[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



 
                   KEEPING OUR SIGHTS ON MARS PART 3:
                       A STATUS UPDATE AND REVIEW
                      OF NASA'S ARTEMIS INITIATIVE

=======================================================================

                                     
                                     

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                 SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS

                                 OF THE

                      COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE,
                             AND TECHNOLOGY

                                 OF THE

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                             MARCH 1, 2022

                               __________

                           Serial No. 117-42

                               __________

 Printed for the use of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology
 

                                     
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       Available via the World Wide Web: http://science.house.gov
       
       
       
       
                           ______

             U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 
 46-525PDF          WASHINGTON : 2023
   
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       

              COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY

             HON. EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas, Chairwoman
ZOE LOFGREN, California              FRANK LUCAS, Oklahoma, 
SUZANNE BONAMICI, Oregon                 Ranking Member
AMI BERA, California                 MO BROOKS, Alabama
HALEY STEVENS, Michigan,             BILL POSEY, Florida
    Vice Chair                       RANDY WEBER, Texas
MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey           BRIAN BABIN, Texas
JAMAAL BOWMAN, New York              ANTHONY GONZALEZ, Ohio
MELANIE A. STANSBURY, New Mexico     MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
BRAD SHERMAN, California             JAMES R. BAIRD, Indiana
ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado              DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida
JERRY McNERNEY, California           MIKE GARCIA, California
PAUL TONKO, New York                 STEPHANIE I. BICE, Oklahoma
BILL FOSTER, Illinois                YOUNG KIM, California
DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey          RANDY FEENSTRA, Iowa
DON BEYER, Virginia                  JAKE LaTURNER, Kansas
CHARLIE CRIST, Florida               CARLOS A. GIMENEZ, Florida
SEAN CASTEN, Illinois                JAY OBERNOLTE, California
CONOR LAMB, Pennsylvania             PETER MEIJER, Michigan
DEBORAH ROSS, North Carolina         JAKE ELLZEY, TEXAS
GWEN MOORE, Wisconsin                MIKE CAREY, OHIO
DAN KILDEE, Michigan
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania
LIZZIE FLETCHER, Texas
                                 ------                                

                 Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics

                   HON. DON BEYER, Virginia, Chairman
ZOE LOFGREN, California              BRIAN BABIN, Texas, 
AMI BERA, California                     Ranking Member
BRAD SHERMAN, California             MO BROOKS, Alabama
ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado              BILL POSEY, Florida
CHARLIE CRIST, Florida               DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida
DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey          YOUNG KIM, California

                         C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

                             March 1, 2022

                                                                   Page

Hearing Charter..................................................     2

                           Opening Statements

Statement by Representative Don Beyer, Chairman, Subcommittee on 
  Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science, Space, and 
  Technology, U.S. House of Representatives......................    10
    Written Statement............................................    11

Statement by Representative Brian Babin, Ranking Member, 
  Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science, 
  Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives...........    12
    Written Statement............................................    14

Statement by Representative Frank Lucas, Ranking Member, 
  Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of 
  Representatives................................................    15
    Written Statement............................................    16

Written statement by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson, 
  Chairwoman, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. 
  House of Representatives.......................................    18

                               Witnesses:

Mr. James Free, Associate Administrator, Exploration Systems 
  Development Mission Directorate, National Aeronautics and Space 
  Administration
    Oral Statement...............................................    20
    Written Statement............................................    22

Mr. William Russell, Director, Contracting and National Security 
  Acquisitions, U.S. Government Accountability Office
    Oral Statement...............................................    26
    Written Statement............................................    28

Dr. Patricia Sanders, Chair, Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
    Oral Statement...............................................    48
    Written Statement............................................    50

The Honorable Paul K. Martin, Inspector General, National 
  Aeronautics and Space Administration
    Oral Statement...............................................    59
    Written Statement............................................    61

Mr. Daniel Dumbacher, Executive Director, American Institute of 
  Aeronautics and Astronautics
    Oral Statement...............................................    72
    Written Statement............................................    74

Discussion.......................................................    82

              Appendix: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions

Mr. James Free, Associate Administrator, Exploration Systems 
  Development Mission Directorate, National Aeronautics and Space 
  Administration.................................................   100

Mr. William Russell, Director, Contracting and National Security 
  Acquisitions, U.S. Government Accountability Office............   118

Dr. Patricia Sanders, Chair, Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel.....   125

The Honorable Paul K. Martin, Inspector General, National 
  Aeronautics and Space Administration...........................   128

Mr. Daniel Dumbacher, Executive Director, American Institute of 
  Aeronautics and Astronautics...................................   134
    Statement from Karina Drees, President, Commercial 
      Spaceflight Federation.....................................   137


                   KEEPING OUR SIGHTS ON MARS PART 3:



                       A STATUS UPDATE AND REVIEW



                      OF NASA'S ARTEMIS INITIATIVE

                              ----------                              


                         TUESDAY, MARCH 1, 2022

                  House of Representatives,
             Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics,
               Committee on Science, Space, and Technology,
                                                   Washington, D.C.

    The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 11 a.m., via 
Zoom, Hon. Don Beyer [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.



[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    Chairman Beyer. Without objection, the Chair is authorized 
to declare recess at any time.
    And before I deliver my opening remarks, I want to note 
that, today, the Committee is meeting virtually, perhaps the 
last time I hope.
    I'm going to announce a couple reminders to the Members 
about the conduct of this hearing. First, Members should please 
keep their video feed on as long as they're present in the 
hearing. Members are responsible for their own microphones, so 
please keep your microphones muted unless you're speaking. And 
finally, if Members have documents they wish to submit for the 
record, please email them to the Committee Clerk, whose email 
address was circulated prior to the meeting.
    And before we get underway, I want to take a moment to 
raise what's in the back of all of our minds, the Russia-
Ukraine conflict and its implications for civil space 
activities. According to media reports, NASA (National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration) has stated that, quote, 
``It continues working with our international partners, 
including the State Space Corporation Roscosmos, for the 
ongoing safe operations of the International Space Station 
(ISS).'' I'm encouraged by that--by the fact that the 
International Space Station partnership has been successfully 
preserved through periods of geopolitical stress in the past 
and that sustaining its safe and productive operation has 
always been a focus of the partnership. That said, this 
Subcommittee will continue to monitor the situation and seek 
updates from NASA as needed.
    So turning now to the hearing, good morning, and welcome to 
today's hearing titled ``Keeping Our Sights on Mars Part 3: A 
Status Update and Review of NASA's Artemis Initiative.'' At 
this time, I'd like to extend a warm welcome to our panel of 
distinguished witnesses. Thank you for being here.
    Before I continue, I want to take a moment to recognize the 
Artemis I team at Kennedy Space Center (KSC). They're working 
hard to prepare for Artemis I, the first launch of the 
integrated Space Launch System (SLS) with the Orion crew 
vehicle. This is an exciting and important milestone for 
Artemis, and we couldn't do it without them.
    It's been four years since President Trump first announced 
a return to the Moon with humans, later naming the effort 
Artemis, and it has been nearly three years since former Vice 
President Pence accelerated the date for the Moon landing by 
four years to 2024. The Biden Administration is continuing 
Artemis, providing the important constancy of purpose for 
NASA's long-term exploration initiative, an initiative that 
will span multiple Congresses and Administrations.
    Today's hearing will review NASA's plans and progress on 
Artemis--the heavy-lift Space Launch System, the Orion crew 
vehicle, the ground systems, the spacesuits, the Human Landing 
System (HLS), the cislunar orbiting Gateway station, and the 
many other systems, payloads, and operations that will support 
planned missions to the Moon in preparation for the next giant 
leap, being the first nation to land humans on the surface of 
Mars.
    Our witnesses will discuss the status of Artemis and 
provide their perspectives on what is needed to make it 
successful. We need their wisdom and guidance because, by all 
accounts, Artemis is facing significant challenges. Advisory 
boards, reviews, and audits are sounding warnings. Taken 
together, those warnings signal that the issues afflicting 
Artemis need serious attention by both Congress and the 
Administration. Schedule delays and cost growth years in the 
making, a confusing mishmash of contract types, and untried 
approaches to organization and management are just a few of the 
concerns that have been raised.
    Throughout its history, NASA has repeatedly shown that it 
can solve hard problems. The question before us today is are we 
willing--is NASA willing--to own the challenges, face them head 
on, and undo any problematic decisions if necessary? That is, 
are both NASA and we in Congress prepared to take the actions 
that will be needed to lead Artemis to success? Well, the 
answer must be a resounding yes because I believe we have a 
unique opportunity in Artemis if we choose to accept it. 
Bipartisan support is strong. I love working with Dr. Babin, 
Mr. Lucas, and others. The desire to explore deep space with 
humans once again is palpable, and the chance to achieve is 
before us. What's missing are the answers to the questions. 
What are we trying to accomplish and how are we going to do it 
and what are our priorities?
    Funding of course will not be unlimited. Choices will need 
to be made. And are we establishing a sustainable lunar program 
of unlimited duration or are we meeting milestones and defined 
objectives that feed forward to enable the Mars goals? Are we 
developing national capabilities needed for Moon to Mars or 
investing in commercial capabilities designed for objectives 
other than national needs? Is Artemis going to be a national 
program or a disparate set of projects? Have we laid out a 
credible plan, approach, organization, and management structure 
and identified the resources needed to implement it?
    Everything--everything is dependent on having a clear and 
agreed-upon story of what we're doing, why, and how we will do 
it. More than four years into Artemis--the Nation's premier 
effort to lead America back to the Moon and onto Mars--I'm 
still looking for that narrative, something I can tell my 
constituents, my family, especially my wife, and my colleagues 
abroad and my colleagues here in Congress, especially the 
appropriators.
    Great nations do great things. I look forward to hearing 
from our witnesses on what's needed to write an Artemis 
narrative that is worthy of our great Nation.
    [The prepared statement of Chairman Beyer follows:]

    Before we get underway, I want to take a moment to raise 
what is in the back of all of our minds, the Russia-Ukraine 
conflict and its implications for our civil space activities. 
According to media reports, NASA has stated that it ``continues 
working with all our international partners, including the 
State Space Corporation Roscosmos, for the ongoing safe 
operations of the International Space Station.'' I am 
encouraged by that and by the fact that the International Space 
Station partnership has been successfully preserved through 
periods of geopolitical stress in the past, and that sustaining 
its safe and productive operation has always been a focus of 
the partnership. That said, this Subcommittee will continue to 
monitor the situation and seek updates from NASA, as needed.
    Turning now to the hearing, good morning, and welcome to 
today's hearing titled ``Keeping Our Sights on Mars Part 3: A 
Status Update and Review of NASA's Artemis Initiative''. At 
this time, I'd also to extend a warm welcome to our panel of 
distinguished witnesses. Thank you for being here. Before I 
continue, I want to take a moment to recognize the Artemis I 
team at Kennedy Space Center. They are working hard to prepare 
for Artemis I-the first launch of the integrated Space Launch 
System with the Orion crew vehicle. This is an exciting and 
important milestone for Artemis, and we could not do it without 
them.
    It's been four years since former President Trump first 
announced a return to the Moon with humans-later naming the 
effort, ``Artemis''. And it's been nearly three years since 
former Vice President Pence accelerated the date for a Moon 
landing by four years, to 2024. The Biden Administration is 
continuing Artemis, providing the important constancy of 
purpose for NASA's long-term exploration initiative, an 
initiative that will span multiple Congresses and 
Administrations.
    Today's hearing will review NASA's plans and progress on 
Artemis-the heavy-lift Space Launch System, the Orion crew 
vehicle, the ground systems, the space suits, the Human Landing 
System, the cislunar orbiting Gateway station, and the many 
other systems, payloads, and operations that will support 
planned missions to the Moon in preparation for the next giant 
leap--being the first nation to land humans on the surface of 
Mars.
    Our witnesses will discuss the status of Artemis and 
provide their perspectives on what is needed to make it 
successful. We need their wisdom and guidance, because by all 
accounts, Artemis is facing significant challenges. Advisory 
bodies, reviews, and audits are sounding warnings. Taken 
together, those warnings signal that the issues afflicting 
Artemis need serious attention by both Congress and the 
Administration.
    Schedule delays and cost growth years in the making; a 
confusing mishmash of contract types; and untried approaches to 
organization and management are just a few of the concerns that 
have been raised.
    Throughout its history, NASA has repeatedly shown that it 
can solve hard problems. The question before us today is are we 
willing--is NASA willing--to own the challenges, face them 
head-on, and undo any problematic decisions if necessary-that 
is, are both NASA and we in Congress prepared to take the 
actions that will be needed to lead Artemis to success?The 
answer must be a resounding ``yes,'' because I believe we have 
a unique opportunity in Artemis, if we chose to accept it. 
Bipartisan support is strong. The desire to explore deep space 
with humans once again is palpable. The chance to achieve is 
before us. What is missing are answers to the questions-what we 
are trying to accomplish and how we are going to do it? And 
what are our priorities?
    Funding will not be unlimited and choices will need to be 
made. Are we establishing a sustainable lunar program of 
unlimited duration, or are we meeting milestones and defined 
objectives that feed forward to enable the Mars goal? Are we 
developing national capabilities needed for Moon to Mars or 
investing in commercial capabilities designed for objectives 
other than national needs? Is Artemis going to be a national 
program or disparate set of projects? Have we laid out a 
credible plan, approach, organization, and management 
structure, and identified the resources needed to implement it?
    Everything. Everything is dependent on having a clear and 
agreed-upon story of what we are doing, why, and how we will 
get there. More than four years into Artemis-the nation's 
premier effort to lead America back to the Moon and on to Mars-
I'm still looking for that narrative, something that I can tell 
my constituents, my family, my colleagues abroad, and my 
colleagues in here in Congress-especially appropriators.
    Great nations do great things. I look forward to hearing 
from our witnesses on what is needed to write an Artemis 
narrative that is worthy of our great nation.

    Chairman Beyer. Let me now recognize my friend, the 
distinguished dentist and Congressman from Houston, Mr.--Dr. 
Babin for an opening statement.
    Mr. Babin. I want to thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 
It's good to see all of our expert witnesses and panelists back 
again and to be with all of my colleagues.
    Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you and your distinguished 
panel of witnesses. This hearing will provide Congress with an 
update on the current status of the Nation's deep space 
exploration initiatives. This panel is uniquely positioned to 
provide that update. One theme that should emerge from this 
hearing is the agreement from all participants, Members and 
witnesses, about the importance of continuity and purpose and 
design and architecture stability of space exploration programs 
that fail because of conflicting direction, uncertain goals, 
and unrealistic expectations. Maintaining progress through 
various administrations and Congresses is critical for space 
exploration programs.
    The Trump Administration brought space policy back in line 
with congressional direction derived from the consistent and 
steady guidance provided by the 2005, 2008, 2010, and the 2017 
NASA Authorization Act. This meant a return to the Moon and 
onto Mars and beyond, not an asteroid distraction directed by 
the Obama Administration. President Biden, to his credit, has 
stayed the course as well so far. Hopefully, future requests 
will prioritize funding an expedited return to the Moon, which 
is important to our Nation geopolitically, scientifically, 
economically, and from a national security perspective. The 
Moon is also a logical and achievable near-term goal that will 
enable the future exploration of Mars.
    In the next few weeks, we will hopefully see a successful 
launch of Orion atop the Space Launch System or SLS derived to 
meet critical national capabilities, NASA's facilities, 
infrastructure, and work force. SLS, Orion, and Exploration 
Ground Systems (EGS) are not just a rocket but national 
capabilities that enable deep space exploration of the Moon, 
Mars, and our solar system. SLS and Orion for Artemis I are at 
the Kennedy Center right now waiting a wet dress rehearsal 
before launch this spring. Core stages and capsules for later 
Artemis missions are well along in production.
    We're also in the early stages of a Human Landing System to 
deliver crew to the surface of the Moon, advance spacesuits to 
replace the aging ISS suits, and allow for surface operations 
and enabling [inaudible] surface power, habitats, and surface 
vehicles that are necessary for a robust exploration program.
    Finally, work on Gateway in space propulsion, other long-
term capabilities are also underway and are poised to enable a 
sustained exploration architecture. As highlighted in the 
testimony, we are receiving today the novel approaches proposed 
for these acquisitions will require robust oversight and 
insight to ensure a success.
    We've returned to the correct goal, are on the right path, 
but we are waiting on the right plan. And as we will hear from 
our witnesses, there are still many details that NASA needs to 
provide. We have no reliable cost for Artemis, no integrated 
master schedule for Artemis and its subcomponents, and no 
clarity on how the integration of elements such as Gateway, 
space suits, HLS, SLS, Orion, and EGS will happen, or who is 
responsible for ensuring ultimate success.
    NASA's new reorganization may be a step in the right 
direction, but many questions certainly remain. The 
reorganization is very similar to the previous reorganization 
proposal from the Trump Administration, which was rejected by 
the majority only to be approved by them under this new 
administration. Is NASA just reiterating deck chairs or will it 
have a real impact? Is NASA's proposed phasing of transition 
from development to operations appropriate, and does it heed 
the past safety warnings from the Columbia Accident 
Investigation Board on deeming spaceflight systems operational?
    I'm sure that we all have many more questions. I'm also 
confident that we all have the same shared goal, and that is a 
robust human spaceflight program. But as the saying goes, the 
devil is certainly in the details. We are still waiting on 
those details.
    I look forward to our witnesses' testimony today, and I 
yield back the balance of my time, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Babin follows:]

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to our distinguished 
panel of witnesses. This hearing will provide Congress with an 
update on the status of the Nation's deep space exploration 
initiatives. This panel is uniquely positioned to provide that 
update.
    One theme I expect to emerge from this hearing is agreement 
by all participants--members and witnesses--about the 
importance of continuity of purpose and design. Past space 
exploration programs have failed because of conflicting 
direction, uncertain goals, and unrealistic expectations.
    We cannot afford to fail on the Artemis program. 
Maintaining progress through various Administrations and 
Congresses is critical for space exploration programs and our 
national competitiveness.
    The Trump Administration made space exploration a priority 
and brought space policy back in line with the direction 
provided by Congress for over a decade. The result is the 
Artemis Program, dedicated to returning to the Moon and on to 
Mars and beyond.
    The current Administration, to its credit, has stayed the 
course so far. Hopefully future budget requests will prioritize 
funding an expedited return to the Moon.
    This effort is important to our national and economic 
security, as other nations like China seek to place a foothold 
on the Moon and gain a strategic advantage over us. The Moon is 
also a logical and achievable near-term goal that will enable 
future exploration of Mars.
    There are many upcoming milestones and important issues 
related to the Artemis program that are critical for this 
Committee to monitor and oversee. In the next few weeks, we 
will hopefully see a successful launch of Orion atop the Space 
Launch System (SLS). SLS, Orion, and Exploration Ground Systems 
(EGS) are not just a rocket, but national capabilities that 
enable deep space exploration of the Moon, Mars, and the solar 
system.
    SLS and Orion for Artemis 1 are at the Kennedy Space Center 
(KSC) awaiting a wet dress rehearsal before launch this spring, 
with core stages and capsules for later Artemis missions well 
along in production. We are also in the early stages of 
developing a Human Landing System to deliver crew to the 
surface of the Moon. Another critical issue is the progress of 
advanced space suits to replace the aging ISS suits that allow 
for surface operations.
    We also must ensure NASA has the technologies for 
communications, surface power, habitats, and surface vehicles 
that are necessary for a robust exploration program.
    Finally, work on Gateway, in-space propulsion, and other 
long-term capabilities are also underway and are poised to 
enable a sustained exploration architecture.
    As highlighted in the testimony we are hearing today, the 
novel approaches proposed for these acquisitions will require 
robust oversight and insight to ensure success. NASA has the 
correct goal, we are on the right path, but we are waiting on 
the right plan. As we will hear from our witnesses, there are 
still many details that NASA needs to provide.
    We have no reliable cost for Artemis, no integrated master 
schedule for Artemis and its subcomponents, and no clarity on 
how the integration of elements such as Gateway, space suits, 
HLS, SLS, Orion, and EGS will happen, or who is responsible for 
ensuring ultimate success.
    NASA's recent reorganization may be a step in the right 
direction, but many questions remain. The reorganization is 
very similar to the previous reorganization proposal from the 
Trump Administration, which was rejected by Congressional 
Democrats, only to be approved by them under this new 
Administration. Is NASA just rearranging deck chairs, or will 
it have a real impact? Is NASA's proposed phasing for the 
transition from development to operations appropriate and does 
it heed past safety warnings? I am sure we all have many more 
questions.
    I am also confident we all have the same shared goal--a 
robust human spaceflight program. But, as the saying goes, the 
devil is in the details. We are still waiting on those details. 
I look forward to our witnesses' testimony and yield back the 
balance of my time.

    Chairman Beyer. Thank you. Thank you, Dr. Babin, very much. 
Now let me recognize the Ranking Chair of the larger whole 
Committee, the distinguished gentleman from Oklahoma, 
Congressman Lucas.
    Mr. Lucas. Thank you, Chairman Beyer, for holding today's 
hearing on the Artemis program and our efforts to send 
Americans back to the Moon and then onto Mars. This mission is 
the most complex, most important that NASA has undertaken to 
date. It is far more ambitious than our landings more than 50 
years ago in the 1960's and 1970's because this time, we're 
going back to stay.
    Still, we can take lessons from that pioneering generation 
space explorers. Just 66 years after the Wright brothers flew--
first flew an airplane, NASA landed humans on the Moon. But in 
the 50 years since we last walked on the Moon, we've not 
returned, nor have we advanced further in our solar system. How 
did NASA go from its founding in 1958 to a Moon landing in 
1969? The same way we accomplish any big mission--we make it a 
priority. We get strong leadership, a clear vision, precise 
timelines, steady funding, and an incredibly talented work 
force. We still have the most talented work force in the world, 
but I'm concerned we're missing the rest of those variables.
    We are 1 year in to the 117th Congress, and this is our 
first hearing on the Artemis program. We've not achieved much 
in space policy in general in this Congress unfortunately. All 
we have to show for our work is an enhanced use leasing bill 
that was hijacked for a dead-end Federal election bill. We're 
back to square one on that, and we'll have to start over.
    As the congressional Committee with jurisdiction over NASA, 
it's our responsibility to maintain a strong space program, and 
specifically, we must ensure a successful Artemis program. We 
have to provide close oversight, clear guidance, and work with 
our appropriators to allocate consistent funding. I stand ready 
to do so, and I'd like to get to work on a NASA reauthorization 
bill as soon as possible. It pains me to say that our 
counterparts in the Senate side have made progress and passed 
legislation on this while we've stalled. But Congress can only 
do so much. NASA needs to provide us with an updated plan, a 
precise timeline, and a realistic budget. Simply put, tell us 
how long it will take, how we will do it, and how much it 
costs.
    The Artemis program must be NASA's highest priority, and I 
expect the Administration's actions to start reflecting this. I 
understand it takes time for--to--for an incoming 
administration to appoint new leadership and then for them to 
get up to speed, but we're a year in now, and we don't even 
have a target date for when we can anticipate a Moon landing.
    A recent Inspector General report made it clear that NASA 
will not meet its goal of landing humans on the Moon in 2024. 
It also recommended that NASA create an integrated master 
schedule to identify and sequence all of the Artemis program 
activities. Operating with a clear and comprehensive timetable 
will improve efficiency and ensure we're holding to realistic 
but prompt deadlines.
    What's more, this Administration has not given us realistic 
budget estimates for Artemis. I'm tired of the narrative that 
Congress isn't giving NASA the money it needs. NASA needs to 
give us a robust and accurate budget request so that Congress 
can authorize and fund appropriately. The same Inspector 
General stated that ``NASA does not have a credible estimate 
that consolidates all of the Artemis costs across mission 
directorates.'' We won't get to the Moon and Mars with 
imprecise budgets and vague deadlines. And underestimating the 
cost of large missions like this doesn't serve anyone. I'd like 
to see this Administration put forth an accurate budget request 
this year so we can take that into account when making funding 
decisions.
    One way to address these ongoing costs and scheduling 
concerns is to designate a single program manager for Artemis 
to integrate and coordinate the many complex elements at play. 
So those are the issues we must address today: cost, budget, 
and leadership. It is my hope that this hearing helps provide 
some answers to these outstanding questions.
    The good news is that I believe we all share the same goal. 
We want to return Americans to the Moon as soon as possible and 
as safely as possible. And we all want to take the next giant 
leap in space exploration and send humans to another planet. 
That's why I'm hopeful we can improve how Artemis is run.
    I believe space exploration has value in and of itself. 
It's human instinct to seek knowledge and to pursue new 
frontiers. I also believe there are economic, technological, 
and national security benefits to America's space program. We 
have long benefited from being the leader in space, but China 
is making aggressive moves to expand their presence, and 
Vladimir Putin is acting increasingly erratic and 
irresponsible.
    At the fore--at the front--as the frontrunner in space 
exploration, the United States established early precedents of 
transparency, open science, peaceful collaboration. I can 
assure you that the space program run by the People's 
Liberation Army does not share those goals.
    Through the Artemis Accords, the United States has pledged 
to work with our allies to support peaceful and cooperative 
exploration and research. We have made a commitment to 
international collaboration and the benefits of all humankind. 
These are the values that must guide our activity in space.
    I am incredibly excited to see Artemis take off, literally 
and figuratively. I'm honored to serve on the Committee with 
oversight over this historic effort. To our witnesses, thank 
you for being here today and sharing your expertise. I look 
forward to hearing more about how we can continue to strengthen 
and improve the efforts to return to the Moon and explore Mars.
    And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Lucas follows:]

    Thank you, Chairwoman Johnson, for holding today's hearing 
on the Artemis program and our efforts to send Americans back 
to the Moon and then on to Mars.
    This mission is the most complex and most important that 
NASA has undertaken to date. It is far more ambitious than our 
landings more than 50 years ago in the 1960s and 1970s because 
this time, we're going back to stay.
    Still, we can take lessons from that pioneering generation 
of space explorers. Just 66 years after the Wright brothers 
first flew an airplane, NASA landed humans on the Moon.
    But in the 50 years since we last walked the Moon, we've 
not returned, nor have we advanced farther in our solar system. 
How did NASA go from its founding in 1958 to a Moon landing in 
1969? The same way we accomplish any big mission--we made it a 
priority. We had strong leadership, a clear vision, precise 
timelines, steady funding, and an incredibly talented 
workforce.
    We still have the most talented workforce in the world, but 
I'm concerned that we're missing the rest of those variables. 
We are one year in to the 117th Congress and this is our first 
hearing on the Artemis program. We have not achieved much on 
space policy in general this Congress, unfortunately. All we 
have to show for our work is an Enhanced Use Leasing bill that 
was hijacked for a dead-end federal election bill. We're back 
to square one on that, and will have to start over.
    As the Congressional committee with jurisdiction over NASA, 
it's our responsibility to maintain a strong space program. And 
specifically, we must ensure a successful Artemis program. We 
have to provide close oversight, clear guidance, and work with 
our appropriators to allocate consistent funding.
    I stand ready to do so. I'd like to get to work on a NASA 
reauthorization bill as soon as possible. It pains me to say 
that our counterparts on the Senate side have made progress and 
passed legislation on this while we have stalled.
    But Congress can only do so much. NASA needs to provide us 
with an updated plan, precise timeline and a realistic budget. 
Simply put: Tell us how long it will take, how we will do it, 
and how much it costs.
    The Artemis program must be NASA's highest priority and I 
expect the Administration's actions to start reflecting this. I 
understand that it takes a minute for any incoming 
Administration to appoint new leadership and for them to get up 
to speed. But we're a year in now and we don't even have a 
target date for when we can anticipate a Moon landing.
    A recent Inspector General report made it clear that NASA 
will not meet its goal of landing humans on the Moon by 2024. 
It also recommended that NASA create an Integrated Master 
Schedule to identify and sequence all the Artemis program 
activities. Operating with a clear and comprehensive timetable 
will improve efficiency and ensure we're holding to realistic 
but prompt deadlines.
    What's more, this Administration has not given us realistic 
budget estimates for Artemis. I'm tired of the narrative that 
Congress isn't giving NASA the money it needs. NASA needs to 
give us robust and accurate budget requests so that Congress 
can authorize and fund appropriately.
    That same Inspector General report stated flat out that 
``NASA does not have a credible estimate that consolidates all 
Artemis costs across mission directorates.''
    We won't get to the Moon and Mars with imprecise budgets 
and vague deadlines. And underestimating the costs of large 
missions like this doesn't serve anyone. I'd like to see this 
Administration put forth an accurate budget request this year 
so we can take that into account when making funding decisions.
    One way to address these ongoing cost and scheduling 
concerns is to designate a single Program Manager for Artemis 
to integrate and coordinate the many complex elements at play. 
So those are the issues we must address today--cost, budget, 
and leadership. It is my hope that this hearing helps provide 
some answers to these outstanding questions.
    The good news is that I believe we all share the same goal. 
We all want to return Americans to the Moon as soon as safely 
possible. And we all want to take the next great leap in space 
exploration and send humans to another planet. That's why I'm 
hopeful that we can improve how Artemis is run.
    I believe space exploration has value in and of itself. 
It's human instinct to seek knowledge and pursue new frontiers. 
And I also believe there are economic, technological, and 
national security benefits to America's space program.
    We have long benefited from being the leader in space, but 
China is making aggressive moves to expand their presence, and 
Vladimir Putin is acting increasingly erratic and 
irresponsible.
    As the frontrunner in space exploration, the U.S. 
established early precedents of transparency, open science, and 
peaceful collaboration. I can assure you that the space program 
run by the People's Liberation Army does not share those goals.
    Through the Artemis Accords, the United States has pledged 
to work with our allies to support peaceful and cooperative 
exploration and research. We have made a commitment to 
international collaboration that benefits all of humankind. 
These are the values that must guide our activity in space.
    I am incredibly excited to see Artemis take off--literally 
and figuratively. And I'm honored to serve on the Committee 
with oversight of this historic effort. To our witnesses--thank 
you for being here today and sharing your expertise. I look 
forward to hearing more about how we can continue to strengthen 
and improve our efforts to return to the Moon and explore Mars.

    Chairman Beyer. Mr. Lucas, thank you very much.
     [The prepared statement of Chairwoman Johnson follows:]

    Good morning. I'd like to join my colleagues in welcoming 
our witnesses to this morning's hearing. We have a lot to 
discuss.
    As Chairman Beyer has noted, it is now more than four years 
since the previous Administration launched its Artemis Moon-
Mars initiative. I have long supported a NASA exploration 
program directed towards the inspiring-but also incredibly 
challenging-goal of human missions to the Moon and then to 
Mars. I would like Artemis to succeed.
    However, I am very concerned that more than four years 
after this program was announced, many of the fundamental 
concerns and questions raised by Members of this Committee 
since the start of Artemis still remain unresolved. For 
example:
    More than four years after Artemis was started, NASA still 
has not established an overall architecture for the initiative, 
and NASA is now saying it hopes to have one by the end of the 
year.
    More than four years after Artemis was started, NASA still 
has not developed the specific objectives that it is to pursue, 
or how they will fit together to support the goal of humans to 
Mars. NASA says it hopes to have them in the coming months.
    More than four years after Artemis was started, no one 
appears to be in charge of the entire Artemis initiative. It is 
still largely a collection of individual projects rather than 
an integrated program managed by an empowered program manager, 
something that has been raised as a serious concern in the 
witness testimony for today's hearing.
    I could go on, but I hope my point is clear-it is hard to 
look at the current state of Artemis and have confidence that 
it is on the right path.
    I hope that today's hearing will help inform this Committee 
about the seriousness of the problems and the steps that will 
be needed to get Artemis on track.
    Before I close, I would like to raise an issue that goes 
beyond Artemis and is really about the future of the nation's 
human spaceflight program. Whether intentionally or 
unintentionally, NASA has taken-and is planning to take-a 
series of actions that when taken as a whole put America on a 
path of essentially privatizing its national human spaceflight 
program. While some of the actions have been undertaken with 
the agreement of Congress, others do not have that agreement 
and are controversial.
    NASA is now totally dependent on paying commercial service 
providers to get its astronauts to the International Space 
Station or even to Earth orbit at all.
    Once the ISS is retired, the United States will have no 
governmental outpost in low Earth orbit-it plans to pay for 
access to still-to-be built private space stations.
    And under NASA's current plans, the U.S. government will 
have no independent capability to get its astronauts to the 
surface of the Moon. It will be dependent on paying private 
companies for its access to the lunar surface.
    NASA will no longer even own its exploration space suits.
    And it now appears that NASA is exploring essentially 
transferring ownership of the Space Launch System-a system 
developed with billions of taxpayer dollars, and a key enabler 
of NASA's exploration missions-to a private company.
    To quote from NASA's recent SLS RFI, ``This model assumes 
the current government-owned and government-led system will be 
moved to industry.NASA will purchase launch services and 
payload delivery, but not take ownership of the flight 
hardware.''
    I find the sum of these actions to be very troubling, and 
it raises the question of whether NASA will even retain the 
capabilities and workforce within the agency that will be 
needed to get U.S. astronauts to Mars if all of these 
privatization plans are realized.
    Beyond that, is it in the nation's long-term interest for 
the U.S. government to have no independent capability for its 
astronauts to access the lunar surface? To be totally dependent 
on getting rides to orbit or to the surface of the Moon from 
private companies whose interests and priorities may at times 
conflict with those of the government? To not have a 
government-owned system that can represent the United States 
internationally in both cooperative and competitive space 
exploration undertakings?
    These questions and their long-term policy implications for 
the nation's future in space need to be thoughtfully considered 
and debated by Congress and the White House, rather than having 
our national policy be set by the cumulative procurement 
actions of a single agency.
    It is my hope that today's hearing will in part serve as a 
starting point for that critically important policy debate.
    Thank you, and I yield back.

    Chairman Beyer. At this time, I'd like to introduce our 
witnesses. Mr. James Free is the Associate Administrator for 
the Exploration Systems Development Mission Directorate at 
NASA. Mr. Free is a formally retired NASA civil servant who 
spent the past few years in a variety of private-sector roles. 
Prior to retiring from NASA, he served as a leader in the Human 
Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate and across 
several NASA sectors. Mr. Free earned his bachelor's degree in 
aeronautics from Miami University, his master's degree in space 
systems engineering from Delft University of Technology.
    Mr. William Russell will be our second speaker. He's a 
Director in GAO's (Government Accountability 
Office's)Contracting and National Security Acquisitions Team. 
He oversees a portfolio of issues related to NASA, DOD 
(Department of Defense) weapons system cybersecurity, 
protection of critical technologies, DOD industrial base and 
supply chain integrity, and defense contracting. Mr. Russell 
earned a master's degree in foreign affairs from the University 
of Virginia and a bachelor's degree in political science from 
Virginia Commonwealth University.
    Dr. Patricia Sanders serves as the Chair of the Aerospace 
Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP). She is currently an independent 
aerospace consultant after having been the Executive Director 
of the Missile Defense Agency. In 2008, Dr. Sanders retired 
from the Federal Government after 34 years of service with 
experience in the management of complex technical programs, 
leadership of large and diverse organizations, and development 
and execution of policy at the DOD level.
    Mr. Paul Martin has served as NASA Inspector General since 
2009. Prior to his NASA position, Mr. Martin served as the 
Deputy Inspector General at the U.S. Department of Justice and 
Deputy Staff Director at the U.S. Sentencing Commission. Mr. 
Martin began his professional career as a newspaper reporter in 
Greensville, South Carolina. He holds a BA in journalism from 
Pennsylvania State University and a JD from the Georgetown 
University Law School.
    And then finally, we'll hear from Mr. Dan Dumbacher. Dan is 
the Executive Director of the American Institute of Aeronautics 
and Astronautics, or AIAA. Before joining AIAA, Mr. Dumbacher 
was a Professor at Purdue University and had also served for 
many years in leadership positions across NASA. Mr. Dumbacher 
earned his bachelor's degree in mechanical engineering from 
Purdue and a master's degree in business administration from 
the University of Alabama in Huntsville.
    As our witnesses should know, you'll each have five minutes 
for your spoken testimony. It's perfectly fine that your 
written testimony is much longer than that. And your written 
testimony will be included in full in the record for the 
hearing. When the five of you have completed your spoken 
testimony, we'll begin with questions and each Member will have 
five minutes to question the panel.
    So we will start with Mr. Free. Mr. Free, you have the 
floor.

                  TESTIMONY OF MR. JAMES FREE,

          ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR, EXPLORATION SYSTEMS

                DEVELOPMENT MISSION DIRECTORATE,

         NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

    Mr. Free. Good morning. Chairman Beyer, Ranking Member 
Babin, Ranking Member Lucas, and Members of the Subcommittee, I 
want to thank you for the opportunity to discuss America's next 
great exploration initiative, the Artemis program. It's 
thrilling to stand in the vehicle assembly building at the 
Kennedy Space Center and see the rocket and spacecraft 
transformed from legislation to real hardware about to embark 
upon its maiden voyage to the Moon. Soon, the entire vehicle 
will be rolled out to the pad for the wet dress rehearsal in 
preparation for the Artemis I mission later this year. This is 
the first in a series of increasingly complex missions that 
will demonstrate this Nation's commitment and capability to 
extend human presence to the Moon and beyond.
    To be clear, NASA's long-term goal is to send humans to 
Mars, and we will use the Moon to help us get there. We could 
not have gotten here without the steadfast bipartisan support 
of Congress, starting with the NASA Authorization Act of 2010 
and followed by the NASA Transition Authorization Act of 2017, 
Congress established a clear vision for NASA to extend human 
presence beyond low-Earth orbit (LEO).
    Following this year's uncrewed Artemis I test demonstration 
flight, NASA will conduct a crewed demonstration flight around 
the Moon in 2024 to demonstrate performance of the Orion crew 
capsule in the non-rectilinear halo orbit.
    No earlier than 2025 NASA will launch Artemis III, which 
will return U.S. astronauts to the Moon. During this mission, 
the astronauts will leave Orion and board the human lander 
system, which will deliver two crewmembers to the surface of 
the Moon. The next generation of Moonwalkers will be much more 
diverse as NASA's Artemis program will land the first woman and 
the first person of color on the Moon.
    NASA is also developing the Gateway, a lunar space station 
that will serve as an orbital platform supporting future human 
and robotic missions to science and resource-rich areas on the 
lunar surface, as well as our preparation for Mars. The Gateway 
is also a continued demonstration of NASA's commitment to 
international cooperation, and the Artemis program extending 
our international partnerships from low-Earth orbit.
    NASA has also begun to work with commercial space industry 
to obtain new spacesuits. Under this new program, NASA will 
continue to leverage its center expertise on spacewalk systems, 
spacesuits, and operational concepts.
    Building upon the work done by the Apollo missions, NASA 
will work to make this exploration effort more sustainable with 
help of newer technologies, as well as innovative commercial 
and international partnerships, all while advancing principles 
for peaceful and sustainable space exploration through the 
Artemis Accords. Through Artemis, NASA will continue to be at 
the forefront of humanity's quest for knowledge.
    NASA plans to send more robots and humans to study more of 
the Moon than ever before where we will learn how to live far 
away from Earth for longer periods of time. We will make new 
scientific discoveries and gain a better understanding of how 
much water and other resources are available on the Moon to 
help build the first long-term presence on the surface of the 
Moon. As much as possible, our technologies and operations will 
be designed for use on both Moon and Mars, all supporting our 
long-term goal of sending the first astronauts to the red 
planet.
    Every bit of work that I have mentioned is possible because 
of the people of NASA and our private sector partners. Our 
people have delivered despite COVID, which includes losing some 
of our teammates because of the virus. They've come to work 
while their homes were damaged and without power due to severe 
storms. They've come with the spirit of exploration that has 
and always will be as tangible as the hardware. I'm grateful to 
be able to represent them here.
    Thank you for the first of what I hope to be numerous 
interactions to help explain our plans, how we can continue to 
work together, and, most importantly, share our progress taking 
humanity further into the solar system. Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Free follows:]
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    Chairman Beyer. Mr. Free, thank you very much.
    We'll next hear from Mr. Russell. The floor is yours.

          TESTIMONY OF MR. WILLIAM RUSSELL, DIRECTOR,

        CONTRACTING AND NATIONAL SECURITY ACQUISITIONS,

             U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

    Mr. Russell. Chairman Beyer, Ranking Member Babin, Ranking 
Member Lucas, Members of the Subcommittee, I'm pleased to be 
here today to discuss NASA's efforts to return astronauts to 
the surface of the Moon and ultimately human exploration of 
Mars through its Artemis missions.
    NASA requested at least $32 billion over the next 5 years 
to support this ambitious undertaking. Since 2017, NASA's been 
developing eight highly complex and interdependent lunar 
programs. These include a Human Landing System to support 
transport crew to the surface of the Moon and spacesuits for 
lunar operations. In addition, NASA plans to rely on existing 
programs, including the Orion multipurpose crew vehicle and the 
Space Launch System to launch and transport crew. Successfully 
executing Artemis missions will require extensive coordination 
across programs and with a wide range of contractors to ensure 
systems operate together seamlessly and safely.
    Our work has highlighted NASA's progress. For example, NASA 
is conducting final integration and test activities for Artemis 
I. NASA is also making progress acquiring hardware needed for 
Artemis II. In terms of Artemis III, NASA is completing 
planning activities such as updating requirements and 
implementing our recommendation to schedule integration reviews 
that help ensure coordination of individual lunar programs to 
support the overall Artemis III mission.
    While NASA continues to make progress, the agency still 
faces a number of challenges related to schedule, cost, 
technology development, and management. For example, the 
Artemis III schedule remains challenging. NASA now plans to 
conduct the Artemis III Moon landing mission no earlier than 
2025, a year later than originally planned, but the schedule 
remains challenging. For example, the 7-month delay in working 
on HLS increases schedule risks as the program already planned 
to develop and launch the system months faster than other 
spaceflight programs and will need to mature critical 
technologies along the way. In July 2021 NASA also approved the 
change from developing its new spacesuits from an in-house 
approach to using a contractor, which may also affect planned 
timeframes.
    There are also increasing costs. Key Artemis III programs 
have experienced cost growth. For example, cost for the Space 
Launch System and ground systems grew by more than $1 billion 
in 2020. In addition, transparency of cost could be improved. 
For example, SLS costs are not captured beyond Artemis I, and 
Orion costs are not captured beyond Artemis II. We recommended 
that NASA create an Artemis III mission cost estimate, and NASA 
plans to do so later in 2022.
    There are also management and integration challenges. In 
May 2021 we found that NASA had not yet finalized roles, 
responsibilities, and authorities for Artemis, and NASA is 
currently in the process of reorganizing its Human Exploration 
Mission Directorate. It's too early to tell the outcome of this 
effort. Given the scale and complexity of the programs, it will 
also be important that NASA continue to hold integration 
reviews going forward to reconcile changes across the programs.
    In summary, NASA has made important progress on its Artemis 
efforts, but completing a lunar landing mission remains 
challenging. NASA will need to manage multiple risks 
seamlessly. NASA is undertaking a series of increasingly 
complex missions that rely on the success of individual 
programs, as well as the agency, to effectively manage and 
integrate across those programs. NASA has already experienced 
cost growth and schedule delays on programs needed for Artemis 
I and Artemis II. Further delays and new technical challenges 
can have cascading effects for the lunar missions. It is 
important going forward that NASA continue to improve oversight 
of the Artemis missions and continue to take steps to establish 
mission and program costs, as well as further mature its 
integration and management functions.
    Chairman Beyer, Ranking Member Babin, Ranking Member Lucas, 
this completes my prepared remarks, and I look forward to any 
questions you may have.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Russell follows:]
    
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    Chairman Beyer. Thank you, Mr. Russell, very much.
    We'll now hear from Ms. Sanders for her five minutes. Ms. 
Sanders, you have the floor.

           TESTIMONY OF DR. PATRICIA SANDERS, CHAIR,

                AEROSPACE SAFETY ADVISORY PANEL

    Dr. Sanders. Yes, Chairman Beyer, Ranking Member Babin, 
Ranking Member Lucas, and Members of the Subcommittee, I thank 
you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss 
this very important topic.
    Since its creation on October 1st, 1958, NASA has been 
responsible for some truly remarkable accomplishments. However, 
past achievement does not guarantee future success, and NASA 
has also had its share of failures.
    All of us here today are vitally interested in the success 
of Artemis, which NASA, faced with numerous challenges, 
constraints, and risks, will execute on behalf of the Nation 
but with the essential support of the Administration, the 
Congress, and the overall national space community. The 
inherent challenges include that Artemis is significantly more 
complex than the objectives of previous programs; sustained 
lunar and Martian missions involve significantly greater risk 
than NASA's experiences in low-Earth orbit; that the 
continually increasing pace of technological change requires 
sufficient flexibility to integrate advantageous achievements 
and advancements; that there is a need to integrate the 
contributions of a more diverse and innovative aerospace 
industry both willing and able to make major contributions; and 
that there is an international community that would like to 
build on the International Space Station experience and 
continue to work with NASA.
    Our Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel has recommended some 
key steps that NASA and its stakeholders should take to meet 
the challenges, manage risk, and facilitate success. First, in 
the evolving environment with increasing commercial space 
capabilities and international interest in participating, NASA 
should take a strategic scrutiny of the role the agency intends 
to play going forward to best incorporate these to the 
advantage of Artemis while ensuring clear accountability for 
risk management. We emphasize the importance for NASA to 
strategically define its mission, is guiding principles, and 
its vision for the agency's leadership role in the future in 
order to assure that risk is managed appropriately.
    Second, NASA should manage Artemis as an integrated program 
with top-down alignment and a designated program manager 
endowed with authority, responsibility, and accountability, 
along with a robust bottoms-up collaborative feedback process 
for both systems engineering integration and risk management.
    Third, all the stakeholders, both internal and external to 
the agency, must be aligned to achieve the Artemis mission as a 
cohesive whole. NASA must clearly communicate its strategic 
mission and guiding principles, and these must be understood, 
embraced, and supported by all mission directors, center 
directors, and the work force as a whole, as well as the 
Administration and the Congress.
    Fourth, it is critical for both NASA and its stakeholders 
to establish technical baselines and schedules that are 
mutually consistent, realistic, and achievable, and that are 
supported by adequate and stable resources.
    And last but by far not the least and has already been 
noted by several of the Members, we stress the requirement for 
constancy of purpose as essential to the ability of the agency 
to manage risk intelligently and proactively. Constant and 
abrupt changes in direction must be avoided.
    So as NASA looks to the future and moves to expand human 
knowledge and operational capabilities beyond low-Earth orbit, 
it must recognize and adapt to a new environment and decide 
strategically how to forge humanity's path outward while 
managing the risks in an appropriate manner. The agency, in 
partnership with the Congress, should hold fast to the 
fundamental standards of risk management while embracing new 
approaches and not fearing alternative methods to achieve those 
fundamentals.
    Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Sanders follows:]
    
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    Chairman Beyer. Thank you very much.
    Now, we'll hear from Paul Martin, our--the floor is yours, 
Mr. Martin.

           TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE PAUL K. MARTIN,

            INSPECTOR GENERAL, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS

                    AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

    Mr. Martin. Thank you so much. Chairman Beyer, Ranking 
Members Babin and Lucas, and Members of the Subcommittee, over 
the past 2 years the Office of Inspector General (OIG) has 
issued seven audit reports that examine issues critical to 
NASA's efforts to land humans on the Moon as a precursor to a 
crewed Mars mission. This morning, I plan to highlight two of 
the most important challenges we identified through this 
oversight work, challenges we believe NASA must address in 
order to achieve its ambitious Artemis goals.
    First, controlling the program's enormous expense and 
technical risk. We estimate NASA will spend $53 billion on 
Artemis from 2021 to 2025. Moreover, we found that the first 
four Artemis missions will each cost $4.1 billion per launch, a 
price tag that strikes us as unsustainable. This $4.1 billion 
figure represents only production costs for SLS, Orion, and 
ground operations and does not include the billions in 
development costs required to get the Artemis program to this 
point in time.
    Apart from its cost, NASA's initial three Artemis missions 
face varying degrees of technical risk that will push launch 
schedules from months to years past the agency's goals. With 
all necessary elements for the Artemis I mission now being 
tested at KSC, NASA is progressing toward the first launch of 
the integrated SLS Orion space flight system this summer. For 
Artemis II, NASA's facing delays due in part to the plan to 
reuse key Orion components. And for Artemis III, given the time 
needed to develop and test a Human Landing System and NASA's 
next-generation spacesuits, we estimate the date for a crewed 
lunar landing likely will slip to 2026 at the earliest.
    Second, the Artemis program lacks transparency. Because 
NASA has not defined Artemis as a formal program under agency 
policies, no full Artemis-wide lifecycle cost estimate is 
required. As a result, for fiscal years 2021 through 2025 the 
agency is relying on a rough cost estimate that excludes $25 
billion it plans to spend for key activities related to 
missions beyond Artemis III. Absent a NASA-developed estimate, 
the OIG aggregated relevant costs across all mission 
directorates, and we project that NASA will spend $93 billion 
on the Artemis efforts from 2012 through 2025.
    We concluded that without NASA fully accounting for and 
accurately reporting the overall cost of current and future 
Artemis missions, it will be much more difficult for Congress 
and the Administration to make informed decisions about NASA's 
long-term funding needs, a key to making Artemis a sustainable 
venture.
    To its credit, NASA has taken steps to help reduce costs 
and accelerate Artemis mission schedule, including modifying 
its procurement and program management practices. For example, 
NASA is obtaining HLS transportation services and the Gateway 
spaceflight hardware using research and development contracts 
that more effectively leverage commercial capabilities. As NASA 
moves forward, it must accelerate these efforts to make Artemis 
programs more affordable. Otherwise, relying on such an 
expensive single-use rocket system will, in our judgment, 
inhibit if not derail NASA's ability to sustain its long-term 
human exploration goals to the Moon and Mars.
    We look forward to assisting NASA in this ambitious and 
exciting undertaking. Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Martin follows:]
    
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    Chairman Beyer. Mr. Martin, thank you very much. And 
finally, we'll hear from Dan Dumbacher from AIAA.

               TESTIMONY OF MR. DANIEL DUMBACHER,

             EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, AMERICAN INSTITUTE

                OF AERONAUTICS AND ASTRONAUTICS

    Mr. Dumbacher. Chairman Beyer, Ranking Member Babin, 
Ranking Member Lucas, and distinguished Members of the 
Committee, I want to thank you for the opportunity to speak to 
you today about complex space systems engineering, especially 
as it relates to NASA's Artemis initiative.
    As a former NASA program manager, I have led several major 
NASA programs, including systems in service today. Developing 
an operating space systems, particularly when human lives are 
at stake, require exacting engineering, our best talent and 
persistence. This is risky business.
    Today's aerospace industry recognizes the need to move at a 
more rapid pace. The speed of innovation is increasing. Four 
important factors are needed to capitalize on the rapidly 
evolving capabilities in the aerospace sector. One, a clear 
strategy and focus for what is to be accomplished, why it is 
important, with consistency over time; two, a clear systems 
engineering approach serving as the glue to bring the program 
elements together; three, a greater tolerance for risk at 
certain points in program development, assuring safety and 
balancing performance, schedule, and cost; and four, 
development and growth of a talented work force who will make 
the strategies reality.
    First and foremost, an organization needs an overarching, 
clear, communicable, and stable strategy. Such a strategy must 
describe goals and objectives and define the needed program 
elements. A well-developed strategy establishes the framework 
for the program elements to be developed in concert with the 
integrated whole and to safely operate. Space activities by 
their nature are highly complex. They require extreme 
reliability and safety and must be operable within the mass, 
cost, and schedule constraints. This requires a highly 
integrated space systems engineering effort to assure the 
needed elements physically operate together.
    Today, the commercial space enterprise has an increased 
level of capability, economic opportunity, and potential to 
carry out the strategic objectives with less cost and more 
speed. This increases the need for clear strategic direction as 
a recently released NASA ASAP panel report correctly 
identifies.
    As the program elements are defined and developed, the 
following fundamentals are required: an understanding of how 
all the pieces of the program fit together, an understanding of 
how the system will operate and tolerate malfunctions and 
failures, establishment of options and backup plans to address 
risks and potential problems with onramps for new technologies 
and capabilities. This requires clear decision criteria, 
coordinated acquisition models, and risk acceptance decision 
processes and authority. A piecemeal, uncoordinated approach is 
doomed to failure.
    With these complex endeavors comes unknown and known risks. 
Program leaders must continually evaluate the overall progress 
and risk posture. This necessitates backup plans, options, and 
risk mitigation plans to assure potential--to address potential 
influences and outcomes, and the team must remain curious and 
challenge the status quo to assure success.
    Undertakings such as the Artemis program require program 
elements and acquisition models be coordinated and integrated 
with shared information and clear leadership. The appropriate 
stakeholder and level must own the decisionmaking authority on 
risk acceptance and interface trades to meet safety, cost, and 
schedule requirements.
    Recognizing that safety, technical performance, cost, and 
schedules are all interrelated is key to success. Our tendency 
to avoid all risk at all cost and at all times must be tempered 
with the need to understand the limits of our designs and 
operations and grow our work force and also to learn rapidly 
from a test in place of analytical perfection.
    Space exploration is a long-term endeavor and requires a 
broad view of the needed work force. Career journeys will be 
built upon strategy and mission. Consistency of strategy is key 
to enabling the best and brightest to commit to space 
enterprise careers. We must continue to grow and enhance the 
talents of the work force through inclusivity, capitalize on 
the various perspectives of our diverse demographic 
communities, and, most importantly, continue to build a 
community where everyone is treated with respect and as equals.
    Team leaders at all levels and especially the most senior 
levels must remain vigilant and totally focused on executing 
and accomplishing the established strategy. Experience has 
taught us that successful organizations are laser-focused on 
strategy and assuring the team has the necessary resources.
    In summary, it is my expert opinion that four crucial 
elements are required for successful complex space endeavors. A 
clear and understood strategy is critical. It underpins all 
decisions moving forward. Clear systems engineering and 
integration implemented is the glue that brings all of the 
elements together for safe operation. Risk acceptance 
appropriate for program phase must be managed at the proper 
level to remain in balance across all elements. And we must 
continue to grow and enhance the talent of the aerospace work 
force. This process will take focused leadership, require hard 
decisions and clear communication. Our economic well-being in 
the generations to follow demand success.
    Thank you once again for allowing me to address the 
Committee. I thank the Committee for its continued support of 
our Nation's space program and look forward to answering your 
questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Dumbacher follows:]
    
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    Chairman Beyer. Mr. Dumbacher, thank you. And thank all of 
our witnesses for your excellent testimony. We will now begin a 
round of questions. I'll begin, to be followed by Ranking 
Member Babin.
    So the fact that we're even discussing the need for a 
clear, agreed-upon story of what we're doing, why, and how we 
can get there four years into the Artemis efforts are cause for 
concern. We've heard this from virtually every one of you. Mr. 
Dumbacher, not to have you repeat the last five minutes, but 
why don't we have a clear strategy at NASA? And while you've 
outlined the elements, what will it take to move us from here, 
you know, many billions of dollars into Artemis, to actually 
get to a clear strategy that we can all agree is a clear 
strategy?
    Mr. Dumbacher. Chairman Beyer, I think what is needed is a 
clear story and a clear understanding of what those elements 
are and what is needed and how those elements tie together. 
There has been the discussion about schedule and cost 
estimates, and also importantly is an understanding of how all 
of the elements will technically fit together, particularly for 
the safe operation in the long haul. So I think that story is 
important. We need to--I understand that the agency has been 
working hard on that and working to get to that communication 
for us all, and we certainly look forward to hearing what the 
NASA team has ahead for us. It certainly needs those key 
elements that we've all discussed.
    Chairman Beyer. Thank you. Mr. Free, let me pile on two 
questions. First, what's the strategy look like? I'm Joe 
Citizen out there. Is it one page, is it five pages, is it a 
50-page white paper? What do we expect this story to look like? 
And then, you know, I was amazed to find out that Artemis is 
not a program, that it's just a series of initiatives. This 
Committee's last NASA authorization, which passed our 
Subcommittee, would have established the Moon to Mars 
initiative as a program. Do you agree that we should be doing 
that and should we be pressing ahead?
    Mr. Free. Yes, thank you for the--for both questions, sir. 
Let me start with your first one, what does the strategy look 
like. For me, it's very simple. Our ultimate goal is putting 
people on Mars. It's getting two people to Mars on the surface 
for 30 days, getting them there and back safely. Everything we 
do should be driven by that on the Moon. That's what I've seen 
from the team. That's what I've talked with the team about. 
That's how long we need to stay on the Moon so we prove the 
systems out that we need to understand from a partial gravity 
environment. That is what we use as everything that's driving 
how we're defining our architecture on the Moon, defining and 
refining it.
    Your question about the program, I believe that in our new 
organization we have set up the Artemis Campaign Development 
Division, which will run all of our Artemis missions. There 
will be a mission manager for every single mission, Artemis II, 
Artemis III, that will understand the requirements of the 
mission, the goals of the mission, will be responsible for 
tracking the hardware through its development and bringing it 
together for the operations people in the Space Operations 
Mission Directorate to execute the mission. So from my--and 
embedded in that is a strong system engineering function. That 
Artemis Campaign Development Division will have the budget. 
They will own requirements, and they will have the system 
engineering function to bring the technical products to execute 
each and every Artemis mission.
    Chairman Beyer. [inaudible], Mr. Free, NASA is splitting 
its former Human Exploration Operations Mission Directorate--
long title--into two mission directorates, including the one 
you oversee, I guess one for human exploration, one for 
operations missions. How will this work now? Who's going to be 
in charge of Artemis and ultimately the authority over budgets 
and tradeoffs between projects and all?
    Mr. Free. Yes, sir. Thank you for the question. The split 
was to really focus in on the execution of our programs, 
completing the development. The scope had grown greatly in the 
Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate. This was 
to split it and have my organization focus on the development 
and have that budget authority over the development of the crew 
vehicle of the lander elements over the suits. And then as we 
developed that hardware and get it proven through flights, 
sometimes multiple flights, sometimes a single flight--we're 
defining development that way--we hand off the--to the 
Operations Mission Directorate the control of those elements. 
And then my organization in the Artemis campaign continues to 
develop the new hardware we're bringing online and defined the 
missions to achieve our ultimate goals, which are tied to those 
two people for 30 days on the surface of the Mars safe there 
and--on Mars safe there and back.
    Chairman Beyer. Thank you, Mr. Free, very much. Let's move 
on then to our Ranking Member, Dr. Babin, for your questions.
    Mr. Babin. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate 
that. I'd like to start out with Mr. Martin. Your testimony 
estimates that SLS will cost $4.1 billion per launch for at 
least the first four Artemis missions. During the shuttle 
program, there was a running joke that the first shuttle launch 
of the year cost $3 billion. All the rest of the flights were 
free. It doesn't look like that's going to hold here.
    Wayne Hale, Chair of the NASA Advisory Council's Human 
Exploration and Operations Subcommittee wrote in 2019, if there 
is to be a program at all, a specialized skilled work force 
dedicated to that program must be paid, specialized facilities 
dedicated to that program must be maintained, and all of those 
things must be paid for, never mind however--how many times a 
year they are used. A real space program is not a buy-it-by-
the-yard kind of thing. The incremental cost of any additional 
shuttle flight was more realistically in the neighborhood of 
$200 million, not cheap but a lot less than 1.54--$1.5 billion 
figure that comes from the simple computation that throws in 
everything and divides by 135, which is the total number of 
shuttle flights. So, Mr. Martin, if flight rates increased, how 
much would the incremental cost per launch be?
    Mr. Martin. Thank you, Mr. Babin. You know, the exact 
figure is unclear because part of it goes to the efficiencies 
that the underlying contractors like Boeing, which is in charge 
of developing the SLS core stage, the efficiencies that they 
make. One of the problems we saw in development of the SLS and 
Orion is the challenging development of course, but we did 
see--notice very poor contractor performance on Boeing's part. 
It was poor planning and poor execution. We saw that the cost-
plus contracts that NASA had been using to develop a combined 
SLS-Orion system worked to the contractor's rather than NASA's 
advantage.
    And then for NASA's part we saw poor project management and 
contract oversight. In fact with--for example, with respect to 
award fees, Boeing received 86 percent of all available award 
fees for the core stage development despite being billions over 
budget and years behind schedule. So if they improve their 
accountability, then we'll certainly get to drive down that 
$4.1 billion cost per flight.
    Mr. Babin. OK. Well, how much of your assessed cost of SLS 
and Orion fund center infrastructure, NASA, work force, or 
other agency capabilities necessary to maintain a civil space 
program, how much?
    Mr. Martin. If you look on page 24 of our November 2021 
report on the Artemis program, you'll see that we cost out $2.2 
billion for production of a single SLS, the Exploration Ground 
Systems at $568 million, Orion at $1 billion, and $300 million 
to the Europeans for the European Space Agency service module. 
You add that together, and NASA checked these figures, and it's 
$4.1 billion.
    Mr. Babin. OK. All right. I see how you arrived at that. 
OK, thank you. My next question is for Dr. Sanders. Ma'am, the 
ASAP report states NASA should assess the work force, including 
the number, types, skills, experience, and responsibilities 
that will be required and the infrastructure facility 
requirements with a plan for managing changes needed to meet 
these--those requirements. And the report also states that NASA 
should also propose general criteria for evaluating make, 
manage, or buy decisions on future programs and projects. So 
when making those make, manage, or buy decisions, how can NASA 
ensure that they are conducting a true apples-to-apples 
comparison when some programs carry costs associated with NASA 
capabilities and some don't?
    Dr. Sanders. Well, when we talked about NASA having a 
strategic vision, we talked more--as much about deciding what 
NASA's role would be relative to the commercial industry and 
the international partners as we did about knowing where it's 
going and what it's developing. And we were recognizing that 
there is a fundamental shift underway in the space industry. In 
the past, NASA owned the design, owned the requirements, owned 
the development entirely itself. And now in many cases NASA 
owns the requirements and the accountability for the success of 
mission but not the design or the hardware. So we were--we're 
talking about NASA having a fundamental understanding of how 
they manage that risk, how they--when they don't control all of 
the variables but still are accountable, and we were--so when 
deciding what your criteria are for make, manage, or buy, you 
needed to take into account how you were going to manage the 
risk in each case and have the right criteria for that. It 
depends on how you intend to do the oversight, how you intend 
to do the insight, how you intend to operate in your 
acquisition strategy as a customer or as a partner, and those 
are fundamentally different relationships. And so we felt that 
was important.
    It does bear on cost. Our--obviously, our panel is focused 
on safety and risk management, but cost can't be ignored. One 
of the advantages of being able to take [inaudible] to 
incorporate commercially built and designed components into the 
Artemis initiative is the fact that you do not necessarily have 
to pay for every part of the development if the commercial 
entity is developing it for other customers besides NASA.
    So, for example, if the human lander is going to--and the 
components of the human lander, particularly the launch 
vehicle, are going to have other users, then NASA shouldn't 
bear the full cost of developing that part of the component. 
But they still have to make sure it meets their requirements 
and that it meets their objectives, so it's something that we 
believe NASA has today evolved to through tactically managing 
the commercial resupply system, the commercial----
    Mr. Babin. OK. Yes, I'm out of time and I appreciate that 
very much. I have several other questions, but we'll just have 
to submit those in writing. So I'll yield back. Thank you. 
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Beyer. Thank you, Dr. Babin. I'm going to now 
recognize the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Norcross.
    Mr. Norcross. Thank you, Chairman, for holding this hearing 
and really appreciate it.
    So my first question will go to Mr. Free but also want to 
hear from the Inspector General if he concurs with this. You 
know, our country over the last two years has been, you know, 
severely impacted by COVID. We've seen time after time that 
companies are shutting down, and now the supply chain is at 
risk in so many areas. Many of the figures that we've heard 
today were developed either before or during much of this 
COVID. Can you reflect in a general way, have you taken into 
effect--the COVID effect--on both work force and supply chain 
and how that's reflected in your numbers, Mr. Free?
    Mr. Free. Yes, thank you for the question, sir. I 
appreciate it. We--so I mentioned in my opening statement the 
challenges we face with COVID and storms. Keeping the work 
force connected--obviously, we have a significant work force 
that is hands-on when we're building vehicles. We've kept our 
team connected and continued our design. So from my perspective 
we--that has continued and not been a factor in increases in 
our cost estimates.
    From a supply chain perspective, I think we still are 
trying to understand that. We are--we've had impacts before 
that. Just the demand for components for space systems has 
increased greatly; the complexity of those systems has 
increased greatly. So we had supply chains that--issues that 
were factored into our earlier estimates.
    From a COVID impact perspective, I still think that's TBD 
(to be decided). You've heard about a lot of the issues around 
chips. For us, it's around valves, it's around tanks. All of 
those I think are things that will--we still have to figure out 
in the weeks and months ahead as we put our next budget 
submittal together.
    Mr. Norcross. Thank you, Mr. Free. And I should start out 
by saying to all those who stayed on the job during COVID, 
thank you. You literally kept things going. But you being one 
of the only organizations that I have ever talked to that said 
they had virtually no impact on their bottom line.
    And with that, I'd like to ask our Inspector General, do 
you concur with the assessment that we just heard?
    Mr. Martin. Thank you, Mr. Norcross. I don't disagree. I 
think it is to be decided. So many of these components that are 
essential to the Artemis missions have such long lead times 
that the production and development began long before COVID. 
But it's clear that, as Mr. Free pointed out, there have been a 
variety of challenges. And I would add an additional one, legal 
challenges. When NASA awarded the contract for the Human 
Landing System, there was a series of legal challenges that 
stopped work with the award-winning contractor for 7 months. 
And so there's a whole--even beyond COVID, there are many 
challenges.
    Mr. Norcross. Thank you. I just want to followup with Ms. 
Sanders. When you talked about owning the risk--and I will use 
the term risk--but plan--how do we not own the design plans? 
Having gone through and--my Committee deals with the F-35 on 
some of those very issues--when we sign away the ownership on 
some of this, we sign away a significant future for those parts 
and plans. Can you give us a little bit more clarity on what we 
will own versus what we won't?
    Dr. Sanders. It will actually depend on how the contract 
acquisition is carried out. But in--for example, the experience 
they've had with commercial crew program--and I think has--
which is carrying forward into the Human Landing System, the--
NASA sets the requirements, and they say this is what we need 
the system to do, and also the verification of meeting those 
requirements. But the provider designs and sets the design, and 
the design may be set to meet more than one--more than NASA as 
a customer. Therefore, it's really important that the 
verification that they meet the requirements that NASA must 
have is well-established and that there is adequate testing, 
adequate verification, adequate insight, oversight in order to 
make sure that NASA can then be accountable for the success of 
its mission.
    Mr. Norcross. Thank you. Let's be clear. We end up paying 
for that design whether we share it direct or indirectly. Those 
are included. And let us just not forget the software.
    Dr. Sanders. Yes.
    Mr. Norcross [continuing]. And owning that. With that, I 
see my time is expired, and I yield back.
    Chairman Beyer. Thank you, Mr. Norcross, very much. Let me 
now recognize the Ranking Member of the Full Committee, the 
Honorable Mr. Lucas.
    Mr. Lucas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I think all of you 
know that I strongly support NASA's efforts to return to the 
Moon. I realize it's going to be expensive, and I realize it's 
going to be hard, but I believe that it is worth the effort. 
And a part of accomplishing that shared goal is, as we've 
discussed in this hearing so far, the need for solid cost and 
schedule plans.
    So I ask this--a question of the panel. I guess maybe a 
phrase would be I survey this panel. And I know, Dr. Free, I 
believe offered 2025. But realistically, each of you, what is 
your estimate based on your vantage point and observations of 
this process about when we'll again land crew on the Moon? I 
believe, Jim, you said 2025, correct?
    Mr. Free. Yes, sir. Yes, sir, I did. And that's based on 
how I see the hardware coming together for the suits and the 
landers and Orion and SLS.
    Mr. Lucas. Could I have the rest of the panel offer an 
observation about what year you realistically believe we'll put 
a--land a crew on the Moon again?
    Mr. Martin. I'm going to jump in. Inspectors General tend 
to be a tad bit more pessimistic than the agency. That's what 
we're paid to do.
    Mr. Lucas. That's your job.
    Mr. Martin. Our current--based on our current work is we 
say no earlier than 2026, citing the two developments that Jim 
mentioned, development of a human-certified Human Landing 
System, as well as the next-generation spacesuits, no earlier 
than 2026, but it could be a good bit later.
    Mr. Lucas. Anyone else care to touch on that? Be brave.
    Mr. Russell. Sure. Congressman Lucas, this is Bill Russell 
from GAO. Certainly, that's what we've seen in our work that 
even 2025 may be optimistic given some of the challenges, not 
the least of which would be getting the Human Landing System 
certified to operate. Spacesuits, same thing, still--there's a 
change in the acquisition strategy, so you're going to have a 
contract award that you need to do this year, and there's still 
some technologies that are not mature, which often point to 
taking longer in development to get there. So 2025 is not 
impossible, but it seems improbable given the current 
situation.
    Mr. Lucas. Carefully worded.
    Dr. Sanders. And our panel would probably echo that. We 
don't think it's impossible, but it's a stretch goal. It's 
sometimes good to have stretch goals in terms of your schedule, 
but you need to be realistic and--as well. And we also believe 
that you shouldn't let having a prescribed deadline kind of 
date cause you to make unwise decisions that impact the safety 
and success because you're just trying to meet that goal.
    Mr. Lucas. Valid point.
    Mr. Dumbacher. Yes, Congressman, I think from our 
perspective the 2025 date is certainly on the optimistic 
stretch goal side, and we would agree with that and certainly 
want to echo Patricia's point on making sure that we make good 
decisions along the way and not let schedule pressure force bad 
decisions.
    I think from our perspective the 2025 to 2027 timeframe is 
probably realistic. With the right focus, the right resources, 
we think it's certainly attainable in the 2025 to 2027 
timeframe.
    Mr. Lucas. Mr. Free, of course, we are clearly in this 
hearing highlighting the question about detailed plans and cost 
for Artemis. When will NASA send Congress a plan, including an 
integrated schedule and detail cost estimates for the Artemis 
program? When will we see that?
    Mr. Free. Yes, sir. You know, we've--we have our new 
organization that I mentioned with our Artemis campaign that 
I'm counting on putting that mission manager in charge to put 
the integrated plan together. We've put together a plan that 
lays out through our Artemis V showing our goals. We have a 
longer-term architecture that we're trying to put the final 
details on by the end of this year. We're in the midst of our 
budget process right now to--that captures out through our 
landing, which will inform the President's budget for 2024.
    So all of those things, I just gave you the list, not to 
defer to your question, but give you the list of how it's all 
lining up that I feel it's my responsibility to put an 
integrated plan and budget together to show--to getting us to 
the first landing.
    Mr. Lucas. Well, clearly, this is now the focus of the 
Committee, and our attention will only increase. And I would 
offer the same observation to my colleagues on the Committee. 
Our responsibilities to do a NASA reauthorization bill are only 
increasing, too. We have responsibilities also with 
specifications that will help enable the Artemis project.
    With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the--whatever time I 
don't have.
    Chairman Beyer. Thank you, Mr. Lucas, very much. And, Mr. 
Lucas, we look forward to your input as we move forward on the 
authorization this spring and reflecting many of your concerns. 
I know you asked about how soon we put men and women on the 
Moon. I now recognize the gentleman who will be concerned about 
when we put them on Mars, Mr. Perlmutter from Colorado.
    Mr. Perlmutter. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And I'll hold up my 
bumper sticker, which all of you have seen before. That 
obviously has been something--thanks, Frank. And I concur with 
Mr. Lucas's comments about us, you know, doing our work and 
getting a NASA authorization bill to give direction to the 
agency as to what we want to see and when we want to see it, 
why we want to see it, all that stuff. So we've got our own 
work to do.
    Mr. Free, I'm going to start with you. And I liked what you 
said in your opening remarks about, look, what we're doing 
here--and this was a conversation we had with Mr. Bridenstine 
when he was leading the agency, Senator Nelson since he's been 
leading the agency, that for me at least going back to the Moon 
is the stepping stone to going on to Mars. And that really is 
what we want to do. So, you know, if there is any schedule 
pressure, Dr. Sanders, Mr. Dumbacher, it's 2033, OK? There's a 
lot of leeway in there.
    So my staff was concerned though in the written testimony 
of all of you, everybody's talking about the Moon like two, 
three times more than you're mentioning Mars. And so for me I 
just want to make sure and I'd like you to kind of reiterate 
what you said, what is it that you're planning to do on the 
Moon that will help us get to Mars? That's what I want to see 
in any report that you guys prepare.
    Mr. Free. Yes, sir. Thank you. Thank you for your question 
and for your passion. I did mention our goal is to get on the 
surface of the Moon so we understand how our systems operate in 
partial gravity. I'll give you an analogy. We tested systems 
for life support for a great deal of time on the Earth, and 
then we put it in orbit, we saw a different type of behavior 
because it was in microgravity. We are trying to set our plans 
for the same thing, life support system, how will--the human 
interaction partial gravity for long duration, how we can use 
power systems that are common. When we talk about adding 
elements to our lunar architecture, it's always about how does 
that play forward into what it can do on Mars. Obviously, a 
lander is going to be different because we have an atmosphere, 
but there are a lot of things that we could do from a rover 
perspective, from a spacesuit perspective, from a surface 
habitation element perspective that have great parallels 
between the Moon and Mars.
    So I'll go back to what I said, two people on the surface 
for 30 days there and back safe to Mars, that drives everything 
we're going to do. So when we feel confident that we have the 
runtime on the surface--and also I should mention Gateway. We 
plan on using Gateway as a platform to test our transit hab as 
well for extended durations to get that runtime is just like 
building reliability in cars, right? We want to build that 
reliability by operating time. That's what we're trying to get 
on the surface and on Gateway before we go on to Mars.
    Mr. Perlmutter. All right. Thank you for that. Mr. Martin, 
let me ask you. You know, when I--earlier on, I want to say it 
was probably about 2016, we had a hearing with NASA executives 
and that's really when they said to me, look, the best time for 
us to get to Mars, making sure it's international in scope and 
public-private partnership because it's a big task, but the 
orbits are close and it saves space travel time, it's safer for 
our astronauts. At that point they--I said how much is this 
going to cost for us to get there 2033? And they said at that 
time, 2016, $200 billion. So this is not inexpensive. Nobody 
ever said it is.
    So looking at that kind of big number, you said we've 
already spent $93 billion, but you took it back to 2012, if I 
heard your testimony correctly. I mean, where are we sort of as 
we--if $200 billion were that--were the right number back in 
2016?
    Mr. Martin. Sir, you're exactly right. The $93 billion was 
from 2012 through 2025. And we picked 2012 because that was 
when the heavy-duty work for the Post-Constellation program 
began and several of the components, both the capsule and the 
rocket from Constellation have evolved into the SLS and Orion, 
so that's sort of why we chose those dates.
    We've done some work looking at potential Mars--the cost of 
potential Mars missions. And to be honest, there's no reliable 
estimates out there about what such a mission would cost given 
the change in strategy. As Mr. Free indicated, we're building--
NASA is building capabilities, many of which they hope to use 
on an eventual Mars mission. So we will continue as an Office 
of Inspector General to look at both what they're spending now 
and how they're developing the equipment and the missions for 
the future.
    Mr. Perlmutter. OK, thank you. I see my time has expired, 
and I have, as you can imagine, a lot of questions. I'll yield 
back to the Chair.
    Chairman Beyer. Mr. Perlmutter, thank you for your 
steadfast Mars advocacy. We need you.
    Let me now recognize the gentleman who has the honor to 
represent Cape Canaveral, Congressman Posey.
    Mr. Posey. Thank you very much, Chairman Beyer.
    Congressman Perlmutter just asked a question which was of 
greatest interest to me, and that was the importance of 
sustained lunar exploration as a precursor to human exploration 
on Mars, and great answers.
    Mr. Free and then Mr. Dumbacher, China and Russia have 
their sights set on the Moon and its resources with their now 
joint lunar base. Given what the Moon represents in terms of 
resources, prestige, U.S. national security, what does the 
United States and NASA need to do to guarantee the success of 
the Artemis program in the coming years?
    Mr. Free. Yes, thank you, sir, for the question and----
    Mr. Posey. [inaudible] besides big checks.
    Mr. Free. Yes. Thank you for the question, and thank you 
for your work force. Representative Norcross asked me earlier 
about impacts. There have absolutely been impacts from COVID on 
the work force, and I don't underestimate that, so appreciate 
your--the folks you represent that work so hard for us.
    I think what we need to do, you know, there's published--
public data about when China plans to go to the Moon, but I 
look at what I have to do every day is keep our focus on 
performance, on our programs, setting a realistic schedule and 
budget, and working to that, highlighting when we can't meet it 
and why, and then, frankly, executing it. I see that as my job 
and what I need to do every day. If I don't keep that focus, 
then I can't say that I'm giving my all to the effort that you 
all have given us the resources to do. We need to continue to 
expand our international partnerships through the Artemis 
Accords, the--Romania signed the Artemis Accords at 10:30 
Eastern today. So we continue to add international partners, 
and we continue--we need to continue to take advantage of what 
the commercial industry provides us for our capability.
    Mr. Posey. Thank you. And you just answered another 
question that I had next. For the record, what is the China-
Russia date?
    Mr. Dumbacher. The Chinese date I think is published to be 
later this decade.
    Mr. Posey. Mr. Dumbacher, do you want to add to that?
    Mr. Dumbacher. Thank you, Congressman. I think, one, I've--
one thing we're certainly seeing across the aerospace industry 
is this--because of the China and Russian activities is a new--
is an increased urgency and an increased need for speed and 
innovation. We have the commercial private industry that we can 
build upon, and with the--again, with the proper focus and the 
proper strategy in place that everybody understands and can--
and we can get people making those--their important decisions 
at their appropriate levels with that new urgency and that 
consistency of purpose or constancy of purpose are how we're 
going to get there and how we're going to get ourselves and 
retain our leadership and in fact increase the U.S. leadership 
in space.
    Mr. Posey. Thank you. Mr. Free, in your written testimony 
you state Artemis represent new opportunities to broaden the 
international Artemis coalition with China using its Belt and 
Road Initiative to expand its influence into outer space. What 
is NASA's plan to compete against this threat? Does it include 
a proactive strategy which you just touched on a minute ago to 
increase the number of countries and other partners to be part 
of the Artemis force?
    Mr. Free. Yes, sir. So I mentioned Romania. And we're 
working with several nations on other contributions to Artemis. 
And it runs across the spectrum from early discussions about 
their desires to participate all the way through finalized 
elements that you know of that are going on Gateway for the I-
HAB (International Habitat), the service modules we get today, 
the ESPRIT (European System Providing Refueling, Infrastructure 
and Telecommunications) refueling module. We're talking with a 
potential partner about an airlock. So it's from small efforts 
to large with several different countries and entities all 
going on at the same time, so we look to continue to expand 
that.
    Mr. Posey. Thank you. Thank you very much. And, Mr. 
Chairman, I yield back.
    Chairman Beyer. Thank you, Mr. Posey.
    We only have one more questioner for this first round, but 
for those Members who would like to hang in for a second round, 
please, please stay.
    And with that, let me recognize the gentlewoman from 
California, Ms. Kim.
    Ms. Kim. Thank you, Chairman Beyer and Ranking Member Babin 
and Ranking Member Lucas. Thank you very much for holding this 
important hearing on Artemis program.
    As all of us are, I am also a very proud supporter of our 
efforts to return to the Moon and land humans on Mars. And I 
really want to thank the witnesses for appearing before this 
Committee today to speak on our progress on achieving that 
goal. And it's my hope that we will soon have a NASA 
authorization bill in the House, and I hope the Space 
Subcommittee will have the opportunity to work with NASA and 
seek input from the industry stakeholders to produce a good and 
bipartisan reauthorization bill that supports our goals of 
getting to the Moon and eventually to Mars.
    The Inspector General's report on NASA's management of the 
Artemis program states that $25 billion should be added to the 
Artemis plan's projected cost, which will bring the projected 
cost of the program to $93 billion for the fiscal years 2021 to 
2025. And this report calls for increased price transparency 
and more realistic cost estimates and calculations of per-
mission costs.
    So, Inspector General Martin, what explains the differences 
between your projected costs and NASA's projected costs of the 
Artemis program through 2025? And I know we're talking more--
rather than 2025, a more realistic goal of 2033.
    Mr. Martin. Thank you, Congresswoman. What's not included 
in that $25 billion are costs for capabilities beyond Artemis 
III. And they include the Gateway, they include development of 
the SLS Block 1B, also the exploration upper stage, the Mobile 
Launcher 2. There's a whole series of capabilities that are 
being developed as we speak now that we total up to be 
approximately $25 billion that are not reflected in NASA's 
current Artemis cost estimates.
    Ms. Kim. Now, Inspector General Martin, so what can NASA do 
to provide more realistic cost assessment for the Artemis 
program?
    Mr. Martin. I'm glad you asked that because we made that 
recommendation to them in our November report that you cited. 
We think that there should be an Artemis-wide lifecycle cost 
estimate. And it's sort of a--not completely clear to us why 
NASA has failed to agree with our recommendations. From our 
perspective an Artemis-wide cost estimate--lifecycle cost 
estimate would help increase transparency into the program. It 
would inform NASA's annual budget request. And I think, 
importantly, it would provide a benchmark against which NASA 
can assess its cost-saving initiatives.
    Ms. Kim. Thank you. You know, as we look to once again go 
beyond the low orbit--low-Earth orbit, I believe it is 
important that we do not forget the research in LEO that is 
required prior to sending astronauts into deep space. The 
Inspector General's report on NASA's management of the ISS 
notes that several research programs dedicated to human 
exploration in deep space will be incomplete by the time the 
ISS is de-orbited. So while I am pleased to see that NASA 
recently released an update to the ISS transition plan, I am 
worried that NASA has not been specific enough on how it 
intends to continue to invest in research into human systems 
integration architecture, injury due to extravehicular activity 
operations, spaceflight end-use cardiovascular disease, space 
radiation exposure, and other critical low-Earth orbit research 
activities when the transition is complete.
    So, Mr. Free, let me ask you a question. Are you confident 
that NASA's ability to complete this research in time for 
future crewed Artemis missions, and how is NASA working with 
commercial partners and international partners who signed the 
Artemis Accords to ensure those LEO research requirements are 
met?
    Mr. Free. Thank you very much for the question. NASA has a 
robust research plan around its--for human research and to buy 
down the risks for the systems for our long-term missions to 
the Moon and Mars. That is based in LEO.
    Today, we're doing a great deal of research on the space 
station of our systems that will actually be used to fly to the 
Moon and to Mars. Carbon dioxide removal as an example. Our 
plan to continue after the space station life is complete is to 
work through our commercial LEO destinations that we just 
awarded three contracts for late last year where we plan to 
continue to do our research that is dependent on microgravity, 
that will continue from what we do on space station today. So 
we are not ending our time in low-Earth orbit when the space 
station life is complete. We're actually enabling that through 
our commercial LEO destinations and completion of our research 
plans.
    Ms. Kim. Thank you very much. I think my time is up. I 
yield back.
    Chairman Beyer. Thank you, Congresswoman Kim.
    Now, let me recognize Congressman Sherman from California 
for his questions.
    Mr. Sherman. Thank you. This one's for the panel. To ensure 
we get the maximum value out of the capacity of the Space 
Launch System, please discuss how NASA plans to take full 
advantage of the Space Launch System's, the SS--the SLS's 
capacities. Are you working with the science community and 
government--and other government agencies, particularly the 
Department of Defense, to help take advantage of America's 
rockets?
    Mr. Free. Yes, sir, and thank you. I'll start and the rest 
of the panel can answer.
    We are--as you know, SLS is really--truly a national 
capability. It has incredible lift capability to low-Earth 
orbit and enabling our lunar missions. And we'll continue to 
expand that as we move through development of Block 1B in the 
Artemis IV mission set today.
    The access to that rocket we're looking to enable through 
our exploration production and operations contract. Other 
entities, both other government agencies, including the science 
community, to take advantage of the capabilities of that rocket 
and eventually our goal with our--that contract is to lower the 
cost of SLS operations as well.
    Mr. Sherman. Thank you. Mr. Martin, you frequently reported 
on the need to implement more effective contracting mechanisms 
to control costs and hold companies accountable if there is 
poor performance. This seems reasonable. Following your recent 
reviews of the Artemis program, can you elaborate on how tools 
like fixed-price contracting could help keep the Human Landing 
System's effort, within Artemis, within budget compared to 
other contracting approaches?
    Mr. Martin. Thank you, Congressman. As NASA has moved a 
number of its spaceflight capabilities to a fixed-price system, 
fixed-price contract mechanism, and that makes sense if only if 
the design for the system is solidified. What we've seen even 
with fixed-price contracts is they award a fixed-price contract 
but then have modifications down the road that are often caused 
by NASA because the engineering and design work has not yet 
been solidified. So we're pro-fixed-price contracts, but they 
have to be appropriately used with a more firm design and 
engineering construct.
    Mr. Sherman. That seems reasonable. Thank you very much. I 
yield back.
    Chairman Beyer. Excellent. Thank you very much.
    We'll now begin a second round of questions. To Mr. Martin, 
in your role as overseeing NASA for all these years, we've come 
up again and again with this whole notion of Artemis-wide 
lifecycle cost estimate. Is there any sense that that would 
terrify the American public and shut down a program like this, 
that instead of looking at it as X-billion dollars per year, we 
looked at the lifecycle cost and then robbed it of its 
political salience?
    Mr. Martin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The politics of it I 
will leave to you and the Members of the Committee and the rest 
of Congress. We just think operationally and strategically it's 
in NASA's best long-term interest to have an idea when they're 
presenting whatever, be it Artemis or be it the James Webb 
Space Telescope, if they have a--as detailed and as accurate a 
lifecycle cost estimate so you know what the American taxpayer 
is buying.
    I mean, there's opportunity cost. If you buy--let's use 
James Webb for instance. It costs over $10 billion. It--we're 
not making a value judgment at the Office of Inspector General 
whether it's worth the $10 billion. It may very well be worth 
$20 billion. That's not our--within our purview here at the 
Office of Inspector General. But that came in many years ago 
approximately as a $1 billion--was presented to Congress as a 
$1 billion project, OK, and then ballooned over the years. It 
is a one-of-a-kind instrument, I get that, but it ballooned 
over the years to $10 billion. There's opportunity costs by 
Congress appropriating and NASA spending that $9 billion 
deficit on the James Webb Space Telescope, there were other 
things it couldn't do. So I think an overall, as accurate as 
possible lifecycle cost estimate should be sort of baseline for 
these major programs.
    Chairman Beyer. Thank you very much. Mr. Dumbacher, you've 
been on all sides here, including a professor at Purdue. 
There's a fascinating piece called ``Good NASA, Bad NASA'' by a 
guy named James Meigs that I read over the weekend. It talked 
about how NASA had done incredibly good work on things like the 
space telescopes and the--all the science stuff, but had just 
spent endless amounts of money year after year through the 
major contractors, the Boeings, et cetera, making virtually no 
progress on human exploration.
    The--does the Elon Musk experience, the development of 
Starship, the ability to go back and forth for what seems to be 
a fraction of the cost of NASA, push us in the direction of 
privatizing more of NASA? And how does that feed into the 
debate about who should own the assets at the end of that, 
assets that the American people have paid for?
    Mr. Dumbacher. Well, that's a very interesting question, 
Congressman. I will do my best to do it in a short form. I 
think the opportunity that the commercial private space 
enterprise companies provide us, one, is they are a new level 
of competition that we haven't had in the past that--or in 
recent memory that has turned and just proven to be beneficial. 
They also bring forward that efficiency, thinking through how 
we can do it more efficiently while retaining our safety and 
our technical performance. I think those are all valuable 
lessons that should be continued.
    What we--and how we can apply that to the future is, as 
NASA moves forward and we consider the typical or the expected 
role of the government investment to reduce the risk for 
private industry to then come in behind the government and to 
make--and to pick up--make it a market potential and get the 
cost efficiency and the speed into it.
    We are going through that transition for the first time 
from a human spaceflight perspective similar to what the 
commercial airline, commercial aviation industry did back in 
the 1940's and 1950's. So what we have to learn forward is that 
we need to work through that transition, we need to think 
through that transition and, importantly, value the taxpayer 
investment because that taxpayer investment and the knowledge 
from it provides the necessary basis for the emerging economic 
opportunity down the road.
    So we have the opportunity with--in the launch vehicle 
industry because of the investments that the government has 
made in the past, they are now coming to commercial fruition, 
and we can begin to apply those. We have to be diligent, 
though, of making sure we protect the knowledge base so that 
the taxpayer investment can be utilized across the board. And 
also recognize that at times--and we have experienced doing 
this. Also recognize at times that we will have to protect 
commercial investment when they--when the commercial entities 
also provide some funding.
    So this is a balancing act. It's a complicated transition 
that we're going through for the first time, and I think we're 
learning and we're seeing good progress. And there's 
opportunity out there. We just have to be cognizant and 
conscious about the hard decisions.
    Chairman Beyer. Thank you, Mr. Dumbacher, very much.
    Now let me recognize Dr. Babin for his questions.
    Mr. Babin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm glad we're going 
back through it a second time. I've got a couple more that I 
was not able to get to.
    I'd like to go to Mr. Free and ask you, will there be one 
mission control for Artemis, SLS, Orion, and HLS, or will there 
be separate mission controls and mission operation centers like 
there are for ISS and the commercial operations? If there's 
just one, where will it be located? And if there will be 
several, where will they be located as well?
    Mr. Free. Yes, thank you, Dr. Babin. Actually, I'm down 
here at JSC (Johnson Space Center) right now, a place you're 
familiar with and a pleasure. I'm sure you meet a lot of folks. 
It was a pleasure to meet you at the astronaut candidate 
induction.
    And so from a mission control perspective, we have mission 
control in Houston, which will be the hub for all of our 
activities around Artemis. There will be mission control for--
from our HLS provider that mission control here in Houston will 
connect with. SLS has a control center where they look at all 
the data for SLS, but the central control for us will be here 
in Houston whenever we put the crew on there. That's where we 
focus our efforts.
    Mr. Babin. OK, great. Thank you very much. That's good 
news, and great to see you again as well, Jim.
    Also, one last question for you. NASA recently initiated an 
effort to reduce the cost of SLS and Orion by 50 percent. What 
is the status of this review? And is the goal reducing 50 
percent of the cost of contracts or the overall programs, 
including NASA's portion of the program? So if you could 
elaborate on that a little bit, I would appreciate that.
    Mr. Free. Yes, sir. That's our exploration, production, and 
operations contract effort. That is currently being set up and 
evaluated through our procurement process internal to the 
agency, so that's ongoing with near-term activities underway. 
Trying to get to that as fast as we can, the focus is on 
beginning that with Artemis V.
    I talked earlier about the change between development and 
operations. That's where we're looking at making that switch. 
The focus of that contract is to work the contractor's side to 
get that 50 percent reduction on everything we have with the 
multiple contracts we have around the Space Launch System in 
today. And we of course will always look at our side of the 
equation also of can we do things differently to lower our cost 
and our general operations to work with the contractor. If we 
give them that contract, that's going to change how we 
interact. That also means we need to make sure that that work 
force has work to go to as well.
    Mr. Babin. OK, thank you so very much. And I really 
appreciate it. I'll yield back, Mr. Chairman. And, Jim, thank 
you for your service, too.
    Chairman Beyer. Thank you, Dr. Babin. I'll now recognize 
perhaps the first Congressman to represent Mars, Mr. 
Perlmutter.
    Mr. Perlmutter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And my questions 
are going to go to you, Mr. Russell, Mr. Martin, and Dr. 
Sanders, just to--and then anybody else. It's sort of more of a 
philosophical kind of an overall kind of thing. Dr. Sanders, 
you talk about the need for a strategic vision. We are in a 
moment now--and this goes back to the beginning of, you know, 
our spaceflight and--where we were in serious competition with 
Russia. And, you know, President Kennedy and President 
Eisenhower said, OK, we got to get busy here. And it was 
civilian and a defense effort.
    So my questions in--my question generally is has there been 
any discussion as you're doing sort of a budget analyses, as 
you're thinking about the strategic vision, what role the 
Defense Department may play in all of this as we're going back 
to the Moon, as we move toward Mars? So I guess it's just a 
very--and I want my Chairman and my Ranking Member to be 
thinking about this. You're not going to have me around for a 
long time, and I have been talking to the Armed Services 
Committee about the need for us to consider this. So I'll yield 
first to you, Dr. Sanders.
    Dr. Sanders. OK. A little bit outside of the lane, but one 
of the things when we talk about the hazards of space 
exploration, they always talk about balancing the value of what 
you're undertaking with the risks that you're--that are 
attendant with it because you're never going to eliminate all 
the risk. And anything that can help you manage that risk 
better, including partnerships with the Department of Defense, 
would certainly be a potential positive there.
    The other thing is is that leadership--the Nation's 
leadership in space is an important aspect of our leadership 
in--across the spectrum, and so cooperation wherever it's 
possible between defense and NASA is certainly a welcome thing.
    Mr. Perlmutter. Thank you. So I guess to Mr. Russell, Mr. 
Martin, in your sort of calculations, do you guys ever consider 
the potential that part of the budget of getting back to the 
Moon, part of the budget of going to Mars could be borne by the 
Defense Department?
    Mr. Russell. Thank you for the question, Congressman. I 
would turn back to what Dr. Sanders was just mentioning about 
the overall goal is to mitigate that risk. And if you can 
leverage government resources, whether it's within NASA or DOD 
to do that, that would be beneficial.
    And so one element to that is using mature technology. So 
if DOD in their realm and their programs, they're very active 
in space, has a key technology that could help enable or 
technology improvement effort, that could help enable what NASA 
is doing, certainly leveraging that across the Federal 
enterprise would be a smart move. But that's the main thing. 
Just wherever you can leverage some of the DOD knowledge to 
help mitigate the risk in putting together the Artemis mission 
set would be beneficial in my view.
    Mr. Perlmutter. Thank you. Mr. Martin?
    Mr. Martin. Thank you, Congressman. I will respectfully 
dodge the question if that's OK but only to underscore a theme 
that's emerged through this hearing both from the panel of 
witnesses, as well as the Members is constancy of purpose. I've 
been here at NASA OIG for the last 12 years, and we've seen--
one of the more problematic things for NASA long term is when 
the national strategy lurches from one--excuse me--from one 
pole to another. And we saw that with the cancellation of 
Constellation and then the Asteroid Retrieval Mission and now 
we are back at Artemis. And so when you lurch, NASA takes years 
to buildup capabilities and billions of dollars in 
infrastructure, and we cannot leave those kind of investments 
on the table.
    Mr. Perlmutter. No, and I thank you for that. I'll yield 
back after this, Mr. Chairman.
    I mean, I think what we've got to do from a congressional 
standpoint is just also, you know, take advantage of other 
budgets that will benefit by the work that we're doing to get 
back to the Moon, to have commercial on the Moon, and to get to 
Mars because we know we are in competition with China, with 
others and, you know, sometimes even though we try to keep the 
civilian side and the defense side separate, there will be a 
benefit to the defense side is what I'm talking about. We 
should be able to take advantage of their budget a little bit 
since it's about 100 times bigger than NASA's.
    So with that, I'll yield back.
    Chairman Beyer. Thank you, Mr. Perlmutter, very much. And 
thanks also for the feedback on the constancy of purpose. I 
remember in 2016 at a Space Subcommittee hearing asking the 
NASA Administrator--and this is three Administrations ago--what 
the constancy of purpose was at NASA, and he had a one-word 
answer, Mars, which he then revised a few minutes later to say 
science, but they're both in the right realm.
    And before we bring the hearing to a close, I thank all of 
you for hanging in there for almost two hours and for 
testifying and being prepared for this. The record will remain 
open for two weeks for additional statements from the Members 
and for any additional questions the Committee may ask of the 
witnesses. We have much to do this year, NASA reauthorization, 
lots of work on space situational awareness and how we manage 
low-Earth orbit traffic, but we always want to keep the Artemis 
mission, the initiative and someday a program, right at the top 
of our priority list. So thank you. The witnesses are excused. 
The hearing is now adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 12:42 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

                                Appendix

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                   Answers to Post-Hearing Questions




                   Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Mr. James Free

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Responses by Mr. William Russell



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Responses by Dr. Patricia Sanders

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Responses by the Honorable Paul K. Martin
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Responses by Mr. Daniel Dumbacher
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