[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                AMERICAS WAY FORWARD IN THE INDO-PACIFIC

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                 SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA, THE PACIFIC, CENTRAL 
                           ASIA, AND NONPROLIFERATION

                                 OF THE

                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                             MARCH 22, 2021

                               __________

                           Serial No. 117-16

                               __________

        Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
        
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       Available:  http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://
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                               __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
43-785PDF                   WASHINGTON : 2022                     
          
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------   
                     
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

		GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York, Chairman

BRAD SHERMAN, California              MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Ranking 
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey                  Member
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia	      CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida	      STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
KAREN BASS, California		      SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts	      DARRELL ISSA, California
DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island	      ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
AMI BERA, California		      LEE ZELDIN, New York
JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas	              ANN WAGNER, Missouri
DINA TITUS, Nevada		      BRIAN MAST, Florida
TED LIEU, California		      BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania	      KEN BUCK, Colorado
DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota	      TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota		      MARK GREEN, Tennessee
COLIN ALLRED, Texas		      ANDY BARR, Kentucky
ANDY LEVIN, Michigan		      GREG STEUBE, Florida
ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia	      DAN MEUSER, Pennsylvania
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania	      AUGUST PFLUGER, Texas
TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey	      PETER MEIJER, Michigan
ANDY KIM, New Jersey	              NICOLE MALLIOTAKIS, New York
SARA JACOBS, California		      RONNY JACKSON, Texas
KATHY MANNING, North Carolina	      YOUNG KIM, California
JIM COSTA, California		      MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida
JUAN VARGAS, California		      JOE WILSON, South Carolina
VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas		      RON WRIGHT, Texas
BRAD SCHNEIDER, Illinois              

		  Sophia Lafargue, Staff Director

             Brendan Shields, Republican Staff Director

                                 ------                                

 Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, Central Asia, and Nonproliferation

                    AMI BERA, California, Chairman,

BRAD SHERMAN, California             STEVE CHABOT, Ohio, Ranking Member
DINA TITUS, Nevada		     SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
ANDY LEVIN. Michigan		     ANN WAGNER, Missouri
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania	     KEN BUCK, Colorado
ANDY KIM, New Jersey		     TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
GERALD CONNOLLY, Virginia	     MARK GREEN, Tennessee
TED LIEU, California		     ANDY BARR, Kentucky
ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia	     YOUNG KIM, California
KATHY MANNING, North Carolina

                      Jamie Morgan, Staff Director
                      
                      
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

                               WITNESSES

Rolland, Nadege, Senior Fellow for Political Affairs, National 
  Bureau of Asian Research.......................................     8
Haass, Honorable Richard N., President, Council on Foreign 
  Relations, Former Director of Policy Planning at the U.S. 
  Department of State............................................    12
Schriver, The Honorable Randall G., Chairman, Project 2049 
  Institute, Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-
  Pacific Security Affairs.......................................    23

                                APPENDIX

Hearing Notice...................................................    52
Hearing Minutes..................................................    53
Hearing Attendance...............................................    54

         STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD FROM REPRESENTATIVE CONNOLLY

Statement for the record from Representative Connolly............    55

            RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Responses to questions submitted for the record..................    57

 
                AMERICAS WAY FORWARD IN THE INDO-PACIFIC

                         Friday, March 22, 2021

                          House of Representatives,
                 Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific,
                 Central Asia, and Nonproliferation
                      Committee on Foreign Affairs,
                                                    Washington, DC.

    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:08 a.m., 
via Webex, Hon. Ami Bera (chairman of the subcommittee) 
presiding.
    Mr. Bera. The Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and 
Nonproliferation will come to order. Without objection, the 
chair is authorized to declare a recess of the committee at any 
point. And all members will have 5 days to submit statements, 
extraneous material, and questions for the record subject to 
the length limitation in the rules. To insert something into 
the record, please have your staff email the previously 
mentioned address or contact full committee staff.
    Please keep your video functions on at all times, even when 
you are not recognized by the chair. Members are responsible 
for muting and unmuting themselves. And please remember to mute 
yourself after you finish speaking.
    Consistent with remote committee proceedings of H.Res. 8, 
staff will only mute members and witnesses as appropriate when 
they are not under recognition to eliminate background noise. 
In recognizing that we probably will have votes called shortly, 
we will continue the hearing as members kind of cycle in and 
out to report their votes on the floor.
    I see that we have a quorum now, and I will now recognize 
myself for opening remarks. I want to thank Ranking Member 
Chabot, the members of this subcommittee, our witnesses, 
members of the public for joining today's hearing.
    Before we get started, I do want to take a moment to talk 
about what we have seen in the hate-filled mass shooting in 
Atlanta earlier this week and to recognize the pain and trauma 
it has caused for many across the country, particularly, in the 
Asian-American, Pacific Islander community. We have seen a 
dramatic rise in hate crimes against Asian Americans over the 
last year, crimes that tear at the very fabric of what makes 
our country so strong. And on Tuesday, eight lives were cut 
short because of this hate, including Daoyou Feng, Paul Andre 
Michels, Hyeon Jeong Park, Julie Park, Xiaojie Tan, Delaina 
Ashley Yaun, and others.
    I know, on this committee, we will be taking a hard look at 
the region and certainly, you know, the Chinese Communist Party 
and what the Chinese Community Party and their government is up 
to. But we also have to be careful about the language we use on 
this committee and understand that the Chinese Communist Party 
is not a reflection of the Chinese people and certainly is not 
a reflection of the many patriotic Chinese Americans and Asian 
Americans.
    So, as we take a hard look and look at the challenges in 
the Indo-Pacific, the challenges in this great strategic power 
competition with China, let's be mindful of the language we use 
and mindful that we do not conflate what the Chinese Communist 
Party is doing with what patriotic Chinese and Asian Americans 
do every day in representing the values of the United States of 
America.
    With that, you know, we do have many challenges. I applaud 
the Biden Administration for their recognition that the Indo-
Pacific region may, in fact, be one of the most challenging 
regions in the coming decades in the pivot and emphasis on 
Indo-Pacific strategy. You know, I appreciate the leaders' 
summit that happened with the Quad and our allies in Japan, 
India, and Australia last week and the partnership and the 
commitment that our friends and allies through the Quad have 
focused on in terms of creating regional security.
    I also applaud Secretary Blinken and Secretary Austin for 
making an early visit to our allies in Japan and Korea to 
strengthen that trilateral relationship as we deal with what is 
still quite a bit of a challenge in North Korea. We need a 
strengthened trilateral alliance to address those issues.
    I also appreciate Secretary Blinken, you know, 
specifically, calling out to China to say they have a 
responsibility in helping us get to the ultimate goal of a 
nuclear-free peninsula on the Korean Peninsula.
    In addition, this subcommittee will spend quite a bit of 
time looking at the increased Chinese aggression. Certainly, we 
are seeing the antidemocratic moves that are taking place in 
Hong Kong with real concern. We see that human rights abuses 
that are taking place in Xinjiang province against the Uyghur 
population, as well as what has happened for years in Tibet. 
And, increasingly, we are seeing Chinese aggression in the 
South China Sea and the East China Sea. And with increasing 
concerns--I know the Ranking Member Chabot and I have talked 
quite a bit about our concerns with Chinese aggression and 
increased aggression toward Taiwan--an importance that we 
understand that, you know, that the United States really does 
stand with Taiwan with our allies. And, hence, we have 
introduced the Taiwan Fellowship Act, which will be a first 
step but not a last step. You know, this Chinese aggression, 
while we are going to have a history of competition with China, 
you know, we do not--our desire is not to have a direct 
confrontation. But, again, we have to have the rule of law. And 
this committee will be taking a long look at building up that 
foundational strategy there.
    So, with that, you know, we have got, you know--the 
committee also has jurisdiction over Afghanistan. We will be 
saying--you know, May 1 is right around the corner, real 
challenges in how we approach Afghanistan. And we will be 
working very closely with the rest of the full committee to 
address that and what that way forward looks like.
    So I expect us to have a very robust agenda on multiple 
fronts, and I look forward to doing things in a very bipartisan 
way. You know, Ranking Member Mr. Chabot and I have worked 
pretty closely together over, you know, my 9 years on the 
subcommittee. And, again, I look forward to having a great 
partnership with Mr. Chabot.
    And, with that, let me recognize my good friend from Ohio, 
Ranking Member Representative Steve Chabot, for any opening 
comments that you may have.
    Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Chairman Bera.
    I want to thank all the members from both sides of the 
aisle as we convene the first hearing of the Asia, Pacific, 
Central Asia, and Nonproliferation Subcommittee of the 117th 
Congress. I also want to thank our distinguished witnesses for 
their willingness to provide their insight and thoughts on how 
the U.S. should continue engaging the Indo-Pacific region 
during these challenging times.
    I have served on the full Foreign Affairs Committee for my 
entire Congress, a quarter of a century now, including having 
chaired this very subcommittee back in 2013 and 2014. And I am 
pleased to have the opportunity to serve as ranking member--of 
course, I prefer to be chair--during what is arguably the most 
important period for U.S. engagement in the Indo-Pacific region 
in recent memory.
    It is hard to overestimate the or overstate the 
significance of this region, which includes over half the 
world's population and more than a third of its global economy. 
Geographically, that is everything between the Caspian Sea and 
Hawaii, excluding Iran and Russia, who are, of course, in the 
jurisdiction of another subcommittee.
    While it would be impossible to discuss all U.S. interests 
in such a vast and important region, the following are some of 
the highlights this committee should be focusing on, in my 
opinion. The Chinese Communist Party poses an existential 
threat to the United States and to our allies. This is evident 
from their massive military buildup, their large-scale 
intellectual property theft, persistent cyber attacks, and 
their mercantilist trade policies. It is also evident from 
their territorial aggression, concealment of the COVID-19 
outbreak, and blatant disregard for human rights, the 
environment, and international treaties, and on and on.
    The CCP wants regional and eventually global hegemony. They 
want to return to a world that is dominated by and resolves 
around the Middle Kingdom. The CCP is unwilling to operate by 
international norms. Unfortunately, given China's size and 
impact on the global economy, we cannot simply isolate them. 
Instead, we must work with our allies and partners to hold 
China to the same rules that everybody else follows and impose 
penalties when they do not.
    It is imperative that America rises to this challenge, and 
our subcommittee has the mission to lead that effort. We must 
sustain and build our alliances and partnerships. I have long 
favored a robust U.S. engagement in the Indo-Pacific region, 
which is demonstrated by the fact that I co-chair, along with 
some of my Democratic colleagues, six caucuses in the region: 
India, Taiwan, Philippines, Cambodia, Kazakhstan, and the 
Pacific Islands.
    While many of our allies and partners share our concerns 
with regard to China, they may not willing to be--resist and 
even sometimes confrontational as we might believe is the wise 
course of action at that time. We should strengthen and 
buildupon the relationship with our Quad partners: Japan, 
India, and Australia. And with our ASEAN partners, especially 
our allies in Singapore and the Philippines.
    Our relationship and deep ties Taiwan, as you have 
mentioned, Mr. Chairman, and Korea are also of paramount 
importance. And I must say strategic ambiguity relative to 
Taiwan and China is, in my opinion, absurd and dangerous. We 
ought to be crystal clear that, if China attacks Taiwan, we 
will be there with Taiwan. That is the best way to keep China 
from miscalculating and starting a war.
    By cooperating with our allies and partners, the U.S. seeks 
to advance prosperity, human rights, and economic development, 
and the rule of law. We believe our model offers the best 
opportunity for the region. It is by working with those who 
share our values that we can help the region take full 
advantage of opportunities.
    Finally, the United States must make trade and investment 
throughout Asia a top priority. Countries throughout the region 
are hungry for U.S. investment, while U.S. Businesses are eager 
for new markets and investment opportunities. By cultivating 
our economic ties, we will grow both our economies and 
economies of our partners.
    Economic engagement is also an excellent means of fostering 
developing relationships in Central Asia where partners like 
Kazakhstan are eager to engage. And improved economic 
partnerships are avenues to diversify our supply chains away 
from China and foster promising alternatives, like Vietnam.
    I would like to close by introducing our vice ranking 
member, Congresswoman Young Kim from California. As a long-time 
staffer to former Chairman Ed Royce, she has worked on trade 
negotiations. She has taken on leadership roles in the U.S.-
Korea interparliamentary exchange, and has a deep understanding 
of the Indo-Pacific region. Her experience and expertise will 
truly advance the work of this subcommittee.
    Mr. Chairman, I believe we have a great group of members on 
our side who bring experience, dedication, and commitment to 
American values to this subcommittee. Your members are okay, 
too. We look forward to working with you and our Democratic 
colleagues on this committee in addressing our Nation's 
challenges in a bipartisan manner.
    And I, again, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for reaching out to 
me and discussing issues in advance of this hearing. And we 
look forward to working with you. Thank you.
    Mr. Bera. Great. Thank you, Ranking Member Chabot.
    I should point out my vice chair, the Congressman from 
Michigan, Andy Levin, he has got a very important resolution on 
the floor today, condemning the actions that we are seeing in 
Burma and standing with the Burmese people against this group.
    With that, let me take a moment to introduce our witnesses. 
Our first witness is Dr. Richard Haass, who is the president of 
the Council on Foreign Relations. Dr. Haass comes to us with a 
widely respected record of innovative thinking on many of our 
biggest strategic challenges.
    Dr. Haass, we are grateful for your presence today.
    We are also joined by Ms. Nadege Rolland. She is the senior 
fellow for Political and Security Affairs at the National 
Bureau of Asian Research. Ms. Rolland is one of the foremost 
experts on Chinese Government strategy and on some China's most 
consequential initiatives, like the Belt and Road Initiative.
    Ms. Rolland, thank you for joining us today as well.
    And last and certainly not least is Mr. Randy Schriver, the 
chairman of the Project 2049 Institute and former Secretary of 
Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs. Mr. Schriver brings 
a long record of service in government on national security 
challenges in the region, including civilian and military 
service.
    Mr. Schriver, we thank you for your service and for being 
with us today.
    I will now recognize each witness for 5 minutes.
    Without objection, your prepared written statements will be 
made part of the record. I will first call on Dr. Haass for 
your testimony.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE RICHARD N. HAASS, PRESIDENT, COUNCIL 
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, FORMER DIRECTOR OF POLICY PLANNING AT THE 
                    U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

    Dr. Haass. Well, thank you, Chairman Bera, Ranking Member 
Chabot, I just want to make clear that I am speaking here on my 
personal capacity, not for the institution I am fortunate 
enough to be the president of. You have chosen a subject that 
is central, not just to this country but really to the 
trajectory of this century. It covers an awful lot, geography 
and otherwise. I will focus, though, on China in my opening 
remarks, even though I cover a lot else in my rather lengthy 
written statement.
    Whatever it is we do in this part of the world, 
multilateralism will prove essential. We simply cannot deal 
adequately with China's power and China's reach unilaterally. 
But we also cannot ask others in the region, our partners and 
allies, to choose between us. We need to understand that they 
will want to maintain a relationship with China at the same 
time they maintain relations with us, even though the specifics 
will obviously differ. We also need to understand the limits of 
what some of our partners or allies are prepared to do with us 
when it comes to China. And here I mention
    [audio malfunction].
    Mr. Bera. It looks like we may have lost Dr. Haass. Is that 
correct from the tech side?
    Voice. Yes, sir. It looks like Dr. Haass is having some 
connectivity issues.
    Mr. Bera. Let's do this, let's go ahead and move to Ms. 
Rolland and then see if we can work on the technical issues 
with Dr. Haass. When he gets back, we will let him do his full 
testimony.
    Ms. Rolland, let's go and recognize you for your testimony.

 STATEMENT OF MS. NADEGE ROLLAND, SENIOR FELLOW FOR POLITICAL 
           AFFAIRS, NATIONAL BUREAU OF ASIAN RESEARCH

    Ms. Rolland. Thank you, sir. Chairman Bera, Ranking Member 
Chabot, I am deeply grateful and honored to be asked to share 
my thoughts with the subcommittee members today. As an analyst 
who devotes her days trying to understand the world through 
Beijing's eyes, I will focus my statement on where the Indo-
Pacific region fits into the Chinese leadership's grand 
strategy.
    The Indo-Pacific region is where U.S. and Chinese tectonic 
plates rub against each other. The term ``Indo-Pacific'' itself 
is very telling about the U.S. perspective. It is primarily a 
maritime geographic expanse that links the U.S. to an 
economically vibrant region and a crucial strategic space where 
many of its key military allies are located, an area the U.S. 
Envisions as free, open, secure, and prosperous.
    There is no Indo-Pacific in Beijing's conception. The 
region is, in fact, included as part of China's periphery. 
Here, too, the term itself is very telling about the Chinese 
perspective. China is at the center and at the top of a 360-
degree peripheral zone that expands over both the continental 
and maritime domains.
    Dr. Haass. I do not know who is talking, but I have 
somebody else who is talking over me. And I got cutoff, and I 
still hear a woman's voice.
    Mr. Bera. Hi, Dr. Haass. We lost you for a moment there 
because of technical difficulties. So we moved on to Dr. 
Rolland to do her testimony. And then, after she finishes, we 
will come back to you, Dr. Haass, and let you do your full 
testimony, if that works. We lost you for a moment.
    Go ahead, Dr. Rolland.
    Ms. Rolland. Thank you, sir. Left unclear are the exact 
geographic extent of this periphery and the kind of future the 
Chinese party-State hopes to see for it.
    In order to get a better understanding of the Chinese 
leadership's objectives for the region, one needs to look back 
over a decade ago. In the immediate aftermath of the 2008 
global financial crisis, Chinese political elites felt that the 
American/Western decline had accelerated while China was on an 
unremitting upward trajectory.
    The 2011 Obama Administration's announcement of the 
rebalance of its diplomatic and security focus to the Asia-
Pacific region was read in Beijing as a move meant to increase 
the pressure on Chinese's immediate periphery, constrict its 
strategic space, and ultimately thwart its rise. In order to 
counter what was essentially perceived as an intensified phase 
of American containment, Chinese planners devised their own 
strategic rebalancing.
    The strategy embraced both land and sea, trying to 
stabilize China's eastern maritime flank, constricting as much 
as possible U.S. access to the China Seas while pressuring its 
allies, while at the same time consolidating China's power on 
its western continental and maritime flanks.
    To expand China's influence and bolster its position over 
the region, Chinese planners decided to use economic power, 
China's strong point, as the main sinews, supplemented by the 
building of an increasingly dense network of both hard and soft 
infrastructures, transportation, energy, information and 
communication infrastructure-building, trade and financial 
agreements, and people-to-people exchanges. The strategic plan 
was announced at the end of 2013 under the name One Belt, One 
Road, which is now better known globally as the Belt and Road 
Initiative.
    Viewed for what it is, namely, as a strategic plan, the BRI 
gives some indications about the Chinese leadership's intent. 
Geographically, BRI includes not only the Eurasian Continent, 
Central, South and Southeast Asia, and the Middle East, Africa, 
and portions of Central and Eastern Europe, also known as the 
Silk Road Economic Belt, but also its adjacent waters, Arctic, 
South Pacific, Indian Oceans, and Mediterranean Sea, also known 
as the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, and its three blue 
economic passages.
    The vision for the region's future is better explained by 
what it is not. It is not one where the widespread respect for 
an application of liberal democratic principles, such as 
freedom, individual rights, rule of law, transparency, and 
accountability, lead to greater openness, prosperity, and 
security. At the same time, it is not where all the countries 
in China's greater periphery end up having muddled themselves 
on the Chinese party-State's system or have become local 
appendages of the Chinese Communist Party.
    It is a vision where the multiplication of dependencies to 
China have created enough positive incentives and coercive 
leverage to ultimately compel regional countries to defer to 
Beijing's wishes and constrict their ability and willingness to 
defy and resist against China's power. This vision is not 
compatible with that of the United States.
    With this, I will yield. Thank you, sir.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Rolland follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Mr. Bera. Thank you, Ms. Rolland.
    Let's go back to Dr. Haass. And, Dr. Haass, if you want to 
start from the top of your testimony, because we lost you in 
there for a moment.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE RICHARD N. HAAS, PRESIDENT, COUNCIL 
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, FORMER DIRECTOR OF POLICY PLANNING AT THE 
                    U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

    Dr. Haass. Okay. Thank you, sir. And apologies for the 
technological differences. I am not at my normal base. But, 
again, I want to thank you and the ranking member for asking me 
here today. I just wanted to make clear I speak for myself and 
not for the organization I lead. Your subject is obviously an 
important one. How Asia goes will in many ways determine how 
the 21st century goes. I will focus, though, on China, even 
though there is a lot else to cover.
    I begin by pointing out that multilateralism is essential 
for all we do. We simply cannot deal adequately with China's 
power and reach unilaterally. That said, we also cannot ask our 
partners and allies to choose between us. Many of them will, 
for example, want to have economic ties with China, even though 
they will emphasize security ties with the United States.
    That said, we also need to understand that there are limits 
to what some of these partners and allies are prepared to do. 
And I am happy to discuss, for example, limits that India might 
face. Whatever it is we do in the region, we need to beef up 
the economic dimension. To be blunt, we have sidelined 
ourselves, we have limited our involvement, and our influence. 
We should join the CPTPP. There is tremendous economic and 
strategic arguments for doing so. And I am also prepared to 
argue there could be climate reasons for doing so.
    As for China, it is anything but a supporter of the status 
quo. Xi Jinping's China is fundamentally different than the 
China of his predecessors. It is stronger, wealthier, more 
repressive, and more assertive. For all that, I do not think it 
is useful to use a cold war framing for our relationship simply 
because China is so different than the Soviet Union was, and, 
as a result, our response will need to be different.
    The priority for our foreign policy ought to be to shape 
China's behavior, particularly its external behavior. We should 
be imposing costs where we must and encouraging cooperation 
where we can. Toward that end, I believe and despite what 
happened in the last 24 hours, a private, sustained, strategic 
dialog is in the interest of the United States, not as a favor 
to China but as a tool of American national security. 
Consistent with that, I believe that regime change is beyond 
our ability to induce and, in any event, is not essential.
    Democracy and human rights consideration can and should be 
a part of our conversation with China, but we must accept and 
approach them with the realization that, one, we have other 
priorities; and, two, our ability to advance what we like to 
see in the realm of democracy in human rights in China is 
distinctly limited.
    When it comes to economics and technology, the United 
States should work with others on selective technological 
restrictions with a scalpel rather than with a blunt 
instrument. But here I would say decoupling from China is 
neither necessary, nor is it possible.
    What we should do, though, and something Congress can play 
a large role in is increase our supply chain resilience. We can 
do that through multiple sourcing, through stockpiling, and 
through domestic and joint production arrangements with our 
partners and allies of selective items.
    We need to strengthen deterrence in the region that 
obviously involves our military presence, cooperation with 
grouping such as the Quad. More than anything else, we must 
increase our ability to deter and prepare for and respond to 
any Chinese coercion against Taiwan. The stakes are enormous. 
Not to act would be, I believe, a strategic error of the first 
order.
    I do believe we should move from strategic ambiguity to 
strategic clarity in terms of the means of our policy. But then 
it is essential that we complement with this move to strategic 
clarity with strategic capability. We cannot allow a gap to 
persist between our commitments and our capabilities to act on 
them.
    Last, and for all of this, I would say China policy begins 
not in the region, but it begins at home. We need to become 
more competitive with China, and this involves everything from 
increasing Federal support for research and development for 
basic research, the kind of thing companies cannot be expected 
to do on their own; for a wise immigration policy that attracts 
the most talented in the world to come and stay here; to build 
infrastructure; to improve our education. And, second of all, 
we need to improve the reality, as well as the appearance of 
our economic and political model.
    When we fail, we essentially let China off the hook. We, 
basically, lose the opportunity to show the advantages of a 
robust democracy and a robust, market-oriented order; 
therefore, their leaders feel no pressure from below.
    So, if we want to succeed versus China, we need to become 
more competitive, but again we need to pose a successful 
alternative. Thank you very much.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Haass follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Mr. Bera. Thank you Dr. Haass.
    Let me now recognize Mr. Schriver for his testimony.

   STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE RANDALL G. SCHRIVER, CHAIRMAN, 
 PROJECT 2049 INSTITUTE, FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
               FOR INDO-PACIFIC SECURITY AFFAIRS

    Mr. Schriver. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 
Chabot, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. I 
appreciate being included in this hearing and given the 
opportunity to express some thoughts on these important 
strategic matters.
    The Indo-Pacific is indeed where our country's future 
fortunes will largely be determined, and, of course, our most 
significant strategic competitor, China, also resides in this 
region. Our interest in the Indo-Pacific are enduring, but the 
challenges are involving. The inheritance, I believe, from the 
previous administration is a strong one. The previous 
administration named the Indo-Pacific region as the priority 
theater, recognized the necessity of adopting a more effective 
competitive posture vis-a-vis China, provided stronger and more 
visible direct support to Taiwan, nurtured and grew emerging 
partnerships with countries like India and Vietnam, gave 
unprecedented attention to the Pacific Islands, and began 
implementing policies to sustain and promote a free and open 
Indo-Pacific. All this despite the efforts of the Chinese 
Communist Party to actively undermine that order.
    The previous administration worked with Congress on a 
number of important initiatives, on reforms to CFIUS, on the 
creation of the Development Finance Corporation, and investing 
in our joint force, making it more lethal and with PLA as a 
pacing element in mind.
    Of course, the previous administration benefited greatly 
itself from the work of its predecessor administration. In many 
ways, the last administration's policy of a free and open Indo-
Pacific was a natural successor to the Obama Administration's 
pivot to Asia.
    And so I think we will likely see continuity, which in my 
opinion is a good thing. I am encouraged by many of the 
statements and actions coming out of the Biden Administration 
through its earlier days. Like you, Mr. Chairman, I applaud the 
meeting of the Quad at the Presidential level. I welcome the 
two-plus-two meetings with Japan and Korea, and Secretary 
Austin's follow-on trip to India. And the continued recognition 
of China as its strategic competitor and the need to partner 
with like-minded countries preserve a free and open order is 
the appropriate vision.
    So, given this good start, rather than criticize the new 
administration, I would like to forward some thoughts and 
recommendations, as there are still policies under review and 
positions yet to be revealed.
    First, I believe the Biden Administration should continue 
to make competition with China its true priority in both word 
indeed, and it should be sufficiently resourced across all 
domains. Our alliances with Japan, South Korea, and Australia 
should be understood to be our greatest asymmetric advantage in 
this competition.
    Two, it should be the goal of the United States to maintain 
a military edge and to achieve a high degree of confidence that 
the U.S. would prevail in a range of known contingencies with 
China. This will necessitate wise implementation of the Pacific 
Deterrence Initiative. And it will also necessitate thoughtful 
approaches to how we might deploy ground-based precision fire 
capabilities that are now allowed after the withdrawal from the 
INF Treaty.
    Three, human rights and democracy promotion should be major 
pillars in our foreign policy, including in the Indo-Pacific, 
where we should also consider the geopolitical environment, and 
we must be deft enough to avoid pushing allies and partners 
further into China's camp. We should also be willing to raise 
the cost to the CCP for China's historic human rights abuses 
and not shy away from articulating a vision for a future of the 
Chinese people beyond authoritarian control and abuse.
    Four, the technology competition with China is very real 
and critical to the overall strategic competition. We should 
continue to develop tools to protect our technology, ensure the 
integrity of our critical supply chains and reduce 
vulnerabilities, and work with partners and allies to achieve 
the same. But prevailing in a tech competition is most 
dependent on out-innovating the other side. So we need our 
government to support entrepreneurship and innovation. And we 
should think creatively about where we are willing to bear 
risk.
    Five, the Quad should be made more meaningful on the 
defense and security side. This can be done through more 
complex exercises and more real-world cooperation. But we 
should also consider a flagship initiative, perhaps, in the 
area of maritime domain awareness and maritime security across 
the region to make it meaningful.
    Six, I very much agree with Dr. Haass, we should pursue 
some type of flagship trade agreement. We need to be in the 
game as economic and trade and commerce are really the 
lifeblood of this region.
    Seven, I believe engagement with Taiwan should be enhanced, 
and U.S. support should be made more visible to further 
strengthen our deterrence against the PLA invasion. And I agree 
we should move away from strategic ambiguity and toward 
strategic clarity and tactical ambiguity.
    And, finally, related to DPRK, I believe the Biden 
Administration should recreate the maximum pressure campaign 
directed at the DPRK but resist providing the early and quick 
diplomatic off-ramps before the sanctions come into full 
effect. I think this would also mean dealing with the DPRK as a 
de facto nuclear state and all that that entails with 
deterrence and counter nonproliferation while still pursuing 
denuclearization.
    Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Schriver follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Mr. Bera. Thank you, Mr. Schriver, for your testimony.
    I will now recognize members for 5 minutes each. And, 
pursuant to House rules, all time yielded is for the purposes 
of questioning our witnesses.
    Because of the virtual format of this hearing, I will 
recognize members by committee seniority, alternating between 
Democrats and Republicans. If you miss your turn, please let 
our staff know, and we will circle back to you. If you seek 
recognition, you must unmute your microphone and address the 
chair verbally.
    I will start by his recognizing myself for 5 minutes.
    You know, each of you touched on a number of consistent 
themes. And maybe I will ask three questions, one to each much 
of you. Dr. Haass, you talked a bit about--or each of you 
talked about the importance of multilateral partnerships with 
likeminded friends and allies in the region. You know, let's 
talk about the Quad for a second. I would love to get your 
perspective on, one, do we more formalize the Quad into a more 
formal organization and your thought there? And how should we 
use the Quad to then engage the ASEAN nations, you know, that 
obviously also have a critical stake? So your thoughts there.
    Ms. Rolland, I would ask you a question. You know, 
obviously, Taiwan and Chinese aggression to Taiwan looms large 
on our committee's mind, and, you know, we want to make sure 
they do not make a misstep. I am glad in my conversations with 
our friends in Japan or our allies in Japan, I am glad the 
Japanese raised it with Secretaries Blinken and Austin. Your 
thoughts--as we formulate a more strategic approach working 
closely with our allies in Japan, I think it is the right 
strategy. But how are the Chinese going to view that closer 
alliance in their perspective and counter?
    And then, Mr. Schriver, you touched on the importance of 
maritime security and the like, and that is something we are 
clearly going to focus on in this committee. We have seen, you 
know, the Chinese Coast Guard becoming much more aggressive 
both in the South China Sea and the East China Sea with some of 
the smaller ASEAN nations. So, as we are thinking through that 
strategy, how should we as well as the Biden Administration 
adjust our U.S. Strategy in both the South China Sea and the 
East China Sea.
    So, Dr. Haass, let's start with you.
    Dr. Haass. Well, thank you, sir. Let me just say two 
things. I think the Quad is important, but to try to formalize 
it, I would like to argue, you would actually risk it. India, 
in particular, has a long tradition of strategic independence, 
and I believe will shy away from anything that smacks of an 
anti-Chinese alliance.
    I think, more broadly, given the many types of challenges 
we face in the region from North Korea to various China-related 
challenges to others, we have flexibility to order the hallmark 
of our approach to multilateralism. For different challenges, 
we put together different groupings of partners and allies. And 
we, again, ought to mostly eschew having anything that is so 
formal.
    I think, with the ASEAN countries, something I would 
recommend is--and it gets at Ms. Rolland's comments--which is 
as part of a response to BRI. I would think that a U.S.-
coordinated and--led infrastructure initiative could be 
something that was very attractive, an infrastructure broadly 
defined. And just like now we are getting more active in the 
region through the Quad in things like vaccines. I think a 
provision of public goods to the region and specific goods and 
specific goods and services to various countries ought to be 
increasingly an example or a priority for what it is we usually 
do in the region.
    Mr. Bera. Great. Ms. Rolland.
    Ms. Rolland. Thank you, sir.
    Regarding Taiwan, I think, obviously, the military 
deterrence is extremely important, and strengthening the 
alliance system in Asia is one part of this response the U.S. 
can have.
    In addition to that, I would submit that Taiwan is under 
enormous pressure, also, in the influence of operations realm. 
And there are things that I think the U.S. and its allies could 
do to better defend and protect the cyberspace.
    And, finally, I think the strengthening Taiwan's 
international diplomatic space as well within international 
institutions is something that the U.S. can do not just with 
its allies in Asia but also in Europe and in other places. I 
think these are three points that could help with deterring 
further aggression of Taiwan. Thank you, sir.
    Mr. Bera. And Mr. Schriver.
    Mr. Schriver. Thank you. Maritime security begins with 
maritime domain awareness. And in that regard, many of our 
partners need to develop more capabilities. So capacity-
building is a big part of this. We need countries to be able to 
see and sense, but also share. So networking is a part of this. 
So targets of interest can be held and passed between countries 
who share that overall vision for a free and open order.
    And then response, having the platforms that can operate in 
ways that challenge vessels that are operating in illegal 
expansive ways. Of course, the United States can operate across 
the full spectrum of seeing, sensing, sharing, and responding. 
We need other countries to be able to move further on that 
spectrum through capacity-building and partnerships.
    Mr. Bera. Thank you. And I appreciate all of those 
perspectives and look forward to working with the three of you.
    Let me go ahead and raise my good friend from Ohio, the 
Ranking Member Mr. Chabot, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And, Secretary Schriver, I will go with you first, if I 
can. I am one of the co-chairs of the congressional Taiwan 
Caucus. In fact, I was one of the original founders about two 
decades ago. And over the past 2 years, China has been 
increasingly provocative in trying to intimidate Taiwan. That 
is nothing new, as I think we know, but they have been 
particularly outspoken recently. An INDOPACOM Commander Admiral 
Phil Davidson testified recently before the Senate Armed 
Services Committee, and he stated that he thought that China 
could invade Taiwan within the next 6 years. What is your 
opinion with respect to both Taiwan's and the U.S. military's 
current state of preparedness in such an event? And you 
mentioned in your statement, strategic ambiguity, as Dr. Haass 
did, and I agree with both of you that that is dangerous. And 
could you elaborate on what would be a better policy with 
respect to strategic ambiguity?
    Mr. Schriver. Thank you. The risks of Taiwan are growing 
because of Chinese investment in their capability to 
operationalize a Taiwan contingency. But this situation is 
dynamic. Taiwan can do things to respond. The United States can 
do things to respond as well. So I certainly noted Admiral 
Davidson's comments. But I do not know that we can be that 
precise in the timeline because, again, it is dynamic, and it 
depends upon how we respond to the growing PLA threat.
    I do believe Taiwan is on the right track with its overall 
defense concept, and the acquisition of some of the systems 
they are now investing in. ISR capabilities, for example, 
through unmanned systems. The coastal missile defenses. And I 
think our planners at INDOPACOM and the Joint Staff are 
thinking about a scenario in much more realistic ways and 
thinking about how we might have to fight in ways that are 
putting us on the right track.
    Of course, the comedian Will Rogers said, ``Even if you are 
on the right track, you can get run over if you are not running 
fast enough.'' We do need a sense of urgency and a sense of 
purpose in these matters, and so we need to work on this very 
diligently.
    On strategic ambiguity, the formula that I like--and I 
applaud Dr. Haass' contribution to this conversation--the 
formula I like is strategic clarity and tactical ambiguity. I 
think with respect to strategic clarity, we should say it is in 
our interest for Taiwan to continue to survive and exist in its 
current form or better. As a fellow democracy and a likeminded 
partner on so many regional and global issues, we should be 
able to say is it not in our interest for Taiwan to be 
controlled by the CCP and Beijing and brought under its 
authoritarian rule.
    We will always have tactical ambiguity when it comes to 
response because response would be highly scenario-dependent. 
And there are certainly a range of things we can do in a 
contingency, and there are a range of things the PLA might do. 
A blockade is different than an all-out attack.
    So I think that formula of clarity on the strategic side 
and ambiguity on the tactical side would strengthen our 
position.
    Mr. Chabot. Thank you. Let me just followup with you, Mr. 
Schriver, at this point. Along with my colleague, Brad Sherman, 
we together are co-chair of the India Caucus. And the Indians 
have historically had different threat perceptions with respect 
to China. But in light of the Galwan Valley Incident, those 
perceptions are likely changing somewhat. With that in mind, 
how should we expect India to contribute in the future to our 
efforts to maintain regional stability and counter Chinese 
aggression?
    Mr. Schriver. Well, thank you. I am optimistic that our 
partnership with India will grow. This is the work over several 
administrations. The Obama Administration did a terrific job 
building the defense relationship. I would like to think the 
Trump administration contributed as well. But a lot of this 
isn't just being driven by the strategic landscape and the 
understanding that China has ambitions on Indian territory. 
China is a partner of Pakistan and sees that as a counter way 
to India to try to divert their attention to their other 
border.
    So we have been able to leverage that shared understanding 
of the threat to really enhance our cooperation. I agree that 
we will probably not formalize anything in a bilateral alliance 
or even a multilateral grouping in a formal way. But in terms 
of real cooperation, we are seeing very positive developments. 
And I think, for us, if the Indians are able to secure their 
territorial interest with enough capability to deter China and 
to be able to operate in the Indian Ocean more effectively so 
that that critical part of the Indo-Pacific remains free and 
open, and smaller South Asian States are secure in their own 
sovereignty and with their interest, India can be a great 
partner to us in that record.
    Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    My time has expired, but let me commend you and committee 
staff on both sides for really putting together a tremendous 
panel of witnesses here this morning, and I yield back.
    Mr. Bera. Great. Thank you, Mr. Chabot.
    Let me recognize my colleague from California, Mr. Sherman, 
for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Sherman. Mr. Bera, congratulations on your first 
hearing of the new Congress.
    Of course, your first hearing of the subcommittee, I always 
remind people, was the first hearing of Congress to focus on 
COVID.
    And I want to associate myself with your comments about the 
AAPI community and understanding that, while we may criticize 
the Communist Party of China, we embrace the AAPI community in 
our country.
    We have spent over the last several years half a billion 
dollars in aid to the government of Myanmar, Burma. That was 
clearly wrong given their treatment of the Rohingya. It is even 
more wrong to continue that, given the recent coup. I would 
hope that we would feel--get ways to turn down the temperature, 
the naval temperature in the South China Sea.
    Dr. Haass and Mr. Schriver both pointed out that a critical 
part of this is our research on new technologies in the future. 
I need to point out that, due to an accounting convenience rule 
that was established over 20 years ago, all American 
corporations are punished in their earnings per share, the most 
important thing to those corporations, when they spend money on 
research. And this pernicious accounting quirk is probably 
depressing the amount of research we are doing by 10, 20, maybe 
even 30 percent. Reversing it would not cost us a penny.
    As we see today, witnesses that come before us tend to do 
it virtually. And this means that we can have witnesses to our 
full committee or our subcommittee, wherever they happen to be, 
even if they had come to the United States, for convenience 
reasons or because our State Department will not give them an 
appropriate visa.
    Dr. Haass, would it be a good idea for us to have as a 
witness at a briefing or hearing the Foreign Minister of 
Taiwan? What message would that send?
    Dr. Haass. Well, again, what it would send is another sign 
you of normalization, if you will, between the United States 
and Taiwan. And I have not thought about that specific thing, 
but let me just make a larger point here.
    Mr. Sherman. Dr. Haass, I have got limited time, and we 
have got to move on. Dr. Haass, I have got limited time, and I 
have to move on.
    All of us on this committee and our witnesses live in a 
world where we get to think of--the geopolitics and how the 
world is going to look decades from now. Our constituents live 
in the real world. They are not worried about the end of the 
world, but they are worried about getting to the end of the 
month.
    Every dollar of trade deficit we run with China probably 
costs us on the order of 10,000 good jobs. So you can see how a 
trade deficit of hundreds of billions of dollars affects our 
people every day. Does any witness have a particular step or 
two we could take to reduce our trade deficit with China? I am 
looking for--I do not--Dr. Haass, do you have----
    Dr. Haass. Well, again, I do not think that reducing our 
trade deficit with China per se ought to be a goal of American 
foreign policy. The order----
    Mr. Sherman. Dr. Haass, that isn't responsive to the 
question. Thank you. I will go back to my constituents and tell 
them it should not matter to them----
    Dr. Haass. Well, Congressman, if you are going to have to 
ask these questions----
    Mr. Sherman. Dr. Haass----
    Mr. Haass [continuing]. I would think you would want to let 
me answer them.
    Mr. Sherman [continuing]. This is the third time you have 
interrupted me. Dr. Haass, please.
    China has made an enormous investment in American debt. 
And, yet, the things that cause the currency to go down are 
running a trade deficit with the world and running a budget 
deficit fiscally.
    Mr. Schriver, from the Chinese perspective, do they think 
that they need to reduce the trade deficit or take any other 
steps to protect them from a precipitous decline in the value 
of a dollar?
    Mr. Schriver. The Chinese understand that trade deficit and 
the amount of debt they hold gives them a certain amount of 
leverage. Of course, it also binds them to us.
    Mr. Sherman. Oh, I disagree with you. If you owe the bank 
money, they have got leverage over you because they can 
foreclose. If you owe the people money in international 
affairs, there is no foreclosure. If my bank could not 
foreclose on my house, my banker would be very nice to me. Do 
you see them moving out of U.S. debt?
    Mr. Schriver. Well, I do not because I think it is the best 
place for them to put the surplus money that they have. They 
are not investing solely to gain leverage over us; they are 
they investing because they have got to do something with all 
of that currency.
    Mr. Sherman. I yield back. Thank you.
    Mr. Bera. Let me go and recognize my colleague from the 
great state of Pennsylvania, Mr. Perry, for 5 minutes of 
questioning.
    Mr. Perry. Thank you, Dr. Bera. Congratulations on the 
hearing. Thank you very much.
    Dr. Haass, I am going to come to you in a minute and let 
you respond to my good friend from California, but I do have a 
question in the meantime for Secretary Schriver. Let me lead up 
to that for a moment. As the administration embarks on 
establishing the Indo-Pacific strategy, I hope to discuss 
perhaps one of the more pressing issues relating to the region, 
at least in my opinion, and that is the security of Taiwan.
    Very shortly, I will be introducing the Taiwan Plus Act. 
The bill would raise the value threshold for arms sales to 
Taiwan before the President would have to notify Congress. So I 
want to give the President some flexibility to do that. It will 
also cut down on the notification time the President would need 
to provide Congress for defense articles that exceed the values 
of the threshold from 30 to 15 days.
    Other than NATO, there are five other countries, the so-
called NATO-plus group that enjoy these privileges. They are 
Australia, South Korea, Japan, New Zealand, and, of course, 
Israel. We do have a time limit on it. And there is history 
regarding the U.S.-Jordan Defense Cooperation Act where we can 
rescind that if the situation changes.
    Assistant Secretary, I want to just ask you, I know I am 
hitting you with this cold, but your general thoughts regarding 
what I characterize as the Taiwan Plus Act and whether or not 
you believe the legislation could work in tandem with already 
existing efforts to ensure deterrence against China, and my 
interest is in deterrence. What are your thoughts?
    Mr. Schriver. Well, thank you. And as I said in my 
statement, we do need a sense of urgency. And so anything that 
gives greater flexibility to the U.S. administration to provide 
security assistance to shorten timelines, I am all for it. So I 
appreciate your initiative and would very much support the 
legislation and hope it is successful.
    Mr. Perry. All right. Thank you, sir.
    Dr. Haass, I just feel like you have been kind of maligned 
there in your treatment a little bit. I want to yield you a 
little time to answer the question that was kind of posed for 
you and you were not allowed to answer. If you do not mind.
    Dr. Haass. Thank you, sir.
    Let me say two points. On Taiwan, like, for example, 
meetings with their Foreign Minister, I would think that I 
would not emphasize such symbolic upgradings of ties with 
Taiwan. What I would focus on is the real meat of our 
relationship. What do we do to increase our ability to deter, 
prepare for, or defend against Chinese coercion or aggression? 
That to me ought to be what Congress focuses on, rather than 
things that simply take a stick and poke China in the eye. 
There are ways you can functionally do things with Taiwan, but 
symbolic things that provoke ought not to be fundamentally what 
we are about.
    With trade, is the other question I was asked. Again, 
balances do not matter. What I care about is China doing 
anything to unfairly advantage their export stock, that stock
    [inaudible] And our American firms having the access they 
need to China's market. And the only thing that should hold us 
back there is our need to be selective on what technologies we 
are allowed to go there.
    Mr. Perry. All right. I appreciate your response. And I 
understand your opinion regarding the symbolic gesture, so to 
speak. And I am not saying it is not one to a certain extent. 
Look, I would like to get much tougher on China, completely. I 
would like it, if you know anything about me, I mean, think we 
ought to just recognize full relations with Taiwan and consider 
them the true China. But, so, maybe that is a little too 
provocative for some people, but I think that sooner or later 
we are going to have to fish or cut bait with the Chinese 
Communist Party, and all we are doing is fiddling around the 
edges.
    So I understand your perspective, but I do want to move 
forward on kind of both avenues. And I think that this is at 
least something in a bipartisan way that signals that we want 
to pull China--or, correction, Taiwan a little closer.
    I mean, going back to the Secretary, what do you think if--
and you know, and, look, I know this is a hard question, but 
how do you think the Taiwan Plus Act would be received by the 
Chinese Communist Party and, specifically, the General 
Secretary? I mean, is it going to be seen as a kind of a hollow 
gesture? Because they seem to blow everything out of 
proportion, but they seem to have some effect at doing that and 
chill every effort on our part to stand with our allies.
    Mr. Schriver. Well, that is certainly one of the problems. 
They object to virtually everything, which then makes it hard 
to sort of disaggregate it and determine which things they 
really care about and which they care less about. But I would 
think, you know, for the more sophisticated analysts on the 
Chinese side and the PLA side, they would see your initiative 
for what it is: a way to strengthen security cooperation, 
defense and military ties, and enhance Taiwan's deterrence 
capabilities and posture. So I think this would be received 
negatively, but certainly that is not the metric for whether or 
not we do something: if China does not like it. In fact, in 
some cases, it is the metric for why we should. And in this 
case, I think we should very much follow the course you are 
suggesting.
    Mr. Perry. Yes, and I appreciate your input. And I would 
agree with much of your sentiments, especially when it comes to 
the Communist Chinese Party. The fact that they oppose it is a 
signal to me that we are on the right track.
    With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back any balance of the 
time. Thank you, sir.
    Mr. Bera. Thank you.
    Let me go on and recognize my colleague from Nevada, Ms. 
Titus.
    Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I thank the witnesses for being here today.
    I would like to ask Dr. Haass more about Burma.
    The situation in Burma is just continuing to escalate every 
day. Even after rebukes from the global community, the violent 
reaction by the military does not seem to show any signs of 
stopping.
    ASEAN has been kind of lukewarm at best in this whole 
process, and we have seen some member countries actually begin 
diplomatic relations with the new military government.
    I wonder what you think is our best course of action, 
working with some of our allies to try to end the conflict, and 
if you think it is realistic to believe that the NLD and Aung 
San Suu Kyi will come back, or is this push for democracy 
bigger than just the cult of her personality.
    Dr. Haass. Well, Congresswoman, the push is bigger than the 
cult of any individual. The problem is the ability of those in 
power now to resist the kinds of pressures you are talking 
about. And they are gradually beginning to expand their ties 
with the outside world, some of the ASEAN countries and China.
    To me, it is a frustrating classic textbook case of the 
difficulty of translating our principles into policy and into 
outcomes that we want. So I think we continue to advocate for 
what we want.
    Look, whether it is China, Russia, Turkey, Myanmar, 
whatever, I think what we are seeing in some ways is the limits 
to America's ability to influence the internal trajectories of 
other countries.
    So, yes, we should still advocate for it, yes, we should 
introduce sanctions where we think it should do some good, but 
I think we also have to be realistic about the limits to our 
influence.
    Ms. Titus. Well, thank you.
    Isn't that, then, conceding to China's point that we should 
stay out of the issues of Taiwan or Tibet or other human rights 
abuses, Hong Kong?
    Dr. Haass. No, none whatsoever. Hong Kong, China violated 
its international undertakings. We ought to be clear 
rhetorically. But, also, we ought to look, working with the 
British and others, look for financial penalties.
    With Taiwan, we have all sorts of obligations under the 
Taiwan Relations Act. We do not have to accept the Chinese 
position on Taiwan or on the Uyghurs or anything else.
    All I am saying is we have to calibrate our response 
against two things. We have got other priorities in American 
foreign policy, not just these. And I think, at times, we have 
to understand there are limits to how far we can succeed when 
we try to pressure other countries to change their internal 
workings.
    This is not new. This is a recurring challenge, for 
example, vis--vis the Soviet Union during the cold war. And I 
think this will always be part of our foreign policy 
experience.
    Ms. Titus. Thank you.
    Ms. Rolland, I would ask you to comment on our relations 
with China. What are some of the things where we can come 
together, even though we see them as our most serious 
competitor? And certainly the talks did not start off too well 
with Secretary Blinken over this past week.
    Ms. Rolland. Thank you, ma'am.
    I think the possibilities for cooperations are really very 
small nowadays, unfortunately. Even if many people are still 
hoping that we can work on global issues and problems like 
pandemic and climate change, I think, fundamentally, the 
interests of both countries are not converging.
    It is important to continue to maintain communication 
channels, obviously, but I think we should lower our 
expectations about the positive outcomes that we could get from 
Beijing.
    Ms. Titus. Do you think strengthening our ties with Japan 
and Korea will help in any way, or is that just----
    Ms. Rolland. I would also broaden the scope and not just 
focus on East Asia, per se. I know that this is where American 
allies are strong and very much in close contact with China.
    But I would also urge the U.S. to think about a broader 
coalition of like-minded countries that extend beyond East 
Asia. Because the challenges that China poses are not just to 
the U.S., and they are not just to Taiwan. It is a broader 
challenge that expands to many different domains--economic, 
technological, human rights, but also in terms of norms.
    So it is a very complex task, because it is so 
multidimensional. And, therefore, the U.S. should--it is 
impossible, I think, to focus on just one segment of it. It has 
to be much broader in terms of domains and in terms of allies 
and partners that you can find to reduce that challenge.
    Ms. Titus. We certainly see Chinese economic influence with 
the Belt and Road, building a port in Peru, for example. It is 
everywhere.
    Ms. Rolland. That is exactly right. That is one good 
example.
    Ms. Titus. Thank you.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Bera. Great. Thank you.
    Let me recognize my colleague from Tennessee, Mr. Burchett, 
for 5 minutes of questioning.
    Mr. Burchett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I have a pretty simple question, because I think words are 
cheap on a lot of this stuff. It does not seem to really do a 
whole lot a lot of times. And it is not a partisan thing, that 
is just my assumption of all this.
    How should the U.S. respond to China's Belt and Road 
Initiative? It seems that is one of the most egregious things 
they do outside of human rights violations. They get their 
claws into these little countries, and then they own them. But 
what can we do to respond to it?
    And that is for the whole panel.
    Dr. Haass. Well, I can say one thing. And, by the way, the 
Council on Foreign Relations has a task force coming out on 
what should be the response next week, an entire comprehensive 
study of it.
    But it involves everything from working with locals, I 
think, on an infrastructure fund. It means new trade 
initiatives, joining CPTPP. It means looking at our foreign 
aid, who gets it, how we use it. It means looking at our 
immigration policy in some cases, our exchanges.
    Bottom line is we have got to compete. And, Congressman, I 
think, if we compete with China, I am not worried so much about 
the reach of Belt and Road. I think, historically, we have got 
a lot more to offer, when it comes to technology, when it comes 
to investment, when it comes to trade. We have just got to get 
out on the dance floor.
    Mr. Burchett. Okay. And we are not doing that right now?
    Dr. Haass. Not nearly enough, sir.
    Mr. Burchett. Okay. Do you all have, does the Council on 
Foreign Relations have any parameters on how much money we 
should be putting into these countries?
    Dr. Haass. I will get you the report presently. How is 
that?
    Mr. Burchett. All right. Will Strother in my office needs 
to get that, if you can.
    Dr. Haass. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Burchett. Any of the others?
    Ms. Rolland. If I may, sir, I have been looking at the Belt 
and Road for the past 7 years myself, and I think really what 
we need to understand, it is like Belt and Road is not just 
about infrastructure building. It is the focus of it, and it is 
where the attention went because of the trillion-dollar number 
attached to it, and because of some of the examples, like in 
Sri Lanka, where Chinese entities have seized assets in the 
Port of Hambantota, for example.
    I think, beyond infrastructure, there are also a lot of 
soft infrastructures that are being built by China, including 
through currency swap agreements, financial integration 
agreements, agreements in higher education and technology, 
industry standards.
    You need to think about BRI as China's response to American 
strategy, not the other way around. And, yes, we need to 
provide alternatives, because the way China is doing business 
through Belt and Road is antinomic to the way international 
standards are promoted. There is no transparency. There is no 
respect for labor rights. There is no respect for the local 
populations or environmental sustainability.
    So, yes, it is important to provide alternatives to these 
countries, but also to go beyond the kind of narrow view that 
this is about infrastructure building. This is about creating a 
world where China is the predominant power in the region 
through a wide array of networks and knitting together the 
region around China.
    So, in that way, I think this is why we need to be more 
multidimensional in the way we address it.
    Mr. Burchett. All right. Thank you.
    Recently, Kazakhstan has pushed back against Russia and 
even against Chinese Belt and Road diplomacy. What are some of 
the ways the U.S. can build a strong relationship with Nur-
Sultan, the capital, and muscle out Moscow and Beijing?
    Ms. Rolland. If I may, I think many of these countries want 
to actually have it both ways. And having China coming in is a 
good leverage for many of them to say, ``Look, we would like to 
engage with other countries,'' so that they can then choose 
what is best for themselves.
    This is where I think it is not just true for Kazakhstan, 
it is true for many of the other regions, in the South Pacific, 
for example, in Southeast Asia as well, and the South Caucasus.
    These countries want to develop themselves, first and 
foremost. And so having different great powers that are paying 
attention to them, it is a good way to leverage one against the 
other and then choose what is the best option for themselves in 
the end.
    Mr. Burchett. Okay. Anybody else on that?
    One final thing. Is there going to be a way that we can 
drive a wedge between the Kazakhs and the Chinese due to the 
Chinese persecution of the Uyghurs?
    Mr. Schriver. I spent a lot of----
    Ms. Rolland. If I may--sorry. Go ahead, Randy.
    Mr. Schriver. I was going to say, I spent a lot of time in 
the region talking about this very issue when I was in 
government. And it will be a slog. I mean, the governments 
themselves are very deferential for reasons that we can 
probably figure out--the proximity to China, the importance of 
the economic relationship, and so on and so forth.
    But in many cases, civil society, to the extent it exists 
in these places, that is where the concern is really growing.
    It is interesting. They will--the governments will complain 
to the U.S. about moving our embassy to Jerusalem, but not a 
peep about the Uyghurs or the Rohingya, which is much more 
closer to home. But if you talk to civil society in these 
countries, they do have concern about how their fellow Muslims 
are being treated.
    Mr. Bera. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Burchett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Bera. You are welcome.
    Let me go ahead and recognize my colleague, the vice chair 
of the subcommittee, Mr. Levin from Michigan.
    Mr. Levin. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
    And I am going to pick up right on your important opening 
remarks. We are having this hearing 3 days after shootings in 
Atlanta that killed eight people, six of whom were Asian women.
    Hate crimes against Asian Americans in major cities 
skyrocketed last year by almost 150 percent, and that is just 
the ones that were reported.
    Obviously, this is a hearing about foreign policy, not hate 
crimes in the U.S., but I do not think we can separate the two 
completely.
    We talk a lot here about foreign policy challenges as they 
relate to China, and we should. I, myself, often talk about the 
Chinese Government's human rights abuses in Tibet, Xinjiang, 
and elsewhere. I witnessed the government's crackdown on 
dissent in Chengdu during the Tiananmen massacre in June 1989 
firsthand.
    I have no illusions about the CCP.
    As we hold the government accountable, though, I think we 
need to keep in mind the impact our words can have on people.
    Donald Trump's racist references to the coronavirus 
absolutely deserve blame for the spikes in attacks. Stop AAPI 
Hate's national report included examples of verbal attacks that 
parroted his words specifically.
    But discrimination against Asians did not start with him. 
In fact, one of our country's first immigration laws was the 
Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882.
    I say all this not to suggest that we should not tackle 
issues related to China or any Asian government. We should and, 
indeed, we must. But I think we need to take care when we talk 
about this to avoid language that stigmatizes people. I know I 
will be challenging myself to do more to stop AAPI hate.
    So let me get to my first question on this topic. I want to 
ask Dr. Haass, how might we do a better job of separating our 
criticisms of CCP policies from the Chinese people and their 
aspirations? And how does racist language from American 
political leaders hurt America's standing in the region?
    Dr. Haass. Congressman, let me just say I think what you 
have raised is--it is troubling and important. Our Founders set 
out to form a more perfect Union, and, clearly, two and a half 
centuries later, we are not quite there. And you are pointing 
to some of the most recent egregious examples.
    Look, I think it is important, in part, to calm down some 
of the public language. I was not a big fan, shall we say, to 
say the least, I thought it was just dead wrong to talk of 
things about the China virus. Yes, it almost certainly began in 
China. The origins are unknown.
    But when it came to the United States, how we responded to 
it was on us. And scapegoating, it seems to me, is never a wise 
public policy. And the scale of the cost in the United States, 
that was not on China. That was on us and what we failed to do.
    So I would just say more broadly, though, as I said, we 
should be pointing out the flaws in China. We should be putting 
forward a more positive image of ourselves. But we have got to 
have a private dialog with them.
    This is the most important bilateral relationship of this 
era. It will have enormous impact on history and on ourselves.
    Mr. Levin. Exactly.
    With my limited time, let me get to one more question.
    I want to sort of pull together some of this dialog we have 
been having about China, Belt and Road, and U.S., how to deal 
with it.
    I think we need to--and some of you referred to this--I 
think we need to not just be reactive, but deal with the world 
as it is in a bold, American, innovative, creative way that 
provides leadership.
    So, for example, might it be an effective thing--and we 
also need, in dealing with China, to have an industrial policy 
in this country.
    So might it be an effective thing to deal with China for 
the United States to lead a hemispheric climate change 
initiative to help all the countries, especially the poorer 
countries in the region, develop wind, offshore wind, solar, 
energy storage on a large scale, where we could have a lot of 
U.S. industrial participation, but also work with them to 
develop their own capacity, in a way that is truly generous, 
but truly multilateral and regional, and that is not defensive? 
Because it deals with the greatest problem of our time.
    So, Dr. Haass, I will start with you. And, if others, if we 
have time, others can jump in.
    Dr. Haass. We are in violent agreement. We ought to be 
offering technology. Sustainable development ought to be 
something that we take the lead in. A lot of BRI is still very 
heavily oriented toward coal.
    So we ought to be looking at, just like we do in the sphere 
of pharmaceuticals, where can we license or make available 
technologies that would help other people grow, and grow in a 
sustainable way? That is exactly the sort of response we ought 
to have to BRI.
    Mr. Levin. Thank you.
    And, Mr. Chair, I think my time has expired. I do not see 
you.
    Mr. Bera. It does look like your time has expired, Mr. 
Levin.
    Mr. Levin. Thank you so much.
    Mr. Bera. Let me go ahead and recognize my colleague from 
Kentucky, Mr. Barr, for 5 minutes of questioning.
    Mr. Barr. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thanks for 
doing such a great job.
    Again, compliments to these terrific witnesses for 
discussing this very significant national security challenge 
and the rise of China and how we respond to it.
    And let me pick up where my friend and colleague from 
Michigan left off. And I appreciate his comments about being 
careful and making distinctions between the CCP and the people 
of China. I think it was an excellent point, and I appreciate 
the sentiments, the very decent sentiments of my friend.
    I do want to just, though, point out that moral clarity is 
required in this discussion, and sharp criticism of the CCP is 
not racist. It is about policy, and it is about foreign policy. 
And I think clarity is really important.
    And so, Mr. Schriver, yesterday, during the meeting in 
Alaska, the Chinese delegation attempted to paint the United 
States as hypocritical for our directly raising a number of 
international concerns regarding the CCP. And while I know the 
United States has gone through a very rough year and we have 
our own issues, I did want to ask a series of questions, and 
they highlight the differences, the moral differences between 
the United States and China.
    Is the United States currently participating in an ethnic 
cleansing of its own population in State-run internment camps, 
yes or no?
    Mr. Schriver. No.
    Mr. Barr. Is the United States currently stealing 
intellectual property from companies doing business here and 
then giving that technology to our military, yes or no?
    Mr. Schriver. Certainly not government--Federal Government 
sponsored.
    Mr. Barr. Is the United States jailing those speaking out 
in favor of democracy and human rights, yes or no?
    Mr. Schriver. No.
    Mr. Barr. No. And thank you.
    And I want to highlight these differences, for when we are 
talking about our way forward in the Indo-Pacific we must be 
clear to our partners and allies--and this must be a moral 
clarity--of who China is and what behavior they engage in, and 
the moral superiority, frankly, of the Western approach and the 
approach of an open, free, and democratic society versus a 
closed Communist police State that is the CCP.
    And I do not believe that that is racist rhetoric. That is 
rhetoric about the challenges that we confront, and it is about 
being clear eyed.
    Let me ask Dr. Haass a question about emerging 
technologies, 5G, 6G, and protecting American technology.
    The U.S.-China Economic Security Review Commission is a 
great resource for the Congress and for policymakers. And, in 
speaking to some of these just outstanding experts on our 
complicated relationship with China, it has been said that we 
need to be putting higher walls around fewer things, and 
especially when it comes to protecting American technology in 
the face of decoupling.
    How can Congress partner with industry in the United States 
and in allied and partner countries to protect necessary 
critical technologies?
    Dr. Haass. That is exactly right, by the way, Congressman. 
We need higher walls around fewer things--scalpel, not 
sledgehammer.
    I think we ought to--the first thing is to identify what 
those technologies are. What are the things most likely to be 
drivers and make a difference in the commercial economy, in the 
intelligence business, in the military.
    And those are the ones we have to think about funding. Not 
just domestically, but one of the things Congress could do also 
is to facilitate joint projects with the partners and allies 
that we spent so much time talking about in the course of this 
hearing.
    Mr. Barr. Let me quickly talk about Belt and Road, and 
countering Belt and Road, followup on Mr. Burchett's line of 
questioning.
    To any of our witnesses, how can we more effectively use 
the Development Finance Corporation and the Export-Import Bank 
in countering Belt and Road?
    Ms. Rolland. Sir, I think this is a very important tool 
that is available to the U.S. I would not believe necessarily 
that what the Americans have to offer is necessarily what the 
developing world wants, because those loans and grants come 
with political conditionalities that many of those countries do 
not want to accept in terms of transparency, rule of law, et 
cetera.
    And this is where the Chinese way of doing things--the 
Chinese Government's way of doing things--is a challenge, 
because they do not offer any political conditionality to those 
countries in terms of democratization or anything else.
    So this is really the crux of the matter, because there are 
two offers there that are very different, and providing an 
alternative is very important.
    At the same time, I think there are other ways, in addition 
to money and funding, that can be helpful, like skills and some 
sort of expertise in demonstrating that perhaps Chinese 
projects are not going to be sustainable in the long run. I 
think this is also an efficient way of coping with BRI.
    Mr. Barr. Thank you, Dr. Rolland.
    Well, obviously, my time has expired. I hope someone on the 
panel will ask about Taiwan accession to the United Nations as 
a deterrent to PRC aggression. And I, obviously, cannot ask 
that question now, but I invite someone else to.
    And I yield back.
    Mr. Bera. All right. Thanks, Mr. Barr.
    Let me now recognize my colleague from Pennsylvania, Ms. 
Houlahan, for 5 minutes of questioning.
    Ms. Houlahan. Thank you. I did not expect to be called. I 
very much appreciate the opportunity to talk.
    My first question is for Dr. Haass, which has to do with 
the Council on Foreign Relations and their recent report on the 
role of women in terrorism. And it said that the U.S. pretty 
traditionally neglects the roles that women play in violent 
extremism.
    And so I was brought personally to include an amendment or 
a provision in the NDAA that asks the DoD to assess this issue 
and how to better incorporate women into our efforts to counter 
violent extremism.
    I was wondering if you have any ideas on how we might be 
doing that more effectively in the Indo-Pacific specifically.
    Dr. Haass. The short answer, Congresswoman, I do not--I do 
not--I know we published it. I am not an expert on it. But I 
will make sure we followup with you.
    Ms. Houlahan. I would very much appreciate that, because I 
think that this is--you know, obviously, we are 51 percent of 
the population, and I think that this is something that needs 
the attention of all of us when we are talking about security 
around the world.
    My next question is for you and for everyone.
    In 2020, the Global Terrorism Index ranked Pakistan, India, 
the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Myanmar as the top 25 
countries impacted by terrorism. The Asia-Pacific area was one 
of only three regions that experienced a rise in terrorism in 
2019.
    I was wondering what you attribute that rise in terrorism 
to specifically in the Asia-Pacific region, and can you 
describe the U.S. counterterrorism efforts that the U.S. has in 
that region to try to combat that trend?
    Dr. Haass, if we could maybe start with you.
    Dr. Haass. I was going to defer to Mr. Randy Schriver, who 
is more of an expert.
    Ms. Houlahan. Of course.
    Dr. Haass. I will just say in 30 seconds, and I will defer 
to him, he is a real expert, is that in many of these cases the 
problem is not strong governments, but weak governments, who 
are either unable or unwilling to make the commitments to 
police what goes on within their own territory, Pakistan being 
the poster child of that.
    And, for us, what we have to think about is not necessarily 
fighting the problem for them, but how we can help build 
capacity in these countries so they can do a better job to meet 
their domestic and international obligations.
    Mr. Schriver. Yes, I agree with that. I think you really 
have to disaggregate and look at each country and the 
challenges they face.
    In the Philippines, in the case of recapturing Marawi City, 
it was not only capacity building for the Air Force of 
Philippines, but it was direct enabling support. We were in the 
fight in a way that became enabling for the AFP to retake the 
city.
    In other cases, it is assistance with reintegration of 
foreign fighters. So you really have to understand the 
specifics of the challenges a particular country may face.
    But it is certainly a focus for our Special Operations 
Command, and it is a focus of Indo-Pacific Command as well, to 
be able to get to that level of granularity and assist the 
countries with the particular challenges they have.
    Ms. Houlahan. Thank you.
    And my next question is actually for you, Mr. Schriver, as 
well.
    Secretary Austin has embarked on a global force posture 
review while also launching a China Task Force to better align 
our military resources and to better address China's evolving 
military capabilities.
    If you were conducting those reviews now, what realignment 
would you consider of basing agreements as well as diplomatic 
and economic resources?
    Mr. Schriver. Well, I wish them success in these efforts. 
It is very important.
    I think, if you look at the potential China fight--and not 
that we want to have that fight, but that, in order to deter 
them, we need to be able to have a high confidence that we 
would prevail--it is about dealing with their ballistic and 
cruise missiles and the fact that they can hold our forward-
deployed forces at risk, so their so-called A2/AD strategy.
    So I think, thinking about dispersal, dispersification, 
survivability, and a protracted ability to continue to operate 
in the environment are the keys.
    I think the Pacific Deterrence Initiative is a great start. 
It gives some new tools to be able to forward deploy 
ammunition, logistic support.
    But ultimately dispersal and access, that means having 
partner countries willing to participate in particular ways, 
give us the access when we need it. So that is really on our 
diplomats, too, to help develop those relationships.
    So I am encouraged with the direction that the Biden 
Administration is taking. There are quite a bit of details to 
be worked through, though.
    Ms. Houlahan. Thank you.
    And I only have 10 more seconds left, and I will submit the 
rest of my questions for the record. But, for Dr. Haass, I very 
much would like to have a continuing conversation on the role 
of women and security in the region.
    Thank you. With that, I yield back.
    Mr. Bera. Thank you, Ms. Houlahan.
    Let me go ahead and recognize my colleague from Tennessee, 
Dr. Green, for 5 minutes of questioning.
    Mr. Green. Thank you, Chairman and Ranking Member, for your 
holding of this committee today.
    I want to thank our witnesses for testifying before us 
today.
    Dr. Haass, let me say your book, ``A World in Disarray,'' 
is one of my favorites, and I suggest every member of this 
committee should read that book.
    While I am ranking member on Western Hemisphere, the 
Chinese Communist Party makes this subcommittee the most 
important one in Congress. The United States and the Chinese 
leadership--note I did not say Chinese people--the U.S. and the 
Chinese leadership have contrasting values and incompatible 
goals.
    We certainly do not share the same vision for the Indo-
Pacific. The United States seeks to advance the fairness-for-
all values of the rules-based international order--in a word, 
freedom. The CCP seeks political power and regional dependence 
on Beijing, not unlike previous Chinese emperors--in a word, 
they want authoritarian control and subservience to their 
concept of world order.
    According to a report by the RAND Corporation, nations in 
the Indo-Pacific believe the United States has more diplomatic 
and military influence than China. However, they believe China 
has more economic influence, and China uses this leverage to 
undermine the United States diplomatically and militarily.
    Many analysts suggest the world is at risk of losing the 
freedom to navigate the region. This is preventable. President 
Biden should continue efforts to negotiate free trade 
agreements with our allies. The President should also continue 
the previous administration's efforts to counter the Belt and 
Road Initiative, such as the Trilateral Partnership for 
Infrastructure Investment.
    Additionally, we need to encourage American companies to 
move their supply chains out of China. That is why I introduced 
the Bring American Companies Home Act, to offset the moving 
costs for American companies that reshore their supply chains 
from China.
    We must not neglect the economic sphere when it comes to 
our allies in the Indo-Pacific. We must show them that the 
international rules-based order is a better alternative to the 
Chinese Communist Party's Middle Kingdom tributary system.
    China's strategy has two critical components. First, to 
advance its technologies and, hence, their sharp power through 
China 2025. And, second, to disrupt our allies and partnerships 
through their Belt and Road Initiative.
    Our strategy should, as the Atlantic Council suggests, 
focus on three long-term objectives.
    First, strengthen. We must strengthen relationships with 
our allies and partners in the rules-based international order 
by, (A) prohibiting Chinese engagement in economic sectors 
vital to our national security; (B) developing new military 
capabilities to maintain a favorable balance of power; and, (C) 
reasserting influence on multilateral institutions and even 
creating new ones when necessary.
    Second, we have to defend, defend against Chinese 
aggressive behavior and impose costs for those violations. That 
means establishing offsetting measures, to use the Council's 
word, collectively, resisting coercion by decreasing dependence 
for ourselves and our allies and partners. And, in order to 
defend, we must counter Chinese IP theft and their influence 
operations.
    Third and final, we need to engage China. Now, that may 
sound odd coming from someone who most would call a China hawk, 
but our ultimate goal here should be to cooperate with China 
where we can--only where we can. Things like public health and 
the environment are two great areas where we can work together 
and communicate and advance our relationship so that we can 
incorporate China into the rules-based order.
    Dr. Haass, do you mind elaborating on the differences 
between Xi Jinping and his predecessors and how that may impact 
or provide enlightenment, so to speak, to our strategy?
    Dr. Haass. Yes, sir.
    The predecessors to Xi Jinping, most importantly Deng 
Xiaoping, were much more cautious in their external behavior 
and their foreign policy, basically said China needs a stable 
periphery in order to do the social, political, and economic 
development at home. And it is not surprising that the best 
period of U.S.-Chinese relations in the modern era was during 
that period.
    What we now have with Xi Jinping is someone who is very 
different, basically is acting as if China's time has arrived, 
sees the United States as weak and divided, and essentially is 
pressing on every front.
    We see it with India. We see it in the South China Sea. We 
see it with Taiwan. We see it with Japan. We see China not 
meeting its international obligations on trade. We see it not 
meeting its international obligations on Hong Kong. We see what 
they are doing vis--vis the Uyghurs.
    This is a very different China that basically is no longer, 
to use the Chinese expression, hiding and biding its time. But 
China is basically saying: We are arrived, and we are going to 
act differently now.
    Mr. Green. Would you say they are in the phase three of an 
insurgency, so to speak, a direct confrontation phase?
    Dr. Haass. No, but I think they are acting in ways, say, 
vis--vis Taiwan, that we have to be extraordinarily mindful of.
    And what we have to do is basically say: How do we now push 
back selectively to make sure that, whatever their goals are, 
where you begin your intervention, whatever their goals are, 
they decide they cannot pursue them successfully? That is what 
we need to get to.
    Mr. Green. Agreed. Thank you.
    My time has expired. I appreciate you all being here today.
    Chairman, I yield.
    Mr. Bera. Thank you.
    Let me go ahead and recognize my colleague from North 
Carolina, Ms. Manning, and welcome to the subcommittee.
    Ms. Manning. Thank you very much, and thank you, Mr. Chair, 
for putting together this excellent panel.
    Dr. Haass, I was particularly interested in your statement 
that the U.S. needs to focus on certain areas where we need to 
enhance our own ability to be competitive. You mentioned, for 
example, that we need to reform our immigration policies to 
attract the best and the brightest.
    We are currently considering immigration reform that would 
increase the number of H-1B visa holders that are exempt from 
caps, people with Ph.D.s in the STEM fields.
    Is this the kind of reform you believe we need? Would we be 
better off if we extended that exemption to people with 
master's degrees or even bachelor's degrees in the STEM areas?
    Dr. Haass. Directionally, it is 100 percent right. If you 
look at the Fortune 200, 500, a shocking percentage of the 
people are either immigrants or the first generation after 
immigrants. This is real talent.
    China does not have an immigration policy of people coming 
in. This is one of our structural advantages, if we will only 
allow it to be.
    Ms. Manning. Thank you.
    You also referenced the importance of ensuring that we have 
supply chain resilience, diversification of sources, and the 
stockpiling of domestic production.
    We saw during this pandemic that we had a dramatic shortage 
of PPEs when our supplies from China were cutoff. In my own 
district, we had manufacturing companies that were told by the 
prior administration to ramp up and produce those PPEs, and 
then they were left with warehouses full of PPEs when they were 
undercut by lower-cost PPEs from China when the supply chains 
opened back up.
    Do we need to maintain domestic supplies in our own country 
in anticipation of future disruptions?
    Dr. Haass. Well, you raise a good question, and there is a 
risk we will be asking companies to take if we go ahead with 
stockpiling.
    I would say, in certain areas, that is a price worth 
paying. We would say, as part of long-term public security, we 
are going to make certain investments in certain areas.
    What we will probably want to do is, given the expiration 
dates of certain things, is come up also with a way of getting 
those things out of stockpiles while they are still valid.
    And, again, it is something that does not just have to be 
domestic. We could use the USMCA with Canada and Mexico. We 
could do certain things with some of the countries that fall 
under the purview of this committee.
    They are much more likely to work with us if there is also 
an upside for them in the process.
    Ms. Manning. I also have a high-tech manufacturer of 
microchips in my district who has said that we will see the 
loss of our microchip industry to China if we do not protect 
domestic supply chains in that area as well.
    What are your thoughts on ensuring the domestic microchip 
industry?
    Dr. Haass. Well, again, I would defer to the other two to 
some extent.
    But I would say, look, so much of it is in Taiwan. One, it 
is a powerful argument for why Taiwan is so important, that its 
security is so important.
    But, also, I think this is a legitimate subject for debate. 
What do we in the United States need going forward in order to 
not eliminate, but reduce our vulnerability? And there is, 
again, diversification of foreign sources, stockpiling, and 
domestic or joint production arrangements. And the areas of 
chips is one of the things absolutely we ought to be looking 
at.
    Ms. Manning. Thank you.
    I am going to ask this last question and open it to anyone, 
any of our wonderful presenters.
    Throughout history, when a rising power has challenged the 
presiding world power, more often than not the result been war, 
and in many cases the wars have devastated all involved.
    How do we avoid what we have seen so often in history as we 
see increasing clashes between China, in its quest for 
dominance, and the U.S.?
    Dr. Haass. That is in many ways the great strategic 
question of our time.
    I would simply say the Chinese are rational. What we 
constantly want to be is sufficiently strong ourselves and 
organize with our partners and allies so any Chinese leader who 
is tempted to do certain aggressive things that could lead to 
conflict will think twice, because they will realize the game 
is not worth the candle. And that is why exactly what we are 
talking about here today is so essential.
    And, in the immediate future, I would think making sure 
that China is not tempted to move against Taiwan coercively 
ought to be a priority for American foreign policy, not just 
what we declare, but what we do. We have got to close the gap 
between our declaratory policy and our ability to implement it.
    Ms. Manning. Mr. Schriver, would you like to add anything 
to that?
    Mr. Schriver. Sure. Thucydides was a very smart person and 
put forward some very compelling arguments, but that was 
largely a world before nuclear weapons and largely a world 
before we built our system of alliances and partnerships.
    So this isn't really about the U.S. and China per se. It is 
about China's revisionist aspirations and growing power against 
a coalition of like-minded partners who want to preserve the 
free and open order.
    So I think the combination of deterrence through the 
strategic weapons we have and the coalition that we have that 
will ultimately push back against China will be our best 
protection against a conflict that nobody wants.
    Ms. Manning. Thank you.
    Ms. Rolland, I am sorry I did not get to you, but my time 
has expired, and I yield back.
    Mr. Bera. Thank you.
    Let me go ahead and recognize my colleague from California 
and welcome her to the subcommittee.
    Mrs. Kim, you are recognized for 5 minutes of questioning.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you, Chairman Bera and 
Ranking Member Chabot. I appreciate your leadership. It is a 
pleasure to join you today for the first hearing of the Asia 
Subcommittee and welcome this distinguished panel of witnesses.
    And I am really excited to be able to serve as a vice 
ranking member of this subcommittee, and I look forward to 
working with all of you in this position moving forward.
    I would like to start my remarks today by recognizing the 
horrific events that have taken place in Myanmar over the past 
month. The actions taken by the Tatmadaw in overthrowing the 
democratically elected government and cracking down on peaceful 
protesters and killing dozens, if not hundreds, of its own 
people in the streets is deplorable, it is horrific, and it is 
wrong.
    The leaders of Myanmar made a commitment to uphold 
democratic principles over a decade ago, and the United States 
will not tolerate the oppression and killing of the freedom-
loving people of Myanmar.
    And I call on our administration to immediately work with 
our partners in Asia to form a united multilateral front to 
pressure the Tatmadaw to step aside and accept the results of 
this election from last year.
    So, for my first question, I would like to turn to the 
Philippines and the hardships facing land owners and farmers 
there as the government allows or participates in stealing land 
from its own citizens for large corporations or government use.
    Many of my own constituents with ties to the Philippines 
have watched as their family lost their lands and livelihoods 
against their will at the hands of the government and big 
businesses.
    So I would like to pose this question to Mr. Schriver.
    Given your experience dealing with the Philippines, could 
you explain why this issue continues to persist and what the 
United States is doing to resolve it?
    Mr. Schriver. Well, our alliance has always been somewhat 
hindered by the fact that the Filipino people have not had the 
good governance and quality governments that they deserve. 
There is certainly a history of corruption. There is certainly 
a history of elitism that results in unfavorable government 
policies to the people. There is now the issue of extrajudicial 
killings related to the drug war.
    So we have an important relationship with the Philippines. 
It is an important ally. And I do not think we should curb our 
engagement, particularly on the military and security side, 
because there are important things happening in that region.
    But certainly, as a friend of the Philippines, and the 
history that we have there and what we have done side by side, 
we have to be encouraging the Philippines for a more 
representative government and a more enlightened approach to 
these various issues. Otherwise, our partner will be diminished 
and left behind.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Well, thank you.
    Next, I would like to turn your attention to Cambodia.
    As you know, Prime Minister Hun Sen has ruled Cambodia for 
decades as the sole source of centralized power.
    In 2017, he further cemented that power by outlawing 
opposition parties from participating in the Nation's 
Parliament and ensuring one-party rule.
    Kem Sokha, who I had the pleasure of meeting, the leader 
of--he is the opposition--the Cambodia National Ruling Party 
leader. He was then arrested on attempts of seeking to 
overthrow the government and charged further with conspiracy 
with foreign powers last year as he awaits a trial for treason.
    So, Mr. Schriver, could you comment on the current safety 
of Mr. Sokha and what options are available to Congress and the 
administration to have him released from the prison and 
democratic representation reinstated in Cambodia?
    Mr. Schriver. Well, thank you for the question.
    Kem Sokha is an important figure in Cambodia, and certainly 
his efforts to promote a democratic future by participating in 
the elections, despite the flaws in the electoral system and 
the fact that Hun Sen was never going to cede power no matter 
the outcomes. So it is important that he be given the 
opportunity not only for his freedom, but to continue to be 
active in the political space.
    I do check in on his condition every once in a while. You 
probably know he has family members in Washington, DC, who are 
active on Capitol Hill and with the administration. His 
conditions have gone from house arrest to prison and 
different--a variety of ways of holding him.
    And I think the important thing is we continue to pressure 
the government in Phnom Penh to not only release him, but allow 
him to participate in the politics of Cambodia, because it is 
so important for the future of the people there.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you.
    I do have further questions, but I would like to submit 
them for the record if I may. And my time is up, so I yield 
back.
    Mr. Bera. Great. Thank you.
    I think all the members have had a chance to ask questions, 
but I am going to take the chair's prerogative, just because we 
have this wealth of expertise in front of us, and certainly we 
will extend the same to the ranking member in his closing 
remarks, to just ask a couple followup questions on issues that 
we have touched on, but also that we may further want to 
explore.
    And, Dr. Haass, I will also reach out to the Council.
    One area that the ranking member and I talked about was, 
obviously, our failure to get the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
across the finish line and the strategic loss of not having 
that rules-based agreement in place.
    So we will reach out to the Council and others to think 
about understanding our own domestic politics and challenges, 
how we might consider pushing, whether it is joining CPTPP or 
some other multilateral agreement. But certainly not having a 
multilateral agreement in place leaves us vulnerable to Chinese 
influence.
    The two questions that I have, if the witnesses are willing 
to indulge, we have alluded to the multilateral coalition and 
over the past 12 months with the pandemic have had multiple 
conversations with our European allies and parliamentarians in 
how we approach the region.
    And if any of the witnesses could comment on how we marry 
an Indo-Pacific strategy with our transatlantic strategy. I 
think that is something we did not do well in the post-World 
War II environment, but certainly in this new world, talking to 
our allies in Germany and elsewhere, I think it is in our 
interest to create that partnership.
    And then a second piece that perhaps Ms. Rolland, but 
certainly would open up to any of the panelists, my last travel 
to the region prepandemic included visiting both Sri Lanka and 
Nepal. And part of the intent in those two countries was we had 
MCC compacts that were approved that were there to help build 
the infrastructure, to help the hydroelectric projects in Nepal 
that would be to the benefit of this young democracy.
    They both got enmeshed in domestic politics, political 
issues there, and I think it is my understanding that neither 
one got across the finish line.
    And, as we think about aid and development, countering Belt 
and Road, it does occur to me that we also--my intuition was 
that, domestically, there probably was Chinese influence in 
turning the public against some of these what, again, I thought 
were incredibly good projects that would help both Sri Lanka 
and Nepal. So how we might think about the influence battle as 
well and how we counter that.
    So I will turn it over maybe to Dr. Haass, and then Ms. 
Rolland, and then Mr. Schriver.
    Dr. Haass. Thank you, sir.
    By the way, 10 seconds on CPTPP. One way to expand, I 
think, domestic support in this country for entry could be if 
we introduced a serious climate component, so it did not just 
make economic and strategic sense, but, for example, if you try 
to modify the agreement so certain types of goods either had 
advantages or disadvantages in trying to enter based upon their 
use, how much carbon and so forth they were associated with, 
that might be something to change the debate in this country. 
Just saying.
    In terms of transatlantic, it is important. We saw with the 
separate EU-China investment agreement, if we do not coordinate 
with the Europeans, we could pay a price for it. We could lose 
leverage vis--vis China. So your meetings with parliamentarians 
are actually a really good idea.
    We should talk about things like coordinating sanctions and 
responses to Taiwan contingencies. There is more we could and 
should be doing on Hong Kong and on other human rights 
violations, like the Uyghurs, agreement on technology transfer 
restrictions, and on something like 5G.
    One of the lessons we should have learned, as Will Rogers 
might have said if you had invited him here today, you cannot 
beat something with nothing. So the United States and Europe 
are natural technology partners. Maybe it is in 6G or other 
things. And that ought to be part of the conversation I would 
think you and your colleagues would have.
    Mr. Bera. Great.
    Ms. Rolland.
    Ms. Rolland. Thank you, sir.
    On the European side, being a European myself, I have to 
say something about that. I think the time is really right. 
And, again, I think European powers are more and more willing 
to look into the Indo-Pacific region.
    Many of them have their own Indo-Pacific strategy set in 
place. That includes not just the military and security 
component, but also other dimensions that I think align very 
well with the American interests.
    Of course, Europeans being Europeans, they will always want 
to retain a degree of strategic autonomy and not necessarily be 
always aligned with Washington, DC. However, I think 
convergence of interests, the convergence of values, are really 
important and are going to lead to greater cooperation in all 
of these domains confronting the China challenge.
    Regarding your experience with Nepal and Sri Lanka, I thank 
you for sharing this experience. And I think this is a great 
example of where actually BRI is, again, more of a grand 
strategy that looks into various domains. Influence operation 
is an extremely important component of them, including the 
cooperation of local elites, which in the long-term influenced 
political decisions.
    And so, if the U.S. wants to provide alternatives to some 
of these projects, it cannot just be in terms of contracts and 
sustainable projects that we can offer, that the U.S. can 
offer, but also working more broadly with different 
constituencies in those countries, improving good governance, 
making sure that, again, the governments of countries where 
China wants to expand its influence are very much aware of the 
consequences it might have for their national interests in the 
long-term as well.
    So it is a comprehensive objective, I believe.
    Mr. Bera. Great.
    Mr. Schriver.
    Mr. Schriver. Well, I endorse those answers.
    I would just add on the EU point, since I came from the 
Defense Department, when it comes to actual hard power, there 
is really--some countries are more important than others.
    And I think we need to look at enhancing our cooperation 
with the French, for example, who have forward-deployed forces 
in the Pacific region given their Pacific holdings. They have 
frigates in New Caledonia and personnel stationed there.
    So working with them, working with the Brits on the 
sanctions enforcement directed at North Korea. People who can 
bring hard power are part of this equation as well, but it is a 
little bit more limited than you will find in the other areas 
of cooperation.
    Mr. Bera. Great. Thank you.
    And, again, I want to thank the witnesses.
    Let me offer the same courtesy to the ranking member, if 
there are any closing questions or clarifications and any 
closing comments that you would like to make.
    Mr. Chabot.
    Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    This panel did such a great job in their presentations and 
answering the questions that I am not going to toss them any 
more questions.
    Also, we have our last vote of the day, the week, and this 
session coming up here any minute now, so I do not want to drag 
it out.
    But, really, all three were excellent. So I, again, commend 
you, Mr. Chairman, and staffs on both sides for working this 
out with these witnesses.
    I hope that we can see them on future panels, which I am 
quite sure we probably will, because they really have been 
great.
    So thank you very much. I hope you all have a great 
weekend. And you are always welcome to come to Cincinnati, the 
greatest city in the United States, at any time. I just happen 
to represent it.
    So, anyway, you all take care.
    Back to you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Bera. Great.
    I want to thank the ranking member, Mr. Chabot.
    I want to thank our witnesses who participated in this very 
important virtual hearing.
    Without objection, all members will have 5 days to submit 
statements, extraneous materials, and questions for the record 
subject to the length limitation in the rules.
    And, again, look forward to working with each of the 
witnesses, as well as the members of the subcommittee, to 
address these major issues.
    And, with that, a virtual bang of the gavel, and the 
subcommittee is adjourned.
    Thank you.
    [Whereupon, at 11:59 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

                                APPENDIX
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          STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD FROM REPRESENTAIVE CONNOLLY
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            RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
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