[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]




 
              DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2022

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 HEARINGS

                                 BEFORE A

                           SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE

                       COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

                         HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                     ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                              FIRST SESSION

                                ________

                         SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE
                         

                     BETTY McCOLLUM, Minnesota, Chair

  TIM RYAN, Ohio                             KEN CALVERT, California
  C. A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland        HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky
  MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio                         TOM COLE, Oklahoma
  HENRY CUELLAR, Texas                       STEVE WOMACK, Arkansas
  DEREK KILMER, Washington                   ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama
  PETE AGUILAR, California                   JOHN R. CARTER, Texas
  CHERI BUSTOS, Illinois                     MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
  CHARLIE CRIST, Florida
  ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona

   

  NOTE: Under committee rules, Ms. DeLauro, as chair of the full 
committee, and Ms. Granger, as ranking minority member of the full 
committee, are authorized to sit as members of all subcommittees.

   Chris Bigelow, Walter Hearne, Brooke Barnard, Ariana Sarar, Jackie 
                                 Ripke,
    David Bortnick, Matthew Bower, William Adkins, Jennifer Chartrand,
    Hayden Milberg, Paul Kilbride, Shannon Richter, and Kyle McFarland
                            Subcommittee Staff

                              _____

                              PART 1
                                                                   Page
                                                                   
  Future Defense Spending, Pt. 1..............................        1
                                                                      
  U.S. Military Academies Overview............................       69
                                                                     
 Climate Change, National Security, and 
 the Arctic...................................................      169
                                                                    
  Future Defense Spending, Pt. 2..............................      233
                                                                    
  U.S. Southern Command......................................       333
                                                                    

                                _____

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

45-770                      WASHINGTON : 2021

 


                      COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

                                ----------                              
                  ROSA L. DeLAURO, Connecticut, Chair


  MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio                                  KAY GRANGER, Texas
  DAVID E. PRICE, North Carolina                      HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky
  LUCILLE ROYBAL-ALLARD, California                   ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama
  SANFORD D. BISHOP, Jr., Georgia                     MICHAEL K. SIMPSON, Idaho
  BARBARA LEE, California                             JOHN R. CARTER, Texas
  BETTY McCOLLUM, Minnesota                           KEN CALVERT, California
  TIM RYAN, Ohio                                      TOM COLE, Oklahoma
  C. A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland                 MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
  DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida                   STEVE WOMACK, Arkansas
  HENRY CUELLAR, Texas                                JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
  CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine                              CHUCK FLEISCHMANN, Tennessee
  MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois                              JAIME HERRERA BEUTLER, Washington
  DEREK KILMER, Washington                            DAVID P. JOYCE, Ohio
  MATT CARTWRIGHT, Pennsylvania                       ANDY HARRIS, Maryland
  GRACE MENG, New York                                MARK E. AMODEI, Nevada
  MARK POCAN, Wisconsin                               CHRIS STEWART, Utah
  KATHERINE M. CLARK, Massachusetts                   STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi
  PETE AGUILAR, California                            DAVID G. VALADAO, California
  LOIS FRANKEL, Florida                               DAN NEWHOUSE, Washington
  CHERI BUSTOS, Illinois                              JOHN R. MOOLENAAR, Michigan
  BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey                   JOHN H. RUTHERFORD, Florida
  BRENDA L. LAWRENCE, Michigan                        BEN CLINE, Virginia
  NORMA J. TORRES, California                         GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania
  CHARLIE CRIST, Florida                              MIKE GARCIA, California
  ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona                            ASHLEY HINSON, Iowa
  ED CASE, Hawaii                                     TONY GONZALES, Texas
  ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York
  JOSH HARDER, California
  JENNIFER WEXTON, Virginia
  DAVID J. TRONE, Maryland
  LAUREN UNDERWOOD, Illinois
  SUSIE LEE, Nevada

 
  

                 Robin Juliano, Clerk and Staff Director

                                   (ii)
                                   
                                   
                                   
 [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 
  


              DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2022

                              ----------                              


                                      Wednesday, February 24, 2021.

                        FUTURE DEFENSE SPENDING

                               WITNESSES

 MR. TODD HARRISON, DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE BUDGET ANALYSIS, CENTER FOR 
    STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
 DR. THOMAS G. MAHNKEN, PRESIDENT AND CEO, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND 
    BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS
 MS. ELIZABETH FIELD, DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE CAPABILITIES AND MANAGEMENT, 
    U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

                  Opening Statement of Chair McCollum

    Ms. McCollum. Good morning.
    This hearing is fully virtual, and so I am going to start 
out with a couple of housekeeping matters.
    For today's meeting, the chair or the staff designated by 
the chair may mute participants' microphones when they are not 
under recognition for the purpose of eliminating background 
noise.
    Members are responsible for muting and unmuting themselves. 
If you notice that you have not unmuted yourself when you are 
talking, I will ask you to do that. If you can, indicate that 
you need help by staff by just nodding. So if you want the 
staff to unmute you, just nod.
    I remind all members and witnesses that there is a 5-minute 
clock and it still applies and it is located on the screen. And 
if there is a technology issue, we are going to move right to 
the next member until the issue is resolved. That member who 
was interrupted, we will keep track of your time and you will 
have your full time returned to you.
    You will notice the clock on your screen and how much time 
is remaining. At 1 minute, the clock will turn yellow. At 30 
seconds remaining, I will gently tap the gavel to remind 
members that their time has almost expired. And when your time 
is expired, the clock will turn red and I will start to 
recognize the other member.
    In terms of speaking orders, we are going to follow the 
order set by the House rules, beginning with the chair and the 
ranking member. Then the members present at the time the 
hearing is called to order, they will be recognized in order of 
seniority. And, finally, members not present at the time of the 
hearing is called to order.
    Finally, the rules of the House require me to remind you 
that we have set up an email address to which members can send 
anything they wish to submit in writing to any of our hearings 
or markups. The email address has been provided in advance to 
your staff.
    Now that I have got all the disclaimers out of the way, I 
welcome everyone to our first official committee activity of 
the year. So I am going to go right into my remarks and keep 
them a little brief here.
    Because of the delay in the release of President Biden's 
fiscal 2022 budget, over the next few months we will be hearing 
from a diverse number of viewpoints on emerging threats, on 
regions that deserve more attention, and defense spending at 
large. The information will help us later this year when we 
analyze the budget request. This is the first of those hearings 
that we will hold to examine the larger issues impacting this 
subcommittee.
    Today's hearing, we will focus on the possible future of 
defense spending. We will not only look at the direction the 
Pentagon may take us in the next 5 years, known as the Future 
Years Defense Program, but we also stand to benefit by thinking 
where we want to go, where we want to be in 10 or 20 years from 
now. And that way, when we write the 2022 Defense 
Appropriations Act, we will do so with medium and long-term 
goals in mind.
    This is a new era for our committee. We have a new 
President in the White House and new leadership in the 
Department of Defense, and in Congress 64 percent of the 
Members of the House were elected after the Budget Control Act 
was enacted, something which I didn't vote for. And this will 
be the first time in 10 years we will be preparing a budget 
without the caps and the firewalls on defense and nondefense 
investment that the Budget Control placed on Congress.
    So these hearings provide us a great opportunity to 
reassess what our future national security priorities are both 
on defense and nondefense side, because we know the investments 
on domestic priorities, like education and workforce 
development, directly impact America's national security and 
America's workforce.
    How do we know to work with the Biden administration in a 
way that allows us to shape and be more diverse with the 
workforce in the Department of Defense that reflects our 
changing fabric of America? What kind of defense budget do we 
want to see, not only in fiscal year 2022, but how do we shape 
our national priorities 5 and 10 years out? And, yes, how do we 
take a hard look or even cut strategically unnecessary, 
outdated programs that just aren't working or just aren't 
necessary?
    As appropriators who make critical decisions on where our 
tax dollars will be used, we have a responsibility to ask these 
questions. That is the work of this committee, and we will 
tackle it in the months ahead. I look forward to the 
contributions of every member on the subcommittee as we do 
that.
    But today we have three witnesses. Elizabeth Field, 
Director of Defense Capabilities and Management at the U.S. 
Government Accountability Office. And we have Mr. Todd 
Harrison, Director of Defense Budget Analysis at the Center for 
Strategic Studies. And Mr. Thomas Mahnken, President and CEO of 
the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.
    They are going to kind of set up where the Pentagon is at 
right now, today. And then we will have, as I said, future 
discussions on where to go and ideas about what we can do 
differently in the future.
    I welcome all the testifiers today.
    But first I want to give a few minutes to my good friend 
and our ranking member, Chairman Calvert, for his opening 
statement.
    Mr. Calvert.

                     Opening Remarks of Mr. Calvert

    Mr. Calvert. Thank you.
    And first I would like to start off by congratulating our 
new chair. Not only is she our new chair, she is a good friend 
and a trusted partner over the years. And I am looking forward 
to seeing what we all can accomplish in the subcommittee with 
her at the helm.
    Next, I want to thank our witnesses for appearing before us 
today. Your input is invaluable as we consider the important 
topics in great detail.
    This hearing today couldn't come at a more critical moment. 
As the 2018 National Defense Strategy tells us, we are in an 
era of great power competition, primarily with China, who is 
investing in military capabilities at an extremely alarming 
rate.
    This competition is largely the lens through which the 
Department prioritizes its resources, and rightfully so. I 
believe without question that we should continue to prioritize 
key modernization and readiness efforts that equip and prepare 
us decisively to win a war against a peer adversary.
    However, we as a Nation continue to ask more of our 
military than just preparing for this type of conflict. As we 
are winding down our troops in the Middle East, we are still 
engaged in counter-extremist operations, low-intensity 
conflicts around the world that require significant manpower 
and resources.
    We are also in the age of rapidly evolving technology, like 
artificial intelligence, quantum computing, capabilities that 
will drastically change the nature of warfare in ways currently 
inconceivable to us. Developments in cyber warfare and space 
pose significant and expensive challenges to our Nation.
    For years we have asked our military to do more and do it 
with less. While Congress has provided significant funding for 
the Department of Defense in recent years, it would be 
shortsighted of us not to recognize that budget instability and 
unpredictability is also a great threat to our military 
readiness and modernization efforts.
    While I believe that most Members of Congress understand 
the important results yielded by current defense spending 
levels, I also know that many of my colleagues are seeking to 
significantly decrease defense spending.
    Even with a flatline budget, we have to begin the hard work 
of aligning budget priorities with the realities of the future. 
This will mean divesting legacy systems, reforming the way that 
DOD does business, making significant reforms to both civilian 
and uniform personnel end strength, and preparing for the 
conflicts of the future.
    I look forward to hearing from our experts on these issues 
and to begin the budget process for the upcoming fiscal year.
    And again, Chair, I would like to thank you for bringing 
these witnesses before us today, and I will yield back the 
balance of my time.
    Ms. McCollum. I thank you very much, Ranking Member 
Calvert.
    As of right now I am not seeing Chair Rosa DeLauro of the 
full committee or Ranking Member Kay Granger of the full 
committee, so we will get just right into testimony. And if 
they join us, we will give them the courtesy of making any 
statements.
    So I am very happy to say that we are hearing first from 
Elizabeth Field from GAO.
    Thank you, Ms. Field, for being with us. I found reading 
through the report a lot of questions that I now have for folks 
when they come into the office from the Pentagon, some good, 
hard ones.
    So thank you for your testimony. Please begin.

                     Summary Statement of Ms. Field

    Ms. Field. Thank you, Chair McCollum, Ranking Member 
Calvert, and members and staff of the subcommittee. I really 
appreciate this invitation, and it truly is an honor to testify 
before you on this important subject today.
    Today's hearing comes at a time of significant challenge 
for our country. As you know, this week marked more than 
500,000 Americans lost to COVID-19. This deadly pandemic has 
exacerbated what is already an unsustainable long-term fiscal 
path for our Nation, caused by an imbalance between revenue and 
spending.
    As the single largest category of discretionary spending, 
the defense budget is likely to play a large role in any 
discussion of future Federal spending. These discussions will 
consider difficult questions about what our top priorities are 
for national security, what tradeoffs we can and are willing to 
make, and what our long-term vision is for defense spending.
    It is not, of course, GAO's role to answer those policy 
questions. So I would like to focus my remarks this morning on 
a few key areas where we think DOD can and should improve its 
management of defense spending, regardless of where the defense 
top line lands in fiscal year 2022 and beyond.
    First, DOD must improve its overall budgeting and execution 
of funds. Each year DOD allows billions of dollars appropriated 
by Congress to expire, and a lot of this funding ends up being 
canceled. Between fiscal year 2013 and 2018, DOD canceled more 
than $81 billion, returning those funds to the general 
Treasury.
    This problem indicates both that DOD needs to better 
estimate its annual budget requirements and ensure that it has 
better systems in place to use the funds it receives consistent 
with congressional direction.
    Second, DOD must more clearly define its future resource 
requirements related to Overseas Contingency Operations, or 
OCO. In its fiscal year 2021 budget request, DOD estimated that 
$48.5 billion of its $69 billion request for OCO was for 
enduring or base requirements, and DOD's long-range forecasts 
reflect these enduring costs as part of the Department's base 
budget. However, we know very little about what makes up these 
enduring costs or how they were calculated.
    Given the expiration of the 2011 budget caps, as you noted, 
Chair McCollum, and the changing nature of contingency 
operations around the world, it is imperative that the 
Department bring greater transparency to its use of these 
funds.
    Third, DOD must continue efforts to reduce improper 
payments. When we have examined DOD programs vulnerable to 
improper payments, we have found substantial weaknesses that 
needed to be addressed.
    For example, in 2018, GAO identified problems with how DOD 
was estimating improper payments in military pay, calling into 
question the accuracy of its assessment and its usefulness in 
developing corrective action plans.
    DOD has since implemented all of the recommendations we 
made as a result of this review. However, in the last fiscal 
year alone, the Department estimated that it paid about $11.4 
billion in improper payments, indicating that this continues to 
be an area for improvement.
    Strengthening the Department's overall financial 
management, an area that has been on GAO's high-risk list since 
1995, would undoubtedly help with this problem. DOD is, as you 
know, the only major Federal agency that has been unable to 
receive a clean audit opinion on its financial statement.
    Last but certainly not least, DOD must pay serious 
attention to strengthening and refining its Department-wide 
business reform efforts. For more than a decade, the Department 
has sought to find efficiencies. But many of these so-called 
reform initiatives have fallen short of expectations.
    The most recent such initiative, Secretary Esper's zero-
based review, did identify about $37 billion in savings, and 
the fact that we could see those savings figures reflected in 
the Department's budget documents was notable progress.
    But we also found that some of these savings were not 
really the result of reform. For example, some were the result 
of delayed contracts, costs that will still be realized in 
future years.
    True business reform means fundamentally transforming the 
way the Department does business across the board, and it will 
take sustained senior leadership commitment. Given the recent 
elimination of the Chief Management Officer position at DOD, it 
remains to be seen how the Department will sustain recent 
progress in this area.
    In sum, DOD has key opportunities to better execute the 
funds it has appropriated, to more reliably and transparently 
determine its resource needs, to safeguard funds from waste by 
reducing improper payments and strengthening financial 
management practices, and to maximize efficiency through 
meaningful business reform.
    Taking these steps would give both DOD and Congress greater 
assurance that as strategic choices are made about tradeoffs 
and where to prioritize investments, those investments that are 
made will be put to best use.
    Thank you again for this opportunity, and I look forward to 
your questions.
    [The information follows:]
    
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]    
    
       
    Ms. McCollum. Thank you. Thank you so much for that. And 
you made me make a whole list of questions to ask, as I said, 
when we move forward.
    Next we are going to hear from Mr. Harrison.
    And I really, in reading what you put forward, really the 
takeaway was how we are getting less for more.
    So please address the committee. Thank you for being here.

                   Summary Statement of Mr. Harrison

    Mr. Harrison. Thank you.
    Chair McCollum, Ranking Member Calvert, and distinguished 
members of the subcommittee, I want to thank you for inviting 
me to testify today on the future of the defense budget.
    But to understand what lies ahead for the Department of 
Defense, we must first look at how we got to where we are.
    Adjusting for inflation, the defense budget today is higher 
than it was at the peak of the Reagan buildup in 1985, but the 
size of the force is smaller by nearly any measure. The number 
of aircraft in the Air Force inventory today is 43 percent less 
than in 1985, the number of the battle force ships in the Navy 
is 46 percent lower, and the Army total force is 33 percent 
smaller.
    The trend is clear: We are spending more for less. The 
driving factors behind this trend are higher personnel costs 
and the steadily increasing costs of operating and maintaining 
our weapon systems.
    From 2000 to 2012, the average cost per Active-Duty 
servicemember grew at a compound annual rate of 3.6 percent 
above inflation, and that excludes war-related compensation 
costs.
    Since 2012, the cost per person has held relatively steady 
thanks to reforms enacted by Congress to arrest the growth in 
healthcare, retirement, and other personnel costs.
    We see similar trends in operation and maintenance. 
Excluding healthcare and war-related costs, the O&M cost per 
person in the military has grown at a compound annual rate of 
2.6 percent above inflation all the way back since the end of 
World War II.
    Over the past 20 years, the Air Force's O&M cost per plane 
grew by 157 percent above inflation. The Army's O&M cost per 
soldier grew by 117 percent. And the Navy's O&M cost per ship 
grew by 99 percent.
    When the committee hears senior civilian and military 
leaders talking about the need for 3 to 5 percent real annual 
growth in the defense budget, these are some of the reasons 
why. A flat defense budget leads to difficult tradeoffs among 
readiness, force structure, and modernization.
    But this is a false choice. We should not accept steadily 
growing O&M and personnel costs as a fact of life. It is an 
unsustainable trend that over time will lead to a progressively 
smaller and less capable force.
    Increasing the defense budget without addressing this 
underlying trend merely delays the day of reckoning. We must 
attack the problem at its core, however painful and unpopular 
that may be.
    While there is no one answer or magic bullet that can fix 
these problems that have been decades in the making, my 
recommendation is to focus on three priorities going forward 
that can bring us closer to the answers we need.
    The first priority should be improving the way DOD measures 
and reports readiness. Despite previous attempts at reforming 
the readiness reporting system, the military continues to 
measure readiness primarily in terms of the resources applied--
inputs--rather than the performance achieved--outputs.
    DOD should instead develop performance-based readiness 
metrics derived from the existing mission-essential task lists 
for each different type of unit.
    For its part, Congress should require DOD to submit more 
detailed budget justification documents for O&M accounts. The 
current O-1 documents do not provide sufficient detail to show 
operating costs by platform or unit type, and they do not 
include cost projections for future years. This lack of 
transparency limits effective oversight.
    A second priority should be to conduct a strategically 
scoped roles and missions review. Without clearly assigned 
roles and missions, gaps in capabilities can emerge where no 
service claims responsibility and precious resources can be 
wasted on redundancies among the services.
    This review should be narrowly focused on the gaps, 
overlaps, and areas of ambiguity that stem from the creation of 
the Space Force, advances in new technologies, changes in 
current military missions, and the emergence of new mission 
areas that are strategically important to DOD.
    A third priority is to identify and build consensus around 
the crown jewels of the future force.
    One of the key enablers needed to prevail in conflict over 
the next 5 to 10 years is the ability to share data fluidly 
across forces to provide a more complete picture of the battle 
space, what has become known as JADC2, Joint All-Domain Demand 
and Control.
    The nodes and connectors of this network are critical to 
making it a reality, and this is where I believe the crown 
jewels of the future force can be found.
    The future force requires stealthy long-range aircraft, 
resilient communication links, robust space defenses, highly 
proliferated constellations of satellites, long-range air and 
missile defense systems, and light-footprint ground forces that 
can operate within and on the edges of contested areas.
    In conclusion, the budgetary and strategic challenges we 
face today are significant. But I remain optimistic, because 
the main obstacles to our success are within our control. 
Making the hard choices now will prevent us from having to make 
even harder choices in the future.
    I thank you and look forward to your questions.
    [The information follows:]
    
    
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]    
       
    Ms. McCollum. Thank you. Thank you very much.
    And finally we are going to hear from Dr. Mahnken. And Dr. 
Mahnken has kind of worked out some scenarios for what may or 
may not be decisions the Pentagon would make with different 
budget scenarios.
    Dr. Mahnken, welcome. Thank you.

                    Summary Statement of Mr. Mahnken

    Mr. Mahnken. Chairwoman McCollum, Ranking Member Calvert, 
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for your 
invitation to appear before you today to discuss future defense 
spending.
    Chairwoman McCollum, as you noted, my testimony today draws 
upon the results of a recent series of budgetary exercises that 
the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and the 
Ronald Reagan Institute organized with a really distinguished, 
bipartisan group of leading defense policy and budget experts 
in October 2020.
    We gathered a group of current and former policymakers, 
current and former legislators, folks from industry, various 
perspectives.
    And these sessions assessed the impact of fiscally 
constrained adjustments to U.S. defense strategy and military 
forces over the coming decade. And each team used our Strategic 
Choices Tool to implement changes in U.S. defense spending over 
the next 10 years.
    And here I would particularly like to acknowledge Todd 
Harrison, who really developed the first iteration of the tool 
during his time at CSBA. We are now in the third iteration of 
that tool.
    Essentially, what it does is it instantiates the Future 
Years Defense Program, the FYDP, over the next 5 years, and 
then a notional FYDP after that. So it allows users to make 
choices, the types of strategic choices that we are talking 
about, based on an overall level of budget. So you can add or 
subtract programs from the budget and see what the implications 
are.
    Specifically, the teams were asked to use the tool to 
adjust U.S. defense spending under two distinct budget 
scenarios. The first was an immediate 10 percent cut to defense 
spending, followed by annual inflation increases. And the 
second was an annual 3 percent increase in defense spending, as 
called for by former Defense Secretary Mattis, former Chairman 
Dunford, and the congressionally mandated National Defense 
Strategy Commission.
    I am going to focus on the former scenario, the budget cut, 
and just say briefly what we found.
    In the 10 percent defense cut scenario, teams were required 
to cut $444 billion in the first 5 years, the first FYDP, from 
fiscal year 2022 to fiscal year 2026, and $200 billion more in 
the second 5 years, fiscal year 2027 to 2031, relative to the 
PB21 defense budget.
    Now, this budgetary target forced participants to make some 
heroic political and strategic assumptions. For example, teams 
had to make large-scale cuts to personnel, force structure, and 
modernization.
    Moreover, the force that remained after these cuts was 
incapable of carrying out the current National Defense 
Strategy. It lacked the ability to respond to the range of 
military contingencies that the United States could reasonably 
expect to face and was too small and brittle to respond to 
unforeseen challenges.
    Let me start with the areas that participants chose to 
invest in, even in this down-budget scenario.
    Teams began by identifying their top strategic priorities, 
things that were must-haves and even needed to be plussed up.
    These included nuclear modernization. Nearly all teams 
chose to preserve all elements of the nuclear triad.
    Attack submarines was another area of emphasis. All teams 
chose either to maintain or increase the size of the attack 
submarine fleet, believing that these platforms are critical 
for operating forward in the face of increasingly capable 
adversaries.
    All teams also emphasized unmanned assets, to include 
attritable systems. Participants believed that unmanned sea and 
air platforms should be procured in sufficient numbers for a 
protracted conflict against a capable adversary.
    And then, finally, teams maximized the joint force's 
ability to deliver precise long-range fires from land, sea, and 
air.
    So those were areas where the teams believed we needed to 
double down.
    To generate the resources necessary for those priorities, 
teams made some difficult offsetting cuts, including to 
tactical fighter aircraft, aircraft carriers, ground force 
structure, and personnel.
    All teams reduced heavily planned procurement of tactical 
aviation. Although most teams wanted to focus on legacy fourth-
generation aircraft, they were ultimately forced to reduce 
fifth-generation aircraft to find needed cost savings.
    All teams also chose to reduce the aircraft carrier fleet 
by 2, bringing the total down from 11 to 9 ships. Although 
partially driven by an effort to move towards a more 
distributed fleet, this was also a budget-driven decision to 
generate cost savings.
    All teams also cut Army force structure, with average cuts 
of four Armored Brigade Combat Teams, six Infantry Brigade 
Combat Teams, and five Stryker Brigade Combat Teams.
    And then, finally, teams made large reductions to civilian 
personnel and military end strength. Now, about half of these 
cuts were embedded in the divestment of platforms and force 
structure, but teams also made standalone cuts to personnel.
    All teams cut the contractor and civilian workforce, 
resulting in reductions of approximately 10 percent and 30 
percent, respectively.
    So some pretty severe cuts, and the implications of those 
cuts were several. One of the most important was that a 10 
percent budget cut would jeopardize the Defense Department's 
ability to maintain a force that can win one war while 
deterring another, which is really the basis of our current 
National Defense Strategy.
    For example, the decision to cut force structure might lead 
the United States to emphasize one great power competitor over 
another, but with the conflict's outcome still highly 
uncertain. All teams chose to accept the greatest risk in 
Europe, while maintaining or expanding forward presence in the 
Pacific.
    The United States would thus face the possibility of not 
merely having a one-war force, but a force designed for a 
particular geographic region. And even there I think 
participants questioned our ability to prevail in some of the 
scenarios that we might encounter.
    The cut would also force a real stark choice between force 
structure and modernization, would result in increased strain 
in the remaining force. And we also had concerns over the 
economic impact of these cuts on the defense industrial base 
and the broader national security innovation base.
    I am happy to go into these results at greater depth. Also 
happy to talk about the alternative scenario, the increase 
scenario. But hopefully this has laid the table for a good 
discussion with the committee.
    Thank you again for inviting me to testify, and I look 
forward to your questions.
    [The information follows:]
    
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]    
    
   
       
    Ms. McCollum. Great. Thank you.
    I have got a couple of questions, but I am just going to 
ask one for now and save one for later so we can get around to 
other members. And this one is for Ms. Field.

                    Overseas Contingency Operations

    So you in your testimony talked quite a bit about, when I 
was reading through it, the Overseas Contingency Operations 
account there. And you talked about how DOD and Congress needs 
a clear determination of DOD's future resource requirements, 
especially how they are going to incorporate the enduring 
Overseas Contingency Operation.
    When I was in the statehouse, we called those tails, you 
know. We always said, you know, this is how much it is going to 
cost. Now what are the tails?
    So part of what you put out there are some scenarios of how 
to have more transparency. So lots of times, I think, when 
Members are voting on Overseas Contingency, they kind of tend 
to think of it as a 1-year account, a 1-year expense, and quite 
often sometimes it is. But other times it does have these 
enduring costs to it.
    So with fiscal year 2020 and 2021, with base and OCO 
spending increased by $2.5 billion, and just looking at the OCO 
part of it, what would be some of the things, if we are going 
to have real, clear accounting as we look to make cuts and 
changes in defense spending, for the committee tell a little 
bit some of the concerns that GAO was raising to the Pentagon 
so that there would be full transparency in the enduring costs 
or tails of the Overseas Contingency Fund.
    Ms. Field. Sure. So there are a lot of really important 
issues there, and I think you hit on a lot of them.
    I think fundamentally a concern that we had is transparency 
and what exactly the Department intends to use these funds for.
    A few years ago we made a recommendation to the Department 
that they move enduring OCO costs into the base budget, and 
they have started doing that, which is, I think, positive 
because if there are costs that are expected to last for 
several years it would make sense that they would be in the 
base budget.
    That said, when we look at the budget request and the 
justification for the budget, there is not a lot of detail in 
there about these funds. So a fundamental recommendation to the 
Department would be use this opportunity of the budget cap 
expiring to be more transparent and detailed about what these 
funds are going to be used for.
    You noted--and I will just very briefly cover this--you 
noted that we have made or we have offered some options that 
are open not just to the Department, but to Congress, for 
ensuring better rigor in how the Department uses OCO funding. 
And I will just mention a couple of them.
    One would be for Congress to use legally binding language 
in the annual appropriations act to very clearly specify the 
purposes for which the funds could be used. There is right now 
general language about how OCO funds can be used, but it is not 
legally binding and it is certainly not very specific.
    Another would be to create separate appropriation accounts. 
Right now, even though they are called something different, 
they are put into the same account, which can make it hard to 
track them.
    There are a lot of others issues here, but I will stop 
there, and hopefully that was an answer to your question.
    Ms. McCollum. Well, thank you.
    Gentlemen, to our other testifiers, I will save my--I have 
got a really good question for you, but I am going to, like I 
said, because other people are attending hearings and that, I 
am going to turn to Mr. Calvert for a question he might have.

                           Civilian Workforce

    Mr. Calvert. Well, those of you who know me probably know 
that the first thing I will delve into is cost figures.
    Any time you have a large organization--and, of course, 
this is probably the largest enterprise that we are involved 
in, in the United States Government, is the Department of 
Defense--and obviously the biggest cost is personnel, both 
uniform and civilian.
    And right now many of you already know that we have the 
highest ratio of civilian employees relative to uniform 
employees in the history of the Pentagon. And, obviously, that 
is not something that can be sustained, and I suspect that--I 
know a lot of thought has been put into this. But I think I 
will ask the question for the panel.
    How do we bring the civilian workforce back into a ratio 
that has been historically what we have had? And by the way, I 
think it would actually create much more efficiencies within 
the Department if we could delve into that problem.
    So I will just listen to the answers. Thank you.
    Who would like to take it first?
    Mr. Harrison. I would be happy to jump in there first.
    You know, I think you are right that we do need to take a 
very hard look at the size and scope and the use of the DOD 
civilian workforce. I would urge some caution, though.
    First of all, if you look at the average cost per DOD 
civilian, it is actually lower than the average cost per 
Active-Duty military personnel. So we need to be careful in 
looking at are we eliminating civilian jobs and that work will 
then be done by a more expensive military person, because that 
is not going to save us money in the long run.
    Also, we need to remember that about 95 percent of the DOD 
civilian workforce is outside of the Pentagon, outside of the 
DC area. Many of them are actually employed in the various 
government owned and operated depots around the country where 
they are performing essentially blue collar types of jobs.
    Mr. Calvert. If I could interrupt just for a second. I am 
not talking about depots. My friend, Mr. Cole, is probably 
listening to this and jumping out of his chair.
    I am talking about primarily the middle management 
bureaucracy within the Department itself. And, by the way, not 
just through the Department of Defense, through the 
intelligence agencies and through the entire enterprise. And, 
it is fast. It is at the historic high.
    And I understand the value of civilian employees. But how 
do we justify a ratio that is significantly higher than any 
time in the history of the Pentagon?
    Mr. Harrison. Well, I guess my point is that ratio, that it 
is at the highest level relative to the Active-Duty force, 
includes all of those blue collar, depot-related civilian 
workers, right?
    If you are just looking at that middle management--and I 
agree with you----
    Mr. Calvert. Let's just take the depot out of this. But it 
is across--I am talking about across the enterprise.
    Mr. Harrison. Yeah, if you look at that middle management, 
it is actually a pretty small percentage of the overall DOD 
civilian workforce. And absolutely we should look at ways to 
reduce that. I don't think you are going to find the savings, 
though, the magnitude of the savings that we need to address a 
lot of our challenges going forward.
    Mr. Calvert. The civilian, the Business Board disagrees 
with you on that.
    Mr. Harrison. Well, if you are referring to the Defense 
Business Board report from I think it was about 5 or 6 years 
ago, if you look carefully at their methodology, what they did 
is they looked at all of the overhead-related functions in DOD, 
they summed up the dollar amount, and then they made a massive 
assumption.
    They said that in the private sector they can generally 
trim about 5 percent from overhead functions, and then they 
applied that 5 percent to overhead functions at DOD. That is 
how they arrived at their $25 billion-a-year savings estimate, 
$125 billion over 5 years.
    So they did not actually identify specific functions and 
specific DOD civilian offices and head counts that could be 
reduced. They just made a big assumption based on their 
experience doing similar things in the private sector.
    Now, with that said, I think there are significant savings 
to be achieved----
    Mr. Calvert. I know my time has expired. But I know that a 
number of comptrollers in the Department of Defense that have 
been in the past disagree. They believe that the civilian 
workforce can be brought--you know, a cut of 5 percent, I am a 
business guy, that is a doable thing in a large organization.
    So with that, Madam Chair, I will yield the balance of my 
time.
    Ms. McCollum. To be continued, I am sure, Mr. Calvert.
    And a lot of the folks that I found that were some of the 
civilian employees, when we started mobilizing for Afghanistan 
and Iraq were also dual-hatters, where they had a position 
where they also were in the Guard or the Reserve as well.
    Mr. Ruppersberger is having technical problems. We are 
trying to work those out. And hopefully he just might be--he is 
driving in and he is having problems with the video. And so we 
just might go to audio. But we are going to skip Mr. 
Ruppersberger just for a minute now.
    And so I am going to go to Mr. Kilmer, and then Mr. Rogers 
will be next.
    Mr. Kilmer.

                       Climate Change Resilience

    Mr. Kilmer. Thanks, Madam Chair.
    For my first question, I was hoping to direct it to Mr. 
Harrison.
    I keep thinking about that old FRAM oil filter commercial, 
``Pay Me Now or Pay Me Later.'' It seems like we have some 
issues related to the resiliency of some of our infrastructure 
that sort of fits that tagline.
    I think about our Naval installations, including in my 
district, Naval Base Kitsap and Puget Sound Naval Shipyard in 
my district. They are already facing climate-related 
challenges, like sea level rise and coastal erosion and more 
frequent and severe storms that really threaten the safety of 
workers and, frankly, risk jeopardizing some of these critical 
defense assets.
    The shipyard at Puget is the Navy's only dry dock on the 
West Coast that is capable of completing carrier repairs and 
retrofits, and it plays a very outsized role in supporting our 
Nation's defense posture in the Pacific.
    So recognizing the threats that are facing not just the 
Puget Sound Naval Shipyard but the other public shipyards, the 
Navy released its Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Plan, or 
SIOP, in 2018, which is a 20-year, $21 billion effort to 
revitalize and modernize those shipyards to increase climate 
resilience and improve resistance to seismic events.
    Personally, I think it is really important for Congress and 
the DOD to work together to keep SIOP on track to shore up that 
critical infrastructure, to address any deficiencies at the 
shipyards, to protect our defense posture in the face of any 
sort of unpredictable and, frankly, an evolving climate or we 
will pay later.
    So my question, Mr. Harrison, as a budget analyst is, what 
do you recommend Congress can do to ensure that that Shipyard 
Infrastructure Optimization now Program and other similar 
resiliency plans can stay on track over not just the next 10-
year trajectory but also the 20-year proposed plan?
    Mr. Harrison. Thank you, Representative Kilmer.
    I think you raise an excellent point, and it is broader 
than just the Navy and the shipyards. Since the Budget Control 
Act was enacted and went into enforcement in 2013, the 
Department of Defense has repeatedly and consistently 
shortchanged funding for bases and maintenance and military 
construction, and we continue to see that in the fiscal year 
2021 request that was released last year.
    It is an easy piggy bank to go to, because you can rob some 
money from it now and promise to pay it back in the future. But 
as you note, the longer you delay the critical maintenance that 
is needed in a lot of these facilities, the more it will end up 
costing in the long run. This is something we need to look at 
Department-wide.
    And I will raise an ugly word that the committee probably 
doesn't want to hear: BRAC, Base Realignment and Closure. That 
is something the Department has got to look at.
    Now, if you look at the numbers produced by DOD, the Navy 
is not the service that is in need of a BRAC. It is primarily 
we see excess bases and facilities in the Air Force and in the 
Army.
    And so I think that should be part of the next defense 
strategy, is taking a hard look at where can we consolidate, 
where can we close some of our bases and facilities to reduce 
the costs that we incur every year to maintain these facilities 
that we don't actually need and are not critical to our force, 
so that we can redirect those resources into more critical base 
maintenance and military construction activities that are 
needed.
    Mr. Kilmer. Thank you.

                               Healthcare

    With my remaining time, Ms. Field, I know that healthcare 
costs are a strain for the DOD just like they are a strain for 
everybody else. I have been hearing concerns from folks in my 
district that DOD health facilities in our neck of the woods 
won't have the capacity to treat retirees, both on TRICARE for 
Life and TRICARE Prime insurance plans, as part of the Military 
Health System reform due to a reduction in billets.
    I am concerned about how staffing cuts, for example, again, 
in my neck of the woods at Bremerton Naval Hospital, at Madigan 
Army Medical Center, will impact access to care in the 
communities I represent.
    In fact, over the past year Bremerton Naval Hospital 
reduced manning levels by about 100 personnel, with those 
Active-Duty billets being removed from Bremerton's manning 
document and those positions no longer being refilled when 
members retire or transfer or separate.
    And that is not unique to Bremerton Naval Hospital. Those 
cuts are already impacting access to care for retirees who have 
dedicated their life to defending our country.
    So my question is, what steps would you recommend to ensure 
that the Military Health System reform accomplishes its goals 
of streamlining the system and enhancing medical force 
readiness and providing access to quality care without 
sacrificing services to people who have earned those services?
    Ms. Field. Thank you.
    So my colleagues in the defense group have looked quite a 
lot at this issue of defense health reform, and as a result of 
some of their reviews I think there has been a bit of a pause 
in sort of how this reform is rolling out, and I think in large 
part because of some of the same concerns that you just 
identified.
    My colleague, Brenda Farrell, and her team have an ongoing 
review right now looking more closely at military treatment 
facilities and what is going on with them. When that work comes 
out, I think they will have some particular recommendations 
focused on what you are interested in.
    I am sorry that I don't have a more detailed answer for you 
right now. But, bottom line, I think your question is well-
taken. The concerns are valid. And in general we would like to 
see the Department have a more clearly defined strategic plan, 
performance measures, ways to monitor how the reform effort is 
being rolled out.
    I would also very quickly say in response to your question 
about climate resilience, we have, as you know, put the 
government's fiscal exposure due to climate change on our High-
Risk List and DOD is a key player in that. Two things we have 
seen.
    First, the Department has not necessarily clearly 
identified which of its installations and other parts of 
infrastructure across the different services are most at risk 
because of climate change. And so that would be an important 
place for them to start.
    We have also found that the Department has not done mission 
assurance for commercial assets that have been deemed critical 
to determine what their vulnerability is to climate change.
    So I just wanted to add that point very quickly.
    Mr. Kilmer. Thank you.
    Thanks. I yield back, Madam Chair.
    Ms. McCollum. Thank you, Mr. Kilmer.
    I was with the Acting Secretary of the Army yesterday and 
healthcare came up. So we are going to take some time and do a 
deep dive on healthcare. And we will work with GAO and see if 
we can time it with the report, because sometimes they like to 
wait until they are done before they comment. But we will work 
with your office to make sure that that happens.
    We are also going to be having in one of our future 
hearings discussions, food for thought, we are going to talk 
about climate change resiliency and energy use.
    So all good things and things that we have to take in 
account when we are doing our budget.
    Mr. Rogers.

                                 China

    Mr. Rogers. Congratulations to you, Madam Chair, for 
assumption of this heavy chore of leading this great 
subcommittee.
    Let me talk to you about China, which is on everyone's mind 
these days.
    In its first month, the Biden administration started a 
review of its strategy toward China. The Department has 
established a task force to provide a baseline assessment of 
its policies and programs related to China.
    A lot of our defense spending obviously is to counter our 
adversaries' spending on programs. Consequently, we need to 
know what our near-peer China is doing in its defense policies 
and spending.
    My question to any of the panelists. How do we know what 
China is spending on what we would call defense? I mean, they 
use PLA money for their trade policies, the Belt and Road 
Initiative, around the world, which indirectly, I suppose, 
could be considered defense. But in our definition of defense 
it would not qualify.
    So how are we determining what China is actually spending 
on actual defense, what we would need to prepare to counter?
    Mr. Mahnken. Congressman Rogers, I will take a first crack 
at that, because I think that is an excellent question.
    In the U.S. case not all defense spending is in the defense 
budget, right? We have part of it in DOE with the nuclear 
budget, for example.
    And if we think about China's spending on national 
security, the way they define it, I think actually a majority 
of their spending is not on the People's Liberation Army, but 
it is also--a majority of their spending is actually on 
internal security, organizations like the People's Armed 
Police. Plus, I think, yeah, they have spending in various 
places.
    So getting a good understanding of the Chinese defense 
budget is a real challenge. We actually have an effort ongoing 
right now to get a better understanding of that and to be able 
to look at the strategic choices that China may face, just as I 
briefed you on the U.S. side.
    At one level, again, if you are talking about how much does 
it cost China to procure a fifth-generation aircraft, that is 
the type of thing that you can figure out, because we still in 
the 21st century pay for aircraft by the pound, we still pay 
for ships by the ton.
    There may be some cost savings. There are definitely some 
cost savings through their theft of our intellectual property. 
But still there are things that they have to pay for.
    And I would agree with you that getting a better 
understanding of their costs, what they are spending on, can 
give us a sense of what they value. Also, getting a better 
sense of what they are spending can go give us maybe some 
strategic options for dealing with them.
    Mr. Rogers. Well, I mean, the expenditures that they are 
using to fund their cybersecurity efforts against the U.S. and 
others, that is a huge problem for us and for the world and for 
the future of the economy of China and the U.S. And yet we 
don't have any idea, I don't think, of how much money they are 
actually spending trying to break through cyber matters.
    What do you say to that?
    Mr. Mahnken. I would agree. I think they--they are imposing 
lots of costs on us. We should be thinking about how we can 
impose costs on them.
    You know, they are forcing us to do all sorts of things 
that are expensive and difficult, and they have over the years. 
We need to be thinking about how to do the same to them. Yeah, 
I would agree with you.
    Mr. Rogers. But at the moment they are cleaning our clock 
economically, militarily, socially. So I welcome the commission 
that the administration is establishing, focusing on the real 
big problems our country faces in the near future.
    Madam Chair, thank you.
    Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
    Next, we have Mr. Cuellar.

                       Russia and China Influence

    Mr. Cuellar. Chairwoman, thank you so much.
    And to our witnesses, I want to thank you.
    My issue has been how do we explain that the United 
States--and I am very supportive of the military--but how do we 
spend more money than China, Russia, and the other countries 
combined and it still seems like they, with less money than we 
spend--and I know a lot of it goes to our military benefits. I 
understand all of that. But my issue is we spend more money 
than they do, but they seem to be in more places than we are.
    For example, one of the things that I am waiting for is I 
am waiting for an assessment that I added on the National 
Defense Authorization to see what we are doing in Latin 
America. And I will be happy to share this with everybody 
later.
    My concern is that, as we are looking at other places of 
the world, in our own backyard we have got--starting to get a 
heavy influence of Russians, but mainly Chinese.
    For example, out of the 31 countries in Latin America, 25 
host Chinese infrastructure projects, 56 port projects. Weapons 
that got sent have been sold. Seventeen out of the 31 countries 
in Latin America are part of the One Belt, One Road loans that 
China has provided since 2007, $155 billion.
    And then the same thing, you know, what they have done in 
Panama, they have done IT smart cities. They have done early 
warning radars. They have sent out their Peace Ark hospital 
ship.
    In Argentina they have a space tracking station where they 
have about 99 percent access and the Argentinians don't have 
anything.
    Mexico is buying a huge amount of vaccines from the Chinese 
and the Russians. You know, this is just right across the 
border itself.
    So my question, as we look at the trends, is we are 
spending all this money on our military, combined more than the 
Chinese and the Russians and a couple of other countries, but 
they seem to be all over the world and especially in my--in our 
own backyard. I live on the border. So I told John Carter I 
don't just go visit there for a few hours. I live there every 
day. So I talk to folks that come in across the border.
    How do we explain this as a trend, for any of the 
witnesses, Elizabeth, Tom, whoever wants to take this on, and 
especially what is happening in our own backyard? It is pretty 
scary, guys.
    Mr. Mahnken. Well, Congressman, if I could lead off. I 
mean, I would agree with you. I was--now it is actually--it is 
going on a year and a half, I was in Bolivia, in Cochabamba. 
And just going through the airport in Bolivia, all of the 
scanning equipment, all of the security equipment was donated 
by the PRC, including facial recognition technology, all sorts 
of things like that.
    I think the United States needs to be very active. We need 
to be active close to home and far from home.
    Now, of course the military is just one instrument to do 
that. And, frankly, the U.S. Government and government 
assistance is only one set of instruments to do that. I think 
our strength as a Nation is not just with the government, but 
it is with private industry. We need to be working with private 
industry to build those ties.
    I think where government can help is that a lot of places 
seek Chinese assistance because there is no strings attached. 
We need to stick with our principles.
    Or I think also the more that the Chinese are out and 
about, the more resentment grows. I think America by and large 
has a good reputation overseas because we have ethics, we have 
laws, we stick to our laws.
    And the complaints that I have heard in Central America, in 
particular in El Salvador, where the government shifted its 
recognition from Taiwan to the PRC, was a sense of betrayal on 
the part of a lot of Salvadoran businessmen who had spent a lot 
of time building relationships with businessmen on Taiwan and 
had basically been sold out by their government.
    So we need to be able to provide support for those people.
    Mr. Cuellar. And thank you so much.
    And let me just say thank you, my time is up, Chairwoman 
and Mr. Calvert and members.
    Yeah, the assessment I called for was not only the 
military, but it also called the State Department, AID, and I 
even had a conference with the U.S. Chamber of Commerce that 
they are also worried about the Chinese coming in, into Latin 
America, because we as a country, we export about 40 percent of 
all of our exports go into Latin America but our attention is 
certainly not 40 percent to there. And even the private sector 
are seeing the Chinese.
    So I am just asking the committee. I know this is only 
part. It still takes the other part, as you mentioned, Tom.
    But we really need to start doing this because we are going 
to wake up like they did back in the 1980s where they said, 
``Oh, my God, look what has happened in Nicaragua. The 
Sandinistas have taken over.'' Sent Oliver North and da, da, 
da, all that.
    We can't just wake up one day and find out that this 
presence of the Chinese and the Russians, especially the 
Chinese, are just right across the Rio Grande itself.
    Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
    Mr. Cuellar. But, anyway, thank you so much. I appreciate 
it.
    Ms. McCollum. Yes. You are welcome.
    Judge Carter, welcome. And it is your turn to ask a 
question, please, sir.
    Mr. Carter. Thank you, and good to hear from you. Thank 
you. And congratulations. Well earned. We are looking forward 
to your leadership. And thank you very much for recognizing me.
    In your testimony, Mr. Harrison, you state that the future 
force requires stealthy, long-range aircraft, resilient 
communication links, robust space defenses, highly proliferated 
constellations of satellites, long-range air and missile 
defense systems, and special operations and light-footprint 
ground forces.
    Currently, the Army's six modernization priorities consist 
of, one, Long-Range Precision Fires; two, Next-Gen Combat 
Vehicles; three, future lifts; four, Army networks; five, Air 
Force missile defense; and, six, soldier lethality.
    Now, is the U.S. Army on the right trajectory to seamlessly 
integrate into the Joint All Domain Command and Control--
JADC2--framework as a result of the concerted efforts of 
initiatives filtered through the ArmyFutures Command? This 
command is my neighbor, and I take great interest in it.
    Mr. Harrison. Thank you, sir, for the question.
    And, you know, I think that the Army's modernization 
priorities may be right for the Army. They are not necessarily 
the top priorities overall for the Department of Defense. And 
that is true for each of the services, quite frankly.
    I think where the Army can play a big role in the future 
force, particularly looking at the challenges we face from 
China and operating in the Pacific region, is helping to 
develop longer-range air and missile defense systems.
    I think that is an important role for the Army, the ground-
based air and missile defense that can be deployed and can 
extend out coverage out over a much farther range than we are 
capable of doing today.
    I think that that would be an important contribution to the 
future force. So that is why I consider it one of the crown 
jewels that should be protected.
    In terms of the Army's ability to integrate with this 
larger battle network of the future that we are calling JADC2, 
Joint All Domain Command and Control, I think they are taking 
some initial steps with the Air Force now. They have a 2-year 
partnering agreement to explore how the network the Air Force 
is attempting to build can be integrated with the Army's future 
battle network.
    But it is not enough. And that is one of the reasons I 
think we need a roles and missions review, is because this 
battle network of the future, JADC2, it falls into gaps among 
the services. And so we need a lead service designated to build 
that overall architecture for JADC2, the network protocols, the 
security standards, all of the details that everyone else can 
plug into.
    If we don't do that, if we allow it to continue along this 
path where each service is doing their own thing and they may 
have ad hoc temporary partnerships along the way, we are not 
going to get to where we need to be. It is a recipe for 
failure.
    So I would urge the committee and the Department of Defense 
to take a proactive look at this and assign a lead service for 
JADC2 and then set up a joint program office, a program 
executive agent for JADC2 that can coordinate all of those 
efforts and enforce the architecture, network requirements, and 
protocols across all the services to ensure we actually are 
able to integrate in the future.
    Mr. Mahnken. Let me agree with Todd and just say that there 
are a whole series of areas, whether it is command and control, 
whether it is sensing, whether it is strike, whether it is 
logistics, that really are fundamental to modern warfare. And 
none of the services acting alone are going to be able to do 
what is needed. And so there really is some ownership needed in 
each of those areas.
    And on issues like base defense, for example, defense of 
overseas bases or even domestic bases, there are gaps there. 
And so there needs to be much more of a joint effort to solve 
those problems.
    Ms. Field. And if I could just----
    Mr. Carter. I agree with you, too, and that is one of my 
concerns, is that coordination has always been a concern, I 
think, with our military to some extent, going back as far as 
we can remember. And I thank you for the work you do.
    Ms. McCollum. Ms. Field, you wanted to add something?
    Mr. Carter, Ms. Field is going to add something to the mix, 
too, so we will give her a few seconds.
    Mr. Carter. Okay. Good.
    Ms. Field. I will just be very quick. And I agree with Mr. 
Harrison and Mr. Mahnken that part of the issue here is the 
ability to rise up above the specific service level and look 
across the board.
    And one of the things that GAO has been recommending to DOD 
is that it set readiness metrics for domains, not just 
individual services. That still hasn't happened, but that is a 
recommendation that is still on the books for us.
    Mr. Carter. Thank you.
    Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
    Mr. Carter. Thank you. Madam Chair, I yield back.
    Ms. McCollum. Oh, very good. And great question.

                                  A-10

    Mrs. Kirkpatrick. Thank you, Madam Chair, for having this 
hearing.
    And thank you to Ranking Member Calvert.
    I really appreciate your interest in this.
    I have two questions, one for Mr. Harrison and one for Ms. 
Field.
    So I represent Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, which is home 
of the A-10 Warthog, which has been highlighted for divestment 
by the Air Force for many years as an offset for modernization 
efforts.
    However, the A-10 is one the least expensive fighters to 
operate. Meanwhile, the cost of other fighters, with smaller 
fleet sizes, has been increasing.
    I am concerned about the risk associated with divesting 
legacy systems that creates a capability gap while we wait for 
a new platform to become operational.
    With regards to the A-10, we have not seen evidence that 
other platforms can perform the close air support and combat 
search and rescue mission as effectively.
    So, Mr. Harrison, my question for you is, what 
recommendations do you have when it comes to balancing the need 
to modernize for a high-intensive conflict with the need for 
current or potential low-intensity conflicts?
    Mr. Harrison. Thank you, ma'am. That is great question. And 
it is one of those hard choices I talked about that we are 
going to have to make to prioritize the capabilities we need 
for the future force.
    The A-10 has absolutely been a star of the Air Force for 
many decades. But we also need to look at how we conduct close 
air support today.
    I think the burden here is actually on the Air Force to 
better demonstrate to Congress how that close air support 
mission that the A-10 is so adept at performing can and is 
being performed by other platforms.
    And a lot of this is enabled by capabilities in terms of 
precision attack that did not exist at the time the A-10 was 
developed, things like drones, like the MQ-9 Reaper, that are 
able to loiter for long times and conduct very surgical strikes 
close in to our troops.
    And even if you look at platforms like the B-1 Bomber have 
also been used for close air support because they now are 
equipped with GPS-guided weapons that are extremely accurate 
and so they can be used in this role.
    The other factor we need to consider is that we have to 
make hard choices, we have to prioritize in our strategy 
between the capabilities that we need for high-end conflict, 
the capabilities that we need for gray zone competition with 
Russia and China, and the capabilities that we need for lower-
end conflicts, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency operations.
    And I think at the end of the day, you are right in your 
assessment that the A-10 on a per-plane basis is not that 
expensive compared to other crewed fighter aircraft. But when 
you compare it to the cost of operating drones, either a cost 
per tail per year or a cost per flying hour, it actually is 
still more expensive than the MQ-9 and the MQ-1s that can do 
many of the functions of the A-10.
    So I think that the Air Force needs to present that 
analysis better to Congress. And I think Congress has got to 
accept that and understand that this may be one of the hard 
choices we have to make, is retiring the A-10 platform, because 
we do have other multipurpose platforms that can take its 
place.
    Mrs. Kirkpatrick. Well, I agree with you, it is going to be 
a really, really hard choice. We really depend on the A-10 in 
southern Arizona. So my district borders Mexico, and the A-10 
can make these low-flying flights over the border to monitor 
what is going on. I just don't think there is any replacement 
for that right now.
    I talked with the A-10 pilots, and they like the A-10. They 
feel like it is easy to fly, it is versatile, and it is going 
to be tough to convert to something else. I don't know if our 
pilots are ready to do that. But I think long-term that is 
something we have to do. So thank you very much.

                         DOD and Climate Change

    I would like to go to my second question, which is for Ms. 
Field.
    In Arizona we are already experiencing the effect of 
climate change. The Department of Defense has acknowledged that 
climate change is a national security priority, and the 
changing environment will impact defense installations and our 
ability to project power.
    So my question is, how do we incentivize a transition in 
the Department of Defense toward more sustainable environmental 
stewardship, to include energy consumption and requirements 
development?
    Ms. Field. That is a great question, and I will be very 
brief.
    A number of years ago we made a recommendation to the 
Department that each military service incorporate criteria in 
their process for racking and stacking new MilCon projects, to 
include criteria related to building resiliency to climate 
change.
    We heard when we went down to the military service level 
that individuals were reluctant to bring forth MilCon projects 
that were related to building climate resilience because they 
didn't think that they would win out in the overall sort of 
racking and stacking of potential MilCon projects.
    So that is one small way, but potentially meaningful way 
for the Department to incentivize the sort of behavior that you 
are talking about. We have a number of other related 
recommendations, but given the time, I will stop there.
    Mrs. Kirkpatrick. Thank you so much for your answer.
    Madam Chair, I want to thank you for having this hearing 
and thank Ranking Member Calvert. I have another hearing I am 
going to have to jump on to.
    Ms. McCollum. Okay.
    Mrs. Kirkpatrick. So I am going to excuse myself. Thank you 
very much. This has been very productive.
    Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
    Mr. Diaz-Balart.
    Mr. Diaz-Balart. Madam Chairwoman, can you hear me?
    Ms. McCollum. Good morning.
    Mr. Diaz-Balart. Let me start by congratulating you, but 
also by thanking you. You have always been just amazingly 
accessible and easy to work with, and I just appreciate working 
with you.
    A few questions. Let me go back to China.

                     China Research and Development

    So my understanding is that China has basically tripled 
their R&D spending in the last decade while, basically, our R&D 
remained pretty constant.
    So how do we keep up with the Chinese threat, understanding 
where we have been going and where we may be going in R&D? I am 
not quite sure who wants to deal with that.
    Mr. Mahnken. I will take a first stab at that.
    Look, I think we do it by not trying to emulate the 
authoritarians and doing it in the way that China is doing it. 
We do it the way democracies do it.
    So I think we do it by trying to lower the barriers between 
the tremendous innovation that is going on within our broader 
economy and within our broader society, and figuring out better 
ways to bring that in, more effective ways to bring that in to 
the service of national defense.
    I think there is enormous innovation going on. There is a 
lot of very good. And government can play a role in terms of 
the demand signal for the particular areas that would most 
benefit defense. But I think there is a lot to be gained by 
lowering those, the barriers, to get things from outside of 
defense industry, outside of government in to serve our needs.
    Mr. Diaz-Balart. You know, it is interesting, I think you 
make a valid point. But we also know that China steals a lot of 
our intellectual property, right? And that is one of the 
challenges when we have an open society that does go to the 
private sector for a lot of R&D. And so that is also a bit of a 
CHEOPS.
    Mr. Mahnken. Absolutely. And I think we need to play a 
strong defense on that front as well.
    Mr. Diaz-Balart. Let me go back very briefly--how much time 
do I have?--to Mr. Cuellar's point on Chinese involvement 
everywhere, including in this hemisphere.
    So what strategic areas does the Chinese military, where do 
they pose strategically the greatest challenge, the greatest 
threat to the U.S., our interests, and our allies' interests, 
like Taiwan? And where is your biggest vulnerability when you 
are dealing with China now and in the near future?

                            China and Space

    Mr. Harrison. If I could jump in here.
    I would actually say that one of our biggest 
vulnerabilities to China right now is in space, that we do have 
much better space capabilities than China, thanks in part to 
our robust commercial space industrial base.
    But what we see is China is making large strategic 
investments in counterspace weapons. And they are making 
advances in counterspace weapons faster than we are advancing 
our space defenses against those systems.
    And so we still have very large vulnerabilities in space I 
think are very concerning.
    And just quickly, back to your earlier point about R&D 
spending. The research and development part of our defense 
budget is actually at a historic high right now. So I wouldn't 
discount it too much.
    But our concerns are, what is the trajectory of the R&D 
budget in the future? And what are we doing to better leverage 
the commercial investments that are being made in R&D right 
now?
    And in particular the DOD has got to figure out different 
paradigms for working with commercial industry to leverage all 
of the great R&D and intellectual capital that is being 
developed there. And in a lot of cases, that means we need to 
look at buying things as a service rather than a product.
    And that is a big paradigm shift for DOD that is used to 
buying weapon systems and operating them itself. There are many 
cases where we can simply buy things as a service and leverage 
what the commercial marketplace is already doing.
    Mr. Diaz-Balart. Madam Chair, I have obviously a number of 
different further questions, but I see that my time is running 
short. And I will lead by example and actually give back a 
little bit of time. So I yield back. Thank you very much.
    Ms. McCollum. Thank you. We might have an opportunity to do 
another round.
    Mrs. Bustos, welcome.

                         Defense Manufacturing

    Mrs. Bustos. Thank you, Madam Chair. And really appreciate 
you and Ranking Member Calvert for holding this hearing today. 
Very, very important.
    I think we can all agree that investment in the Nation's 
defense is absolutely critical to deterring future conflicts.
    With that said, many on the committee have heard me talk 
about the Rock Island Arsenal in the past, I usually have some 
question that revolves around that, located literally on an 
island in the middle of the Mississippi River. I have already 
invited our new chair to come and visit, and I hope that we 
will be able to make that happen.
    So the Rock Island Arsenal is home to the Army's Additive 
and Advanced Manufacturing Center of Excellence. We are very 
proud of that. They are on the cutting edge of 3D printing 
technology for future use, things like research and development 
work on the Next-Generation Combat Vehicle, while also building 
the vehicles and armament needed today.
    Like every day, every workday there they are converting 
Humvee chassis to ambulances. They are now converting those 
Humvee chassis to make shop equipment vehicles.
    And so I share this to say that the district that I 
represent is an example of the larger defense investment 
discussion, the fact that we need to smartly balance investment 
in future needs and technology with modernization of the 
existing force.
    So that leads into the question that I would like to ask, 
and I will direct this to any and/or all of the witnesses that 
we have today, whoever would like to take this.
    But I would like to get your thoughts on the importance of 
advanced and additive manufacturing to the future of defense 
spending.
    As you all already acknowledged, and as we know, the 
National Defense Strategy places tremendous emphasis on the use 
of disruptive technologies to counter threats from near-peer 
competitors.
    So just a little bit deeper here. So additive and advanced 
manufacturing is such a disruptive technology that it has the 
potential to significantly change how we address supply chain 
issues, completely rethinking how we develop certain weapon 
systems, while saving significant funding.
    So I am wondering if, similar to the creation of the Joint 
Artificial Intelligence Center, it would make sense to create 
an office to better coordinate advanced manufacturing 
activities across DOD. Your thoughts on that.
    Again, any and/or all of the panelists can answer that, 
please.
    Mr. Mahnken. I will take a first stab at it, which is, 
look, I think it is a great idea. I think if we look at future 
concepts, combat concepts, warfare concepts that the services 
are developing, Joint Staff is developing, they place that 
premium on mobility and agility, right? And having the ability 
to do additive manufacturing, advanced manufacturing forward, 
and to be able to serve the needs of forces, I think is going 
to be a critical capability.
    We are still in the 21st century. We are slowed down by the 
need to haul food, water, supplies, and power. Well, the water 
and food you are not going to get away from as human beings.
    But the ability to lighten the logistical load, and through 
things like advanced manufacturing, I think is a real promising 
area. It is one of the reasons why I think the logistical piece 
of warfare needs to get a greater attention and really does 
need to have high-level advocacy and sponsorship.
    Mrs. Bustos. I am glad to hear you say that.
    Please.
    Mr. Harrison. I would jump in and add to that. I think 
additive manufacturing has a lot of potential to help with 
military readiness.
    And being able to print specialized tools in the field that 
you may not want to have to carry with you because they are 
rarely needed, and in some cases being able to print 
specialized replacement parts, spare parts, that you would not 
want to have to carry with you, that can be very valuable going 
forward.
    And so that is something that is definitely worth exploring 
and looking at investments in.
    I also would not want to discount the role of the private 
sector here in leading the charge for additive manufacturing.
    I have looked at a lot of companies that are figuring out 
ways that they can build parts and components that go into 
everything from rocket engines to jet engines to you name it, 
things that they literally could not build without additive 
manufacturing, that are greatly improving the performance, the 
reliability of the systems they are building.
    So there is a lot of work going on here in the private 
sector we should not discount.
    Mrs. Bustos. Thank you.
    Ma'am, is there anything else you would like to add with 13 
seconds left?
    Ms. Field. No, thank you. I have nothing to add on this 
particular topic.
    Mrs. Bustos. Okay. Thanks very much.
    Madam Chair, I yield back.
    Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
    Mr. Crist, you are next.

                    Missile Defense and Hypersonics

    Mr. Crist. Great. Thank you, Madam Chair. And thank you so 
much for holding this hearing.
    And I appreciate you, Ranking Member Calvert, as well.
    I think I want to direct it to Mr. Harrison.
    You were talking about earlier the notion of getting less 
while paying more. And I think at the conclusion of your 
presentation you talked about the fact that this deals to some 
extent missile defense.
    And one of the concerns I have had, and I think several 
members of the subcommittee, obviously, as well, deals with the 
hypersonics.
    And so my concern about that is if we are paying more for 
getting a sufficient defense, if you could elaborate on that or 
give us some insight. It is of grave concern to me, just what I 
know about it from prior meetings that we have discussed this 
topic and it seems like a vulnerability to me, frankly.
    And if you can assuage that in my mind, that would be 
delightful. But I am just searching for the truth and what the 
facts may be. If you can be helpful that way, that would be 
wonderful. I appreciate it.
    Mr. Harrison. Sure. I will lead this off here.
    I think that I outlined in my testimony I think one of the 
crown jewels of the force in the future is actually air and 
missile defense systems.
    But you are right that the way that we have proceeded in 
this area to date has been very costly, it has been very 
expensive. The technology is expensive to develop.
    And particularly if you look at the cost-exchange ratio, 
how much it costs an adversary like China to build a ballistic 
missile or a cruise missile or even a hypersonic weapon versus 
how much it costs for us to defend against that capability, 
which may require multiple interceptors being fired to achieve 
a sufficient probability of intercept, it is prohibitive, and 
it does not scale in our favor.
    So I think that should be one of the focus areas in our 
integrated air and missile defense systems, is how do we change 
that cost-exchange ratio so that it is more affordable to field 
missile defense systems that are sufficiently scalable to 
counter the threats that we face from adversaries?
    So I think we should prioritize those investments, in 
particular looking at things like directed energy systems.
    There is still a long road ahead. The technology is not 
there today. Let's be honest. It is not quite there.
    We have got to continue investments in directed energy 
systems, particularly things like electric lasers, solid state 
lasers that can achieve higher power levels to intercept 
incoming warheads and missiles and munitions of various types 
in a more affordable and scalable manner.
    Mr. Crist. Thank you for that. But to follow up, I think 
that if we don't have the technologies and other countries 
apparently do, where is the deficiency? Where does it lie? Is 
it just a matter of additional funding in order to achieve the 
technological know-how in order to protect America? Or is there 
something else at work here that we should be aware of?
    Mr. Harrison. I think it is a combination of both time and 
funding. Our adversaries don't have missile defenses that are 
any better than ours. In fact, we are pretty far ahead when it 
comes to missile defense.
    Where they are making advances is in their missile 
technology that can threaten us. And that is our concern. You 
know, if they are building hypersonic weapons, it doesn't mean 
that we need hypersonic weapons. It means we need defenses 
against hypersonic weapons, right?
    So this is an asymmetric competition here.
    Mr. Crist. If I might, Mr. Harrison. Maybe it is both. 
Maybe as a deterrent we should have the hypersonics available 
to us, in addition to better defenses, of course. I couldn't 
agree with you more on that point.
    But I would like to be able to have the ability to strike, 
which in many instances gives the adversaries the reticence to 
strike us, because we can do what they can do and so they don't 
want to do it at all, and neither do we.
    Mr. Harrison. And where you can achieve symmetry and mutual 
vulnerability, if you will, then, yes, those can be a very 
effective deterrent.
    I am looking at more of the asymmetric situations where 
they can pose more of a threat to us with their missile forces 
than we could actually pose to them. And so that is where we 
need to be looking at better defenses.
    And to your earlier question, I think it takes both more 
funding and more time. We need both. This is not something 
where you can leap ahead in technology. You actually have to do 
the hard work of developing and maturing that technology over 
time.
    Mr. Crist. It sounds like we ought to do it.
    I yield back, Madam Chair. Thank you so much.
    Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
    Mr. Calvert. Madam Chair, this is Ken Calvert.
    Ms. McCollum. Yes.
    Mr. Calvert. I have a hard stop at 11. I had a commitment I 
couldn't--it went a little longer than I thought. So I 
apologize. It won't happen in the future. But I have got to 
move on. So I will touch base with you later and see what 
happens.
    Ms. McCollum. Absolutely. So you are putting Judge Carter 
in charge?
    Mr. Calvert. Yeah. Is Judge Carter still on?
    Ms. McCollum. He is still on.
    Mr. Calvert. Good. Okay.
    We will talk, Judge.
    All right. Thank you.
    Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
    Ms. Kaptur.

                 Energy and the Defense Production Act

    Ms. Kaptur. Thank you, Madam Chair, very much for this, and 
for all of our guests and the members.
    My questions are two. The first relates to energy, the 
second the Defense Production Act.
    In terms of energy, I have had a career-long interest in 
this issue, initially because of our entire politics being 
impacted by our oil imports, but over the years as we have 
advanced in the energy field. Now, with climate change, we have 
new challenges ahead of us.
    I will just share with you that when I first got involved 
in this issue I was shocked at how unconscious the Department 
of Energy was about the energy that it consumed. It is the 
largest energy user in the country. And as a result of work 
over many years, we were able to get deputy assistant 
secretaries focused in the different departments on this issue, 
but it isn't really cohesive.
    And as we look at trimming spending in all accounts really, 
not just defense, I wanted to ask you, from what you know, how 
could we better organize across the Department DOD's progress 
in terms of their own energy expenditures, but then in terms of 
DARPA and other research that are ongoing, breakthroughs that 
could help us both on the defense as well civilian side?
    So that is question one.
    Question two really relates to the Defense Production Act, 
and I, along with many of my colleagues, obviously, on this 
call, am concerned about where we are falling behind.
    Many years ago, Thomas Johnson outlined many areas in which 
the United States was already losing edge. Those included lift 
capacity for a number of our systems, silicon wafers of late. 
Obviously, in cyber we are not doing as well as we would wish. 
Rare earth, strategic metals.
    And, of course, medicines, where we don't make penicillin 
anymore, we don't make a lot of antibiotics in this country.
    And I am worried about the ability to support military in 
theater.
    So we hear a lot from President Biden about the Defense 
Production Act. But my experience is it is one of the weakest 
parts of the Department. It has never been given the support 
that it needs. And I am very concerned about meeting these gaps 
where other countries are ahead of us.
    If we put too much burden on the Defense Production Act--
which I support, I supported for 39 years. But I know how weak 
it is. And, therefore, I am concerned about staffing and 
capabilities there.
    So the first deals with energy. How can we strengthen the 
Department's own consciousness in reporting and advancements in 
that field to better help our country in the world?
    And then, secondly, Defense Production Act, in order to 
make things in this country again. How do we strengthen that 
particular arena of DOD, which has been underresourced for my 
entire career, four decades?
    Thank you.
    Ms. Field. I will take a stab at your first question 
related to energy.
    You know, a number of years ago, I believe it was in 2014, 
we examined what DOD was doing related to net zero and whether 
there was a strategy in place. And there really wasn't much of 
one at all, and I am sure that is not a surprise to you. And it 
does not appear that a lot has happened over the last 4 or 5 
years in that space.
    We have been, GAO has been mandated to take a look at what 
DOD is doing in the net zero space in the coming year. And so 
one of the things we will be looking at is, is there a renewed, 
reinvigorated effort at the Department to develop a sound 
strategy for net zero?
    So that is one area that I think should be examined.
    The second, your question about structure. I believe that a 
number of years ago there was a DASD(E) position at the 
Department focused on energy, energy use, it was trying to look 
sort of across the board. I do not believe that position exists 
now or has existed in recent years.
    But it would be interesting to see if the new 
administration reinstitutes a position like that and at what 
level. Some might argue that DASD(E) is not high enough.
    So I will stop there on the energy piece and defer to the 
other witnesses on your second question.
    Ms. Kaptur. I appreciate that insight. I did not realize it 
was still operational. Thank you.
    Ms. Field. I believe it is not still operational, I should 
say.
    Ms. Kaptur. Unbelievable. Unbelievable
    Mr. Mahnken. Just very briefly on your second question.
    I mean, I do think that the Defense Department in recent 
years has begun a serious effort to look at supply chain and 
supply chain vulnerabilities. I know the Office of Commercial 
and Economic Analysis, as part of the Air Force, has been doing 
some work there.
    And I think reducing that, that vulnerability, and whether 
it is bringing things--on-shoring jobs in the United States, or 
relying on our close allies who we know we can rely on, I think 
that is extremely important.
    Ms. Kaptur. Thank you.
    Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
    Mr. Ruppersberger.

                             Cybersecurity

    Mr. Ruppersberger. Well, Madam Chair, congratulations on 
the assumption of this very important committee.
    I appreciate you all being here today, the time that we are 
talking about critically difficult strategic choices.
    The recent SolarWinds attack demonstrated the 
sophistication of our adversaries' cyber capabilities, and more 
importantly, our inadequate defense against them. And it was 
really I think shocking to a lot of us who do a lot in the area 
of cyber about how inadequate our defenses were.
    The attack impacted nine Federal agencies, like Cisco and 
Belkin, two of the largest that we deal with, that we have in 
our country, and by some estimates over 18,000 customers.
    This was a really serious attack, and we really were 
unprepared. We need to do a lot better in our defense of our 
cybersecurity.
    The issue that we have, we know that we need to do more. 
And our adversaries, like China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran, 
their capability is getting stronger. And by the way, we are, 
too, on the offense. But as SolarWinds demonstrates, we are not 
that way when it relates to our defense.
    And my question is--and, I guess, Mr. Harrison, I assume, 
or anybody else that wants to pick up--if the defense budget is 
reduced, what impacts do you see on our ability to keep pace 
with these countries in areas like cyberspace and hypersonics?
    Mr. Harrison. Well, I can begin there.
    I think that the impact is up to us. It is how we choose to 
implement a reduction in the defense budget will determine how 
much we are impacted in these critical areas that I believe are 
essential for the future force.
    I think that we should prioritize our investments in 
cybersecurity, cyber attack capabilities as well, and in space 
security and being able to better defend our space systems from 
attack.
    So a reduction in the defense budget does not mean that we 
have to reduce these areas.
    I think it is also important that these are areas that need 
to be addressed in a strategically focused roles and mission 
review. Because if you go back to the Key West Agreement of 
1948, space and cyber are not part of that. Those were not 
areas, domains in which we operated at the time.
    They are very important domains today, and I don't think we 
have clear allocation of roles and responsibilities in these 
areas to ensure we don't have gaps or redundancies across the 
services.
    Mr. Ruppersberger. Yeah, I agree with you, too.
    And I do want to get this in before my time or anybody else 
who wants to speak.
    We also have an issue with the authorities of NSA. We need 
to maintain our privacy issues, and it is very important for 
our country. But in this situation, NSA was not allowed to be 
involved, even though they have--they do have the best 
technology in the world, I think, and also in our country.
    And so I think we, as Members of Congress, and the private 
sector need to start working more together so that we can 
defend ourselves. Because what is happening now, a lot of the 
big companies aren't cooperating with each other. And teamwork 
would have made a big difference for our defense, and it just 
wasn't there now. And we need to look at the laws on what NSA 
can and cannot do without violating our privacy.
    Do you have any comments on that?
    Mr. Harrison. I think you are exactly right on the point 
that this needs to be--in some of these areas, like cyber and 
space, they are areas that extend outside of just DOD and needs 
to involve more interagency coordination across government.
    And that is one of the reasons that, as I have written in a 
recent paper on the need for a roles and missions review, that 
this, the allocation of these responsibilities, probably needs 
to happen at a level higher than a DOD instruction or a 
decision from the SecDef.
    This needs to come from the White House. This requires 
overall executive branch leadership to clearly allocate what is 
the NSA going to be responsible for, what is the NRO going to 
be responsible for, what are the roles of Commerce and 
Transportation and all the other areas of government that are 
affected in some of these mission areas.
    Mr. Ruppersberger. But I also would add, Congress needs to 
be involved as far as making laws and to maintain our national 
security, but also our privacy issues.
    Thank you. I yield back.

                  Energy Resiliency and Climate Change

    Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
    Ms. Field, you wanted to make sure that we understood 
something correctly?
    Ms. Field. Yes, just very quickly. In response to 
Representative Kaptur, I wanted to clarify. I said it was 
DASD(Energy) that has gone away. It was Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Operational Energy. That is the position I think is 
not currently encumbered. And that would suggest a place 
potentially for the Department to look at this issue.
    Ms. McCollum. Very good. And we will be having talking 
about energy resiliency and climate change at a future hearing. 
So thank you.
    Mr. Carter, we could--it is you, myself, and Mr. Diaz-
Balart. We could do another question for 3 minutes if that is 
okay with you?
    Mr. Carter. That is okay with me.
    Ms. McCollum. All right. So, Mr. Carter, I am going to let 
you go next.

                     Conventional Forces Reduction

    Mr. Carter. Well, thank you.
    First let me comment. And I don't know whether Mr. Cuellar 
is on, but Mr. Diaz-Balart is. I, too, have concerns about our 
neighbors to the south and what is going on with the Chinese 
down there. And I join them in saying that I have those 
concerns.
    The CSBA exercise concludes that the reduction in 
conventional forces in a 10 percent cut scenario would limit 
flexibility to manage a crisis and yield a force that could at 
best win one war at a time and increase reliance on nuclear 
deterrence as an alternative. The report states conflict may 
become even more likely because adversaries can question 
whether the U.S. posture is even credible.
    With that said, a reduction in conventional forces does not 
necessarily equate to a reduction in mission requirements. 
Consider the fact that despite less deployment rotations to the 
CENTCOM area of responsibility, approximately 15 percent of the 
soldiers stationed at Fort Hood, Texas, have been deployed 
during any month since 2011.
    What happens when the attrition rate of near-peer threats' 
conventional forces is slower than the U.S. and conflict arises 
that requires the quick regeneration of conventional forces? 
And for how long is the coinciding strain on existing 
conventional forces tenable?
    If anybody wants to answer that one.
    Mr. Mahnken. No, I will take a cut at it. Which is, look, I 
think, as unpleasant as it is to think about--and it is 
unpleasant--but we are in a period of great power competition 
and we face the prospect, however remote, of great power war. 
And everything--all the signs point to a very costly, very, 
very bloody conflict. And that unfortunate reality is something 
that we haven't had to face in a quarter century.
    And part of that is thinking about how to best array the 
force, how to best array our infrastructure, how to best array 
industry to prepare ourselves for such a conflict, if only to 
deter it. And that includes attrition. That includes all sorts 
of things.
    And so I think your point is good one. And I think we as a 
country need to realize that that is the world that we are 
living in, however unpleasant that may seem.

                     DOD and Technical Capabilities

    Mr. Carter. And I agree with that.
    Finally, just to add something I just read recently. It is 
kind of interesting. When Silicon Valley first arose a lot of 
the work they were doing was related to our national defense. 
Right now, the civilian side of technology has leaped leaps and 
bounds forward, and yet our Defense Department's technology is 
greatly lacking. And in fact, one of the comments was the 
average soldier is carrying around more ability in his back 
pocket than they have at the entire Defense Department.
    Would either of you like to comment on that?
    Mr. Harrison. Yeah, I think there is a lot of truth to 
that. I also wouldn't want to discount the exquisite technology 
that is being developed in the more traditional parts of the 
defense industrial base.
    But you are absolutely right, that in many areas where 
there are dual-use capabilities, where things can be used for 
commercial purposes or for military purposes, we do see 
tremendous investment and innovation in the private sector.
    I think that DOD needs to do a better job of figuring out 
how to work with those companies and how to leverage that 
innovation.
    And as I said before, I think part of that is working with 
commercial companies on their terms and buying things as a 
service rather than a product. That is what a lot of these 
commercial companies are looking to do, commercially oriented 
firms.
    Mr. Carter. Thank you.
    Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
    Mr. Diaz-Balart.

                     Chinese Military Modernization

    Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
    Again, I also want to continue to talk a little bit about 
China. The Chinese military has done some significant 
modernization efforts; one would argue rather successful ones.
    And so, I kind of talked about this in a different realm in 
my previous question, but can you talk a little about the 
current Chinese capabilities and what poses the greatest threat 
now to our men and women, to our servicemen and -women, who 
might be on the field one day confronting a Chinese military?
    The conversation right before was talking about what that 
might look like. It is not a pretty thought.
    So what are one of those capabilities that might threaten 
our men and women more greatly?
    Mr. Mahnken. Yeah. So I know Mr. Harrison talked being 
threats to space. I would say also China has been focused on 
denying our ability to project power in the Western Pacific.
    So whether it is our air bases, our Naval vessels, our 
soldiers, our marines, they have been focused squarely on us, 
where they have had us in the crosshairs. And it is development 
of ballistic and cruise missiles, development of hypersonics, 
increasingly capable air and missile defenses on their end, 
yeah, we are right in their crosshairs.
    So I think our infrastructure, our basing, our bases in the 
Western Pacific need defense. Our power projection forces need 
defense. And we need to develop concepts to be able to project 
power to defend our interests, defend our allies, and defend 
our territory in the face of those threats.
    Mr. Diaz-Balart. I guess one of the most ambitious things 
that China has done recently is this Chinese, the Belt and Road 
Initiative. Again, going back to my friend and colleague Mr. 
Cuellar, he mentioned about there is a lot of Chinese presence 
in the Western Hemisphere. And so more than 60 countries have 
signed on to projects linked to this initiative.
    How can we do a better job countering them, particularly in 
this hemisphere and elsewhere? And is it just a function of 
money? How can we do a better job?
    Mr. Mahnken. I think working together with our friends and 
also providing an alternative to what the Chinese are offering. 
I know, look, the Trans-Pacific Partnership had its supporters, 
had its detractors on both sides of the aisle. I think that was 
a good effort to try to bring people together in a vision that 
is kind of in line with our values.
    I think we need to be doing that. We need to provide a 
democratic alternative to what China is offering and give the 
countries that want to make the better choice the ability to 
make the better choice.
    Mr. Diaz-Balart. I am out of time. Thank you, Madam 
Chairwoman.

                           Focus on Diplomacy

    Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
    So, Mr. Diaz-Balart, that is a perfect lead-in, how Mr. 
Mahnken finished his question, for where I wanted to go.
    I want to just kind of shift this a little bit, because we 
have heard former Defense Secretaries talk about our power, our 
soft power, the importance of having a strong State Department. 
And lots is often given about what the Chinese and the Russians 
are spending and what we are spending in an arms race. And so 
the focus has been on military.
    But you also know how important it is to our military to 
have good diplomacy, and that helps develop enhanced security.
    So my question is, what are some of the things that our 
military should be leaning towards for our State Department 
maybe to do to develop enhanced security and ideas on how we 
could work smarter with our allies to address these great 
powers concerns that we do have about China and Russia, and how 
that could maybe have a great influence in an approach to be 
more disciplined in the Department of Defense's top line 
spending and maybe even see it decrease?
    Mr. Mahnken. I will take a stab at it.
    I mean, look, I worked for Secretary of Defense Bob Gates, 
who I think believed in his bones about the importance of a 
strong State Department and really the symbiotic relationship 
between diplomacy and military force.
    Diplomacy is more credible when undergirded by the threat 
of military force. And, similarly, diplomacy can help avoid the 
use of military force. So I think the two go hand in hand.
    I do think when it comes to our allies, if I just focus on 
the military part of it, though, being able to work closely 
with our allies, interoperability with our allies, really is 
key going forward. I think they are looking for us to have skin 
in the game, and we are looking for them to have skin in the 
game.
    So I think the two really are inseparable, a strong 
military and a strong diplomatic corps and strong State 
Department.
    Mr. Harrison. If I could jump in.
    One specific area where I see there is a lot of potential 
to leverage our soft power to help improve our security is 
norms of behavior in space.
    And that is one area where it needs to be an all-of-
government approach, not only to try to establish internally 
within the U.S. Government what we believe are positive, 
constructive norms of behavior that we are willing to follow 
ourselves, and then put those forward in the international 
community and start to build a consensus with our allies and 
partners.
    Norms of behavior in space help you identify what the 
abnormal behavior is so you can call it out and you can work 
against it. And we want to be at the forefront of setting those 
norms in space because we want them to reflect our values and 
our interests both in this domain and on Earth.
    I would commend NASA for something it did within the past 
year in setting up what they called the Artemis Accords, and 
that is a set of agreements that other countries have to sign 
onto with the United States in order to partner with us on our 
mission to go back to the moon and establish a permanent 
presence there.
    And so those Artemis Accords are a good first step in 
helping to establish norms of behavior and get international 
agreement and buy-in among like-minded countries.
    Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
    And I realize I kind of asked a political question there 
for Ms. Field from GAO. And I can read a report on State 
Department from GAO.
    I want to thank the three of you for your presentation. I 
wanted to take this opportunity of waiting for the Biden 
administration to prepare their first budget to present to 
Congress for us to also look at the way we talk about defense 
spending, to look at the programs, to ask some of the 
questions, rather than just have the military folks come in and 
we start doing line by line and this space and this program and 
you know.
    This gives us an opportunity to think about where we want 
to be 5, 10 years from now and how we are going to have to 
maybe make some really hard and tough choices to get to where 
we want to be there.
    So we are going to be moving forward, as I said to other 
committee members, talking about resilience and climate change, 
and look forward to a whole host of leaders from academia and 
from some of the other think tanks all across the spectrum that 
work and have opinions on defense spending and that.
    So thank you for being the first three out the gate for us 
to do that. And we might have a couple other questions we will 
submit to you. As a former teacher, I promise it won't be a 
deluge of homework, it just might be something here and there.
    But thank you for so much for setting a wonderful tone for 
this first hearing.
    And so with that, Mr. Carter, I am going to adjourn the 
meeting.
    This meeting is adjourned.

                                            Tuesday, March 2, 2021.

                U.S. MILITARY SERVICE ACADEMIES OVERVIEW

                               WITNESSES

 LIEUTENANT GENERAL DARRYL A. WILLIAMS, SUPERINTENDENT, UNITED STATES 
    MILITARY ACADEMY WEST POINT
 VICE ADMIRAL SEAN BUCK, SUPERINTENDENT, UNITED STATES NAVAL ACADEMY
 LIEUTENANT GENERAL RICHARD M. CLARK, SUPERINTENDENT, UNITED STATES AIR 
    FORCE ACADEMY
    Ms. McCollum. So now we are officially to order here. This 
meeting is going to be fully virtual, and so I am going to go 
over a few housekeeping rules.
    For today's meeting, the chair or the staff designated by 
the chair may mute participants' microphones when they are not 
under recognition for the purpose of eliminating background. 
Everybody was really good last time, so I don't anticipate any 
problems this time.
    Members, though, you are responsible for unmuting yourself. 
If we notice that you have not unmuted yourself, I will ask you 
if you would like the staff to unmute you. If you can please 
indicate by nodding your head, and staff will unmute your 
microphone.
    I remind all members and witnesses--they should see it on 
the screen; if they don't, let us know--there is a 5-minute 
clock and the 5-minute clock will apply. If there is a 
technical issue, we will move to the next member until the 
issue is resolved, and you will keep the balance of your time.
    Once again, you will notice a clock on your screen, and it 
is going to show how much time is remaining. At 1 minute, the 
clock will turn yellow. At 30 seconds remaining, I will gently 
tap the gavel to remind members that their time has almost 
expired. When your time has expired, the clock will turn red, 
and I will, when it turns red, recognize the next member.
    In terms of speaking order, we are going to follow the 
order set forth in the House rules, beginning with the chair 
and the ranking member. Then members present at the time the 
hearing is called to order will be recognized in the order of 
seniority, and, finally, members not present at the time the 
hearing is called to order.
    Finally, House rules require me to remind you that we have 
set up an email address to which members can send anything they 
wish to submit in writing at any of our hearings or our 
markups. So this email address has been provided to your staff.
    One other piece of housekeeping. We are going to have votes 
during this. When the votes take place, I will give a list of 
order of members to speak, I will turn the gavel over to the 
most senior member present, I will go vote, and then I will 
come right back. So we will keep this meeting going forward so 
everyone can ask their questions.
    So, without further ado, I am going to make a few remarks 
here.

                  Opening Statement of Chair McCollum

    This morning, the subcommittee will receive testimony and 
an update on military service academies.
    And I welcome our three witnesses: Lieutenant Darryl 
Williams, superintendent of West Point, founded in 1802; Vice 
Admiral Sean Buck, superintendent of the Naval Academy, founded 
in 1845; and Lieutenant Richard Clark, superintendent of the 
Air Force Academy, founded in 1954. I do know the Air Force 
Academy is 66 years old, because that is the year I was born 
too, so we were established at the same time.
    Gentlemen, I want to thank you all for being here today, 
and I appreciate you being here to share the current state of 
military service academies.
    Each of the service academies house some of the best and 
brightest of our young generation. Many of these young men and 
women will hold leadership positions in their respective 
services for the next 30 years. Given this fact, it is 
imperative that they are all well-educated, not in only 
executing military missions of the future but also grounded in 
the ideals in which this Nation has been built and to the oath 
that they take to serve.
    Each of these topics we will discuss today will encompass 
how effectively each one of the academies is striving to 
achieve these goals. Some topics for today's hearing include 
the admission structure at each of the service academies and 
how our academies are reflecting the diversity of our country 
in preparing cadets, midshipmen, and, I will add, doolies at 
the Air Force Academy for the myriad challenges that they face 
ahead; some of the social issues each academy is dealing with, 
notably sexual assault, racism, diversity, character, and the 
way forward for that to continue to progress.
    Congress is here to support you in these efforts, but we 
also know that you have been dealing with something new, the 
impact of COVID-19 at each of the service academies. How has it 
impacted learning, operations, and the well-being of the 
student body, faculty, and campus workforce?
    And then I would like to have a robust discussion on 
maintenance, restoration, and resilience efforts for each of 
these campuses. West Point and the Naval Academy have buildings 
over 100 years old. And the Air Force Academy, its buildings 
are on average 60 years old. The military service campuses have 
not escaped the impacts of climate change, and we welcome each 
of the superintendents to share their concerns and their ideas 
to address these environmental calamities.
    We also look forward to hearing what more we can do as 
Members of Congress to help the service academies in their 
nomination process. It is an honor and a privilege that we have 
the ability to make these nominations.
    Once again, I want to thank you for appearing before the 
committee today to discuss these issues.
    And now I want to recognize our distinguished ranking 
member, Mr. Calvert, for any comments he might want to add.
    Mr. Calvert.

                    Opening Statement of Mr. Calvert

    Mr. Calvert. Thank you. Thank you, Chair McCollum.
    Today, I am very pleased to welcome the superintendents of 
our incredible service academies, Lieutenant General Clark, 
Lieutenant General Williams, and Vice Admiral Buck. Thank you 
all for taking time to testify to us today.
    This subcommittee is responsible for ensuring our military 
has the tools it needs to protect our Nation and carry out the 
National Defense Strategy. We hear from service chiefs and 
secretaries, combatant commanders, and other leaders in the 
Department of Defense about critical resourcing requirements 
and threats. We must never lose sight that these missions 
cannot be carried out without capable, intelligent, and 
prepared soldiers, sailors, marines, airmen, and now guardians.
    That is why today's hearing is so important. As our 
witnesses have noted in their respective testimonies, our 
academies continue to thrive and produce the world's finest 
leaders, but they also face a range of challenges that we must 
confront with a unified vision.
    COVID-19 has undoubtedly reshaped the way all education is 
done in this country, as the chairman noted. This is no 
different for our service academies. I am sure we will discuss 
these impacts in great detail today.
    I am aware how well the academies have adjusted their 
curriculums to educate students in a new learning environment. 
This was made possible by the incredible leaders before us 
today and their experienced and professional staff.
    So, first off, I would like to thank each of you.
    I would like to commend the future leaders currently 
studying at our academies. Your commitment to our Nation, 
especially during a time such as this, it does not go unnoticed 
or unappreciated.
    As we continue the fight against COVID-19, the academies 
are faced with challenges such as addressing aging 
infrastructure, increasing inclusion, diversity, and preparing 
our cadets and midshipmen for the wars of the future. I have 
great confidence in the leaders before us today and their 
students, as we work together to take on these challenges, and 
I look forward to hearing from them in more detail today.
    Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back.
    Ms. McCollum. Thank you very much. Well-said.
    For everyone, your full written testimony that has been 
provided by our service academies' superintendents will be 
placed in the record, and members have copies at their seats. 
So, in the interest of time, I strongly encourage each of you 
to keep your summarized statement to 5 minutes or less, to be 
complete but succinct in answering questions, because we will 
have votes and we do want to get to your questions.
    So we are going to go in this order: Vice Admiral Buck, you 
will come after Lieutenant General Williams; and then, General 
Clark, you will close it out.
    So, thank you for your testimony. And I will defer my 
questions to the end so I can go vote and we can keep this 
moving.
    I would like, at this time, to ask Lieutenant General 
Williams to kick off the testimony, and then the rest of you 
fall in the order I mentioned. Thank you.

               Summary Statement of Lt. General Williams

    General Williams. Chair McCollum, Ranking Member Calvert, 
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the 
opportunity to discuss the United States Military Academy, and 
thank you for your continued support to its programs.
    If you were at West Point today, you would see an academy 
thriving as it develops leaders of character, despite the 
constraints of the global pandemic. The Academy's mission is to 
educate, train, and inspire the corps of cadets so that each 
graduate is a commissioned leader of character, committed to 
both Army values and the ideals of duty, honor, country, and 
prepared for a career of professional excellence and service to 
the Nation as Army officers.
    Our vision is to be the Nation's premier leader development 
institution. We do this through a process where cadets develop 
the academic, military, physical, and character foundation 
necessary for continued professional growth and service while 
internalizing the values necessary to live honorably, lead 
honorably, and demonstrate excellence.
    Our faculty and staff model is deliberately focused on 
developing leaders of character, and we have an outstanding 
team of faculty, coaches, tactical officers, and 
noncommissioned officers, all hand-selected--a blend of soldier 
and civilian talent and expertise committed to our mission and 
to cadet excellence.
    We have operationalized our mission and strategy around 
five lines of effort that constitute my priorities: one, 
developing leaders of character who are prepared to fight and 
win in the crucible of ground combat; two, cultivating a 
culture of character growth necessary to build and sustain 
cohesive teams built on trust, dignity, and respect; three, 
building diverse and effective winning teams by leveraging the 
talent of every member of the organization; four, modernizing, 
sustaining, and securing our capabilities and infrastructure 
and strengthening partnerships with academe, our alumni, the 
American people, and our international partners while 
continuing to contribute to the Army profession.
    All five lines of effort ultimately support the Army's 
mission, enhance Army readiness, and are aligned with Army 
strategy and initiatives, including its ``people first'' 
mentality and ``winning matters'' attitude.
    Over the past year, we successfully continued our mission 
while adapting to the realities and overcoming the challenges 
of the COVID-19 environment--challenges that have made our 
entire community stronger, more resilient, and cohesive. This 
was possible because of our deliberate, disciplined, and 
comprehensive approach throughout the pandemic that ensured the 
health and safety of the corps and the West Point community at 
large.
    We quickly regained the critical human interactions that 
are essential to the success of our leader development 
experience after our remote education last spring. Reluctantly, 
over the past year, we had to contract our engagement with our 
alumni, parents, and the local community on post to protect the 
corps and the community. We look forward to reestablishing 
connections as conditions allow.
    Over the past year, we sustained Army readiness by 
successfully graduating a thousand new officers into the Army; 
executed our academic, military, physical, and character 
programs; and competed in intercollegiate athletics.
    Our cadets have excelled across the board, notably in our 
Graduate Scholars Program. To date, West Point proudly boasts 
13 winners of prestigious graduate scholarships, to include two 
Rhodes scholars. Additionally, we have several semifinalists in 
ongoing competitions, including 18 semifinalists for the 
Fulbright scholarship. In fact, the Fulbright Commission has 
recognized us as the top-producing institution for the 2021 
academic year.
    These inspiring young men and women are motivated and 
demonstrating excellence every day. I am so proud to be their 
supe, and you can be proud of them as well.
    Character development is the most important thing we do at 
West Point, because, ultimately, character development is 
critical to building Army readiness. We meet cadets where they 
are and immerse them in a culture of character growth. This 
means that character development is ongoing throughout West 
Point--in the classroom, during military training, on the 
athletic fields, and in the locker rooms and barracks. 
Character development is deliberately woven into every aspect 
of the cadet experience to ensure we develop them into leaders 
our Army and our Nation require: trained, disciplined, and fit 
officers who lead by example, create cohesive teams built on 
trust, dignity, and respect, and who take care of our Army's 
greatest strength, its people.
    Over the last 2 years, we mobilized academy resources to 
better integrate our character development efforts throughout 
all aspects of cadet leader development. We created the 
Character Integration Advisory Group, which elevates character 
development resources to my level of command for additional 
emphasis and synchronization across all programs.
    Additionally, aligned with the Army, we continue our 
efforts toward eliminating the corrosive behaviors that 
undermine trust, such as sexual assault and harassment, racism, 
and extremism. We are making progress in this space but 
recognize we still have a long way to go.
    In closing, I remain confident we are preparing our cadets 
well to lead in the 21st-century Army while cultivating the 
culture that puts people first so that they are ready to build 
and lead cohesive teams--teams made up of the sons and 
daughters entrusted to our Army.
    I thank you again for the opportunity to discuss the state 
of our academy with you today. I look forward to your 
questions.
    [The information follows:]
    
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]    
        
                 Summary Statement of Vice Admiral Buck

    Admiral Buck. Chairwoman McCollum, Ranking Member Calvert, 
and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for 
the opportunity to appear before you today on behalf of the 
United States Naval Academy.
    Our mission is to develop midshipmen morally, mentally, and 
physically and to imbue them with the highest ideals of duty, 
honor, and loyalty. I am pleased to report to you today that 
the Naval Academy is succeeding in its mission.
    The COVID-19 pandemic has presented incredible obstacles to 
achieving that mission over the last 12 months. We had to 
rapidly adapt our organization to meet the threat of COVID and 
continue to execute our mission safely and effectively. 
However, despite these challenges and obstacles, our faculty, 
staff, and coaches, and, most importantly, our brigade of 
midshipmen have endured, often creating their own success.
    This past year, we successfully graduated and commissioned 
1,002 members of the class of 2020 into the fleet, and they are 
now serving as ensigns and second lieutenants in our Navy and 
our Marine Corps. We also brought aboard the class of 2024 for 
an in-person Plebe Summer experience. We are proud of the 
resilience and dedication displayed by our newest Naval Academy 
class, who were inducted in the midst of a pandemic.
    It is our firm belief at the Naval Academy that you cannot 
develop leaders online. This is why we made it a priority and a 
mandate to return the entire brigade to Annapolis this past 
fall for the 2020-2021 academic year.
    In order to do this, the Naval Academy reimagined how our 
most basic operations are conducted in order to keep the entire 
brigade, as well as our faculty, staff, and coaches, safe on 
the Yard. This ran the gamut and included hybrid, socially 
distanced learning; instituting a robust COVID-19 surveillance 
and testing protocol; dedicating one of our eight dormitory 
wings for quarantine and isolation; and shifting our meals to a 
noncommunal grab-and-go format.
    Because of our adherence to public health guidelines across 
our entire Naval Academy community, our COVID-19 positivity 
rates have remained very low throughout the majority of the 
school year, well below those of our surrounding community. 
While we have seen an uptick in the number of cases within the 
brigade during this past week, we are confident that we will be 
able to reduce our numbers using the same strict mitigation 
protocols employed by our Navy's fleet units to contain the 
spread of COVID-19.
    We recently began the process of vaccinating volunteers 
from our faculty and staff and hope to start our midshipmen 
vaccination process soon--an imperative if we are to execute 
fleet training this coming summer.
    We are looking forward to when the COVID vaccine allows us 
to regain a greater sense of normalcy here in Annapolis. In the 
meantime, we will continue to prioritize our midshipmen's 
physical and mental well-being during this difficult period.
    In addition to the challenges posed by COVID-19, the Naval 
Academy has not lost focus on our long-term and ongoing 
priority of developing leaders of character. The racial justice 
movement in America that rose this past summer impacted many 
members of our Naval Academy community, and the associated 
events have provoked important conversations regarding 
diversity, equity, and inclusion on our campus.
    The Naval Academy must be a visible cornerstone of a value-
based Naval culture of dignity and mutual respect. And that 
includes improving sexual assault prevention efforts and 
continuing to strengthen response support for victims.
    There is continued work to be done at the Naval Academy so 
that we can attract, retain, and develop a diverse cadre of 
future Navy and Marine Corps officers who are resilient, 
innovative, and equipped to lead in a highly diverse, socially 
complex, and multigenerational workforce.
    Lastly, we remain vigilant of the long-term existential 
threat that climate change and sea-level rise pose to our 
continued operations here in Annapolis. We have studied the 
science, we have implemented several resiliency projects, and 
we are in the process of formulating a military installation 
resiliency plan that is due to be complete at the end of this 
calendar year.
    For 175 years, the Naval Academy has met its mission for 
our Nation. However, we still face many challenges ahead. I 
believe that our top-notch team of senior leaders, faculty, and 
staff are prepared to meet these challenges using the same 
ingenuity, flexibility, and adaptability that has allowed us to 
continue our mission in the face of a global pandemic.
    Thank you for your time today, and thank you for your 
enduring support of all of our service academies. I am prepared 
to answer your questions as they are posed. Thank you very 
much.
    [The information follows:]
    
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]    
       
                 Summary Statement of Lt. General Clark

    General Clark. Chairwoman McCollum, Ranking Member Calvert, 
and other distinguished members of the committee, good morning 
from the United States Air Force Academy. And thank you to my 
fellow superintendents for your statements. I am grateful for 
this opportunity to update you on some of our recent successes 
and to share some of the obstacles we face in the coming years.
    Thank you for all that you do to support our cadets and to 
enable the mission success of not only our academy but our air 
and space forces as well. The interest and support of this 
committee is greatly appreciated, and I look forward to our 
discussion today.
    About 5 months ago, it was my great honor to take command 
of the institution I am proud to call my alma mater. Nearly 
four decades ago, as a cadet at the United States Air Force 
Academy myself, I found my purpose and established a foundation 
of character and service that I could not have built anywhere 
else.
    I have returned as superintendent to an academy on an 
outstanding trajectory but also one facing great challenges, 
some unique to our mission and others that we share with other 
campuses, our fellow service academies, and communities across 
our country.
    In these initial months, I laid out priorities that seek to 
recognize and overcome not only the challenges we face at our 
academy but also those that our graduates will soon encounter 
as decision-makers in an era of great-power competition and 
rapid change.
    My first priority is one that is fundamental and 
unwavering, even as the world changes around us: We will 
continue to develop leaders of character. Character is the 
cornerstone of leadership and should be the hallmark of an 
academy graduate. Each element of our mission must remain 
aligned with the moral compass that character provides. Without 
a commitment to character, the leadership foundation we build 
here will not be strong enough to support the weight of our 
goals and ambitions.
    My second priority is our immediate tactical challenge and 
one of the toughest our academy has ever faced: We must defeat 
COVID-19. I am proud that our response to this crisis is 
utilizing the amazing brainpower we have within our faculty, 
our staff, and our cadets. Trusting the science, putting our 
math skills to work, and strict adherence to guidelines will be 
our continued approach. And the health and safety of our entire 
community will remain at the center of our decision-making 
process. Some of us may be done with COVID-19, but COVID-19 is 
not done with us.
    Third, we must prepare leaders who will fight and win in 
future conflicts. These conflicts will look different than any 
of those experienced by any of us today. We are in an era where 
our freedom to operate in the air and space cannot be taken for 
granted. As our Air Force chief of staff, General Charles 
Brown, stated, we must accelerate change or lose. Our academy 
will do just that, developing innovative, creative, and bold 
thinkers and leaders prepared to solve the unknown problems of 
tomorrow.
    Finally, we must foster a culture of dignity and respect. 
This will not only make our campus a better place to work, 
live, and learn, but it also is a strategic imperative for our 
Air Force and our Space Force.
    The cadets on our campus form the most diverse classes we 
have ever had at our academy, and they will lead increasingly 
diverse airmen and guardians. They must enable and empower the 
diversity of thought that can be derived from this uniquely 
American strength. They must also be able to relate to and 
thrive in partnerships with other cultures and allied nations 
in increasingly collaborative combat operations.
    If dignity and respect is not engrained in our culture, we 
will not only fail in these collective efforts, but we will 
also fail in the proper development of future leaders.
    In the longer statement submitted for the record, I have 
elaborated in greater detail on some of the programs, 
initiatives, and actions that we have taken or will take to 
implement these priorities. I am proud of our direction and am 
fully confident in the skills and abilities of our cadets, 
faculty, and staff, but there are areas where we still have 
work to do to uphold the high standards that our society 
rightfully expects of us.
    Our 4,221 cadets, 206 preparatory school cadet candidates, 
and the infrastructure that makes up our campus represent a 
critical investment in the future of our national security. I 
welcome the opportunity to discuss how we can ensure our 
mission success together.
    Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
    [The information follows:] 
    
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]    
        
    Ms. McCollum. Thank you very much, gentlemen.
    For the first question, as I said, I had the opportunity of 
speaking to the three of you over the past several days, so I 
am going to reserve my question for the end, and I am going to 
turn to Mr. Ruppersberger first for questions.

                             Climate Change

    Mr. Ruppersberger. I want to thank all three for the job 
that you do in preparing, you know, our future leaders of the 
military. Excellent job.
    I want to thank you, Chairwoman McCollum, Ranking Member 
Calvert, for your leadership.
    And my first question is going to be about climate change. 
You mentioned that in your remarks, Admiral Buck. And I am 
going to speak to the broader context of an infrastructure 
budget.
    Now, I am president of the Naval Academy Board of Visitors, 
and we speak often about many of the challenges that we have 
there, but I am particularly concerned with the issue of sea-
level rise. And I know that both Air Force and West Point don't 
have that issue and have plenty of land there, while the Naval 
Academy is surrounded by water, and it is getting worse and 
worse.
    Now, Admiral Buck, can you explain to us the magnitude of 
this issue for the record and what steps that you are taking to 
address these concerns, what your needs are?
    And you might want to discuss also the new building, one of 
the first new buildings that was built in the Naval Academy in 
many years, the cybersecurity building, and how that was 
designed to protect the interior of the building and the 
equipment in the building, but how that can repel or save the 
building from the sea-level rise that occurs on a regular 
basis.
    Admiral Buck.
    Admiral Buck. Congressman Ruppersberger, thank you very 
much for the questions. Great to see you at least two-
dimensionally and hopefully three-dimensionally sooner than 
later.
    With regards to the series of questions you asked, all 
related to climate change, you have identified our greatest 
vulnerability; it is our geographic location. We are built on a 
lot of reclaimed land. We are at the confluence of one of 
Maryland's major rivers and the Chesapeake Bay, large bodies of 
water. And we are also affected throughout the entire day, 365 
days of the year, by the prevailing winds that have existed for 
centuries, easterly and southeasterly winds, which, when you 
combine that weather with sea-level rise, with subsidence that 
is pretty significant in the Chesapeake Bay area here on the 
East Coast and in the mid-Atlantic, we are continually 
experiencing the negative effects of high-tide flooding, almost 
on a regular basis.
    To touch on the one question you asked about the magnitude 
of it, for an example, to kind of give a compelling statistic, 
in the entire decade of the 1990s, the Naval Academy was 
negatively affected by high-tide flooding 41 times in a decade. 
Now we are experiencing 41 instances of high-tide flooding per 
year.
    And as we look at all of the projections from all of the 
science and those that are looking at this, especially on the 
East Coast and looking at it for Naval infrastructure, it is 
projected by 2050 that we will see this high-tide flooding 
negative effect every single day of the year.
    What does that mean? It floods out some of our roads, some 
of the key networks that we bring our workforce on the campus 
day-in and day-out. It affects some of our parking lots where 
they try to park. And it affects the entrances and exits to 
some of our buildings.
    So it is a reality, and I am very proud to tell you that my 
predecessor formed the U.S. Naval Academy Sea-Level Rise 
Advisory Council in 2015, and I have the pleasure, the honor, 
and the imperative to carry on the work of that advisory 
council. It is made up of scientists from the Naval Academy, 
engineers, different stakeholders in my Naval Academy team, as 
well as stakeholders from the city of Annapolis and the State 
of Maryland.
    It is informed by the Army Corps of Engineers and other 
experts that we bring in to get after a study that they have 
embarked on now that we intend to see, or expect to see, at the 
end of this calendar year that will help us create a military 
installation resiliency plan.
    They are going to present to us different courses of 
action, engineering solutions, that we can take around the 
Yard. They might be building up cement seawalls higher and 
better. It might be creating earthen berms or levies and 
raising the level of roads to block different areas. And it may 
be in combination with correcting some of our stormwater 
drainage systems that maybe has not had a good look at a 
modernization in a number of years.
    We understand that, as we combine all of those recommended 
engineering solutions and understand and appreciate their 
associated costs that we can present to you, to Members of 
Congress, and to my Navy for help, that if we do that very 
deliberately over the next 30 years, very consistently, 
deliberately, and with conviction, we can ensure that we not 
only protect the infrastructure at the Naval Academy but also 
with our host city, the historic city of Annapolis.
    Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
    Mr. Ruppersberger. Okay. I have to yield back. My time is 
up. Thank you for those answers.
    Ms. McCollum. It is a great question, and we will be 
following up on it. And I think we need a different--in my 
opinion, a different timeframe that is a little quicker than 30 
years, because that is the best-case scenario, I think, that we 
heard from that.
    Mr. Calvert.
    Mr. Ruppersberger. I wanted to say that.

                     Preparation of Future Leaders

    Mr. Calvert. Thank you.
    And I thank the superintendents for their testimony.
    It has been pointed out that we are currently in the age of 
rapidly evolving technology, unseen in human history, impacting 
warfare domains in almost every single way imaginable. Of 
course, Dutch has an installation that is in his district that 
is involved in that every single day. I mean, cyber is a huge 
issue that we have to face every single day--and, now, space 
domains.
    Can each of you give us examples of how your respective 
institutions are preparing our future leaders to adapt to this 
type of environment? Are you making curriculum changes that 
focus more heavily on that technology?
    I guess that is for all three or one of you, representing 
each other.
    General Williams. Yes, sir. Thank you for that question. I 
will start off. General Williams here at West Point.
    Sir, we, as we talked yesterday--thank you for that 
question--we absolutely are, here at West Point, thinking about 
the future in very critical ways.
    I would start with--and thanks to Congress--our Cyber 
Engineering and Academic Center, which will transform how we 
think about the future in very real ways. And it will also 
allow us to continue to attract the best and brightest from our 
country.
    We just broke ground about 2 months ago, and thanks to 
Congress, we have the ability to do that. So we look forward to 
having the space to develop and provide a forum where, not only 
will our cadets be able to interact with the best and brightest 
around the world and invite folks to continue that discussion, 
but also their daily conversation will be influenced and shaped 
by this great facility.
    And, sir, in terms of how we do our curriculum, in terms of 
the Academy, we have new majors. We have a space science major 
and a space science minor, just recently, that is under the 
direction of our physics and nuclear engineering department. 
They have made a lot of great inroads with that. I have been 
there for some time. Currently, we have 70 cadets enrolled in 
the major, 20 cadets enrolled in the minor.
    We also have a geospatial information science major, where 
we have 85 cadets currently enrolled.
    So we are producing the young men and women who will be 
leaders in this space, if you will, in the future, and we feel 
very comfortable about that.
    We also enjoy the Army's Cyber Institute, which is co-
located here. It is the Army's think tank to what we think 
about. And that really is a nexus where we bring the best and 
brightest. And they routinely provide to the literature about 
what we should be thinking about to compete and defeat our 
adversaries in the future and in the cyber domain.
    So those are some of the things internal to West Point, the 
brick-and-mortar projects which you all have helped fund, and 
then, more importantly, the adjunct Army Cyber Institute just 
outside the gate. And cadets are allowed to interface with the 
Army Cyber Institute, so folks come in and out of that in their 
classroom. And the instructors actually rotate on my staff as 
well.
    Thank you for your question, sir.
    Mr. Calvert. Thank you.
    Navy, Air Force, any addition to that?
    General Clark. Yes, sir. Thank you for the opportunity.
    And what I will start with is our National Defense Strategy 
that tells us as a country that we have to be prepared to 
compete in an environment of great-power competition. And our 
chief of staff, General Brown, has charged us in his order to 
``accelerate change or lose'' to develop airmen that are 
prepared to compete in that environment.
    So, at the Academy, much like West Point and Annapolis, we 
are developing leaders that are looking to the future. And that 
is one of my top priorities. We have 50 percent of our majors 
are STEM majors; 50 percent of our core courses are STEM 
courses.
    But, beyond that, we are also developing leaders to think 
boldly, to be innovative and solve problems that we don't even 
know about. And we have recently stood up an Institute for 
Future Conflict to help us to meet the needs and to prepare our 
cadets so that they are not ready to meet challenges for 5 
years from now but challenges 25 years from now.
    And we are very excited about the direction that we are 
taking and that we are moving. In fact, we have just hired a 
new director of that institute.
    So I think we are in a great place to have our leaders 
ready to lead us into the future and compete well on the future 
stage of our global environment.
    Thank you, sir.
    Mr. Calvert. Well, thank you.
    It looks like my time is just about up, Madam Chair, so I 
will yield back the balance of my time.
    Ms. McCollum. Well, that is good. Maybe we will have an 
opportunity to catch up on the last service we didn't hear 
from.
    Ms. Kaptur.

                 Diversity and Culture at the Academies

    Ms. Kaptur. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. And thank you 
for hosting us this morning with these really outstanding 
leaders for our country, all the superintendents.
    My two questions involve diversity and culture at the 
academies.
    The first is, could each of our guests please summarize 
their progress in terms of diversity, which has been one of the 
most challenging aspects of my work as a Congresswoman relative 
to the academies? Despite the diverse district I respect, 
getting young people to apply who would be more representative 
of the district that I represent--and believe me, it isn't for 
lack of trying. It has been very, very hard. So just talk to us 
about, in each of the academies, your progress in terms of 
recruitment for admission.
    And then, secondly, in terms of culture, I was very 
interested in Superintendent Williams' use of the word 
``character,'' developing character. I am interested in your 
views at the Academy of the types of students that are being 
admitted and some of your challenges there.
    I am familiar with some of the drug problems that have 
occurred at West Point, but it is not the only place where 
those have happened.
    And I am interested in your talking about the cheating that 
has occurred on many of the tests in each of the academies, and 
how, in fact, you can educate to character. Do your admissions 
not possess those traits? Do you have to teach to that? Has 
this changed in the last 40 years?
    I am very interested in your comments on diversity and on 
developing cadets with character.
    General Williams. Yes, ma'am. Thank you for the opportunity 
to talk about that.
    Diversity, as I mentioned in my opening comments, is a line 
of effort, it is a priority. I think it is very important for 
young men and women that come here that we look like the United 
States Army, we represent the country.
    I actively am in this space. We have a very active outreach 
program. I would love to reach out and help you in that effort, 
ma'am, as we go forward. I actively--in this virtual space, it 
is a little difficult, but we hold a number of online webinars. 
I usually participate in them on Saturday, and I actually talk 
and recruit people of different diversity.
    Ma'am, we meet or exceed all of the officer percentages 
here at West Point. So for African Americans, for Asians and 
Hispanics, we are at or over the percentage that are actively 
represented in the Active Duty Army officer corps right now at 
West Point--24 percent women, 17 percent African American. And 
I can share with you more of those details later.
    So diversity is something that I think is critical to 
winning. And, especially as we look at complex problems in the 
future, you have to have folks that are of diverse backgrounds 
and ethnicities, I think.
    In terms of culture, I mentioned before how we have 
elevated culture. It is a very deliberate effort. We have a 
highly qualified individual who integrates across the 
enterprise, not only in the academic departments but in my 
physical department and in my military department, who answers 
to me about culture.
    And we have nine highly qualified--the Army allowed us to 
have these folks to come in here, and they are a part of our 
program. And it is a very deliberate way to take young men and 
women who--right now, there is a set of high school seniors who 
will be here in about 4 months. And we take them where they 
are, and, over the 47-month experience, we develop them into 
leaders of character. So it is a very deliberate effort. I can 
talk to you about that in more detail.
    And then, finally, ma'am, you asked about honor. Last 
spring, our young men and women were in a remote learning 
environment and were challenged--some were challenged in terms 
of home life at home and a variety of issues, which I can go 
into in more detail later if you would like. They were away 
from their coaches, their teachers, their TACs, their TAC NCOs, 
and the structures that provide the way ahead.
    And, from my perspective, these young men and women had 
only been here a semester, and there is no excuse for violating 
United States Military Academy Honor Code, and I have all the 
tools I need to hold them accountable for that, and we will. 
And the ones that remain here, we will develop them into 
leaders of character, and they will learn from this experience.
    Thank you, ma'am.
    Ms. Kaptur. General, what about drug use at West Point?
    General Williams. Ma'am, I haven't seen--that we have some 
small instance--it is not raging right now, to use that word. 
There are the normal kinds of challenges that any commander 
faces. This is not something that is a very high, currently, 
raging at West Point in terms of----
    Ms. Kaptur. Have you expelled anyone because of drug use?
    General Williams. I have. Not this year, but in my past 3 
years, yes, ma'am, I have.
    Ms. Kaptur. Thank you.
    General Williams. Yes, ma'am.
    Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
    Mr. Rogers.

                       Pandemics on the Academies

    Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    I thank the gentlemen for their appearance before our 
subcommittee and for the great job you are doing in your 
respective academies.
    Let me ask you about something that is unpleasant, one 
aspect, a big aspect, of the COVID-19 problem, and that is the 
mental well-being of our world in these times, but, especially, 
of course, at the academies, with your personnel, the mental 
health.
    In the spring of 2020, COVID-19 forced the academies to 
change how they operated--locking down campus, quarantining 
cadets and midshipmen, moving classes online, and ultimately 
sending the student body home early for the school year.
    While the cadets and midshipmen at West Point and the Naval 
Academy were sent home in March, the Air Force Academy kept 
senior cadets on campus. And, in March, two Air Force Academy 
seniors were found dead in suspected suicides while under 
strict lockdown because of COVID-19.
    That led, of course, to conversations about the impact of 
the pandemic on mental health. Both West Point and the Naval 
Academy reported seeing indicators of mental health decline in 
the cadets and midshipmen throughout the coronavirus pandemic.
    How are the academies dealing with this obvious problem, 
following COVID-19 safety protocols, as well as keeping your 
campuses safe and the well-being of cadets and midshipmen in 
good shape?
    Admiral Buck. Congressman Rogers, Admiral Buck here from 
Annapolis. I will take the lead on answering that from our 
perspective here at the Academy.
    Looking back chronologically, when we did shift very 
rapidly to an online environment back in the spring, the spring 
semester of 2020, I am very proud to tell you that our team 
here, our collective team of people that can help midshipmen 
develop their resiliency and respond to them in their times of 
need, quickly converted every single service that we have to an 
online environment. And I don't believe we missed a beat with 
regards to making ourselves available to each and every 
midshipman.
    And it is a large cohort of folks. It is their shipmates, 
their fellow midshipmen. It is their company leadership or the 
commissioned officers and the enlisted leaders in the brigade 
that usually see them on damn near an hour-by-hour basis each 
day. It is our Chaplain Corps. It is our Midshipmen Development 
Center, which is staffed by psychiatrists, psychologists, 
nutritionists, social workers, and sexual assault folks that 
can help. All of those people were able to immediately make 
themselves available to the midshipmen during that distanced 
environment in the spring and the summer.
    What we saw was a rise in a request for services, not a 
rise at all for specific appointments for therapists. And that 
should be noted. It was a significant difference in their 
request to try to learn to cope for themselves, to cope amongst 
their family environment or wherever they were operating from 
to take school online.
    But, as I said in my opening statement, it is an imperative 
to bring these young men and women back and develop them and 
care for them in person. And we began that right near the end 
of June with Plebe Summer, with some summer school, with a bit 
of our summer training, and then the fall semester. And that 
allowed all of those stakeholders to once again reach out and 
help midshipmen in person. It is a very robust network.
    And I also have differentiated to myself and to my senior 
leadership team, it is one thing to talk about mental health, 
it is another thing to talk about morale, and there is a very 
big difference there.
    We take their mental health of our midshipmen and even our 
faculty and our staff, our whole Naval Academy family, we take 
that very seriously and try to look out for one another and 
address it when we can.
    It is incumbent upon my commandant of midshipmen and myself 
and other senior leaders to also work to improve morale when we 
have to impose certain things like the lockdown to the campus 
when we have spikes of COVID to try to mitigate it and knock it 
down.
    And we have seen success in addressing both a morale issue 
as well as a mental health issue, sir.
    Mr. Rogers. There is a huge stigma--with human beings in 
general, but speaking now of military personnel--a huge stigma 
about asking for mental health help. How are you able to 
overcome that problem?
    Admiral Buck. Sir, in my past, as a flag officer in the 
Navy, I was given an assignment to lead the 21st Century Sailor 
Office, which looked at all of destructive behaviors of Navy 
sailors. And one of those was, I was the suicide prevention 
officer for the United States Navy.
    And I am proud to tell you that what we realized was we 
needed to work diligently to reduce that stigma and to, 
instead, advertise to Navy sailors, to all of us, that it is 
okay to ask for help. In fact, the way we branded that was, it 
is a sign of strength to ask for help. And what we are seeing 
is, over 50 percent of the battle is just to be able to have an 
ability to talk to somebody, to get some of your problems and 
your demons off your chest by talking to someone.
    So learning to be a good active listener, making yourself 
available, and ensuring that everyone realizes that, the minute 
you ask for help with a mental health issue, you are not going 
to be thrown out of the Naval Academy or you are not going to 
be tossed out of the Navy. We have made such a big investment 
in you, we see such great potential in you, that we would like 
to help you through your demons and help you through what is 
stressing you, and then get you back up on that horse that 
threw you off and make you a productive midshipman and then, 
hence, a productive Naval officer out in the fleet.
    Ms. McCollum. Thank you so much for that thoughtful 
question, Mr. Rogers. And mental health is something in our 
military we know we want to cut down on people feeling that 
they can't ask. So thank you. And I am sure the committee 
members appreciated the fact that we took an extra minute to 
get that answer. Thank you very much.
    Mr. Cuellar.

             Efforts Takens for Diversity in the Academies

    Mr. Cuellar. Thank you so much, Madam Chair.
    I wanted to go back on the question of diversity that I 
believe Representative Marcy Kaptur brought up. Can you tell us 
a little bit about prep schools and how you all use prep 
schools to get diversity into your academies?
    I know there are some prep schools in different parts of 
the country, but there are areas that there are really no prep 
schools at all, and they have to travel a long way to get some 
of those students, to get the diversity.
    Could you all tell us what you all do and how you all set 
up some of those prep schools, or is it all private-sector-
involved, or are there partnerships for the academies?
    General Clark. Sir, this is Lieutenant General Clark from 
the Air Force Academy, and I can address that.
    Our prep school is significant in helping us to shape the 
diversity and the makeup of our cadet population as they come 
in. And they are on campus; it is about 200 prep school cadet 
candidates that are there. But we also have opportunities at 
other prep schools, as you mentioned, throughout the country 
where we can garner cadet candidates from to bring into the 
Academy.
    And we have an organization called our Falcon Foundation, 
which is comprised of a lot of graduates and volunteers who 
help us to shepherd people into those other prep schools so 
that we can have the opportunity to reach from all districts of 
our country to bring them into the Academy, help them to 
achieve.
    If there are any shortfalls in their admissions or any 
issues that they need to deal with to make them more 
competitive for the Air Force Academy, we bring them into those 
schools, and they really do help us to shape not only from an 
ethnic and racial but gender perspective.
    And our Falcon Foundation is that organization that I 
talked about that helps us to do that. They really meet any 
needs that we have. So if we see shortfalls in the makeup of 
our cadet population, they are very responsive to us and help 
us to shape it to make our class everything we want it to be.
    And, frankly, it is working. Our current class of 2024, our 
freshmen, is the most diverse class we have ever had at the Air 
Force Academy. We continue to lean on external partners to help 
us to shape our class.
    Over.
    General Williams. Sir, I will take a shot at it as well. 
Much like Rich, we depend on the prep school, USMAPS. It is up 
the hill. My son went to the prep school before he came here. 
It is a vital part of how we build diversity here at the United 
States Military Academy.
    The purpose--like Rich, we have about 225 places up there 
every year. As you know, sir, you apply to West Point, and if 
you are lacking in some of the skills that you need to succeed 
down the hill, as we call it here, that is a perfect year for 
you to do better.
    And we do use it, as well, to get at diversity, not only as 
Rich mentioned but also from soldiers from the regular Army. We 
have about 40 of that 225 soldiers from the regular Army. And a 
lot of the things that were talked about earlier, they bring a 
maturity to some of the things that were talked about earlier--
sexual assault, sexual harassment--because they have real-life 
experience. And they are mentors down in the corps in that next 
year.
    I would add another, sort of, layer to that.
    I don't know if my Navy shipmate has anything to add.
    Admiral Buck. Very similar to my sister academies, our 
magnitude, about 250 young men and women matriculate to the 
Academy through the Naval Academy Prep School. Ours is not co-
located with Annapolis. It is up in Newport, Rhode Island. And 
we also affiliate with 17 private prep schools around the 
country. We call them foundation schools.
    On any given year, sir, 300 midshipmen will have furthered 
their academic skills and allow us to garner greater diversity 
in the brigade by coming through either our prep school or our 
foundation program. And the purpose of that is exactly as my 
two colleagues have described to you.
    Mr. Cuellar. All right.
    Let me, before my time is over--I have about 30 seconds. 
First of all, thank you. And I am really happy that we work 
well, just like the other members, with your academies. So I 
want to thank you for diversifying the academies.
    Could I ask each of you all to provide--I don't know if 
anybody else wants copies of this, but I would like to be 
provided by all three of you all your work with prep schools, 
the different schools you have, and the foundation, the Falcon 
Foundation, and all that.
    If you all can send that over to me, because there are 
areas--my time is over, but let me just say this: There are 
areas along the border, highly Hispanic areas--you know, 
Laredo, for example, is 96 percent Hispanic, and I am sure some 
other folks they have very high-minority areas. And I would 
love to see if we can partner up with you all on some of those 
prep schools on that.
    So if you all can send to that over, I really would 
appreciate it.
    Thank you, Madam Chair.
    [The information follows:] 
    
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]    
        
    Ms. McCollum. Yeah, that would be fabulous. I think the 
whole committee would like that. And I also know there are some 
high school programs too. So that would be wonderful, if you 
would share that.
    Thank you for asking that question. It was a great 
question.
    Mr. Womack, who took me to West Point, you are up.

                         Preparatory Academies

    Mr. Womack. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thanks for 
the hearing.
    Thanks to the supes for what you are doing and for being 
with us today.
    Henry, you would be pleased to know--and they have spoken 
to this. These prep schools are wonderful opportunities. I kind 
of call them red-shirt years, because they do some things that 
really prepare a lot of these young men and women for the 
opportunity, without just throwing them in as direct admits and 
putting them in a very difficult situation. I think, from a 
diversity standpoint, these prep schools are great.
    Also, General Williams, I don't know what we call it, but 
there is also the ability to send some of these kids out to 
other schools, like Marion Military Academy, those kinds of 
places, for a freshman year and then recompete for a direct 
admit the following year, kind of like prep school but in a 
different setting. So, they are wonderful.
    As a matter of disclosure, I chair the Board of Visitors at 
West Point, so I own that, and that forms the basis for some of 
my understanding of what goes on at these academies, 
particularly up there on the Hudson.
    And I want everybody on the call to know, on this Zoom 
today to know, that the current holder of the Commander-in-
Chief's Trophy are the Black Knights of the United States 
Military Academy at West Point.
    Can I get a ``hooah'' on that, General Williams?
    General Williams. Hooah, Congressman. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Womack. All right.

                       Academy Cheating Scandals

    I am going to go back to the issue that was brought up 
earlier regarding the cheating scandals, and I am going to give 
each one of the supes about a minute to fashion an answer. And, 
Chair McCollum, we may go over just a little bit.
    It is one thing to have an attrition model, where you make 
a mistake, you are out of here. It is a whole another thing to 
have a developmental model, where we take young men and women 
from society, bring them in as freshmen, and then begin the 
grooming process. Man, if all these kids were ready to be 
lieutenants, we wouldn't spend 4 years trying to groom them. I 
am a big believer that, when they come in, if they, you know, 
skin their knee, they make some mistakes, that we work with 
them.
    And I am going to start with General Clark. Tell me what 
you have at your disposal, what you do, to help kids--because 
all the academies have had, you know, a bout with a cheating 
scandal, many thanks to COVID. But tell me what you do in terms 
of bringing these kids through an honor program and 
reacquainting them with the values that we espouse at the 
Academy.
    General Clark. Yes, sir. Thank you for that question.
    And I know that I can speak for my fellow superintendents 
that we are all approaching a developmental model of honor 
rather than a fear-based or a punitive model. Now, there are, 
obviously, punitive elements to our honor systems, but, like 
you said, we have to bring our cadets--when we bring them in, 
it is a matter of developing them to that honorable-living 
capacity or desire that we have.
    So we have a very robust honor education system that starts 
from the day that they walk into the Academy. And it consists 
of instructional opportunities, different mentorship 
opportunities. And it goes all the way throughout their time as 
cadets.
    Now, if they are found in violation of the Honor Code, 
especially in the early years, we have a strong probationary 
program, that we help them to develop, help them to recognize 
where their shortfalls were, and to bring them to a place where 
they understand how to continue to live honorably and abide by 
our code.
    We have had a 95-percent success rate, meaning cadets who 
get into that probationary status, they never have another 
incident or issue with the Honor Code. So we are very proud of 
it.
    The developmental aspects are key and critical, and we want 
our cadets to respect, not fear, the Honor Code.
    Over, sir.
    Mr. Womack. Admiral Buck.
    Admiral Buck. Likewise, sir, we have an honor concept at 
the Naval Academy.
    I will address that we sensed that we had a cheating issue 
on a final exam that was administered just this last December, 
a couple months ago. I am right near the end of concluding the 
investigation of that to better understand the magnitude and 
appreciate exactly what happened. It was with a younger cohort 
of midshipmen, the sophomores, with the physics exam.
    Like my colleagues, we completely embrace the developmental 
model. I would suggest that you probably get a little bit more 
understanding when you are a freshman or a sophomore, but as 
you spend more time in your 47-month journey at the Naval 
Academy immersed on a daily basis in a culture of character and 
a culture of honor, that our expectations of you, as you get 
closer to entering the fleet as a junior and a senior, that 
there may not be as much of a look for remediation and second 
chances.
    But we do want to look at each case individually. If you 
are found or alleged to have violated our honor concept, your 
case goes in front of a midshipmen-led honor committee. They, 
the midshipmen, your peers, make a determination of your guilt 
or your innocence. And if it comes out that you are guilty, you 
then go into consideration by the commissioned chain of 
command, whether you are chosen for remediation and retained or 
whether you are recommended to be separated from the Academy.
    We share almost the exact same statistic as Air Force. We 
have a 95-percent success rate of those that enter the honor 
system for a violation once in their time here, they don't ever 
enter it again. And they matriculate very well, and by the time 
we release them to the fleet, we are confident that we have 
some honorable young leaders and--you have heard us say--
leaders of character.
    Mr. Womack. Yeah. Well, look, thank you, Admiral, and I am 
going to--I never want to speak for the superintendent at West 
Point, because he speaks well for himself, but I will save the 
time on this one.
    Let me just say this for the benefit of my colleagues: You 
will hear from time to time from graduates of these academies. 
We call them old grads, for the most part. And many times the 
opinions of the old grads are more based on attrition models 
than they are developmental models, because they have been 
through it.
    So I think we have to be very careful, Madam Chairwoman, to 
be terribly judgmental, particularly when these kids come to 
these academies as freshmen and particularly when they come 
from some less-than-ideal circumstances.
    And that is why I congratulate each of the superintendents 
for what they are doing regarding this developmental model.
    And I will yield back my time.
    Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
    Mrs. Kirkpatrick.

                           Sexual Harassment

    Mrs. Kirkpatrick. Thank you, Madam Chair and Ranking Member 
Calvert.
    I have a question about sexual harassment. So, when I look 
through many of the programs built to combat sexual harassment 
and assault, a lot of them focus on service provided to victims 
after they suffer abuse. I agree it is absolutely critical that 
we provide every possible resource to survivors, but I do 
believe that we are overlooking opportunities in prevention.
    Lieutenant General Williams, you discussed the lack of 
relationship and interpersonal skills that have been in some 
young cadets, which can enable corrosive behaviors to take 
root.
    Can you share with us how the academies are prioritizing 
training focused on developing healthy relationships to prevent 
sexual assault and harassment; and if you are looking outside 
of these internal-created programs to civilian entities that 
specialize in developing these skills in today's young adults?
    And that is for everybody on the panel.
    General Williams. Yes, ma'am. Thank you for your question.
    I will tell you that leadership matters in this space. And 
my secretary, the chief of staff of the Army, the sergeant 
major of the Army have been very clear in terms of how do we 
get at this.
    When we brought our cadets back from winter leave in 
January, I took a look at the Fort Hood independent review, 
which I know many of the members are--all members probably are 
aware of. And we talked to every single cadet when they came 
back from the leave.
    I led off the session, and then I had my experts, my SHARP 
director and others, talk. And I said, this isn't about Fort 
Hood, this could be any fort, this could be Fort West Point. 
And we talked to them about personal courage and what it takes 
to hold each other accountable as peers here at the United 
States Military Academy.
    So I think leadership matters--I know it matters. And I 
know that all of the corrosives that the chief talks about and 
the Secretary and the SMA and that we also take on here, the 
only way to combat that, ma'am, is for peer leadership and for 
leadership at the very top.
    I will also tell you, we piloted last summer a relational 
character course. We are going to expand it this summer to talk 
exactly about what you mentioned in there, how do we relate 
with each other.
    When the cadets came back last summer, our cadets were 
brilliant in this space. We have trust and peer leaders in the 
cadet companies, and they are the ones that are at--they are 
resources for young men and women to talk to.
    So we allowed our cadets last summer--we will do the same 
thing with the new classes that come in--a time, the space, to 
talk about tough subjects. It really is about these young men 
and women looking each other in the eye--I know it is difficult 
during these COVID experiences here, but looking each other in 
the eye and saying, ``Look, I care about you, and I expect you 
to treat me with dignity and respect.''
    And so that is what we do here at West Point. We provide 
them the opportunity and the space to talk about it.
    But I am in this space and I am not leaving this space, as 
the superintendent of the United States Military Academy.
    Thank you, ma'am.
    Admiral Buck. Congresswoman Kirkpatrick, Sean Buck from 
Navy.
    Very like what General Williams just said, the number-one 
way for us to get after preventing sexual assault or sexual 
harassment is through peer leadership.
    What we have found over and over again in the formal 
surveys that are given at the Naval Academy and all of our 
academies are that our midshipmen and our cadets, they trust 
the commissioned leadership at the academies, they trust the 
senior enlisted leaders, but they are having a difficult time 
trusting their peer leadership. Most of the sexual assaults 
over time at my academy have been midshipman-on-midshipman. And 
that is very distressing, that it is blue-on-blue.
    So, in our prevention efforts, which is now the 
preponderance of the effort in the military across all the 
services and across all three of our academies, is getting 
after prevention and strengthening the confidence and the 
ability of our midshipmen leaders to lead themselves, with 
adult supervision. That is where we are going to nip it in the 
bud.
    You did ask one particular question, if any of us are 
leaning on external resources and innovation and creativity 
from maybe other university systems around the country or any 
other asset that might be helping organizations get after 
sexual assault. And, yes, ma'am, we are.
    There is a very robust investment by the Department of 
Defense and all of our services to allow us to do best 
practices, wherever they may be, to get after this scourge and 
make it go away from our academies, ma'am.
    General Clark. And, ma'am, I don't know if--this is General 
Clark. I don't know if--I know our time is up--if you would 
like me to make a short statement?
    Mrs. Kirkpatrick. Yes, if you could, please.
    Ms. McCollum. Yes, 30 seconds.
    Admiral Buck. Yes, ma'am. I will just say that we are in 
the same mode of thinking as both Navy and West Point.
    And we look at a sexual assault prevention framework, where 
we can actually address this issue with our cadets, both pre-
admission through programs that we have them involved in--we 
work with parents on alcohol-related issues so that parents can 
work with their young high school graduates before they come.
    We work during their time here throughout. We have great 
programs that address healthy relationship training, that 
address personal skills, and that also address bystander 
intervention skills for our whole cadet wing so that nobody 
stands by just to let these horrible events happen.
    And we also have a series of pilot programs that allow us 
to assess each program that we implement so that we understand 
exactly the type of effect we could expect, but also to use our 
time wisely so that we can target exactly the problems that we 
have to address in this space.
    So I think all of us are committed to decreasing and, in 
fact, defeating this scourge and making our academies and our 
forces better.
    Over.
    Ms. McCollum. Thank you so much.
    I am going to do a bit of housekeeping before we hear from 
Mr. Aderholt's question.
    Mr. Ryan, you are present. I am going to go and vote. The 
staff will send you the list of the next speakers. It is 
Aderholt, Aguilar, Carter, and then the rest are listed.
    I know we are in good hands, and, with that, I will be 
going to vote.
    Thank you, sir.
    Mr. Aderholt.

                     COVID-19 Vaccines for Students

    Mr. Aderholt. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    And thanks, everyone, for being before the subcommittee 
today.
    I have been in contact with my colleague, Congressman 
DesJarlais of Tennessee. And one of the issues that has come up 
is, I was just wondering if you could provide a little bit of a 
timeline about the COVID-19 vaccines that will be available for 
the academy members.
    I know a couple of you may have mentioned that a little bit 
in your comments earlier on. But as far as a timeline as to 
when you foresee the members being able to actually receive the 
shots, or if they have started receiving the shots, could you 
please just give us a brief outline as far as what you are 
looking at right now at your particular academy?
    General Clark. Yes, sir. This is Lieutenant General Clark. 
I can start with that one.
    All of us, all three of us, General Buck, General Williams, 
we talk regularly about our issues with COVID-19, and I believe 
that we are all in very similar situations as far as the 
impacts of it on our mission, how we are testing, and then, 
now, vaccines which have come our way.
    We are all adhering to the DOD schema, the Department of 
Defense schema, that lays out the priorities of who should get 
the vaccines when. So, it starts off with first responders; it 
cascades down to mission-essential members and deployers; it 
gets into medical beneficiaries; and then our cadets actually 
fall into the lowest category because they are all healthy 
others. They are the most healthy of our population, and they 
fall into the lower level of that schema.
    So we all get vaccines that are filtered to us. We get them 
periodically, as is the rest of the installations in at least 
the Air Force and the Space Force, and I think the Army and 
Navy are the same. We fall into a system that, when they come, 
we execute the vaccines and get them into arms as quickly as 
possible but in accordance with the schema that the Department 
of Defense has given us.
    So, right now, for us at the Air Force Academy, it is 
primarily our first responders, our staff and faculty who we 
consider mission-essential who have been the folks that have 
gotten the vaccine so far. Eventually, though, as we get more 
vaccines into arms, our cadets will be recipients of that 
vaccine.
    And I will yield the floor to my other superintendent 
colleagues. Over.
    General Williams. Congressman, we are getting fantastic 
support from the Army and DOD in this space. To date, we have 
vaccinated just over 4,000 here at West Point. That is not the 
corps of cadets. That is, much as Rich laid out, the framework 
of first responders and such and folks that are in vulnerable 
populations. I have 4,400 cadets here, but in the community 
writ large at West Point, about 8,000 in the community and 
such.
    So we are on path. Rich laid it out in terms of, when it is 
available, we will do it. As you know, we are under emergency 
use, so we cannot mandate. But, sir, we have very high--the 
cadets want this vaccination. It is well over 90 percent that 
are going to--so when we get it and when it is available, I am 
confident that we will be vaccinated here at the United States 
Military Academy and contribute to Army readiness as we go 
forward.
    Mr. Aderholt. Thank you.
    Admiral Buck. And, Congressman Aderholt, what I have is 
done is--I have the same schema; it is a DOD schema. It is 
going well. I would suggest it is slow and steady. We went 
after the same prioritization as General Clark articulated to 
you.
    I have given my Navy a timeline for when I need to have the 
midshipmen vaccinated, because the way we do our summer 
training is I will send the vast majority of midshipmen out to 
the fleet to embark on operational ships, submarines, 
squadrons, Navy SEAL teams.
    And our Navy has prioritized the operational forces first. 
They are getting vaccinated. They have a very safe and healthy 
bubble. And for them to be willing to accept our midshipmen 
from the Academy as well as midshipmen from NROTC universities 
around the country, we need to vaccinate them prior to the 
summer training started.
    So we are anticipating our summer training--it first opens 
up around the 15th of May. I need to start vaccinating that 
small cohort of midshipmen around the last week of this month, 
March. And then I hope to be able to start vaccinating all the 
rest of them in the first 3 weeks of April.
    And that will allow them to get through the two-shot 
schema, 4 weeks between them, and then develop the immunity 
with 2 weeks after that second shot, and they will be an up-
and-ready round for the fleet. And all the captains of the 
units out in the Navy fleet will be ready to accept them, and 
we can conduct summer training, which is such an important 
aspect of the development of a midshipman.
    Over.

                             Academy Pledge

    Mr. Aderholt. Mr. Chair, I know my time is up, but if I 
could just ask for the--I wanted to ask about one other issue, 
and they can respond on the record.
    Of course, I believe in mutual respect. That is important 
for all our cadets, no matter what service they are in. But a 
little bit--this question about this pledge to respect the 
intersexual identities of servicemembers at the Naval Academy. 
Like I said, it is my understanding that mutual respect and 
leadership traits and leadership principles, that is already a 
part of the program and should already be well drilled in to 
these cadets.
    And I just want to just inquire about that. And since my 
time is up, you can reply for the record.
    Mr. Ryan [presiding]. I appreciate that, Mr. Aderholt. 
Thank you.
    Mr. Aguilar.

                         Composition of Faculty

    Mr. Aguilar. Thank you, Mr. Ryan.
    And I appreciate the chairwoman putting this hearing 
forward and, superintendents, for your work.
    Gentlemen, I wanted to ask a little bit about the faculty. 
Could you describe the composition of your faculty at each 
academy? What is the mix of civilian and military professors, 
and how diverse is the population, and the types of 
qualifications, and if tenure applies?
    I just wanted to get a better understanding and hear that 
with my colleagues. If we could start with Superintendent 
Williams and then proceed, that would be appreciated.
    General Williams. Yes, sir. Thank you for the question.
    Yeah, so our staff and faculty here are diverse, about 70 
military/30 civilian. We have been on that path for some time.
    I will tell you that we have--at the core of it are our 
great department heads. We have 13 department heads. And these 
are men and women who are Army colonels who have devoted their 
life to their particular discipline and spent some time here. 
That is one part of the triumvirate here.
    And then our great Army civilians, our senior Army 
civilians, who have been recently tenured in the last few 
years, who also add to the academics. They partner with those 
department heads.
    And then there is this rotational part of the faculty that 
are young captains and majors who provide intellectual capital 
back to our great Army. So, this is Captain Major Williams. You 
know, they are midway through their career. They go back, 
receive a Ph.D., teach here for 3 years in a utilization tour, 
and then return intellectual capital back to our great Army. 
And that is usually about a 5- and sometimes it could be a 6-
year tenure.
    And so those are the different elements. You have more 
senior tenured professors, civilian; you have senior tenured 
colonels who have devoted their life to this academic 
profession; and then our rotational faculty, who are younger 
officers who will return also to the Army and be the battalion 
brigade commanders for our cadets.
    So the relationship and the sense of ownership that our 
young faculty have with these cadets is a vital part of how we 
go forward.
    Thank you for your question, sir.
    General Clark. And, sir, Lieutenant General Clark from Air 
Force. I will add on.
    We are about 60 percent military and 40 percent civilian in 
our faculty. And, like General Williams stated, our military 
faculty really bring an operational flavor to the academic 
curriculum; and, of course, our civilians, many Ph.D's, many 
from other areas of academia, who help us to bring that 
perspective to our program.
    I want to also highlight, though, we have coaches, we have 
air officer commanding who are in charge of each cadet squadron 
with our academy military trainers, our enlisted members, who 
help to lead those squadrons, who also bring the perspectives 
that our cadets need in their development.
    I will say, one of the things that we are working very 
diligently on is to increase the diversity of our staff and 
faculty and to ensure that not only our cadets look like 
America but that our staff and faculty represent that as well. 
That will be a great benefit to our cadets' development, and we 
will continue to work that.
    Thank you, sir.
    Admiral Buck. Congressman Aguilar, we at Navy are a little 
bit different than my other two sister academies. We are 
traditionally 50/50. Today, as I speak to you, we are 53 
percent civilian/47 percent military professors. And it is a 
total of 600 faculty here.
    In that uniformed group of faculty, 19 percent of them are 
women, 19 percent of them are men or women of minority. We 
continue to look at our hiring practices across the whole 
faculty to try to develop a diverse faculty workforce there so 
that the young men and women that go to school here look and 
see men and women that may look like them.
    We have a tenure program here. So we have tenured 
professors, full professors, associate professors. And then 
each year, to fill the gaps, we hire a fluctuating number of 
adjunct professors to fill in where we may have holes on one 
particular year. And those professors come from a very diverse 
background, sir.
    Mr. Aguilar. I appreciate the answers, gentlemen, and would 
just, you know, continue--and I specifically appreciate 
Superintendent Clark talking a little bit about the continued 
need to review hiring practices and to better reflect the 
diverse population that we want the academies to serve.
    So thank you, gentlemen. I know this is an evolving issue, 
and I appreciate your openness to these questions on this 
topic.
    Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Mr. Ryan. Thank you, Mr. Aguilar. I appreciate you asking 
those very important questions.
    Judge Carter.
    Mr. Calvert. Mr. Chairman, before that----
    Mr. Ryan. Yes.
    Mr. Calvert. Judge Carter is going to cover for me. 
Unfortunately, I have a conflict. So the judge has got it from 
here. Thank you.
    Mr. Ryan. Okay.
    Judge Carter, you are also up for your 5 minutes of 
questions.
    Mr. Carter. Thank you for recognizing me.
    And thank you to the superintendents for being able to be 
here and talk to us today. We are learning quite a bit.
    I am going to ask a couple of things that go back when we 
were back talking about cyber. With the concept of all joint 
command and control, how are you attracting and retaining 
qualified civilian faculty in the technical disciplines? And 
what type of funding do you need to ensure that the U.S. 
maintains a resilient cyber force within the Department of 
Defense and with our intelligence partners? What kind of help 
do you need?
    General Clark. Yes, sir. I can start off with that. 
Lieutenant General Clark.
    We have majors and many classes throughout our entire 
curriculum that address our cyber needs. And as both General 
Raymond, our Space Force commander, who says that every 
guardian has to speak digital as their language, they have to 
understand the cyber domain if we are going to be able to 
execute joint all-domain command and control, and General 
Brown, in his charge for accelerating change or lose, has 
emphasized that as well. So our majors in cyber, every course 
that we teach in cyber is critical for us.
    We are also breaking ground this month on our Cyber 
Innovation Center, which is an opportunity for us to bring in 
partners not only from the broader Air Force and Space Force 
but also from industry so that our cadets can have the 
opportunity not only to learn in academics but also to 
experience the real-world needs and address real problems.
    One of the areas that we could use help with, though, sir, 
is in our information technology. Our IT is woefully behind 
where we need to be to be, I think, a provider of cyber 
excellence.
    Right now, we have needs for immediate funding for this 
year, funding unfunded requirements. Plus, we need money into 
the POM, because our network is not the same network that the 
broader Air Force uses. We are on a dot-edu, whereas the Air 
Force is on a dot-mil. The dot-edu allows us to collaborate, it 
allows us to innovate, and it connects us with researchers and 
other universities that we need to be a world-class 
organization.
    So we don't fall under the normal IT funding that the rest 
of the Air Force comes under. So that funding that we need not 
only now but into the out-years is vital for us. In fact, it 
threatens our accreditation.
    During COVID, we have recognized our weaknesses as we have 
gone to more virtual classes. So we have great needs, I think, 
from a fiscal standpoint, to allow us to meet our aspirations 
to be that school of cyber excellence.
    So I will stop there, sir, but we appreciate any help that 
you can provide to move us forward with our IT so that we are 
the provider of cyber excellence.
    Over.
    Mr. Carter. Anyone else?
    Admiral Buck. Congressman Carter, the Naval Academy, we are 
proud to represent ourselves as a center of cyber excellence. 
We aggressively got after this about 12 years ago and committed 
ourselves to doing so.
    And, just this year, on my tenure, we opened up, I believe, 
one of the first cyber operations center buildings in the 
country, and we brought the capability here to be able to teach 
our midshipmen right from the ground floor at the Top Secret, 
Specially Compartmented level. And, as you know, the topic of 
cyber, it is very unremarkable to teach it at the unclass 
level.
    So, now, when these young men and women graduate from the 
Naval Academy, having been exposed to cyber across their entire 
journey here, they are much more capable, much more aware, much 
more cognizant of how to fight and work and live within the 
cyber domain.
    We take on an all/many/few concept here. Every single 
midshipman takes two courses in cyber. We present many 
opportunities for many to be exposed to cyber through lectures 
and conferences and research projects. And we now have a cyber 
operations major, in which 75 midshipmen matriculate to each 
time--each year entering class.
    If I were to tell you what we have trouble with in 
attracting the best faculty to teach in cyber, it is being able 
to pay a cyber professor on a Federal pay scale. That is very 
difficult to compete with what they can do out in private 
industry, sir.
    I am not so sure how to crack that nut other than to 
present them a really, really rewarding experience teaching 
fine young men and women at the Academy who are passionate to 
learn. We now present world-class facilities. But you do know 
that it would be very difficult to present a Federal pay scale 
to someone steeped in cyber who can do a lot better on the 
outside.
    Over.
    Mr. Carter. Anybody else?
    General Williams. Yes, sir.
    Sir, three components: the brick-and-mortar aspect, as I 
mentioned earlier, the Cyber Engineering Academic Center, which 
will transform the very face of West Point. I know when--we 
look forward to welcoming you back again, sir; you were here 2 
years ago. That will be transformational.
    But I will tell you, while we are waiting for that to 
mature, we enjoy efficiencies with the Army Cyber Institute, 
which is just outside West Point. And we attract right now the 
best and brightest from our civilian counterparts. So that 
becomes a skunkworks for our cadets to work on their projects 
that they are working on, but also to be informed by the best 
and brightest in the cyber energy that we are realizing every 
single day.
    And in terms of our actual pedagogy, sir, we have six 
academic majors--computer science, applied statistics and data 
science, electrical engineering, information technology, and 
system engineers--producing about 100 cadets each year who are 
motivated, inspired to winning and defeating our adversaries in 
cyberspace.
    Mr. Carter. Well, thank you. That is all good information.
    I know I have gone past my time. Just curious, and you 
might send me some information, about any endowments you have 
for graduate students in the area of STEM which would fit into 
our concept of future warfighting. I think that is important.
    Remember, we are the Appropriations Committee, and we are 
interested in how we can help, and that is why I ask these 
funding questions.
    I will yield back.
    Mr. Ryan. Appreciate it, Judge.
    Mr. Crist.

                          Racism and Extremism

    Mr. Crist. Thank you for being here, to the three of you.
    You know, in the military, I have been reading news 
accounts lately that the academies are grappling with White 
supremacy, racism, and extremism. And I am curious what actions 
the academies have taken to address any and all of these 
issues.
    Please. For any one of the three of you.
    General Williams. Sir, General Williams at West Point. I 
will start.
    So, sir, we have, as a part of--back to my earlier comment 
about what our chief refers to as our corrosives: sexual 
assault, sexual harassment, racism, and extremism. So the 
approach we have taken here, as I mentioned before, is how we 
have elevated character.
    What I don't want here at West Point is that we have sort 
of this whack-a-mole approach. We have to approach this 
comprehensively from an interdisciplinary standpoint. This is 
about treating each other with dignity and respect. We start 
there and we end there in our small squads, peer-to-peer 
relationships.
    And so, sir, what we do, to answer specifically your 
question, what we have been doing, we are on our fifth 
honorable living day. So, in 2 weeks, I will stand down the 
entire Academy--the cadets, the community. There will be no 
work, there will be no sports, no one will go to class. And we 
will focus on this very subject. The Secretary of Defense has 
given us some interim guidance on how these discussions will 
ensue, and I know my wingmen are working on it as well.
    But that, for us, is just a preliminary step. We will take 
it much further. The key to this, sir, is that these young men 
and women look each other in the eye and face this issue and 
talk to each other about this. So we will provide the space and 
the time for the Academy to come together and talk about 
extremism.
    Thank you, sir.
    Mr. Crist. General, if I could follow up--and thank you 
very much. I appreciate that.
    So when you stand down the entire Academy and you discuss 
this, what is, sort of, the forum, format? How do you do that? 
What do you talk about? Have you done one yet already?
    General Williams. Yes, sir. Not specifically in an 
extremism space, but in these other corrosives, we have done 
it.
    So the cadets actually demand them; they ask. They are a 
vital part of it. The cadets help us design what it is going to 
look like.
    So it usually starts in our stadium, sir, with myself and 
the other senior leaders. And I stand up and talk about our 
values and what is important and why it is important to be in 
this space. So I will start off the day.
    And then, normally, what we found in the last one--we did 
one on racism last fall--we will have a cadet panel. So the 
cadets will be up there, and they will share their experiences 
with their classmates.
    Mr. Crist. Right.
    General Williams. And there will be real, raw conversations 
which will pull at the emotive strings a little bit.
    And then, from there, we will bring in, sometimes, experts 
from the field, sort of referring back to the earlier question.
    But the most important, vital part, sir, is the small 
group, not at the macro level but at the micro level, at the 
squads and platoons, facilitated by our great TACs and TAC NCOs 
and our professors facilitating those questions. Because our 
young men and women are at different parts of their 47-month 
journey, and they are going to need a little assist.
    And so they will have these discussions, but then our folks 
who have--our majors and our colonels and our generals and 
sergeants and coaches will be part of this vital, active 
conversation, which will help them fill in the gaps if we need 
to, sir.
    Mr. Crist. That is excellent.
    It sounds like to me--I have these yellow wristbands that I 
wear every day, and it says, ``Practice the golden rule every 
day.'' And, of course, the golden rule is ``do unto others as 
you would have done unto you.'' And, to me, that is the 
ultimate in character, that you treat people with mutual 
respect, with decency, and that you comport yourself that way. 
I try to do it every day. I don't always succeed, but I try.
    And it sounds like, to me, that that is sort of the road 
you are going down when you stand down the Academy for a full 
day--no class, no sports, no nothing, except talking about 
character and decency and goodness.
    General Williams. Yes, sir. If I could follow up, 
absolutely, sir, that is exactly the heart of this. Nothing 
else matters except this.
    And then we have follow-on--we are not so naive to think 
that that one day is going to make a difference. It is going to 
send a clear and unambiguous signal to everybody on the post 
that the leaders care, but then there is the follow-up action. 
What is the action plan? What do we do after that day? And that 
is what we are finding.
    And we work with our cadets. And the cadets lead in this 
space. Our trust in peer cadets absolutely champion this space. 
And we look forward to talking to you more about that, sir, in 
the future. They do really well in facilitating these tough 
discussions.
    Mr. Crist. General, I appreciate your answer. I am out of 
time. I will yield back. But God bless you, and thank you.
    Ms. McCollum [presiding]. I am back. And I understand it is 
Mr. Diaz-Balart's turn to ask a question.

                         Character Development

    Mr. Diaz-Balart. Madam Chairwoman, thank you so much.
    All of you have spent--and I think it has been very 
productive--talking a lot about sexual assault, which is so 
important, and also the instances of cheating, for the lack of 
a better term.
    And, obviously, a big part of what you all do--and you do 
it better than anyone in the Nation and, frankly, anyone in the 
world--is instill, you know, character and character 
development, but you do a lot of that through peer-to-peer 
leadership. There was some conversation about that.
    Right now, with COVID and everything else--and we have seen 
the increase of incidents, for example, you know, of cheating, 
et cetera--but how are you able to instruct, you know, get that 
character development, when, in fact, you know, we are limited 
on the peer-to-peer interaction?
    And anyone who wants to deal with it, or maybe all of you.
    General Clark. Sir, Lieutenant General Clark. I can start 
with that.
    The character development--and here at the Air Force 
Academy, we have a leader-of-character development framework 
that our whole program is focused on, because that is the core 
of what we do. And we are able to actually do things virtually 
that we haven't been able to do in a world where we weren't as 
virtual.
    For example, we just had a National Character and 
Leadership Symposium, where we had dozens of leaders of 
character from around our country, regardless of--some were 
military, some from the civilian sector. And what they do is, 
they are able to share with our cadets and other partners that 
we invite into this symposium to give them examples and to help 
them understand what it means to be a leader of character, what 
it means to live honorably. And the theme for this year's 
symposium was ``warrior ethos.''
    And we not only reached our whole cadet population, but we 
reached thousands of others outside of our population. But it 
is these kinds of examples and stories and opportunities for 
the cadets to see what that means.
    But, also, in our internal programs and processes, like you 
mentioned, peer-to-peer education is critical, but the virtual 
world allows us to reach people in different ways. And I 
believe that we are able to continue our program and still 
focus on our leader-of character framework to develop those 
leaders that are the core of our mission.
    Over.
    Mr. Diaz-Balart. Is there a way to kind of know if that is 
as effective, you know, the whole virtual world, as effective 
as one-on-one, you know, human interaction when it comes to 
character development?
    And, actually, the same thing on, you know, obviously, you 
know, sexual assault and sexual harassment, which is, you know, 
the worst possible infraction, right?
    So is there a way to know if--can we track how effective 
this is, this new reality of virtual, you know, contact versus, 
you know, human-to-human contact?
    General Clark. I think it is hard to know, sir, what, you 
know, the end results would be and is it as effective. My gut 
tells me that person-to-person, face-to-face contact, in many 
instances, is better. But when we are limited in the ways that 
we are, we are doing the absolute best that we can.
    And I think that at least the feedback from our cadets is 
that they still have those opportunities. And we can't miss a 
beat. We don't have time to rest just because COVID is here and 
is a part of our lives now. We still have to develop these 
leaders, because we still have to graduate these cadets when 
their time comes so that they can go out and serve.
    But I think your point is well-taken. Sometimes face-to-
face is just better. That human interaction helps us. But we 
are working to overcome some of those challenges.
    Over, sir.

                             Mental Health

    Mr. Diaz-Balart. And, lastly, really, on the same issue, I 
imagine that, also, you know, it is more difficult to kind of 
find out, track, frankly, discover issues of mental health when 
you don't have, again, the one-on-one interaction.
    So I am assuming that those are all challenges that you all 
are--I know that you are facing them, and I know that you are 
doing the best job--probably the best job in the country. But 
it would be interesting to kind of figure out what you are 
looking at, what is working, what isn't working on this new era 
that you all have kind of inherited of having to do this stuff 
virtually.
    General Williams. Sir, if I could comment, I will tell you 
that a lot of what Rich talked about in terms of setting these 
frameworks--my dean does a great job with our professors here 
to set a framework that they can operate in. So she goes 
through a very deliberate process of training up and 
calibrating our leaders.
    And I will give you an example. Last year, ``study of war 
and the human condition'' were the threads that linked all, 
whether you were on the STEM side or the humanities side. So 
she sets the framework out, and our great officers and 
civilians here move in that.
    Next year, the theme for next year is ``ethical leadership 
in a diverse world.'' So they now have the template, which they 
can then spend the spring and the summer preparing that way.
    And back to the metrics or measuring, I will tell you, one 
technique we use in the honor thing--and Congressman Womack 
mentioned it earlier--but our Special Leader Development 
Program, allowing cadets--you measure on the front end of their 
47-month experience, and then you measure on the aft end of 
their 47-month experience, and you can see the maturity in 
their writing in terms of how they think about what is 
happening to them, what is happening in the world around them.
    That is how you develop a lot of these metrics, which are 
very hard to tease out and are things that are a little more 
opaque.

                         Infrastructure Repairs

    Ms. McCollum. I would like to talk about facilities for a 
few minutes. So, when I reviewed the information from my staff 
regarding the needs and repairs on some of the items, they have 
been listed there for quite a few years. The committee had held 
a service academy hearing 2 years ago, and it really appears 
that items are still there from 2019. They haven't been 
addressed. They have either been not funded or underfunded.
    Let me give you an example. Support facility Camp Buckner, 
where I was 2 years ago, we saw serious issues with mold. Mr. 
Womack was there on that. Or the utility bridge at the Naval 
Academy, that urgently needs to be replaced, and if we lose 
that, that will be a catastrophe.
    So I am going to press the secretaries of your services on 
those questions, because these issues can't lay dormant. And, 
you know, 10-, 20-, 30-year plans for some of this stuff is 
putting a lot of hope and a lot of wishes that they are going 
to move forward.
    So I am going to ask you gentlemen to take a minute and, 
you know, tell me why you think these delays remain and why 
these projects haven't been addressed in a timely fashion.
    Because I am going to ask your leadership why they aren't a 
priority. I am not going to ask you why you don't think that 
they are a priority with your leadership; I am going to ask 
them. Because we think it is a priority.
    So we are going to have some questions that we are going to 
follow up on, but we just have a minute right now, and I have a 
page of questions on these projects that the committee staff is 
going to be sharing with you, and then I will share with the 
whole committee when we get the answers back.
    But what is the hold-up on these projects not getting done, 
in your opinion? Because I think Mr. Womack and I and others 
have made it very clear in our conversations with the service 
heads that we are looking to see that these projects be 
finished.
    And maybe I will start with you, Mr. Buck. Because letting 
that bridge wait too long is, in my opinion, a very 
unprofessional, dangerous, and foolish thing to do.
    Admiral Buck. Thank you, ma'am, for that question and the 
opportunity to give a response. And I don't know whether my 
response mirrors my colleagues, so this is just unique to the 
Naval Academy and to our Navy.
    Since 2010, my budgets for sustainment, renovation, and 
modernization have remained pretty constant, without 
recognizing the growth that we have had here of new 
construction. And then, when we hit sequestration in 2013 and a 
significant reduction in budgets, our Navy as a whole had to 
reprioritize what was most important to the infrastructure for 
the whole Navy. And we all were affected by that, no matter 
what installation or where we were located in the world. And 
the Naval Academy wasn't immune from that.
    So we put on hold--as to use your word, we put on hold some 
really important projects to either renovate, modernize, and we 
began to focus just on sustainment, and sometimes sustainment 
with Band-Aids, just to get us through with leaky roofs and 
things like that, but not a whole frame-up restoration where it 
might be needed.
    You have mentioned one of my top three priorities. The 
utility bridge is in need of replacement. MacDonough Hall, 
which is the center of my physical fitness mission at the Naval 
Academy, is on the chart right now to be renovated, and we hope 
that funding remains that has been given to us.
    Our Navy, in fiscal year 2020 and fiscal year 2021 that we 
are enjoying right now, revitalized our infrastructure budgets. 
And we have been healthy and been able to begin to plan back 
toward improving and addressing our infrastructure projects.
    What I want to leave you with and the committee with is, we 
need to be sure that we have a consistent budget in each of the 
out-years. That would be really important to our planning 
effort and our ability to know that we are going to get after 
our highest-priority infrastructure projects.
    Ms. McCollum. Mr. Clark, if you take a minute, you were 
impacted by the recent storms along with some other projects 
that you had. Some of the issues with your pipes, is that being 
considered a priority to be repaired now by the Air Force to 
help you out with that?
    Sir, you are on mute.
    General Clark. Can you hear me, ma'am?
    Ms. McCollum. I can hear you now, sir.
    General Clark. Okay. I am sorry.
    Yes, it is a priority for our Air Force. But I will say, 
overarching, our enterprise is constantly sustaining, 
restoring, modernizing across the entire Air Force. We do 
receive, I think, priority commensurate with the rest of the 
Air Force and Space Force mission, and we have been in a 
steady, I think, restoration and modernization mode for some 
time.
    As you stated earlier, all of our buildings were built at 
the same time, back, you know, in the sixties and the fifties. 
So we are seeing a lot of the issues that are arising; they all 
arise in about the same timeframe. And our Air Force is 
responsive to help us with this. It is just the problem is 
pretty significant and we have a constant drumbeat.
    But I would say that we are right in line with the rest of 
our Air Force as far as SRM goes. So we could always use more 
help from a budgetary standpoint, because there is a lot to do 
here, and we appreciate anything you can do for us.
    Thank you, ma'am.
    Ms. McCollum. Mr. Williams, I am going to let you have the 
last word, because I mentioned your facility first, and Mr. 
Womack and I have seen it firsthand.
    Is that a 10-year, did you say, repair for those buildings? 
Some of them have mold, they have water issues and that. Is 
that a 10-year spread-out that they are giving you to replace 
the buildings?
    General Williams. Chair McCollum, thank you. And I 
appreciate your continued focus, as you and Congressman Womack 
were out here 2 years. We actually were helped a lot by you 
coming out here to Camp Buckner.
    The Army has fully endorsed and integrated all aspects of 
our plan. We came up with a plan shortly after your visit, the 
USMA 2035 plan. Fiscal year 2021-2030 facility investment plan, 
which I worked very closely with AMC and senior Army leaders, 
is fully endorsed.
    And with respect to Buckner, we are working right now. In a 
few weeks, we get after the barracks and the mold. It is a two-
phase project. The first part of the phase is focused on the 
barracks that we took you in and you saw that mold. The second 
phase is a 5-year MILCON plan that gets at both where the task 
force that comes and participates with the summer training, 
Camp Natural Bridge, and also Camp Buckner.
    We feel very comfortable with what the Army has currently 
given us with respect to funding associated with Camp Buckner, 
ma'am.
    Ms. McCollum. Well, we are going to follow up and make sure 
that, you know--there is a reason why we became appropriators. 
It is nice to have great ideas and want to do all the wonderful 
things the authorizers have, but without the resources to do 
it, they remain just great ideas.
    General Williams. Thanks, Chair.
    Ms. McCollum. Thank you. We will be following up on that.
    Mr. Ryan, thanks again for helping me out.

                          Health and Wellness

    Mr. Ryan. Thank you, Madam Chair. I almost kept that gavel, 
you know.
    Ms. McCollum. You have your own.
    Mr. Ryan. I appreciate it.
    I just have one question. And thank you for all the answers 
and thoroughness.
    I want to talk to General Clark for a second about the 
Academy, and you guys conducted a test of the new campus dining 
card, if you are familiar with this.
    And one of the issues that we have been working on a lot 
really is combining the idea around health and wellness, 
especially around diet, because we look at the cost of obesity, 
diabetes. It is more than a significant cost for us around 
healthcare for our Active Duty, and that makes its way into our 
VA budget as well.
    And, really, we want to try to get to the root issue there, 
and that is really teaching our men and women in the academies, 
you know, what to eat and how to eat and how to really function 
at a peak level. And they are, in so many ways, not different 
than many college kids, who--all of us who have been to college 
know that it is not necessarily the best diet in college.
    So I want to ask you about the Mitchell Dining Hall 
facility. The cadets were allowed to use their meal entitlement 
outside of the Mitchell Hall dining facility at venues offering 
healthier offerings instead of going out-of-pocket for other 
meals. It is generally known that, at the service academies, 
they do not eat all their meals at the campus dining facility.
    We have heard that your program, not surprisingly, was 
extremely popular with the cadets who were fortunate to be a 
part of this test, but we heard that the test was cut short. 
And so if you could just speak in the next couple of minutes, 
why was the program stopped, and what were the key findings 
from the program, and will you be implementing any of those 
changes into the program moving forward?
    Sorry, you are still muted. There you go, General.
    General Clark. Can you hear me, sir?
    Mr. Ryan. I can hear you now, yep.
    General Clark. Apologies. A little tech difficulty.
    Mr. Ryan. That is all right.
    General Clark. We need that IT funding. That is what is 
going on there, sir.
    But I will just say, sir, that your point is spot-on. 
Healthy nutrition is key for peak performance here. At all of 
our academies, the rigor of our programs demands that our 
cadets are healthy, that their nutrition is solid.
    And we have just hired a new dietician for Mitchell Hall, 
we also hired an executive chef, with a focus on providing 
nutritious and delicious meals to our cadets so that they do 
have the desire to go into Mitchell Hall, into the dining 
facility, to take part in that. And we are getting some good 
results so far.
    As far as the dining card project that we did, we started 
that, and we, unfortunately, did have to cut it short due to 
COVID. And COVID didn't allow our cadets to go to some of the 
other options that they had for dining.
    So we cut it short. We do want to reinvigorate that 
program, though, in fiscal year 2022 so that we can provide 
those other options for our cadets to take part in. But 
regardless of how we do this, we want to ensure that it is 
always, always about their nutrition and that it is healthy 
options.
    So we will monitor it. We will probably start off small 
when we begin in fiscal year 2022 with on-base opportunities, 
and then look to perhaps expand. But we are going to start with 
our on-base options and provide them with healthy 
opportunities.
    Over, sir.
    Mr. Ryan. Well, I appreciate that.
    And, Madam Chair, as we have talked, you know, I want to do 
what we can from this committee really across the academies and 
across the military. We invest so much money into our men and 
women, yet we seem to lack the kind of initiatives around diet 
and nutrition. And we see it; the end result is around the 
diabetes and obesity issues that we have with Active Duty.
    And I believe that we have an opportunity with the 
academies really to set these young people up to really 
function at a very, very high level. You know, I watched with 
great interest the pre-stories of the Super Bowl, with Tom 
Brady and his diet and how he functions at such a peak level. 
We are putting a lot of money into these academies, a lot of 
money into these kids. We should try to get at least some level 
of that to our academies and our military.
    So, with that, I yield back the balance of my time, Madam 
Chair. Thank you.
    Ms. McCollum. Thank you. And our last question--and it is 
12:30 eastern standard time--had to do with lunch and food. So 
perfect timing.
    Gentlemen, I want to thank you for your accessibility to 
the committee. I think you know that we are here to make sure 
that our young men and women who go to our military academies 
graduate with a great education, a great sense of 
responsibility, a great sense of our appreciation for them. And 
part of the way that we do that is by the faculty that we give 
them and the facilities that they are attending. Because you 
are competing, we are competing, America is competing with all 
the other colleges and universities that are out there for 
these, the brightest and the most talented that our country 
has.
    So I want to thank you so much for everything. And we will 
follow up, especially on the maintenance and some of the 
facility issues. I look forward to COVID ending so that some of 
us can come out and visit your facilities and get to spend time 
with the midshipmen as well as the cadets and those who are 
serving at the Air Force Academy.
    So that concludes today's hearing. And, with that, the 
subcommittee stands adjourned. Thank you again.

                                         Wednesday, March 17, 2021.

           CLIMATE CHANGE, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND THE ARCTIC

                               WITNESSES

 SHERRI GOODMAN, SENIOR FELLOW, WILSON CENTER
 VICE ADMIRAL DENNIS V. MCGINN (RET.), ADVISORY BOARD MEMBER, CENTER 
    FOR CLIMATE AND SECURITY
    Ms. McCollum. This meeting will come to order.
    This hearing is fully virtual. So I am going to address a 
few things that Kyle did not talk about with housekeeping 
matters.
    For today's meeting, the chair or staff designated by the 
chair may mute participants' microphones when they are not 
under recognition for the purpose of eliminating background 
noise.
    Members are responsible for muting and unmuting themselves. 
If you notice or I notice that you haven't unmuted yourself, I 
will ask you if you would like staff to unmute you. If you 
would like, indicate by nodding your head, and staff will 
unmute your microphone.
    I remind all the members and witnesses that the 5-minute 
clock still applies, and you can see the clock up in the screen 
there.
    If there is a technology issue, we will move to the next 
member until the issue is resolved, and you will retain the 
balance of your time.
    You will notice, as I said, a clock on your screen. That 
will show how much time is remaining. At one minute remaining, 
the clock will turn yellow. At 30 seconds remaining, I will 
gently tap the gavel, my mouse, to remind members that their 
time is almost expired.
    When your time has expired, the clock will turn red, and I 
will begin to recognize the other member. I will just start 
recognizing the other member once it turns red.
    In terms of speaking order, we will follow the order set 
forth in the House rules, beginning with the chair and ranking 
member; and then members who are present at the time that the 
hearing was called to order, they will be recognized in order 
of seniority; and, finally, members not present at the time of 
the hearing is called to order.
    And I am going off script for a minute. We are going to try 
to put the order on deck for speaking on the chat, so look at 
your chat screen. And hopefully we will get some feedback, and 
maybe if that works for members, then they will know when they 
are up.
    Finally, House rules require me to remind you that we have 
set up an email address to which members can send anything they 
wish to submit in writing at any of our hearings or markups. 
That email address has been provided to your staff.
    So that takes care of the housekeeping.

                  Opening Statement of Chair McCollum

    Last month, the subcommittee held a hearing on budget 
trends and potential trajectories of defense spending in the 
next 10 to 20 years. As I mentioned, I want the subcommittee to 
use our time before we see the fiscal year 2022 budget request 
to think about larger themes, what priorities we want to direct 
funds towards in the upcoming budget cycle to address future 
challenges. This is another hearing in that series.
    This morning, the subcommittee will receive testimony from 
two of the foremost experts on the subject of climate change 
and national security. Sherri Goodman is a senior fellow with 
the Polar Institute and Environmental Change and Security 
Program at The Wilson Center, and retired Vice Admiral Dennis 
McGinn is an advisory board member at the Center for Climate 
and Security. We look forward to both of their testimonies.
    There can be no doubt--no doubt--that our climate is 
changing. The Department of Defense and the entire Federal 
Government must be prepared or suffer the consequences.
    In the last few years, we have seen historic hurricanes, 
catastrophic damage to Tyndall Air Force Base in Florida, Camp 
LeJeune in North Carolina. Those hurricanes seriously impacted 
the Air Force and Marine Corps' operations and cost taxpayers 
millions of dollars.
    In 2019, the historic Mississippi floodwaters overflowed 
onto Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska, posing a threat to U.S. 
Strategic Command operations. These are not isolated climate 
incidences. Climate change is a national security threat to our 
Nation now, and the threat is growing.
    The largest Federal consumer of energy--the largest--is the 
Department of Defense. It has a responsibility, then, to play a 
leading role in making its systems more efficient and to curb 
emissions in order to reduce these catastrophic events. And 
that is why I am pleased, in his first week of office, 
President Biden signed an executive order which requires the 
following: the Director of National Intelligence to issue a 
report on the national and economic security impacts of climate 
change; the Secretary of Defense to develop a climate risk 
analysis that could incorporate into modelling, simulation, 
wargaming, and other analysis; and, finally, the Secretary of 
Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to 
consider security implications of climate change in developing 
the National Defense Strategy, defense planning guidance, the 
Chairman's risk assessment, and other relevant strategy 
planning and programming documents.
    These actions are long overdue, and I thank President Biden 
for leading on this critical issue.
    The change in climate will impact every corner of the 
Earth, but nowhere is it more pronounced than in the Arctic. As 
a former social studies teacher, I can say many Americans don't 
realize that the United States is an Arctic nation, and I have 
a map here, and you can look at it, and I handed out a map 
before. This is my moment to be a social studies teacher. You 
need to look at your map and look at Alaska, and look at how we 
are part of the Arctic Council, folks.
    We must ensure that the Arctic region plays an appropriate 
role in our national security planning. Our adversaries, they 
are active in the region, and we must be ready to respond from 
issues relating to thawing permafrost affecting installations 
or our ability to train and use equipment that can survive in 
extreme environments. We must ensure the freedom--the freedom 
of navigation through the Bering Strait, and these are just 
some of the important topics to discuss.
    With that, I want to thank everyone for participating at 
today's hearing, and I would like to recognize our 
distinguished ranking member, Mr. Calvert, for his comments.

                     Opening Remarks of Mr. Calvert

    Mr. Calvert. Well, thank you.
    Thank you, Chair McCollum. I appreciate that.
    And happy Saint Patrick's Day. And I apologize for some of 
our Republican colleagues who won't be on the conference this 
morning because we have our Republican Conference meeting this 
morning. Some of them won't make it or be on late.
    But let me extend a warm with welcome to our distinguished 
witnesses. As the United States continues to focus on our 
National Security Strategy on great power competition, 
specifically threats arising from a more assertive China and 
Russia, it is important that we be attentive to other 
nontraditional challenges.
    Over the years, Department of Defense has periodically 
assessed the effects of a changing climate on DOD missions, 
operational plans, and installations. A report to Congress in 
2019, for example, noted a range of severe related events 
impacting our military installations; discussed how a change in 
climate can create insecurity, increasing demands for 
humanitarian assistance; and how it can create unanticipated 
vulnerabilities through mission execution.
    Perhaps the most notable impact of changing climate to our 
strategic environment has been in the Arctic, as the chair 
mentioned. According to a new report by the Atlantic Council, a 
geopolitical friction over resources, territory, and 
transportation channels suggest the Arctic is likely to be one 
of the 21st century's most contested areas.
    With that in mind, I welcome Secretary Austin's 
announcement that the Department will take appropriate actions 
to incorporate climate change considerations in DOD's 
activities and risk assessments to mitigate this driver of 
insecurity. I look forward to hearing from our experts on these 
issues and begin our assessment of the Department of Defense 
budget for the fiscal year 2022.
    Again, thank you to our witnesses for appearing before us.
    And, with that, chair, I yield back.
    Ms. McCollum. Thank you so much, Mr. Calvert.
    To the witnesses, your full written testimony will be 
placed in the record, and members have copies at their desks.
    In the interest of time, I would strongly encourage each of 
you to keep your summarized statement to 5 minutes because we 
are going to have to leave time for questions. And I want you 
to be complete, as succinct as you can also, in responding to 
our questions so we can get more in.
    Ms. Goodman, we will start with you. Welcome, and thank you 
for being here.

                    Summary Statement of Ms. Goodman

    Ms. Goodman. Chair McCollum, Ranking Member Calvert, and 
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the 
opportunity to testify today.
    I have over 30 years of experience as a national security 
professional. I served as the first Deputy Under Secretary of 
Defense for Environmental Security in the 1990s and for 14 
years at the Center for Naval Analysis, now at The Wilson 
Center, and the Center for Climate and Security. The views I am 
presenting today are my own.
    As my Navy colleagues like to say, give me the BLUF, the 
bottom line upfront. Okay. Here is mine.
    First, climate change presents a direct threat to U.S. 
national security that must be integrated into defense 
strategy, planning, and programs at all levels.
    Second, the U.S. must prioritize climate change in its 
security engagements with allies and partners.
    And, third, the Department of Defense can lead by example 
on clean energy, resilience, and climate predictive 
capabilities in a way that both serves and supports our 
military mission and enhances American leadership at home and 
abroad.
    I will focus my opening remarks on the first point. My 
colleague, Vice Admiral McGinn, will address points two and 
three.
    Okay. A bipartisan Congress has already spoken to the 
unprecedented threat of climate change to national security. In 
the fiscal year 2018 NDAA, Congress stated that climate change 
is a direct threat to the national security of the United 
States and is impacting stability in areas of the world both 
where the U.S. Armed Forces are operating today and where 
strategic implications for a future conflict exists.
    As far back as the 2008 NDAA, Congress directed that the 
national security implications of climate change be included in 
the National Defense Strategy, the National Military Strategy, 
and the Quadrennial Defense Review.
    The CNA Military Advisory Board, which I founded in 2007, 
comprised of senior U.S. retired generals and admirals, 
including Vice Admiral McGinn, identified climate change as a 
threat multiplier, recognizing that climate change can 
exacerbate political instability where food, water, and 
resource shortages already exist, often in the world's most 
dangerous and fragile regions.
    But it is also here at home. Impacts from extreme weather 
and sea-level rise also pose threats to military installations 
and strain our military readiness in the U.S. and around the 
world. As you mentioned, Madam Chair, the losses at Camp 
LeJeune and Tyndall Air Force Base from Hurricanes Florence and 
Michael in 2018 are estimated by DOD to be approximately $3 
billion to $5 billion each for each base, so we are already 
paying for this.
    And, as the ranking member noted, in 2019, a DOD report 
identified 79 military installations facing climate-related 
risks, including flooding, drought, and wildfire. The National 
Guard now responds to humanitarian-type assistance, both at 
home and health-related and around the world, and is straining 
our military resources and readiness.
    These factors have implications for our ability to project 
power and influence around the world and can constrain our 
capacity to effectively advance our interests abroad.
    For example, China is exerting greater control over 
resources and supply chains, from PPE to energy, both 
domestically and to gain power and an influence over parts of 
the world, including the Arctic, Latin America, and Africa.
    In some cases, the U.S. will need to compete for influence 
where China is taking advantage of climate change to improve 
its military posture in the South China Sea or become the 
relief provider of first resort to vulnerable Pacific Island 
nations.
    In the Arctic, China and Russia are exerting greater 
influence in an open Arctic due to climate change, which is 
emboldening their actions. China has declared itself to be a 
near Arctic state with ambitions to build a Polar Silk Road 
across the region. Russia envisions a toll road for shipping 
and transit across its northern sea route and seeks to enforce 
this maritime route as an internal waterway. As we see an 
increase from commercial activity, the U.S. must increase its 
preparedness and its search-and-rescue capability.
    In sub-Saharan Africa, while not the sole factor, climate 
change has contributed to political instability there as well. 
Already, changes in precipitation patterns and droughts are 
exacerbating existing tensions among farmers and herders in the 
Sahel.
    In the past year, climate-change-related flooding 
contributed to instability in East Africa, a region already 
strained by the pandemic, rising food insecurity, and a locust 
plague. As the head of the World Food Program described the 
events of 2020 in the region, it is shock upon shock upon 
shock.
    The DOD can lead by example, and Vice Admiral McGinn will 
address those specific ways in which using resilience, 
technology, predictive capability, and clean energy can help 
address these challenges.
    In closing, Congress has strengthened and should continue 
to strengthen authorities, programs, and funding available to 
the Department to address these threats. Climate proofing our 
security is essential to protect America's 21st century near- 
and long-term national security interests.
    Thank you, Madam Chair and Ranking Member Calvert. I look 
forward to your questions.
    [The information follows:]
    
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]    
        
    Ms. McCollum. Well, thank you. It sounds like we are going 
to have testimony that really is going to build and complement 
one another, so thank you both for coordinating that.
    Vice Admiral McGinn, you are next.

                  Summary Statement of Admiral McGinn

    Admiral McGinn. Chairwoman McCollum, Ranking Member 
Calvert, distinguished members of the subcommittee, first order 
of business, happy Saint Patrick's Day. What a wonderful and 
great day to have this important conversation.
    I have over 35 years of experience in the uniform of the 
United States Navy. I served for almost 4 years as the 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy from 2013 to 2017 for Energy, 
Installations, and Environment. And, importantly, I have over 
15 years' experience in the private sector working challenges 
and opportunities in energy and environmental issues, including 
climate change.
    Secretary Goodman very succinctly framed it with the three 
bottom lines upfront and very effectively summarized that first 
critical point that climate change indeed presents a direct 
threat to U.S. national security. So I will pick up on the 
second two that the U.S. must prioritize climate change in 
global security engagements, and that the Department must lead 
by example.
    As Secretary of Defense Austin has stated, quote, ``There 
is little about what the Department does to defend the American 
people that is not affected by climate change.'' He referenced 
specifically our national security strategies, operations, and 
infrastructure.
    When it comes to U.S. security engagements around the 
world, we have stated in our own Center for Climate and 
Security Plan for America that the Defense Department should 
develop a security forces climate engagement plan to promote 
regular military-to-military and civil-military international 
engagement in order to enhance the operational resilience of 
U.S. allies and partners and to enhance United States' 
influence vis-a-vis its primary competitors.
    Importantly, combatant commanders around the globe should 
engage allied and partner nations' militaries in adapting to 
climate change and working to mitigate the adverse effects to 
military operations, energy resilience, infrastructure, and 
readiness through a variety of pathways, everything from formal 
intergovernmental negotiations under NATO, or regional--
regionally focused military and civil security planning forums.
    The third point of framing our bottom lines upfront, 
leading by example. As the Nation's largest user of energy, as 
you have pointed out, Chair McCollum, DOD can lead by example 
in key energy and climate technologies that align nicely with 
the military mission. Here are just a couple of examples.
    Electric vehicles. The Department of Defense leases 166,000 
vehicles from the General Services Administration every year 
according to the Fiscal Year 2020 Strategic Stability 
Performance Plan. The Department can help diversify its 
transportation energy sources, reduce operational costs and 
carbon footprint and also help to scale up and accelerate the 
transition to net-zero transportation through the use of 
electric vehicles of all types, nontactical, and rapid 
deployment of charging stations on DOD installations.
    Micro grids and resilient transmission infrastructures. The 
Department of Defense needs to be able to carry out its 
critical military missions on key installations, despite the 
growing threats of cyber-attack; severe weather, such as ice 
storms, wildfires, hurricanes, floods; or even deliberate 
terrorist attack. That is why military bases practice, quote, 
``Black Start'' exercises to recover from a power outage and 
maintain operations for extended periods, even if the grid is 
down.
    The technologies and practices needed to ride out these 
threats, including micro grids, distributed energy systems, and 
advanced energy storage methods, will have the added benefit of 
promoting resilient infrastructure throughout our civilian 
communities.
    Climate predictive capabilities. From military operations 
planning to resilient base infrastructure, a new generation of 
Earth system observations and predictive capabilities that 
provide asset-level climate data analytics for shorter term--
hours to weeks to months--planning is becoming increasingly 
available both in government technical centers and in the 
private sector. As DOD adapts these technologies for the 
military mission, that will further reduce risk to both 
operations and to our military infrastructure.
    In conclusion, our Nation's energy, economic, and 
environmental security are the critical foundations upon which 
our overall national security and quality of life rest. The 
essential leadership role of the Department of Defense in 
facing the challenges of climate change can effectively turn 
those challenges into great opportunities for America and for 
our partners.
    Thank you very much, and I look forward to your questions.
    [The information follows:]
    
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]    
    
    Ms. McCollum. Thank you so much.
    The members on this committee, before I became chair, heard 
me ask all kinds of questions about the Arctic and talk about 
some of the challenges in Africa, so I am going to save my 
questions now for the end of this round and let Mr. Ryan go 
next.
    Mr. Ryan.
    Mr. Ryan. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you 
for prioritizing this hearing. I think this is a critically 
important issue. And, as our witnesses have testified, this has 
far-reaching implications for our military, our economy, our 
country. So I want to say thank you.
    Happy Saint Patrick's Day to everybody. Glad we are getting 
right to work here on Saint Patty's Day. We can celebrate 
later.
    I have got a couple of questions, and I would like Madam 
Secretary Goodman and Admiral McGinn both to kind of take a 
crack at this. You mentioned the electric vehicles, 
electrification, and how important that is. I want to kind of 
take a half a step back here, and I have had conversations with 
the chairwoman about this.
    The ability for the Defense Department to spend money, to 
procure things, is an awesome amount of buying power and I 
think can shift the market in significant ways, whether we are 
talking about electrification or anything else. If you could 
just talk to us about--we did a call a couple days ago with the 
Energy Subcommittee with Bill Gates and his new book about, you 
know, saving ourselves from climate disaster, and part of the 
conversation was about moving into kind of green steel and 
cement.
    And have we done anything within the Department of Defense, 
or have you looked at anything to say we are going to give 
preference to--as we are building things, we are going to give 
preference to those companies that are moving in that 
direction? And I know we are not there yet, but can you see 
that as a significant way to really begin to also be a part of 
shifting the market towards a greener economy?
    And the other one I would like you to touch upon, too, we 
buy a--you know, billions of dollars' worth of food to feed our 
military, and one of the more progressive ways of capturing 
carbon is through sustainable and regenerative agriculture. So 
is there a way that we can say we are going to give preference 
to General Mills, for example, just to pick a random company 
out of the country, but General Mills, who is buying farms to 
do regenerative agriculture to supply their own food 
production?
    I just think, if we are going to do this, there are kind of 
ways that maybe are one layer deep or two layers deep that 
could really begin shifting the market. I mean, if the 
Federal--if the Department of Defense said we are going to give 
preference for food contractors for those food production 
companies that participate 30 percent in regenerative 
agriculture in the next however many years or whatever we would 
do, we could significantly start capturing carbon and really 
moving the market.
    So, if you could just comment on that, steel, cement, 
regenerative agriculture, how do we really do this in a big way 
aside from the technology and the other things that you 
mentioned?
    Ms. Goodman. Okay. Thank you very much, Congressman Ryan, 
for that question.
    It was about a decade ago now that the Department of 
Defense established energy as a key performance parameter in 
its acquisition system, and that led to being able to 
prioritize energy for the purpose of ensuring that there was 
adequate energy in our weapons systems for performance. Prior 
to that, at least we had always assumed we had energy at the 
front.
    The next step--and there have been a variety of efforts to 
green the procurement chain--supply chain over the years. For 
example, I remember fighting hard to have recycled paper at The 
Pentagon back in the 1990s, and we were deploying the first 
generation of hybrid vehicles in the vehicles DOD leases from 
GSA. Now there are greater opportunities to advance that with 
electrification.
    As you note, in certain sectors--in certain sectors--DOD 
does have substantial buying power because of its own mission 
needs. So where those mission needs align--and I would say 
that, given the President's executive order and the Secretary 
of Defense's strong statement, and including the Climate 
Working Group that has been now established in the Department 
of Defense to look at various lines of effort, there will be an 
effort to look at how appropriately to green the supply chain 
across DOD.
    And that would include potentially, where cost-effective 
and meeting mission needs, the ability to, as you say, acquire 
either more agriculture that is based on more regenerative 
properties that conserves resources--as you say, conserves 
water, as--and leads us to a next generation, as well as in the 
energy supply chains.
    As you know, DOD has been an exporter of technology for 
many years, from the internet to GPS, and I see that that could 
potentially happen again in some of these areas.
    Mr. Ryan. Great. Admiral, any comment?
    Admiral McGinn. I think your question is right on the mark, 
Mr. Ryan, and I agree that the Department of Defense has 
tremendous buying power; indeed, the entire Federal Government.
    And using that buying power in a very careful way--we don't 
want to spend money on much more expensive goods and services 
for DOD or for--indeed, for the entire Federal Government. But 
there are so many ways that we can put our thumb on the scale 
towards more sustainable products, whether it is steel, cement, 
agricultural products.
    These are industries that, in many cases, are very, very 
close to very economic scales. And, by using that buying power 
to accelerate and extend the scale-up of these goods and 
services, I think it is right on the mark.
    We don't clearly want to waste any money. We want to make 
sure that we are getting good value for every dollar. But we 
can do that in a way that has the double goodness of providing 
necessary materials to the Department of Defense and also 
provides preferences for American industries and American 
agriculture that can really have a beneficial effect across the 
economy.
    Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
    Mr. Ryan. Thank you.
    Ms. McCollum. Great question, Mr. Ryan.
    Mr. Calvert.

             Military Installations and Climate Resilience

    Mr. Calvert. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    I think this question, probably both our witnesses may want 
to participate in an answer. As I mentioned in my opening 
testimony, there are about 200 bases in the United States, and 
the military maintains and operates hundreds of other 
facilities abroad.
    The need to climate-proof key military installations can be 
readily handled by seawalls, improved infrastructure reliance, 
and, as the worst case, relocation of bases to less vulnerable 
locations.
    What percent of our bases at home and abroad need to be 
climate-proofed today, and what will that cost? Can the 
military leverage the private sector to incorporate new 
technology in future military construction projects?
    So either Ms. Goodman or Admiral?
    Admiral McGinn. I would like to have Ms. Goodman go first 
because then I can say, ``I agree with everything that 
Secretary Goodman says.''
    Mr. Calvert. Okay. Fine.
    Ms. Goodman. Okay. Thank you. Thank you, Vice Admiral 
McGinn.
    Okay. Congressman Calvert, it is a great question. You 
know, almost all of our bases really need to be climate-proofed 
and made resilient. As was noted earlier, we are already paying 
billions of dollars to rebuild Tyndall Air Force Base, Camp 
LeJeune, and Offutt from the hurricanes that occurred in the 
last few years. So we need to flood proof, hurricane proof. We 
need to address permafrost at bases in the Arctic where it is 
collapsing.
    So, as we do this, if we do it smartly, we will invest for 
the future. We will also be working with our communities in a 
way that makes them more resilient, too. And, in programs that 
Congress has authorized and appropriated to, there is 
increasing collaboration among communities. And I would say 
that is very important to continue because bases are part of 
their communities, whether it is in Norfolk or Annapolis or all 
around the country. And there are opportunities to do this in a 
way that helps lift up and make our communities and our bases 
and their military families stronger.
    Admiral McGinn. I would add, Mr. Calvert, that we have to 
have a prioritization system. Every installation in the United 
States and around the world could use more climate-proofing, if 
you will, or the additional of resilient design. But there has 
to be, because of budgetary considerations, a keen sense of 
priority.
    It is not a question of if. It is a question of when. 
Climate-driven severe weather is coming to an installation near 
you. It can be any form. It can be wildfires out West. It can 
be flooding. It can be severe weather, hurricanes, et cetera.
    So the idea is to look at those installations that are most 
vulnerable to the various types of threats and to try to invest 
in resilience. In many cases, it is not a lot of money. It is 
mostly being thoughtful about how you design a base, where you 
put things.
    For example, if I have a building on an installation that 
is in a 100-year flood plain, probably be a good idea not to 
put the computers in the basement of that building. Just locate 
critical functions in areas that are going to be less 
vulnerable to the flooding or other effects of wind or heat or 
whatever.
    I think, also, thinking about how we actually use 
construction materials, cross-laminated timber is really, 
really seeing a resurgence. It is as strong as steel for very, 
very large buildings these days. So, using different materials 
can really have a double effect of good strength and also 
sourcing from very, very sustainable industries.
    Ms. Goodman. And let me just add I think the private sector 
will be doing most of this work because that is how DOD will 
see technologies, whether it is climate-predictive capabilities 
or new resilience infrastructure, and there are going to be 
great opportunities for Americans at all levels across the 
country through the private sector from firms big and small to 
do the work of making more resilient our military 
infrastructure.
    Mr. Calvert. I know--I was over at Camp LeJeune shortly 
after the hurricane damage, and a lot of those facilities, 
which were built some time ago in a hurry during World War II 
and other times, but they weren't built to the code that we 
have today. And a lot of those facilities--certainly Tyndall is 
the same, but that--so today's building techniques, I think, 
more engages what we need to do, I would hope.

                   Military Bases and Energy Sources

    One issue on energy are these new small nuclear reactors 
that we are using more and more of around the country that have 
exciting capabilities. I would hope we are looking at using 
those as a small energy sources at various military bases----
    Admiral McGinn. I would say, most emphatically, that 
nuclear power has to have a future in global energy portfolio. 
The development of small modular reactors of various sizes is 
in fairly early development stage. I would say that the--
probably in the 10-year timeframe when we would actually have 
them in a form with the kind of function that we would want to 
have on various military bases.
    They are part of a portfolio of energy choices, and--but I 
think we should, as the United States, boldly look at, what is 
the future of nuclear, and how can we make it a part? It is not 
a silver bullet, but it is part of a whole array of energy 
technologies that are emerging that can really, really help to 
diversify our energy sources and provide a lot more resilience.
    Ms. Goodman. I would add nuclear has a central role in our 
energy future. And, also, Congressman, the Uniform Facility 
Code that DOD uses to--is being updated to account for the 
climate resilience it needs when it rebuilds its bases now.
    Ms. McCollum. Thank you. Some of the same questions I had. 
Good questions.
    Mr. Ruppersberger.

                            Arctic Security

    Mr. Ruppersberger. Okay. Well, first, thank you, Chairwoman 
McCollum, for putting together this important hearing today.
    As a Member who represents the Chesapeake Bay watershed in 
Maryland, I am glad to have these distinguished panelists 
before us today to help us and the Department of Defense be a 
leader, not a laggard, on the issue of climate change.
    Now, coastal communities like my district in Maryland are 
home to 42 percent of our country's population and millions of 
businesses that supply most of our country's populations and 
millions of businesses that supply most of our gross domestic 
product.
    We must better position the Department to tackle this 
problem. It is both a moral issue of protecting the planet for 
future generations and a very real national security threat 
that our panelists today have so eloquently highlighted.
    Now the question is to both of the panelists. The security 
posture balance in the Arctic region has me worried. As more of 
the ice caps melt, the easier it is for nations to ignore the 
norms of securing cooperation in the Arctic and employ a go-it-
alone strategy in a region that has historically thrived from 
skilled political cooperation because of the operating 
environment is so unforgiving.
    Now, Ms. Goodman, in your testimony, you mentioned how 
important it is for the U.S. to lead on this issue to better 
enable our hand in geopolitical negotiations that concern the 
Arctic.
    In your opinion, how big of a role does access to the 
region play? Does purchasing platforms that enable our access 
to the Arctic show our commitment to enforcing norms, or does 
it create a zero-sum game, or both?
    Ms. Goodman. Congressman, thank you for that question.
    I do think we need to up our game in the Arctic. We have a 
plan now--the Coast Guard has got an approved plan by Congress 
to build six new icebreakers to replace our aging one-and-a-
half fleet. We need to move forward expeditiously with that. 
Our Department of Defense also needs to increase its Arctic 
capability.
    And, in the last year, all the services--the Air Force, the 
Navy, and, just yesterday, the Army--have issued new Arctic 
strategies. These are important to tie together now at the 
overall Department of Defense level to have an integrated 
approach to the set of Arctic capabilities that we need.
    And I am hopeful that we will take a whole-of-government 
approach because deterrence really is the best defense. By 
increasing our ability to meet our potential adversaries in the 
Arctic, that way we can hopefully continue to keep the peace 
but, at the same time, reduce risk of miscalculation of an 
accident that could require a search-and-rescue or a 
misunderstanding.
    What sometimes keeps me up at night is increased ship 
traffic through the region. As you said, vast, still difficult 
to operate in. If communication among vessels--and increasing 
exercises have already led to tensions when U.S. fishermen were 
found in areas where the Russians were exercising in the Bering 
Strait last summer, and the U.S. and Russia are only 30 miles 
apart at their narrowest point.
    So it is important for us to increase our presence in the 
region in order to keep the peace and keep stability.
    Mr. Ruppersberger. Okay.
    Admiral McGinn. I would add, Mr. Ruppersberger, that, in 
addition to the traditional security threats that Ms. Goodman 
just outlined, the Arctic is having other effects. We are--have 
become familiar over the past few years with so-called polar 
vortex and the tremendous harm that that can do, most recently 
in Texas and in Oklahoma.
    Another aspect that is, I guess, more scientific but 
nevertheless ominous is the warming tundra in the Arctic tundra 
is releasing a lot of methane hydrates from deep below. There 
have even been explosions as this methane builds up, leaving 
craters that are a 100 meters deep.
    So the Arctic is very, very important, and it is just a 
real indicator of the climate changing and the potential for 
very, very bad effects coming from that.
    Mr. Ruppersberger. Okay. And I was in Alaska with the 
commandant of the Coast Guard about a year ago, and literally 
right up to the--we could see the glaciers just melting away 
right before our eyes, and that has got to affect sea--the sea 
level issues that we are all dealing with right now in the 
coastal areas.
    Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
    Mr. Ruppersberger. I yield back.
    Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
    Mr. Cole, I believe, has stepped out for a minute, so that 
will lead us to you, Mr. Carter.

         Department of Defense Installations Energy Consumption

    Mr. Carter. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and thank you for 
this very important hearing we are having today, and I really 
appreciate our guests that have come to talk about this.
    A number of critical energy projects of the U.S. military 
almost tripled from 2011 to 2015. And the Army, which, as you 
all know, I represent Fort Hood--its goal is to get to 25 
percent energy consumed from renewables by 2025 and to be zero 
by 2030.
    Fort Hood, Texas, right now is getting 50 percent of its 
power from renewable energy. 63,000 solar panels that are 
onsite, and 21,000 offsite wind turbines are producing 65 
milliwatts for power.
    How could the Department of Defense further lower energy 
costs in installations and lower its operational energy 
consumption and costs?
    Admiral McGinn. I have been impressed, Mr. Carter, by the 
tremendous deployment of especially wind power and increasingly 
solar power in Texas. It is a good example of us diversifying 
our energy portfolio in what is effectively the energy capitol 
of the world by getting less expensive, more sustainable 
renewable power as part of that critical resilient energy 
portfolio. And I think that not only the DOD but the entire 
economy is benefiting from a combination of renewable energy--
solar, wind, and the addition of storage capabilities--
batteries, if you will--and pump hydro--that can really, really 
help us to have sustainable and very, very much less expensive 
sources of energy.

                            Battery Storage

    Mr. Carter. And, as a backup question to you, you mentioned 
storage. To developing countries, that has been the big 
stumbling block over renewable energy.
    Where are we on battery storage? Is DOD actively engaging 
in the research it takes for battery storage because I know the 
industry is trying and trying, but at least the last time I 
looked, they weren't successful.
    Admiral McGinn. Couple of things. Near term, yes, the DOD 
is always doing good research related to energy storage, in 
partnership sometimes with NASA, the space operations. But, 
increasingly, as we deploy unmanned systems--surface, air, 
subsurface--they are going to need better energy storage in 
batteries. So that will contribute to the overall knowledge 
base.
    However, the cost of batteries, the capability, the energy 
density of batteries is increasing significantly, and that is 
good news for many, many applications, military and civilian.
    A little bit further term--let's say 5 to 10 years, the 
deployment of what is called green hydrogen is going to really 
be making a difference to capture the energy from the sun, from 
the wind, other renewable sources, and use it to maintain a 
baseload effectively of energy power for our various major 
grids as well as micro grids.

                           Electric Vehicles

    Mr. Carter. And, if you had to convert to electric cars, 
the range of electric vehicles right now is--I guess the--
probably the biggest range they have got is around 400 miles. 
And the average of the--is around 200 miles. So, in that 
situation, how does that fit the overall battle plan of 
American warriors with the limited resources, and how do you 
refuel on the battlefield?
    Admiral McGinn. I believe that the focus on electric 
vehicles initially for DOD will be primarily on nontactical--
what I call nontactical vehicles. The good news is the industry 
is producing greater battery density and, therefore, greater 
range of electric vehicles of all sorts, whether it is a bus, a 
minivan, or a sedan, or even pickup trucks. I am personally 
waiting for a good F-150 electric. If they can do a Mustang 
that is electric, I think they can do a good pickup truck as 
well.
    But I think the news--the good news is that the 
electrification of our transportation system is going to be 
good for our economy, first of all, and it is really going to 
be good for local, regional, and, of course, global 
environmental quality.
    Mr. Carter. Well, being from Texas, pickup trucks are 
really important to me, too. And, when they said they were 
going to have an F-150 out and then they backed off of it, it 
was discouraging for me, too, but I hope they will be 
victorious soon.
    Thank you, Madam Chairman.
    Admiral McGinn. Yes, sir.
    Ms. McCollum. Well, as a granddaughter of a Ford mechanic 
in Montana, all of this is very interesting from Mustangs to 
pickup trucks.
    Mr. Kilmer.

                    Shipyards Risk of Climate Change

    Mr. Kilmer. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thanks for holding 
this hearing today.
    I have got a dozen questions, but I will try to keep it to 
two. My first is for Ms. Goodman.
    You know, we are seeing threats like rising sea levels and 
seismic shifts and shoreline erosion and erratic weather 
patterns that really have the capacity to compromise the 
security of military bases across the country, including naval 
installations. Puget Sound Naval Shipyard in my district is 
undeniably vulnerable to climate change and represents a single 
point of failure for carrier maintenance in the Pacific.
    In response to the growing need to counter threats brought 
about by climate change and to shore up our public shipyards, 
the Navy created an investment strategy called the Shipyard 
Infrastructure Optimization Plan, or SIOP, which is a 20-year, 
$21 billion effort to modernize these shipyards to increase 
their climate resilience, to improve resistance to earthquakes 
and other natural disasters.
    That is one piece of a multifaceted solution necessary to 
address a problem the size and scope of climate change. Another 
that comes to mind, although maybe not directly created for 
this purpose, is the Defense Community Infrastructure Program, 
DCIP. That is a program created in 2019 that was designed to 
address infrastructure deficiencies in communities surrounding 
military installations.
    And those grant funds can help to preserve military 
readiness and security, and I am thinking of examples of, you 
know, off-base infrastructure that may be vulnerable to climate 
change. It strikes me that Congress needs to work in 
coordination with the DOD to keep these programs like SIOP and 
DCIP on track.
    I would love to just get your sense. Do you think that the 
effects of climate change will outpace these mitigation 
efforts, and how important do you think it is for Congress and 
the DOD to look for areas to accelerate programs like the SIOP 
and like DCIP?
    Ms. Goodman. Mr. Kilmer, thank you for that question. I 
think it is absolutely essential. Those are two good programs 
that you mentioned. They are critical. Only with that 
investment and ambition and commitment of the Department of 
Defense to these and other programs will we be able to ensure 
that both our military infrastructure, for example, in your key 
district and in many others, is--becomes resilient to these 
climate threats, rising sea levels, extreme weather events, 
ocean acidification in your region as well, as well as water 
scarcity, flooding, drought in other regions.
    And so those are two very important programs. And what is 
particularly important about the second one you mentioned is 
the opportunity to work with the community because I think that 
is also essential.
    And I am pleased that Congress has continued to broaden the 
authorities for DOD to invest in conjunction with communities 
because some of these investments are better done when there is 
a cost sharing. For example, that program you mentioned has 
cost sharing also. The REPI program, the Readiness 
Environmental Protection Initiative, enables cost sharing 
between communities and DOD. And that is also going to be 
continually important in those areas and others in order to 
maximize the benefit.
    So thank you for raising that. I think these are very 
important programs for our future.
    Mr. Kilmer. Thank you.

                Department of Defense Building Materials

    Admiral, I wanted to follow up on Ranking Member Calvert's 
question. It seems like another way in which the DOD can be 
part of the solution is through innovative building materials. 
You know, the Department is one of the largest builders on the 
planet.
    You mentioned cross-laminated timber. I think there is a 
real opportunity there because it has a smaller carbon 
footprint than steel and concrete. It comes from a renewable 
resource.
    CLT isn't alone. We have seen incredible uses of recycled 
composite material. In my district, we have something called 
the Composite Technology Recycling Center that incorporates 
recycled carbon fiber into products to reduce weight and 
increase strength and promote sustainability.
    I want to get your sense, Admiral. What steps would you 
recommend to ensure that the DOD is taking advantage of 
innovative and alternative building materials? You know, are 
there enough resources being invested into developing new 
technologies, and how can Congress help on this front?
    Admiral McGinn. I think promoting--it is a great question. 
Promoting interaction between the public and private sector--in 
this case, DOD--and the building--advanced building industry is 
really, really critical, so that we break free of the old model 
of stick building on site, that we can move towards modular 
construction, new materials like CLT, and really, really take a 
look at how we actually design buildings, how we design 
facilities so that they are, by design, very, very much more 
efficient and effective and resilient.
    So I think that what the Congress can do is, in guidance to 
the Department of Defense, indeed to the Federal Government in 
all procurement for our buildings, to look for opportunities 
for private--public-private coordination and to try to remove 
barriers that may exist from old legislation that prevents the 
type of partnership that really shares risk, shares reward in 
approaching our building industry in new ways.
    Mr. Kilmer. Thank you, Admiral.
    Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back.
    Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
    Mrs. Kirkpatrick.

                           Lower Energy Cost

    Mrs. Kirkpatrick. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    I just have a couple of questions. My first question is for 
both of the witnesses.
    The Department of Defense is the single largest energy user 
in the United States, and energy consumption is a significant 
cost to the Department and the services. So this is just sort 
of a follow-up question to Representative Kilmer's question.
    Transitioning to green energy in the Department can 
introduce efficiencies and reduce logistical requirements. So I 
guess my question is, how can the Department further lower 
energy costs at installations and--as well as operational 
energy consumption and costs, and are there enough resources 
being invested in energy innovation within the Department?
    Admiral McGinn. Sherri.
    Ms. Goodman. Okay. Thank you very, very much, Ms. 
Kirkpatrick, for that question.
    I think DOD has already invested a lot in recent years in 
improving its energy posture, but it can do more today. And 
there are many good--particularly in research and development 
to meet the military mission, there are some good programs. 
Among them, the Strategic Environmental Research and 
Development Program, the Energy Services Technology 
Certification Program, and a number of others also in the 
services. They do the good basic RDT&E. They do the 
demonstration validation. The challenge is to get over the 
valley of death and now deploy many of these new technologies 
for use.
    In your district, of course, we have one of the largest 
solar arrays, you know, at Davis-Monthan, and that is 
important. We can do more of that now that the cost of wind and 
solar has come down. But, as has been noted, there is more we 
can do in batteries, in energy transmission infrastructure.
    By setting the right targets, such as the Black Start 
exercises, which set a goal of being able to go without power 
from the grid for approximately 14 days, those increase--those 
incentivize the right type of investment. And there will be 
other goals, I am sure, that the Department of Defense will 
work on to help incentivize investment, and I think we will 
begin to see that R&D pay off as we also get some spinout into 
the commercial sector and we allow technologies to come into 
our work.
    Admiral McGinn. I would add that an inherently efficient 
military force, whether it is Army, Navy, Marines, Coast Guard, 
Air Force, is a more effective force. You can go further, stay 
longer, and carry more of your--whatever the payload you have 
if you are inherently more efficient in an operational energy 
sense.
    Clearly, on the installation side, the same thing applies. 
There was a great study about, I would say, 7 years ago by MIT 
Lincoln Labs that took a look at the benefits of centralizing 
emergency backup power so that you eliminate individual diesel 
generator sets for--scattered across an installation for 
emergency backup. They tend to be dirty, they tend to be 
unreliable, and they tend to be expensive to own and operate 
them and to procure them.
    So centralizing backup power and improving installation 
distribution is going to be a great contributor to greater 
resilience.
    Mrs. Kirkpatrick. Thank you.
    Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back.
    Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
    Mr. Cuellar has stepped out. Mr. Cole has not returned, so 
we are going to go to Mr. Crist next.

                   Flood Resiliency at Installations

    Mr. Crist. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you for holding 
this very important hearing.
    The Tampa Bay region in Florida, where my district is 
located, is one of the most at-risk areas for storm surge from 
hurricanes in the world, comparable, in fact, to Miami and New 
Orleans in that regard.
    It has been nothing short of a miracle that we have avoided 
a direct hit for a very long time now since back before most of 
the area was settled and before MacDill Air Force Base, home to 
CENTCOM and SOCOM, was founded on the waterfront of Tampa Bay, 
including in 2017 when Hurricane Irma struck Tampa Bay as a 
major hurricane, while MacDill largely avoided damage from that 
storm.
    Admiral McGinn, what is the Department doing to improve 
flood resiliency at installations like MacDill where they are 
failing--falling short, rather--excuse me--and what can be done 
to either help them or push to do even more? Please, sir?
    Admiral McGinn. I think, Mr. Crist, the first thing that 
they are doing is they are looking at where are their critical 
assets, the most vulnerable ones? What are the single-point 
failures for a mission? MacDill, of course, as you know, with 
all of those Special Forces, Central Command operations, 
absolutely critical that they can sustain any type of weather 
and continue to do the mission.
    I think that taking a look at where are their electrical 
system vulnerabilities, where are the necessary pumps to reduce 
or to mitigate flooding, where are critical buildings, can 
there be a relocation, not writ large but selectively, to put 
critical functions in better locations or raise them up on 
upper stories of buildings, have methods of taking flooding in 
lower floors but be able to remove it but still keep the lights 
on and the function?
    It is a very tough engineering challenge but one that we 
have the ability to do, and I think our Navy Seabees and our 
Corps of Engineers are very much up to the task, especially if 
they work with the private sector and the good ideas and 
innovations that are out there.
    Mr. Crist. Great. Thank you very much.
    There seems to be a misconception out there that the threat 
of climate change poses to our facilities is only from storm 
surge or hurricanes. And, while that may be the case in many 
situations, the fires in California and the record-breaking 
inland low pressure system that flooded Offutt Air Force Base 
in Nebraska show that climate change can have consequences that 
are beyond what first it was imagined.
    For either of you, what have we learned over the past 5 to 
10 years about the full effects of climate change on our 
installations and defense infrastructure, and what is the 
Department doing or not doing to respond thereto?
    Ms. Goodman. Well, thank you, Mr. Crist.
    Yes, the Department has learned that it needs to address 
all the threat multipliers of climate change, from fires to 
floods, as well as sea-level rise and extreme weather, and 
drought in certain parts of the region which affect water 
availability at bases and communities.
    At Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska, that severe flood 
really showed what Vice Admiral McGinn just said, where the new 
command headquarters--that was the newest building on the base 
and was built on higher ground--rode out the storm fairly well. 
It was the older, lower-lying buildings that were much more 
subject to damage. We have learned that the hard way.
    Now, the wildfire is a particular challenge out in the 
West, and that is going to require both reducing, you know, the 
fuel load, so changing how we manage energy overall, the fuel 
load in the forests, and recognizing that conditions have 
gotten hotter and drier but also looking at new building 
materials, new energy systems, and being able to take further 
preventive action being able to address these fires early on 
and reduce the fuel load so they don't get as dangerous.
    Admiral McGinn. I would add that we are in a race against 
time. You know, the great author, Tom Friedman, said Mother 
Nature always bats last, and she always bats a thousand. And I 
think that we are seeing weather phenomena that are literally 
unprecedented, certainly in modern history.
    We really, really need to focus on resilience from all 
sorts of things. It is ironic that last--late last summer, 
California suffered widespread power outages due to a heat 
wave. Yet, just a few weeks ago, Texas and Oklahoma suffered 
terrible, terrible damage and suffering because of a polar 
vortex. Hot, cold, the manifestations of severe weather are 
quite varied, and we need to be prepared geographically for the 
most likely ones.

                   Damage From Extreme Weather Events

    Ms. McCollum. Thank you. I haven't asked a question yet. I 
want to kind of follow up on a little bit of the theme we heard 
here, especially from Mr. Crist.
    So I am going to talk about Tyndall Air Force Base and kind 
of what all happened there and paint a bigger picture.
    So, in your written testimony, Admiral McGinn, you talked 
about the Category 5 hurricane there in 2018. Could you expand 
a little more about the type of damage the base infrastructure 
went through and the F-22 squadron sustained there and then 
just about how we had to move resources all over, the aircraft, 
which has potential effect on our readiness? Can you kind of 
paint a bigger picture of what one of these catastrophes really 
looks like in the broad sense?
    Admiral McGinn. Yes. Basically Hurricane Michael coming as 
it did from due south of Tyndall in the Gulf of Mexico, very, 
very rapid escalation to a Category 5 when it came ashore, did 
not allow a lot of time for preparation, although given the 
severity of the storm, the wind and surge, even more 
preparation wouldn't have significantly altered the damage. The 
wind force damaging buildings unbelievably. F-22s that were 
stationed there at Tyndall, not all of them were in a 
maintenance condition that allowed them to fly away to 
hurricane evacuation, to inland bases. So those, because of the 
damage to, literally construction of some of the hangers, were 
also severely damaged.
    So I think the lesson is we need to know that our 
installations are in the path of various severe weather events. 
In this case, along the Gulf, Florida, the Atlantic Coast, 
hurricanes are clearly one of the most frequent and 
significantly damaging phenomena. So we need to be prepared for 
that.
    Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
    I am going to turn it over to Ms. Kaptur. We will have time 
for a second round.
    Ms. Kaptur.

          Department of Defense Posture Towards Climate Change

    Ms. Kaptur. Thank you, Madam Chair, very much.
    And I thank our guests, Secretary Goodman for sure and 
Admiral McGinn.
    I am very interested. I was one of the people who in the 
nineties that was fighting for an energy focus at the 
Department of Defense, and we finally got one to some extent. I 
have a few questions here. Do you think the Department has 
taken this newest challenge, climate change, and the 
initiatives it needed to seriously in the way the Department 
itself has structured its operations? Which military service do 
you believe has taken the lead?
    And if the answer is Navy, is that because, Admiral, with 
the warming oceans, you felt it first? I am just curious.
    And then I would like both of your recommendations on where 
to go in our country or world where you see real innovation 
occurring at the Department of Defense? Because this issue of 
climate change and energy gets lost in the mammoth nature of 
the Department. Where can I go to look at real leadership in 
innovation and application in overground transportation, number 
one; number two, hydrogen fuel cells, current generation and 
next generation, battery storage; and, finally, base energy 
independence? I represent the first Guard base that flew a 
biofueled plane almost 20 years ago and but it was an 
exception, not the rule. It was on the cover of Guard Magazine 
at the time. We were very proud of that as biofuels have come 
online in our country.
    I have found the Department laggard. I don't find the 
Department a leader, and in the clean energy mandate and in the 
area of innovation, it tends to get lost somehow. I am just 
curious. Do you think that, again, the Department has really 
taken this seriously? Are they structured to properly deal with 
it in the way that they have handled the assignment of duties 
inside the Department? Which department has taken the lead? 
And, finally, could you name me the three locations on 
overground transportation; hydrogen fuel cells, current and 
next generation, battery storage; and then base independence, 
where?
    Admiral McGinn. I would start by saying that the entire 
Department of Defense gets it. They see renewable energy and 
various other forms of energy, including hydrogen, hydrogen 
fuel cells, and other means as a key part of their mission.
    In many cases, however, over the past years, the Department 
has very wisely used commercial off-the-shelf energy 
technology. I am reminded of the wonderful United States 
Marines in Afghanistan deploying commercial solar panels to 
forward operating bases in order to reduce the reliance on oil 
convoys, which were very, very deadly to our young men and 
women in uniform over there.
    But I would start, of course, with the Department of the 
Navy. We did do a lot there and continue to do a lot, but so 
does the Air Force and the fuel research going on at Wright-
Patt, at the Air Force research lab, is really, really helpful. 
It is done in many cases in coordination or certainly trading 
technology stories with civilian aviation.
    I think that the future for hydrogen is very, very bright 
as a storage medium and as well as a producer of electricity 
using fuel cells for both transportation as well as for onsite 
power.
    I would specifically point out that Secretary of Defense 
has named a senior climate advisor directly reporting to 
Secretary Austin, and his name is Joe Bryan. He is innovative. 
He is smart. He is experienced. I know this because Joe was the 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Energy when I was 
the Assistant Secretary. He is a great example of the 
recognition of the need for science and innovation and asking 
the questions about why can't we move further, why can't we 
move faster.
    Ms. Kaptur. DARPA, are they doing anything that you are 
aware of?
    Admiral McGinn. I am sorry. Who was that?
    Ms. Kaptur. DARPA, Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency? I am looking for--where do I go for overground 
transport? Do I go to the war and tank command? Where do I go 
to see the future within DOD?
    Admiral McGinn. Right. I would start with DARPA. That is a 
good spot. I would also check in the Department of Energy with 
the Advanced Research Projects Agency for Energy, ARPA-E, and 
you would also want to take a look at some of the DOE 
laboratories and how they are coordinating in some cases with 
the Department of Defense laboratories and technology centers.
    Ms. Goodman. I would also add, Congresswoman, as I have 
stated in my testimony and I have said elsewhere, I think the 
Department of Defense, in addition to the very good efforts 
that are already being made under the current Secretary, 
Secretary Austin, and the new current climate advisor, Joe 
Bryan, could benefit from having a clean energy innovation 
office that pulled together a lot of the work that is--some of 
the work that is ongoing and that can be further magnified by 
clear lines of investment and also a clean energy transition 
fund to help us get over this valley of death. When there is 
good research and development coming out of our labs, private 
sector or government labs, sometimes there is a lag between 
getting it actually into use because the demand signal isn't 
always there at the buying level. And a transition office could 
help get us beyond that.
    Ms. Kaptur. Thank you so much.
    Ms. Goodman. Excuse me. A transition fund.
    Ms. Kaptur. Thank you, Secretary Goodman. And you think 
that should be within the Department of Defense somehow, in its 
contracting operations?
    Ms. Goodman. I think it should be, and it should be modeled 
on other things we have done when we wanted to spur innovation 
in other types of technologies.
    Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
    So, Ranking Member Calvert, we are going to go to a second 
round of questioning. I would like you to lead that off if you 
have another question.

            Climate Change Impact on Planning and Operations

    Mr. Calvert. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Yes, it is an issue, as suggested, that increased 
probability of droughts, floods, famine, disease, loss of 
habitable land, other large-scale natural and humanitarian 
disasters will create problems for communities and governments 
abroad.
    So to what extent do our geographic combat commanders need 
to factor in the potential impact of climate change across 
their spectrum of planning and operations? Secondly, if there 
should be a core requirement of the GCCs in how they undertake 
a cost-effective way without falling prey to institutional 
overreach in owning an issue that may more properly be the 
domain of the Department of State, USAID, and others in the 
inner agency, how do you approach that?
    Ms. Goodman. Well, thank you, Congressman.
    I think it is vitally important that climate security be 
integrated into our security engagements arrangements, security 
engagements which are principally conducted by our combatant 
commands.
    You know, in the 1990s when I served as the Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense in a different era, we were conducting 
environmental security engagements with each of the combatant 
commands to address the environmental challenges of that era, 
which were largely cleanup of contaminated bases, complying 
with air, water, and waste laws, conserving endangered species. 
That, of course, all continues. Today we are in the climate 
era. Those combatant commanders can use these same kind of 
environmental security engagements addressing climate security 
threats.
    For example, Pacific island nations, many of them, you 
know, who depend very much on American security see increased 
approaches from China to being the provider of the first resort 
when they have an extreme weather event, facing food and water 
insecurities. The U.S. should be right there, working with them 
and in other regions of the world and can do so, can integrate 
climate security into its theater engagement plans. There are 
new improved Earth system observation capabilities that can be 
utilized to enable better planning and to be shared in some 
cases with our allies and partners as well.
    Admiral McGinn. I think the record of the U.S. military 
throughout the world but especially in the India and Pacific 
Ocean area is really remarkable, especially in terms of 
humanitarian assistance, disaster recovery operations. You just 
can't as a combatant commander or any of the subordinate 
service commanders avoid that responsibility.
    So I think, as Ms. Goodman pointed out, engagement with 
other militaries, other nations, civilian and military, about 
how can we do things together that will increase the resilience 
in a particular region, whether it is an island nation or 
coastal nation, that will help to mitigate the worst effects of 
some of these typhoons and other phenomena that are coming our 
way, increasingly in terms of intensity and frequency.
    Mr. Calvert. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Ms. McCollum. Oh, you are welcome.
    Great. These questions have all been fabulous, and the 
answers have been enlightening. Thank you.
    Mr. Ruppersberger.

                        Combating Climate Change

    Mr. Ruppersberger. Well, firstly, I am going to go from the 
Arctic now to more global and then district. My district is a 
coastal community with many DOD entities including Army, 
Aberdeen Proving Ground, and an Air National Guard base right 
on what we call Middle River of east Baltimore. I am also the 
chairman of the U.S. Naval Academy Board of Visitors in 
Annapolis, which fights for funding every year to protect 
itself against sea level rise. In our most recent hearing with 
the Naval Academy about 2 weeks ago, Admiral Buck mentioned the 
strategy to address sea level rise, but he said it could take 
to 2035 to complete base on funding levels and that is just 
totally unacceptable.
    With the sea level rising and the aging of the Naval 
Academy, they have real issues and problems with sea level. We 
just built, the Naval Academy just built their newest building, 
a cyber building, which was constructed with the sea level in 
mind, rising in mind. It is a pretty unique building. Other 
than that, there are a lot of other issues that are there.
    I know that Ms. Goodman mentioned things that we can do for 
sea level and one of those was to create, I think, at DOD a 
clean energy office and a transition fund, but basically my 
question, you know: How does the Department--do they have the 
tools to assess global warming, sea level rise? In all of these 
installations, I think, the last one I heard in your testimony, 
billions of dollars it will cost and aging. So we really have 
to deal with this, or it is going cost us a lot more money, and 
an example of that is the United States Naval Academy.
    So, if you could relay, again, what steps do you recommend, 
I know some of them Ms. Goodman had mentioned, to better 
address these issues on a defense-wide basis?
    Ms. Goodman. Well, thank you, Congressman.
    I mean, Congress has already directed DOD to integrate 
resilience into its military installation resilience plans, and 
Secretary Austin has said that work is already underway. I 
believe the Department now will begin to accelerate that work 
per the requirements both of the President's executive order 
and its own direction. And the question for--the issue is going 
to be first doing the planning but then, as you say, putting 
the money on the project, sort of invest--the investments that 
are needed.
    As we all know, it is often the infrastructure accounts 
that are underfunded in the Department of Defense 
historically--historically. So that is going to have to be re-
prioritized within the way the Department does its investments. 
I am pleased to say that I believe, you know, the Department is 
looking at that right now, how to set those priorities, how to 
ensure that critical facilities like the Naval Academy don't 
have to wait until 2035 to become more resilient.
    This is going to require some new ways of doing business 
for the Department of Defense, to give greater priority to the 
investments needed based on those resilient plans that will be 
coming forward. As you say, at the Naval Academy, they already 
have a plan. Other bases are coming forward in the coming year 
or so. Then those investments will have to be prioritized. It 
is my hope--go ahead.
    Mr. Ruppersberger. The Naval Academy's plan is totally 
inadequate going out to the year 2035. It is not going to work.
    Ms. Goodman. Right. So there have to be some priorities set 
to occur within the next several years probably and certainly a 
substantial investment within what we call the FYDP, the 5-year 
defense plan, and so the Secretary and the services are going 
to have to make some choices about those important investments.
    Admiral McGinn. One of the positive aspects, Mr. 
Ruppersberger, is that you as the chair of the Board of 
Visitors and Admiral Buck as the superintendent, you get it. It 
isn't a question of, gee, I hope we don't have a hurricane here 
or tidal surge of the Severn River. And knowing that it is 
inevitable will motivate the kind of thinking and investment in 
protecting these critical assets right along the river.
    Mr. Ruppersberger. It seems the timing is right for global 
warming, for dealing with these issues. You have the Secretary 
of the Defense is making it a priority. Betty McCollum, our 
chair, has made this a priority. This is the first hearing we 
have had. I have been on this committee for a long period of 
time. I think the chairman and I have talked about maybe going 
to the Naval Academy so she can see some of these issues. We 
will probably do that in the next 2 or 3 months.
    So I think the timing might be right with all the players 
that we have here is going to focus on this issue so we can 
plan, including plan on what needs to be done from an 
infrastructure point of view to prepare ourselves because the 
Naval Academy is not going to move, but the water keeps rising.
    Admiral McGinn. I talked to Professor Flack, who is a 
professor at the mechanical engineering department at the Naval 
Academy, doing wonderful things over the years with educating 
midshipmen on energy and environment. That is Professor Flack.
    Ms. McCollum. Okay. I think Mr. Calvert was trying to be 
recognized.
    Mr. Calvert. Yes. I just wanted to point out, Madam Chair, 
the Naval Academy and other bases also, which is also a 
problem, is a lot of these bases were built on fill and 
certainly the Naval Academy a lot of it is on fill. You have 
the subsidence that is occurring on ton of it. So these areas 
are literally sinking.
    So, you know, so sometimes you can throw a lot of money at 
this problem in the seawalls and the rest, but if your 
underlying foundation is weak or failing, you may have to look 
at other considerations to fix it. I don't know. It is going to 
be expensive. I know that.
    Thank you. I just wanted to point that out.
    Ms. McCollum. I think that is a good point, and we have got 
a partner in Chairwoman Wasserman Schultz with MILCON. A lot of 
these are MILCON projects, but we know that they are going to 
affect our readiness and ability to move forward. So I look 
forward to our committee on not only working with the 
authorizers on this but working with MILCON. There are 
certainly things we can do. There are other things that MILCON 
does do, and I think this is a unique opportunity for the three 
committees to, you know, really sit down. And we can tell the 
story of what is happening. They can look at their budget for 
what is planning and then work with the authorizers on how to 
move forward, but we can't afford to waste any time.
    With that, Mr. Carter.

                 Icebreakers' Importance for the Arctic

    Mr. Carter. Well, thank you, Madam Chairman.
    And being ranking member on MILCON myself, I can tell you 
that is a pretty small budget as it compares to DOD, and we 
have MILCON projects that are emergencies, and we have talked 
about a couple of them today, and we have to have the deep 
pockets of DOD involved in order for us to do this. I just have 
to point that out because the MILCON budget is a small budget 
as it compares even to the VA budget. So it is a challenge.
    Ms. McCollum. Mr. Carter, ranking member of MILCON, I 
couldn't agree with you more. I am just not going to go in 
somebody else's jurisdiction. So we will work together on that, 
sir.
    Mr. Carter. Absolutely. Absolutely.
    Ms. McCollum. Your question.
    Mr. Carter. The other thing I want to raise, going back in 
history to when I was the chairman of Homeland, the 
icebreakers. We don't have the money for those things in the 
Homeland Security budget either, and we were trying, and I 
think successfully, to partner with the Navy on that first one. 
I don't know if anybody knows whether that is still going on or 
not, but it is going to have to be a partnership with the big 
boys to get seven icebreakers in the Arctic. If we don't, we 
are going to literally lose jurisdiction in the Arctic.
    Ms. Goodman. Congressman, you raise an important point that 
adding six icebreakers into the Coast Guard's budget could be a 
budget-breaking effort for the small service that it is. The 
Navy has historically had a lot of other priorities in its 
budget, other big-ticket items. I think it is going to take a 
whole-of-government effort and a look from the top at overall 
what we need in Arctic capabilities and to be able to set the 
right overall level of investment and then decide how it is 
going to be made across the Federal Government because we have 
to be able to up our capability to have presence in the Arctic, 
both across the Department of Defense and across the Coast 
Guard and other agencies. Research in the Arctic continues to 
be very important so we can understand those changing 
conditions and plan and prepare our forces to be able to 
operate there.
    There are a variety of agencies across the Federal 
Government that are very important, and thank you for pointing 
that out. It is going to take an effort coordinated probably 
through the White House with the relevant Federal agencies.
    Mr. Carter. And with all the climate change issues we have 
got in the Arctic and with the shipping that is now going into 
the Arctic, the rescue mission of one icebreaker that can be 
effective in heavy ice and should there be a disaster from what 
we now calling the Northwest Passage, it could be a real Earth-
shaking disaster if it was some kind of cruise ship full of 
people that got in big trouble. To reach them without an 
icebreaker could be a real disaster, in addition to the climate 
issues that are up there and the jurisdiction issues. I want to 
keep emphasizing everybody has got to be thinking about 
icebreakers. We need them.
    Now back to my question and I still got a little time left. 
The Biden administration has set national security objectives. 
In those, their last security guidance, they mention near-peer 
competition by non-state actors, infectious disease, cyber 
attacks, and disinformation campaigns.
    Where would you put a climate change initiative, which 
General Austin and the Secretary have put forward, where would 
you put that in the ranking of what the administration has 
given? It is not concluded now, but it is one of those national 
security guidances that probably should be. Where do you think 
it should be put?
    Ms. Goodman. I think it should be there with the others, 
and I believe it is included in the President's interim 
National Security Strategy, perhaps not quite in that sentence 
but elsewhere in the direction, to address climate threats and 
it should be included because it affects all those others. 
Changing climate, drought, and food insecurities are increasing 
the opportunities for extremists, violent extremists, across 
North Africa, the Middle East, and in South Asia. That brings 
our forces, your forces from Fort Hood and elsewhere are all 
called up to serve when our Nation is threatened.
    Mr. Carter. Right now. Right now.
    Ms. Goodman. Correct.
    Mr. Carter. They gave us a guidance, and there was a 
conversation about climate change in there. That is correct. I 
think we should prioritize it.
    Ms. Goodman. I heartily agree.
    Mr. Carter. Maybe it is being technical, but if you don't 
make noise, you don't get things done.
    Ms. Goodman. Exactly.
    Mr. Carter. I yield back.
    Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
    Ms. Kaptur.

                    Leadership on New Energy Systems

    Ms. Kaptur. There is a disadvantage to a few minutes.
    And I want to go back to my original questions from the 
last round because I didn't get clarity on where in the U.S. 
military you could look for a site visit to the place that is 
doing the most on advancing overground transportation in new 
energy systems. I heard what was said about ARPA and DARPA. I 
know them well. I am asking, who is taking leadership?
    In the same ways we have Blue Angels and they do shows, air 
shows across the country, I really don't see the Department of 
Defense being a leader publicly in some of these areas in which 
we so desperately need advancements.
    For example, the war and tank command, which is at the 
doorstep of every major U.S. producer in Michigan, they don't 
take a public lead in terms of new transportation systems. They 
don't have a Blue Angels type show or anything like that that 
would inspire the public. I don't really see any base energy 
independence pride in the way the military presents itself. So 
perhaps the gentleman you mentioned that has just been 
appointed by Secretary Austin, perhaps he will be helpful in 
this.
    I have found a real resistance or just lack of 
consciousness in the Department in general, despite your--both 
of your--stellar efforts to make a difference. So, again, I 
ask, are you aware of any place in the Department that is 
showing direct leadership in moving these critical sectors of 
overground transportation, new fueled flight, new energy flight 
systems, some of the storage arenas where we know that we have 
to make progress? Is there any base? Is there any person? Is 
there any division that you can point to?
    I know the Marine Corps has done an astounding job overall, 
but, again, the Department hasn't really coalesced its progress 
in any way that is understandable to most Members of Congress 
and the American people.
    Ms. Goodman. It is such a good question. Here is what I 
would like to see. You know, the Department of Defense has 
awards in many categories, and I am familiar with its 
environmental and installation awards because, for 8 years, I 
gave them out as the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 
Environmental Security. We gave the awards out at the 
installation and at individual level for cleaning up 
contaminated sites, complying with air laws, complying with 
water laws, complying with waste, conserving natural resources, 
conserving cultural resources.
    Vice Admiral McGinn may have more familiarity. I think we 
should look at creating new award categories along some of the 
lines you mentioned, and that will encourage the competition 
and incentivize the Department. It is not to the exclusion of 
certain funds that I mentioned earlier. By creating an award 
and recognizing leadership in certain new categories, such as 
the ones you have mentioned, I think we will give the 
Department an opportunity to bring its best forward.

                             Culture Change

    Ms. Kaptur. Thank you, Secretary Goodman. I am so glad to 
hear you say that.
    Let me just point out in the air shows, if I go to the Air 
Force and look at them, the air shows come and always do a 
preshow field display. Usually they have this giant truck that 
shoots flames out the back. Okay? So, the military has figured 
out how to do that. Why don't they bring forward new 
technology, hydrogen fuel cell vehicles or new fuel advanced 
biofuel vehicles? Why don't they teach the public? They don't 
do that after all these years. So I am not yelling at you. I am 
just frustrated as one Member who is tried to make a difference 
in my little puddle, you know. I see this mammoth department, 
and I don't see a rollout that is impressive. Thank you for the 
suggestion.
    Admiral McGinn. I would say the culture of the Department 
is changing. I served in the Obama administration, second term, 
and there was a lot of emphasis on renewable energy, energy 
efficiency, sustainability, environmental care, and that 
eclipsed somewhat over the past administration that is 
unfortunate. Nevertheless, culturally, in the services, in the 
Department of Defense people are still doing their job.
    I would point to Marine Corps Air Station Miramar out in 
San Diego as an example of an installation that has worked 
very, very hard to try to get to net zero. The Marine Corps 
down in Logistics Base, Albany, Georgia, has done a tremendous 
amount of work in terms of sustainability and energy 
independence from the grid if it is needed. So there are many 
pockets. I mentioned two Marine Corps bases. There are many 
fine Navy bases: Naval Base San Diego; right down the 
Chesapeake Bay from Washington, Patuxent River Naval Air 
Station.
    I think this culture of really highlighting how important 
and essential sustainability and fighting climate change and 
turning the challenges into opportunities will bring out, if 
you will, the bragging rights of many of the services and many 
of the installations that are doing some really, really good 
stuff, including to your point about transportation.

                    Global Impact of Climate Change

    Ms. McCollum. Thank you. I am going to wrap kind of--take 
us back to the beginning of your testimony again and kind of 
wrap around it. We talked about, you know, the effects of 
climate change on our bases right here in the United States and 
some of our bases around the world.
    We talked about the effects of the climate change in the 
Arctic and China and Russia and, you know, the extreme weather 
and how there is so much more work to be done there.
    In your statements, you also mentioned about climate change 
just isn't happening here in the United States or in the 
Arctic; it is happening all over the world. I have had the 
opportunity to be in different parts of the world and 
experience what is going on with climate change, whether it is 
talking to political leaders or talking to people who live in 
those communities.
    Climate change can exacerbate environmental, social, 
economic, political drivers of instability and conflict. 
Climate change variability has intensified economic and 
resource insecurity across the continent of Africa, throughout 
the Middle East, leading to mass migration, the displacement of 
vulnerable populations. That is part of what is happening in 
our border is climate change with what we are witnessing with 
some of the people who are fleeing the effects of climate 
change in Central America.
    In turn, these populations, though, especially in Africa 
and the Middle East, are more susceptible to recruitment by 
extremist groups and exploitation by terrorist groups.
    I am going to give one example and then ask a question. So 
I have been in the area of Africa. I have been in Chad, and 
Lake Chad is a water source for more than 30 million people. It 
has shrunk to less than one-tenth of its size compared to just 
50 years ago. It has led to population displacement in a region 
that is very volatile, and we know that extremist groups are 
constantly trying to get a good foothold in there.
    What role can the Department play in preparing for regional 
and global instability to major climate change events? Maybe 
you could give us an example either in the Sahel or something 
that you have seen in Africa to round this off before I close 
the hearing.
    Thank you.
    Ms. Goodman. Thank you. Well, if you overlay in Africa our 
deployments in recent years to combat violent extremists, it 
coincides almost perfectly where--the regions where we see the 
severest climate threats, around the Lake Chad region, Mali, 
and Nigeria, and a few other locations across Africa.
    So, as part of our defense planning through Africa Command, 
for example, in particular, understanding the underlying causes 
of climate threats, the drought, the food insecurity, the 
shrinking of Lake Chad that has enabled Boko Haram and others 
on the Nigerian side to take advantage of vulnerable 
populations that has sent herders, farmers, fishermen fleeing 
the region because they can no longer support their livelihoods 
and their families in that area.
    The long-term solutions to the climate challenges are 
primarily not through military action. They are going to be 
through development and diplomacy, through local action. In 
those parts of Africa, you mentioned, our European partners are 
very deeply engaged. And climate insecurity activity in Europe 
very much means working with development and diplomatic 
agencies. I think we in the U.S. can be, should be doing more 
of that ourselves to round out the totality of our approaches. 
I think that is where this administration is headed in its 
climate security, foreign policy, and national security 
planning to integrate those approaches so we have an integrated 
approach to the diplomacy and development that is needed in 
these regions to enable sustainable livelihoods with military 
forces using their tools, their tools that are reasonable, 
whether it is security forces or combatant commander engagement 
as a backup capability to support further sustainable action.
    Admiral McGinn. Chair McCollum, I would also point to South 
Asia as a critical area that is being affected by climate 
change. With shrinking ice capping glaciers in the Himalayas 
that feed or don't feed, in some cases, the four sacred rivers 
that flow through India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan, we have a 
recipe for regional strife as it is alternating floods in some 
years or drought in others, from those rivers that have been so 
essential to sustaining the people in that region. We really, 
really need to make sure we are engaging with those nations at 
the combatant commander level and really at the head-of-state 
level to make sure that there is some sense of unity to try to 
recognize the common enemy of climate change and to try to do 
some things that increase resilience and to reduce the adverse 
effects on populations in that very, very critical region of 
South Asia.
    Ms. McCollum. Thank you. Thank you both for your testimony.
    And that is a good note to land on because there is a role 
for the Department of Defense, as Judge Carter pointed out. 
There is a role for Homeland Security. There is a role for 
MILCON. But there is a role for the whole of the United States 
Government to be addressing climate change, and that is why I 
am so glad we are back in the Paris climate accord because if 
we are not looking at this through a whole of government and 
working internationally with allies and finding new partners in 
this, it is just going to increase the conflict, and that is 
not anything that I have heard from our Joint Chiefs of Staff 
that they want to see happen, that the Secretaries of Defense 
have all said that that is the best thing that we can do is to 
build towards more peace. That will help with their being able 
to provide security.
    Thank you both for your testimony.
    And, with that, I will conclude today's hearing. This 
subcommittee is adjourned. Thank you.
    [Answers to submitted questions for the record follow:]
    
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]    
    
    

                                           Tuesday, March 23, 2021.

                        FUTURE DEFENSE SPENDING

                               WITNESSES

 DR. JAMES ACTON, CO-DIRECTOR OF NUCLEAR POLICY PROGRAM AND JESSICA T. 
    MATHEWS CHAIR, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE
NILOOFAR RAZI HOWE, SENIOR FELLOW, NEW AMERICA
MANDY SMITHBERGER, DIRECTOR OF THE CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION, 
    PROJECT ON GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT
ROGER ZAKHEIM, DIRECTOR, RONALD REAGAN PRESIDENTIAL FOUNDATION AND 
    INSTITUTE

                   Opening Statement of Ms. McCollum

    Ms. McCollum. This meeting will come to order.
    This meeting, as fully virtual, and I am going to go over a 
couple of the housekeeping matters again.
    For today's meeting, the chair or the staff designated by 
the chair, and that is Kyle, may mute participants' microphones 
when they are not under recognition for purposes of eliminating 
background noise. Members are responsible for muting and 
unmuting themselves. If you notice that you have not unmuted 
yourself, I will ask you if you would like the staff to unmute. 
So if you are having problems I will ask you if the staff 
should unmute you, and you just shake your head, yes, and Kyle 
will do that.
    If there is a technology issue, we will move to the next 
member until that issue is resolved, but you will retain your 
balance of time.
    And I remind all members and witnesses that the 5-minute 
clock still applies, and you can see it displayed in the 
screen. At 1 minute remaining, the clock will turn yellow. At 
30 seconds remaining, I will gently tap the gavel, aka, my 
mouse here working my computer to remind you that your time has 
almost expired. When your time has expired, the clock will turn 
red, and I will begin to recognize the next member.
    In terms of order of speaking, we will follow the order set 
forward by the House rules, beginning with the chair and the 
ranking member, then members present at the time the hearing is 
called to order, and they will be recognized in order of 
seniority, and, finally, members not present at the time that 
the hearing is called to order.
    Finally, House rules require me to remind you that we have 
set up an email list to address which members can send anything 
they wish to submit in writing to any of our hearings or 
markups. This email address has been provided in advance to 
your staff. I would just want to add one more item. The chat 
function on this Microsoft WebEx, that is the happy face that 
Kyle was talking about, I double-checked it out. So if you are 
having problems, just click on the happy face there and we will 
assist you.
    So good afternoon, everyone. This subcommittee is holding 
its third hearing in a series of emerging issue discussions 
that are going to affect future defense spending. While 
cybersecurity, nuclear modernization, and overseas contingency 
operations funding sound like they are three unrelated topics, 
the common thread that unites them is the significant impact 
they all have had on our bill the last several years and how 
they will continue to shape our work for the years to come.
    Today, we will hear from three witnesses. Niloofar Howe, 
senior fellow with a New America will discuss cybersecurity. 
James Acton, the codirector of the Nuclear Policy Program at 
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace will cover 
nuclear modernization. Mandy Smithberger, the director of the 
Center for Defense, Information, and the Project on Government 
Oversight will detail problems and challenges with the OCO 
spending. And Roger Zakheim, the Washington director of the 
Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation and Institute will 
address broad spending issues.
    In the last decade, we have transitioned from thinking of 
cybersecurity as primarily a function of protecting the 
Department of Defense information networks to creating a 
functional cyber integrating cyber effects into most of our 
missions.
    Our adversaries will continue to advance their techniques 
and capabilities which will force our subcommittee and the 
whole of government to evolve on the issue of cybersecurity.
    Few efforts will have more budgetary impacts than nuclear 
modernization. Aging systems, such as the Minutemen, Ohio-class 
submarines, the B-1, and B-2 bombers necessitate modernization 
of the nuclear triad.
    In its most recent report projecting the 10-year cost for 
nuclear forces, the CBO estimated the nuclear enterprise to 
cost DOD $326 billion from 2019 to 2028. When these costs are 
combined with the Department of Energy, the total was 23 
percent greater than CBO's previous estimate.
    And, finally, the budget control caps and discretionary 
spending allowed us to have a more conversation about what is 
going on with the overseas contingency fund. The last 10 years 
Democratic and Republican administrations in Congress used OCO 
as a budget gimmick. That is my opinion, but I think it bears 
out in a lot of the reading that you will see. It was a budget 
gimmick, and it was used to circumvent the budget control caps.
    It is time that we correct those past mistakes. I would 
like to remind my colleagues that on our fiscal year 2021 House 
report we stated, and I quote from it, ``The OCO experiment has 
been an abject failure. It has given the Department budgetary 
relief valve that has allowed it to avoid making difficult 
decisions.'' end of quote. And that is part of the--I totally 
agree with that sentiment.
    Our subcommittee will face a of serious difficult decisions 
in the coming months. And I know our witnesses will provide 
information that will help us in guiding, making some of those 
hard choices.
    I would now like to recognize our distinguished Ranking 
Member Mr. Calvert for his comments.

                     Opening Remarks of Mr. Calvert

    Mr. Calvert. Well thank you, Chairwoman McCollum. First, I 
would like to thank our esteemed witnesses for appearing before 
us today as we move closer to receiving the budget request for 
fiscal year 2022. I hope that is pretty soon. It is important 
that we take a strategic step back and consider the larger 
questions. Of course, facing the Department of Defense in both 
the long-term and short-term environments. As I said in the 
first hearing on this topic, these hearings happening at a 
critical time in our Nation's history.
    Adversaries like China and Russia continue to challenge the 
rules-based order that America and our allies have created over 
the past century. The era of great power competition requires 
smart, effective resourcing by the Department of Defense, our 
industry partners, and ultimately this subcommittee.
    In our hearing last month, we discussed some of the tough 
choices we will have to make to ensure that the military 
mission is aligned and properly funded to take on future 
threats. This includes divesting legacy systems, restoring 
critical infrastructure, and improving the way we develop and 
field new advanced technologies.
    We also discussed the adverse impacts that cutting the 
defense budget would have on our war fighters and our 
capabilities. I continue to be concerned by the efforts of some 
in this body to significantly cut the Department of Defense 
budget.
    With our adversaries, particularly China, continuing to 
close the gap on our capabilities advantage, now is not the 
time to halt the progress made in rebuilding our military. As 
just a little statistical fact, the Chinese have just passed us 
this in a number of ships that are deployed throughout the 
world.
    I look forward to hearing our witnesses to discuss these 
and other topics here today. I thank you again for the 
witnesses who are appearing before us today, and I yield back.
    Ms. McCollum. Well, thank you.
    To our witnesses, your full testimony will be placed in the 
record. In the interest of time, I strongly encourage each and 
every one of you to keep your summarized statements to 5 
minutes or less. Be complete but be succinct when we are in a 
question and answer period.
    With that, Ms. Howe, I would like turn it over to you to 
lead us off.

                     Summary Statement of Ms. Howe

    Ms. Howe. Thank you so much, Chairwoman McCollum, Ranking 
Member Calvert, distinguished committee members, thank you for 
inviting me to testify on the important topic of cybersecurity. 
My name is Niloofar Howe, and I have spent close to three 
decades focused on innovation in the technology and national 
security in cybersecurity sectors.
    Malicious actors operating in cyberspace are fast, 
creative, persistent, and unconstrained by norms, laws, and 
regulation. They have proved themselves extraordinary opponents 
who study our weaknesses and are able to adjust, evolve, and 
move with the sophistication and speed that evades our best 
defenses and exploits our technical, human, legal and 
regulatory vulnerabilities.
    The SolarWinds supply chain operation by Russia and 
exploitation of Microsoft Exchange Servers by China are just 
the latest examples of how sophisticated these adversaries have 
become, purposefully using U.S. infrastructure to launch 
devastating attacks against thousands of organizations in a 
short period of time.
    No matter how sophisticated our defense is, no matter how 
vigilant we are in training and educating, human error, coupled 
with a complex entangled digital ecosystem will always leave a 
door open for committed adversaries; a door we need Congress' 
help to close.
    Underpinning all of our struggles is the fact that the 
internet was constructed in an environment of trust. And that 
assumption has turned out to be a damaging flaw. Everything we 
do is increasingly enabled by the internet. And the security of 
our systems is inversely proportional to the number of notes, 
the number of users, and the number of applications it 
supports.
    Over time, almost everything we have experienced in the 
physical world will happen digitally, but with a speed and 
severity that we are just starting to comprehend. At the same 
time, cyber capabilities that enable attacks are becoming 
commercialized offered as a service by groups that specialize 
in specific aspects of the chain. Creating a fundamentally 
asymmetric dynamic for defending against these attacks is 
increasingly difficult.
    Importantly, while there are no silver bullets, there are 
solutions we can embrace to both deter malicious actors and 
build resilience to their attacks. I propose 15 in my written 
testimony. Almost all of them will be familiar to experts in 
the industry because we have been advocating for them for 
years. Progress against these solutions requires Congress' 
support and action, and we need to move fast.
    We must turn to the issue of ransomware. Ransomware attacks 
are rising exponentially as are the accompanying extortion 
demands. Criminal gangs carry out their ransomware operations 
with impunity and little fear of retribution and prosecution. 
Reducing the plague of ransomware should be a national priority 
and requires us to impose costs on nations, like Russia, that 
are knowingly harboring and perhaps encouraging these 
activities.
    We must also build resilience by, for example, creating a 
voluntary cyber civilian corps that can respond to these 
incidents, especially when they impact resource constraint 
organizations and municipalities, much as our voluntary 
firefighters do.
    We must reduce supply chain risk. The security of our 
digital ecosystem is directly correlated to the least secure 
supplier. SolarWinds revealed that long-term campaigns focused 
on supply chain vulnerabilities can be very difficult to detect 
and by extension incredibly productive for the attacker.
    SolarWinds is not a unique campaign. We must assume that 
quiescence Malware resides throughout our infrastructure 
waiting to be stealthily called into action at the right time. 
To address this issue, we should subject software vendors 
relied upon by our most critical organizations to risk 
assessments and a certification process that creates a trusted 
list of acceptable vendors.
    Discovery of SolarWinds was voluntarily disclosed by one of 
its victim's cybersecurity firm FireEye. Without their 
voluntary disclosure, Russia would likely still be collecting 
information from this operation. To this day, we neither know 
the scope nor the scale of this intrusion as many victims have 
not come forward with details.
    Government agencies and especially the Department of 
Defense can make real-time breach notification a condition of 
contracts with penalties for noncompliance. Compelling 
information sharing is table stakes. Both the Russian and 
Chinese campaign leverage our intelligence blind spot and legal 
constraints using U.S. infrastructure for their campaigns. We 
must raise the bar for adversarial activity on U.S. 
infrastructure and eliminate that blind spot.
    Unless we change our approach, our adversaries will 
continue to identify vulnerabilities for maximum impact with 
little to no fear of retaliation. They will continue to advance 
intrusion tools and trade craft faster than gaps in our cyber 
defenses can be closed.
    As we embrace new waves of technology such as Cloud and its 
computing, autonomous vehicles, 5G microsensors, AI, low Earth 
orbit satellites, IoT drones, autonomous weapons, quantum 
computing, and synthetic Biology, we must reimagine how we 
organize and defend against the threats each new technology 
brings with it.
    The first few months of 2021 should serve as a wake-up call 
to take the actions we know we must take, to make the changes 
we know we must make no matter how difficult the path and do it 
with the agility, speed, and boldness of our adversaries.
    I thank the committee and look forward to your questions.
    [The statement of Ms. Howe follows:]
    
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]    
    
    
    Ms. McCollum. Well, thank you. And you packed a lot into 
your time. Thank you so much.
    Dr. Acton, we are anxious to hear from you.

                     Summary Statement of Dr. Acton

    Mr. Acton. Well, thank you, Madam Chairwoman, and I should 
say, it is both a professional honor but also a personal honor 
to testify before you today. As it happens, my wife was in 
Congress on the Lowey staff for many years, including when she 
chaired the Appropriations Committee. So, it has been well-
drilled into me that in Congress there are Democrats, 
Republicans, and appropriators.
    As you flagged in your opening remarks, Madam Chairwoman, 
the United States currently stands at the beginning of a major 
modernization weight. Almost every American nuclear delivery 
system, missile, warhead, and command and control asset will 
require some kind of modernization over the next 10 to 20 
years. Through the momentous (ph) program, the Congressional 
Budget Office estimates that annual spending on U.S. nuclear 
forces will rise from about $34 billion in 2019 to about $63 
billion in 2028 before peaking in the mid-2030s.
    Now, some of this increase is inevitable and appropriate. 
But I believe that the spending growth could be curtailed 
without compromising U.S. or allied security, providing that 
funds are allocated effectively. To this end, today, I would 
like to highlight two programs that I believe are extraneous, 
and one that I believe is actually underfunded.
    First, the United States is set to spend approximately $95 
billion on procuring the ground-based strategic deterrent, a 
fleet of new intercontinental ballistic missiles. The 
Department of Defense argues that ICBMs are needed because of 
the quote, ``intractable targeting program'' unquote that they 
present to Russia. This problem would be the same, however, 
whether or not we acquire new ICBMs.
    The feasibility of extending existing Minutemen III ICBMs 
should be examined, therefore. DOD previously rejected this 
option in a 2015 study. As I discuss in my written testimony, I 
believe the assumptions behind this study were flawed. The fact 
that the cost of GBSD has risen by almost 50 percent in the 
last 6 years suggests that the study's conclusions may be 
flawed too.
    I suggest, therefore, that Congress pulls the GBSD program 
by reducing fiscal year 2022 funding to the lowest level 
consistent with preserving the program in its current state, 
pending a full assessment by an independent commission of the 
feasibility and cost of extending the service lives of 
Minutemen III ICBMs.
    Second, the United States should retain some low-yield 
nuclear warheads. Indeed, we are currently modernizing relevant 
capabilities. In addition, the Trump administration initiated 
the development of a new $9 billion sea-launched cruise missile 
with a lower-yield option. Given plans to modernize the nuclear 
armed cruise missile however I believe that this new sea-
launched cruise missile is redundant. The air-launch cruise 
missile carried by stealthy B-21 bombers should be highly 
survivable before launch. And after launch, the two missiles 
would have essentially identical flight profiles. For this 
reason, I believe that Congress should refuse any further 
funding for the nuclear arms Sea Launch Cruise Missile.
    Third, the United States would be literally unable to 
conduct any kinds of nuclear operations without a functional 
nuclear command and control system. The development of a highly 
resilient nuclear command and control system should, therefore, 
be the single highest priority to nuclear modernization. 
Unfortunately, it is not. A major and unappreciated challenge 
is that most command and control assets support both nuclear 
and nonnuclear operations.
    In a conventional conflict, therefore, a U.S. adversary 
might attack these assets in order to undermine our known 
nonnuclear operations. So, to tax, however, would have the 
effect of degrading our nuclear command and control 
capabilities, producing potentially catastrophic escalation 
risks.
    I believe that the Department of Defense has not factored 
this kind of risk into planning for the future nuclear command 
and control architecture. And, indeed, the new generation of 
U.S. early wanting satellites will actually have fewer 
satellites in them than the current generation potentially 
reducing their redundancy.
    In response to this and other growing threats, I 
respectfully suggest that Congress should increase funding to 
nuclear command and control modernization and require the 
Department of Defense to study fundamentally different and more 
resilient architectures.
    I hope these suggestions are helpful, and I very much look 
forward to your questions. Thank you for the time.
    [The statement of Mr. Acton follows:]
    
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]    
    
    
    Ms. McCollum. Thank you very much. Ms. Smithberger, please, 
we are anxious to hear your testimony.

                  Summary Statement of Ms. Smithberger

    Ms. Smithberger. Thank you so much, Chair McCollum, Ranking 
Member Calvert, and esteemed members of the subcommittee for 
inviting me to testify today on future defense spending plans 
and the overseas contingency operations account. As I 
mentioned, I am Mandy Smithberger, the director of the Center 
for Defense Information on the Project on Government Oversight.
    As you have noted in your opening statement, Chair 
McCollum, the subcommittee knows better than most the many ways 
the OCO account has been abused to circumvent spending limits 
put in place by the Budget Control Act. We think that the 
expiration of the Budget Control Act should be the end of using 
OCO.
    We agree with what the committee wrote last year about OCO 
being an abject failure. And I agree with what you said, 
Representative Calvert, that we have to be smart and strategic 
about how we use our resources. Our work has found that the 
misuse of OCO is bad for the Department, and it is bad for the 
budget overall. We recommend ending its use to avoid creating 
and to avoid creating or using supplemental funds for base 
budget needs in the future.
    The Department's reliance on supplemental and off-budget 
funds has become so commonplace in the past 20 years; it can be 
easy to forget just how usual the practice is. The usual 
practice in the United States has been to only use supplemental 
funding in the initial years of the conflict when the costs 
were unpredictable. What was previously about 2 percent of DOD 
spending has now become something closer to 10 percent in total 
discretionary funding for DOD.
    The reliance on OCO harms planning and management making it 
easier to fund expensive and lower priority programs that 
wouldn't normally make the cut. It also adds additional budget 
instability and uncertainty for personnel and multiyear 
programs, making it that much harder for the Pentagon to think 
ahead. Our future security should not continue to rely on OCO.
    Additionally, we would urge the committee to look at two 
other policies that fuel unsustainable top-line spending by 
reducing discipline and increasing the likelihood of wasting 
taxpayer dollars.
    The first are statutory requirements for unfunded 
priorities list. By telling the Department's components that 
they will have two bites at the apple, Congress is increasing 
pressure and incentives to increase the Department's budget. 
Former Defense Secretary Robert Gates discouraged the practice, 
and through his leadership significantly curved the size and 
cost of those lists. Eliminating those statutory requirements 
would enhance discipline without jeopardizing Congress' ability 
to conduct oversight and receive feedback from the executive 
branch.
    Second, we urge the committee to continue to examine 
whether new authorities given to the Nuclear Weapons Council 
will lead to wasteful spending. Allowing defense leaders to add 
their own spending priorities to other agencies' budgets 
without providing offsets is likely to crowd out other 
agencies' own priorities and lead to more spending.
    In conclusion, OCO reform has been one of the rarer issues 
in Washington, garnering and continue to maintain bipartisan 
support. Moving OCO to bases included in the recommendations of 
both the Sustainability Defense Task Force and the National 
Defense Strategy Commission. While the former saw this as part 
of the strategy for necessary defense budget cuts, and the 
latter argued the budget should increase, both agreed on the 
need to stop using OCO.
    Thanks to pressure from Congress and civil society, the 
Department has already begun planning to draw down its reliance 
on OCO. Both the Trump administration budget and the Future 
Years Defense Program would significantly decrease OCO starting 
this fiscal year.
    The budget process should create clear priorities for 
spending and program execution. To the maximum extent possible, 
we should have a process that encourages the President and 
Congress to set responsible fiscal goals and make tough choices 
about national security priorities. OCO has enabled both 
endless war and unsustainable top-line growth by discouraging 
prioritization. We urge you to work with the Department by 
ending the use of the OCO account. Thank you again for the 
opportunity to testify, and I am happy to answer any questions 
you may have.
    [The statement of Ms. Smithberger follows:]
    
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]    
    
    
    Ms. McCollum. Thank you. And last but not, least Mr. 
Zakheim, will you please share with us your thoughts on this 
issue.

                        Statement of Mr. Zakheim

    Mr. Zakheim. Thank you, Chair McCollum, Ranking Member 
Calvert, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, I am 
grateful for this invite--invitation to testify today on future 
defense spending.
    The White House has recently released national security 
guidance reaffirmed that the U.S. faces a growing rivalry with 
the quote, ``more assertive and authoritarian China,'' while 
they continue to face threats like Russia, Iran, cyber and 
nuclear proliferation to name only a few. Though these 
challenges have economic, diplomatic, and technological 
dimensions, an adequately resourced military is critical to 
successfully confront these challenges.
    To that end, I want to highlight three overarching points. 
Number 1, a 3 to 5 percent real growth per annum increase in 
defense spending is needed for the DOD to execute its current 
and likely future mission requirements.
    Number 2, defense cuts seriously threaten the United 
States' ability to win a high intensity war with a pure 
adversary, yet alone simultaneously deter opportunistic 
aggression in the second theater.
    And, No. 3, below the top line, the Pentagon faces 
critical, strategic choices regarding how to allocate its 
resources to sustain and modernize the force and compete with 
near peer competitors like China.
    Defense budgets must be strategy-driven, not budget-driven. 
Secretary Austin echoed this view during his Senate 
confirmation hearing, saying, quote, ``our resources need to 
match our strategy, and our strategy needs to match our 
policy.''
    The 2018 bipartisan National Defense Strategy Commission, 
which I was able to serve on, warned that even with its current 
defense budget, quote, ``U.S. military could lose the next 
state-versus-state war it fights.'' While the Trump 
administration deserves some credit for launching an effort to 
rebuild the military, this work is by no means complete. In 
fact, much of the increased funding this committee appropriated 
in the fiscal years 2018 through 2020 was allocated towards 
restoring readiness, and only a small percentage focused on 
modernization.
    The Biden administration national security guidance 
indicates that China will remain the pacing threat with Europe 
and Middle East continuing to demand attention.
    Even before the economic downtown triggered COVID-19, calls 
to reduce defense spending emerged from elements in both 
political parties. After examining the real consequences of 
cuts to the Pentagon's resources through the Reagan Institute 
and the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 
Strategic Choices Exercises, it was clear that one, a 10 
percent cut can reduce the U.S. to a de facto hemispheric power 
by 2030.
    And, two, while flat budgets may appear to be sufficient to 
maintain the status quo, readiness and modernization accounts 
tend to shrink in a flat budget scenario. This would leave the 
United States less able to either deter adventurism them by 
adversaries or to secure allies that America will come to their 
Defense.
    Now, even with the top line that offers some budget growth, 
the DOD cannot avoid difficult strategic choices to balance the 
need to modernize the force for the future and the need to 
maintain a force structure capable of meeting the national 
challenges of today.
    While some progress has been made DOD needs to continue 
developing operational concepts that incorporate new 
technologies and systems that are often the focus of future 
force discussions, such as machine learning and artificial 
intelligence and some of the other technologies my colleague 
has offered in her testimony.
    Congress has done well to mandate such priorities in recent 
legislation. Yet, this will continue to be a challenge for the 
Pentagon and is an area that will benefit from congressional 
oversight. Calls to rapidly integrate new technologies need to 
be accompanied with a radical approach to the Pentagon's 
management practices, specifically, how the DOD acquires new 
technology.
    My testimony offered a number of specific recommendations 
for the Defense Department on those points. I will just mention 
one now. The DOD should measure progress in contracts awarded, 
total dollars awarded, and speed of procurement.
    Even amidst this shift to new technologies and procurement 
processes, the Pentagon should not trade reliable capability 
for systems that do not exist beyond a PowerPoint slide. The 
temptation to trade real capability today for something new in 
the future will require Congress to play a critical and careful 
role in ensuring such legacy systems are indeed unneeded.
    To that end, defense investments should be tightly linked 
to and measured against specific war-fighting objectives. The 
highest priority should be on investments that will make the 
greatest impact in a reasonable timeframe in the most pressing 
scenarios confronting our military, like the Taiwan scenario in 
the Baltic states.
    In 1984, President Reagan observed, quote, ``history 
teaches that war begins when governments believe the price of 
aggression is cheap. To keep the peace, we and our allies must 
be strong enough to convince any potential aggressor that war 
can bring no benefit, only disaster.'' The recently released 
Reagan National Defense Survey revealed that support for 
American leadership in the world, consistent with President 
Reagan's, ``peace through strength'' philosophy remains strong.
    Americans understand that what it will take to sustain the 
peace and our prosperity and are willing to make the 
investments necessary to support a strategy that will deliver 
just that.
    Thank you to committee for having me. I look forward to 
answering your questions.
    [The statement of Mr. Zakheim follows:] 
    
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]    
        
    Ms. McCollum. Will you please give us the first question 
for our panel?

                   Russia and China Cyber Activities

    Mr. Aguilar. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you for having 
this hearing, and I appreciate the panelists' time and 
testimony.
    Ms. Howe, we have heard a lot about SolarWinds and 
Microsoft Exchange hacks a few months ago. Recently, we heard 
the first about this breach. And then earlier in March, 
Microsoft announced the vulnerabilities within its Exchange 
Server and whether the fallout is still being measured. But, 
can you give us a sense about how the amount of resources that 
Russia and China dedicate to cyber activities has changed over 
the past 10 years?
    Ms. Howe. Thank you, Congressman Aguilar, I will be the 
first to admit that I am not an expert on the resource 
spending. What I can tell you is from a strategic priority and 
a competitive strategic perspective, there is no question that 
cyberspace is critically important to the priority that both 
countries have.
    And these operations, SolarWinds and the Microsoft Exchange 
Servers are just one example of how quickly they move, how 
purposefully they move, how stealthily they move, and how they 
can stake advantage and understand what our weaknesses are and 
use them for all of their priorities, whether they are 
military, whether they are national security, whether they are 
economic, whether they are societal.
    There is no question that it is of competitive importance, 
it is of strategic importance to both of them. Their operations 
are very effective, and they have been able to carry them out 
with very little fear of retribution or consequence. And that 
is ultimately the problem. We are moving much slower.
    Harvard sociobiology Professor E.O. Wilson has this great 
quote which is, ``the problem with humanity is that we have 
paleolithic emotions, medieval institutions, and God-like 
technology.'' And today we haven't figured out how to organize 
to make sure that that God-like technology, that for the most 
part, we as a country has developed isn't used against us. And 
right now our adversaries are using it against us. It is a 
critical priority to both of them.

                     Responses to Cyber Activities

    Mr. Aguilar. How should we respond to these types of 
activities? You mentioned consequences. You know, what should 
we be thinking through, and what types of investments should 
the subcommittee be looking to make in the future moving 
forward?
    Ms. Howe. That is a great question. When we look at the 
SolarWinds intrusion, at its core, as of today, it remains 
fundamentally an espionage operation. And how we respond to an 
espionage operation is probably very different than how we 
would respond if the goal was something different.
    What I would tell you is that Russia is--Russians are 
behind most of their ransomware attacks that we suffer in this 
country. Those attacks are overwhelming our security 
professionals, and they are preventing us from focusing on more 
strategic issues and more critical vulnerabilities like the 
ones we have seen in SolarWinds and the Microsoft Exchange 
Servers.
    So, if we wanted to reduce the threat surface and enable 
and empower our security professionals, responding to Russia 
both harboring and potentially encouraging these criminal gangs 
would be fully appropriate. And using our full arsenal of 
national power, including economic tools such as sanctions, 
from my perspective would be an appropriate thing to do.
    As we think about funding, there has been a fair amount of 
funding going to DHS and CISA, which is very important. Our 
response, though, has to be a whole of government response. And 
we have to ensure that we do not lose our technology edge. So 
funding research and innovation, and, especially, how we 
securely develop new technologies is critically important. We 
have to learn from our 5G experience and make sure that we 
never lose our seat at the innovation table. And as we look at 
the sort of next generation of technology, but especially with 
respect to the subcommittee superfast computing and next 
generation encryption which is it cable stakes, we have to make 
sure that we maintain that leadership position.
    We need to make sure that cyber command and NSA which has 
significant capabilities today continue to receive the funding 
they need to support all the agencies as they go after cyber 
actors.
    CISA will require support as it operationalizes. And we 
need to remain clear-eyed about the timeline and leadership is 
going to take for CISA to fully be able to execute on its 
mission, and the support it is going to need from agencies like 
NSA to provide the technical depth that they need in order to 
carry out their mission.
    In the meantime, there has been other suggestions that have 
been put out there, for example, creating something like a 
cyber National Guard, or a cyber civilian corps. When we look 
at ransomware attacks against our municipalities, they are 
under resourced and unable to respond to them in a way that is 
efficient.
    I proposed 15 in my written testimony. I would be happy to 
explore more.
    Mr. Aguilar. Thanks, Ms. Howe. I appreciate it. I yield 
back, Madam Chair.
    Ms. McCollum. Well, thank you. Mr. Calvert.

                            Risk Mitigation

    Mr. Calvert. Thank you, Madam Chair. I just want to make a 
quick point. Both the Republican and Democratic administrations 
have found that a service life extension program for the 
ground-based system ends up costing us more and without 
enabling the system to be effective against current and future 
threats. So, I just wanted to point that out before I ask my 
question.
    The 2018 National Defense Strategy states that the 
department needs to focus its resources to counter China and 
Russia. However, our military, we are still carrying out low 
intensity missions throughout the world.
    While I agree that we should prioritize our research and 
development efforts on fielding capability, which is decisively 
win a war against threats like China, I believe we must also be 
realistic about the missions we are currently tasking the DOD 
with. Even the best resource strategy inevitably allows for 
some risk. Where should the United States be willing to absorb 
that risk?
    I guess for the whole panel, who is best prepared to answer 
that? Maybe Roger, your since I asked Roger on here.
    Mr. Zakheim. Thank you, Congressman. I am happy to take 
that on. And you are right to mention the National Defense 
Strategy had the focus on China and great power competition, 
which includes Russia as well. I would say if there was any 
area where we are supposed to absorb risk per the 2018 National 
Defense Strategy is in those areas like the Middle East, low-
end conflict where the resources should be less intensive. The 
platforms that we use in those theatres should be revisited to 
make sure, for example, we are not using fifth-generation 
platforms, fighter aircraft to deal with a deterrent mission 
that doesn't require something like that.
    So, less use of high-end capability, reduction of force 
structure that can be applied against the threat posed by China 
were the areas that both the National Defense Strategy and the 
2018 National Defense Strategy Commission focused on.
    I would highlight, though, Mr. Calvert that that was the to 
say where we should absorb some risk, not that we should leave 
those areas entirely. So some level of deterrence is required 
to ensure that we don't find ourselves back in some form of 
conflict there because we have talked away from the deterrence 
that we have put in place there.

                      Department of Defense Budget

    Mr. Calvert. With that, you would probably agree that to 
sustain the objectives of the National Defense Strategy, if 
Congress doesn't provide real growth to the budget, it will be 
very difficult to do that.
    Mr. Zakheim. Mr. Calvert, I do agree with that. And I think 
really the point I am trying to convey which justifies the 3 to 
5 percent real growth that I outlined in my statement is that 
we still need to be present in multiple theaters around the 
world. While we don't want to emphasize the Middle East or 
central command theater like we had done a decade or so ago, we 
are not going to walk away from it either.
    And then to lead in Indo-Pacific, to lead in Asia with 
NATO--excuse me in Europe with NATO, and then to also deter in 
the Middle East, those three regions are animating our military 
and required significant resources.
    Mr. Calvert. All right. Let me question on----
    Ms. Smithberger. If I may just add, I think the other thing 
that the committee needs to look at is some of the weapons 
systems that we are acquiring where we are learning that they 
aren't serving the missions that they should be; that they are 
too expensive to maintain; and in some cases where we need to 
slow down production of those systems so that we can make sure 
that we get things right so that they can be maintained and 
effective, and we are not putting those costs on the force.
    Mr. Calvert. Which system are you talking about?

                            F-35 Challenges

    Ms. Smithberger. I think we are seeing increasingly 
challenges with the F-35. I know that won't be a very popular 
one to highlight, but that we already have increased 
development costs incurring. That when you look at the report 
of the National Commission on Aviation Safety that it is not as 
reliable as we expected it to be. So it is important that we 
get this program right so that it is going to be able to serve 
us in the future.
    Mr. Calvert. I hear that, and the problem is that we made a 
determination to move to the F-35, retire the F-18, the F-15, 
the F-16, and that we have gone to that platform. And, 
unfortunately, those other aircraft are not survivable in a war 
with a near peer competition such as China or Russia. They are 
out of the air almost immediately.
    And so really at this point, our only alternative is the F-
35 until we get to another level of aircraft, a generation six 
aircraft, which we are not at yet.
    So even though we have had some difficulties with these 
platforms--we had problems with a C-17 when it first started. 
But, unfortunately, we are involved with the F-16 whether we 
like it or not at this point.
    By that way, that brings up a question on innovation. All 
of these systems have software problems. Your F-35 is no 
exception to that. And it is because we don't have new 
technologies capabilities that we should have to test and 
retest that software quickly and to make sure that it is 
capable. And so, the smaller companies, I think, have a better 
understanding of that type of technology, medium and small 
companies, which have a hard time working with the Department 
of Defense.
    And so, as we move forward, Madam Chairwoman, I hope we can 
find ways to get these innovators in the Department so they can 
help us with our national security.
    And with that, I yield back the balance of my time.
    Ms. McCollum. Thank you, and that is a good thing to bring 
up. And I want to make sure that we do talk about how we help 
small and medium-sized businesses, and part of that is them 
having access to classified space in which to work in, which is 
sometimes not near where their production facilities and where 
they are doing their work.
    Mrs. Kirkpatrick.

                       Supply Chain Vulnerability

    Mrs. Kirkpatrick. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you for 
having this hearing. My question is for Ms. Howe. Many of the 
modernization efforts within the Department of Defense require 
increased network capability, such as 5G to connect sensors and 
process large amounts of data quickly. The Department of 
Defense has acknowledged the importance of 5G but has only 
fielded a few pilot projects. Additionally, we land--we lack an 
end-to-end organic U.S. supply chain, which requires us to rely 
on foreign suppliers, including China.
    Is it too late to get ahead of our adversaries when it 
comes to 5G and supply chains? And should the Department of 
Defense be leading the effort in 5G considering its inherent 
need? My other question is where should this subcommittee 
invest to secure our technology supply chain in 5G 
semiconductors and microchips to position us to compete better?
    Ms. Howe. Thank you so much, Congresswoman, for that 
important question. It is not too late, but we have to move 
fast. Time is not on our side. The clock is ticking. We lost a 
lot of time with 5G, but we can absolutely make up ground. And 
we can't lose your leadership position either with respect to 
5G or any future technology that comes up.
    The future of our military, the future of our weapon 
systems are all dependent on understanding the security risks 
that are inherent in not only the technologies, but the 
interdependence of these technologies. And that interdependence 
is what SolarWinds is fundamentally about.
    And so if we acknowledge that we live in a software-enabled 
world today, in an IP-enabled world today, in a technology-
enabled world today, and understand that the best militaries 
will be defined by access to the best software in these best 
technologies, but a secure form of those software's, then it 
becomes important to organize around that.
    I do believe it needs to be important that we reward the 
Department of Defense and program managers not just with 
meeting time and costs but also meeting security requirements 
with respect to the systems that they deployed. So, all of 
that, I believe, can be done, and time is not--it is not too 
late.
    The question you raise around supply chain vulnerability is 
one of the biggest issues we have today. And, again, the 
SolarWinds intrusion by Russia was very indicative of how hard 
it is to find supply chain vulnerabilities. And this one was 
discussed almost by accident but by FireEye.
    It underscores the fact that without mandated information-
sharing, which again the DOD can mandate information-sharing 
within its contractor base, much more easily than we can do 
that in the private sector, we would have never found out about 
what is happening with SolarWinds.
    There have been many recommendations from a number of 
commissions of creating an organization that is responsible the 
Europeans are doing this now for assessing supply chain risks 
both with respect to the most critical piece of software that 
we use, as well as with the most critical vendors that we use, 
and to create trusted lists of suppliers.
    This is hard. We should not be asking every organization to 
do it for itself, every agency to do it for itself. It requires 
for firmware level and code level inspection. And it is 
important to have a centralized function that can do that. And, 
again, I would just say if nothing else with respect to my 
testimony, pace matters. Moving fast really matters.
    Mrs. Kirkpatrick. Thank you.
    Mr. Zakheim. Can I just add?
    Mrs. Kirkpatrick. Okay.
    Mr. Zakheim. Just one more piece to that, Congresswoman. I 
think on-shoring manufacturing capability is critical here. I 
mentioned Taiwan in my opening statement. You are talking about 
technologies that rely on semiconductors that for the most part 
are manufactured in Asia; many in Taiwan. That is precisely the 
area that China is challenging. And so on-shoring that 
capability in the United States and investment and 
manufacturing will be a key area for this committee and the 
Congress to look at.
    Mrs. Kirkpatrick. Thank you. I have some more questions, 
but I don't know that we can get to them. My time is just about 
expired.
    But how does the United States government recruit, develop, 
and retain the best cyber professionals when most of the 
innovation and highest paying jobs in this area are in the 
commercial sector?
    Ms. Howe. The mission matters, and it matters in the 
industry. I do believe that there is a compelling mission that 
we can use to recruit the best. The authorities that exist, 
especially within the Department of Defense in terms carrying 
out cybersecurity mission is very compelling. If we have a 
commitment to training people and create a way for 
cybersecurity professionals to come and serve in the 
government, take that training back out to the private sector, 
and to be able to come in and out, we can do a lot to solve 
that problem.
    And I will say we have to recruit a much broader base of 
people to our industry, and this is where diversity and equity 
matters. There are some tremendous programs that are being run 
by NSA, FBI, CISA, to encourage STEM education and 
cybersecurity education with diversity and equity in mind. And 
we have highlighted those programs. We need to fund their 
rollout.
    Mrs. Kirkpatrick. Madam Chair, do I have time for one more 
question.
    Ms. McCollum. We are going to have time to do another 
round. Are you able to stay with us, Mrs. Kirkpatrick?
    Mrs. Kirkpatrick. Yes. Thank you. I yield back.
    Ms. McCollum. Oh, perfect. Mr. Womack.

                        Defense Spending Issues

    Mr. Womack. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thanks to the 
participants on this committee. Count me as a ``peace through 
strength'' guy. Roger alluded to that, and as he should, with 
the Reagan Institute. I believe in it. And with any strength 
program, there comes a cost. And it is those costs that I think 
are center point in our discussion today. And there is a lot of 
things that we should be doing.
    But, Roger, you said something in your testimony, and that 
resonates with me, and that is that too often we are caught up 
in trying to fit defense funding, defense spending, if you 
will, in a budgetary box. It has got to fit some kind of a 
number.
    I have always believed that if you are going to have true 
peace through strength, it has got to be based on--you said in 
your testimony, the strategy. I am more referred to it as the 
threat--the things that we are going to try to do that the 
National Defense Strategy commands us to do to meet the threat, 
known and perceived, near-term, long-term. And if it is a 3 to 
5 percent real growth in defense spending that has to accompany 
that, then I accept that. If it is less, even better.
    But I would suspect that if we are going to continue to 
meet a peace through strength objective, we have got to get 
away from trying to fit it into some budgetary framework, even 
though it is important, and fit it toward meeting what the 
perceived--known and perceived threats are. Would you not 
agree?
    Mr. Zakheim. Congressman, I think that is elemental for any 
strategy. The Congress has mandated that the Department of 
Defense put forward a National Defense Strategy. And the 
Congress should know what the cost is for that strategy. Going 
ahead as the--as we have had before with the Budget Control Act 
with the artificial cap, for example, which, of course, will 
not apply going forward but do for a number of years, really 
then, did not make the strategy impactful, because the Congress 
has stated at the outset, here is as much we are going to pay, 
and then much of that strategy became hollow.
    So, yes, Congressman, I completely agree with your outlook 
that the budget really has to come after the strategy. And that 
does not mean we don't have to make important choices. Much of 
what we are discussing and others testifying are talking about 
are choices we are going to have to make. You can't do it all.
    We have prioritized China. We prioritized great power 
competition. That was a key element of National Defense 
Strategy. Other areas will get less focus. But at the end of 
the day, we have committed to strategy, and we ought to 
resource it. That is what we owe the men and women in uniform.

                           Mandatory Spending

    Mr. Womack. My colleague from California, Ken Calvert, said 
it best in that we are always going to have to achieve a 
certain amount of risk. We are going to have to balance the 
needs of our defense strategy against the acceptable risk that 
we need to take. And I think we need to narrow down our focus 
on what is that acceptable level of risk, and that is what we 
rely on our war fighters and our leaders to do.
    My last question is also about resourcing, and it is what I 
consider to be the biggest threat to our ability to do what we 
are all hopeful of doing, and that is protecting and achieving 
our constitutional objective of providing for the common 
defense.
    And it is mandatory spending. And we spend a whole lot of 
time having major food fights over what we spend on national 
defense and what we spend on Labor H and what we spend on all--
but if you look at the last 10 years of our Federal budget, the 
Defense, and Labor, and Health and Human Services, and all of 
the things that we have in our discretionary budget, they 
haven't grown appreciably. I mean, they have grown but in small 
percentages.
    I mean, if you look at what we were spending on the 
discretionary budget, say, in 2009, the year before I was 
elected to Congress versus what we are spending today, I think 
it fits into any reasonable category of reasonable growth over 
time. It is the mandatory side it has.
    And we spend no time, zero time in Congress talking about 
what to do to wrestle mandatory spending to the ground. It is 
growing exponentially. Ten thousand people a day are going to 
age into these programs. And there is no end in sight to how 
much more pressure it is going to put on us appropriators in 
trying to meet the demands that are expressed in our 
discretionary budget.
    So to any of you, would you agree, or maybe to all of you, 
do you agree that Congress needs to get about the task of doing 
something about the mandatory side to spending to include net 
interest on the debt which is going to exceed $300 billion this 
year?
    Anybody?
    Mr. Zakheim. Congressman, I will jump at. I agree, and it 
probably won't surprise you, and the reality is that if you 
want to get after the debt and deficit, going after 
discretionary spending, whether it is defense or nondefense is 
not going to get you there.
    Mr. Womack. To any of you?
    Ms. McCollum. To the former chair of the Budget Committee, 
the other witnesses I don't think came prepared necessarily to 
do that.
    Mr. Womack. Well, look, here is the deal, and then I am 
going to yield back.
    If we are going to have a meaningful conversation about 
future years spending on defense or any other discretionary 
item, we have to be honest with ourselves that the real 
pressure on these programs is not the defense is spending too 
much money, it is that we are all being constrained by how much 
money is going out the door in the Federal budget versus our 
revenues that is having to pay for the mandatory programs that 
Congress has no appetite to solve, and we have to develop that 
appetite.
    I will get off my platform and yield back. And I do have 
other commitment I have got to make and can't stay. But 
Chairwoman McCollum, Ranking Member Calvert, and to our 
witnesses, thank you so much for your time today.
    I yield back.
    Ms. McCollum. Well, thank you. But we also don't want the 
Ways and Means Committee to do what they did to us in 
Interior--both Mr. Calvert and I had to deal with it--and that 
is a payment in lieu of taxes. They decided not to make it 
mandatory to our counties and governments for payment of lieu 
in taxes, and instead just put it over in the Department of the 
Interior. And then Mr. Calvert and I found ourselves having to 
take that out of hide. So that is not a good solution either 
sometimes.
    Mr. Diaz-Balart, I am going to ask you, if you would, to go 
next. So Mr. Diaz-Balart.

                   Threat Level From China and Russia

    Mr. Diaz-Balart. Well, thank you. You are very kind. I want 
to first kind of really add, agree with what my colleague, Mr. 
Womack, just mentioned. And, you know, we always spend a lot of 
time because we are appropriators on discretionary--obviously, 
we spend so little time on, frankly, two-thirds of the spending 
and what is really creating all of the issues.
    I obviously hope that we don't add additional new issues to 
discretionary because I think that not only is it a problem for 
our fiscal future, but it is also potentially a national 
security threat kind of adding to what Mr. Womack said.
    To the panelists, does anybody believe that China is not a 
real, you know, threat and national security threat in the 
future of our--you know, for my child and for my kids' kids, is 
China going to be less of a threat, and anybody believe that is 
going to be less of a threat or potentially going to be a 
threat?
    Ms. Howe. Congressman, I am happy to start with that. I 
believe that China is a long-term strategic threat on a number 
of dimensions, and especially in my area of expertise which is 
cybersecurity.
    Russia is today's threats. But from a strategic perspective 
as we look forward, and as we look forward at the new waves of 
technology that are coming online, and how China is organizing 
globally, there is no question that they are a long-term 
strategic threat.
    Mr. Diaz-Balart. And, you know, thank you for also 
mentioning Russia. Let me add that to my question. You already 
answered it very succinctly. Anybody else? Does anybody think 
that China is not a current or future threat? And that Russia, 
while, you know, obviously, doesn't have the economy of China 
is going to somehow stop being a threat in the near future?
    Mr. Zakheim. Congressman, I believe that China is the 
threat, our peer competitor. And I actually would put them even 
today ahead of Russia in terms of what we have to deal with 
both in terms of their capability and how they are challenging 
us across the political, economic, and, of course, security 
sphere.
    Mr. Diaz-Balart. Let me, since, you know, let me kind of 
take back my time. If anybody disagrees that China is a threat, 
does anybody believe--any of you believe that China is going to 
be less of a threat in the future looking at how they are 
investing, what they are doing, or are they going to be more of 
a threat in the future?
    Ms. Smithberger. Congressman, I think it is going to depend 
a lot on what investments we make as a Nation across our 
government to manage that competition----
    Mr. Diaz-Balart. I get that we do, but I am just asking 
about them. Does anybody think that China is going to be less 
of a threat, that they are going to change their posture, and 
they are going to become, you know, I don't know, Switzerland? 
Or do you believe--do any of you believe they are going 
potentially less of a threat, or are they going to continue to 
expand, increase their military's power, et cetera?
    Mr. Zakheim. I think there is a consensus, Congressman, 
that they are going to be more of a threat, and everything they 
are doing reflects that.
    Mr. Diaz-Balart. Well, let me, again, if anybody disagrees 
with that, please speak up. But if not, because I think that is 
the consensus, I think, amongst most of us also.
    Mr. Action. Congressman, can I----
    Mr. Diaz-Balart. Yes, I am sorry. Go ahead.
    Mr. Acton. Sir, just, I mean, speaking kind of from my 
expertise of nuclear policy, I do worry enormously about 
China's conventional modernization and its cyber forces.
    I think nuclear policy is a bit of a different area there 
in which the United States is going to continue to enjoy very 
significant superiority in nuclear forces for what that is 
worth for the foreseeable future.
    And I don't think that China's steady slow nuclear buildup 
is going to challenge that significantly for the foreseeable 
future.
    Mr. Diaz-Balart. But you do expect them to build up?
    Mr. Acton. Yeah, I mean the Department of Defense projects 
that China's nuclear forces will--sorry, China's nuclear 
warhead stockpile will roughly double over the next 10 years or 
so which would still make it round about 8 to 10 times smaller 
than the United States even at the end of buildup.

                   Research and Development Spending

    Mr. Diaz-Balart. No, and I get that. But I think that there 
is an agreement, right, I would say that there is a consensus 
that it is a threat, it is going to continue to be a threat, it 
is going to continue to be a greater threat. And we also know 
that China has tripled its research in R&D over the past decade 
while our spending has remained constant.
    And so, here is the question. Is there any way that we can 
keep up, compete with a China--an emerging military, 
potentially even nuclear superpower by keeping our R&D flat, 
and also potentially by keeping our defense spending plat? How 
do we do that?
    I just don't see how we can do both things. We can stay 
ahead of the curve while our adversaries, particularly China, 
is according to, I think, everybody's understanding is getting 
more dangerous and not less.
    How can we do that while reducing spending, whether it is 
in basic military spending or R&D? How do we do that? Can we do 
that, or is it frankly just increasing our risk exponentially?
    It is a rhetorical question, but I would like to hear it.
    Mr. Zakheim. Congressman, we have looked at that in our 
Project for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Dr. Macon 
testified before this committee before. The answer is no. A 
flat defense budget will make it very difficult to compete with 
China. And even if you felt that you could compete with China, 
you are inviting risk in other regions in the world. Russia, 
for example, would be the prime spoiler in that scenario which 
would further weaken our interest.
    So even at flat levels and in making really great choices, 
you are inviting significant risk.
    Mr. Diaz-Balart. Madam Chairwoman, yeah, if anybody else 
wants to respond to that, I just want to be conscious of our 
time and be respectful to the chairwoman.
    Ms. McCollum. Thank you so much.
    So, you know, we need to be looking at a defense posture 
against, you know, near peers China and Russia. But we also 
have to realize that their governments work very different than 
ours do, and they don't have the citizen input that we have. 
And all of are us have traveled the world.
    So, when they are talking about what they are doing with 
their defense budgets and that, they are doing so at, you know, 
not taking care of their population and not having public input 
on it. So sometimes it is nice to just talk the dollars, but we 
also have to remember the type of governments that our near 
peers have, and if that is what they decide to do, the public 
has and the people that they are supposed to be representing 
have no side in it.
    A lot has been talked about defense, but I also just want 
to talk about the three Ds because whether it was Secretary 
Gates or Colin Powell, when he was Joint Chief of Staff and the 
Secretary of State always talked about development, diplomacy, 
and defense. And sometimes their best defense is winning the 
hearts and minds and building more allies around the world.
    I am going to take my first and second round and combine 
them. And then before I start asking my question, I just want 
to let people know the order they are up in. It would be Mr. 
Aguilar, Mr. Calvert, Mrs. Kirkpatrick, and then you again you 
again, sir, Mr. Diaz-Balart.

                         Cyber Attack Response

    Ms. Howe, my first question is for you. You mentioned in 
your testimony that our cybersecurity adversaries, they are 
fast, and they are creative, they are persistent, and they are 
unconstrained by law or regulation. Unlike us, right, when we 
compare governments to governments. The add deterrence in 
building resilience, what is the tipping point for the DOD 
should respond when our government and businesses are 
constantly attacked? And I am putting that out because you 
talked about a whole of government.
    Do we need to have a conversation in our democracy on how 
we respond as a whole of government on some of these attacks? 
And when is an attack on our economic system or our healthcare 
system or our public health--public service like water and 
electricity, should we be having those conversations on how to 
respond as a whole government?
    Ms. Howe. Congresswoman, Chairwoman, you are absolutely 
right, and this is a very important question. You highlight a 
critical issue, which is we have not developed the appropriate 
response deterrence policy, escalation policies with respect to 
cyber activity. And every time we come across another event 
that is where a nation state is behind it, we struggle with the 
question of what the appropriate response is. We need to 
develop those norms. We need to develop those policies. We 
can't do them in a vacuum. There needs to be, you know, a 
multilateral agreement with like-minded allies in terms of what 
that appropriate policy would look like.
    What I would tell you is that without restoring deterrence, 
without using all of our tools of national power to respond to 
these attacks in the right way, the private sector does not 
stand a chance. We will not be able to keep committed nation 
state adversaries at bay, out of our system, out of our 
networks. Our governments don't stand a chance. Our critical 
infrastructure does not stand a chance.
    You are absolutely right to say that we have to--we do not 
have the policies in place to--the deterrence policies in 
place, the escalation policies in place. That is the 
conversation that should be happening. And there is no question 
that it is complicated, but we are running out of time to do 
that, so it is--and this is where we need Congress' support. 
Again, this is only something you can do, so we would be 
grateful if that conversation would take place.

                   Ground Based Strategic Deterrents

    Ms. McCollum. So I noticed Mr. Cole came back. So, Mr. 
Cole, what I am doing is I combined my first and second round, 
so you will be right after me and then we will go to Mr. 
Aguilar.
    I would like to direct my next question to Dr. Acton. Your 
testimony calls for a pause in the ground based strategic 
deterrent program, and looking at further alternatives. But at 
the same time, you seem a little skeptical about the long-term 
viability of the intercontinental ballistic, the ICBMs, in 
general. Is there any scenario in which you would recommended 
moving forward with GBSD?
    Mr. Acton. Well, thank you for the question, Congresswoman. 
And I am concerned about the long-term viability of ICBMs, 
especially silo-based ICBMs, as all U.S. systems are. We have 
spoken a lot in this hearing about Russia and China. I think it 
is possible, indeed likely, that over the next 30 to 40, 50 
years, Russia and China would develop large numbers of long-
range conventional weapons that could be used to attack U.S. 
silos.
    And the only concept we would have for then defending those 
nuclear weapons would be to launch large numbers of nuclear 
weapons in the event that Russia or China launch non-nuclear 
attacks against our silos. I don't think that threat is 
credible. I don't think we should want to put any President in 
that position.
    Now, look, let me be honest here. You know, I don't have 
access to classified information. I haven't read the 2015 
analysis of alternatives conducted by the Department of Defense 
about the new ICBM. But based on what has been reported, I 
think there is good reasons to want to see that analysis 
reviewed by an independent body.
    Just to give you one example, the 2015 analysis of 
alternatives assumed that the United--reportedly assumed that 
we should retain 450 ICBMs. That requirement has already 
dropped to 400 ICBMs, and that matters because the fewer ICBMs 
we keep the more we have that are available for testing and 
hence the longer you can sustain the Minuteman-III force form.
    So, you know, this is why I think this should be looked 
over, reviewed by an independent body to look at some of the 
options that weren't considered in the 2015 analysis of 
alternatives, you know, including slightly reducing the size of 
the Minutemen-III force as a way of keeping it viable for 
longer.
    Ms. McCollum. Okay. Thank you. My next--I am going to go--I 
need to be respectful to the other members, and so I have a 
question for both Ms. Smithberger and you, sir, Mr. Zakheim, 
and it goes to OCO. So, Congress and the executive branch, how 
do we use overseas contingency funds? Are they ever necessary?
    And with, Mr. Zakheim, when you were also talking about 
flat-line funding, cuts to funding, and inflationary and 3 
percent and all that, when you were talking about that, how did 
you calculate OCO into that? Because that becomes--that is 
something I am looking at very seriously because some of the 
OCO funding has actually now become baseline funding, and some 
of the OCO funding then has tails that goes into the next year, 
so how we account for all that is really important.
    So, what should Congress and the executive branch be 
looking at if we do anymore of these overseas contingency 
accounts in the future? What should they look for? Should we 
include tails, and how should they be strategically used? If 
both of you could answer that question, and then I am going to 
go to Mr. Cole.
    Ms. Smithberger. Absolutely. Thank you for the question. I 
think at the initial stages of a conflict when the costs are 
unclear, something like OCO can be appropriate. As much as 
possible though, Congress should be very clear about what they 
want that to be used for, that there should--to the degree 
there is a tail to that spending, they should be asking for 
more transparency and reporting about what that is.
    If we don't see a budget--or if we see a budget that 
continues to support OCO, I think you should work with the 
Department to let's make sure that that is only being 
supported--supporting things that are unexpected costs. But 
really the best way to improve planning and management is for 
the Department to not be using this fund.
    Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
    Mr. Zakheim. Madam Chair, I agree with that. In terms of 
your specific question about OCO, the 3 to 5 percent growth is 
talking about the base budget primarily. It didn't include OCO.
    Ms. McCollum. It didn't include any of the tails of OCO 
or----
    Mr. Zakheim. So to the extent that OCO fixes in, right, 
into the base budget, then it would be inclusive, and that is 
part of my point I want to add on to OCO, which is as you 
migrate away from OCO, which I think we should for the reasons 
Ms. Smithberger outlined, we have to make sure that they are 
migrating into the base budget and we are not just simply 
cutting them off, because the Department has relied on it, 
right, and therefore what you are essentially doing is further 
shrinking the base budget if it wedges its way in without 
seeing some top-line relief.
    I also just want to add, Madam Chair, in terms of Mr. 
Acton's point before, just simply that the 2018 National 
Defense Strategy Commission did look at this issue with respect 
to the third leg of the triad ICBM and GBSD and felt that the 
Obama administration decision to move forward with the GBSD 
program was sound. So that was an outside review I referred to 
the committee.
    Ms. McCollum. Well, thank you.
    So, Mr. Cole, I am glad you were able to come back. 
Welcome.
    Mr. Cole. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. I had been at 
the Rules Committee on War Powers Act, so this is back to back 
is the important set of----
    Ms. McCollum. We appreciate your work, sir.

                       Competing With Adversaries

    Mr. Cole. Well, thank you very much. I don't know what I 
did to anger my leader, but I paid for it. Anyway, let me ask 
the big picture question, if I may. I came in and I heard, of 
course, my good friend from Arkansas' comments, which I agree 
with very much, also with yours, Madam Chair, that we have a 
different set of inputs into our defense decisions and our 
potential adversaries do for sure. And we also maintain an all-
volunteer force, which honestly, for soldiers a lot more 
expensive than either of our two adversaries, and that is 
something we do by choice.
    There is a third part of the equation we don't like to talk 
about very much, and that is, in the past, when we dealt with 
this sort of Chinese, Russian access aligned against us, we had 
overwhelming economic advantage over those two economies 
combined. That is not true anymore, and particularly, given the 
growth of the Chinese economy and given its projected growth 
going forward.
    I want to ask all of our witnesses really sort of a big 
picture question. Given the domestic demands we have, given the 
manner in which we have chosen to fund our force with much 
higher per-person cost, and given the fact that we don't have 
the economic advantage over our peer competitors that we once 
had, you know, how realistic is it for us to maintain 
substantial advantage going forward over our competitors?
    And I will just start, if I could, with Mr. Acton, Dr. 
Acton, excuse me, with you and kind of work through the panel.
    Mr. Acton. Well, thank you for the question, Congressman, 
and to some extent, that is kind of above my pay grade, as it 
were. But, you know, focusing on the nuclear aspect of this 
specifically, I believe that the United States can retain a 
very significant advantage over China and can continue to be in 
a situation of strategic parity with Russia while spending--
while reducing the increase in expected spending on nuclear 
weapons.
    And, you know, as defense appropriators, you are one of the 
few organs within the entire U.S. Government that can really 
consider the tradeoffs between the nuclear and nonnuclear parts 
of the budget, I mean, indeed, the Appropriations Committee as 
a whole between the defense and non-defense parts of the 
budget. But what I would just point out is that I don't view 
reductions slowing the rate at increase in nuclear spending as 
in any way compromising the strategic security of the United 
States and its allies.
    Mr. Cole. Thank you.
    Ms. Howe.
    Ms. Howe. Thank you, sir, for the question. From the 
perspective of a cybersecurity person, we have to invest in 
order to maintain our advantage. There is no question about 
that. We have to invest in technology. We have to understand 
the future of technology. We have to own the standards in order 
to manage the supply chain risk.
    Next-generation encryption, investments in super-fast 
computing, those are table stakes, and nothing else matters if 
we lose that competitive edge. So I don't know what tradeoffs 
would need to happen in order to make the investments that are 
required, but for us to maintain our competitive strategic edge 
in cyberspace and to protect our Nation and to protect our 
democracy, we have to invest.
    Mr. Cole. Okay. Ms. Smithberger.
    Ms. Smithberger. I think that we can maintain our 
advantage. It is certainly going to be a challenge. The 
pandemic has created no shortage of concerns. And I think it is 
important to look back to comments that General Milley made 
about how a lot of our strength is our national economy. So I 
think as we look at how to fund each of our agencies in the 
government, it is making sure that we are making smart 
strategic investments.
    And I think, particularly with the many ways that the 
Department of Defense needs to reform, I think that it is going 
to be more advantageous to those reforms if we see reductions 
in spending. And I am concerned that if we see significant 
increases that we are going to continue to fund boondoggle 
programs that aren't going to make us safer.
    Mr. Cole. Okay. And Mr. Zakheim.
    Mr. Zakheim. Thank you, Congressman. I believe that our 
political and economic system will ultimately lead us to the 
prosperity we expect and desire, and that ultimately it is our 
comparative advantage vis--vis China. What we need to do is, in 
parallel with strengthening our economy and working with allies 
because that is another comparative advantage, make sure that 
we continue to invest in our national defense.
    Relative to everything else we spend in this country, the 
budget we are discussing here is a modest down payment to 
ensure that the Chinese or the Russians don't exploit an 
opportunity because they perceive us as weak or unwilling to 
make the investments to secure our peace and prosperity that 
ultimately our political system and economic system delivers.
    I am bullish on us vis--vis China. It is the economic and 
political system that will win the day. We just have to keep 
pace with our security investments.
    Mr. Cole. Okay. Well, thank you very much. Don't 
misunderstand, I am very much a hawk and very much agree with 
your sense of prioritization, all of you collectively, about 
the importance of defense.
    But I also was the chairman and ranking member of Labor-H, 
and I can tell you, we used to use the line, ``You are a lot 
more likely to die in a pandemic than a terrorist attack.'' It 
used to be a great line, now it is true, half a million plus in 
the last year.
    So there are other areas of government that are going to 
have to be invested in, and there are things like the National 
Institutes of Health and CDC, and honestly, they are a fraction 
of the cost of what we spend in defense.
    So, again, I have approached this as a hawk, but I also 
recognize that we have got some other challenges as well, and 
there are limits to the resources we have.
    I think that is where you are trying to take us, Madam 
Chair, in terms of having a serious discussion about priorities 
inside our overall budget.
    With that, I yield back.
    Ms. McCollum. Thank you, Mr. Cole, and that is what we need 
to do. We need to balance everything, and we haven't even 
talked--we have talked about China and Russia here, but there 
is other adversaries that we haven't talked about, the uprising 
of terrorism in Africa and other parts of the world and that, 
and cyber fits into a lot of what those individuals are doing.
    But how do we prepare for that if all of our focus is on 
China and Russia? And it needs to be. They are our near-peer 
adversaries. But we know after September 11 that people can do 
things that are very disruptive and very hurtful to our 
democracy, our Nation, and our people with a lot less expensive 
weapons that they figure out how to use to them, and think of 
all the money we have now spent on that.
    Mr. Aguilar, you have been very patient to ask your second 
question, and you are up.

                              Space Force

    Mr. Aguilar. Thanks, Madam Chair. Appreciate it and 
appreciate the discussion.
    Ms. Smithberger, Space Force is going to play an important 
role in protecting our vital infrastructure that we have made 
investments in over the past few decades; however, there is a 
concern that it will become another, you know, bloated and slow 
part of our Defense Department.
    What recommendations, what best practices, what should we 
be looking at to avoid that type of outcome?
    Ms. Smithberger. Thank you for the question. And, you know, 
to be honest, we had had some concerns about the way that Space 
Force was established, that we aren't setting them up to 
succeed by creating a separate bureaucracy and just kind of 
what inherently tends to come along with that.
    But I think what we need to look at is making sure that we 
are learning the lessons of some of these past risky 
acquisition systems, so how are we making sure that we are not 
pursuing immature technology, how are we making sure that we 
are adequately funding cyber testing as well for these 
different kinds of systems, how are we making sure that we have 
just a healthy culture for the organization as well.
    So I really appreciate the question. I think it is going to 
take very vigorous congressional oversight to make sure that 
the Space Force is working well with the goals of the 
Department and being responsible stewards of taxpayer dollars.
    Mr. Aguilar. How can we do that, you know, better? How can 
we make sure that that connection is closer from the policy 
side to the implementation side with respect to budgeting and 
best practices?
    Ms. Smithberger. That is a good question. So I think as 
much as possible it is making sure that when we are getting--
when you are getting briefings about our space capabilities 
that you have the various components of the Department that are 
focused on these areas.
    And this might be something where my colleague, Dr. Acton, 
can weigh in on as well, but looking at--making sure that there 
is coordination. Certainly, a slightly different issue, but we 
have seen just this week on hypersonic weapons that there are 
concerns about duplication that is going to occur.
    A lot of it is just having very clear transparency about 
what are we building, what are we doing, and having as much 
coordination as possible.
    Mr. Aguilar. Dr. Acton.
    Mr. Acton. Well, thank you for the question. I mean, very 
briefly, I think that everything Dr. Smithberger says about the 
risk of duplication in hypersonics is very true. That is not so 
much a Space Force issue as it is the Air Force has its 
systems, the Navy has its systems, the Army has its systems. I 
think there is cooperation between the services, but a number 
of systems being developed that I think is disproportionate to 
the potential military benefit.
    On Space Force specifically, you know, look, my own area 
here is on nuclear command and control. I don't know if there 
is anybody else in the nongovernmental community who considers 
themselves passionate about that subject, but I do. I would 
just make a couple of points.
    You know, firstly, I think that there are--we ought to be 
looking to enhance the resilience and redundancy of these 
systems. I think this is an area where we ought to be spending 
more as a country not less, especially because of the threats 
to these systems in a--the kind of conventional conflict that 
might precede a nuclear war.
    And, secondly, you know, both in terms of nuclear command 
and control and in terms of nuclear forces more generally, I 
want to emphasize that cooperation in the forms of reciprocal, 
verifiable arms control is one of the most effective ways we 
have to curtail spending without compromising security, not 
only because it avoids getting into arms race, we have to build 
fewer weapons, also in the savings on intelligence because we 
have on-the-ground verification could be very, very 
significant.
    I think it was one of the three Ds that Chairwoman McCollum 
mentioned, ``diplomacy.'' That has to be, in my view, part of 
an integrated strategy as well here.
    Mr. Zakheim. Congressman, could I just add two quick 
metrics that you ought to consider?
    First, the radical in management of the Department in terms 
of the growth of the workforce supporting the Space Force. It 
is supposed to be a lean and mean organization, and Congress 
can, through its legislation, ensure it stays that way.
    Second, rapid acquisition. We see what is going on in 
commercial space. There is no reason why the same investments 
on the government side can't see the speed and delivery that we 
are seeing on the commercial side. This is not decades. It is 
years at most. That is a second area to make sure you are 
getting the bang for your buck when it comes to the Space 
Force.
    Mr. Aguilar. Thank you. I appreciate it.
    Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back.
    Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
    Mr. Calvert.
    Mr. Calvert. Thank you, Madam Chairman. That was an 
interesting round of questions.
    I just want to make a point, that our nuclear weapons are 
old. We need to rework that arsenal. We have capped our number 
of nuclear weapons. We have talked about the arms agreements. 
You know, Russia never stopped in designing and building 
nuclear weapons and weren't honest about what they are up to. 
And their nuclear weapons arsenal is the largest in the world, 
exceeds both the United States and China combined. And I would 
point out that China is rapidly building a nuclear arsenal, so 
it is nothing to sneeze at.
    One other thing about what was brought up about Space 
Command, which I am concerned about, and what was brought up 
about the, you know, personnel within the Department of Defense 
and, Madam Chair, you know what I am going to say----
    The numbers of people in the Department of Defense civilian 
workforce has never been higher relative to those in uniform, 
and we need to get a hold of that bureaucracy. And as fear I 
had with space is that they were going to change--go down that 
same path, so we should not let that happen.

               Department of Defense and the Space Domain

    Getting back to space, that is the high ground, and if any 
conflict happens, I think that that is something that we need 
to maintain superiority at. China is rapidly gaining access to 
space and, quite frankly, capability, and we are losing our 
quantitative edge.
    Last month, Todd Harrison from the Center of Strategic 
International Studies told our subcommittee that China is 
making advances in counter space weapons faster than we are, 
advancing our space defenses against those systems. I would 
ask, what is your assessment on DOD's progress in the space 
domain, and how do we budget properly to be prepared for this 
rapidly evolving threat? I would ask that for any of the 
panelists.
    Mr. Acton.
    Mr. Zakheim. Congressman, I am happy to field part of that. 
I think it is the acquisition speed, it is the redundancy that 
Dr. Acton spoke about. And, I mean, you have done this on the 
civilian workforce writ large, but it is also ensuring that it 
is happening within the Space Force.
    To me, those are the key areas that the Congress should be 
focused on, and that will challenge China. Particularly, if we 
are able to increase a number of satellites, smaller, cheaper, 
that puts great--that is a competitive cost-imposing strategy 
on the Chinese.
    If I can on the GBSD, Congressman, just briefly, I agree 
with you that you need to have nuclear weapons that work, and 
that the problem with the service life extension on the 
Minutemen is that we have heard from the commander that you 
can't extend the life of this, that it doesn't work, and that 
obviously creates great danger.
    Particularly in this environment, the National Defense 
Strategy, we lean on nuclear weapons more, as you know, in the 
strategy. And if we are going to have them, we have got to make 
sure they are going to work, and STRATCOM has told us it will 
not.
    Mr. Calvert. Thank you.
    Mr. Acton. Congressman, if I could weigh in on the issue on 
satellites. Our nuclear command-and-control satellites are in 
very high orbit, and right now the threats to those orbits are 
less than all of, you know, the low-Earth orbit satellites that 
are in dire jeopardy. The threat to those higher-altitude 
satellites is increasing, and our acquisition of antisatellite 
weapons won't in and of itself negate Russian and Chinese 
antisatellite weapons, that won't protect our satellites.
    I believe that DOD should be looking at fundamentally 
different, more resilient architectures to defend these most 
valuable satellites. Just to give you one example, one of the 
systems we used to have for nuclear communications, something 
called ASATCOM involved dispersing communication transponders 
on very large numbers of satellites being used for other 
purposes, 20, 30, exact numbers are classified. That was a much 
more resilient system than building a few absolutely exquisite 
but relatively vulnerable satellites.
    When I say we should be looking at new architectures, that 
is the kind of example of programs that I mean that I think DOD 
is very resistant to changing the way it has done nuclear 
command and control because that is actually quite difficult to 
make that change.
    And on GBSD, all I would say simply is that the assumptions 
on which previous studies into replacing the Minutemen--into 
Minutemen-III life extensions were an extremely restrictive set 
of assumptions. And I think everybody recognizes that the--you 
know, you can predetermine the outcome of a study by the 
assumptions you choose to put into it.
    Mr. Calvert. Yeah. Thank you for that.
    And the last point I want to make, Madam Chair, is that 
Mike Griffin, our former R&D guy at the Department, made a 
point that our turnaround time on new satellite development 
sometimes is 20 years.
    The Chinese are doing it in 2 years. We have to cut the 
time in which we start a program and launch the program 
enormously in order to make sure we keep up. And we are not 
doing that right now. We need to change the culture, and that 
is a difficult thing to do.
    Thank you. Yield back.
    Ms. McCollum. Mr. Diaz-Balart and then Mr. Cole for a 
second question.

                        Semiconductor Production

    Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    A little while ago, I think, Roger--and, again, I apologize 
for using your first name--I think you talked about on-shoring, 
you know, semiconductors and that kind of thing.
    So I just recently read, and I may be wrong, if I read it 
wrong, that I think Ford automobiles is--they are building--I 
don't know if it is their F, you know, 150 pickup trucks 
without the semiconductors, because they don't have enough of 
them, and then they are going to put them on later.
    Now, that is bad enough, but when you are dealing with 
defense national security that is catastrophic. And so, you 
know, any ideas as to what we should be doing to on-shoring, 
you know, national security, defense-like semiconductors, which 
is obviously something I think you talked about, you know, the 
vulnerability of having a lot of them being built in places 
like Taiwan?
    If you care to kind of expand as to some ideas as to how do 
we do on-shore, incentivize companies to build those 
semiconductors, those national security semiconductors here in 
the United States.
    Mr. Zakheim. Thank you, Congressman. Happy to talk about 
that. You are right that cutting-edge semiconductors are not 
manufactured in the United States. They have one foundry. As 
you go from 14 animators and down, you really have to look into 
Asia.
    So the previous administration and this administration and 
this Congress has made significant investments--I am thinking 
of the CHIP Act here, at least it requires appropriations, so 
it is quite relevant to this committee, but at least the 
authorization to on-shore some of this capability.
    And we have seen this with some of the U.S. semiconductor 
companies, as well as the one that gets discussed the most is 
Taiwan's semiconductor manufacturing company, which there is a 
move to invest in a foundry, I believe, in Arizona.
    But the other slice of it is that we are going to have to 
continue working with allies. We are going to have to continue 
working and getting semiconductors from Korea and Taiwan, and 
that gets back to this committee's jurisdiction, which is to 
demonstrate to the Chinese that the United States is committed 
to the defense of Taiwan, that that is not only necessary 
because we are both democracies and we should support 
democracies, but also it is vital to the supply chain for our 
security and our economy.
    And that is pretty much where we are at right now and why 
this is so critical. And we are seeing it, as you reference, 
outside the security context, just economically right now, Ford 
is having difficulty getting their semiconductors.
    Mr. Diaz-Balart. And I agree with you, and I think, you 
know, about your--you know, the posture towards Taiwan and to 
others. But should we treat semiconductors--I mean, you know, 
obviously, we want to--I would like to on-shore everything, 
right.
    But there is, I believe, a difference between 
semiconductors, hugely important for pickup trucks, and 
semiconductors for our national defense.
    So should we treat those differently and have a different 
way to, you know, to more aggressively treat those differently 
than we do with, you know, other semiconductors, or for that 
matter anything that is not defense, directly defense related?
    Mr. Zakheim. Well, it is interesting when it comes to the 
fab support to smaller semiconductors, and I don't know what 
size the Ford F-150 uses, but generally this is viewed as 
something that is needed on the commercial side as well on the 
security side. So it is actually a twofer when you come to 
think of it.
    And given the capital-intensive requirements to support 
high-end manufacturing like a foundry for semiconductors, you 
are going to need a commercial market to support it. So vital 
to getting our security and defense needs met when it comes to 
semiconductors, we actually have to make it part of the supply 
chain for the commercial sector as well.
    And that is really reflective of the overall environment we 
are in right now where so much of what the military needs in 
terms of technology are things that the private sector, the 
commercial sector is leading on. Semiconductors is one that 
gets a lot of focus because we simply have to look to Asia to 
source it.
    Mr. Diaz-Balart. Appreciate that.
    Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I yield back.
    Ms. McCollum. Mr. Cole.

                  Nuclear Modernization and Hypersonic

    Mr. Cole. Thank you.
    Mr. Zakheim, I understand you are part of the 2018 National 
Defense Strategy Commission. Obviously, one of the things you 
looked at was nuclear modernization, so a couple questions.
    One, do you think there is any reason to think we need to 
do anything different than that commission outlined.
    Two, do you have any concerns--and this may be a very 
elemental question--about the fact that both Russia and China 
still continue to manufacture nuclear weapons? We seem to just 
simply rework the nuclear weapons that we have. And I know Mr. 
Calvert touched on this a little bit.
    I understand from a previous hearing, it would be very 
difficult for us to actually make from scratch, if not 
impossible right now in any short period of time, a nuclear 
weapon. Does that give you any pause for concern looking 
forward?
    Mr. Zakheim. Thank you, Congressman Cole. And, yes, I think 
the 2018 National Defense Strategy Commission language on 
nuclear weapons, in particular the triad and GBSD stands. The 
strategy demands it. Because we are simply focused so much on 
China, we have to rely even more than previously on the 
deterrent.
    We have our limitations. We have our reasons why we don't 
test, for example, nuclear weapons. The Commission didn't say 
we should revisit that. What it did say is that we should 
reinvest in the design, understanding, and modernizing.
    And it is simply dangerous to rely on something that was 
put out there in 1970. That people understand the designs, 
should they actually have them, are not alive.
    I think the rationale for the triad remains strong. We do 
need the GBSD, the ICBM because there are vulnerabilities that 
it addresses that the other legs of the triad do not.
    And we should go ahead and modernize for the safety of the 
American people and the cities in which these silos reside and 
for the deterrence it brings us and our allies in Europe and 
Asia.
    Mr. Cole. Okay. Thank you.
    Dr. Acton, I know you know a great deal about hypersonics. 
It is an area that I think we have allowed ourselves to get 
behind in. But I am particularly interested in not just the 
offensive capability, but, you know, you have raised the danger 
of hypersonic attack on land-based silos.
    What kind of defensive possibilities do we have in dealing 
with hypersonics? I know I have seen--Fort Sill is in my 
district, the air defense artillery station there. There has 
been some--at least beginning work on lasers. How close are we 
to having any kind of reasonable defense against a hypersonic 
attack?
    Mr. Acton. Thanks for the question, Congressman. I would 
distinguish here between point defenses and area defenses. So, 
area defenses are systems like the ground-based midcourse 
system deployed in California and Alaska. Those are--you know, 
those are intended to defend very wide areas. Conceptually, 
they are a bit like defensive linemen in football trying to 
knock down the ball just after it leaves the quarterback's 
hand.
    You know, those kind of area defenses against hypersonic 
weapons are extraordinarily difficult. I would point out, they 
are also extraordinarily difficult against normal ballistic 
missiles. You know, our defenses are not designed to intercept 
Russian or Chinese ICBMs. They wouldn't have the ability to 
intercept Russian or Chinese hypersonic weapons. Obviously, if 
those hypersonic weapons were conventionally armed, that would 
represent a qualitatively new threat facing us.
    The good news is, I am a lot more bullish about point 
defenses. This is like your cornerbacks at football trying to 
intercept the ball just before it lands in the wide receiver's 
hands. They can only intercept a small area. They are expensive 
as a result.
    But, you know, systems like that have been shown to have a 
pretty good effectiveness against ballistic missiles. 
Hypersonic weapons generally move slower than ballistic 
missiles of the same range.
    You know, you can't just point that at a hypersonic weapon 
and hope it would work. You have to modify the system. But the 
very, very intent heat signature of a hypersonic weapon is 
something that an infrared seeker interceptor can lock on to.
    So, yeah, I am moderately bullish about this. I think this 
is an area in which DOD is already spending quite a lot on 
hypersonic defense. I think for point defense is that 
investment is a worthwhile one.
    It is not going to be a silver bullet, but when you combine 
it with hardening, dispersal, you know, my net assessment is 
that Russian and Chinese conventional regional hypersonics 
don't really increase the threat we face relative to the 
ballistic missiles that they already have, especially if we 
make good investments in defenses, active and passive.
    Mr. Cole. Well, thank you, Dr. Acton, for speaking in 
football analogies. That is something those of us in Oklahoma 
actually grasp and understand much more quickly, so that was 
very helpful to me.
    Mr. Acton. Yeah, I have to thank my wife for that. You can 
probably tell by my accent, I didn't grow up with that.
    Mr. Cole. Well, I was going to compliment you. You clearly 
have mastered it.
    Chair, I yield back.
    Ms. McCollum. Well, we could always do hockey from my part 
of the world. I just want to thank the panelists. We had you 
here today to make us think about us and some of the tough 
decisions we are going to have to make, and you put a lot of 
homework on our plate.
    So here is some of the things that my takeaway from this 
is: One, we need to really work with the authorizers and with 
the Department of Defense and with this administration for this 
upcoming budget cycle to get a clear focus on the mission of 
the Space Force and make sure that there is transparency in it.
    When it comes to the overseas contingency accounts, and 
this is something we have all hungered for, I think, as 
appropriators, transparency, clean accounting, and 
understanding where the tails are that bind us up into the 
future.
    When it comes to workforce, working with maybe Mr. Cole's 
committee on how we get a workforce in cybersecurity and how we 
get the whole-of-government working on it and understanding 
when an attack on cybersecurity is an attack on us as a nation 
state.
    Coming up with this idea of like a new DARPA where we can 
have people from cybersecurity both come in and come out and 
use their talent and everything. It was just great. Now, some 
of this isn't necessarily in appropriations; it is working with 
authorizers and people in whole-of-government.
    The whole supply chain, I mean, the pandemic, again, 
brought this up. So, whether it is semiconductors or PPE, 
right, that puts a vulnerability here at home.
    And then the discussion on nuclear from everybody has been 
fascinating. It is how many, what kind, and what really 
resonates as a deterrent, and what do we do to defend ourselves 
against these issues. But for me, there is also tails on that, 
and maybe that is in the Department of Energy's account, but I 
think it also starts falling in the Department of Defense, 
storage, maintenance.
    These are not, you know, weapons that you can just put 
down, put in a locker, lock it up and guard it. There is a lot 
that goes into this that has a lot of expense for future 
generations. It is the tails that we live for future 
generations.
    I just want to thank you again, Ms. Howe, Mr. Acton, Ms. 
Smithberger, and Mr. Zakheim. It was a fascinating discussion, 
and I think it is one that we need to have because we are going 
to be making, as Mr. Cole and others pointed out, some really 
tough decisions. So I thank and each and every one of you for 
giving us a lot, a lot to think about.
    And with that, Mr. Calvert, I am going to conclude the 
hearing unless there is anything you want to add really quick 
at the end?
    Mr. Calvert. I just want to thank you for the hearing, 
Madam Chair. Obviously, we have near-term, long-term 
challenges, and this is a good hearing to try to understand 
that better. I can't think of anything more important. Thank 
you.
    Ms. McCollum. Yes. Thank you.
    So, with that, thank you again to each and every one of the 
panelists and for the committee members who were able to come 
in and out.
    And with that, this subcommittee stands adjourned.
    [Answers to submitted questions follow:]
    
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]    
    
    

                                          Thursday, April 15, 2021.

                     UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND

                                WITNESS

ADMIRAL CRAIG S. FALLER, COMMANDER, UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND

                   Opening Statement of Ms. McCollum

    Ms. McCollum. Good morning. This subcommittee is going to 
be receiving testimony from the U.S. Southern Command. Our 
witness is SOUTHCOM Commander Admiral Craig Faller.
    Admiral Faller, welcome back to the subcommittee. We look 
forward to hearing your testimony.
    Today's hearing is the first of several this subcommittee 
will hold with geographic combatant commanders to discuss 
national security challenges we face around the world and to 
look to see how each command is postured and has the resources 
it needs to the meet these challenges.
    The President--and it is called the ``skinny'' budget, 
right? It describes the need to counter the pacing threat from 
China as the Department's top challenge. As we await the full 
budget, though, we are going to continue to move forward with 
these hearings.
    In the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility, influences of 
foreign actors and drug cartels has increased. Russia and 
China, with their meddling in Venezuela, have also created 
challenges. China has taken advantage of the COVID-19 pandemic 
to gain influence. I want to hear from our witness about the 
destabilizing activities in the region and SOUTHCOM's response.
    At the same time, we need to be mindful that many of the 
challenges we face may require diplomatic or economic responses 
rather than a military one. We need to be smart about using all 
the tools that are at our disposal--development, defense, as 
well as, I think most importantly, diplomatic.
    One of the things that makes the SOUTHCOM area of 
responsibility different than other combatant commands is the 
proximity to the United States. Events in the region can have a 
direct impact on the United States and our friends and allies.
    And there are numerous examples of this. Venezuela has 
completely broken down. That country's economic and political 
system has displaced millions and created instability in the 
region. Thousands of Venezuelans have fled to the United 
States. Last month, the Biden administration recognized this 
humanitarian situation and extended temporary protective status 
to thousands residing here.
    The turmoil in Venezuela has created a haven for 
transnational criminal organizations, who thrive in a lack of 
government and security. Criminal organizations continue to 
traffic record numbers of drugs into the United States while 
also engaging in human smuggling and trafficking.
    In Central America, economic and security conditions, 
combined with extreme weather events made worse by climate 
change, continue to cause thousands to migrate north. And, as 
we know, the region has been hit hard by COVID-19, straining 
healthcare systems and economies and creating instability, 
particularly in Brazil.
    We will be looking forward to hearing today how Southern 
Command is postured and resourced and is ready to play its part 
in addressing all these issues. We also look forward to hearing 
how SOUTHCOM is working with partner countries to address our 
common challenges.
    And, finally, we will discuss the detention facility at 
Guantanamo, Cuba. We know that the Biden administration has 
launched a formal review of the detention facility, with the 
aim of finally closing it before President Biden leaves office. 
And that is something I strongly, very strongly, support.
    So, with that, I want to thank everyone for participating 
in today's hearing, and I will now recognize the distinguished 
ranking member, Mr. Calvert, for his remarks.

                     Opening Remarks of Mr. Calvert

    Mr. Calvert. Well, thank you, Chair McCollum. I appreciate 
that introduction.
    Admiral Faller, welcome back to what we understand will be 
your last appearance before the subcommittee. We deeply 
appreciate your service and all the men and women who serve 
under your command.
    I appreciate the chair calling this hearing. As the Admiral 
knows, SOUTHCOM AOR is of keen interest to me and members of 
both sides of the aisle, especially since I am from a border 
State and understand some of your challenges.
    Many of us have felt that your command has been under-
resourced relative to your needs, particularly my colleagues 
Mario Diaz-Balart and Henry Cuellar, which is an issue that we 
sought to address in last year's bill.
    More broadly, the chaos on our southern border reminds us 
of the perils of taking our eye off the ball and allowing our 
own hemisphere to become a victim of strategic neglect here in 
Washington. I hope your testimony will be a needed correction 
to that mindset.
    For example, I am struck by your stark assessment that the 
hemisphere is under assault from criminal organizations and 
that imminent action is needed if we are to effectively discuss 
China's corrosive but growing influence there. Much of this 
task will fall to others in the interagency, particularly the 
State Department and USAID, but SOUTHCOM has a critical role to 
play in countering threats to the homeland and helping to 
strengthen the security of our partners in the region.
    In your testimony, I hope you will identify SOUTHCOM's most 
serious resource constraints, including with respect to your 
longstanding requirement for persistent ISR.
    I look forward to the testimony and dialogue to follow.
    And, with that, Madam Chair, I yield back.
    Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
    Well, today, we have the honor and the privilege of being 
joined by Ms. Granger, who is the full ranking member of the 
Appropriations Committee.
    And, Ms. Granger, I believe you were the first woman ever 
to lead this Subcommittee on Defense.
    Welcome.

                         Remarks of Ms. Granger

    Ms. Granger. Thank you very much. Thank you.
    And thank you, Admiral Faller, for being here. It is good 
to see you.
    SOUTHCOM is an extremely important area of operation that 
frequently doesn't get the priority it deserves because of 
conflicts in other areas of the world. It has been and will 
continue to be a priority of mine.
    The crisis on our southern border is just the most recent 
reminder of how critically important the region is to the 
security of our own country. I have seen for myself on many 
visits to the border and to the region that this is not a new 
problem we are trying to solve.
    We have tried many times to address the reasons why people 
decide to make the dangerous journey from Central America to 
the United States. Despite well-meaning efforts going back 
decades, we have not found the right formula for lasting 
success. And, unfortunately, some of the changes made by the 
previous administration to stem the flow of migration have now 
been reversed.
    I hope this administration will consult with our partners 
in the region, as well as this committee, to understand the 
lessons that have been learned in the past to ensure that our 
efforts produce better results.
    I look forward to your views on other pressing challenges, 
including China's growing influence in the region. I also hope 
you can speak to some of our successes in your area of 
responsibility, including expanding and deepening our key 
partnerships in the region, such as Costa Rica and Colombia.
    This hearing is typically classified so that we can gather 
the full picture of what is going on in the region. While this 
hearing today is open to the public, I hope it will not prevent 
you from giving us full answers. I encourage you to provide 
classified responses in writing if you can't respond to the 
questions members ask today.
    And I thank you again for your service, and I look forward 
to your testimony.
    And I yield back.
    Ms. McCollum. Thank you. Thank you, Ranking Member Granger.
    I was going to mention the fact that this is an open 
hearing. If something is classified, Admiral, please let us 
know and we will arrange to have those answers done. Because we 
are living in the age of COVID, we needed to keep these 
combatant command hearings moving forward as we await the full 
budget. There is no time to waste. And a lot of what we can 
discuss can be done in open session.
    The staff, both Democratic and Republican staff, are 
working together to figure out how we can do classified 
briefings. I spoke with Chair Schiff yesterday. They had their 
first classified briefing in the Intel Committee, and it was a 
little bumpy, as they all can't be in the room together. We are 
working that out.
    And if somebody has something that is of a classified 
nature for an answer, sir, feel comfortable in saying so, and 
the staff will work to accommodate that those answers are not 
only provided to the member but to everyone on the full 
committee.
    So, with that, I am going to ask a question on climate 
change before we turn to the ranking member. The reason why I 
am going with climate change is that it affects not only what 
we need to be doing to secure our assets and build resiliency 
into them but also through the response that you have in facing 
issues with responding to disasters and the instability that 
climate change causes.
    We know in Key West, for example, it is particularly 
vulnerable to climate change, and you do have some plans moving 
forward down there. Guantanamo Bay is another area that is out 
there, very vulnerable, as well as some of the response that 
you have now had to focus things on and missions on because of 
climate change.
    Could you talk about climate change as a national security 
issue, not only for the immediate effects of your command but 
for the disruption it causes in the area?
    Admiral Faller. Well, thank you, Madam Chair and Ranking 
Member Calvert and distinguished members of the committee. And 
we will get right into questions. In the interest of time, I 
had an opening statement that I will just submit for the 
record. You wanted to proceed, I am ready to dive in. Whatever 
you want to do, Madam Chair.
    Ms. McCollum. We would like to hear your opening statement. 
We do have time. If you want to redact a little bit, that is 
fine. And that is on me. That is my apology--

                  Summary Statement of Admiral Faller

    Admiral Faller. It is quite all right.
    But thank you all. Madam Chair and Ranking Member Calvert 
and distinguished members, it is a real honor to testify today.
    Now more than ever, I feel a deep sense of urgency that our 
region is under assault from a vicious circle of threats. And 
these are global threats, and they are right here, right now, 
in our neighborhood.
    And the Western Hemisphere is our home. It is our shared 
neighborhood. And a number of you have talked about that 
proximity and how it matters. And in the Interim National 
Security Strategy, we saw that it was designated as a 
hemisphere of vital national interest to the United States.
    The INDOPACOM commander recently testified that China is 
the number-one strategic threat of the 2lst century, and we see 
that in this hemisphere every day.
    I would like to address a few myths that I hear and do some 
myth-busting at the start of this hearing.
    One myth that I often hear is that China's interests in the 
Western Hemisphere are primarily economic. The Chinese 
Communist Party, with its insidious, corrosive, and corrupt 
influence, seeks global dominance. And that runs from Taiwan 
right here into our neighborhood. And our strategic approach 
for China as a nation and as a whole of nations together must 
be global as well.
    They have over 40 port deals in work. They are dishing out 
significant loans for political and economic leverage. They are 
pushing IT infrastructure. And they are engaged in an array of 
predatory practices, such as illegal, unregulated, unreported 
fishing, all with little or no concern for human rights, the 
environment, or the rule of law.
    The second myth is that transnational criminal 
organizations are just drug traffickers and only a law 
enforcement problem. To be clear, it is our assessment that the 
transnational criminal organizations, or TCOs, pose a direct 
threat to our national security. They traffic in arms, humans, 
drugs, and they claim tens of thousands of lives each and every 
year here in the United States and in our partner nations. They 
undermine democracy. Their murderous tactics have resulted in 
43 of the 50 most violent cities being in our hemisphere. And 
they drive illegal immigration and allow bad actors like China 
to gain influence.
    Myth three is that the United States military or partner-
nation militaries have no role to play with these threats. Our 
role is a supporting role for sure, but the professionalism of 
our United States military men and women is an example that our 
partners seek to model each and every day. And we do that 
through our education and training programs, our exercise 
programs, and our humanitarian assistance, to name just a few.
    We have established programs that help partner nations 
develop and implement respect for the rule of law and human 
rights. And our programs, as is our equipment, are corruption-
free. And when you work with the United States, you work on a 
relationship, not a client relationship. We provide not only 
positive role models but the tools and strategies for them to 
implement them, enhancing their capacity and making us all 
stronger together.
    Underpinning these national security threats is growing 
fragility in the region. COVID-19 has hit the hemisphere hard. 
According to the IMF, the economies of Latin America and the 
Caribbean shrank by 7.4 percent in 2020. The impacts of the 
pandemic will alter the hemisphere for years to come. And in 
the midst of the pandemic, two back-to-back major hurricanes 
devastated Central America, creating even greater instability.
    The pandemic and these unprecedented storms struck on top 
of the vicious circles of threats that I have highlighted, 
creating strong push factors for the people of the region to 
head north in search of safety and basic needs for their 
families.
    In Venezuela, despite an economy in tailspin and more than 
5 million refugees that have fled the country, the illegitimate 
Maduro regime continues to cling to power, with support from 
Cuba, Russia, Iran, and China.
    We can't face these daunting challenges on our own. The 
only way to counter these threats is to strengthen our 
partnerships, and that is how we will win the strategic 
competition. No one nation is as strong as all of us working 
together.
    And I have been impressed by the nations who have worked 
shoulder-to-shoulder with us in countering threats to our 
neighborhood. For example, last year, Colombia brought together 
more than two dozen nations in Operation Orion VI to conduct a 
counter-transnational-criminal-organization operation. And 
earlier this year, Brazil became the first Latin American 
country to send forces to our high-end U.S. Army training in 
Fort Polk, Louisiana.
    Good neighbors are here to help when you need them most, 
especially during a crisis, and during this pandemic the United 
States Southern Command stepped up. We provided humanitarian 
assistance to our partners when COVID struck, and we did it 
with the speed of relevance, delivering field hospitals and 
critical PPE. To date, we have executed 498 projects in 28 
countries, with a total investment of more than $70 million. 
And this investment, thanks to your support, is making a 
difference.
    SOUTHCOM works every day to build the readiness and 
professionalism of our trusted military partners and security 
partners. Modest investments in intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance, security cooperation, and presence go a long 
way in the hemisphere and will help us and our partners counter 
these global threats.
    Finally, our successes would not be possible without our 
most important resource: our people, our SOUTHCOM team. And we 
are taking proactive steps to protect our people from 
unacceptable behaviors like sexual assault and harassment, 
racism, and extremism. We take these threats seriously because 
it is the key to readiness and it is the right thing to do.
    Madam Chair, Ranking Member Rogers, on behalf of the 
SOUTHCOM team, thank you for your trust. I look forward to the 
questions and discussion today.
    [The information follows:]
    
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]    
       
                 Climate Change

    Ms. McCollum. Thank you so much. And your full testimony 
has been submitted for the record, and members have a copy of 
it. Thank you so much for that overview.
    You heard my questions on climate change. You touched a 
little bit about some of the challenges that you are facing in 
your opening statement. Would you please elaborate on that?
    Admiral Faller. Our main line of effort, our main 
engagement, is to work with our partners on their ability to 
respond rapidly.
    And the science is there; the climate is more violent. And 
I will give you an example, Madam Chair. In the fall of 2019, I 
went on an extensive tour to different base locations in 
Guatemala. And as we flew around the country and talked about 
how they could improve their security and how we could partner 
together, it struck me that the rivers were dry, the fields 
parched, and the crops that should have been ready for harvest 
were withering. And they had been in a drought condition for 
some number of years.
    One year later, those same fields were flooded and washed 
out by the two most violent storms to hit that region in rapid 
succession. Category 4 hurricanes right around the beginning of 
November rolled in on the same track 15 days apart. And, today, 
all three nations in the Northern Triangle have declared 
national food emergencies, and there is a significant portion 
of their populations that don't have the basic food to eat.
    So that is an example. And then where we come to play is to 
help our partners determine the best way to respond. Their 
response, their department of militaries is necessarily in 
support of their interagency, but just as we look inward in a 
disaster, they do. We work on rapid response.
    We are very fortunate--as was mentioned in some of your 
opening statements, posture is key. We are very fortunate to 
have a security cooperation location in Soto Cano, Honduras. 
And there we have Army helicopters, lift, around 14 of them. We 
immediately deployed those helicopters during that hurricane to 
save lives and help our partners. We deployed them in support 
of our embassies, our ambassadors, and the USAID, and we had 
them in constant operation for about a month's time last 
November.
    And I think it points to, when partners are in need and the 
United States steps forward and extends an outstretched hand, 
we build trust and we further strengthen that relationship for 
the long term, and it can be a force for good.
    Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
    Mr. Calvert.

   Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance

    Mr. Calvert. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    And, Admiral, thank you for your service.
    Admiral, it is my understanding that SOUTHCOM uses less 
than 1 percent of the DOD's ISR resources. Is that correct?
    Admiral Faller. Yes, sir. It is about 1 percent of the 
resources for ISR.
    And as I mentioned in my opening statement, that is 
absolutely critical. Our intel drives everything we do. You 
know, we turn it into knowledge. We share it where we can, 
particularly with our own U.S. Government agencies. It helps us 
understand about what is on the field and how to best respond 
long term.
    Mr. Calvert. But if you had additional ISR to counter 
transnational organized crime, other critical objectives, that 
would be very, very helpful. You need additional platforms to 
make that mission succeed?
    Admiral Faller. Yes, sir. We really appreciate the support 
of this committee, in particular, in the past. We had an ISR 
transfer fund that was critical to meeting those needs, a very 
cost-effective fund that was not included in last year's 
budget. And while we have not seen the full budget for 2022, I 
would anticipate that at the top of my unfunded requirements 
list will be the need for additional ISR, to include what we 
call nontraditional ISR.
    It is using machine learning and artificial intelligence to 
look through the vast amount of commercially available foreign 
data, data on foreign adversaries. We have used that ISR 
transfer fund money to do work in that environment, and we have 
uncovered a considerable amount of useful information that we 
have been able to pass to host nations for their action, our 
law enforcement partners. And, in some cases, it has been used 
to be able to illuminate malign Chinese and Russian behavior.

                         Global Posture Review

    Mr. Calvert. Regarding the global posture review and the 
new National Defense Strategy--I guess they are reevaluating 
that at the Pentagon now, as you are aware--and our existing 
security relationships with key partners in the SOUTHCOM AOR, 
what focus do you think we need to change in regards to the 
great-power competition, especially China?
    Many have questioned the utility, by the way--and I will 
just bring that up because I only have a little bit of time--of 
putting more littoral combat ships in your AOR to give you some 
more flexibility in that operation. What is your comment on 
that?
    Admiral Faller. To start with, the global posture review, 
it is welcome, always welcome, to look at our global footprint.
    I think our approach needs to be truly global. The front 
line of competition with China is in our neighborhood, in this 
hemisphere. And in order for us to win that competition, which 
would be far more cost-effective than a confrontation, we have 
to compete with our strengths where we can get the best 
leverage. And, in this hemisphere, a small amount of time and 
presence and resources has a high rate of return on investment.
    We need Navy ships to be in that mix. Up until 2019, we 
would get an occasional United States Navy ship. We made the 
case during the combatant command review for additional assets. 
And we had, on average, about three United States Navy ships 
over the past year to augment our very robust Coast Guard 
presence.
    Those Navy ships participated in transnational criminal 
organization operations, worked with partners, worked with the 
Coast Guard, and made a difference--significantly put pressure 
on the transnational criminal organizations, sent a message to 
would-be competitors that the United States values the region 
and is here. We were able to conduct exercises with partners 
from Ecuador to Colombia, to Peru--partners with capable 
navies.
    And so, for me, it is about the capability. It is about 
having built-in-the-U.S. Navy ships working with Joint 
Interagency Task Force-South and our Navy South component from 
Florida. So whatever capability that the United States Navy can 
source to that I welcome.
    But I would note that our littoral combat ships, 
particularly the Freedom's recent deployment and the Gabby 
Giffords, perform quite well. And I know that the Navy is 
committed to overcoming the challenges associated with the 
maintenance on those ships.
    Mr. Calvert. Thank you, Admiral.
    And, Madam Chair, I yield back.
    Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
    Next, we have Mr. Cuellar.

                   Latin and South America Influences

    Mr. Cuellar. Thank you very much, Madam Chair and Ranking 
Member, for holding this meeting.
    Admiral, I want to talk about your sense of urgency of what 
is happening in Latin America. As all of us on the committee 
have said, we are so used to looking at the Middle East and 
looking at other parts of the world that we keep forgetting our 
own backyard.
    And I think the maps that you have provided to us to show 
where the criminal organizations are coming from and how they 
are affecting us, whether they are bringing in drugs or people, 
they are there. And many times, as you have said and as we all 
know, sometimes those organizations are stronger than some of 
the state security forces that we have.
    And then, on top of that, it is not only those 
transnational organization groups that we have, but we have the 
influence of Iran in South America. Not only do we have the 
influence of them, but we also have the Russian influence in 
countries. But the one that we have been talking about is the 
one with the Chinese.
    The last time you provided these reports, Admiral, you 
know, we had X amount of countries in South America, 19--I 
mean, there were less than that, but now we have 19 out of the 
33 countries that have joined the One Belt One Road Initiative. 
There are now 25 out of the 33 countries that host Chinese 
infrastructure projects, including Mexico, Belize, or even, 
outside of that, the Bahamas, Panama, where the canal is at, 
and then so many other ones.
    Then we talk about, even now, eight countries that are 
producing and using and testing or interested in purchasing 
Chinese COVID-19 vaccines.
    Then we look at--and this is what is very interesting. We 
know the major Chinese IT footprints and space tracking 
stations in Argentina. You have some in Peru, Ecuador, 
Guatemala, Brazil, and, of course, Venezuela. And, you know, 
all of that worries me, because, from the last time you 
provided this, the numbers keep going up, the investments keep 
going, and they keep getting closer and closer to the U.S.-
Mexico border, where I live at.
    I want you to talk to us about this sense of urgency and 
what this committee can fund. I know there is an assessment 
that you all are working on with the Department of State, 
USAID, and I think the RAND Corporation is going to be involved 
to do that study. And it should have been done by this last 
December, but COVID had something to do with that, but I think 
it should be ready by the 3lst of this year.
    Tell us what we need to invest. Because I agree with you, 
we should have a sense of urgency. I mean, we keep looking at 
everywhere, but it is our own backyard that worries me. Tell us 
about your sense of urgency and what we ought to be investing 
in and what this committee should be doing.
    Admiral Faller. Well, thank you for emphasizing that sense 
of urgency that we certainly feel at United States Southern 
Command. And the Department has been supportive, as has your 
committee. By last year, your committee, in particular, was 
supportive in establishing additional funds in our security 
cooperation.
    I mentioned the 1 percent of ISR. Intelligence drives 
everything, and the more we know and understand what the 
threats are up to, the better we can participate in a whole-of-
government and a whole-of-nation response. The National Defense 
Strategy certainly nails it in talking about that global 
competition and the competition with China.
    We looked at ISR. We talked about ISR. Security cooperation 
is key. That is what builds partner capacity. That is how we 
become more interoperable with partners. The U.S. has the best 
equipment in the world, and partners want our equipment, and it 
is a long-term relationship.
    As the budget is unveiled, I believe that will be at the 
top of my unfunded priorities. There is more that could be 
invested in the capacity. We sit at about $120 million for 28 
countries to help them build. It is a good investment long term 
for both the United States and our partners. It keeps them 
close. It is a relationship.
    And then on the presence, posture matters. We were very 
supportive of Congress asking tough questions about some of the 
intended cuts to the defense attache. Those are our front lines 
in our embassy. We should look at the manning of our 
embassies--it is very, very lightly manned for today's 
competition--and then look at where we are postured as a 
military and where is the United States postured. In this 
hemisphere, it is the right thing to not have permanent bases; 
have light locations where we can come in and out and work with 
our partners on their training and readiness.
    Thank you for the question.
    Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
    Mr. Rogers.

                      Trafficking in South America

    Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
    Admiral, welcome to the subcommittee. Welcome to the Hill 
again. At one point in your career, I understand you were on 
the staff of Senator Ted Kennedy. So welcome back to the Hill.
    Let me ask you and follow up on Mr. Cuellar's line of 
questioning about the role of the Chinese in the drug traffic 
in South America, Latin America.
    China adversely affects the region through drugs, human 
trafficking, guns, and illegal mining, all of which are 
underwritten through Chinese money laundering. And here is how 
I understand that works. Historically, drug cartels have 
struggled to get their illegal profits back within their 
borders. However, recently, Chinese--what do we call them--
money brokers have emerged as vital partners for Latin American 
drug cartels. Those cartels will bring proceeds from U.S. 
illegal drug sales to these Chinese brokers, who then launder 
those proceeds back to the drug cartels here in Latin America.
    That has resulted in Chinese crime groups increasing their 
presence in places like Colombia. In fact, I spoke on the phone 
just yesterday with President Duque of Colombia--who, by the 
way, I think his administration is doing great work--and I 
welcome your comments--on eradicating coca, which is a main 
source of the opium in the U.S.
    Thank you, Admiral, for being here today.
    Let me ask you what you are doing about the drug problem--
the drug cartels and the Chinese brokers. Tell us how that 
works and what we are doing about it and what we need to do on 
the up and up.
    Admiral Faller. Thank you for recognizing Colombia. They 
are a trusted partner. They exceeded all their goals in the 
counter-narcotics fight last year despite the pandemic. I would 
trust them to be alongside me and our team in any fight, as 
professionals that adhere to human rights and all the standards 
that we expect of our U.S. Armed Forces men and women. And 
thank you.
    With respect to transnational criminal organizations, in 
this hemisphere, we have 8 percent of the global population and 
more than 60 percent of cryptocurrency. It is clear that 
entities, threat entities, are working around ways to strangle 
their money supply.
    As I have met with key law enforcement partners, like NYPD 
Counter Narcotics Strike Force, FBI, DEA, and others, 
consistently they cite the significant and consequential role 
of Chinese banks in money laundering. And it is very hard to 
crack into that, with technology barriers, language barriers.
    And so, when you look at the corrosive and corrupt 
influence of transnational criminal organizations--because 
corruption really fuels them, their ability to undermine 
officials and use extortion--it is the same sort of principles 
that the Communist Party of China thrives on. They could shut 
this down if they wanted to, but it is not in their interest to 
do so. It is in their interest to undermine the democracies so 
that they can gain more influence for their version of a future 
world order.
    Mr. Rogers. Well, it is a huge item. I am told that 
transnational criminal organizations are generating around $90 
billion in profits just from cocaine. And a lot of that cocaine 
and the drugs out of South America lands in my district. And we 
have been fighting that fight with an organization called UNITE 
now for a dozen years, but it is being flooded by the drugs 
coming out of South America.
    Thank you for your service, your lifetime of service, 
Admiral. And thank you for your present duties. A tough chore. 
Somebody has to do it, and you are doing great. Thank you.
    I yield back.
    Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
    We are going to hear from Mr. Aguilar, and then we will go 
to full committee Ranking Member Granger.

                           Drug Interdictions

    Mr. Aguilar. Thank you, Chairwoman.
    Admiral, good to see you again, and thank you for your 
service.
    We have talked a little bit about drug interdiction, and if 
I could just ask a follow-up question on that. You talked with 
Mr. Calvert about some of the ISR capabilities. And, you know, 
through the briefings we have had, we know that our ability to 
identify drug smuggling in the Pacific is far greater than our 
capacity to interdict.
    What more can we do to help you in these efforts? What 
resources are needed? And if you can touch on specifically some 
of the work that you have been doing with the Coast Guard in 
aiding those drug interdictions in SOUTHCOM AOR.
    Admiral Faller. Thank you.
    The area that we are looking at, where the principal routes 
run, is larger than the United States. And, on any given day, 
we are covering that area with about 10 U.S. ships, a mix of 
Coast Guard and U.S. Navy, an innovative vessel called the MMSV 
that you all have appropriated, which has been very successful.
    And then we do that with partners. When the Coast Guard and 
the United States Navy are there, partners step up. And we saw 
last year that partners increased their participation in the 
counter-transnational-criminal-organization operations, the 
pressure, by 10 percent in interdictions. And that is 
significant in 1 year, especially given the pandemic. It is an 
example of, when the Coast Guard and the Navy are there, others 
will come out.
    We cited the success of Colombia. Costa Rica is another 
partner that has done extremely well. Panama just stood up a 
fusion center. The key here, long term, is getting a network of 
partners together to keep pressure on the source, the supply 
lines, all aspects of the business model.
    Another key in the last year as part of our surge in this 
threat space has been the development of a targeting process 
with the interagency here in the U.S. So, learning from what we 
have done in the counterterror ops and then working as a part 
of a U.S. Government interagency process, we have been able to 
improve that targeting process by using machine learning, 
artificial intelligence, and really increase the speed of which 
we can build a target package and then hand off to a partner 
nation's law enforcement. So that is significant.
    We will never interdict our way out of this. We have to 
look at these organizations as an organization and determine 
where their key nodes are, centers of gravity, if you will, and 
then crush that. We talked about money laundering as part of 
that. There is a cyber piece of this; there is an information 
piece of this.
    Bringing all elements of power and all domains is the way 
forward for us to make a lasting difference on this threat.
    Mr. Aguilar. I appreciate the answer. Thanks so much, 
Admiral.

                         China in South America

    Mr. Aguilar. Can you talk a little bit more about China and 
what keeps you up at night, as far as their activities within 
the AOR and the relationships in some of these countries?
    Admiral Faller. When we sit down with our partners, it is 
part of the conversation that we talk about the Chinese economy 
and the U.S. economy. It is undeniable that China is the 
number-one trading partner with the United States, number-one 
trading partner with most of our partner nations. Now they are 
number-one trading partner with South America writ large and 
soon, I think, will be a larger trading partner with the 
hemisphere.
    We have to determine as a Nation how we win the competition 
without ever going to conflict. And when China is able to come 
in and gift militaries in our region significant quantities of 
money with very little or no strings attached, that concerns 
me.
    Some of our key partners have turned those gifts down, and 
I applaud that and thank them for turning it down. Others say 
to me, ``We are drowning, we feel like we are drowning, 
Admiral, in a lifeboat, and we are going to take that life ring 
because we need it.'' And I say, ``hey, watch where the cord is 
attached and what happens on that cord.''
    We recently hosted a security conference with our allies--
U.K., Canada, French, the Dutch--that have interests here. And 
one of the Canadian members to that conference, from their 
foreign ministry, a citizen, a civilian, said to me, ``we see 
the region--the threats of the region as a whirlpool and the 
nations in a lifeboat that are getting sucked down by the 
various pressures.''
    It does add to that sense of urgency that has been a theme 
here, and that is really what keeps me up at night.
    Mr. Aguilar. Thanks, Admiral. Appreciate your service, and 
thanks so much for being here today with us.
    Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back.
    Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
    And with no disrespect mentioned, trying to do things from 
distance to distance here, we will now hear from Ms. Granger. 
Thank you.

                         Littoral Combat Ships

    Ms. Granger. Thank you very much.
    Admiral, President Biden indicated during the campaign that 
he intended to devote as much as $4 billion to address the root 
causes of Central American migration. And the budget framework 
released last week includes the first year of this funding, 
$850 million, to address the matter.
    We have talked so much about the issues in your area and 
the drug trade and particularly the drug trade and the help we 
need when they are going by water.
    Recently, I was in a meeting and was very, very concerned 
and disappointed to hear that there was an attempt to mothball 
all littoral combat ships. And I would ask you--you mentioned 
those ships. Have you found them helpful, particularly in the 
area you are in and in the drug control?
    Admiral Faller. The Navy's presence has been essential, and 
it has increased the capacity of our partners. And, frankly, I 
have been on board the ships, destroyers and littoral combat 
ships, and talked to the Navy crews. They have really improved 
their readiness. It is a win-win.
    On that program that you mentioned for the Northern 
Triangle, it is a welcome program. We need a long view for the 
region. And Plan Colombia was a good model because we stuck 
with it for 10 years and we didn't have fits and starts 
annually with the plan. This is a generational problem, 
developing the sustainable economies and the type of 
democracies that can take care of themselves so that we don't 
have this crisis in Central America that drives people to walk 
thousands of miles to save their kids and save their lives.
    And I think, ma'am, that the military does have a role 
here, a very focused supporting role. Because our track 
record--we have learned from our past. We know how to abide by 
the rule of law and human rights. And we have a human rights 
program at SOUTHCOM, and we have worked with our partner 
nations to professionalize them. And they are part of the 
solution. And, in order to help going forward, we have to be 
present to help influence good behavior to be part of the long-
term, sustainable solution.
    We welcome a long-term plan. And so far, the discussions 
and the involvement of my command with Chairman Milley and the 
Secretary of Defense have been very transparent, very 
iterative, and they have been listening to us.
    Ms. Granger. Good. I hope you will speak out for the 
littoral combat ships, because part of that was going into 
shallow water, being quiet, almost silent, the speed. And all 
the other indications I have is they are still helpful, so I 
was surprised at that.
    I want to make sure that you have--are there other 
resources that--in this pandemic time, are there other 
resources you need to change or add to help you?

                          Assistance Programs

    Admiral Faller. Our humanitarian assistance program and the 
authorities we have there are the best tool I have. It is 
responsive. It is scalable. We can meet partners' needs, short 
and long term.
    With the support of Congress, we received additional 
money--and the Department of Defense--additional money at the 
beginning of the pandemic. We have applied that to good use.
    It is an authority that we are able to apply to partners' 
health agencies or civil agencies. I would like to see an 
expansion of that authority and the appropriation of the money 
to be able to work with partner militaries. And I think we 
could get enough oversight on it that we would ensure it did 
the right thing. That would be in the humanitarian assistance 
realm.
    Similarly, given the competition we are in and our need to 
be able to flex to a partner's needs, when I visited the region 
in October, I found that our partners were just exhausted and 
running out of fuel and basic necessities. Yet I lack a near-
term relevant mechanism to provide some assistance in that 
manner.
    We have 2-year funding, which is greatly appreciated, a 
long view, which is what we need, but I think we need a 
military assistance program for small-dollar amounts--I am 
talking $15,000, $50,000--that would be real game-changers to 
build near-term trust and respond to partners' needs mil-to-
mil.
    Ms. Granger. Thank you very much. Appreciate that.
    I yield.
    Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
    Mrs. Kirkpatrick and then Mr. Womack.

                  Transnational Criminal Organizations

    Mrs. Kirkpatrick. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thanks for 
having this hearing.
    Admiral, I represent a border district in Arizona, and I am 
very focused on how we ensure our border communities are 
protected from illicit drug activity and violence from 
transnational criminal organizations.
    While the Department of Defense does not have the lead in 
many aspects of the counter-drug efforts, the Department is the 
lead agency for the detection and monitoring of aerial and 
maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States.
    My question is this: Can you provide an update on efforts 
to counter transnational criminal organizations? And how does 
the U.S. measure success or failure in this area?
    Admiral Faller. We appreciate the work that Air Force South 
in Tucson has done in the aerial part of this detection and 
monitoring. And they work hand-in-hand with Joint Interagency 
Task Force-South in Key West, which is a team of teams that is 
led by a Coast Guard two-star, Rear Admiral Doug Fears, that 
each and every day focuses on this very problem set.
    In JIATF, we have every relevant agency in the U.S. that 
works in a counter-narcotics, counter-transnational-criminal-
organization space, as well as partner nations from 24 
different partner nations. And that is the real key. And we 
have made progress.
    So, using the additional resources that the Department 
supplied in terms of Navy ships last year, we put more pressure 
on the networks. That kept our partners in the game. These 
security cooperation programs do have long-term payback for the 
United States. And, as I mentioned previously, our partners 
stepped up and increased their participation and their 
interdiction.
    We were able to increase our targeting, so we were able to 
get on more targets last year, disrupt more flow, put more 
pressure on the networks, which generates more opportunity for 
partner nations and law enforcement partners to capture, 
detain.
    And so we are on the good glide slope, but clearly not 
enough, when we still have tens of thousands dying in the 
United States and we still have organizations that have budgets 
larger and bigger than many of the security forces they face, 
and organizations that control territory, frankly.
    And so more pressure, sustained pressure; and more focus on 
the source; and more focus on, as was mentioned in some of your 
opening comments, diplomacy and development as a way for people 
to have other models.

                          Human Rights Office

    Mrs. Kirkpatrick. Thank you. I appreciate that.
    I have one other question here. You also have the only 
human rights office throughout the combatant commands. Do you 
see meaningful progress in these areas? And what support do you 
need from Congress to strengthen these programs?
    Admiral Faller. We could have the best equipment, and we 
do, in the United States; we could have the best women and men 
in our force, and we do; but we could still lose the 
competition that we are in or the next war that we fight 
because we don't have legitimacy with our people. We can never 
take that for granted.
    When I joined the military 42 years ago, it was not a 
foregone conclusion that we would have the trust of the United 
States population. And we do this by adhering to the rule of 
law, human rights, respect, those unacceptable behaviors that I 
talked of at the beginning--relentless pursuit of all of that.
    Our command recognized over 20 years ago that key to 
sustainable security in this hemisphere was improving the human 
rights record of all aspects of our engagement mil-to-mil. And 
we invested in a human rights team, and we have increased that 
investment. It is something we fund out of hide; it is not a 
program of record with the Department of Defense.
    We have been able to install human rights advisors in our 
partner-nations' security force, conduct workshops with our 
partner nations, ensure that it is embedded in their training 
programs, that it is embedded in their doctrine. And we have 
offered that into all the U.S. schoolhouses as a key element of 
building that professionalism and legitimacy.
    Mrs. Kirkpatrick. Thank you for the good work that you are 
doing. I, as representing a border district in Arizona, really 
appreciate your efforts.
    And, Madam Chair, I yield back.
    Ms. McCollum. Mr. Womack.

                          Drugs and Migration

    Mr. Womack. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
    And, Admiral Faller, it is great to see you again.
    You know, of all the COCOMs that we are going to get 
posture briefings from, I consider this, as it concerns the 
direct impact on my constituents, to be one of the most 
important, if not the most important. To be clear, what is 
going on in INDOPACOM or in Eastern Europe and some of the 
other trouble spots around the globe pose existential threats 
to our country; there is no question about that. But as it 
concerns my constituents, there is not another combatant 
command AOR that has such an immediate impact on my people than 
yours. And we are going to beat this TCO issue again, because I 
think it is of critical importance.
    And I just recently came back from the border. Went down 
with Whip Scalise to McAllen, Texas. I know that is a little 
north of your AOR. But I am reading from a slide right now that 
was given to us by the Rio Grande Valley Border Patrol folks.
    ``In the period of time between March 4 and April 1, there 
were 14-plus pounds of cocaine''--so this is less than a month, 
14 pounds of cocaine--``3,251 pounds of marijuana, $1 million 
in currency, 24 firearms, 8 gang member arrests, 622 criminal 
arrests.'' That is in less than a month. And I know that a lot 
of this stuff is coming up into my district.
    Thank you for your leadership in trying to bang the drum on 
the transnational criminal organizational piece.
    But there is one part about it that we have only kind of 
glossed over, and that is the tremendous migration that is 
happening in a lot of your AOR into our area. And I know you 
have some numbers on it, how many people have actually migrated 
out of those areas because of the safety concerns. Can you 
speak to that and how incredibly important these numbers are?
    Admiral Faller. The threats hitting your home of 
Bentonville, Arkansas, and my home of Fryburg, Pennsylvania, it 
is killing people and it is stressing economies and governments 
and it is undermining security.
    Just as an example, Congressman, when you look at this--
yesterday, the intelligence agencies published an annual 
report. It is unclassified. And they looked at the scope of the 
migration over a 5-year period: 40 million. Forty million have 
migrated in this hemisphere. And they are looking at Haiti, 
Cuba, Venezuela, and Central America. Forty million people.
    And that is the insecurity, the lack of ability to get 
healthcare for your children, lack of ability to find something 
to eat. And it has to be a whole-of-government, whole-of-
nation, regional kind of approach, sustained, to put these 
numbers and give folks some hope.
    Mr. Womack. Yes. Well, look, again, I appreciate your 
willingness to bring this to the attention of not only the 
Congress but other military leaders. And even though you are 
going to be retiring sometime this fall, I sure hope that you 
will continue to be outspoken on it.

                       State Partnership Program

    By the way, speaking of partnerships, as everybody on this 
committee knows, I am a big advocate of the State Partnership 
Program. And I would be remiss if I didn't give you an 
opportunity to talk about how incredibly important the SPP 
program is in your AOR.
    Admiral Faller. The State Partnership Program is the 
number-one assigned force that we have in order to help our 
partners build capacity in the United States Southern Command. 
And we are blessed to have the most robust partnership lineup, 
with 24 partners. Arkansas is aligned with Guatemala.
    It is a long-term relation, as our Guard gets to develop 
and build that. And we really appreciate Congress's support in 
that. And I am constantly in communication with the TAGs of the 
various States as we look to how to help the partners build 
capacity.
    And, frankly, training is good for the Guard too. I get the 
feedback. It is a two-way win as we move forward.
    I think, as we look forward, if the Guard had some 
flexibility on this for 2-year money, things that could meet 
the partners' speed--they often have difficulty budgeting 
inside of our cycle and being able to do things--that might be 
one thing to look at.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Womack. Yeah. Thank you.
    Madam Chairwoman, before I yield back, I just want to 
associate myself with the remarks of Ken Calvert and others 
that have talked about the ISR needs of SOUTHCOM and the ISR 
transfer fund that was lost. But critically important. 
Leveraging that kind of technology with the mission going on in 
SOUTHCOM I think is pretty important, and I sure hope that we 
can continue to make the arguments for it.
    And I will yield back. Thank you.
    Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
    We are going to hear from Ms. Kaptur and then Mr. Diaz-
Balart. Thank you.
    Ms. Kaptur.

              Latin and South America Country Governments

    Ms. Kaptur. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    And, Admiral Faller, thank you for your service to our 
country.
    This has been a rather grim hearing in the way I view the 
world. I am reminded, 60 years ago John Kennedy launched the 
Alliance for Progress. And I am glad he did, but it doesn't 
seem like we have made a lot of progress over the decades. So 
maybe the architecture of what we are doing isn't integrated in 
the proper way.
    What percentage of the territory in your AOR would you say 
is ungovernable?
    Admiral Faller. Thanks for mentioning the success of past 
historical models. We have spent a lot of time looking at what 
has worked and what hasn't worked, and the key is often the 
consistency over time and then getting at all aspects of our 
partners' needs, not just a couple points here or there. And 
the places where we have been able to make that work, we have 
turned chaos into democracy.
    So, while there is a sense of urgency and some amount of 
grimness, as you suggest, Congresswoman, in the 1990s and the 
1980s many of our partners in Central America were in civil 
wars. And so, from that respect, their democracies are fragile 
and young, and we have to hang with them as we get this right. 
And I think there is hope. I have met the people. We have 
values in common to get this right.
    In terms of the threat and, as we discussed, the 
transnational criminal organizations that are in many cases 
better funded, their end strength is larger than the police, in 
some cases the police and the militaries combined in some 
countries, some 200 different organizations. And they do 
control territory. It ebbs and flows and----
    Ms. Kaptur. Take a stab, Admiral. What percent? What 
percent is not under normal civil----
    Admiral Faller. I would have to take that one for the 
record and come back with a more detailed analysis----
    Ms. Kaptur. Is it more than a third? Is it more than a 
third?
    Admiral Faller. I don't think it is more than a third, 
ma'am. But there are swaths that are very concerning.
    And we would have to look at this holistically with my 
shipmate from NORTHCOM to look at the impacts from Mexico. 
Mexican cartels have grown their market share and moved south, 
which is a concerning trend.
    Ms. Kaptur. Well, I was extremely troubled when Mexico's 
President released Caro Quintero, the number-one drug lord on 
the DEA's list. I thought, ``So Mexico is gone.'' And I won't 
go into all my experiences with Mexico. My experiences with 
people are very good; my experiences with the government are 
horrendous.
    And I think, my sense is, that we are talking about narco 
states. And I am interested in your assessment, if not publicly 
now, privately, as to what is happening in these different 
countries and which of them are absolutely ungovernable.
    And that is at the basis of so much what is causing 
disturbance in this country, certainly with the narcotics 
trade. And I would recommend a book--you have probably read 
it--by Sam Quinones, ``Dreamland.'' Because after the collapse 
of the white corn market in Mexico, displaced by corn grown in 
my region, yellow corn, the drug trade began to lock down the 
opium fields in the very places where the white corn market 
disappeared. We have never solved that problem. And all those 
people in those villages, from Oaxaca and everything, started 
to move north. They left their parents in those provinces, and 
then the kids came up north. A lot of them got involved in the 
drug trade.
    And I really--I sense it is out of control. You may not 
feel that way. You are closer to the ground than I am. But I 
know in my region up in northern Ohio, because of drugs and the 
routes that are coming from Mexico to Columbus, Ohio, and then 
like a spoke out around the entire State, it is frightening. 
And my own neighbor is involved in some of that drug trade.
    It is just--it is a continental scourge. And it doesn't 
seem to me that, the way we are structured, we are being 
maximally effective.
    And you have given a great share of your life to this, so I 
am very interested in the map of what is ungovernable. I am a 
city planner by training; I like to look at maps, and I like to 
understand.
    I also know that, after World War II, Britain created new 
towns, safe places.
    I think we need a different strategy that is more cosmic, 
less--because the current system isn't working. It is getting 
worse. And China is an added complexity. But if you really look 
at what is going on there, I don't think that our approach 
addresses the magnitude of what we are facing.
    My time has probably expired, but I am very interested, in 
another setting, to look at the map that you might have. You 
are a Navy man, but I think you like land. And very interested 
in what is ungovernable and other alternatives to create safe 
havens for people, how do we do that. And I mean villages.
    And what do we do about those places that are raising the 
plants that produce the cocaine, from an agricultural 
standpoint? I have never heard one person from the State 
Department, or any department talk about that massive 
transformation that occurred after 1993 that completely turned 
Mexico upside-down.
    Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
    We now have Mr. Diaz-Balart, then Mr. Ruppersberger, and 
then Mr. Carter.

                        Combating Illicit Drugs

    Mr. Diaz-Balart. Madam Chairwoman, thank you very much.
    Admiral Faller, first and foremost, you know, words don't 
suffice to thank you for your decades of honorable service to 
our country. I have the privilege to have Southern Command in 
my district, and I will tell you, we have had over the years, 
over the decades, some outstanding leaders of SOUTHCOM, but, 
Admiral, no one has done a better job than you have. So, again, 
thank you so very much.
    In your testimony, you mentioned how many Americans die 
from illicit drugs. I think it is 87,000 in 2020 alone. And 
that is a result of the drug trade that originates in Latin 
America.
    And so, very specifically, what kind--and I know that, you 
know, SOUTHCOM interdicts more drugs than, I believe, all of 
the police departments in the entire country combined. But what 
specifically, what resources do you need to be able to do even 
more? Because you literally are saving American lives.
    Admiral Faller. We do interdict, in accordance with the 
statute provided, the bulk of the drugs for about 1 percent of 
the overall budget that is associated with that effort across 
all the U.S. agencies. And it is indicative of being able to 
try to push it to the source before it gets divided into so 
many little packets that can ease into south Florida or Ohio or 
all the other places.
    And the key, I think, to go back to the last question, the 
key is that there are good people. And our ability to leverage 
our values, which is our strength as Americans, and values that 
are common to some of these good people and create stronger 
institutions in our partner nations that are resilient to 
corruption.
    And that has to be a whole-of-government effort. We have to 
focus on a corruption-free, strong military and police and 
judicial systems. And when we leave off the pressure or don't 
incentivize our partners to do better in a certain area, it 
creates a gap or a hole.
    I hear from partner nations that, hey, look, we wish we had 
a stronger judicial system, because when the criminals get to 
the end in the judicial system, to quote a phrase from Costa 
Rica, they say, ``Pura vida,'' which is, ``Don't worry, be 
happy.'' They fear the U.S. judicial system. They respect the 
U.S. military, they respect our Customs and Border Protection, 
they respect our State Department INL. Staying consistent and 
investing in the institutions.
    A couple programs that are important that are under-
resourced: Institutional Capacity Building. It is a program, 
and I have enough for about three advisors for the whole 
hemisphere. It is funded through Section 333 security 
cooperation money out of an institute in California, Monterey, 
California, where the ministries of our partners will agree to 
put an advisor in there--and these are experienced, savvy, 
usually retired military personnel--to help them develop 
transparent, accountable, corruption-free budget systems. That 
is a small investment for a good rate of return if we fund it 
and if we stay with it.
    There are more examples like that where we can get results. 
I will give you one more. A partner nation, Guatemala, their 
special naval forces, working with other U.S. Government 
agencies, we have developed a very capable, corruption-free, 
trustworthy special naval force that gets it done on the sea.
    There are areas of that that we can spread the trust and 
spread the accountability, but we have to stay with it over 
time. And that small, focused investment does have a rate of 
return for a safer U.S. in every one of our cities.

                           National Security

    Mr. Diaz-Balart. Admiral, you also talked about--and this 
is not a classified briefing, so I don't expect--as a matter of 
fact, let me just ask a couple of specific questions about 
state actors and nonstate actors, as far as are they a threat 
to our national security interests in this hemisphere or are 
they not. Let me just--very briefly.
    China. Is it a threat to our national security interests in 
the region?
    Admiral Faller. As I stated in the opening, China is the 
pacing threat for----
    Mr. Diaz-Balart. Yeah.
    Admiral Faller [continuing]. The 21st century and----
    Mr. Diaz-Balart. One more. How about Russia?
    Admiral Faller. Absolutely.
    And I would be remiss, on the transnational criminal 
organizations, one of the gaps, Congressman, is that it is not 
reflected in our higher-level documents. So, you know, that is 
a decision that will be made by policymakers, and I respect 
that----
    Mr. Diaz-Balart. All right.
    Admiral Faller [continuing]. But it is hard to compete if 
we don't respect something as a threat to our national 
security.
    Mr. Diaz-Balart. How about Cuba?
    Admiral Faller. Cuba's malign influences are felt 
throughout the hemisphere. I wish it were different, but they 
undermine democracies. They are currently the--they are a de 
facto [inaudible] To keep the illegitimate Maduro in power.
    Mr. Diaz-Balart. And, lastly--and I am running out of 
time--Iran. Are they also a player in this hemisphere?
    Admiral Faller. The long arm of Iranian malfeasance is felt 
around the globe. They are the number-one state sponsor of 
terrorism in the world.
    Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you, Admiral, again.
    Madam Chairwoman, thank you. My time has run out, so I 
yield back.
    Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
    Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Carter, and Mr. Ryan will be after 
Mr. Carter.

                             China and Iran

    Mr. Ruppersberger. Well, thank you, Congresswoman McCollum 
and also Ranking Member Calvert.
    Admiral, you have served your country well. I have always 
felt, the amount of years that I have been in Congress--and I 
was on the Intelligence Committee for 12 years--that we, from a 
resource point of view, have not given the resources to South 
America, Central America, and I think we are paying for it in a 
lot of different ways.
    And I will say that, from your perspective and your 
leadership, you have been able to bring the team together. You 
mention in your statement that intel drives everything we do, 
and that gives you the ability to do the things you need to do. 
And part of what I like from your style is the teamwork. And I 
am going to call out the DEA as an example. A very small 
organization, and they are in a very dangerous situation, but 
they have done a good job. Now, with the support of the 
military, FBI, I think we are on the right road. Thank you for 
what you have done.
    China's influence in Latin America continues, outside of 
Mexico, to be really the reason and the involvement in South 
America, Central America. And I am very concerned about where 
we are with respect to China.
    And I want to give you some numbers here, that China's 
trade with the region overtook the United States in 2018 and 
extended that in 2019 to more than $22 billion, versus U.S. 
trade of $198 billion, according to analysis of the trade 
figures from the U.N. Comtrade database.
    Now, I know that throughout the pandemic in the United 
States, we have had a great partner with the different 
countries that we are working with. But, in the end, we are 
looking at a situation that is getting worse and worse as it 
relates to China.
    Now, from your perspective, what do you need to do to 
counter China in the region? Do you see any changes in the 
diplomatic front with the new administration?
    And, also, to what degree do you see insecure technology 
offerings from China, like Huawei, or bad loan terms driving 
relationships between your AOR, your area of responsibility, 
and China? And do countries truly want to work with the 
Chinese, or do they want them as a piggy bank?
    Now, outside of our near-peer, what type of Iranian 
activity are you also seeing in the region? I think you 
answered that question before. And I have always been concerned 
about their potential to stir up conflicts in our backyard.
    Admiral Faller. The focus of our National Defense Strategy 
on strengthening partnerships and of our SOUTHCOM strategy of 
strengthening partnerships is exactly the best approach to 
outcompeting China.
    So focus, first and foremost, by looking in the mirror 
every day and asking ourselves, are we the best, to use a 
sports analogy, athletes on the field, morally, physically, 
mentally, and ready to take that forward to engage with our 
partners? And I can say we are. Now, we are not the perfect 
people, but we work hard at all aspects of that to get it right 
in the United States military and in SOUTHCOM in particular. 
And partners want to partner with the world champions. And that 
is our standard to never lose. And we appreciate your support 
in that.
    So, when I sit with partners, they want to work with the 
U.S., absolutely. And we have so much in common--values in this 
hemisphere being at the top of that list, the great U.S.-built 
equipment. And we look for areas of commonality and how we move 
that forward.
    We have to be present to do that, physically and with some 
level of resources. As I say, you have to be on the field to 
compete, and you have to be seen and heard to compete.
    And I don't ask partners to choose, because that puts them 
often and publicly in a very cumbersome and tough situation. 
But I do point out, what system do you want, and do you have 
and do you want your children and grandchildren to grow up 
under, a democracy or an autocracy? And it is really an easy 
question to answer as we move forward.
    Our best way to compete is to be the best and folks will 
want to partner with us. But we have to be consistent and we 
have to stay with them in that respect.
    China, they are growing in their boldness. You mentioned a 
number of things, Congressman. We see it with the vaccines. The 
U.S. is the largest contributor to the COVID health response in 
this hemisphere, but you wouldn't know that by some of what you 
hear coming out of Chinese and Russian information and 
disinformation. We just have to stay the course and make sure 
the truth is told.
    Mr. Ruppersberger. Okay.
    I yield back. Thank you.
    Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
    Mr. Carter and then Mr. Ryan.
    Mr. Carter.

                  Migration Housing on Military Bases

    Mr. Carter. Thank you for being patient with me. I have 
another hearing I am trying to take care of too.
    Admiral, I had a great conversation with you yesterday. 
Sorry to have to cut it off to go vote, but we had a great talk 
and I enjoyed it.
    The transnational criminal organizations has been a subject 
that we have been talking about a lot. It is reported that over 
200 violent TCOs control territory in Central and South 
America, and they influence government and the governance of 
those countries. Additionally, China and Russia are involved in 
the region and spreading their influence out.
    As these TCOs traffic guns, drugs, money, and people into 
the United States, basically through Mexico, illegal aliens are 
being housed on military bases, such as Fort Bliss, Texas, and 
Joint Base San Antonio. Do you see any inherent risk to 
national security in housing those people on active military 
posts?
    Admiral Faller. Congressman, I will leave the policy of 
where we put them to Department of Defense and others that are 
looking at that.
    The underlying driver, though, here--the violence, the 
murderous violence, the ability of these groups to use 
corruption to undermine governance and capture territory--is 
critically at the center of gravity, the center of this perfect 
storm. And that is what we are really trying to get after, 
working with all the U.S. Government agencies.
    And, as we stated, the absolute criticality of intel to 
drive that as a way to better understand what levers need to be 
applied and pulled.
    Mr. Carter. Well, the way I look at it, I am concerned 
national security issues, but, in turn, I am also very 
concerned about placing children on live-fire military posts 
like Fort Hood, where live-fire ranges are within walking 
distance of where they would be housed. And most of these 
children are teenagers, and teenagers are very curious. And 
when tanks start shooting, they are going to want to go see. 
And I am worried about somebody getting killed. But I know that 
is not what your purpose is.
    What you are doing on the border, though, has an influence 
on what is pushing this massive migration, basically, into my 
State. And now we are moving them to other States as they 
require, but it is a gigantic problem for the State of Texas.

                   Countering Influence of Adversarys

    The One Belt One Road program that the Chinese are doing, 
we are doing some things to counter those things. Are the 
things that we are doing to counter them as effective or at 
least somewhat effective in changing the influence that they 
are imposing on our Central and South American friends?
    Admiral Faller. The security and all the insecurity that 
you cite, Congressman, has got to be part of the economic 
solution. And so, when One Belt One Road and its promise of 
Chinese investment and access to Chinese economies, the best 
way to outcompete that is to use U.S. companies, incentivize 
their business and incentivize supply chains for the Americas, 
secure supply chains, that take advantage of that proximity to 
our country and take advantage of the tremendous hardworking 
labor that comes with the migration.
    And so that has to be--and I think it was mentioned a 
number of times today: Getting development right, with the 
diplomacy and the security, has to be key.
    And we are focused on that. We routinely meet. And we have, 
in our headquarters, members of the interagency groups, and we 
look for ways to help enable them as a small piece of the 
security solution to get the work done. Development Finance 
Corp., which was part of Congress's BUILD Act, is one such 
lever that shows promise, I think. And I know that our 
ambassadors, as I interact with them, in the region are focused 
on these types of things.
    Mr. Carter. You mentioned in our conversation yesterday the 
idea of maybe a Central and South American country Marshall 
Plan. And with all the money we are throwing around these days, 
we would have to figure out how to fund all that. But would you 
like to talk about that concept?
    Ms. McCollum. Mr. Carter, we are going to have time for a 
second round, so that will give the Admiral time to think that 
over.
    Mr. Carter. Okay. Thank you very much. I yield back.
    Ms. McCollum. And I am interested to hear the answer.
    Mr. Ryan.
    Mr. Ryan. Thank you, Madam Chair. Appreciate the 
opportunity.
    Thank you, Admiral.

                 United States Coast Guard Cutter Stone

    One of the questions I had--I read with great interest 
about what happened in March with the United States Coast Guard 
Cutter Stone, which was deployed to the South Atlantic to help 
curb illegal Chinese fishing. And this was the Coast Guard's 
first such deployment in over a decade. And the mission, we are 
told, was primarily a success, and the crew was able to conduct 
some training with several countries.
    And evidently the mission hit a snag when the Argentine 
Government refused to provide dock services for the Stone. And 
we know that that would normally be pretty routine. And we know 
that Argentina has been one of the largest recipients of funds 
from the Chinese Government for their Belt and Road Initiative.
    And I am just interested in your opinion, if you believe 
that that deepening relationship with China was the reason that 
we were refused to be able to dock the Stone there.
    Admiral Faller. Coast Guard Cutter Stone, a national 
security cutter--and those are awesome ships, well-built. I 
have been aboard them. They are built to do a range of 
missions--had a very successful patrol, as you point out, 
Congressman, and was aimed at getting after a significant 
source of insecurity, which is this idea of illegal, 
unregulated, unreported fishing. Admiral Schultz and our 
Homeland Security Department have put forward a strategy for 
that. We are participating with them; they are in the lead. 
This patrol was part of that.
    Last year, we saw off Ecuador a tremendously large fleet, 
primarily of a state-owned, Chinese, distant-water fleet, that 
would every day turn off their transponders and go into the 
ecological zone of the Galapagos. And we can only wonder what 
was happening when you turn those off. It is for two reasons 
only: You are trying to mask illegal behavior, or it is broken. 
And you don't have half a fleet broken at the same time.
    This was meant to get after that. Argentina has had their 
share of issues with illegal, unreported, unregulated fishing, 
and we worked with their coast guard successfully.
    I was in Argentina last week, had a very excellent series 
of meetings with the Minister of Defense and their Chief of 
Defense about a whole range of areas that we can cooperate on 
together. They want to partner with us. We talked about the 
Coast Guard ship Stone's work and exercise. It is a right 
level. And we got into the issue with the port. It was 
approved, and then we had to try to find another port at the 
last minute because of some port safety concerns that were 
raised by our Coast Guard.
    So, after speaking with Argentinian authorities, I actually 
think it was more of a misunderstanding than any slight. They 
clearly want to partner with us.
    They point out that China is their largest economic 
partner, as it is with the U.S. We have to figure out how to do 
that going forward and provide an incentive for U.S. business, 
industry, and our defense establishment to be able to sell in a 
competitive manner with Argentina.
    Mr. Ryan. It was a safety issue, that we determined it was 
a safety issue?
    Admiral Faller. We canceled the first port visit based on 
concerns raised by the cutter's skipper. I am confident, I 
trust in what I heard from the Minister of Defense, the Chief 
of Defense there, that it was the right decision. And I look 
forward to the next time we can come down and do a port visit 
in Argentina.
    Mr. Ryan. ``Safety'' as far as just safety of the ship or 
terrorism or some kind of attack?
    Admiral Faller. No. There are a number of factors. As a 
ship driver myself, you assess the water depth, the pier, the 
weather, all kind of things. And it was a decision made at the 
commanding officer level. I have done the same thing before a 
port visit, as you assess what is best for your ship.
    Certainly not terrorism or any physical-threat safety to 
that ship. Argentina has very capable security forces, and that 
would have been taken care of, I am assured.

                            Illegal Fishing

    Mr. Ryan. What are the international laws governing the 
illegal fishing? Is there a body of law, a regime that we are 
relying on to try to stop it?
    Admiral Faller. Absolutely. And within nations' exclusive 
economic zones, they have a right to that by international law. 
And we see that there are nations that have distant high seas 
fleets that routinely violate that international protocol.
    Mr. Ryan. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Ms. McCollum. Thank you, Mr. Ryan.
    We have an opportunity to do another round of questions, so 
I am going to ask--as you can see, the timer has been set to 3 
minutes. And we will start with Mr. Cuellar.

                           Funding Inventory

    Mr. Cuellar. Especially. Thank you.
    Admiral, just give me an inventory of what we can do to 
address the issues that I asked on the first round of 
questions. Just quickly give me an inventory of items that you 
think we ought to fund or put the language in there. Just a 
quick inventory.
    Admiral Faller. Thank you.
    First, I haven't seen the details of the next year's 
budget. Once we do, we will come forward, as you all have asked 
and as we have done in the past, with an unfunded requirements 
list. I am confident that our department has a prioritization 
system that is fair. We will make our case. But intel is one 
area and, in particular, support for ISR platforms and the ISR 
transfer fund.
    In security cooperation, we greatly appreciate the 
committee's support last year to restore which had been about a 
32-percent cut over the previous 3 years. And at that, at about 
a $120 million level, I think we need to all ask in the 
Department of Defense, with that being my main muscle mover, 
where the money is best spent to win the competition. And I 
think we will make the case in our unfunded requirements based 
on what we see in the level for additional funds there.
    And then in terms of security cooperation, locations, and 
presence, continued support to ensure that we have the right 
level of people and the right level of presence. That would 
include access to locations like Comalapa and Soto Cano.
    Mr. Cuellar. Okay. Good.
    And, again, thank you for what you do. I am going to yield 
back the balance of my time. But if you can follow up with the 
committee on my question, we want to be very helpful. Again, I 
think the committee shares--I don't want to speak for 
everybody, but I think we share the sense of urgency of what we 
are seeing with those actors in South and Central America.
    Admiral Faller. If I could just add, sir, the report that 
you asked for is very important, because it will provide, from 
a respected think tank, an analysis of the needs that we can 
compare to our own analysis and, I think, would really inform 
the work of your committee and Congress to help look at the 
global balance of resources that we have, recognizing we will 
never have enough for all the needs that we have, but where is 
it best applied to get the leverage we need to be competitive 
today and tomorrow. And I welcome that.
    And I also appreciated your initiative on the Western 
Hemisphere Initiative. It really is the seeds for what would be 
a Marshall Plan-like initiative as we move forward.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Cuellar. Thank you.
    Madam Chair and Ranking Member, members of the committee, 
yeah, I was hoping this would have been ready on December 31st 
of 2020, but COVID hit, so it will be ready on July 31st. And 
this will give us a comprehensive of what we need to do with 
the Department of Defense, State Department, USAID, a whole-of-
the-government approach for Central America. So maybe we could 
put a placeholder there and work on it.
    But my time is up. Thank you so much, Admiral, and thank 
you, Madam Chair. Thank you.
    Ms. McCollum. Absolutely. And I look forward to seeing the 
report. And this needs to be a whole-of-government approach. We 
need to be relying on diplomacy and development, and defense 
should always be our last resort.
    Would Mr. Calvert--and, Mr. Calvert, could you find out if 
Ms. Granger is going to be able to join us back and let our 
staff know? I know your staff is listening, so they could just 
email.
    Mr. Calvert.

                               Guantanamo

    Mr. Calvert. Thank you, Chair.
    You brought up Guantanamo, Chair, and I wanted to get into 
that a little bit with you, Admiral.
    I know that you recently closed Camp Seven. The chair and I 
were out there about, I guess--how long has that been? About a 
year ago, I guess. And you consolidated everything into the 
Camp Five, and we took a look at that when we were down there.
    Could you describe the reason for this change? I think I 
know that. It was obviously financial, along with the daily 
operations related to costs. Is that working?
    Admiral Faller. I certainly appreciated visiting there with 
you and the chair. It was very productive, and it actually 
helps us to see it through your eyes.
    It was principally a safety issue. That camp you referenced 
was never built to last, and it was in need of a number of 
safety upgrades. And my mission is the safe treatment of the 
detainees, and that is what we take very seriously. There will 
be manpower efficiencies associated with that, so it is good in 
that respect as well, but that is why we did it moving forward.
    I would note, too--and you saw this when you were there, 
sir--is the importance of that Naval station as the only base 
we have in the hemisphere. Earlier I mentioned some security 
cooperation locations, but that is the base that reports 
directly to the Department of the Navy. It is a strategic 
location. And the detention facility that is under my command 
is just a small tenant of that overall strategic location and 
Naval station.
    Mr. Calvert. I understand that, Admiral.
    One thing I wanted to bring up: As you know, the people 
that are left there are the worst of the worst, and that is why 
they are there. What, you have approximately 40 people there, 
including Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the mastermind behind the 9/
11 attack on the United States. Is that about the right number, 
about 40 of them?
    Admiral Faller. Yes, Congressman.
    Mr. Calvert. Now, the President has indicated a desire, as 
the chair mentioned, to close the detention facility at some 
point. Have you received any tasking orders or otherwise have 
any information that a policy decision has been made to close 
that facility?
    Admiral Faller. That will be a policy decision, and we will 
flex to however it goes forward, and we are looking forward to 
being part of that process. But no decision has been made, to 
my knowledge.
    Mr. Calvert. Finally, obviously, you have the most, in my 
mind and in a lot of people's mind, one of the most evil men on 
the planet at Guantanamo, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.
    We were supposed to set up trials for some of these folks, 
which never took place. Do you want to comment on what is going 
on with the legal process there on Guantanamo?
    Admiral Faller. The commission process is important. It is 
important, as a Nation of laws, that we get this right and see 
this to fruition. My role in this is to ensure that the 
commissions get the right support logistically and with 
security.
    The commissions themselves report directly to the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense. And I know everybody in the 
Department of Defense is committed to moving forward on this 
line. COVID, of course, set us back some as we have worked 
through the protocols associated with ensuring that we don't 
introduce any COVID-19 at all on the island.
    Mr. Calvert. Well, you can understand, it has been over 20 
years, or almost 20 years, since 9/11, and a lot of Americans 
are frustrated that the final justice has not been submitted to 
that individual. I appreciate your concern. Thank you.
    I yield back, Madam Chair.
    Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
    Ms. Kaptur.

                        Risk to Latin and South

    Ms. Kaptur. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Admiral, how difficult would it be for me to get a briefing 
listing every one of the countries that you have responsibility 
for under your command and to get them ranked?
    So, for example, you mentioned Guatemala and the 
significant challenges of Guatemala. They would be underwater 
on such a chart, in terms of the way you look at the world. You 
said good things about Colombia, so they would be above the 
watermark. Could you do that for all the nations in Latin 
America to give me a better sense of which ones are deeply 
troubled?
    And then, in those countries, how much of the land is 
really ungovernable, where people's lives are at risk, they are 
leaving? You talked about the millions of people who have fled 
different countries. Where can I get that information so I can 
gain a more granular understanding?
    Admiral Faller. We would be happy to set up a classified 
briefing and go through all the factors.
    But I wouldn't characterize Guatemala as underwater, other 
than what we saw as the impacts of the hurricanes last year. 
There are good people and there are aspects of the Guatemala 
security team that I work with that are really good and working 
hard to make a difference. I cited one, their Special Naval 
Force. Their new Minister of Defense is committed to doing the 
right thing. He is a trusted partner. Their new Chief of 
Defense is the same.
    And there are many reasons to be concerned about the sense 
of urgency with which we have to get after the threats, but we 
also need to recognize and play to our strengths too, which is 
democracy and values. And I see real rays of light with respect 
to Guatemala in that case, ma'am.
    Ms. Kaptur. We have a lot of people who are escaping from 
Guatemala and don't want to go back there. And, you know, you 
could blame it on the hurricane, but I think there are other 
reasons as well.
    And in terms of the actual out-migration, does your office 
calculate that from these various countries, or is that some 
other--State Department or something?
    Admiral Faller. That is other agencies, State Department 
and the United Nations, that work on that data, ma'am.
    Ms. Kaptur. Do we have good maps of where opiates are being 
grown in the region under your command?
    Admiral Faller. Absolutely. The DIA and the CIA have the 
best data available and the best analysts in the world.
    Ms. Kaptur. All right. If you help me gain a better 
understanding, you could access that data?
    Admiral Faller. Ma'am, we can set up a classified briefing, 
and we will do that as soon as your availability supports. 
Thank you.
    Ms. Kaptur. All right. Thank you very much. Appreciate your 
service. God bless you. Thank you.
    Admiral Faller. Thank you, ma'am.
    Ms. McCollum. Ms. Kaptur, we will also work with the staff 
to get you the information that the CIA World Factbook has. And 
the World Bank has great statistics on everything from economic 
development to stunting, to land title and everything else to 
help you be prepared for when you have your classified 
briefing. I found those to be excellent resources.
    So, Mr. Rogers?

                               Venezuela

    Mr. Rogers. Okay.
    In my conversation yesterday that I mentioned, on the 
telephone with President Duque of Colombia, one of the biggest 
topics that he brought up was the border problem they have with 
Venezuela--skirmishes that are taking place along the border of 
Venezuela, fueled in large degree, they say, by the drug 
traffic from Colombia through Venezuela and to the rest of the 
world.
    Maduro, President Maduro, in Venezuela has driven 1.7 
million Venezuelans to abscond to Colombia. They are dealing 
with 1.7 million refugees on top of all the other problems that 
Colombia is facing.
    Is there any indication, Admiral, that the reported 
skirmishes with Venezuela will escalate? And do we have any 
presence in that matter?
    Admiral Faller. It is a credit to the Colombians and their 
humanity and their heart that they have been able to accept 
this large influx of migrants in a way that has respected them 
and human rights in the midst of COVID. And it hasn't been 
easy, and I commend President Duque and his team and their 
leadership in this matter and their adherence to democracy in a 
really tough situation, tough times.
    Because right next-door, you have Maduro and his cronies, 
enabled by tens of thousands of Cubans, hundreds of Russians, 
Chinese and Iranians, including, you know, Iranian security 
assistance, including cyber assistance by Russia, Russian 
Spetsnaz, that have created a virtual narco-trafficking 
paradise.
    And so the significant influx of narco trafficking into 
Venezuela by the ELN, FARC dissidents, and other groups, the 
ease with which they can use that now as a base of operation to 
distribute into Europe, into the Caribbean islands, to the 
United States via Central America has complicated all of our 
efforts to get after the problem set.
    And you cite specifically the recent clashes, which, on the 
face of it, would look like Maduro has turned against the narco 
traffickers, but it is, as in all these things, much more 
complicated. And then they quickly pointed and tried to blame 
this on Colombia, when the facts of the matter are it is more 
of a drug war/turf war between the Maduro security forces, 
which are, for the most part, led by corrupt leaders, and the 
narco traffickers, which share a similar values systems.
    Colombia has held the line on the border.
    Our role, the DOD's role, and our interagency role, with 
this crisis, we have used it to strengthen our relationship 
with Colombia, particularly in sharing intel. It is a two-way--
we get some of our best intel from their teams, and we share 
what we know. And we have developed great protocols and systems 
using our security cooperation authorities in this regard.
    Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
    Mr. Ryan, and then we have Mr. Diaz-Balart.

                  Support for Latin and South America

    Mr. Ryan. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    I have a question. I know we were talking about some of the 
issues around human trafficking and stemming the flow of 
migrants north on that very dangerous journey that we keep 
hearing about.
    What are we doing to help train some of our partners that 
are involved, you know, along the way, along that journey? Are 
we doing anything to help them deal with it?
    And are you involved in those countries at all, helping 
with some of the security issues that are there? I know there 
is a lot of work going on with trying to, you know, build the 
economy, but nothing is going to happen with the economy in 
those countries until we get the security piece straight. If 
you can enlighten us on that, that would be great.
    Admiral Faller. You are absolutely right; we have to have 
sustainable security to support the democracies and the 
prosperity. The three of it goes together like the three legs 
of a well-balanced stool. And INL and State Department and 
others--DEA, CVP, and others--have the principal role, working 
with the police, which need to be at the front line. In many of 
these countries, though, the police are the most likely to be 
corrupted and the ones that need the most help.
    They are backstopped by their partner-nation militaries. 
And what we have seen is the growing credibility of partner-
nation militaries that turned from the insurgencies of the 
1980s and 1990s to professional forces that still have a long 
way to go but that have made progress.
    Our role in this is that professional development. It 
starts with education programs. The IMET program, which is 
congressionally appropriated through the Foreign Ops, is our 
main game-changer there. We bring people to U.S. schools. We 
are funded at about the $11 million range. When you all ask for 
what more we could do, there is more that could be invested 
there to come to U.S. schools.
    Another great program that was mentioned is our human 
rights program, funded out of our own budget at five people for 
a whole hemisphere. More could be done there if resources were 
available.
    Women, Peace, and Security. You would say, how does that 
matter? But it matters a lot. And it is a nascent program that 
we have started, and it has proven to help our partners see how 
they can better leverage the 50 percent of their population to 
get involved in sustainable security. We have a small amount of 
funds, and what we have seen is it resonates with our partners 
as we go forward.
    Noncommissioned Officer Development. Here in the United 
States, we value our enlisted team. Our partners sometimes see 
that differently. Getting them to value officers and enlisted 
as one team working together inclusively is key. And we are 
really investing, along with our State partners, in that.
    So, going forward, DOD has a role to play, and we look 
forward to playing that role, as we work on a sustainable 
solution under the new $4 billion multiyear project that is 
being conceived.
    Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
    Mr. Ryan. I yield back, Madam Chair.
    Ms. McCollum. Thank you. And, Mr. Ryan, what you brought up 
on the fishing is something that we need to be addressing with 
the international community on that. I look forward to working 
with you more on that.
    Mr. Diaz-Balart.

                          Cartel Relationships

    Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
    Admiral, you have talked a lot and there have been 
questions about the TCOs, about these organizations. Talk to me 
about, is there any relationship between the cartels that, you 
know, import arms, that traffic in arms, the cartels that 
traffic in humans, the cartels that traffic in drugs? What 
relationship do they have? Is that all they do? Like, if there 
is a cartel that traffics in humans, is that all they do? Or 
are they also the same ones or related to, have any 
associations with ones that traffic in drugs and other things? 
And, also, do they have any association or potential contacts 
with cartels that not only are in this hemisphere?
    So, you know, talk to us a little bit about: are they a 
threat, who are they, why are they a threat. I understand this 
is not a classified briefing, but whatever you think you can 
share.
    Admiral Faller. When COVID struck with a vengeance and just 
tore at all of us, frankly--I am sure everyone here on this 
screen has been impacted in some way, a family member, 
personally--what we saw, the murderous nature of the cartels, 
is they expanded their business model to include PPE and COVID 
supplies and social services as they tried to gain influence 
with the population.
    So there are over 200 different narco-trafficking groups, 
and one of the key efforts going forward has got to be to map 
them in rank and rack-and-stack the most important and the 
strongest to the less and determine the sorts of things that 
each one thrives on.
    And it changes and changes over time. So illegal mining, 
business extortion, human trafficking, narco trafficking, the 
distribution of medical supplies, corruption and undermining of 
public business. Their business model revolves around basically 
whatever they can do to make money and keep themselves in 
power.
    That has got to be part of how we get after it going 
forward, and that has been a key part of our renewed efforts.

                       Intelligence Capabilities

    Mr. Diaz-Balart. All right.
    And you have had some questions about ISR. And I just want 
to make sure that we kind of understand not only the importance 
of it, but--you talked about it before, I think it was to Mr. 
Calvert's question, about, you know, what percentage of ISR you 
get.
    Are you getting enough? And I understand that nobody has 
enough, right? I mean, there is no command that will tell you, 
oh, we have too much of it. Right? But I am saying, how 
deficient is the level that you are getting? Is it, you know, 
very deficient, or are you kind of scraping by but you would 
like a little bit more? Where are you there?
    And, actually, Madam Chairwoman, I just realized that my 
time may have run out, so maybe if we have a second round.
    But, if not, Admiral, if you can maybe just, you know, get 
some information to me on that when you can.
    I apologize, Madam Chairwoman, for going over.
    Ms. McCollum. All right. Well, that is okay.
    If you can answer that quickly.
    So, if you can answer maybe in 30 seconds and then give the 
committee back a fuller response.
    Admiral Faller. Eight percent of our requirement was met 
last year, and that was before the cut of the transfer fund. 
And that transfer fund represented about 38 percent of our 
overall budget for ISR. We will be even less than that as we 
move through the execution here this year.
    Ms. McCollum. Thank you.
    Mr. Carter.
    Mr. Calvert. You know, Madam Chair, before the judge asks 
his question, I am going to apologize. I have to go chair my 
California delegation meeting, the few of us that are left. I 
appreciate the judge taking over for a while.
    Thank you.
    Ms. McCollum. He is most welcome to do that.
    Mr. Carter, for 3 minutes.

                             Marshall Plan

    Mr. Carter. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
    Admiral, you mentioned an idea that you had of a Marshall 
Plan for Central and South America. Do you want to talk a 
little bit about that?
    Admiral Faller. I am very encouraged, sir, by the efforts 
of the administration to apply resources to Central America and 
look at a longer-term plan, $4 billion over time, as I 
understand it, as it moves forward.
    I mean, I think as we look globally at the challenges and 
then where are the opportunities, there is so much opportunity 
here in this hemisphere, with the people--we share so much 
values, democracies--the proximity, the resources, the 
tremendous resource-rich hemisphere. It has a positive water 
ratio--water is so important in the global future--and so much 
arable land, access, important sea lines of communication, deep 
harbors.
    And so, if we look at the promise of the hemisphere and the 
resources, I think, as a Nation, is it time to look at a big 
idea for the hemisphere along the lines of some that we have 
seen in the past? And, you know, I certainly get very excited 
about the opportunity. The challenges and the sense of 
urgencies are real, but we can leverage these opportunities to 
make strength for the Americas, a hemisphere of promise and 
prosperity.
    Mr. Carter. Thank you. I like that challenge. With the 
spending we are doing, it is going to be interesting, how we 
would fund such a thing.
    But one of the things the Marshall Plan did was rebuild the 
existing industries of the countries that had been destroyed in 
the war. Our challenge would be more to strengthen their 
existing various factories and so forth, but, in turn, our 
industry going down and participating in that area. And that 
requires a safe harbor for them to be able to do it, including 
a legal system that gives them recourse to protection under the 
law, which is one of the real weaknesses I know about in 
Central America. You just can't get protection from the legal 
system.
    It is going to be a real challenge. And it will take a lot 
of people to go down there and straighten things out. But I 
like the idea that we are thinking about it. So thank you, 
Admiral, for doing that.
    Madam Chairwoman, thank you.

                         Climate Changes Impact

    Ms. McCollum. Well, thank you, Mr. Carter.
    Sir, I have one follow-up on climate change. Due to time 
limitation, we talked a little bit about it yesterday, but we 
did touch on resilience and what we needed to do to be prepared 
for future storms for our assets, especially in Key West--
housing back-up, emergency generators, all those kinds of 
things, because you are interconnected with everyone on the 
island as well.
    I know you have some of that available. Anything you want 
to add to that later, please provide to the committee.

                                 Brazil

    I have two questions. One is on Brazil. In 2019, President 
Trump designated Brazil as a major non-NATO ally after he 
visited the Brazilian President. Last month, Brazil's President 
fired the Defense Minister. And, more recently, the three 
branches of Brazil's Armed Forces all jointly resigned after 
meeting with the new Defense Minister of Brazil.
    Can you provide us a little bit of an update on the 
situation in Brazil and how this has affected your relationship 
with the new Defense Minister, who was a celebrated military 
dictator, part of a dictatorship? 1964 through 1985, they 
killed and tortured thousands of Brazilians. Could you maybe 
enlighten us as to, well, what we are doing about that now?
    Admiral Faller. The designation of Brazil as a major ally, 
a non-NATO partner, was exactly the right thing to do to 
recognize the progress that has been made and the 
professionalism of their force. We have a great history and a 
foundation to work forward from, with their participation with 
us in World War II.
    I have been to Brazil on multiple occasions, gone to their 
schools, met with their Armed Forces. And that is what we do; 
we work with their institutions. And the core of their 
institutions are professional and are doing the right thing and 
have responded in a professional manner.
    I am very confident in my conversations with their Chief of 
Defense and others that they are going to stay that 
professional course. And I think that is what militaries do as 
the ebb and flow of politics occurs, and I think we are seeing 
some of that now in Brazil.
    If I could just touch on that resilience question with 
JIATF too. So important----
    Ms. McCollum. I don't have enough time, because I have one 
more question, so if you----
    Admiral Faller. Okay.
    Ms. McCollum [continuing]. Could get back to us on that, 
because I want to be respectful of your time.
    I am going to, in my capacity as a Member of Congress, talk 
to State about what is going on with the Defense Minister. I 
understand you have a different role that you play with that.

                        Humanitarian Assistance

    Humanitarian assistance. Last year, Congress provided $90 
million--that is 15 more than requested--for humanitarian 
assistance. That was under the CARES Act for the COVID 
response.
    Before COVID, the USS Comfort and Mercy hospital ships were 
often deployed to do humanitarian assistance in the region. Has 
there been any discussion about bringing back a hospital ship 
to the region later this year?
    Admiral Faller. The Comfort deployments were extremely 
successful with the hearts and minds and helping our partner 
nations with their health services, which have been really 
stressed.
    We are actively planning in the right opportunity to do 
medical engagement. It may be via the Comfort or a scalable air 
mobile concept that we are working on called Heart. We are 
looking at the right time for that. Many of our forces for 
that, our Guard and our NGO partners, play heavily in that, 
and, as we know, the Guard and our military is very engaged 
right now supporting our domestic COVID response.
    So, as we plan forward, we are looking, along with the 
Department of Defense, of when the best window is. We certainly 
think there is more opportunity there for that really important 
program, the humanitarian assistance being coupled with that 
medical support. And it shows the best of who we are here in 
the United States with an outstretched hand of help.
    Ms. McCollum. Well, I want to thank you for your emphasis 
and for what you discussed with me with humanitarian assistance 
and the role that the Department of Defense can play in 
development and diplomacy in that engagement.
    I also, when going through with your bio--I am going to 
thank you for your years of service. You understand 
humanitarian assistance in a way that really brought it home to 
me: You worked on the USS Shiloh when the tsunami hit 
Indonesia. You know how important our military can be showing 
in professionalism, in the way that we can deliver aid, in the 
way that we can deliver service. And we do that in a way that 
our near-peer competitors can't.
    And so, anything you would like to say in closing about 
humanitarian assistance would be appreciated, if you want to 
give this chair a little more direction on how to use the 
Department of Defense for that.
    And, once again, thank you so very much for your years of 
service. We wish you good health and a wonderful retirement.
    Admiral Faller. Thank you, Chair.
    And thank you for representing that experience I had on 
Shiloh. It really made an impression to the whole crew and all 
of us that winning the competition is so important and so less 
costly, really, than the conflict that we never want to have.
    And we have to invest in winning this day-to-day 
competition globally, not just regionally but globally. And the 
modest investment in things like humanitarian assistance, 
hospital ships, engagement, training and education, are really 
key to doing that.
    And we have to have that capability to bring it, but we are 
best when we bring it with a handshake and, when we can in the 
future, a hug. And thank you for recognizing that.
    Ms. McCollum. Well, thank you again. We all, as you can 
tell from the accolades early on, you know, thank you for your 
service and wish you the best.
    I want to thank all the committee members for their time.
    So, Mr. Carter, we are going to adjourn at this time, you 
standing in for the ranking member.
    This concludes today's hearing, and the subcommittee stands 
adjourned. Thank you all.
    [Clerk's note.--Questions submitted by Mr. Cole and the 
answers thereto follow:]
                     Economic and Developmental Aid
    Question. Admiral, in your written testimony, one of the ways you 
highlighted the importance of this region to U.S. national security 
interests was by outlining the attention and presence paid to it by 
some competitive and/or adversarial states. The threats and 
opportunities on the continent are multidisciplinary. They encompass 
the interests, and require the attention of, a number of federal 
agencies and programs in a cooperative manner. Most of that we won't 
get into in this forum, but I will ask further about the cooperation 
with State and USAID in particular. For example, the U.S. role in 
helping to train foreign forces is about as much a diplomatic 
engagement as military. Can you speak to the value of that supplemental 
engagement and also to intersections of your mission with the role of 
U.S. economic and developmental aid in the region? Are we leveraging 
these interagency efforts with each other as effectively as some of the 
other nations challenging for influence in the region?
    Answer. The benefits of training with the U.S. military are far 
greater than just increased technical capability for the partner. Every 
engagement builds trust with our partners and reassures them that the 
United States wants to partner in meaningful ways, and at the speed of 
relevance. When the U.S. military is present, we bring with us our 
values and we model professional behavior--we show our partners what 
``right'' looks like. We have programs in place to build the 
institutional capacity of our partner nation forces and make them 
resilient to all external influences and threats; programs to help 
partner nations develop diverse and inclusive militaries that respect 
the rule of law and human rights.
    The military institution does play an important role in stabilizing 
many countries. As we have seen throughout the COVID-19 response, 
several partner nation militaries have been a lead and responsible 
actor under complex conditions.
    I do believe that economic and developmental aid are more likely to 
have a positive and lasting impact if there is a basic level of 
security in place. All military engagements with partner nations are 
coordinated with the Chief of Mission and Country Team to ensure 
alignment across U.S. Government (USG) and public and private sector 
efforts. I do believe that interagency coordination is strong at 
various levels of the USG, to include at the Country Team, and this 
close coordination is key to leveraging all elements of U.S. national 
power in a partner nation. However, there is always room for 
improvement and, frankly, it is always going to be more difficult for a 
democratic country like the U.S. to fully coordinate its efforts 
compared to an authoritarian government that can fully control all 
elements of its government and other sectors.
             Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
    Question. Admiral Faller I certainly understand how important ISR 
is for many missions in your theater of operation, and I suspect we 
share a belief that ISR availability is not only critical, but probably 
a nearly universal problem for U.S. forces. SOUTHCOM has raised this 
issue with the Committee before. I also believe manned ISR platforms 
continue to have an important place, along with unmanned.
    So, I am also pleased this is a bicameral interest, as the Senate 
Armed Services Committee encouraged the Department of Defense in their 
FY21 report to explore enhancing ISR capabilities through modifications 
or increased maintenance of current ISR assets or through possible 
leasing of such systems. Do you anticipate support from the Department 
in this area? How are things progressing?
    Answer. SOUTHCOM is facing a critical shortfall of Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) this year due to the loss of the 
ISR Transfer Fund, which has made up 47% of our total ISR funding over 
the last five years. We have conveyed our concern about this ISR 
shortfall within the Department and look forward to seeing funding 
levels for ISR when the President's FY22 Budget Request is released.
                          National Guard Role
    Question. I was very pleased your testimony highlighted the 
significant role Guard and Reserve forces play in achieving your 
mission. These men and women are very highly trained and capable of 
stepping into critical roles seamlessly. I'm proud to note that 
components of our own Oklahoma NG/ANG have supported important SOUTHCOM 
missions in recent years. This may be less of a question than a 
shameless plug for the hard work and training put in by these men and 
women from my district--they are absolutely on par and professional in 
their occupation specialties, but I will ask if you've found in your 
experience that we are adequately resourcing them to be fully 
operational from an equipment standpoint with your active duty 
components?
    Answer. I, too, am very proud of the significant role the National 
Guard and Reserve plays. These forces are outstanding partners in 
assisting us in meeting U.S. strategic objectives in our region. While 
I would defer to the National Guard Bureau on specific resourcing 
information, I can tell you that when they participate in our 
partnership events, operations, or exercises, they always arrive ready 
to successfully execute as needed. Their equipment has been deployable, 
sustainable, and interoperable with our active duty forces, as well as 
with our partners in many cases.
    [Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Cole. 
Questions submitted by Mr. Womack and the answers thereto 
follow:]
                       State Partnership Program
    Question. The National Guard's State Partnership Program focuses on 
building partner military capacity and defense capability in 82 
countries, adding more partners each year. These partnerships support 
COCOM, embassy, and partner nation objectives by providing or 
facilitating things like cooperative training and exercises, disaster/
emergency response, leadership development, aviation operations, cyber 
defense/communications security, military medical support, and counter 
terrorism activities to name a few. These partnerships build enduring 
relationships with an effective ``whole of society'' approach. One 
critical component of these partnerships is the Bilateral Affairs 
Officer (BAO), which are permanent National Guard billets located in 
the partner nations. Can you please explain the overall importance of 
the SPP in your AOR and specifically address the importance of having a 
present Bilateral Affairs Officer in each of your partner nations? What 
challenges have you experienced with having the BAO billets filled? 
Finally, if you are funding any of these billets out of pocket, how 
many are you funding and why are you doing so?
    Answer. The State Partnership Program (SPP) is an integral part of 
our engagement capability with our partners and a force multiplier in 
the SOUTHCOM region. The State Partnership Program enables the exchange 
of tremendous expertise resident in our citizen Soldiers and Airmen and 
fosters long-term relationships with partner nation military and 
security forces. SOUTHCOM fully leverages this value with 24 State 
Partnerships--the most of any region. Bilateral Affairs Officers (BAOs) 
are National Guard Bureau assigned personnel within our security 
cooperation offices in partner nations that assist the State and 
SOUTHCOM in managing and executing requirements associated with the SPP 
and facilitate regular contact with the partner nation. This frequent 
interface is a key component of building enduring relationships with 
our partners. They are absolutely critical to the outstanding working 
relationships between our partner nations, SOUTHCOM, and States 
coordinating program events. While I defer to the National Guard Bureau 
on specific issues with filling the various BAO positions around the 
globe, I can tell you that NGB has been very supportive in filling our 
BAO billets and they fund the majority of those billets as well.

    [Clerk's note.--End of questions submitted by Mr. Womack.]