[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 814 Reported in Senate (RS)]
<DOC>
Calendar No. 49
117th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 814
To promote security partnership with Ukraine, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
March 17 (legislative day, March 16), 2021
Mr. Risch (for himself, Mr. Menendez, Mr. Portman, Mr. Murphy, Mr.
Barrasso, Mrs. Shaheen, and Mr. Graham) introduced the following bill;
which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
April 26, 2021
Reported by Mr. Menendez, with an amendment
[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed
in italic]
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To promote security partnership with Ukraine, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
<DELETED>SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.</DELETED>
<DELETED> This Act may be cited as the ``Ukraine Security
Partnership Act of 2021''.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 2. FINDINGS.</DELETED>
<DELETED> Congress makes the following findings:</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) Throughout its history, Ukraine has
experienced several long periods of occupation.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) Between 1919 and 1991, Ukraine was brutally
ruled by the Soviet Union, whose policy of agricultural
collectivization caused the Holodomor of 1932-1933, a man-made
famine that resulted in the death of at least 3,000,000
Ukrainians by starvation.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) During the Nazi occupation of Ukraine
accompanying World War II--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) approximately 3,500,000 Ukrainian
civilians and 3,000,000 soldiers were killed;
and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) approximately 1,500,000 Jews were
massacred.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (4) Ukraine declared its independence from Moscow
in 1991, after the collapse of the Soviet Union.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (5) In the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, the Russian
Federation, the United States, and the United Kingdom pledged
to ``respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing
borders of Ukraine'' and ``refrain from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of Ukraine'' in exchange for Ukraine's surrender
of its nuclear arsenal.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (6) From November 2004 through January 2005,
thousands of Ukrainians took to the streets to peacefully
protest electoral fraud and widespread corruption by the ruling
elite in the 2004 Presidential election, successfully
triggering a re-vote, in what became known as the Orange
Revolution.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (7) During Ukraine's 2014 Revolution of Dignity,
or Euromaidan, the pro-Russian government of President Viktor
Yanukovych was forced to resign after thousands of Ukrainians
peacefully protested Yanukovych's decision to reject a closer
relationship with the European Union and his continued systemic
corruption, and over 100 of those protestors were killed by
violent government suppression.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (8) Fearful of Ukraine's strengthened pro-Western
orientation after the Revolution of Dignity, the Government of
the Russian Federation, in violation of international law and
in contravention of its commitments in the Budapest
Memorandum--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) sent undisclosed military personnel
into Ukraine's Autonomous Republic of Crimea in
February 2014 and has illegally occupied the Crimean
Peninsula for the past six years;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) sent covert, unmarked military
personnel into the Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and
Luhansk in April 2014, instigating and supporting a
still-ongoing conflict that has cost nearly 14,000
lives; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) provided the Buk missile system used
by those Russia-backed forces to shoot down Malaysian
Airlines Flight 17 over eastern Ukraine in July 2014,
killing all 298 passengers and crew on board.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (9) Under Russian control, Crimean authorities
have kidnapped, imprisoned, and tortured Crimean Tatars,
opposition figures, activists, and other minority populations,
and have persecuted religious minorities by pressing false
charges of terrorism and deregistering religious
centers.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (10) In September 2014, in an attempt to stop the
fighting that the Russian Federation had initiated in eastern
Ukraine, France, Germany, Ukraine, the Russian Federation, the
Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE), and Russia-
backed forces from eastern Ukraine signed the Minsk
Protocol.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (11) In February 2015, after the failure of the
initial Minsk Protocol, the Russian Federation committed to the
Minsk II Agreement, the roadmap for resolving the conflict in
eastern Ukraine, signed by the Governments of Ukraine, Russia,
France, and Germany.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (12) Despite these agreements, the Government of
the Russian Federation continues to violate Ukrainian
sovereignty through--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) manipulation of Ukraine's dependence
on Russian natural gas, including cutting off access in
2014, which deprived Ukraine of its energy supply and
transit fees;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) espionage and clandestine
assassinations on Ukrainian territory;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) continuous cyber warfare against the
Government of Ukraine and Ukrainian businesses, such as
the NotPetya hack in 2017; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (D) seizure of Ukrainian property and
citizens, including the November 2018 seizure in the
Kerch Strait of three Ukrainian naval vessels and 24
Ukrainian officers on board those vessels.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (13) In July 2018, Secretary of State Michael R.
Pompeo issued the Crimea Declaration and reiterated in February
2020 on the sixth anniversary of Russia's illegal occupation
that ``Crimea is Ukraine''.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (14) On February 26, 2021, President Joseph R.
Biden confirmed that Crimea is Ukraine and the United States
does not and will never recognize Russia's purported annexation
of the peninsula.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (15) Since April 2014, at least 4,100 Ukrainian
soldiers have died fighting for their country against the
Russian Federation and Russia-backed forces, while no less than
3,361 civilians have perished as a result of that
fighting.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (16) Despite Ukraine's tumultuous history and
neighborhood, in under 30 years it has risen from the collapse
of the Soviet Union to become a developing democracy, steadily
working to overcome its Soviet legacy of oppression, oligarchic
control, and corruption.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (17) Running on a strong anti-corruption platform,
Volodymyr Zelensky won the 2019 presidential election with 73
percent of the vote, and his political party, Servant of the
People, won a parliamentary majority in the Ukrainian
parliament.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (18) The OSCE confirmed the 2019 elections were
``competitive and fundamental freedoms were generally
respected''.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (19) Since 2014, the Government of Ukraine has
made difficult and substantial reforms in an effort to address
corruption and more closely align with the West, such as
slimming and decentralizing its bureaucracy, removing immunity
from prosecution for Members of Parliament, reforming its gas,
pension, and procurement systems, and working to adapt its
military to the standards of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO).</DELETED>
<DELETED> (20) Despite progress in reforming many areas of
Ukrainian governance, serious issues still remain, particularly
in the areas of corruption and rule of law.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (21) The United States Government has consistently
supported Ukraine's democratic transition and its fight against
Russia-backed forces by assisting its governance reform
efforts, maintaining robust and coordinated sanctions against
the Russian Federation alongside the European Union, and
providing the Ukrainian military with training and equipment,
including lethal defensive weaponry.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (22) In addition to the United States, the
European Union, European countries, and Canada have provided
substantial diplomatic, monetary, and military support for
Ukraine's democratic transition and its fight against Russia-
backed forces in eastern Ukraine, and also have implemented and
maintained robust sanctions regimes against the Russian
Federation for its illegal occupation of Crimea and its active
destabilization of Ukraine.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (23) the Government of Ukraine has steadfastly
supported the United States and European allies by deploying
troops to Iraq, Afghanistan, and NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR),
allowing United States military planes to refuel on Ukrainian
soil, and trading billions of dollars' worth of goods and
services with the United States.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (24) NATO has recently decided to include Ukraine
in its Enhanced Opportunities Partnership in recognition of
Ukraine's contributions to NATO missions and efforts to reform
its military in line with NATO standards.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (25) Since the Russian Federation's 2014 invasion
of Ukraine, the United States Congress has demonstrated its
support for Ukraine through the passage of legislation,
including the Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity,
Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014
(Public Law 113-95; 22 U.S.C. 8901 et seq.), the Ukraine
Freedom Support Act (Public Law 113-272; 22 U.S.C. 8921 et
seq.), the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative established
under section 1250 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114-92; 129 Stat. 1068), the
Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (Public
Law 115-44), and the Protecting Europe's Energy Security Act of
2019 (Public Law 116-92, title LXXV), and the United States
Congress continues to demonstrate strong support for assisting
Ukraine in defending itself and deterring Russia.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.</DELETED>
<DELETED> It is the sense of Congress that--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) Ukraine stands as a bulwark against the malign
influence of the Russian Federation in Europe, and robust
United States support for Ukraine is vital to United States
national security and demonstrates the commitment of the United
States to upholding a free and open international
order;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) since Ukraine's independence in 1991, the
Government and people of Ukraine have made significant strides
towards improved governance, rule of law, anti-corruption
measures, and economic reforms;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) Ukraine's long-term viability is directly
connected to its efforts to reduce corruption and build strong
democratic institutions that are able to defend against
internal and external corrupt actors;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (4) the efforts and sacrifices of Ukrainian
citizens to determine their own fate after centuries of
oppression, through democratic representation and governance
reforms, is evidence of that country's dedication to a free,
independent, and democratic future;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (5) Ukraine has proven itself to be a valuable
security partner of the United States, not simply a recipient
of assistance;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (6) it is in the national security interests of
the United States to continue and deepen its security
partnership with Ukraine, including through the provision of
both lethal and non-lethal assistance;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (7) the United States should continue to place
policy-based conditions on Ukraine's receipt of financial and
military assistance, as that mechanism has proven effective in
incentivizing reforms in Ukraine;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (8) the United States should use its voice and
vote at NATO to encourage the adoption of a policy by the
Alliance that all of its member states will refuse to recognize
the illegal attempted annexation of Crimea by the Russian
Federation;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (9) the United States should continue to bolster
the capacity of the Ukrainian Navy as it strives to fulfill the
goals it set out in its ``Strategy of the Naval Forces of the
Armed Forces of Ukraine 2035'';</DELETED>
<DELETED> (10) the military-focused technical, training,
maintenance, and logistical assistance provided by the United
States to Ukraine is as essential as the military hardware
provided to the country;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (11) all security assistance provided to Ukraine
should continue to be subject to rigorous vetting requirements
under section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22
U.S.C. 2378d) and security cooperation under section 362 of
title 10, United States Code, including assistance provided to
units in the National Guard of Ukraine as well as all units
falling under the authority of the Ministry of
Defense;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (12) the Office of Defense Cooperation at the
United States Embassy in Ukraine should be fully staffed with
officers who serve three-year terms in order to administer the
security assistance being provided to the country;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (13) the Secretary of Defense should conduct an
assessment of the staffing resources of the Office of Defense
Cooperation and strongly consider providing additional staff to
the Office of Defense Cooperation in Ukraine;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (14) the enduring partnership between the United
States and Ukraine, including bipartisan support for a
sovereign, democratic, and whole Ukraine through political,
monetary, and military assistance, remains strong and must
continue to be reaffirmed; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (15) the United States should continue to strongly
support Ukraine's ambitions to join the Euro-Atlantic community
of democracies.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.</DELETED>
<DELETED> It is the policy of the United States--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) to refuse to recognize the attempted
annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation, an action that
was taken in contravention of international law;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) to utilize existing sanctions and other
authorities to deter malign actions by the Russian Federation
in Ukraine, including the mandates and authorities codified by
the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act
(Public Law 115-44);</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) to work with our European allies to coordinate
strategies to curtail Russian malign influence in Ukraine;
and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (4) to support democratic, economic, and anti-
corruption reforms in Ukraine and the country's integration
into Euro-Atlantic institutions.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 5. STRATEGY ON UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT FOR
UKRAINE.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report with a strategy on how
the United States will work to diplomatically support Ukraine during
fiscal years 2022 through 2026.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (b) Elements.--The report required under subsection (a)
shall include the following elements:</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) A description of how relevant departments and
agencies of the United States Government will work together to
collectively support efforts by the Government of Ukraine to
deter Russian aggression in the form of military incursions,
cyber attacks, the coercive use of energy resources, use of
passportization, and efforts to corrupt the Ukrainian political
and economic systems.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) A description of the United States current
efforts and strategy to support Ukrainian diplomatic
initiatives when they align with United States
interests.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) A strategy on how the United States will use
its voice and vote at the United Nations, OSCE, Council of
Europe, NATO, and other relevant international bodies to
support Ukraine and its reform efforts.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (4) A strategy on how the United States will
assist Ukraine in bolstering its diplomatic, economic, energy,
and maritime relationships with key Black Sea countries,
including Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey, and Georgia.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (5) A strategy on how the United States will
engage with Germany, France, Ukraine, and Russia to advance the
Normandy Format and Minsk Agreements.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (6) A strategy on how the United States will work
with allies to continue to engage Ukraine to ensure meaningful
progress on democratic, economic, and anti-corruption
reforms.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (c) Form.--The report required under subsection (a) shall
be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified
annex.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 6. UNITED STATES-EUROPE WORKING GROUP ON
UKRAINE.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (a) In General.--The Secretary of State should seek to
establish a United States-Europe Working Group on Ukraine.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (b) Representation.--The United States-Europe Working
Group on Ukraine should include high-level representatives from the
European Union, its institutions, and relevant European governments, as
appropriate, to jointly prioritize, evaluate and coordinate economic
and policy reform assistance and support for Ukraine.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (c) Termination.--The authorities authorized under this
section shall terminate on September 30 of the fifth fiscal year
beginning after the date of the enactment of this Act.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 7. SPECIAL ENVOY FOR UKRAINE.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (a) Establishment.--The President should appoint, by and
with the consent of the Senate, a Special Envoy for Ukraine, who should
report to the Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and
Eurasia.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (b) Rank.--The Special Envoy for Ukraine shall have the
rank and status of ambassador.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (c) Responsibilities.--The Special Envoy for Ukraine
should--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) serve as the United States liaison to the
Normandy Format, tasked with leading the peace process between
Ukraine and the Russian Federation;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) facilitate diplomatic outreach to and dialogue
with countries in the Black Sea region that, like Ukraine, are
faced with the impact of Russia's growing militarization of the
Sea;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) coordinate closely with the Chief of Mission
in Ukraine;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (4) coordinate with the United States-Europe
Working Group on Ukraine established pursuant to section
6;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (5) coordinate with the OSCE Special Monitoring
Mission to Ukraine; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (6) provide the Committee on Foreign Relations of
the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives regular updates and briefings on the status of
peace negotiations.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (d) Termination.--The Special Envoy for Ukraine position
authorized under subsection (a) shall terminate 5 years after the date
of the enactment of this Act.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 8. FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated for the Department of State for each of fiscal years
2022 through 2026 $300,000,000 for Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
assistance to Ukraine to assist the country in meeting its defense
needs.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (b) Availability of Funds.--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) In general.--Of the amount authorized to be
appropriated for each fiscal year pursuant to subsection (a),
not more than $150,000,000 shall be made available until the
Secretary of State makes the certification described in
paragraph (2) for such fiscal year, including a detailed
explanation justifying the certification with respect to each
of the categories listed in subparagraphs (A) through (G) of
such paragraph. The certification shall be submitted to the
appropriate congressional committees in unclassified form, but
may contain a classified annex.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) Certification.--The certification described in
this paragraph is a certification by the Secretary of State, in
coordination with the Secretary of Defense, that the Government
of Ukraine has taken actions to--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) make defense institutional reforms, in
accordance with NATO standards;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) further strengthen civilian control of
the military;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) reform its state-owned arms production
sector;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (D) increase transparency and
accountability in defense procurement;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (E) respect Verkhovna Rada efforts to
exercise oversight of the Ministry of Defense and
military forces; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (F) promote respect for the observation of
human rights as enshrined in the requirements of
section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22
U.S.C. 2378d) within the security forces of
Ukraine.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (c) Notice to Congress.--Not later than 15 days before
providing assistance or support under pursuant to subsection (a), the
Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a notification containing the following:</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) A detailed description of the assistance or
support to be provided, including--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) the objectives of such assistance or
support;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) the budget for such assistance or
support; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) the expected or estimated timeline for
delivery of such assistance or support.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) A description of such other matters as the
Secretary considers appropriate.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (d) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
assistance provided under this section should--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) prioritize the procurement of vessels for the
Ukrainian Navy and other articles that bolster the capacity of
the Ukrainian Navy to counter Russian maritime aggression and
maintain the freedom of innocent passage throughout the Black
Sea; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) ensure adequate planning for maintenance for
any equipment provided.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (e) Authority To Provide Lethal Assistance.--The Secretary
of State is authorized to provide lethal assistance under this section,
including anti-armor weapon systems, mortars, crew-served weapons and
ammunition, grenade launchers and ammunition, anti-tank weapons
systems, anti-ship weapons systems, anti-aircraft weapons systems, and
small arms and ammunition.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (f) Transfer Authority.--The Secretary of Defense may
transfer amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for
assistance under section 333 of title 10, United States Code, to the
Department of State to be made available for Foreign Military Finance
assistance to Ukraine.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 9. EXPEDITED EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLES TRANSFER
PROGRAM.</DELETED>
<DELETED> During fiscal years 2022 through 2026, the delivery of
excess defense articles to Ukraine shall be given the same priority as
that given other countries and regions under section 516(c)(2) of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j(c)(2)).</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 10. STRATEGY ON EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLES FROM
ALLIES.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State in consultation with
the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a classified strategy on how the United States will
encourage third countries to donate excess defense equipment to
Ukraine.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (b) Elements.--The report required under subsection (a)
shall include the following elements:</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) A listing of all friendly and allied nations
that have excess defense material that may be compatible with
the needs and systems utilized by the Armed Forces of
Ukraine.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) A description of the diplomatic efforts
undertaken by the United States Government to encourage allied
nations to donate their excess defense articles to Ukraine on
an expedited basis.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 11. IMET COOPERATION WITH UKRAINE.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated to the Department of State $4,000,000 for each of
fiscal years 2022 through 2026 for International Military Education and
Training (IMET) assistance for Ukraine. The assistance shall be made
available for the following purposes:</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) Training of future leaders.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) Fostering a better understanding of the United
States.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) Establishing a rapport between the United
States Armed Forces and Ukraine's military to build
partnerships for the future.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (4) Enhancement of interoperability and
capabilities for joint operations.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (5) Focusing on professional military education,
civilian control of the military, and human rights.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (b) Availability of Funds.--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) In general.--Of the amount authorized to be
appropriated for each fiscal year pursuant to subsection (a),
not more than $3,000,000 may be made available until the
Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of
Defense, makes the certification described in paragraph (2) to
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the
Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives,
including a detailed explanation justifying the certification
with respect to each of the categories listed in subparagraphs
(A) through (G) of such paragraph. The certification shall be
submitted to the appropriate congressional committees in
unclassified form, but may contain a classified
annex.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) Certification.--The certification described in
this paragraph is a certification by the Secretary of State, in
coordination with the Secretary of Defense, that the Government
of Ukraine has taken actions to--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) make defense institutional reforms, in
accordance with NATO standards;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) further strengthen civilian control of
the military;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) reform its state-owned arms production
sector;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (D) increase transparency and
accountability in defense procurement;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (E) respect Verkhovna Rada efforts to
exercise oversight of the Ministry of Defense and
military forces; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (F) promote respect for the observation of
human rights as enshrined in the requirements of
section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22
U.S.C. 2378d) within the security forces of
Ukraine.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (c) Notice to Congress.--Not later than 15 days before
providing assistance or support pursuant to subsection (a), the
Secretary of State shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations
of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives a notification containing the following
elements:</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) A detailed description of the assistance or
support to be provided, including--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) the objectives of such assistance or
support;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) the budget for such assistance or
support; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) the expected or estimated timeline for
delivery of such assistance or support.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) A description of such other matters as the
Secretary considers appropriate.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 12. STRATEGY ON IMET PROGRAMMING IN UKRAINE.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
the Government of Ukraine should fully utilize the United States IMET
program, encourage eligible officers and civilian leaders to
participate in the training, and promote successful graduates to
positions of prominence in the Ukrainian Armed Forces.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (b) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a strategy for the implementation
of the IMET program in Ukraine authorized under section 11.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (c) Elements.--The strategy required under subsection (a)
shall include the following elements:</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) A clear plan, developed in close consultation
with the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces of
Ukraine, for how the IMET program will be used by the United
States Government and the Government of Ukraine to propel
program graduates to positions of prominence in support of the
Ukrainian military's reform efforts in line with NATO
standards.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) An assessment of the education and training
requirements of the Ukrainian military and clear
recommendations for how IMET graduates should be assigned by
the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense upon completion of education
or training.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) An accounting of the current combat
requirements of the Ukrainian military and an assessment of the
viability of alternative mobile training teams, distributed
learning, and other flexible solutions to reach such
students.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (4) An identification of opportunities to
influence the next generation of leaders through attendance at
United States staff and war colleges, junior leader development
programs, and technical schools.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (d) Form.--The strategy required under subsection (a)
shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified
annex.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 13. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON LOAN PROGRAM.</DELETED>
<DELETED> It is the sense of Congress that--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) as appropriate, the United States Government
should provide direct loans to Ukraine for the procurement of
defense articles, defense services, and design and construction
services pursuant to the authority of section 23 of the Arms
Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763) to support the further
development of Ukraine's military forces; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) such loans should be considered an additive
security assistance tool, and not a substitute for Foreign
Military Financing for grant assistance or Ukraine Security
Assistance Initiative programming.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 14. STRATEGY TO PROTECT UKRAINE'S DEFENSE INDUSTRY FROM
STRATEGIC COMPETITORS.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
the United States should work with the Government of Ukraine to ensure
strategic assets and companies in Ukraine's defense industry are not
subject to foreign ownership, control, or undue influence by strategic
competitors to the United States, such as the People's Republic of
China (PRC).</DELETED>
<DELETED> (b) Strategy Required.--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense and
the Secretary of State shall jointly submit to the appropriate
committees of Congress a strategy to support Ukraine in
protecting its defense industry from predatory
investments.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) Elements.--The strategy required under
paragraph (1) shall include the following elements:</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) A description of the efforts by
strategic competitors, such as the PRC, to acquire
strategic assets and companies in Ukraine's defense
industry in a predatory manner and the national
security implications for Ukraine, the United States,
and other NATO allies and partners.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) A description of vulnerable strategic
assets and companies in Ukraine's defense industry that
would benefit from foreign investments and joint
ventures.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) A description of the reforms to
Ukraine's defense industry and export controls that are
necessary to incentivize Western investments in
them.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (D) A strategy to promote, as appropriate,
United States direct investment in and joint ventures
with strategic companies in Ukraine's defense industry
to provide an alternative to PRC investments, and to
engage like-minded allies and partners on these
efforts.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) Form.--The strategy required under paragraph
(1) shall be submitted in classified form.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (c) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the
Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 15. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.</DELETED>
<DELETED> In this Act, the term ``appropriate congressional
committees'' means--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the
Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives.</DELETED>
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Ukraine Security Partnership Act of
2021''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Throughout its history, Ukraine has experienced several
long periods of occupation.
(2) Between 1919 and 1991, Ukraine was brutally ruled by
the Soviet Union, whose policy of agricultural collectivization
caused the Holodomor of 1932-1933, a man-made famine that
resulted in the death of at least 3,000,000 Ukrainians by
starvation.
(3) During the Nazi occupation of Ukraine accompanying
World War II--
(A) approximately 3,500,000 Ukrainian civilians and
3,000,000 soldiers were killed; and
(B) approximately 1,500,000 Jews were massacred.
(4) Ukraine declared its independence from Moscow in 1991,
after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
(5) In the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, the Russian
Federation, the United States, and the United Kingdom pledged
to ``respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing
borders of Ukraine'' and ``refrain from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of Ukraine'' in exchange for Ukraine's surrender
of its nuclear arsenal.
(6) From November 2004 through January 2005, thousands of
Ukrainians took to the streets to peacefully protest electoral
fraud and widespread corruption by the ruling elite in the 2004
Presidential election, successfully triggering a re-vote, in
what became known as the Orange Revolution.
(7) During Ukraine's 2014 Revolution of Dignity, or
Euromaidan, the pro-Russian government of President Viktor
Yanukovych was forced to resign after thousands of Ukrainians
peacefully protested Yanukovych's decision to reject a closer
relationship with the European Union and his continued systemic
corruption, and over 100 of those protestors were killed by
violent government suppression.
(8) Fearful of Ukraine's strengthened pro-Western
orientation after the Revolution of Dignity, the Government of
the Russian Federation, in violation of international law and
in contravention of its commitments in the Budapest
Memorandum--
(A) sent undisclosed military personnel into
Ukraine's Autonomous Republic of Crimea in February
2014 and has illegally occupied the Crimean Peninsula
for the past seven years;
(B) sent covert, unmarked military personnel into
the Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk in April
2014, instigating and supporting a still-ongoing
conflict that has cost nearly 14,000 lives; and
(C) provided the Buk missile system used by those
Russia-led forces to shoot down Malaysian Airlines
Flight 17 over eastern Ukraine in July 2014, killing
all 298 passengers and crew on board;
(9) Under Russian control, Crimean authorities have
kidnapped, imprisoned, and tortured Crimean Tatars, opposition
figures, activists, and other minority populations, and have
persecuted religious minorities by pressing false charges of
terrorism and deregistering religious centers.
(10) In September 2014, in an attempt to stop the fighting
that the Russian Federation had initiated in eastern Ukraine,
France, Germany, Ukraine, the Russian Federation, the
Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE), and Russia-
led forces from eastern Ukraine signed the Minsk Protocol.
(11) In February 2015, after the failure of the initial
Minsk Protocol, the Russian Federation committed to the Minsk
II Agreement, the roadmap for resolving the conflict in eastern
Ukraine, signed by the Governments of Ukraine, Russia, France,
and Germany.
(12) Despite these agreements, the Government of the
Russian Federation continues to violate Ukrainian sovereignty
through--
(A) manipulation of Ukraine's dependence on Russian
natural gas, including cutting off access in 2014,
which deprived Ukraine of its energy supply and transit
fees;
(B) espionage and clandestine assassinations on
Ukrainian territory;
(C) continuous cyber warfare against the Government
of Ukraine and Ukrainian businesses, such as the
NotPetya hack in 2017; and
(D) seizure of Ukrainian property and citizens,
including the November 2018 seizure in the Kerch Strait
of three Ukrainian naval vessels and 24 Ukrainian
officers on board those vessels.
(13) In July 2018, Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo
issued the Crimea Declaration and reiterated in February 2020
on the sixth anniversary of Russia's illegal occupation that
``Crimea is Ukraine''.
(14) On February 26, 2021 President Joseph R. Biden
confirmed that Crimea is Ukraine and the United States does not
and will never recognize Russia's purported annexation of the
peninsula.
(15) Since April 2014, at least 4,100 Ukrainian soldiers
have died fighting for their country against the Russian
Federation and Russia-led forces, while no less than 3,361
civilians have perished as a result of that fighting.
(16) Despite Ukraine's tumultuous history and neighborhood,
in under 30 years it has risen from the collapse of the Soviet
Union to become a developing democracy, steadily working to
overcome its Soviet legacy of oppression, oligarchic control,
and corruption.
(17) Running on a strong anti-corruption platform,
Volodymyr Zelensky won the 2019 presidential election with 73
percent of the vote, and his political party, Servant of the
People, won a parliamentary majority in the Ukrainian
parliament.
(18) The OSCE confirmed the 2019 elections were
``competitive and fundamental freedoms were generally
respected''.
(19) In March and April 2021, the Russian Federation
amassed over 75,000 troops on its border with the Eastern
Ukraine and in the occupied territory of Crimea.
(20) Since 2014, the Government of Ukraine has made
difficult and substantial reforms in an effort to address
corruption and more closely align with the West, such as
slimming and decentralizing its bureaucracy, removing immunity
from prosecution for Members of Parliament, reforming its gas,
pension, and procurement systems, and working to adapt its
military to the standards of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO).
(21) Despite progress in reforming many areas of Ukrainian
governance, serious issues still remain, particularly in the
areas of corruption and rule of law.
(22) The United States Government has consistently
supported Ukraine's democratic transition and its fight against
Russia-led forces by assisting its governance reform efforts,
maintaining robust and coordinated sanctions against the
Russian Federation alongside the European Union, and providing
the Ukrainian military with training and equipment, including
lethal defensive weaponry.
(23) In addition to the United States, the European Union,
European countries, and Canada have provided substantial
diplomatic, monetary, and military support for Ukraine's
democratic transition and its fight against Russia-led forces
in eastern Ukraine, and also have implemented and maintained
robust sanctions regimes against the Russian Federation for its
illegal occupation of Crimea and its active destabilization of
Ukraine.
(24) the Government of Ukraine has steadfastly supported
the United States and European allies by deploying troops to
Iraq, Afghanistan, and NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR), allowing
United States military planes to refuel on Ukrainian soil, and
trading billions of dollars' worth of goods and services with
the United States.
(25) NATO has recently decided to include Ukraine in its
Enhanced Opportunities Partnership in recognition of Ukraine's
contributions to NATO missions and efforts to reform its
military in line with NATO standards.
(26) Since the Russian Federation's 2014 invasion of
Ukraine, the United States Congress has demonstrated its
support for Ukraine through the passage of legislation,
including the Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity,
Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014
(Public Law 113-95; 22 U.S.C. 8901 et seq.), the Ukraine
Freedom Support Act (Public Law 113-272; 22 U.S.C. 8921 et
seq.), the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative established
under section 1250 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114-92; 129 Stat. 1068), the
Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (Public
Law 115-44), and the Protecting Europe's Energy Security Act of
2019 (Public Law 116-92, title LXXV), and the United States
Congress continues to demonstrate strong support for assisting
Ukraine in defending itself and deterring Russia.
SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) Ukraine stands as a bulwark against the malign
influence of the Russian Federation in Europe, and robust
United States support for Ukraine is vital to United States
national security and demonstrates the commitment of the United
States to upholding a free and open international order;
(2) since Ukraine's independence in 1991, the Government
and people of Ukraine have made significant strides towards
improved governance, rule of law, anti-corruption measures, and
economic reforms;
(3) Ukraine's long-term viability is directly connected to
its efforts to reduce corruption and build strong democratic
institutions that are able to defend against internal and
external corrupt actors;
(4) the efforts and sacrifices of Ukrainian citizens to
determine their own fate after centuries of oppression, through
democratic representation and governance reforms, is evidence
of that country's dedication to a free, independent, and
democratic future;
(5) Ukraine has proven itself to be a valuable security
partner of the United States, not simply a recipient of
assistance;
(6) it is in the national security interests of the United
States to continue and deepen its security partnership with
Ukraine, including through the provision of both lethal and
non-lethal assistance;
(7) the United States should continue to place policy-based
conditions on Ukraine's receipt of financial and military
assistance, as that mechanism has proven effective in
incentivizing reforms in Ukraine;
(8) the United States should use its voice and vote at NATO
to encourage the adoption of a policy by the Alliance that all
of its member states will refuse to recognize the illegal
attempted annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation;
(9) the United States should support at the highest level
and take an active part in the Ukrainian ``Crimean Platform''
initiative to ensure that the international community's
attention remains focused on--
(A) the unacceptable violation of Ukraine's
territorial integrity in Crimea; and
(B) working towards the reversal of such violation;
(10) the United States should continue to bolster the
capacity of the Ukrainian Navy as it strives to fulfill the
goals it set out in its ``Strategy of the Naval Forces of the
Armed Forces of Ukraine 2035'';
(11) the military-focused technical, training, maintenance,
and logistical assistance provided by the United States to
Ukraine is as essential as the military hardware provided to
the country;
(12) all security assistance provided to Ukraine should
continue to be subject to rigorous vetting requirements under
section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
2378d) and security cooperation under section 362 of title 10,
United States Code, including assistance provided to units in
the National Guard of Ukraine as well as all units falling
under the authority of the Ministry of Defense;
(13) the Office of Defense Cooperation at the United States
Embassy in Ukraine should be fully staffed with officers who
serve three-year terms in order to administer the security
assistance being provided to the country;
(14) the Secretary of Defense should conduct an assessment
of the staffing resources of the Office of Defense Cooperation
and strongly consider providing additional staff to the Office
of Defense Cooperation in Ukraine;
(15) the United States should continue to support Ukraine's
NATO aspirations, including through work towards a Membership
Action Plan;
(16) the enduring partnership between the United States and
Ukraine, including bipartisan support for a sovereign,
democratic, and whole Ukraine through political, monetary, and
military assistance, remains strong and must continue to be
reaffirmed; and
(17) the United States should continue to strongly support
Ukraine's ambitions to join the Euro-Atlantic community of
democracies.
SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to refuse to recognize the attempted annexation of
Crimea by the Russian Federation, an action that was taken in
contravention of international law;
(2) to utilize existing sanctions and other authorities to
deter malign actions by the Russian Federation in or intended
to harm Ukraine, including the mandates and authorities
codified by--
(A) the Countering America's Adversaries Through
Sanctions Act (22 U.S.C. 9401 et seq.); and
(B) the Protecting Europe's Energy Security Act of
2019 (title LXXV of Public Law 116-92; 22 U.S.C. 9526
note);
(3) to work with our European allies to coordinate
strategies to curtail Russian malign influence in Ukraine;
(4) to work with our allies and partners to conduct more
frequent multinational freedom of navigation operations in the
Black Sea in order to demonstrate support for Ukraine's
internationally-recognized maritime boundaries, to safeguard
the unimpeded traffic of lawful commerce, and to push back
against excessive Russian Federation claims of sovereignty;
(5) to work with our allies and partners to demonstrate
support for Ukraine's territorial integrity, including its
internationally-recognized land borders; and
(6) to support democratic, economic, and anti-corruption
reforms in Ukraine and the country's integration into Euro-
Atlantic institutions.
SEC. 5. STRATEGY ON UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT FOR UKRAINE.
(a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report with a strategy on how
the United States will work to diplomatically support Ukraine during
fiscal years 2022 through 2026.
(b) Elements.--The report required under subsection (a) shall
include the following elements:
(1) A description of how relevant departments and agencies
of the United States Government will work together to
collectively support efforts by the Government of Ukraine to
deter Russian aggression in the form of military incursions,
cyber attacks, the coercive use of energy resources, the
disruption of lawful commerce and traffic to Ukrainian ports,
use of passportization, and efforts to corrupt the Ukrainian
political and economic systems.
(2) A description of the United States' current efforts and
strategy to support Ukrainian diplomatic initiatives when they
align with United States interests.
(3) A strategy on how the United States will use its voice
and vote at the United Nations, OSCE, Council of Europe, NATO,
and other relevant international bodies to support Ukraine and
its reform efforts.
(4) A strategy on how the United States will assist Ukraine
in bolstering its diplomatic, economic, energy, and maritime
relationships with key Black Sea countries, including Bulgaria,
Romania, Turkey, and Georgia.
(5) A strategy on how the United States will engage with
Germany, France, Ukraine, and Russia to advance the Normandy
Format and Minsk Agreements.
(6) An assessment of Ukraine's recent progress on anti-
corruption reforms and a strategy on how the United States will
work with allies to continue to engage Ukraine to ensure
meaningful progress on democratic, economic, and anti-
corruption reforms.
(c) Form.--The report required under subsection (a) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.
SEC. 6. UNITED STATES-EUROPE WORKING GROUP ON UKRAINE.
(a) In General.--The Secretary of State should seek to establish a
United States-Europe Working Group on Ukraine.
(b) Representation.--The United States-Europe Working Group on
Ukraine should include high-level representatives from the European
Union, its institutions, and relevant European governments, as
appropriate, to jointly prioritize, evaluate and coordinate economic
and policy reform assistance and support for Ukraine.
(c) Termination.--The authorities authorized under this section
shall terminate on September 30 of the fifth fiscal year beginning
after the date of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 7. SPECIAL ENVOY FOR UKRAINE.
(a) Establishment.--The President should appoint, by and with the
consent of the Senate, a Special Envoy for Ukraine, who should report
to the Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasia.
(b) Rank.--The Special Envoy for Ukraine shall have the rank and
status of ambassador.
(c) Responsibilities.--The Special Envoy for Ukraine should--
(1) serve as the United States liaison to the Normandy
Format, tasked with leading the peace process between Ukraine
and the Russian Federation;
(2) facilitate diplomatic outreach to and dialogue with
countries in the Black Sea region that, like Ukraine, are faced
with the impact of Russia's growing militarization of the Sea;
(3) coordinate closely with the Chief of Mission in
Ukraine;
(4) coordinate with the United States-Europe Working Group
on Ukraine established pursuant to section 6;
(5) coordinate with the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to
Ukraine; and
(6) provide the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives regular updates and briefings on the status of
peace negotiations.
(d) Termination.--The Special Envoy for Ukraine position authorized
under subsection (a) shall terminate 5 years after the date of the
enactment of this Act.
SEC. 8. FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated for the Department of State for each of fiscal years 2022
through 2026 $300,000,000 for Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
assistance to Ukraine to assist the country in meeting its defense
needs.
(b) Availability of Funds.--
(1) In general.--Of the amount authorized to be
appropriated for each fiscal year pursuant to subsection (a),
not more than $150,000,000 shall be made available until the
Secretary of State makes the certification described in
paragraph (2) for such fiscal year, including a detailed
explanation justifying the certification with respect to each
of the categories listed in subparagraphs (A) through (G) of
such paragraph. The certification shall be submitted to the
appropriate congressional committees in unclassified form, but
may contain a classified annex.
(2) Certification.--The certification described in this
paragraph is a certification by the Secretary of State, in
coordination with the Secretary of Defense, that the Government
of Ukraine has taken actions to--
(A) make defense institutional reforms, in
accordance with NATO standards;
(B) further strengthen civilian control of the
military;
(C) reform its state-owned arms production sector;
(D) increase transparency and accountability in
defense procurement;
(E) respect Verkhovna Rada efforts to exercise
oversight of the Ministry of Defense and military
forces;
(F) promote respect for the observation of human
rights as enshrined in the requirements of section 620M
of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2378d)
within the security forces of Ukraine; and
(G) support the work of Ukraine's anti-corruption
bodies, including the High Anti-Corruption Court,
National Anti-Corruption Bureau, and the Special Anti-
Corruption Prosecutor's Office.
(c) Notice to Congress.--Not later than 15 days before providing
assistance or support pursuant to subsection (a), the Secretary of
State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a
notification containing the following:
(1) A detailed description of the assistance or support to
be provided, including--
(A) the objectives of such assistance or support;
(B) the budget for such assistance or support; and
(C) the expected or estimated timeline for delivery
of such assistance or support.
(2) A description of such other matters as the Secretary
considers appropriate.
(d) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that assistance
provided under this section should--
(1) prioritize the procurement of vessels for the Ukrainian
Navy and other articles that bolster the capacity of the
Ukrainian Navy to counter Russian maritime aggression and
maintain the freedom of innocent passage throughout the Black
Sea; and
(2) ensure adequate planning for maintenance for any
equipment provided.
(e) Authority To Provide Lethal Assistance.--The Secretary of State
is authorized to provide lethal assistance under this section,
including anti-armor weapon systems, mortars, crew-served weapons and
ammunition, grenade launchers and ammunition, anti-tank weapons
systems, anti-ship weapons systems, anti-aircraft weapons systems, and
small arms and ammunition.
SEC. 9. EXPEDITED EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLES TRANSFER PROGRAM.
During fiscal years 2022 through 2026, the delivery of excess
defense articles to Ukraine shall be given the same priority as that
given other countries and regions under section 516(c)(2) of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j(c)(2)).
SEC. 10. STRATEGY ON EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLES FROM ALLIES.
(a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State in consultation with the
Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a classified strategy on how the United States will
encourage third countries to donate excess defense equipment to
Ukraine.
(b) Elements.--The report required under subsection (a) shall
include the following elements:
(1) A listing of all friendly and allied nations that have
excess defense material that may be compatible with the needs
and systems utilized by the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
(2) A description of the diplomatic efforts undertaken by
the United States Government to encourage allied nations to
donate their excess defense articles to Ukraine on an expedited
basis.
SEC. 11. IMET COOPERATION WITH UKRAINE.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated to the Department of State $4,000,000 for each of fiscal
years 2022 through 2026 for International Military Education and
Training (IMET) assistance for Ukraine. The assistance shall be made
available for the following purposes:
(1) Training of future leaders.
(2) Fostering a better understanding of the United States.
(3) Establishing a rapport between the United States Armed
Forces and Ukraine's military to build partnerships for the
future.
(4) Enhancement of interoperability and capabilities for
joint operations.
(5) Focusing on professional military education, civilian
control of the military, and human rights.
(b) Notice to Congress.--Not later than 15 days before providing
assistance or support pursuant to subsection (a), the Secretary of
State shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate
and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a
notification containing the following elements:
(1) A detailed description of the assistance or support to
be provided, including--
(A) the objectives of such assistance or support;
(B) the budget for such assistance or support; and
(C) the expected or estimated timeline for delivery
of such assistance or support.
(2) A description of such other matters as the Secretary
considers appropriate.
SEC. 12. STRATEGY ON IMET PROGRAMMING IN UKRAINE.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the
Government of Ukraine should fully utilize the United States IMET
program, encourage eligible officers and civilian leaders to
participate in the training, and promote successful graduates to
positions of prominence in the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
(b) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a strategy for the implementation
of the IMET program in Ukraine authorized under section 11.
(c) Elements.--The strategy required under subsection (a) shall
include the following elements:
(1) A clear plan, developed in close consultation with the
Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces of Ukraine,
for how the IMET program will be used by the United States
Government and the Government of Ukraine to propel program
graduates to positions of prominence in support of the
Ukrainian military's reform efforts in line with NATO
standards.
(2) An assessment of the education and training
requirements of the Ukrainian military and clear
recommendations for how IMET graduates should be assigned by
the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense upon completion of education
or training.
(3) An accounting of the current combat requirements of the
Ukrainian military and an assessment of the viability of
alternative mobile training teams, distributed learning, and
other flexible solutions to reach such students.
(4) An identification of opportunities to influence the
next generation of leaders through attendance at United States
staff and war colleges, junior leader development programs, and
technical schools.
(d) Form.--The strategy required under subsection (a) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.
SEC. 13. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON LOAN PROGRAM.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) as appropriate, the United States Government should
provide direct loans to Ukraine for the procurement of defense
articles, defense services, and design and construction
services pursuant to the authority of section 23 of the Arms
Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763) to support the further
development of Ukraine's military forces; and
(2) such loans should be considered an additive security
assistance tool, and not a substitute for Foreign Military
Financing for grant assistance or Ukraine Security Assistance
Initiative programming.
SEC. 14. STRATEGY TO PROTECT UKRAINE'S DEFENSE INDUSTRY FROM STRATEGIC
COMPETITORS.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United
States should work with the Government of Ukraine to ensure strategic
assets and companies in Ukraine's aerospace and defense sector are not
subject to foreign ownership, control, or undue influence by strategic
competitors to the United States, such as the People's Republic of
China (PRC). These efforts will require support from across the
Executive Branch and should leverage all available tools and
authorities.
(b) Strategy Required.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the President, acting through the
Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State and in
consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the heads
of other relevant Departments and agencies as the President may
determine, shall submit to the appropriate committees of
Congress a strategy to support Ukraine in protecting its
aerospace and defense industry from predatory investments.
(2) Elements.--The strategy required under paragraph (1)
shall include the following elements:
(A) An assessment of the efforts by strategic
competitors, such as the PRC, to acquire strategic
assets and companies in Ukraine's aerospace and defense
sector and the national security implications for
Ukraine, the United States, and other NATO allies and
partners.
(B) An assessment of the vulnerabilities that
strategic competitors of the United States exploit to
acquire strategic assets in the Ukrainian aerospace and
defense sector, Ukraine's progress in addressing them,
and United States initiatives to support these efforts
such as assistance in strengthening Ukraine's
investment screening and national security vetting
laws.
(C) An assessment of Ukraine's efforts to make
reforms necessary to incentivize Western investment in
Ukraine's aerospace and defense sector and United
States support for these efforts.
(D) A strategy to--
(i) promote, as appropriate, United States
direct investment in Ukraine's aerospace and
defense sector;
(ii) better leverage tools like debt
financing, equity investments, and political
risk insurance to incentivize greater
participation by United States firms;
(iii) provide an alternative to PRC
investments; and
(iv) engage like-minded allies and partners
on these efforts.
(3) Form.--The strategy required under paragraph (1) shall
be submitted in classified form.
(c) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on
Armed Services of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on
Armed Services of the House of Representatives.
SEC. 15. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
(a) In General.--There is authorized to be appropriated to the
Department of State $50,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2022
through 2026 for the purposes described in subsection (b) with respect
to Ukraine.
(b) Use of Funds.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection (a)
may only be used--
(1) to strengthen Ukraine's cyber security, cyber
resilience and intellectual property enforcement, including
expanding the United States Transnational and High Tech Crime
Global Law Enforcement Network through International Computer
Hacking and Intellectual Property Advisor or Intellectual
Property Law Enforcement Coordinators to provide training and
capacity building related to cyber crime and intellectual
property crime;
(2) to provide support and training in Ukraine for--
(A) sectoral reforms related to banking and public
finance management reform;
(B) the privatization of state-owned enterprises;
(C) regulatory independence;
(D) subsidy reform;
(E) land reform;
(F) corporate governance; and
(G) foreign investment screening;
(3) to combat corruption, improve the rule of law, and
otherwise strengthen independent legal institutions, including
by--
(A) expanding regional anti-corruption training and
exchanges among Ukrainian Ministry officials, law
enforcement officers, judges, and prosecutors to build
peer support, share best practices, maintain reform
momentum, and protect reforms from capture;
(B) supporting regional training of United States
Embassy personal responsible for supporting anti-
corruption and the rule of law to improve their
effectiveness in supporting the consolidation and
expansion of reform;
(4) to respond to the humanitarian crises caused or
aggravated by the invasion and occupation of Ukraine by the
Russian Federation, including by supporting internally
displaced persons and communities in conflict-affected areas;
(5) to improve participatory legislative processes in
Ukraine, including through--
(A) engagement with members of the Verkhovna Rada;
(B) training on government oversight, legal
education, political transparency and competition, and
compliance with international obligations; and
(C) supporting the development of professional
legislative staff to advise and assist member of the
Verkhovna Rada and committees in the execution of their
duties and build legal and policy expertise within the
Verkhovna Rada; and
(6) to further build the capacity of civil society,
independent media, human rights, and other nongovernmental
organizations in Ukraine, with an emphasis on--
(A) building capacity outside of Kyiv; and
(B) regional civil society training and exchange
programs.
SEC. 16. DETERMINATION OF WHETHER NORD STREAM 2 AG AND ASSOCIATED
CONSTRUCTION VESSELS MEET CRITERIA FOR IMPOSITION OF
SANCTIONS UNDER PROTECTING EUROPE'S ENERGY SECURITY ACT
OF 2019.
(a) In General.--Not later than 15 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress a report
that includes the following:
(1) The determination of the President with respect to
whether Nord Stream 2 AG meets the criteria for the imposition
of sanctions under the Protecting Europe's Energy Security Act
of 2019.
(2) The determination of the President with respect to
whether the following vessels and entities meet the criteria
for the imposition of sanctions under the Protecting Europe's
Energy Security Act of 2019:
(A) Akademik Cherskiy.
(B) Umka.
(C) Errie.
(D) Yuri Topchev.
(E) Mentor.
(F) DP Gezina.
(G) Krebs GEO.
(H) Vladislav Strizhov.
(I) Glomar Wave.
(J) Finval.
(K) Katun.
(L) Venie.
(M) Murman.
(N) Baltiyskiy Issledovatel.
(O) Artemis Offshore.
(P) Havila Subsea.
(Q) Russian Maritime Register of Shipping.
(R) LLC Insurance Company Constanta.
(S) TUV Austria Holding AG.
(3) A detailed explanation for each determination made
under paragraph (1) or (2), including with respect to any
determination that the criteria for the imposition of sanctions
under the Protecting Europe's Energy Security Act of 2019 were
not met with respect to a vessel or entity.
(b) Definition.--In this section, the term ``Protecting Europe's
Energy Security Act of 2019'' means the Protecting Europe's Energy
Security Act of 2019 (title LXXV of Public Law 116-92; 22 U.S.C. 9526
note), as amended by section 1242 of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law
116-283).
SEC. 17. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.
In this Act, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
Calendar No. 49
117th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 814
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To promote security partnership with Ukraine, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
April 26, 2021
Reported with an amendment