[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                    CDBG DISASTER RECOVERY: STATES,
                     CITIES, AND DENIALS OF FUNDING

=======================================================================

                            VIRTUAL HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                       SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
                           AND INVESTIGATIONS

                                 OF THE

                    COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES

                     U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                             JULY 15, 2021

                               __________

       Printed for the use of the Committee on Financial Services

                           Serial No. 117-38
                           
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                              __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
45-385 PDF                 WASHINGTON : 2021                     
          
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------  

                 HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES

                 MAXINE WATERS, California, Chairwoman

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York         PATRICK McHENRY, North Carolina, 
NYDIA M. VELAZQUEZ, New York             Ranking Member
BRAD SHERMAN, California             FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York           BILL POSEY, Florida
DAVID SCOTT, Georgia                 BLAINE LUETKEMEYER, Missouri
AL GREEN, Texas                      BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan
EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri            ANN WAGNER, Missouri
ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado              ANDY BARR, Kentucky
JIM A. HIMES, Connecticut            ROGER WILLIAMS, Texas
BILL FOSTER, Illinois                FRENCH HILL, Arkansas
JOYCE BEATTY, Ohio                   TOM EMMER, Minnesota
JUAN VARGAS, California              LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
JOSH GOTTHEIMER, New Jersey          BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia
VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas              ALEXANDER X. MOONEY, West Virginia
AL LAWSON, Florida                   WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio
MICHAEL SAN NICOLAS, Guam            TED BUDD, North Carolina
CINDY AXNE, Iowa                     DAVID KUSTOFF, Tennessee
SEAN CASTEN, Illinois                TREY HOLLINGSWORTH, Indiana
AYANNA PRESSLEY, Massachusetts       ANTHONY GONZALEZ, Ohio
RITCHIE TORRES, New York             JOHN ROSE, Tennessee
STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts      BRYAN STEIL, Wisconsin
ALMA ADAMS, North Carolina           LANCE GOODEN, Texas
RASHIDA TLAIB, Michigan              WILLIAM TIMMONS, South Carolina
MADELEINE DEAN, Pennsylvania         VAN TAYLOR, Texas
ALEXANDRIA OCASIO-CORTEZ, New York   PETE SESSIONS, Texas
JESUS ``CHUY'' GARCIA, Illinois
SYLVIA GARCIA, Texas
NIKEMA WILLIAMS, Georgia
JAKE AUCHINCLOSS, Massachusetts

                   Charla Ouertatani, Staff Director
              Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations

                        AL GREEN, Texas Chairman

EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri            TOM EMMER, Minnesota, Ranking 
ALMA ADAMS, North Carolina               Member
RASHIDA TLAIB, Michigan              BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia
JESUS ``CHUY'' GARCIA, Illinois      ALEXANDER X. MOONEY, West Virginia
SYLVIA GARCIA, Texas                 DAVID KUSTOFF, Tennessee
NIKEMA WILLIAMS, Georgia             WILLIAM TIMMONS, South Carolina, 
                                         Vice Ranking Member
                           
                           C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
Hearing held on:
    July 15, 2021................................................     1
Appendix:
    July 15, 2021................................................    31

                               WITNESSES
                        Thursday, July 15, 2021

Begg, Stephen, Deputy Inspector General, Office of the Inspector 
  General, Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).....    12
Haddock, Carol, Director, Houston Department of Public Works and 
  Engineering....................................................     6
Hidalgo, Hon. Lina, County Judge, Harris County..................     8
Lagrone, Heather, Senior Deputy Director, Community Development 
  and Revitalization, Texas General Land Office (GLO)............    10
Saadian, Sarah, Vice President, Public Policy, National Low 
  Income Housing Coalition.......................................     4

                                APPENDIX

Prepared statements:
    Begg, Stephen................................................    32
    Haddock, Carol...............................................    61
    Hidalgo, Hon. Lina...........................................    66
    Lagrone, Heather.............................................    69
    Saadian, Sarah...............................................    73

              Additional Material Submitted for the Record

Green, Hon. Al:
    Written statement of City of Houston Mayor Sylvester Turner..    95
    Written statement of the Council of State Community 
      Development Agencies (COSCDA)..............................    97
    Written statement of HUD.....................................    99
    Houston Chronicle article entitled, ``Bush says he will ask 
      HUD to send $750M in flood aid to Harris County following 
      backlash''.................................................   102
Begg, Stephen:
    Written responses to questions for the record submitted by 
      Representative Tom Emmer...................................   105
Lagrone, Heather:
    Written responses to questions for the record submitted by 
      Representative Sylvia Garcia...............................   107
    Written responses to questions for the record submitted by 
      Representatative Al Green, with attachments................   112
Saadian, Sarah:
    Written responses to questions for the record submitted by 
      Representative Nikema Williams.............................   131

 
                    CDBG DISASTER RECOVERY: STATES,
                     CITIES, AND DENIALS OF FUNDING

                              ----------                              


                        Thursday, July 15, 2021

             U.S. House of Representatives,
                          Subcommittee on Oversight
                                and Investigations,
                           Committee on Financial Services,
                                                   Washington, D.C.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 12:01 p.m., 
via Webex, Hon. Al Green [chairman of the subcommittee] 
presiding.
    Members present: Representatives Green, Cleaver, Adams, 
Tlaib, Garcia of Texas, Williams of Georgia; Emmer, Loudermilk, 
Mooney, Kustoff, and Timmons.
    Ex officio present: Representative Waters.
    Chairman Green. The Oversight and Investigations 
Subcommittee will come to order.
    Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare a 
recess of the subcommittee at any time.
    Also, without objection, members of the full Financial 
Services Committee who are not members of the subcommittee are 
authorized to participate in today's hearing.
    As a reminder, I ask all Members to keep themselves muted 
when they are not being recognized by the Chair to minimize 
disturbances while Members are asking questions of our 
witnesses. The staff has been instructed not to mute Members 
except when a Member is not being recognized by the Chair and 
there is inadvertent background noise.
    Members are reminded that all House rules related to order 
and decorum apply to this remote hearing.
    Members are also reminded that they may participate in only 
one remote proceeding at a time. If you are participating 
today, please keep your camera on, and if you choose to attend 
a different remote proceeding, please turn your camera off.
    If Members wish to be recognized during the hearing, please 
identify yourself by name to facilitate recognition.
    The title of today's hearing is, ``CDBG Disaster Recovery: 
States, Cities, and Denials of Funding.''
    I will now recognize myself for 3 minutes to give an 
opening statement.
    In May of 2018, Ms. Lagrone sat before this subcommittee 
and said in her testimony about Hurricane Harvey, ``To further 
illustrate the scope of this disaster, the Harris County Flood 
Control District reported that 1.5 feet of water covered 70 
percent of the 1,800 square miles that comprise Harris County. 
The weight of that water depressed the Earth's crust enough to 
temporarily drop the elevation of Houston by 2 centimeters. The 
amount of water was approximately 1 trillion gallons.''
    In May of 2021, almost 3 years exactly after that 
testimony, Ms. Lagrone's office, the Texas General Land Office 
(GLO) announced that Houston and Harris County would receive 
zero dollars out of $4 trillion in mitigation funding 
appropriated by this body. Such was the result, GLO said, of 
the formula it had conceived to govern the allocation of Harvey 
mitigation funds. GLO said nothing could be done for these, the 
hardest-hit disaster victims in the most impacted areas, 
because the allocation formula had spoken.
    Left unsaid was that the vaunted formula was rigged ab 
initio, from the inception, against the disaster victims and 
residents of Harris County and Houston. Also left unsaid by GLO 
was that this was exactly what was expected, because GLO had 
been warned in January 2020 by experts in the City of Houston 
and advocacy groups that reliance on GLO's proposed formula 
would shut out the most densely-populated and most-impacted 
low- or moderate-income (LMI) jurisdictions in the State.
    But just days later, GLO announced that it would circumvent 
its own rigged formula as applied to Harris County, and 
instead, GLO sought an accomplice when it simply, by fiat, 
proposed to direct HUD to give $750 million to Harris County, 
something GLO was without legal authority to do.
    Then, in a fit of pique, GLO falsely and publicly stated 
that HUD had denied its request for direct allocation to Harris 
County; though should any first-year law student read the law, 
they could tell you that it flatly prohibits direct allocation 
to certain jurisdictions, and Harris County unfortunately was 
included in these jurisdictions.
    And so, today, we are here to provide critical oversight of 
a rigged formula, the highjacking of a Federal mitigation 
appropriations process, and to do what we can to prevent the 
rigging of the system by a grantee of Federal resources in a 
manner that further victimizes the victims of disasters.
    I think that the time has come for a course correction.
    The Chair now recognizes the ranking member of the 
subcommittee, Mr. Emmer, for 5 minutes for an opening 
statement.
    Mr. Emmer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you 
holding this hearing today. And thanks to our witnesses for 
appearing before this subcommittee. I look forward to all of 
your testimony.
    The Community Development Block Grant Disaster Relief 
(CDBG-DR) Program is designed to address unmet needs of our 
most vulnerable communities, to help lower- and moderate-income 
people, and to help small businesses fully recover from the 
most severe natural disasters. It is one of several ways that 
Congress and the Federal Government assist in the local 
recovery process.
    Currently, this program lacks the proper oversight needed 
to succeed in this endeavor, so we frequently see instances 
where these funds are misused, and our government struggles to 
swiftly distribute billions of dollars in disaster relief to 
those who need it most.
    Why is this program so susceptible to waste, fraud, and 
abuse? I hope the testimony we hear today will help us to 
better understand that question and help to shape our continued 
efforts as a committee, specifically the efforts of my 
colleagues, Chairman Green and Congresswoman Wagner, to codify 
this program.
    When disasters strike, it is critical that aid comes in an 
effective and efficient manner, which can only be done through 
implementing proper controls and oversight of the distribution 
of billions of dollars in disaster relief. I am proud that this 
subcommittee shares this priority.
    As we will explore in this hearing, communities are 
currently left without a clear understanding of where to turn 
and how to properly access the Community Development Block 
Grant Disaster Recovery funds. If codified, this program will 
establish a clear, streamlined structure so that all parties 
involved in distributing relief to communities understand the 
processing guidelines.
    For example, the supplemental appropriations for disaster 
relief far exceed the annual appropriation for the Department 
of Housing and Urban Development's Community Development Block 
Grant Program. We need to be smart stewards of the taxpayers' 
dollars and codify this program because, frankly, there are too 
many dollars at stake to manage the program on an ad hoc basis.
    Of course, no two disasters are the same, which is why it 
is so important that affected communities are able to put this 
money to the best use, but it is crucial that this program has 
the proper controls in place.
    This funding is supposed to help rebuild homes and 
infrastructure, provide assistance to affected business owners, 
and support our low- and moderate-income community. But time 
and time again, we see examples of grantees misusing disaster 
recovery money for purposes outside the scope of approved 
action plans, or we see bureaucratic gridlock in distributing 
funds appropriately.
    The Department of Housing and Urban Development's Office of 
the Inspector General has spent years conducting audits and 
investigations of this program, revealing the potential for 
mismanagement and the possibility of waste, fraud, and abuse.
    I look forward to the witnesses' testimony so that we can 
further our efforts to protect vulnerable communities in times 
of disaster, increase transparency into the program, and 
establish the proper structure and oversight so that funds can 
be swiftly distributed.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the remainder of my 
time.
    Chairman Green. Thank you, Mr. Emmer.
    The Chair now recognizes the Chair of the full Financial 
Services Committee, the gentlewoman from California, Chairwoman 
Waters, for 1 minute.
    Chairwoman Waters. Thank you so very much, Chairman Green.
    The disaster mitigation funding that Congress has 
appropriated to Texas since 2018 was meant to finance 
infrastructure projects that would protect the most-vulnerable 
communities from future disasters, yet Texas awarded none of 
this money to Houston, which suffered the lion's share of the 
damage from Hurricane Harvey.
    We know that hurricanes, wildfires, and other disasters are 
getting worse, endangering millions of Americans, their homes, 
and their businesses. To better prepare for future disasters, 
we must target mitigation funding directly to those who need it 
or to protect those communities that are at highest risk.
    Today, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about 
what went wrong in Texas and how to better prevent 
misallocations of disaster relief in the future.
    Thank you so very much for paying attention to this very 
important issue, Chairman Green. I yield back the balance of my 
time.
    Chairman Green. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
    The Chair now recognizes the Vice Chair of the 
subcommittee, the gentlewoman from Georgia, Ms. Williams, for 1 
minute.
    Ms. Williams of Georgia. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Natural disasters are unexpected and devastating, but even 
if we can't predict when and where they are going to happen, 
there is one thing that we can prepare for: We can design the 
strongest possible Federal framework for disaster recovery now 
so that we are ready to build our communities back stronger 
than ever when disasters do strike. That is why this hearing is 
so important.
    If there is one thing the global pandemic has taught all of 
us, it is that we have to think differently about recovery. We 
can't just get back to normal when disaster strikes. Our goal 
should always be to rebuild from disaster in a way that puts 
all people, especially those most marginalized, in a better 
position to build a good life for themselves and their 
families.
    Today, I am looking forward to discussing how we can ensure 
that our disaster recovery dollars are serving all of our 
communities, and serving them in a way that best positions them 
for long-term success.
    Thank you to all of our witnesses for joining us today.
    And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
    Chairman Green. The gentlewoman yields back.
    Please allow me now to welcome our witnesses, and I am very 
pleased to introduce this panel: Ms. Sarah Saadian, vice 
president of public policy with the National Low Income Housing 
Coalition; the Honorable Lina Hidalgo, a Harris County Judge; 
the Honorable Carol Haddock, director of public works and 
engineering for the City of Houston; the Honorable Heather 
Lagrone, a senior deputy director for community development and 
revitalization at the Texas General Land Office; and Stephen 
Begg, Deputy Inspector General in the Office of Inspector 
General at the Department of Housing and Urban Development.
    And I must say that I should recognize the first witness as 
the Honorable Sarah Saadian.
    Once the witnesses finish their testimony, each member will 
have 5 minutes to ask questions.
    Ms. Saadian, you are now recognized for 5 minutes. And 
please correct my pronunciation of your name if I have not done 
so properly.

  STATEMENT OF SARAH SAADIAN, VICE PRESIDENT, PUBLIC POLICY, 
             NATIONAL LOW INCOME HOUSING COALITION

    Ms. Saadian. Thank you, Chairman Green, Ranking Member 
Emmer, and members of the subcommittee. I am really grateful 
for the opportunity to testify before you today.
    The National Low Income Housing Coalition has worked on 
disaster recovery issues for more than 15 years, since 
Hurricane Katrina, and from this experience, we have reached a 
simple conclusion: America's disaster housing recovery 
framework is fundamentally broken and in need of major reform.
    When disasters strike, the most marginalized households are 
often hardest hit. They have the fewest resources to sustain 
themselves during a disaster, and they face the longest, 
deepest path to recovery. And yet, our nation's recovery and 
mitigation programs often overlook their needs. They are 
consistently left behind in recovery and rebuilding efforts, 
and their communities are made less resilient to future 
disasters. In turn, this exacerbates the housing crisis, 
solidifies segregation and racial inequities, and deepens 
inequality.
    Today, we are discussing the Community Development Block 
Grant Disaster Recovery Program, which is a vital tool that 
provides flexible, long-term resources needed to rebuild after 
a disaster and prepare for future harm. But too often, the most 
marginalized survivors--those with the lowest incomes, people 
of color, people with disabilities, and others--face enormous 
challenges to a complete and equitable recovery under the 
program.
    First, it takes far too long for assistance to reach 
households. Congressional inaction and the lack of formal 
authorization means that years can pass before households 
receive help.
    Second, recovery and mitigation efforts consistently favor 
higher-income White communities at the expense of low-income 
communities and communities of color. Decisions about how to 
allocate resources are often made based on inaccurate data that 
underestimates the needs of low-income renters.
    Low-income communities and communities of color are often 
located in areas that are at higher risk of disasters and have 
less resilient infrastructure due to decades of disinvestment, 
and yet resources tend to go towards higher-income communities 
that face lower risks.
    The consistent lack of fair housing and civil rights 
enforcement by HUD means that survivors are further 
marginalized, and State action plans can contribute to 
inequity.
    And, third, disaster recovery efforts often worsen 
America's housing crisis. A major cause of the housing crisis 
is the severe shortage of housing affordable to people with the 
lowest incomes, and for too long, these homes have been placed 
in areas at the greater risk of natural disasters.
    When a disaster strikes, affordable housing is often 
damaged and destroyed, but never rebuilt. The consequences can 
be devastating, putting survivors at risk of displacement and, 
in worse cases, homelessness.
    It is critical that we work towards several key goals. 
Recovery and mitigation must be centered on survivors with the 
greatest needs. Dismantling segregation and inequity must be an 
explicit goal of disaster recovery. All neighborhoods should be 
made free of environmental hazards and be safe and resilient, 
and those who are most impacted must have a say in how their 
communities are rebuilt.
    As a first step towards these goals, Congress should enact 
the Reforming Disaster Recovery Act. If enacted, it would 
permanently authorize the CDBG-DR Program, allowing funds to 
reach households and communities more quickly.
    But it also provides important safeguards and tools. It 
targets resources to households with the greatest needs, it 
prioritizes data transparency and better oversight, it protects 
civil rights and fair housing standards, and it encourages 
mitigation and resiliency.
    I thank you again for the opportunity to testify before you 
today, and I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Saadian can be found on page 
73 of the appendix.]
    Chairman Green. Thank you.
    Ms. Haddock, you may now proceed with your opening 
statement.

  STATEMENT OF CAROL HADDOCK, DIRECTOR, HOUSTON DEPARTMENT OF 
                  PUBLIC WORKS AND ENGINEERING

    Ms. Haddock. Chairman Green, Ranking Member Emmer, and 
members of the Financial Services Committee's Oversight and 
Investigations Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to 
be here today.
    My focus for my discussion is going to be on the Community 
Development Block Grant Mitigation funds, the $4.3 billion 
allocated to the State of Texas after Hurricane Harvey.
    My name is Carol Haddock, and I am the director of Houston 
Public Works, a department that is responsible for Houston's 
public street, drainage, water and wastewater infrastructure, 
as well as permitting and inspection of development for more 
than 2.3 million Houstonians. In this role, I am in the midst 
of recovery from Hurricane Harvey, and the 2015 and 2016 storms 
before that.
    Houston has a significant flooding history, but we are 
committed to build forward towards a resilient Houston that 
will be ready to withstand the next storm, since we all know 
that next storm will happen. However, we still face significant 
challenges, and one of the biggest ones today is the fact that 
the General Land Office has failed Houstonians who want and 
need to mitigate from future storms.
    Even after input and warnings from multiple communities and 
their leaders, the State of Texas submitted an action plan that 
resulted in no funding awards to the areas in Texas that 
received the most damage from Harvey, which include: Aransas 
and Nueces Counties, where Harvey made landfall; Jefferson 
County, which endured the highest rainfall totals; and the City 
of Houston and Harris County, which suffered 50 percent of the 
damage Statewide.
    The Texas General Land Office's process for allocating 
granted zero dollars to all of these localities, and it was 
only after bipartisan political pressure that the GLO 
retroactively requested $750 million for Harris County.
    The complaints and criticisms of GLO's process are not new. 
There have been multiple points where the City of Houston has 
elevated our concerns, to no avail. Both Mayor Turner and Chief 
Recovery Officer Steve Costello offered comments in December 
2019 on a draft version of the State Action Plan.
    At this hearing, the City specifically requested that 
mitigation funding be used to: revise programs to ensure that 
distribution is proportional to the impacts of Hurricane Harvey 
and the previous storms for that area; increase the maximum 
points for mitigation resiliency measures to provide actual 
mitigation; and revise the program language to incentivize 
regional coordination through the joint application process.
    And the next two items really cut to the heart of this 
matter: to remove the limit on the project applications by 
entity and the cap on grant awards; and to remove the 
percentage of persons benefiting within jurisdictions' 
language.
    These two items essentially ensured that Harris County and 
Houston could not obtain funding, as projects were limited in 
size by funding caps, and then we were punished because these 
smaller projects didn't benefit our full population.
    These comments were also submitted in writing on January 6, 
2020; however, the requested changes were not incorporated into 
the GLO's State Action Plan.
    More than a year later, in June 2021, the GLO announced the 
outcome of this flawed State Action Plan. As previously warned, 
the City of Houston and Harris County received no funding 
allocation. Every single City of Houston and Harris County 
elected official signed a joint letter to Commissioner Bush to 
reconsider, to revise the metrics, and to allocate CDBG 
mitigation funding based on the proportionality of damages.
    In my day-to-day job as director of Houston Public Works, I 
see Houstonians who continue to struggle to recover from 
Hurricane Harvey. Next month, it will have been 4 years since 
these damages were inflicted--4 years. And to date, the 
response from the GLO is that mitigation is not worthy of 
funding in Houston.
    Houston, on the other hand, took immediate action to ensure 
that people would not put themselves in harm's way. Houston 
updated our floodplain standards and issued substantial damage 
letters to more than 1,000 homeowners, requiring that they not 
repair where they were but that they be brought into current 
code compliance.
    New homes are required to be built higher, above the 
floodplain. And we implemented a proxy for the higher rainfall 
totals that resulted from Atlas 14. We have increased detention 
requirements for new development. We are doing our part. We 
need help in getting the existing historic development out of 
harm's way.
    In June of 2021, Mayor Turner and Judge Hidalgo requested 
that HUD Secretary Fudge work with Texas' GLO to disperse an 
equitable and proportional amount of the $4.3 billion to 
entities within Harris County; specifically, to Harris County 
and the City of Houston as direct subrecipients. To support 
this ask, we noted that more than half, more than 154,000 of 
the 300,000 structures that flooded, and 36 of the 68 
fatalities were in Harris County.
    In contrast to the GLO system, 40 percent of the funds 
under the Federal Emergency Management Agency's Hazard 
Mitigation Grant Program went to the City of Houston and Harris 
County. We thank the Texas Division of Emergency Management for 
their great partnership in getting these funds into local hands 
and to getting mitigation on the ground.
    To date, the City of Houston still has not been allocated 
CDBG funding under the Hurricane Harvey State competition, and, 
in fact, past funding has been used as an excuse that we don't 
need current funding.
    I look forward to working with this committee and answering 
any questions that you might have on this topic.
    Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Haddock can be found on page 
61 of the appendix.]
    Chairman Green. Thank you very much.
    And let me compliment the witnesses on doing an outstanding 
job with your testimony in terms of maintaining the time, but 
the staff has reminded me that there is a protocol that I must 
adhere to. And, hence, I will advise the witnesses that you are 
reminded that your oral testimony will be limited to 5 minutes. 
You should be able to see a timer on your screen that will 
indicate how much time you have left, and a chime will go off 
at the end of your time. I would ask that you be mindful of the 
timer, and quickly wrap up your testimony if you hear the 
chime, so that we can be respectful of the witnesses' and the 
committee members' time.
    And without objection, your written statements will be made 
a part of the record.
    Once the witnesses finish their testimony, each Member will 
have 5 minutes to ask questions.
    Judge Hidalgo, you are now recognized for 5 minutes.

 STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE LINA HIDALGO, COUNTY JUDGE, HARRIS 
                             COUNTY

    Ms. Hidalgo. Chairman Green, Ranking Member Emmer, and 
members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me here.
    On behalf of the people of Harris County, I want to express 
my gratitude for your calling this hearing, and for your work 
in making sure that these programs reach our communities, 
because we depend on these programs to recover from disasters.
    As our county's chief executive and chief emergency 
manager, I have seen firsthand the heartbreaking devastation 
our communities are still reeling from since Hurricane Harvey 
struck in 2017. The national media attention may have faded 
away by now, but there are still thousands of families 
suffering in silence--businesses, homeowners, renters, 
neighborhoods, all yearning to benefit from long-term 
mitigation projects before the next flood hits. Yet, due to 
CDBG Disaster programs that are mired in red tape, complexity, 
and uncertainty, millions of our residents, particularly 
vulnerable residents, continue to feel abandoned and 
frustrated.
    Harris County bore the majority of fatalities in Texas due 
to Hurricane Harvey. We also suffered the most damage compared 
to any other jurisdiction in our State. More than half, around 
154,000 of the roughly 300,000 structures that were damaged or 
destroyed across the State during Harvey were in Harris County.
    Harris County is a big county. We have roughly 5 million 
people. We have the geographic size of the State of Rhode 
Island. Not only are we the largest jurisdiction in Texas, but 
we, along with the City of Houston, are also the economic 
engine for much of the southwestern United States, and the 
epicenter of our national energy infrastructure.
    Despite our past losses, despite our growing risk in the 
face of climate change, and despite the national importance of 
our critical energy infrastructure, our county received zero 
CDBG-Mitigation funds in the latest round of funding. In 
response to that, I joined Mayor Sylvester Turner of the City 
of Houston in asking HUD Secretary Marcia Fudge for certainty 
in an allocation and for a review of the criteria used. I also 
have expressed those two goals to members of our congressional 
delegation.
    First, the GLO must make the $750 million direct allocation 
to Harris County that it has announced publicly, which we view 
as an initial downpayment relative to what our community needs.
    Second, the City of Houston and Harris County must each 
receive at least $1 billion in CDBG-MIT funds. We ask that HUD 
approve the portion of the GLO's action plan that pertains to 
the $750 million for Harris County but reject the flawed 
allocations.
    The Harris County Flood Control District acts as the flood 
control district for all cities within Harris County and folks 
in unincorporated areas. Approximately half of my constituents 
are residents of the City of Houston. I want to stress that 
Harris County supports the City of Houston in its efforts to 
obtain its own funds.
    I must also note that, if approved by HUD, the projects 
proposed in the current action plan for the $750 million are 
focused on LMI areas of the county, and around half of the 
funding would go to projects located within the City of 
Houston.
    In addition to the recent debacle with the CDBG-MIT 
Program, the CDBG-DR Program also has been a source of trauma 
and frustration for residents, particularly when it comes to 
programs like the homeowner assistance and reimbursement 
programs, which are designed to help and protect vulnerable and 
low-income individuals.
    Unlike FEMA funds, which flow quickly and with certainty in 
the hours after a declared disaster, CDBG-DR funds take years 
to reach survivors, with no certainty as to how much or when 
funds will arrive.
    Each grantee has a different way of administering their 
funds, and the funds are mired in delays as rules are 
developed, RFPs are written, et cetera. There is no intuitive 
or standard way for survivors to sign up for help. Required 
documentation is burdensome and varies, and we need CDBG-DR 
funds to be treated as emergency funds.
    When it comes to flood control or flood recovery relief, 
the people of Harris County care about results, not action 
plans, appropriations, or competition rules.
    Thank you for your time.
    [The prepared statement of Judge Hidalgo can be found on 
page 66 of the appendix.
    Chairman Green. Thank you, Judge Hidalgo.
    The Chair now recognizes Ms. Lagrone for 5 minutes to give 
an oral presentation of your testimony.

   STATEMENT OF HEATHER LAGRONE, SENIOR DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR 
 COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AND REVITALIZATION, TEXAS GENERAL LAND 
                          OFFICE (GLO)

    Ms. Lagrone. Good afternoon, Chairman Green, Ranking Member 
Emmer, and members of the subcommittee. My name is Heather 
Lagrone. I am the senior deputy director for community 
development and revitalization at the Texas General Land 
Office. Thank you for having me here today to help clarify the 
record on our recent mitigation allocation and, in so doing, 
hopefully provide information that will be helpful in removing 
some of the restrictions that limit the State's options when 
disbursing these kinds of funds.
    On February 8, 2018, Congress passed Public Law 115-123, 
directing the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 
to make available no less than $12 billion in Community 
Development Block Grant-Mitigation funds to specific grantees 
that received CDBG-DR allocations for 2015, 2016, and 2017 
disasters, in the same proportion as received in CDBG-DR funds.
    With no further congressional intent provided, more than 
1\1/2\ years later, HUD published in the Federal Register dated 
Friday, August 20, 2019, and named the State of Texas as the 
grantee responsible for administering almost $4.3 billion in 
140 total eligible counties.
    I want to emphasize that the Federal Register specifically 
indicated that mitigation funds were provided to mitigate 
disaster risk and reduce future risk in areas impacted by 
recent disasters, in contrast to some of the public statements. 
None of this money could be used for recovery from past events. 
HUD was very specific that the CDBG-MIT funds are to be used 
for distinctly different purposes than the CDBG-DR funds.
    The State of Texas Action Plan outlines the use of funds, 
programs, eligible applicants, and eligibility criteria in 
accordance with HUD rules and requirements and extensive 
guidance. The plan included competitions for eligible entities 
for each of the 3 disaster years, and 8 additional programs for 
mitigation projects and resilient housing, totaling nearly $4.3 
billion.
    The plan was sent to HUD on February 3, 2020, after an 
extraordinary public outreach effort, including a 50-day public 
comment period and 8 regional public hearings, more than 
doubling HUD's Federal requirements.
    HUD approved the plan, including the mitigation 
competition's growing criteria, on March 31st. HUD and the 
State of Texas executed a grant agreement on January 12, 2021.
    Of the $4.3 billion allocated to the State of Texas, the 
GLO set aside $2.3 billion to fund local mitigation projects 
through a competitive process. In May of 2020, the GLO launched 
the first round of the competition for nearly $1.2 billion. 
Applications were submitted by cities, counties, special 
purpose districts, and eligible Texas counties impacted by 
Hurricane Harvey and severe flooding in 2015 and 2016.
    The GLO received more than $6.5 billion in requests for 
mitigation project funding, underscoring the urgent need for 
increased resiliency throughout the eligible area. Applications 
closed for that first round of funding on October 28th, and the 
GLO evaluated all 290 submitted applications in accordance with 
HUD-approved scoring criteria and CDBG-MIT eligibility. The 
eligible applicants with the highest scores were awarded funds.
    The GLO conducted 3 competitive application programs that 
awarded $31 million to 2015 mitigations competition, $135 
million to 2016 mitigation competition, and $975 million to the 
Hurricane Harvey Mitigation Competition.
    To understand the shift in focus from HUD's CDBG-DR Program 
to this new CDBG program, it is important to note HUD's 
definition of mitigation--those activities that increase 
resilience to disasters and reduce or eliminate the long-term 
risk of loss of life, injury, damage to and loss of property, 
and suffering and hardship.
    In a letter to the GLO dated June 14th, HUD stated that, 
unlike CDBG-DR allocations, which are allocated based on a 
long-established, disaster-based formula, CDBG-MIT was made 
available in Public Law 115-123, confirming that the GLO could 
not consider previous damage in administering these funds.
    While drafting the action plan, the GLO staff repeatedly 
reminded HUD staff that previous damage was not a 
consideration.
    Chairman Green. The gentlelady's time has expired.
    The Chair will allow you additional time if you have not 
finished.
    Ms. Lagrone. Thank you, sir.
    Harris County is one of 28 counties impacted by all 3 
eligible events. The County Government, the Harris County Flood 
Control District, and the City of Houston did not submit 
applications that were competitive against the higher-scoring 
projects submitted by other eligible entities and, as such, did 
not receive direct funding from the Hurricane Harvey Mitigation 
Competition Round 1. However, several projects within Harris 
County received awards, totaling $117 million from this first 
round.
    For the record, Texas Land Commissioner George P. Bush was, 
by design, recused from the scoring committee and the scoring 
process. The Commissioner was informed of the competition 
results only after the projects had been through eligibility 
review and scored in accordance with the federally-approved 
action plan.
    The GLO now plans to subaward $750 million in mitigation 
funding to Harris County. The GLO, in coordination with Harris 
County, has drafted an action plan amendment that will include 
a set-aside of $750 million in CDBG-MIT funding for the county 
to develop a method of distribution. The remaining funds in the 
mitigation competition, the HMG Supplemental, Coastal 
Resilience, and Planning Programs, will be reprogrammed to 
direct at least $500 million in additional funds to the 
regional mitigation. There are currently three active Federal 
Registers governing the CDBG mitigation funds.
    Per HUD requirements, the action plan is currently being 
translated from English into five additional languages. When 
translation is completed, we are required to post for public 
comment for 45 days and to hold public hearings to gather 
additional comments. Once we have responded to those comments, 
the action plan will be sent to HUD, which has up to 60 days to 
approve or deny the amendment.
    As a State operating under 20 different Federal Registers, 
with 7 separate disaster events and 3 Federal Registers over 
simply the CDBG-MIT grant, streamlining the process and 
permanently codifying the CDBG-DR grant program will be 
extremely beneficial. It will provide grantees with clear 
guidance, reduce the time it takes from disaster impact to 
program implementation, and prevent references to multiple 
Federal Registers.
    I am happy to answer any questions you may have.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Lagrone can be found on page 
69 of the appendix.]
    Chairman Green. Thank you very much.
    The Chair now recognizes Mr. Stephen Begg, who is the 
Deputy Inspector General in the Office of the Inspector General 
of the Department of Housing and Urban Development, for 5 
minutes.

STATEMENT OF STEPHEN BEGG, DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL, OFFICE OF 
    THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN 
                       DEVELOPMENT (HUD)

    Mr. Begg. Good afternoon, Chairman Green, Ranking Member 
Emmer, and distinguished members of this subcommittee. Thank 
you for the opportunity to participate in today's hearing. It 
is my honor to represent the dedicated oversight professionals 
of the HUD Office of Inspector General, and to discuss our work 
related to disaster recovery.
    In recent years, we have identified the administration of 
disaster recovery assistance as a top management challenge for 
HUD, as the frequency of disasters and the amount of Federal 
spending on them through HUD's programs has increased 
exponentially.
    We appreciate the Department's commitment to working with 
our office to continuously improve these disaster programs. But 
several themes from our work remain challenges for HUD: the 
lack of permanent program requirements; grantees' building 
capacity to manage large grants early on, and then to spend 
funds timely to achieve intended outcomes; and HUD maintaining 
capacity to monitor grantees as the program increases in size 
and complexity.
    Our office believes that codifying HUD's disaster program 
requirements is critical to reducing the amount of time it 
takes for grantees to access funds and to deliver assistance to 
the individuals and communities in need.
    In 2018, we recommended codification of the requirements 
that do not change across disasters. Earlier this year, we 
found that the timing of HUD's release of Federal Register 
notices and signing of grant agreements for the 2017 disasters 
was significantly delayed due to its negotiations with the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) about potential new 
requirements. HUD could reduce the amount of time it takes to 
work through these stages with grantees by standardizing 
aspects of the program.
    Our reviews have also found that grantees are challenged 
early in the process to hire adequate staff, establish internal 
controls, and stand up systems sufficient to manage large 
grants. The complexity of program requirements outlined in many 
Federal Register notices can exacerbate these challenges, 
especially for grantees with limited experience.
    We found that capacity issues existed for the HUD grantees 
in Texas and Puerto Rico, and we noted specifically that the 
unprecedented amount of grant funds they were administering was 
a significant factor in their struggle to establish capacity.
    We know that codification would not solve all of the issues 
that grantees face, but it could provide grantees with more 
certainty about core requirements while they are planning and 
establishing programs immediately following a disaster. HUD and 
its grantees could then focus more on addressing capacity 
issues with technical assistance and working through the unique 
circumstances of each recovery and mitigation effort. As 
grantees build systems and processes to comply with standard 
requirements, those programs could be executed more efficiently 
in future disasters.
    Providing clear, reasonable expectations for grantees would 
also help avoid spending delays later in the grant cycle. We 
have identified recently that the complexity of new 
requirements can cause confusion, even for experienced 
grantees, and can lead to years-long delays in spending at the 
local levels.
    In our report on HUD's top management challenges, we noted 
our concern with the increasing number of disaster grantees 
that HUD has designated as slow spenders. We are currently 
reviewing HUD's process for monitoring and assisting these 
grantees in increasing the timeliness of their activities.
    HUD has made progress in increasing its staffing capacity 
and procedures to oversee grantees, but opportunities still 
exist to improve insight into grantee operations and data, 
especially at the subgrantee level. Increased access to data 
would also assist HUD and our office in detecting and 
preventing waste, fraud, and abuse.
    The COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated the existing challenges 
in HUD's disaster programs, as HUD was unable to conduct onsite 
monitoring reviews for an extended period, and many grantees 
struggled to communicate effectively with their local partners 
and to advance construction projects and control costs.
    Moving forward, our office will continue conducting 
oversight to help HUD achieve its strategic objective to 
support effectiveness and accountability in the long-term 
disaster recovery. We believe codification is an important step 
towards achieving that objective.
    We appreciate the bipartisan efforts from the members and 
staff of this committee to advance legislation on codification, 
and we look forward to supporting your work on this topic in 
the future.
    Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our oversight 
work. I look forward to answering your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Deputy Inspector General Begg 
can be found on page 32 of the appendix.]
    Chairman Green. Thank you, Mr. Begg.
    I will now recognize the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. 
Cleaver, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Cleaver. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate your 
having this subcommittee hearing. As you and I discussed, I am 
chairing the Subcommittee on Housing, Community Development, 
and Insurance, which takes in, of course, the Oversight 
Subcommittee, and this is something that is very important to 
me, and it is something that we have to get right.
    I don't need to remind you, Mr. Chairman, that you, Full 
Committee Chairwoman Waters, and I were in Mississippi and 
Alabama--
    Mr. Emmer. Point of order, Mr. Chairman.
    We can't see Mr. Cleaver. He needs to put his camera on.
    Mr. Cleaver. Oh, wow. I apologize. And I want to be seen, 
because I have on a new tie. So, thank you.
    Ms. Adams. Well, you are looking good.
    Mr. Cleaver. Pardon me, Mr. Chairman. I apologize.
    So here is the question I want to raise to you, Mr. Emmer. 
We are going to have more of these events happening, and I know 
there are probably people who believe climate change is some 
kind of joke that was invented on late-night TV, but here in 
Kansas City, Missouri, we are having the kind of summer that 
people usually have in Seattle. I doubt if it is 80 degrees 
here. Normally, we are hovering at 100.
    And so we are going to have--this is going to happen over 
and over again. And that makes CDBG-DR extremely important, I 
think. And when you consider the fact that the areas where we 
are going to have a lot of flooding and--we found that the 
moderate- and high-poverty Census tracts are correlated with 
flood-prone Census tracts. And so, the top five States with the 
highest share of the homeless population are also among the top 
six States that are the most disaster-prone in the country.
    And so, if you put aside the sheer need we have for 
increasing the number of housing units, can you explain why 
Congress should also be committed to ensuring that those units 
are resilient, sustainable, and equitable?
    In other words, increasing the number of housing units is 
something we are working on, but do you see the need also for 
us to make sure that the units that we are helping to build or 
redevelop are resilient and sustainably built and sited 
equitably?
    When I say sustainably built, I am talking about the 
housing that was built in Ward 9 down in New Orleans after 
Katrina, which Mr. Green and I have both seen.
    Do you think that we need to start trying to make sure that 
poor people living in those areas--as we are building 
affordable housing, should not we start thinking about building 
them with a higher level of sustainability?
    Mr. Emmer. And, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Cleaver's camera went off 
again.
    Chairman Green. Mr. Cleaver?
    Mr. Cleaver. Yes.
    Chairman Green. We have lost sight of you again, and we 
would like to see that lovely tie that you have on.
    Mr. Cleaver. I'm sorry. I was trying to reach Mr. Emmer.
    I was talking to him about sustainably-built housing for 
poor people in areas that are likely going to be hit with 
repeated events like Katrina, and I talked about the housing we 
saw in New Orleans.
    My time probably is running out. Mr. Emmer?
    Mr. Emmer. You are putting that to me, Mr. Cleaver?
    Mr. Cleaver. No, no, no. I was looking at your face. I 
actually wanted the question to go to Ms. Saadian. I am messing 
up your name too, like I will probably mess up others, so 
forgive me. And would you please respond?
    Ms. Saadian. Sure. I would be happy to. It is really 
important that we are building both resiliently and in areas 
that are left with disasters--
    Chairman Green. Ma'am, we will ask that you kindly submit 
the remainder of your answer in writing, for the record, if you 
would, please?
    Mr. Cleaver. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Green. Thank you. And we will try to give you time 
later on to answer the question.
    The Chair now recognizes Mr. Emmer for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Emmer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Ms. Lagrone, so the record is clear, how much Federal 
funding for housing repair and mitigation has Houston actually 
received to date? And of that amount, how much has actually 
been spent?
    Ms. Lagrone. Yes, sir. The City of Houston and Harris 
County both received about $1.1 billion each for disaster 
recovery unmet needs. The City of Houston has spent about $88 
million of that, and the County has spent about $29 million of 
that $1 billion.
    Mr. Emmer. So, how many homes has the City of Houston 
helped to rebuild in the past 4 years?
    Ms. Lagrone. The City of Houston has built just over 250 
homes as of today.
    Mr. Emmer. Out of how many that were damaged?
    Ms. Lagrone. That number is kind of a sliding scale. I 
think earlier testimony said 300,000 houses were flooded in 
Houston.
    Mr. Emmer. Thank you. Is it true that the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development had to take over Houston's 
housing programs? And, if so, what was the reason?
    Ms. Lagrone. HUD did not take over the programs, but the 
GLO did have to take over the housing programs for the City of 
Houston and Harris County.
    Mr. Emmer. All right.
    Ms. Lagrone. In both instances, the State is the grantee to 
HUD, and Harris County and the City are subrecipients to the 
State of Texas.
    And those programs were not progressing as quickly as we 
wanted to see them progress, and our programs were doing really 
well in the other 48 counties. So we stepped in to utilize our 
resources within the City limits of Houston and in Harris 
County.
    Mr. Emmer. Yes. And the City limits of Houston, you are 
talking about 29 billion of the billion that had been spent 
in--is roughly 200 homes, and that is why they stepped in?
    Ms. Lagrone. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Emmer. You mentioned that the City opted for a lawsuit 
to obtain a temporary restraining order instead of working with 
the General Land Office. I would like to drill down on the 
state of affairs at that time.
    You mentioned that Houston received nearly $1.3 billion in 
housing funds. I think you said $1.2 billion just a second ago. 
Can you tell us how many people had the City of Houston reached 
with that pot of money as of when the City filed for the 
temporary restraining order?
    Ms. Lagrone. Sure. The City had completed less than 100 
houses at that point in time.
    Mr. Emmer. And how much money did Houston budget for the 
purpose of suing the GLO?
    Ms. Lagrone. The number that I saw in the press was 
$700,000.
    Mr. Emmer. And what was the effect of the restraining 
order? Did it shut down the General Land Office's work of 
rebuilding and repairing homes in Houston?
    Ms. Lagrone. It definitely slowed us down in the initiation 
of our bringing those resources to the table within the City 
limits, yes.
    Mr. Emmer. When the temporary restraining order went into 
effect, how many homes had GLO rebuilt and how many 
reimbursements had been issued by that time?
    Ms. Lagrone. We had just hit 1,000 houses at the Land 
Office, and we had spent about $85 million on reimbursements to 
homeowners who had come out of pocket and paid for their own 
repairs.
    Mr. Emmer. Is that about 2,700 reimbursements?
    Ms. Lagrone. Oh, yes, sir, 2,700.
    Mr. Emmer. In light of those numbers, the 1,000 homes and 
the 2,700 reimbursements completed by the GLO versus the 80 by 
the City of Houston, I think we have every right to ask why 
giving no-strings-attached money to Houston is the answer here?
    Ms. Lagrone, what does your office hear from people with 
housing repair needs who are waiting for help in Houston?
    Ms. Lagrone. Since we have taken on the Houston program, we 
have had many homeowners who have told us that they had 
submitted information to the City that the City did not 
transfer to us, and so we are having to re-create documents for 
those homeowners or with those homeowners. And in a lot of 
cases, those homeowners have simply just given up and moved on 
to other resources and/or settled into the situation they are 
living in.
    Mr. Emmer. They would agree that we should be questioning 
no-strings-attached money?
    Ms. Lagrone. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Emmer. Thank you.
    Mr. Begg, in June of this year, the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development's Office of the Inspector General 
released an article entitled, ``Harris County Community 
Services Department, Houston, Texas, was inefficient and 
ineffective in operating its Hurricane Harvey program'', and 
found that in the 3 years after Hurricane Harvey, Harris County 
had assisted only 112 of 4,513 land program participants and 
had spent less than 1 percent of its disaster funds.
    What is the process to get money into the hands of disaster 
victims, and can you explain the relationship between HUD, the 
grantee, and, in this case, Texas GLO from the subgrantees?
    Mr. Begg. Thank you, Congressman, for the question. The 
process--
    Mr. Emmer. Actually, Mr. Begg, I am terribly sorry. It 
looks like my time has run out. If you don't mind, can you 
submit that to us in writing?
    And, Mr. Chairman, my time has expired.
    Mr. Begg. Absolutely.
    Chairman Green. Thank you, Mr. Ranking Member. Your time 
has expired.
    The Chair now recognizes Ms. Adams of North Carolina for 5 
minutes.
    Ms. Adams. Thank you, Chairman Green, Ranking Member Emmer, 
and Chairwoman Waters, for holding the hearing today.
    And to our witnesses, thank you as well for your testimony.
    After Hurricane Matthew devastated eastern North Carolina 
in 2016, CDBG's disaster relief account provided over $200 
million, which has helped tens of thousands of North 
Carolinians here in my State to get their lives back on track.
    Now, I know I was proud to vote for that critical funding 
in H.R. 5235 along with you, Chair Green, but I think it is 
important to point out that in my home State, these critical 
CDBG-DR dollars were put to use to help solve the affordable 
housing crisis that was exacerbated by national disasters like 
Hurricane Matthew.
    And according to the North Carolina Office of Resiliency, 
76 percent of CDBG-DR funds allocated to my State were used to 
repair homes. And that statistic shows us just why it is 
necessary that we make sure that these funds are being used as 
Congress intends and not held hostage.
    So, Ms. Saadian, what are the disadvantages to States, 
localities, and victims of disaster of Congress' failure to 
codify the rules for CDBG-DR, and what do you recommend with 
respect to codification?
    Ms. Saadian. The lack of authorization means that 
communities have less advance knowledge of what they will be 
held to or how program dollars can be used, which means that 
they can't prepare in advance of disasters. It also means that 
money will reach them and households in need much more slowly. 
It is really important that Congress pass the Reforming 
Disaster Recovery Act to help those dollars reach communities 
more quickly.
    But there are other really important tools and safeguards 
that are in the bill that will also help communities and 
survivors. The bill requires that dollars are targeted to those 
who are most in need and that we are equitably allocating 
resources between homeowners, renters, and people experiencing 
homelessness, and that we are rebuilding to a higher resiliency 
level.
    There are additional things that aren't in the bill that I 
think would also go a long way towards helping communities. One 
I think that is really important is that we are using these 
housing dollars in a more transformational way by building 
housing that is more deeply affordable to those who have the 
greatest needs.
    So, for example, the underlying cause of the housing crisis 
is the shortage of housing for people who are extremely low 
income. And if we focus our resources on building those units 
and increasing the supply, we can both recover more quickly and 
more equitably, but also help tackle the housing crisis at the 
same time.
    Ms. Adams. Okay. Thank you. How can the program be improved 
to better include the voices and on-the-ground knowledge of 
communities impacted by disasters?
    Ms. Saadian. That is a great question. What we see over and 
over again is that State and local government officials are 
under enormous pressure to get dollars out as quickly as 
possible, and so that means that they often make the public 
input process very short and ineffective.
    What needs to happen is that communities are engaging with 
those who are most impacted before disaster hits and throughout 
the process, so there can be mid-course corrections and 
improvements to programs if they are not working and if they 
are not reaching households.
    We also need to see this when it comes to decisions about 
how to rebuild and whether to mitigate or whether households 
need to reallocate. And because there is not formal 
authorization of the program, we see wildly different outcomes 
in different communities.
    For example, in New Jersey, after Superstorm Sandy, 
households weren't able to receive recovery dollars if they 
wanted to relocate to safer areas. But in Puerto Rico, 
households were told that they have to relocate and couldn't 
use dollars to mitigate or to build more resiliently.
    It is really important that those decisions are made 
equitably and that the people in those communities are driving 
the decisions about whether and how to rebuild.
    Ms. Adams. Thank you. Some of your comments indicated that 
we need to be a little more proactive. But thank you very much.
    Mr. Chairman, I am going to yield back.
    Chairman Green. The gentlelady yields back.
    Mr. Loudermilk of Georgia is now recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Loudermilk. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate 
everyone on the panel today and this hearing.
    First, I would like to emphasize the need for a permanent 
statutory structure for the CDBG-DR Program. The lack of a 
permanent law governing the program means that any time 
Congress activates the program following a disaster, the 
structure of the program must be established on an ad hoc 
basis, and HUD must engage in a rulemaking process every time 
new funds are appropriated. Of course, this leads to major 
inefficiencies and delays with distributing funds.
    For my first question, Mr. Begg, do you agree with this 
assessment, and can you explain the problems that are caused by 
the lack of structure for this program?
    Mr. Begg. Thank you for the question, Congressman. I do 
agree with your assessment and our office has, historically. 
The problems that we generally see, I touched on in my opening 
statement, but first and foremost is timeliness. There are 
stages of the process that cannot be completed while HUD is in 
the process of making requirements through Federal Register 
notices. There are aspects of grantee and subgrantee planning 
that cannot take place with certainty while that happens. And, 
ultimately, these initial lags in planning and development of 
programs cause future downstream delays that could be taken 
care of in large part by standardizing the requirements that 
don't change across disasters and grants.
    Mr. Loudermilk. Okay. I appreciate that. And something else 
I appreciate is that Mr. Green and Mrs. Wagner have been 
working, on a bipartisan basis, over the past several years 
toward providing a permanent statutory framework for the 
program. And I hope that we will be able to get this bill 
signed into law in this Congress.
    Mr. Begg, I know you are aware of many examples of wasted 
CDBG-DR funds, the disaster relief funds, that were supposed to 
go to housing improvements but have gone to museums, flood 
walls, ports, State slush funds, and other area that are not 
intended for the purpose of the funds. So besides establishing 
a permanent statutory structure for the program, what should 
Congress and HUD be doing to eliminate waste or 
misappropriation in this program and ensure that funds are used 
for their intended purpose?
    Mr. Begg. Thank you again for that question. One area that 
we see as a potential to eliminate waste, fraud, and abuse is 
increased access to grantee data and standardization of the 
data and the reporting the grantees and subgrantees are 
required to provide to HUD. That would assist us and the 
Department in proactively analyzing and assessing risk early on 
so that we can prevent it rather than chase it.
    Mr. Loudermilk. So something besides just misuse of funds, 
we need to eliminate the waste in general, but it also needs to 
be balanced with the need to distribute the funds promptly. 
What other changes can be made to make sure that the funds 
don't take 3 and 4 years to distribute?
    Mr. Begg. Something that you just mentioned, Chairman 
Green's proposed draft of legislation includes deadlines and 
timelines that are built in to the statute that would require 
out of the gate certain deadlines be met in each phase. 
Creating expectations along those lines would be consistent 
with promoting more swift distribution of the funds.
    Mr. Loudermilk. Thank you, Mr. Begg.
    Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the time. And even though this 
is unusual for me, I will yield back the balance of my time.
    Chairman Green. Thank you. The Chair will remember this in 
the future.
    The Chair now recognizes Ms. Tlaib, the gentlelady from 
Michigan.
    Ms. Tlaib. Thank you so much, Chairman Green, for convening 
this important hearing.
    As many of you know, we just had some record rainfall in 
Michigan, where thousands of our families were underwater, 
their homes, some of our city halls, and even some of our 
hospitals. And the President just approved our emergency 
request for assistance. So this is [inaudible] Timely.
    One of the most immediate and devastating impacts of 
disasters is on housing affordability for our low-income 
neighbors in markets across the country already squeezed by the 
lack of housing supply. And disasters often cause dramatic 
spikes in rental prices leading, of course, to displacement, 
evictions, and homelessness.
    Sarah, I was really struck by the portion of your testimony 
where you outline the effects of disasters on the housing 
stock, based on ZIP Codes. And the Houston area, for instance, 
saw rent increases of 15 percent after Hurricane Harvey. Large 
portions of [inaudible] Housing stock were wiped out by one of 
the wildfires that happened in 2018. And so, one of the things 
I was hoping is that you can describe or talk about how long 
did the rental markets in these communities take to really 
truly recovery to pre-disaster levels, if ever? And were low-
income residents permanently displaced as a result of the 
delayed and inefficient CDBG-DR distribution?
    Ms. Saadian. That is a great question, and there are a lot 
of elements to that. But what we have seen is that, for too 
long, affordable housing has been cited in areas that are at a 
higher risk for disaster. The National Low Income Housing 
Coalition has just put out a report taking stockc, which found 
that a third of federally-assisted households are at higher 
risk of natural disasters than those in the private market, and 
they are also surrounded by inadequate infrastructure, which 
exacerbates disasters when they happen so that rental units are 
lost and oftentimes never rebuilt. And so, the housing crisis 
that existed before a storm is made worse for those households.
    It is really important that we rebuild those units. One of 
the pieces of the bill would require a one-for-one replacement 
of federally-assisted housing that is damaged or destroyed from 
a storm. But there are other things that we can be doing to 
make sure that we are rebuilding in a way that doesn't worsen 
the housing crisis.
    One proposal that is not included in the bill that we would 
love to see is forward funding of CDBG-DR dollars, so that we 
don't have to wait years for Congress to pass those resources 
in a disaster supplemental. You may have seen that it took 8 
months after Hurricane Michael for Congress to pass these 
resources. It has already been a year since the 2020 disasters 
and Congress hasn't provided those funds either. If we were 
able to forward-fund those resources, we could more immediately 
rebuild after a disaster to make sure that housing units aren't 
made worse by the housing crisis and by the disaster.
    Ms. Tlaib. No. Thank you very much, because I was going to 
talk to you about urgency. Because what I saw happen a few 
weeks ago in my community, I could tell they needed--I mean, 
this is their home. This is where they live. This is where all 
of their belongings are. So, I am glad you answered my second 
question [inaudible] Some of the particular things that we 
could be doing to truly make sure that we rehab and replace 
these homes.
    You all know that due to climate change, disasters are 
intensifying and really leaving more damage in their wake than 
ever before. And I am curious to hear your ideas on how we 
[inaudible] Similar to I know what Sarah had talked about. For 
example, in my community, we are seeing that flood maps are 
increasingly inaccurate and out of date, and certainly don't 
take into account climate risk right now. In fact, we just got 
a rainfall that I described that was worse than an 1,000-year 
rainfall. Our water system didn't even have any projection for 
an event like this. And this isn't just in my district. This is 
happening [inaudible] Have scorched the West side of our 
country and so much more.
    And when 100-year floods and wildfires have become annual 
occurrences, I think we need to be adapting to how we invest in 
our recovery fund. So to all of the witnesses, are there ways 
we can reform CDBG-DR programs to promote resiliency in 
affected communities and avoid costly disasters in the future, 
particularly in areas that may be more susceptible to disasters 
today than they were 10 to 20 years ago?
    Sarah, I know you answered. If there are any other 
witnesses, how about Heather, can you talk about this, and Lina 
and Carol?
    Ms. Lagrone. Thank you so much for that question. That is a 
really great point. Any time you delay getting the recovery 
dollars out to communities, your housing stock continues to 
deteriorate. So what could have been a rehab for $50,000 
becomes a full reconstruction for $200,000. Very quickly, you 
are spending more money per house and, ultimately, we never get 
enough funding in any of these allocations and are not able to 
complete as many houses as a result. So, timeliness is by far 
the most important piece of this.
    Secondarily, and we have seen it here in Texas since 2005 
with our Hurricane Rita funding, when you build houses back in 
a more resilient fashion, when they are elevated and they are 
built to windstorm standards, then you absolutely see dividends 
on that investment, because those houses withstand the next 
event so much better.
    Chairman Green. The gentlelady's time has expired. Any 
additional witnesses will respond by giving us a written 
statement for the record.
    And the Chair will remind Members that if you wait until 
the end of your time to have your question answered, you are 
not likely to get a complete answer. The Chair is going to be 
generous, but I would beg that you not wait until the end of 
your time.
    The Chair will now move to--
    Ms. Tlaib. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. It is so hard 
when I don't see the clock, but I appreciate that--
    Chairman Green. Oh, well, I apologize for the clock not 
being in view. We will have to do something about that.
    Ms. Tlaib. Oh, it is because I am doing something in my 
district, so it is hard when you are on your phone. But I 
sincerely appreciate your consideration.
    Chairman Green. Thank you. The Chair has enjoyed the 
colloquy with the gentlelady.
    Mr. Kustoff of Tennessee is now recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Kustoff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to the 
witnesses for appearing in today's hearing.
    Mr. Begg, I would like to follow up along Mr. Loudermilk's 
line of questioning about the deficiencies in the supplemental 
appropriations and what difficulty that causes you and your 
staff. My question is essentially with the way the 
appropriations are handled supplementally, does the lack of a 
permanent staff contribute to problems within the program in 
inefficiencies?
    Mr. Begg. Thank you for the question. If I could ask a 
clarifying question, the lack of permanent staff, was that the 
question?
    Mr. Kustoff. Yes, sir. Let me ask you, is there in fact a 
lack of permanent staff? And if the answer is yes, does that 
contribute to inefficiencies?
    Mr. Begg. Thank you for the clarification.
    With respect to HUD staff, there are permanent staff within 
the Office of Community Planning and Development who oversee 
the administration of block grant assistance, and then 
specifically, Disaster Recovery and Special Issues is the name 
of the division. But we have noted in our top management 
challenges reporting over the years that that office needs 
additional staff to oversee the growing number of dollars and 
grantees and complexity with which the program has been 
infused.
    At the grantee levels, we have noticed in our reviews of 
capacity that there are staffing issues that would hit on your 
question in the sense that many grantees have to wait to hire 
staff until they have new grant dollars, and so there is 
frequently turnover. They are at risk of not being able to 
staff to plan until the money is in their hands.
    Mr. Kustoff. And correct me if I am wrong, the problem that 
you just identified is related to the fact that the program is 
administered with individual supplemental appropriations?
    Mr. Begg. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Kustoff. Okay. Again, if I could, to follow up further 
on Mr. Loudermilk's questioning to you, could you talk to me 
about HUD's relationship and authority to reject a subgrantee's 
CDBG-DR action plan when there is a concern about their ability 
to provide benefits to the area that is impacted by a disaster 
event?
    Mr. Begg. Sure. HUD generally provides primary grantees 
with significant discretion to operate their programs and will 
generally--what we have seen in our work is that they will 
generally approve action plan amendments, as long as they are 
consistent with Federal law, statute, and then, of course, the 
notice requirements that are administered through the Federal 
Register. That is the general framework that is available. 
Certainly, HUD's Office of Community Planning and Development 
has the--the policymakers are in the best position to describe 
how they would treat subgrantee plans and changes to 
amendments.
    Mr. Kustoff. Thank you, Mr. Begg. And earlier in your 
testimony, again with Mr. Loudermilk, you talked about waste 
and fraud and abuse in your questioning and the answers. I will 
ask you generally your opinion, what reforms can be made to 
this program to prevent further and future waste, fraud, and 
abuse?
    Mr. Begg. Thank you for that question. And in addition to 
what I mentioned previously with respect to enhanced access to 
data, certainly codification of certain requirements around 
duplication of benefits would assist in preventing waste, 
fraud, and abuse. Additionally, standardization of requirements 
could help reduce the number of programs that grantees create 
from scratch, which would help reduce some of the uncertainty 
in developing programs that will ultimately drive outcomes for 
the individuals on the ground level. And we could see a 
reduction in waste in that regard.
    Mr. Kustoff. Thank you, Mr. Begg. I appreciate it.
    Judge Hidalgo, in your testimony, you talked about the 
program essentially being mired in red tape, complexity, and 
uncertainty. If I could--and my time is expiring--could I ask 
you to submit in writing examples of the problems that the red 
tape has caused and your suggestions on a way to correct it? 
    Ms. Hidalgo. Absolutely, we will get that to you. Thank 
you.
    Mr. Kustoff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    Chairman Green. Thank you. The gentleman's time has 
expired. And the Chair appreciates the gentleman's adherence to 
the protocols.
    The Chair will now recognize the gentlelady from Texas, Ms. 
Garcia for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Garcia of Texas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you 
for this very important hearing. It is something that is really 
a critical issue, not only in my district, but in the Houston 
region, and in fact across the country, because we are not the 
only ones who face a disaster and are in need of these funds. 
So, anything that we might be able to do to reform and improve 
this program and address some of the issues, like in the bill 
that you are proposing, would be a big help to all Americans.
    The issue is serious. We have faced unimaginable challenges 
in the wake of Hurricane Harvey. Despite what the General Land 
Office has claimed, we have not asked for any special treatment 
or any special favors. All we are asking for is fairness and 
equity.
    Natural disasters of historic proportions do warrant more 
attention in vulnerable areas. That is the sole purpose of the 
disaster mitigation grant. This was put into place to prepare 
vulnerable coastal areas for disasters such as these. Out of 
300,000 structures that flooded, over half of them were in 
Harris County. And according to FEMA, the Houston area 
experienced the largest amount of rainwater ever recorded in 
the continental United States from a single storm.
    Despite the brutal realties of the disaster, the General 
Land Office has chosen to disregard the very real need for 
disaster mitigation that is sitting right in front of them, 
instead hiding behind an obscure rigged formula as its primary 
reason for denying the Houston area and Harris County much-
needed assistance.
    We have been given insubstantial explanations for why the 
General Land Office has allocated their funds this way. And 
despite HUD's willingness to work with the State, they have 
pushed back on amending their proposal, instead blaming HUD and 
bureaucracy for the situation.
    Thank you for helping get to the bottom of this. Our 
citizens' lives depend on it.
    Judge Hidalgo, back in January of 2020, did local officials 
like yourself or the Mayor of Houston alert GLO to the adverse 
disparate impacts that the proposed formula would have on urban 
and LMI areas with denser population levels, such as Houston 
and Harris County?
    Ms. Hidalgo. Yes, Congresswoman. I know the Mayor and 
officials with the City did, at least.
    Ms. Garcia of Texas. But did you [inaudible]. And what was 
their response?
    Ms. Hidalgo. The outcome was that the formula remained what 
it was, and ultimately, it disadvantaged large urban areas such 
as ours. For example, there was one criterion where you had to 
divide the impact by the number of residents. Seeing as we have 
5 million residents, it disadvantaged our scoring in the 
criteria. That is--
    Ms. Garcia of Texas. It was almost as if it was purposely 
done to exclude large urban areas.
    Ms. Hidalgo. That was my sense, our sense, that it was 
disadvantaging urban areas. And that is why I am asking, 
alongside Mayor Turner, for a review of that initial formula. 
That said, I also am asking for certainty in the $750 million, 
because for my constituents, it is irrelevant to them when or 
how the funds come. We just know we need around a billion 
dollars in funding for flood control in Harris County and the 
City of Houston each. So, we really need that $750 million.
    Ms. Garcia of Texas. Okay. So, let's ask Ms. Lagrone. Who 
participated or who devised the formula?
    Ms. Lagrone. Thank you for that. The General Land Office is 
the State of Texas designee for the disaster recovery.
    Ms. Garcia of Texas. We know all that. I am asking a 
specific question: Who devised the formula in the General Land 
Office?
    Ms. Lagrone. It was done here at the General Land Office--
    Ms. Garcia of Texas. No, ma'am. You have been very clear 
that the commissioner did not score it. But did the 
commissioner participate in any way in devising the formula?
    Ms. Lagrone. Oh, my apologies. No. It was created by our 
community development and revitalization area and my team.
    Ms. Garcia of Texas. So, did the commissioner participate, 
review it, staple it, mutilate it, score it? Did he participate 
in any way in the development of the formula?
    Ms. Lagrone. He did not.
    Ms. Garcia of Texas. He did not.
    Okay. So, it is abundantly clear that the grant program is 
not based on past disasters. And I reviewed the GLO's 
application guide; however, I still have some clarification 
that is needed.
    You designated 50 percent of your MIT funding to the 
State's most impacted or distressed counties. None of these 
counties overlapped with HUD's designated most impacted or 
distressed counties. Furthermore, most of these State-
designated counties are farther inland, nowhere near where some 
of the damage occurred, away from the most vulnerable places 
hit by Hurricane Harvey.
    How did you determine which counties, separate from HUD's 
designated impacted counties, would get their own pool of 
money?
    Chairman Green. The gentlelady's time has expired. The 
witness will respond in writing for the record.
    Ms. Garcia of Texas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look 
forward to the response.
    Chairman Green. Thank you.
    The Chair now recognizes Mr. Timmons of South Carolina for 
5 minutes.
    Mr. Timmons. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Ms. Lagrone, your office has dealt with a great deal of 
public pressure and even allegations of discrimination 
throughout the process of distributing Hurricane Harvey relief 
funds. And that dynamic really escalated after Harris County 
and Houston were not awarded money in the first round of 
funding for Hurricane Harvey relief. Is that accurate? Is that 
an accurate assessment?
    Ms. Lagrone. Yes, sir, that is accurate.
    Mr. Timmons. Can you help us understand the formula used to 
award funds, and did HUD approve that formula?
    Ms. Lagrone. Yes, sir. We went through the Federal Register 
and found all of the priorities and/or requirements on the 
funding that HUD wrote into the regulations, for mitigation in 
particular. We created a 100-point score, with low- and 
moderate-income areas being prioritized first and foremost. 
Then, we looked at social vulnerabilities of the populations 
being served. We looked at a community disaster index that 
considered the likelihood of that county being hit again by a 
flood and/or a hurricane.
    We looked at if they had done local planning. We looked at 
their past capacity to administer programs with us or with the 
Federal Government as a whole. And then, we looked to see if 
they have done any mitigation related to the need that they 
were identifying in their application.
    There was an aspect of the program that considered the 
cost-benefit analysis, if you will, or a percentage of the 
population being served or a percentage in dollars being 
served.
    Mr. Timmons. Sure. Do you think future formulas should 
maybe take into account population density and just the public 
perception that it is inappropriate to not give any resources 
to some of the larger areas? Is that reasonable?
    Ms. Lagrone. What we did is we looked at a total population 
being served as an aspect of the scoring criteria. And one 
would think that when you have a higher population to serve, 
that number, that denominator, if you will, would be a bigger 
number. So we thought that by putting together a formula that 
allocated funds based on populations served, we were accounting 
for the larger population areas.
    Mr. Timmons. Okay. And it is my understanding that they can 
expect $750 million in the coming weeks and months. Is that 
correct?
    Ms. Lagrone. That is correct. We set aside $750 million for 
use in Harris County.
    Mr. Timmons. Great. Thank you.
    Mr. Begg, I want to remark first that you would likely get 
a 10 out of 10 from Room Raters for your office background. I 
am a bit jealous with my Zoom fake background. So, I just 
wanted to begin with that.
    Mr. Begg. Thank you.
    Mr. Timmons. Second, I want to give you an opportunity to 
answer the question Ranking Member Emmer posed before he ran 
out of time. HUD's Office of Inspector General's audit showed 
that less than 1 percent of Harris County's grant funding was 
spent in the past 3 years. So can you tell us what the process 
is to get money into the hands of disaster victims? And can you 
explain the relationship between HUD, the grantee, and the 
subgrantees?
    Mr. Begg. Thank you for the question. Absolutely. As I 
mentioned, after Congress appropriates funding for a disaster, 
HUD goes through a process of determining the allocation that 
will go to the grantees. And grantees then in turn will work to 
determine the method by which they will distribute that funding 
to the affected areas, those most impacted and distressed. And 
they will work with subgrantees on occasion, when they deem it 
appropriate to utilize their offices to distribute the money 
locally.
    In this instance, the Texas General Land Office is the 
primary grantee. Harris County and the City of Houston have 
been designated as subgrantees for their unmet needs funding. 
Our office has done work related to both of those grants and 
subgrantee's administration of them. We published a report 
related to Harris County's performance, and we are in the 
process of concluding our work on the City of Houston. And we 
will be able to share that work with this committee and the 
public in the near future.
    Mr. Timmons. Thank you. I think maybe the shorter answer is 
that the government bureaucracy takes time. And the faster we 
can get the money to the people who are adversely impacted, the 
better.
    I have a follow-up question. I am running out of time. But 
I was doing some research, and it seems like a lot of these 
projects go to places other than low- and moderate-income 
families who have been impacted by disasters. And I am going to 
send you an additional question, and I would appreciate an 
answer in writing. And I just appreciate you all taking the 
time to be here.
    And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you.
    Chairman Green. The gentleman yields back.
    The Chair now recognizes the gentlewoman from Georgia, the 
Vice Chair of the subcommittee, Ms. Williams, for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Williams of Georgia. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Ms. Lagrone, I want to follow up on a discussion that you 
had earlier. In your written testimony, on page 2, you quote 
the August 2019 Federal Register notice which said, ``CDBG-MIT 
funds do not require a tieback to the specific qualified 
disaster that has served as the basis for the grantees' 
allocation of CDBG-MIT funds.''
    Am I correct in reading this to mean that while a tieback 
to a particular disaster, such as Hurricane Harvey, was not 
required under the rule cited, neither was the tieback 
prohibited by the rule?
    Ms. Lagrone. That is correct. A tieback was not prohibited; 
however, it was not required. And HUD told us that damage from 
a previous event was not something we should consider with the 
allocation of the methodology that we put together.
    Ms. Williams of Georgia. The tieback was not prohibited by 
the rule. Therefore, would you agree that under the HUD rule 
cited, GLO could have tied back the CDBG-MIT funded projects to 
Hurricane Harvey?
    Ms. Lagrone. No. Based on our technical assistance and our 
conversations with HUD, they clarified that statement for us, 
that we could not consider previous damage in our methodology 
for distribution of the $4 billion.
    Ms. Williams of Georgia. So, GLO chose not to do so?
    Ms. Lagrone. Based on the guidance that we received from 
HUD.
    Ms. Williams of Georgia. So, GLO thought it was appropriate 
to unlink mitigation dollars from Harvey, given this discretion 
to deploy mitigation funds in relation to Harvey?
    Ms. Lagrone. No, ma'am. We followed HUD's guidance, that 
disaster unmet needs not be a part of our criteria for the 
distribution of the mitigation funds.
    Ms. Williams of Georgia. Okay. Ms. Lagrone, your written 
testimony continues at page 2, and based on this definition and 
clarifying statement, the GLO was not able to use damage 
assessments from previous storms when developing the 
competition scoring criteria. Is that an accurate statement?
    Ms. Lagrone. That is correct. We were not allowed to use 
disaster need that remained in the 49 eligible counties, 140 
eligible counties for the distribution of these funds.
    Ms. Williams of Georgia. But, Ms. Lagrone, what we have 
reviewed, you would have to agree that it is not correct, it is 
false to maintain that under the rule that you cite, GLO was 
not able to tie back CDBG-MIT funding to Harvey when you have 
already stated in your previous testimony, in your written 
testimony, that there was no prohibited tieback to the rule, by 
the rule?
    Ms. Lagrone. In a different portion of the Federal 
Register, we were told that the mitigation disaster funds were 
to reduce future losses. In another portion, we were told that 
the CDBG-Mitigation funds were used for a distinctly different 
purpose than the disaster recovery funds.
    In looking at both of those examples, those seemed to 
clarify and support what HUD had told us about not using 
disaster recovery needs or damage from a previous event for our 
allocation methodology.
    Ms. Williams of Georgia. Well, Ms. Lagrone, I am confused 
about the statement in your testimony. And I am curious as to 
who put it in your testimony, because what the rule actually 
says is that a tieback was not required, not that a tieback was 
prohibited. Correct?
    Ms. Lagrone. In that particular statement, yes. That is one 
piece of a 34-page Federal Register document.
    Ms. Williams of Georgia. Ms. Lagrone, I just want to make 
sure that the committee is clear on what the true reason is 
that GLO was not able to use Harvey damage assessments in the 
scoring criteria, since it clearly wasn't due to the HUD rule 
cited in your testimony.
    Ms. Lagrone. So, the one rule that you are pointing to is 
not the full discussion in the Register. The other items that I 
pointed out to you, training and technical assistance from HUD, 
did tell us that we could not use damage assessments towards 
that.
    In comments that we received from the City of Houston, 
specifically--I'm sorry, from Harris County, said that they 
received 44 percent of the damage from Hurricane Harvey and 
were only eligible to receive 8 percent of the funds. In our 
action plan that HUD approved, we responded, ``The allocation 
of the CDBG-MIT funds is based on future risk, not previous 
damage per the HUD Federal Register notice.''
    That was our response when Harris County raised the issue 
and had approved that response.
    Ms. Williams of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, I am out of time. 
And I do have some questions that I would like to submit to Ms. 
Saadian around equitable recovery. And I will submit those for 
the record and request a written response.
    Chairman Green. Without objection, they are submitted in 
the record.
    Ms. Williams of Georgia. Thank you.
    Chairman Green. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Mooney of West 
Virginia for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Mooney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Some of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle, as 
you just heard, have claimed that the Texas General Land Office 
(GLO) purposely wrote rules and used the word, ``criteria,'' 
that made it harder, if not impossible, for the large urban 
areas to receive any funding.
    So, Ms. Lagrone, can you answer that question directly. Did 
the GLO purposely write rules that make it harder for large 
urban areas to receive funds?
    Ms. Lagrone. No, sir, we did not.
    Mr. Mooney. Thank you.
    And also, Ms. Lagrone, can you explain how your office 
prioritizes low- and moderate-income (LMI) families in the 
criteria for Community Development Block Grant Disaster Relief 
competitions?
    Ms. Lagrone. I thank you for that. LMI is the highest-
prioritized criteria in our criteria of 100 points. It is 20 
percent of the score. If you are not doing an LMI project, you 
didn't score enough to be awarded.
    Mr. Mooney. Okay. A follow-up to that, Ms. Lagrone, was 
that, ``level of impact,'' was one of the reasons why Houston 
and Harris County did not score high enough to receive funding. 
As a follow-up to that, did they not prioritize the most-
vulnerable populations?
    Ms. Lagrone. Yes, sir. Both Harris County and Houston did 
lose points in those criteria because the populations that they 
served were not as large as they could have been.
    Mr. Mooney. Okay. Thank you.
    I think it is fair to say that in this case, neither 
Houston nor Harris County was singled out on purpose, but 
rather because they did not follow the competition rubric for 
subgrantees to receive funding. The truth is that there are 
plenty of ways to improve the Community Development Block Grant 
Disaster Relief Program. Chief among them is cutting down on 
waste, fraud, and abuse. Those issues should be the focus of 
this hearing. I just wanted to make those comments, and I thank 
you for testifying.
    And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
    Chairman Green. The gentleman yields back.
    The Chair now desires to engage in a colloquy with Mr. 
Emmer or the person who is designated currently as the person 
to take on my questions.
    Mr. Emmer, are you there, or is there someone else in your 
chair?
    Mr. Timmons. William Timmons is here, from South Carolina, 
to sit in for Mr. Emmer.
    Chairman Green. Thank you very much.
    The Chair would ask now, do you have any additional Members 
who will be asking questions?
    Mr. Timmons. No, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Green. Okay. With that said, the Chair will now 
proceed to grant himself 5 minutes to ask questions.
    Let me start with a statement to you, Ms. Lagrone. I did 
award you extra time. And this was done because, quite frankly, 
I don't blame you for what is happening. I know you have a 
tough job. And I want to make sure that we not only treat you 
fairly, but we give the appearance of treating you fairly. So, 
I thank you for the answers that you have given. And I thank 
the Members for indulging me in allowing me to accord you the 
extra time.
    It has been intimated that a lawsuit by the City of 
Houston, and an inaction by the City of Houston as well, is the 
reason that Houston has been left behind.
    However, I would like to call to the subcommittee's 
attention an article from the Houston Chronicle that, without 
objection, I will submit for the record. It is styled, ``Bush 
says he will ask HUD to send $750 million in flood aid to 
Harris County following backlash.'' The backlash, of course, 
being when bipartisan personalities who associated with 
politics, who hold public trust, opposed what was being done 
when GLO was awarding Houston, as well as Harris County, zero 
dollars. And in no universe should Harris County and Houston 
get zero dollars.
    But in this article, it is indicated--and I will read what 
it says--``in a statement, Bush blamed the situation on Federal 
red tape requirements and complex regulations that he described 
as the hallmark of the Biden Administration.'' Well, the truth 
is that the Biden Administration did not work with GLO 
initially when the action plan was developed, because the Biden 
Administration was not in place at that time.
    So, Ms. Lagrone, would you just kindly answer that one 
question. Isn't it true that the Biden Administration was not 
in place when you initially worked on your action plan?
    Ms. Lagrone. That is correct.
    Chairman Green. Continuing, the Biden Administration did 
have an opportunity to work with you, but I would like to 
mention another article from the Houston Chronicle, dated June 
1, 2021, styled, ``Bush blamed Federal rules for Harris County 
lack of flood aid.'' Our analysis shows that is false. This is 
from the Houston Chronicle.
    And the part of the Chronicle that addresses this that I 
would like to call to your attention reads, ``A Houston 
Chronicle analysis of the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development flood mitigation program revealed a different 
reality''--a different reality from Bush blaming Federal rules, 
is what they are talking about.
    ``Not only does the Federal Government grant States 
significant discretion to decide how to spend their funds, but 
the criteria Bush's General Land Office developed discriminated 
against populous areas, meaning large areas like Houston, 
Texas.''
    Now, this is the Houston Chronicle alleging discrimination. 
And there is additional information, empirical evidence that 
they contend supports the notion that there was some 
discrimination taking place such that areas that were less 
populated were going to receive dollars more so than the areas 
that were more populated.
    Isn't it true, ma'am, that you adhere to a formula when you 
distribute these dollars? You have to adhere to a formula, that 
is a part of your action plan. Isn't this true?
    Ms. Lagrone. Yes, sir. The criteria is in the action plan.
    Chairman Green. Yes, ma'am. And isn't it true that the 
action plan was developed sometime prior to your actually 
announcing the results, wherein you indicated that Houston, as 
well as Harris County, would get zero dollars? Isn't it true 
that the plan was developed before that announcement?
    Ms. Lagrone. That is correct. The action plan was submitted 
to HUD in February of 2020, and we announced awards for the 
mitigation beginning in March of 2021.
    Chairman Green. So if you were adhering to your action 
plan, you could not deny Houston and Harris County, but more 
specifically Houston, funds by virtue of inaction on Houston's 
part related to construction of homes or inaction by virtue of 
them filing a lawsuit, as opposed to doing something else.
    It would be true that you were adhering to an action plan 
that had a formula that didn't include lawsuits, a formula that 
did not include Houston possibly doing something that you found 
offensive. Isn't it true that it was the action plan that you 
were working with?
    Ms. Lagrone. Yes. So the criteria--
    Chairman Green. Excuse me, I am going to do this. I did 
give you a large amount of time initially. I have to close, and 
I have 11 seconds.
    It has become somewhat intuitively obvious that we have a 
circumstance wherein we have to take corrective action. I am 
proud to work with Mrs. Wagner, and hopefully we will come up 
with something that our Members will be able to support.
    I would like to yield back the balance of my time, as my 
time has expired.
    Now, dear friends, let me move to bring our hearing to an 
end. And to do this, the staff has given me an ending that I 
shall have to call to your attention.
    Mr. Timmons. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Green. Yes, the Chair recognizes the gentleman for 
a question.
    Mr. Timmons. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I would make a motion for 
unanimous consent to give you an extra 5 minutes, if you would 
like.
    Chairman Green. The Chair appreciates the generosity. The 
Chair will simply, at this time, move to bring the hearing to 
an end, and will give you kudos for being so kind.
    Allow me now to thank the witnesses for their testimony, 
and for devoting the time and resources to share their 
expertise with this subcommittee. Your testimony today will 
help to advance the important work of this subcommittee and of 
the U.S. Congress.
    The Chair notes that some Members may have additional 
questions for these witnesses, which they may wish to submit in 
writing. Without objection, the hearing record will remain open 
for 5 legislative days for Members to submit written questions 
to these witnesses and to place their responses in the record. 
Also, without objection, Members will have 5 legislative days 
to submit extraneous materials to the Chair for inclusion in 
the record.
    Friends, thank you for your participation. This hearing is 
now adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 1:43 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

                            A P P E N D I X

                             July 15, 2021
                             
                                [all]