[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2000 Reported in Senate (RS)]
<DOC>
Calendar No. 90
117th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 2000
To promote the United States-Greece defense partnership, and for other
purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
June 9, 2021
Mr. Menendez (for himself, Mr. Rubio, Mr. Van Hollen, Mr. Coons, and
Mr. Rounds) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and
referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
June 24, 2021
Reported by Mr. Menendez, with an amendment
[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed
in italic]
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To promote the United States-Greece defense partnership, and for other
purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
<DELETED>SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.</DELETED>
<DELETED> This Act may be cited as the ``U.S.-Greece Defense and
Interparliamentary Partnership Act of 2021''.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 2. FINDINGS.</DELETED>
<DELETED> Congress makes the following findings:</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) The United States and Greece are strong allies
in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and have
deepened their defense relationship in recent years in response
to growing security challenges in the Eastern Mediterranean
region.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) Greece participates in several NATO missions,
including Operation Sea Guardian in the Mediterranean and
NATO's mission in Kosovo.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) The Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy
Partnership Act (title II of division J of Public Law 116-94),
authorized new security assistance for Greece and Cyprus,
lifted the United States prohibition on arms transfers to
Cyprus, and authorized the establishment of a United States-
Eastern Mediterranean Energy Center to facilitate energy
cooperation among the United States, Greece, Israel, and
Cyprus.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (4) The United States has demonstrated its support
for the trilateral partnership of Greece, Israel, and Cyprus
through joint engagement with Cyprus, Greece, Israel, and the
United States in the ``3+1'' format.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (5) The United States and Greece have held
Strategic Dialogue meetings in Athens, Washington DC, and
virtually, and have committed to hold an upcoming Strategic
Dialogue session in 2021 in Washington, DC.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (6) In October 2019, the United States and Greece
agreed to update the U.S.-Greece Mutual Defense Cooperation
Agreement, and the amended agreement officially entered into
force on February 13, 2020.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (7) The amended Mutual Defense Cooperation
Agreement provides for increased joint United States-Greece and
NATO activities at Greek military bases and facilities in
Larissa, Stefanovikeio, Alexandroupolis, and other parts of
central and northern Greece, and allows for infrastructure
improvements at the United States Naval Support Activity Souda
Bay base on Crete.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (8) In October 2020, Greek Foreign Minister Nikos
Dendias announced that Greece hopes to further expand the
Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement with the United
States.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (9) The United States Naval Support Activity Souda
Bay serves as a critical naval logistics hub for the United
States Navy's 6th Fleet.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (10) In June 2020, United States Ambassador to
Greece Geoffrey Pyatt characterized the importance of Naval
Support Activity Souda Bay as ``our most important platform for
the projection of American power into a strategically dynamic
Eastern Mediterranean region. From Syria to Libya to the
chokepoint of the Black Sea, this is a critically important
asset for the United States, as our air force, naval, and other
resources are applied to support our Alliance obligations and
to help bring peace and stability.''.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (11) During a September 2020 visit to Souda Bay,
then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that the USS
Hershel ``Woody'' Williams, the second of a new class of United
States sea-basing ships, will be based out of Souda Bay, the
first permanent United States naval deployment at the
base.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (12) The United States cooperates with the
Hellenic Armed Forces at facilities in Larissa, Stefanovikeio,
and Alexandroupolis, where the United States Armed Forces
conduct training, refueling, temporary maintenance, storage,
and emergency response.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (13) The United States has conducted a
longstanding International Military Education and Training
program with Greece, and the Government of Greece has committed
to provide $3 for every dollar invested by the United States in
the program.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (14) Greece's defense spending in 2020 amounted to
an estimated 2.68 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP),
exceeding NATO's 2 percent of GDP benchmark agreed to at the
2014 NATO Summit in Wales.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (15) In September 2020, Greek Prime Minister
Kyriakos Mitsotakis announced plans to modernize all three
branches of the Hellenic Armed Forces, which will strengthen
Greece's military position in the Eastern
Mediterranean.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (16) The modernization includes upgrades to the
arms of all three branches, including new anti-tank weapons for
the Hellenic Army, new heavy-duty torpedoes for the Hellenic
Navy, and new guided missiles for the Hellenic Air
Force.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (17) The Hellenic Navy also plans to upgrade its
four MEKO 200HN frigates and purchase four new multirole
frigates of an undisclosed type, to be accompanied by 4 MH-60R
anti-submarine helicopters.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (18) The Hellenic Air Force plans to upgrade 84 of
its fleet of F-16 jets to the F-16 Viper variant by 2027 and
has expressed interest in participating in the F-35 Joint
Strike Fighter program.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (19) The United States ejected Turkey from the F-
35 Joint Strike Fighter Program in July 2019 as a result of its
purchase of the Russian S-400 air defense system. Eight F-35
Joint Strike Fighters were produced for Turkey but never
delivered as a result of its ejection from the
program.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.</DELETED>
<DELETED> It is the sense of Congress that--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) Greece is a pillar of stability in the Eastern
Mediterranean region and the United States should remain
committed to supporting its security and prosperity;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) the 3+1 format of cooperation among Cyprus,
Greece, Israel, and the United States has been a successful
forum to cooperate on energy issues and should be expanded to
include other areas of common concern to the members;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) the United States should increase and deepen
efforts to partner with and support the modernization of the
Greek military;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (4) it is in the interests of the United States
that Greece continue to transition its military equipment away
from Russian-produced platforms and weapons systems through the
European Recapitalization Investment Program;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (5) the United States Government should continue
to deepen strong partnerships with the Greek military,
especially in co-development and co-production opportunities
with the Greek Navy;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (6) the naval partnership with Greece at Souda Bay
and Alexandroupolis is mutually beneficial to the national
security of the United States and Greece;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (7) the United States should support the sale of
F-35 Joint Strike Fighters to Greece to include those F-35
aircraft produced for but never delivered to Turkey as a result
of Turkey's exclusion from the program due to its purchase of
the Russian S-400 air defense system;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (8) the United States Government should continue
to invest in International Military Education and Training
(IMET) programs in Greece;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (9) the United States Government should support
joint maritime security cooperation exercises with Cyprus,
Greece, and Israel;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (10) in accordance with its legal authorities and
project selection criteria, the United States Development
Finance Corporation should support private investment in
strategic infrastructure projects in Greece, to include
shipyards and ports that contribute to the security of the
region and Greece's prosperity;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (11) the Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement with
Greece should be extended and include deepened partnerships at
Greek military facilities throughout the country, and, as
appropriate and necessary, the United States should partner
with Greece in order to increase rotational deployments and
presences of forward-based troops at Greek bases;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (12) the United States Government should restore
congressionally appropriated military construction funds for
construction projects at Naval Support Activity Souda Bay
focused on a warehouse storage facility and an airport
passenger terminal; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (13) the United States Government should establish
the United States-Eastern Mediterranean Energy Center as
authorized in the Eastern Mediterranean Energy and Security
Partnership Act of 2019.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 4. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR EUROPEAN
RECAPITALIZATION INCENTIVE PROGRAM.</DELETED>
<DELETED> There is authorized to be appropriated for the Department
of State $25,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026 for
European Recapitalization Incentive Program (ERIP) assistance to Greece
to assist the country in meeting its defense needs and transitioning
away from Russian-produced military equipment.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 5. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON LOAN PROGRAM.</DELETED>
<DELETED> It is the sense of Congress that--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) as appropriate, the United States Government
should provide direct loans to Greece for the procurement of
defense articles, defense services, and design and construction
services pursuant to the authority of section 23 of the Arms
Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763) to support the further
development of Greece's military forces; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) such loans should be considered an additive
security partnership tool, and not a substitute for European
Recapitalization Incentive Program assistance.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 6. EXPEDITED EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLES TRANSFER
PROGRAM.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (a) In General.--During fiscal years 2022 through 2026,
the delivery of excess defense articles to Greece shall be given the
same priority as that given other countries and regions under section
516(c)(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
2321j(c)(2)).</DELETED>
<DELETED> (b) Report.--During each fiscal year listed in subsection
(a), the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of
State, shall report not later than October 31 to the appropriate
congressional committees and the Committees on Armed Services of the
Senate and the House of Representatives on Greece's defense needs and
how the United States will seek to address such needs through transfers
of excess defense equipment to Greece for that fiscal year.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 7. DELIVERY OF F-35 JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER AIRCRAFT TO
GREECE.</DELETED>
<DELETED> The President is authorized to expedite delivery of any
future F-35 aircraft once Greece is prepared to move forward with such
a purchase on such terms and conditions as the President may require.
Such transfer shall be submitted to Congress pursuant to the
certification requirements under section 36 of the Arms Export Control
Act (22 U.S.C. 2776).</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 8. IMET COOPERATION WITH GREECE.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated to the Department of State $1,000,000 for each of
fiscal years 2022 through 2026 for International Military Education and
Training (IMET) assistance for Greece. The assistance shall be made
available for the following purposes:</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) Training of future leaders.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) Fostering a better understanding of the United
States.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) Establishing a rapport between the United
States Armed Forces and Greece's military to build partnerships
for the future.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (4) Enhancement of interoperability and
capabilities for joint operations.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (5) Focusing on professional military education,
civilian control of the military, and protection of human
rights.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 9. CYPRUS, GREECE, ISRAEL, AND THE UNITED STATES 3+1
INTERPARLIAMENTARY GROUP.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (a) Establishment.--There is established a group, to be
known as the ``Cyprus, Greece, Israel, and the United States 3+1
Interparliamentary Group'', to serve as a legislative component to the
3+1 process launched in Jerusalem in March 2019.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (b) Membership.--The Cyprus, Greece, Israel, and the
United States 3+1 Interparliamentary Group shall include a group of not
more than 6 United States Senators, to be known as the ``United States
group'', who shall be appointed jointly by the majority leader and the
minority leader of the Senate.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (c) Meetings.--Not less frequently than once each year,
the United States group shall meet with members of the 3+1 group to
discuss issues on the agenda of the 3+1 deliberations of the
Governments of Greece, Israel, Cyprus, and the United States to include
maritime security, defense cooperation, energy initiatives, and
countering malign influence efforts by the People's Republic of China
and the Russian Federation.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 10. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.</DELETED>
<DELETED> In this Act, the term ``appropriate congressional
committees'' means--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the
Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives.</DELETED>
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``U.S.-Greece Defense and
Interparliamentary Partnership Act of 2021''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The United States and Greece are strong allies in the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and have deepened
their defense relationship in recent years in response to
growing security challenges in the Eastern Mediterranean
region.
(2) Greece participates in several NATO missions, including
Operation Sea Guardian in the Mediterranean and NATO's mission
in Kosovo.
(3) The Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy
Partnership Act (title II of division J of Public Law 116-94),
authorized new security assistance for Greece and Cyprus,
lifted the United States prohibition on arms transfers to
Cyprus, and authorized the establishment of a United States-
Eastern Mediterranean Energy Center to facilitate energy
cooperation among the United States, Greece, Israel, and
Cyprus.
(4) The United States has demonstrated its support for the
trilateral partnership of Greece, Israel, and Cyprus through
joint engagement with Cyprus, Greece, Israel, and the United
States in the ``3+1'' format.
(5) The United States and Greece have held Strategic
Dialogue meetings in Athens, Washington D.C., and virtually,
and have committed to hold an upcoming Strategic Dialogue
session in 2021 in Washington, D.C.
(6) In October 2019, the United States and Greece agreed to
update the United States-Greece Mutual Defense Cooperation
Agreement, and the amended agreement officially entered into
force on February 13, 2020.
(7) The amended Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement
provides for increased joint United States-Greece and NATO
activities at Greek military bases and facilities in Larissa,
Stefanovikio, Alexandroupolis, and other parts of central and
northern Greece, and allows for infrastructure improvements at
the United States Naval Support Activity Souda Bay base on
Crete.
(8) In October 2020, Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias
announced that Greece hopes to further expand the Mutual
Defense Cooperation Agreement with the United States.
(9) The United States Naval Support Activity Souda Bay
serves as a critical naval logistics hub for the United States
Navy's 6th Fleet.
(10) In June 2020, United States Ambassador to Greece
Geoffrey Pyatt characterized the importance of Naval Support
Activity Souda Bay as ``our most important platform for the
projection of American power into a strategically dynamic
Eastern Mediterranean region. From Syria to Libya to the
chokepoint of the Black Sea, this is a critically important
asset for the United States, as our air force, naval, and other
resources are applied to support our Alliance obligations and
to help bring peace and stability.''.
(11) During a September 2020 visit to Souda Bay, then-
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that the USS Hershel
``Woody'' Williams, the second of a new class of United States
sea-basing ships, will be based out of Souda Bay, the first
permanent United States naval deployment at the base.
(12) The United States cooperates with the Hellenic Armed
Forces at facilities in Larissa, Stefanovikio, and
Alexandroupolis, where the United States Armed Forces conduct
training, refueling, temporary maintenance, storage, and
emergency response.
(13) The United States has conducted a longstanding
International Military Education and Training (IMET) program
with Greece, and the Government of Greece has committed to
provide $3 for every dollar invested by the United States in
the program.
(14) Greece's defense spending in 2020 amounted to an
estimated 2.68 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP),
exceeding NATO's 2 percent of GDP benchmark agreed to at the
2014 NATO Summit in Wales.
(15) Greece is eligible for the delivery of excess defense
articles under section 516(c)(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j(c)(2)).
(16) In September 2020, Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos
Mitsotakis announced plans to modernize all three branches of
the Hellenic Armed Forces, which will strengthen Greece's
military position in the Eastern Mediterranean.
(17) The modernization includes upgrades to the arms of all
three branches, including new anti-tank weapons for the
Hellenic Army, new heavy-duty torpedoes for the Hellenic Navy,
and new guided missiles for the Hellenic Air Force.
(18) The Hellenic Navy also plans to upgrade its four MEKO
200HN frigates and purchase four new multirole frigates of an
undisclosed type, to be accompanied by 4 MH-60R anti-submarine
helicopters.
(19) The Hellenic Air Force plans to fully upgrade its
fleet of F-16 jets to the F-16 Viper variant by 2027 and has
expressed interest in participating in the F-35 Joint Strike
Fighter program.
(20) The United States ejected Turkey from the F-35 Joint
Strike Fighter Program in July 2019 as a result of its purchase
of the Russian S-400 air defense system. Eight F-35 Joint
Strike Fighters were produced for Turkey but never delivered as
a result of its ejection from the program.
SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) Greece is a pillar of stability in the Eastern
Mediterranean region and the United States should remain
committed to supporting its security and prosperity;
(2) the 3+1 format of cooperation among Cyprus, Greece,
Israel, and the United States has been a successful forum to
cooperate on energy issues and should be expanded to include
other areas of common concern to the members;
(3) the United States should increase and deepen efforts to
partner with and support the modernization of the Greek
military;
(4) it is in the interests of the United States that Greece
continue to transition its military equipment away from
Russian-produced platforms and weapons systems through the
European Recapitalization Investment Program;
(5) the United States Government should continue to deepen
strong partnerships with the Greek military, especially in co-
development and co-production opportunities with the Greek
Navy;
(6) the naval partnerships with Greece at Souda Bay and
Alexandroupolis are mutually beneficial to the national
security of the United States and Greece;
(7) the United States should, as appropriate, support the
sale of F-35 Joint Strike Fighters to Greece to include those
F-35 aircraft produced for but never delivered to Turkey as a
result of Turkey's exclusion from the program due to its
purchase of the Russian S-400 air defense system;
(8) the United States Government should continue to invest
in International Military Education and Training (IMET)
programs in Greece;
(9) the United States Government should support joint
maritime security cooperation exercises with Cyprus, Greece,
and Israel;
(10) in accordance with its legal authorities and project
selection criteria, the United States Development Finance
Corporation should consider supporting private investment in
strategic infrastructure projects in Greece, to include
shipyards and ports that contribute to the security of the
region and Greece's prosperity;
(11) the Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement with Greece
should be extended for a period of five years and include
deepened partnerships at Greek military facilities throughout
the country, and, as appropriate and necessary, the United
States should partner with Greece in order to increase
rotational deployments and presences of forward-based troops at
Greek bases;
(12) the United States Government should restore
congressionally appropriated military construction funds for
construction projects at Naval Support Activity Souda Bay
focused on a warehouse storage facility and an airport
passenger terminal that were redirected to United States border
wall programs in 2019; and
(13) the United States Government should establish the
United States-Eastern Mediterranean Energy Center as authorized
in the Eastern Mediterranean Energy and Security Partnership
Act of 2019.
SEC. 4. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR EUROPEAN RECAPITALIZATION
INCENTIVE PROGRAM.
There is authorized to be appropriated for the Department of State
$25,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026 for European
Recapitalization Incentive Program (ERIP) assistance to Greece to
assist the country in meeting its defense needs and transitioning away
from Russian-produced military equipment.
SEC. 5. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON LOAN PROGRAM.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) as appropriate, the United States Government should
provide direct loans to Greece for the procurement of defense
articles, defense services, and design and construction
services pursuant to the authority of section 23 of the Arms
Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763) to support the further
development of Greece's military forces; and
(2) such loans should be considered an additive security
partnership tool, and not a substitute for European
Recapitalization Incentive Program assistance.
SEC. 6. TRANSFER OF F-35 JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER AIRCRAFT TO GREECE.
The President is authorized to expedite delivery of any future F-35
aircraft to Greece once Greece is prepared to move forward with such a
purchase on such terms and conditions as the President may require.
Such transfer shall be submitted to Congress pursuant to the
certification requirements under section 36 of the Arms Export Control
Act (22 U.S.C. 2776).
SEC. 7. REPORT ON EXPEDITED EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLES TRANSFER PROGRAM.
During each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026, the Secretary of
Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, shall report
not later than October 31 to the appropriate congressional committees
and the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives on Greece's defense needs and how the United States
will seek to address such needs through transfers of excess defense
equipment to Greece for that fiscal year.
SEC. 8. IMET COOPERATION WITH GREECE.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated to the Department of State $1,800,000 for each of fiscal
years 2022 through 2026 for International Military Education and
Training (IMET) assistance for Greece. The assistance shall be made
available for the following purposes:
(1) Training of future leaders.
(2) Fostering a better understanding of the United States.
(3) Establishing a rapport between the United States Armed
Forces and Greece's military to build partnerships for the
future.
(4) Enhancement of interoperability and capabilities for
joint operations.
(5) Focusing on professional military education, civilian
control of the military, and protection of human rights.
SEC. 9. CYPRUS, GREECE, ISRAEL, AND THE UNITED STATES 3+1
INTERPARLIAMENTARY GROUP.
(a) Establishment.--There is established a group, to be known as
the ``Cyprus, Greece, Israel, and the United States 3+1
Interparliamentary Group'', to serve as a legislative component to the
3+1 process launched in Jerusalem in March 2019.
(b) Membership.--The Cyprus, Greece, Israel, and the United States
3+1 Interparliamentary Group shall include a group of not more than 6
United States Senators, to be known as the ``United States group'', who
shall be appointed jointly by the majority leader and the minority
leader of the Senate.
(c) Meetings.--Not less frequently than once each year, the United
States group shall meet with members of the 3+1 group to discuss issues
on the agenda of the 3+1 deliberations of the Governments of Greece,
Israel, Cyprus, and the United States to include maritime security,
defense cooperation, energy initiatives, and countering malign
influence efforts by the People's Republic of China and the Russian
Federation.
SEC. 10. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.
In this Act, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
Calendar No. 90
117th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 2000
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To promote the United States-Greece defense partnership, and for other
purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
June 24, 2021
Reported with an amendment