[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                  20 YEARS AFTER 9/11: THE STATE OF THE 
                 TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

=======================================================================


                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                     COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                           SEPTEMBER 29, 2021

                               __________

                           Serial No. 117-30

                               __________

       Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
                                     

[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 
                                     

        Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov

                               __________
                               
                   U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
46-486 PDF                 WASHINGTON : 2022                     
          
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------                                 
                               
                               

                     COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

               Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas            John Katko, New York
James R. Langevin, Rhode Island      Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey     Clay Higgins, Louisiana
J. Luis Correa, California           Michael Guest, Mississippi
Elissa Slotkin, Michigan             Dan Bishop, North Carolina
Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri            Jefferson Van Drew, New Jersey
Al Green, Texas                      Ralph Norman, South Carolina
Yvette D. Clarke, New York           Mariannette Miller-Meeks, Iowa
Eric Swalwell, California            Diana Harshbarger, Tennessee
Dina Titus, Nevada                   Andrew S. Clyde, Georgia
Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey    Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida
Kathleen M. Rice, New York           Jake LaTurner, Kansas
Val Butler Demings, Florida          Peter Meijer, Michigan
Nanette Diaz Barragan, California    Kat Cammack, Florida
Josh Gottheimer, New Jersey          August Pfluger, Texas
Elaine G. Luria, Virginia            Andrew R. Garbarino, New York
Tom Malinowski, New Jersey
Ritchie Torres, New York
                       Hope Goins, Staff Director
                 Daniel Kroese, Minority Staff Director
                          Natalie Nixon, Clerk
                            
                            
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

                               Statements

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress 
  From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on 
  Homeland Security:
  Oral Statement.................................................     1
  Prepared Statement.............................................     4
The Honorable John Katko, a Representative in Congress From the 
  State of New York, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 
  Security:
  Oral Statement.................................................     5
  Prepared Statement.............................................    13

                               Witnesses

Mr. David P. Pekoske, Administrator, Transportation Security 
  Administration:
  Oral Statement.................................................    15
  Prepared Statement.............................................    16
Mr. Peter V. Neffenger, Private Citizen, Former Administrator, 
  Transportation Security Administration:
  Oral Statement.................................................    22
  Prepared Statement.............................................    24
Mr. John S. Pistole, President, Anderson University, Former 
  Administrator, Transportation Security Administration:
  Oral Statement.................................................    26
  Prepared Statement.............................................    27
Mr. James M. Loy, Private Citizen, Former Administrator, 
  Transportation Security Administration:
  Oral Statement.................................................    28
  Prepared Statement.............................................    30

                             For the Record

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress 
  From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on 
  Homeland Security:
  Statement of American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-
    CIO..........................................................     3
The Honorable John Katko, a Representative in Congress From the 
  State of New York, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 
  Security:
  Statement of Honorable Michael Chertoff........................     6
  Statement of Kip Hawley........................................     9
The Honorable Michael Guest, a Representative in Congress From 
  the State of Mississippi:
  Photo..........................................................    42

                                Appendix

Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson for David P. Pekoske..    71
Question From Hon. J. Luis Correa for David P. Pekoske...........    71
Questions From Hon. Michael Guest for David P. Pekoske...........    71
Questions From Hon. Diana Harshbarger for David P. Pekoske.......    72
Questions From Hon. Carlos A. Gimenez for David P. Pekoske.......    72

 
     20 YEARS AFTER 9/11: THE STATE OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY 
                             ADMINISTRATION

                              ----------                              


                     Wednesday, September 29, 2021

                     U.S. House of Representatives,
                            Committee on Homeland Security,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., via 
Webex, Hon. Bennie G. Thompson [Chairman of the committee] 
presiding.
    Present: Representatives Thompson, Jackson Lee, Langevin, 
Payne, Correa, Cleaver, Green, Clarke, Titus, Watson Coleman, 
Demings, Barragan, Gottheimer, Katko, Higgins, Guest, Van Drew, 
Norman, Miller-Meeks, Harshbarger, Clyde, Gimenez, LaTurner, 
Meijer, Cammack, Pfluger, and Garbarino.
    Chairman Thompson. The Committee on Homeland Security will 
come to order. The committee is meeting today to receive 
testimony on the state of Transportation Security 
Administration 20 years after 9/11. Without objection, the 
Chair is authorized to declare the committee in recess at any 
point.
    Good morning. I want to thank TSA Administrator David 
Pekoske as well as former administrators Peter Neffenger, John 
Pistole, and James Loy for being with us today and for their 
leadership in safeguarding our Nation. Let me say that we have 
never had assembled before this committee such an august group 
of individuals who have done so much to keep us as a Nation 
safe 20 years in, so I am looking forward to their testimony.
    Twenty years ago, the morning of September 11, the United 
States suffered the most devasting targeted attack in history. 
Thousands of lives were lost and many more were changed 
forever. In the weeks, months, and years that followed, the 
Federal Government engaged in a massive effort to reshape our 
security efforts and respond to new global threats.
    Most importantly for today's hearing, it was clear that 
Federal authorities needed to be responsible for safeguarding 
our Nation's transportation system and so the Transportation 
Security Administration was born. In its 20-year history TSA 
has had 7 Senate-confirmed administrators; 4 of them are with 
us today. Together they represent the majority of the history 
of TSA and they can speak to the incredible changes and growth 
the agency has undergone in the past 2 decades.
    When TSA began amid an uncertain threat picture, a rapid 
response required a ``one-size-fit-all'' approach to security 
measures, primarily using simple metal detectors and X-ray 
machines. Over the years, TSA has responded to evolving threats 
involving terrorist tactics to advance its approach to 
screening and vetting. Today, TSA utilizes modern technologies 
such as advanced imaging technology and computed tomography 
machines to detect a range of nonmetallic weapons.
    TSA has developed a sophisticated, risk-based security 
approach and leveraged intelligence, passenger vetting, and 
Trusted Traveler programs to focus limited resources on the 
most pressing threats. TSA must continue to evolve because we 
continually face new kinds of threats.
    Today threats are arising not just from violent terrorist 
groups, but from lone wolf actors, cyber criminals, public 
health emergencies, and unruly passengers. We have also seen 
threats expand from a focus on passenger aircraft to include 
other transportation modes and assets such as air cargo, mass 
transit, freight and passenger rail, and pipelines. 
Collectively, these threats challenge the limits of TSA's 
authorities and resources, and Congress must ensure TSA remains 
prepared to execute its critical security mission. I am eager 
to hear about the changes TSA has undergone to meet those 
threats and allow Americans to travel securely throughout the 
on-going global pandemic.
    Unfortunately, even with all the modern improvements TSA 
has made, some issues have remained stagnant. The agency has 
struggled throughout its history to create a well-compensated, 
empowered, and fulfilled work force. I am happy to see the 
Biden administration taking steps to improve the situation.
    On Monday, Administrator Pekoske announced a new Memorandum 
of Agreement with the Merit Systems Protection Board, or MSPB, 
under which the MSPB has agreed to review adverse action 
appeals from front-line officers. This action responds to long-
standing calls for a fair third-party disciplinary appeals 
process for the TSA work force. I commend Administrator 
Pekoske, Secretary Mayorkas, and the Biden administration for 
taking this important step. Still, a change in the law and 
significant funding will be needed to provide TSA workers with 
the workplace rights and the competitive pay they deserve.
    To that end, I look forward to continuing to advance my 
bill, the Rights for the TSA Workforce Act of 2021, which this 
committee marked up in July.
    Before I close, I would also note, as Chairman I strive to 
bring diverse witness panels before the committee. Although 
there has been some diversity among TSA's leadership over the 
years, only White male administrators have ever been confirmed 
by the Senate to lead the Transportation Security 
Administration. I hope TSA will increase the diversity of its 
leadership both for its work force as well as the American 
people.
    As we look ahead, the successes as well as the missteps of 
the past 2 decades will help guide our mission to provide 
Americans with a safe, efficient, and secure transportation 
system. I look forward to reflecting on those issues today.
    Before I recognize the Ranking Member and without 
objection, I include in the record a statement from the 
American Federation of Government Employees on the subject of 
today's hearing.
    [The information follows:]
   Statement of American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO
                           September 29, 2021
    Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Katko, and Members of the 
Committee: The American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO 
(AFGE), which represents 700,000 Federal and District of Columbia 
employees in 70 agencies, including approximately 45,000 Transportation 
Security Officers (TSOs) at the Transportation Security Administration 
(TSA) thanks the committee for holding this important hearing today, 
``20 Years After 9/11: The State of the Transportation Security 
Administration.'' Indeed, by some measures the agency has experienced 
tremendous progress in the past 20 years, but when it comes to fair pay 
and due process, it has left its most crucial resource--the 
Transportation Security Officer workforce--back in the 20th century.
    When this committee held a hearing in May of this year, ``Twenty 
Years of Workforce Challenges: The Need for H.R. 903, the Rights for 
the TSA Workforce Act of 2021,'' AFGE testified that full rights under 
title 5 of the U.S. Code, as other Federal employees are accorded, 
would directly improve the ability of TSA to provide the flying public 
the highest level of aviation security. We also testified to the low 
morale and toxic work environment that two decades of TSA 
administrators have allowed to fester and consume the TSA work culture.
    AFGE urges the committee to continue to explore the impact of the 
toxic work culture as it is juxtaposed against the many demands placed 
on the TSO workforce as TSA has grown and changed over 20 years. Over 2 
decades, TSOs have gone from operating hand wands and walk-through 
metal detectors to utilizing Advanced Imaging Technology machines and 
pat-downs. As TSA has invested in new technologies, TSOs have taken 
training on new equipment nearly every year.
    It is clear that investment in advanced technology has contributed 
to 20 years of aviation security. But we ask, where is the investment 
in the workforce? Where has TSA leadership been as supervisors fostered 
work cultures that forced many TSOs to resign or endure harassment, 
humiliation, and undue discipline?
    The TSO workforce has been on the job throughout the longest 
Government shutdown in American history and the COVID-19 Pandemic. Over 
10,000 TSA employees, mostly those in the screening workforce, have 
contracted COVID-19 and 29 have tragically lost their lives. TSA 
reported earlier this month that with the imposition of checkpoint mask 
mandates, there have been more than 4,000 ``mask-related incidents'' 
and the agency is pursuing penalties in 126 cases.\1\ That number is 
likely higher as many TSOs endure punishing treatment by the flying 
public they are working to protect rather than report or respond when 
they sustain abusive behavior at the checkpoint. Even a cross tone 
toward an unruly passenger could result in a disciplinary action where 
the TSO has little or no recourse to explain mitigating factors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ ``More than 4,000 face-mask incidents have been reported to the 
TSA,'' The Washington Post, September 10, 2021
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Fair treatment of the TSO workforce is a goal that should have been 
a priority from Day 1 and from the top down, but it was not. In the 
aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on American soil, 
Congress granted the TSA administrator unusually broad authority to 
develop a separate personnel management system. Congress did not grant 
this authority to allow mistreatment against the TSO workforce. Now 
that 20 years have passed, it is time to bring personnel management 
under regular order and make the rights and compensation of the TSO 
workforce a priority. This committee has favorably reported the 
``Rights for the TSA Workforce Act'' and AFGE hopes to work with the 
committee to achieve passage in the full House in the coming weeks.
    Turnover in the screening workforce has been a persistent problem. 
With very low pay and little reward for experience many TSOs go on to 
other agencies where they work under the more reliable and market-based 
general schedule (GS) pay scale. Elsewhere in the Federal Government, 
they are guaranteed due process in disciplinary matters, whistleblower 
protections and reasonable and consistent agency action when they 
experience harassment and discrimination. This committee has examined 
the March, 2019 Office of Inspector General Report, ``TSA Needs to 
Improve Efforts to Retain, Hire, and Train Its Transportation Security 
Officers'' which attributed the high attrition among TSOs to low pay 
and fairness of pay and found TSOs' ``dissatisfaction with their 
supervisors included management's competence, communication, promotion 
of negative work environment, disrespect, lack of trust, lack of 
appreciation or recognition, and unfair practices in appraisal, 
discipline, and advancement.''\2\ While we do not believe the OIG's 
recommendations went far enough to remedy these pay and management 
failures, it is important they were identified and brought forward. In 
the context of the 20-year anniversary of TSA, it is time to enact 
legislation that will address these intrinsic inequities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General 
Report, ``TSA Needs to Improve Efforts to Retain, Hire, and Train Its 
Transportation Security Officers'' March 28, 2019, OIG-119-35.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    We raise our questions and concerns not to chide the administrator 
or former administrators for personnel management failures, but to 
ensure that human beings who perform essential homeland security 
functions are not left behind in the calculation of securing the 
homeland but are front and center when this agency addresses crises in 
the future and sets the vision for the TSA the American public deserves 
20 years from now. AFGE looks forward to working with the committee and 
with TSA to achieve a better workplace and a more successful agency.

    Chairman Thompson. Again, I thank our witnesses for joining 
us and for their honorable and steadfast service to our Nation.
    [The statement of Chairman Thompson follows:]
                Statement of Chairman Bennie G. Thompson
                           September 29, 2021
    Good morning.
    I want to thank TSA Administrator David Pekoske, as well as former 
Administrators Peter Neffenger, John Pistole, and James Loy for being 
with us today and for their leadership in safeguarding our Nation.
    Twenty years ago, on the morning of September 11, the United States 
suffered the most devastating targeted attack in our history.
    Thousands of lives were lost, and many more were changed forever.
    In the weeks, months, and years that followed, the Federal 
Government engaged in a massive effort to reshape our security efforts 
and respond to new global threats.
    Most importantly for today's hearing, it was clear that Federal 
authorities needed to be responsible for safeguarding our Nation's 
transportation system. And so, the Transportation Security 
Administration was born.
    In its 20-year history, TSA has had seven Senate-confirmed 
administrators. Four of them are with us today.
    Together, they represent the majority of the history of TSA, and 
they can speak to the incredible changes and growth the agency has 
undergone in the past two decades.
    When TSA began amid an uncertain threat picture, a rapid response 
required a ``one-size-fits-all'' approach to security measures, 
primarily using simple metal detectors and X-ray machines.
    Over the years, TSA has responded to evolving terrorist tactics to 
advance its approach to screening and vetting.
    Today, TSA utilizes modern technologies such as Advanced Imaging 
Technology and Computed Tomography machines to detect a range of non-
metallic weapons.
    TSA has developed a sophisticated, risk-based security approach 
leveraging intelligence, passenger vetting, and trusted traveler 
programs to focus limited resources on the most pressing threats.
    TSA must continue to evolve, because we are continually facing new 
kinds of threats.
    Today, threats are arising not just from violent terrorist groups, 
but from lone-wolf actors, cyber criminals, public health emergencies, 
and unruly passengers.
    We have also seen threats expand from a focus on passenger aircraft 
to include other transportation modes and assets, such as air cargo, 
mass transit, freight and passenger rail, and pipelines.
    Collectively, these threats challenge the limits of TSA's 
authorities and resources, and Congress must ensure TSA remains 
prepared to execute its critical security mission.
    I am eager to hear about the changes TSA has undergone to meet 
these threats and allow Americans to travel securely throughout the on-
going global pandemic.
    Unfortunately, even with all the modern improvements TSA has made, 
some issues have remained stagnant.
    The agency has struggled throughout its history to create a well-
compensated, empowered, and fulfilled workforce.
    I am happy to see the Biden administration taking steps to improve 
the situation.
    On Monday, Administrator Pekoske announced a new Memorandum of 
Agreement with the Merit Systems Protection Board, or MSPB, under which 
the MSPB has agreed to review adverse action appeals from front-line 
officers.
    This action responds to long-standing calls for a fair, third-party 
disciplinary appeals process for the TSA workforce.
    I commend Administrator Pekoske, Secretary Mayorkas, and the Biden 
administration for taking this important step.
    Still, a change in the law and significant funding will be needed 
to provide TSA workers with the workplace rights and the competitive 
pay they deserve.
    To that end, I look forward to continuing to advance my bill, the 
Rights for the TSA Workforce Act of 2021, which this committee marked 
up in July.
    Before I close, I also must note that, as Chairman, I strive to 
bring diverse witness panels before the committee.
    Although there has been some diversity among TSA leadership over 
the years, only white, male administrators have ever been confirmed by 
the Senate to lead the Transportation Security Administration.
    I hope TSA will increase the diversity of its leadership, both for 
its workforce as well as the American people.
    As we look ahead, the successes--as well as the missteps--of the 
past two decades will help guide our mission to provide Americans with 
a safe, efficient, and secure transportation system.
    I look forward to reflecting on those issues today.
    Again, I thank our witnesses for joining us and for their honorable 
and steadfast service to our Nation.

    Chairman Thompson. With that, I recognize the Ranking 
Member, the gentleman from New York, Mr. Katko, for an opening 
statement.
    Mr. Katko. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 
having this hearing today. I appreciate it. As you well know, I 
started out as a subcommittee Chair for TSA in Homeland 
Security, so this is a topic that is always near and dear to my 
heart.
    On September 11, 2001, 19 hijackers proceeded through U.S. 
airport security and, once on-board, commandeered 4 commercial 
aircraft, flying them into the World Trade Center in New York, 
the Pentagon, and a field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania. Two 
other people that went into the--that were flight attendants on 
the American Airlines flight that crashed into the World Trade 
Center were friends of mine.
    The Transportation Security Administration was created in 
the months after this terrorist attack and made dramatic 
changes to our travel landscape. Gone are the days when you 
could arrive for a flight minutes before takeoff or meet your 
arriving family members at the gate, but with the immense help 
of the private sector, TSA quickly stood up and established a 
robust aviation screening system, and our Nation is truly 
grateful.
    Over the past 20 years, TSA has continuously adapted their 
screening procedures based on critical intelligence and risk 
while also expanding its focus on securing surface 
transportation. This is exactly the type of elasticity that the 
Homeland Security Committee in the wake of 9/11 envisioned.
    When our committee was in New York recently at the 9/11 
Museum, a memorial for the 20th anniversary of that terrible 
day in our Nation's history, we all reflected on the nearly 
3,000 Americans that died on 9/11. We didn't believe it was 
possible at the time, but TSA and the Department of Homeland 
Security have been very successful in preventing a significant 
9/11-style attack of our transportation system over the last 20 
years. That is an amazing feat and I want to keep it that way 
for the next 20 years. I know all the Members of the committee 
feel the same way.
    Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to enter written 
testimonies from former Secretary Chertoff and former 
Administrator Hawley into the record. We appreciate their 
services as well as the service of the esteemed panelists who 
are here before the committee today.
    Chairman Thompson. Without objection.
    [The information follows:]
                Statement of Honorable Michael Chertoff
                           September 29, 2021
    As we reflect on the twentieth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks and 
the reasons behind the creation of the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) in 2001, I believe that the underlying case for 
establishing the agency is as strong as ever. On September 11, 2001, 19 
terrorists executed a horrific plan to hijack aircraft and turn them 
into guided missiles that destroyed the World Trade Center, damaged the 
Pentagon, and killed approximately 3,000 people. In carrying out their 
plot, the terrorists exploited vulnerabilities or gaps in several 
security systems that were intended to protect our borders and our 
aviation system. Among these weaknesses were the lack of a sufficient 
program to collect and analyze information about foreign travelers 
coming to the United States; insecure identification requirements for 
passengers boarding flights domestically; a largely privatized 
passenger and baggage screening process at the airports; and no real 
security on board the aircraft itself.
    After the attacks of September 11, 2001, our Nation emerged more 
united and determined than ever before and worked tirelessly to 
confront the new reality that our country faced. That determination led 
to the creation of the TSA and, later, the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS). The most noticeable and consequential investments 
included enhanced screening of people and cargo traveling into the 
United States by air, sea, rail, and land. We also made successful 
improvements in our ability to share information across law enforcement 
agencies. DHS implemented the Law Enforcement Information Sharing 
Initiative which improved how local, National, and international 
agencies share information. Proof of the enhancements in our 
information-sharing capabilities is evident in the 2006 thwarted plot 
to detonate liquid explosives aboard airliners bound for the United 
States and Canada from Great Britain. By working closely with our 
overseas counterparts and the cooperation of U.S. intelligence agencies 
monitoring the threat, a large-scale attack was foiled, and hundreds of 
lives were saved.
    During the past two decades, the United States remained largely 
focused on the threat posed to our homeland by global terrorism and the 
coordination of large-scale attacks by Jihadists. However, in recent 
years newer threats have emerged that present the challenge of a three-
front war on terrorism.
    With the degradation of ISIS and al-Qaeda capability, the United 
States has now focused its budget and operational capabilities on near 
peer countries. We have witnessed foreign governments, and their 
sponsored proxies, conduct sophisticated cyber attacks against our 
critical infrastructure and commercial software supply chains. These 
countries, and their sponsored proxies, have also undertaken 
sophisticated information operations against the people of America. 
They have penetrated social media platforms and have exacerbated 
partisan issues with the sole intention of polarizing the American 
people and fomenting discontent in almost every aspect of our lives. 
These adversarial agents have created an environment where both the far 
left and far right are convinced of the other's intention to 
``overthrow'' Federal, State, and local governments, as well as 
undermine their respective affinity groups and institutions, whether 
that be social justice organizations or law enforcement.
    The successful information operations conducted by foreign 
countries to sew distrust in our Government, and pit American against 
American, have dramatically increased the on-going risk of domestic 
terrorism. The events over the last 2 years by both far left and far 
right organizations demonstrate the violence that can take place around 
the country and in our Nation's capital, because of this polarized 
discourse. The country has become more partisan, with extremists on 
both sides becoming violent. There is no clearer manifestation of this 
threat than the events that unfolded on January 6. Led by paramilitary 
groups like the Oath Keepers and Proud Boys and communicating by way of 
encrypted messaging, they launched an attack on the U.S. Capitol and 
the very foundation of our Nation's democracy.
    While up to now, the United States has largely been successful in 
defeating centralized ISIS and al-Qaeda capability, the accelerated 
withdrawal from Afghanistan provides a possible safe haven for 
terrorist adversaries to reconstitute and prepare to carry out attacks 
against the United States. Without a U.S. presence in Afghanistan, 
America now has little if any on-the-ground visibility into nefarious 
activities, let alone a local capability to disrupt planning.
    Over the last 20 years, the United States has evolved from a united 
populace focused on the defeat of a single threat to a fractured and 
often aggressive populace whose divisions are further exacerbated 
within the context of a global pandemic. The world, and America in 
particular, is a much more dangerous place now, than it was right after 
9/11. Today's security risk landscape requires a multi-faceted, 
coordinated approach that addresses the discrete aspects of our most 
pressing challenges, which include a persistent threat from the 
pandemic, foreign-based terrorist threats, cybersecurity threats to 
both public and private networks, and, increasingly, domestic terrorism 
threats that pose a significant threat to the core of our democracy.
                         tsa the next 20 years
    Looking ahead to the next 20 years, TSA will need to remain an 
agile and entrepreneurial agency focused on implementing intelligence-
based solutions to counter evolving and increasingly sophisticated 
range of physical and cybersecurity threats to the Nation's 
transportation systems and infrastructure from State and non-State 
actors and domestic violent extremists. TSA will need to continue to 
protect and empower its workforce with more capable tools and 
technology, strengthen and expand partnerships, and continue to invest 
in cybersecurity capabilities to counter increasing threats against the 
Nation's pipelines and transportation systems.
                           covid-19 response
    After the emergence of COVID-19, passenger enplanement dropped as 
much as 97 percent. TSA implemented measures at security checkpoints 
across the Nation to make the screening process safer for passengers 
and its workforce by reducing the potential of exposure to COVID-19. In 
February 2021, TSA implemented provisions of President Biden's 
Executive Order on Promoting COVID-19 Safety in Domestic and 
International Travel by requiring passengers to wear face masks when 
they are in airports, bus, and rail stations, and while on passenger 
aircraft, passenger railroads, and public transportation.
    These efforts to protect the traveling public helped restore 
confidence and paved the way for the increased passenger volumes we are 
now seeing at airports around the country. Throughout the pandemic, the 
TSA workforce has served professionally adapted to challenging 
circumstances.
    Unfortunately, during this time, the TSA workforce has also 
experienced a dramatic increase in unruly passengers at TSA checkpoints 
across the country and on-board aircraft. Since January 1, 2021, TSA 
has reported more than 4,000 reports of face mask-related incidents 
since the requirement was implemented this year. Inflight disturbances 
have risen from 2 incidents per 1 million screened in 2019 to 12 per 1 
million in 2021.
    In response, TSA Administrator Pekoske recently announced an 
increase in the range of civil penalties that may be imposed on 
individuals who violate the Federal mask mandate at airports, on 
commercial aircraft, and in various modes of surface transportation. 
The new penalty range will be $500-$1,000 for first offenders and 
$1,000-$3,000 for second-time offenders. I support these actions and 
believe TSA, the Department, and Congress must continue to do 
everything they can to help protect the TSA workforce and ensure they 
have the support and tools needed to address the vast array of security 
and safety challenges they face every day.
                      tsa technology advancements
    As air travelers returning to airports for the first time since 
before the pandemic, many of them will see changes to the screening 
technologies at security checkpoints. New state-of-the-art technology 
solutions like Credential Authentication Technology (CAT) identity 
verification systems and Computed Tomography X-ray machines that offer 
significant advancements for identity verification and screening 
passenger carry-on items, while reducing physical contact during the 
screening process and improving the passenger experience.
                  expanding trusted traveler programs
    As air travel continues to rebound and eventually exceeds pre-
pandemic levels and with funding sources expected to remain flat, TSA 
must continue to expand access to TSA PreCheck and other DHS Trusted 
Traveler programs that allow enrolled individuals to use expedited 
lanes at airport checkpoints and when crossing international borders. 
TSA must continue to work with private-sector partners to improve 
marketing efforts and increase access enrollment opportunities for 
PreCheck. By increasing the percentage of travelers that have been 
vetted and are known to be lower risk, TSA will be better-positioned to 
provide those individuals with an expedited checkpoint experience while 
also applying a greater portion of its limited resources to those 
passengers that require a greater level of screening at the checkpoint.
    TSA PreCheck also offers an opportunity for introducing new 
technologies to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of security 
screening process. Recent biometric technology pilots have shown the 
potential to be powerful tools for improving the identity verification 
of passengers enrolled in TSA PreCheck, which enhances security 
effectiveness, improves operational efficiency, and enables a more 
streamlined passenger experience in the post-pandemic travel era. Along 
with biometrics development, digital credentials, such as mobile 
driver's licenses and digital passports, will become increasingly 
common and will enable TSA to support a touchless experience at the 
checkpoint. TSA must continue to partner actively with private 
industry, NIST, and State DMV organizations to support the adoption of 
common standards that will enable the integration of these technologies 
at the screening checkpoint.
    While biometrics have the potential to be a powerful tool in 
security environments, TSA must continue to prioritize the protection 
and appropriate use of passenger biometric and biographic data from 
cybersecurity threats and potential misuses. Passengers who apply for 
TSA PreCheck or Global Entry must be confident that their personal data 
is always protected and only used for appropriate purposes.
                  pipelines and cybersecurity threats
    TSA must also be able to confront significant cyber risks, as we 
saw on May 7, 2021, when the Colonial Pipeline Company announced it 
halted its pipeline operations due to a ransomware attack, cyber 
intrusions into pipeline computer networks have the potential to 
disrupt critical supplies of gasoline and other refined gasoline 
products and negatively impact our National security, economy, 
commerce, and well-being.
    This attack on the Nation's pipeline systems is a warning about the 
dangers of connecting critical infrastructure to the wider internet 
without implementing the appropriate security measures. It also makes 
clear how activities in cyber space can affect deadly outcomes in the 
physical world, just as the cutting of fiber optic cables in the 
physical world can have significant repercussions in cyber space.
    The creation of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security 
Agency (CISA) was important for expanding the Department's cyber 
capabilities while enhancing its ability to coordinate cybersecurity 
efforts with TSA and other agencies across the Government. We must 
continue to ensure that TSA and CISA have the resources and personnel 
they need to both coordinate the cybersecurity of Government systems 
and respond to large-scale attacks affecting private and public 
entities.
    In response to this cyber intrusion, TSA exercised its Aviation and 
Transportation Security Act of 2001 (ATSA) authorities to strengthen 
the cybersecurity and resilience of pipeline owners and operators by 
issuing 2 Security Directives that were developed in close consultation 
with owners and operators of pipeline facilities, CISA, and critical 
interagency partners. The first Security Directive requires pipeline 
operators to report cybersecurity incidents, assess their cybersecurity 
posture, and transmit the results to TSA and CISA. The second Security 
Directive requires TSA-designated critical pipelines to develop 
cybersecurity contingency and recovery plans, carry out a cybersecurity 
architecture design review, and implement specific mitigation measures 
to protect against ransomware attacks and other known threats to 
operational technology systems.
    As these actions and the close partnership between TSA and CISA 
highlight, it is a strength, not a weakness, that the Department is 
responsible for addressing threats in both physical and cyber domains, 
allowing for a unity of effort that can better address threats spanning 
the cyber and physical worlds. Today's threats are rarely, if ever, 
limited to either the physical or cyber worlds. The wide-spread 
application of smart technologies to every aspect of our lives has 
brought with them new capabilities and threats. Cyber attacks on 
critical infrastructure have only served to highlight this sort of 
threat.
    Safeguarding the Nation's pipeline systems is a critical 
undertaking and partnership for TSA and CISA that requires extensive 
collaboration with pipeline owners and operators. This was not the 
first cyber intrusion in our Nation to have a direct impact and 
cybersecurity incidents affecting surface transportation systems 
continue to be a growing and evolving threat.
                       domestic security threats
    There is no clearer manifestation of the threat of domestic 
terrorism than the events that unfolded on January 6. The January 6 
assault on the Capitol demonstrated how unprepared we were for domestic 
terrorism fueled by extreme ideologies and misinformation. The attack 
offers lessons that are applicable to TSA and across the Department.
    The vast majority of domestic terrorists in recent memory have used 
the internet to consume and post their extremist views and connect with 
a network that shares their ideology. We must work to ensure that 
relevant intelligence information is properly shared, that the right 
resources are in place to allow for rapid incident response, and that 
lines of communication are effective.
    More effective utilization of open-source intelligence will 
increase our ability to circumvent a planned attack as well as study 
the on-line behavior of anyone that espouses hateful philosophies. We 
also need to do a better job of working with social media companies to 
detect and handle extremist content while also remaining cognizant of 
foreign actors that further spread disinformation through on-line 
platforms. We also need to empower the Department to work with fusion 
centers around the country on how to conduct thorough intelligence 
analysis. State and local agencies are our first line of defense 
against domestic extremists.
    Finally, as we secure our Nation against domestic extremist 
violence, we must not ignore the continuing threat of international 
terrorism. Our departure from Afghanistan may embolden groups like 
ISIS-K or al-Qaeda. Thus, we must continue to maintain and upgrade our 
foreign intelligence collection capabilities and our border and 
infrastructure security. We do not have the luxury of contending with 
only one threat at a time. As President Biden has made clear, however, 
we have the will and determination to defend against all these threats.
    Michael Chertoff is the former Secretary of the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security (2004-2009) and now co-founder and executive chairman 
of The Chertoff Group, a security and risk-management firm that has 
clients and performs services for companies that manufacture biometric 
and computed tomography X-ray systems.
                                 ______
                                 
                        Statement of Kip Hawley
                           September 29, 2021
    Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Katko, and distinguished Members 
of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to contribute to this 
hearing on the 20th anniversary of the creation of the Transportation 
Security Administration.
    It was my honor to participate in the start-up of TSA in 2001-2002 
and serve as TSA administrator from 2005 until 2009. TSA's challenges 
seem like they come at you from a firehose. Nonetheless, several issues 
run consistently through TSA's existence and will greatly influence 
TSA's future success. Here are ten.
10. Continued Vigilance & Evolving Threat
    In the hectic days during fall 2001 when Congress created TSA, 
nobody was predicting 20 years of safety from a catastrophic terror 
attack. Attacks against us were in the planning stages and the 
prevailing sentiment was that terror attacks were a question of 
``when'' not ``if.'' By any standard, 20 years is a remarkable 
milestone for TSA. A key success factor in counterterrorism is to fight 
hard with a sense of urgency every day. Attacks are not beaten, they 
are postponed. While 20 years is great, we must be mindful that 
terrorism constantly changes across all its dimensions--people, 
weapons, targets, ideology, etc. TSA must continue to design and 
execute layered security measures that are capable of stopping attacks 
that we know about and ones that may not yet have been conceived. 
Focused, sustained effort pursued every day can lead to continued 
future years of safety for the traveling public.
9. Regulatory DNA vs. Dynamic Risk Management
    TSA was born out of the FAA and inherited many of its processes and 
people. As a result, TSA has an institutional instinct to regulate--
write rules and then audit their performance. That makes risk 
management sense if, as in aviation safety, the risk is static. 
However, terror risk is dynamic and unpredictable. Confronting terror 
risk with a checklist is a recipe for disaster. It is not easy to 
balance the need for auditable accountability with the operational 
necessity of having dynamic security measures. The VIPR program was a 
successful example of maintaining accountability and structure in a 
variety of transportation settings with effective, dynamic security 
actions. With VIPR, different TSA disciplines came together as 
temporary teams (Air Marshals, TSO's, Inspectors, K-9's) and popped up 
in locations dictated by the latest security intelligence. VIPR 
operations were unpredictable to terrorists and thus an effective 
deterrent. If TSA operates according to a uniform game plan, then if 
once a terrorist figures that out, the entire network is vulnerable. 
TSA has been successful in using multiple layers spread throughout the 
transportation environment. Like a safe combination, if a burglar 
figures out one number, there are multiple other problems to crack.
    In short, we identify innovative concepts and technology to stay 
ahead of terrorist threats. It is a collaborative approach, especially 
with our international partners, because the transportation system is a 
global network where any weak link could be exploited. Connectedness is 
an important security measure itself. We know that terrorists are 
studying airport security around the world, trying to find ways to 
attack, and we must be united in our commitment to keeping travelers 
safe.
8. People
    We pay for the most advanced technology on earth--the human brain--
and have it already deployed at every checkpoint in the country, for 
that matter, everywhere there is a TSA person. We should get the most 
out of that brainpower technology. Trained, empowered people are the 
necessary foundation for a counterterrorism organization. My point 
above about checklist mentality ties in here. We need to automate that 
which can be reduced to binary decisions and take advantage of a well-
trained and motivated workforce to undertake the essential security 
work that requires outthinking smart, dedicated terror operators. TSA's 
workforce needs to be elite. TSA jobs need to be well-paid and 
professionally demanding. And TSA's security processes need to be 
designed to take full advantage of that workforce.
    Intelligence and technology are critical to effective security, but 
people were--and still are--TSA's strongest asset. Nothing can adapt 
quicker to complex threats than the human mind. During my tenure, we 
implemented pay increases for the front-line Transportation Security 
Officer (TSO) workforce and developed a career path to increase 
motivation and retention. Additional pay enhancements have been made 
since I left TSA, but the starting salary for a TSO is still too low to 
ensure they stay and grow in the agency. If TSA is to operate as a 
world-class transportation security organization, the pay for the 
people on the front lines has to improve to reflect the importance of 
what they do, day in and day out. I hope Congress will continue to 
support that.
    The need to be elite extends up the leadership chain as well. We 
need to make it more attractive to serve at TSA, and recruiting should 
maintain a steady flow of a more diverse leadership team. There is 
always room for more smart, committed people who want to serve the TSA 
mission. We were lucky at the beginning of TSA when Secretary Norm 
Mineta's courage and energy led the stand-up of TSA amid a very 
tumultuous time. His deputy, Michael Jackson, had the professional 
management skills needed to maneuver and sometimes bulldoze the way for 
TSA to stand up on time. They had a rare combination of experience, 
intelligence, stamina, confidence, and humility. Leaders like them do 
not grow on trees but, if we look, we will find them.
7. Diversity and Combatting the Failure of Imagination
    Diversity is a core foundational element of a sound security 
system. A Standard Operating Procedure that covers every threat 
imaginable becomes instantly useless the moment a terrorist devises a 
threat that was not imagined. How to protect yourself against the 
unimaginable? The power of diversity is a place to start. TSA needs 
people of all backgrounds and experiences and those different voices 
must be heard. TSA can be purposeful in its recruiting at all levels to 
ensure a vibrant mix of talent. Diversity in people means that their 
ideas will be diverse and, at TSA, means that security measures can be 
innovative. The concept extends to technology, information sources, and 
virtually every aspect of TSA's work. Protecting a huge network such as 
our transportation system calls for constant innovation and diversity 
is a necessary ingredient.
6. Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) & Flight Crews
    The Federal Air Marshal Service is an essential part of TSA's 
arsenal. We know that they are feared by terrorists and that they can 
do their anti-hijacking job second to none in the world. Air Marshals 
are so much more than that. I mentioned earlier the importance of well-
trained, highly-trained, and intelligent people. They are a flexible 
force that can be used on the ground as with VIPRs, in airports or 
transit systems undercover, with other agencies like the JTTF's, with 
other nations as they work daily. That is the FAMS. After 9/11, I 
remember a conversation with Norm Mineta in which he speculated on how 
long a robust FAMS would last. There were 32 Air Marshals on 9/11. We 
must not cut their capability because we don't see all they do for our 
security.
    Like you, I have seen news reports about passengers attacking 
flight crew members recently. In the aftermath of 9/11, TSA pushed for 
training for pilots and flight crews so that they could play an active 
role should an attack happen, and the training was well-received. These 
dedicated professionals are truly the last line of defense on a plane, 
in addition to Federal Air Marshals, and they must be prepared for 
potential attacks. Congress would be wise to continue investing in 
programs to ensure they can protect the skies.
5. Trust
    TSA must maintain the trust of the American people. Passengers 
depend on TSA for their safety. Passengers who undergo all kinds of 
inconvenience need to believe that it is for valid security purpose. 
This partnership between TSA and the flying public is a vital component 
of security because an active engaged public increases TSA's 
effectiveness. TSA should ask only what is required for current 
security needs. This is easy to say and hard to do. Too much change is 
confusing and difficult to implement across the huge TSA network. We 
can take this 20-year milestone as a point to streamline the checkpoint 
process. I have written before about my concerns about PreCheck's 
security vulnerabilities as well as its operational inefficiency. These 
issues remain. Perhaps making the process smooth for everybody would 
turbocharge the entire system. Yes, this would mean looking at 
prohibited items like sharp objects and the liquid restrictions. Open 
discussion with stakeholders like airlines, airports, flight crews, and 
the public could strengthen the trust--and security effectiveness--
among all parties.
    Another trust issue is privacy. We implemented Secure Flight in 
2009 with a great deal of help from GAO. After some fumbles, we rebuilt 
Secure Flight from scratch with privacy protections built in. I believe 
that they are hard-wired. However, in today's world, privacy is more 
and more difficult to protect and I urge TSA and Congress to keep a 
close eye on the privacy promises made during Secure Flight's 
inception. I have no reason to believe this is a problem, it is just 
that all that data is so tempting to use for other purposes.
4. Technology
    In 20 years we have gone from metal detectors and wands to almost 
limitless capability. The problem has always been getting the right 
technology onto the floor. CT is a good example of a technology that is 
relatively inexpensive, easy to maintain, and very flexible. Software 
upgrades can result in a step-up in capability that otherwise would 
require buying an entirely new machine. Terrorists know where specific 
technology is deployed because terrorists study the system and know 
where specific technology is deployed. We are better off with a wide 
deployment of CT than a spotty deployment of more sophisticated 
technology.
    TSA needs to open up its technology identification process. TSA has 
relied on its own internal process to specify, identify, and procure 
its technology. All in-house. This stands in the way of innovation. TSA 
could benefit from the technology innovation processes at DoD, where 
new technology is supported.
    There needs to be some independent review of TSA's technology. 
During my time at TSA, we required scanner manufacturers to separate 
the hardware they built from the software they used to process images. 
This allowed us to reduce purchasing costs and encouraged software 
innovation. Further, we partnered with the National Science Labs at 
Sandia, Lawrence Livermore, and Los Alamos to review our requirements 
for the accuracy of scanners. The results, even from their early stage 
review, were vital. Both programs were unfortunately discontinued. The 
point is, with all the money TSA invests in technology, shouldn't there 
be some independent review somewhere in the process? (See Diversity, 
above.)
3. Intelligence
    The Intelligence Community (IC) was critical during my time at TSA. 
The DHS head of Intelligence, Charlie Allen, supported TSA by opening 
doors within the IC, helped us hire into TSA and made sure we had full 
independent access to critical information. This allowed TSA to make 
connections that others had not made and on occasion, a TSA analyst had 
a nugget published in the President's Daily Brief (PDB). This 
independent analysis resulted in some friction but it made all of us 
sharper and have a higher sense of urgency. For instance, TSA 
implemented a total liquid ban in 4 hours when faced with a plot in 
2006. We would not have been able to act as fast as we needed without 
the intelligence access that TSA had at the time. There are many 
examples of how TSA was able to take elements of intelligence reporting 
and convert them within hours into effective security measures both in 
the United States and abroad. A strong partnership with the IC and a 
strong independent intel operation at TSA will help the agency focus 
both on known and evolving threats.
2. Return on Investment.
    Was it worth it? We have all been frustrated by TSA and that 
constant irritant perhaps makes it difficult to see its big picture 
value. Going back to my first point about Vigilance, 20 years is a long 
time to withstand any kind of threat. The attacks on 9/11 and plots 
like the 2009 Christmas Day bomber and foiled UK liquid explosive 
attack are not top of mind for many people traveling through airports. 
During my tenure alone, there were dozens of dangerous attack plans 
that were broken up by colleagues in law enforcement, the intelligence 
agencies, armed services, international and other partners working 
together. I have no reason to believe that the threat has disappeared. 
TSA's role is impossible to quantify, but it is a major player. What is 
the value of flying safely in freedom for 20 years? Had there been 
follow-on 9/11 attacks, would our economy have grown as it has? TSA has 
cost somewhere around $100 billion and introduced unwelcome friction to 
be sure. On balance though, I believe that TSA has carried its fair 
share and then some.
    TSA has made great strides in the past 20 years, thanks to the 
support of Congress, strong leadership at DHS, and collaboration with 
Federal agencies, international partners, and the private sector. We 
have come a long way since 9/11, but there is more work to be done.
    It has been the greatest honor of my life to serve alongside the 
women and men of TSA. My profound thanks and great respect go out to 
those who serve and continue to serve TSA and its mission. Not a day 
goes by when I do not reflect on those who lost their lives on 9/11 and 
those who answer the challenge to protect our country. As time passes, 
it is ever more important to remember that 9/11 is not just a distant 
moment in history, it is a charge to all of us to stand up and answer 
our country's call.
1. Never Forget.

    Mr. Katko. Thank you. It is impressive that we will hear 
from 4 of the 7 Senate-confirmed TSA administrators. I want to 
thank all of you for all you have done and continue to do in 
keeping our country secure. As we approach TSA's 20th 
anniversary on November 19, it is imperative that we now turn 
our attention to how TSA should be positioned to counter new 
and emerging threats, threats we couldn't conceive of in the 
early days after 9/11.
    I am extremely concerned that our withdrawal from 
Afghanistan will create a new safe haven for terrorists. Our 
homeland is again at risk with the rise of ISIS and al-Qaeda in 
that region where they now once again have found a comfortable 
home.
    As terrorist threats continue to evolve, TSA needs to 
accelerate its deployment of next generation technology and 
biometrics to the checkpoint. We cannot delay these investments 
or accept movement at a snail's pace, lest we risk being caught 
flatfooted once again. These needed technologies include 
credential authentication technology, computed tomography, 
advanced imaging technology, stand-off detection, and so much 
more.
    TSA must be agile and ensure that its work force is 
positioned to counter the evolving threats we will see over the 
next 20 years. As former Administrator Kip Hawley said in his 
statement for the record, ``Intelligence and technology are 
critical to effective security, but people were and still are 
TSA's strongest asset.''
    I wholeheartedly agree, and I thank the employees of TSA 
for their service to securing the Nation's transportation 
systems. Their dedication has shown through as they have 
continued to perform their critical duties in the midst of a 
global pandemic.
    Over 10,000 TSA employees have tested positive for COVID-19 
and 29 have tragically died. I have spoken to Administrator 
Pekoske, my friend, regularly regarding my concern that the 
front-line TSA work force is not paid enough, and I know he 
shares that concern. Transportation security officers have an 
important job and their pay does not reflect it.
    I have heard time and again that the pay issues are going 
to be fixed, but they never are. I look forward to hearing from 
Administrator Pekoske today on the details of the compensation 
that he is providing to the front-line work force and what 
Congress can do to support these pay initiatives.
    As we reflect on the past 20 years of TSA and its 20 years 
going forward, we must remember one thing, we must never, ever 
forget.
    With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    [The statement of Ranking Member Katko follows:]
                 Statement of Ranking Member John Katko
    Thank you, Chairman Thompson, for convening this important hearing 
today.
    On September 11, 2001, 19 hijackers proceeded through U.S. airport 
security and, once on board, commandeered 4 commercial aircraft, flying 
them into the World Trade Center in New York, the Pentagon, and a field 
in Shanksville, Pennsylvania.
    The Transportation Security Administration was created in the 
months after the terrorist attacks and made dramatic changes to our 
travel landscape.
    Gone are the days when you could arrive for a flight minutes before 
take-off or meet your arriving family members at their gate. But with 
the immense help of the private sector, TSA quickly stood up and 
established a robust aviation screening system. Our Nation is grateful.
    Over the past 20 years, TSA has continuously adapted their 
screening procedures based on critical intelligence and risk, while 
also expanding its focus on securing surface transportation.
    When our committee was in New York recently at the 9/11 Museum and 
Memorial for the 20th anniversary of that terrible day in our Nation's 
history, we all reflected on the nearly 3,000 Americans that died on 9/
11.
    We didn't believe it was possible at the time, but TSA--and the 
Department of Homeland Security--have been successful in preventing a 
significant 9/11-style attack on our transportation system over the 
last 20 years.
    That's an amazing feat, and I want to keep it that way for the next 
20 years. I know all the Members of the committee feel the same.
    Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to enter written testimonies 
from former Secretary Chertoff and former Administrator Hawley into the 
record. We appreciate their service, as well as the service of the 
esteemed panelists who are here before the committee today.
    It is impressive that we will hear from 4 of the 7 Senate-confirmed 
TSA administrators. Thank you for all you have done and continue to do 
in keeping our country secure.
    As we approach TSA's 20th anniversary on November 19, it is 
imperative that we now turn our attention to how TSA should be 
positioned to counter new and emerging threats. Threats we couldn't 
conceive of in the early days after 9/11.
    I'm extremely concerned that our withdrawal from Afghanistan will 
create a new safe haven for terrorists. Our homeland is again at risk 
with the rise of ISIS and al-Qaeda in that region.
    As terrorist threats continue to evolve, TSA needs to accelerate 
its deployment of next-generation technology and biometrics to the 
checkpoint. We cannot delay these investments or accept movement at a 
snail's pace, lest we risk being caught flat-footed once again.
    These needed technologies include credential authentication 
technology, computed tomography, advanced imaging technology, stand-off 
detection, and more.
    TSA must be agile and ensure that its workforce is positioned to 
counter the evolving threats we will see over the next 20 years.
    As former Administrator Kip Hawley said in his statement for the 
record, ``intelligence and technology are critical to effective 
security, but people were--and still are--TSA's strongest asset.'' I 
wholeheartedly agree and I thank the employees of TSA for their service 
to securing the Nation's transportation systems.
    Their dedication has shown through as they have continued to 
perform their critical duties in the midst of a global pandemic. Over 
10,000 TSA employees have tested positive for COVID-19 and 29 have 
tragically died.
    I've spoken to Administrator Pekoske regularly regarding my concern 
that the front-line TSA workforce is not paid enough and I know he 
shares that concern. Transportation Security Officers have an important 
job and their pay does not reflect it.
    I've heard time and time again that the pay issues are going to be 
fixed but they never are. I look forward to hearing from Administrator 
Pekoske today on the details of the compensation he is providing the 
front-line workforce and what Congress can do to support these pay 
initiatives.
    As we reflect on the past 20 years of TSA and its next 20 years, we 
must never forget.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

    Chairman Thompson. Other Members of the committee are 
reminded that under committee rules, opening statements may be 
submitted for the record. Members are also reminded that the 
committee will operate according to the guidelines laid out by 
the Chairman and Ranking Member in our February 3 colloquy 
regarding remote proceedings.
    I now welcome our panel of witnesses. Our first witness is 
the Honorable David Pekoske, the current administrator of the 
Transportation Security Administration, a position he has held 
since 2017. In his role, he is responsible for overseeing the 
execution of TSA's mission to secure the Nation's 
transportation system and lead TSA's work force of more than 
60,000 employees.
    Prior to his time as TSA administrator, he spent 33 years 
in the U.S. Coast Guard where he became the service's 26th Vice 
Commandant in 2009. In addition, Mr. Pekoske was selected 
earlier this year by President Biden to be the Acting Secretary 
of Homeland Security ahead of Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas' 
confirmation. I appreciate his willingness to appear on this 
panel with former TSA administrators.
    Our next witness is the Honorable Peter Neffenger who was 
TSA administrator from 2015 to 2017 and is a retired vice 
admiral in the U.S. Coast Guard.
    Under his leadership, TSA developed its use of automated 
screening technology, examined airport public area security, 
and cultivated TSA's relationship with industry to resolve long 
checkpoint delays at airports across the country.
    Vice Admiral Neffenger is a 34-year veteran of the U.S. 
Coast Guard where he served as the 29th vice commandant before 
being nominated by President Barack Obama to be TSA 
administrator.
    Our third witness is the Honorable John S. Pistole, the TSA 
administrator from 2010 to 2014. He is the president of 
Anderson University, his alma mater, in Anderson, Indiana.
    During his tenure at TSA, Mr. Pistole oversaw the creation 
of the PreCheck program and was the first administrator to 
grant TSA work force limited collective bargaining rights. 
Prior to his position as administrator, Mr. Pistole spent 26 
years with the Federal Bureau of Investigation where he led the 
Counterterrorism Division following the attacks of 9/11. In 
October 2004, he arose to the position of deputy director of 
the FBI.
    Our fourth witness, the Honorable James M. Loy, was the 
second TSA administrator serving from 2002 to 2003. He came to 
TSA from his position as commandant of the Coast Guard, the 
role he was in on the day of the 9/11 attacks. As one of the 
earliest leaders of TSA, he oversaw the launch of many of TSA's 
operational activities and the hiring of tens of thousands of 
newly-minted TSA employees. He later served as the deputy 
secretary of Homeland Security under President George W. Bush, 
capping off a career in public service spanning more than 4 
decades.
    Without objection, the witnesses' full statements will be 
inserted in the record.
    I now ask Administrator Pekoske to summarize his statement 
for 5 minutes.

 STATEMENT OF DAVID P. PEKOSKE, ADMINISTRATOR, TRANSPORTATION 
                    SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

    Mr. Pekoske. Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Katko, and 
distinguished Members of this committee, thank you for holding 
this morning's hearing and for your comments in your opening 
statements. I appreciate the opportunity to appear with 3 
distinguished former administrators of TSA. They each continue 
to make substantial contributions to our country and they are 
all friends and colleagues. It has been my honor to build on 
the foundation they established during their time leading TSA.
    Each year, we remember the 9/11 attacks and the 2,977 
people who perished. In our remembrance this year at TSA 
Headquarters and the airports around the country our theme was 
``United in Memory, Together in Mission''. I, like many of you, 
remember that day as if it were yesterday, and in addition to 
witnessing in horror the terrorist attacks carried out on our 
homeland, I remember the way it felt to watch our country unite 
behind a shared experience, and together commit to ``Never 
Forget and Never Again''.
    Our motto in TSA is ``Not on my watch''. In living this 
motto, we must ensure that unity of effort and unity of purpose 
so evident immediately following 9/11 continue to endure.
    Approximately 2 months following 9/11, Congress passed the 
Aviation and Transportation Security Act establishing TSA. In 
that legislation and in our first major reauthorization just 3 
years ago, you have provided us with the authorities needed to 
protect the Nation's transportation systems.
    The theme of this morning's hearing is the state of TSA 20 
years after 9/11. In assessing the state of TSA, I would 
respectfully submit that the state of TSA is very strong. We 
continue to accomplish our mission in the face of threats to 
our transportation system, both aviation and surface, and we 
are achieving our vision to be an agile security agency 
embodied by a professional work force that engages as partners 
in the American people to outmatch a dynamic threat.
    I would like to briefly highlight 3 elements of this 
success: Agility, partnerships, and our people that are 
particularly relevant to this hearing. First agility. The 
intelligence community's work in assessing threats has allowed 
us to mitigate risks to aviation and surface transportation. We 
have rapidly changed our procedures in domestic airports and at 
last-point-of-departure international airports based on 
intelligence community assessments ensure this information 
rapidly as appropriate with our partners.
    Thanks to your support, we are in the midst of a major 
upgrade to the technology in our screening checkpoints at over 
400 airports around the country. These upgrades include 
improved passenger identify verification and screening through 
the use of credential authentication technology, improved 
carry-on bag screening using computed tomography, or CT, X-ray 
technology, and soon improved on-person screening through 
upgraded advanced imaging technology.
    The net result of all these advancements is twofold: 
Significantly enhanced security effectiveness and an improved 
passenger experience. I thank you for your support of these 
technology improvements. They are critical to our continued 
success.
    Additionally, exercising the agility you have provided in 
law, we have recently issued security directives to improve 
cybersecurity in our Nation's most critical gas and hazardous 
liquid pipelines, and we plan to expand this cybersecurity 
effort to include all critical transportation security 
infrastructure.
    The second key element of success is partnerships. We have 
outstanding partnerships with other Federal agencies as well as 
our partners in State, local, Tribal, and territorial 
governments. Similarly, we have worked very closely with our 
international partners to ensure global aviation security, 
especially at last-point-of-departure airports.
    I appreciate your support of our one-stop security efforts 
to enable us the pilot security equivalency at select 
international locations. This will improve aviation security. I 
am very proud of the partnerships we have with the aviation and 
surface transportation owners and operators. This model of 
engagement has allowed us to improve security at a pace and 
level of sophistication that would not otherwise be possible.
    And with that, the security and convenience benefits to 
passengers who use these systems every day.
    Without question, a key element of our success is our 
people, and I couldn't be prouder of the people who serve their 
country in TSA. They professionally ensure secure travel to 
millions of people every single day. I have worked tirelessly 
to earn their trust and provide the support and guidance they 
need to accomplish our critical mission. I continue to strongly 
support adjustments to pay for all of our people, especially 
our front-line workers.
    Regarding our screening work force in particular, I would 
add 2 additional comments. We have already transitioned to 
adverse action appeals to the Merit Systems Protection Board 
and very shortly I will sign a new directive providing full 
collective bargaining rights.
    In conclusion, we are united in memory, together in 
mission. I thank each Member of this committee for your support 
of TSA and the opportunity to testify this morning, and I look 
forward to your comments and questions. Thank you, Mr. 
Chairman.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Pekoske follows:]
                 Prepared Statement of David P. Pekoske
                           September 29, 2021
    Good morning Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Katko, and 
distinguished Members of the committee. I am honored to appear before 
you today to recognize the 20th anniversary of the Transportation 
Security Administration (TSA) and share our progress and substantial 
accomplishments over the last 20 years.
    September 11, 2001 is one of the darkest days in our Nation's 
history. Even still, the American people emerged from these horrific 
events more united than ever. In the aftermath of that dreadful day, 
TSA was created to safeguard the United States against another 9/11-
type attack by strengthening the security of our Nation's 
transportation systems while also ensuring freedom of movement for 
people and commerce.
                   founding and congressional support
    TSA was established by the Aviation and Transportation Security Act 
(ATSA), which was signed into law on November 19, 2001. With the 
enactment of ATSA, TSA assumed the significant challenge of protecting 
our Nation's transportation systems from terrorist threats. There was 
no blueprint for this urgent and immense task. The early leaders of TSA 
built the organization 1 day at a time, initiating valuable 
relationships with international, industry, Governmental, and private-
sector partners.
    The agency was created to oversee security in all modes of 
transportation, but aviation security was at the forefront of the 
Nation's mind after the 9/11 attack. ATSA required TSA to deploy 
Federal security screeners to inspect airline passengers, their 
baggage, and air cargo; expanded the Federal Air Marshal Service; and 
required reinforced cockpit doors among many things designed to enhance 
transportation security. Additionally, the Implementing Recommendations 
of the 
9/11 Commission Act (9/11 Act) required TSA to implement the 
recommendations of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon 
the United States, such as requiring 100 percent air cargo screening on 
passenger aircraft departing the country. Finally, through the TSA 
Modernization Act of 2018 (TSA Mod Act), the agency's first 
comprehensive reauthorization since its inception, TSA was further 
authorized to expand field operational testing of advanced screening 
technologies, increase the usage of canine resources, enhance public 
area security, and improve the security of passengers, cargo, cockpits, 
cabins, surface transportation, and foreign airports.
    This November, TSA will mark 20 years since its formation. TSA's 
mission and focus began with the urgent task of preventing another 9/
11-style attack on the homeland, but its operations have expanded and 
evolved across the entire transportation landscape, from aviation to 
surface and the physical and cyber domains. As we approach this 
milestone, Congress' continued support remains essential to ensure TSA 
can respond to this dynamic threat landscape, and I am committed to 
working with you to ensure TSA has the authorities and resources needed 
to both respond to emerging threats and support its workforce.
                       changing threat landscape
    TSA's mandate is not only to mitigate the threats of today but to 
preempt evolving threats as our adversaries continue to adapt and 
evolve their tactics and methods. In the 2000's, we witnessed hijackers 
using planes as weapons, and we saw unique methods in attempts to 
conceal explosives in items like shoes, underwear, and soft drinks. In 
the 2010's, we witnessed explosives hidden in electronics and attacks 
on the public side of the airport. Now, in the 2020's, we face new and 
extremely sophisticated threats from state and non-state actors, 
ranging from cyber attacks to concerns about hostile and non-hostile 
unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), in addition to traditional threats. 
From January 2018 through August 2021, there were 2,476 UAS events 
reported to TSA affecting all modes of transportation. From the 
beginning of 2021 through the end of August, there has been a 169 
percent increase in UAS sightings in the domestic aviation environment, 
requiring 31 aircraft evasive actions. We are not only focused on 
elaborate plots and large-scale attacks but also on current threats, 
which could come from domestic violent extremists as well as insiders. 
While the threat landscape has grown more complicated over the years, 
one thing has not changed--we still face ambitious adversaries who are 
intensely focused on finding a point of attack and waiting for 
opportunity.
    We have also faced another unprecedented and unexpected adversary--
a global pandemic. If COVID-19 has taught us anything, it is that we 
must remain vigilant and adapt quickly, because not all threats look 
the same. And just like 9/11, the COVID-19 pandemic will have a lasting 
impact on the future of transportation.
    Fortunately, agility is part of our DNA. When TSA was created, it 
was done with the express purpose of forming an entrepreneurial agency 
that could remain nimble in its approach to protecting our Nation's 
transportation systems. From the beginning, our work force has been 
taught to anticipate and prepare for the unexpected. When our officers 
report to the checkpoint each day, the only thing they know for sure is 
that the upcoming day will be different than the one before. That 
mentality extends to the top of the organization, where our leaders 
know that our adversaries are still committed to doing us harm, and we 
must remain vigilant, innovative, and agile.
    Today, TSA relies on intelligence to develop and implement its 
approach to security and works closely with transportation, law 
enforcement, and intelligence partners to set the international 
standard for excellence in transportation security. Since the agency's 
formation, TSA has implemented a robust series of security procedures, 
developed a workforce well-trained in threat mitigation, and sought and 
implemented state-of-the-art technologies to screen passengers, 
baggage, and air cargo. The agency's security measures are continually 
evaluated and enhanced by experts to address evolving threats, 
including those potentially emanating from air cargo, while preserving 
individual rights and freedoms. TSA is developing an Air Cargo Security 
Roadmap, which is a strategic plan drafted in collaboration with key 
industry and other Federal partners with equity in air cargo. The 
Roadmap will outline TSA's strategic direction toward modernizing, 
streamlining, and further securing the air cargo ecosystem over the 
next 5 years.
    While TSA is best known for aviation security, it also plays a key 
role in protecting the Nation's surface transportation networks--mass 
transit and passenger rail, freight rail, highway and motor carrier, 
pipeline, and maritime. Following the Colonial Pipeline ransomware 
incident, TSA helped lead the Department's efforts to improve baseline 
cybersecurity requirements for the pipeline sector through the issuance 
of two Security Directives. These directives are complementary to the 
TSA and CISA efforts in the Pipeline Cybersecurity Initiative. TSA, 
along with CISA, Coast Guard, and interagency stakeholders, continues 
to identify opportunities to use existing authorities and private-
sector relationships to improve cybersecurity and information sharing 
across all modes of transportation. We actively work across all surface 
modes to enhance intelligence information sharing with our partners so 
we can collaboratively address security issues unique to the mode of 
transportation, such as the Surface Transportation Security Advisory 
Committee (STSAC) recommendation to stand up a Surface Information 
Sharing Cell. The tremendous challenge of protecting our Nation's 
surface transportation systems and pipeline security infrastructure 
from physical and cyber-based threats is not new; and it will continue 
to be one of the most persistent threats in the future. To that end, in 
September 2020, the TSA Security Training Rule, a 9/11 Act requirement, 
became effective. This regulation, which had been in the rulemaking 
process for many years, requires owners/operators of higher-risk 
freight railroad carriers, public transportation agencies (including 
rail mass transit and bus systems), passenger railroad carriers and 
over-the-road bus companies to provide TSA-approved security training 
to employees who perform security-sensitive functions. Additionally, 
TSA is currently drafting a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for the 
vetting of front-line public transportation and railroad surface 
transportation employees.
                             our workforce
    Over the last 20 years, TSA's workforce has become an extremely 
professional, highly-skilled, and proactive workforce of approximately 
60,000 people. I am appreciative of and remain committed to the TSA 
workforce, and am proud of everything the agency has accomplished 
because of their efforts. I consider it a great privilege to serve 
alongside such a dedicated group of individuals. We continue to see 
tremendous efforts by our front-line screening officers, Federal Air 
Marshals, inspectors, canine handlers, vetting personnel, and all of 
those who support TSA's mission.
    While the COVID-19 pandemic has tested our resiliency, TSA has 
adapted and maintained its security posture while also working to 
ensure the health and safety of both our employees and the traveling 
public. This has been accomplished through distributing critical 
personal protective equipment, adjusting procedures to accommodate 
social distancing, and integrating of technologies that decrease the 
need for touch points between officers, passengers, and their property. 
TSA also issued and subsequently extended mask requirements in U.S. 
transportation systems until January 18, 2022. Effective Friday, 
September 10, 2021, TSA increased the range of civil penalties that may 
be charged against individuals who violate this Federal mask mandate in 
U.S. transportation systems. The new range of penalties will be $500-
$1,000 for first offenders and $1,000-$3,000 for second offenders.
    TSA is also investing in its workforce by working to address long-
standing workforce challenges, which were highlighted in the Blue 
Ribbon Panel of public and private sector human capital experts I 
commissioned in 2018. Pursuant to its ATSA authorities, TSA has 
developed 3 initiatives to enhance TSA officer compensation and make 
career progression more transparent: Service Pay, Career Progression, 
and Model Officer Recognition. Service Pay provides a predictable 
annual salary increase that acknowledges enhanced experience and skill 
mastery. The next phase of Career Progression, being implemented this 
year, will provide a one-time pay increase for eligible E-Band officers 
who successfully complete certain advanced skills training and take on 
additional responsibilities. Finally, the Model Officer Recognition 
program identifies and rewards TSA's top officers in all pay bands with 
monetary and non-monetary awards or pay increases for their on-going 
contributions to the mission. We are also leveraging funding to launch 
efforts to recruit new employees in support of screening operations at 
many of TSA's approximately 430 Federalized airports Nation-wide. We 
will continue to pursue focused veteran and military recruitment and 
outreach to help fill these and other important positions. Finally, TSA 
is committed to workforce protections, expanding collective bargaining 
at the National level, and ensuring that TSA's standards and processes 
adhere to the principles applied by the Merit Systems Protection Board. 
TSA continues to review options within existing authorities to achieve 
these goals and expand items covered by the collective bargaining 
agreement.
    Historically, TSA employees have received limited pay progression 
due to budget constraints. Recent initiatives such as Transportation 
Security Officer (TSO) Service Pay and TSO Career Progression have, 
however, increased compensation to compensate TSA employees at a level 
more commensurate with the tremendous responsibility they bear for the 
security of our transportation system.
    TSA is committed to fostering a fair and equitable workplace and 
fostering diversity and inclusion at all levels of the organization, 
including within many of our highest-ranking positions. To achieve 
this, TSA formed an Inclusion Action Committee (IAC) devoted to 
strengthening our diversity and sustaining an inclusive culture to 
further empower and engage our employees. Consistent with President 
Biden's Executive Order on Preventing and Combatting Discrimination on 
the Basis of Gender Identity or Sexual Orientation, and based on an IAC 
recommendation, TSA issued a Management Directive and accompanying 
Handbook in April 2021. This guidance provides policy and procedures 
for addressing the needs and issues that arise for transitioning and 
transgender TSA officers, as well as TSA's equal opportunity and 
nondiscrimination policy as it relates to these employees and 
applicants for employment. TSA is at its best when all employees feel 
valued and are fully engaged to outmatch dynamic threats, committed 
adversaries, and evolving circumstances.
               evolution of airport security & screening
    TSA's airport screening process is intelligence-driven and applies 
a risk-based strategy that establishes security practices to expedite 
screening for known and trusted travelers at security checkpoints while 
focusing resources on high-risk and unknown passengers. TSA screens 
more than 1 million passengers daily, on average, and more than 2 
million daily before the COVID-19 pandemic through TSA's Secure Flight 
passenger vetting system, introduced in 2009.
    TSA's security strategy also includes other vetting activities. To 
address risks associated with Insider Threats, TSA vets more than 25 
million transportation workers daily against the Terrorist Watchlist, 
including airport workers, airline flight crewmembers, mariners, 
commercial drivers who haul hazardous materials, and cargo screeners 
and handlers. In December 2020, TSA established the TSA Insider Threat 
Mitigation Hub to mature and expand the capabilities of the Insider 
Threat Program to enhance the ability to deter, detect, and mitigate 
insider threats to transportation. TSA also vets students who enroll in 
training through FAA-certified flight training providers and the entire 
Airman Registry against changes or updates to the Terrorist Watchlist. 
To improve the vetting process, TSA has implemented the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI) recurrent criminal history vetting service known 
as ``Rap Back'' to provide near real-time updates to an aviation 
worker's criminal history, representing a significant improvement to 
threat mitigation. With all of our screening and vetting programs, we 
work to ensure that there are appropriate redress mechanisms in place 
to ensure the protection of travelers' civil rights and civil 
liberties.
    TSA also works closely with its international partners to share 
best practices, techniques, and technologies, and to collaborate and 
facilitate measures to harmonize mutual aviation security goals for the 
safety of travelers. Air cargo is more secure than it has ever been 
with 100 percent of cargo on flights departing U.S. airports to 
international locations screened or secured, consistent with the 
International Civil Aviation Organization's (ICAO's) updated standards. 
TSA also established the Third-Party Canine-Cargo (3PK9-C) program to 
enhance the screening of air cargo by leveraging the capabilities of 
third-party explosives detection canine teams.
                        technology advancements
    Since TSA's inception, we have continuously refined our security 
approach by examining the procedures and technologies we use to secure 
our Nation's transportation systems. The introduction of new 
technologies has played a significant role in how airport security has 
evolved and been enhanced over the past 20 years as industry develops 
new methods to help TSA detect threats to the aviation sector. As we 
look to the future, TSA strives to remain the recognized global leader 
of transportation security by focusing on capability innovation and 
threat-informed, information-driven operations. A number of improved 
technologies and enhancements that TSA has recently introduced provide 
significant advancements over existing equipment used for identity 
verification and the screening of individuals and their accessible 
property while also reducing contact during screening to improve the 
passenger experience. These key technologies include:
   Computed Tomography, or CT, which produces high-quality 3-D 
        images that can be rotated up to 360 degrees on three axes for 
        a more thorough visual analysis of a carry-on bag's contents. 
        It also reduces the need to touch or manually check bags.
   Credential Authentication Technology, or CAT, machines 
        automatically verify identification documents presented by 
        passengers during the security screening process and confirm a 
        passenger's flight information and vetting status without the 
        need for our officers to see a boarding pass. TSA has worked to 
        modify CAT machines to allow self-service operation, so 
        passengers can scan their own photo ID without our Officers 
        touching the document. Additionally, the Self-Service CAT with 
        camera (CAT-2) upgrade units promote social distancing, reduce 
        the need for a physical ID handoff at the Travel Document 
        Checker (TDC), and make passenger screening more automated.
   Advanced Imaging Technology, or AIT, safely screens 
        passengers for both metallic and non-metallic threats such as 
        weapons and explosives without physical contact. Enhancements 
        have reduced the number of false alarms at the checkpoint by 
        using even more sophisticated millimeter wave technology.
                   biometrics and identity management
    In addition to new and improved screening technologies, we are also 
investing in biometric technology, which adds an important layer to our 
security procedures. Biometrics are a powerful tool, such as to improve 
identity verification performance, but must be used carefully and with 
the utmost respect and safeguarding of passenger privacy. In our 
pilots, testing protocols always use a voluntary process for passengers 
choosing to go through using the biometric technology in addition to 
conducting passenger surveys about our technologies and their use. 
TSA's CAT-2 uses facial matching technology that compares the live 
image of a passenger with the image on the passenger's photo ID, never 
stores biometric information, and any information captured for one 
passenger is deleted by the time the next passenger approaches. TSA 
remains mindful that biometric systems may have error rates and tests 
such systems to ensure accurate performance across diverse demographic 
groups. A recently concluded DHS Science and Technology Directorate 
(DHS S&T) test of the CAT-2 devices for match performance across 
demographic groups concluded that ``no consistent statistically 
significant differences in performance across gender, race, and skin 
tone were observed across test conditions for the CAT-2 system.'' 
Maintaining passenger equitability and dignity is an agency priority 
and new technologies, like CAT-2, should enhance both transportation 
security and the passenger experience.
    Along with biometrics development, digital credentials, such as 
mobile driver's licenses and digital passports, are becoming 
increasingly common. Mobile driver's license technology can enable a 
more seamless airport security screening experience for travelers and 
TSA is working with industry and the public to find innovative ways 
mobile driver's licenses can facilitate easier and faster transit 
through TSA checkpoints while complying with REAL ID Act of 2005 
requirements, enforcement of which was extended until May 3, 2023, due 
to the COVID-19 pandemic. Mobile driver's license technology marks a 
major milestone for TSA to provide an additional level of convenience 
for the traveler by enabling more opportunities for touchless TSA 
airport security screening. Moving forward, TSA will continue to pursue 
innovative solutions that allow us to improve identity management while 
ensuring privacy and mitigating any potential risks that these new 
technologies may introduce. Technology advancements are just one part 
of TSA's multi-layered approach to ensuring transportation security.
                              partnerships
    Protecting our Nation's transportation systems requires robust 
partnerships and effective security operations across all modes of 
transportation. Similar to other security efforts, TSA considers 
engaging public and private partners vital to ensuring the safety and 
security of our transportation network. Due to our expansive scope of 
operation and influence, TSA works with: Owners and operators of 
transportation systems, industry associations, manufacturers, advisory 
bodies (e.g., Aviation Security Advisory Committee and STSAC), Critical 
Infrastructure Government and Sector Coordinating Councils under the 
National Infrastructure Protection Plan, and other Government and 
quasi-Governmental agencies (e.g., ICAO).
    We are also extremely cognizant of the needs of passengers that use 
the transportation systems. TSA's Disability and Multicultural 
Coalition alone coordinates with over 450 advocacy and community-based 
organizations representing diverse communities. Additionally, we 
continue to expand our cadre of Passenger Support Specialists to 
provide real-time support in successfully engaging with and screening 
our diverse traveler populations. The TSA Mod Act also advanced our 
partnerships in this area. We appreciate Congress' direction as TSA 
continues to foster a culture that treats all passengers with dignity 
and respect.
    TSA has always welcomed and actively pursued engagement and 
alignment with our partners, and we have always worked together toward 
our mutual objectives of keeping passengers, cargo, and goods secure 
while also ensuring a positive travel experience. We rely on our 
partnerships to help secure the National transportation system and will 
continue to develop them in the years ahead to enhance security across 
the whole of the surface transportation enterprise.
                                closing
    Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Katko, and Members of the 
committee, I appreciate this opportunity, on the occasion of TSA's 20th 
anniversary, to share the significant steps the agency has taken to 
meet the challenges of the ever-evolving security threat landscape. Our 
homeland is stronger today than it was 20 years ago, and I am extremely 
proud of the hard work and achievements we have made since our 
founding. Today, I reaffirm our commitment to transportation security 
and assure you that we remain steadfast in our mission to protect the 
Nation's transportation systems and ensure the freedom of movement for 
people and commerce. Thank you for your continued support of TSA's 
mission and the chance to appear before you today. I look forward to 
answering any questions you may have.



    Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. I now ask Admiral 
Neffenger to summarize his statement for 5 minutes.

   STATEMENT OF PETER V. NEFFENGER, PRIVATE CITIZEN, FORMER 
     ADMINISTRATOR, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

    Mr. Neffenger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good morning to 
you, Ranking Member Katko, and the distinguished Members of 
this committee. Thank you for inviting me to join my 
distinguished colleagues and my good friends in recognizing the 
20th anniversary of the TSA and to reflect upon what is the 
unique value and critically important service it provides to 
our Nation.
    Transportation underpins our economic health, is essential 
to our prosperity and resilience, and is a key component of our 
National security, and one of the greatest privileges of my 
career was to have served with the women and men of the TSA. 
They are among the most dedicated, professional, and selfless 
public servants I have known, and our Nation is safer and more 
secure because of their work, and I remain grateful for their 
service.
    TSA's missions encompasses the full spectrum of our 
Nation's transportation system: Aviation, maritime, mass 
transit, passenger and freight rail, over-the-road motor 
carriers, interstate pipelines, and more. It is an 
extraordinarily dynamic and complex mission set made even more 
so by a continually evolving and expanding threat environment. 
Transportation security today is a direct outgrowth, as we have 
heard, of the tragic attacks of September 11, the 20th 
anniversary of which we sadly commemorated this month.
    Transportation was the weapon of 9/11 and it offered the 
means and the instruments for terrorists to strike at America. 
This hearing has recounted the history of our Nation's actions 
and successes since that tragic event and has already 
highlighted TSA's many accomplishments. My colleagues will also 
describe in chilling detail the diversity of new threats we 
face. Building upon this, I will add some thoughts looking 
forward.
    We are safer and more secure because of the security 
architecture we have built over the past 20 years. We have 
developed more capable systems and technologies. We have 
integrated and shared intelligence among many stakeholders. We 
have designed processes and procedures for vetting people who 
access or work in critical areas. We have developed tactics and 
techniques to prevent large-scale attacks like 9/11 from 
happening again.
    We have become exceptionally adept at instituting 
countermeasures to the terrorist tactics we have seen and 
experienced, and such countermeasures are essential. Security 
is necessarily additive as terrorists and criminals rarely 
remove a tool from their kit.
    However, today's security systems, as good as they are, are 
not sufficient for tomorrow's threats. Adversaries are agile, 
adaptive, aggressive, and creative. We have to be even more so. 
There is no perfect system, no ideal technology, and no we got 
it right moment. Success demands systems and technologies that 
are adaptive, innovative, and focused on imagining what might 
happen in addition to protecting against what has happened, and 
that imagination is key.
    Terrorists and criminals are dangerous entrepreneurs, 
always seeking advantage and ever poised to exploit 
vulnerabilities. These include increasingly sophisticated, 
interdependent cyber systems, the shocking lessons of the 
global COVID-19 pandemic, vulnerabilities presented by 
interconnected industrial control systems, and the growing 
sophistication and deployment of technologies such as unmanned 
systems and autonomous vehicles.
    Moreover, barriers to entry continue to lower, especially 
with respect to cyber. The Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack 
and the hacking of a major U.S. maritime port just last week 
dramatically illustrate the ease with which critical 
infrastructure can be attacked and disabled by remote cyber 
actors. Administrator Pekoske has presented a compelling 
strategy for investment in the TSA work force, including 
increasing pay and evolving and modernizing TSA's systems and 
architecture.
    The TSA Innovation Task Force and the Office of 
Requirements and Capabilities Analysis are working hard to 
imagine future threats to innovate faster than our adversaries, 
but their work requires predictable, stable, and reliable 
funding and support to succeed, and I urge this committee and 
Congress to fully fund TSA's strategy to ensure they will 
continue to evolve faster than the threats we envision.
    I also urge you to support efforts to mature research and 
development efforts across DHS to include robust private-sector 
engagement and open architecture standards; coordinated, on-
going, operationally-focused, and integrated R&D is fundamental 
to counter future threats. Security is a never-ending race and 
we need to stay in the lead.
    I thank this committee for your continued and steadfast 
support of the TSA over the years and for support of its 
dedicated work force, and I look forward to your comments and 
any questions you may have. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman and 
Ranking Member Katko and distinguished Members.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Neffenger follows:]
                Prepared Statement of Peter V. Neffenger
                           September 29, 2021
    Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Katko, and distinguished Members 
of the committee, thank you for inviting me here today to add my 
thoughts to those of my former colleagues as we recognize the 20th 
anniversary of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and 
reflect upon the unique value and critically important service it 
provides to our Nation.
    One of greatest privileges of my career was to have had the honor 
of serving with the women and men of the TSA. They are among the most 
dedicated, professional, and selfless public servants I have known, and 
our Nation is safer and more secure because of their work. I remain 
grateful for their service.
    Most Americans know TSA as the agency responsible for aviation 
security. But as this committee well knows, TSA's missions are many and 
encompass the full spectrum of our Nation's transportation system--
aviation, maritime, mass transit, passenger and freight rail, over-the-
road motor carriers, interstate pipelines, and more. It is a dynamic 
mission set that is extraordinarily complex, comprehensive, and 
challenging, made ever more so by a continually evolving and expanding 
threat environment. And today's threat environment is much more 
dynamic, diverse, and complex than the one faced when TSA came into 
being on November 19, 2001.
    The transportation network underpins our Nation's economic health. 
It enables reliable access to materials and markets and the ability to 
take advantage of economies of scale and production. Transportation is 
central to our economic prosperity and resilience, and transportation 
security is a key component of our National security. We've lived 
through devasting impacts to our lives and economy when transportation 
systems have been disrupted or compromised. Indeed, as we meet here 
today, our supply chains face severe challenges in part due to the 
transportation disruptions of the global COVID pandemic.
    Our current approach to transportation security is a direct 
outgrowth of the tragic attacks of September 11, 2001--the 20th 
anniversary of which we sadly commemorated by remembering those we lost 
and honoring the heroes who responded. Transportation provided the 
weapon of 9/11 and was central to al-Qaeda's strategy that day. 
Transportation offered the means and the instruments for terrorists to 
strike at America. Transportation also provided the mechanism for the 
19 hijackers to travel and coordinate their plot.
    My colleagues on this panel have recounted the history of our 
collective actions and successes in the 2 decades following that tragic 
event and have specifically highlighted the many accomplishments of TSA 
to date and suggested approaches for the future. They have also 
described in chilling detail the challenging and diverse array of new 
threats facing our Nation. Building upon this, I will focus my comments 
on transportation security looking forward.
    The robust and capable security architecture we have built over the 
past 20 years has arguably made us safer and more secure from terrorist 
attacks. We have developed more capable systems and technologies, 
integrated and shared intelligence among stakeholders, designed 
processes and procedures for vetting people who access or work in 
critical areas, and developed tactics and techniques to prevent large-
scale attacks like 9/11 from happening again. We have become 
exceptionally adept at instituting countermeasures to the terrorist 
tactics we have seen and experienced. Such countermeasures are 
essential. Security is necessarily additive, as terrorists and 
criminals have not been known to remove a tool from their kit.
    However, a security system that is primarily reactive is a security 
system that can, and will, eventually fail. Adversaries are agile, 
adaptive, aggressive, and creative. Our approaches to security must be 
even more so. Effective and capable security systems are dynamic and 
ever-evolving. There is no perfect system nor ideal technology and no 
``we got it right'' moment. Success demands security systems and 
technologies that anticipate and predict--systems that are creative, 
adaptive, and innovative, and that focus on imagining what might happen 
in addition to protecting against what has happened.
    Imagining what might happen is key, as the transportation threat 
picture presents in a multitude of new and ever-changing configurations 
and pathways. Terrorists and criminals are dangerous entrepreneurs 
searching for advantage. In addition to the on-going, persistent threat 
from direct attacks, we are subject to growing array of new perils and 
concerns. These include increasingly sinister and sophisticated cyber 
actors; the shock and lessons of a global pandemic and its impact on 
global transportation; vulnerabilities presented by our reliance on 
increasingly interconnected industrial control systems; and the growing 
sophistication and deployment (and inherent vulnerabilities) of 
technologies such as unmanned systems and autonomous vehicles.
    Moreover, the barriers to entry for those who would attack or harm 
continue to lower, especially with respect to cyber threats. The 
Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack and the hacking of a major U.S. 
maritime port just last week dramatically illustrate the ease with 
which our critical infrastructure can be attacked and disabled by 
remote cyber actors.
    For these reasons and more, the transportation security systems of 
today cannot be the transportation security systems of tomorrow. 
Today's state-of-the-art systems, as good as they may be, will not be 
sufficient to meet tomorrow's threats. We need the resolve and courage 
to dedicate the resources and build the integrated systems necessary to 
imagine the next threats and continually refresh and refine our 
training, technologies, and processes to evolve faster than the threats 
we foresee.
    Administrator Pekoske has presented a compelling strategy and 
persuasive argument for increasing investment in the TSA workforce and 
in continually evolving, improving, and modernizing TSA's systems and 
architecture. But this strategy requires predictable and reliable 
funding and support to succeed. For example, the TSA Innovation Task 
Force and the TSA Office of Requirements and Capabilities are working 
hard to imagine future threats and innovate faster than our 
adversaries. They are rapidly developing, testing, and deploying 
systems and processes to front-line operators to counter the threats of 
the future. I urge this committee and Congress to fully fund TSA's 
strategy road map along with programs such as these that encourage 
rapid innovation, provide for continuous technology improvements and 
deployment, and give the workforce the tools and training they need.
    I also urge you to support efforts to further mature research and 
development efforts across the DHS enterprise. Coordinated, on-going, 
operationally-focused, and integrated research and development across 
DHS can provide TSA and other agencies with the capabilities they need 
to counter the complexity and diversity of evolving threats, foreign 
and domestic. Such work should be linked to intelligence assessments 
and a detailed requirements and capabilities development process with 
robust private-sector engagement, input from partners and stakeholders, 
open architecture standards, and acquisition strategies and processes 
that promote rapid deployment of new technologies across the full 
spectrum of the mission set.
    Security is a never-ending race, and we need to stay in the lead.
    Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Katko, and Members of the 
committee, thank you again for this chance to share my thoughts as we 
mark TSA's 20th anniversary. Thank you for your continued support of 
the TSA and its dedicated workforce. I look forward to any questions 
you may have.

    Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. I now ask Mr. 
Pistole to summarize his statement for 5 minutes.

 STATEMENT OF JOHN S. PISTOLE, PRESIDENT, ANDERSON UNIVERSITY, 
  FORMER ADMINISTRATOR, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

    Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is good to see 
you, sir, and Ranking Member Katko. Just a personal note, I 
happened to be in your district on 9/11 20 years ago doing FBI 
audit and inspection. I was in the Federal courthouse when the 
planes hit there, so. Also thank you to the rest of the Members 
of the committee and to the professional staff who make this 
hearing possible.
    I just have 3 points I would like to make, Mr. Chairman and 
Ranking Member Katko. First, I strongly encourage you and the 
administration to continue support for the broad authorities 
for the TSA administrator, which each of the other former 
administrators and current Administrator Pekoske have exercised 
judicially.
    Just a couple of examples, one from a threat perspective 
and one from an innovation perspective that I experienced in my 
4\1/2\ years as the administrator. One, we are all well 
familiar with the October 2010 AQAP toner cartridge plot out of 
Yemen where two toner cartridge bombs were being sent from 
Sana'a, Yemen, to Chicago. That plot was foiled by just great 
intelligence, so it wasn't because of great screening. That 
actually came from the White House and Deputy National Security 
Advisor, at the time, John Brennan, before he went to the CIA, 
working with the head of the Ministry of Interior of the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and then the chief counsel at both TSA 
and the Department of Homeland Security Office of Security 
Operations and International Affairs, along with the FBI, CIA, 
and State Department, and, of course, all of those at DHS 
Headquarters.
    I was able to issue emergency amendments which literally 
barred any and all cargo from being shipped from Yemen to the 
United States. There are a number of ramifications and 
unattended consequences of that action, but it kept future 
bombs from being shipped to the United States.
    Second, on the innovation aspect of the broad authorities, 
with the terrific senior leadership team that I inherited at 
TSA and great support from then Secretary of Homeland Security 
Janet Napolitano and CBP Commissioner Alan Bersin, we 
envisioned and launched the TSA PreCheck program, which is, of 
course, now a popular Trusted Traveler program with nearly 11 
million people enrolled in addition to those who do dual 
enrollment from CBP's Global Entry program, a hugely successful 
Trusted Traveler program for international travelers.
    So thank you to Chairman Thompson and other Members of the 
committee who had the foresight in crafting legislation 
initially standing up TSA, to provide those authorities because 
it gave me the opportunity to take immediate action to 
mitigate, No. 1, a clear and present danger, and then also to 
implement a risk-based security initiative to facilitate 
smooth, safe travel for millions of law-abiding citizens and to 
move, as you said, Mr. Chairman, from a one-size-fits-all to 
risk-based security approaches.
    Second, I would encourage you and the entire committee to 
support the TSA work force that has been articulated by 
Administrator Pekoske, especially the front-line TSOs. Better 
pay is the key issue and there is--I am heartened by some of 
the efforts being made to improve the pay whether that means 
moving the work force to the GS pay system under Title 5 or 
other initiatives. I think that is an important thing to do.
    Let me just make a comment on the collective bargaining 
since I was the administrator who issued that determination to 
allow for a modified form of collective bargaining. I think 
AFGE on the union representing the TSOs has done a good job of 
representing them in this unique, non-traditional collective 
bargaining agreement. Both the chief counsel of TSA, Francine 
Kerner, and the general counsel for AFGE, David Bore, they are 
the two constants over the last 10 years since I issued the 
determination who provided great legal advice, context, and 
clarity as moving forward.
    Then third is that I support and encourage what my two 
successors have done in terms of innovation because we know 
innovation doesn't happen in a vacuum. It is really just a 
couple of points there, through investment and key technologies 
and processes, and then the partnerships, which the current 
administrator has mentioned; partnerships with the private 
sector so they are incentivized to do the R&D to deploy NextGen 
technology today, tomorrow, and for years to come.
    So, obviously, partnerships with you, Mr. Chairman, and 
Ranking Member Katko and OMB, the manufacturers, the airlines, 
the airports, the associations, including A4A; AAAE; ACI-North 
America; Global Business Travel Association; Air Cargo, Rail 
Passengers, and Railway Industry Associations; Pipeline 
Association; and then the international partners such as IATA. 
Those are all critical to the success of TSA.
    As we saw with the underwear bomber Christmas Day 2009, and 
his nonmetallic and composite explosive device, and the toner 
cartridge plot that I mentioned, terrorists are innovative and 
determined, so must we be. Spiral development is one thing, but 
breakthrough technology is even better.
    I had the opportunity to testify 3 times before the 9/11 
Commission and, of course, one of the findings from that was 
that one of shortcomings of the U.S. Government writ large 
counterterrorism efforts prior to 9/11 was a ``failure of 
imagination''. It is incumbent, I believe, on all of us to 
ensure that doesn't happen again.
    Then my last point, 3.5, is on cybersecurity, which has 
been mentioned; same points as on innovation through 
investment, partnership, maximize the partnerships, evaluate 
and repeat. So thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to take 
questions from you and the committee at this time.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Pistole follows:]
                 Prepared Statement of John S. Pistole
                           September 29, 2021
    Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Katko, Members of the committee, 
thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I must 
admit, it's a freeing feeling testifying as a former TSA administrator. 
I would just like to highlight a few key points as I assess the 
landscape of transportation security in the United States 20 years 
after 9/11.
    First, as you know Chairman Thompson, when I was confirmed by the 
Senate in June, 2010 and began my tenure as TSA administrator, I was 
pleasantly surprised at the broad, almost sweeping authorities Congress 
had given the position when the Bush administration proposed it after 
the 9/11 attacks. I'll be glad to cite 1 or 2 examples during my oral 
testimony. My strong recommendation to you and all of Congress is to 
maintain these broad authorities which allow TSA, through its 
administrator and the Secretary of DHS, to act quickly and decisively 
in time of imminent threat, such as was experienced on Christmas Day 
2009 with the ``Underwear'' bomber, or with the October, 2010, AQAP 
toner cartridge bombing plot. Under these broad authorities, my 
leadership team and I were able to effectively address those threats 
through domestic and global mitigation measures through my issuance of 
Emergency Amendments and Security Directives. Additionally, under these 
broad authorities, we were able to envision and implement the popular 
trusted traveler program TSA PreCheck, now with nearly 11 million 
members.
    Second, I would encourage you and the administration to ensure the 
administrator has maximum flexibility and authorities for internal 
personnel matters, such as pay, promotion, and representation. When I 
issued my Determination to allow TSA employees the right to pursue 
collective bargaining, it was important in my mind to recognize and 
support the front-line workforce, especially the Transportation 
Security Officers (TSOs), while ensuring that security considerations 
remained outside the purview of the CBA. I could not imagine a 
situation where TSOs would be allowed to go on strike in a time of 
crisis, thereby possibly impacting National security.
    Third, I believe both of my successors, Adm Peter Neffinger and Adm 
David Pekoske, have done an outstanding job of encouraging innovation 
in and among the TSA workforce and with key stakeholders, including 
providers of security equipment and processes. This type of innovation, 
such as done through the Innovation Task Force, is critical for 
ensuring that TSA stays at least one step ahead of the terrorists. And 
the best innovation I've seen is usually done in partnership with 
industry. The best way to facilitate meaningful partnerships is through 
shared investments. So my strong recommendation in this respect is that 
your committee, working with the Appropriators and OMB, help fund this 
innovation work to incentivize the private sector, which obviously has 
to have a positive return on investment. And this security investment 
needs to be made not only in the screening equipment at airport 
checkpoints and checked baggage locations, but in the processes and 
connectivity which enables TSA to seamlessly ``deploy next generation 
technology today'' across the 440+ airports with TSA personnel.
    Finally, each day we hear about new cyber attacks, especially 
ransomware, impacting private businesses and governmental agencies 
globally. This spring's Colonial Pipeline attack caused panic buying 
across the southeast United States and, frankly, I think most Americans 
were surprised to learn that TSA has regulatory authority over that 
critical infrastructure. Congress and the administration must continue 
investing money, resources, and personnel, to ensure that key 
transportation systems, whether pipelines or much better known critical 
systems such as Secure Flight and FAA's Air Traffic Control systems, 
are secure 24/7.
    The women and men of TSA are dedicated to keeping travelers safe. 
Thanks for doing your part to ensure they have the tools, resources, 
and support to do this critical job properly. I'll be glad to take any 
questions you may have.

    Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. I now ask Admiral 
Loy to summarize his statement for 5 minutes.

      STATEMENT OF JAMES M. LOY, PRIVATE CITIZEN, FORMER 
     ADMINISTRATOR, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

    Mr. Loy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Katko, and Members of 
the committee. I appreciate being included in your committee's 
look-back and on-going oversight of TSA. As the commandant of 
the Coast Guard on 9/11/01, I joined millions of my fellow 
citizens as we watched the events of that day unfold. The Coast 
Guard organized and led the maritime boat lift in the New York 
Harbor that evacuated over half a million people from Manhattan 
over the water to Staten Island and New Jersey, and that day 
remains for me and for all Americans sort-of our generation's 
Pearl Harbor.
    I remember well the countless meetings that followed as we 
came to terms with the reality that the two great oceans no 
longer were going to provide any guarantee that America cannot 
be reached by those intent on doing us harm. The resulting 
legislation created first the TSA and then the Department of 
Homeland Security. Those pieces of legislation were 
announcements to the world that we had awakened to this new 
terrorism threat. The days that followed included the most 
significant in Executive branch reorganization since 1947.
    Coordination with the Congress produced the TSA Act 
outlining the establishment and shape of this new Executive 
agency. Where the FAA had heretofore been responsible for both 
safety and security of commercial aviation, the new law called 
for the security elements to be responsibility of the new TSA. 
Although centered on aviation, for obvious reasons the law 
mandated that the new agency focus on all modes of 
transportation.
    The legislation provided the road map and we then set about 
to establish the agency. It was probably the most--it was the 
most gratifying yet challenging years of my 42 years of public 
service as we took that on. We recruited applicants for 60,000 
positions at airports across the country. Those applicants were 
vetted, hired, trained, and distributed to over 400 airports in 
9 weeks.
    We allowed the reality of the stand-up process to shape and 
evolve the agency, which has continued to-date. We will work 
with all the major airlines, the trade associations, the 
appropriate Government agencies, foreign advisors, commercial 
vendors to design and outfit with thousands of checkpoints that 
would provide that physical security required by the law.
    I will never forget the night of 12/31, December 31, 2003, 
when I was able to report to then Secretary Norm Mineta that 
the airport on Guam had ``gone green,'' which was our 
vernacular for gaining operational compliance with the law. As 
in any endeavor of this magnitude, it required contributions 
from many to be accomplished well and on time. As is also the 
case with any such endeavor, changes were made in policy and 
practice as I and my successors in the administrator's chair 
led and managed the agency over the years, which you have 
already heard.
    Mr. Chairman, several things stand out to me as being 
deserving of the committee's on-going attention. First, and it 
has been mentioned already, the adequacy of TSA's link to the 
intelligence community for threat analysis and for the 
evolution of what that threat means to the operating days and 
weeks of the agency itself.
    Second, adequate attention to all modes of transportation, 
not just aviation. It is clearly reasonable that we have 
focused on aviation over the years, but terrorist incidents, 
for example in London in subway systems and Spain on rail 
systems, make those serious issues as well, and I appreciate 
the committee's on-going attention to all modes of 
transportation, not just aviation.
    Then a constancy of focus on response and recovery as well 
as preparedness and prevention planning for dealing with any 
scenario that would interrupt the transportation system.
    Mr. Chairman, we plank-owners at TSA are enormously proud 
of our time in standing up and leading the agency. We coined 
the motto, ``Never forget,'' and just met together for the 20th 
annual ceremony remembering the events of 9/11/2001. The staff 
and employees all renewed their oath of commitment to remain 
vigilant in their quest to keep America secure.
    I take no comfort in the fact that 20 years have gone by 
without another 9/11. We have to remain vigilant and diligent 
and focus on today and tomorrow, and this hearing is to me a 
formal statement about how important that relentless diligence 
is to keeping us safe going into the future.
    Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to your 
questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Loy follows:]
                   Prepared Statement of James M. Loy
                           September 29, 2021
    Mr. Chairman/Ranking Member, thank you for including me in your 
committee's look-back and on-going oversight of the Transportation 
Security Administration (TSA).
    As the Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard on 9/11/2001, I joined 
the millions of my fellow citizens as we watched the events of that day 
unfold. The Coast Guard organized and led the maritime boatlift in New 
York Harbor that evacuated over 500,000 souls from Manhattan over the 
water to Staten Island and New Jersey. That day remains for me and for 
all Americans our generation's Pearl Harbor. I remember well the 
countless meetings that followed as we came to terms with the reality 
that the two great Oceans no longer provided any guarantee that America 
could not be reached by those intent on doing us harm. The resultant 
legislation creating first the TSA and then the Department of Homeland 
Security were announcements to the world that we had awakened to the 
new terrorism threats. The days that followed included the most 
significant Executive branch reorganization since 1947.
    Coordination with the Congress produced the Transportation Security 
Act outlining the establishment and shape of the new TSA. Where the FAA 
had heretofore been responsible for both the safety and security of 
commercial aviation, the new law called for the security elements to be 
the responsibility of the new TSA. Although centered on aviation for 
obvious reasons, the law mandated that the new agency focus on all 
modes of transportation. I was scheduled to retire from the Coast Guard 
in May, 2002, but was asked by Transportation Secretary Norm Mineta and 
President Bush to lead the stand-up of TSA. The following years at TSA 
and then DHS became the most challenging and gratifying years of my 42 
years of public service. The legislation provided the road map and we 
set about to establish the agency. We solicited applicants for 60,000 
positions at airports across the country. Those applicants were vetted, 
hired, trained, and distributed to those airports in 9 weeks. We 
allowed the reality of the stand-up process to shape and evolve the 
agency. We worked with all the major airlines, the trade organizations, 
the appropriate Government agencies, foreign advisors, and commercial 
vendors to design and outfit the thousands of checkpoints that would 
provide the physical security required by the law. I'll never forget 
the night of 12/31/2003 when I was able to report to Secretary Mineta 
that the airport on Guam had ``gone green'' which was our vernacular 
for gaining operational compliance with the law.
    As in any endeavor of this magnitude, it required contributions 
from many to be accomplished well and on time. As is also the case in 
any endeavor, changes were made in policy and practice as I and my 
successors in the administrator's chair led and managed the agency over 
the years.
    Mr. Chairman, several things stand out to me as being deserving of 
the committee's on-going attention:
   Adequacy of the TSA's link to the intelligence community for 
        threat analysis and evolution
   Adequate attention to ALL modes of transportation, not just 
        aviation
   Constancy of focus on Response and Recovery as well as 
        Preparedness and Prevention planning for dealing with any 
        scenario that would interrupt transportation service.
    Mr. Chairman, we plank-owners at TSA are enormously proud of our 
time standing up and leading the agency. We coined the motto NEVER 
FORGET and just met together for the twentieth annual ceremony 
remembering the events of 9/11/2001. The staff and employees all 
renewed their oath of commitment to remain vigilant in their quest to 
keep America secure. I take no comfort in the fact that 20 years have 
gone by without another 9/11. We have to remain diligent and focus on 
today and tomorrow. This hearing is to me, a formal statement about how 
important that relentless diligence is and must remain. NEVER FORGET!

    Chairman Thompson. I thank the witnesses for their 
testimony. Obviously, your unique role within TSA speaks for 
itself.
    So, I remind each Member that he or she will have 5 minutes 
to question the witnesses. I will now recognize myself for 
questions.
    TSA is a unique agency within Government. No other agency 
interacts so intermittently with such a broad swath of the 
public on a daily basis. All of us can remember Admiral Loy 
when we first started. You know, we were basically trying to 
put it together because we needed to do it, so the men and 
women did a wonderful job. We have come a long way as an 
agency. We have done the threat analysis and the threats have 
changed from time to time.
    But what I would like to do is go from our current 
administrator back to Admiral Loy to talk about what did you 
find most challenging during your tenure of leading TSA? If you 
could point to that issue that you felt that you just had to 
somehow address, and with our current administrator, I am sure 
you could start us off with that.
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, Mr. Chairman, thank you. I would say, you 
know, the thing that I found most challenging is something we 
have already talked about this morning, and that is to ensure 
that we adequately compensate our work force. I have found no 
one disagrees with that at all. Everyone agrees. It is just 
finding the funding to be able to execute on that very 
important priority for all of us, and that is one of my very 
top priorities as the administrator.
    The other thing that I would mention from my 4 years-plus 
now in this chair, one of the things that is very exciting 
about being the administrator of TSA, what really requires an 
awful lot of focus is there are a lot of things that come up 
every single day, and there are a lot of priorities that any 
one of us would look at and say we got to get that one done, we 
got to get that one done. The challenge, really, and the 
opportunity, is to establish those clear priorities so that we 
get a concrete set of actions in place.
    The key here, too, and my predecessors have already 
commented on this, is it is not just TSA acting alone. We have 
to act with our partners because our partners are part and 
parcel of a successive security regime in this country. So it 
is always providing that strategic direction to keep our focus 
on true north and to get the most important priorities done. 
But I would say, sir, you know, the most challenging, and I 
hope to see some positive successes on this over the course of 
the next several months, is on pay, particularly for our front-
line work force. Thank you.
    Chairman Thompson. Admiral Neffenger.
    Mr. Neffenger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would certainly 
echo everything that Administrator Pekoske just said, getting 
adequate pay to the front line is critical and key. It is a 
very challenging and demanding job out there, and one of the 
things that really struck me when I came to TSA was how skilled 
those front-line TSOs are in that job. You know, I think the 
average American citizen and the average traveler has no real 
appreciation for how much work it takes to be good at what they 
do out there, so let me echo that.
    Let me add, you know, a couple of challenges that I saw, as 
you know I was--during my tenure was the time when we saw a 
dramatic and significant increase in the number of people 
traveling on a daily basis. We climbed over 2 million 
passengers a day on average screening through the TSA 
checkpoints, and that was in the face of--from staff shortages 
and some other challenges that we had based upon DHS IG 
findings that inadvertently were leaked, a Classified report 
that was leaked to the public, and put TSA into a lot of crisis 
situation and demoralized the front-line work force. So, I 
would say one of the greatest challenges I faced was rebuilding 
confidence in the agency and rebuilding a sense of purpose to 
the front-line work force that was, unfortunately, the brunt of 
most of the criticism that came out. As I said during that 
time, if there is criticism to be had, it is not the front-line 
work force that deserved it. It was the people who led the 
agency that failed the front-line work force.
    So, I think it was--in my mind, that was--one, it was one 
of the more gratifying asterisks of my tenure as I watched that 
front-line work force really regain its confidence and focus on 
getting good at what they did again. But that was a 
particularly challenging time I think for TSA and I have been 
really proud of what they have accomplished since and have 
continued to accomplish under the current administrator.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Thompson. Thank you. Mr. Pistole.
    Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Chairman Thompson. I think when I 
arrived as administrator in the summer of 2010 part of it was 
to provide the opportunities to go from the one-size-fits-all 
to a risk-based security using some common-sense things, and 
then also helping professionalize the work force in a way that 
they had not been afforded that opportunity previously by 
creating the TSA Academy down at FLETC and then also creating--
expanding on the office work force engagement, and then did the 
Office of Professional Responsibilities.
    So, I had come from the FBI, you know, an agency that had 
been around more than a hundred years, had time to really build 
some of that infrastructure to say--systems and processes to 
say here is how consistent, fair adjudication of misconduct and 
other things should be. So, I was given that opportunity and 
with a great support from the Department, from you and others 
on the Hill, and obviously from the work force to say, yes, 
let's take these steps to help professionalize and provide that 
exceptional service that is expected for those 2 million-plus 
passengers a day. So those were some of the challenges and 
highlights.
    Chairman Thompson. Admiral Loy.
    Mr. Loy. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I think my recollection, you 
know, in the stand-up process was the very simple recognition 
from those of us who were in the middle of the crucible, so to 
speak, recognizing that we didn't have a corner on the market 
of good ideas. We reached out as you have defined partnerships 
to so many different players, trade associations of commercial 
aviation, and the land transportation elements of our country.
    I remember a personal association with Herb Kelleher, who 
was then the president of Southwest Airlines, a remarkably 
visionary kind of a guy, now passed unfortunately, but it was 
his willingness as the CEO of a major airline to literally get 
in the work trenches with us to figure out the best ways to do 
what we needed to do next. So, I think that notion of American 
citizens in lots of walks of life standing up and being willing 
to be counted and being willing to participate in the design of 
this new agency that was going to impact a large portion of 
their lives, and that included even international reach.
    I remember my colleagues at the Israeli Security Agency, 
well-known for their already 40 years of focus on aviation 
security around the globe, they could not have been more 
deliberative. They allowed me to check very deeply into the way 
they did business in Israel. Those ideas that we were able to 
bring back and integrate into the design of the checkpoints, et 
cetera, were critical to our early stand-up process, and I 
think establishing standards lower than which we would never go 
with regard to mandating superior performance out of our new 
agency.
    So, it is that partnership business and recognizing that we 
needed to open our doors and windows to new ideas, and even 
established existing ideas, that would help us establish this 
agency as well as we could possibly do it.
    Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. Let me just say all 
four of you have talked about the work force, how we need to 
make sure that we pay them adequately for the job that they are 
doing and give them the support as Government employees they 
need. A lot of us have pursued that for quite a while, and I 
look forward to working with the administrator currently to 
make that a reality and treat our TSOs like all other 
Government employees are, and if that is giving them Title 5 
rights, we should do that.
    The Chair recognizes the Ranking Member of the full 
committee, the gentleman from New York, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and it is good to see 
all of the witnesses today. It has been a while since I have 
seen you, Mr. Neffenger, and the others there, so I am happy to 
have this moment to chat with you.
    I don't have a question on the employee issue, but I do 
want to make this statement and make it clear, which I think I 
did at the last hearing. Since I have been in Congress, we have 
been talking about getting better pay for the front-line 
workers, and we have made minimal progress in that regard. That 
is why I broke from my opposition to Title 5 funding and said I 
was going to support it. So, let that be a warning that if we 
don't get this issue fixed, I am going to support it going 
forward.
    The reason I was concerned about the funding last time is I 
think people in the headquarters get paid quite a bit of money 
and they are doing just fine. I am worried about the front-line 
workers, and I am worried about their ability to have adequate 
pay given the very serious job that they have, so let this be a 
warning shot. I am not backing down from making sure they get 
the support they need, and that is well past time for us to 
institutionalize that salary for them.
    Admiral Pekoske, I want to stick with you strictly because 
you are in the job now. I agreed with what Mr. Pistole said 
about the emerging technologies that the bad guys seem to be 
quite adept at creating, and, obviously, we have something the 
size of my cell phone that can take down a good-sized airplane. 
So, I think computed tomography is one of the key things that 
we need to have, and my concerns are that the computed 
tomography is going to take so long to implement given the 
budgetary constraints that we have right now that it is going 
to be rendered obsolete by the time we get them all on-line in 
10 years.
    So, Admiral Pekoske, very briefly, do you have a number, 
can you tell us what you need to get a hundred percent CT 
technology at all the airport checkpoints Nation-wide and how 
long it will take?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir, thanks for your comments, and I 
couldn't agree more. I mean, CT is one of the most important 
technologies for us to advance in our checkpoint system. We 
have done a really good job so far. We have got 300-plus units 
already in place thanks to your support and the support of this 
committee back in 2019. We also just awarded an option for 314 
more of our brand-new midsized integrated systems. But when I 
look at the length of time it is going to take us to get to all 
2,400-plus X-ray systems currently in the country, that is a 
very, very long time.
    What I asked my team to look at is, hey, given the contract 
vehicles that we are going to have in place or currently have 
in place, how much could we spend every year reasonably to be 
able to accelerate the implementation of this very important 
technology? The answer is about 350 million a year just for CT. 
But I say that----
    Mr. Katko. For how many years? How many years, sir?
    Mr. Pekoske. Probably about 5 years to get it all done. 
But, you know, this is bounded a bit by practicality. I mean, 
we just can't buy them all and replace them all at the same 
time. That needs to be sequenced because there is a lot of 
airport work that needs to be done, and there is also 
manufacturing capability. But, you know, it is really critical 
for us to get this technology in place as soon as we can. I 
can't even describe, given this venue that we are in, the 
difference in detectability that that CT technology provides. 
It is really critical for our security.
    Mr. Katko. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just think we 
should really try and prioritize that with the other 
committees. I think this is a message that is really important 
for our Nation's security, the aviation security. Now, I want 
to switch gears and talk about my One-Stop Security pilot 
legislation, which looks to be voted on by the House this week 
we hope. It is important bipartisan legislation, Mr. Pekoske, 
which will raise a global baseline of aviation security and 
will improve post-pandemic travel. So, Administrator Pekoske, 
could you explain how One-Stop screening will streamline the 
international travel while also enhancing global aviation 
security standards?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir, and I will start with how it will 
enhance global aviation security and it will do that in a 
number of ways. One, it will improve the technology baseline 
globally with the airports that we have One-Stop agreements 
with because we will specify what standards to screening that 
we require and our partners are going to require for the other 
direction coming to them.
    We will also promote the establishment of common standards 
for this technology around the globe, particularly in the 
nations that have the most advanced aviation systems. We feel 
that that will drive the technology industry to build to those 
standards. So, in toto it brings the entire global aviation 
system up to a much higher level.
    Additionally, part of the One-Stop Security initiative is 
to do covert testing that is integrated. Teams that are 
integrated with that country's experts and our experts to do 
covert testing to really assess the effectiveness of the 
screening regimes that we put in place. So, in toto, it 
increases the security of flights, you know, bound for the 
United States. That is a very good thing.
    Then from a passenger perspective, what that means for a 
passenger, and I use a hypothetical, let's say for argument's 
sake we have a One-Stop agreement with London Heathrow Airport 
in the United Kingdom. What that will mean is a passenger 
flying from London Heathrow through JFK and a follow-on flight, 
let's say to Charlotte, North Carolina, does not need to be 
rescreened in JFK because that screening will be satisfactorily 
accomplished to our desires at London Heathrow. So, it greatly 
facilitates travel and also improves security. Whenever I look 
at technology investments or policy adjustments, I am looking 
for that two-type benefit. One, first and foremost, to improve 
security, and then second, improve the passenger experience and 
facilitate travel.
    Mr. Katko. Well, thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, before 
I yield back, I just want to say to Mr. Neffenger and Mr. 
Pistole, Mr. Pekoske and Mr. Loy, that I think history is going 
to smile kindly upon all of you because you have taken an 
impossible situation and you made it very good. So, I am proud 
of all of you for the work that you have done to keep our 
airlines safe, and I am very proud of the culture you have 
created whereby you listen to oversight, you welcome oversight, 
and you act upon it, and you have made TSA a much better agency 
because of it. So, please don't stop taking the input from us 
because we are trying to--we are on the same team here. I 
appreciate all the front-line workers have done and we got to 
do more to help them. With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. The Chair will now 
recognize other Members for questions they may wish to ask the 
witnesses. I will recognize Members in order of seniority 
alternating between Majority and Minority. Members are reminded 
to unmute themselves when recognized for questioning and to 
then mute themselves once they have finished speaking and to 
leave their cameras on so they are visible to the Chair. The 
Chair recognizes for 5 minutes the gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. 
Jackson Lee.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, thank you so very much for 
yielding. Thank you for your leadership. Thank you to the 
Ranking Member for us having a common viewpoint of National 
security.
    Let me take a moment to salute the Transportation Security 
Administration and the TSOs of which every moment I have an 
opportunity to fly into different airports, small, medium, and 
large, I take a moment to talk to TSOs, supervisors, managers, 
and others about both their needs and as well our commitment to 
their service.
    Let me thank you, too, Administrator Pekoske, for 
committing to collective bargaining. Of course, we all support 
the Chairman's legislation on that very important issue of 
dignity, professionalism, and, of course, service.
    Administrator Pekoske, let me go to you immediately and as 
my time wanes I will be quickly trying to go to others. Tell us 
in a pictorial oration of the daily protection in stopping 
various incidences that might--or individuals that might get on 
planes, knives, guns, and otherwise, that you can see over the 
landscape that your agency and TSOs are stopping.
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, thank you, Congresswoman. I really 
appreciate that question. I will just give you a sense for what 
we have detected this calendar year to-date in our checkpoints. 
If we start with live weapons, these are weapons that either 
have a round chambered or a magazine inserted into the weapon, 
we have detected 4,300-plus live weapons in our screening 
checkpoints. The rate of weapons carriage in our checkpoints 
now is about 2 times per million passengers what it was in 
2019. Generally, when I reference prior activity I go back to 
2019 because that was the pre-COVID year.
    Other weapons which would be anything from stun guns to 
replica weapons, almost 3,400 other weapons. Then go on to 
prohibited items which are things like knives and throwing 
stars, things of that nature, about 3,250 prohibited items.
    Then one of the things that is really important about our 
system is that we validate the identity of every single 
passenger as they approach the screening checkpoint. This is 
designed to ensure that we do provide the right level of 
screening based on the risk that the passenger may represent.
    So, having the right ID is critically important and we have 
detected over 300 fraudulent IDs already. With the advent of 
the credential authentication technology, those numbers will 
continue to go up. I should also mention and I really 
appreciate your support for our officers and for our Federal 
air marshals, Federal air marshals perform a really critical 
function of in-flight security and security in and around the 
airport. We place our Federal air marshals on flights where we 
deem there is more risk than others. This is also a job that is 
not easy to perform. They have to be alert 100 percent of the 
time and ready to quickly jump into action should the need be. 
So I join you in recognizing the terrific work of our front-
line work force and really all those that support them, that 
enable them to do the great work that they do. Thank you.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you so very much. Admiral Neffenger, 
Pistole, and Loy, please try to get my question in for all of 
you to get a few seconds in because I value and appreciate your 
leadership. The Taliban now is in control of Afghanistan. We 
know what happened 21 years ago or 20 years ago. Just an 
assessment of how difficult or how important TSOs are, although 
domestically based, even though we have an infrastructure 
overseas, in what may be proposed or a new volatility. Admiral, 
can you do that real quickly? I have seconds, please. Admiral 
Neffenger.
    Mr. Neffenger. Yes, Congresswoman Jackson Lee, thank you 
very much for the question. That is an important question. I 
think I go back to my opening comments and this is where it 
takes great imagination to think about what the next level of 
threats and the next array of threats may be, and in doing so, 
recognizing that, you know, one, we hope we never catch a 
terrorist at the checkpoint. There are a lot of failures that 
would lead to that event happening, but I will tell you the 
last line of defense, you know, in the airport is clearly the 
TSO on the front line.
    So for my----
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Can I jump to Pistole? I am so sorry, 
Admiral.
    Mr. Neffenger. Yes, that is fine. Thank you.
    Mr. Pistole. Yes, thank you, Congresswoman. Good to see 
you, ma'am. I think there is still a number of gaps in the 
intelligence collection opportunities as it relates to the 
direct threat posed by the Taliban at this point. So the TSOs 
and TSA really have been the last line of defense, it is even 
more incumbent and crucial that they are doing their job in the 
best professional way they can to make sure that nobody slips 
through the cracks.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Loy.
    Mr. Loy. Yes, I would just, you know, endorse exactly what 
has already been said. The criticality of the link between the 
intelligence world of TSA and the rest of the intelligence 
community is absolutely crucial to being able to imagine in 
advance what the scenario could be that we can then plan to 
deal with if, in fact, it actually happened. So, I would just 
highlight the criticality of the positive linkage between TSA's 
intelligence wing and the rest of the intelligence community.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Very important. Thank you so very much. I 
am sorry for the cutting off of the question. Thank you, Mr. 
Chairman. I appreciate all of these gentlemen and TSA, salute 
them as I said before. Thank you again.
    Chairman Thompson. Thank you. The Chair recognizes the 
gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Higgins, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Higgins. I thank the Chairman and I would like to 
commend the Chairman and the Ranking Member for holding this 
hearing today on the state of TSA 20 years after 9/11. We 
certainly as a body salute our front-line agents there that 
struggle every day with millions of passengers, very 
professional and keep America safe.
    On 9/11, 9 of the 19 hijackers had been flagged in some 
manner by Federal aviation as potential terror threats, and yet 
they were still allowed to get on a plane due to the security 
protocols at the time. Since then, of course, the Nation has 
responded with the creation of the Department of Homeland 
Security and TSA, and over the last 20 years, we have adjusted 
as American citizens to this new enhanced level of screening 
and safety and we appreciate the professionalism that we 
witness every day.
    We have evolved, TSA has changed, and American citizens 
have adapted to those changes. We expect that the intelligence 
failures prior to 9/11 will not be repeated. The Pentagon is 
actively warning Congress of the increased likelihood of 
terrorist attacks on U.S. soil. It is critical that in this 
time of heightened threat levels that all gaps in our National 
security are reviewed and sufficiently addressed.
    It is with that spirit that I point out the TSA website 
currently has 16 forms of identification that are accepted to 
get on an airplane. These documents are not codified in law and 
is subject to change based on bureaucratic orders and rules. 
The TSA website states that in coordination with DHS 
counterparts, TSA has identified acceptable alternative 
identification for use in special circumstances at the 
checkpoint. Now, many would consider this a loophole that has 
allowed undocumented human beings to access our airplanes 
across the country through TSA.
    So Administrator Pekoske, would you address that, sir, in a 
brief response? Has Secretary Mayorkas instructed TSA to allow 
undocumented migrants on a plane without one of the 16 
acceptable identification documents?
    Mr. Pekoske. No, sir. We have worked very hard with 
undocumented new arrivals into the country that need follow-on 
air travel to ensure that we are sure who they are, and we work 
very closely----
    Mr. Higgins. Excuse me, good sir. You are saying that you 
are sure who an undocumented immigrant is that is getting on an 
airplane although the Department of Homeland Security itself 
and Customs and Border Patrol will readily admit we are not 
positive who they are. In most cases, we are accepting who they 
tell us they are, but you are telling me you know who they are. 
That is what you are saying right now.
    Mr. Pekoske. What I am saying is we use the very same data 
that Customs and Border Protection obtains----
    Mr. Higgins. Exactly, good sir. So. I am just asking, 
America needs to know. America needs to know. I get it. You are 
accepting what Customs and Border Protection is sending you, 
but America needs to know are undocumented illegal immigrants 
that are being transported to another part of our country, are 
they getting on airplanes without a picture ID and without the 
American Government, Customs and Border Protection, TSA, 
Department of Homeland Security, are they getting on airplanes 
to travel when we readily admit that we are not sure who they 
are and they do not have photo ID, that they do not have one of 
the TSA's own 16 forms of acceptable identification that 
Americans themselves are subject to? I mean, yes or no, are 
these people getting on a plane with us?
    Mr. Pekoske. People are getting on the planes after they 
are thoroughly screened before they even----
    Mr. Higgins. Thoroughly screened by who?
    Mr. Pekoske. By the TSA, sir.
    Mr. Higgins. It is screened by TSA. You mean going through 
the checkpoints like we all do?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. So----
    Mr. Higgins. But they are going----
    Mr. Pekoske [continuing]. We are sure when they enter the--
--
    Mr. Higgins. But just clarify, please, good sir, in the 
interest of time, are they going through--like I have to have 
my photo ID to go through TSA checkpoints, but does an illegal 
immigrant that is being transported somewhere else in the 
country on an airplane, are they required to have a photo ID, 
yes or no?
    Mr. Pekoske. We have processes for people that do not have 
photo ID.
    Mr. Higgins. Are they required to have a photo ID? My God, 
it is hard to get a straight answer out of this administration.
    Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Higgins. Well, can the gentleman answer my question, 
good sir? You have extended that courtesy, Mr. Chairman. Can 
the gentleman answer my question?
    Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time has expired. The 
Chair recognizes----
    Mr. Higgins. Can the gentleman answer my question?
    Chairman Thompson. The gentleman----
    Mr. Higgins. Mr. Chairman, I object to my colleagues across 
the aisle----
    Chairman Thompson. Well, I am going to tell you----
    Mr. Higgins. [continuing]. Being granted additional time--
--
    Chairman Thompson [continuing]. Your time----
    Mr. Higgins. [continuing]. And yet Republicans are not. Can 
the----
    Chairman Thompson. No. No.
    Mr. Higgins. Can Mr. Pekoske answer my question?
    Chairman Thompson. No. No. The gentleman's time----
    Mr. Higgins. It is a yes or no answer.
    Chairman Thompson [continuing]. Has expired. Now, either 
you recognize it or I am going to cut your mic off.
    Mr. Higgins. Well, please do. But the man should answer the 
question, yes or no. You have allowed my colleagues to answer 
the question.
    Chairman Thompson. Look, you can be civil, Mr. Higgins, or 
you can just----
    Mr. Higgins. I am trying to be civil, Mr. Chairman. You are 
stopping----
    Chairman Thompson. No. No. I am ruling----
    Mr. Higgins. The man runs the TSA. It is a yes or no 
question.
    Chairman Thompson. But look----
    Mr. Higgins. Will he answer it or not?
    Chairman Thompson. I am not going put the administrator in 
this position. Your time has expired.
    Mr. Higgins. Wow.
    Chairman Thompson. The Chair recognizes the gentleman----
    Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Thompson [continuing]. From New Jersey, Mr. Payne.
    Mr. Payne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Can you hear me, sir?
    Chairman Thompson. Yes, we hear you. Go ahead.
    Mr. Payne. Thank you. Let's see. This is for Mr. Pekoske 
and Neffenger and Pistole. You know, over the years, TSA has 
rolled out very sophisticated technologies and polices to 
provide formidable defense against potential terrorist attacks. 
Unfortunately, TSO pay and benefits have not evolved with the 
rest of the agency as many long-time employees remain near the 
bottom of the pay band. Unlike the General Schedule, or the GS, 
pay system used by most Federal agencies, the TSA pay system 
has not historically provided for regular salary increases. 
Salary increases are not built into TSA's baseline budget and 
identifying funding for fixing the problem of low pay has 
proven to be difficult for Congress and multiple 
administrations across party lines.
    Do you believe TSA employees should receive regular salary 
increases at the same level as most other Federal employees? 
That is a yes and no.
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Neffenger. Yes, I do.
    Mr. Pistole. Yes, I do.
    Mr. Loy. Absolutely.
    Mr. Payne. Great. We are all on the same page. But it seems 
like it has been a 20-year effort to get this enacted. Would 
having such salary increases required under law make funding 
increases through the annual budget and appropriations process 
easier?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes. Yes, sir, it would.
    Mr. Payne. OK, well, I thank you all for the concise 
answers and I just don't understand why with the legislation 
that the Chairman has put forth, we cannot get to the end goal 
of making our TSOs the front line, to the men and women in the 
field that have kept us safe for 20 years, cannot be 
compensated in the manner in which they should be. It is just a 
failure on our part--all of us here in these positions that 
that has not happened. You know, it really pains me to see this 
constant situation where the people working the hardest, the 
people on the front lines, the people that are doing the grunt 
work at times are never compensated as well as the people 
sitting in the lofty offices. Just--it is just not right. It 
harkens back, you know, to history in this country where the 
people working the hardest are treated the worst. We just have 
to stop it.
    With that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back.
    Chairman Thompson. The gentleman yields back.
    The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Mississippi for 5 
minutes, Mr. Guest.
    Mr. Guest. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Pekoske, I want to thank you for being here. I want to 
thank you for the hard work that your men and women do every 
day in keeping the traveling public safe. We know that TSA 
officers are dedicated and they are hard-working public 
servants that do a difficult job and we know the importance of 
that job in protecting our homeland.
    I want to follow up very briefly on Congressman Higgins' 
questioning as it relates to the importance of photo ID in the 
screening process. We know that that is something that has been 
required now since 9/11 for members of the traveling public to 
show some sort of photo ID. We know that that is something that 
your men and women use during that screening process. I know 
first-hand from when I was down on the border at McAllen seeing 
immigrants who were in the airport waiting to board flights but 
did not have that photo ID.
    So my question to you is how can we adequately screen 
migrants without a photo identification? If we are going to 
require that of every American who is getting on a plane, how 
can we adequately screen those who do not have that photo ID 
available to them?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir.
    With migrants that may not have a photo ID in their 
possession, we rely on the biographic and the biometric 
information the CBP has collected when they cross the border. 
We have the technology to have that information right in front 
of us as the person is presenting themselves for screening.
    Additionally, our protocols always require different levels 
of screening based on the level of identity verification that 
we have. So if you show up to a security checkpoint and you do 
not have a photo ID we have processes in place where we do 
whatever we can to see if we can establish your identity. In 
this case, the same process happens with migrants with our CBP 
colleagues. Then we provide enhanced screening to make sure 
that a person doesn't have anything that would concern us in 
their carry-on bags, on their person, and in any checked 
baggage. Migrants typically do not have any checked baggage, 
though.
    Mr. Guest. Let me ask you, has TSA ever prohibited any 
migrant from boarding flights and flying to the interior? Has 
there been instances where TSA has told Customs and Border 
Patrol that they--you will not allow those migrants to travel?
    Mr. Pekoske. I am sure there have--I don't have the exact 
number, sir, but I am sure there have been instances where we 
have not been satisfied within the Department and we have gone 
back and done some additional work. So the person didn't travel 
at the time they wanted to or they might not have traveled at 
all. But I don't have the specific numbers in front of me.
    Mr. Guest. Well, and let me ask you about a particular 
program, the CBP One, an app that is used. I know that it is 
something that TSA is working with CBP on. At this time I would 
ask the clerk if she would please put up a photo to accompany 
my questions. Mr. Chairman, I would like this photograph to be 
entered into the record as well.
    As that is being put up, I will let you know that this was 
a photograph----
    Chairman Thompson. Without objection, so ordered.
    [The information follows:]
    
    

    Mr. Guest. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    This is a photograph that was taken at DCA and it says 
there that photo capture--the particular section of the 
document that I want to question you to, that the photo capture 
is optional. As it relates to migrants, that migrants may 
decline to have their photograph taken as part of this 
screening process.
    So it would seem to me that we have a two-tiered system. 
That we have a system for United States citizens where we are 
required by law when TSA requires us to show photo ID before 
traveling, and then we have a second system for non-citizens in 
which not only are they not required to show a photo ID, but 
they can even decline to have their photograph taken if they 
decide to do so.
    So I would ask, if you could, if at all possible, please 
talk about the disparity in when U.S. citizens travel versus 
when migrants travel and why migrants have the ability to 
decline to have their photograph taken, but yet as a citizen I 
don't have the ability to decline to present a photo ID.
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir.
    I am unaware of any circumstance where an undocumented 
individual has declined to have their photo taken.
    Mr. Guest. But they do have that option, do they not? From 
the document there, clearly the documents state not once but 
twice that they have the option. Not trying to be argumentative 
but you----
    Mr. Pekoske. Right.
    Mr. Guest [continuing]. Would agree with me that that 
document says on two different occasions that they have the 
option to decline to have their photograph taken?
    Mr. Pekoske. Again, I am not aware of any circumstance 
where that has occurred.
    Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time has expired.
    The Chair the gentleman from California, Mr. Correa.
    Mr. Correa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Can you hear me OK?
    Chairman Thompson. Yes, I can.
    Mr. Correa. Just wanted to thank you, Mr. Chairman and the 
Ranking Member, Mr. Katko, for holding this hearing.
    I was also in New York to commemorate the solemn 
remembrance of the 20th anniversary of 9/11.
    Mr. Pekoske, you are absolutely right, united in memory, 
together in mission. I remember 20 years ago watching civilians 
run from those burning buildings while the first responders 
were essentially running in, knowing that we are probably 
facing certain death. That moment that united us in America.
    But today the lessons are we also have to be ready. That is 
what this hearing is all about. We talk today about our TSA 
front-line workers. I also Chair the Subcommittee on 
Transportation and Maritime, so this issue is very near and 
dear to my heart.
    But, you know, I look at the issue of equity in pay not as 
an issue of pay but rather professionalism. Nobody would 
question what we pay our police officers or FBI agents because 
they do the job and they put their lives out there. One of you 
witnesses mentioned that the last line of defense for airlines 
is essentially those TSA officers. Those people who are looking 
into the screens or looking at us or really being pains to the 
passengers for making those passengers open their luggage, look 
in their places to make sure there is nothing there that should 
not be going into a plane. So we have to make sure they are 
professionals. It is not only about pay, it is about to make 
sure that these folks are there for 30 years. We need their 
professional expertise to protect us in the air.
    So, you know, Mr. Pekoske, I would ask you to continue to 
think about it as professionalizing the work force and making 
sure that Americans have the best line of defense, their last 
line of defense is their best.
    I have a question for you similar to Mr. Higgins when it 
comes to IDs. Remembering 9/11, those folks that got on those 
airlines had valid IDs. The problem we had was a break in our 
intelligence system. We knew those folks maybe should have been 
questioned twice before they got on a flight, but they weren't. 
We were acting homeland security in silos. No. 2, the issue of 
IDs I think is secondary to making sure that those people don't 
have an explosive on them and making sure that they can 
actually--should be boarding the plane.
    We can have an ID, anyone in the world, valid visa, valid 
passport, and get on a flight. We just have to make sure that 
we coordinate intel with the rest of the world, with our 
friends and frenemies so to speak, to make sure somebody 
doesn't bring down a flight.
    So my question in the last few moments that I have, sir, is 
how are we working to make sure, No. 1, TSA is no longer in 
silos but sharing that information? No. 2, you are open to 
folks across the pond, South America, to make sure we have the 
best intel available.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. Congressman Correa, thank you very 
much for your comments.
    I couldn't agree more and what I would say is that in 
addition to the comments you made, you know, TSO officers, 
Transportation Security Officers, they are the last line of 
defense. They have enormous responsibility on their shoulders. 
It is our job to give them the discretion, the procedures, and 
the technology so that they are successful in their very 
important mission.
    The other thing that I would emphasize is, you know, our 
system is built on layers of security. We don't rely on any 
single layer to ensure that somebody who gets on a plane 
shouldn't be on a plane. We have multiple layers. As Mr. 
Neffenger mentioned at the very beginning, in many ways if a 
terrorist presents themselves for screening, we have already 
had some issues in the other layers that should have picked 
that up before that person even arrived.
    Then going back to the migrants for a second, the non-
documented individuals with follow-on travel in this country, 
we have captured their biometrics when they cross the border. 
The One app does that. Those biometrics are compared to our 
screening databases in our secure flight system. So there is--
given the biometric, there is some surety that that person is 
not listed on any of our watch lists and has traveled.
    Then, as you mentioned, we do do the right screening level 
based on the information we have and the risks that the 
individual presents.
    The last thing I will mention, sir, very quickly, is one of 
those layers--and you talk abut 9/11--one of those layers now 
is a very robust Federal Air Marshal Service that are assigned 
to flights based on the risk of the flight. They are an 
incredibly professional group of individuals and their mission 
is to prevent a terrorist attack in flight.
    Mr. Correa. Thank you very much.
    Mr. Chairman, how much time do I have? Or is my time out?
    Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Correa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield.
    Chairman Thompson. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from 
North Carolina, Mr. Norman.
    Mr. Norman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Administrator Pekoske, are you--did you say that the--when 
Congressman Guest put up on the TSA website the photo capture 
is voluntary, are you denying that? Are you saying that doesn't 
exist?
    Mr. Pekoske. No, sir, I am not denying it. I am saying I am 
unaware of any situation where that has occurred. Additionally, 
their biometric has already been checked with the checks that 
we would make in our secure flight system as they cross the 
border.
    Mr. Norman. OK. Let me ask you this, how do you check 
biometrics when they cross illegally? When they don't go 
through the screening process. Walk me through how you get the 
biometrics if they cross the border illegally.
    Mr. Pekoske. Right. Well, so if we have somebody present at 
the screening checkpoint that does not have----
    Mr. Norman. No, no, no. I am saying if they cross illegally 
where they don't go through the screening process, walk me 
through what you do to get the biometrics when there is no 
screening to them, they are illegal.
    Mr. Pekoske. Correct. So those individuals would generally 
not be allowed access to the screening checkpoint. these--the 
folks that are undocumented----
    Mr. Norman. No, no, no. But if you cross--you are missing--
you are not answering my question. It is a simple question. If 
you come across, you don't have the biometrics, if they go to 
the airport you have no documentation, what do you do? Do you 
turn them away? Or if--they have got the right not to have 
their picture. These are people who you have no information on. 
How do you--walk me through the screening process. Americans 
need to know this. And----
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Norman. Just walk me through what you do.
    Mr. Pekoske. I will walk you through quickly.
    Whenever somebody presents themselves at a screening 
checkpoint without identification we have a process we go 
through to try to verify that identification. Depending on what 
that process shows us depends on the level of screening we 
provide that person. Or, if we are not satisfied that the 
person should continue into the sterile area of an airport, 
then they are not allowed into the sterile area.
    Mr. Norman. OK. Let me ask you this, I was at McAllen, 
Texas. I have been to the border.
    Mr. Pekoske. Mm-hmm.
    Mr. Norman. Several times. Out of 120 seats, 100 of them 
were by those who had cardboard things across their necks 
saying we don't speak English, show me which airport to get 
on--which airplane to get on. They were allowed to get on. How 
do you explain that?
    Mr. Pekoske. We coordinate all of those very closely, sir, 
with Customs and Border Protection. So my assumption, based on 
the information you provided, is that all of those individuals 
did cross the border, were registered, their biometrics 
recorded by CBP.
    Mr. Norman. Well, I don't know that. You assume that. But 
this is----
    Mr. Pekoske. Well, our procedures require that.
    Mr. Norman. You know, you have to be right 100 percent of 
the time. The terrorists that made 9/11 happen killed 3,000 
people. They, as has been said, had identification. They were 
just terrorists. We have got suicide bombers who have got 
sophisticated things that can put in their bodies to blow the 
whole airplane up, including themselves. How do you screen 
against that?
    Mr. Pekoske. We do a very thorough screening of anything an 
individual is carrying and there on person, including a pat-
down. So we are sure that----
    Mr. Norman. How about if they swallow----
    Mr. Pekoske. Beg your pardon?
    Mr. Norman. How about if they swallow it or put up one of 
their cavities? How does that screen?
    Mr. Pekoske. Our--we have a very thorough screening process 
for both on-person detection and for carry-on bags that we are 
very certain that an individual who comes into the sterile area 
of an airport will not be carrying anything that could harm 
anybody on a flight.
    Mr. Norman. Not be carrying it, but they could put it in 
one of their body cavities.
    Mr. Pekoske. We have not seen that occur, sir.
    Mr. Norman. OK. All right. So I guess what I am saying is 
we have got an open border where known terrorists are getting 
across, the ones we catch, but it is the ones we have not 
caught. Here we are, I have not heard a peep out of TSA 
objecting to this because we are going to have 1.5-2 million 
illegals that are coming into the country. Some go through the 
screening, those that get away, the terrorists, are smart 
enough not to do it. You are saying you have got a 100 percent 
proof that you will either deny them access on the airplane to 
protect Americans and those who go through the process, as 
Congressman Guest says, or you have got some magic way of 
finding out who they are when you have no record, you have no 
knowledge of--you don't have biometrics. But you are telling me 
now that you have got a foolproof way to make sure that doesn't 
happen. That they don't get on the airplane and that they--all 
the sudden make--you are finding out a history that they have 
not given before because they haven't come through the 
screening process.
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. What I am telling you is that people 
that board aircraft anywhere in this country, including the 
Southwest Border are thoroughly screened and we would not 
permit them on aircraft if we had any concern that they might 
present a threat to that aircraft or the passengers on board.
    Mr. Norman. Well, if you don't have any information on 
them, how does that not present a concern?
    Mr. Pekoske. We have layers of security, sir, and identity 
verification is one layer of security.
    Chairman Thompson. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from 
Rhode Island, Mr. Langevin, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you 
for convening this hearing.
    Administrator Pekoske, I want to begin by thanking you for 
your many years of service to our Nation. I want to begin also 
by thanking you for your work on cybersecurity at TSA, 
specifically for your release of two pipeline security 
directives in the wake of the Colonial Pipeline incident.
    I am, however, concerned that the second of these 
directives was not made public. I understand of course the 
reluctance to publish security directives may be rooted in 
existing TSA practice, like aviation security. I know you and I 
had that conversation on the phone yesterday and certainly I 
understand that part of it. But knowing the specifics of 
airport screening protocols would be highly useful, you know, 
to terrorist groups who otherwise would need to physically 
surveil airports to identify vulnerabilities that could enable 
terrorist attacks. However, in the cyber realm bad actors don't 
need physical access to conduct intelligence surveillance and 
reconnaissance against our critical infrastructure. They can do 
so from anywhere in the world.
    So what is more, other agencies also publish security 
directives, including CISA, which is specific vulnerabilities 
and time lines called out in emergency directives TSA is 
required to follow. So in my view all TSA is doing by shrouding 
its cybersecurity directives in secrecy is denying itself the 
benefit and the ability to improve these directives through the 
feedback of the largest cybersecurity community.
    So my question, Administrator Pekoske, would you consider 
changing your policy and publishing the pipeline directives and 
any future cybersecurity directives from TSA?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, Congressman Langevin, thank you very 
much. Thank you for your time yesterday. I enjoyed very much 
and learned a great deal in talking with you, as always.
    As I said yesterday, yes, we will. We will take that back 
and look at that. You raised some very good points. I mean our 
goal here is to provide as much information on what the right 
cybersecurity preventive measures are and to get more and more 
organizations in my position, owners and operators of 
transportation systems, in the country to have stronger 
cybersecurity measures in place. So I take your suggestion very 
seriously, sir.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Langevin. Very good. Thank you.
    Administrator Pekoske, I want to also ask you now about 
ensuring compliance with TSA security directives. I understand 
that pipeline owners and operators must maintain documentation 
of their compliance with TSA regulations. I also understand 
that TSA has the ability to verify self-reported security 
controls through inspections.
    During these inspections are TSA inspectors conducting on 
network testing of systems?
    Mr. Pekoske. Sir, right now they are not doing on-network 
testing of systems, penetration testing. That is something that 
CISA, Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency, and TSA are 
working on.
    Mr. Langevin. OK.
    Mr. Pekoske. We think that is important as well.
    Mr. Langevin. So, you know, having inspectors and auditors 
conducting on-network testing I believe is crucial for 
evaluating a covered entity cybersecurity posture. Evaluating 
the architecture of a network is not enough. Just because a 
covered entity designs its human resources network, for 
example, to be segmented from its operational technology 
network does not automatically make that true. On-network 
testing I believe is critical to verify those kinds of issues.
    So in the absence of this testing TSA relies on self-
reporting, which I do not believe is sufficient. In my view, 
the solution is for TSA to implement third-party auditing of 
its covered entities and an impartial third-party auditor, such 
as a critical--certified private sector company or CISA would 
have both the impartiality and on network testing personnel 
necessary to ensure covered entities actually adhere to TSA's 
regulations.
    So, Administrator Pekoske, TSA has the authority over 
pipeline security for nearly 20 years, yet the first directive 
was issued in May. I realize this is early days, but with that 
in mind will you commit to working with me and the rest of this 
committee on implementing third-party auditing to verify 
compliance with TSA's security directives?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir, I commit to working with you and I 
appreciate your expertise.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Administrator.
    You know, should you require additional statutory budget or 
budgetary support to implement third-party auditing, will you 
work with this committee to obtain that support?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Langevin. Very good. It is all I can ask.
    Thank you very much.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
    The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Iowa, Ms. Miller-
Meeks.
    Ms. Miller-Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chair and Ranking Member 
as well, and thank you to all of those providing testimony to 
us today.
    Since its inception in 2012, TSA PreCheck and expedited 
screening has become very popular among members of the 
traveling public, myself included. Administrator Pekoske, as 
travel volume continues to recover, what more can TSA to do 
significantly increase PreCheck enrollment moving forward?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, ma'am, thank you for the question.
    Actually, PreCheck enrollment now is almost 11 million 
passengers. Our enrollment rates are now back at 2019 rates. So 
there are now more people basically resuming the practice of 
enrolling in PreCheck as pre-pandemic.
    Additionally we are increasing our enrollment services 
operation by adding two additional vendors to PreCheck 
enrollment. So that should make PreCheck much more accessible 
to people and much easier for them to register for that 
important program. I appreciate your interest in it.
    Ms. Miller-Meeks. Also one of the things I have noticed 
when I am flying in and out of various airports, sometimes it 
is smaller airports, but sometimes it is the very large ones 
early in the morning or late in the evening that the PreCheck 
lanes aren't operational. So what specifically is TSA doing 
to--you know, you are promoting enrollment in PreCheck but you 
also don't have the lanes open even though oftentimes there 
seems like there is more than adequate to have the TSA PreCheck 
lane open. So is there a number of passengers that have to go 
through for the PreCheck to be open? How is that determined? 
Why can't I always count on a PreCheck lane being open?
    Mr. Pekoske. Ma'am, what we look at in terms of processing 
is how long the wait is for passengers and we measure that at 
every single lane in the country every hour. Our standard for 
PreCheck processing is 5 minutes or less. So our protocol would 
be to open additional lanes if we couldn't achieve that 5 
minute wait time standard.
    The other thing that we have instituted in the airports 
that have a very small number of lanes and sometimes it is hard 
to dedicate a single lane to PreCheck is a process called 
blended screening, which means that the passenger in front of 
you might be a non-PreCheck passenger, they will get the level 
of screening that that requires, the next person, yourself, for 
example, as a PreCheck passenger would then get PreCheck 
screening.
    So we are using that to provide passengers with the 
convenience of PreCheck and the speed of PreCheck. But whenever 
we see the wait time ticking out beyond 5 minutes overall then 
that is the time to open up an additional lane.
    Ms. Miller-Meeks. Yes, I think the challenge is that those 
individuals who have PreCheck clearance or have CLEAR, 
typically are very efficient in how they package their 
materials. People that aren't, that blended, you know, 
screening, takes a lot of time because the person in front of 
you may not--they have to take their liquids out, they have to 
take their laptop out, they have to take their belt, their 
keys, their coins, et cetera. So you understand the dilemma it 
poses.
    But it is good to know that it is a 5-minute waiting 
period, so I will keep track of that in the future and then let 
you know.
    Then, last, you know, Apple recently announced that it is 
partnering with the TSA to have its customers use mobile 
driver's licenses on their, you know, phones or watches as 
proof of identification at certain airport checkpoints. Now, to 
me this collaboration seems very exciting. I always worry about 
losing my driver's license when I put it away to quickly go 
through the screening process. So, you know, when should we 
expect to see this technology at airport checkpoints and at 
which States? Please explain the TSA's approach to 
incorporating this security and efficiency benefits that 
digital identity provides at the checkpoint.
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, ma'am. The digital identity, or the 
mobile driver's license, is a very exciting initiative and we 
have worked with a cooperative research and development 
agreement with Apple. Had the same opportunity available to 
non-Apple manufacturers as well. We expect to roll this out at 
certain airports. Of course that requires the States to also 
agree that their driver's license can be uploaded in a digital 
format. There are several States that have already agreed to 
that and we anticipate that we will roll out the mobile 
driver's license capability in select airports beginning at the 
very end of this calendar year or into early calendar year 
2022.
    So it is really--it is very--it is right around the corner.
    Ms. Miller-Meeks. Well, thank you so much for that. As you 
said, it is really exciting that it will be coming in the 
forefront. So I hope it gets to my airports and I will check 
with my State.
    So thank you for that.
    Thank you, Chair Thompson. I yield back my time.
    Chairman Thompson. The gentlelady yields back.
    The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from New York for 5 
minutes, Ms. Clarke.
    Ms. Clarke. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I thank our 
Ranking Member. I thank our panelist for their expert witness 
this morning.
    My question--my first question is to the entire panel. In 
the 20 years since TSA's formation the agency has confronted a 
wide range of threats, which continue to evolve. In your view 
what has emerged as the most prevalent challenges to TSA's 
mission, to its work force, and to its resources?
    Administrator Pekoske, why don't we just start with you?
    Mr. Pekoske. OK. Thank you, ma'am. Appreciate that.
    With respect to the threat picture, I mean the thing that 
has emerged over the past several years is the prevalence of a 
domestic terror threat, which is very different from a foreign-
based or foreign-inspired terrorist. It has required us to 
refocus our effort. We have a very mature risk identification 
and risk management process in TSA. It impacts both the 
aviation sector and all the surface modes of transportation. So 
there is a change in the threat.
    Additionally, the threat is not just physical any longer. 
There is a physical threat and a cyber threat that has 
developed. We saw that with our directives to the pipeline 
industry following the Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack.
    So, you know, we have, just based on the changes to the 
threat and the linkages that we have to the intelligence 
community, to make sure that we are staying ahead of where the 
threat is going. We change our procedures, we change our 
technology in that regard.
    I hope that is responsive to your question.
    Ms. Clarke. What would you say that threat has presented to 
the work force? Is there a need for additional training and 
resources specific to that training?
    Mr. Pekoske. Well, the threat has presented itself to the 
work force in a number of ways. The key remedy we have for that 
is to ensure that the work force has the right tools to do the 
very, very important job that they have. So some of the 
technologies that we have talked about this morning, the 
credential technology, the new X-ray system, the on-person 
detection systems, are very important to putting the right 
tools in the hands of our work force.
    Additionally, what is important as well is to have a 
significant and visible presence to deter any potential threat 
actor from acting out. This is particularly relevant in the 
case of domestic terrorists.
    Ms. Clarke. Would either of the other panelists care to 
respond? Administrator Pistole.
    Mr. Pistole. Yes. Yes, Congresswoman, this is John Pistole.
    Unfortunately, in addition to the deaths of TSOs from 
COVID, it was during my tenure that the murder--the execution 
of TSO Gerardo Hernadez at LAX occurred by however this--you 
know, disgruntled, mental health-challenged individual who shot 
him in the back and then shot 2 other TSOs. So that is always 
an issue on the minds of TSOs and of concern that what happens 
when somebody who with that mindset and with a weapon can 
simply walk into an airport before going through any security 
and open fire. So that is something that I think is--it is a 
challenge because working closely with the airport police, the 
sworn law enforcement, in addition to some other resources, 
that is one of the things that continues to be an issue.
    Mr. Neffenger. Congresswoman Clarke, let me just add to 
what Mr. Pistole said.
    You know, I was in Brussels airport on the morning of March 
22, 2016 when the Brussels airport attacks--2 suicide bombers 
detonated their large suitcase bombs in the public area. So I 
think these--the public areas of the airport are far more 
challenging now than they used to be and are clearly a 
potential target area. So we have done a great job of keeping 
people from getting into sterile areas at the airport, but 
those public areas are a great concern. As people have--can 
rapidly radicalize because of the ability to find like-minded 
ideological individuals on the internet and through social 
media, it becomes much more challenging to stay ahead of that.
    Ms. Clarke. Then in keeping that, I guess, Administrator 
Pekoske, TSA has had to work closely with other agencies across 
Federal Government throughout the COVID-19 pandemic. Has TSA's 
collaboration with other Federal agencies matured since its 
founding? Are there areas in which TSA still needs to improve 
its inter-agency coordination efforts?
    Mr. Pekoske. Ma'am, I think our inter-agency coordination 
efforts are quite outstanding. You know, we have very, very 
strong relationships across the board with all of our inter-
agency partners.
    I think the continued area of focus for us, and it is not 
that the relationships need improvement, it is just that the 
focus is going to be even more so on the surface transportation 
systems and the modes of surface transportation safety that 
exists in the Department of Transportation. But the 
relationships I think are very, very strong and very important 
to us.
    Ms. Clarke. Thank you.
    I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you, gentlemen.
    Chairman Thompson. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from 
Michigan for 5 minutes, Mr. Meijer.
    Mr. Meijer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to our 
witnesses for joining us here today. I appreciate this timely 
and important look back on the 20th anniversary, or 
thereabouts, of the founding of the Transportation Security 
Administration and of our differing approach to travel, 
security, and airport security, but not limited to that. That 
touches upon my first question for the administrator.
    You know, while most of the TSA resources have been focused 
on commercial aviation your agency also has responsibility for 
the security of mass transit, for freight rail, elements of 
highway infrastructure, and other critical transportation 
sectors. The ransomware attack on the Colonial Pipeline earlier 
this year was the first opportunity for many of us to learn 
that TSA also had responsibility for pipeline security.
    So I guess my question to you, Mr. Administrator, is how is 
the TSA ensuring that these missions are receiving adequate 
attention and resources? Are there any components of the broad 
mission apart from airport security that have been historically 
underfunded or neglected, either by Congress or DHS leadership?
    Mr. Pekoske. Sir, the way we assess resource allocation 
within the agency, and this affects our allocation within the 
current budget year, then also our budget request for the 
future years, is looking at the risks and how the risk is 
changing. So this is informed by intelligence information, it 
is informed by information we receive from our Government 
partners and our private-sector partners across the board. We 
assess risks. As the risk changes then we put in risk 
mitigation measures that might require a redirection of funds.
    We have also organizationally to make sure, to your point, 
that surface transportation security is achieving the right 
priority. Thanks the work of this committee in our 2018 re-
authorization we have established a separate assistant 
administrator position and staff for surface transportation 
security and have a similar staff in our policy operations. So 
surface transportation policy has its own organization. Surface 
transportation operations is also a clearly-identified 
organization.
    Finally, we have established regional networks where we 
have a leader, a member of the Senior Executive Service in 5 
regions around the country, all aligned with the FEMA regions, 
that oversee surface transportation security in the interaction 
with those owners and operators on a regional basis and has 
available for them literally hundreds of inspectors to be able 
to do the important work we do.
    Mr. Meijer. I appreciate that answer, Mr. Administrator.
    I just wanted to quickly follow up. You know, it has been 2 
decades since these missions were put under TSA during that--or 
close to 2 decades during that reorganization in the early 
2000's. At this point, looking back on 15 to 20 years of 
operations, do you think that any of these missions should be 
reassigned to other components within DHS or within the broader 
Executive branch?
    Mr. Pekoske. No, sir, I do not. I think the missions that 
are assigned to TSA are exactly the right missions and I think 
we have demonstrated that over the course of 20 years. I would 
just highlight with respect to the Colonial Pipeline, because 
of the authorities Congress has provided us in law and 
reinforced in our re-authorization, we were able to move very, 
very quickly in putting measures in place to mitigate any 
future attacks on critical pipeline systems.
    So I think that the missions that we have is exactly right 
for TSA. It is incumbent upon us, of course, to make sure that 
we coordinate robustly, to the prior question, with our inter-
agency partners not just at the Federal level, but also 
particularly in surface transportation items at the State and 
local eminence below us.
    Mr. Meijer. On that inter-agency partner point, can you 
give a better--or a little bit additional description on TSA, 
how would they collaborate with specifically the intelligence 
community, but also with the private sector on security, you 
know, vetting procedures, intelligence sharing? You know, what 
type of coordination problems persist and what is TSA doing to 
address those challenges?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. It is probably best that I just 
briefly describe how we--when we see a threat stream 
developing, how we change our procedures, how we might change 
some of the requirements we place on private sector or other 
public owners and operators of systems. Essentially the way we 
do that is to bring the chief security officers of those 
organizations in, provide them an intelligence brief, so that 
they are looking at the intelligence that we see, and then 
collaborate closely with them to achieve the security outcomes 
that we know we have to achieve.
    This can happen fast. We have been very successful with 
doing this. It can happen fast and what it net results in is a 
private sector or a local government partners who understand 
the threat and understands the rationale for the measures we 
put in place. Then for the private-sector operators, they can 
also offer different ways of accomplishing the security outcome 
we want to accomplish. Sometimes their measures are actually 
more effective because they know their systems better than we 
do at time. Oftentimes they require less cost. From my 
perspective, as long as we can achieve the desired security 
outcome, we will generally approve those, what we call 
alternative measures.
    Mr. Meijer. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    Chairman Thompson. The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from 
Nevada, Ms. Titus, for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I would like to ask the administrator about the new opening 
of the international travel markets. I represent Las Vegas, 
McCarran Airport, and we welcome a lot of international 
travelers and we expect that number to increase. It was 
especially good to hear that the administration had lifted the 
restrictions on a number of places around the world. As the 
same time these new travelers are going to be coming American 
travelers are going out again. They have this pent-up need to 
go out and travel after a year-and-a-half of being locked down. 
So we are going to see a lot more people in the air.
    Now, we have seen that the aviation infrastructure really 
wasn't prepared to deal with so many at one time. It was kind-
of like the problem after 9/11. I am wondering how TSA is 
preparing to welcome all these new travelers, especially the 
international ones, and what resources you might need or 
something we might be able to do to help us accommodate them. 
We know that travel begins the minute you leave the house. So 
your airport experience is a part of how you remember the trip 
of going and coming. So could you address that for us?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, Congresswoman Titus, happy to address 
that.
    One of the things that is very important for us is that we 
in working with the carriers project what we think air travel 
will be for the coming year. I know that is hard to do 
sometimes the further out you go, but we have been very 
successful in identifying a window of, you know, the minimum 
and the maximum number of passengers, except for the COVID 
years. But certainly we were in fact very, very close to our 
estimates for this past summer. So what that does is it drives 
the requirement for the staffing levels at airports around the 
country. What is important here is that because of the training 
that is necessary to certify one of our officers in the 
important jobs that they have at the checkpoints, we really 
need to hire people a good 4 to 5 months ahead of when the 
passenger need will be.
    So we are in the process now really of looking at next 
summer's travel projections, ensuring that we bring on an 
adequate number of transportation security officers to handle 
that demand.
    Finally, we work very closely with the airports, like your 
airport in Las Vegas, to do whatever we can to make sure that 
we have the right number of lanes. Whenever an airport wants to 
add an additional lane to their screen checkpoint, we welcome 
that every single time and we will staff those lanes so that we 
can manage the flows during the peak periods. Because, as you 
know, there are certain times of the day when a lot of flights 
depart and so those tend to be very challenging for everybody 
to get through not just screening but to get through ticketing 
and to get out to the gate.
    Ms. Titus. Like a Monday morning after a Raiders' game, you 
have got a lot of people going through that airport.
    Well, thank you. I am glad to hear that.
    Another question related to our international travelers is 
their ability to read the signs. I know if I am in China in an 
airport and I can't read the signs, I am going to be lost. So 
we have a lot of those international travelers, as well as the 
fact that Las Vegas is an international city in terms of its 
residents.
    Our committee--thank you, Mr. Chairman, for helping with 
this--passed the Translate Act and it got out of the House, got 
stuck in the Senate, but that was to be sure that all the 
signage is in several different languages as well as accessible 
for people who are visually or hearing impaired. Is TSA making 
any progress along those lines even though the bill didn't 
pass?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, ma'am. In fact at Las Vegas Airport the 
Las Vegas Airport Authority has been kind enough to provide an 
entire checkpoint to TSA to test out our newest technologies. 
The benefit of this arrangement at Las Vegas is that we can 
actually divert passengers to this checkpoint and have actual 
passengers go through some of our changed processes or new 
technology so we can assess how it actually works in a real-
life situation.
    One of the things we look at in terms of signage are what 
are called totems that are electronic signs that can be changed 
to provide information in different languages. You know, often 
times we can make a pretty good guess at what languages would 
need to be accommodated in a given airport given where the 
flights are flying off to or coming from.
    So a lot of work is being done on that and to provide as 
much easy information as we possibly can to passengers.
    Ms. Titus. Well, that is great.
    I know that McCarran is an innovation checkpoint. You have 
been using some UV screening as well to clean the luggage 
places and--is that working out? Have you been able to 
translate some of the things that you discovered there to other 
airports?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes. We are still testing that UV technology 
out, ma'am, but essentially when the bins get returned in what 
are called automatic screening lanes, these are, you know, 70- 
or 80-foot-long lanes that allow multiple people to divest, put 
their stuff in a bin at the same time, so that improves flow. 
It also makes sure that when we want to search a bag that it is 
not accessible to that passenger. So a passenger can't reach 
and pull a bag that we know we need to search. Then there is 
plenty of room for a passenger to kind-of recompose after the 
screening process is done. But the idea is that those bins 
would--as they travel back to the front of the lane, would be 
UV scanned and that would reduce the virus load in those bins. 
So far our testing shows that works pretty well. We are just 
testing different times to dwell and also the brightness of the 
light.
    But if this continues to proceed I would expect that we 
would have that as an option in our systems across the Nation.
    Ms. Titus. Great. I know you have got that CAT system----
    Chairman Thompson. The gentlelady's time has----
    Ms. Titus [continuing]. Too where you can scan your own ID. 
So that is great.
    Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is good news.
    I yield back.
    Chairman Thompson. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from 
Georgia, Mr. Clyde, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Clyde. Well, thank you, Chairman Thompson. I appreciate 
this opportunity and this hearing.
    This question would be for Administrator Pekoske. Earlier 
this year I joined some of my colleagues on a trip in April to 
witness the crisis in the country that we are experiencing at 
our Southern Border. On our way back there were multiple 
illegal migrants who had been apprehended between 24 and 72 
hours prior to our flight. We also know that--or we were told 
that there were several individuals on the known terrorist 
database that had been apprehended at the border.
    Now, with such a quick turnaround time in processing 
migrants who illegally cross, that is 24 to 72 hours, how is 
TSA ensuring that the safety and security of domestic 
transportation systems are not compromised? I mean these 
illegal migrants, many have not received a thorough medical 
assessment. What concerns me greatly is how do we know whether 
these people have a criminal record in their home country?
    So what information are you relying on to properly vet the 
migrant passengers? I mean you are doing it within 24 to 72 
hours. So how are you doing that?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. The vetting that we provide is done 
electronically, so the time is not the critical factor here. 
Essentially what we do is we take the biographic and biometric 
information and compare that to watch lists that we hold in the 
U.S. Government to ensure that nobody who is a known or 
suspected terrorist is admitted into the airport without either 
very thorough screening or they might be in a category where 
they are just not permitted to fly. There are different levels 
that we assess.
    So it is based on biographic, biometric information. We may 
not have information on their criminal history in their home 
country, but, you know, we do have that good biometric 
information to compare to our watch list.
    Mr. Clyde. OK. So I heard you in previous testimony talk 
about enhanced screening and multiple layers. I think you said 
you do whatever we can. But if a person doesn't actually have 
ID, all right, and their name is Joe and they tell you that 
their name is Sam, all right, now am I correct in that prior to 
getting on these flights that if they don't have ID you 
actually create a Government ID for them? Is that right? Or is 
that not right?
    Mr. Pekoske. No, sir, that is not right. You know, we make 
an assessment passenger to passenger as to whether we think a 
passenger should be permitted into the sterile area of an 
airport or onto an aircraft. So it is a very individualistic 
look. I am very confident that we do that carefully and 
successfully for every passenger that boards an aircraft.
    Mr. Clyde. OK. So every American that flies has to have a 
photo ID, all right, that actually verifies who they are. But 
yet what you are telling me then is an illegal migrant doesn't 
have to have a photo ID and we don't necessarily know who they 
are. You might actually screen them to make sure they don't 
have, you know, knives or whatever, something illegal on the 
airplane, but we don't know if they are a criminal coming into 
this country that has ill intent, something beyond the airport 
itself or not. Isn't that what you are telling me? That you 
don't know that.
    Mr. Pekoske. Sir, this goes back to our multiple layers of 
security. What I will tell you we do know is we do know that 
any person who is permitted into the sterile area of an airport 
or boards an aircraft has been properly screened so that the--
if they do not pose a risk to the aircraft or to other people 
in the sterile area. I can guarantee you of that.
    Mr. Clyde. OK. All right. So it is OK for TSA to allow 
people on an aircraft without an actual Government-issued ID. 
On what authority do you allow that? All of us, we have to have 
one.
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. I have the authority as the 
administrator to allow that. There are passengers that are 
American citizens that occasionally show up in screening 
checkpoints that do not have their ID with them. Again, we have 
a verification process that we use to see if we can verify the 
identity. We make a judgment at the time based on criteria we 
have in the agency and we ensure that all passengers are 
thoroughly screened before they board an aircraft.
    Mr. Clyde. OK. All right.
    Let me follow up with you on this, TSA requires anyone 
traveling from other countries to provide a confirmed negative 
COVID-19 test within 72 hours prior to their entering the 
United States. Is this same standard being applied to illegal 
migrants as well?
    Mr. Pekoske. To the best of my knowledge it is not being to 
illegal migrants. That is the Centers for Disease Control 
decision.
    Mr. Clyde. OK. But yet you enforce it, right?
    Mr. Pekoske. Customs and Border Protection and TSA enforce 
it, yes, sir.
    Mr. Clyde. OK. All right.
    Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Clyde. OK.
    Chairman Thompson. The Chair recognizes the gentlelady 
from----
    Mr. Clyde. Thank you. I yield back.
    Chairman Thompson [continuing]. New Jersey, Ms. Watson 
Coleman.
    Ms. Watson Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you 
to each of our witnesses for this very informative discussion 
that we are having.
    Let me associate myself with your comments and the Ranking 
Member and every Member who has spoken out on behalf of the 
compensation and the recognition of the significance of our 
front-line workers here, our TSOs, and that they should have 
predictability, a pathway for a career. This would help us with 
the morale issues.
    I have--I think about the unique question. In the 21st 
Century you may not need a terrorist aboard a plane to hijack 
it. As planes, trains, subways, and buses become increasingly 
automated, we need to be prepared for when hijackers inevitably 
put lives at risk by launching a cyber attack against the 
operational or navigation systems of the transportation target. 
As we have seen in recent ransomware attacks, our adversaries 
consider no target off-limits.
    So, Administrator Pekoske, I would like to speak to you 
about this. How does TSA work with its inter-agency partners to 
prevent malware from infecting the operational systems of its 
planes, trains, subways, buses, et cetera? Are you in 
conversations with CISA and DoT and the FAA and other 
regulators to ensure this threat is addressed and that TSA 
plays a significant role in mitigating it?
    Mr. Pekoske, please.
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, ma'am. Thank you, Congresswoman Watson 
Coleman, for your question.
    Yes, we are in very close coordination with CISA for sure 
and then with all of the modes in the Department of 
Transportation, whether it is FAA, PHMSA, Federal Railroads, et 
cetera. So that coordination is very good.
    Additionally, it is important that we coordinate closely 
with the owners and operators of those systems and also to 
bring on cybersecurity expertise within TSA and to ensure we 
have good strong connections with CISA to be able to benefit 
from their expertise overall.
    So I think we have made a lot of progress on cybersecurity 
already, but I recognize, and I think you would agree, that a 
lot more needs to be done.
    Another key element, just to quickly mention, ma'am, is we 
are offering very specific briefings to the CEOs and CSOs of 
these organizations so that they understand the threat that we 
see and the urgency of getting at it.
    Ms. Watson Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Pekoske.
    I also know that there were advisories issued by you all 
after the malware attack on the Pipeline. I am wondering if you 
are considering the same kinds of oversight and 
accountabilities from these other transportation systems, the 
airplanes, the buses, the subways, the trains. I think that 
these are reasonable targets and I don't know if you are 
engaged in those discussions, I don't know if you have enough 
resources to be able to address this area.
    I would like to have your response to that so that we could 
be as helpful as possible.
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, ma'am, we are engaged with those owners 
and operators and private-sector companies. There has been a 
very good dialog to date. We will of course base our actions 
based on the risk that we see. So the risk to one element of 
surface might not be the same as the risk to another. Or even 
within the pipeline sector there were certain pipeline owners 
and operators that we felt were at greater risk than others. 
This dialog has been very robust. It will continue. It supports 
the 60-day cybersecurity sprint that the Secretary has put in 
place for the transportation sector which began the first of 
September, runs through the end of October. So there has been 
an awful lot of effort on that and I think we have made some 
very good progress.
    Ms. Watson Coleman. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
    The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr. 
Gimenez, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Gimenez. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    I was listening to the testimony, I am--you know, I had a 
line of questioning, but I am going to change my line of 
questioning.
    So, Administrator Pekoske, in order for somebody to get 
from Europe to the United States what do they need to show in 
terms of COVID? Do they need to show they're vaccinated, do 
they need to show that they have had a negative test? Somebody 
coming from Europe here, what do they need to show?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir.
    New procedures will come in place very shortly where they 
need to show that they are vaccinated and have had a test 
within a certain number of hours prior to flight.
    Mr. Gimenez. Somebody coming from Canada, what do they need 
to show?
    Mr. Pekoske. Same, sir. By air.
    Mr. Gimenez. The same thing. Somebody crossing the border 
from the south, what do they need to show?
    Mr. Pekoske. They don't need to show the same things coming 
from the Southwest Border. This is also based on advice we have 
received from the Centers for Disease Control.
    Mr. Gimenez. So the Centers for Disease Control seem to 
think that somehow the virus somehow is more contagious coming 
from Europe and from Canada than it is coming from the Southern 
Border, which kind-of blows up the whole argument about 
following the science, doesn't it?
    Mr. Pekoske. Sir, I am not a medical expert.
    Mr. Gimenez. No, I am not saying--I am not saying--no, sir, 
that is not for you. That is my comment. This whole thing about 
following the science is a bunch of hooey. If we tell Canadians 
that they have to be vaccinated and show a proof of negative 
test, we do the same thing with Europeans, and we do nothing 
for people crossing the Southern Border. So this whole thing 
about the CDC following the science, it really doesn't. It 
follows political science, but not really the science.
    So, you know, it is very--it has been very, very 
illuminating today's testimony.
    One thing I would like to ask, one thing that I do support 
is the fine work that our TSA agents are doing with all these 
different kinds of guidances they are getting from the CDC and 
everybody else, the fine work that they do on the ground. I 
would hope, sir, that you find the way to increase their pay 
and benefits of those that are doing the great work that the 
TSA does.
    I know that I proposed that during our mark-up to actually 
increase the pay, and unfortunately the Majority voted it down. 
So what steps are you taking to increase the pay and the 
benefits of those people that are on the ground doing this 
great work?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir, I couldn't agree with you more. I 
think it is an absolute imperative that we increase the pay for 
anyone in TSA, especially the front-line work force where there 
is a pay discrepancy between what they get paid and what their 
counterparts in the rest of Government would get paid. They 
have very, very difficult jobs to do, significant 
responsibility on their shoulders, and very arduous work hours 
as well. They are showing up at 3 o'clock in the morning in 
many airports to begin to open the screening process.
    My top priority is to continue to improve pay, but I want 
to improve it--and I know the Chairman agrees with this 100 
percent--as substantially as we can to get that equity in the 
system and to properly compensate people going forward.
    I would note that we have made attempts and we have made 
some progress increasing pay, but it has not been enough. It is 
really important for us. We spent a lot of money with people 
that come into TSA and find--and they identify for us the No. 1 
reason they leave is because of the pay. It is very expensive 
to recruit and retain people without adequate pay structure. So 
I am 100 percent in support of that. We will work very, very 
hard to make sure we get across the finish line.
    Mr. Gimenez. Thank you very much, Administrator. I yield my 
time back.
    Chairman Thompson. The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from 
Florida for 5 minutes, Mrs. Demings.
    Mrs. Demings. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to 
our witnesses for being with us today to discuss, of course, 
this extremely important issue. I want to, first of all, 
associate myself with the remarks of my colleagues who paused 
for just a moment to take the time to thank our TSOs for the 
extraordinary job that they do every day. We all travel a lot 
and I think it is important that we let them know that we see 
them, that we hear them, and that we do appreciate them.
    Since 9/11, we all know that we have come a long way in 
terms of, I believe, our preparation. Interagency cooperation, 
we have heard discussion about that, information sharing. But 
Admiral Loy, you said something to the effect that you find 
little comfort in the fact that we have not been attacked in 20 
years. Meaning, that we must remain ever-vigilant in our 
efforts to make sure that we are not attacked. Admiral, you 
mentioned that you felt there was more work to do in terms of 
establishing a better link between the TSA and the IC 
community. Could you just talk a little bit more about that?
    Mr. Loy. Yes, ma'am. Thanks for your question. My reference 
was to where we were on 9/11/01 and where we found ourselves 20 
years later. Of course, that is being the purpose of this look-
back for the committee. I was only endorsing as a constant, the 
responsibility of both the committee itself, as well as the 
administrator and the people in the Executive branch 
government, to be conscious of and focused on continuing that 
linkage between the intelligence community writ large and that 
information from within the intelligence community that can be 
actionable for TSA. To the degree we continue to focus on that, 
we don't let it--we don't assume that we are there. We don't 
assume that we are going to be there in the future. But, 
rather, it is one of those elements of constant focus that we 
always have on our table both in the administrator's chair, in 
the committee's discussions with regard to their 
responsibilities, and that we just don't begin to take for 
granted that once we were there we are going to stay there.
    This is an evolutionary challenge just as we heard with 
regard to the comments about Afghanistan and the resurgence of 
the Taliban. If that is a opportunity for us to be concerned, 
we should focus on that in a continuing manner going into the 
future. Thanks for your thought on that, or your focus on that.
    Mrs. Demings. Well, thank you so much for your response on 
that. Administrator Pistole, since 9/11, how has the TSA's 
mission and operations drawn on and contributed to the work of 
the intelligence community?
    Mr. Pistole. Well, thank you, Congresswoman. It is 
interesting because I am testifying from the National 
Intelligence University in Bethesda where I am on the Board of 
Visitors. There is an intelligence collection cycle that is 
inherent in what TSA does. I know I was impressed when I came 
over from the FBI in 2010 to become administrator, how robust 
and informed TSA was in the morning intelligence briefings as 
it related to transportation issues. TSA was getting the same 
information that the FBI was and so, it was that inherent 
dependence upon and reliance upon risk-based security.
    One of the keys is risk-based intelligence-driven. So, you 
can't just do things as Admiral Pekoske has said, you can't 
just do it in a vacuum. It is all based on what is the latest 
intelligence. Is there a non-metallic IED threat out there? Is 
there a cargo threat out there? Is there a suicide bomber 
threat or hijackers, whatever it may be?
    So, that is the way TSA starts off every day is--at least 
when I was there, in terms of having that intelligence-informed 
start to say here is where we need to go based on the 
intelligence.
    Mrs. Demings. Thank you so much. Mr. Chairman, I can't see 
the clock. Do I have time for one more question?
    Administrator Pekoske, just very quickly. We know that on 
the front line with the TSOs or local enforcement, and I think 
we have continued to further build a more functional and 
effective relationship. Could you just talk a little bit about 
the information sharing working relationship with local law 
enforcement?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, ma'am. Local law enforcement absolutely 
critical to the safety and security of everybody in the 
airport. They have been wonderful partners with us at airports 
around the country. Orlando absolutely included in that from 
your time there. Local law enforcement is very important now 
for--even more so, because we are seeing more disturbances both 
inflight and in checkpoints. Local law enforcement is right 
there to make sure that our officers are fully protected and a 
situation is deescalated as quickly as it can be.
    Additionally, as we have talked about, you know, public 
area security is very, very important. Local law enforcement 
presence and sometimes augmented by our own VIPR teams from 
TSA, it is really important to just let people know that law 
enforcement is there, present roaming around. If anybody has a 
situation, they are readily nearby to be able to address it. 
So, I am very, very proud of our partnership with local law 
enforcement and salute all the law enforcement officers, 
particularly this week for their service to our country and to 
our officers.
    Mrs. Demings. Thank you so much. Mr. Chairman, I yield 
back. Thank you.
    Chairman Thompson. The gentlelady yields back. The Chair 
recognizes the gentleman from New York, Mr. Garbarino.
    Mr. Garbarino. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to 
the Ranking Member for having this hearing. Thank you to all 
the witnesses that are here. The bulk of my questions are for 
Administrator Pekoske.
    One thing I am going submit into record, I have a report 
here by Security Scorecard that they conducted on the pipeline 
security shortly after the Colonial attack. The report notes 
that while the cybersecurity posture of pipeline industry as a 
whole is better than the Fortune 500, there is a wide variance 
within the industry with Colonial at the bottom of the list 
before the breach. I am going to submit this report into the 
record and send it with some questions. I hope you can look 
through it and get me some answers to those questions because I 
am sure you haven't seen the report yet, but I would appreciate 
it----
    Chairman Thompson. Without objection,----
    Mr. Garbarino [continuing]. Without objection.
    Chairman Thompson [continuing]. So ordered.*
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    * The information has been retained in committee files and is 
available at https://securityscorecard.pathfactory.com/all/the-state-
of-cybersecurity-in-the-energy-pipeline-industry-in-north-america.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Mr. Garbarino. Yep, thank you.
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. I would be happy to look at it and 
provide some reaction to it. Thank you.
    Mr. Garbarino. Thank you. But so, my other questions though 
now are, as you know, the bulk of the TSA's funding and 
employees are focused on commercial aviation, but TSA has a 
responsibility for the security of cargo, air cargo, general 
aviation, mass transit, freight, rail, highway, infrastructure, 
pipeline, and ferries. Does TSA have the appropriate funding 
and employees dedicated to working on pipeline security? If 
not, what additional resources or support would you need from 
Congress to fulfill this responsibility?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. We have increased the size of our 
pipeline security staff significantly over the past couple of 
years and, actually, the staff of all of our surface 
transportation security modes. So, we are making progress in 
that regard. Additionally, we have added about 54 cyber 
professionals, both on the policy side and on the operations 
side, you know, with that critical cybersecurity expertise that 
is so important across the entire system, you know, and to 
include aviation and surface. But these are dedicated primarily 
to surface transportation.
    Rest assured we will include in our budget requests any 
resources that we need. We recognize, of course, that the risk 
is changing with domestic terrorists now becoming more 
prominent in our risk profile. We want to make sure that we do 
everything we can in the assistance that we provide to the 
owners and operators of those systems is as robust as possible. 
So, I thank you for your question.
    Mr. Garbarino. You mentioned domestic terrorists, but I 
am--it seems when we deal with cybersecurity, most of it is 
coming from overseas. Is that something you are seeing mostly 
that it is more international and not domestic?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Garbarino. Yes.
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir, mostly overseas-based.
    Mr. Garbarino. OK, thank you. I want to go, TSA has now 
issued two security directives to the pipeline industry 
following the ransomware attack on Colonial. Can you provide 
the committee with an update to where those--where things 
stand? Is the pipeline industry better prepared to defend 
against future attacks?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir, thank you. The pipeline industry is 
unquestionably better prepared to respond to future attacks. 
The first security directive, there has been 100 percent 
compliance with the first security directive. The second 
security directive still has some deadlines that have not yet 
been achieved in terms of, hey, we got some deadlines in--later 
into 2022. But so far, the dialog we have had with the owners 
and operators that are subject to those security directives has 
been very, very good and I think we are on a very good path 
with Security Directive 02. As has been mentioned, we intend to 
take what we have learned from both security directives in 
pipeline and apply it more broadly across the transportation 
sector.
    Mr. Garbarino. You had said--I know you had said before you 
are working with CEOs and CISOs of companies making sure that 
they are better prepared for these cyber attacks. Has that been 
receptive across pipeline owners and operators, as well as 
across the board, I guess?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir, very perceptive and actually very 
regular as well. To have, you know, we have regular 
opportunities to engage to make sure that we are all on track 
to get the cyber directives fully implemented and also look at 
other ways that we might provide better cybersecurity overall 
for the system. Additionally, any CEO knows that if they want 
to call and talk to me about anything, that is absolutely their 
privilege to do, and I would be happy to have those 
conversations.
    Mr. Garbarino. I appreciate it. One final question, just 
switching. It is not about cyber, but TSA PreCheck. I 
understand that the TSA has entered into 3 more contracts for 
TSA PreCheck services. What steps is TSA taking to ensure there 
is no brand confusion between companies and that all provide 
these services at equivalent level of service?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. That is something that we are very, 
very focused on to make sure that when we do roll out the 2 
additional vendors for PreCheck enrollment, that there is no 
brand confusion there. We will work with both those vendors as 
we get through the IT certification process with both of them 
so that we are well-prepared when the rollout time comes.
    Mr. Garbarino. If you could give me a more detailed answer 
to that later on. I know I am out of time. That would be great. 
Thank you----
    Mr. Pekoske. OK.
    Mr. Garbarino [continuing]. Very much and I yield back.
    Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. The Chair 
recognizes the gentlelady from California, Ms. Barragan, for 5 
minutes.
    Ms. Barragan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. TSA Administrator 
Pekoske, if I showed up at the airport today and I didn't have 
a photo ID, it is true that I might still be able to fly. Is 
that correct?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, ma'am, that is correct.
    Ms. Barragan. As a matter of fact, isn't it true that on 
TSA.gov there is an entire section that says, forgot your ID? 
And talks about the procedures you may have to go through if 
you don't have an ID?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, ma'am, and it happens every single day 
across our system.
    Ms. Barragan. Thank you. I just wanted to clarify that 
because there is not a different standard. It is not like if 
you are in the United States, you are a citizen and you show up 
at the airport, you are going to be denied a flight. But if you 
are a migrant and you have other paperwork, that you are 
allowed to board.
    As a matter of fact, a few months ago, I was at a airport 
and I assisted a migrant and saw and witnessed first-hand what 
TSA did in an instance where you had migrants with paperwork 
from CBP showing that they had been registered at the border 
and were proceeding on. I have to tell you, it was a very 
thorough process. So, I want to thank you for the work that the 
men and women are doing to ensure that our flights are safe. My 
2 sisters are flight attendants. There is nobody more important 
to me than family and making sure we are taking care of those 
in our skies and the American people. So, I want to say thank 
you for that.
    I want to talk a little bit about the topic of unruly 
passengers. Last week, a major U.S. carrier proposed creating a 
centralized database of unruly passengers, ensuring that 
passengers banned by one airline for hazardous behavior, can be 
treated similarly by other carriers. Let's start with you, TSA 
Administrator Pekoske, what is your reaction to this proposal? 
If the major carriers, in fact, move forward with this concept, 
do you see a role for TSA in implementing it?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, thank you, ma'am. Before I answer that 
question, just to you, personally, please thank your sisters 
for the very, very important work they do as flight attendants. 
That is a very difficult job. As we have seen inflight 
disturbances go up over time, it has become more difficult over 
the course of the summer. So, I really appreciate the work that 
all the flight attendants and all the flight deck crew do each 
and every day to help keep our systems secure.
    Ms. Barragan. Thank you.
    Mr. Pekoske. With respect to the individual carrier no-fly 
lists, I mean, the carriers have made a judgment, many of them 
have that when passengers refuse to wear masks or they create 
an inflight disturbance, that they deny them future flight on 
their carrier. The challenge here is that the standards carrier 
to carrier may be somewhat different. So, in terms of, you 
know, across the system, I personally do not see a role for TSA 
there. I think that is private-sector carrier to private-sector 
carrier in terms of how they want to coordinate what they do 
and share information. But I would be concerned about the 
standards that they apply to place somebody on a list.
    Really, you know, the better terminology for these lists 
is, you know, no-fly means something different to TSA. That 
means that there is a connection with terrorism when you say 
no-fly in TSA. These are really do not boards. You know, that, 
you know, they are denying flight, do not board in the future. 
But, you know, I know they are going to continue to work on 
this collaboration across the carriers.
    Ms. Barragan. Well, thank you for that. I am not sure I 
completely agree. I think it is a safety issue. But I 
completely understand the response. Just to go around the 
panel, does anybody else want to comment on their reaction to 
this proposal?
    OK, hearing none, I will move on to the next question. 
Between March 2020 and July 2021, there were over 85 physical 
assaults on TSOs and other, 3,600 inflight disturbances, as you 
just mentioned, Mr. Administrator. Just last week, there were 
reports that a passenger choked a flight attendant and 
attempted to storm the cockpit on a flight from Boston to San 
Juan. Earlier this summer, news reports highlighted passengers 
literally biting TSOs. In contrast, there were only 1,230 
inflight disturbances in 2019. What additional actions can TSA 
take to deter these incidents and fight back against this surge 
in unruly passengers?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, ma'am, thank you for highlighting that 
situation. It makes the job of a TSO ever more difficult when 
you are subject to an assault. Verbal assaults are bad enough, 
but physical assaults cross a different threshold. We have seen 
an increase in physical assaults in our checkpoints and 
certainly in physical assaults and verbal assaults in in-flight 
instances. Our posture is for every disturbance in a 
checkpoint, we proceed with a civil penalty action. That may or 
may not result in a civil penalty. It depends on what the 
investigation shows. But in many cases, it does. So, we always 
proceed with a civil penalty action.
    The FAA controls in-flight disturbances in aircraft. I know 
the FAA has been very, very forward-leaning on this. Their 
fines are quite substantial and I think they have had some good 
success there.
    So, this is an area of significant concern for us. Finally, 
to build on what Congresswoman Demings had raised, in a 
checkpoint whenever there is a disturbance, local law 
enforcement will often proceed with a State or local charge 
against those individuals as well. So, you know, it is 
basically us doing everything we can within our authorities to 
hold folks that create these disturbances accountable for their 
actions and to absolutely include our State and local partners 
in that operation.
    Ms. Barragan. Thank you, sir. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Chairman Thompson. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from 
Kansas, Mr. LaTurner, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. LaTurner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it. 
Director Pekoske, I appreciate you being here today, and I want 
to talk about a couple different topics. But first, I 
understand that TSA plans to replace the aging explosive 
detection systems for checked baggage with the same type of 
systems, with the same standards. We know that international 
airports are already using better systems. Could you talk to me 
about this and why we aren't upgrading the standards?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. I wouldn't agree that international 
airports are using better systems across the board. Our goal is 
to make sure that we are the gold standard for systems that 
detect threats both in checked baggage and in checkpoints. Part 
of the upgrade, if you will, is not necessarily a hardware 
upgrade in these systems. There are some rather significant 
software upgrades that we have made that improve our 
detectability in our what we call explosive detection systems 
for checked bags in airports around the country.
    Mr. LaTurner. Are there systems out there that are better? 
You said that you wouldn't agree that generally they are all 
better. But are there systems that are better than ours than--I 
know we want to be the gold standard, but once you are through 
this process of upgrading, will we be?
    Mr. Pekoske. We will be, yes, sir. You know, we will 
continue to upgrade our installed base of technology with 
software updates. We do that on a regular basis. We have made 
some very, very good progress there. We share that progress 
also with our international partners because it is in our 
interest as well as theirs that we all have this close standard 
of detection that we can, particularly for flights, obviously, 
that are destined for the United States.
    Mr. LaTurner. I appreciate that. As you know well, the 
lynchpin of our security screening system is to make sure that 
people are who they say they are. How can we better incorporate 
biometrics into the process such as in the CAT machines where 
you put your driver's license and give it to a TSA officer for 
review? How can we make that better and include biometrics 
within it?
    Mr. Pekoske. We are working on just that, sir, to have what 
we call a one-to-one match, biometric match, so when you insert 
your driver's license or your passport into the credential 
authentication technology, what that technology will do in the 
future is it will pull your image on your credential, digitize 
that image, and then a camera system will capture an image of 
you as you are standing in front of the officer and then the 
technology compares those digital images together. The match 
capability is significant. It is much better than if you were 
doing it visually. The important thing with this is that that 
is a one-to-one match. It is not a gallery of images. It is the 
image that is on your credential. Then once the passenger 
removes their credential, all that image data is erased. So, we 
don't retain any of that information at all because we have no 
further use for it.
    Mr. LaTurner. What is the roll-out of that going to look 
like? Will that be available to TSA PreCheck people first or, 
you know, the CBP's Global Entry, or the Known Crewmember 
programs? If you are working on it, what will that look like 
and what is the time frame?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. We have been prototyping it now in 
several airports across the country. It has worked very, very 
well. We have a process whenever we prototype, our process is 
generally to opt-in so that passengers don't have to 
affirmatively say I want out. They affirmatively say I want to 
use that new technology. Then our goal overall is as we 
introduce new technologies----
    Mr. LaTurner. But with----
    Mr. Pekoske [continuing]. Into the process----
    Mr. LaTurner. Excuse me, but with PreCheck folks, like 
those folks have already opted in.
    Mr. Pekoske. Right.
    Mr. LaTurner. So, that would be the place you are going to 
start? Is that what you are saying?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, and with PreCheck now, we are having 
people provide their facial images upon registration. So, we 
already have that data. So, that opt-in has already been done. 
What I was going to say is as we deploy technology, we like to 
put it first in PreCheck.
    Mr. LaTurner. OK, all right. Is the pace of hiring for TSA 
officers keeping up with attrition?
    Mr. Pekoske. Pace of hiring is keeping up with attrition, 
but I am concerned about hiring overall. I think everybody in 
the aviation industry is concerned about hiring overall. That 
is one of the reasons why these pay initiatives are so 
important because, you know, without a predictable level of pay 
that is going to increase over time, it is harder and harder to 
recruit people into the Federal Government. It is also harder 
and harder to retain people in service. So, you know, to me, it 
improves our ability to recruit. It vastly improves our ability 
to retain. Fundamentally, it is the right thing to do.
    Mr. LaTurner. I appreciate that and I appreciate your time 
today. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. The gentleman 
yields back. We had our membership ask questions, but what I 
would like to do to kind-of wrap things up is give our 
witnesses the opportunity to look for the next 20 years for TSA 
and see what kind of thoughts they might have that they can 
provide the committee with in terms of what that 20 years on 
the TSA might look like. So, Admiral Joy, I will start off with 
you and kind-of bring it forward.
    Mr. Loy. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I think my thinking with 
regard to the adequacy of both the committee's sort-of 
inventory of concerns and, of course, the administrator's 
inventory of concerns and making certain that there is a 
matching effort, and, of course, hearings do that. 
Conversations among Members and TSA employees do that as well. 
But my concerns for the future are just to be consistent with 
regard to what has been our concerns, and I hate to say it, but 
over a pretty successful window of these 20 years. As I 
indicated in my original testimony, I take no great comfort in 
the fact that we have been as successful as we have been over 
20 years. I just want to make sure that we have the focus and 
oversight and adequate attention that continues to be vigilant 
going forward.
    So, my concern would just be to take stock of what happened 
just now in Afghanistan and see what that evolutionary change 
to the threat index is and how we need to be compensating for 
it going forward. So, my notion, sir, is that the committee and 
the administrator looking into the next 20 years, has the same 
vigilance that has proven successful for us as a country in 
traveling safely and securely for this past 20 years and making 
sure that the constancy of focus is never let down.
    Chairman Thompson. Mr. Pistole.
    Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think I would 
summarize my perspective for the next 20 years really within 
the categories of personnel that we have had some great 
testimony about today in terms of the importance of supporting 
the work force so there is not high attrition so people aren't 
looking to go to other agencies or the private sector to get 
better pay or better benefits. So, I think that personnel 
investment is critical to helping to continue the 
professionalization of the work force.
    The second is in policies. That relates to making sure that 
the administrator and future administrators has those 
authorities that enable him or her to make sure they can take 
decisive action in the face of threats and can do that in the 
interagency arena, not only domestically, but internationally. 
The importance of doing that and to be recognized for that 
authority and ability.
    Then third, as I have mentioned, is on technology. To make 
sure that we are not nickel-and-diming investments in 
technology that hamper our efforts to provide world-class 
security in the way that most Americans who travel expect and, 
frankly, who the world looks to for leadership through 
international associations such as IATA and others to say what 
is the United States doing and how are they setting the trends 
that can make sure that they are providing the world's best 
security in the most efficient way. So, I think those three 
things would be what I would be looking for as the continued 
maturation of TSA continues over the next 20 years.
    Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. Admiral.
    Mr. Neffenger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will, of course, 
echo exactly what my colleagues have said. Let me say with 
respect to work force, as I said in my opening statement, it is 
one of the best work forces I have ever had the pleasure. I say 
that after 34 years of working with a great work force in the 
Coast Guard, but the TSA work force is one of the most 
professional. We need to support them. We need to pay them 
adequately. We need to assure that we can retain them after we 
do so. There have been a number of things said to that effect 
already.
    With respect to technology, you never have a perfect 
system, but you can have a better system every day. It is 
critical that we invest in the technology refresh and 
improvement. I think it is also critical that we engage the 
private sector more effectively when it comes to that. That 
means getting requirements out, allowing the private sector to 
help us develop the technologies we need, and maybe looking at 
the possibility of technology as a service, the way we look at 
software as a service so that the private sector can refresh 
faster than the Government will ever be able to given the 
challenges with respect to budgets and so forth. So, I think 
that there is opportunity for transforming the way we bring 
technology to operations on a daily basis.
    Then finally, with respect to intelligence, you know, TSA 
is first and foremost an intelligence agency with a very 
challenging front-line operational mission. So, I would echo 
that need to maintain that connection to the intelligence that 
tells us rapidly what we need to foresee for the future. I 
would just end by saying I want to thank you for the support 
that this committee has had. I think it is critical that TSA 
and Congress work closely together and I certainly appreciated 
the oversight when I was there. I know that sounds odd to say 
you appreciate Congressional oversight, but when I put aside 
the personal side of it and said this is about making sure the 
agency does the right things, you collectively ask the right 
questions. You dig into the right kinds of issues. In my 
experience, you were always, you know, very supportive of the 
work of the agency. So, thank you, sir.
    Chairman Thompson. Thank you. Mr. Administrator.
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I agree 
with what all of my predecessors have mentioned. I would just 
highlight a couple things. One is intel-based and risk-based 
operations going forward. It is the core of TSA as Peter has 
just mentioned. I think we need to continue to ensure that we 
best leverage the resources of the U.S. Government overall, the 
resources of our intelligence community, and best contribute to 
the development of intelligence in the United States. So, I 
think that is key going forward.
    The second thing I would emphasize is there will be 
increased investment in surface transportation security. It is 
an imperative. The threat is changing. We just need to get 
about the business of doing this. We are already on a path. But 
I predict that will be a continuous evolution over the course 
of the next several years.
    Next, I think we need to rather than replace all our 
technology at once, we need to have a continuous refresh 
process for our technology so that we are always at the leading 
edge. You know, don't make it easy for somebody to look at our 
system and try to assess what we can detect and not because 
they just won't know what technology they might encounter when 
they go through our screening processes or their baggage or 
their cargo goes through our process.
    The next is very, very strong partnerships. We have them 
already. They have been in my time as the administrator, they 
have been a significant key to our country's success in 
providing transportation security, and I would submit also to 
the success globally. Because we are a global leader. We will 
remain a global leader. Having the private sector deeply 
involved in that is critically important for us.
    Finally, I predict that we will have a more and more 
specialized work force as technology continues to improve. We 
continue to hone our procedures. With that will come more clear 
career paths for our employees. A greater overall professional 
development opportunities for them. Greater diversity in our 
work force.
    We have one of the most diverse work forces in the Federal 
Government at the entry level and at the front lines of our 
organization and our screening checkpoints. As you mentioned at 
the very beginning of this hearing, that is not the case as you 
go up through the middle and the upper levels of the agency. We 
need to fix that. We need to fix it properly. We have stood up 
an inclusion action committee. I have established a diversity 
equity and inclusion position that reports directly for me to 
make sure we have a constant effort in this regard going 
forward.
    Sir, I would conclude by thanking you as the Chairman. You 
and I have known each other for a good number of years. Ranking 
Member Katko and I have known each other for a good number of 
years. The two of you and the entire committee have been very, 
very supportive of TSA. You hold us accountable where we need 
to be held accountable, but you are always there with a 
solution to help us along. I greatly appreciate that oversight 
and your leadership in this regard, sir.
    Chairman Thompson. Well, thank you very much. One of the 
questions all of us have historically asked every 
administrator, do you have all the authorities and all the 
budget that you need to do your job? Somehow all the 
administrators would come back with, well, if Congress provided 
us resources, we would use those resources to the best of our 
ability. You would never say yes or no. So, I guess somewhere 
there is a training camp for future TSA administrators that you 
never acknowledge whether you have all the authorities or all 
the monies you need. You just kind of you are able to do it. I 
think the Ranking Member is cognizant of that too. But let me 
assure you that we are committed to the mission of the agency. 
We have had excellent administrators. Technology is the way 
forward and the force multiplier for security. So, we 
absolutely have to get it right.
    The one thing we did not talk about is how can we expedite 
procurement so that by the time as the Ranking Member will tell 
you, we got a technology but by the time we buy it, it is 
already obsolete. So, we somehow we have to--we passed some 
legislation but we still need to ramp it up.
    So, let me again thank the current administrator and past 
administrators for their testimony and our Members for their 
questions. The Members of the committee may have additional 
questions for the witnesses and we ask that you respond 
expeditiously in writing to those questions. Our Ranking 
Member, would you want to have a closing comment or something?
    Mr. Katko. Yes, I appreciate the opportunity, Mr. Chairman. 
I just want to say, you know, observing the back and forth 
today, it makes me very proud to be part of this committee 
because it was productive. There was no gotcha questions. I 
think we are just trying to make sure we do the proper 
oversight, but make sure we give you the tools you need to do 
your job. That is really our role in Congress. Absent of 
theatrics today, we did a good job, I think, all the way 
around, all the witnesses did and all the questioners. So, I 
commend everybody on both sides and keep up the good work and 
please tell everybody at TSA how proud we are of them 
especially the front-line workers. I yield back, thank you.
    Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. I am glad the 
Ranking Member mentioned that. But in response to the screening 
of nonresident aliens, the policy that is followed now is a 
policy that has been in place since we started. So, that is not 
policy of the last 6 months. It is the policy. So, I want this 
hearing to reflect that there is no special policy right now. 
It is the policy. So, I want the administrator to reflect that 
going forward that his explanation was what the policy is and 
what it always has been.
    So, the Chair reminds the Members that the committee's 
record will remain open for 10 business days. Without 
objection, the committee stands adjourned. Thank you, 
gentlemen, again.
    [Whereupon, at 12:12 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]



                            A P P E N D I X

                              ----------                              

    Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson for David P. Pekoske
                    covid-19 workforce vaccinations
    Question 1a. What efforts does TSA have planned to encourage as 
many TSA employees and contractors as possible to get vaccinated 
against COVID-19?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 1b. How is TSA engaging with the American Federation of 
Government Employees (AFGE) on those efforts?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 2. How is TSA working to ensure all TSOs, including those 
who work part-time, have ample opportunity during duty time to access 
TSA-owned computers to upload their vaccination information?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 3. What consequences is TSA contemplating or currently 
pursuing for employees who refuse to get vaccinated?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
                     vaccine mandate for passengers
    Question 4. What are the potential challenges and advantages of 
implementing a vaccine mandate for domestic travel?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 5a. What conversations with other agency partners, such as 
the CDC, has TSA had regarding the implementation of a health 
credential to verify a person's vaccine status for travel, if the 
administration were to announce a vaccine requirement?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 5b. What are the potential challenges and benefits?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
         Question From Hon. J. Luis Correa for David P. Pekoske
    Question. Our TSA agents are our last line of defense protecting 
our airline passengers. As ``bad folks'' get more sophisticated, we 
have to be much more prepared, and we have to anticipate them. 
Complicating your job is the fact that the line between foreign and 
domestic terrorists is now a blurred line. How are you approaching this 
new reality? What actions are you taking to assure that info sharing, 
especially amongst Federal agencies, is taking place in an effective 
and timely manner to help you in this new environment? And how can 
Congress help you do your job better?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
         Questions From Hon. Michael Guest for David P. Pekoske
    Question 1. In Mississippi, we have 2 Category II airports and 5 
Category IV airports, however most updated equipment is sent to larger 
airports. What is TSA doing to ensure that smaller airports have the 
opportunity to receive updated equipment?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 2. Mississippi has received verbal commitment from TSA for 
K-9 allocation but has not received a commitment in writing. Could you 
please advise when TSA Mississippi will receive notice of an official 
K-9 allocation?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
       Questions From Hon. Diana Harshbarger for David P. Pekoske
    Question 1. The PreCheck program has been a huge success, and with 
travel recovering it's going to be more important than ever. 
Stakeholders have raised real concerns about pending changes to 
PreCheck enrollment, and the potential for privacy issues, and traveler 
confusion related to enrollment and renewal. PreCheck has been such a 
critical success, has TSA fully thought through the customer experience 
before making such significant changes?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 2. The success of the PreCheck program could be enhanced 
if we focused enrollment in communities that have not been widely 
exposed to the program, such as rural communities. What is TSA doing, 
and what should it be doing, to reach rural populations through mobile 
enrollment, and other communities where enrollment has lagged?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 3. With the potential for additional vendors being added 
to PreCheck enrollment, what will TSA do to ensure the safety of 
traveler data, and how will TSA prevent this data from being used for 
private commercial purposes? Has TSA issued clear privacy guidelines?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
       Questions From Hon. Carlos A. Gimenez for David P. Pekoske
    Question 1. What is the process that TSA uses to vet migrants who 
arrive at airport checkpoints without U.S. Government-issued photo 
identification? How many migrants has TSA screened at airport 
checkpoints since January 2021, both through the National 
Transportation Vetting Center and the CBP One app?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 2. How many migrants has TSA prohibited from entering 
airport checkpoints Nation-wide since January 2021? Why were these 
migrants prohibited from entering airport checkpoints? Is law 
enforcement called in those cases? What happened to the migrants who 
were denied access to the checkpoint?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 3. At what airports does TSA have a CBP One app pilot? Is 
TSA able to see in the CBP One app how often each migrant has traveled 
domestically via air?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 4. How many Haitian migrants who recently departed from 
Del Rio, Texas have traveled via air through U.S. airports? How was 
their vetting process handled by TSA officers at these security 
checkpoints?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.

                                 [all]