bilateral and multilateral forums to increase 
development of hypersonic technologies with Allies and international 
partners. For example, the DAF has over a 15-year relationship with the 
Australian Department of Defense developing and testing hypersonic 
technologies, and we recently began a new project to develop and test 
air-launched, air-breathing flight test vehicles capable of cruising at 
hypersonic speeds. The DAF is also currently discussing potential 
collaboration in hypersonic technologies with other Allies.
    We must continue to follow International Traffic in Arms 
Regulations, and comply with the Missile Technology Control Regime, but 
I am not aware of any instances where these regulations impose 
significant limitations on our existing or planned collaboration on 
hypersonics with allies and partners.
    Mr. Turner. The Office of the Secretary of Defense recently 
released a hypersonics roadmap that covered a range of activities to 
related to reusable hypersonic flight, including transport, ISR and 
strike, and responsive space access. According to OSD, these 
technologies are well into development and could reach initial 
operating capability (IOC) in the 2030s. I would like to get your 
perspectives on how these high speed capabilities might be used to 
achieve your current objectives and how they might influence long-term 
changes in strategy.
    What unique equities might IC agencies have when it comes to high 
Mach platforms--whether for ISR collection or for space launch? Do you 
believe any structural changes are needed to ensure that the IC has a 
seat the table in development and planning for operational use of these 
technologies?
    How will high Mach platforms enhance the tactically responsive 
space mission? Do you believe your respective services and agencies are 
properly resourced to pursue development on published timelines? Are 
there any additional resources or authorities this committee might 
provide to support development?
    The commercial sector is currently making an ambitious push to 
develop and field high Mach aircraft in the 2030 timeframe. As you 
know, many of these technologies--from propulsion to materials to test 
facilities--are dual use and could significantly advance DOD efforts to 
field their own aircraft. How is DOD working with NASA to leverage 
these advances? Are there any current restrictions that limit 
cooperation?
    Much of the commercial and defense work on high Mach flight is 
occurring in allied countries. What steps have been taken to explore 
partnership opportunities with allied nations? Are there any 
restrictions--such as export controls--that are limiting valuable 
collaboration?
    Dr. Scolese. We will continue to work closely with the DOD to 
explore future opportunities to utilize numerous emerging technologies 
to meet our objectives. In addition to advancements in our traditional 
launch methods, hypersonics may provide additional methods for 
responsive transport to the space domain.
    Speaking for the NRO, we are interested in any technologies that 
may further our collection mission or launch of our systems. Our end-
to-end functional capabilities have us positioned to develop, based on 
our requirements and the requirements of our customers, innovative 
solutions to customer needs.
    The NRO does not foresee any need to restructure to respond to new 
technologies.
    We continue to work closely with our DOD partners to find 
opportunities to address their warfighting challenges, including 
building a tactically-responsive space architecture. Space launch 
options using hypersonics hold opportunities to meet this and other 
needs. The NRO works closely with our partners to prioritize 
initiatives to meet our broad customer's needs and mission 
requirements.
    We are interested in any technologies that may further our 
collection mission or launch of our systems. Our end-to-end functional 
capabilities have us positioned to develop, based on our requirements 
and the requirements of our customers, innovative solutions to customer 
needs.
    While not currently pursuing collaboration with regard to high-Mach 
flight with our allies, the NRO seeks collaborative development where 
possible to further capabilities of all participant while still 
protecting sensitive technologies.
    Mr. Turner. Demand for commercial imagery, data and services is 
greatly increasing and I understand that we will soon see that 
reflected in requirements from the COCOMs and Services. Will the NRO 
FY22 budget reflect a greater degree of commercial procurements in line 
with the advancements of the commercial space industry? Additionally, 
it's critical this imagery gets in the hands of our warfighters. What 
is your commitment to ensuring that the flow of Commercial Imagery to 
the Services and Combatant Commands is not interrupted?
    Dr. Scolese. The NRO is committed to providing high-quality and 
high-capacity GEOINT support to hundreds of thousands of users, 
including COCOMs and Services. As the quality and volume of commercial 
providers of GEOINT continue to increase, the NRO will ensure that we 
are continually leveraging our domestic providers. The NRO's next 
generation of commercial imagery contracts is responsive to 
requirements from the COCOMs and Services to the extent that they were 
included in the GEOINT Functional Manager's (NGA's) draft Statement of 
Capabilities (SOC) for Commercial Imagery. We expect that the SOC will 
be validated this summer by both the Intelligence Community and 
Department of Defense, at a level that fully meets users' needs. We 
also expect that the Independent Cost Estimate and budget will be 
sufficient to satisfy those requirements.
    With regard to the flow of commercial imagery to warfighters, NGA 
is responsible for dissemination via various mechanisms; from a 
contractual standpoint, however, NRO confirms that there will not be 
any gap in support as we transition from the current operational 
contracts to the new commercial imagery contracts. Current contracts 
will be extended, as required, until the new contracts are in place.
    Mr. Turner. The Office of the Secretary of Defense recently 
released a hypersonics roadmap that covered a range of activities to 
related to reusable hypersonic flight, including transport, ISR and 
strike, and responsive space access. According to OSD, these 
technologies are well into development and could reach initial 
operating capability (IOC) in the 2030s. I would like to get your 
perspectives on how these high speed capabilities might be used to 
achieve your current objectives and how they might influence long-term 
changes in strategy.
    What unique equities might IC agencies have when it comes to high 
Mach platforms--whether for ISR collection or for space launch? Do you 
believe any structural changes are needed to ensure that the IC has a 
seat the table in development and planning for operational use of these 
technologies?
    How will high Mach platforms enhance the tactically responsive 
space mission? Do you believe your respective services and agencies are 
properly resourced to pursue development on published timelines? Are 
there any additional resources or authorities this committee might 
provide to support development?
    The commercial sector is currently making an ambitious push to 
develop and field high Mach aircraft in the 2030 timeframe. As you 
know, many of these technologies--from propulsion to materials to test 
facilities--are dual use and could significantly advance DOD efforts to 
field their own aircraft. How is DOD working with NASA to leverage 
these advances? Are there any current restrictions that limit 
cooperation?
    Much of the commercial and defense work on high Mach flight is 
occurring in allied countries. What steps have been taken to explore 
partnership opportunities with allied nations? Are there any 
restrictions--such as export controls--that are limiting valuable 
collaboration?
    General Cleveland. NGA's role in space ISR involves tasking, 
processing, exploiting, and disseminating data collected from NRO 
satellites. NGA has the authorities it needs to meet challenges in the 
space domain. We are closely tied with the NRO and likewise leverage 
the Geospatial Intelligence Committee (GEOCOM) executive steering 
structure to coordinate Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) needs across 
the interagency, the Intelligence Community (IC), and Combatant 
Commands. NGA works closely with our commercial, interagency, IC, and 
DOD partners to meet the needs of the warfighter. For space launch and 
space operations, NGA defers to NRO for research, development, 
acquisition, launch, and the operation of imagery intelligence 
satellites. NGA's FY22 budget request and current authorities meet the 
Agency's needs as the GEOINT functional manager. Although NGA does not 
have any equities related to fielding aircraft, we are partnered with 
NASA on a range of technologies, most recently focused on potential 
lunar and cislunar operations, and Global Navigation Satellite System 
(GNSS). At this time, there are no restrictions limiting cooperation 
between NGA and NASA.
    Mr. Turner. Demand for commercial imagery, data and services is 
greatly increasing and I understand that we will soon see that 
reflected in requirements from the COCOMs and Services. Will the NRO 
FY22 budget reflect a greater degree of commercial procurements in line 
with the advancements of the commercial space industry? Additionally, 
it's critical this imagery gets in the hands of our warfighters. What 
is your commitment to ensuring that the flow of Commercial Imagery to 
the Services and Combatant Commands is not interrupted?
    General Cleveland. NGA continues to coordinate closely with NRO to 
inform commercial procurement. NGA is thoroughly committed to providing 
uninterrupted, real-time support to the warfighter and leverages all 
available sources to accomplish this, including commercial imagery. NGA 
works with both commercial imagery providers and military customers to 
ensure that warfighter requirements are clearly understood and 
delivered to meet the needs and specifications of the military user. 
Our paramount goal is to support warfighters at the tactical edge in as 
effective and timely a manner as possible, while ensuring that the 
highest priority operational requests take precedence.
    Mr. Turner. The Office of the Secretary of Defense recently 
released a hypersonics roadmap that covered a range of activities to 
related to reusable hypersonic flight, including transport, ISR and 
strike, and responsive space access. According to OSD, these 
technologies are well into development and could reach initial 
operating capability (IOC) in the 2030s. I would like to get your 
perspectives on how these high speed capabilities might be used to 
achieve your current objectives and how they might influence long-term 
changes in strategy.
    What unique equities might IC agencies have when it comes to high 
Mach platforms--whether for ISR collection or for space launch? Do you 
believe any structural changes are needed to ensure that the IC has a 
seat the table in development and planning for operational use of these 
technologies?
    How will high Mach platforms enhance the tactically responsive 
space mission? Do you believe your respective services and agencies are 
properly resourced to pursue development on published timelines? Are 
there any additional resources or authorities this committee might 
provide to support development?
    The commercial sector is currently making an ambitious push to 
develop and field high Mach aircraft in the 2030 timeframe. As you 
know, many of these technologies--from propulsion to materials to test 
facilities--are dual use and could significantly advance DOD efforts to 
field their own aircraft. How is DOD working with NASA to leverage 
these advances? Are there any current restrictions that limit 
cooperation?
    Much of the commercial and defense work on high Mach flight is 
occurring in allied countries. What steps have been taken to explore 
partnership opportunities with allied nations? Are there any 
restrictions--such as export controls--that are limiting valuable 
collaboration?
    Mr. Ludwigson. We have not assessed DOD's short or long-term 
hypersonic strategy, including activities related to reusable 
hypersonic flight, transport, ISR and strike, and responsive space 
access, outside of identifying the breadth and scope of their current 
efforts in the past and the next few years into the future. DOD has 
initially focused most resources on developing and proving offensive 
weapon prototypes. Most of the estimated $15 billion for hypersonic 
weapons and related technologies from fiscal year 2015 through fiscal 
year 2024 has been used or is planned to be spent on offensive weapons 
that will potentially turn into programs of record. Future efforts that 
may influence reusable hypersonic flight, ISR, and defense applications 
are at earlier stages of development. If successful, they have the 
potential to evolve into future programs that may shape DOD's portfolio 
and hypersonic strategy and open up the types of platforms that can 
carry hypersonic weapons or utilize the technology. Given the breadth 
of these activities and their potential expansion to include additional 
organizations within DOD, formalizing coordination for effective 
achievement of DOD's objectives will be important.
    For our report examining hypersonics, we obtained information on 
acknowledged research efforts and formal programs, but did not 
explicitly seek to identify others. However, to the extent IC agencies 
have equities in hypersonic platforms, it might be important for them 
to be included in efforts to formalize coordination in hypersonic 
weapons development efforts.
    We have not done work to assess the relationships of high Mach 
platforms with the space mission to understand resource requirements 
needed to support published timelines or to inform authorities this 
committee may consider.
    DOD and NASA have agreements in place that support DOD using NASA 
testing facilities. NASA shares subject matter expertise in hypersonic 
technology, such as at NASA Langley. DOD, in some cases, reimburses 
NASA for use of its wind tunnels. In some instances NASA officials said 
that NASA waives the reimbursement costs because it is able to acquire 
data from testing it would not be able to obtain on its own because it 
would be too expensive. We have not done work to assess whether there 
are any current restrictions that limit cooperation.
    Our report on efforts to develop hypersonic weapons and related 
technologies included information on some partnership efforts between 
DOD and allied countries. However, we have not done comprehensive work 
to assess the extent to which work on hypersonic flight is occurring in 
allied countries, steps DOD has taken to explore partnership 
opportunities, or export controls that may be inhibiting collaboration.
    Mr. Turner. Demand for commercial imagery, data and services is 
greatly increasing and I understand that we will soon see that 
reflected in requirements from the COCOMs and Services. Will the NRO 
FY22 budget reflect a greater degree of commercial procurements in line 
with the advancements of the commercial space industry? Additionally, 
it's critical this imagery gets in the hands of our warfighters. What 
is your commitment to ensuring that the flow of Commercial Imagery to 
the Services and Combatant Commands is not interrupted?
    Mr. Ludwigson. We have begun a review of the National 
Reconnaissance Office's (NRO) Commercial Systems Program Office (CSPO) 
in response to a provision in the House report accompanying a bill for 
the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 and a 
subsequent letter from the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Senate 
Select Committee on Intelligence. CSPO is the office in NRO responsible 
for purchasing commercial satellite imagery on behalf of DOD and the 
Intelligence Community. Our review is looking into how NRO is 
leveraging commercial imagery for DOD and the Intelligence Community, 
including how they are meeting Congressional direction to engage the 
commercial satellite remote sensing industry to the maximum extent 
practicable. While the scope of our review focuses on CSPO, it will 
also include information from stakeholders throughout DOD and the IC, 
including combatant commands and military services. We anticipate 
providing a draft report to DOD and the IC for comment in early 2022.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN
    Mr. Lamborn. Recently, China and Russia recently announced that 
they have entered into a MOU on establishing a lunar International 
Research Station. Although this was publicized as a scientific effort, 
some perceive this as a thin veil for military cooperation on the moon. 
Currently, NASA is the only government organization tasked with 
establishing a presence on the lunar surface with the Artemis program.
    Is the DOD taking any actions to look ahead at potential military 
needs and capabilities beyond our traditional orbits and near the lunar 
region?
    Mr. Hill. Whether in traditional orbits or beyond, DOD operations 
in space are and will remain fully compliant with U.S. obligations 
under international law, including the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, and 
with U.S. law and policy. In this regard, DOD does not intend to 
establish military bases, installations, or fortifications, test any 
type of weapons, or conduct military maneuvers on the Moon or on other 
celestial bodies.
    This approach remains consistent with our longstanding national 
security interests, and does not prevent DOD from pursuing emerging 
national security interests beyond traditional orbits or from extending 
our space situational awareness and other activities to the lunar 
regime. For example, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA) is developing the Demonstration Rocket for Agile Cislunar 
Operations (DRACO) to demonstrate a nuclear thermal propulsion (NTP) 
system above low Earth orbit in 2025. The system would demonstrate 
rapid maneuver capability in cislunar space, which can be important in 
various national security space applications.
    Mr. Lamborn. Follow-up on the question: 'From an ``organize, train 
and equip'' perspective, where should investments be made to our space-
based capabilities, to ensure we can prevail in a conflict against 
China?'
    In addition to the answer you provided (upgrading/modifying 
existing systems, making things ``less interesting'' in the design 
phase, and developing a deeper understanding of adversary 
capabilities), can you discuss which specific programs or capabilities 
the DOD or Space Force currently have or are developing to fill those 
roles or meet that criteria?
    General Thompson. Key to prevailing in a conflict against China and 
other potential adversaries is our ability to modernize our 
capabilities to protect what we have on orbit today, evolve to more 
resilient architectures, develop warfighting capability, and grow new 
space missions. Most of the important details in each of these areas is 
classified; I welcome the opportunity to brief you on all of them at 
the appropriate classification level.
    In addition to the categories above, we must also improve our 
ability to assess and understand our adversary's activity, which is 
accomplished through space domain awareness. The budget includes $127M 
for the Space Based Surveillance System (SBSS) follow-on known as 
SILENTBARKER which will provide timely detection and custody of on-
orbit threats in order to protect U.S. high-value assets in space. The 
Unified Data Library investment facilitates universal data access for 
all-domain space domain awareness data sharing from all sensors to 
support space-focused battle management and command and control 
($17.1M)
    The Ground Based Optical Sensor System (GBOSS) is an upgrade to the 
existing Ground-based Electro-Optical Deep Space Surveillance System 
(GEODSS) that enables monitoring of small, closely-spaced, and advanced 
threats in low, mid, high, and geostationary orbits ($56.2M). Finally, 
we are investing $123M on a Deep Space Advanced Radar Concept that will 
deliver radar sensors that can monitor satellites and space debris in 
geostationary orbits.
                                 ______
                                 
                 QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. DESJARLAIS
    Dr. DesJarlais. The Office of the Secretary of Defense recently 
released a hypersonics roadmap that covered a range of activities 
related to reusable hypersonic flight, including transport, ISR and 
strike, and responsive space access. According to OSD, these 
technologies are well into development and could reach initial 
operating capability (IOC) in the 2030s. I would like to get your 
perspective on how these high speed capabilities might be used to 
achieve your current objectives and how they might influence long-term 
changes in strategy.
    Mr. Hill. Hypersonic flight offers solutions that straddle the air 
and space domains. For example, our ability to reconstitute critical 
space-based assets rapidly is constrained, in part, by a limited number 
of rockets operating from a limited number of launch sites. A notional 
future hypersonic aircraft could serve as the first stage of a two-
stage-to-orbit launch system to deliver up to 20,000 pounds of payload 
to low Earth orbit. An aircraft-based approach to space launch would 
allow for flexible runway-reliant basing, safer launch abort 
capability, and improved airspace integration. High-speed and 
hypersonic aircraft could also support replenishment of space-based 
assets and mission assurance efforts in more lethal, non-permissive 
future environments.
    Dr. DesJarlais. The commercial sector is currently making an 
ambitious push to develop and field high Mach aircraft in the 2030 
timeframe. As you know, many of these technologies--from propulsion to 
materials to test facilities--are dual use and could significantly 
advance DOD efforts to field their own aircraft. How is DOD working 
with NASA to leverage these advances? Are there any current 
restrictions that limit cooperation?
    Mr. Hill. Recently, there has been a renewed interest in both the 
public and private sector on the utility of hypersonic aircraft for 
responsive space launch and responsive point-to-point transportation. 
The Department of the Air Force is working with Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering and with NASA to 
develop a national strategy for High Mach and Hypersonic Aircraft that 
will provide technologies for aircraft-based, responsive space launch 
by 2040. This strategy includes the key enabling technologies and sub-
systems that will provide for both commercial and military application 
of future hypersonic reusable systems.
    There are no restrictions that currently limit DOD and NASA 
collaboration on future reusable hypersonic aircraft and the level of 
technology development applicable to both military and civilian 
application. There are limitations on the application of NASA human and 
fiscal capital directly to development of DOD systems; however, those 
limitations do not pose any impediment on either agency to meeting our 
respective needs.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Much of the commercial and defense work on high 
Mach flight is occurring in allied countries. What steps have been 
taken to explore partnership opportunities with allied nations? Are 
there any restrictions--such as export controls--that are limiting 
valuable collaboration?
    Mr. Hill. Governments and industries in many countries are 
investing in research and development to enable future reusable 
hypersonic aircraft. Some of those countries are allies and some are 
not. DOD is working to make sure we fully understand the scope of that 
work to identify areas of mutual benefit and interest with our allied 
partners and to assess the risks of the efforts of our potential 
adversaries. As we pursue our roadmap, we are looking for collaborative 
opportunities with our allies, with propulsion being a key area of 
potential cooperation. Export controls and other restrictions do not 
prevent DOD from using its authorities to pursue collaboration when we 
determine it is the best approach. Collaborative research, development, 
and production can add programmatic complexity, particularly associated 
with requirements regarding information security, intellectual property 
protection, and claims. However, collaboration can also leverage 
diverse sources of expertise, promote common standards and 
interoperability, and generate net savings as partners pool 
requirements and share fiscal burdens. Over a long history of 
successful collaboration with partners, DOD has shown we are able to 
leverage our authorities and overcome the complexities to deliver 
mutually beneficial outcomes.
    Dr. DesJarlais. The Office of the Secretary of Defense recently 
released a hypersonics roadmap that covered a range of activities 
related to reusable hypersonic flight, including transport, ISR and 
strike, and responsive space access. According to OSD, these 
technologies are well into development and could reach initial 
operating capability (IOC) in the 2030s. I would like to get your 
perspective on how these high speed capabilities might be used to 
achieve your current objectives and how they might influence long-term 
changes in strategy.
    General Thompson. Hypersonics are a critical technology with broad 
impact across the national security landscape. There has been renewed 
interest in both the public and private sectors for responsive launch--
there are many concepts under consideration, to include use of 
hypersonic aircraft as the first stage of a two-state system. The 
benefits of an aircraft-based space launcher include flexible basing 
and launching locations, and less restrictive public safety 
requirements. The Space Force's Rapid/Agile Launch Initiative is 
currently leveraging more responsive launch options. We are working 
with OSD (R&E) and NASA to develop a national strategy for High Mach 
and Hypersonic Aircraft that could provide technologies to enable the 
aircraft-based hypersonic space launch by 2040.
    One additional area where the Space Force has a role is in 
detecting and tracking hypersonic missiles. That mission is 
challenging. The Space Force is presently conducting analysis on new 
capabilities to provide hypersonic missile warning from space.
    Dr. DesJarlais. How will high Mach platforms enhance the tactically 
responsive space mission? Do you believe your respective services and 
agencies are properly resourced to pursue development on published 
timelines? Are there any additional resources or authorities this 
committee might provide to support development?
    General Thompson. As the DOD identifies space requirements for 
responsive launch, acquisition of these capabilities will be 
appropriately budgeted for and reflected in our overall strategy for 
space. The current budget for U.S. space launch addresses the current 
requirements, but we anticipate the Department will request additional 
funding for these efforts as additional requirements are identified.
    Dr. DesJarlais. How will high Mach platforms enhance the tactically 
responsive space mission? Do you believe your respective services and 
agencies are properly resourced to pursue development on published 
timelines? Are there any additional resources or authorities this 
committee might provide to support development?
    Dr. Scolese. We continue to work closely with our DOD partners to 
find opportunities to address their warfighting challenges, including 
building a tactically-responsive space architecture. Space launch 
options using hypersonics hold opportunities to meet this and other 
needs. The NRO supports the FY 2022 President's Budget.
    Dr. DesJarlais. How will high Mach platforms enhance the tactically 
responsive space mission? Do you believe your respective services and 
agencies are properly resourced to pursue development on published 
timelines? Are there any additional resources or authorities this 
committee might provide to support development?
    General Cleveland. NGA works closely with our commercial, 
interagency, Intelligence Community, and DOD partners to meet the needs 
of the warfighter. NGA does not have or provide any space launch 
capabilities. The NGA FY22 budget request and current authorities meet 
the Agency's needs as the GEOINT functional manager.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KHANNA
    Mr. Khanna. How is the United States Space Force working to bring 
in new commercial capabilities, to include additive manufacturing, to 
support the goal of a dynamic and responsive launch capability? In your 
opinion, is the Space Force doing enough to increase the purchase of 
small launch providers to support and prove this requirement for 
responsive launch?
    Mr. Hill. Yes. The U.S. Space Force has a dedicated office for 
enhanced coordination with the U.S. commercial space launch industry 
and is actively pursuing opportunities to leverage innovation. DOD is 
exploring how to pair its requirements with cutting-edge domestic space 
technology--some of which may utilize responsive launch opportunities. 
The USSF currently has eight small launch providers on-contract through 
its SRP-4 and OSP-4 agreements, and is currently on-ramping other new 
providers. Space Force also expects to on-ramp new vendors every year 
to continue to leverage industry innovation.
    Mr. Khanna. What is your assessment of the report on the ``State of 
the Space Industrial Base 2020'' which concluded (among other things) 
that ````The very long schedules of many DOD space programs limit the 
opportunities for short design-build-test projects that stimulate 
interest and innovation within the U.S. workforce. Many new small 
launch vehicles are coming into service. An increased rate of space 
experiments and prototypes by DOD would enhance the viability of these 
small launchers providers.'' How is Space Force working with those in 
acquisition to decrease the timelines for DOD space programs and 
increase the rate of space experiments and prototypes for small launch? 
How are you supporting new U.S. satellite companies working to gain 
entry into the DOD market?
    Mr. Hill. DOD is engaging in a broad-based effort to leverage 
commercial technology for the fulfilment of its space requirements. 
This includes reducing the timelines that have been typical in 
traditional programs that meet military requirements not typically 
addressed in commercial space and diversifying acquisition approaches 
to leverage commercial innovations that can offer new solutions and new 
capabilities on much shorter timelines. From the Space Development 
Agency, to the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, to the Space 
Rapid Capabilities Office, to the Air Force Research Laboratory, and to 
the Space and Missile Systems Center, DOD using rapid prototyping and 
other innovations in research, development, and acquisition programs 
that are providing opportunities to leverage the agility and 
flexibility of emerging commercial launch and satellite providers. The 
U.S. Space Force has also established a dedicated office for enhanced 
coordination and alignment to meet these growing needs for small launch 
and pair programs with the best launch opportunities.
    Mr. Khanna. With the DARPA launch challenge concluding without a 
winner, what other space related programs focusing on responsive launch 
is Space Force interested in? What is the Space Force's plans to engage 
with new launch companies going forward to develop a responsive launch 
capability?
    Mr. Hill. The U.S. Space Force has two programs dedicated to 
engaging launch companies. The National Security Space Launch program 
handles traditional launch vendors and supports new entrants into 
future phases. The Department's Rocket Systems Launch Program manages 
the Tactically Responsive Launch Program Element, which leverages three 
available contract strategies to utilize emerging small launch 
providers to support DOD space requirements. The Department has and is 
continually looking to utilize responsive launch capabilities, and 
explore opportunities to enhance DOD responsive space launch 
requirements.
    Mr. Khanna. How is the Space Force planning to utilize tools such 
as additive manufacturing, and would Space Force's mission benefit from 
the integration of new space companies utilizing new manufacturing 
techniques such as additive manufacturing--in order to meet the Space 
Force requirement to launch within 24 hours as part of the tactically 
responsive launch requirements?
    Mr. Hill. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
    Mr. Khanna. As SDA, DARPA, Space RCO and others continue to advance 
new capabilities within DOD, including satellite servicing and the 
deployment of satellite constellations, what is the strategy to engage 
and work with new launch partners who may be able to provide access to 
precise orbits at a lower cost point than traditional launch providers? 
More specifically, how is the Space Force team incorporating the 
Spacepower doctrine's call to provide ``dynamic and responsive'' launch 
to the arsenal?
    Mr. Hill. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
    Mr. Khanna. The Director of the Space Development Agency, Dr. Derek 
Tournear has not yet made a decision about which launch company or 
companies will take on the Tranche 1 mission. During a recent 
discussion he stated that it was unclear if it would be feasible to 
utilize SMC or the National Security Space Launch program due to budget 
constraints. Would you and your team support efforts to broaden the 
scope of available launchers to include new responsive launch 
capabilities being developed by newer entrants into the launch market? 
How is the NRO and NGA working to engage and increase competition in 
the launch market as well?
    Mr. Hill. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
    Mr. Khanna. The Air Force and Space Force have expressed support 
for new economic development to spur the space economy forward, 
increase launch cadences, and bring on new commercial capabilities. 
Both the rocket systems launch program for space and the tactically 
responsive space launch lines support this effort. Does the budget for 
these lines reflect the urgency of maintaining the U.S. commercial and 
national security edge in space?
    Mr. Hill. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
    Mr. Khanna. How is the United States Space Force working to bring 
in new commercial capabilities, to include additive manufacturing, to 
support the goal of a dynamic and responsive launch capability? In your 
opinion, is the Space Force doing enough to increase the purchase of 
small launch providers to support and prove this requirement for 
responsive launch?
    General Thompson. Yes. The U.S. Space Force (USSF) has a dedicated 
office for enhanced coordination with the U.S. commercial space launch 
industry. The DOD is exploring how to pair DOD requirements with 
cutting edge domestic space technology--some of which may use 
responsive launch opportunities. The USSF currently has eight small 
launch providers in our Orbital Services Program (OSP)-4 contract pool, 
and is currently on-ramping other new providers. We also plan to on-
ramp new vendors every year to continue to leverage industry 
innovation. The Department already uses space launch services from U.S. 
space industrial base entities that use additive manufacturing, such as 
3D printing.
    Mr. Khanna. What is your assessment of the report on the ``State of 
the Space Industrial Base 2020'' which concluded (among other things) 
that ``The very long schedules of many DOD space programs limit the 
opportunities for short design-build-test projects that stimulate 
interest and innovation within the U.S. workforce. Many new small 
launch vehicles are coming into service. An increased rate of space 
experiments and prototypes by DOD would enhance the viability of these 
small launchers providers.'' How is Space Force working with those in 
acquisition to decrease the timelines for DOD space programs and 
increase the rate of space experiments and prototypes for small launch? 
How are you supporting new U.S. satellite companies working to gain 
entry into the DOD market?
    General Thompson. The DOD is engaging in a cohesive effort across 
responsive small satellites, ground systems, requirements, policy, and 
other critical aspects in the responsive space architecture to 
increasingly use commercial technologies that support space-to-
terrestrial warfighting requirements. On the small satellite front, 
programs like Space Safari are enabling quick turn capabilities for 
operational use. Experiments and prototypes have a tailored board 
process to receive DOD sponsorship and ensure support, minimize 
timelines and leverage launch industry capabilities. Additionally, 
programs like Space System and Prototype Transition (SSPT) directly 
leverage commercially available technology and utilize non-traditional 
contracting approaches such as other transaction authorities to attract 
non-traditional vendors to accelerate acquisition timelines to deliver 
prototypes with residual operations capability. For example, Blackjack 
is integrating a military payload onto a commercially commoditized 
satellite bus. The U.S. Space Force utilizes the Mission Manifest 
Office (MMO) as the front door for all satellites leading to enhanced 
coordination and alignment across the DOD and mission partners. The 
Rocket Systems Launch Program (RSLP) procures small launch services and 
the MMO utilizes excess launch vehicle performance to maximize on-orbit 
capability, providing the U.S. Space Force the ability to employ 
multiple innovations to maintain responsiveness and assured access to 
space.
    Mr. Khanna. With the DARPA launch challenge concluding without a 
winner, what other space related programs focusing on responsive launch 
is Space Force interested in? What is the Space Force's plans to engage 
with new launch companies going forward to develop a responsive launch 
capability?
    General Thompson. The U.S. Space Force has two programs dedicated 
to engaging with launch companies. The National Security Space Launch 
program handles our traditional launch vendors and supports new 
entrants into future phases. The Department's Rocket Systems Launch 
Program (RSLP) manages the Tactically Responsive Launch Program 
Element, which leverages three available contract strategies to use 
emerging small launch providers to support DOD space requirements. RSLP 
has awarded 5 small space launch contracts to 6 different small launch 
providers; providing 19 small space launches and over 700 suborbital 
launches going back to 1972. RSLP's current primary launch contract 
mechanism has eight different providers, on-ramps new providers and 
procures launch services annually, and has procured one launch service 
to-date. The Department continues to look to use responsive launch 
capabilities and explore opportunities to enhance DOD responsive space 
launch requirements.
    Mr. Khanna. How is the Space Force planning to utilize tools such 
as additive manufacturing, and would Space Force's mission benefit from 
the integration of new space companies utilizing new manufacturing 
techniques such as additive manufacturing--in order to meet the Space 
Force requirement to launch within 24 hours as part of the tactically 
responsive launch requirements?
    General Thompson. The Department already uses space launch services 
from U.S. space industrial base entities that use additive 
manufacturing, such as 3D printing. Commercial innovation is a key 
component of ensuring U.S. preeminence in space, and the Department 
enthusiastically supports commercial efforts to rapidly develop 
reliable and responsive space capabilities.
    Mr. Khanna. As SDA, DARPA, Space RCO and others continue to advance 
new capabilities within DOD, including satellite servicing and the 
deployment of satellite constellations, what is the strategy to engage 
and work with new launch partners who may be able to provide access to 
precise orbits at a lower cost point than traditional launch providers? 
More specifically, how is the Space Force team incorporating the 
Spacepower doctrine's call to provide ``dynamic and responsive'' launch 
to the arsenal?
    General Thompson. The USSF Launch Enterprise is responsive to our 
customers' needs across the spectrum of small and large launch. For 
example, in 2019, we worked with our National Security Space Launch 
(NSSL)-class commercial partners to increase rocket performance less 
than 4 months before launch to provide more on-orbit resiliency. By 
using the NSSL Phase 2 contract, we can order and launch a mission in 
12 months. For small launch, we have contractual vehicles in-place that 
can rapidly award launches to eight different vendors currently, 
several of which can already launch within six months of award. Many of 
the small launch providers are non-traditional defense contractors. We 
also plan to on-ramp new vendors every year to continue to leverage 
industry innovation.
    Mr. Khanna. The Director of the Space Development Agency, Dr. Derek 
Tournear has not yet made a decision about which launch company or 
companies will take on the Tranche 1 mission. During a recent 
discussion he stated that it was unclear if it would be feasible to 
utilize SMC or the National Security Space Launch program due to budget 
constraints. Would you and your team support efforts to broaden the 
scope of available launchers to include new responsive launch 
capabilities being developed by newer entrants into the launch market? 
How is the NRO and NGA working to engage and increase competition in 
the launch market as well?
    General Thompson. The Space Development Agency, in coordination 
with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition & 
Sustainment and Department of the Air Force, is still assessing launch 
requirements for the Tranche 1 series of satellites. The National 
Security Space Launch (NSSL) approach achieves the lowest overall costs 
to the government across the full spectrum of mission needs with 
commercial-like pricing for commercial-like launches. Further, the NSSL 
approach cuts the prices for the most demanding missions by over 50 
percent. However, the DOD may consider alternative launch options 
should it be beneficial to the Department, national security, and the 
U.S. taxpayer. Considering new providers, the DOD is interested in the 
capabilities of new NSSL class launchers as we prepare for our efforts 
beyond the Phase 2 contract for launch services procured in FY25. 
Additionally, we are already engaging in several efforts to use space 
launch providers who offer small and/or responsive launch capabilities. 
I am supportive of these efforts and believe the growth of the 
commercial space launch sector will directly support DOD's agility and 
strength in space. I am aware our counterparts in the NRO have procured 
launches outside the launch enterprise. However, the DOD coordinates 
closely with the IC to incorporate their requirements into our launch 
acquisition strategies, and we are committed to fostering competition 
in the industrial base.
    Mr. Khanna. The Air Force and Space Force have expressed support 
for new economic development to spur the space economy forward, 
increase launch cadences, and bring on new commercial capabilities. 
Both the rocket systems launch program for space and the tactically 
responsive space launch lines support this effort. Does the budget for 
these lines reflect the urgency of maintaining the U.S. commercial and 
national security edge in space?
    General Thompson. As the Department of Defense identifies space 
requirements for responsive launch, acquisition of these capabilities 
will be appropriately budgeted for and reflected in the Department's 
overall strategy for space. I believe the current budget for U.S. space 
launch requirements addresses the current requirements, but anticipate 
the Department will request additional funding for these efforts as 
additional requirements are identified.
    Mr. Khanna. As SDA, DARPA, Space RCO and others continue to advance 
new capabilities within DOD, including satellite servicing and the 
deployment of satellite constellations, what is the strategy to engage 
and work with new launch partners who may be able to provide access to 
precise orbits at a lower cost point than traditional launch providers? 
More specifically, how is the Space Force team incorporating the 
Spacepower doctrine's call to provide ``dynamic and responsive'' launch 
to the arsenal?
    Dr. Scolese. For specific questions on the Space Force team's 
implementation of their Spacepower Doctrine, please contact USSF. The 
NRO predominantly utilizes Space Force's Launch Enterprise Directorate 
to procure our launch services and leverages their R&D investment in 
launch systems addressing Space Mobility and Logistics objectives 
described in the USSF doctrine. However, the NRO recently awarded a 
Streamlined Launch Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) 
Contract (SLIC) for risk tolerant payloads, which leverages commercial 
processes and growing competition among emerging launch service 
providers. Maximizing commercial practices to the greatest extent 
possible can reduce both cost and timelines from contract award to 
launch.
    Mr. Khanna. The Director of the Space Development Agency, Dr. Derek 
Tournear has not yet made a decision about which launch company or 
companies will take on the Tranche 1 mission. During a recent 
discussion he stated that it was unclear if it would be feasible to 
utilize SMC or the National Security Space Launch program due to budget 
constraints. Would you and your team support efforts to broaden the 
scope of available launchers to include new responsive launch 
capabilities being developed by newer entrants into the launch market? 
How is the NRO and NGA working to engage and increase competition in 
the launch market as well?
    Dr. Scolese. The NRO has broadened the scope of available launch 
providers and competition through our recently awarded Streamlined 
Launch Infinite Delivery Infinite/Quantity Contract (IDIQ). New 
entrants can onboard onto the contract and be eligible for award of a 
risk-tolerant launch service or rideshare, after one successful orbital 
launch.
    Many of our missions, however, require higher rocket performance, 
government insight and mission assurance, and are more complex from an 
integration and security perspective than commercial missions, driving 
additional costs. USSF and NRO share these costs so that National Space 
Security (NSS) unique costs do not encumber our domestic launch 
providers' commercial pricing. Adding more launch service providers to 
the National Security Space Launch Program (NSSLP) as it is currently 
structured, would increase fixed costs to the NRO and USSF.
    The NRO fully supports an open competition among all qualified 
launch service providers for NSSLP Phase 3. We are currently working 
with USSF to develop an appropriate acquisition strategy that reflects 
the diverse needs of NSS missions and the likely state of the launch 
industry in 2025 and beyond.
    Mr. Khanna. The Air Force and Space Force have expressed support 
for new economic development to spur the space economy forward, 
increase launch cadences, and bring on new commercial capabilities. 
Both the rocket systems launch program for space and the tactically 
responsive space launch lines support this effort. Does the budget for 
these lines reflect the urgency of maintaining the U.S. commercial and 
national security edge in space?
    Dr. Scolese. While the NRO does not comment on other agencies' 
budgets, the NRO is leveraging innovative commercial industry to 
supplement and in applicable, warranted cases, replace certain 
government systems through commercial imagery, launch services and 
cloud computing service, which will allow a whole new range of 
technologies to help expand our supplier base, potentially lower the 
cost, and possibly shorten program timelines with increased 
flexibility.
    Mr. Khanna. As SDA, DARPA, Space RCO and others continue to advance 
new capabilities within DOD, including satellite servicing and the 
deployment of satellite constellations, what is the strategy to engage 
and work with new launch partners who may be able to provide access to 
precise orbits at a lower cost point than traditional launch providers? 
More specifically, how is the Space Force team incorporating the 
Spacepower doctrine's call to provide ``dynamic and responsive'' launch 
to the arsenal?
    General Cleveland. NGA does not have or provide any space launch 
capabilities.
    Mr. Khanna. The Director of the Space Development Agency, Dr. Derek 
Tournear has not yet made a decision about which launch company or 
companies will take on the Tranche 1 mission. During a recent 
discussion he stated that it was unclear if it would be feasible to 
utilize SMC or the National Security Space Launch program due to budget 
constraints. Would you and your team support efforts to broaden the 
scope of available launchers to include new responsive launch 
capabilities being developed by newer entrants into the launch market? 
How is the NRO and NGA working to engage and increase competition in 
the launch market as well?
    General Cleveland. NGA does not have or provide any space launch 
capabilities
    Mr. Khanna. The Air Force and Space Force have expressed support 
for new economic development to spur the space economy forward, 
increase launch cadences, and bring on new commercial capabilities. 
Both the rocket systems launch program for space and the tactically 
responsive space launch lines support this effort. Does the budget for 
these lines reflect the urgency of maintaining the U.S. commercial and 
national security edge in space?
    General Cleveland. NGA does not have or provide any space launch 
capabilities.
    Mr. Khanna. As SDA, DARPA, Space RCO and others continue to advance 
new capabilities within DOD, including satellite servicing and the 
deployment of satellite constellations, what is the strategy to engage 
and work with new launch partners who may be able to provide access to 
precise orbits at a lower cost point than traditional launch providers? 
More specifically, how is the Space Force team incorporating the 
Spacepower doctrine's call to provide ``dynamic and responsive'' launch 
to the arsenal?
    Mr. Ludwigson. We have not reviewed efforts related to engaging 
with new launch partners or incorporating responsive launch into 
national security space programs.
    Mr. Khanna. The Director of the Space Development Agency, Dr. Derek 
Tournear has not yet made a decision about which launch company or 
companies will take on the Tranche 1 mission. During a recent 
discussion he stated that it was unclear if it would be feasible to 
utilize SMC or the National Security Space Launch program due to budget 
constraints. Would you and your team support efforts to broaden the 
scope of available launchers to include new responsive launch 
capabilities being developed by newer entrants into the launch market? 
How is the NRO and NGA working to engage and increase competition in 
the launch market as well?
    Mr. Ludwigson. We have not reviewed agency efforts to broaden the 
scope of available launch providers or increase competition outside of 
or within the National Security Space Launch (NSSL) program. In our 
August 2017 report on space launch coordination mechanisms, we found 
that federal agencies who acquire launch services--DOD, NRO, and NASA--
spend over a billion dollars per year on space launch. While DOD and 
NASA use some of the same providers for their launches, each agency has 
separate acquisition processes and launch requirements. We found in the 
past that interagency coordination in space launch acquisitions has the 
potential to help leverage the governments buying power and eliminate 
the potential for redundancy and duplication. This past work found that 
coordination is important for operations and maintenance of launch 
ranges, scheduling launch missions, and government-wide strategic 
planning for launch. We found that opportunities exist for improving 
longer-term, government-wide planning for launch programs and for space 
programs in general. Acquiring launches outside of the current 
contract--the Phase 2 Launch Service Procurement--could sub-optimize 
the NSSL program's strategy to leverage the U.S. government's buying 
power to achieve the lowest overall cost of maintaining assured access 
to space. However, there are circumstances where using NSSL's larger 
launch vehicles (and associated costs) may not be justified, such as 
for experiments using small satellites.
    Mr. Khanna. The Air Force and Space Force have expressed support 
for new economic development to spur the space economy forward, 
increase launch cadences, and bring on new commercial capabilities. 
Both the rocket systems launch program for space and the tactically 
responsive space launch lines support this effort. Does the budget for 
these lines reflect the urgency of maintaining the U.S. commercial and 
national security edge in space?
    Mr. Ludwigson. We have not reviewed the extent to which the budget 
lines for the Rocket Systems Launch Program or Tactically Responsive 
Space Launch program support efforts to spur the space economy. 
However, in our May 2019 report on commercial space launch, we found 
that the industry was growing as U.S. launch providers capture a 
greater share of the global commercial market. We also found that the 
Federal Aviation Administration was expanding its workforce in 
anticipation of growth in the commercial launch industry but needed 
better information for long term planning. In our December 2020 report 
on options for supporting U.S. launch infrastructure, we examined FAA 
efforts to assess options to facilitate and promote greater investments 
in space transportation infrastructure. We found that FAA's assessment 
was limited and did not include a range of options that could better 
promote space transportation infrastructure to support national 
security, civil government, and commercial space customers at minimal 
cost to the federal government. We recommended that FAA examine a range 
of potential options to support space transportation infrastructure, 
including the necessary trade-offs of different potential approaches.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MORELLE
    Mr. Morelle. For what reasons might organizations choose to acquire 
their own launches, rather than use the NSSL Phase 2 approach? How 
often has this happened? Is DOD paying more for NSSL launches because 
of programs seeking to launch their satellites outside of the NSSL 
contracts? How might this affect the Phase 2 launch service procurement 
plan?
    Mr. Hill. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
    Mr. Morelle. For what reasons might organizations choose to acquire 
their own launches, rather than use the NSSL Phase 2 approach? How 
often has this happened? Is DOD paying more for NSSL launches because 
of programs seeking to launch their satellites outside of the NSSL 
contracts? How might this affect the Phase 2 launch service procurement 
plan?
    General Thompson. There may be limited instances (security reasons 
as an example) where other factors override the significant impacts to 
NSSL Phase 2 and future Government buying power. Any of these limited 
instances should be evaluated for negative impacts to the larger 
enterprise even if there are isolated benefits to individual programs. 
Procuring missions outside NSSL reduces future buying power across the 
NSSL-class spectrum and will affect the ability to maintain or improve 
on Phase 2 pricing in future procurements, especially for higher 
performance requirements. National Security Space Launch (NSSL) has an 
unprecedented record of mission success with 87 consecutive successful 
launches. The NSSL approach achieves the lowest overall costs to the 
government across the full spectrum of mission needs, including assured 
access to space, demanding orbits, and complex satellites. NSSL Phase 2 
dramatically reduced launch prices over Phase 1 and provides cost 
effective launch services for unique government requirements. The 
Department encourages maximum use of the NSSL Phase 2 contract. The 
significant impacts in acquiring NSSL-class capability outside the NSSL 
contracts include forfeiting the NSSL provided Mission Assurance, 
limiting the flexibility provided by the Phase 2 contract (assured-
access to space through two providers, up to 1-year mission 
acceleration, fixed-price mission unique capabilities), and reducing 
future Government buying power.
    Mr. Morelle. There are reportedly 32,000 objects on-orbit, 
including roughly 7,000 active and retired satellites. Does DOD have 
sufficient space situational awareness to monitor and assess risks to 
space systems and what are the risks of space congestion to DOD 
operations?
    General Thompson. The United States Space Force operates a variety 
of ground- and space-based sensors that track and characterize space 
objects. While this system of systems has been adequate to the track 
objects in the past, in an era of rapidly expanding space actors, from 
commercial actors to countries, we are seeing more satellites and 
associated debris than ever before. To ensure the Space Force is able 
to maintain our Space Domain Awareness (SDA) in a congested space 
environment, we are investing in new technologies and pursuing new data 
sources to enhance our capability to detect smaller objects and more of 
them. This includes incorporation of data from the rapidly expanding 
commercial SDA market and collaboration with Allies and partners to 
share information and sensors, as authorized, in a coalition approach 
to SDA.
    Mr. Morelle. For what reasons might organizations choose to acquire 
their own launches, rather than use the NSSL Phase 2 approach? How 
often has this happened? Is DOD paying more for NSSL launches because 
of programs seeking to launch their satellites outside of the NSSL 
contracts? How might this affect the Phase 2 launch service procurement 
plan?
    Dr. Scolese. In rare cases, the NRO has the ability to use 
alternative methods to procure launch services depending on the 
satellite program's objectives, and when doing so, will still seek 
input from the USSF. In selecting an NSS Launch Program (NSSLP) or non-
NSSLP launch strategy, program objectives are balanced across all 
program factors including national security policy, cost, schedule, and 
performance objectives. NRO procured launch vehicles outside of the 
NSSL procurement were previously approved and not included in the 
procurement plan. We defer to USSF on the costs of NSSL launches and 
any potential to impact future pricing for Phase 3 launches.
    Mr. Morelle. There are reportedly 32,000 objects on-orbit, 
including roughly 7,000 active and retired satellites. Does DOD have 
sufficient space situational awareness to monitor and assess risks to 
space systems and what are the risks of space congestion to DOD 
operations?
    Mr. Ludwigson. GAO has not done work to verify the count of objects 
tracked on-orbit, nor has GAO specifically assessed the overall 
sufficiency of DOD's space situational awareness (SSA) systems. We have 
reviewed SSA programs for over a decade, including an in-depth review 
on SSA funding in 2015. Our past work has shown that SSA data are 
provided by a variety of sensors and systems from across the 
commercial, civil, military, and intelligence communities. As space 
continues to become more congested and contested, SSA systems are key 
to ensuring safe operation of space assets for the U.S. government. As 
such, DOD has made investments in SSA, such as the Space Fence radar 
system, which significantly increased the number of objects that the 
U.S. can track in space, and the Space Command and Control (Space C2) 
program, which is expected to significantly improve processing and 
dissemination of SSA data. U.S. Space Force documentation also 
emphasizes the importance of information on orbiting objects. For 
example, in its Space Power Space Capstone Publication, U.S. Space 
Force identifies Space Domain Awareness (SDA) as one of its five core 
competencies. The Capstone defines SDA as the effective identification, 
characterization and understanding of any factor associated with the 
space domain that could affect space operations and thereby impact the 
security, safety, economy, or environment of our Nation. It goes on to 
emphasize that to maintain awareness of spacecraft orbiting in the 
domain, space forces need to know not only orbital trajectory but also 
mission related details such as missions, intentions, system 
capabilities, patterns-of-life, and the status of consumables and 
expendables. Whether DOD's investments are sufficient to meet the needs 
of the rapidly-changing space paradigm is not something we have 
examined but the answer appears unclear at this time. For example, in 
2019, we found that DOD faced a number of challenges in developing new 
command and control capabilities under its Space C2 program, including 
management issues and technical complexity. We also found that the DOD 
faced limits in processing the increased amount of SSA sensor data with 
current data systems. DOD concurred with recommendations we made for 
addressing such challenges. We are continuing to monitor the 
development of SSA capabilities. Specifically, we are reviewing Space 
C2 program annual reports in response to a provision in the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020. Additionally, beginning 
this year we plan to initiate a review of the National Space Defense 
Center's SSA needs and role in integrating SSA data in response to a 
provision in the House report to a bill for the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021.