[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                        [H.A.S.C. No. 117-17]

                      NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES

                     AND U.S. MILITARY ACTIVITY IN

                        NORTH AND SOUTH AMERICA

                               __________

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                              HEARING HELD

                             APRIL 14, 2021


                                     
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 

                               __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
44-983                       WASHINGTON : 2022                     
          
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                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                    One Hundred Seventeenth Congress

                    ADAM SMITH, Washington, Chairman

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island      MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
RICK LARSEN, Washington              JOE WILSON, South Carolina
JIM COOPER, Tennessee                MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut            DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
JOHN GARAMENDI, California           ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia
JACKIE SPEIER, California            VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri
DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey          AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona               MO BROOKS, Alabama
SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts          SAM GRAVES, Missouri
SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California        ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland,          SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
RO KHANNA, California                TRENT KELLY, Mississippi
WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts    MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
FILEMON VELA, Texas                  MATT GAETZ, Florida
ANDY KIM, New Jersey                 DON BACON, Nebraska
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania       JIM BANKS, Indiana
JASON CROW, Colorado                 LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan             JACK BERGMAN, Michigan
MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey           MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
VERONICA ESCOBAR, Texas              MIKE JOHNSON, Louisiana
JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine               MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee
ELAINE G. LURIA, Virginia, Vice      STEPHANIE I. BICE, Oklahoma
    Chair                            C. SCOTT FRANKLIN, Florida
JOSEPH D. MORELLE, New York          LISA C. McCLAIN, Michigan
SARA JACOBS, California              RONNY JACKSON, Texas
KAIALI'I KAHELE, Hawaii              JERRY L. CARL, Alabama
MARILYN STRICKLAND, Washington       BLAKE D. MOORE, Utah
MARC A. VEASEY, Texas                PAT FALLON, Texas
JIMMY PANETTA, California
STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida
STEVEN HORSFORD, Nevada

                     Paul Arcangeli, Staff Director
                Will Johnson, Professional Staff Member
                 Kyle Noyes, Professional Staff Member
                          Emma Morrison, Clerk
                            
                            
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

              STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Ranking Member, 
  Committee on Armed Services....................................     3
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Chairman, 
  Committee on Armed Services....................................     1

                               WITNESSES

Faller, ADM Craig S., USN, Commander, U.S. Southern Command......     6
Salesses, Robert G., Performing the Duties of Assistant Secretary 
  of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security, Office of 
  the Secretary of Defense.......................................     4
VanHerck, Gen Glen D., USAF, Commander, U.S. Northern Command and 
  North American Aerospace Defense Command.......................     8

                                APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

    Faller, ADM Craig S..........................................    84
    Salesses, Robert G...........................................    67
    VanHerck, Gen Glen D.........................................   108

Documents Submitted for the Record:

    [There were no Documents submitted.]

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

    Mr. Carbajal.................................................   137
    Mrs. Luria...................................................   138
    Ms. Speier...................................................   137
    Mr. Waltz....................................................   138

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

    Mr. Bacon....................................................   149
    Dr. Jackson..................................................   152
    Mr. Moore....................................................   152
    Mr. Moulton..................................................   148
    Mrs. Murphy..................................................   153
    Mr. Norcross.................................................   148
    Mr. Scott....................................................   142
    Ms. Speier...................................................   141
    Mr. Waltz....................................................   151

 
 NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES AND U.S. MILITARY ACTIVITY IN NORTH AND 
                             SOUTH AMERICA

                              ----------                              

                          House of Representatives,
                               Committee on Armed Services,
                         Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 14, 2021.
    The committee met, pursuant to call, at 11:00 a.m., in room 
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Adam Smith (chairman 
of the committee) presiding.

  OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
       WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

    The Chairman. With that, I will call the meeting to order.
    The committee meets this morning on our ``National Security 
Challenges and U.S. Military Activity in North and South 
America.'' We have the commanders of both NORTH- and SOUTHCOM 
[Northern Command and Southern Command] with us today.
    I must first, since this, again, is a hybrid hearing, read 
the statement that explains how the hybrid hearing will be 
conducted.
    Members who are joining remotely must be visible on screen 
for the purposes of identity verification, establishing and 
maintaining a quorum, participating in the proceeding, and 
voting.
    Those members must continue to use the software platform's 
video function while in attendance unless they experience 
connectivity issues or other technical problems that render 
them unable to participate on camera. If a member experiences 
technical difficulties, they should contact the committee staff 
for assistance.
    Video of members' participation is broadcast in the room 
and via the television/internet feeds.
    Members participating remotely must seek recognition 
verbally, and they are asked to mute their microphones when 
they are not speaking.
    Members who are participating remotely are reminded to keep 
the software platform's video function on the entire time they 
attend the proceeding. Members may leave and rejoin the 
proceeding. If members depart for a short while for reasons 
other than joining a different proceeding, they should leave 
the video function on. If members will be absent for a 
significant period or depart to join a different proceeding, 
they should exit the software platform entirely and then rejoin 
it if they return.
    Members may use the software platform's chat feature to 
communicate with staff regarding technical or logistical 
support issues only.
    Finally, I have designated a committee staff member to, if 
necessary, mute unrecognized members' microphones to cancel any 
inadvertent background noise that may disrupt the proceedings.
    Thank you.
    As I was saying at the start, our committee hearing is on 
``National Security Challenges and U.S. Military Activity in 
North and South America.'' We have with us today Mr. Robert 
Salesses, performing the duties of Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security; we have 
Admiral Craig Faller, U.S. Navy, Commander, U.S. Southern 
Command; and General Glen VanHerck, U.S. Air Force, Commander, 
U.S. Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense 
Command.
    And I thank you all for being here. We look forward to the 
discussion. Obviously, there are a lot of challenges going on 
in the world right now, and, you know, the one that dominates 
is COVID [coronavirus]--its impacts, how it is impacting your 
commands, how it is impacting stability in your areas of 
responsibility.
    We are very interested to hear how it is going in terms of 
making sure that we protect our service members, maintain our 
ability to train and meet our readiness requirements, and, at 
the same time, how COVID may be impacting your areas of 
responsibility.
    Obviously, there is a great deal of instability, in 
particular in South America--two hurricanes, continued economic 
challenges. We have the ongoing crisis in Venezuela, and we 
have seen the impact in the flow of folks coming to the border.
    There are a lot of challenges in that region. We would be 
anxious to hear--are anxious to hear from Admiral Faller about 
the details of that and how best we should respond and work 
with partners in the region to meet those challenges as they 
impact that region and certainly as they impact us once you 
come further north.
    Also curious to hear from both of you about your thoughts 
on the border, what role you can play in helping us deal with 
that challenge, and what the best policy is going forward as we 
try to deal with what is undeniably a very challenging 
situation driven by the incredible instability in--well, in 
Mexico as well as, more so, in Central America. We need to 
figure out how to address that issue.
    One thing I am curious, as I mentioned yesterday, we don't 
yet have a budget, which is problematic and challenging. I do 
understand the transition to a new administration, but it is 
mid-April. So the sooner we get that, the better we will be 
able to meet our responsibilities in terms of passing the 
national defense authorizing act this year, and, of course, the 
appropriators would also like to see the budget. But I am 
curious about what your initial insights are on how that budget 
might impact you.
    I think one of the great challenges particularly in 
SOUTHCOM over the course of the last 20 years is there has been 
so much going on in the rest of the world that SOUTHCOM tends 
to be pretty far down the priority list. When you look at what 
has been going on in CENTCOM, the pivot to Asia, even a number 
of the challenges that have cropped up in Africa, you know, how 
do we meet all of those responsibilities and still do enough in 
SOUTHCOM?
    And, similarly, how this impacts NORTHCOM's budget. And I 
know, General VanHerck, you have been particularly focused on 
the Arctic. And that is something that, speaking for myself and 
for others, we don't understand that issue as well as we 
should. And I think, in part, because of all those other 
challenges that we have had, adding what seems like a new one 
is a challenge. But we have to understand what is going on up 
there. Obviously, Russia has been very active in that area.
    And I guess, lastly, based on our conversation before the 
hearing, I am very curious to get your take on how you perceive 
the threats to the homeland, the rise of both Russia and China 
in terms of their global capability. North Korea, as well, has 
introduced a level of threat to the homeland that we haven't 
seen before. How do we need to respond to that? What is the 
most intelligent spending we can do in the Department of 
Defense budget to meet those challenges?
    And then what is the whole-of-government response as well? 
Because obviously this is not just--none of the challenges that 
I just talked about are just the military. How do we work with 
the entire different pieces of our government to meet those 
challenges?
    I look forward to the testimony and to the questions and 
answers.
    And, with that, I will yield to the ranking member, Mr. 
Rogers, for his opening statement.

 STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA, 
          RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

    Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you 
holding this hearing today.
    The defense of the homeland and our security efforts in the 
Western Hemisphere are becoming increasingly more complex as 
China and Russia and other adversaries expand their reach and 
improve their capabilities to strike us.
    NORTHCOM is charged with defending our homeland against 
those threats. Operating our missile defense systems, 
countering increased Russian and Chinese activity in the 
Arctic, and supporting civilian response to emergencies are 
just a few of NORTHCOM's many mission priorities. Supporting 
these missions should continue to be a priority for this 
committee.
    In recent years, China and Russia have established an 
extensive military and economic presence in South and Central 
America. Their presence destabilizes the region and threatens 
our national security. SOUTHCOM is responsible for countering 
those threats.
    SOUTHCOM relies on security cooperation programs, 
humanitarian and disaster response assistance, and counter-
narcotic capability building to promote security and counteract 
the influence of China and Russia. It is important for the 
committee to continue our bipartisan support of these programs.
    I have no doubt the men and women of NORTH- and SOUTHCOM 
can successfully carry out their critical missions, but they 
will only be able to do so if we provide them the resources 
they need. That is why I greatly was disappointed with the 
President's top-line budget number of $715 billion requested 
for DOD [Department of Defense], which constitutes a nearly $5 
billion cut in real dollars.
    It also completely disregards the recommendation of the 
bipartisan National Defense Strategy Commission. To counter the 
growing threat from China, Deputy Secretary Hicks and the rest 
of the commissioners urged Congress to grow the defense budget 
each year by 3 to 5 percent. This budget doesn't even keep pace 
with inflation.
    My biggest concern is that this request fails to ensure our 
military can deter the growing threat from China and Russia. 
General VanHerck and Admiral Faller are dealing with these 
threats every day. I look forward to their best military advice 
on the impact of their operations from a budget that fails to 
keep pace with inflation.
    And, with that, I thank the witnesses for their service to 
our country and for being here, and I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you very much.
    Mr. Salesses, I believe you are first.

   STATEMENT OF ROBERT G. SALESSES, PERFORMING THE DUTIES OF 
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND GLOBAL 
          SECURITY, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

    Mr. Salesses. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers, 
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the 
opportunity to testify before you today on the national 
security challenges faced by the United States and the U.S. 
military activity in North and South America. I am honored to 
be here in the company of Admiral Faller and General VanHerck.
    Today, I would like to emphasize three key points. First, 
today's global security environment is more complex than ever 
before. Our adversaries are developing capabilities to 
challenge us in every domain and, increasingly, to hold the 
homeland at risk. Second, consistent with the President's 
strategic guidance and Secretary Austin's priorities, DOD is 
strengthening the multidomain defense of the Nation to maintain 
our competitive advantage. And, third, domestic emergencies and 
disasters are increasing in severity, causing DOD's Federal, 
State, and local partners to rely more and more on the 
Department of Defense.
    The increasingly complex and dynamic global security 
environment is driven by the accelerating strategic competition 
with Russia and China, where both are engaged in aggressive 
military modernization programs designed to target what they 
perceive as DOD's strategic vulnerabilities. China has become 
more capable in every domain and constitutes a significant 
long-term security threat to the U.S. China is our top 
priority, while Russia presents a near-term threat.
    Within the Western Hemisphere, to the north, Russia is 
expanding its Arctic posture, and China has classified itself 
as a near-Arctic nation, raising concerns with both nations' 
intentions. To the south, in Central and South America, a key 
strategic region, China and Russia are attempting to increase 
their influence within the region.
    As DOD confronts this competition with Russia and China in 
every domain, it must also ensure its ability to deter today's 
range of threats, including those posed by Iran and North 
Korea, while countering terrorism and violent extremists both 
abroad and here at home.
    DOD is committed to strengthening its decisive advantage in 
defending the U.S. homeland by reinforcing our defenses in the 
approaches to North America and by building stronger 
partnerships to advance freedom, prosperity, and security 
throughout the Western Hemisphere.
    DOD, as the region's partner of choice, is working closely 
with our hemispheric neighbors to address the region's shared 
challenges through security cooperation programs. DOD also 
continues its support of interagency efforts to disrupt 
transnational criminal organizations and to counter trafficking 
of illicit narcotics in the region.
    COVID-19 significantly challenged our hemispheric partners. 
With congressional support, DOD provided and will continue to 
provide medical assistance to our partners.
    In defense of the homeland, DOD must be ready for future 
conflicts that will likely include multidimensional targeting 
of critical infrastructure. The United States and Canada are 
jointly working to increase capabilities to provide enhanced 
indications and warning to detect aerospace threats and cue our 
air and missile defense systems against them. DOD is 
strengthening its homeland missile defenses through the 
development of next-generation interceptors and a new 
generation of ground- and space-based sensors.
    In defending the U.S. maritime approaches, DOD has taken 
steps to enhance its awareness of activities on and under the 
sea, provided early warning of approaching maritime threats.
    DOD is successfully competing with adversaries in 
cyberspace by defending forward to disrupt and degrade 
malicious cyber activity close to its origin and improving 
response options.
    As a DOD mission, DOD regularly provides defense support of 
civil authorities to Federal, State, and local partners. The 
COVID-19 pandemic has posed an unprecedented challenge on our 
Nation. Since the start, DOD has protected its people and 
supported the Nation's response by providing unparalleled 
support, to include medical assistance, supply and acquisition 
support, and the development, distribution, and administration 
of vaccines.
    Recent hurricanes and wildfire seasons have challenged 
response efforts and driven increased requests for DOD 
capabilities.
    Hemispheric challenges and events in the homeland have also 
led to increased requests for DOD support. At the southern 
border, DOD continues to support DHS's [Department of Homeland 
Security's] border security mission and HHS's [Department of 
Health and Human Services'] mission to shelter unaccompanied 
children.
    DOD also continues its support to the U.S. Capitol.
    In conclusion, DOD is strengthening its defense of the 
homeland, building stronger partnerships in the Western 
Hemisphere, and assisting more than ever our Federal, State, 
and local partners.
    It is an honor to serve alongside our Nation's military and 
civilian members of the Defense Department as they work every 
day to keep our Nation safe and secure.
    Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers, distinguished 
members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to 
testify today. I would also like to express my appreciation for 
the support of the Congress, and thank you for your continued 
commitment and support of the men and women of the Defense 
Department.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Salesses can be found in the 
Appendix on page 67.]
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Admiral Faller.

STATEMENT OF ADM CRAIG S. FALLER, USN, COMMANDER, U.S. SOUTHERN 
                            COMMAND

    Admiral Faller. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers, and 
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the 
opportunity to testify before you today. I am honored to be 
here with my shipmates General Glen VanHerck and Assistant 
Secretary Bob Salesses.
    Now more than ever, I feel a deep sense of urgency about 
the global threats we face, including in this region. The 
Western Hemisphere is our home, it is our shared neighborhood, 
and it is a hemisphere which is of vital national interest to 
the United States.
    Two of the most significant threats are China and 
transnational criminal organizations. As the INDOPACOM [Indo-
Pacific Command] commander, Admiral Davidson, stated, China is 
the number one strategic threat of the 21st century.
    I would like to take a few minutes to do some myth-busting 
about these threats.
    Myth one: China's interests in the Western Hemisphere are 
purely economic.
    The Chinese Communist Party, with its insidious, corrosive, 
and corrupt influence, seeks global dominance. Our strategic 
approach to China must also be global.
    China is quickly growing its influence here in the 
hemisphere, working on more than 40 port deals, dishing out 
significant loans for political and economic leverage, pushing 
its IT [information technology] infrastructure, and engaging in 
predatory practices such as illegal, unregulated, and 
unreported fishing, all with little concern for human rights, 
the environment, or the rule of law.
    Myth two: Transnational criminal organizations are just 
drug-trafficking organizations and only a law enforcement 
problem.
    To be clear, transnational criminal organizations, or TCOs, 
pose a direct threat to our national security. They traffic in 
arms, humans, drugs, and claim tens of thousands of lives here 
in the United States each year. Their murderous tactics have 
resulted in 43 of the 50 most violent cities in the world in 
this hemisphere. They drive illegal migration, and they allow 
bad actors like China to gain influence.
    Myth three: The military has no role to play in this 
region.
    Our professional U.S. military men and women in the region 
serve as an example every day as we collaborate through 
education and training exercises and humanitarian assistance. 
DOD has established programs to help partner nations develop 
diverse and inclusive militaries that respect the rule of law 
and human rights. Our programs help develop the professional 
forces to secure and stabilize our hemisphere.
    Our security cooperation programs include institutional 
capacity building that make partner-nation forces resilient to 
corruption and external influences. Our exercise program 
develops readiness, interoperability, and the ability to 
respond regionally to threats. We provide not only positive 
role models but tools and strategies for our partner nations to 
implement that enhance their capacity, and they make us all 
stronger together.
    Underpinning those national security threats is growing 
fragility in the region. COVID-19 has hit the hemisphere hard. 
According to the IMF [International Monetary Fund], the 
economies of Latin America and the Caribbean shrank by 7.4 
percent in 2020. The impacts of the pandemic will alter the 
hemisphere for years to come.
    In the midst of this pandemic, back-to-back major 
hurricanes devastated Central America, creating even greater 
instability. The pandemic and these unprecedented storms struck 
on top of the already vicious circle of threats that I 
previously highlighted, creating strong push factors for the 
people of the region to head north in search of safety and 
basic needs.
    Despite an economy in a tailspin and more than 5 million 
refugees fleeing the country, the illegitimate Maduro regime 
continues to cling to power in Venezuela with support from 
Cuba, Russia, Iran, and China.
    We cannot face such daunting challenges on our own. The 
only way to counter these threats is to strengthen our 
partnerships in order to win the strategic competition. No one 
nation is as strong as all of us working together. And I am 
very impressed by the nations who have worked with us shoulder 
to shoulder to counter the threats.
    For example, last year, Colombia brought together more than 
two dozen nations to conduct Operation Orion VI, a countering-
transnational-criminal-organizations operation. And, earlier 
this year, Brazil became the first Latin American country to 
send forces to our high-end U.S. Army training at Fort Polk, 
Louisiana.
    Good neighbors are there to help when you need them the 
most, especially during a crisis. We provided humanitarian 
assistance to our partners when COVID struck, and we did it at 
the speed of relevance, delivering field hospitals and critical 
PPE [personal protective equipment]. To date, we have executed 
498 projects in 28 countries with a total investment of $72 
million. This is making a difference.
    SOUTHCOM works every day to build readiness and 
professionalism of our trusted military and security partners. 
Modest investments in intelligence, security cooperation, and 
presence go a long way in this hemisphere and will help us and 
our partners counter these global threats.
    Finally, our success would not be possible without our most 
important resource: our people, our SOUTHCOM team and their 
families. And we are taking proactive steps to support them and 
to protect our force from unacceptable behaviors, like sexual 
assault and harassment, racism, and extremism. We take these 
threats seriously because it is key to readiness and it is the 
right thing to do.
    Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Rogers, on behalf of the 
SOUTHCOM team, thank you for the trust you place in us, and 
thank you for the opportunity to testify. And I look forward to 
the questions.
    [The prepared statement of Admiral Faller can be found in 
the Appendix on page 84.]
    The Chairman. Thank you, Admiral.
    General VanHerck.

   STATEMENT OF GEN GLEN D. VANHERCK, USAF, COMMANDER, U.S. 
 NORTHERN COMMAND AND NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND

    General VanHerck. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers, 
distinguished members of the committee, it is a privilege to 
testify before you today.
    I am honored to serve as the commander of United States 
Northern Command [USNORTHCOM] and North American Aerospace 
Defense Command [NORAD]. And I am grateful to appear alongside 
Mr. Salesses and Admiral Faller, as they are crucial partners 
in homeland defense.
    USNORTHCOM and NORAD are separate commands charged with the 
critical mission of defending North America. USNORTHCOM is the 
U.S. geographic combatant command responsible for defense of 
the homeland, defense support of civil authorities, and theater 
security cooperation with Canada, Mexico, and the Bahamas. 
NORAD is the binational command that provides aerospace 
warning, aerospace control, maritime warning for the United 
States and Canada.
    Over the last year, NORAD fighters, tankers, and airborne 
early-warning aircraft responded to numerous incursions into 
our air defense identification zones; multiple ships sortied 
under USNORTHCOM operational control to defend our maritime 
approaches; and USNORTHCOM synchronized the Department of 
Defense's support to lead Federal agencies in the fight against 
coronavirus, multiple hurricanes, and wildfires. No matter the 
threat, we are always ready to defend the lives of our citizens 
and our homelands.
    As thousands of service members provide lifesaving 
vaccinations to our citizens, the threats we face and the pace 
of change in the geostrategic environment continue to advance. 
We have entered an era of renewed global competition, and this 
time we are facing two nuclear-armed peer competitors.
    Our competitors are focused on circumventing our defenses, 
both kinetically and nonkinetically, from all directions and in 
all domains, and exploiting a perceived gap between our 
foundational homeland defense--our nuclear deterrent--and also 
our conventional homeland defense deterrent capabilities.
    Concurrently, the rise of transnational criminal 
organizations and the subsequent instability they create has 
generated opportunities for our competitors to exploit.
    We must adapt to the challenges posed by this reality. We 
must outpace our competitors by accelerating efforts to 
transform into a culture that thinks and operates globally and 
invests early and often in relationships with our allies, 
partners, and other like-minded nations. Our culture must also 
adapt and cultivate talent within the ranks and counter 
extremists and destructive behaviors that oppose our values.
    In addition, we must factor in homeland defense into every 
strategy, plan, force management, force design, acquisition, 
and budgetary decision so we can deter in competition, de-
escalate in crisis, and, if we must, defeat in conflict.
    To do this, USNORTHCOM is building capability to deter and, 
if needed, defend against increasingly advanced global all-
domain threats. In concert with the other 10 combatant 
commands, the recent Global Information Dominance Experiment 
highlighted the effectiveness of operating without geographic 
seams to execute coordinated actions across all combatant 
commands.
    In coordination with the Missile Defense Agency, United 
States Strategic Command, United States Space Command, 
USNORTHCOM is maintaining and improving upon our Nation's 
ballistic missile defense capability. And together with the 
Canadian Armed Forces, NORAD is in the early stages of 
modernization and building additional military capabilities in 
the Arctic.
    In order to balance our readiness for crisis and conflict, 
we are also staying in global competition. We are placing 
significant emphasis on left-of-launch framework. This 
framework grants decisionmakers increased decision space and 
more deterrence and de-escalation options vice endgame kinetic 
defeat.
    Our priority effort is all-domain awareness that uses a 
layered, open-sensor data architecture, machine learning that 
enables information dominance and decision superiority. This 
framework provides flexible response options to deter, deny, 
or, if required, defeat every threat to the United States and 
Canada.
    USNORTHCOM and NORAD service members and civilians take 
solemn pride in executing the Secretary of Defense's top 
priority by standing watch to defend our Nation against all 
threats, whether posed by competitors, natural disasters, a 
pandemic. I am grateful for the trust and responsibility that 
you place in USNORTHCOM and NORAD, and thank you for the 
opportunity and support. In time, I look forward to answering 
your questions.
    Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of General VanHerck can be found in 
the Appendix on page 108.]
    The Chairman. Thank you very much.
    This is our first hearing this year where we are going in 
reverse order, just to keep things interesting I guess. So we 
are starting at the bottom, working our way up.
    I will ask just one question before yielding to Mr. Rogers, 
and that is: General VanHerck, we talked a little bit about the 
Arctic, you know, what is going on up there. Can you give us 
just--what should we do? I know we are waiting to see the 
budget, what our investment is, but as the commander in this 
area, if you had, like, your three priorities for how we need 
to be responding to what is happening in the Arctic, what would 
they be?
    General VanHerck. Thanks, Chairman.
    First, to compete in the Arctic, you have to be on the 
field. And, currently, our capabilities, I would assess that we 
are in the game-plan development. We are not able to have the 
persistence that I need to compete day-to-day in the Arctic.
    My priorities start with domain awareness. It starts with 
the ability to communicate and provide data and information so 
that we can operate and have persistence in the Arctic.
    I am grateful for $46 million that have been provided 
towards this. We have 10 satellites currently on orbit, with 
approximately 100 more that will be in the future. And we will 
take that additional money and have two companies providing the 
satellite capability.
    But to be persistent, you also have to be on the playing 
field, and that requires fuel so that Coast Guard cutters, Navy 
destroyers and cruisers can remain persistent in the Arctic.
    And I have a requirement that is stated and validated for 
fuel north of Dutch Harbor, Alaska, and that would give us the 
persistence, as well as, also, additional infrastructure for 
our ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] 
platforms and our fighter capabilities so that we can compete 
on a day-to-day basis and be close and present with the Russian 
activities. They have dramatically modernized and increased 
their capabilities in the Arctic.
    I am encouraged by the President and also the Prime 
Minister for discussing NORAD modernization, and I look forward 
to the Department putting a framework together with the 
ministry in Canada to move forward with continued 
modernization.
    The Chairman. Thank you very much.
    Mr. Rogers.
    Mr. Rogers. And I share the chairman's concern about the 
Arctic, and I am glad to know that you are on top of it. And we 
want to make sure you have what you need to stay on top of 
that.
    To that end, I now would ask this of both Admiral Faller 
and General VanHerck: If your funding does not at a minimum 
keep pace with inflation, how does it impact your ability to 
meet these challenges from China and Russia that you described 
in your various AORs [areas of responsibility]?
    Admiral Faller, I would start with you. I know you and I 
talked a lot about what China is doing in South America.
    Admiral Faller. Certainly, prioritization is going to have 
to happen, always needs to happen, versus all the various 
needs. We will make our strong case for why winning the day-to-
day competition, particularly in our neighborhood, given the 
proximity that we share--and proximity matters to threats--and 
given the people ties, why that matters. We will lay that out.
    It is a modest investment in this hemisphere. We have about 
1 percent of the intelligence assets assigned to United States 
Southern Command. Intelligence drives everything. And then add 
security cooperation, where we received great support from 
Congress last year. I think there are additional investments 
that could be made there to help partner capacity.
    And then, finally, assets. Being on the field is important. 
We must be heard and seen in order to win the competition. And 
winning the competition is so critical, globally, so that we 
don't have to go into confrontation and have a war.
    General VanHerck. I would say a couple things. First, I 
look forward to seeing the fiscal year 2022 budget, when it 
comes out, to actually get an understanding of where we are 
with regards to future funding.
    In the near term, we understand the top line of $715 
billion. We will be able to exist and work just fine in the 
near term.
    But, long term, I would be concerned, if we don't keep up 
with the pace of inflation, of the potential for us not to keep 
pace with our peer competitors throughout the globe. So I think 
it is crucial that we maintain a funding pace within the 
inflation role.
    We are going to certainly be able to continue our 
modernization efforts. We will focus on sustainment. We will 
also need to focus on efficiencies and what capabilities and 
legacy capabilities that we may need to divest to enable us to 
go forward with the approach that I discussed in my opening 
statement and that is in my posture statement.
    Mr. Rogers. Would you describe the threat or the activity 
pace of China, in particular, as growing in your AOR, or is it 
static?
    Admiral.
    Admiral Faller. China is increasing their influence across 
all elements of their power, from IT, cyber, information. 
Particularly in the military, it is below--it is insidious, it 
is right below the threshold of what you would observe. But the 
gifts in tens of millions of dollars that they are offering, 
their expansion of the PME [Professional Military Education] 
program, mirroring what we do at Leavenworth and all our great 
schools, and then opening up even further, offering cyber 
engineering scholarships with full Mandarin immersion to second 
lieutenants at various forces, it has picked up at an alarming 
pace.
    Mr. Rogers. So it is an aggressively growing threat?
    Admiral Faller. It is aggressive.
    Mr. Rogers. Okay.
    General.
    General VanHerck. I share the same sentiment as Admiral 
Faller, Congressman. China is absolutely taking aggressive 
steps in the Western Hemisphere and in the NORTHCOM AOR through 
COVID diplomacy; additional actions with buying up businesses' 
capability, especially tourism industry in the Bahamas, trying 
to gain additional access; 5G, trying to stand up their 5G in 
the Western Hemisphere.
    Mr. Rogers. So am I hearing you correct, then, if the 
activity by the Chinese--and not to mention the Russians and 
the others you've got to worry about--is aggressively growing, 
if your funding is static or less than what you received last 
year, are you going to be able to effectively meet those 
challenges, Admiral?
    Admiral Faller. I believe the front line of competition is 
right here in this neighborhood, Chairman. We will have to come 
forward and determine what that means and ask ourselves tough 
questions about where the prioritization is. And I think modest 
investment here goes a long way to assuring the security of the 
United States.
    General VanHerck. Congressman, I believe we have to balance 
and balance back into the Western Hemisphere to focus on things 
going on right here in our neighborhood. We have a unique 
opportunity to do that right now. I look forward to seeing what 
the 2022 budget does and where the Department is going in the 
Western Hemisphere, but I do believe that we need to apply 
additional resources and funding here.
    Mr. Rogers. Yeah. And I do too. And that is the thing I am 
trying--the point I am trying to make is, this is not brain 
surgery. If the Chinese are increasing, as they have stated, 
their funding by 7 percent--and I think that is not true; I 
think it is more than that. But their declared increase in 
defense spending is 7 percent. If we do not fund you at least 
at the rate of inflation, and hopefully aligned with the 
National Defense Strategy Commission's recommendation of 3-5 
percent increase, then we are doing you and our country a great 
disservice.
    And, with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mrs. Murphy is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for 
keeping it interesting by starting at the bottom of the virtual 
dais today.
    Thank you to the witnesses for your testimony and your 
service to our country.
    I find the conversation about the aggressive actions of 
China in our shared neighborhood to be very disconcerting. And, 
Admiral Faller, you put quite a bit of information both in your 
written and oral testimony today about the ways in which China 
is seeking to increase its influence in our shared 
neighborhood. And I want you to know that, as somebody who 
represents a district in Florida, I am a near neighbor. And so 
it is something that I am very concerned about and determined 
to do something about.
    And, yesterday, I introduced a bill to require the State 
Department, the Department of Defense, and the intelligence 
community and the National Security Council to jointly prepare 
a holistic assessment for Congress, containing both an 
unclassified and a classified section, on China's efforts to 
expand its influence in South America, Central America, the 
Caribbean, and Mexico and how these efforts could compromise 
U.S. interests.
    You know, I think it goes to what--we need this assessment 
so that we can answer the question that the ranking member is 
posing about precisely what military, diplomatic, and economic 
activities China is conducting in the region and then how we 
prioritize our response.
    For my part, I am particularly concerned about the CCP's 
[Chinese Communist Party's] relationship with the authoritarian 
regimes in Venezuela and Cuba and the security implications of 
these investments in the deepwater ports that were mentioned 
already, as well as their export of technology to governments 
that could use it to monitor and repress their citizens, their 
exportation of their autocratic, dystopian technology.
    But, you know, budget aside, what are three specific things 
that you think the U.S. should be doing which we are not 
currently doing to combat China's malign activities?
    Admiral.
    Admiral Faller. Thank you for the question. And, 
importantly, thanks for visiting with SOCOM [Special Operations 
Command] and Special Operations Command South this week to hear 
up front their concerns and challenges and opportunities.
    Whole-of-government solutions, whole-of-nation solutions 
are so important here. And there is more to do, working 
together, both in prioritization and coming up with actionable 
steps. And you highlighted the importance of whole-of-
government steps.
    Within the Department, I cite the 1 percent intelligence. 
We have to leverage data, big data, machine learning, and AI in 
an innovative way that recognizes that the threats are stealing 
that, and as a nation of laws, we rightly have to buy it and 
protect it. But we need to leverage it in a way that represents 
the 21st century within the Department.
    And it goes along with my shipmate Glen VanHerck's comment 
about all-domain awareness and how we tie this all together 
holistically so we can make decisions based on what the threat 
is doing, not what the threat did years and years ago.
    And then, finally, back to being on the field to compete, 
the right level of presence. Recent trip to Guyana--massive 
untapped oil reserves. ExxonMobil is in there in a big way. It 
is a complicated partnership with China. China is leveraging 
it, a country with a 50 percent disputed border. Florida is the 
main--Florida National Guard, State partner, is the main muscle 
mover for things that we are doing in Guyana.
    And so how do we best leverage all our elements in the DOD 
with the right authorities. I think there is more that we could 
offer our Guard and Reserve in that regard to help us get in 
there and compete day in and day out.
    Mrs. Murphy. Thank you.
    And speaking of whole-of-government approaches, with 
regards to the rise in transnational criminal organizations, 
are there lessons that can be learned from our decades in CVE 
[countering violent extremism]?
    And then do you believe that we are approaching the 
transnational criminal organizations in the right way, with law 
enforcement in the lead? Are there other ways in which DOD 
could play a more robust role?
    Admiral Faller. Transnational criminal organizations are a 
national security imperative. They are driving the insecurity 
across the hemisphere, particularly in the Northern Triangle 
Central America region. There is a crisis, and it is the crisis 
of insecurity that is driving people to find safety elsewhere.
    And our approach has been one of interdiction at the source 
and in transit. We are never going to interdict our way out of 
this. We have to adopt and adapt some of the lessons that we 
have learned the hard way over a generation in the 
counterterrorism fight to model the networks and then take a 
network approach to get after the centers of gravity. And DOD 
is a supporting element----
    The Chairman. I am so sorry, Admiral. The----
    Admiral Faller. Thank you.
    The Chairman [continuing]. Gentlelady's time has expired.
    And I should warn the witnesses, once we get to the end of 
time, I don't want to cut you off, but if you could wrap up as 
quickly as possible once we hit zero, that would be great.
    Mr. Moore, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Moore. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I share 
Representative Murphy's appreciation for the switch-up in the 
order today. None of my questions have been asked yet. I don't 
know what to do with all this power.
    I want to thank the witnesses as well--in particular, your 
message about myth-busting. Our ongoing presence in the Middle 
East and the increased awareness of and emphasis on the Indo-
Pacific can't overshadow, you know, making sure that we protect 
our neighborhood in North and South America. So I appreciate 
this conversation today.
    And, with that, with the challenges that do exist in the 
Western Hemisphere, I think it is important to highlight the 
wins that we have had and learn from those, as you just started 
to comment.
    As NATO's [North Atlantic Treaty Organization's] only 
global partner in the region, Colombia continues to be a 
regional model on how to progress beyond the drug-fueled 
internal conflicts. Could you continue to expound on lessons 
learned from that relationship and what we can do to maybe 
apply that to the Northern Triangle?
    Admiral Faller. Thank you, Congressman.
    Plan Colombia was a 10-year, about-a-billion-dollar-a-year 
investment by the United States, and the Colombians matched 
that with their talent and their money two-to-one. We stuck 
with it for 10 years, so it was consistency over time and 
addressing every element of the whole of government, truly 
whole of government, in Colombia.
    We also brought in other nations that contributed. And 
Colombia has a close relation, because of their experience in 
the Korean War, with South Korea. Other nations contributed to 
this in a million different ways and importantly. And that has 
left a legacy of professionalism.
    Not perfect. We are not perfect. But the Colombians do the 
right thing for the right reason, and I am proud to serve 
alongside them--professionalism, particularly. They have 
adopted some of our own human rights programs within their 
military that have paid off when their forces have been 
confronted with really tough situations.
    I think there are things to be learned from that to develop 
a long-view approach to Central America and not the cyclic 
start/stop, 6 months/1 year, that we see and have seen as we 
have studied best practices.
    Mr. Moore. I think it is a great point to make, as our 
Nation, you know, tries to find the right balance for 
immigration policy. And if we can implement that in the 
Northern Triangle, I think there is lots to learn there. So 
thanks for that. And it is a great opportunity for us to show 
where our defense-related world can interact with some of our 
domestic policies.
    I will continue on with Admiral Faller but welcome comments 
from the other witnesses.
    Just, you know, working in that region--the Latin American 
region may recover last from COVID-19, as you have said in your 
testimony--are we doing enough to combat China's presence? And 
is there anything else we can do to make sure to get out ahead 
of that?
    Admiral Faller. COVID was like a perfect storm on the 
hemisphere. The fragility that existed from the transnational 
criminal organizations and their day-in and day-out violence; 
young institutions, young democracies that are plagued with 
corruption has just fueled this. The conditions in Central 
America are--they rival the Great Depression here in the United 
States in terms of how hard it has hit, and more needs to be 
done.
    This has opened a door for China, and Russia to a lesser 
extent. We see it in their vaccine, heavy-handed vaccine 
diplomacy. The New York Times ran an excellent article that 
cited a couple countries where they are using the vaccines to 
leverage a shift to Taiwan, they are using the vaccines for 
better deals--and this is China using it--for better deals for 
5G and Huawei, for example.
    And so we have to come forward with positive, proactive 
results for these countries to help them. Things like our 
Development Finance Corp. are the right idea--through the BUILD 
[Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development] 
Act--at the right time. DOD has a role as we stay engaged 
professionally.
    Mr. Moore. I welcome additional comments. Okay to pass if 
not.
    General VanHerck. I would agree. I think there is an 
opportunity for whole-of-nation education and a solution to 
this.
    I am encouraged. The President stood up a task force to 
look at China. The Department has a task force to look at the 
China problem set. This will require us to go back to a 
competition focus, but this time it is a global competition 
focus, and it will come with the requirement to balance 
resources on a global basis. So that will determine how we do 
prioritization of those resources. It is an opportunity for us 
to look at it.
    Mr. Salesses. The only thing I would say is, there are a 
lot of good things going on down there right now from the 
Defense Department, too, with our security cooperation, our 
foreign military sales, the education things that we do. So 
there may be, certainly, a lot of competition, but we are in 
the competition. I think that is important to recognize, and we 
need to stay in it.
    As Admiral Faller pointed out, too, the vaccine is an 
important part of that. And as the administration has pledged 
all $4 billion to the COVAX [Coronavirus Vaccines Global 
Access] initiative, that is going to be very helpful in helping 
out Central and South America also.
    Mr. Moore. Thank you.
    I yield back.
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Panetta is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Panetta. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And thank you, gentlemen, for being here, and appreciate, 
obviously, your service.
    Sunday I just got back from McAllen, Texas. Did a border 
visit. Obviously got a limited view of the many challenges that 
just that one area faces when it comes to the migration that we 
are seeing right now as well as the influx of narcotics that we 
are seeing hit our borders as well.
    Obviously--that was one of five times I have been to the 
border area. I am from California, central California, so going 
to the border is obviously eye-opening to me. But I have come 
away with the same impression each time I have been there, in 
that there needs to be more resources, obviously short term in 
dealing with our border, but also long term, looking beyond the 
border and, yes, looking at the Northern Triangle and Central 
American countries.
    Obviously, providing resources, Admiral Faller, as you 
mentioned--but, unfortunately, in April of 2019, what we saw is 
a freeze of $450 million of resources, similar to ones that you 
just spoke about, in regards to programs that deal with 
violence prevention, poverty, and improving the justice 
systems.
    And so my question to you is, based on your last statement, 
has that set us back? The fact that we froze those programs, 
has that set us back in our efforts to help down there and work 
with the Northern Triangle countries?
    Admiral Faller. I think, Congressman, consistent programs 
with the right policy and oversight hooks provide us more 
leverage over the long term. And in the foreign ops bill last 
year that zeroed out FMF, foreign military financing, for the 
Northern Triangle, I think we lost leverage, rather than gained 
leverage, in terms of how we can help professionalize behavior.
    And some of the programs that are important that we rely on 
are our humanitarian assistance program. That is a win, and we 
have done well with that. We rely on our security cooperation 
program, where we install institutional capacity-building 
advisors--it is a fancy name for advisors in ministries of 
defense--that can look after corruption-free programs. In fact, 
Monterey is the source of that, the Naval Postgraduate School.
    But being consistent with these programs year to year 
builds trust. And it takes time to build a professional, 
trusted institution in a partner.
    Mr. Panetta. Great. And, obviously, when you say partner, 
that is very important in regards to the work that we do with 
these nations in that area. Is there anything else we can be 
doing at this point in continuing to build those partnerships?
    Admiral Faller. Stay consistent with the exercise program. 
We are appreciative that the Department of Defense supported 
our program request for last year. We are very appreciative 
that we got a plus-up on our security cooperation budget. We 
had that 32 percent reduction over the previous 2 years. The 
Department and the support of Congress arrested that slide. And 
those are key investments going forward to build the capacity 
of our partners.
    The reality is that partner-nation militaries are involved 
in the internal problems that they have. That is just the 
reality. And they are professional and they are the most 
trusted of all the security institutions in these countries, 
and we have to stay with them, because they want to emulate and 
model our professionalism. They learn it at our schools, and 
they learn it by example.
    Mr. Panetta. If you could, Admiral, go into, briefly, the 
Joint Interagency Task Force-South and what work we are doing 
to continue--like you said, you can't interdict our way out of 
it. Although we saw what the Border Patrol is doing there when 
they come to the ports of entry and the efforts that they are 
or are not doing, what else can we do beyond our borders when 
it comes to stopping that flow of narcotics?
    Admiral Faller. Joint Interagency Task Force-South in Key 
West is a team of teams. We have every partner nation, 
including Mexico, Canada, and our allies in Europe, represented 
there. Despite COVID, they stepped up. When the U.S. stayed on 
the field, they stepped up and increased their interdictions 
from 50 to 60 percent participation rate. That is key.
    So we have to incentivize them to do that, recognize when 
they do. And Colombia is one of the countries that made a big 
impact. In fact, Costa Rica, Panama, Honduras, Guatemala all 
made impacts last year professionally in that space.
    So continuing to invest in that capability is a good deal 
and a good return on investment for the U.S.
    Mr. Panetta. Thank you. Thank you, gentlemen.
    I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Carl is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Turn your microphone on, sir. Sorry.
    Mr. Carl. That always helps, doesn't it, sir?
    The Chairman. Yep. There we go. You are good.
    Mr. Carl. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman Smith, Ranking 
Member Rogers.
    And I thank the witnesses for being here, and I certainly 
thank you for your service to this country.
    Admiral, over the recent years, we have heard an increasing 
role that China has played throughout Central and South 
America. China has continued to invest in projects to improve 
their relationship with these countries, which--that is what 
you have been highlighting here. And now your written testimony 
describes the increasing actions China has taken through 
diplomacy because of the COVID-19 pandemic.
    Can you explain what China has been doing and how the Navy 
ships, hospital ships, can be used to combat these while 
continuing to advance our relationship in the region?
    Admiral Faller. The National Defense Strategy and the 
Secretary of Defense's priorities rightly call out that China 
is a pacing threat and a competition that we have to win. And 
we have to recognize that they are the number one trading 
partner with the United States and they are our partners' 
number one trading partner.
    So I don't ask them to choose, but I point out to our 
partners, whose gear would you rather work with? The United 
States, built in America, is the best gear out there, the best 
equipment, best ships. Whose values system better matches your 
values system? And that is our competitive advantage. And our 
workers and our country is our competitive advantage.
    And so I go and I represent the best of the U.S., our 
service men and women and their equipment, and so we talk about 
the Navy and the importance of our Navy participating in 
exercises. And our Navy, with the support of SECDEF [Secretary 
of Defense], stepped up last year and supplied ships, ships 
built in Alabama and all over this great Nation, to work with 
our partner nations. And they did really well in the exercises 
and the training programs.
    It works on interoperability, domain awareness, things that 
General VanHerck has cited as important to defending our Nation 
and important to building our strong alliance and partnerships 
globally.
    Mr. Carl. Thank you, sir.
    Second question: Given the upkeep requirements of our Navy 
hospital ships right now--we have two, correct? We have one in 
dry dock right now, and one is on the east coast?
    Admiral Faller. Correct, sir.
    Mr. Carl. Have I got that right? Yeah.
    Admiral Faller. The Mercy and the Comfort.
    Mr. Carl. Yeah. Given the upkeep requirements for both of 
those and these aging ships, how can increasing the number of 
Navy medical ships help in the response to China's activity in 
the AOR?
    Admiral Faller. Our partnerships, one of the strongest 
aspects of them has been our outreach in humanitarian 
assistance and medical assistance.
    And I have seen firsthand the power of two Comfort 
deployments during my tour, where you send an outstretched 
hand, you help a mother with their son or daughter that has 
never been to a doctor. They are 8 years old, 9 years old. And 
you see the value of that to win hearts and minds. And the 
value of that is it shows the best of America.
    So that capacity in winning the day-to-day competition and 
being able to respond in a competitor fight, a global war, is 
important. So, to me, it is how the services, the Navy, working 
with Secretary of Defense, best resources that. But it is 
really important that we never lose that capability to be able 
to supply the combatant commanders in peace so that we never 
have to fight.
    Mr. Carl. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back my time.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Veasey is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Veasey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General VanHerck, I wanted to ask you about the weather 
event that we had in Texas. I know that NORTHCOM works very 
closely with FEMA [Federal Emergency Management Agency] and DOD 
when it comes to natural disasters. And I was hoping that you 
would be able to talk a little bit about what the response was 
to the power outage in Texas and how DOD responded to the 
event.
    General VanHerck. Sure. Thank you for the question.
    So defense support of civil authorities is obviously a 
crucial mission at United States NORTHCOM and something that we 
do as a no-fail mission. Our direct support to that was in 
support of a lead Federal agency, in this case FEMA, to provide 
generator support to where there was no electrical power to 
sustain hospitals and those kinds of things.
    And the result of this is to take a look at our overarching 
resiliency as a nation, something that we do routinely to 
ensure that, from a defense of the homeland, that that is 
factored in to any potential not only disaster but attack on 
our homeland. And so working with the interagency, we continue 
to analyze the resiliency overall from that event you are 
referring to.
    Mr. Veasey. Is there anything that you learned from that 
event that can help us better prepare in the future? Obviously, 
there is still a great amount of concern. The State legislature 
right now is looking at, you know, what sort of safeguards they 
can possibly put in place to try to prevent something like that 
from ever happening again.
    With it being, you know, so many people that were affected 
by that storm, is there something that you think needs to 
happen or that you are going to be looking at so we can better 
respond in the future?
    General VanHerck. So I would say that the largest lesson 
out of that should be applied to the fact that, although this 
was a natural disaster, that somebody with nefarious activity 
could take some kind of action that would put us in a 
precarious situation just like that. They will learn, they will 
see the potential vulnerabilities, and they will take action.
    So us as not only the Department of Defense, within the 
interagency, should exercise this. We should work through the 
command and control of the future to ensure that we are in a 
properly positioned place to command and control and look at 
our resiliency.
    Mr. Veasey. Thank you very much.
    Admiral Faller, you were asked a question earlier about 
Colombia and some of the successes that they have had there 
post Medellin and Cali cartels, when that country was a 
complete wreck. And I wanted to ask you specifically about what 
sort of--if today you could implement something to try to 
stabilize the countries where we receive most of the migration 
headed north to our southern border, what would be the first 
thing that you would implement?
    And what sort of requirements or--and maybe ``requirement'' 
is not the best word, but what should be the expectation from, 
you know, a country like Honduras, where there is just, you 
know, such a long history of corruption, to be quite frank? 
Like, what, you know, should be, you know, asked of them in 
order to make anything that you would implement be a success?
    Admiral Faller. Thank you for recognizing the 
professionalism and the excellence of the Colombian security 
forces. They work hard every day at that and emulate our values 
in that respect.
    I would ask support for a legislative proposal that we have 
submitted to Congress for the U.S.-Colombia Action Plan. It is 
a plan that is an offshoot of Plan Colombia that helps use 
security cooperation to fund a regional approach.
    Colombia is now a net exporter of professional security and 
has trained thousands of Central American/Northern Triangle 
nations' security forces. And the cultural fit is a very good 
one, and they have trained them to do professional work. They 
are willing to contribute with some additional funding here.
    I would also ask support for our institutional capacity-
building efforts, where we put these advisors that are trained 
at the institute in Monterey in host nation. We could, for 
example, with additional funding and support, embed one in the 
Ministry of Defense for Honduras. We know who the trusted 
partners are, and the Minister of Defense and his team are 
trying to do the right thing in Honduras. We know, working with 
other agencies, that they are trusted. And by putting an 
advisor in, we could provide the right system and overall view 
to add transparency so we can account correctly to Congress, 
your oversight role, that the dollars are being spent in a 
right way and invested that is going to be a return on 
investment for the U.S.
    Mr. Veasey. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Jackson is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Dr. Jackson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 
Rogers, and to our witnesses for being here today.
    While we spend much of our time talking about the threats 
posed by China and Russia, people need to understand, I think, 
that those threats are not limited to geographic locations. The 
threat and the influence imposed by China and Russia impacts 
both NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM AORs. The National Defense Strategy 
correctly prioritizes competition with China and Russia, and 
the Department has seen great progress over the last 4 years in 
confronting that challenge.
    With looming budget cuts in the pipeline, any advantage we 
may have could be wiped out by malign espionage efforts 
influenced by China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea through 
their proximity to our military installations. While there are 
conflicting views on this committee about many topics, I would 
hope that one view we all share is that our adversaries should 
not be the owners and operators of any facility that is 
anywhere close to a United States military installation.
    With that said, I am worried about the potential espionage 
efforts related to this particular issue.
    Mr. Salesses, could you speak to the threat that would be 
posed by China or any other adversary in their ability to 
purchase real estate near an installation and the intelligence 
that that could pose to our country?
    Mr. Salesses. Congressman, thanks for the question.
    Obviously, that would be a very significant challenge, and 
we would need to--I know that that has come up around the 
country a couple of times. And we work very closely with the 
Justice Department and other organizations that would be 
involved in those kinds of activities in how we could limit 
that kind of activity here in the country.
    Dr. Jackson. Thank you, sir.
    I have one more question.
    The threat posed by China and our adversaries is of grave 
concern worldwide. However, there are things that threaten our 
military's ability to train here in the United States as well. 
While we as a country begin to look at renewable sources of 
energy, such as wind, one thing that has not always been 
considered is the impact that construction of these projects 
can have on our readiness levels. It is critical that the young 
men and women training in the United States are able to do so 
in order to prepare for the threats that they may face when 
they are deployed.
    General, could you speak about the detrimental effects that 
wind farms can have on our military training routes [MTRs], 
what steps are being taken to mitigate that impact, and the 
overall readiness impact that occurs when we are forced to 
reduce the number of low-level MTRs flown out of pilot training 
bases, such as the one in my district, Sheppard Air Force Base?
    General VanHerck. Congressman, that is probably best 
answered by the service. But I would tell you that there is a 
detrimental effect that could limit our ability to train here 
in the United States, would have potential readiness impacts.
    What is crucial is that we have a partnership, local 
partnerships with local commanders, with the local civic 
leaders, the mayors, et cetera, that, more broadly, also 
includes a broader discussion, a national security discussion, 
so that we can come to a solution for business--folks that want 
to make that money for renewable energy, as you pointed out, to 
make us resilient as well--and the potential impacts on 
national security.
    And that discussion has to happen any time there is a 
potential building of some kind of a facility that could impact 
training.
    Dr. Jackson. Yes, sir, I agree with you. And I think it 
will be our job as legislators to make sure that that happens 
before this stuff is put into place, because that is what I was 
seeing at Sheppard Air Force Base. And it goes back to my first 
question as well. If we don't think about those things up 
front, then that stuff is going to happen before we realize it, 
and then we are going to be in a position where we can't go 
back and undermine that.
    I thank you all for your thoughtful responses. We face 
threats across the globe and, unfortunately, even some here at 
home. I look forward to working with each of you and with all 
of my colleagues here on the committee to provide our military 
with the resources and the authorities that we need to protect 
our country.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back my time.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Ms. Strickland is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Strickland. Thank you, Chairman Smith and Ranking 
Member Rogers and to our witnesses.
    I have the privilege of representing the Western Area 
Defense Sector, WADS, which is one the two sectors responsible 
for peacetime air sovereignty, strategic air defense, and 
airborne counter-drug operations in the continental U.S. under 
NORAD.
    As we continue to implement the National Security Strategy, 
we must continue to ensure that our homeland assets are a 
deterrent to our adversaries. I strongly support ensuring that 
WADS has the resources it needs to continue to defend our 
homeland.
    General VanHerck, I would like to start with you. And I 
have a few questions, one about WADS and then another about 
hypersonic detection, if we can get there.
    One of the innovations that NORAD is working on is 
Pathfinder, which previously took separate data systems and 
combined them so NORAD can see a more complete picture. I know 
that a contract was recently awarded, so can you please tell me 
how the integration is going, if there are any difficulties, 
and why you think Pathfinder is so important to the concept of 
an all-domain awareness?
    Thank you.
    General VanHerck. Thank you for the opportunity, ma'am, to 
talk about Pathfinder.
    Pathfinder is an innovative capability that we have 
designed to do exactly what you talked about. And working in a 
partnership to take data and information--which, by the way, I 
think is a strategic value, is something that we need to 
utilize. Pathfinder ingests data from multiple sources and 
fuses that data and uses machine learning and intelligence 
capabilities to process and share in near-real-time.
    But, previously to Pathfinder, we had 12 manual systems, 
phone calls, those kinds of things, that would take longer, 
minutes, if not longer. Today, when you utilize Pathfinder, it 
gives us a picture in seconds or less and a much more broad 
picture to help our air defense sectors accomplish our mission 
of defending our homeland.
    Pathfinder is going great. The Canadians just gave us some 
additional funding to continue the program, and we look forward 
to moving that forward.
    I will give you an example real quick, and I don't want to 
steal too much of your time, but Pathfinder was utilized, if 
you remember, in 2015, the gyrocopter that flew down from north 
in the National Capital Region here and landed on the Capitol 
lawn. When you take all the sensors in the National Capital 
Region and you look at them separately, none of the sensors 
detected that gyrocopter. When you take all those sensors--we 
took the real data and you take those sensors and you fuse it 
into Pathfinder, into a single system that aggregates that data 
and assesses it, sure enough, we were able to see that 
gyrocopter.
    That is the value of information and data. Previously, the 
data was left on the cutting room floor and not analyzed. 
Pathfinder analyzes it.
    So thanks for the opportunity to talk about that.
    Ms. Strickland. Great. Thank you. And it just really 
underscores how we talk a lot about data but it actually helps 
us make good decisions.
    So I want to switch over to hypersonic detection and stay 
with General VanHerck.
    As the commander of NORTHCOM and NORAD, what do you see as 
the most critical gap that must be filled in regard to sensor 
coverage of the U.S. for advancing Russian and Chinese threats 
of advanced cruise and hypersonic missiles?
    And as the Air Force completes their analysis of 
alternatives of northern approaches, have NORTHCOM and NORAD 
priorities been accounted for in that final product that we 
get?
    General VanHerck. Well, I look forward to seeing the 
product as the Air Force completes it. I do believe that our 
equities will be accounted for in the product, but I haven't 
seen the final product. It is still with the Air Force.
    Specific domain awareness is what we need for NORAD and 
United States Northern Command, and that is in my priorities 
that you will see in my statement and on my priority list that 
I submitted to the Department--domain awareness to get further 
out.
    Today, competitors have increased capabilities. The 
Russians can actually shoot from over the Russian homeland and 
strike the continental United States. And so we need over-the-
horizon radars and those kinds of capabilities.
    Specifically with regards to hypersonic capabilities, I 
remain concerned. We are focused on offensive hypersonic 
capabilities, and that is crucial to our overarching deterrent. 
But just as important is our ability to detect, have a threat 
assessment, threat warning and attack assessment, for 
hypersonic coming in. And that is part of our deterrence by 
denial.
    And any solution that we come up with for hypersonics 
should not be just a sensor that tells us what is inbound, but 
it ought to be able to deliver weapons-quality information so 
that we could actually negate that threat from a hypersonic 
vehicle that may be inbound.
    And, by the way, hypersonics are here today. The Russians 
have fielded them. It is not something in the future. They are 
absolutely a threat right here and right now.
    Ms. Strickland. Great.
    And, very quickly, do you think Canada is doing its part to 
equitably contribute to hypersonics?
    General VanHerck. Canada is a wonderful ally and does a 
great thing, specific with the North Warning System and our 
legacy systems. They have funded about 60 percent of that over 
time.
    Going forward, what we really need to do, ma'am, is create 
the framework for NORAD modernization. I am encouraged by the 
President and the Prime Minister talking about it. But there is 
much more work to do on what that framework will look like in 
the future.
    Ms. Strickland. Thank you very much.
    Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mrs. McClain is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. McClain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you, gentlemen, for being here, and thank for your 
service.
    As it pertains to national security, I have heard a lot of 
words today--rule of law, human rights, deterrence--and, 
really, consistencies with our programs and our policies.
    With that said, General VanHerck, as we know, the 
disastrous situation at our southern border is not only a 
humanitarian crisis but a national security crisis, where 
former President Trump had the border secured.
    My question is simple. Has President Biden's actions to 
open the southern border and encourage migrants to illegally 
cross our border made the United States safer or less safe? And 
do President Biden's border policies threaten the security and 
stability in Mexico and the Northern Triangle?
    General VanHerck. Thanks for the opportunity to talk about 
national security.
    I am not going to comment about the specifics on policies. 
I would ask the President and defer to him about those. But I 
would tell you that we have a national security imperative 
right now on our southern border that we need to deal with.
    Admiral Faller made it very clear in his comments about the 
confluence of things that have come together. Transnational 
criminal organizations create an environment not conducive to 
successful rearing of families, employment, economics, et 
cetera. Combine that with COVID and two major natural 
disasters, and you have a confluence of things ongoing.
    I would say there is a perception that folks can come here 
and bring your family with you. What we need to do is approach 
this from a national security imperative and come up with a 
whole-of-government approach that will secure our borders.
    I am concerned from a homeland defense perspective. I 
believe the symptoms that we are seeing today are exactly that; 
they are symptoms: migration, counter-narcotics, human 
trafficking. The problem and the challenge is creating an 
environment where these folks can succeed so they don't feel 
like they have to migrate. And that takes a whole-of-nation 
approach to get after transnational criminal organizations.
    We figured this out with al-Qaida and ISIS [Islamic State 
of Iraq and Syria]. You can cut off their funding, you can do 
additional things as a whole of government, working with allies 
and partners to get after this problem. And so I look forward--
I believe the administration is on a good track there. I look 
forward to seeing where it goes.
    Mrs. McClain. Thank you. As we know, perception is 90 
percent of reality.
    I am going to switch gears for a moment. My next question 
is for all the witnesses.
    As we know, China has become an ever-increasing threat not 
only to the Pacific region but globally. In addition to the 
buildup in their armed forces, they have been developing 5G 
technology, as we have discussed earlier, and the United 
States, it appears, is falling further behind in this regard.
    My question is this to each of you: Would a 5G secured 
network accessible anywhere in the world to our forward 
operating bases or other command centers for transmission of 
data be a priority for USNORTH and SOUTHCOMs?
    Mr. Salesses. Congresswoman, any secure network would be 
very helpful. The question is, you know, what are the other 
things that we are balancing against that? So I agree that any 
secure network would be helpful, but we will have to look at 
what other challenges we have associated with that.
    Admiral Faller. When I sit down with our partners, their 
cybersecurity is in the top three of all their security 
challenges. And that is at every level in that partner. And it 
is in our top three as well. So it is important that we get 
this right.
    And we know there is no civil-military divide by law in the 
People's Republic of China. And so any investment in Huawei and 
ZTE and their 5G is a direct pipeline to the PLA [People's 
Liberation Army] and their intelligence services.
    And I point this out to our partners at each and every 
visit and every time. At a professional level, they get it, and 
they don't want to invest in that technology. They want to 
invest in secure technology, clean technology, U.S. or other 
trusted partner technology. And it is important that 
initiatives come forward that allow them an option to do that.
    General VanHerck. To directly answer your question, it 
would be incredibly valuable to have 5G secure technology.
    And we have moved out on that at United States Northern 
Command. Our J6 [Director, Cyberspace Operations] is very 
innovative. J6 does our, you know, command and control and 
those kinds of things. That gives us resiliency as a nation, 
candidly.
    Today, I am able to take a single device to do unclassified 
and classified information from any location and have 
resiliency, not reaching back to a single building or a single 
server, if you will, but can access multiple servers. That is 
incredibly valuable going forward in a crisis, whether that be 
crisis from a natural disaster or a potential attack on the 
homeland.
    Mrs. McClain. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    The gentlelady yields back.
    Ms. Jacobs is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Jacobs. Well, thank you, Mr. Chair.
    And thank you so much to our witnesses for being here.
    First, I would just like to say to my colleagues who are 
expressing concern about the southern border, as a 
Representative of San Diego, we feel very safe, and I think we 
know that the root causes are really the key to making sure 
that this situation abates.
    And on the question of root causes, Admiral Faller, I would 
like to ask you: As you referenced in your testimony, Latin 
America militaries and militia groups have a history of 
violating human rights, and these violations have sometimes 
been ignored or even encouraged by the United States. 
Throughout the civil wars of the 1990s, we saw special forces 
trained by the U.S. were used to commit these abuses.
    So, given that reality, I was wondering if you could talk a 
bit about our current train-and-equip missions that SOUTHCOM is 
conducting and how you are working to prevent these types of 
violations from occurring.
    Admiral Faller. Thank you. It is an important question.
    We have learned from that history. SOUTHCOM has a human 
rights program, the only combatant command to have one. It is 
now in its 20th-plus year. We have invested our own money in 
increasing the capacity of that program. We use that program 
with our partners. We have helped our partners--Honduras, 
Guatemala, El Salvador--install human rights observers and 
advisors in their ministries and with their chiefs of defense. 
We hold seminars.
    And I routinely, through that program, meet with the human 
rights NGOs [nongovernmental organizations] in the United 
States and in partner nations, for example in Guatemala, to 
listen to their concerns. These important NGO partners, they 
know their stuff and they have on-the-ground insights. And we 
take it very, very seriously.
    And then we apply that into our Leahy vetting process, 
which is another extremely important program that we should 
look to enhance, frankly, and really embed in a systematic way 
within the Department and make it very consistent.
    These programs have helped change behavior over time. And, 
while not perfect, we have made progress. And particularly in 
the last year, when there was every reason for partner nations, 
their militaries--that is what I can speak to--to turn inward, 
they didn't, and they acted professionally. There were some 
reports here and there, but, by and large, they acted 
professionally.
    You can't assume that that will be future performance, but 
the building blocks are in place to have a better professional 
performance going forward. And I assure you, we are committed 
to that at our headquarters and in our training and education 
programs.
    Ms. Jacobs. Thank you.
    And still to you, Admiral Faller, I think, you know, as we 
have talked about the region and we often emphasize our willing 
partners, especially, for instance, the Colombian Government, I 
was wondering how you believe this partnership will serve the 
U.S. goals in the region as it relates to any peace deal with 
FARC [Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia] or any potential 
peace deal with the ELN [National Liberation Army].
    Admiral Faller. Well, certainly we support our partners in 
information sharing. That is really key to understanding what 
promises are made, what promises are being broken.
    It is unfortunate the Venezuelan crisis has just made all 
that worse. Venezuela is essentially a paradise for 
narcotraffickers, and Maduro and his illegitimate government 
and the military are profiting from that. And by creating that 
safe haven and encouraging them, ``them'' being the FARC 
dissidents and the ELN, it has compounded the situation.
    The 5 million migrants that have been pushed out by the 
human rights abuses of the Maduro regime have also compounded 
it. Colombia has really, overall, just behaved and performed 
with humanity in accepting these migrants.
    And so we are with them. We talk to them every day and 
share information. And it is largely in their ministry and 
government levels, so I just provide--I share information with 
my counterpart, General Navarro, who is just a wonderful, 
professional interlocutor.
    Ms. Jacobs. Thank you. And thank you for your long service 
to our country.
    And, Mr. Chair, I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mrs. Bice is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. Bice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member.
    And thank you for the witnesses being here and for your 
service.
    To each of you, in a hearing memo, it listed, in the last 2 
years, a quarter of a billion dollars has been spent--DOD 
dollars have been spent for DHS border support.
    Will you be reimbursed for those dollars? And, if not, what 
programs are going to be impacted by the quarter of a billion 
dollars that you have lost in funding?
    Mr. Salesses. So, Congresswoman, I will take that question. 
We have not been reimbursed. It was done on a nonreimbursable 
basis.
    And that funding came out of the defense budget and other 
places. It probably impacted, depending on where the money was 
taken, depending what it impacted. It was probably training, 
some personnel costs, and those types of things, where the 
services had available money to use in that case.
    Mrs. Bice. So, when we are talking about funding, you are 
asking for additional funding to make sure that you have the 
resources needed, but, in fact, you are actually having dollars 
pulled away from you in other ways, including to support DHS 
border support, that do impact the readiness and availability 
of the forces, it seems. Is that correct?
    Mr. Salesses. That is correct.
    Mrs. Bice. Thank you.
    My second question is: In the last 6 years, the United 
States has spent over $3.5 billion in strategy and engagement 
for Central America. Do you believe that we are getting a 
return on our investment, given that we have seen a tremendous 
amount of influx of migrants from the Northern Triangle area, 
which is where the bulk of these dollars have been going?
    And I would open that for any of the witnesses.
    Admiral Faller. Consistency in our programs is as important 
as the dollar amount.
    And we have been in extremely good discussions. The 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and SECDEF have been excellent at 
asking for our advice on what might work and will work as part 
of the administration's $4 billion multiyear plan.
    And we are encouraged by the long look of this program. It 
takes time for partners' security forces--I can speak to 
military--to implement programs that they can responsibly and 
professionally enact that will make a difference in tamping 
down the violence.
    And I know State Department--we work hand in hand with 
State Department on this--is committed through their INL 
[Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs] 
to the same professionalization of the police forces.
    The issue has been that we have not applied this 
consistently. It has been started and stopped. And so, while 
there may have been a high dollar value, it is hard to make the 
argument that it was consistently applied over the time period 
that would be required to make a difference.
    Mrs. Bice. Thank you for that.
    Last question. Mr. Salesses, have you been requested to 
provide additional border support or security for fiscal year 
2022? And, if so, what are the conversations surrounding that?
    Mr. Salesses. We have not been requested. But, obviously, 
we are talking to DHS, because, as you are aware, 
Congresswoman, we have military members on the border right now 
and have consistently provided military members over the last 
several years in support of DHS's mission.
    Currently, there is no request for 2022, but that doesn't 
mean that we may not get a request for 2022.
    Mrs. Bice. And the request that you have received over the 
last, let's say, several months, is that impacting Reserves or 
National Guard readiness as they are being pulled away to help 
support what is happening on the southern border?
    Mr. Salesses. I don't believe so, Congresswoman. The force 
that is down there now, even though it is National Guard 
members, was brought on as title 10, because it was part of 
their time to come on duty, full-time duty. And so we were able 
to make use of that by having them come on duty during that 
period.
    Mrs. Bice. Great.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Morelle is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Morelle. Good morning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for 
this very, very important hearing.
    And I want to thank the witnesses for being here today to 
share your expertise and also your dedication to our Nation's 
safety and security.
    I am a new member of this committee, and so some of my 
questions will seem pretty basic. I am just trying to get a 
level set. But I would like to hear, General, a little more 
about NORTHCOM's mission associated with the Arctic. And 
appreciate the questions that my colleagues have asked up to 
this point about it.
    But, General, if I were to go back home and talk to 
constituents and talk about the importance of the Arctic to the 
United States and the challenges associated, what would I say? 
How would I describe to them the importance of Arctic as a 
region and then also the challenges specifically associated 
with the Arctic?
    General VanHerck. Thanks, Congressman.
    The Arctic is very important, and the environmental changes 
that have been ongoing have allowed increased access to the 
Arctic. The Arctic has tremendous resources, natural resources.
    And it is also a line of communication now, with the 
environmental changes, that have a flow from Asia to the 
European AOR and back and forth. And having that flow, the 
economic flow, is crucial to maintain for prosperity of not 
only our Nation but other nations around the globe.
    Russia gets 25 percent of their GDP [gross domestic 
product] from resources in the Arctic, so they absolutely have 
a vested interest in the Arctic, and they also want to ensure 
that it is secure for their efforts, if you will.
    What I would tell you is, both Russia and China would like 
to change the international rules-based norms and the 
consistency that we have had that has served the globe well 
since the end of World War II. So it is incumbent upon us to be 
persistent by working with allies and partners and like-minded 
nations to ensure that we maintain the consistency of the 
international rules-based norms and laws that have served us 
well over time.
    Mr. Morelle. So, just so I might say it in--just so that I 
understand it, it is essentially that the changes in climate, 
then--I think that is what you are referring to in terms of 
environmental--make it more navigable, make it more accessible, 
and, at the same time, our two adversaries want to change the 
rules that govern the region and how we have historically 
approached the region.
    Is that right? Did I get that?
    General VanHerck. Yes. So environmental change has created 
more access and opportunity. And both Russia and China are 
interested in ensuring that the activities conducted in the 
Arctic are favorable to them individually, not necessarily the 
international community.
    Mr. Morelle. So talk to me a little bit about that. So what 
type of investments and capabilities are they--what types of 
investments are they making in capabilities that increase that 
concern? Could you give me a little specificity around that, 
those investments?
    General VanHerck. Sure.
    Russia has taken a dozen or so military installations that 
after the Cold War sat dormant, and they have revitalized 
those. They have worked hard on their nuclear capabilities and 
revitalized those as well, to include their bombers and 
infrastructure. Not only are they placing defensive 
capabilities that they state are obviously for defensive 
purposes, they are putting offensive capabilities into the 
Arctic, capabilities which are capable of not only striking 
Canada and North America but, obviously, our homeland.
    China calls themselves a near-Arctic nation and wants to be 
influential in the Arctic as well. I would remind the committee 
that next month, in May, Russia takes over the Arctic Council. 
It is very important for us to ensure that like-minded nations, 
allies, and partners are well-aligned as we go into this, 
because Russia and China will try to exploit any gaps or seams.
    Mr. Morelle. Thank you.
    If I could just stay on that subject just for a moment 
more, as I use the balance of my time here. As we assess our 
capabilities in the Arctic, talk a little bit about the 
challenge you find with the extreme cold, ice, high altitude on 
our military equipment. And is there anything we should be 
doing in terms of working with industry on innovations to help 
address those needs? And have you began pursuing those 
partnerships? Are we engaged with partnerships already in that 
regard?
    General VanHerck. Thanks, Congressman. I think that is a 
great question.
    And so I do think there is more we can be doing. And units 
that are organized, trained, and equipped and ready to operate 
in the Arctic is crucial. I believe that we need to do a better 
job of identifying those units, enabling them through day-to-
day competition to practice their operations.
    And working closely with industry, as you point out, to 
ensure that the capabilities that we do develop are conducive 
for successful operations in the Arctic. That goes from the 
human asset all the way to specific platforms and capabilities 
overall.
    Mr. Morelle. Thank you, gentlemen.
    And thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back my time.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Waltz is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Admiral Faller, I am struck and I would encourage my 
colleagues to look at your chart here of Chinese activity in 
South/Central America. Just some of the key things hopping out 
at me: 25 out of the 33 countries hosting Chinese 
infrastructure projects; 60 ports; 70 percent increase in 
Chinese Navy port calls; nearly a billion in weapons sales; 
and, most importantly, or at least most disturbingly I think, 
both sides of the Panama Canal now owned in some way, shape, or 
fashion by the Chinese in controlling that strategic choke 
point.
    It leads me to wonder, is the Monroe Doctrine dead or at 
least on life support?
    And if you could elaborate a bit more on what you are doing 
with the interagency. Because we are talking military tools 
here, which are critical, and I certainly support security 
assistance and increasing your security assistance efforts, but 
these are nonmilitary tools. And what tools do you need and 
what tools does the interagency need to combat this and to 
compete?
    Admiral Faller. Certainly, the statistics you cite fuel a 
sense of urgency with respect to strengthening our 
partnerships. Partnerships are key. We like to think of it as a 
good-neighbor doctrine. It resonates. Good neighbors have like 
values. And values are our strength in this hemisphere.
    We recently visited Argentina. They want to do more with 
us. They want to partner with us at a mil-to-mil level. We have 
to do everything we can----
    Mr. Waltz. Which, by the way, now, Argentina has a Chinese 
space tracking station which lines up with our polar launches 
out of----
    Admiral Faller. We discussed----
    Mr. Waltz [continuing]. Vandenberg Air Force Base.
    Admiral Faller. We discussed those important issues.
    We have to look to the Antarctic as well as the Arctic. 
China has a growing interest there. We have visited Ushuaia, 
which is the furthest port in this hemisphere, the continental 
hemisphere, and its important access.
    You mentioned the Panama Canal. Panama, under the current 
leadership there, their President Cortizo, has opened with 
renewed commitment to a relationship with the United States. We 
are working on that with our Department of State. That is 
important. Panama is a very strategic partner with very 
professional security forces.
    And those are the investments we need to make. A small 
investment in security cooperation, a little goes a long way. A 
businessperson, you would invest in it. It is a high P/E [price 
to earnings] stock.
    Mr. Waltz. No, thank you, Admiral.
    And I would also note, you know, we are on the verge of 
having Barbados, Haiti, Honduras potentially switch their 
recognition of Taiwan; port projects in Honduras, Cuba, and, 
General, also, under your purview, the Bahamas as well; in 
addition to potential fishing rights going to the Chinese next 
to our underwater testing facilities.
    Is that correct?
    General VanHerck. China is very aggressive in the Bahamas 
right now, with a new ambassador that is very aggressive. They 
have the largest embassy in the Bahamas right now, and they 
continue to buy up the tourism industry to have access and 
influence.
    And you are exactly right; they do have access right now to 
an overwatch, if you will, of our Navy test and training 
facilities, which is very concerning.
    We are partnering closely with the Royal Bahamian Defense 
Force. They are fantastic partners for domain awareness, 
putting capabilities in the south right now for domain 
awareness, such as radar. This year, we will put one into 
Nassau, as well, to give us additional capabilities.
    But a little will go a long ways for investment with 
regards to Bahamas and Mexico.
    Mr. Waltz. Thank you.
    Just switching to the other--from the Bahamas to the Arctic 
and adding to some of my colleagues. My understanding, the 
Coast Guard has one operational icebreaker that is about 60 
years old, one under construction. The Russians have dozens.
    The Northwest Passage is now open for shipping, along with 
shipping from across the north side of Russia from Asia to 
Europe.
    Do we need more icebreakers?
    General VanHerck. Congressman, for persistence, I support 
the current plan for additional icebreakers for the Coast 
Guard. Your numbers are correct. They have two assigned. They 
had a fire on one. They are about to resurrect that, which will 
end up with two. But for persistence, we do need extra 
icebreakers.
    Mr. Waltz. Great.
    And just with my remaining time--thank you for that, 
General--Admiral Faller, if you could send to my office for the 
record your legislative proposal on adding to Plan Colombia.
    And I would just mention to my colleagues, we have had 
Special Forces in Colombia with an all-of-government effort now 
for 30 years. So a lot of discussion in Washington these days 
of endless wars, but that persistent engagement can be 
incredibly effective.
    Please send that over. Thank you.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 138.]
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mrs. Luria is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. Luria. Well, thank you, gentlemen, for appearing 
today.
    And, Admiral Faller, I wanted to start with you. I recently 
read a press release from SOUTHCOM that announced the 
completion of the LCS-1 [littoral combat ship] USS Freedom 
deployment in support of JIATF-South [Joint Interagency Task 
Force-South]. It applauded the work of the ship's crew in 
counter-drug operations, working with partner nations to build 
interoperability, and hosting a U.S. Coast Guard LEDET [Law 
Enforcement Detachment] to counter illicit trafficking.
    All in all, my takeaway from this press release was that 
this was a successful deployment. Would you concur in this 
assessment?
    Admiral Faller. There have been some real bright spots with 
littoral combat ship deployments. You cite Freedom. It was a 
very successful deployment. They had a high operational 
availability.
    I would also cite the USS Gabby Giffords' recent 
deployment, where the CO [commanding officer], on his own 
initiative, made a video for his crew and for his families that 
went public about their high operational success.
    So that capability has proven, and the CNO [Chief of Naval 
Operations], Admiral Gilday's commitment to getting the 
maintenance right is making a difference.
    Mrs. Luria. So it sounds to me that you would welcome 
additional LCS deployments in your AOR. But I also noted, 
however, the headline of this article was ``USS Freedom Returns 
for Final Deployment.''
    Even though the LCS can provide significant contributions 
in your AOR and the Navy wants to grow its fleet, they intend 
to decommission the first LCS in class. Do you agree with this 
plan?
    Admiral Faller. The Navy shipbuilding plan has stated a 
capability and a size that the Navy needs, and I think it is 
recognized that we need a larger fleet. How the Navy sources 
that capability through the joint process, to me, is--I am 
indifferent on what type of ship, but we need a ship. Zero is 
equal to zero or unsolvable in any equation.
    Mrs. Luria. Well, thank you. And I appreciate you noting, 
as we talked about last year, the limited number of ships 
deployed in your AOR.
    And, General VanHerck, I would like to switch and better 
understand the geographic responsibilities of the three 
combatant commanders whose AORs intersect at the Arctic.
    On the west coast--and I am going to focus on naval 
assets--you have a single combatant commander at USINDOPACOM 
with 100-plus naval forces assigned, ``forces for'' [Forces for 
Unified Commands]. On the east coast, you have two combatant 
commanders responsible for deterring Russian aggression from 
the east coast to the Barents Sea, but USNORTHCOM has no 
permanently assigned naval forces in the ``forces for'' 
document, and EUCOM [European Command] has very few, which are 
mostly focused in the Mediterranean.
    As USNORTHCOM, U.S. Fleet Forces Command is your maritime 
component commander. Is that correct?
    General VanHerck. That is correct.
    Mrs. Luria. But do you have operational control of those 
forces, as INDOPACOM does on the west coast?
    General VanHerck. Ma'am, I do not have operational control 
of the majority of the forces. Sometimes I get allocated those 
forces to execute for short durations of time, but to answer 
your question directly, no, I do not.
    Mrs. Luria. Okay.
    And then, in 2018, Admiral Richardson, then CNO, stood up 
the new version of the 2nd Fleet, and he said that ``the Second 
Fleet will approach the North Atlantic as one continuous 
operational space and conduct expeditionary fleet operations 
when and where needed.''
    And so, according to Admiral Richardson, the 2nd Fleet's 
area of responsibility crosses the NORTHCOM and the EUCOM AOR, 
yet they are not forces forward to either combatant commander. 
Is this correct?
    General VanHerck. That is correct.
    Mrs. Luria. And I recall that the Harry S. Truman recently 
conducted operations above the Arctic Circle. What combatant 
commander was assigned operational control of the Harry S. 
Truman Strike Group when they were operating in the Norwegian 
Sea?
    General VanHerck. General Wolters at the European Command 
had operation control.
    Mrs. Luria. Okay.
    So, if I understand correctly, with the reestablishment of 
2nd Fleet, we introduced a new Navy and NATO joint command that 
appears to have broad geographic responsibility but is not 
assigned to either combatant commander.
    And, along with commander of USEUCOM, you are given the 
responsibility to deter Russian aggression and activity in the 
North Atlantic, but you essentially have no assigned naval 
forces. Is that correct?
    General VanHerck. That is correct now. From a ship 
perspective, you are correct.
    Mrs. Luria. And so I just wanted to comment--I saw that 
Captain Mohler, the Chief of Staff at 2nd Fleet, recently said 
in regards to this process of standing up the 2nd Fleet that 
``we were given no blueprints, we were given no resources, we 
were just told to do it.''
    So this command of 2nd Fleet, do you feel that the area of 
responsibility crossing two combatant commands has been 
effective, as the NORTHCOM commander, in the overall mission 
that you need to accomplish in the Arctic?
    General VanHerck. Specific to the 2nd Fleet, I would defer 
to Vice Admiral Lewis there on that question. I will tell you 
that I am closely----
    Mrs. Luria. But, sir, can I just stop you, in the time I 
have remaining? U.S. Fleet Forces Command is your maritime 
component commander, and Admiral Lewis works for them, so he 
works for you.
    The Chairman. I am sorry but the gentlewoman's time has 
expired. You will have to continue this for the record or 
later. Sorry.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 138.]
    Mr. Bergman is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Bergman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And, gentlemen, thank you all for your thoughtful, 
proactive leadership and continuing engagement.
    General, the Joint Pub. 3-27 on Homeland Defense published 
in April of 2018 states that the purpose of homeland defense is 
to protect against incursions or attacks on sovereign U.S. 
territory, the domestic population, and critical infrastructure 
and key resources.
    The publication also states that virtually all strategic 
threats to the homeland are based in the areas of 
responsibility of other geographic commanders and that major 
operations against an enemy in the U.S. remain, quote, ``highly 
unlikely.''
    You can take any part or all of this question for the 
record or, you know, offer comments however you would like. But 
are these assumptions in Joint Pub. 3-27 still valid?
    General VanHerck. Congressman, I think the last point you 
made with regards to a likely attack on the homeland from a 
peer competitor is accurate, that we don't see indications of 
that right now. But we do see indications of peer competitors 
developing capabilities to hold the homeland at risk, which 
would have influence on our ability to project power on our 
timeline.
    Specific to your first comment with regards to a majority 
of the threats existing in other AORs, I think we need to 
reconsider that. I think the persistent, proximate threat is 
here and it is here to stay in the future.
    Mr. Bergman. Is NORTHCOM prepared to conduct operations in 
the homeland?
    General VanHerck. Day to day, based on current indications 
and warning, my assessment is yes. If indication and warning 
dramatically change, then I am going to have to ask for forces. 
And those forces would have to be allocated to me through the 
Secretary of Defense, at which point the Secretary would have 
to balance the globe based on the threat and risk that he would 
accept.
    Mr. Bergman. Well, in that case, has all coordination with 
the many State and local jurisdictions been precoordinated, 
rehearsed, trained, exercised, et cetera, to allow NORTHCOM to 
quickly and effectively carry out its mission in the homeland 
when an immediate response is required?
    General VanHerck. My assessment, if I understand your 
question, is, do we need to practice and execute----
    Mr. Bergman. Well, any time, whether you are Active, 
Reserve, Guard, whatever it is, you have a mission, you put 
together a plan, you get the people, get the gear, and then go 
train it, exercise it, see where you need to improve it or 
change it or whatever it is.
    So that is, I guess, what I am asking, is, are those cross 
boundaries, everything from, you know, who is in charge when 
you start mixing title 10, title 32, et cetera, et cetera.
    General VanHerck. We do that on a daily basis, specifically 
with defense support of civil authorities. We do that with our 
seaborne response as well. We train that.
    I am pushing hard for an exercise that is focused on a 
state-actor attack on the homeland that takes a look at exactly 
what you are talking about. Historically, when we work with an 
interagency, we work from a perspective of us providing support 
to the interagency. I think we also need to look at the 
opposite, where there is a potential state-actor attack on the 
homeland, where I am the supporting commander in that 
situation, and we work closely about command and control across 
the interagency with the other combatant commanders as well.
    Mr. Bergman. Okay.
    And, lastly, is Joint Pub. 3-27 in need of an update or a 
revision?
    General VanHerck. My assessment, based on the comments you 
made, was we need to go look at it and update it to reflect the 
threat to the homeland that exists today.
    Mr. Bergman. Good. Thank you.
    Admiral, my colleague asked a question about the littoral 
combat ships. I am going to ask a slight derivative of it, and 
the answer can be a simple ``yes'' or ``no.'' Do we need to 
consider other platforms, other than LCS, for use in SOUTHCOM 
AOR at this point?
    Admiral Faller. Staying engaged with our people is our 
number one and making sure we are properly resourced there, so 
absolutely.
    And we are appreciative for Congress's involvement in 
ensuring that we didn't get cuts last year in our defense 
attaches. That is our front line, our senior defense officials.
    So I think it is the capabilities, and there is none better 
than the U.S. service women and men.
    Mr. Bergman. Okay. Thank you.
    And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Ms. Escobar is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Escobar. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, for this very 
critical hearing.
    And, gentlemen, thank you so much for your testimony today.
    I represent El Paso, Texas, which is on the southern 
border. And I am delighted that we are finally focusing a bit 
more on the Western Hemisphere, because, frankly, the crisis is 
not at our border; the crisis is outside of our borders, all 
the way south to the Northern Triangle.
    And so it is really critical, I think, that in this moment 
where we can come forward with solutions to what is happening 
outside of our Nation's front door that we really examine where 
we have been effective, where we have been ineffective, and 
recognize this as a decades-long situation where we have failed 
to meet the moment over and over and over again, is my thought.
    I think the thing that we need to recognize is we need a 
multifaceted approach to addressing mass migration coming from 
south of us. As we have, as a country, limited legal pathways 
for folks, we should not be surprised that illegal pathways 
become an only option for people who are fleeing exactly what 
you have described, Admiral Faller, with what is happening in 
their home countries.
    And so, as a Congress, we need to reexamine what pathways 
we need to reopen, what legal pathways, for refugees, for 
asylum seekers, possibly TPS [Temporary Protected Status].
    I think we also, as a Congress, need to acknowledge that 
many of those transnational criminal organizations that are 
trafficking drugs are in place, in part, because of America's 
insatiable appetite for those drugs. And so we need to look in 
the mirror, recognize our role as well.
    But I would like to focus a little bit on those 
transnational criminal organizations and what we can do. I do 
think that, again, going back to a multifaceted approach, in 
addition to opening up legal pathways, in addition to 
investment and collaboration with our neighbors--you talked 
about good neighbors, Admiral. I am a big believer in that, as 
well, and coming up with solutions together, where there is not 
just investment but accountability.
    We also--although I am not a huge fan of relying on the DOD 
for efforts like this, I do think that the DOD has a role to 
play. And I am curious about what your thoughts are in terms of 
the opportunities that exist.
    I think we have to recognize we need a sustained approach. 
It can't be in fits and starts. And so we have to really work 
with those neighbors closely and make a long-term commitment. 
We have to respect human rights within those countries. We have 
to hold those countries accountable.
    Because those organizations have become more powerful and 
more sophisticated over the last several years, and the 
policies of the last 4 years, like ``Remain in Mexico,'' which 
is being unwound now by this administration, title 42, which 
has been kept in place by this administration, those policies 
basically don't stop migration. They just create a sea of 
humanity right outside our front door that is victim to these 
organizations. I have heard accounts right across from my 
community in Ciudad Juarez about horrific rapes, kidnapping, 
persecution. It is horrific, what is happening. And these 
policies basically provide that human fuel to these 
organizations.
    What is our first step? And how do we ensure that we uplift 
the human rights of folks who have been vulnerable for decades?
    And I have 1 minute. I am so sorry.
    Admiral Faller. The transnational criminal organizations, 
the first step is recognizing them in our strategic documents, 
that they are a national security threat and a national 
security imperative.
    And, as you cite, while I am a big fan of DOD as well, we 
play a supporting and minor role in this, but a key role, 
because we pull people together.
    An example of that success: During the last year, we helped 
the interagency develop a targeting process to identify and 
then identify the right interagency or partner lever to go 
after these threat networks on a more holistic threat basis.
    An example of the magnitude of the problem that you cite: 
Forty million migrants over the last 5 years, 40 million, is 
the number, total, across the hemisphere. That is just an 
example of the scope and scale of the violence and the 
insecurity that is driving mothers and families to separate 
from their kids to seek a better life.
    Ms. Escobar. Thank you so much, Admiral.
    I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Bacon is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And I appreciate all three of you being here today and your 
leadership roles in defending our country.
    And I want to say, it is great to see a fourth star on 
General VanHerck. So congratulations.
    I have two questions for General VanHerck and one for 
Admiral Faller if time allows.
    My first question is dealing with hypersonic weapons. You 
know, ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles] take about 35 
minutes from Russia to reach here; China, maybe a little 
longer. But hypersonics cuts that time in half.
    How can we support you better out of Congress in being able 
to respond to those shorter times? Do you need better sensors? 
Better interceptors? How do we do a better job ensuring 
continuity of government with the--I mean, there is a whole 
myriad of issues that we have to look at with a 15-minute 
response time.
    Thank you.
    General VanHerck. Thanks, Congressman.
    First, I would say, go back to that domain awareness 
discussion I had up front, and create the domain awareness to 
have situational awareness on an inbound hypersonic live 
vehicle or a missile and the ability to take that awareness and 
transition it into a defense capability.
    But, more broadly, as I talked about previously, it is 
getting further left. And we need to utilize data and 
information, that domain awareness, that gives us a picture 
ahead of any activity.
    And so we can take today's GEOINT [geospatial intelligence] 
capability from satellite imagery or signals intelligence 
capability or even open-source from cell phone tracking to 
phones, et cetera, and give us a broader picture and a better 
picture much earlier, before we actually have to be defending, 
to create options to deter or de-escalate.
    And that is where we are focused at United States Northern 
Command and NORAD.
    Mr. Bacon. One of the things that concerns me is the 
continuity of government, having nuclear C3 [command, control, 
and communications] confidence in deterrence. I know it is 
broader than just your combatant command, but with a 15-minute 
warning time and some of our stuff right off the coasts, I just 
think we need to rethink when it comes to deterrence and having 
an assured ability to respond.
    A second question. Do you feel like we are on the right 
track with the Next Generation Interceptor program? And do you 
think it will adequately address the future threats?
    General VanHerck. In my discussions with Vice Admiral Hill 
at MDA [Missile Defense Agency], I do believe we are on the 
right track. I can't afford, from my mission, to have any 
further delays. I am encouraged by the decision the Deputy 
Secretary made to move forward with that, and I look forward to 
continuing to partner with MDA to deliver on that capability on 
time.
    Going forward, I remain concerned about capacity, from the 
10 October parade that we saw in North Korea, to ensure that I 
maintain enough capacity for the total number of ballistic 
missiles that North Korea could launch at the United States or 
North America.
    I am also concerned about their capability--capability to 
develop advanced techniques to potentially deceive, decoy, 
those kinds of things.
    In that way, Next Generation Interceptor will address 
those, both the capacity and the capability.
    Mr. Bacon. Thank you.
    Admiral Faller, with China's GDP reaching ours, Russia 
totally modernizing its nuclear force, you know, regional 
threats, it seems to me America cannot do it alone, but yet we 
are indispensable. We are going to have to do more and more to 
bring in countries with like values to help shoulder this 
burden.
    So what are the opportunities in your AOR? And, 
particularly, how about Brazil? It is growing in wealth, 
growing in capability. Hopefully they will see a role for 
themselves in this area.
    Thank you.
    Admiral Faller. The National Defense Strategy calls out 
strengthening our alliances and partnerships as a top priority. 
The new Secretary's guidance is right in line with that, as is 
National Security Strategy, interim security strategy.
    Brazil recently signed on a partnership with New York Guard 
and, in the last couple years, has really worked to align 
themselves with our training and exercises in a way that 
recognizes their strengths and our needs. And so, you know, 
partnerships being two ways, the legacy that we have with 
Brazil that goes back to World War II and the capable fighting 
force that they have is an area that we are clearly looking at, 
as we move forward, as a way to enhance capacity.
    We are not going to outspend--we can't outspend our way out 
of this challenge of competition. We have to prioritize, focus 
on the right instruments with ruthless prioritization that give 
us the highest rate of return. And some of these competition 
elements--security cooperation exercises, Guard partnerships--
we need to have an increased appreciation for the value they 
bring for $1 or 1 hour of investment in time for the overall 
defense of our great Nation.
    Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Admiral.
    And, Mr. Chair, I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Crow is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Crow. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I wanted to start with Admiral Faller.
    You had mentioned before that, you know, China is the 
pacing threat and a significant threat in your area of 
operations. And one thing you didn't mention in the beginning 
was just the threat of the climate crisis and climate change.
    Obviously, you are a career Navy man, and you know well how 
that is impacting our ports, our operations around the world. I 
would just like a brief comment from you on the impact in the 
near- and mid-term on the climate and your operations.
    Admiral Faller. In the fall of 2019, I flew all over 
Guatemala with the then-NORTHCOM commander, General 
O'Shaughnessy, and we saw--we were doing a partner visit to 
both Mexico and Guatemala, and we saw firsthand dried white 
corn fields, endless fields, dried and parched.
    In the fall of 2020, back-to-back Category 4 hurricanes 
within a 2-week period, on the same track, unprecedented, that 
flooded and wiped out what little crops were left across 
Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador. It is a credit to 
Honduran security forces and Guatemala that they responded so 
professionally with such devastation.
    So it is a fact that climate is changing. Science--I 
believe in science. And it is a fact that that requires rapid 
response. And that is a military capability that we have, 
something that our partners need enhancement with, something 
that our security cooperation programs can and should focus on.
    Mr. Crow. Thank you.
    And, General VanHerck, a similar question to you. I am 
wondering about particularly the impact of a warming climate 
and climate change on installations in Alaska. I know we are 
having some issues regarding our radar facilities as the tundra 
actually thaws out, challenges with the infrastructure.
    So a brief comment on that, if you will?
    General VanHerck. Sure, Congressman. I will be real brief.
    You are absolutely correct. The permafrost, as it thaws, 
creates access problems to infrastructure, infrastructure we 
have for legacy warning systems, those kinds of things, which 
challenge us to get to those.
    It also creates challenges for us in building any future 
capabilities within the Arctic. We must plan for that. It has 
to be part of any strategy and plan going forward.
    Mr. Crow. Thank you.
    And just to carry on my colleague Mike Waltz's comments 
about the icebreakers, I wanted to dig into that a little bit 
more, because I know Russia, you know, has over 20, I believe, 
and I don't even need this full hand to count ours.
    I know you had mentioned your support for the Coast Guard 
plan. Is that enough? Are we on a right track to actually be 
competitive and to have the navigability and the access and the 
persistence that you talked about in the Arctic with our 
current plan?
    General VanHerck. My assessment is that, right now, their 
plan for six additional icebreakers would give me the 
persistence and the capability. That is a resource decision, 
though. If they are allocated elsewhere in the globe, then it 
may challenge me for my persistence.
    My assessment is Russia has 54 icebreakers, not only 
military but overall, civilian as well.
    Mr. Crow. Okay. Which is even worse than I thought. Thank 
you for that comment.
    And then back to you, Admiral Faller. I, like many of my 
colleagues, recently went to the border to conduct oversight of 
the unaccompanied-minor issue. Obviously, we need to go to the 
root cause, because, you know, we set up these, quote/unquote, 
``emergency'' facilities, but this is an emergency that 
actually happens every year at the same time every year. It is 
fairly predictable.
    So we have to go to the root cause and stabilize Central 
America. You already talked about the transnational criminal 
organizations that are important, but--and the predictability 
of our investment funding.
    With regard to the Northern Triangle countries, are there 
opportunities--do the conditions exist for us to expand our 
training and our professional exchange programs, given some of 
the challenges with the government officials in the current 
governments in those areas?
    Admiral Faller. There are opportunities, working with the 
professional elements of their security forces and working by, 
with, and through our embassies--we take the lead from the 
embassies and our ambassadors and charges on everything--to 
look at smart investments.
    The exercise program focuses on their needs; it focuses on 
partner needs, rapid response. Along with that we use 
humanitarian assistance authorities and money very successfully 
to do minor construction projects--for example, helping fix a 
leaky roof on a school, which is a skill set for partner 
militaries, it is a skill set for our Guard and Reserve forces, 
which are our principal force providers, and it provides hope--
hope to the people.
    And so there are opportunities. And we are currently 
looking at our existing exercise program for the next few 
months and next year, at how we can enhance that, in close 
cooperation with Secretary Salesses and others to get this 
right. And so, yes.
    Mr. Crow. Thank you.
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time----
    Mr. Crow. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman [continuing]. Has expired.
    Mr. Gaetz is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Gaetz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And I would like to start by saying I am glad that 
President Biden is continuing the good work of President Trump 
to end the war in Afghanistan. There was a bipartisan 
consensus, a bipartisan majority, on this committee regarding 
legislation that would have limited President Trump's effort to 
draw down troops in Afghanistan, and I am grateful that 
President Biden appears to be going in a direction more aligned 
with President Trump than the majority of this committee.
    And while that may not seem particularly relevant to this 
discussion about the Western Hemisphere, it is. My community is 
home to the 7th Special Forces Group. They have as their 
principal area of responsibility Latin America, and yet they 
have seen frequent, persistent, bloody deployments to CENTCOM 
[Central Command].
    And so I am hopeful that under this announcement from 
President Biden that they will be able to get back to their 
good work in the area of responsibility that I think 
increasingly calls for our attention.
    Admiral Faller, you mentioned the importance of our partner 
nations. And I want to talk about the methodology of that 
engagement. One theory of the case is we can always be sending 
our service members down to our partner nations for train-and-
equip missions. The other theory of the case is that we could 
do more by bringing some of those partners forces here so that 
we can collaborate and train and build those capabilities.
    What is your assessment about the cost savings that could 
be realized if we did more of the train-and-equip work here in 
our country as opposed to down in the jungle?
    Admiral Faller. The engagement with our partners is so 
critical. And 7th Special Forces Group is a professional team 
that is culturally aligned and engaged day-to-day in training--
training and advising, not accompanying. It is appropriate for 
the progress we have made. And they are doing it 
professionally, along with General Clarke's focus on 
professionalism and doing the right thing.
    And so I think it is a mix. I think we have to go to 
partner-nation countries. Sometimes that can be very cost-
effective, and it really gains cultural skills that our teams 
need. And then bringing our partners here gives them an 
appreciation. And I have been to the 7th Special Forces Group 
headquarters, been there, and they appreciate that two-way 
exchange. We learn as much from our partners as they learn from 
us.
    And that persistent and episodic engagement with the 
Special Forces team, small teams--three, four, sometimes 
seven--is key to helping our partners build that capacity and 
securing our hemisphere, our home, and our neighborhood.
    Mr. Gaetz. You mentioned that we cannot interdict our way 
out of these challenges in Latin America. I would suggest we 
also can't decapitate our way out of them. As we take out 
leaders in some of these organizations, they seem to have quite 
capable human resources to be able to replenish that talent. 
And so it would seem that those partner capabilities are 
increasingly important.
    And it would also seem that we save a lot of money doing 
more and more of that here. And it has the added benefit of our 
service members being able to have their heads and beds at 
home, which I know increases their own morale and capability as 
well.
    I also wanted to ask about the Chinese Communist Party's 
investments in infrastructure in the Western Hemisphere, and 
Mr. Waltz went through those. And you busted the myth that this 
is purely economic.
    Could you talk about the infrastructure enhancements from 
the Chinese Communist Party that are most concerning to you?
    Admiral Faller. Most concerning infrastructure enhancement 
and advancements are in space and intelligence assets. We would 
welcome a classified hearing at a future date on that.
    They are in IT and in the lack of civ-mil divide in how IT 
is viewed based on Chinese Communist Party law.
    Enhancements in port infrastructure, which could be easily 
scaled up. And we have seen how that has insidiously scaled up 
globally.
    And I think the world welcomes a fair competition and a 
fair access to the economic progress that we all need, but not 
an unfair one. And----
    Mr. Gaetz. Thank you.
    Admiral Faller [continuing]. In cyber and IT.
    Mr. Gaetz. Yeah, no, that is very helpful.
    One final question. ELN seems to be playing the Duque 
government and the Maduro government off of each other in some 
of the work that they are doing in the border region between 
Colombia and Venezuela. Any comment you would have about how we 
ought to contextualize what ELN is currently doing?
    Admiral Faller. I think the illegitimate Maduro government 
has synergy with the ELN and the FARC dissidents. They share a 
lot in common: no values, a lack of respect for human rights, 
and a brutality that is driving migration.
    I applaud the way President Duque and his Minister of 
Defense and team has responded to the challenge, given the 
circumstances.
    Mr. Gaetz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Brown is for recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I have a question--two questions each for Admiral Faller 
and General VanHerck. And I will ask that perhaps you can take 
no more than a minute each in answering each of the questions. 
And I will ask one at a time.
    The first one is regarding the directive from Secretary 
Austin in late January, early February, for each command across 
the Department to conduct a stand-down for the purpose of 
discussing the problem of extremism in the ranks.
    So my question for each of you is: What activities have you 
undertaken or directed within your command to execute and 
implement the Secretary's directive? And what lessons, if any, 
have you learned and are you able to share with us today?
    Admiral Faller. This is an important topic. It gets at 
readiness. It gets at cohesion. It gets at harmony. It gets at 
the necessity for all that to be combat-ready. And these 
unacceptable behaviors--extremism, racism, sexual assault and 
harassment--just erode at that good order and discipline, and 
we can never do enough to get after that.
    And I think what I have learned is the importance of 
listening and the importance of perceptions and bias that comes 
into that. And whether we believe it or not, I think we all 
have them and we carry them with us. And we have done a lot to 
try to break down those barriers and look for ways to move 
forward.
    Mr. Brown. General VanHerck.
    General VanHerck. Yeah. Thank you for the opportunity.
    So, specific, we executed and I personally led a session 
with the leadership in the headquarters that addressed the 
Secretary's guidance. Very informative. This is a leadership 
problem, and we have to apply leadership molecules to it. The 
rest of the command executed, as well, on the timeline that the 
Secretary asked.
    I agree with Admiral Faller that the lessons are quite 
significant that we ought to take away--perception, realism. We 
led a diverse organization, a diverse group, and hearing from a 
diverse crowd on the challenges that are faced by those 
individuals is quite eye-opening.
    Thanks.
    Mr. Brown. Thank you.
    And, look, I agree with Secretary Austin; the vast majority 
of men and women serving in uniform, as well as civilian 
employees at DOD, embrace the values that we fight for and 
protect and value as a nation and a military. But even if you 
have a small element within the ranks that adhere to extremist 
views, we have to do everything we can to discover it and 
address it.
    My second question: Can you briefly describe the 
initiatives or programs or activities within your command that 
you use to develop a culture that values diversity, equity, and 
inclusion?
    And, also, can you share with us the diversity of your 
leadership team in your headquarters?
    Thank you.
    Admiral Faller. It goes back to listening, Congressman, and 
the importance of including that in training. So our training 
and education program has embraced that. The human rights 
training, I think, is key to that as well. They are all really 
interconnected as fundamental human rights, the ability to 
approach things and have an equal opportunity in whatever 
aspect.
    And so, as we saw the tragedy of George Floyd unfold last 
year, we stood up a diversity and inclusion team. And I picked 
a brigadier general, Regina Sabric, ``Torch'' Sabric, and one 
of our civilians, Mr. Darrell McCarthy, to lead that. We hold 
listening groups that are part of our training, and we feed 
that back in to how to do better things in the command.
    Our leadership team: My deputy commander, civilian deputy 
commander, is an ambassador, Ambassador Jean Manes, a female. 
The Chief of Staff is the first female Hispanic admiral in the 
United States Navy, Rear Admiral Yvette Davids. And we have a 
deputy director, a one-star admiral, and I have a female. And 
then I have an African-American one-star deputy J3.
    So we have tried to use what I would call the Rooney law in 
our hiring within our own headquarters.
    Mr. Brown. Thank you, Admiral.
    General.
    General VanHerck. Congressman, thanks for the opportunity.
    First of all, I think it starts with action, and your 
actions speak much louder than words. And so that is where we 
are focused. We continue to have sensing sessions in groups to 
expose and have a candid discussion about the challenges of 
extremism and diversity.
    With regards to what we have done, I did a climate 
assessment that concluded in January ahead of the Secretary in 
the office, and it gave us a good focus on where we stand 
today. We are going to conduct the Secretary's additional 
climate assessment.
    In my office, when you walk in, I have an African-American 
master sergeant, a Hispanic female, I have a female aide-de-
camp, I have an African-American junior----
    The Chairman. I do apologize. The gentleman's time has 
expired here. A couple quick closing thoughts there?
    Mr. Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Okay. Thank you.
    Mr. DesJarlais is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you, Chairman.
    General VanHerck, as the commander of NORTHCOM, you are 
tasked with defending the homeland. Can you describe the 
importance of maintaining strong, secure borders in defending 
the homeland?
    General VanHerck. Thanks, Congressman.
    Border security is national security, and we must have 
awareness of who is coming across that border and what their 
actual intent is. I think it is a security imperative overall.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Yeah. As far as controlling the spread of 
the coronavirus, what does a vulnerable, porous border do to 
your efforts to stop the spread of this virus and get the 
pandemic under control?
    General VanHerck. It certainly increases the potential 
risk, because those folks coming across the border, we are 
unaware of their exposure, whether they have been vaccinated, 
et cetera. So I assess that, overall, it is a slight increase 
in risk to the U.S. population.
    Dr. DesJarlais. The numbers were pretty stark, saying up to 
10 percent. I think the holding facilities, I have heard, that 
have a capacity of maybe for 33 are at 1,000 times capacity. 
So, certainly, that is not any kind of protocol that we have 
followed in the United States and certainly shouldn't be 
following at the border.
    For the sake of time, just a ``yes'' or ``no'': Do you 
believe strong enforcement of existing immigration laws serve 
as a deterrent to legal immigrants?
    General VanHerck. Well, as I said, I believe our border 
security is national security and that the laws that we have on 
the books would be part of contributing to overarching national 
security when enforced.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. So, on the other side of that, do you 
believe the weak enforcement of immigration laws can serve as a 
pull factor in drawing more migrants to our southern border?
    General VanHerck. As we previously stated, I believe it is 
a confluence of multiple things that are drawing folks to our 
border, from transnational criminal organizations, to COVID, to 
multiple natural disasters, to include the perception of weak 
border enforcement.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. So, I mean, you believe that 
maintaining a secure border should be a top priority in our 
shared goal of protecting the homeland?
    General VanHerck. Border security is national security, and 
we must know who is coming across the border and what their 
intent is, especially for potential nefarious actors. My 
assessment would be, nefarious actors that might want to do 
harm to the United States of America and our citizens, if there 
is a porous opportunity, they will find a way to exploit that.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Yeah. Well, the CBP [Customs and Border 
Patrol] refuses to release the numbers of individuals on the 
terror watchlist that have been apprehended on the border. We 
can assume that the two men from Yemen are not alone in making 
the trip.
    What are the implications of this free flow of unvetted, 
sometimes highly dangerous individuals crossing our southern 
border when it comes to protecting the homeland?
    General VanHerck. I remain concerned about knowing who is 
coming across that border. And we work closely with Homeland 
Security and Customs and Border Protection and FBI, other law 
enforcement agencies who enforce the laws on our border, so 
that I maintain awareness of what is actually going on with 
regards to the border.
    I am aware of the reports that you are alluding to. I won't 
talk about those in an unclassified environment. But I will 
tell you, the numbers are very small right now. But we do need 
to maintain an awareness on who is coming across that border.
    Dr. DesJarlais. All right.
    And, in 2018, when President Trump and Secretary Mattis 
deployed U.S. troops to support CBP and DHS efforts to counter 
transnational criminal organizations, human trafficking, and 
drug trafficking activities at the border, they were met with 
harsh criticism by many on the political left in Congress as 
well as the media.
    Can you discuss the need to continue fighting these 
transnational criminal organizations at the southern border 
from a national security and homeland defense perspective?
    General VanHerck. Well, Homeland Security, I would defer to 
them for the law enforcement aspect of enforcing what 
transnational criminal organizations do with counternarcotics 
and those kinds of things. We are in direct support of Homeland 
Security and Customs and Border Protection.
    Let me tell you what I am doing. I have a fantastic 
partnership and a relationship with Mexico, SEDENA [Secretariat 
of National Defense] and SEMAR [Naval Secretariat], General 
Sandoval and Admiral Ojeda. They are a fantastic partner. I am 
encouraged by what I heard the President announce with regards 
to an additional 10,000 folks from the Mexican military to help 
us get after this problem, Congressman.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay.
    Well, I mean, clearly, from the reports that we are all 
seeing on the news, there has been an escalation at the border 
that wasn't there a few months ago. Do you agree with that?
    General VanHerck. Congressman, there has been a significant 
uptick of migrants coming across the border. In the last 
quarter, it has been over 350,000.
    Dr. DesJarlais. And a lot of this is created by the cartels 
and criminal organizations. And so, certainly, this provides 
opportunities to our adversaries, whether it be China, Russia, 
or nonstate actors, to exploit these vulnerabilities. Do you 
agree?
    General VanHerck. I agree it creates opportunity. 
Instability does create----
    Mr. Larsen [presiding]. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you, General.
    Mr. Larsen. And I recognize Representative Carbajal for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Thank you all for being here. And I look forward to my 
colleague Mr. DesJarlais supporting President Biden's 
immigration proposal to address those very important issues.
    With that, Mr. Salesses, I want to take a moment to discuss 
DOD's coordination with FEMA and HHS to temporarily house 
unaccompanied children at military installations.
    Earlier this month, DOD announced that it received a 
request for assistance, RFA, to use land at Army National Guard 
Base Camp Roberts, which is located in my district. I 
understand that DOD confirmed it will support this RFA.
    In what ways does DOD support HHS throughout this process, 
from installation selection to when the first unaccompanied 
children arrive on base? And after the children arrive, in what 
capacity does DOD personnel stationed on the base interact with 
HHS facilities and personnel?
    Mr. Salesses. Congressman, thank you for the question.
    Currently, right now, we are at Fort Lewis. We are 
supporting HHS, the Administration for Children and Families, 
who oversees the sheltering of the unaccompanied children. We 
are also planning to use Camp Roberts.
    We work very closely with HHS, but the Defense Department, 
in particular, has no role in supporting the children directly. 
We provide facilities or we provide land. If we provide the 
land, like we will at Camp Roberts, HHS will contract and 
develop soft-sided facilities there. They will provide all the 
services, the wraparound services, and they will provide the 
care for the children.
    So there is very little interaction from the Defense 
Department and our military members in dealing with the 
children at all.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you for that clarification.
    General VanHerck, as the combatant commander responsible 
for the defense of the United States against rogue nations' 
ballistic missile threats, besides the Next Generation 
Interceptor, what would be your top three priorities in the 
upcoming budget that must be prioritized to keep pace with the 
growing threat around the world?
    General VanHerck. As I have alluded to, domain awareness is 
at the top, and that would include over-the-horizon radar 
capability to see beyond where our legacy systems do today.
    Undersea surveillance would be number two on my integrated 
priority list to take a look and ensure we know what is going 
on to our approaches from an undersea capability.
    And then, obviously, that domain awareness and information 
that I talked about earlier to get further left to give us 
options before endgame kinetic defeat and give us options to 
create deterrence during competition would be the primary 
focuses.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
    Admiral Faller, I want to ask you about Brazil. In the past 
few weeks, the leaders of all three branches of Brazil's armed 
forces jointly resigned the day after President Bolsonaro fired 
the Defense Minister. All of this is very alarming.
    How have these departures affected SOUTHCOM's engagement 
with Brazil's armed forces?
    Admiral Faller. I have remained engaged with the Chief of 
Defense, General Botelho. He is a professional. And we look at 
the future, and there is a professional force with values that 
we have shared and trained and worked together, particularly 
through programs like our IMET program, our International 
Military Education and Training.
    So, with continued investments in those types of programs, 
I am confident that, institution to institution, which is what 
we focus on, that we will be together in the long haul. And the 
rest is a political decision and choices that people make.
    Mr. Carbajal. Do you feel there is enough continuity there 
to give us assurances that our partnership can weather?
    Admiral Faller. Ultimately, sovereign nations make 
decisions based on their own policy. What we can do is provide 
the best professional and consistent partnership from our 
standpoint.
    That is why it is so important we remain on the field. If 
you are not on the playing field, if you are not engaged, you 
are not going to be heard or seen, and you can't make an impact 
and you can't make a difference.
    So consistency year to year, and then looking at where we 
can make modest increases to stay together. The education 
program is one where we could use an increase. IMET is a State-
run program; there is more capacity there.
    But, given what we have invested in it to date, I am 
confident we will stay together as professional institutions, 
Brazil and across the hemisphere.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
    And, lastly, Mr. Salesses and General VanHerck, the 
Department and NORTHCOM have been critical partners this past 
year in the fight against COVID. What lessons have you both 
learned from this past year? And what changes are you looking 
to implement within your jurisdictions going forward to be 
better prepared for a health crisis?
    Mr. Larsen. The gentlemen will have to respond for the 
record. The gentleman's time has expired.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 137.]
    Mr. Larsen. And the chair recognizes Representative Scott 
of Georgia for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Scott. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
    Admiral, I know that multiple members have talked with you 
about Communist China's increasing influence in the Western 
Hemisphere. I have a specific question with regard to that, and 
it has to do with money laundering for the transnational 
criminal organizations.
    And so could you speak to Communist China's increase in 
influence? And what is happening with regard to the money 
laundering for the transnational criminal organizations?
    I also know that you lost funding of the ISR transfer fund. 
That is something that I am interested in and the impact that 
it has on you and your mission in SOUTHCOM.
    And then Representative Panetta hit on this a little bit, 
but the differing authorities that you have for humanitarian 
assistance and disaster relief compared to authorities that you 
have for security cooperation.
    So there are three questions that I have for you, and look 
forward to your response.
    Admiral Faller. Our interagency partners here in the United 
States have pointed out to us, the FBI, and others that Chinese 
money laundering is the number one underwriting source for 
transnational criminal organizations.
    If you look at SOUTHCOM's area of responsibility, we have 8 
percent of the world's population, 60 percent of the 
cryptocurrency. So there are active efforts to evade tough 
enforcement that the U.S. does and can provide when legitimate 
banking systems and methods are utilized.
    It is a concern. It goes back to the need for a holistic 
approach to getting after these organizations and metrics to do 
so and big data and artificial intelligence, machine learning. 
DOD and SOUTHCOM play a supporting role in those overall 
efforts.
    With respect to the ISR transfer fund, it is a fund that 
was set up by the appropriators in Congress to augment all the 
combatant commands. ISR is underappreciated by many but not by 
us in terms of its ability for us to see and hear and 
understand the battlefield.
    That fund was not authorized and appropriated last year, 
and that resulted for SOUTHCOM in a precisely 38 percent 
reduction to our overall funding for ISR. That is significant. 
We only have about 1 percent of the ISR.
    Intel drives everything. And without that intel--and that 
is in-year, this year's funding--we are going to understand 
less of the battlespace.
    The humanitarian assistance program has been key. It is a 
flexible program. It allows us to meet our partners' needs. In 
the past year, we have had, just in COVID response, close to 
500 projects, $74 million worth, and we have been able to work 
with 28 different countries. That has strengthened our 
partnerships, it wins hearts and minds, and it is responsive to 
need. It is about long-term capacity.
    Because of the way the rules are written in the 
authorizations, I can't apply that authority to work with a 
partner military force. I think that is a gap. I think we 
should look at how we could work that authorization so we can 
meet the point of need with our partners and work on capacity. 
A strong partnership, whatever the country, is good for the 
United States. It is a good return on investment.
    I would also like to see if we could look into our security 
cooperation programs, the 333 program and others, and how would 
we craft a small-dollar-amount, flexible military assistance 
program, along the lines of the humanitarian assistance 
program, to allow combatant commanders to have a 21st-century, 
flexible, and responsible tool that will allow us to outcompete 
and win by meeting our partners' needs and focusing on our 
collective needs and our collective readiness.
    Mr. Scott. Thank you, Admiral.
    And, you know, I would point out to my colleagues that you 
said millions. In many cases, we are talking about billions. We 
are talking about the whole Western Hemisphere. We could get a 
whole lot more return on our dollar if we focused on some of 
the areas closer to home, I believe, with regard to security 
for the United States.
    General, the questions I have for you have--many of them 
have been answered. But one of the questions I have a concern 
about is the ability to use small, unmanned aerial systems to 
attack U.S. military installations.
    And do you have the authorities that you need to protect 
our military installations from these small or unmanned aerial 
systems?
    General VanHerck. Congressman, we have the authorities over 
Federal installations to protect Federal people and equipment.
    My concern is, that is a little bit of a reactive and a--we 
are approaching this from a law enforcement perspective. 
Looking at defense, I want to get more proactive, to be able to 
engage when they are detected through that domain awareness and 
further out when they are a threat. So we are working closely 
with the FAA [Federal Aviation Administration] and the 
interagency to get there with those authorities.
    Mr. Scott. Thank you, General.
    Mr. Larsen. The gentleman's time has expired.
    I recognize Representative Speier for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Speier. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
    And thank you, gentlemen, for your presentations and for 
your service.
    I was impressed by what you said, Admiral Faller, about a 
little goes a long way in SOUTHCOM. What would you define as a 
little?
    Quickly, because I have lots of questions to ask you.
    Admiral Faller. A congressional visit. A partnership 
exchange. This past week, I visited Uruguay. I was the first 
combatant commander to go there in a number of years. That 
visit went a long way to strengthen our relationship.
    So time is our most underappreciated resource and one that 
I welcome an increased investment of in this hemisphere.
    Ms. Speier. Okay.
    I have a very different view of the littoral combat ship 
than my colleague, and I would like to drill down on this a 
little bit.
    The Freedom class is, in my view and in the view of many, 
terribly unreliable, with the Little Rock, Detroit, and Sioux 
City all recently experiencing major propulsion failures. The 
Freedom-class LCS may also have a classwide defect, a flawed 
combining gear that breaks early in life of the ship. That will 
require a massive and expensive taxpayer-funded reconstruction. 
In the meantime, the last administration increased the OPTEMPO 
[operational tempo] to new highs.
    So I would like to know the following. And if you could 
just be prepared to answer them either here in person or 
subsequently.
    How much are taxpayers spending for each LCS deployment in 
SOUTHCOM? How much have LCS deployments increased over the past 
3 years?
    A recent article in Defense News says that each LCS costs 
about $70 million a year to operate. And there are some 35 of 
them. So it is $70 million per year to operate, almost as much 
as the cost of operating a much larger Arleigh Burke-class 
destroyer. Is that accurate?
    But let me go on with my other questions, and you can 
answer them all at the same time.
    What is the impact of the LCS maintenance problem on 
SOUTHCOM's ability to complete drug interdiction and 
humanitarian missions?
    Admiral Faller. Congresswoman, it is an important question, 
and the Navy is committed.
    I look at it this way: Those ships that came into the fight 
have saved lives across the United States. So, whatever the 
steaming-hour cost, we have saved hundreds of lives. Without 
those Navy ships, about 40 percent more drugs would have made 
it into the United States. The CNO----
    Ms. Speier. I understand that, but let's talk, separately 
from saving 100 lives in terms of drugs, to the actual 
functionality of these ships that cost over $500 million apiece 
and then $70 million a year to operate and maintain. And when 
you said a little money goes a long way in SOUTHCOM, you know, 
I would much rather see us spending some of that money there 
than on ships that don't float.
    And I would also say, the Belt and Road Initiative, as you 
pointed out, is an example of how China has used $50 billion to 
$100 billion a year across the world in a way to benefit 
themselves exclusively, frankly. We tend to give money out in 
ways that are soft money that help the country. So maybe what 
we need to do is be a little smarter about how we invest in 
some of these countries.
    But I think that somehow relying on the fact that you are 
interdicting some drugs to keep these ships operating makes no 
sense. And, at some point, we have to recognize--and the 
Department is very reluctant to say, ``You know, we made a 
mistake''--and cut our losses. And I guess I am asking you to 
think about that and do that.
    And I have only 59 more seconds, so let me just move on to 
Mr. Salesses.
    When I was at Fort Hood recently, I went and visited some 
of the barracks. I have to tell you, it was like looking at 
tenements.
    Now, beyond the barracks, we have 135 childcare development 
centers in the military that are defined as failing or poor. 
Now, I don't want to send my kid to a failing childcare 
development center. So, even though 135 have been identified, 
only 8 have been fixed in the last 10 years.
    So my question to you is, how is DOD planning to spend the 
$2.2 billion remaining of the military construction funds that 
were diverted to the border wall but were not spent? Will you 
spend that money on doing something on behalf of our service 
members----
    Mr. Larsen. The Representative's time has expired. I would 
like to offer that for the record.
    Ms. Speier. Please respond.
    Thank you. I yield back.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you. The panel will take that for the 
record.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 137.]
    Mr. Larsen. The chair recognizes Representative Wilson of 
South Carolina for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much.
    And I want to thank the panel for being here today. Your 
service is just so appreciated.
    I also, Admiral Faller, want to share a concern with 
Congressman Mike Waltz about the influence of the Chinese 
Communist Party on both sides of the Panama Canal. This is a 
threat to the people of Panama, and we need to be ever 
vigilant.
    Additionally, Admiral Faller, I am a grateful Naval Academy 
graduate dad myself, so I particularly appreciate your service.
    And I appreciate your update on Plan Colombia. This has 
been a real success story the American people need to know, 
working to stop narcoterrorists. And then my wife and I have 
been the South Carolina co-chairmen of the Partners of the 
Americas program, working with the country of Colombia. We have 
hosted students to live with us, high school students from 
Colombia. It has been very uplifting. In fact, my Naval Academy 
graduate actually was an exchange student to Colegio Bennett in 
Cali, Colombia. So we have such a relationship with that 
country.
    And then I am very grateful, with the leadership of 
Adjutant General Van McCarty, former Adjutant General Bob 
Livingston, South Carolina National Guard is the State partner 
with Colombia. And so what a great opportunity we have working 
together, particularly with the tyrannical regime that now 
rules in Venezuela.
    With that, Admiral, I have a question. What is your 
assessment of the whole-of-government approach to countering 
Russian, Iranian, and Chinese support to the corrupt regime in 
Venezuela? What can SOUTHCOM do to assist the multinational 
efforts to assist the people and benefit the people of 
Venezuela?
    Admiral Faller. Thank you for recognizing the Naval 
Academy, my alma mater. And I had the opportunity to speak to 
the class of 2021 in the fall, and I would tell you, 
Congressman, that we should all be proud of the young men and 
women that are going to be today and tomorrow's leaders. They 
are just as strong as any other generation, and they make you 
proud. Under the leadership of Admiral Buck at the Academy and 
others, we are in good shape for the future, I am convinced of 
that.
    Thanks also for recognizing the importance of our State 
Partnership Programs. South Carolina Guard is so actively 
involved with Colombia. There are ongoing exchanges. No one 
ever stepped down when the pandemic heated up. And we are 
working particularly to use the Guard's capability of the F-
16s. As Colombia has stated, that is an important capability 
that they need, and they are willing to commit their resources 
to that capability going forward.
    That is the kind of investment that will make a difference 
against Venezuela, as they continue to isolate themselves. And 
you correctly point out the insidious and corrosive influence 
of Russia, Cuba, Iran, and China inside their--you look at that 
as an example. And over the last year, we see thousands of 
Cubans, hundreds of Russians, an increase in Iranian presence. 
And they are working in the cyberspace, as well, to control 
that information domain.
    We have to work together for solutions that strengthen the 
neighbors, strengthen our partnerships with the neighbors, and 
isolate the Venezuelan regime, as Maduro has increasingly done 
himself through his human rights atrocities.
    Mr. Wilson. Okay. Thank you for that response. And, indeed, 
it is remarkable to see the success of Colombia and then to see 
what was possibly the most wealthy country of South America, 
being Venezuela, being reduced to destitution. And so, what a 
great contrast. So thank you for your efforts.
    Additionally, General VanHerck, the Russian threat spans 
two COCOMs [combatant commands]. What coordination do you take 
with the U.S. European Command to properly address Russia's 
military strategy?
    General VanHerck. Congressman, we work closely in 
partnership with the U.S. European Command through my various 
components, as well, to deal with threats to the homeland 
presented by not only Russia but others that may come through 
our approaches that may include the European Command area of 
responsibility. It may include working closely with my partner 
right next to me, Admiral Faller, the approaches that come from 
the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility, as well as INDOPACOM and 
working closely with our Canadians.
    So we work closely in partnership. I believe relationships 
and partnerships are crucial and that homeland defense does not 
start in the homeland; it actually starts with the 
relationships and partnerships, not only with my fellow 
combatant commanders but also allies and partners for each of 
those combatant commanders as well.
    Mr. Wilson. And, again, thank all of you for your service, 
and we look forward to working with you in a bipartisan manner.
    Thank you. I yield back.
    The Chairman [presiding]. Thank you.
    Mr. Courtney is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And thank you to both witnesses here today.
    Admiral Faller, I just want to say, your description of 
the--and you are in a unique position, given your portfolio in 
SOUTHCOM. But your description of, sort of, the, you know, 
forces, the external forces, that are driving, you know, 
massive numbers of people from their homes in the Northern 
Triangle, whether it is, you know, the COVID depression that 
has hit the economy in that region, the natural disasters that, 
you know, were, I think, very underreported in the U.S., and, 
of course, the political violence that, again, is forcing 
people to make a, you know, incredibly difficult and high-risk 
decision to send their kids northward.
    So thank you for that testimony today. Because I frankly 
think, coming from you, you know, it is a really important 
message that people should really think about as we try to deal 
with the problems at the border.
    General VanHerck, your colleague from INDOPACOM testified, 
Admiral Davidson, a couple weeks ago, again, who is also 
dealing with, sort of, maritime challenges, freedom of 
navigation, which, again, are somewhat similar to what is going 
on up in the Arctic. Admiral Davidson actually was very, you 
know, frank about the fact that he believes that the U.S. 
should join the international Law of the Sea treaty, as did his 
predecessors and your--you know, in the EUCOM theater, same 
thing. We have heard that over the years. You know, there is a 
bipartisan group of us--Don Young from Alaska, who also is 
supporting a resolution with me calling on the Senate to ratify 
the UNCLOS [United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea].
    And I just wondered, you know, based on what you are seeing 
up there, in terms of the increased maritime activity and the 
competition for seabed minerals, whether you have any 
perspective or comment, as your combatant commanders have made, 
regarding UNCLOS.
    General VanHerck. Congressman, I would share the sentiment 
of Admiral Davidson. I support the accession to UNCLOS. I think 
it puts us in a more strategic position when we address these 
issues internationally, globally with competitors or our allies 
and partners as well.
    Mr. Courtney. Well, thank you for that testimony. As I 
said, you know, on this committee, we have certainly elicited 
the same response from other combatant commands. I think, 
frankly, that is the first time we have heard that from the 
Northern Command.
    And we are going to have a joint hearing with Foreign 
Affairs at the end of April to, sort of, dig deeper into this. 
It is really time that the U.S. get in the game in terms of 
being able to stake claims for seabed minerals as well as to 
protect freedom of navigation.
    You know, we have had some discussions regarding the Coast 
Guard's involvement up in the Arctic. And I just would note 
that this committee was the one that authorized construction of 
the first large icebreaker a number of years ago.
    Again, the Coast Guard's program office in terms of 
shipbuilding just really needed some help, and we provided an 
assist in terms of Navy's collaboration, which is continuing to 
this day with the joint program office. But, again, your 
testimony about the fact that we need to kind of boost that 
capability, I think, is also extremely helpful.
    Admiral Faller, you in your testimony described the work 
that you are doing with your sea service, you know, colleagues 
in the Coast Guard. And I was wondering if you could talk 
about, you know, the offshore patrol cutters and how they 
collaborate with the Navy in SOCOM.
    Admiral Faller. The Coast Guard is such a tremendous, 
important element of our engagement in countering threats. 
Recently, the recent patrol of the United States Coast Guard 
cutter Stone, a national security cutter, to get after illegal, 
unregulated, unreported fishing, with China being the principal 
state sponsor of this IUU [illegal, unreported and unregulated] 
threat, is one example. Tremendous, reliable vessels. Their 
fast-response cutters, the whole cutter fleet is topnotch, and 
I am a big supporter. Tremendous readiness, and they have done 
a great job for us.
    Additionally, another, sort of, example I would cite, 
Congressman, is some of our Navy patrols. And I call them 
patrols because they are short-duration. It is exactly the kind 
of focused, small investment that goes a long way. The USS 
Vermont's deployment to patrol to Brazil, where we worked joint 
exercises and capability demonstrations, was exactly in line 
with what we need to do to prepare for the future and increase 
our own crew's readiness.
    Mr. Courtney. Well, thank you, Admiral.
    Again, Mr. Chairman, just for the record, the USS Vermont 
is our newest Virginia-class submarine, which was commissioned 
in the middle of COVID, up in Groton.
    So I thank you for the mention, and I will certainly pass 
along your compliments to the shipyard.
    And, with that, I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    For your situational awareness, gentlemen--appreciate you 
being here--is that we have two more at the moment. That does 
not mean that someone might not come back in the next 10 
minutes, but, for now, we have Mr. Fallon.
    Mr. Fallon, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Fallon. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Appreciate it.
    SOUTHCOM is responsible for the region that covers 31 
countries in Central and South America. And the thing that 
concerns me is the drug trafficking, because they seem to be, 
every year, increasing in wealth, in power, in influence, and 
it is clearly a major national security threat, and I think 
everybody here would agree that it presents a clear and present 
danger to our country.
    And, under the prior administration, you know, it had been 
a flood and it reduced to a trickle, in large measure. And now, 
unfortunately, it is back to a flood.
    I was at the Donna holding facility a couple weeks ago, 
where it was supposed to be 250 people in the facility, and 
there were 4,377. And there were 3,700 unaccompanied minors. 
There were pods where they had these unaccompanied minors, and 
they were sectioned off, and they had segregated them by gender 
and then roughly by age. And, in each pod, there were supposed 
to be 32 children, and unfortunately there were 500. And the 
Border Patrol was babysitting these kids. And that was their 
term for it.
    And Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador have 34.5 million 
people. That is an inexhaustible amount of human folks that--
and it is a long way to travel. I believe it is about roughly 
1,200 miles from Central America to the United States. And, you 
know, it begs the question, how did they get here? Do they owe 
and who do they owe for the transit? Are the traffickers 
facilitating this?
    And the reason why we mention this is, the Border Patrol 
agents were telling us the cartels love this crisis because it 
makes it very much easier for the cartels to do their business 
of smuggling illicit drugs because almost half of the Border 
Patrol are in these facilities changing diapers and what have 
you.
    And so I wanted to ask the SOUTHCOM commander if he does 
agree that this is a clear and present danger, the drug 
trafficking and the cartels' power and influence?
    And, sir, in your opinion, what is the best way to combat 
the Mexican drug cartels and the other drug traffickers and 
organized crime in Central America in reducing their power?
    Admiral Faller. Transnational criminal organizations are 
exactly as you state, Congressman, a national security threat, 
killing people in your home State and in my hometown in 
Pennsylvania as well.
    And they are fueled by a tremendous amount of resources, 
money, a multibillion-dollar-a-year industry. And drugs are 
actually not their top source of revenue. It is illegal mining, 
it is illegal businesses, it is extortion, it is human 
trafficking, it is arms trafficking, it is PPE, illicit PPE and 
COVID supplies, and everything to carry forward their influence 
and access. They are fueled by corruption.
    The best way of stopping this is a whole-of-government 
approach, whole-of-nation approach, and empowering our partners 
with the right tools. And one of them is good judicial systems 
that do the right thing and operate in accordance with the rule 
of law.
    And I have talked to these partners. The narcoterrorists, 
they fear the U.S. judicial system. They need to fear their 
home countries' judicial system too, because they need to have 
instilled in them the deterrent model that they are going to be 
held accountable for their murderous behavior and the violence 
that is driving people to leave their homes and make that 
treacherous trip.
    Mr. Fallon. You know, Admiral, exactly to your point, too, 
according to the Department of Justice, in 2018, the most 
dangerous country on the planet, if you define that by murders 
per 100,000, weren't--if you asked a regular American--and, 
quite frankly, I had the impression that it was going to be 
maybe a country like Yemen, Afghanistan, Somalia, or Iraq. But 
it is in this hemisphere, and it was El Salvador, at 50 murders 
per 100,000. Honduras was closely behind at 40, and Guatemala 
was 22.5. And to give that context, Mexico is at 26, the United 
States is at 5, and a very safe country like Denmark is only at 
1.
    So it seems that the more power that the drug cartels have, 
the less GDP growth we have and the more violence. And it is 
something that we just have to address. I think it is the 
number one, right now, topic that we must--and it is the 
greatest national security threat. And it is an economic drain, 
as well, on our country.
    And I hope that we can work in a bipartisan fashion to 
solve it, because we have the resources to do so; it is just a 
question of if we have the political will.
    And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Larsen [presiding]. Thank you, and I appreciate that.
    I now will recognize myself for 5 minutes. I would note 
that Representative Smith did say there were two more, but we 
have had additional people show up, so it will be more than two 
more. So I want to just add that.
    First off, I will come back to you, Admiral Faller, but it 
is good to see you again. It is always good to see you.
    General VanHerck, thanks for the conversation yesterday. I 
am really pleased to hear my colleagues talk about the Arctic, 
something that I have been talking about for the last 20 years. 
So welcome aboard, everybody, on the concerns we have about the 
Arctic.
    What I didn't hear today, though, is--I have had a briefing 
from the Air Force on the Arctic. I have had a briefing from 
the Coast Guard. I have had a briefing from the Navy. What I 
haven't had is the DOD briefing--that is, the umbrella strategy 
about what we are doing in the Arctic.
    And I wanted to hear from you, General, about Northern 
Command's view of that. Is there a broader strategy? Or, as you 
said on page 12 of your testimony, with regards to data, 
getting all the data, breaking down stovepipes is achievable. 
Do we have a stovepiped approach on our strategy in the Arctic 
with regards to the DOD? And what do we do to break those down?
    General VanHerck. So the Department did put out a strategy 
in 2019 for the Arctic, followed by each of the services. I 
also put out a strategy this winter as well. My strategy is not 
focused specifically on the Arctic, but the Arctic figures in 
heavily to my strategy at USNORTHCOM and NORAD as well.
    I do think there is more we can do as a group focused on 
the Arctic to collaborate. It is not just a NORTHCOM problem, 
it is a EUCOM problem, it is an INDOPACOM problem, it is an 
ally and partner problem with multiple nations. And I think 
that is how we should approach it, from a global problem, to 
ensure that we approach and compete in the Arctic to keep the 
international rules-based order that we have had in the past.
    Mr. Larsen. I think what we will learn, too, as folks look 
into it more, is that there is not one Arctic. It is easy to do 
operations--a little easier to do operations in the Barents Sea 
or north in Norway because the water is a lot more free of ice 
year-round than it is in our part of the Arctic. And so we 
really need to be thinking about what is appropriate, what is 
the appropriate presence, what is the appropriate persistence 
that we need up there.
    And, on that point, can you expand a little bit more on 
gaining knowledge to the left of action or the all-domain 
dominance and the decision superiority? What does that mean for 
us when we look at the budget?
    General VanHerck. That means having the sensor capabilities 
that will allow us to see further than we have in the past, 
that will allow us to take data--much of it exists today--and 
share that data, although it is in stovepipes where there may 
be laws or policies that don't allow us to share that data and 
information.
    I believe data and information is a strategic asset that 
will enable us to--no kidding--win in the future in conflict if 
we have to, but, more importantly, take us further left in the 
competition to deter and de-escalate in crisis.
    And so what I hope we see when the 2022 budget comes out is 
a domain awareness capability, such as over-the-horizon radars, 
undersea capabilities, and a focus on the ability to take that 
information and share it. What you would hear the Department 
talk about is joint all-domain command and control, if you put 
a bow around what I have been talking about.
    Mr. Larsen. Yeah.
    I would also note, this begs the question, though, about: 
You get all that data; then what? I mean, you are the dog who 
caught the car, so what do you do with it now?
    So I think, you know, looking at maybe one of the 
subcommittees that we have, the CITI [Cyber, Innovative 
Technologies, and Information Systems], looking at the role of 
AI [artificial intelligence] and machine learning. And the 
applications, the algorithms need to be written to gather that 
information and pick through it for you to give you decisions--
is a critical part, which may not be your budget, but it is 
still an important part of DOD's efforts.
    General VanHerck. Congressman, I concur. We have to move 
forward with machine learning and artificial intelligence from 
a policy perspective and get our arms around this. What we 
can't do is field capabilities and then wait till the end and 
we don't have our arms around the policy or the laws that go 
with it that enable us to support it.
    What you do with this information, in my mind, is you give 
it to decision-makers--decision-makers all the way from the 
tactical level that may be pulling a trigger, but, more 
importantly, what I see is the operational level and the 
strategic level that you can take action on. Me, as an 
operational commander, could posture forces to create 
deterrence, or the President or the Secretary of Defense can 
use messaging to create deterrence as well.
    Mr. Larsen. Right. Right.
    Admiral Faller, I will be really quick here. IUU fishing is 
important for us in the Northwest because of the Gulf of Alaska 
and the problems we have with not just Russians but Chinese and 
others.
    Why is IUU fishing an important issue--be very specific why 
it is important--in Central and South America?
    Admiral Faller. Food security is national security for any 
nation. And when nations are losing their food stocks, their 
fishing, it is impacting their life. It is driving insecurity. 
It is all connected. And we play a role. Domain awareness is 
key there, helping people see on and across the sea.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you very much.
    I yield back. Thank you.
    The Chairman [presiding]. Thank you.
    Mr. Lamborn.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    It is great to have you all here.
    General VanHerck, congratulations on your promotion into 
this position. I look forward to seeing you in Colorado Springs 
one of these days when the COVID protocols make it easier.
    But I would like to ask you a little bit more about missile 
defense. And I believe you are of the opinion, as are all the 
experts who look at North Korea's threat, that, while we can 
address that currently, starting around 2025, if current 
projected rates of their progress come true, that we start 
encountering greater risk.
    And so I know that you are in support of an NGI, Next 
Generation Interceptor, to hopefully have by the end of this 
decade. In the meantime, do you support an underlayer or 
layered homeland defense with things like the Standard Missile-
3 IIA, SM-3 IIA, and other assets that would give us an interim 
additional layer of protection?
    General VanHerck. Congressman, thanks for that question.
    I think there is tremendous value in looking at the 
possibility of an underlayer. I know you are aware of the 
recent SM-3 test that proved incredibly successful. As you 
said, I am comfortable where we are today, but, as we go 
forward, there will be additional capabilities developed to 
hold our homeland at risk, and an underlayer would give us 
additional capacity and capability to do that.
    If we do create an underlayer or additional sensors and 
capabilities to support that, it should not be focused on a 
single threat, such as a ballistic missile. That underlayer--a 
layered defense of the homeland should focus on everything from 
small UAS [unmanned aircraft systems] all the way to ballistic 
missiles, cruise missiles, and everything in between.
    We can't afford any longer to build stovepiped systems 
which have capabilities for only one threat. We need to look 
more broadly at these systems to achieve affordable solutions 
to defend the homeland.
    Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you for that answer.
    And you mentioned cruise missiles. Let's talk about that. 
What do we need to do to better protect ourselves from that 
particular very dangerous threat?
    General VanHerck. Congressman, the first thing I am working 
on is getting a policy on what must we defend kinetically in 
our homeland. I would tell you that it looks something along 
the lines of continuity of government, our nuclear 
capabilities, command and control, ability to project power 
forward, and our defense industrial base. That would defend 
against a cruise missile kinetic kind of capability.
    But I will go back to where I am focused in domain 
awareness. And I don't want to be shooting cruise missiles down 
in our homeland. And that is why it is so important to have 
these domain-awareness capabilities using information, machine 
learning, and artificial intelligence to get further left of 
that launch so we then create options for deterrence and de-
escalation much sooner in competition.
    We also need to balance our focus between planning, 
strategy, force management, force development from a conflict 
focus and more balanced on a competition focus as well, and 
competition globally across all domains.
    But endgame defeat is not where I want to be. We need to 
figure out what that looks like. But I want to get further left 
and give our decision-makers options.
    Mr. Lamborn. And I know we are in an open setting here, but 
can you be more specific about going to the left and having 
these additional options?
    General VanHerck. Yeah, so going left means getting 
information sooner to make decisions. So, for example, our 
satellite capability, our GEOINT, our signals intelligence 
capability comes from National Security Agency or even open-
source information--from social media, for example. Oftentimes, 
that information is not analyzed in a timely manner to have 
decision-makers make a decision.
    So getting further left means taking that information, 
making it readily available by having policy and laws that 
allow us to do that, and then sharing it, and taking machine-
learning capabilities and artificial intelligence to rapidly 
analyze and process in near-real-time, and then sharing it with 
decision-makers. That will give us the opportunity to be 
further left.
    I can give you a specific example. So if you take a look at 
a parking lot over and over that supports a submarine base, for 
example, the machine will figure out how many cars are in that 
parking lot. And when you start to see changes and you couple 
that with cell phone data or information through social media, 
you can build a picture. Now it gives us the ability to take 
action much sooner.
    Mr. Lamborn. And also, General, lastly, you have talked 
about making sure we have the authorities in place that we 
need. And I think the implication is that we don't have all 
those authorities.
    What are some specific authorities that maybe when we are 
looking at the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] this 
year we should consider that make your job easier?
    General VanHerck. I believe we need to take a look at 
intelligence sharing. Intelligence should be part of our 
overall deterrence factor. And what we share and reveal and 
conceal, for example, if you don't know about it, it is not 
creating any deterrence effects. But sometimes our policies or 
laws may hinder us from sharing that information.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Okay. We are going to stop at 2:00. We have Mr. Langevin. 
We have Mr. Khanna. All right, I lie. We are going to stop at, 
like, 2:02. But Mr. Langevin and Mr. Khanna are going to be 
last, and so we are done at that point.
    Mr. Langevin is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I want to thank our witnesses for your testimony today. We 
have covered a lot of ground today in looking at national 
security challenges and U.S. military activities in North and 
South America.
    I guess what I would like to start with, if we could, with 
General VanHerck: As we look to increase nonkinetic options 
available for homeland defense, how do you plan to incorporate 
things like emerging technologies such as directed energy, 
hypersonics, and artificial intelligence?
    General VanHerck. Well, absolutely, we must take machine 
learning, artificial intelligence, and innovative technologies 
and factor them into every homeland defense strategy, plan, 
policy.
    I believe that everything that we do from now on, based on 
the threat to the homeland, from the strategy plan, force 
management, force design, acquisition, and budgets, ought to 
start with a discussion about what is the potential impact to 
homeland, what is the potential impact to a risk of strategic 
deterrence failure. We must incorporate the technologies as we 
go forward.
    Mr. Langevin. So further discussion, too, on, say, 
information sharing. Let me also talk about communications. 
When you talk about left-of-launch deterrence, how important 
are secure and robust command-and-control systems in the 
strategy? And how do other Federal agencies contribute to the 
strategy?
    General VanHerck. Secure capabilities are an imperative, 
Congressman. We have to go down that path with encrypted 
capabilities going forward to ensure that we have access to 
that data and information. That is an imperative that General 
Nakasone talks about routinely from his CYBERCOM [Cyber 
Command] and NSA [National Security Agency] hat as well.
    Mr. Langevin. And for Mr. Salesses: So the COVID response 
demonstrated that homeland chemical and biological scenarios 
demand a whole-of-government response. What are the major 
investments DOD made in interagency coordination? And how do 
you plan to sustain those gains beyond the current pandemic?
    Mr. Salesses. Thanks, Congressman.
    I think the first thing is our ability to detect and 
surveil the kinds of biological threats that we face in the 
future, to include pandemics, our ability to do that more 
effectively.
    And beyond that, it is certainly working with the 
laboratories, as we have, to develop the kind of 
countermeasures that we need to protect our population against 
those threats.
    Mr. Langevin. It is important to incorporate those lessons 
learned and make sure that they are institutionalized. This 
isn't going to be the last challenge that we face--
biologically, manmade, or otherwise--that we see.
    For all three, I think we have touched on this a bit, but I 
am going to ask it directly: Do you believe that climate change 
is undermining your command's core mission or at least 
complicating it? And if yes, then how?
    Admiral Faller. I believe in the science of climate change, 
and it has made rapid response imperative in our exercise, our 
training programs. And to the extent that it has caused us to 
respond to support partners' humanitarian assistance and 
disaster relief, it is a fact.
    The point you make about secure communications, that has a 
role here too. So our ability to talk to our partners as part 
of this joint all-domain command and control concept that my 
shipmate General VanHerck talked about is so key. So we have to 
get that right.
    And the vision that the Air Force and Lieutenant General 
Crall, the Joint Staff J6, have to encompass partners at the 
right scalable level in the future is key. If we can't talk to 
our partners secure, we can't respond rapidly to that 
catastrophic event. And, you know, we were challenged to talk 
to them, in some respects, last fall when those two major 
hurricanes hit.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
    General VanHerck. Congressman, I will go next.
    To specifically answer your question, I am not sure it 
undermines our ability to accomplish our mission. What I think 
it does is, environmental change creates opportunities and it 
creates vulnerabilities. The question is, are we postured to 
take advantage of the opportunities and to plug any 
vulnerabilities that that may create for us?
    Mr. Langevin. And Mr. Salesses?
    Mr. Salesses. Obviously, climate change is having a big 
impact. We have talked about the Arctic a lot today. We talk 
about sea rise. We talk about all those things.
    For the Defense Department, it is the vulnerabilities that 
are created from these efforts. And our work here in the 
homeland, in particular, as we have seen the severity of storms 
and wildfires and those types of things, it drives additional 
requirements on the Defense Department in support of our 
Federal partners.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
    Well, I can't underscore enough how we need to think 
holistically about how climate change is affecting U.S. 
national security.
    I think it was, Admiral, you who talked about how climate 
change is affecting food supplies, food stocks, creates 
instability. That creates problems for international security, 
where the U.S. has to get involved.
    So, with that, my time has expired and I will yield back. 
Thank you all.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Khanna is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Khanna. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding 
this important hearing.
    Admiral Faller, one of the causes of our border crisis is 
the rampant human rights abuses in El Salvador and Guatemala 
and in Honduras. As you know, the State-Foreign Ops bill 
specifically forbids any foreign military financing aid to 
these countries that have had oppressive practices.
    Does SOUTHCOM intend to make sure that we aren't having 
section 333 programs in the Northern Triangle, in light of the 
State-Foreign Ops bill?
    Admiral Faller. Congressman, every program we apply, we 
apply the principles of the Leahy law and the processes. And 
our human rights training and programs are embedded in every 
single one of those. And we are making a difference with those 
security institutions over time as part of U.S. Government 
whole-of-government efforts, working with our embassies. And so 
we are committed to that, working forward.
    In addition to the human rights programs, we have ramped up 
our Women, Peace, and Security Program, which is another part 
of the fundamental rights enshrined in the various 
constitutions of all these countries. So it is extremely 
important.
    Mr. Khanna. Thank you, Admiral. But specifically on section 
333 programs, are we still doing them with those countries, or 
are we are not? And can you just address that as it relates to 
the State-Foreign Ops bill?
    Admiral Faller. I think, to be heard and seen, we have to 
stay engaged, and those programs allow us to stay engaged. And 
so we are continuing with the 333 programs. We are following 
all the guidelines that are set out for the right vetting and 
the right rule sets. I think we are going to have modeled 
responsible behavior better if we stay engaged with those 
programs, Congressman.
    Mr. Khanna. And maybe we can explore it after the hearing 
just to make sure that the equipment that is being given to 
these countries isn't in violation of the State-Foreign Ops.
    But I think, more broadly, there are many people in 
Congress who are concerned that the ongoing drug war is 
actually hurting Americans' safety, that it is one of the 
causes for the mass migration to our border. Because you have 
these military governments in Honduras, in Guatemala, in El 
Salvador basically justifying oppression, in a desire to crack 
down against drug lords or drug cartels, captured by drug 
cartels. We have seen in Uruguay, where you have had a move 
towards legalizing and decriminalizing drugs, a more stable 
democracy, and we don't have many Uruguayan migrants coming to 
our border.
    Mr. Salesses, could you speak to the possibility of 
rethinking this drug war if we really are serious about 
lessening migrants coming to our border?
    Mr. Salesses. Congressman, I think we have heard this today 
several times, the importance of a whole-of-nation approach to 
this. The Defense Department can certainly play a role in 
helping, but it also takes the diplomatic, the economic, the 
information, the law enforcement, all of that and our partners 
in the south, working together, too, to rethink this. And I 
think that approach can be very successful.
    I do think that the work the Defense Department is doing 
down in Central and South America is key, though. As Admiral 
Faller has repeated several times today, it is the values 
system, it is our professionalism, it is what the U.S. military 
brings to the region and provides to the militaries down there 
with security cooperation, foreign military sales, education, 
institutional reform. Those kinds of initiatives make a huge 
difference in that region and need to continue.
    Mr. Khanna. And one final question, Mr. Chairman.
    I am one of 80 cosponsors on the Berta Caceres Human Rights 
Act, and that would suspend our law enforcement aid to some of 
these military regimes, consistent with Leahy and what Senator 
Merkley are proposing in the Senate, just making sure that 
American tax dollars aren't going to repressive human rights 
practices that are then causing migrants to come to our border.
    Do you have a view on the Berta Caceres Human Rights Act 
and any thoughts on it?
    Admiral Faller. I think the human rights is a focus we need 
to continue. And I worry that if we abandon our partners, that 
Chinese malign influence will take over. And that is a view of 
human rights I don't think any of us want in our neighborhood.
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
    And I think that is the----
    Mr. Khanna. Thank you.
    The Chairman [continuing]. Balance that is very difficult 
to strike. We want to maintain those relationships, but we 
don't want to give support to human rights violations. On the 
other hand, no nation, including our own, is perfect. So how do 
we strike that balance? Because if we just cut them off, like 
you said, they are going to turn to others, and then we don't 
have any influence. So how do we balance that? I think we--
well, I know we always try to strike that balance in this 
committee.
    With that, I really want to thank our witnesses above and 
beyond, staying with us for 3 hours, without a break, I might 
add.
    And, as you can see, members have a great deal of interest 
in your areas of responsibility. There are incredibly important 
policy decisions we have to make, and I found this enormously 
helpful to all of us, to get your expertise and background on 
how we should approach those challenges. Look forward to 
continuing to work with you.
    And, with that, we are adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 2:03 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

    
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                            A P P E N D I X

                             April 14, 2021
      
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              PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                             April 14, 2021

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[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

      
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              WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING

                              THE HEARING

                             April 14, 2021

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              RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER

    Mr. Salesses. Of the total $3.6 billion made available for border 
barrier projects under 10 U.S.C. 2808, $2.1 billion is currently 
unobligated. An additional $0.1 billion for a Navy project in 
Washington State that was deferred to make funds available for Section 
2808 construction also is unobligated, but pursuant to a court order 
that is on appeal, the funds were released to the Navy.
    As announced April 30, 2021, consistent with Presidential 
Proclamation 10142 (issued on January 20, 2021), the Department of 
Defense has cancelled all border barrier construction projects paid for 
with funds originally appropriated for other military missions and 
functions. With this cancellation, unobligated military construction 
funds that had been allocated for border barrier military construction 
projects will be released and made available to fund previously 
deferred military construction projects.   [See page 49.]
                                 ______
                                 
            RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CARBAJAL
    Mr. Salesses. The COVID-19 pandemic is the greatest public health 
challenge our nation has faced in more than 100 years, since the 1918 
influenza pandemic. Domestically, most disasters or emergencies either 
affect a single State or region within the United States. In contrast, 
the COVID-19 pandemic not only affected the entire United States, but 
the entire world. This created an unprecedented demand signal for DOD 
support.
    When the risk of the pandemic has passed, or sufficiently 
diminished, a data-driven and comprehensive after-action review is 
needed to prepare for the next health crisis. However, DOD has 
conducted an in-stride strategic review, which has identified some 
potential opportunities for improvements, such as:
      The need to evaluate approaches to accelerate and expand 
capability to develop and mass-produce tests and medical capabilities 
rapidly for future man-made or naturally occurring biological threats 
of interest;
      The need to digitize DOD's manual contact tracing 
program;
      Investments in medical intelligence and bio-surveillance 
may be warranted to enable early warning of a potential outbreak.
      The need to incorporate lessons learned from the COVID-19 
pandemic into planning for domestic incidents while concurrently 
conducting national defense missions.
      The need to identify and realign personnel to those 
medical capabilities most needed in wartime and other crises.
      The need for further analysis to incorporate lessons 
learned from the COVID-19 pandemic into future medical command and 
control structures and to inform the optimal joint force mix between 
Active and Reserve Component medical forces.   [See page 46.]
    General VanHerck. I have placed strong emphasis on capturing and 
incorporating all lessons learned during the COVID crisis, and 
highlight the following two specific topics:
    1) Relationships and rehearsals are crucial. The activation of the 
National Response Framework (NRF) and National Response Coordination 
Center provided an established coordinating structure that immediately 
reinforced effective leadership and interagency coordination. 
USNORTHCOM has developed long-standing, close relationships over many 
years with the Federal Emergency Management Agency and other 
interagency partners, as well as state and local governments, by 
exercising the NRF and supporting lead federal agencies in times of 
crisis. These formal and informal relationships set the conditions for 
a successful military response.
    2) Resiliency matters, especially in command and control. To 
prevent cross-infection during the pandemic, USNORTHCOM and NORAD 
dispersed the force, moved watch-standing functions to multiple 
locations, and sequestered teams from the larger population. This 
ensured continuity of operations as USNORTHCOM and NORAD maintained 
100% mission assurance of critical homeland defense missions throughout 
the pandemic response.   [See page 46.]
                                 ______
                                 
              RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. WALTZ
    Admiral Faller. We look forward to continuing our work with 
Congress on this important issue once the President has transmitted his 
Legislative Proposals for FY22.   [See page 31.]
                                 ______
                                 
              RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MRS. LURIA
    General VanHerck. For clarification, Naval Forces North (NAVNORTH), 
commanded by ADM Chris Grady, is the U.S. Navy's component command that 
works for USNORTHCOM; Second Fleet is not organizationally aligned 
under NAVNORTH or USNORTHCOM. While Second Fleet does work for ADM 
Grady in his Navy responsibility as Commander of U.S. Fleet Forces 
Command (FFC), Second Fleet does not work for USNORTHCOM in this 
designated Navy chain of command.
    Regarding your specific question, yes, purely from an 
organizational perspective, USNORTHCOM and USEUCOM routinely employ a 
variety of command and control mechanisms to ensure the appropriate 
combatant commander receives required USN support when and where 
required. Consistent with how adjacent combatant commanders in other 
areas of responsibility execute command and control, USNORTHCOM and 
USEUCOM regularly assess and iterate command and control mechanisms to 
seamlessly operate between our two commands.
    I would add however that USNORTHCOM has numerous documented 
capability gaps related to establishing a persistent, sustainable 
presence in the Arctic, to include maritime fueling capability north of 
Dutch Harbor, which is necessary to expand the Navy's and Coast Guard's 
operations; improved facilities for air assets (e.g., fighters, 
tankers, and ISR platforms); and reliable, resilient communications 
systems.   [See page 33.]

     
=======================================================================


              QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                             April 14, 2021

=======================================================================

      

                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER

    Ms. Speier. How much are taxpayers spending for each LCS deployment 
in the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility, and what is the typical 
duration of such a deployment?
    Admiral Faller. A typical LCS deployment to the SOUTHCOM AOR is 
planned for approximately 120 days. The daily operating cost for an LCS 
(according to United States Fleet Forces) is $45,574 per day, or $5.4M 
per 120-day deployment.
    Ms. Speier. How much have LCS deployments increased over the past 3 
years in the SOUTHCOM areas of responsibility? What is the breakdown 
among drug interdiction, humanitarian and disaster response, and other 
missions?
    Admiral Faller. There have been nine LCS deployments over the last 
three years to the SOUTHCOM AOR. The first LCS deployment began in Nov 
2019. Five deployments were executed in 2020 as part of SOUTUHCOM's 
enhanced operations to counter-transnational criminal organizations 
(TCOs). In 2021, three LCS have deployed.
    LCS deployments in the SOUTHCOM AOR are predominately focused on 
countering TCOs, accounting for 95% of all mission days. Less than one 
percent of LCS mission days were spent on Humanitarian Assistance/
Disaster Response (three mission days) and the remaining 4% on 
traditional U.S. Navy (USN) missions and Theater Security Cooperation 
exercises.
    Ms. Speier. For the Freedom-class ships assigned to SOUTHCOM, what 
was the average number of days that the ships were in dry dock in 2019 
and 2020? What is the average number of days that they were planned to 
be at sea in 2019 and 2020? What is the average number of days that 
they were unable to complete planned/assigned missions in 2019 and 2020 
due to maintenance requirements?
    Admiral Faller. When a USN ship deployed in the SOUTHCOM AOR has a 
serious maintenance problem, it goes into dry-dock facilities stateside 
where Fleet Forces Command takes operational control. When this occurs, 
the USN works to fill our operational requirement with another ship to 
minimize impact to operations. For specific information on the number 
of days a particular ship was in dry dock, I would have to refer you to 
the U.S. Navy.
    Ms. Speier. What capability does the LCS provide to SOUTHCOM that 
is not present in other available vessels in the fleet?
    Admiral Faller. LCS, with its employment of the SH-60S helicopter 
and 11-meter Rigid-hull Inflatable Boat (RHIB), is the only USN 
combatant that can execute both airborne use of force (day and night) 
and surface use of force--a critical capability during the interdiction 
and apprehension stage. Structural modifications and asset re-
allocations would be required to embark 11-meter RHIBs and SH-60S on 
other vessels.
    Ms. Speier. A recent article in Defense News says that each LCS 
costs about $70 million per year to operate--almost as much as the cost 
of operating a much-larger Arleigh Burke-class destroyer. Is that 
accurate? If not, what is the actual annual operating cost of a 
Freedom-class LCS?
    Admiral Faller. I would have to defer to the U.S. Navy for specific 
operational costs of different types of ships.
    Ms. Speier. What is the impact of the LCS maintenance problems on 
SOUTHCOM's ability to complete drug interdiction, humanitarian, and 
other missions?
    Admiral Faller. From April 1, 2020 until May 10, 2021, we have lost 
118 operational days because of LCS maintenance issues, and that number 
continues to grow. To the Navy's credit, they have worked to mitigate 
the operational days lost, and the above number is lower than it could 
be due to their efforts. However, the LCS platform is still plagued by 
systemic maintenance issues, which reduce its effectiveness.
    Ms. Speier. What is the impact of the combination of high OPTEMPO 
and the unreliability of the Freedom-class LCS on the sailors who crew 
these ships? What, if anything, are you doing to mitigate these 
impacts?
    Admiral Faller. Due to shorter deployment cycles in the SOUTHCOM 
Area of Responsibility, the impact to crews has been minimal and 
significantly less than impacts from COVID associated with restriction 
of movement (ROM) requirements and country access. Navy's employment 
model for LCS mitigates high OPTEMPO. Each LCS, with few exceptions, 
have two crews--blue and gold. This two-crew model mirrors that of 
other maritime platforms. Crews conduct a crew swap every 4-7 months, 
which is designed to limit OPTEMPO.
    Ms. Speier. What are your plans going forward for OPTEMPO and LCS 
deployments in SOUTHCOM? Are you reconsidering the increased OPTEMPO?
    Admiral Faller. We anticipate future LCS presence to continue in 
this AOR. SOUTHCOM has an ideal mission set and compatible geography 
for this platform, but it will remain up to the U.S. Navy to provide 
assets based on SOUTHCOM's stated requirements. Although LCS presence 
has increased in the SOUTHCOM AOR, Navy's LCS employment model 
mitigates OPTEMPO concerns.
    Ms. Speier. Both in media reporting and in my personal experiences 
speaking with service members and their families, it is clear that high 
OPTEMPO has been incredibly destructive to our military. How do you 
balance your mission needs, especially the unpredictability of disaster 
response, with stable force planning to reduce the burden of on short-
notice deployments on the force?
    Admiral Faller. As a Combatant Command with no assigned forces, we 
rely exclusively on the Services to meet our mission requirements, both 
planned and emergent. We work closely with the Joint Staff through the 
Global Force Management Process to plan for normal, predictable mission 
requirements. While we cannot anticipate all emergency deployments, we 
take some proactive steps to minimize unplanned, short-notice 
deployments. For example, we do try to time deployments to coincide 
with hurricane season so that we can simply shift the mission of an 
already ongoing deployment to respond rapidly, rather than having to 
request a new deployment to react to a disaster.
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT
    Mr. Scott. How would the designation of cartels as foreign 
terrorist organizations affect U.S. Southern Command?
    Admiral Faller. While designating cartels as Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations (FTOs) could change operational authorities from ``law 
enforcement support and training'' to the broader ``counterterrorism'' 
authorities, practically speaking, DOD activities would likely not 
change significantly. Alternatively, recognizing Transnational Criminal 
Organizations (TCOs) formally as threats to national security in key 
national strategic documents, which are directly tied to funding 
decisions, could result in direct positive impacts in the region.
    Mr. Scott. The U.S. Coast Guard plays a significant role in 
SOUTHCOM. Do you have sufficient Coast Guard assets in SOUTHCOM or 
could you use more?
    Admiral Faller. The Coast Guard plays a key role in maintaining 
forward operating presence in the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility and 
is a top force provider in the region. The unique capabilities and 
authorities the Coast Guard bring are invaluable, and more USCG 
aircraft, cutters, and personnel would certainly contribute to meeting 
our mission requirements. However, Coast Guard assets are in demand 
worldwide, and they are only one force provider to our joint command. 
We work with the Joint Staff to source mission requirements through the 
Global Force Management Process, which includes assets from all 
Services.
    Mr. Scott. CDR Daniel Upp, U.S. Navy, wrote in the April 2021 
edition of Proceedings, ``. . . the Paraguayan Navy is a worthy and 
critical partner for the United States in the struggle against the TCOs 
that threaten regional security in Latin America.'' What additional 
support does the Paraguayan Navy need from both the U.S. Coast Guard 
and the U.S. Navy so that it can defeat the transnational criminal 
organizations on some of South America's critical rivers?
    Admiral Faller. SOUTHCOM is addressing the lack of riverine 
security capability in Paraguay to conduct successful Counter 
Transnational Criminal Organizations (C-TCO) operations through an 
approved FY22 Significant Security Capability Initiative (SSCI) which 
was recently funded at $773K to equip and train the Paraguayan Maritime 
Forces. We are currently looking to provide a new maritime riverine 
platform along with additional domain awareness capacity. In 
coordination with the Security Cooperation Office in Asuncion, DSCA, 
U.S. Navy South and the U.S. Coast Guard, we will assess the 
requirements and build an FY22 Section 333 support package to include a 
Minister of Defense-level Institutional Capacity line of effort 
executed by the U.S. Institute for Security Governance (ISG). 
Additionally, Paraguay and Colombia have agreed to conduct bi-lateral 
training under the U.S. Colombia Action Plan (USCAP), which will 
include both Military (DOD supported), and Public Security Forces 
(State supported) lines of effort.
    Mr. Scott. Commander Jennifer Runion, U.S. Coast Guard, wrote in 
the February 2021 edition of Proceedings an article entitled ``Protect 
Western Hemisphere Fish.'' Is a regional fisheries commission needed to 
coordinate information sharing and enforcement efforts to protect Latin 
American fish stocks? Would the establishment of a shiprider program by 
the U.S. Coast Guard be effective in protecting the region's fisheries?
    Admiral Faller. The practice of Illegal, Unreported, and 
Unregulated (IUU) fishing is an economic and ecological threat, but 
also undermines port and maritime security, widens existing gaps in 
maritime governance, and is utilized by criminal elements to traffic 
drugs, arms, people, and other contraband. The Coast Guard is 
implementing a global strategy to combat IUU fishing that incorporates 
not only at-sea enforcement, but also intelligence sharing, legal 
support, and policy development. Partnerships with coastal nations 
aimed towards countering predatory behavior, and strengthening of 
multilateral and multinational coalitions, is a key part of this global 
framework. The Coast Guard coordinates partner nation cooperation and 
capacity building based on each nation's capabilities and needs through 
the Department of State as well as the Department of Defense.
    Mr. Scott. Commander Jonathan Ahlstrom, U.S. Navy, wrote in the 
January 2021 edition of Proceedings an article entitled ``People-to-
People Exchanges for the Win.'' Has the U.S. Southern Command 
identified unfunded opportunities to ``facilitate the cultural, 
educational, and people-to-people exchanges that create the networks of 
current and future political, civil society, and educational leaders 
who will extend a free and prosperous world.'' If so, what are they and 
how much would they cost to implement?
    Admiral Faller. The benefits of collaborating with the U.S. 
military are far greater than just increased technical capability for 
the partner and we look for every opportunity to further our network of 
relationships within the region. Every engagement builds trust with our 
partners and reassures them that the United States wants to contribute 
in meaningful ways, and at the speed of relevance. The tools available 
through Security Cooperation, for example, allow for maximum engagement 
with our partner nation military and security forces. These tools 
include key leader engagements, subject matter expert exchanges, 
conferences, workshops, mobile training teams, and institutional 
capacity building at the Ministry level, to name a few. Our 
professional military education efforts in the region including 
International Military Education and Training (IMET), exchanges, and 
exercises shape future leaders and foster long-term relationships with 
partner nation military personnel. The programs are generally small 
investments with high, long-term return. A little bit goes a long way 
in this theater. When the U.S. military is present, we bring with us 
our values and we model professional behavior--we show our partners 
what ``right'' looks like. We have programs in place, like our Women 
Peace and Security initiative and the only Human Rights Office among 
the Combatant Commands, that help build the institutional capacity of 
our partner nation forces and make the resilient to all external 
influences and threats; programs to help partner nations develop 
diverse and inclusive militaries that respect the rule of law and human 
rights. We also agree with CDR Ahlstrom's assessment that the inverse 
is also critical to developing our relationships--sending our U.S. 
military personnel to schools and exchange programs in partner nations 
and building cultural awareness and literacy within our own ranks shows 
partners that we are interested in understanding where they come from 
while informing our own decisions on how best to work with our partners 
in ways that are relevant to them. We will be submitting a list of 
unfunded requirements to Congress shortly after the President transmits 
the FY22 budget to Congress that will include partner engagement 
activities.
    Mr. Scott. How is SOUTHCOM addressing the emerging threat of drones 
and drone swarming tactics?
    Admiral Faller. The Department of Defense has announced an intent 
to continue important research, development and procurement of unmanned 
aircraft systems (UAS) and counter-UAS (C-UAS) technology. As DOD 
continues to develop, procure, and deploy these systems, we will work 
closely with our partner nations in the region to determine a 
collaborative way forward in the area of UAS.
    Mr. Scott. What SOUTHCOM's capabilities against a drone swarm 
attack? Do we currently have the ability to defeat a drone swarm attack 
and ensure we do not take out our drones?
    Admiral Faller. Unmanned aircraft systems are increasingly small, 
cheap, scalable, and disposable and can be used both offensively and 
defensively. We are paying attention to this technology and would be 
happy to discuss further in a classified setting.
    Mr. Scott. What is SOUTTHCOM working on to defeat adversary drones, 
singles and swarms, today and in the future?
    Admiral Faller. We would be happy to provide a classified briefing 
on this topic.
    Mr. Scott. What are the factors limiting your ability to deploy 
counter-UAS systems in SOUTHCOM?
    Admiral Faller. We continue to work together with partner nations 
in the region to evaluate and develop strategies in this area based on 
current capabilities and requirements.
    Mr. Scott. Admiral Faller, you testified last year that ISR was 
critical to drug interdiction efforts, an issue with direct impact on 
the security of our nation and our communities. Despite that, you've 
said in the past that SOUTHCOM is forced to cover down on an area the 
size of the United States with just a handful of assets and that you're 
reaching just 20 percent of your overall ISR goal. What steps have you 
taken to remedy this shortfall? How do you assess your current ISR gaps 
or needs? Does your command plan to partner with U.S. companies to fill 
the gap with contractor-owned, contractor-operated ISR assets? How can 
Congress help?
    Admiral Faller. SOUTHCOM receives only one percent of DOD ISR. This 
creates a significant gap in our intelligence. For years, Congress has 
supported our intelligence program through the ISR Transfer Fund and 
other additional funding that has enabled us to mitigate some of those 
shortfalls. We have used these additional resources to contract, as 
well as purchase, ISR capabilities such as maritime patrol aircraft, 
tactical UAS, and more recently, non-traditional ISR capabilities that 
allow us to better harness large amounts of data to inform C-TCO and 
other operations in our AOR. Congressional recognition of the 
importance of this hemisphere, our own neighborhood, is key to sourcing 
this mission and countering the threats that directly impact our 
homeland. Modest increases in ISR, security cooperation, and presence 
in this region really go a long way in building our partners' 
resilience to all threats--TCOs, influence from malign state actors 
like China, and even humanitarian crises spurred by climate change.
    Mr. Scott. In 2020, Congress responded to the combatant commanders' 
call for more ISR resources by appropriating $250M for the ISR transfer 
fund, which funded additional ISR activities in the SOUTHCOM AOR. How 
did you leverage these additional resources in 2020? For 2021, the 
Pentagon did not request any funds for the ISR transfer fund and 
Congress did not appropriate any additional funds. How will the lack of 
ISR transfer funds in 2021 impact your mission?
    Admiral Faller. Intelligence drives everything. The loss of the ISR 
Transfer Fund this year resulted in a 38 percent reduction to our ISR 
in the current year. Over the last five years, the ISR Transfer Fund 
has provided 47 percent of our ISR. That's significant, especially 
since we only have about 1 percent of DOD ISR. Without that 
intelligence, we are going to understand less of the battle space. 
Small investments in ISR help inform us and, just as important, our 
partner nations, on the activities of the People's Republic of China 
(PRC) and TCOs in this region. With capabilities like COGINT 
(Commercial + Open Geointelligence) and Open Source Intelligence, we 
are able to understand the impact malign influences are having in the 
SOUTHCOM AOR and do so rapidly by leveraging automated machine 
learning. For instance, we have a better understanding of which Chinese 
companies and vessels are conducting illegal, unreported, and 
unregulated (IUU) fishing, and are constantly monitoring patterns of 
activity. This information is key to help strengthening relationships 
with our impacted partners and for maritime sovereignty and security 
throughout the region.
    Mr. Scott. What is the current rate of interdiction and 
apprehension of narcotics traffickers, and is this rate increasing or 
decreasing?
    Admiral Faller. SOUTHCOM works very closely with the interagency on 
the counternarcotic mission, as this is a true team effort. DHS, and 
specifically the U.S. Coast Guard, working with Joint Interagency Task 
Force-South (JIATF-S), is our primary law enforcement partner for drug 
interdictions at sea. Disruption rates have stayed within a tight range 
over the past five years. In terms of metric tons interdicted, JIATF-S 
saw an 11.6 percent rate of interdiction in 2020 which was 
approximately the same as the year before. It is worth noting that 
partner nation participation in these disruptions has increased to 60 
percent, up from 50 the previous year. While we must continue to 
prevent as many drugs from entering our homeland as possible, we must 
also look toward a whole-of-society approach to address this scourge. 
For our part, SOUTHCOM can directly impact the supply side by 
continuing to work with our partners to stop the TCOs who will traffic 
in any commodity to turn a profit. It's not just about stopping the 
flow of drugs, we must go after their logistics chains and ultimately, 
their profits.
    Mr. Scott. As SOUTHCOM's demand for ISR continues to grow 
exponentially, year after year, how is SOUTHCOM positioning itself to 
properly process, exploit, and disseminate the growing volume of 
information?
    Admiral Faller. SOUTHCOM continues to learn how best to leverage 
capabilities in order to stay innovative. Part of this effort is 
leveraging emerging artificial intelligence and machine learning 
capabilities that would allow us to collect and exploit information 
orders of magnitude faster than we once could and with fewer manpower 
requirements. We will look to continue expanding and investing in non-
traditional ISR utilizing 21st Century tradecraft as a means of 
illuminating and limiting disinformation/misinformation in a whole of 
government approach that includes engaging with industry to best 
compete in a competitive information environment.
    Mr. Scott. How is SOUTHCOM leveraging the opportunities that 
advanced cloud computing and artificial intelligence/machine learning 
can offer to more effectively manage this increasing volume of 
information?
    Admiral Faller. As I've said before, ISR drives everything. One 
thing we have started looking at more closely as an institution is non-
traditional ISR. For example, our Special Operations Command South 
looks at big data--commercially available information--and they are 
able to quickly analyze this large quantity of data and make it 
actionable through artificial intelligence and machine learning. The 
next step is removing barriers to sharing information in order to 
leverage that data to understand what the threat is doing and to better 
inform our partners.
    Mr. Scott. Do you think ABMS and Joint All-Domain Command and 
Control will have enough operational capability to fill the ISR gaps 
that JSTARS will not be able to fulfill once it is parked?
    Admiral Faller. The E-8C (JSTARS) has been a very valuable asset in 
our region. This platform enables valuable layered intelligence and the 
unique ability to characterize wide-areas of maritime trafficking 
environments with its moving target indicator (MTI), vital to 
identifying unknown suspicious surface activity along traditional high-
volume trafficking routes. Additionally, employing the E-8C gives 
SOUTHCOM the opportunity to leverage external intelligence expertise 
for second and third phase analysis. The E-8C, when packaged with other 
airborne and surface Detection & Monitoring (D&M) assets, enables 
JIATF-S helicopter-equipped surface assets to increase their 
probability of detection of maritime targets from 7% to up to 50%. I 
would refer you to the Air Force for information on the Advance Battle 
Management System (ABMS) and Joint All Domain Command and Control 
(JADC2) systems and what their capabilities will be in the near to mid-
term.
    Mr. Scott. I am a strong supporter of the National Guard's State 
Partnership Program. My home State of Georgia is partnered with 
Argentina. While the current political environment makes it a 
challenge, can you talk about the value added by the Georgia National 
Guard to this partnership with Argentina?
    Admiral Faller. The State Partnership Program (SPP) is an integral 
part of our engagement capability with our partners and a force 
multiplier in the SOUTHCOM region. The State Partnership Program 
enables the exchange of tremendous expertise resident in our citizen 
Soldiers and Airmen fostering long-term relationships with partner 
nation military and security forces. SOUTHCOM fully leverages this 
value with 24 State Partnerships--the most of any region. The Georgia 
National Guard engagements with Argentina are nested under our security 
cooperation priorities. As part of the State Partnership Program, 
Georgia and Argentina continue to strengthen their relationship through 
multiple annual engagements since 2016. In 2020, even with COVID 
restrictions, the Georgia National Guard conducted 10 events with 
Argentina and have successfully executed nine of 27 events planned for 
2021. One of the most recent engagement was a virtual subject matter 
expert exchange on COVID-19 best practices working group which enable 
leaders from each organization to share effective pandemic influenza/
infectious disease (PI/ID) countermeasures, response to the novel 
outbreak and lessons learned. A team of medical professionals from 
Georgia National Guard, Georgia Department of Public Health, National 
Guard Bureau and Air Force South led the virtual engagement, sharing 
best practices with the Argentina partners on how the state of Georgia 
was managing its COVID-19 distribution logistics. They have exchanged 
knowledge in other SPP focus areas such as Cyber, Maintenance and 
professional development.
    Mr. Scott. Could increased maintenance of current ground-based 
radar and communications intercept ISR assets expand capability? Has 
SOUTHCOM looked at leasing options with respect to ground-based ISR 
assets to include radars and communications intercept systems?
    Admiral Faller. We are always looking for ways to expand our 
ability to illuminate threats, not only to the U.S. but also our 
partners in the region. Maintenance of our assets is a critical but 
complex task to orchestrate at forward operating locations. We prefer 
basing our assets at U.S. controlled facilities or at locations where 
have existing agreements with a partner nation. We do consider leasing 
if it is the only option that allows us to collect the information we 
need, and funding is available.
    Mr. Scott. What is the demand signal for Navy hospital ships in 
SOUTHCOM?
    Admiral Faller. Navy hospital ships are capable platforms that 
provide a vital service to our partner nations in their hour of need. 
They help build goodwill and highlight the best of America to our 
neighbors and the world. We have had multiple hospital ship deployments 
in SOUTHCOM's area of responsibility: from 2007-2019 those deployments 
treated 634,463 patients and performed 7,781 surgeries. There is a 
stable, consistent demand for medical care in many areas of the region, 
which is compounded by natural disasters and other crises. As a result 
of the seasonal threat of hurricanes, we have looked to schedule 
deployments in the summer in order to have hospital ship presence in 
order to quickly respond to an event.
    Mr. Scott. What would the benefits be for NORTHCOM if the U.S. Navy 
established an Arctic Fleet?
    General VanHerck. As the Commander of USNORTHCOM and NORAD, I have 
consistently stated that our strategic competitors are exhibiting 
behaviors and taking actions that demonstrate their intent to compete 
with the United States globally and in all domains, including in the 
Arctic.
    In order to counter their actions, the Department must establish a 
persistent, sustainable presence in the Arctic and close capability 
gaps. That includes establishing a maritime fueling capability north of 
Dutch Harbor, Alaska, which is necessary to expand the Navy's and Coast 
Guard's operational reach; improving facilities for air assets in 
coordination with our Canadian and Danish allies (e.g., fighters, 
tankers, and ISR platforms); and building reliable, resilient 
communications systems in the high north. We must also increase the 
capability of the Joint Force to operate in the Arctic, which 
necessitates examining existing equipment allowances as well as 
expanding opportunities to train in the Arctic.
    I fully support the Navy's implementation of its ``A Blue Arctic'' 
strategy, with the objectives of establishing a more persistent 
maritime presence in the high north, strengthening relationships with 
Arctic allies and partners, and developing the capabilities and 
proficiency necessary to operate in the challenging Arctic environment. 
Achieving these objectives in all domains--not just at sea--would 
enable USNORTHCOM and NORAD to more effectively deter and counter 
strategic competitors' malign activities in the Arctic during day-to-
day competition, provide national leaders with expanded options to de-
escalate crises, and significantly improve the ability of USNORTHCOM 
and NORAD to defeat attacks against the homeland originating from or 
transiting through the Arctic approaches. I defer to the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense and the Chief of Naval Operations as to the 
advisability or feasibility of establishing an Arctic Fleet.
    Mr. Scott. What are the advantages to Arctic security of joint U.S. 
and Canadian Coast Guard patrols through the Northwest passage?
    General VanHerck. The extensive experience of the U.S. Coast Guard 
and Canadian Coast Guard in the Arctic and their long-shared history of 
combined operations in the Arctic Ocean provide significant benefits 
for Arctic security. Combined U.S. and Canadian Coast Guard operations 
demonstrate the strong security relationship and extensive maritime 
expertise between our nations and contribute to a safe, cooperative and 
prosperous Arctic region that protects the international rules-based 
order.
    Mr. Scott. How much would it cost to modernize the missile early 
warning system with the capability to give the United States a clear 
advantage over Russia?
    General VanHerck. I defer to the Missile Defense Agency, the United 
States Space Force, and the United States Air Force regarding the cost 
to modernize the missile early warning system. USNORTHCOM and NORAD 
identify capability requirements in support of our assigned missions 
and work closely with the DOD Services and Agencies to provide fiscally 
viable solutions. I believe the emergence of peer competitors and their 
fielding of large numbers of long-range conventional cruise missiles 
and delivery platforms necessitates a more aggressive approach to 
missile defense for the homeland. USNORTHCOM and NORAD are aggressively 
working within the Department, along with Canada and other partners, to 
assess and identify capabilities such as over-the-horizon-radars that 
may complement terrestrial, airborne, and space-based technologies to 
improve early warning capabilities against current and future threats. 
A more aggressive approach must account for defense against the full 
spectrum of air and missile threats that we currently face in the 
homeland; we must avoid single threat solutions. The Department needs a 
more holistic approach in order to field an effective and affordable 
homeland defense capability.
    Mr. Scott. How is NORTHCOM addressing the emerging threat of drones 
and drone swarming tactics?
    General VanHerck. NORAD is responsible for and has the authority to 
defend against attacks by large unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). 
However, the responsibility and authority for defense against small UAS 
(sUAS) is distributed across multiple DOD and non-DOD agencies under 
law enforcement authorities. NORAD, together with USNORTHCOM, is 
aggressively collaborating with multiple DOD organizations and 
interagency partners to address the emerging threat of sUAS attack 
(e.g., small radar signature, easily purchased, commercially 
available). As an example, my commands are developing an integrated 
prototype sUAS detection and warning system, to include threats from 
swarms, that we intend to use in the continental United States.
    The National Strategy for Aviation Security (NSAS) recognizes the 
wide variety of sizes in UAS, and that law enforcement has the 
authorities to counter sUAS. There is no lead federal agency designated 
to address sUAS threats within the National Airspace System.
    I note that national-level statutes and policies currently 
constrain development of an effective interagency solution to this 
emerging sUAS threat. As such, I fully support efforts to establish 
national-level authorities and responsibilities that will enable a more 
fully integrated, interagency, whole-of-government solution that will 
mitigate potential sUAS and swarm sUAS attacks on the homeland.
    Mr. Scott. What are NORTHCOM's capabilities against a drone swarm 
attack? Do we currently have the ability to defeat a drone swarm attack 
and ensure we do not take out our drones?
    General VanHerck. Today, NORAD (vice USNORTHCOM) has limited 
capability to detect small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS) swarm 
attacks (e.g., small radar signature, easily purchased, commercially 
available). Further, NORAD has no ability to counter or defeat sUAS 
threats, nor is NORAD assigned the mission to counter-sUAS at this 
time. Instead, the counter-sUAS mission is conducted under law 
enforcement authorities as a reactive, not proactive, approach in 
domestic airspace. The counter-sUAS mission is conducted under military 
Service authorities only when over covered DOD assets and 
infrastructure. From a homeland defense perspective, I remain concerned 
with the reactive vice proactive approach to countering sUAS.
    Mr. Scott. What is NORTHCOM working on to defeat adversary drones, 
singles and swarms, today and in the future?
    General VanHerck. NORAD (vice USNORTHCOM) is actively working with 
the Joint Counter-UAS Office and the Services to improve the 
Department's collective capability to successfully mitigate both single 
as well as swarm small unmanned aircraft system (sUAS) threats. 
Advanced technologies, such as the USNORTHCOM and NORAD Pathfinder 
prototype, are allowing us to take advantage of increased computing 
power, data analytics, and machine learning to detect and identify sUAS 
using existing sensors.
    Through technologies such as Pathfinder, military commanders and 
senior civilian decision makers will gain decision space and the 
ability to employ a greater range of options. Instead of a reactive 
stance to sUAS threats, an expanded and integrated decision space will 
be key to a proactive defense against either single or swarm attacks.
    By law and policy, the mitigation of sUAS is the responsibility of 
the Services and law enforcement agencies. NORAD (as the command tasked 
with aerospace warning and aerospace control) is focused on enhancing 
the ability to detect, track, identify sUAS in order to provide DOD 
installation commanders and interagency partners with the decision 
space necessary to successfully engage single and swarm sUAS threats. 
Gaining this enhanced awareness necessitates a more comprehensive 
approach than the installation-by-installation and point-by-point 
efforts that have been focused on in the past. It requires the netting 
together of DOD and non-DOD sensor data to gain composite air domain 
awareness, allowing for real-time detection of the full spectrum of air 
threats, including sUAS. This holistic approach will enable those 
tasked with the mitigation of sUAS by providing critical threat 
information, and most importantly, increased decision time.
    My team is currently working with both DOD and interagency partners 
to test a prototype system that uses machine learning and artificial 
intelligence to provide real-time identification of those sUAS that are 
operating in such a manner as to warrant attention. This system will 
first be evaluated in the National Capital Region and Puget Sound, WA. 
Enabling early identification and shared early warning will increase 
decision time and allow those tasked with threat mitigation to take 
action when warranted.
    Mr. Scott. What are the factors limiting your ability to deploy 
counter-UAS systems in NORTHCOM and specifically U.S. airspace?
    General VanHerck. As the NORAD (vice USNORTHCOM) Commander, I have 
the authorities needed for defense against large unmanned aircraft 
system (UAS) threats under the NORAD mission set. As the USNORTHCOM 
Commander, however, there are legal and policy limitations for 
employment of counter-small UAS (sUAS) systems in the defense of the 
homeland. For example, domestic security partners are restricted from 
sharing sUAS data with DOD organizations, which has impeded the 
development of a holistic, integrated approach for early detection of 
sUAS and protection of national infrastructure and critical assets from 
sUAS threats. In addition, Federal Aviation Administration controls 
designed to ensure safety of civilian aircraft preclude the use of some 
of the UAS mitigation systems that have proven effective in other 
theaters. Finally, no single agency is assigned within the National 
Strategy for Aviation Security to set overarching technical and 
operational standards necessary to facilitate an effective, whole-of-
government approach to the sUAS threat.
    Mr. Scott. Will the continued National Guard presence on the 
Southwest border become an enduring mission after the current 
mobilization authority expires?
    General VanHerck. This is a policy decision that I will defer to 
the Secretary of Defense. DOD personnel are currently deployed to the 
southwest border in response to a request from the Secretary of 
Homeland Security that was subsequently approved by Secretary of 
Defense authorizing up to 4,000 total DOD personnel on the border in 
FY21. All are currently National Guard members in Title 10 status 
providing support to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and U.S 
Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) homeland security mission, 
enabling DHS and CBP personnel to focus their efforts on law 
enforcement.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. NORCROSS
    Mr. Norcross. General VanHerck, in your testimony you state that 
there is significant emphasis being placed on ``left of launch 
framework'' to provide ``flexible response options to deter, deny or if 
required defeat every threat. . . .''
    Can you please describe in a bit more detail how this framework 
matches up against and can be utilized to defend the homeland or U.S. 
forces against adversary hypersonic weapons?
    General VanHerck. A left-of-launch framework to deter in 
competition, de-escalate in crisis, and deny and defeat in conflict 
against any threat--including hypersonic glide vehicles and cruise 
missiles--is all about increasing the ability to anticipate an attack 
before it occurs or has the ability to threaten the homeland. That is 
why my top priority is improving all-domain awareness, particularly 
against existing and emerging air and missile threats.
    An all-domain awareness capability, achieved through layering a 
global array of existing and new sensors, will provide detection, 
identification, and tracking of the full range of threats, from 
hypersonic missiles to small unmanned aircraft systems. Although all-
domain awareness by itself is not sufficient to deter an attack, it 
will enable information dominance and decision superiority by 
increasing decision space and creating an expanded range of options for 
military commanders and senior civilian decision makers, allowing them 
to assess and act well ahead of our competitors.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MOULTON
    Mr. Moulton. Admiral Faller, you referred in your testimony to PRC 
efforts to expand access to South American infrastructure and networks, 
including through its Safe City program, which exports the CCP's 
particular brand of technologically enabled authoritarianism. If, as 
you state, values are our strength in the hemisphere, where are you 
most concerned about losing ground to PRC influence, access, and 
particularly tools of oppression in South America? Can you elaborate on 
what additional tools, resources, or interagency support does 
USSOUTHCOM need to properly address this threat?
    Admiral Faller. In our AOR, China is increasing activity across all 
fronts, and it is all concerning: IT, cyber, space, extractive 
industries, ports (sea, air, land), roads, infrastructure, legal and 
illegal fishing, agriculture, and military-especially Spanish and 
Portuguese language professional military education modeled after U.S. 
education systems, along with gifts of military equipment because China 
knows countries in our hemisphere have fragile economies. China thrives 
on the corruption and lack of transparency in business and political 
deals resident in many of the countries in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. Additionally, COVID 19 and the subsequent vaccinations 
brought on a new era of mask, health, and vaccine diplomacy that China 
seeks to leverage to its advantage. Chinese information operations are 
aggressive and full of lies--not bound by the same authorities or 
values as the U.S. As I said in my testimony, our strategic approach to 
China must be global. We can start by leveraging intelligence--find out 
everything we can about China across all dimensions and domains and 
document it. Information sharing in this endeavor is key. We need to 
operate in a manner that allows us to release this information to our 
partners and, in some cases, the public. We'll use the findings to 
inform better DOD and USG actions to include resources. Additionally, 
we must remain present in the AOR--you can't win if you aren't on the 
field. We need to continue to get better and stronger with respect to 
partnerships, both bilaterally and multilaterally, through security 
cooperation activities. We are stronger together and even modest 
investments in this hemisphere go a long way and will help us and our 
partners counter these global threats.
    Mr. Moulton. General VanHerck, in your testimony you discuss the 
need for all-domain awareness enabled by machine learning and 
artificial intelligence. The Future of Defense Task Force, which I co-
led last year, highlighted the importance of digital education and 
training to maximize use of those technologies. What changes in 
training do your leaders--junior and senior--need to be able to fully 
utilize and trust these capabilities to achieve decision superiority 
over our adversaries?
    General VanHerck. Digital education and training, as well as 
embedding a culture of innovation within USNORTHCOM and NORAD, are 
essential to reaching the strategic goals of attaining domain 
awareness, information dominance, and decision superiority over any 
competitor. To that end, I am pursuing a concentrated and focused 
effort to affect a digital cultural transformation across my commands, 
and within the Department of Defense. The cornerstone of this effort is 
investing in the digital education of our people in a way that makes us 
better today, and better able to counter future threats. Specifically, 
within my commands, initial efforts are to define the necessary skills 
to become digitally literate for every echelon of activity from 
operator to commander. The commands will then expand the model to 
address specialized, job-specific digital education and training to 
develop and deepen the technical expertise across the enterprise. 
Because many best practices often lie outside the Department, I am also 
seeking avenues to bring in experts from academia and industry, and 
leverage their knowledge and experience to educate our personnel and 
sharpen the edge of our digital initiatives. I expect to implement most 
of the commands' digital transformation training and education 
initiatives this calendar year.
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BACON
    Mr. Bacon. Over the last year, Iran has flouted sanctions and made 
illicit oil deliveries to Venezuela. According to the Biden 
administration, they are aware of reports of a Venezuelan-Iranian 
petroleum exchange and continue to monitor. There are reports that Iran 
is disguising their vessels to evade these sanctions. What is DOD doing 
to counter these illicit flows and keep these two despotic regimes from 
propping each other up?
    Mr. Salesses. DOD is aware of the alleged Venezuelan-Iranian 
petroleum exchange and is closely monitoring the situation. As DOD's 
role is a supporting role, I defer to the Departments of State, 
Treasury, and Justice regarding U.S. Government efforts to counter the 
alleged illicit activities in violation of U.S. sanctions.
    Mr. Bacon. The 2021 USSOUTHCOM Posture Statement notes that the 
dissemination of intelligence to our partners is critical to ``shine a 
light on the PRC's predatory and corrupt actions.'' China has made 
deliberate attempts to expand it's ``Belt and Road'' Initiative to 
South America by establishing self-serving, exploitative economic and 
military ties to cement a foothold there What is your assessment of our 
partners' response to our intelligence sharing efforts?
    Admiral Faller. U.S. Intelligence is a highly desired commodity by 
our partners, and our ability to share is a critical capability that is 
greatly appreciated. Sharing of this commodity is a persistent topic in 
my staff's interactions with partners. To this end, our Intelligence 
Directorate has a dedicated team focused on intelligence cooperation, 
sharing at the bilateral and multilateral level, and building and 
enhancing our partners' intelligence capacity and capabilities to 
include partner ability to absorb, secure, process and disseminate 
intelligence. In 2020 alone, our intelligence staff and partners 
collectively shared over 1,700 intelligence products and conducted over 
8,000 intelligence collaboration voice/video calls. These interactions 
allow our partners to make better informed decisions and adroitly 
apportion scarce resources to counter shared threats in our AOR.
    Mr. Bacon. In 2020, USSOUTHCOM initiated Enhanced Counter Narcotics 
Operations under the whole-of-government approach to stem the flow of 
illicit drugs into the homeland. One year later, have these operations 
been successful in achieving their objective and what are some benefits 
and drawbacks to using this type of operation? Have you noted any links 
between this activity and the activity at our southern borders?
    Admiral Faller. The enhanced counter narcotics efforts were 
critical in keeping tons of illicit drugs off our streets and saving 
American lives. Our presence and commitment to the region, which 
continued through the COVID-19 pandemic, was reciprocated by partner 
nations, who contributed to an increasing percentage of interdictions. 
Key partners like Colombia, Costa Rica, Panama, Guatemala, El Salvador, 
and others were involved in 60% of drug disruptions during the 
operation. These efforts not only stop the drugs themselves, but 
address the violence, corruption, and erosion of the rule of law caused 
by TCOs and the drugs they smuggle through the region, impacts that are 
a driving force behind the population movements we see on our border. 
However, this is a complex issue that cannot be solved by interdiction 
alone. While the U.S. military plays a critical role in countering 
these TCOs and addressing the root causes of illegal migration, this 
national security imperative will ultimately require a whole of society 
approach.
    Mr. Bacon. SOUTHCOM's contractor-owned contractor-operated service 
has provided wide area persistent ISR of the SOUTHCOM AOR for the past 
year. How important is this service for SOUTHCOM and do you intend to 
extend COCO operations to ensure there are no ISR gaps?
    Admiral Faller. SOUTHCOM receives only 1% of DOD ISR assets. To 
mitigate our ISR shortfalls, we have used additional funds provided by 
Congress through the ISR Transfer Fund to contract for ISR 
capabilities. With the loss of the ISR Transfer Fund this year, which 
provided 47% of our ISR requirements over the last five years, our 
ability to close some of these gaps has been limited. As an example, we 
have used these additional congressional funds to contract aerial ISR 
capabilities, to include required sensor packages, that have been 
critical to our missions in this region.
    Mr. Bacon. In March you emphasized that Russia remains the top 
threat to the U.S. homeland due in large part to their whole-of-
government strategy that leverages information operations, deception, 
and threats of military force. On March 29th, Russian Tu-142 maritime 
patrol aircraft entered the Alaskan Air Defense Identification Zone, in 
another sign of their resolve to assert themselves in the western 
hemisphere. Russia continues to conduct operations below the threshold 
of war against our institutions with the aim of causing discord and 
dissent. What can Congress do to help you reinforce your strategy to 
protect the Homeland and diminish Russia's operational effectiveness in 
targeting the American people?
    General VanHerck. Immediate actions Congress could take are to 
ensure sufficient research and development funding for emerging 
technologies and data science developments, while continuing to create 
opportunities for partnerships between DOD and outside experts. In 
addition, Congress can help to foster and support a culture where 
failure, when properly managed, is okay and a natural part of 
accelerating capability development--the Department learns the most 
from failures. Those collaborative efforts are critical to achieving 
all-domain awareness, information dominance, and decision superiority. 
As threats continue to advance, it is increasingly important to foster 
public-private partnerships, as well as collaboration with national and 
defense labs, the National Guard, and our Canadian partners to outpace 
our competitors.
    I would also welcome any progress toward more streamlined and 
flexible acquisition processes that allow USNORTHCOM and NORAD to take 
full advantage of the innovative solutions offered by our tech industry 
partners. Russia has fielded advanced long-range and stealthy systems 
that are specifically designed to overcome current defense 
capabilities, and the Department must move quickly and efficiently to 
regain its strategic and technological advantage.
    Mr. Bacon. As the Arctic grows in significance to U.S. and allied 
security, NORTHCOM/NORAD has an urgent need for increased early warning 
and maritime domain awareness in the high north. What advantages and 
challenges do you see with the use of unmanned systems as an affordable 
option to provide early warning (AEW) and maritime domain awareness 
(MDA) in the Arctic? Are there viable options to partner with Canada 
and other Arctic Allies to increase AEW and MDA coverage in the Artic 
and how do you recommend we engage with them?
    General VanHerck. Unmanned systems can provide persistent 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities from the 
sea floor to space, including providing that critical information in 
the high north. However, unlike manned systems, they lack the ability 
to respond to our competitors' actions if or when needed. The harsh 
Arctic environment remains unforgiving and only the most robust manned 
or unmanned systems are capable of sustained Arctic operations. Whether 
undersea, on land, or in the air, unmanned systems still face the 
challenges of remote maintenance, a difficult logistical tail and, for 
now, a limited communications infrastructure. In fact, the North 
Warning System, which is the system of radars across Alaska and the 
Canadian Arctic, is an unmanned land-based system. Operational for over 
three decades, this is the system NORAD still relies on each and every 
day. An opening Arctic invites competitors to operate ships and 
submarines on our northern flank, compounding our maritime challenge. 
Maritime domain awareness, above and below the surface, will be 
increasingly important to our ability to deter competitors in the North 
American Arctic. As the DOD Advocate for the Arctic, I have directed 
USNORTHCOM and NORAD to begin work to establish additional persistent 
early warning capabilities in the Arctic by advocating for land-, sea-, 
air-, and space-based sensors that will provide persistent domain 
awareness. Part of the solution will likely include modern over-the-
horizon radar (OTHR) technology that has shown promise for delivering 
cost-effective, persistent wide area surveillance of the Arctic. The 
United States and Canada are pursuing the fielding of OTHR at key 
locations and actively researching polar OTHR technology as a means to 
surveil the entire polar region. Timely information sharing between 
allies and partners is also vital to global all-domain awareness, and 
USNORTHCOM and NORAD gain critical insight from the mutually beneficial 
and highly valuable relationships we share with Canada and our other 
Arctic allies. Finally, I am on record that I believe the United States 
must include a space-based sensor network as soon as possible to 
provide a global, persistent, and resilient surveillance capability so 
threats to the homeland can be detected and tracked from wherever they 
may be launched.
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WALTZ
    Mr. Waltz. A whole-of-government approach to combat the trafficking 
of illegal narcotics and other contraband into the United States is 
essential to the protection of the homeland from transnational criminal 
organizations (TCOs). Federal law enforcement agencies partner with the 
Department of Defense (DOD) to work closely together to detect, 
interdict, and prosecute these criminal actors utilizing the source, 
transit, and arrival zones (to include the U.S. maritime waters) as 
primary smuggling routes for their illicit goods. U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection (CBP) Air and Marine Operations (AMO) partners 
closely with U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), U.S. Northern Command 
(NORTHCOM), the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), and other federal agencies in 
bringing to bear a whole-of-government capability against these 
transnational criminal actors exploiting the maritime environment. From 
my understanding, AMO is a critical partner to these interdiction 
efforts utilizing aircraft and vessels, hand in hand with DOD and USCG 
partners, to impact TCOs. I also understand that current authorities 
limit AMO's maritime enforcement zone to only twelve nautical miles 
from our coasts. There is a draft legislative proposal to extend AMO 
Customs Authorities from the current limit of twelve nautical miles out 
to twenty-four nautical miles, incorporating the Contiguous Zone to the 
fullest intended extent (as authorized by the 1999 Presidential 
Proclamation number 7219). Would the extension of AMO's authority help 
DOD in its overall counter-narcotics mission?
    Admiral Faller. You are absolutely correct that a whole of 
government approach to combat the trafficking of illegal narcotics and 
other contraband into the United States is essential to the protection 
of the homeland from TCOs. Because our mission really focuses on 
identifying activity as close to the source as possible, the impact of 
the referenced bill would be minimal to DOD. Under 10 USC 124 DOD is 
the single lead agency of the Federal Government for the detection and 
monitoring (D&M) of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into 
the U.S. DOD may operate equipment to intercept a vessel or aircraft 
detected outside the land area of the U.S., but typically these 
interdictions are happening well beyond the U.S. Contiguous Zone and 
are closer to the departure zones in South and Central America. I would 
not speak for the Coast Guard, U.S. Northern Command, or other 
government entities who have missions that bring them much closer to 
U.S. soil.
    Mr. Waltz. A whole-of-government approach to combat the trafficking 
of illegal narcotics and other contraband into the United States is 
essential to the protection of the homeland from transnational criminal 
organizations (TCOs). Federal law enforcement agencies partner with the 
Department of Defense (DOD) to work closely together to detect, 
interdict, and prosecute these criminal actors utilizing the source, 
transit, and arrival zones (to include the U.S. maritime waters) as 
primary smuggling routes for their illicit goods. U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection (CBP) Air and Marine Operations (AMO) partners 
closely with U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), U.S. Northern Command 
(NORTHCOM), the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), and other federal agencies in 
bringing to bear a whole-of-government capability against these 
transnational criminal actors exploiting the maritime environment. From 
my understanding, AMO is a critical partner to these interdiction 
efforts utilizing aircraft and vessels, hand in hand with DOD and USCG 
partners, to impact TCOs. I also understand that current authorities 
limit AMO's maritime enforcement zone to only twelve nautical miles 
from our coasts. There is a draft legislative proposal to extend AMO 
Customs Authorities from the current limit of twelve nautical miles out 
to twenty-four nautical miles, incorporating the Contiguous Zone to the 
fullest intended extent (as authorized by the 1999 Presidential 
Proclamation number 7219). Would the extension of AMO's authority help 
DOD in its overall counter-narcotics mission?
    General VanHerck. USNORTHCOM provides support to counterdrug 
operations at the request of federal law enforcement agencies, to 
include CBP. Because CBP operates under authorities that do not extend 
to the Department of Defense, extending AMO's authority would be 
unlikely to impact USNORTHCOM's counterdrug support.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. JACKSON
    Dr. Jackson. There are opportunities to help train young operators 
as they learn to use technology out in the field. One example could be 
training for sensor operators learning to perform surveillance and 
reconnaissance while piloting Remotely Piloted Aircraft.
    These operators could get real world application by conducting 
their training in support of law enforcement by monitoring the southern 
border and providing surveillance coverage.
    General VanHerck or Mr. Salasses, could either of you speak to the 
feasibility of this and perhaps identify other areas in which DOD could 
utilize its training time to support law enforcement in their efforts 
to address the crisis at the southern border?
    Mr. Salesses. I defer to General VanHerck, who is currently 
commanding DOD's military support of U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
at the southern border of the United States.
    Dr. Jackson. There are opportunities to help train young operators 
as they learn to use technology out in the field. One example could be 
training for sensor operators learning to perform surveillance and 
reconnaissance while piloting Remotely Piloted Aircraft.
    These operators could get real world application by conducting 
their training in support of law enforcement by monitoring the southern 
border and providing surveillance coverage.
    General VanHerck or Mr. Salasses, could either of you speak to the 
feasibility of this and perhaps identify other areas in which DOD could 
utilize its training time to support law enforcement in their efforts 
to address the crisis at the southern border?
    General VanHerck. The DOD regularly leverages required military 
unit training when possible to also provide incidental support to the 
Department of Homeland Security. Specifically on the southern border, 
the 2-13th Aviation Battalion, which operates the U.S. Army Unmanned 
Aerial Systems Training Schoolhouse in Ft Huachuca, AZ, flies sorties 
to train and certify their soldiers while simultaneously providing 
support to U.S. Customs and Border Protection. I see the potential for 
expanded training opportunities that could support multiple USNORTHCOM 
missions, however I will defer to the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense and the Services regarding the feasibility to execute.
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MOORE
    Mr. Moore. Your testimony detailed the challenges posed to our 
legacy warning and assessment systems. Do you believe our deterrent 
capabilities outpace the modernization efforts of our adversaries?
    Mr. Salesses. Both Russia and China are advancing modernization 
programs aimed at eroding the U.S. military advantage, limiting U.S. 
freedom of movement, and deterring the United States from intervening 
in a regional conflict. As our competitors develop and deploy 
increasingly sophisticated offensive systems capable of striking the 
U.S. homeland, it is imperative that the U.S. modernization of 
assessment and warning systems outpaces competitor capabilities and 
provide sufficient decision space to enable timely action to detect and 
defeat incoming threats. Armed with timely information drawn from 
modern sensor systems and advanced software, and backed by flexible and 
responsive conventional defeat capabilities, DOD would be capable of 
deterring or denying adversary acts of aggression more effectively.
    Mr. Moore. Bad actors necessitate the need for increased missile 
defense of the homeland. Do you think recent efforts are adequate to 
address existing gaps in missile defense?
    General VanHerck. No. While I currently have the ability to defend 
against a limited number of ballistic missile threats from rogue 
nations, I am very concerned about their ability to exceed my defensive 
capacity and capability in the near future and my intelligence team 
keeps me continuously apprised of North Korean and Iranian efforts to 
advance their missile programs. Without improvements to our current 
system--such as fielding of the Next Generation Interceptor, on time or 
sooner, and a Department decision about a layered missile defense 
capability--our defensive capacity will remain constant, while the 
threat continues to grow, eventually exceeding my defensive capacity 
and capability.
    I would also note that the U.S. strategic deterrent provides the 
foundation for our defense against ballistic missile threats. The 
reliable and credible U.S. strategic capability, backed by a policy of 
deterrence by punishment, makes clear to potential adversaries that 
launching a ballistic missile attack against the United States would 
result in an overwhelming and devastating response. That deterrent 
effect, when reinforced by the deterrence by denial afforded by a 
reliable and capable ballistic missile defense system is critical to 
defending the homeland against ballistic missile threats. As such, I 
believe future deterrence reviews such as the Nuclear Posture Review 
and Missile Defense Review should be a single product to ensure that 
U.S. deterrence policy and corresponding capabilities are part of a 
comprehensive approach that considers all elements of overarching 
deterrence.
    In addition, I believe the emergence of peer competitors and their 
fielding of large numbers of long-range conventional cruise missiles 
and delivery platforms necessitates a more aggressive approach to 
missile defense for the homeland. A more aggressive approach must 
account for defense against the full spectrum of air and missile 
threats that we currently face in the homeland; we must avoid single 
threat solutions. The Department needs a more holistic approach in 
order to field an effective and affordable homeland defense capability.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. MURPHY
    Mrs. Murphy. With regards to the rise in transnational criminal 
organizations (TCOs), are there lessons that can be learned from our 
decades in countering violent extremism, and do you believe we are 
approaching the TCOs in the right way by having law enforcement take 
the lead? Are there other ways in which the Department of Defense could 
play a more robust role?
    Admiral Faller. Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) are 
murderous, violent entities that pose a direct threat to our national 
security. The corruption, instability, and human suffering that is 
fostered by TCOs not only drives the flow of narcotics and illegal 
migration, but it also opens the door for competitors like China to 
leverage the dire circumstances in these countries for their gain. TCOs 
are an existential threat, and we need to approach them from every 
angle--not through law enforcement or military action alone but with a 
whole-of-government strategy that includes all U.S. elements of 
national power and leverages our partners and Allies globally. In order 
to do that, we must recognize the significant threat TCOs pose to our 
nation and include them in our national strategic documents that drive 
priorities and funding.

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