[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                     

                          [H.A.S.C. No. 117-5]
 
                      NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES

                      AND U.S. MILITARY ACTIVITIES

                          IN THE INDO-PACIFIC

                               __________

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                              HEARING HELD

                             MARCH 10, 2021


                                     
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]





                            ______

             U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 
45-064              WASHINGTON : 2021 




                                     
                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                    One Hundred Seventeenth Congress

                    ADAM SMITH, Washington, Chairman

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island      MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
RICK LARSEN, Washington              JOE WILSON, South Carolina
JIM COOPER, Tennessee                MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut            DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
JOHN GARAMENDI, California           ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia
JACKIE SPEIER, California            VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri
DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey          AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona               MO BROOKS, Alabama
SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts          SAM GRAVES, Missouri
SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California        ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland,          SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
RO KHANNA, California                TRENT KELLY, Mississippi
WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts    MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
FILEMON VELA, Texas                  MATT GAETZ, Florida
ANDY KIM, New Jersey                 DON BACON, Nebraska
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania       JIM BANKS, Indiana
JASON CROW, Colorado                 LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan             JACK BERGMAN, Michigan
MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey           MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
VERONICA ESCOBAR, Texas              MIKE JOHNSON, Louisiana
JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine               MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee
ELAINE G. LURIA, Virginia, Vice      STEPHANIE I. BICE, Oklahoma
    Chair                            C. SCOTT FRANKLIN, Florida
JOSEPH D. MORELLE, New York          LISA C. McCLAIN, Michigan
SARA JACOBS, California              RONNY JACKSON, Texas
KAIALI'I KAHELE, Hawaii              JERRY L. CARL, Alabama
MARILYN STRICKLAND, Washington       BLAKE D. MOORE, Utah
MARC A. VEASEY, Texas                PAT FALLON, Texas
JIMMY PANETTA, California
STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida
Vacancy

                     Paul Arcangeli, Staff Director
                Matt Rhoades, Professional Staff Member
                       Forrest McConnell, Counsel
                          Emma Morrison, Clerk
                          
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

              STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Ranking Member, 
  Committee on Armed Services....................................     3
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Chairman, 
  Committee on Armed Services....................................     1

                               WITNESSES

Abrams, GEN Robert B., USA, Commander, United Nations Command/
  Combined Forces Command/U.S. Forces Korea......................     8
Davidson, ADM Philip S., USN, Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific 
  Command........................................................     6
Helvey, David F., Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-
  Pacific Affairs, Department of Defense.........................     5

                                APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

    Abrams, GEN Robert B.........................................   105
    Davidson, ADM Philip S.......................................    63
    Helvey, David F..............................................    49

Documents Submitted for the Record:

    [There were no Documents submitted.]

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

    Mr. Larsen...................................................   131

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

    Mr. Banks....................................................   143
    Mr. Bergman..................................................   143
    Mr. Carl.....................................................   147
    Mr. Cooper...................................................   136
    Mr. Fallon...................................................   149
    Dr. Jackson..................................................   146
    Mr. Johnson..................................................   144
    Mr. Kelly....................................................   142
    Mrs. McClain.................................................   145
    Mr. Moore....................................................   153
    Mr. Moulton..................................................   141
    Mrs. Murphy..................................................   149
    Mr. Rogers...................................................   135
    Mr. Scott....................................................   138
    Ms. Strickland...............................................   147
    Mr. Waltz....................................................   144
    
 NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES AND U.S. MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE INDO-
                                PACIFIC

                              ----------                              

                          House of Representatives,
                               Committee on Armed Services,
                         Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 10, 2021.
    The committee met, pursuant to call, at 11:01 a.m., in room 
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Adam Smith (chairman 
of the committee) presiding.

  OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
       WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

    The Chairman. I will go ahead and call the meeting to 
order, if we could have members take their seats.
    Once again, we are doing a hybrid hearing, so I will read a 
fun-filled little statement here that explains how that hybrid 
hearing is going to work and what the rules are.
    Members who are joining remotely must be visible on screen 
for the purposes of identity verification, establishing and 
maintaining a quorum, participating in the proceeding, and 
voting.
    Those members must continue to use the software platform's 
video function while in attendance unless they experience 
connectivity issues or other technical problems that render 
them unable to participate on camera. If a member experiences 
technical difficulties, they should contact the committee staff 
for assistance.
    Video of members' participation will be broadcast in the 
room and via the television/internet feeds.
    Members participating remotely must seek recognition 
verbally, and they are asked to mute their microphones when 
they are not speaking.
    Members who are participating remotely are reminded to keep 
the software platform video function on the entire time they 
attend the proceeding.
    Members may leave and rejoin the proceeding. If members 
depart for a short while for reasons other than joining a 
different proceeding, they should leave the video function on. 
If members will be absent for a significant period or depart to 
join a different proceeding, they should exit the software 
platform entirely and then rejoin if they return.
    Members may use the software platform's chat feature to 
communicate with staff regarding technical or logistical 
support issues only.
    Finally, I have designated a committee staff member to, if 
necessary, mute unrecognized members' microphones to cancel any 
inadvertent background noise that may disrupt the proceeding.
    Thank you.
    And, again, I want to thank our staff for pulling all of 
this together. Members, you know, it has been a complicated, 
let's call it, year, but we have made it work. So I appreciate 
the cooperation in a bipartisan way on the staff to make sure 
that we can continue to do our job within the limitations that 
the pandemic has placed on us.
    And today we have our first posture hearing of 2021, our 
first hybrid posture hearing, and we are focused on the Indo-
Pacific region this morning. And we have three witnesses: Mr. 
David Helvey, who is the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for Indo-Pacific Affairs with DOD [Department of Defense]; 
Admiral Philip Davidson, United States Navy, who is the 
Commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command; and General Robert 
Abrams, who is joining us at--what is it, like, 1 o'clock in 
the morning there, General?
    General Abrams. Yes, Mr. Chairman, it is; 0103, to be 
precise.
    The Chairman. Well, you look like it is the middle of the 
afternoon, just all ready to go. So we thank you for joining us 
and for your flexibility. I understand you are engaged in 
exercises on the Korean Peninsula right now that are important 
for you to be there, so thank you for making the time.
    I do also want to note that, in all likelihood, this is the 
last time that General Abrams and Admiral Davidson will appear 
before our committee.
    And I wanted to very, very sincerely thank both of you for 
your leadership, certainly for your service to our country, the 
outstanding jobs you have done, but also for your relationship 
with this committee. Both of you have really gone out of your 
way to be accessible, to make sure that we are kept informed of 
what you are doing, to answer our questions and work with us. 
You are two great examples for this country and for the United 
States military. So I thank you very much for your service and 
look forward to our opportunity to talk with you today.
    As mentioned, we are here to do our posture hearing for the 
Indo-Pacific Command and the Indo-Pacific region. This is an 
incredibly important part of the world, as China is, without 
question, the largest national security challenge and 
competitor that we have in the world today. I think it is not 
an overstatement to say that, you know, how the next 50 years 
goes for this globe is going to be significantly impacted by 
how we manage that relationship with China, how we meet the 
challenges that they present in many areas but certainly in the 
Indo-Pacific region. And I really welcome the opportunity to 
have a conversation with our witnesses today, who are so expert 
on that subject.
    There is no doubt that the problem with China has grown in 
the last decade. They are looking to export an ideology, an 
authoritarian ideology, and they are also looking to diminish 
our influence in the world.
    There are a number of different challenges here, but, 
overwhelmingly, I just want to make it clear, I think it is 
incredibly important that the United States stay present in the 
Indo-Pacific region so that we can be there to work with our 
partners and allies to make sure that a rules-based system 
holds sway in that region and that China is not able to crush 
it and take a hegemonic approach instead.
    Central to this, in my view, are the partnerships that we 
have in the region. Now, certainly we can have influence, but 
the stronger nations like India and Japan and South Korea and 
Thailand and the Philippines and others are, the stronger our 
partnership is, the more we can continue to enforce that rule 
of law and make sure that there is a fair balance of power in 
the region. It is enormously important that we do that.
    Now, as we move forward, I also want to make sure that we 
don't stumble into a Cold War with China. And, you know, I will 
be interested to hear more from our witnesses on how to do 
this, but I want us to be strong enough to deter China. The 
idea that we can build a military large enough and strong 
enough to dominate China in the modern world is not realistic 
and is fraught with danger. So I hope we can better understand 
how to make the proper investments.
    And that is one big point. I was very pleased to work in a 
bipartisan way last session to create the Indo-Pacific Defense 
Initiative. That is incredibly important to build partnerships 
going forward. And I know that it is going to have to be 
funded, but I want to make sure that we are making wise 
investments in that. We have far more demands for DOD money 
than we have money, so we are going to have to make some tough 
choices to figure out what is the best way to spend it, what is 
the wisest way to live with that.
    As some of you might have heard, I drew an analogy to the 
NFL [National Football League] salary cap recently. You know, 
basically, you have to put together a team, you have to meet 
all these different responsibilities, but you have one cap on 
how much money you can spend. And if you spend it all on one 
area, then the other area will be too weak to accomplish your 
overall objectives. And I am trying to strike that balance.
    And, obviously, the other big challenge in the region is 
North Korea. I definitely look forward to hearing from General 
Abrams about that challenge, what he thinks our best approach 
is going forward.
    I just want to close again by emphasizing, I think the most 
important thing we can do in the region is build partnerships 
and build partner capacities. There are a lot of countries in 
that part of the world that are sympathetic to where we are 
coming from, that want to work with us. We need to take 
advantage of that, build those partnerships as strong as they 
possibly can be, and build the capacity of those partners.
    With that, I will yield to Mr. Rogers for his opening 
statement.

 STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA, 
          RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

    Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Last week, the Chinese Communist Party rolled out a new set 
of defense policies. It included a 7 percent increase in 
defense spending and a plan to become an Arctic and Antarctic 
power. The CCP [Chinese Communist Party] also reiterated their 
expectation that the world will soon be doing business on its 
terms.
    Our allies in the Indo-Pacific share America's commitment 
to freedom and democratic government. Like us, they are at risk 
of being overrun by China's push for global supremacy. 
Effective American military strength in the Indo-Pacific is 
essential to the security of our allies, global trade, and 
democracy.
    That means we need to build a modern, credible, 
conventional deterrent to ongoing Chinese territorial 
expansion, and it means that we need a modernized nuclear triad 
to deter a broader conflict. This is not about domination; it 
is about deterrence. We must make any attack on Americans or 
our allies too costly for the Chinese Communist Party to 
consider.
    Section 1251 of this year's NDAA [National Defense 
Authorization Act] required Admiral Davidson to complete an 
independent assessment of what INDOPACOM [Indo-Pacific Command] 
needs to build a meaningful deterrent in the region. He 
reported back that we need to make investments in integrated 
air and missile defenses, long-range precision fires, and 
logistical capabilities that can survive in a contested 
battlefield.
    Capabilities like the Guam Defense System using Aegis 
Ashore and TACMOR [Tactical Mobile Over the Horizon Radar] in 
Palau will provide our forces with critical information about 
coming targets. Long-range precision fires, backed by more 
robust ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] 
capabilities, will create openings for our forces to move in a 
contested environment.
    I don't think these capabilities are nice-to-haves. I 
believe they are bare minimum of what we need to protect our 
forces and deter China's territorial ambitions. This committee 
created the Pacific Defense Initiative in a bipartisan fashion 
to get honest military advice from experts like Admiral 
Davidson. We would be foolish to seek out his advice and then 
toss it aside.
    I look forward to hearing from Admiral Davidson today about 
these important priorities.
    General Abrams faces similar challenges. Allied forces 
under his command have been the backbone of deterrence on the 
Korean Peninsula for decades, but we need to continue to 
improve our capabilities in the region to maintain that 
deterrence.
    Even under extreme sanctions, North Korea continues to 
modernize its military, developing larger and more advanced 
missiles to threaten South Korea, Japan, and even the U.S. 
mainland. We cannot afford to let that go unchecked.
    I am interested to hear General Abrams' thoughts on North 
Korea's newly publicized capabilities as well as South Korea's 
ongoing defense modernization. I also want to know whether the 
new Special Measures Agreement announced this weekend will 
improve our ability to deter North Korea's aggression.
    To effectively deter the threat posed by China, North 
Korea, and other adversaries, we must fill existing readiness 
gaps while at the same time modernizing our forces. But that 
comes at a price, and it is not going to be cheap. The 
bipartisan National Defense Strategy Commission recommended 
annual growth of 3 to 5 percent above inflation in the defense 
top line. Our defense leaders and experts inside and outside 
the Pentagon have affirmed that level of investment.
    I understand that some are opposed to spending what is 
needed. They would like to see the money invested elsewhere. 
But I believe that now is not the time to cut or even freeze 
defense spending. Doing so delays the development and delivery 
of critical new capabilities our military leaders need to 
maintain deterrence, protect our allies, and defend our Nation.
    After we hear about the threats we face from our witnesses 
today and other combatant commanders that will come before us 
soon, I hope that we can agree that we must keep investing in 
defense.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Before turning it over to our witnesses, I do want to 
recognize Matt Rhoades, who is our staff lead for this hearing 
today. It is his last day on our committee. And Matt has done 
incredible service. I mention all the time what a terrific 
staff we have; Matt is one of those examples.
    So thank you very much for your service. And sorry to see 
you go, but you are going to a better place, as they say. We 
are sure you will do well. Thank you very much.
    And, with that, I will turn it over to Mr. Helvey for his 
opening statement.

  STATEMENT OF DAVID F. HELVEY, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF 
    DEFENSE FOR INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

    Mr. Helvey. Well, Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers, 
and distinguished members of this committee, thank you for the 
opportunity to appear before you today to testify on the 
Department's efforts in the Indo-Pacific region.
    I would like to express my appreciation for the continued 
support from Congress, and this committee in particular, in 
shaping and resourcing our strategy in this critical region.
    I am also pleased to be here joined by Admiral Davidson, 
Commander of United States Indo-Pacific Command, and virtually 
by General Abrams, Commander of United States Forces Korea, the 
Combined Forces Command, and the United Nations Command.
    As a Pacific nation, the future of the United States is 
inextricably linked to that of the Indo-Pacific region. From 
the earliest days of our Nation, our leaders and diplomats have 
been committed to preserving an Indo-Pacific region that would 
remain free and open for all.
    As our Department's priority theater, we are committed to 
upholding a free and open Indo-Pacific region where all 
nations, large and small, are secure in their sovereignty, can 
pursue economic opportunity and resolve disputes without 
coercion, and can exercise the freedoms of navigation and 
overflight consistent with an open and stable international 
order. It is an order that places all nations on a level 
playing field and holds them responsible for preserving the 
principles that have benefited all of us.
    Today, this framework is being challenged. The People's 
Republic of China seeks to use all elements of its national 
power to reshape the world order into one that is consistent 
with its authoritarian model and its national goals.
    Likewise, North Korea's continued pursuit of weapons of 
mass destruction and ballistic missile programs constitutes an 
extraordinary threat to the United States and our allies and 
partners in the region. Pyongyang's proliferation of weapons 
and advanced technology is a threat to international peace and 
security, and it undermines the global nonproliferation regime.
    And we continue to see, you know, within the Indo-Pacific 
region a variety of transnational threats, including terrorism, 
illicit arms, drug and human trafficking, piracy, and natural 
disasters, including infectious disease. The Department 
regularly works to address these threats alongside our allies 
and partners throughout the region to prepare for and, when the 
time comes, which it certainly will, respond to them quickly 
and effectively.
    To advance our vision, the Department has been implementing 
an Indo-Pacific strategy which comprises three principal lines 
of effort. The first is preparedness--bolstering our ability to 
compete across all domains and, if necessary, to fight and win 
a conflict with a near-peer competitor. Second, partnerships--
reinvigorating our alliances and partnerships by increasing our 
interoperability and leveraging our combined resources for a 
common goal. And, third, promoting a networked region--
promoting an interconnected network of allies and partners that 
can serve as a force multiplier to advance our shared 
interests.
    These lines of effort are the baseline for our efforts in 
the Indo-Pacific and guide our relationships in defense 
cooperation with allies and partners, translating them into 
concrete actions that are advancing a shared vision for the 
region.
    The Department is strongly committed to fielding robust 
military capabilities that leave no doubt to allies, to 
partners, or our adversaries of our ability to deter and 
respond to aggression.
    Secretary Austin has stated clearly that China is our 
highest priority and the pacing challenge for the Department, 
and he has directed us to review our activities and ensure 
their alignment with our strategic priorities.
    Mr. Chairman, I thank you again for inviting me to appear 
today, and I look forward to taking your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Helvey can be found in the 
Appendix on page 49.]
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Admiral Davidson.

STATEMENT OF ADM PHILIP S. DAVIDSON, USN, COMMANDER, U.S. INDO-
                        PACIFIC COMMAND

    Admiral Davidson. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers, 
and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the 
opportunity to appear before you to discuss the Indo-Pacific 
region.
    And thank you, Chairman Smith, for your very kind remarks.
    Today, I am joined by Indo-Pacific Command Senior Enlisted 
Advisor Command Sergeant Major Shane Shorter, a Special Forces 
warrior with decades of experience in the Indo-Pacific 
operating and training alongside our most critical allies and 
partners.
    I can report that Indo-Pacific Command is laser-focused on 
the Secretary of Defense's immediate five priorities, beginning 
with the initiative centered on the health and well-being of 
our people. Indeed, investing in our most critical and 
resilient resource, our people, is a national security 
imperative.
    For the past 12 months, we have worked to support the 
protection and sustainment of our joint force readiness while 
mitigating the effects of the COVID-19 [coronavirus 2019] 
pandemic. Additionally, our team has worked extensively with 
local, State, and national leadership to help defeat the 
disease and minimize the impact on our ability to perform our 
missions.
    We also remain deeply focused on cultivating a safe 
environment for our DOD professionals to learn, thrive, execute 
their mission, and fulfill their oath to the Constitution. In 
doing so, we must work--and continue to work--to eliminate 
sexual assault, sexual harassment, racism, and extremism, all 
of which have no place within our ranks. Such abhorrent 
behaviors are inconsistent with our values and the principles 
we are sworn to defend.
    Our greatest military strength is our people. Therefore, 
operating in an environment free of discrimination, hate, and 
harassment while accomplishing our mission is paramount to our 
success. Indeed, it is paramount to ensuring we can accomplish 
our mission, to meet the greatest challenges of the 21st 
century.
    The Indo-Pacific is the most consequential region for 
America's future and remains the United States priority 
theater. The region itself contains four of the five priority 
security challenges identified by the Department of Defense: 
China, Russia, North Korea, as well as violent extremist 
organizations.
    The Indo-Pacific region also experiences frequent natural 
and manmade disasters, the negative impacts of climate change, 
rapid population growth, drug and human trafficking, and, of 
course, disease and pandemics.
    The region accounts for 60 percent of the world's current 
gross domestic product and contributes more than two-thirds to 
the present global economic growth. And in 10 years, the region 
will host two-thirds of the world's population and two-thirds 
of the global economy.
    Our Nation's vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific serves 
as an important reminder to all nations that the U.S. remains 
committed to free, fair, and reciprocal trade, shared access to 
global markets, good governance, and human rights and civil 
liberties.
    Now, let me focus my remaining remarks on the greatest 
long-term strategic threat in the 21st century, and that is the 
People's Republic of China.
    In stark contrast to our free and open vision, the 
Communist Party of China promotes a closed and authoritarian 
system through internal oppression as well as external 
aggression. China's very pernicious approach to the region 
includes a whole-of-party effort to coerce, corrupt, and coopt 
governments, businesses, organizations, and the people of the 
Indo-Pacific.
    As China continues to increase the size of the PLA 
[People's Liberation Army] and advance their joint 
capabilities, the military balance in the Indo-Pacific is 
becoming more unfavorable for the United States and our allies. 
And with this imbalance, we are accumulating risk that may 
embolden China to unilaterally change the status quo before our 
forces may be able to deliver an effective response.
    The greatest danger the United States and our allies face 
in the region is the erosion of conventional deterrence vis-a-
vis the People's Republic of China. Absent a convincing 
deterrent, China will be emboldened to continue to take action 
to supplant the established rules-based international order and 
the values represented in our vision for a free and open Indo-
Pacific.
    Our deterrence posture in the Indo-Pacific must demonstrate 
the capability, the capacity, and the will to convince Beijing, 
unequivocally, that the costs of achieving their objectives by 
the use of military force are simply too high. Indeed, we must 
be doing everything possible to deter conflict. Our number one 
job is to keep the peace.
    But we absolutely must be prepared to fight and win should 
competition turn to conflict. I want to thank this committee 
for your deep commitment to defending U.S. values and interests 
in the Indo-Pacific through your efforts to establish the 
groundbreaking Pacific Deterrence Initiative, or the PDI. PDI 
provides the foundation for establishing a forward-deployed, 
defense-in-depth posture that defends the U.S. homeland and our 
interests abroad, deters aggression, assures allies and 
partners, and provides flexible response options should 
deterrence fail. It is the joint integration you seek in the 
theater.
    On behalf of the men and women of the United States Indo-
Pacific Command, I thank you for your time today, for your 
continued support, and for your desire to improve the 
prosperity and security of the Indo-Pacific--indeed, the most 
critical region on the planet.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    [The prepared statement of Admiral Davidson can be found in 
the Appendix on page 63.]
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    General Abrams.

   STATEMENT OF GEN ROBERT B. ABRAMS, USA, COMMANDER, UNITED 
   NATIONS COMMAND/COMBINED FORCES COMMAND/U.S. FORCES KOREA

    General Abrams. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers, and 
distinguished members of the House Armed Services Committee, I 
am honored to appear before you today.
    As the chairman mentioned, we are currently conducting our 
biannual theater-level Combined Command Post Training. Our men 
and women in uniform, alongside our Republic of Korea forces, 
are immersed in a very realistic and challenging training 
environment. And I am appearing this morning, our time, from an 
undisclosed wartime command bunker.
    Chairman Smith, thank you, sir, for approving my request to 
testify virtually. Your support has allowed me to remain on the 
Korean Peninsula in order to execute my responsibilities, as 
the Commander of United Nations Command, Combined Forces 
Command, and U.S. Forces Korea, to lead our combined forces to 
ensure that we are indeed ready to ``fight tonight.''
    I also want to recognize the commitment of all the Members 
of Congress to fulfill their constitutional duty on January 6. 
The events of that day deeply affected USFK [United States 
Forces Korea] personnel stationed 8,000 miles away from the 
Nation's capital, and, as an American citizen, I was proud to 
see the Congress complete their constitutional duty under some 
very stressful and dangerous conditions.
    I am honored today to represent the soldiers, sailors, 
airmen, Marines, Department of Defense civilians, contractors, 
and families who also serve here in the Republic of Korea.
    When I briefed the committee last year, COVID-19 was 
attempting to test our readiness, and the subsequent impact of 
the global pandemic exacerbated the challenge across our 
operational environment. Our alliance, however, rose to the 
occasion to adapt, innovate, and, in the end, strengthen the 
bond between our two nations.
    We have greatly benefited from our robust partnership with 
the Republic of Korea Government and the Korean Disease Control 
and Prevention Agency, KDCA, who have supported our efforts. 
And, as a result, our rate of infection has remained extremely 
low. Of the 58,000 people who touch USFK bases daily, we have 
seen a total of 110 local affiliated cases, and, of that 110, 
only 28 service members have tested positive--a remarkable 
record.
    Our biggest challenge has been from inbounds or returnees 
coming from the continental United States, where we have had 
approximately 700 positive cases. We strictly follow ROK 
[Republic of Korea] Government control measures for reception 
of every flight, and we follow the ROK quarantine guidance very 
closely. And, as a result, there has been no threat to our 
personnel or the Korean people.
    Now I will provide a quick update on the current situation 
here on the Korean Peninsula.
    There remains a palpable reduction in tension that emerged 
in 2018 after a very dangerous and provocative 2017. Despite 
the reduction in tension, rest assured that we have not become 
complacent when it comes to North Korea. We remain clear-eyed 
about the persistent challenges we face today and in the 
future.
    North Korea continues their development of nuclear and 
advanced missile systems, cyber capability, as well as other 
conventional and emerging asymmetric military technologies. We 
will continue to ensure a strong and effective deterrence 
posture so that Pyongyang never misjudges our role, never 
misjudges our commitment and our capability to respond as an 
alliance.
    Above all, I am proud to report that our combined joint 
force here in Korea is credible and ready to execute our 
assigned deterrence and warfighting missions. We stand together 
to deter aggression, maintain the armistice conditions, and 
ensure the security of the Republic of Korea. Your continued 
support of our capability enhancements, joint and combined 
training programs, and theater exercises is critical to our 
``fight tonight'' readiness posture.
    The ROK-U.S. alliance remains the linchpin of security and 
stability in northeast Asia, and our partnership continues to 
grow by promoting economic cooperation, mitigating threats to 
regional stability, and fulfilling our commitments to allies 
and partners in the region.
    Every alliance has its challenges, however, and our 
ironclad alliance is no exception. One such challenge that 
confronts us is limited access to training ranges and airspace 
here in South Korea. If left unsolved, this limitation could 
affect our force readiness. We are currently working hard with 
our ROK allies to identify a bilaterally supportable solution 
so that our forces can train on the peninsula and maintain a 
credible combat deterrent.
    The alliance between the Republic of Korea and the United 
States was forged in the crucible of war and shaped over 71 
years of combined military operations and training. The shared 
sacrifice built on trust, respect, commitment, and mutually 
agreed principles underpins everything that we do here.
    Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today, and I 
look forward to answering your questions.
    [The prepared statement of General Abrams can be found in 
the Appendix on page 105.]
    The Chairman. Thank you very much, General.
    Admiral Davidson, we talked a lot about--both Ranking 
Member Rogers and I spoke about deterrence, you know, how do we 
deter China, and what are we deterring them from doing. And I 
think the most obvious example, obviously, is Taiwan. Nothing 
would blow the situation up there more than if China took an 
aggressive move against Taiwan.
    What do you think is most important for us to do to deter 
China from taking a step like that?
    Admiral Davidson. Well, sir, we have described in our 1251 
assessment, which was mandated by law for me to submit to you 
directly--it articulates the needs principally in five 
categories.
    You know, first, an effort to increase our joint force 
lethality. That includes long-range precision fires; integrated 
air and missile defense; my number one priority, which is a 
defensive system at Guam, which is centered on the Aegis Ashore 
system but certainly, and importantly, delivers the network--
the command and control for the network that enables it to link 
to other joint assets on the defensive side and potentially on 
the offensive side as well. That includes air, maritime, and 
other ground forces as well.
    We are also focused on enhancing our design and posture in 
the region. You have heard a lot of talk about dispersal and 
hardening of bases and dispersal to places that might be 
possible in the first and second island chain. There are 
several proposals along those lines.
    We are advocating for strengthening our allies and 
partners. That is principally done through foreign military 
sales, but it is also done through our exercise program, which, 
as our allies and partners in the network are bringing aboard 
important assets with us, like fifth-gen fighters, integrated 
air and missile defense, and advanced fires themselves, we need 
to advance our exercise program to make sure that we have the 
capabilities to exercise, preserve the things that we want to 
preserve, you know, not reveal to potential adversaries, and 
move forward.
    We are also very focused on exercises, experimentation, and 
innovation. We think that is an important element to bring to 
our training ranges as well as our joint exercise program.
    And then, lastly, we have several proposals in joint 
logistics that we think are critical to the sustainment, the 
provision of munitions, fuel distribution in the theater, and 
recapitalization of lift assets, and our means to command and 
control them as well.
    The Chairman. Okay. Thank you.
    And, General Abrams, just quickly, you mentioned your 
response to COVID-19, the pandemic. And thank you. You did an 
outstanding job of responding to that, protecting our force, 
and making sure you could continue in the readiness.
    What would you say are sort of the top-level lessons 
learned about why your response was successful and what we can 
learn from that now and going forward?
    General Abrams. Chairman, first and foremost, we needed to 
operationalize our response immediately. Early on, you know, it 
was sort of in health channels. And I have the utmost respect 
for our infectious disease doctors and so forth and our health 
force protection people, but we had to operationalize this. So 
that was step number one.
    Step number two was effective communications to inform our 
force, to inform our entire community on the nature of the 
threat and then what should we do about it. And it was 
constant, clear, concise, transparent communications throughout 
the entire peninsula, led by commanders, our base commanders, 
garrison commanders being very aggressive in reducing the 
anxiety with our people.
    And then the third thing, Chairman, is an adoption of core 
tenets. We call it the new normal that everyone is very 
familiar with, but this was very strange for everyone over a 
year ago. You know, the simple things--practicing good personal 
hygiene, washing your hands, wearing a mask, maintaining 
physical distancing, avoiding large groups, disinfecting our 
areas, maximizing telework. These are our core tenets.
    And I would say those are the three top-line messages.
    The Chairman. Thank you very much.
    Mr. Rogers.
    Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Admiral Davidson, in response to the chairman's question, 
you made reference to your 1251 report and your recommendation 
for an Aegis Ashore system on Guam.
    Can you explain in an unclassified manner why that is 
important and why it needs to be integrated with other systems?
    Admiral Davidson. The threat as it has developed in the 
Western Pacific has moved in a way in which we need to have 
better integrated air and missile defense capability on Guam in 
order to defend it.
    What you have in place right now is THAAD [Terminal High 
Altitude Area Defense] radar, which only has a 120-degree-wide 
look at threats in the region, and, in fact, it is oriented on 
North Korea. And it is meant to defend against a rogue shot of 
intermediate range from North Korea. We supplement that with an 
Aegis destroyer.
    As we look at the expanse of Chinese weapons systems and 
their employment of air and maritime forces in the region, we 
need a 360-degree defense now of Guam. And it must be able to 
meet the ballistic missile threat that can come from PRC 
[People's Republic of China] land as well as PRC ships, but it 
also should meet the 360-degree threat around Guam that comes 
from circumnavigations of Guam by PRC naval assets, including 
submarines that could shoot land-attack cruise missiles, for 
example, as well as bomber approaches and its ability to shoot 
land-attack cruise missiles as well.
    We have to be able to defend against all those threats. 
Aegis Ashore is a proven technology that you have today at sea 
and you have it ashore in Romania and Poland to help in the 
defense of Europe. That system would enable all the 
capabilities that you have today and begin to meet the threats 
in the future.
    As China develops hypersonic weapons during the course of 
this decade, clearly there is going to be a need to have space 
sensing associated with that. You are still going to have to 
have an interceptor to meet the threat. In my view, that is 
going to--you rectify that by bridging Aegis Ashore with our 
space capability that is to come.
    Mr. Rogers. Great.
    How does fielding a long-range precision fire enable 
mobility with a state like China in conflict?
    Admiral Davidson. You know, much of our long-range 
precision fires come from our air and maritime assets today. 
That is it. That enables any adversary to focus their means of 
sensing and ability to target our assets on only a portion of 
the joint force. If we had a wider base of long-range precision 
fires, it forces the Chinese intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance apparatus to work much, much harder locating all 
those nodes.
    And then in all the ways that ground, air, and maritime 
forces can hide--manipulation of the electromagnetic spectrum, 
speed, concealment, all those things--we can then use those to 
enhance the maneuver of the force.
    And, you know, for those with military experience, you know 
that maneuver and fires work hand in hand, and they are key to 
the overall set of needs that we have to employ at the 
operational level to be successful.
    Mr. Rogers. Great.
    In your professional military judgment, if we build out the 
capabilities you have described in your report, along with the 
other investments we have in the region, would that, in fact, 
have a deterrent effect on Chinese aggression?
    Admiral Davidson. We call it in brief ``Regain the 
Advantage.'' We think those are the key elements of joint 
integration that are required to bring by what--I am very 
encouraged by all the individual service doctrines, but it has 
to come together in a joint approach, and this is the 
methodology to do that. And it is meant to deter.
    Mr. Rogers. Okay.
    General Abrams, the South Korean Government has committed 
to increasing their defense spending and buying a lot of their 
own hardware. Is that hardware going to be interoperable with 
our systems?
    General Abrams. Congressman, interoperability is at the 
very core of our ROK-U.S. military alliance, and it has been 
that way for decades. So it is part of our DNA.
    And to answer your question specifically, yes. These key 
capabilities, as they come online, even the indigenously 
produced, we have a shared commitment from both nations to 
ensure that we maintain interoperability.
    Mr. Rogers. Excellent.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Langevin is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I want to thank our witnesses for being here this morning, 
particularly you, General. You are going above and beyond the 
call, being available at such a late hour, but thank you.
    Let me start on a technology question. The USS Portland 
will deploy in your area of operations with a 150-kilowatt 
laser next year. And the Navy is in the process of integrating 
its new HELIOS [High Energy Laser with Integrated Optical-
dazzler and Surveillance] laser system with Aegis.
    Admiral Davidson, how do you envision incorporating these 
weapons systems into your operational concepts, rules of 
engagement, and tactical employment considerations?
    Admiral Davidson. Directed energy weapons, Congressman, I 
think, are the way of the future. In my view, the capability 
that Portland is bringing and then, in the future, our ability 
to marry that directed energy with the Aegis weapon system, is 
really going to help us in our terminal defenses, which are so 
critically important.
    Because we are going to find over time that our need to 
defend--while a network of sensors is going to be extremely 
important going forward to project long-range fires, whether 
those are offensive or defensive fires, we are going to have to 
layer in some defensive weapon capabilities. And this is where 
I think directed energy is going to make its entree into the 
joint force.
    Very encouraged by it.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Admiral.
    One thing [inaudible] as we develop new technologies like 
directed energy--can you still hear me okay?
    The Chairman. You are kind of breaking up a little bit, 
Jim. Take another shot at it.
    Mr. Langevin. Okay. So I was saying that I am concerned, as 
we develop new technologies like directed energy, high-level 
planners won't understand their capabilities and will fail to 
take advantage of their true potential.
    So, Admiral Davidson, how are you working to improve your 
staff and subordinate commanders' understanding of these new 
technologies and how they will be utilized?
    Admiral Davidson. Yeah. So one of the things we did at 
Indo-Pacific Command was to, you know, create a process for 
planning and operations collaboration that pulled on the very 
narrow set of people that have the highest classifications that 
address the highest technologies that we are bringing in the 
force, to make sure that our future plans are developed in a 
way that understand those high-classification, high-technology 
priorities.
    I think that process addressment has been extraordinarily 
helpful in the headquarters. As we have worked to work on--you 
know, the assignments, I get to do contingency planning itself, 
and I think it is going to be the wave of the future.
    At the end of the day, we are going to have to have more 
people understand these technologies at the appropriate 
classification level in order to introduce these properly into 
our planning and ops.
    Mr. Langevin. I agree with that. I am glad you are planning 
well for the future.
    Let me ask one other question to you, Admiral Davidson. 
When looking at emerging technologies that our peer adversaries 
are developing, Admiral, what do you believe is the most 
dangerous technology or capability that has been deployed in 
your AOR [area of responsibility]? And what do you think will 
be the most dangerous in the future?
    Admiral Davidson. Well, sir, you know, my obligations, you 
know, have to span a number of potential adversaries as well as 
a number of threat systems. I would be hard-pressed to identify 
one that I can't--you know, I must account for them all, 
somewhat, in the current environment.
    As we think about the future, the creation and the fielding 
of hypersonic weapons, the potential ranges, that those might 
affect and influence much wider and wider areas of the globe, I 
think, are really going to challenge our needs to develop like 
offensive capability as well as defensive systems against 
those.
    Mr. Langevin. Very good. Thank you, Admiral.
    My time is winding down, so I will just thank you all for 
your service and for your testimony here today. I look forward 
to our continued work together.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Wilson is recognized.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And thank each of you for being here today.
    And, in particular, Admiral Davidson, I want to thank you 
for your recognition of Guam, how strategically located that 
is, and how the citizens there are such patriotic Americans and 
so proud to serve. They have the highest percentage of 
membership in the military of any State or territory of the 
United States. So we have a real asset there that we want to 
work with, so thank you for your identification of that.
    Additionally, Secretary Helvey, recently I introduced the 
Foreign Influence Transparency Act to limit foreign 
interference within our universities, many that conduct defense 
research.
    We know that the People's Republic of China integrates 
information operations into its defense posture by way of 
Confucius Institutes. These are extensions of the Chinese 
Government that Human Rights Watch says censors on political 
grounds and expects loyalty from its employees.
    Has DOD assessed the risk posed by China's information 
operations efforts at our universities and the implications for 
defense research? How can we further assist DOD to confront 
China's influence in U.S. academia?
    Mr. Helvey. Well, Mr. Wilson, thank you for that question. 
And you are right. We are very concerned about the potential 
for what could be called, you know, nontraditional types of 
intelligence operations in the United States, one of which 
would be the use of students, sometimes witting or not, at our 
universities and research centers.
    So part of what we have tried to do as a department is, 
one, to understand the nature of that challenge and threat and, 
two, you know, work with our partners across the interagency, 
including domestic law enforcement, to help, you know, educate 
over the nature of that challenge, to help educate folks, you 
know, how China uses some of these tools and instruments to, 
you know, conduct its influence operations and conduct its 
intelligence operations.
    And so part of it has been kind of documenting this and 
working to make sure that that information is provided so that 
folks can make their own decisions on whether or not they want 
to participate and how they want to interact.
    I think the second thing that we have been able to do is, 
working again with our partners across the interagency, to work 
to tighten the controls, you know, whether it is export 
controls or licensing, so that as we identify, you know, 
entities that could be of concern, entities of concern, 
entities that have an affiliation with the Chinese Communist 
Party, the People's Liberation Army, that we can provide that 
information to allow folks to be able to make due-diligence 
decisions on how they engage with them.
    So, for example, we started to publish the list of entities 
associated with--so-called, the 1237 report, which goes back to 
a piece of legislation that Congress passed to identify Chinese 
military companies and affiliated companies. You know, the 
Department of Defense has a responsibility to produce that; we 
are producing that. And that serves, we think, as an important 
tool to help our partners in the interagency but also, you 
know, private citizens and entities to be able to make 
decisions on how they want to engage with these organizations 
and outfits.
    Mr. Wilson. Well, thank you for being proactive.
    And I am really grateful that the University of South 
Carolina, led by President Bob Caslen, former superintendent of 
West Point--they have taken the effort to remove the Confucius 
Institute. And so we need other colleges and universities to 
show equal courage.
    Additionally, General Abrams, I am encouraged by the 
agreement in principle between the United States and South 
Korea, and that is, with the agreement as a meaningful 
deterrent to malign actors as well as a symbol of our continued 
peace through strength with our courageous Korean allies.
    Given the changing security environment presented by an 
emboldened China, what are the steps being taken for a joint 
strategy against the DPRK [Democratic People's Republic of 
Korea]?
    General Abrams. Congressman, as you are well aware, it is 
really on two levels.
    The first level, on the military side, all of our planning 
to deal with any sort of contingency here on the Korean 
Peninsula, that is governed by an alliance decision-making 
process, alliance-produced strategic planning guidance and a 
strategic planning directive that drives all of our operational 
planning. And that is at the center of our military alliance 
operations.
    On a broader scale, in terms of the strategy, I would defer 
to Mr. Helvey, but this is all part and parcel of the North 
Korea policy review that was directed by President Biden. That 
review is ongoing. And, as you probably are aware, they are 
firmly committed to ensuring that there is proper and adequate 
consultation and close coordination with the ROK Government----
    The Chairman. I have to apologize for interrupting, 
General. The gentleman's time has expired, and we have a lot of 
people to get to, so I have to get on to the next member.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Mr. Larsen is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
    Admiral Davidson, welcome. And can you discuss in brief how 
USINDOPACOM [United States Indo-Pacific Command] will utilize 
and reposition SOCOM [Special Operations Command] forces as 
part of the PDI? It is an issue of the use of SOCOM in the 
great power competition sphere, and I wonder if you had some 
comments on how you envision that.
    Admiral Davidson. I will leave some of the specifics to the 
classified hearing, sir, but, you know, broadly, special 
operations forces, Special Operations Command, in support of 
our efforts, you know, their traditional missions are in 
building partner capacity, building relationships with other 
nations in peacetime, in a nonkinetic environment.
    There is a lot of opportunity to do that across the whole 
of the Indo-Pacific region. I have been quite pleased with the 
way SOCPAC [Special Operations Command Pacific] has adapted in 
the region, providing, you know, small elements of teams that 
help build those partnerships with other nations. But I will 
talk to some of the specifics in the classified hearing.
    Mr. Larsen. Great. Thank you.
    Mr. Helvey, welcome back as well.
    Many of the nations that were both listed in your--well, 
talked about in your testimony, listed in Admiral Davidson's 
testimony--are great supporters of the United States. However, 
there is a feeling in that region--and I think Prime Minister 
Lee of Singapore mentioned this at the last Shangri-La Dialogue 
that we could go to. He maybe didn't say it this way, but the 
theme was, ``Don't make us choose.''
    And so I am wondering how the Department of Defense is 
managing that feeling in the region about ``don't make us 
choose'' between the U.S. and China--although, from testimony, 
it looks like they have chosen. But how do you manage that 
attitude among some of the countries that we would like to see 
more support out of?
    Mr. Helvey. Well, thank you, Mr. Larsen.
    And, you know, first and foremost, yeah, you are right to 
point out, our allies and our partners are a critical asset to 
the United States, and it creates an advantage that we have 
that our adversaries cannot hope to match.
    And we have taken on board and understand concerns from the 
region. We have heard it very clearly, you know, ``Don't make 
us choose.'' That has been a consistent refrain.
    And the reality is that we are not asking nations to choose 
between the United States or China. In fact, we welcome and 
encourage all nations across the Indo-Pacific to maintain, you 
know, peaceful, productive relations with all of their 
neighbors, China included.
    Framing the strategic competition that we find ourselves in 
with China as a choice between us or China or as a choice 
between nations, you know, is really a false choice. The choice 
that our allies and our partners and everyone in the region 
faces is between supporting the existing international order, 
the existing system that is free and open--it is the system 
that we helped to create and that we have supported and that we 
believe has benefited everybody in the region, in particular 
including China--and the alternative now that China is 
presenting, which is a closed system and a more authoritarian 
governance model.
    So it is a competition between systems, and it is a choice 
between systems. Do you want to choose a free and open system, 
or do you want to choose a closed and authoritarian one?
    And so we are only asking countries to do their part to 
uphold the international laws, rules, and norms which support 
their interests, which they have benefited from, and then help 
to provide for security and prosperity for all of us. And so 
that is the ask that we have of our allies and our partners.
    Mr. Larsen. All right. Thanks. I will probably have more. 
And I will also note, the Chinese Government makes it really 
easy for some countries, as well, to choose a free and open 
world order.
    General Abrams, the last time I was in Korea, which was 
about, it seems like, 4 million years ago, we talked about 
training exercises. And I think my question to you was, if 
things didn't go well with the negotiations between the United 
States and North Korea, would we re-up and reinvigorate the 
training exercises? Can you tell us where things sit with that 
between the USFK and ROK?
    The Chairman. And, sadly, you have 12 seconds to answer 
that question. That is what members do here----
    Mr. Larsen. You are interfering with my time, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Go ahead, sir.
    General Abrams. Congressman, I will provide your office an 
appropriate response that is necessary, but I will go back to 
my opening comments: We have a trained and ready force, and our 
training has continued.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 131.]
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Turner is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General Abrams, I appreciated the opportunity to be able to 
talk to you last week. I understand that when we were talking 
about the issue of the impact of COVID, there is a great deal 
of concern as to how our foreign-based personnel and their 
families are receiving the vaccination. This was undertaken as 
a Federal program, Warp Speed. And, certainly, protecting our 
service members should be an incredibly high priority.
    I understand you have about 65,000 service members, 
families, civilians, contractors, and retirees. They don't have 
the ability to go off-base, as you do in the United States. If 
you are in another State that has a program, you could go and 
participate in that program. So they are reliant on your 
ability to deliver the vaccine.
    There is a 75 percent take rate in vaccination. And could 
you please tell us about the availability of the vaccine, what 
you are receiving--excuse me, guys.
    Hey, guys?
    Could you please tell us about the number of vaccines you 
are receiving, how few they are, and your increased need?
    General Abrams. [Inaudible.]
    Mr. Turner. And they have muted you. I think it is the deep 
state.
    General Abrams. Okay. Congressman, can you hear me now?
    Mr. Turner. There we go.
    General Abrams. Thank you. Thanks for the question. And 
since you and I last spoke, I am happy to report that we 
recently received, unforecasted, 9,700 doses of the Johnson & 
Johnson vaccine, which will go a long way towards being able to 
give the immunizations to our beneficiaries.
    But to your broader point, we are following the Department 
of Defense schema. And, as you stated, my concern is, you know, 
for our large portion of our healthy military force, but it is 
really our nonmilitary beneficiaries. We have retirees, we have 
family members, et cetera, who are affiliated as part of that 
65,000. I am concerned about the continued availability. We 
have a great push right now, but we have some concerns, going 
forward, to ensure that our family members and others have the 
access to the vaccine commensurate with their stateside 
counterparts.
    Mr. Turner. Certainly. And, also, as we all know, the 
Johnson & Johnson vaccine is not as effective as the others, so 
we are sort of downgrading.
    And, Mr. Chairman, I would love to join with you on an 
inquiry on the issue of what are our plans for our foreign-
based personnel, because it does sound like we are shorting 
them.
    General Abrams, as you are aware, we had land-based 
tactical nuclear weapons on the North Korean Peninsula and 
South Korea for decades. George Herbert Walker Bush pulled them 
out in 1991. I think, you know, certainly, that is a great 
illustration of rebutting the philosophy of ``if we 
denuclearize, others won't pursue nuclear weapons,'' because 
now you are facing a nuclear North Korea.
    They are moving to solid propellants, greater accuracy, 
intercontinental ballistic missiles that will affect the United 
States, and, of course, sub-based.
    What do you need and what is your assessment of the missile 
defense priorities, as you look to what you are facing from 
North Korea?
    General Abrams. Congressman, we have a very robust combined 
capability between the ROK and the U.S. air and missile defense 
forces. And we have been the beneficiary of congressional 
support of a joint urgent operational needs statement from a 
couple years ago. MDA [Missile Defense Agency] is in the 
process of fielding three specific capabilities--one is already 
here; the other two will come on board this year--that will 
significantly enhance our ballistic missile defense.
    Mr. Turner. Admiral Davidson, the F-35. Tell us how 
critical it is to your overall planning and defense and, as you 
look at what the capabilities of our adversaries in the area 
may be or that they are developing, what the F-35's role would 
be.
    Admiral Davidson. Thank you very much, Congressman.
    The fifth-gen fighters, the F-35 and the F-22, are critical 
to any, you know, future warfight we might have in the theater. 
Our adversaries are developing or are fielding already fifth-
gen fighters themselves.
    And we know from our own gaming and emulations that fifth-
gen fighters are actually a game-changer in the warfight. To go 
backwards into fourth-generation capability as a substitute 
broadly would be a mistake, in my view, and would actually put 
us at a severe disadvantage over the course of this decade when 
it comes to----
    The Chairman. And, again, I must apologize, Admiral, for 
interrupting. The gentleman's time----
    Mr. Turner. Thank you, Admiral.
    The Chairman [continuing]. Has expired.
    And Mr. Cooper is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Because I am going to ask my questions in the classified 
session, I would like to yield my time now to Mr. Courtney.
    Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Cooper.
    Thank you to the witnesses.
    And, again, General Abrams and Admiral Davidson, thank you 
for your great tours of duty at a critical time.
    Admiral Davidson, on page 35 of your testimony, you set 
forth China's, sort of, brazen, repeated violations of the Law 
of the Sea treaty and mention the fact that 80 South China Sea 
geographic features were renamed with, I guess, Chinese names.
    Can you flesh that out a little bit, what that means in 
terms of, you know, maritime territorial claims and the impact 
in terms of freedom of navigation?
    Admiral Davidson. Well, the Chinese are trying to basically 
impose Chinese national law on the international regime that 
provides for the freedom of navigation and freedom of the seas.
    We have spoken quite a bit about the Chinese use of 
lawfare. This is, you know, one of the methodologies in which 
they do it. It is not just the naming or renaming of features 
that have had longstanding names in the region. It is the 
redefinition of what they might be, because, you know, rocks, 
islets, islands all have very specific navigational rights 
associated with them, as well as their continued militarization 
of the features that they built out early in the last decade.
    Their continued militarization is to, frankly, deter not 
only the United States but truly cow all of our allies and 
partners in the region and certainly the South China Sea 
claimants from their absolute rights to operate and those 
rights that they enjoy for economic resource extraction, 
freedom of the seas, freedom of the airways, et cetera.
    Mr. Courtney. Well, thank you for that answer. Because, 
again, as you point out, this isn't just about, sort of, names; 
it is also about, sort of, territorial claims and what that 
means to the rules-based system that has been so successful 
over the last 75 years.
    Your predecessor, Admiral Harris, back in 2015, when he was 
asked about whether or not the U.S. should participate as a 
full, ratified country in terms of UNCLOS [United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea], was pretty forthright in 
terms of saying that--and I am quoting--``I think that in the 
21st century our moral standing is affected by the fact that we 
are not a signatory'' to UNCLOS.
    Can you state what your military opinion is in terms of 
whether we should become a full signatory and whether you agree 
with Admiral Harris's statement?
    Admiral Davidson. Yes, sir, I agree. I am on the record at 
my confirmation hearing that I think being a signatory is 
important, and I haven't changed my mind at all.
    Mr. Courtney. Well, thank you for that answer, because, 
again, the Seapower Subcommittee is working with the Foreign 
Affairs Committee to try and do a joint hearing to really 
elevate this issue.
    Back when Admiral Harris was testifying, that was when the 
Philippines had the claim against China, which, as you know, 
The Hague ruled, you know, unanimously in favor of the 
Philippines. The U.S. tried to even get observer status in that 
proceeding. They obviously couldn't get party status as not a 
signatory. But, again, we were denied observer status and had 
to rely on Australia to kind of be our legal aid lawyer to sort 
of represent our interests. So it is really, you know, way past 
time for us to become a full participant.
    Also, on page 32 of your testimony, you noted the fact 
that, in 2020, China commissioned 25 major warships, which is 
kind of a stunning factoid, in terms of the middle of a 
pandemic, that they would be able to churn out those.
    I would just remind my colleagues, you know, just about a 
year ago, we got a budget from the prior administration which 
cut shipbuilding by 18 percent. It was seven ships in the 
budget, according to the Congressional Research Service, two of 
which were tugboats.
    Again, we did yeoman's work in this committee to backfill 
those cuts. And I want to publicly thank you, Admiral Davidson, 
for speaking out about the fact that we could not lose a 
submarine if we wanted to really, again, have an effective 
deterrence in that region. And, you know, again, it is that 
type of leadership which I think really helps the Congress, who 
has the constitutional duty to provide and maintain a Navy, to 
at least try and, you know, have some semblance of deterrence 
in that region in the world.
    And, with that, I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Lamborn is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Helvey, I have a couple questions for you.
    China wants to be considered a major player on the 
international stage, but it keeps engaging in irresponsible 
behavior. Some of these examples are violating territorial 
waters of other nations in the South China Sea, theft of 
intellectual property, genocide of the Uighur people, their 
social credit system, environmental pollution, lack of 
donations to international relief efforts, and on and on and 
on.
    And one other area of irresponsibility is that they have 
not entered into any arms control agreements. And this is while 
they are modernizing their nuclear weapons and they are 
increasing the number of their nuclear weapons. But there is no 
transparency.
    And I know many people have said they need to be part of an 
international arms control protocol. What is the Biden 
administration doing to bring them into arms control 
negotiations?
    Mr. Helvey. Thank you, sir, for that question. And you are 
right; China has been pursuing a robust strategic forces 
modernization, and the transparency into it is truly lacking.
    Yeah, there have been efforts over the years to try to 
encourage China to participate in some type of arms control 
discussion. This was something that was undertaken under the 
previous administration, under Marshall Billingslea, to try to 
work with China to bring them into the discussion that we have 
with the Russians. The Chinese, to date, have refused.
    In terms of how the current administration is going to 
approach it, that is something that is being looked at as part 
of a broader based China strategy and policy review. That is 
going to have to kind of play out before the President is able 
to make determinations on how he wants to address China in this 
particular aspect.
    Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Well, I want to hear, and I think we all 
want to hear, how that comes along. I wish you were farther 
along, but I guess we will have to just wait and see how this 
evolves. But there has to be a plan to--and it may not work, 
but there at least should be a plan to push them in that 
direction.
    And then I would like to ask you about India. I think we 
all agree that it needs to be a better partner and a 
counterweight to China. So what is the Biden administration 
plan to build a stronger partnership with India, both 
economically and militarily?
    Mr. Helvey. Well, sir, what I will try and do is stay 
within the defense lane. And you are right to point out India 
is a real partner, a rising partner of the United States. We 
have a unique designation with India; it is called a major 
defense partner. One of the things that we are prioritizing is 
looking at ways to operationalize this defense partnership with 
India, to be able to look at ways where we can, you know, work 
together in the defense space in pursuit of common interests 
based on our converging strategic interests.
    So one of the things we would like to be able to do is 
build on some of the foundational agreements that we have been 
able to conclude with India in recent years--say, for example, 
with information security or logistics arrangements--to where 
we could share more information with India so we can build a 
common strategic understanding of the types of threats that we 
face together, look at how we can use our forces and Indian 
forces in the Indian Ocean region and beyond to be able to work 
together, whether it is in maritime domain awareness or 
maritime security or humanitarian assistance and disaster 
response. As you know, the ``Quad'' [Quadrilateral Security 
Dialogue] that people talk about has its origins in responding 
to the 2004 tsunami.
    So we are looking at ways to where we can work with India 
and with other like-minded partners to be able to 
operationalize our cooperation in pursuit of common tasks. So I 
think that is one area.
    Another area that we are looking to do is deepen our 
military-technical cooperation with India that is based on 
providing them arms and equipment so we can build interoperable 
forces and capabilities, and work with India as it is 
developing its own defense industrial base so that India is 
able to produce equipment to service their needs and to be able 
to work more with us and others around the region.
    Mr. Lamborn. Admiral, do you have anything to add to that?
    Admiral Davidson. No, sir. I agree with Mr. Helvey.
    Over the course of my tenure at INDOPACOM, there has been 
some opportunity to cooperate in maritime and to assist a 
little bit in information sharing, some cold-weather gear and 
things like that, with India's challenges along the Line of 
Actual Control. I think it has gone a long way to deepening our 
relationship and really presents a key strategic opportunity, I 
think, for the United States to----
    Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Well, thank you. And I look forward to 
hearing more specifics. I know it is early in the 
administration, but I really want to hear some more specifics 
as we get farther along.
    Thank you, and I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Garamendi.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General Abrams, thank you for the discussion last week. I 
will forgo additional questions at this time.
    Mr. Helvey, your response to Mr. Lamborn was most useful 
and interesting with regard to India, and I would want to 
pursue that.
    My question really goes to Admiral Davidson.
    You have recently, in response to the current NDAA, issued 
a Pacific Deterrence Initiative. I thank you for that piece of 
work.
    In previous discussions, we have talked about the tyranny 
of distance. And I am concerned that this document does not 
talk about maritime logistics from the west coast or anywhere 
in the continental United States to support the Pacific 
enterprise.
    This is something that I would want to take up in a 
classified hearing; perhaps that is where it is. I know that 
Mr. Wittman and Mr. Courtney have expressed concerns about this 
whole issue of maritime logistics, specifically on the demand 
and supply side.
    The demand for supplies, fuel, I don't see addressed in 
your document. Could you speak to that and then, in a broader 
sense, about how you would propose at this point to deal with 
the maritime logistics issue, the tyranny of distance?
    Admiral Davidson. Yes, sir. Thank you.
    The 1251 assessment, provided to inform the Pacific 
Deterrence Initiative, does have as one of its five main 
pillars joint logistics in it. Our approach to that document is 
to address the joint integration that must happen. So there is 
a very heavy logistics focus in it.
    The services all represent the platforms of their 
capabilities. And, without a doubt, recapitalization of 
military sealift is very, very important to our warfighting 
concept in the Indo-Pacific, as well as the 1251 report. 
Because the 1251, you know, specifically addresses the need to 
be able to distribute fuel, munitions, the other costs of 
sustainment, so to speak, through a wider, more dispersed set 
of places, bases, as well as seaborne assets.
    So it does address what our needs are in the sealift. And 
it does it from all the way from the west coast of the United 
States and all the way to the point of delivery, what our total 
joint logistics needs are.
    Mr. Garamendi. I will be looking forward to the detail 
behind that statement and, also, how we would provide that 
sealift--where is the money for it, where are the ships for it, 
what kind of ships, and so on and so forth. We have been 
talking about a national maritime strategy using the Jones Act 
fleet to support the military in a way that has not been done 
for 70 years--or 75 years.
    So we would be looking at those things. I look forward to 
working with you and your people on this entire maritime 
strategy, the logistics piece of it. Thank you so very much.
    With that, I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Wittman.
    Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Gentlemen, thanks so much for coming to join us today.
    Admiral Davidson, I wanted to ask you a question. It is 
really a dynamic about generating current readiness and the 
need to make sure we have long-term readiness.
    As you know, we have the Global Force Management Allocation 
Plan [GFMAP], which essentially says, what do the combatant 
commands need in the long term? And then there is a request for 
forces. So, if things change operationally, you can request and 
say, listen, based on a threat, we need more assets in these 
particular areas.
    The one thing that does, though, is it creates a challenge 
for us, because we need to understand, where is that request 
for forces? And the process, to be honest with you, is a little 
opaque. It is hard to understand exactly where that demand 
comes from.
    I wanted to ask this. When the COCOM [combatant command] 
submits a very high volume of request for forces without us 
understanding what has changed in the operational environment, 
that kind of runs counter to the GFMAP, as it is called, and 
that does create some questions. So I wanted to know, is that 
essentially saying the GFMAP is incorrect?
    And, secondly, do you think that INDOPACOM has been 
judicious in its request for forces?
    And, thirdly, if there is this imbalance between the 
request for forces and the GFMAP, do you think we need to 
relook at the process and what goes into generating the 
information in the GFMAP, especially since we are generating 
readiness today which consumes resources that do also need to 
be allocated to generating readiness in the future?
    So I just wanted to get your perspective on that.
    Admiral Davidson. Thank you for the question, Congressman. 
Very complex process.
    Mr. Wittman. Yeah.
    Admiral Davidson. I understand that exactly.
    Basically, a request for forces is to address an urgent or 
current need. The GFMAP, as it is developed, actually is 
developed beginning about 2 years in advance of the fiscal year 
going forward.
    Whenever an RFF is submitted from whatever combatant 
commander might submit it around the world, the process 
actually brings together all the people that might be affected. 
That certainly includes the service chiefs, whose focus is on 
both current readiness and long-term readiness, and it 
certainly brings in the affected combatant commanders as well. 
So we at least get an opportunity to comment on what we believe 
the risks are.
    I could tell you, my own addressing of these issues has an 
eye on both the long-term and current risk. You know, actually 
formerly being a fleet commander, I know what these effects are 
going forward. And I would say that INDOPACOM's approach 
throughout this process has been very judicious.
    Mr. Wittman. Very good. Thanks, Admiral.
    I wanted to again go back to the idea of short-term 
readiness versus long-term readiness. And, as you know, last 
year, the Lincoln returned after 283 days at sea. We just saw 
the USS Nimitz return after 321 days at sea. That is the 
longest deployment since Vietnam. We see we are sending out the 
USS Eisenhower. She is going to be double-pumped. So we are 
continuing to really stress the assets that we have today to 
generate readiness that we have before us.
    And, again, it looks at the dichotomy between the request 
for forces and the GFMAP and determining, if we have a lot of 
requests for forces, where does that really leave us in what we 
are trying to do in the long term. And that is, how do we 
balance those risks, long-term versus short-term?
    First of all, I want to ask, do you believe it is important 
to have an aircraft carrier presence in INDOPACOM? And do you 
believe that they have the ability to deter conflict within the 
region, and what that perspective is from your standpoint.
    And in your best professional military judgment, do you 
believe that, considering the current stress on the aircraft 
carrier force, that taking out an aircraft carrier from service 
just before its midlife refueling would be a smart thing to do?
    Admiral Davidson. Thank you for the question, Congressman.
    Yes, carrier presence forward-deployed is one of our main 
mechanisms of deterrence and certainly provides a high level of 
assurance to our allies and partners in the region that the 
United States considers the Indo-Pacific not only a priority 
but its number one priority going forward.
    There is no capability that we have that can substitute for 
an aircraft carrier, in my view. You can see by the strain of 
deployments over the course of the last year that they are in 
high demand by all the combatant commanders, and sustaining 
that capability going forward, in my view, is critically 
important. I am in full support of the law, which calls for the 
number of carriers in the United States.
    Thanks, sir.
    Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    The Chairman. Ms. Speier.
    Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you all for your service.
    Admiral Davidson, where does cybersecurity fit into your 
proposal for expanding the Pacific Deterrence Initiative? If 
you receive your additional 90 billets, will any of them be 
devoted to cyber issues?
    Admiral Davidson. Yeah, a little more than a quarter, 
little less than a third are actually committed to 
cybersecurity issues.
    Of course, cybersecurity support for the combatant 
commanders--there is a support, supported, supporting 
relationship with CYBERCOM [Cyber Command]. And, of course, all 
the services, as well, you know, have some responsibilities to 
help provide for cybersecurity. So a portion of that 90 is 
actually committed to that.
    Ms. Speier. Thank you.
    I understand that in your report you asked for a number of 
investments to strengthen military capabilities in the Indo-
Pacific. I notice that your request did not include mention of 
the littoral combat ship or the Constellation-class frigates.
    Do these ships have any use in our efforts to confront 
China in the Indo-Pacific, or are they draining resources away 
from more useful and effective equipment?
    Admiral Davidson. No, they have absolute utility, ma'am.
    The focus of the 1251 report was really on the joint--you 
know, the capabilities that are needed to bring the joint force 
together there effectively to deter as well as, you know, if we 
were called upon, to fight and win in conflict.
    I can't possibly write a report that would accommodate for 
every platform and every capability desire across all the 
services. That said, I am in full support of what the services 
have advocated for, both in their vision, for doctrinal 
evolution of, you know, their individual service visions. And I 
am in close coordination with those service chiefs to make sure 
that our warfighting concepts out there adapt to those visions.
    Ms. Speier. So you are endorsing the littoral combat ship 
we are now calling a frigate because it isn't really a combat 
ship?
    Admiral Davidson. We had great success with the Gabrielle 
Gifford's deployment during the course of 2019 and 2020. There 
will be more LCSes [littoral combat ships] deploying to the 
Indo-Pacific during the course of this calendar year. And it 
has been very, very important to us for engagement, especially 
across Southeast Asia. And it does have a warfighting 
capability.
    Ms. Speier. All right. I am aware of serious maintenance 
problems, especially, I believe, with the Freedom class. So I 
will leave that there.
    Let me ask you one final question. I saw in your written 
testimony that you have conducted surveys on sexual harassment 
and sexual assault and have used the results to improve 
prevention and response programs.
    Would you tell us more about what you learned from those 
climate surveys?
    Admiral Davidson. Yeah. One of the things that was 
important--and this is specific to my headquarters alone--was, 
because of the joint nature of Indo-Pacific Command and the 
large service presence, we didn't have direct representatives 
on the staff to manage the program for sexual assault, as well 
as to do EO, equal opportunity, and equal opportunity 
employment functions. If anybody had an issue on the staff, 
they were required to actually go to the service component 
headquarters, where there was representation to address those 
issues.
    Certainly to smooth communications, get more accountability 
in it at the leadership level and the headquarters, I took out 
of hide people that had the training to do those functions, 
established them in the headquarters. And it has improved my 
ability to share best practices and receive best practices 
across the island of Oahu, as well as assure my force that we 
are properly paying attention to this.
    I am not quite sure whether all combatant commands have 
that issue, but I would say that the----
    Ms. Speier. I guess I am more interested--excuse me for 
interrupting--in what the climate surveys showed you.
    Admiral Davidson. We had a rating of ``excellent.'' Ninety-
three percent of the people on the staff said that our approach 
to program management with sexual assault was positive and gave 
it an ``excellent'' rating.
    Ms. Speier. All right.
    Finally, in 34 seconds, there is in Hawaii a serious 
problem with childcare. And you are anticipating new positions. 
Have you contemplated how the childcare component of that is 
going to be considered?
    Admiral Davidson. Yes, ma'am. I appreciate your citing 
that.
    There is high demand for childcare in Hawaii broadly. What 
is going on right now is, they are conducting virtual--they are 
having a virtual hiring fair. The DOD has also addressed this 
by improving use of licensed----
    The Chairman. And, again, I must apologize----
    Admiral Davidson [continuing]. Sites and other things. I 
would be happy to talk to you more off----
    Ms. Speier. I thank the chairman. I yield back.
    The Chairman. The gentlelady's time has expired.
    Ms. Stefanik.
    I beg your pardon?
    Ms. Stefanik. I don't think I am next in line. I think I 
came late to the hearing.
    The Chairman. Okay. According to my----
    Ms. Stefanik. I will ask a question though.
    The Chairman. According to my handy-dandy sheet here----
    Ms. Stefanik. Okay.
    The Chairman [continuing]. You are, in fact----
    Ms. Stefanik. Great.
    The Chairman [continuing]. Next in line.
    Ms. Stefanik. Great. I will not yield to others then.
    I want to talk about some of our cyber capabilities. As you 
are looking at China continuing to make investments in their 
cyber capabilities and AI [artificial intelligence], this has 
been a priority for the subcommittee that I am the ranker on, 
the previous IETC [Intelligence and Emerging Threats and 
Capabilities]. Now it is strictly focused on cyber and 
technical capabilities.
    Can you talk about what steps you think we need to take to 
make sure that we maintain leadership in those technology 
capabilities and how we can partner more effectively with our 
allies within PACOM on both the cyber side and AI side?
    Admiral Davidson. Specific to my theater alone and in my 
own priorities, ma'am, I have advocated for in the 1251 report 
a mission partner environment. This is IT [information 
technology] technology that is available to us now which would 
deepen our collaboration and our ability to share information, 
do planning, that kind of stuff, with the allied and partner 
network broadly across the region. So I think that is a key way 
ahead.
    We do have a system called BICES-X [Battlefield Information 
Collection and Exploitation Systems Extended] right now that we 
share with a number of partners in the region. That needs to be 
sustained, in my view, in order to provide this resiliency and 
security that you talk about going forward.
    Of course, there are broader needs across the globe, but I 
would have to leave that to Policy and DOD to address.
    Mr. Helvey. Well, ma'am, I understand you will be getting 
briefings and testimony later from folks from USCYBERCOM 
[United States Cyber Command] and others that are directly 
responsible for cyber policy.
    I would just add that we understand, given the increased 
investments from the threat actors like China, North Korea, 
that cyber is an area that we have to maintain focus, not only 
in terms of ensuring that we have hardened and defended 
networks but also that we can share information with our allies 
and partners to help them address their own vulnerabilities.
    One of the things that has been a consistent theme both in 
terms of what I have talked about today and what Admiral 
Davidson has talked about, as well as General Abrams, is how 
important being able to share and work closely with our allies 
and partners around the region is. And to the extent to which 
cyber threats affect not only us and our allies and partners, 
we have a responsibility to help make sure that we are clean, 
as well as the folks that are to the left and right of us.
    Ms. Stefanik. And General Abrams.
    General Abrams. Congresswoman, I am in full agreement with 
Mr. Helvey and Admiral Davidson. And we are the beneficiary of 
great support on the cyber side from Army Cyber, which is the 
combatant command support agency for us here. But I strongly 
endorse Mr. Helvey's comments about the importance when it 
comes to dealing and interacting and interoperability with our 
ROK counterparts.
    Ms. Stefanik. Thank you. I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    I should have said this at the outset, but, as members 
know, at 2 o'clock we are going to move over to the CVC 
[Capitol Visitor Center] for a classified brief. I want to give 
the witnesses some time in between, so we are going to have a 
hard stop at 1:15. At 1:15 we will pause, if people want to 
grab a quick lunch, and then we will reconvene in the CVC 
auditorium at 2 o'clock for a classified discussion.
    Mr. Carbajal is recognized.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    First, I want to thank both Admiral Davidson and General 
Abrams for including in your testimonies your commitment to 
address and prevent sexual assault and harassment within your 
commands. In order to effectively address this, obviously, 
there must be buy-in at all levels of the leadership. So I 
appreciate your and the Biden administration's pledge on this 
very, very important issue.
    Admiral Davidson, China is exceedingly operating in the 
gray zone between peaceful relations and overt hostilities. How 
does your assessment of resourcing requirements for the Pacific 
Deterrence Initiative meet the challenge that is gray-zone 
warfare in the region?
    Admiral Davidson. Well, the fundamental underpinnings of 
the document, sir, is to approach the region with a deterrence 
strategy. Deterrence writ large, while we have some new names 
and things like that for gray zone, it is about our ability to 
do it day to day in peacetime.
    So the approach that we have taken is to bring together a 
set of capabilities and the five pillars that I described 
earlier in a way that helps deter our potential adversaries--
and that would include North Korea--as well as assure our 
allies and partners, all while preparing the strength of what I 
believe is U.S. influence in the region, which is our allied 
and partner network. Get them to assist in many of these 
things, share in the information that they develop and that we 
develop, and basically pursue, you know, the idea, with the 
assurance to others that we are there to stay, for a free and 
open Indo-Pacific.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
    In both your testimonies, Admiral Davidson and Secretary 
Helvey, you discuss how a changing climate is an increasing 
security challenge for the region.
    Can both of you elaborate on how the Department and 
INDOPACOM is working with partner nations on addressing climate 
change, especially when it comes to small island nations, who 
are more at risk?
    Admiral Davidson. That principally falls into my 
responsibility out there in the theater, sir.
    One of the--and to be brief--one of the organizations that 
reports to INDOPACOM is called the Center for Excellence for 
Disaster Management. And it trains not only my military people 
in the Pacific but government officials in the United States, 
local, State, national, nongovernment organizations. And we 
have offered this course to partner nations in the region, 
principally in Oceania, to train both their civilian defense 
force officials, law enforcement, in how to mitigate the 
effects of a natural disaster, some of which may be, you know, 
a 500-year storm a couple of years ago, in the wake of climate 
change.
    That is a very important engagement organization for me, 
and it has great influence and weight far beyond, you know, the 
resources that we actually put into it. And I think that is, 
you know, the prime way in which I address this in the region 
right now.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
    Secretary Helvey, in your testimony, you state that one of 
the Department's most far-reaching objectives is to set the 
military relationship between the United States and China on a 
long-term path of transparency and nonaggression.
    That is a worthy goal. So how are we balancing the desire 
for nonaggression with long-term strategic competition with 
China?
    Mr. Helvey. Thank you for that question, sir. And you are 
right to point out, in the 2018 National Defense Strategy, it 
was identified as our farthest reaching goal.
    The way we accomplish that is basically in three pillars. 
One, obviously--and this is the stuff that Admiral Davidson has 
talked a lot about this morning--we have to be able to maintain 
a credible forward presence and a credible deterrence.
    A second aspect of it is working very carefully with our 
allies and partners around the region to ensure that they are 
able to work with us and with each other in order to preserve 
and protect their own sovereignty. That helps to augment 
deterrence and help to maintain a regional and security 
environment that is peaceful and stable.
    And then the third part of it would be how we engage with 
the Chinese themselves, where we are very careful and 
deliberate, consistent with the statutory limitations in the 
National Defense Authorization Act of fiscal year 2000. We are 
looking at ways to ensure that we are maintaining open channels 
of communication at all levels of the People's Liberation Army 
and then prioritizing, within those dialogues, the tools and 
mechanisms to ensure risk-reduction and confidence-building 
measures, so that, as we operate close to each other, if there 
is an incident, if there is an accident, we have the tools in 
place so that we can manage it in a way that doesn't escalate 
into a confrontation or a conflict.
    And the last part of it is, we want to look for areas where 
we can cooperate, where we have mutual interest.
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired----
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
    The Chairman [continuing]. And Mr. DesJarlais is 
recognized.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you, Chairman Smith.
    And I would like to thank our witnesses today for their 
service.
    Admiral Davidson, what do you consider the most likely 
potential target of Chinese aggression or military action in 
the next 5 to 10 years?
    Admiral Davidson. Given what they have said both publicly 
and over time and certainly during the tenure of Chairman Xi 
Jinping, I would say Taiwan is the first.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Yeah. I noted on Monday a top Chinese 
diplomat, State Councillor Wang Yi, warned that there is no 
room for compromise on Taiwan and that the U.S. Government 
should drop the prior administration's dangerous acts of 
playing with fire. Also on Monday, White House Press Secretary 
Jen Psaki said the American commitment to Taiwan is rock solid.
    What have you seen in your 3-year tenure as far as how that 
relationship has evolved, and where do you think they currently 
stand?
    Admiral Davidson. I am sorry, whose relationship, sir?
    Dr. DesJarlais. The relationship between China and Taiwan.
    Admiral Davidson. I would say that China's basic revocation 
of a one-country, two-systems approach in Hong Kong alarmed 
Taiwan, to the extent that, during the course of the late-2019 
election in Taiwan, that both parties that were running for 
election were required to say they didn't support a one-
country, two-systems approach with China.
    So it has steeled, I think, Taiwan's status in the region. 
And I think all other nations in the region, as well, have 
noticed a very pernicious approach that China took to Hong 
Kong, and that has put a chill on many relationships as well.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay.
    One of the more notable items included in your proposal for 
PDI was the request for ground-based, highly survivable, 
precision-strike fires from greater than 500 kilometers.
    I don't know whether you think that would have a deterrent 
impact, but what is our best strategic option to uphold U.S. 
defense and possibly offensive capabilities in this region?
    Admiral Davidson. Well, I think broadening our base of 
long-range fires across all domains is incredibly important, as 
is the defense of Guam going forward.
    And the advantage that the defense of Guam brings us is its 
capability that is already online. It is not in development. It 
is actually stuff you have purchased already. It is highly 
integrable with the joint force on both offensive and defensive 
fires, which I think is critically important. And it will be a 
very, very important command and control node for us in Guam.
    Guam is key to our approach to the Western Pacific. Not 
only is it U.S. territory; it is a critical sustainment, 
munitions, power-projection platform, and repair facility for 
our ships forward.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you. I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Brown. Up here, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Mr. Brown. I saw you in the back room; now 
you are on screen. It was confusing.
    Mr. Brown is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Brown. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for 
convening this posture hearing.
    And thanks to our panelists for being here today and for 
your leadership.
    Admiral Davidson, I wanted to talk to you about our 
alliances and partnerships in the region. And beyond, sort of, 
coordinating presence, I would like to know what coordination 
there is with our allies and partners around force structure, 
investments in capabilities and capacity.
    And I ask this because, as was stated by the chairman at 
the outset of the hearing and as we all know, the United States 
simply can't do this alone and certainly not in isolation, 
given, you know, China's increasing enhanced capabilities and 
capacities.
    So I know in Europe we have a pretty mature process of 
coordinating investments and force structure. Can you describe 
the processes and the commitment to doing that in the Indo-
Pacific?
    Admiral Davidson. Thanks for that, Congressman.
    You know, we have a series of bilateral alliances in the 
Indo-Pacific--Japan, Korea, Australia, Philippines, and 
Thailand. And we have key partnerships, some of which Mr. 
Helvey addressed--of course, India, Singapore, New Zealand. 
And, of course, we have other alliances where we have 
influencing nations in the Indo-Pacific like the United 
Kingdom, of course, and Canada, as well as others.
    Many of these--I can tell you that many of our bilateral 
allies in the region buy U.S. equipments. Even, you know, as 
their status as defense partners or, you know, even as lesser 
partners out there, they seek U.S. equipments. I think it is 
incredibly important because it generates a level of 
compatibility and interoperability when we are all operating 
like equipments.
    We have a series of dialogues with these individual 
nations, some of which are run at the policymaking level at OSD 
[Office of the Secretary of Defense]. I have bilateral defense 
dialogues as well. Investments in that regard, what people 
want, and what we bilaterally think are improvements are always 
discussed in the process.
    Mr. Brown. Thank you.
    And another question for you, Admiral. There has been some 
criticism that the training exercises in the Indo-Pacific 
Command are a little outdated and they rely a lot on, sort of, 
like, big-fleet/big-ship exercises, they are not necessarily 
joint, they are not reflecting the doctrine or the concepts 
that you are moving towards, the more distributed maritime 
operations, and they don't necessarily adequately involve our 
allies and partners in, sort of, like, a multiforce way, a real 
combined force way.
    Can you just speak to that criticism? And if it is 
accurate, what are we doing to, sort of, course-correct?
    Admiral Davidson. Yes, sir. That was one of the things I 
addressed in the 1251 assessment--it is one of our pillars 
there--to advance our exercises, our experimentation, and our 
innovation, and actually calls for some moneys that would 
stress to higher end threats not only the U.S. force but those 
of our allies and potentially our partners as well.
    One of the key investments is not only, you know, 
improvements in the joint exercise program that you are talking 
about, the exercises themselves, but advocacy for a Pacific 
multidomain training center, which is really a mobile concept 
designed to knit together the really extraordinary training 
ranges we have in the Indo-Pacific--in Alaska, in Hawaii, in 
Guam, and potentially with our allies in Australia and Japan.
    We think it is a very cost-effective way to bring 
multidomain--which we have to bring cyber, space capability, 
all these long-range fires, integrated air and missile 
defense--into our exercises in order to present the kind of 
adversary in a virtual and constructive, computerized construct 
in order to more highly stress the force. I think it is 
critically important.
    Mr. Brown. Just finally, and you may not be able to answer 
it fully, but each of the services seem to be developing new 
operating concepts: multidomain for the Army; little operations 
in a contested environment for the Marines. What are you doing 
to sort of, like, synthesize and aggregate those different 
concepts in a more joint concept?
    Admiral Davidson. Very briefly, we have certainly used that 
to inform, as I have mentioned, the joint integration that is 
the approach in our 1251 assessment. And it has also informed 
what we were required to do for contingency planning, as well 
as what we call the Indo-Pacific Warfighting Concept, which is 
informing the Joint Warfighting Concept in the Pentagon.
    Mr. Brown. Thank you, Admiral.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. You are welcome.
    Mr. Gallagher is next.
    Mr. Gallagher. Chairman--oh, there we go.
    Admiral Davidson, in your statement, you highlight that 
INDOPACOM requires highly survivable, precision-strike fires 
featuring increased quantities of ground-based missiles and 
improved air and long-range naval fires capable of ranges over 
500 kilometers.
    I agree emphatically. Unfortunately, last year, the 
appropriators zeroed out funding for Marine Corps anti-ship 
missiles that would have provided exactly this kind of 
capability.
    Just so everyone is crystal clear, why, operationally, do 
you need this capability so badly?
    Admiral Davidson. The require to deter in the near term 
given the advances in Chinese capability, I think, requires the 
use of existing capabilities that we have. What the Marine 
Corps has asked for have already been developed in the Navy and 
is employed on Navy ships--things like Maritime Strike 
Tomahawk, SM-6. These are immediate capabilities that I think 
should be made available to the Marine Corps, yes.
    Mr. Gallagher. Can you speak to how, specifically, the cut 
for Marine Corps long-range precision fires last year impacted 
your command? How would a similar cut this year impact 
readiness in your command?
    Admiral Davidson. Well, we have spoken a lot, a little bit 
earlier today, about our ability to enhance the maneuver of our 
air and maritime forces. This is what a broadened base of fires 
actually brings to us. I would say, continuing to cut that in 
hopes for some future capability is not meeting the time needs 
that we have to address the Chinese threats that are manifest 
in theater right now, and it undermines our deterrence.
    Mr. Gallagher. And we have talked a lot, relatedly, about 
dispersal today. The Marine Corps Expeditionary Advanced Base 
Operations [EABO] concept is one innovative solution that I 
believe would supplement our fixed-base infrastructure in the 
region with dispersed teams of Marines contesting strategically 
important maritime spaces.
    In your professional judgment, is this kind of dispersed 
EABO concept feasible without long-range precision fires?
    Admiral Davidson. Certainly not as effective.
    Mr. Gallagher. And to put a point on that, if you want 
dispersed mobile and survivable firepower in the Indo-Pacific, 
do you need to ensure the Marine Corps and the Army have 
ground-based anti-ship missiles with ranges over 500 
kilometers?
    Admiral Davidson. Yes. I agree.
    Mr. Gallagher. Admiral, finally, in your statement, you 
wrote, ``The greatest danger for the United States is the 
erosion of conventional deterrence.''
    What role would ground-based anti-ship missiles play in 
supplementing or strengthening conventional deterrence? And 
what are the consequences if we unilaterally cede this 
capability to Beijing?
    Admiral Davidson. Yeah, again, I think the expansion of 
ground-based fires enables the maneuver of our maritime and air 
forces, because what you get is the require for much more 
intense search for offensive capability out of any adversaries' 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance network.
    We want to make our adversaries work harder to find our 
stuff and to defend against it. That is what deterrence is 
about; it is imposing costs.
    Mr. Gallagher. Thank you, Admiral.
    Mr. Helvey, I think you mentioned earlier the fiscal year 
1999 NDAA report, the 1237 report. Or someone mentioned it. 
Forgive me.
    You know, Admiral, thanks in part to your predecessor's 
help and strong support, we passed the Foreign Investment Risk 
Review Modernization Act in the last Congress, you know, 
strengthening CFIUS [Committee on Foreign Investment in the 
United States]. What we haven't really addressed is, sort of, 
outbound investment to Chinese companies.
    So, Mr. Helvey, I would be curious, in what little time I 
have left, do investments in companies on that list complicate 
your job and make all of our jobs more difficult when it comes 
to our force posture in the Indo-Pacific?
    Mr. Helvey. Well, certainly I think, you know, one of the 
principal benefits of the 1237 or 1260(h) reports is to 
increase the transparency. And that is why we try to make sure 
that we have a rigorous methodology to identify these entities 
and companies and their connections, and we try to base it on 
open information, to the greatest extent possible, so that it 
allows, you know, private citizens, companies, commercial 
entities to be able to do due diligence so they understand 
where their resources could be going and what they could be 
contributing to.
    And, quite frankly, given China's strategy of military-
civil fusion, having that type of transparency and due 
diligence helps folks to understand, because, yes, you could be 
contributing to commercial enterprises in China that are 
building equipment that could ultimately pose threats to the 
United States or our allies.
    Mr. Gallagher. Thank you. I am out of time.
    The Chairman. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Kim is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Kim. I thank you, Chairman, for bringing us together 
with this.
    And thank you all for joining us here today.
    I wanted to just start with a big-picture question here in 
terms of next steps. Some of my colleagues have raised issues 
about what next, when it comes to actually coalition-building 
in the region.
    And, Admiral Davidson, I wanted to just kind of get from 
you a sense of, what comes next with regards to the Quad? You 
know, when we have seen these initial discussions that are 
happening sort of building out over the last couple years, what 
is the end goal here? You know, what is it that we are actually 
trying to achieve strategically here that we are trying to get 
towards?
    Admiral Davidson. Yes, sir. Something I think Mr. Helvey 
should address as well.
    I think the potential for Quad is far more than just a 
security relationship. I think the whole of the region is 
looking for assurances from a network of like-minded partners 
for a free and open Indo-Pacific. I think the visions that have 
been articulated not only by the Quad but by others in the 
Nation, you know, support that vision going forward.
    So, you know, as we think about it in the military and 
diplomacy and economics, information in the military sphere, I 
think there is great opportunity across the whole of that 
apparatus.
    Mr. Kim. Yeah.
    Mr. Helvey, I would be interested in hearing your thoughts.
    And if you don't mind, also, just throw on top of that just 
the dynamics that we are seeing between South Korea and Japan 
right now. I know that there is some news that perhaps we are 
going to have some diplomatic discussions, and how it is that 
we can try to strengthen that relationship. Because I think 
many of us would agree that that dynamic is not where we would 
like it to be, between South Korea and Japan.
    So how does that lay on top of some of the visions moving 
forward for the Quad, especially given that South Korea is not 
part of that type of structure? How do we see this, kind of, 
fitting together?
    Mr. Helvey. Well, thank you for that question.
    As I mentioned early on in this hearing, the origins of the 
Quad actually go back to--the Quad being the United States, 
Japan, Australia, and India--go back to the multilateral 
response to the 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean region. But 
beyond that initial, kind of, response, we saw that we have 
shared values and converging strategic interests, and, between 
the four countries, we have a pretty strong commitment to 
upholding a rules-based international order and a free and open 
Indo-Pacific.
    You know, we see the Quad as a venue for coordination and 
collaboration across our respective governments. This is not 
something that is uniquely defense and security. In fact, most 
of the discussion within the Quad has been about diplomacy and 
economics. And I know this is something that will be discussed 
on Friday at the leader level, which--you know, President Biden 
is going to be holding a virtual Quad.
    So what we would like to be able to see over time is the 
introduction of operational and practical types of cooperation, 
not only among the Quad nations, but the Quad nations and other 
like-minded allies and partners.
    I think we saw evidence of this last year when we had the 
Malabar exercise, which was the first time since 2007 when the 
four parties were able to get together and work at a very 
practical task through a maritime exercise.
    You know, beyond that, we could see areas for cooperation 
in things like humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, 
cooperation in some of these new domains like space and cyber.
    A lot of this is stuff that, you know, it creates the types 
of challenges that we all face but we can't necessarily tackle 
it alone. And so, when you look at it in that context, you see 
that the Quad becomes part of a broader regional security 
architecture, which is overlapping layered sets of capabilities 
and groupings that have as its foundation and core a series of 
bilateral relationships.
    Admiral Davidson talked about our treaty relationships. You 
know, we also have strategic partnerships or, in India's case, 
a major defense partnership. We have a number of multilateral 
venues that we can operate on, you know, which is the Quad-
inclusive, things related to the Association of the Southeast 
Asian Nations, trilateral relationships like between the United 
States----
    Mr. Kim. Yeah.
    Mr. Helvey [continuing]. Japan, and South Korea.
    Mr. Kim. Why don't I just pause there for a second.
    So one last thing I wanted to ask General Abrams about, 
just in the final seconds here: There have been discussions 
about whether or not we should move forward, as the United 
States, with a formal end to the Korean War. I know there are 
political discussions about that, in terms of how that should 
figure into negotiations on a diplomatic angle. But, from a 
military standpoint, is there any problem or any challenges 
that you want to cite for us in terms of a declaration of that 
sort?
    General Abrams. Congressman, the short answer is, I have no 
immediate military concerns in terms of our mission here in 
Korea. The bigger point, though, is that that should be 
considered as part of a broader strategy with a clearly defined 
end state.
    Mr. Kim. Thank you, sir.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Bacon is recognized.
    Mr. Bacon. Thanks to all three of our panelists today. 
Thanks for your leadership.
    Over here. It is always hard to find who is talking with 
the masks on.
    But I really appreciate the three of you and what you do 
for the defense of our country.
    Admiral Davidson, we have already talked a little about the 
need for surface-to-surface missiles, Navy projection 
capabilities. And a lot of this is the result because we were 
part of the INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] Treaty, so 
we couldn't build these capabilities, while China could. Now 
they can target all of our bases in the Pacific.
    One thing I haven't heard you talk about is the need for 
long-range strike aviation stealth capabilities like the B-21. 
Could you talk about how important that capability is to you 
for your combat plans?
    Admiral Davidson. You know, as I think about the future in 
the region and the proliferation of offensive fires in the 
region as well as, you know, ever-increasing improvements in 
range, you know, a long-range stealth bomber like the B-21 is 
going to be incredibly important going forward.
    I speak quite frequently about what it takes to deter in 
the region. And our ability to do so means we have to be able 
to fight in the clinch as well as to be able to fight from 
outside the ring too. And it is the power of those capabilities 
that has been core to the warfighting concepts for the United 
States going back 100 years now and I suspect will be needed 
going forward as well.
    Mr. Bacon. And I would point out, the B-21 gives you rapid 
response capability, perhaps your fastest response capability.
    And one of the concerns, if we are looking at surface-to-
surface missiles, which I think are important, what countries 
do you think would be willing to host these, knowing they are 
targeting China? Because that is a big part of the question.
    Admiral Davidson. Well, certainly, I made mention earlier 
that I think all nations in the region are somewhat alarmed by 
China's activities and the very profound changes in the numbers 
of ballistic missiles that they have in the region. And I would 
say that many nations out there are considering what their 
needs are here. But there is certainly going to have to be a 
policy approach to a number of nations there. And I would let 
Mr. Helvey here talk about that.
    Mr. Bacon. It sure seems to me we need multiple 
capabilities to get this done.
    I want to pivot a little bit to nuclear deterrence. There 
has been a debate in this body for the last 3 or 4 years on do 
we modernize the ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles]? 
Do we go to a dyad? I think the debate has swung towards the 
triad and modernizing the ICBMs.
    But I think it would be important to have your perspective 
in regards to China. If we do not modernize our 400 ICBMs and 
focus on bombers and submarines, what do you think is the 
impact to strategic deterrence with China?
    Admiral Davidson. Certainly, the lessons I have learned 
during the course of my career is that the triad has been 
critically important to the security of the United States, you 
know, as we think about the Cold War with the Soviets.
    As I look towards the great expansion of Chinese 
capability, I made comment yesterday that they have quadrupled 
the size of their force over the course of the last 20 years 
till today. And it is estimated that it will at least double 
over the next 10 years. That is going to require, you know--
going to have to be the basis of our assessment as we think 
about what our strategic deterrent is going forward.
    Mr. Bacon. Strategic deterrence is job number one, I 
believe. And I think it is so important that we do modernize.
    My final question. I used to be an electronic warfare 
officer for most of my career in the Air Force. We had 
superiority in the electronic magnetic spectrum up through the 
1990s, and then we sort of disinvested and put our money in 
other places, while China really invested in this area. And I 
think many folks would say they have superiority in this area, 
in controlling the electronic magnetic spectrum, but we have 
tried to do some good work on this for the last 4 or 5 years to 
turn this around.
    Are you satisfied with the direction of the Department when 
it comes to regaining superiority in the electronic magnetic 
spectrum? And do you feel satisfied with where we are going 
when it comes to your theater?
    Thank you.
    Admiral Davidson. Yeah, the effort over the last 5 years 
has been critically important to restoring this.
    We went through a relatively finite period here over the 
previous two decades in which we didn't have to worry about 
challenges to that dominance out there. But as I think about 
investments going forward writ large--and this, you know, goes 
beyond the electromagnetic spectrum alone--we have to think 
about contested environments. And one of those things that can 
contest multiple environments--the maritime, the air, the 
ground, space, and cyberspace--is the exploitation of 
electromagnetic fires.
    So we need to continue to stay after that to preserve and 
regain, in some cases, the advantages that we enjoy in those 
other domains.
    Mr. Bacon. Thank you. I yield back.
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mrs. Luria.
    And sorry, I do want to--1:15, we have to be done. I 
apologize. We will get to as many as we can between now and 
then.
    Mrs. Luria,
    Mrs. Luria. Oh, I apologize. It seems this--is this 
microphone working? Oh.
    Well, thank you, Admiral Davidson. Nice to see you and have 
you here again to talk about this very critical area of the 
world for our national defense.
    And, in your testimony, you talk about providing a 
convincing deterrent. So a convincing deterrent requires 
presence within the AOR, so I wanted to talk a little bit about 
that. Obviously, there is the tyranny of distance. We have our 
forward-deployed naval forces in Japan, but the other forces 
coming from CONUS [continental United States] take much longer 
to transit.
    Can you talk a little bit about the potential growth of, 
you know, other places that our forces could be stationed 
overseas to provide more continuous presence within the AOR? If 
there are any particular locations that you are optimistic that 
we could create basing arrangements with our allies in order to 
have a more sustained operational presence within the region?
    Admiral Davidson. Well, three of the areas that have been 
being developed over the course of the last several years have 
been northwest Australia, Singapore, and, of course, Guam. And 
associated with the Guam is the DPRI [Defense Policy Review 
Initiative], the restationing of Marines from Okinawa in 
partnership with Japan, and Guam is one of the beneficiaries 
there.
    Those are three areas in which I think bases need to be 
continued to flesh out. It may not mean necessarily more people 
or more capabilities in all places, but certainly the access 
and some of what we envision in the Indo-Pacific Warfighting 
Concept and in the PDI to facilitate, you know, things like 
sustainment and logistics will be critically important.
    I can't leave out Diego Garcia as well.
    Now, we do have ambition in there for what I call ``places, 
not bases.'' Not permanent bases that look like housing and the 
permanent assignment of troops, but places that we might 
assess. They are well-articulated in the classified 1251 
report, and perhaps we could talk about some of those countries 
later.
    Mrs. Luria. I also wanted to touch on the recent 
announcement by the Navy that they would be reestablishing the 
1st Fleet.
    So, as the combatant commander and, kind of, looking at the 
naval forces in the AOR, do you find that would be 
advantageous, from your position, to have that split between 
the 1st and the 7th Fleet? Or do you find that the current 
operations, with the 7th Fleet covering essentially the whole 
maritime area of your AOR, is sufficient?
    Admiral Davidson. Admiral Aquilino at Pacific Fleet has 
been asked by Navy to look at some options for what the 1st 
Fleet might do. He is still in the process of developing what 
the concepts might be, what the impacts, pros and cons, are, 
and how it would affect 7th Fleet, some of our relationships 
out there as well. I look forward to having that conversation 
with----
    Mrs. Luria. Okay. Certainly can follow up on that.
    And also talking about presence and the type of ships and 
aircraft we have in the theater, recently the U.S. Coast Guard 
deployed to the PACOM AOR. And I wonder if you could talk about 
your perspective on the utility of that type of platform 
operating, you know, under the control of the Coast Guard and 
potentially under tactical control of the Navy or yourself at 
future times.
    Do you find more utility? Should we have more Coast Guard 
assets in the region? And is that particular platform something 
that is very useful under the Coast Guard within your AOR?
    Admiral Davidson. We work in close collaboration with the 
PACAREA [Pacific Area] Commander, Vice Admiral Linda Fagan. The 
Coast Guard has relationships in the region, you know, the same 
country-to-country relationships that we would have but in 
unique portfolios like illegal, unregulated, and underreporting 
fishing; narcotrafficking; human trafficking; maritime domain 
awareness. And they have key relationships with countries, 
particularly at Oceania, that may only have law enforcement 
organizations.
    So the Coast Guard presence in the region is very, very 
important as what we talked about earlier, building partner 
capacity and our engagements. I am very grateful for their 
approach to the region. And they seek to collaborate with us, 
the Coast Guard does.
    I am also very appreciative of the very unique 
relationships--they have fisheries relationships with Taiwan, 
even the People's Republic of China--that are important venues 
to engage and advance mutual interests that we are both 
concerned with.
    Mrs. Luria. Thank you. And I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    So we have 15 minutes left, and that means we have Ms. 
Cheney, Mr. Kahele, and Mr. Waltz. So we will get to those 
three, and then we will be done and reconvene over at the CVC 
for the classified brief.
    Ms. Cheney is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Cheney. Thank you very much, Chairman Smith.
    And thank you to all of our witnesses for being here today.
    To start, I want to thank, in particular, General Abrams 
for your comments about January 6. And I think all of us 
recognize we were reminded that day of how fragile our systems 
could be but also how resilient they are. And the systems held.
    And I know that, in a bipartisan fashion, we all strive 
every day to make sure that we remember and recognize the 
sacrifices that have been made to defend our freedom and the 
sacrifices that those of you in uniform continue to make and to 
conduct ourselves in ways that are worthy of your service and 
your sacrifice.
    So thank you for your service, and thank you for those 
comments, and thank you for being here with us today.
    Admiral Davidson, I wanted to ask you about deterrence. And 
Chairman Smith has mentioned a couple of times a concern about 
ensuring that we aren't creating a new Cold War vis-a-vis 
China. And so I wondered if you could dispel that notion.
    Talk a little bit about exactly what this strategy is--I 
know you talked about this yesterday over in the Senate--in 
terms of what really is required to ensure that the Chinese 
military recognizes and understands how painful the first 24, 
48, 72 hours would be for them, ensuring that we have 
sufficient resources and capabilities so that they aren't 
provoked by our weakness, frankly.
    But if you could give us a little bit more detail in terms 
of how you look at that deterrence. And I know some of that 
will come in the classified portion as well.
    Admiral Davidson. Thank you, Congresswoman. And very well 
articulated.
    At the heart of our approach in the Indo-Pacific is a 
deterrence-by-denial approach. In my mind, that takes a 
requirement to have the capability forward that involves both 
our forward-based forces today as well as the forces that we 
rotate routinely in the region; you know, sufficient warning, 
ISR presence of conventional assets; and, you know, the ability 
to project offense, to defend our forces, to defend our 
obligations in the theater, not only U.S. territory but our 
bilateral allies as well.
    And, you know, in order for any adversary to peel back the 
curtain every day and say, ``I see they have the presence, the 
capability in the numbers, the capacity, and, you know, the 
desired training and authorities to actually prevent me from 
pursuing my objectives,'' and then, you know, close the curtain 
and say, ``Today is not the day,'' that is the very nature of 
what we are trying to accomplish. We seek to maintain the 
peace.
    Ms. Cheney. Thank you. And I will look forward to talking 
to you in more detail about that in the classified setting.
    Could you just say a few words, Admiral Davidson, about 
operational concepts? I know this is something that the 
National Defense Strategy focused on a few years ago. But, in 
your view, where are we in terms of having updated and adequate 
operational concepts, with respect to China in particular?
    Admiral Davidson. Yes, ma'am. The Joint Staff, the Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs and his staff, are working very diligently 
on a Joint Warfighting Concept and four subordinate warfighting 
concepts--logistics and networking and others--that we believe 
are critically important. We have been running a series of war 
games to help inform development of those concepts.
    And, as I mentioned earlier, you know, given my requirement 
to focus on the immediate needs that are present out there in 
the theater, we are working with the services quite closely, as 
new capabilities come in, to be able to pull them into our, 
what we call, Indo-Pacific Warfighting Concept that would be, 
you know, our approach to the region over the next few years.
    Ms. Cheney. Okay. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    And I apologize, I made an error. One of the things about--
people come and go, and when they come back, if they were here 
ahead of the list--so I apologize to Mr. Kahele. We are not 
going to be able to get to you. Mr. Keating has returned, and 
he was here at the start.
    So Mr. Keating is recognized for 5 minutes, and then Mr. 
Waltz will wrap us up.
    Mr. Keating.
    Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will try and be 
brief and narrow.
    I thank the witnesses.
    You know, what really continues to be a concern is, you 
know, the reports where we had started out with joint--not 
``we,'' but the Chinese and Russians, and that is quite a 
change in their posturing before--actually engaged in joint 
training exercises.
    Could you comment on what the outlook is for continuation 
of that, what your take is on, you know, the threat that could 
impose, and what changes in their relationship could impact us?
    Admiral Davidson. Thank you, Congressman.
    During the course of the last 3 years, we have seen the 
Chinese participate with the Russians in Russia's capstone 
Eastern Military District exercises on an annual basis. We have 
seen some co-bomber flights, you know, side-by-side flights of 
bombers from the People's Liberation Army in China as well as 
Russian forces, and we have also seen some naval exercises 
during the course of my 3 years in command in the Indo-Pacific.
    I think we will continue to see exercises and cooperation 
like that. There are many that say that those exercises are 
pretty nascent and don't demonstrate the kind of coalition 
approach that the United States might have with others. 
Nevertheless, they are learning along the way, and we should be 
concerned about it.
    Mr. Keating. Well, thank you. And that just speaks to our 
necessity in moving forward on our own partnerships, like the 
one you referenced in your Senate testimony with the Quad--
India, Japan, Australia, and the U.S.
    Mr. Chairman, I will yield back some time so that everyone 
gets a chance at the end. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you. I appreciate that, not that that 
will give us time to get to Mr. Kahele. So, yeah, coming and 
going.
    Mr. Waltz is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to be sure you 
can hear me okay?
    The Chairman. Yes, we got you.
    Mr. Waltz. Thank you.
    And thank you, Admiral, Mr. Helvey, General Abrams. Thank 
you so much for your service over the last few years and for 
your candor and commitment to the oversight of this committee.
    I just want to throw out there where I am starting, kind 
of, at least from my perspective. I do believe we are in a Cold 
War with the Chinese Communist Party, or at least they believe 
that they are in one with us. We need a bit of a wake-up call 
across our populace to that fact.
    And, you know, just by definition, if we have a competitor 
that has a, by many measures, larger economy than ours and is 
on track to have a larger military and is seeking to displace 
us diplomatically, economically, and through the information 
space, that that is a Cold War environment, at least by my 
definition.
    So, Admiral, I would like your opinion on some analysis 
that I have been absorbing that points to what the CCP and the 
PLA define as success. And one of the things that they plan on, 
at least in their long-range campaign planning, is the United 
States financially, fiscally, no longer being able to compete, 
essentially the United States, in many ways, declining 
economically to the point where we can't afford to be a 
competitor with China and certainly not in the Pacific and in 
the Indo-Pacific.
    Do you agree with that analysis?
    Admiral Davidson. Sir, I think, you know, one of the key 
advantages of the United States over the course of the last--
over the course of the post-World War II history is our ability 
to lead the world in innovation. That has led not only to 
prosperity in this Nation but, I would say, across the globe as 
well.
    Investments that focus on innovation--and there are plenty 
of opportunities there in artificial intelligence and 5G 
technologies and, you know, on and on there, you know, advanced 
energy production and things like that, there are plenty of 
opportunities for the United States to continue to lead the 
globe there.
    I will say that one of the Chinese talking points and one 
of their efforts to deter the world and to deter us from our 
bilateral alliances and multilateral associations is to 
convince the rest of the world precisely that: that we are on 
the decline and they are on the rise. I have to tell you, I am 
an optimist about America, if we focus on our strengths.
    Mr. Waltz. Yes, absolutely. Thank you, Admiral.
    And I would just submit that if we don't have our own house 
in order financially, if we continue to build on a $30 trillion 
debt, that that may imperil our ability to make those 
investments that you find so critical.
    And then, secondly, if we continue to allow the Chinese 
Communist Party to steal their way to the top, through cyber, 
through mergers and acquisitions, and through, frankly, just 
outright theft in our research and academic universities, the 
conversations that we have in this committee may not matter, 
because we just cannot keep pace.
    So one of the things that I would like to get after, at 
least in the few minutes I have remaining, is: Do you agree 
that--or what does Beijing fear the most? I mean, do they fear 
internal unrest? A rearmed Japan? A unified Korean Peninsula? 
Western, U.S. allies on their periphery?
    I mean, we have talked a lot today about how to defend our 
basing and to maintain our capabilities, but how do we get 
inside their decision-making, as we seek to maintain 
deterrence?
    Admiral Davidson. Well, thank you, sir, for that.
    You know, I would say that they are--setting aside fears 
for a minute, their number one priority is to keep the 
Communist Party of China in power. They have concerns about 
their own internal security, what the influences are there. And 
they have external security concerns, which I think are totally 
unwarranted, given the West's, you know, support to China over 
the last nearly 40 years now, specifically, as well.
    Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will yield my 10 
seconds.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Appreciate that. Hey, that is 
better than average.
    And last but not least, Mr. Kahele.
    Mr. Kahele. Aloha. Thank you so much, Chair.
    Aloha, Admiral Davidson. It is great to see you. Thanks so 
much for taking the time to meet with me just before coming 
here to Washington, DC.
    I will be quick. I appreciate the testimony. And I couldn't 
agree more about your analysis of 360-degree missile defense 
capability protection for Guam. And I hope that, whatever 
system we put in place there to protect our first and second 
island chains, we one day look at protecting Hawaii as well. As 
you well know, I represent Hawaii. I commend the Navy for the 
successful--and INDOPACOM--successful FTM-44 [Flight Test Aegis 
Weapon System-44] test last December off the coast of Kauai and 
showing the value of the Pacific Missile Range Facility [PMRF] 
at Barking Sands.
    And so my question is, in regards to China's increasing 
threat and their development of their threats, specifically 
potential ballistic missile threats for Hawaii, is there any 
thoughts or discussion put into one day looking at SM-3 
[Standard Missile-3] Block IIA interceptors either deployed on 
Aegis ships off of Hawaii or utilizing the VLS [vertical 
launching system] Aegis Ashore site at PMRF once we direct our 
attention towards Guam and then start to look at things like 
Hawaii?
    Admiral Davidson. Well, thanks for your question, 
Congressman.
    You know, my nearest priority there is for the Homeland 
Defense Radar-Hawaii, and it is unfortunate that that falls 
outside the Pacific Deterrence Initiative. But, as we think 
about developing threats, what it might come to, that sensing 
and awareness, you know, helps improve capability gaps when it 
comes to maneuvering decoys--ballistic missiles that might have 
decoys associated with their reentry vehicles, and then 
potentially for maneuvering vehicles when they enter the 
atmosphere as well.
    I hope everyone in the Congress has noted that the SM-3 IIA 
had a very successful engagement here several months ago from 
the USS John Finn. It presents certainly a capability option to 
the Nation, and it is something that I think should be 
considered going forward, as we see the threats develop.
    Mr. Kahele. Great./
    And my last question then, Admiral, is, if that is the 
case, as a National Guardsman, it is my understanding that 
NORTHCOM's [Northern Command's] ground-based missile defense 
system is manned in combination with the Army National Guard 
and Active Component soldiers in Colorado and Alaska and 
California.
    The chief naval officer, Admiral Gilday's 2021 Navigation 
Plan, in it he states that, to remain ahead of our competitors, 
we will divest ourselves of legacy capabilities that no longer 
bring sufficient lethality to the fight. This includes 
divesting non-core Navy missions like Aegis Ashore and 
transferring those shore-based ballistic missile defense sites 
to ground forces. Enables sailors to focus on their core 
missions at sea and frees up resources to increase our 
lethality.
    Admiral Davidson, do you ever think that the Aegis Ashore 
system could be possibly manned in INDOPACOM by the National 
Guard?
    Admiral Davidson. I think certainly there is the potential 
for that. The Navy has built the training infrastructure, the 
maintenance pipelines, you know, the supply parts needs, all 
that other kind of stuff, to be able to bridge off of. And I 
know that the Chief of Naval Operations is in discussion with 
his service chief counterparts in the Pentagon about what the 
way ahead might be.
    Mr. Kahele. All right. Thank you.
    Thank you, Chair. Mahalo.
    The Chairman. Thank you all very much. That will conclude 
our hearing.
    I want to thank General Abrams for joining us. He will not 
be joining us, obviously, in the classified session in the CVC.
    But, again, really appreciate your service and your 
leadership. You have done a fantastic job. Good luck with the 
rest of the exercise, and thank you again.
    To our other witnesses, as well, we will see you in 45 
minutes over in the CVC.
    And, with that, we are adjourned--oh. Mr. Rogers. You don't 
have anything?
    Mr. Rogers. I was just going to tell General Abrams to go 
get some sleep now.
    The Chairman. He probably has to go back to work. I don't 
think your microphone was on, so I don't think he heard you.
    But, anyway, Mr. Rogers was urging you to get some sleep, 
if you have the opportunity, but we will see how that goes.
    Thank you very much. We are adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 1:16 p.m., the committee proceeded in closed 
session.]



      
=======================================================================




                            A P P E N D I X

                             March 10, 2021

=======================================================================

      



      
=======================================================================


              PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                             March 10, 2021

=======================================================================

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

      

      
  

      
=======================================================================


              WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING

                              THE HEARING

                             March 10, 2021

=======================================================================

      

      

              RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LARSEN

    General Abrams. The determination to resume exercises to pre-2018 
levels is a future decision for Alliance leaders. If the decision is 
made to adjust the size, scale, and scope of exercises on the Korean 
Peninsula it will take advance notice in order to properly coordinate 
the deployment and participation from off-peninsula tactical and 
strategic assets that formerly contributed to these events.   [See page 
17.]



      
=======================================================================


              QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                             March 10, 2021

=======================================================================

      

      

                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS

    Mr. Rogers. Admiral Davidson, in testimony before the Senate this 
week, you referenced INDOPACOM's current level of support to Taiwanese 
military exercises, including providing observers. In your military 
judgment, would enhancing our bilateral cooperation with Taiwan in 
these ways be consistent with our strategy and goals in the INDOPACOM 
region?
    Admiral Davidson. U.S. exercise support to Taiwan's military 
exercises helps us understand how Taiwan thinks of their defense and 
how those exercises contribute to the advancement of their doctrine. 
The results we observe from these exercises inform other USINDOPACOM 
military-to-military engagement programs with Taiwan, along with 
strategic- and operational-level dialogues. Continued bilateral 
cooperation increases Taiwan's readiness, improves their warfighting 
capacity, and reduces direct risk to U.S. forces, should conflict 
occur.
    Mr. Rogers. During your confirmation hearing in 2018, you indicated 
that you would evaluate the idea of inviting Taiwanese military forces 
to participate in military exercises in the Indo-Pacific region. What 
would be the benefits of inviting Taiwanese forces to participate in 
military training exercises, and would we be better served by 
multilateral exercises involving American allies and partners in the 
INDOPACOM region? What are the obstacles you face in making Taiwanese 
forces' participation in bilateral or multilateral exercises a reality?
    Admiral Davidson. Expanding United States-Taiwan cooperation to 
include joint military exercises would significantly improve Taiwan's 
ability to effectively manage its critical command and control 
functions. There is no substitute for both sides training together 
during an exercise scenario. Inviting Taiwan to observe one of our 
unilateral exercises would also significantly improve their exercise 
capabilities.
    Taiwan would receive only limited operational training benefit from 
participating in multilateral training exercises. However, 
participating in multilateral exercises would have a significant impact 
in terms of highlighting the productive role Taiwan plays in the region 
and enabling positive military-to-military relations between Taiwan and 
its neighboring nations.
    Mr. Rogers. In its Section 1251 Report, your command says Indo-
Pacific's military balance continues to become ``more unfavorable.'' Is 
that true in the Taiwan Strait? Why?
    Admiral Davidson. Yes, the military balance of power continues to 
become ``more unfavorable'' to the United States in the Taiwan Strait. 
The United States continues to support the peaceful resolution of 
cross-Strait issues and is very interested in peace and stability in 
and around the Taiwan Strait. However, the cross-strait situation is of 
increasing concern giving the harsh rhetoric from Beijing toward Taipei 
and the recent massive PRC military investment, including additional 
ballistic and cruise missiles, long-range rocket launchers, advanced 
ships, aircraft, and more. With this enhanced force, the PLA has 
intensified its posture near and around Taiwan, including 
circumnavigating the island with H-6 bombers, crossing the centerline, 
and flying aircraft into Taiwan's air defense identification zone at 
the highest rate in 25 years. The PRC also continues to incorporate 
amphibious assault training into national-level exercises.
    The United States response has been properly focused, but slow. The 
United States continues to provide defense articles and services to 
Taiwan to maintain sufficient self-defense capabilities that are 
commensurate with the threat Taiwan faces in accordance with the Taiwan 
Relations Act. USINDOPACOM also focuses on improving the Taiwan 
military's joint interoperability, training, readiness, and 
professional development. USINDOPACOM must continue to invest in 
capabilities that provide persistent presence through forward-based and 
rotational joint forces to assure Allies and partners, to deter 
potential adversaries, and to ensure U.S. access to international sea 
lanes and airspace.
    Mr. Rogers. In the Section 1251 Assessment, your command says that 
``[T]he National Guard's [State Partnership Program] provides a 
valuable tool for conducting military to military engagement to support 
security cooperation objectives.'' Should an SPP or similar National 
Guard program be created with Taiwan?
    Admiral Davidson. The State Partnership Program (SPP) supports the 
security cooperation objectives of the United States and USINDOPACOM. 
We have SPP relationships throughout the Indo Pacific Region that help 
us improve partner capacity, increase interoperability with those 
partner forces, strengthen our enduring relationships, while increasing 
force readiness. In accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act, 
USINDOPACOM will continue to conduct a wide variety of engagements with 
Taiwan, some of which include both active duty and National Guard 
elements. We will continue leveraging these existing, long-standing 
relationships.
    Mr. Rogers. How important are U.S. arms sales to Taiwan? Do you 
believe robust U.S. arms sales to Taiwan should continue? What 
capabilities do you believe they most need?
    Admiral Davidson. Consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, the 
U.S. provides Taiwan defense articles and services to allow Taiwan to 
maintain sufficient self-defense capabilities commensurate with the 
threat that Taiwan faces. Given the growing disparity in the cross-
Strait balance of military power, we encourage Taiwan to purchase large 
quantities of asymmetric systems that are highly mobile, lethal, and 
survivable, to include coastal defense cruise missiles (CDCMs), short-
and medium range air defenses, and sea mines. I also believe Taiwan 
needs to modernize and sustain critical conventional capabilities like 
F-16V; Patriot missiles; and modem ships, submarines, and aircraft. We 
also encourage Taiwan to expand Reserve Forces integration, improve 
irregular warfare capabilities, prioritize service interoperability, 
and develop and implement joint doctrine and a professional non-
commissioned officer corps.
    Mr. Rogers. What is the value of improved air and missile defense 
in Guam when it comes to responding to PRC aggression in the Taiwan 
Strait?
    Admiral Davidson. Improved air and missile defense in Guam protects 
the most forward U.S. territory in the Pacific and maintains the 
ability to project power, deter adversaries, and respond to crises 
across the USINDOPACOM area of responsibility, to include Taiwan. 
Protecting the U.S. air, maritime, and land forces on Guam is critical 
to USINDOPACOM operational requirements and, important for maintaining 
peace through combat-credible deterrence in the theater. As a strategic 
location, we must keep in mind force protection requirements for 
current and future threats facing Guam.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER
    Mr. Cooper. Understanding that Guam is U.S. territory, can you 
please give a policy overview of how we conduct missile defense for the 
United States against Chinese ballistic and air breathing threats? Is 
there anything that makes Guam different in this policy calculation?
    Mr. Helvey. China has developed and continues to grow a range of 
conventional and nuclear missile capabilities as part of its anti-
access/area denial strategy intended to deny the United States freedom 
to operate throughout the Western Pacific in support of its security 
interest. Within the Indo-Pacific region, China's growing anti-access/
area denial missile capabilities threaten Guam and the Northern Mariana 
Islands, a strategic hub for our presence in the region. DOD's ability 
to operate from Guam, including defenses that enable sustained 
operations during a conflict, will be central to implementing the 
U.S.'s Indo-Pacific strategy. Missile Defense is one component of the 
U.S. capability to counter missile centric strategies that seek to 
inhibit the United States' ability to deploy rapidly, project power, 
and support allies and partners in contested regions. In this role, 
effective and affordable missile defense provides a critical tool for 
shaping an adversary's riskbenefit decision calculus. Strengthening 
Guam's defensive posture will create doubt for China and North Korea 
that it would be possible to neutralize critical forward-deployed 
military capabilities with a few missiles and with a low risk of 
escalation.
    Mr. Cooper. Has there been a policy review of how adding additional 
capability, for example, the increase of deployed forces, build up of 
the air field and deep water port, and the potential of future 
hypersonic weapons being placed there would be viewed by China, and how 
that would change their calculus for targeting Guam as U.S. homeland 
with a conventional strike? What are the options being considered to 
change that calculus aside from a missile defense system?
    Mr. Helvey. Guam has long been a critical hub for U.S. military 
operations in the Western Pacific, and DOD is aware that the People's 
Republic of China has developed significant capabilities over many 
years intended to disrupt our operations. We assess that the People's 
Republic of China's calculus is comprehensive in nature while 
accounting for Guam-based capabilities, and our response to change that 
calculus requires a similar comprehensive approach. Integrated air and 
missile defense is one part of a broader set of DOD capabilities--along 
with passive defenses such as dispersal and hardening, as well as 
offensive capabilities--that strengthen deterrence and limit disruption 
to U.S. military operations if deterrence fails.
    Mr. Cooper. Chairman Smith has highlighted the difference of 
deterrence and domination when it comes to China, and the constant push 
from the Department to focus on the latter. In the case of Defense of 
Guam, I would think a key piece of that deterrence would be a strong 
policy statement by the U.S. to China that any strike on U.S. soil 
would have significant repercussions. Has there been that type of 
statement vis-a-vis Guam by either the previous administration or this 
one? If not, do you think that piece is just as important as deploying 
a military capability to counter missile threats?
    Mr. Helvey. It is axiomatic that an armed attack against the United 
States, including its territories and possessions, would be a grave act 
that would elicit a serious and appropriate response by the United 
States under the international law of armed conflict. I believe that 
the People's Republic of China understands that an attack on Guam would 
result in a robust U.S. response with substantial negative 
consequences. Our best deterrent is to field lethal and survivable 
capabilities and to establish a distributed and resilient force posture 
so that strikes against any single U.S. location do not result in an 
overwhelming loss of the capabilities needed to prosecute a conflict.
    Mr. Cooper. You have stated that Defense of Guam and an integrated 
air and missile defense capability on the island is your #1 priority. 
Congress has yet to see development or deployment of this system 
included in a President's budget request--why is that, and where was 
the pushback in the Department in the last administration for not 
requesting funding in the FY21 budget request?
    Admiral Davidson. The Department of Defense has not submitted the 
Guam Defense System in a budget request because they desired additional 
analysis. At this time, details of the FY 2022 President's budget 
request are pre-decisional.
    Mr. Cooper. In your written statement, you included ``In January 
2021, the MDA was directed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense to 
reprogram up to $29M in FY21 RDT&E funding to begin the architecture 
design for the GDS.'' In checking with both OSD and MDA, this statement 
is incorrect, and no reprogramming direction has been given to MDA to 
initiate an architecture design for a Defense of Guam system. Can you 
please clarify what was provided in your statement and what is 
currently being worked on for a Defense of Guam architecture?
    Admiral Davidson. My statement is correct. On 9 December 2020, 
Acting Secretary of Defense Miller confirmed his support and intent to 
direct $28.6M toward project and design development for the Guam 
Defense System (GDS). On 12 January 2021, Vice Admiral Hill from MDA 
informed USINDOPACOM that the Department directed MDA to develop an 
Above Threshold Reprogramming (ATR) package to identify $28.6M in FY21 
to fund GDS. On 15 January 2021, MDA submitted the ATR to OSD 
Comptroller to submit the reprogram request to Congress. The current 
status of the ATR is uncertain.
    There is no funding allocated to support progress on immediately 
delivering a material solution for a Defense of Guam architecture in 
response to advanced threats. While we wait for funding, MDA has 
continued to study and optimize design for an open architecture 
composed of current Programs of Record. OSD's Office of Cost Assessment 
and Program Evaluation (CAPE) is also conducting a study to determine 
alternate solutions that incorporate non Program of Record concepts. 
Non Program of Record solutions contain greater risk of not delivering 
their advertised capability in the timeframe required. As such, 
USINDOPACOM favors an initial system composed of the best Program of 
Record solutions today while maintaining an open architecture capable 
of incorporating future contributing technologies as they mature.
    Mr. Cooper. Understanding the threat to Guam is real, and that we 
do need to weigh options to defend the island, there has only been one 
solution put forward from you on what a Defense of Guam capability 
would look like--and it is a Navy system that I know you have 
familiarity with. Currently, DOD assigns air base defense to the Army, 
as well as many other integrated air and missile defense capabilities 
for the joint force. Have you given just as much thought into what the 
Army could provide, even if in an interim capability, with THAAD, 
Patriot, and in the future the Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense 
Sensor, Indirect Fire Protection Capability, and Integrated Air and 
Missile Defense Battle Control System? Why are you not pressing for at 
least some of the capabilities the Army could provide in the more near-
term?
    Admiral Davidson. The Guam Defense System (GDS) is not exclusively 
an Aegis Combat Weapon System. GDS will integrate known Programs of 
Record that include Army land-based sensors, interceptors, and command 
and control (C2) systems to provide persistent 360-degree defense of 
the island from the full range of PRC threats. GDS also integrates with 
mobile U.S. Air Force, Navy, space-based systems to create a networked 
defensive system of systems to provide situational awareness, 
information advantage, and missile defense protection for freedom of 
maneuver in the Western Pacific. The Aegis Combat Weapon System 
provides the only Program of Record capable of C2, joint sensor 
integration, and interceptors to address the combined upper and lower 
tier PRC threats to Guam deliverable by 2026.
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT
    Mr. Scott. It is my understanding that flame-resistant combat 
uniforms can reduce body burn by 80 percent in the event of a flash 
fire. Because of this increased protection, service members operating 
in Iraq and Afghanistan are currently required to wear flame-resistant 
combat uniforms. However, despite the prevalence of flash fire as a 
risk to U.S. forces from IEDs and other threats, service members 
operating outside of Iraq and Afghanistan are not currently required to 
wear flame-resistant combat uniforms. This leaves our servicemen at 
unnecessary risk of burn injuries, including personnel deployed to 
INDOPACOM.
    Can you tell me if there has been any consideration to requiring 
flame-resistant combat uniforms for troops deployed to the Indo-Pacific 
AOR? If not, why not?
    Admiral Davidson. I'm confident the Services are doing an excellent 
job in carrying out their responsibility to equip U.S. service members 
serving in the Indo-Pacific. Although service members in the USCENTCOM 
AOR wear flame-resistant combat uniforms, this type of clothing still 
has challenges related to durability, comfort, and expense. Research 
and development is ongoing to overcome these drawbacks at a reasonable 
cost. As the challenges mentioned above are resolved, flame-resistant 
uniforms will be more readily available for all U.S. service members 
and not just those serving in a combat zone.
    Mr. Scott. Do you have a sufficient amount of Joint STARS deployed 
to your region to satisfy all of your INDOPACOM requirements for 
Surface Moving Target Indicator (MTI) and forward manned Battle 
Management Command and Control (BMC2)?
    Admiral Davidson. I anticipate that the Department will only source 
a fraction of our validated airborne ISR MTI requirements in FY22. As a 
result, the E-8C JSTARS allocated to USINDOPACOM will continue to 
support MTI requirements at the expense of other mission sets. Any 
increase in airborne ISR sourcing of MTI capable platforms, including 
additional E-8C JSTARS, will provide more opportunities for the E-8C 
JSTARS to fulfill other functions, including in its BMC2 capacity.
    Mr. Scott. Congress has provided additional funding resources for 
Joint STARS and guidance to the USAF to sustain and modernize the fleet 
sufficiently to support overseas operations in the last two National 
Defense Authorization Acts. Are you seeing the results of those 
actions? What if any additional capabilities would you like to see 
funded for Joint STARS to improve its ability to support your 
operations?
    Admiral Davidson. The additional funding enabled JSTARS to continue 
playing an active role in the Indo-Pacific AOR and they remain in very 
high demand world-wide. USINDOPACOM supports near term resourcing and 
U.S. Air Force modifications that will improve data collection and 
transmission demands on its onboard systems, including enhancements to 
its communications, radios, and datalinks. All of these capabilities 
are immediate needs. Contested environments will require more robust 
and agile battle management systems that link sea, air, space, land and 
cyber domains at real-time.
    Mr. Scott. In your recently released Pacific Deterrence Initiative 
(PDI) Investment Plan for Fiscal Years 2022-2027, you call for enhanced 
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) augmentation, ``for 
persistent, long-range detect and track of air and surface targets.'' 
Have you considered the use of unmanned systems to augment your 
requirement of ``specialized manned aircraft?'' It is my understanding 
that the Office of Naval Research is successfully developing an ultra-
long endurance Group III Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) capable of 
staying aloft for up to 5 days with significant payloads. I believe 
this could provide a very capable and cost-effective solution. What is 
INDOPACOM's plan to leverage long-range, high-endurance UAS for 
persistent ISR coverage?
    Admiral Davidson. USINDOPACOM remains in close coordination with 
service and industry partners to develop new and advanced UAS 
technologies. We continue to provide opportunities to test and collect 
the data necessary to assist in developing these platforms. By 
supporting live demonstrations, we are able to develop concepts of 
operations for integrating new capabilities while helping to satisfy 
theater intelligence requirements.
    Long-range, high-endurance UAS platforms are integral to providing 
persistent ISR coverage across the Indo-Pacific region. The 
capabilities provided by these platforms provide substantial support to 
priority ISR requirements, including monitoring of Chinese or Russian 
distant sea military operations, grey zone activities, expansionist 
military activities, and economic exclusion zone violations.
    Mr. Scott. The Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) Investment Plan 
for Fiscal Years 2022-2027, mentions the significance of emboldened 
adversaries in the USINDOPACOM area of responsibility. Your PDI 
investment plan calls for enhanced intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance (ISR) augmentation and the requirement to ensure access, 
maneuver and fires in shared domains, presumably including contested 
environments. I am concerned that INDOPACOM has inadequate surveillance 
that could warn against chemical attacks and is able to track 
activities linked to the deployment of weapons of mass destruction and 
other illicit activities by both state and non-state actors. It has 
come to my attention that INDOPACOM is considering the development of 
High-Altitude Multi-Domain Ultra-Compact Hyperspectral Imaging sensors 
that can identify chemical plumes and track illicit tracking activities 
and WMD deployment preparations. Could you provide an overview of this 
development and how this will be leveraged to augment INDOPACOM 
operations?
    Admiral Davidson. Ultra-compact hyperspectral imaging systems 
(UCHIS) are suitable for UAVs and High Altitude Balloons (HAB), 
especially in a contested environment. The payload can detect chemical 
plumes from stand-off distances and will be able to cue Chemical 
Biological Radiological Nuclear and high yield Explosives (CBRNE) 
reconnaissance assets in real time. They are well suited for Pacific 
Air Force's Agile Combat Employment (ACE) concept by rapidly deploying 
and assessing potential airfield sites and landing zones, as well as 
providing day or night ISR support. UCHIS can support littoral and 
amphibious operations by surveilling these waters and shores for 
hazards.
    Mr. Scott. Would you support the deployment of U.S. Coast Guard Law 
Enforcement Detachments (LEDETs) with their unique capabilities to 
complement, not duplicate, Indo-Pacific security initiatives and uphold 
the global rules-based international order against malign influences of 
nation-states and TCOs? If so, what would be the minimum number you 
would like to have in your theater?
    Admiral Davidson. USINDOPACOM supports the deployment of USCG 
LEDETs through the Oceania Maritime Security Initiative. The LEDETs 
embark USN ships and enforce the sovereignty of Pacific Economic 
Exclusion Zones. The LEDETs provide a specialized law enforcement 
capability to address the Pacific Island Countries' greatest concerns: 
transnational crime; illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing; and 
drug trafficking. I fully support a permanent rotational LEDET presence 
in the region.
    Mr. Scott. Commander Brian Smicklas, USCG, wrote in the February 
2019 issue of Proceedings, ``Today's Coast Guardsmen likely are unaware 
that until 1991, the Coast Guard was a worthwhile warfare partner in 
the fight against peer adversaries. The 378-foot high-endurance and 
270-foot medium-endurance cutters were designed for antisubmarine 
warfare (ASW) missions and outfitted with the AN/SQS-17 and AN/SQS-38 
sonars and Mark-46 torpedoes--and some hulls carried Harpoon antiship 
missiles.'' Moreover, according to CDR Smicklas, ``The Coast Guard must 
recommence ``guarding the coast,'' including the active deterrence and 
detection of threats from peer adversaries. Doing so would augment Navy 
high-demand/low-density (HDLD) warship capabilities allocated to 
combatant commanders while providing the Coast Guard a true course 
toward maritime homeland-defense competencies and renewed relevance 
against the threat of interstate conflict.'' Would U.S. INDOPACOM be 
supportive of the U.S. Coast Guard's acquisition and deployment of more 
lethal platforms that could augment naval forces against a peer 
adversary like Communist China?
    Admiral Davidson. The Coast Guard's National Security Cutters are 
equipped with the same combat suite and command and control system 
found on the Littoral Combat Ship allowing integration with the U.S. 
Navy. However, I caution against putting more lethal platforms aboard 
Coast Guard assets because it may put at risk their trusted access and 
unique capabilities that stem primarily from their soft power/non-
kinetic options.
    Mr. Scott. Commander Rob Brodie, U.S. Navy, wrote in the February 
2021 issue of Proceedings, ``The complete capabilities of a $1.8 
billion Arleigh Burke-class destroyer or a San Antonio-class amphibious 
transport dock cannot be had for $130 million, but by leveraging high-
speed ferries, the Navy can more quickly bring hypersonic missiles to 
the fleet, launch clouds of unmanned sensors and communications relay 
equipment, and gain the flexible amphibious lift required to win the 
expeditionary fight.8 By doing these things and executing some of the 
discrete warfare missions such as BMD with ``less exquisite'' 
platforms, the high-end carrier strike groups will be better able to 
focus on sea control.'' Do you agree or disagree about this assessment 
on high-speed ferries for surface and amphibious warfare against the 
Communist Chinese in the U.S. Indo-Pacific AOR?
    Admiral Davidson. The use of ``less exquisite'' platforms like 
unmanned vessels for discrete missions provide distinct advantages in 
this theater with respect to responsiveness (lead time), agility, and 
overall sustainment operations.
    Mr. Scott. Does the U.S. Navy's shipbuilding plan lack the number 
of vertical launch cells to win a missile fight in the INDOPACOM AOR?
    Admiral Davidson. More vertical launch cells are required in the 
Indo-Pacific region.
    Mr. Scott. Could containerized weapons and sensors on converted 
merchant ships provide effective and affordable platforms to deploy 
cruise missiles and autonomous drones rapidly and in sufficient numbers 
to win in the Indo-Pacific AOR?
    Admiral Davidson. This and other distributed, low cost, and 
asymmetric--yet high impact--capabilities to increase our lethality in 
a contested environment are viable options. We must also consider other 
low cost, high impact Camouflage, Concealment, and Deception (CC&D) 
capabilities to increase survivability in this contested environment.
    Mr. Scott. Should the U.S. Coast Guard establish Patrol Forces 
Indo-Pacific to build regional partnerships in law enforcement and 
maritime security?
    Admiral Davidson. No. Coast Guard Sector Guam already has a 
significant footprint in the region. In FY21, their footprint expanded 
to include three new Fast Response Cutters (FRCs) with outstanding 
expeditionary capabilities, two of which are already in theater. The 
U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) is planning a high visibility, triple 
commissioning ceremony for these FRCs to announce Sector Guam's re-
branding and elevation to U.S. Coast Guard Forces Micronesia/Sector 
Guam. USCG Forces Micronesia/Sector Guam operations and missions 
include search and rescue, law enforcement, maritime domain awareness 
and information sharing, ports and waterways security, aids to 
navigation, maritime security, EEZ enforcement for the Compact of 
Freely Associated States, theater cooperation with Pacific Island 
Countries and Territories, and regional maritime exercises.
    Mr. Scott. Is automated unmanned systems technology advanced enough 
to allow the Navy to design a new mine-warfare concept of operations?
    Admiral Davidson. The evaluation and integration of unmanned 
systems is ongoing, and I support that effort. The added capabilities 
these systems provide are promising, and USINDOPACOM fully supports the 
U.S. Navy's Warfare Development Centers' efforts to continuously 
evaluate and update concepts of operations as the technology of 
automated unmanned systems matures.
    Mr. Scott. Should the People's Liberation Army Navy be invited to 
RIMPAC 2022 or RIMPAC 2024 like they were for RIMPAC 2014 and 2016?
    Admiral Davidson. No, the U.S. should not invite the People's 
Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to RIMPAC. The U.S. disinvited the PLAN 
from RIMPAC 2018 because of their efforts to militarize the South China 
Sea and because China's behavior was inconsistent with the principles 
and purpose of the exercise.
    Furthermore, the FY19 National Defense Authorization Act prohibits 
People's Republic of China (PRC) participation in RIMPAC stating, ``The 
Secretary of Defense shall not enable or facilitate RIMPAC 
participation unless the Secretary certifies to congressional defense 
committees that China has: (A) Ceased all land reclamation activities 
in the South China Sea, (B) Removed all weapons from its land 
reclamation sites, and (C) Established a consistent four-year track 
record of taking actions toward stabilizing the region.'' If Congress 
does not change the law and if the PRC do not meet the aforementioned 
criteria, the United States will not invite the PRC to future RIMPAC 
participation.
    Mr. Scott. How would enhanced cooperation between the United States 
and Taiwan in building up a stockpile of U.S. made weapons better help 
Taiwan defeat an initial invasion or blockade?
    Admiral Davidson. The United States continues to support the 
peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues in a manner consistent with 
the wishes and best interests of the people of Taiwan. In the event of 
hostilities, an adequate stockpile of mobile, survivable, and lethal 
conventional and asymmetric weaponry are key to helping dissuade, 
delay, and defeat aggression from the People's Liberation Army. U.S. 
weapons in Taiwan create both a strategic deterrent and also the 
technical advantage necessary to enable Taiwan to resist initial 
invasion or blockade.
    Mr. Scott. Does the urgency of Communist China's threat to China 
justify consideration of transferring to Taiwan much larger quantities 
U.S. munitions from DOD's inventory to rapidly boost their stockpile of 
weapons?
    Admiral Davidson. USINDOPACOM supports our obligations under the 
Taiwan Relations Act and the United States provides Taiwan defense 
articles and services in such quantities to allow Taiwan to maintain 
sufficient self-defense commensurate with the threat it faces. 
Consistent with this policy imperative, our arms sales to Taiwan must 
be timely and effective.
    Mr. Scott. Is the sale of short-range ballistic missiles to Taiwan 
more or less provocative that China's buildup of over 2,000 missiles 
targeting Taiwan, Japan, and Guam?
    Admiral Davidson. For over 40 years we have been required by law 
(the Taiwan Relations Act) to make available to Taiwan defense articles 
and services as necessary for Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self 
defense. We do not consider defensive capabilities to be provocative.
    It is only the People's Republic of China (PRC) leaders who 
characterize such actions as ``provocative'' in an effort to retain the 
massive military advantage they built vis-a-vis Taiwan over the past 
few years. China continues to field and exercise a broad array of 
offensive ballistic and cruise missiles capable of striking key 
facilities in Taiwan and across the western Pacific. U.S. and Taiwan 
capabilities need to keep pace in order to maintain the status quo 
necessary to deter aggressive PRC military action.
    Mr. Scott. Does the United States need to develop a coherent 
strategy to address Communist Chinese expansion and coercion in the 
South China Sea and other regions?
    Admiral Davidson. While the strategic competition with China is 
global, the military component of that competition resides primarily in 
the Indo-Pacific region. USINDOPACOM is executing a coherent Theater 
Strategy that nests under national level guidance. Where appropriate, 
we have coordinated planning, operations, and activities with our 
allies and partners. The USINDOPACOM Strategy includes a resourcing 
plan that restores combat credible deterrence and provides flexible 
deterrent options. My Section 1251 Independent Assessment reflects 
requirements that are vital military capabilities to deter China.
    Mr. Scott. Does the United States, in cooperation with our treaty 
allies and partner nations, wage an integrated grand strategy that 
utilizes all of the national instruments of power to compel Communist 
China to change its policy of coercion?
    Admiral Davidson. An integrated grand strategy like that held by 
NATO in the European theater, is not implemented in the Indo-Pacific 
region. Doing so may force our allies and partners to ``choose sides'' 
between the United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC) 
which would almost certainly result in economic coercion, if not 
isolation, of our allies and partners from the PRC. We are, however, 
currently implementing a range of global and regional strategies and 
plans. One such family of plans is the Global Campaign Plans, derived 
largely from the National Defense Strategy. We are also heavily 
involved in the continuous development and review of strategies, 
frameworks, and plans to better integrate with the global force, 
interagency, and strategic aims of the U.S. government. Our efforts 
involve increasingly close collaboration with our allies and partners 
with a focus of converging on a Free and Open Indo-Pacific as a 
unifying theme.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MOULTON
    Mr. Moulton. Admiral Davidson, last year I co-led the Future of 
Defense Task Force, which was a bipartisan effort to identify the hard 
choices and smart investments necessary to secure our future 
competitive advantage. A key finding from our work on the task force is 
that it is necessary to divest of some legacy systems to make room for 
the next generation of technology. Subsequent guidance from both the 
White House and Department of Defense has also made it clear that this 
is a priority. In your testimony and in the Section 1251 Independent 
Assessment, you articulate the resourcing requirements needed to 
maintain momentum for the Pacific Defense Initiative. Can you also 
highlight specific platforms and systems in INDOPACOM that are designed 
for conflicts of decades past and, in your assessment, are unsuited for 
future warfighting concepts?
    Admiral Davidson. Due to the constantly evolving threat in the 
Indo-Pacific, some stalwart legacy systems have reached obsolescence 
because of our near-peer competitors' modern weapon systems. 
Furthermore, the threat has demonstrated the willingness and ability to 
operate below the level of conflict in multiple domains which takes 
away DOD's standard processes and our timeline to sunset legacy 
systems. Some examples of systems that are reaching decommissioning 
value include the: A-10, F-16, F-15C/D, MQ-9, U-2, C-130E H, KC-10, KC-
135, Dock Landing Ships (LSD), and USMC Ml Al. I support decisions to 
divest legacy systems in order to invest in modernization and future 
warfighting capabilities.
    Mr. Moulton. Admiral Davidson and General Abrams, I commend you 
both for your work on protecting and sustaining joint force readiness 
while mitigating the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic over this past 
year. We still have a ways to go. In light of recent testimony in front 
of this committee that approximately one third of service members are 
turning down the vaccine, how will such a high refusal rate undermine 
your force posture as a credible and convincing deterrent? How will a 
partially vaccinated force impact our ability to cooperate and execute 
missions with our allies and partners?
    Admiral Davidson. COVID-19 has had minimal impact on USINDOPACOM's 
ability to perform its mission and remain a credible deterrent in the 
region. In cooperation with our partners and allies, we minimized the 
loss of readiness by modifying exercises and training events, 
integrating the potential COVID-19 vectors, and moving venues. Most 
2021 exercises and events are occurring as planned using proven 
mitigation measures. USINDOPACOM continues mitigation efforts 
throughout the region, to include, when applicable, restrictions of 
movement, pre-and post-deployment quarantines, reduced manning, 
flexible work schedule, pre-screening, and of course, enforcing 
mandatory mask policies and social distancing. I am confident that our 
ability to maintain readiness levels will only improve as vaccination 
percentages increase.
    Mr. Moulton. Admiral Davidson, in your testimony you stated that, 
``There is no capability that we have that can substitute an aircraft 
carrier'' and that, ``sustaining that capability going forward is 
critically important''. Yet in your testimony to the Senate Armed 
Service Committee, you also described the test launch of the PLA's DF-
21D anti-ship ballistic missile into the South China Sea last August as 
an ``unmistakable message'' that China is committed to deterring any 
military action off its eastern coast by threatening to destroy the 
major sources of U.S. power projection in the region, its carrier 
battle groups. As China continues to modernize its anti-ship missile 
capability, does a forward deployed carrier presence in the Western 
Pacific continue to provide a convincing deterrent? Or does it embolden 
the PRC to inflict an unacceptable loss on our force?
    Admiral Davidson. Our operational scheme of maneuver, tactics, and 
countermeasures are designed to enable us to operate our forces, 
including carriers, in areas where threats exist. If we choose not to 
employ this critical asset, we play directly into PRC's hands--we will 
have been deterred ourselves. The carrier ``Air Wing of the Future'' 
will pace in front of Chinese threats with standoff range and tempo 
while providing a convincing and credible deterrent.
    Additionally, a forward deployed carrier is my most convincing 
deterrent available and a significant assurance to our allies. China 
has spent years of research to counter our carriers because it is the 
most survivable strike platform in the Westem Pacific and holds many of 
their platforms at risk.
    Mr. Moulton. Admiral Davidson and General Abrams, I commend you 
both for your work on protecting and sustaining joint force readiness 
while mitigating the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic over this past 
year. We still have a ways to go. In light of recent testimony in front 
of this committee that approximately one third of service members are 
turning down the vaccine, how will such a high refusal rate undermine 
your force posture as a credible and convincing deterrent? How will a 
partially vaccinated force impact our ability to cooperate and execute 
missions with our allies and partners?
    General Abrams. United States Forces Korea's (USFK) current 
declination rate is 18%, and these numbers continue to lower. It is 
anticipated that USFK will achieve ``Community Immunity'' (defined as 
75% of total population inoculated) by mid-May 21. As such, there is no 
impact to training or readiness as a result of declinations. Continued 
adherence to Republic of Korea and U.S. restriction of movement and 
quarantine measures does, in the short term, hinder training but has 
minimal impact on readiness.
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KELLY
    Mr. Kelly. The tri-service maritime strategy discusses the theme of 
``day to day competition,'' including below the level of armed 
conflict. How is the Coast Guard able to provide support in this area? 
Have you been satisfied with the performance of National Security 
Cutters and Fast Response Cutters and would you be able to employ those 
assets if more were made available?
    Admiral Davidson. I am very satisfied with the unique capability 
the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) brings to the Indo-Pacific during day-to-
day competition. USCG ships have access to locations where U.S. Navy 
(USN) ships do not. USCG forces also offer specific law enforcement 
authorities and training that is not organic to USN combatants. 
Increased deployments of USCG Cutters would significantly open 
opportunities to support day-to-day competition and support Oceania 
Maritime Security that satisfies critical engagements in the region.
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BANKS
    Mr. Banks. Admiral Davidson, I am concerned with the rapid pace of 
modernization of the Chinese military, especially as it relates to 
submarine production and capabilities. Would you share your view of the 
role sonobuoy sensors and targeting data will play in your efforts to 
maintain a persistent presence and deterrent posture in the INDOPACOM 
region? Do you agree that in light of China's increasing and evolving 
undersea threats, it is critical for the U.S. Navy to continue to 
acquire and maintain a robust sonobuoy inventory as part of a strong 
ASW advantage for U.S. naval forces? Would you support a request to 
significantly increase the Navy's sonobuoy capacity to continually 
compete with China's Naval growth?
    Admiral Davidson. The utilization of sonobuoys fits into an overall 
family of systems that includes subsurface, surface, and airborne 
sensors to locate China's undersea threats. It is crucial that the U.S. 
Navy not only continue to acquire and maintain a robust sonobuoy 
inventory, but also increase its submarine inventory to compliment the 
capabilities offered from sonobuoys. USINDOPACOM supports an increase 
in the Navy's sonobuoy capacity to compete with China's expanding 
undersea capabilities.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BERGMAN
    Mr. Bergman. Admiral Davidson, in your Pacific Deterrence 
Initiative (PDI) investment plan, you identified ranged investments 
which included the Pacific Multi-Domain Training and Experimentation 
Capability (PMTEC) and the objective of creating a fully instrumented, 
live-virtual constructive (LVC) training area across the near entirety 
of the Pacific Ocean. The plan specifically highlighted the need for 
upgrades to the Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex (JPARC) at 
Elmendorf, AK. Would upgrading JPARC with a Secure, Synthetic Inject to 
Live LVC (SITL LVC) air combat training capability help INDOPACOM meet 
its requirement to provide forces capable of fighting in highly 
contested environments against technologically advanced opponents? 
Would providing this capability at JPARC specifically and other ranges 
help increase overall readiness and combat capability for both 
INDOPACOM and allied forces?
    Admiral Davidson. The Pacific Multi-Domain Test and Experimentation 
Capability (PMTEC) is critical for developing the training capacity to 
integrate Service recommended weapons and capabilities into a joint 
warfighting concept that deters the adversary and trains our most 
capable warfighting force while expanding the breadth and scale of 
experimentation.
    Upgrading JPARC with LVC is integral to PMTEC. This capability will 
offer the Joint Force more effective, realistic, all domain training 
and experimentation at the tactical and operational level. The LVC 
capability enables our warfighters to train in a distributed manner, 
while simulating the highly contested threat environment of a near-peer 
conflict or operation. LVC is a must for enabling real threat emulation 
and live force-on-force training and provides the efficient means to 
increase and improve threat-representative, high-end training.
    PMTEC will network test and training ranges from the west coast of 
the United States to Japan and Australia. I envision a future where our 
allies and partners could benefit from the state of the art training 
ranges.
    Mr. Bergman. Admiral Davidson, can you confirm that 5th generation 
airpower is a requirement for your mission in INDOPACOM, and can you 
explain how 5th generation aircraft, like F-22 and F-35, meet that 
requirement? As you know, many of our key allies in the Indo-Pacific 
region are participants in the F-35 program. In your opinion, has the 
F-35 program had a positive impact on both military and diplomatic 
relations with these key allies?
    Admiral Davidson. Fifth generation aircraft like the F-35 and F-22 
aircraft are vital to the USINDOPACOM mission to counter the highly 
advanced, multi-dimensional, integrated defense networks of near peer 
adversaries. Stealth technology, combined with other formidable 5th 
generation capabilities, increases survivability and effectiveness in 
an Anti-Access and Area-Denial (A2/AD) environment. F-35 capabilities 
combined with the F-22's air dominance allows U.S. forces the ability 
to achieve air superiority in a contested environment.
    The F-35 program demonstrates the positive impacts of working with 
allies on modem weapon platforms. The F-35 program has allowed the 
United States to increase its level of collaboration and 
interoperability, which is also resulting in allies and partners' 
willingness to be security providers. Furthermore, this level of shared 
technology improves interoperability with our partners which will 
enhance our exercises, training, operations, and ability to drive 
coalition and joint force readiness.
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WALTZ
    Mr. Waltz. Admiral Davidson, you recently described the significant 
modernization advancements that the PRC and Russia have achieved, 
including the commissioning of 25 major ships in the PLA Navy in 2020--
comprising of combatants, amphibious warfare ships, and nuclear-powered 
ballistic missile submarines--as well as significant advancements 
within the Russian Pacific Fleet inventory that further increase their 
anti-ship and anti-submarine capabilities. PRC's and Russia's 
capabilities are growing increasingly sophisticated and complex--
providing them with quieter, more agile surface and undersea 
maneuverability.
    Admiral, will you describe the magnitude of the threat that our 
Commanders face in the region now, and as we look to the future?
    Admiral Davidson. China and Russia are fielding increasingly 
capable and trained forces that will only become more challenging over 
time. In addition to the rapid fielding of advanced naval systems you 
note, the PLA is also producing a broad array of modem aircraft; 
ballistic, cruise, and other missiles; electronic warfare; and space/
counter-space systems. Nearly all of these new capabilities represent 
substantial qualitative improvements (e.g., range, speed, accuracy, 
lethality) over the systems they are replacing. The PLA is combining 
these new weapons and systems with rapid advancements in joint 
warfighting structure, doctrine, training, and operations to create a 
much more capable force.
    Russian advancements are less dramatic but are following similar 
paths. Material improvements include new or upgraded ships, submarines, 
aircraft, air defense and anti-ship missiles, and more. Like the PLA, 
Russian forces are training to transform these new capabilities into a 
coherent fighting force.
    Individually, both China and Russia are threats; if they work 
together, as they have begun to do in recent years, they will become 
even more challenging.
    Mr. Waltz. Admiral Davidson, you have spoken about the importance 
of U.S. intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance (ISR) 
capabilities in the region, to include critical sensor systems such as 
sonobuoys and towed array technologies which provide critical 
intelligence and protection to our U.S. and allied naval forces.
    Admiral, do you believe there are merits to increasing and 
modernizing the Navy's surface and undersea capabilities, to include 
our sonobuoy and next generation towed array technologies considering 
the increasing capabilities of the PRC and Russian navies in your 
region?
    Admiral Davidson. Yes, the ability to effectively detect, classify, 
and track submarines, specifically new generations of extremely quiet 
enemy submarines, is critical to the success of the U.S. Navy. The 
utilization of sonobuoys fits into an overall family of systems that 
includes subsurface, surface, and airborne sensors to locate China's 
undersea threats. It is crucial that the U.S. Navy not only continue to 
acquire and maintain a robust sonobuoy inventory, but also increase its 
submarine inventory to compliment the capabilities offered from 
sonobuoys.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. JOHNSON
    Mr. Johnson. Admiral Davidson, you've highlighted many of the 
challenges we face in the Indo-Pacific in responding to the rapid 
militarization that China has committed to in recent years. One of the 
things that strikes me as alarming is their commitment to enhancing 
their nuclear capabilities--it's been widely reported the Chinese are 
in the process of at least doubling their current capabilities. Can you 
speak to the threat that this poses to our forces and allies in the 
Indo-Pacific and generally about the need for the United States to have 
a fully-modernized nuclear deterrent?
    Admiral Davidson. China's growing nuclear capability poses a 
significant threat to U.S. and allied forces in the region. The 
People's Liberation Army (PLA) is fielding a diverse array of nuclear-
capable platforms, ranging from intercontinental ballistic missiles 
(ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBMs) that can 
target the continental United States, to intermediate- and mid-range 
ballistic missiles (IRBMs & MRBMs) that can strike regional targets 
across South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Oceania. The PLA is also 
upgrading its H-6 strategic bombers that may enable a nuclear air-
launched ballistic missile (ALBM) capability, completing the final leg 
of China's nuclear triad. China is also investing heavily in the 
development of hypersonic capabilities that are likely to be available 
to the nuclear forces within the near-future.
    Improvements to the effectiveness, reliability, and survivability 
of China's nuclear forces, coupled with Beijing's lack of transparency, 
underscore the threat China's capabilities pose to the United States 
and our allies. For this reason I support Department initiatives to 
ensure the United States maintains a flexible, adaptable, and resilient 
nuclear deterrent capability.
                                 ______
                                 
                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. McCLAIN
    Mrs. McClain. As we all know, China has become an ever-increasing 
threat not only to the Pacific region, but globally. In addition to the 
build up in their armed forces, they have been developing 5-G 
technology, and the United States is falling further behind in this 
regard.
    My question is:
    Would a 5-G secured network, accessible anywhere in the world for 
our Forward Operating Bases, or other command centers for transmission 
of data, be a priority for the Indo-Pacific Command?
    Is an integrated information system for rapid response a priority 
for you?
    Is there a strategic military advantage to having a 5-G secured 
network to transmit and receive data anywhere in the world that would 
integrate U.S. military sea, air and land forces?
    Mr. Helvey. Secure and reliable communications are essential to our 
ability to operate in the IndoPacific region. Secured 5G wireless 
communications are one way to achieve that end. The Department and its 
interagency partners are working on a number of initiatives to explore 
how we can further leverage 5G technology to accomplish our mission 
more effectively in peace, crisis, and conflict.
    The Department supports a whole-of-government engagement with 
allies and partners to identify risk-mitigation methods for untrusted 
telecommunications vendors, establish shared standards, and determine 
security principles that will improve network security and resilience. 
The Department of Defense also supports efforts to provide technical 
and financial assistance to international partners to help secure 
communications networks from untrusted vendors. These efforts will 
strengthen interoperability with our allies and partners and enable us 
to pursue our shared objectives in the Indo-Pacific region.
    Although these efforts will reduce some of the risk of using 
overseas telecommunications networks, including 5G, the Department is 
also developing as-yet nascent capabilities to operate over unsecured 
networks. These investments will never remove the risks of untrusted 
vendors in partner networks, but will allow us to mitigate some of the 
associated risks. The Department presently maintains integrated 
information systems to support the warfighter across the continuum of 
conflict.
    Mrs. McClain. As we all know, China has become an ever-increasing 
threat not only to the Pacific region, but globally. In addition to the 
build up in their armed forces, they have been developing 5-G 
technology, and the United States is falling further behind in this 
regard.
    My question is:
    Would a 5-G secured network, accessible anywhere in the world for 
our Forward Operating Bases, or other command centers for transmission 
of data, be a priority for the Indo-Pacific Command?
    Is an integrated information system for rapid response a priority 
for you?
    Is there a strategic military advantage to having a 5-G secured 
network to transmit and receive data anywhere in the world that would 
integrate U.S. military sea, air and land forces?
    Admiral Davidson. Would a 5-G secured network, accessible anywhere 
in the world for our Forward Operating Bases, or other command centers 
for transmission of data, be a priority for the Indo-Pacific Command?
    Providing the most advanced, secure networking technology to the 
warfighter is always a USINDOPACOM priority. Secure adoption of 5G is 
part of the holistic modernization of communications capabilities 
across the theater and is required to fight and win in a Denied, 
Degraded, Intermittent, Limited (DDIL) Bandwidth communications 
environment. Modernization of U.S. and allied telecommunications 
infrastructure is critical to the region where China is currently the 
leading telecommunications provider.
    Is an integrated information system for rapid response a priority 
for you?
    Yes. With particular emphasis on 5G experimentation, the Pacific 
Multi-Domain Training and Experimentation Capability (PMTEC) is aimed 
at integration of advanced communications technologies in training 
ranges to inform innovation and modernization activities throughout the 
theater. Furthermore, the Mission Partner Environment (MPE) will 
provide a resilient, secure, adaptable, and interoperable information 
architecture and will deliver the same function as a physical data 
center.
    Is there a strategic military advantage to having a 5-G secured 
network to transmit and receive data anywhere in the world that would 
integrate U.S. military sea, air and land forces?
    Enhancing the integration of U.S. military forces is significant. 
Information dominance and the ability to conduct all domain operations 
is of particular importance in maintaining the advantage over an 
adversary like China. The adoption of 5G represents a key component of 
the technology required for achieving these ends.
    Mrs. McClain. As we all know, China has become an ever-increasing 
threat not only to the Pacific region, but globally. In addition to the 
build up in their armed forces, they have been developing 5-G 
technology, and the United States is falling further behind in this 
regard.
    My question is:
    Would a 5-G secured network, accessible anywhere in the world for 
our Forward Operating Bases, or other command centers for transmission 
of data, be a priority for the Indo-Pacific Command?
    Is an integrated information system for rapid response a priority 
for you?
    Is there a strategic military advantage to having a 5-G secured 
network to transmit and receive data anywhere in the world that would 
integrate U.S. military sea, air and land forces?
    General Abrams. Would a 5-G secured network, accessible anywhere in 
the world for our Forward Operating Bases, or other command centers for 
transmission of data, be a priority for the Indo-Pacific Command?
    For the specific United States Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) 
position, United States Forces Korea (USFK) defers response to them.
    USFK is interested in the benefits of 5G for our warfighters with 
its impressive low latency and high bandwidth. USFK continues to follow 
the development of 5G technology and how it would integrate into our 
secure network. Our staff will continue to stay engaged with INDOPACOM, 
Defense Information System Agency (DISA) and National Security Agency 
as they develop a secure means to communicate over 5G and the national/
international policies for militaries to utilize this capability.
    The infrastructure at Forward Operating Bases for 5G would be 
extremely limited, if present at all, and would have to rely on current 
line of sight communication or over the horizon satellite communication 
(SATCOM) terminals. This limitation on the infrastructure would exist 
not only for 5G during conflict but also for 4G technology as well.
    Is an integrated information system for rapid response a priority 
for you?
    An integrated information system for rapid response is always a 
priority for U..S Forces. U.S. Components in the Republic of Korea 
operate in a Joint environment where our information technology system 
must talk across all our components (United States Air Force, Marine 
Corps, Army, and Navy). USFK cannot solely rely on the local 
infrastructure and requires a multi-dimensional communications 
infrastructure to ensure connectivity for our warfighters.
    The integration of our coalition partners under the United Nations 
Command is critical to the safety and security of the people of Korea. 
To ensure the integration of the coalition, USFK is working with its 
partners, U.S. Components, INDOPACOM, and DISA to build the framework 
of Multi-Partner Enclave to streamline our integration, control and 
information sharing.
    Is there a strategic military advantage to having a 5-G secured 
network to transmit and receive data anywhere in the world that would 
integrate U.S. military sea, air and land forces?
    A secure 5G network present in the battlespace would certainly be a 
benefit to friendly forces. I believe we are still some time away from 
a global 5G network, as the most advanced countries are just now slowly 
coming on board in selected areas, and other countries are banning 5G 
altogether.
    There are commercial satellite communication (SATCOM) terminals 
that operate in the 5G frequency band that offer higher bandwidth than 
the current ground tower systems. Unfortunately, the frequency band 
that host nations currently utilize for 5G mobile conflicts with the 
SATCOM frequency band. Therefore 5G coverage into places where military 
forces operate is unlikely without specific planning for the satellite 
coverage required.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. JACKSON
    Dr. Jackson. Mr. Helvey, could you speak to existing challenges in 
the region regarding our current vertical lift platforms and how do 
those challenges compare to those faced by our adversaries? Also, can 
you explain how important our vertical lift modernization efforts are 
for our partners in the region and how our modernization efforts will 
improve their capabilities as well?
    Mr. Helvey. Vertical lift is an important component in the mobility 
of our forces both to assist and work in combination with our allies 
and partners. It is too early for me to comment on the Army's rotary-
wing modernization efforts, but we will work closely with the Army to 
ensure that their modernization efforts meet the requirements of our 
strategy. Where our adversaries are concerned, the Department's most 
recent China Military Power Report noted that during 2019, ``the 
People's Liberation Army fielded the Z-20 medium lift helicopter, which 
will enhance aviation and air assault brigades' ability to perform 
rapid air insertion operations, light infantry force projection, and 
expedited logistics.''
    Dr. Jackson. Admiral Davidson, could you speak to the importance of 
undergraduate pilot training and the need to rapidly advance 
modernization programs like the T-7A Red Hawk? Also, could you explain 
the negative impact to readiness if pilots are unable to train 
adequately?
    Admiral Davidson. Undergraduate pilot training is essential to 
ensuring our combat capabilities. With aging aircraft, like the T-38, 
decreases in pilot production are common place and mishaps more 
frequent, which the United States nor its allies and partners can 
afford. Modernization programs like the T-7A Red Hawk not only 
alleviate these issues, but ensure pilots are prepared to operate next 
generation airframes like the F-22 and F-35. I am confident in the 
ability of the Services to man, train, and equip the most modem force 
available.
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CARL
    Mr. Carl. Admiral Davidson, your written testimony highlights the 
importance of a distributed force. With the important role the Navy 
will continue to play in operating a distributed force in the South 
China Sea, what does the United States' projected 2030 fleet look like 
and how does it compare to the fleet China intends to field in 2030?
    Admiral Davidson. By 2030, the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) 
battle force is expected to be about 425 ships, including 360 major 
surface combatants, submarines or amphibious ships. The backbone of the 
Chinese surface fleet will be 60 modern multi-warfare platforms such as 
the Renhai guided missile cruiser and Luyang III series guided missile 
destroyers, plus 135 frigates and corvettes. Their attack submarine 
fleet will include 14 nuclear-powered and 46 diesel boats and the PLA 
is forecast to have up to 5 aircraft carriers and 18 large amphibious 
ships. PLAN ships will be equipped with long-range sensors and weapons 
for anti-air, anti surface, anti-submarine, and land-attack missions.
    By 2030, modernization of the U.S. Navy fleet will be well underway 
with an inventory approaching 350 ships and additional investments in 
unmanned capabilities. The Department of Navy's 2020 Report to Congress 
on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels 
outlines the fleet priorities of the Department and reflects a 
substantial overhaul of its surface and subsurface fleet over the next 
decade. The most substantial modernization efforts are in the combat 
logistics and support vessels which will see an increase of 
approximately 30% by 2030 to support a more robust and distributed 
logistical footprint. The Navy also recognizes the advantages of 
unmanned capabilities, both on the surface and undersea, and is 
planning to procure more than 20 of these assets over the next five 
years.
                                 ______
                                 
                 QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. STRICKLAND
    Ms. Strickland. Mr. Helvey, JBLM is a strategically vital, joint 
force power projection platform and is vitally important to ensuring a 
free and open Indo-Pacific. I am aware that the Army plans to have 
three Multi-Domain Task Forces, one in Europe and two in the Indo-
Pacific. JBLM was proud to host the pilot program. As you consider the 
requirements in the Indo-Pacific, can you commit to keeping one of the 
Task Forces at JBLM?
    Mr. Helvey. I agree that Multi-Domain Task Forces remain vitally 
important to our power projection in the Indo-Pacific. I am committed 
to continuing to work closely with Congress on this issue.
    Ms. Strickland. As our focus moves to China, I don't want to forget 
our treaty allies like Korea. I am acutely aware of the importance of 
our presence and strongly support maintain our presence to provide a 
deterrence and ensure stability in the Korean Peninsula. I am concerned 
about the readiness of our joint force. I am also very concerned about 
North Korea's asymmetric capabilities especially in cyber. How have you 
shifted the forces to respond to the cyber threat?
    How are you planning to shift the force to deal with the threat as 
it continues to evolve?
    General Abrams. As Commander, United States Forces Korea (USFK) and 
Combined Forces Command (CFC), I have provided guidance to develop 
policy, resources, and authorities to mitigate this threat and enhance 
information sharing among Alliance partners. Specifically, those 
partners support combined cyberspace operations with the appropriate 
scope and scale to provide timely and coordinated threat indicators and 
warning to senior U.S. and ROK military leadership.
    The USFK Joint Cyber Center (JCC) has led the effort to establish 
and expand the effectiveness of a CFC Combined Cyberspace Coordination 
Cell (4C). However, we are still reliant on Republic of Korea (ROK) 
Joint Chiefs of Staff support to enlist ROK cyber expertise, as no 
inherent combined cyber capability exists organically within CFC. The 
USFK JCC serves as the nexus for cyberspace operations in the command, 
fusing component and external equities to provide relevant 
recommendations. United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) has also 
established a forward element within USFK--the Cyber Operations 
Integrated Planning Element (CO-IPE)--to facilitate cyber effects, 
forces planning and current operations on behalf of the Combatant 
Commander. This integration synchronizes the timing and tempo of 
USCYBERCOM assets into USFK operations in both armistice and crisis.
    A robust cyberspace defensive posture to protect our mission 
systems requires constant vigilance due to the rapidly changing nature 
of cyberspace technology and the ease of access to malicious cyber 
tools and tradecraft. While there has not been any indication of 
compromise on our most critical military command and control (C2) 
systems, we continually modify our defensive tactics, techniques and 
procedures. We also employ active hunt missions--that is, `the search 
for adversary malware'--to defend USFK systems by employing our 
USCYBERCOM-aligned Cyberspace Protection Team and assist USFK Component 
defenders through the frequent mobilization and deployment of subject 
matter expertise not available on peninsula. Our enduring relationship 
with USCYBERCOM and its service cyber components is vital to protect 
our most critical assets with highly trained professionals who are 
focused on advanced threats and have the appropriate technology to find 
and defeat those threats.
    The Secretary of Defense approved re-alignment of command 
relationships between supported Combatant Command's and supporting 
USCYBERCOM forces effective October 1, 2021. This will allow USCYBERCOM 
and Service Cyberspace Components to exercise greater flexibility in 
the training and employment of forces protecting critical cyber 
terrain.
    Ms. Strickland. General Abrams, I know you've expressed concerns 
with access to air space and the inability to do live fire exercises in 
the Korean Peninsula. Can you discuss how these restrictions have 
harmed and will harm readiness? How do you think the Korean government 
can help solve some of these issues?
    General Abrams. In recent years these issues have resulted in 
critical U.S. Army weapons system crews being unable to maintain 
appropriate readiness levels due to inadequate access to live fire 
ranges. A prime example is the recent need to send AH64 attack 
helicopter crews to the United States to complete live fire 
qualification; training formerly accomplished on the Korean Peninsula 
that can no longer be executed due to civilian obstruction of range 
access. Until recently, similar problems affected the execution of 
Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) qualification with training 
cancelled for almost a full year due to protestors obstructing the 
launch site or occupying the impact area. The MLRS issue has only 
recently been resolved through the development of alternate launch 
sites and focused engagement by ROK civil and military officials.
    Air space allocation and scheduling challenges coupled with range 
access and compatibility issues have also negatively impacted the 
proficiency of United States Air Force (USAF) pilots stationed in 
Korea. Half of the U.S. fighters maintain readiness at the level for 
combat operations. Additionally, only two locations (Jik-Do Islands and 
Pilsung) support USAF A-10 and F-16 aircrew requirements to drop 
unguided, laser-guided, and inertially-aided heavyweight munitions. 
Only 30% and 50% of the range time at these locations is allocated to 
U.S. pilot training. These constraints have resulted in approximately 
60% of aircrews maintaining required weapons proficiency over the past 
two years. Finally, with the ROK there is only one location that 
consistently replicates surface-to-air threats for conducting 
Electronic Warfare (EW) training. The EW range time afforded 
approximately only one-half of Air Force A-10 and F-16 aircrew 
maintaining proficiency over the past two years. Ultimately, Korean 
based USAF units must send crews outside of Korea to maintain 
proficiency in all assigned mission sets.
    The ROK government can help in addressing the training issues 
resulting from: restrictions imposed due to civilian concerns; 
insufficient training area availability; or training area scheduling 
practices that have negatively impacted the ``Fight Tonight'' readiness 
of U.S. component formations in the ROK. In several instances these 
readiness challenges have resulted in the export of training off the 
Korean peninsula. The U.S. is currently shouldering the fiscal burden 
associated with these off-Pen deployments to sustain the minimal level 
of combat readiness necessary to fulfill combined defense obligations. 
This is an additional area where the ROK government can help.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FALLON
    Mr. Fallon. Would you agree that is is advantageous for the U.S. to 
have our partners and allies, who share many of our values and 
interests, to spend an additional 3.5% or higher, to account for annual 
inflation, on defense spending to ensure a more robust military 
capability in the region? If levels were funding levels were to be 
frozen at today's levels what would the effect be?
    Mr. Helvey. Our allies and partners are the greatest advantage that 
we have when it comes to long-term competition with adversaries that 
seek to undermine our shared values. We appreciate the contributions 
and support they have provided to maintaining peace and security in the 
Indo-Pacific region over the last few decades.
    Looking to the future, we must also be prepared to face more 
numerous and complex challenges together. To adapt and prepare for the 
challenges posed by this rapidly evolving strategic environment will 
require more robust investment from both the U.S. and our allies and 
partners.
    Some of our allies, such as Japan and the Republic of Korea, have 
already increased their investments in our combined defense. We are 
working with all of our allies and partners to find ways that they can 
more effectively contribute to our shared goals and take on additional 
responsibility for maintaining peace and security in a rapidly evolving 
security environment.
    Mr. Fallon. Would you agree that is is advantageous for the U.S. to 
have our partners and allies, who share many of our values and 
interests, to spend an additional 3.5% or higher, to account for annual 
inflation, on defense spending to ensure a more robust military 
capability in the region? If levels were funding levels were to be 
frozen at today's levels what would the effect be?
    Admiral Davidson. We welcome greater investment by our likeminded 
allies and partners in their own security, and in becoming net security 
providers to uphold the rules-based order that has global benefits. Our 
allies' and partners' commitment to shared ideals and values is also 
extremely valuable to global security in support of a Free and Open 
Indo-Pacific. Comparisons of GDP per capita with defense spending per 
capita show the nations of the Indo-Pacific are favorably contributing 
to their own security compared with other world regions. Any stagnation 
in funding in the Indo-Pacific is certain to undermine efforts to 
improve ally and partner capacity. Underfunding could also drive some 
to look to global competitors to cheaply enhance their own security at 
the expense of interoperability with the United States.
    Mr. Fallon. Would you agree that is is advantageous for the U.S. to 
have our partners and allies, who share many of our values and 
interests, to spend an additional 3.5% or higher, to account for annual 
inflation, on defense spending to ensure a more robust military 
capability in the region? If levels were funding levels were to be 
frozen at today's levels what would the effect be?
    General Abrams. The United States system of alliances and partners 
around the world is one of our greatest advantages. I believe defense 
spending should match resources to strategic national priorities, and I 
share Secretary of State Blinken's position that ``stronger allies make 
for stronger alliances''.
    If the defense spending remains constant at today's levels and the 
common threats continue to advance at their current pace, I believe we 
will see erosion in our competitive advantages and we will have to play 
catch up in the future.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. MURPHY
    Mrs. Murphy. The closest relationships that the U.S. has with any 
sovereign nations are with the three that formerly were a territory the 
U.S. administered and are now freely associated states [the Republics 
of the Marshall Islands and Palau and the Federated States of 
Micronesia]. They give the U.S. strategic control of an expanse of the 
Pacific from Hawaii to the Philippines and Indonesia. The Marshall 
Islands also host what the Joint Chiefs says is ``the world's premier 
range for ICBM testing and space operations support.'' But, China, 
which covets shipping lanes the U.S. controls through these islands, 
has been aggressive in trying to influence them financially. The last 
administration initiated negotiations to extend the free associations 
with extensions of domestic Federal programs and services and financial 
assistance. But it failed to get agreement among agencies on extended 
programs and its financial proposal was rejected as inadequate by all 
three freely associated states. It failed because, unlike the original 
negotiations for the associations or for the amendments to them in 
2003, the last administration's efforts were not led by a special 
appointee of the administration with the ability to engage all 
decision-makers backed by the active involvement of the National 
Security Council and an interagency team. For example, DOD was not at 
the table. Secretary Blinken has said that the negotiations will be a 
priority. Do you agree that they should be? Does the new administration 
recognize the deficiencies of the last administration's approach? Do 
you agree with the NDAA-required report to the Secretary of Defense 
that a failure to provide needed assistance would be a ``self-inflicted 
wound'' to U.S. security and economic interests? How serious would it 
be?
    Mr. Helvey. The Department of Defense takes seriously our defense 
and security obligations under the Compacts of Free Association. The 
access we receive as part of that authority and responsibility is 
critical to our ability to ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific. Both 
the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Navy traveled to the 
region in 2020 highlighting the importance DOD places on these 
relationships.
    The defense and security provisions of the Compacts of Free 
Association with the Freely Associated States last in perpetuity or 
until mutually terminated. These provisions are not part of the ongoing 
negotiations on expiring provisions related to economic assistance, 
including certain federal programs and services. It may be more 
appropriate to direct questions regarding previous and ongoing 
negotiations of the expiring provisions of the Compacts of Free 
Association to the Department of State and the Department of the 
Interior. We are confident the interagency team, which Department of 
Defense supports, will be successful in its negotiations related to the 
Compacts of Free Association with each of the Freely Associated States.
    The Department of Defense has a vested interest in a mutually 
beneficial outcome of the negotiations. The relationship will be 
strengthened and the FAS will be increasingly more resilient to the 
Peoples' Republic of China's coercive efforts.
    Mrs. Murphy. How can the United States balance strategic power 
projection needs in the Indo-Pacific with the need to challenge Chinese 
grey zone activities worldwide? Is this an opportunity for our special 
forces to play an enhanced role?
    Mr. Helvey. The U.S. military's global presence allows it to 
compete effectively against an increasingly global Chinese military. 
Special Operations Forces can play an important role in engaging and 
building up allied and partner nations who are currently dealing with 
Chinese gray-zone activities. These activities can include increased 
situational awareness of Chinese malign activity, efforts to combat 
Chinese disinformation, and other measures to increase allied and 
partner nations' resilience against subversion and coercion. Such an 
approach emphasizes the need to work across the U.S. Government and 
leverage all elements of national power, alongside our allies and 
partners, to address these shared threats and challenges.
    Mrs. Murphy. To ensure a free, open, and prosperous Indo-Pacific, 
the United States must have stable relationships with its allies and 
partners. Our allies and partners must have stable relationships with 
each other, too. What can the United States do to facilitate closer 
cooperation between Japan and South Korea, two nations with a strained 
relationship? Has our training been effected by this, and what are the 
long term risks associated with these tensions?
    Mr. Helvey. The Republic of Korea and Japan are among our most 
important and longstanding allies in the world. Trilateral cooperation 
among the United States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan is integral 
to the maintenance regional security.
    The United States supports a future-oriented Republic of Korea-
Japan bilateral relationship that learns from the past while focusing 
on the future. The United States also supports enhanced bilateral and 
trilateral cooperation on a wide range of security issues, especially 
information-sharing between the Republic of Korea and Japan. We 
continue to encourage the advancement of shared priorities to face 
future regional security challenges.
    Mrs. Murphy. The closest relationships that the U.S. has with any 
sovereign nations are with the three that formerly were a territory the 
U.S. administered and are now freely associated states [the Republics 
of the Marshall Islands and Palau and the Federated States of 
Micronesia]. They give the U.S. strategic control of an expanse of the 
Pacific from Hawaii to the Philippines and Indonesia. The Marshall 
Islands also host what the Joint Chiefs says is ``the world's premier 
range for ICBM testing and space operations support.'' But, China, 
which covets shipping lanes the U.S. controls through these islands, 
has been aggressive in trying to influence them financially. The last 
administration initiated negotiations to extend the free associations 
with extensions of domestic Federal programs and services and financial 
assistance. But it failed to get agreement among agencies on extended 
programs and its financial proposal was rejected as inadequate by all 
three freely associated states. It failed because, unlike the original 
negotiations for the associations or for the amendments to them in 
2003, the last administration's efforts were not led by a special 
appointee of the administration with the ability to engage all 
decision-makers backed by the active involvement of the National 
Security Council and an interagency team. For example, DOD was not at 
the table. Secretary Blinken has said that the negotiations will be a 
priority. Do you agree that they should be? Does the new administration 
recognize the deficiencies of the last administration's approach? Do 
you agree with the NDAA-required report to the Secretary of Defense 
that a failure to provide needed assistance would be a ``self-inflicted 
wound'' to U.S. security and economic interests? How serious would it 
be?
    Admiral Davidson. Continued support of the Compacts of Free 
Association (COFA) must be a priority to demonstrate U.S. commitment to 
the region. The Freely Associated States (FAS) are small island 
countries located along our strategic lines of communication and are 
critically important to the United States' ability to project power, 
sustain forward presence, conduct · commercial trade, and defend 
the Homeland. The 2019 meeting between the U.S. President and the 
Presidents of Palau, Marshall Islands, and the Federated States of 
Micronesia, and the subsequent visits by several cabinet members and 
senior U.S. officials to these countries, demonstrate the importance 
our Government places on these relationships and our commitment to 
greater cooperation to ensure a Free and Open Indo-Pacific.
    Mrs. Murphy. The bottom line is China seeks to export its 
authoritarian political system around the world in order to dominate 
regions, co-opt or coerce international organizations, create economic 
conditions favorable to China, and displace democratic institutions. 
Admiral Davidson, recognizing the limits imposed by this open setting, 
can you describe the attributes and strengths of our Special Operations 
Forces that can help contribute to a U.S. strategy to work with allies 
and partners to confront this broader challenge I just described?
    Admiral Davidson. Our SOF teams work closely with U.S. Country 
Teams, the interagency, and our allies and partners through 
relationships built over decades countering violent extremist 
organizations (VEO) and responding to crises and natural disasters, to 
identify and contest PRC malign activity and disinformation. SOF teams 
are a low-signature force with language skills, cultural expertise, and 
proven experience. In addition, Military Information Support Operations 
(MISO) work with U.S. and partner public affairs and diplomacy 
organizations to identify and respond to disinformation using modem 
influence approaches and technical solutions. Civil Affairs teams 
partner with local government and security forces to conduct civil 
outreach. All of these special teams provide access and critical 
services in hard to reach areas while promoting U.S. and partner nation 
commitment to local populations.
    Mrs. Murphy. How can the United States expand security cooperation 
among ``Quad'' members, namely the United States, Australia, India, and 
Japan, particularly as it relates to maritime domain awareness and 
overall intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities?
    Admiral Davidson. The United States, Australia, India, and Japan 
are a diamond of democracies that could have a tremendously positive 
impact on the region for security matters, diplomacy, and economics. 
Although the Quad has greater potential than just a security apparatus, 
a defense pillar to the Quad would allow us to develop coordinated 
information sharing, expand on existing maritime cooperation, and build 
strong government support internally in each Quad country. There are 
significant opportunities to deepen multilateral exercises, defense 
collaboration in humanitarian assistance/disaster response, regional 
capacity building, counter-terrorism and countering transnational crime 
that we should maximize.
    Mrs. Murphy. How can the United States balance strategic power 
projection needs in the Indo-Pacific with the need to challenge Chinese 
grey zone activities worldwide? Is this an opportunity for our special 
forces to play an enhanced role?
    Admiral Davidson. The Joint Force provides access and intelligence 
which support other U.S. agencies in challenging Chinese grey zone 
activities. Strategic power projection in the Indo-Pacific includes 
persistent presence through forward-based and rotational joint forces 
and serves as the most credible way to reassure allies and partners and 
to demonstrate U.S. commitment to the region. Special Forces certainly 
have an important role to play in countering hybrid warfare activities 
worldwide with their unique language skills, cultural acumen, and 
decades of operating and training alongside our allies and partners.
    Mrs. Murphy. To ensure a free, open, and prosperous Indo-Pacific, 
the United States must have stable relationships with its allies and 
partners. Our allies and partners must have stable relationships with 
each other, too. What can the United States do to facilitate closer 
cooperation between Japan and South Korea, two nations with a strained 
relationship? Has our training been effected by this, and what are the 
long term risks associated with these tensions?
    Admiral Davidson. Strong alliances and partnerships represent the 
most essential components of U.S. national power. The United States 
will best meet the challenges posed by North Korea through a unified 
strategy with our allies and partners, in particular our two treaty 
allies: South Korea and Japan. As South Korea and Japan continue to 
address bilateral issues, USINDOPACOM will continue to work both 
bilaterally and trilaterally to protect and advance our shared security 
goals, including through military-to-military exercises, training 
events, and intelligence sharing. I do not anticipate long term risks 
associated with current tensions, as our three nations remain focused 
on common challenges and goals.
    Mrs. Murphy. The closest relationships that the U.S. has with any 
sovereign nations are with the three that formerly were a territory the 
U.S. administered and are now freely associated states [the Republics 
of the Marshall Islands and Palau and the Federated States of 
Micronesia]. They give the U.S. strategic control of an expanse of the 
Pacific from Hawaii to the Philippines and Indonesia. The Marshall 
Islands also host what the Joint Chiefs says is ``the world's premier 
range for ICBM testing and space operations support.'' But, China, 
which covets shipping lanes the U.S. controls through these islands, 
has been aggressive in trying to influence them financially. The last 
administration initiated negotiations to extend the free associations 
with extensions of domestic Federal programs and services and financial 
assistance. But it failed to get agreement among agencies on extended 
programs and its financial proposal was rejected as inadequate by all 
three freely associated states. It failed because, unlike the original 
negotiations for the associations or for the amendments to them in 
2003, the last administration's efforts were not led by a special 
appointee of the administration with the ability to engage all 
decision-makers backed by the active involvement of the National 
Security Council and an interagency team. For example, DOD was not at 
the table. Secretary Blinken has said that the negotiations will be a 
priority. Do you agree that they should be? Does the new administration 
recognize the deficiencies of the last administration's approach? Do 
you agree with the NDAA-required report to the Secretary of Defense 
that a failure to provide needed assistance would be a ``self-inflicted 
wound'' to U.S. security and economic interests? How serious would it 
be?
    General Abrams. United States Forces Korea defers response to 
United States Indo-Pacific Command.
    Mrs. Murphy. To ensure a free, open, and prosperous Indo-Pacific, 
the United States must have stable relationships with its allies and 
partners. Our allies and partners must have stable relationships with 
each other, too. What can the United States do to facilitate closer 
cooperation between Japan and South Korea, two nations with a strained 
relationship? Has our training been effected by this, and what are the 
long term risks associated with these tensions?
    General Abrams. The United States' role should be consistent and 
subtle, focusing on common interests while encouraging progress. Japan 
and the Republic of Korea (ROK) are two of our most important allies in 
the Indo-Pacific region. We share common values and converging 
strategic interests in a dynamic security and geopolitical environment. 
I believe the United States should continue to leverage our close 
relationship with both countries to encourage closer ties and increased 
interoperability at the mil-to-mil level.
    At the mil-to-mil level, the United States should continue to 
emphasize the operational and practical types of cooperation such as 
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, cybersecurity, missile 
warning, and maritime military confidence-building exercises that lead 
to substantive and comprehensive trilateral security cooperation, where 
we can exemplify the full potential of a partnership network of like-
minded nations. We should capitalize on both bilateral and trilateral 
mechanisms and pursue areas of mutual interest that promote 
interoperability, increased frequency and complexity of information 
sharing, and enhanced security cooperation. Deterrence and defense 
cooperation vis-a-vis North Korea's nuclear, missile and cyber threats 
are some areas we can reinvigorate today through bilateral and 
trilateral joint exercises.
    To your second question, I believe building and fine-tuning our 
readiness through practical training are truly outstanding 
opportunities to demonstrate the vitality of U.S. alliances. We must 
remain clear-eyed of evolving threats, and take advantage to train and 
exercise our core competencies to support our strategic interests 
through sustained military readiness. North Korea, China and Russia 
remain vigilant and any perceived weakness in Japan-ROK ties may affect 
the strategic interests of both countries and ultimately those of the 
United States.
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MOORE
    Mr. Moore. While U.S. military-to-military relations with Burma 
were already extremely limited due to human rights abuses conducted by 
their military, what does our military-to-military engagement with 
Burma look like following the Rohingya crisis? Additionally, what 
conditions or factors would be used to determine the scope and scale of 
engagement going forward?
    Mr. Helvey. The Department of Defense ceased all military-to-
military engagement with the Burmese military after the Rohingya crisis 
in 2017, and only began to re-introduce limited engagement with 
officers at the O-6 level and below in 2019, in the form of academic 
exchange programs focused on security sector reform, promoting civil-
military relations, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. 
Following the military coup on February 1, 2021, the Department ceased 
all planned academic exchanges with Burmese military and government 
officials. Because of the coup, we have no plans to re-engage with the 
Burmese military again in the near future.
    Mr. Moore. Currently, the United States lacks a modern short to 
medium range missile that could be deployed in the Pacific. Not only is 
the United States outgunned in the region but is years away from 
developing an equivalent. Are there any current weapon systems that can 
fill this void to establish an equilibrium of force?
    Admiral Davidson. To address adversary missile capabilities, 
USINDOPACOM requires a spectrum of land-, sea-, and air-deployed 
weapons with a mix of capabilities, able to target ships, mobile land 
systems, and fixed adversary targets. To address the short and medium 
range missile threats in the region, priority programs that are either 
fielded or rapidly on their way to fielding include: the Standard 
Missile-6 (SM-6), Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM), Joint Air to-
Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM-ER), Airborne Rapid Response Weapon 
(ARRW), Naval Strike Missile (NSM), Maritime Strike Tomahawk (MST), and 
Ground Based Anti Ship Missile (GBASM).
    Mr. Moore. China is rapidly growing its space capabilities and has 
ambitions to use them quickly and effectively in a conflict. How has 
China's growing space capability changed the way you view the Indo-
Pacific? How should we respond?
    Admiral Davidson. China continues to develop and demonstrate 
multiple counter-space capabilities designed to degrade and deny U.S. 
use of space-based assets during crisis and conflict. The United States 
uses the space layer to sense for strategic nuclear deterrence, to 
communicate across the joint force, and to sense and distribute 
information to the conventional force.
    Space is now a contested domain. The Unites States must build 
resiliency into our space apparatus and must build a warfighting 
architecture that fuses the space domain with other domains to enable 
timely and actionable delivery of our emerging weapons. Growing PRC 
efforts in the space domain may also jeopardize the space capabilities 
of other countries, so the United States will need to work with other 
like-minded allies and partners to effectively defend our equities that 
reside or transit the space domain.
    Mr. Moore. Critics highlight the risk that further American 
military deployment to the region would raise tensions. However, China 
has already raised tensions by rapidly developing missile systems 
capable of striking every aircraft carrier in the region and the 
strategic island of Guam. Does the strategic advantage gained from 
increasing military equities in the region justify exacerbating 
regional tensions?
    Admiral Davidson. China raised tensions in the region by 
militarizing the South China Sea, provocatively pressing its 
territorial claims, and coercing small and vulnerable nations. We do 
not intend to change the status quo by force nor do we intend to raise 
regional tensions with our force posture enhancements. Rather, our 
intent is to maintain peace, security, prosperity, and freedom. 
USINDOPACOM focuses on ensuring the capabilities, capacity, and posture 
to successfully execute U.S. missions in the region and to uphold the 
international rules-based order. Our persistent defense of the common 
domains, to include the strategic island of Guam and all of our U.S. 
territories throughout the Pacific, is essential to strong economic 
prosperity and security in the region.