

as President of the United States to the manifest injury of the people of the United States, and has committed a high misdemeanor in office.

Therefore, Donald John Trump by causing such harm to the society of the United States is unfit to be President and warrants impeachment, trial, and removal from office.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under rule IX, a resolution offered from the floor by a Member other than the majority leader or the minority leader as a question of the privileges of the House has immediate precedence only at a time designated by the Chair within 2 legislative days after the resolution is properly noticed.

Pending that designation, the form of the resolution noticed by the gentleman from Texas will appear in the RECORD at this point.

The Chair will not at this point determine whether the resolution constitutes a question of privilege. That determination will be made at the time designated for consideration of the resolution.

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DAMON PAUL NELSON AND MATTHEW YOUNG POLLARD INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEARS 2018, 2019, AND 2020

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on the Intelligence Authorization Act.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

There was no objection.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 491 and rule XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 3494.

The Chair appoints the gentleman from California (Mr. HUFFMAN) to preside over the Committee of the Whole.

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IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 3494) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2020 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, with Mr. HUFFMAN in the chair.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The CHAIR. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered read the first time.

General debate shall be confined to the bill and amendments specified in the first section of House Resolution 491, and shall not exceed 1 hour equally divided and controlled by the chair and

ranking minority member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

The gentleman from California (Mr. SCHIFF) and the gentleman from California (Mr. NUNES) each will control 30 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. SCHIFF).

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself as much time as I may consume.

Along the wall in the upper lobby of the CIA headquarters building is a large picture of the head and torch of the Statue of Liberty accompanied by the following words: "We are the Nation's first line of defense. We accomplish what others cannot accomplish and go where others cannot go."

These two sentences distill the essence of America's intelligence community and the quiet sense of mission that tens of thousands of our fellow citizens bring to their jobs every day.

H.R. 3494, the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020, is our contribution to the work of the IC.

This is a bipartisan bill, reported unanimously out of the Intelligence Committee and embodying the collective efforts of Democratic and Republican members.

Though H.R. 3494 contains many new initiatives authored during my chairmanship, it also preserves provisions developed during Ranking Member NUNES' tenure as chairman as well.

Despite disagreements over the Russia investigation, the committee has come together to support our intelligence community.

HPSCI oversees highly sensitive, highly classified activities, and we collaborate with the IC to ensure that it has the resources and authorities necessary to collect vital intelligence. That won't work, however, unless the committee trusts the IC elements it oversees, and those same elements trust the committee.

At the same time, HPSCI must ensure that legal and policy constraints are vigorously enforced. That requires us to maintain both a professional distance and a healthy skepticism about the activities we oversee. When warranted, the committee must impose additional checks and limitations, at times over intelligence community objections.

It is a delicate balance, which HPSCI strikes through use of many different oversight tools. The most important by far is our annual Intelligence Authorization Act.

H.R. 3494 gets the balance right. It authorizes funding for the IC at roughly 1.4 percent above the President's budget request for the coming year. It prioritizes the IC's collection and analytic capabilities against China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, while sustaining critical intelligence capabilities that support counterterrorism and counterproliferation.

The bill also ensures that the men and women of the IC have what they need to collect and analyze the intelligence that policymakers require.

At the same time, H.R. 3494 ensures close oversight by Congress, rejecting the funding of legacy IC programs with overseas contingency operation resources, or OCO, funding; and requiring, for the first time, the submission to the intelligence committees of detailed information on unfunded IC programs.

Another provision authored by Representative WELCH calls for more information in the IC's budget for counterterrorism matters to be released to the public consistent with the protection of national security. Still another authorizes the Public Interest Declassification Board, which plays a vital role in ensuring that historical documents about IC programs are declassified appropriately.

The legislation is especially strong in three other areas. The first has to do with foreign malign activities, including those by Russia. The bill calls for extensive IC reporting and creates new notification requirements regarding covert or overt efforts by foreign governments to undermine trusted institutions or to interfere in the democratic process, our own or those of other nations.

This bill also strongly supports the IC workforce. H.R. 3494 obliges the IC elements to offer their employees 12 weeks of paid parental leave on top of the unpaid leave already guaranteed to them by law. Other language ensures that the families of CIA personnel who are killed or injured as a result of wars, hostile acts, or other incidents can be appropriately compensated.

The bill also bolsters the IC's ability to recruit, hire, retain, and promote a workforce that represents the diversity of the Nation that it serves.

Lastly, technology. Many have sounded alarms about the rise of so-called "deep fake" algorithms and the transition in our country and elsewhere to a fifth-generation telecommunications network. To help the IC address both challenges, H.R. 3494 instructs the DNI to hold competitions and to award prizes for cutting-edge research into deep fake and 5G technologies.

H.R. 3494 is not perfect; it is the result of negotiation and compromise. I am pleased that, despite our public differences, we have once again been able to put those aside to focus on the important work of overseeing the intelligence community. The result is a strong, bipartisan bill, which I am proud to support.

Mr. Chair, let me conclude by thanking Ranking Member NUNES, my committee colleagues, and the entire HPSCI staff for their collaborative efforts.

Mr. Chair, I urge all Members of the House to join me in voting for H.R. 3494.

Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of H.R. 3494, the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020.

Passing an annual intelligence authorization bill is the most important tool Congress has to conduct effective oversight of the intelligence activities of the United States.

Today, Chairman SCHIFF and I are bringing the tenth consecutive intelligence authorization bill to the floor. I am pleased that, as in years past, this bill is a bipartisan product that reflects the contributions of all the committee's members. It was reported out of the committee by a unanimous voice vote.

This legislation is the product of bipartisan work by the majority and the minority and provides the intelligence community the necessary resources and authorities to ensure the IC remains capable of protecting and defending the United States.

The bill folds in many priorities from fiscal year 2018 and 2019, including the defense of elections from foreign threats, enhanced injury benefits to CIA employees, and bolsters intelligence oversight by improving the IC accountability to Congress.

Additionally, the bill protects all CIA covert intelligence officers' identities, establishes a paid parental leave program for the IC, and it mandates counterintelligence briefings and notifications to the intelligence committees by the FBI on a quarterly basis and prompt notification when an investigation is carried out regarding a counterintelligence risk related to a Federal election or campaign.

This bill supports critical national security programs, particularly those focused on countering threats from hard targets, such as China.

Lastly, the bill continues to ensure that the dedicated men and women of our intelligence community have the funding, authorities, and support they need to carry out their mission and to keep us safe.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I am proud to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. QUIGLEY).

Mr. QUIGLEY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I rise in support of H.R. 3494.

As the United States learned in 2016, there are few things more important to our democracy than ensuring that our electoral system is kept free from outside interference.

We also have a responsibility to educate our partners and our allies about the threat from foreign interference, as well as share our best practices with those nations that face similar threats.

Taiwan, one of Asia's most vibrant democracies, is acutely aware of the risks posed by foreign influence. The Chinese Communist Party, angry that

another nation has the audacity to prove that a culturally Chinese democracy can thrive, will stop at nothing to degrade Taiwan's political independence.

This year's Intelligence Authorization Act requires the Director of National Intelligence to report on influence operations China conducts to interfere in Taiwan's upcoming 2020 elections and find out what assistance the U.S. government provided to counter these operations and provide a comprehensive list of the specific organizations that conducted these influence operations.

The U.S. is in a unique position to share the tools and techniques with others that we are implementing to safeguard our own democratic elections.

In line with our obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act, we urge the administration to do all it can to assist Taipei with creating conditions for a free, fair, and secure election that is free from interference.

This provision brings us one step closer to that goal.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I yield as much time as she may consume to the gentlewoman from New York (Ms. STEFANIK).

Ms. STEFANIK. Mr. Chairman, I am proud to rise in support of this year's Intelligence Authorization Act.

After the recent partisan NDAA debate and vote, it is an accomplishment that this committee came together to produce a bipartisan bill that supports our intelligence community and provides the warfighter with the intelligence support needed to protect the United States and our allies.

I am particularly pleased that this bill contains the Counterintelligence Accountability Act that I introduced earlier this year that I wanted to take a moment to highlight for the American public.

This bill amends the National Security Act by requiring the FBI to provide quarterly counterintelligence briefings to the congressional intelligence committees, which is not only necessary for us to conduct meaningful oversight over the FBI's counterintelligence operations, but also provides the American people with the comfort that the FBI is subject to the same types of scrutiny as other intelligence agencies.

Importantly, this bill also mandates that the FBI notify the congressional intelligence committees when the FBI has a counterintelligence investigation open related to a CI risk to an election or campaign for Federal office.

Given former FBI Director Comey's testimony in 2017, I am still deeply concerned that the FBI failed to provide notification to the congressional intelligence committees regarding the investigation opened into the Trump campaign in 2016 until well after the election.

This bill ensures that Congress is kept fully and currently informed of

these types of counterintelligence activities. This is good, accountable governance.

Mr. Chair, I appreciate the chair and ranking member's support in adding my legislation into this bill and urge my colleagues to vote "yes" on final passage.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I am proud to yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Washington State (Mr. HECK).

Mr. HECK. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chair of the committee for yielding.

Mr. Chair, I rise to strongly support the David Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act.

In the last year we have made some pretty incredible progress in reducing the security clearance backlog, yet, frankly, after all the progress we have made, we are still—and you are hearing this number correctly—left with nearly a half a million people on the waiting list for security clearance.

Earlier this year, the average wait time for top secret security clearance was reduced to 468 days, down from 534 days.

So, in other words, when we are out there competing for young talent to come in and be a member of the intelligence community, say in a field such as cyber, we are told we have to tell them, "Cool your jets. We will get back to you in a year, year and a half or so."

Indeed, closer to home, my senior military adviser is a distinguished graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He served not one, but two tours in Afghanistan, where he had a security clearance, and yet when he joined a staff in the House of Representatives, to again earn a security clearance, it took 20 months, nearly 2 years.

We are losing good people when we subject them to that long of a wait time.

This bill makes some progress. It will build on the progress we made this year by providing needed reform to this mission. It creates a system of accountability and clear goals for how the process should run.

Furthermore, the bill allows for innovation on using digital tools, and reciprocity among agencies to improve our efficiencies when clearances are needed to be transferred from one agency to another.

Our government can and must efficiently and effectively review security clearance applicants. We owe our national security workforce at least that much. This bill will help us to do that, to further reduce it, so that the intelligence community can compete for the best and the brightest in a timely fashion.

Mr. Chair, for that reason, among many, I urge Members' support for the Intelligence Authorization Act.

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Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from Alabama (Ms. SEWELL).

Ms. SEWELL of Alabama. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 3494, the Intelligence Authorization Act.

Mr. Chairman, as the chair of the Defense Intelligence and Warfighter Support Subcommittee, I believe this bill will ensure our warfighters retain the information and decisionmaking advantages to which we have grown accustomed and improve the intelligence community's ability to attract and retain a diverse workforce.

The bill includes provisions that authorize increased intelligence funding for combatant commanders and our growing strategic competition with China, Russia, and other malign actors; supports the Defense Intelligence Agency's ongoing assessment of its roles and missions; and provides the Director of National Intelligence with the necessary authority to manage intelligence community-wide academic programs.

This bill also includes language I authored which will improve Federal campaign election security. My provision will require the Director of National Intelligence to work with the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security to make available an advisory report on foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats to those campaigns. Additionally, my language requires the Director to publish a summary of best practices and provide information to campaigns to help thwart these attacks.

This legislation also continues the committee's longstanding and bipartisan work to promote increased diversity within the intelligence community's workforce. This bill contains language directing the intelligence community to expand its annual demographic hiring report by adding grade level, years of service, career categories, gender identity, and sexual orientation reporting categories. These changes will improve the IC's ability to track how well it retains and promotes persons of diverse backgrounds.

Finally, for the first time in many years, the Intelligence Authorization Act will provide significant funding for programs that will improve the IC's ability to introduce students from diverse backgrounds to its mission.

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to voting in support of this legislation. I commend the chairman and ranking member on working together to provide these important authorizations. I encourage my colleagues to do the same and vote for this bill.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I continue to reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. SWALWELL).

Mr. SWALWELL of California. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chairman of our committee for working with the minority to put together a bipartisan piece

of legislation that serves our national security purposes.

I also want to acknowledge both of the individuals for whom the bill is named, but particularly Damon Paul Nelson, the former staff director for the then-majority at the time, someone whom I and my colleagues saw put his heart and soul into the committee and someone who was able to keep many lines of communication that were necessary open during some of our most trying times. This is a fitting recognition of his service to our country.

As chairman of the Intelligence Modernization and Readiness Subcommittee, I celebrate this bipartisan bill and the patriotic young people who enter service in the intelligence community, sometimes immediately after college, despite extraordinary student debt. For that reason, we have included measures to enhance intelligence community-wide student loan repayment and forgiveness programs.

Reducing the financial burden on intelligence community workers helps us recruit and retain a talented and diverse workforce to remain competitive with the private sector. To that aim, we have also included a measure to authorize 12 weeks of paid parental leave for intelligence community employees in the event of a birth or adoption.

This authority would supplement the 12 weeks of unpaid leave currently afforded to intelligence community employees and other government personnel under existing law, sending a strong message to the intelligence community workforce that they do not need to choose between their career, serving our country, and their family.

These will help the intelligence community recruit and retain individuals capable of meeting the security goals of the United States and will set the example for other Federal agencies seeking pro-worker policies.

Our goal on the subcommittee is to anticipate the needs of the intelligence community workforce. Reaching across the aisle for our intelligence community is how we will secure a next-generation intelligence community workforce.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I continue to reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, it is now a pleasure to yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. SEAN PATRICK MALONEY).

Mr. SEAN PATRICK MALONEY of New York. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chairman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I rise today to offer support for this bill, which includes my legislation, the Gregg Wenzel Clandestine Heroes Parity Act.

Mr. Chairman, my bill honors an unsung son of the Hudson Valley, CIA Officer Gregg Wenzel, who died in Ethiopia on July 9, 2003. He was only 33 years old.

Gregg was inspired to join the Clandestine Service after September 11 and dedicated his life to making the United

States stronger in our fight against terrorism. That is what CIA officers do; they put their lives on the line for our freedoms. But because of the nature of their work, they rarely get the recognition they deserve.

This bill simply ensures that the families of fallen CIA officers receive the death benefits their loved ones earned laying down their lives in service of our Nation.

Gregg was born in the Bronx and graduated from Monroe-Woodbury High School in Orange County, New York. He went on to earn degrees from the State University of New York at Binghamton and then the University of Miami School of Law.

After joining the CIA, he was assigned his first overseas tour as an operations officer in the Horn of Africa. The assignment was challenging, but Gregg was known for his grit and good spirit.

After his death, Gregg was awarded the CIA's Intelligence Commendation Medal and the Exceptional Service Medalion. You can find his star, number 81, on the CIA Memorial Wall in Langley. And we even honored his service in 2015 by renaming the Monroe, New York, post office the Gregg David Wenzel Memorial Post Office, which is the first such honor ever to be bestowed on a CIA officer.

But even with these distinctions, Gregg's family was never able to access the death benefits he had earned in life. A loophole currently blocks benefits for all CIA officers who don't have dependents or who are not killed by a known act of terrorism. My bill simply changes that and rights this wrong.

I am so thankful to Gregg's parents, Gladys and Mitch Wenzel, for never giving up on this fight. This bill is an opportunity for us, as a grateful nation, to honor Gregg and his family and to honor all of our fallen CIA officers and the families they have left behind.

Mr. Chairman, I urge all Members to vote "yes" on this bill.

Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, this year's IA is named after Damon Nelson and Matthew Pollard, two staffers who passed away unexpectedly last year.

Matt Pollard was a staffer with the Senate Intelligence Committee, and he is remembered fondly by staff and members who had the pleasure of working with him.

Damon Nelson was a former Republican staff director on the House Intelligence Committee and a personal friend. Damon would be happy with the bill today, and I am happy that this committee was able to produce a bipartisan product.

In closing, I want to take a moment to thank the men and women who serve in our intelligence community. I am honored to get to know so many of them in the course of the committee's oversight work.

I also thank my colleagues on the Intelligence Committee for their contributions to our oversight over the past year.

I also thank all of the staff on the committee for their hard work on the bill and their daily oversight of the intelligence community. In particular, I thank the professional oversight staff from the minority, especially Nick Ciarlante, Laura Casulli, Meghan Green, Andrew House, Lisa Major, Bill Flanigan, Steve Keith, Marissa Skaggs, Betsy Hulme, Jack Langer, and Allen Souza.

I would also like to take just a moment to thank our fellow from Los Alamos National Laboratory, Scott Miller. Scott joined the committee in 2016 and, in a few weeks, will be finishing up his midcareer educational program with the House and will be returning to New Mexico.

Mr. Chairman, I wish Scott all the best as he, his wife, Rebecca, and daughter, Sarah, return home.

All the staff members spent long hours working on the legislative text and its classified annex, and the bill is stronger for it.

Mr. Chairman, I thank Chairman SCHIFF and all of his staff for the bipartisan work product.

Mr. Chairman, I urge passage of H.R. 3494, as amended, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, I wish to say only a few words of recognition before concluding my remarks on the Intelligence Authorization Act.

First, my HPSCI colleagues and I remember HPSCI's Damon Nelson and SSCI's Matthew Pollard, two dedicated staffers and public servants who passed away last year. The legislation is named in their honor.

I also express my tremendous thanks and support to the men and women of the intelligence community. They strive quietly and tirelessly every day, and their work helps keep the Nation safe.

I greatly appreciate the work of Ranking Member NUNES, as well as my other HPSCI colleagues.

And I would be remiss if I did not recognize these members of my staff who worked tirelessly together with their minority colleagues to produce this bipartisan legislation: Wells Bennett, Timothy Bergreen, Maher Bitar, Carly Blake, Patrick Boland, Kris Breaux, Linda Cohen, Thomas Eager, Will Evans, Patrick Fallon, Daniel Goldman, Abby Grace, Nicolas Mitchell, Daniel Noble, Diana Pilipenko, Lucian Sikorskyj, Conrad Stosz, Kathy Suber, Amanda Rogers Thorpe, Aaron Thurman, Rheanne Wirkkala, Raffaella Wakeman, and William Wu.

One more personnel note: I want to recognize the exemplary contributions of Brandon Smith, who has been a member of HPSCI's staff for 18 years. Brandon has announced that he will be leaving HPSCI soon. We are deeply grateful for his work and his long-standing and continuing service to the Nation.

Let me conclude by urging all Members of the House to join me in voting

for H.R. 3494 and in supporting the measure as it proceeds to the Senate and, after that, to the President's desk.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

The CHAIR. All time for general debate has expired.

Pursuant to the rule, the bill shall be considered for amendment under the 5-minute rule.

In lieu of the amendment in the nature of a substitute recommended by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, printed in the bill, the amendment in the nature of a substitute consisting of the text of Rules Committee Print 116-22, modified by the amendment printed in part A of House Report 116-154, shall be considered as adopted. The bill, as amended, shall be considered as an original bill for purpose of further amendment under the 5-minute rule and shall be considered as read.

The text of the bill, as amended, is as follows:

H.R. 3494

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020".

SEC. 2. DIVISIONS AND TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) DIVISIONS.—This Act is organized into two divisions as follows:

(1) Division A—Intelligence Authorizations for Fiscal Year 2020.

(2) Division B—Intelligence Authorizations for Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019.

(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title.

Sec. 2. Divisions and table of contents.

Sec. 3. Definitions.

DIVISION A—INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2020 TITLE I—INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.

Sec. 102. Classified schedule of authorizations.

Sec. 103. Intelligence community management account.

TITLE II—CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.

TITLE III—GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

Sec. 301. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.

Sec. 302. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by law.

Sec. 303. Paid parental leave.

Sec. 304. Unfunded requirements of the intelligence community.

Sec. 305. Extending the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982.

Sec. 306. Intelligence community public-private talent exchange.

Sec. 307. Assessment of contracting practices to identify certain security and counterintelligence concerns.

Sec. 308. Required counterintelligence briefings and notifications.

TITLE IV—MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Sec. 401. Establishment of Climate Security Advisory Council.

Sec. 402. Transfer of National Intelligence University to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

TITLE V—MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES

Sec. 501. Annual reports on influence operations and campaigns in the United States by the Communist Party of China.

Sec. 502. Report on repression of ethnic Muslim minorities in the Xinjiang region of the People's Republic of China.

Sec. 503. Report on efforts by People's Republic of China to influence election in Taiwan.

Sec. 504. Assessment of legitimate and illegitimate financial and other assets of Vladimir Putin.

Sec. 505. Assessments of intentions of political leadership of the Russian Federation.

Sec. 506. Report on death of Jamal Khashoggi.

TITLE VI—FEDERAL EFFORTS AGAINST DOMESTIC TERRORISM

Sec. 601. Definitions.

Sec. 602. Annual strategic intelligence assessment of and comprehensive report on domestic terrorism.

TITLE VII—REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS

Sec. 701. Modification of requirements for submission to Congress of certain reports.

Sec. 702. Increased transparency regarding counterterrorism budget of the United States.

Sec. 703. Task force on illicit financing of espionage and foreign influence operations.

Sec. 704. Study on role of retired and former personnel of intelligence community with respect to certain foreign intelligence operations.

Sec. 705. Report by Director of National Intelligence on fifth-generation wireless network technology.

Sec. 706. Establishment of 5G prize competition.

Sec. 707. Establishment of deepfakes prize competition.

DIVISION B—INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATIONS FOR FISCAL YEARS 2018 AND 2019 TITLE XXI—INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 2101. Authorization of appropriations.

Sec. 2102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.

Sec. 2103. Intelligence Community Management Account.

TITLE XXII—CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Sec. 2201. Authorization of appropriations.

Sec. 2202. Computation of annuities for employees of the Central Intelligence Agency.

TITLE XXIII—GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

Sec. 2301. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.

Sec. 2302. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by law.

Sec. 2303. Modification of special pay authority for science, technology, engineering, or mathematics positions and addition of special pay authority for cyber positions.

Sec. 2304. Modification of appointment of Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community.

Sec. 2305. Director of National Intelligence review of placement of positions within the intelligence community on the Executive Schedule.

Sec. 2306. Supply Chain and Counterintelligence Risk Management Task Force.

- Sec. 2307. Consideration of adversarial telecommunications and cybersecurity infrastructure when sharing intelligence with foreign governments and entities.
- Sec. 2308. Cyber protection support for the personnel of the intelligence community in positions highly vulnerable to cyber attack.
- Sec. 2309. Elimination of sunset of authority relating to management of supply-chain risk.
- Sec. 2310. Limitations on determinations regarding certain security classifications.
- Sec. 2311. Joint Intelligence Community Council.
- Sec. 2312. Intelligence community information technology environment.
- Sec. 2313. Report on development of secure mobile voice solution for intelligence community.
- Sec. 2314. Policy on minimum insider threat standards.
- Sec. 2315. Submission of intelligence community policies.
- Sec. 2316. Expansion of intelligence community recruitment efforts.
- TITLE XXIV—MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY**
- Subtitle A—Office of the Director of National Intelligence
- Sec. 2401. Authority for protection of current and former employees of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
- Sec. 2402. Designation of the program manager-information sharing environment.
- Sec. 2403. Technical modification to the executive schedule.
- Sec. 2404. Chief Financial Officer of the Intelligence Community.
- Sec. 2405. Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community.
- Subtitle B—Central Intelligence Agency
- Sec. 2411. Central Intelligence Agency subsistence for personnel assigned to austere locations.
- Sec. 2412. Special rules for certain monthly workers' compensation payments and other payments for Central Intelligence Agency personnel.
- Sec. 2413. Expansion of security protective service jurisdiction of the Central Intelligence Agency.
- Sec. 2414. Repeal of foreign language proficiency requirement for certain senior level positions in the Central Intelligence Agency.
- Subtitle C—Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of Department of Energy
- Sec. 2421. Consolidation of Department of Energy Offices of Intelligence and Counterintelligence.
- Sec. 2422. Establishment of Energy Infrastructure Security Center.
- Sec. 2423. Repeal of Department of Energy Intelligence Executive Committee and budget reporting requirement.
- Subtitle D—Other Elements
- Sec. 2431. Plan for designation of counterintelligence component of Defense Security Service as an element of intelligence community.
- Sec. 2432. Notice not required for private entities.
- Sec. 2433. Establishment of advisory board for National Reconnaissance Office.
- Sec. 2434. Collocation of certain Department of Homeland Security personnel at field locations.
- TITLE XXV—ELECTION MATTERS**
- Sec. 2501. Report on cyber attacks by foreign governments against United States election infrastructure.
- Sec. 2502. Review of intelligence community's posture to collect against and analyze Russian efforts to influence the Presidential election.
- Sec. 2503. Assessment of foreign intelligence threats to Federal elections.
- Sec. 2504. Strategy for countering Russian cyber threats to United States elections.
- Sec. 2505. Assessment of significant Russian influence campaigns directed at foreign elections and referenda.
- Sec. 2506. Information sharing with State election officials.
- Sec. 2507. Notification of significant foreign cyber intrusions and active measures campaigns directed at elections for Federal offices.
- Sec. 2508. Designation of counterintelligence officer to lead election security matters.
- TITLE XXVI—SECURITY CLEARANCES**
- Sec. 2601. Definitions.
- Sec. 2602. Reports and plans relating to security clearances and background investigations.
- Sec. 2603. Improving the process for security clearances.
- Sec. 2604. Goals for promptness of determinations regarding security clearances.
- Sec. 2605. Security Executive Agent.
- Sec. 2606. Report on unified, simplified, Governmentwide standards for positions of trust and security clearances.
- Sec. 2607. Report on clearance in person concept.
- Sec. 2608. Reports on reciprocity for security clearances inside of departments and agencies.
- Sec. 2609. Intelligence community reports on security clearances.
- Sec. 2610. Periodic report on positions in the intelligence community that can be conducted without access to classified information, networks, or facilities.
- Sec. 2611. Information sharing program for positions of trust and security clearances.
- Sec. 2612. Report on protections for confidentiality of whistleblower-related communications.
- TITLE XXVII—REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS**
- Subtitle A—Matters Relating to Russia and Other Foreign Powers
- Sec. 2701. Limitation relating to establishment or support of cybersecurity unit with the Russian Federation.
- Sec. 2702. Report on returning Russian compounds.
- Sec. 2703. Assessment of threat finance relating to Russia.
- Sec. 2704. Notification of an active measures campaign.
- Sec. 2705. Notification of travel by accredited diplomatic and consular personnel of the Russian Federation in the United States.
- Sec. 2706. Report on outreach strategy addressing threats from United States adversaries to the United States technology sector.
- Sec. 2707. Report on Iranian support of proxy forces in Syria and Lebanon.
- Sec. 2708. Annual report on Iranian expenditures supporting foreign military and terrorist activities.
- Sec. 2709. Expansion of scope of committee to counter active measures and report on establishment of Foreign Malign Influence Center.
- Subtitle B—Reports
- Sec. 2711. Technical correction to Inspector General study.
- Sec. 2712. Reports on authorities of the Chief Intelligence Officer of the Department of Homeland Security.
- Sec. 2713. Review of intelligence community whistleblower matters.
- Sec. 2714. Report on role of Director of National Intelligence with respect to certain foreign investments.
- Sec. 2715. Report on surveillance by foreign governments against United States telecommunications networks.
- Sec. 2716. Biennial report on foreign investment risks.
- Sec. 2717. Modification of certain reporting requirement on travel of foreign diplomats.
- Sec. 2718. Semiannual reports on investigations of unauthorized disclosures of classified information.
- Sec. 2719. Congressional notification of designation of covered intelligence officer as persona non grata.
- Sec. 2720. Reports on intelligence community participation in vulnerabilities equities process of Federal Government.
- Sec. 2721. Inspectors General reports on classification.
- Sec. 2722. Reports on global water insecurity and national security implications and briefing on emerging infectious disease and pandemics.
- Sec. 2723. Annual report on memoranda of understanding between elements of intelligence community and other entities of the United States Government regarding significant operational activities or policy.
- Sec. 2724. Study on the feasibility of encrypting unclassified wireline and wireless telephone calls.
- Sec. 2725. Modification of requirement for annual report on hiring and retention of minority employees.
- Sec. 2726. Reports on intelligence community loan repayment and related programs.
- Sec. 2727. Repeal of certain reporting requirements.
- Sec. 2728. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community report on senior executives of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
- Sec. 2729. Briefing on Federal Bureau of Investigation offering permanent residence to sources and cooperators.
- Sec. 2730. Intelligence assessment of North Korea revenue sources.
- Sec. 2731. Report on possible exploitation of virtual currencies by terrorist actors.
- Subtitle C—Other Matters
- Sec. 2741. Public Interest Declassification Board.
- Sec. 2742. Technical and clerical amendments to the National Security Act of 1947.
- Sec. 2743. Technical amendments related to the Department of Energy.
- Sec. 2744. Sense of Congress on notification of certain disclosures of classified information.
- Sec. 2745. Sense of Congress on consideration of espionage activities when considering whether or not to provide visas to foreign individuals to be accredited to a United Nations mission in the United States.

SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:

(1) **CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES.**—The term “congressional intelligence committees” has the meaning given such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).

(2) **INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.**—The term “intelligence community” has the meaning given such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).

**DIVISION A—INTELLIGENCE
AUTHORIZATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2020**

TITLE I—INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2020 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States Government:

- (1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
- (2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
- (3) The Department of Defense.
- (4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
- (5) The National Security Agency.
- (6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force.
- (7) The Coast Guard.
- (8) The Department of State.
- (9) The Department of the Treasury.
- (10) The Department of Energy.
- (11) The Department of Justice.
- (12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
- (13) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
- (14) The National Reconnaissance Office.
- (15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
- (16) The Department of Homeland Security.

SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

(a) **SPECIFICATIONS OF AMOUNTS.**—The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101 for the conduct of the intelligence activities of the elements listed in paragraphs (1) through (16) of section 101, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany this Act.

(b) **AVAILABILITY OF CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.**—

(1) **AVAILABILITY.**—The classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be made available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and to the President.

(2) **DISTRIBUTION BY THE PRESIDENT.**—Subject to paragraph (3), the President shall provide for suitable distribution of the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection (a), or of appropriate portions of such Schedule, within the executive branch.

(3) **LIMITS ON DISCLOSURE.**—The President shall not publicly disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any portion of such Schedule except—

(A) as provided in section 601(a) of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C. 3306(a));

(B) to the extent necessary to implement the budget; or

(C) as otherwise required by law.

SEC. 103. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

(a) **AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**—There is authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2020 the sum of \$565,637,000.

(b) **CLASSIFIED AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**—In addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account for fiscal year 2020 such additional amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a).

TITLE II—CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability fund \$514,000,000 for fiscal year 2020.

**TITLE III—GENERAL INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY MATTERS**

SEC. 301. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the United States.

SEC. 302. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY LAW.

Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law.

SEC. 303. PAID PARENTAL LEAVE.

(a) **PURPOSE.**—The purpose of this section is to—

(1) help the intelligence community recruit and retain a dynamic, multi-talented, and diverse workforce capable of meeting the security goals of the United States; and

(2) establish best practices and processes for other elements of the Federal Government seeking to pursue similar policies.

(b) **AUTHORIZATION OF PAID PARENTAL LEAVE FOR INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY EMPLOYEES.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—Title III of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3071 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 304 the following:

“SEC. 305. PAID PARENTAL LEAVE.

“(a) **PAID PARENTAL LEAVE.**—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a civilian employee of an element of the intelligence community shall have available a total of 12 administrative workweeks of paid parental leave in the event of the birth of a child of the employee, or placement of a child with the employee for adoption or foster care in order to care for such son or daughter. Such paid parental leave shall be used during the 12-month period beginning on the date of the birth or placement. Nothing in this section shall be construed to modify or otherwise affect the eligibility of an employee of an element of the intelligence community for benefits relating to leave under any other provision of law.

“(b) **TREATMENT OF PARENTAL LEAVE REQUEST.**—Notwithstanding any other provision of law—

“(1) an element of the intelligence community shall accommodate an employee’s leave request under subsection (a), including a request to use such leave intermittently or to create a reduced work schedule, to the extent that the requested leave schedule does not unduly disrupt operations; and

“(2) to the extent that an employee’s requested leave described in paragraph (1) arises out of medical necessity related to a serious health condition connected to the birth of a child, the employing element shall handle the scheduling consistent with the treatment of employees who are using leave under subparagraph (C) or (D) of section 6382(a)(1) of title 5, United States Code.

“(c) **RULES RELATING TO PAID LEAVE.**—Notwithstanding any other provision of law—

“(1) an employee may not be required to first use all or any portion of any unpaid leave available to the employee before being allowed to use the paid parental leave described in subsection (a); and

“(2) paid parental leave under subsection (a)—

“(A) shall be payable from any appropriation or fund available for salaries or expenses for positions within the employing element;

“(B) may not be considered to be annual or vacation leave for purposes of section 5551 or 5552 of title 5, United States Code, or for any other purpose;

“(C) if not used by the employee before the end of the 12-month period described in sub-

section (a) to which the leave relates, may not be available for any subsequent use and may not be converted into a cash payment;

“(D) may be granted only to the extent that the employee does not receive a total of more than 12 weeks of paid parental leave in any 12-month period beginning on the date of a birth or placement;

“(E) may not be granted—

“(i) in excess of a lifetime aggregate total of 30 administrative workweeks based on placements of a foster child for any individual employee; or

“(ii) in connection with temporary foster care placements expected to last less than 1 year;

“(F) may not be granted for a child being placed for foster care or adoption if such leave was previously granted to the same employee when the same child was placed with the employee for foster care in the past;

“(G) shall be used in increments of hours (or fractions thereof), with 12 administrative workweeks equal to 480 hours for employees with a regular full-time work schedule and converted to a proportional number of hours for employees with part-time, seasonal, or uncommon tours of duty; and

“(H) may not be used during off-season (non-pay status) periods for employees with seasonal work schedules.

“(d) **IMPLEMENTATION PLAN.**—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this section, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees an implementation plan that includes—

“(1) processes and procedures for implementing the paid parental leave policies under subsections (a) through (c);

“(2) an explanation of how the implementation of subsections (a) through (c) will be reconciled with policies of other elements of the Federal Government, including the impact on elements funded by the National Intelligence Program that are housed within agencies outside the intelligence community; and

“(3) all costs or operational expenses associated with the implementation of subsections (a) through (c).

“(e) **DIRECTIVE.**—Not later than 180 days after the Director of National Intelligence submits the implementation plan under subsection (d), the Director of National Intelligence shall issue a written directive to implement this section, which directive shall take effect on the date of issuance.

“(f) **ANNUAL REPORT.**—The Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees an annual report that—

“(1) details the number of employees of each element of the intelligence community who applied for and took paid parental leave under subsection (a) during the year covered by the report;

“(2) details the number of—

“(A) employees of each element of the intelligence community stationed abroad who applied for and took paid parental leave under subsection (a) during the year covered by the report; and

“(B) employees of each element of the intelligence community stationed abroad who applied for paid parental leave but such application was not granted because of an undue impact on operations as specified in subsection (b)(1); and

“(3) includes updates on major implementation challenges or costs associated with paid parental leave.

“(g) **DEFINITION OF CHILD.**—For purposes of this section, the term ‘child’ means a biological, adopted, or foster child, a stepchild, a legal ward, or a child of a person in loco parentis, who is—

“(1) under 18 years of age; or

“(2) 18 years of age or older and incapable of self-care because of a mental or physical disability.”.

(2) **CLERICAL AMENDMENT.**—The table of contents in the matter preceding section 2 of the

National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3002) is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 304 the following:

“Sec. 305. Paid parental leave.”.

(c) **APPLICABILITY.**—Section 305 of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (b), shall apply with respect to leave taken in connection with the birth or placement of a child that occurs on or after the date on which the Director of National Intelligence issues the written directive under subsection (e) of such section 305.

SEC. 304. UNFUNDED REQUIREMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

“SEC. 512. UNFUNDED PRIORITIES OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

“(a) **BRIEFINGS.**—Upon the request of an appropriate congressional committee, the Director of National Intelligence shall provide to the committee a briefing on the unfunded priorities of an element of the intelligence community.

“(b) **DEFINITIONS.**—In this section:

“(1) **APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.**—The term ‘appropriate congressional committees’ means—

“(A) the congressional intelligence committees; and

“(B) the Committees on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Senate.

“(2) **UNFUNDED PRIORITY.**—The term ‘unfunded priority’, in the case of a fiscal year, means a program, activity, or other initiative of an element of the intelligence community that—

“(A) was submitted by the head of the element to the Director of National Intelligence in the budget proposal for the element for that fiscal year, but was not included by the Director in the consolidated budget proposal submitted to the President for that fiscal year; or

“(B) was submitted by the Director in the consolidated budget proposal submitted to the President for that fiscal year, but was not included in the budget of the President submitted to Congress for that fiscal year pursuant to section 1105 of title 31, United States Code.”.

(b) **CLERICAL AMENDMENT.**—The table of sections in the first section of such Act is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 511 the following new item:

“Sec. 512. Unfunded priorities of the intelligence community.”.

SEC. 305. EXTENDING THE INTELLIGENCE IDENTITIES PROTECTION ACT OF 1982.

Section 605(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3126(4)) is amended—

(1) in subparagraph (A)—

(A) by striking clause (i);

(B) in clause (i), by striking “, and” and inserting “;”; and

(C) by striking “agency—” and all that follows through “whose identity” and inserting “agency whose identity”; and

(2) in subparagraph (B)(i), by striking “resides and acts outside the United States” and inserting “acts”.

SEC. 306. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PUBLIC-PRIVATE TALENT EXCHANGE.

(a) **POLICIES, PROCESSES, AND PROCEDURES REQUIRED.**—Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall develop policies, processes, and procedures to facilitate the rotation of personnel of the intelligence community to the private sector, and personnel from the private sector to the intelligence community.

(b) **DETAIL AUTHORITY.**—Under policies developed by the Director pursuant to subsection (a), pursuant to a written agreement with a private-sector organization, and with the consent of the employee, a head of an element of the intelligence community may arrange for the temporary detail of an employee of such element to such private-sector organization, or from such

private-sector organization to such element under this section.

(c) **AGREEMENTS.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—A head of an element of the intelligence community exercising the authority of the head under subsection (a) shall provide for a written agreement among the element of the intelligence community, the private-sector organization, and the employee concerned regarding the terms and conditions of the employee’s detail under this section. The agreement—

(A) shall require that the employee of the element, upon completion of the detail, serve in the element, or elsewhere in the civil service if approved by the head of the element, for a period that is at least equal to the length of the detail;

(B) shall provide that if the employee of the element fails to carry out the agreement, such employee shall be liable to the United States for payment of all non-salary and benefit expenses of the detail, unless that failure was for good and sufficient reason, as determined by the head of the element;

(C) shall contain language informing such employee of the prohibition on sharing, using, or otherwise improperly handling classified or unclassified non-public information for the benefit or advantage of the private-sector organization;

(D) shall contain language governing the handling of classified information by such employee during the detail; and

(E) shall contain language requiring the employee to acknowledge the obligations of the employee under section 1905 of title 18, United States Code.

(2) **AMOUNT OF LIABILITY.**—An amount for which an employee is liable under paragraph (1) shall be treated as a debt due the United States.

(3) **WAIVER.**—The head of an element of the intelligence community may waive, in whole or in part, collection of a debt described in paragraph (2) based on a determination that the collection would be against equity and good conscience and not in the best interests of the United States, after taking into account any indication of fraud, misrepresentation, fault, or lack of good faith on the part of the employee.

(d) **TERMINATION.**—A detail under this section may, at any time and for any reason, be terminated by the head of the element of the intelligence community concerned or the private-sector organization concerned.

(e) **DURATION.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—A detail under this section shall be for a period of not less than 3 months and not more than 2 years, renewable up to a total of 3 years.

(2) **LONGER PERIODS.**—A detail under this section may be for a period in excess of 2 years, but not more than 3 years, if the head of the element making the detail determines that such detail is necessary to meet critical mission or program requirements.

(3) **LIMITATION.**—No employee of an element of the intelligence community may be detailed under this section for more than a total of 5 years, inclusive of all such details.

(f) **STATUS OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES DETAILED TO PRIVATE-SECTOR ORGANIZATIONS.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—An employee of an element of the intelligence community who is detailed to a private-sector organization under this section shall be considered, during the period of detail, to be on a regular work assignment in the element. The written agreement established under subsection (c)(1) shall address the specific terms and conditions related to the employee’s continued status as a Federal employee.

(2) **REQUIREMENTS.**—In establishing a temporary detail of an employee of an element of the intelligence community to a private-sector organization, the head of the element shall—

(A) certify that the temporary detail of such employee shall not have an adverse or negative impact on mission attainment or organizational capabilities associated with the detail; and

(B) in the case of an element of the intelligence community in the Department of De-

fense, ensure that the normal duties and functions of such employees are not, as a result of and during the course of such temporary detail, performed or augmented by contractor personnel in violation of the provisions of section 2461 of title 10, United States Code.

(g) **TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR PRIVATE-SECTOR EMPLOYEES.**—An employee of a private-sector organization who is detailed to an element of the intelligence community under this section—

(1) shall continue to receive pay and benefits from the private-sector organization from which such employee is detailed and shall not receive pay or benefits from the element, except as provided in paragraph (2);

(2) is deemed to be an employee of the element for the purposes of—

(A) chapters 73 and 81 of title 5, United States Code;

(B) sections 201, 203, 205, 207, 208, 209, 603, 606, 607, 643, 654, 1905, and 1913 of title 18, United States Code;

(C) sections 1343, 1344, and 1349(b) of title 31, United States Code;

(D) chapter 171 of title 28, United States Code (commonly known as the “Federal Tort Claims Act”) and any other Federal tort liability statute;

(E) the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.); and

(F) chapter 21 of title 41, United States Code;

(3) may perform work that is considered inherently governmental in nature only when requested in writing by the head of the element;

(4) may not be used to circumvent any limitation or restriction on the size of the workforce of the element;

(5) shall be subject to the same requirements applicable to an employee performing the same functions and duties proposed for performance by the private sector employee; and

(6) in the case of an element of the intelligence community in the Department of Defense, may not be used to circumvent the provisions of section 2461 of title 10, United States Code.

(h) **PROHIBITION AGAINST CHARGING CERTAIN COSTS TO THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.**—A private-sector organization may not charge an element of the intelligence community or any other agency of the Federal Government, as direct costs under a Federal contract, the costs of pay or benefits paid by the organization to an employee detailed to an element of the intelligence community under this section for the period of the detail and any subsequent renewal periods.

(i) **ADDITIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS.**—In carrying out this section, the Director, pursuant to procedures developed under subsection (a)—

(1) shall, to the degree practicable, ensure that small business concerns are represented with respect to details authorized by this section;

(2) may, notwithstanding any other provision of law, establish criteria for elements of the intelligence community to use appropriated funds to reimburse small business concerns for the salaries and benefits of its employees during the periods when the small business concern agrees to detail its employees to the intelligence community under this section;

(3) shall take into consideration the question of how details under this section might best be used to help meet the needs of the intelligence community, including with respect to the training of employees;

(4) shall take into consideration areas of private-sector expertise that are critical to the intelligence community; and

(5) shall establish oversight mechanisms to determine whether the public-private exchange authorized by this section improves the efficiency and effectiveness of the intelligence community.

(j) **DEFINITIONS.**—In this section:

(1) **DETAIL.**—The term “detail” means, as appropriate in the context in which such term is used—

(A) the assignment or loan of an employee of an element of the intelligence community to a private-sector organization without a change of position from the intelligence community element that employs the individual; or

(B) the assignment or loan of an employee of a private-sector organization to an element of the intelligence community without a change of position from the private-sector organization that employs the individual.

(2) PRIVATE-SECTOR ORGANIZATION.—The term “private-sector organization” means—

- (A) a for-profit organization; or
(B) a not-for-profit organization.

(3) SMALL BUSINESS CONCERN.—The term “small business concern” has the meaning given such term in section 3703(e)(2) of title 5, United States Code.

SEC. 307. ASSESSMENT OF CONTRACTING PRACTICES TO IDENTIFY CERTAIN SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CONCERNS.

(a) ASSESSMENT.—

(1) CONTRACTING PRACTICES.—The Director of National Intelligence shall conduct an assessment of the authorities, policies, processes, and standards used by the elements of the intelligence community to ensure that the elements appropriately weigh security and counterintelligence risks in awarding a contract to a contractor that—

(A) carries out any joint research and development activities with a covered foreign country; or

(B) performs any contract or other agreement entered into with a covered foreign country.

(2) ELEMENTS.—The assessment under paragraph (1) shall include the following:

(A) An assessment of whether the authorities, policies, processes, and standards specified in paragraph (1) sufficiently identify security and counterintelligence concerns.

(B) Identification of any authority gaps in such authorities, policies, processes, and standards that prevent the intelligence community from considering the activities specified in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph (1) when evaluating offers for a contract.

(3) CONSULTATION.—In carrying out paragraph (1), the Director shall consult with each head of an element of the intelligence community.

(b) REPORT.—

(1) REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the assessment under subsection (a)(1).

(2) MATTERS INCLUDED.—The report under paragraph (1) shall include the following:

(A) The assessment under subsection (a)(1).

(B) An identification of any known contractors that have—

(i) carried out activities specified in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of subsection (a)(1); and

(ii) submitted an offer for a contract with an element of the intelligence community.

(C) A description of the steps that the Director and the heads of the elements of the intelligence community took to identify contractors under subparagraph (B).

(3) FORM.—The report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(c) COVERED FOREIGN COUNTRY DEFINED.—In this section, the term “covered foreign country” means the government, or any entity affiliated with the military or intelligence services of, the following foreign countries:

(1) The People’s Republic of China.

(2) The Russian Federation.

(3) The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

(4) The Islamic Republic of Iran.

SEC. 308. REQUIRED COUNTERINTELLIGENCE BRIEFINGS AND NOTIFICATIONS.

(a) FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND CYBERSECURITY THREATS TO FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGNS.—

(1) REPORTS REQUIRED.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—As provided in subparagraph (B), for each Federal election, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall make publicly available on an Internet website an advisory report on foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats to election campaigns for Federal offices. Each such report shall include, consistent with the protection of sources and methods, each of the following:

(i) A description of foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats to election campaigns for Federal offices.

(ii) A summary of best practices that election campaigns for Federal offices can employ in seeking to counter such threats.

(iii) An identification of any publicly available resources, including United States Government resources, for countering such threats.

(B) SCHEDULE FOR SUBMITTAL.—A report under this subsection shall be made available as follows:

(i) In the case of a report regarding an election held for the office of Senator or Member of the House of Representatives during 2018, not later than the date that is 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(ii) In the case of a report regarding an election for a Federal office during any subsequent year, not later than the date that is 1 year before the date of the election.

(C) INFORMATION TO BE INCLUDED.—A report under this subsection shall reflect the most current information available to the Director of National Intelligence regarding foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats.

(2) TREATMENT OF CAMPAIGNS SUBJECT TO HEIGHTENED THREATS.—If the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis jointly determine that an election campaign for Federal office is subject to a heightened foreign counterintelligence or cybersecurity threat, the Director and the Under Secretary, consistent with the protection of sources and methods, may make available additional information to the appropriate representatives of such campaign.

(b) BRIEFINGS ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.), as amended by section 304, is further amended by adding at the end the following new section:

“SEC. 513. BRIEFINGS AND NOTIFICATIONS ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.

“(a) QUARTERLY BRIEFINGS.—In addition to, and without any derogation of, the requirement under section 501 to keep the congressional intelligence committees fully and currently informed of the intelligence and counterintelligence activities of the United States, not less frequently than once each quarter, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall provide to the congressional intelligence committees a briefing on the counterintelligence activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Such briefings shall include, at a minimum, an overview and update of—

“(1) the counterintelligence posture of the Bureau;

“(2) counterintelligence investigations; and

“(3) any other information relating to the counterintelligence activities of the Bureau that the Director determines necessary.

“(b) NOTIFICATIONS.—In addition to the quarterly briefings under subsection (a), the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall promptly notify the congressional intelligence committees of any counterintelligence investigation carried out by the Bureau with respect to any counterintelligence risk or threat that is re-

lated to an election or campaign for Federal office.

“(c) GUIDELINES.—

“(1) DEVELOPMENT AND CONSULTATION.—The Director shall develop guidelines governing the scope of the briefings provided under subsection (a), the notifications provided under subsection (b), and the information required by section 308(a)(2) of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020. The Director shall consult the congressional intelligence committees during such development.

“(2) SUBMISSION.—The Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees—

“(A) the guidelines under paragraph (1) upon issuance; and

“(B) any updates to such guidelines by not later than 15 days after making such update.”.

(2) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of contents at the beginning of such Act, as amended by section 304, is further amended by inserting after the item relating to section 512 the following new item:

“Sec. 513. Briefings and notifications on counterintelligence activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.”.

TITLE IV—MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

SEC. 401. ESTABLISHMENT OF CLIMATE SECURITY ADVISORY COUNCIL.

(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

“SEC. 120. CLIMATE SECURITY ADVISORY COUNCIL.

“(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Director of National Intelligence shall establish a Climate Security Advisory Council for the purpose of—

“(1) assisting intelligence analysts of various elements of the intelligence community with respect to analysis of climate security and its impact on the areas of focus of such analysts;

“(2) facilitating coordination between the elements of the intelligence community and elements of the Federal Government that are not elements of the intelligence community in collecting data on, and conducting analysis of, climate change and climate security; and

“(3) ensuring that the intelligence community is adequately prioritizing climate change in carrying out its activities.

“(b) COMPOSITION OF COUNCIL.—

“(1) MEMBERS.—The Council shall be composed of the following individuals appointed by the Director of National Intelligence:

“(A) An appropriate official from the National Intelligence Council, who shall chair the Council.

“(B) The lead official with respect to climate and environmental security analysis from—

“(i) the Central Intelligence Agency;

“(ii) the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State;

“(iii) the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency;

“(iv) the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy;

“(v) the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence; and

“(vi) the Defense Intelligence Agency.

“(C) Three appropriate officials from elements of the Federal Government that are not elements of the intelligence community that are responsible for—

“(i) providing decision-makers with a predictive understanding of the climate;

“(ii) making observations of our Earth system that can be used by the public, policymakers, and to support strategic decisions; or

“(iii) coordinating Federal research and investments in understanding the forces shaping the global environment, both human and natural, and their impacts on society.

“(D) Any other officials as the Director of National Intelligence or the chair of the Council may determine appropriate.

“(2) RESPONSIBILITIES OF CHAIR.—The chair of the Council shall have responsibility for—

“(A) identifying agencies to supply individuals from elements of the Federal Government that are not elements of the intelligence community;

“(B) securing the permission of the relevant agency heads for the participation of such individuals on the Council; and

“(C) any other duties that the Director of National Intelligence may direct.

“(c) DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF COUNCIL.—The Council shall carry out the following duties and responsibilities:

“(1) To meet at least quarterly to—

“(A) exchange appropriate data between elements of the intelligence community and elements of the Federal Government that are not elements of the intelligence community;

“(B) discuss processes for the routine exchange of such data and implementation of such processes; and

“(C) prepare summaries of the business conducted at each meeting.

“(2) To assess and determine best practices with respect to the analysis of climate security, including identifying publicly available information and intelligence acquired through clandestine means that enables such analysis.

“(3) To assess and identify best practices with respect to prior efforts of the intelligence community to analyze climate security.

“(4) To assess and describe best practices for identifying and disseminating climate security indicators and warnings;

“(5) To recommend methods of incorporating analysis of climate security and the best practices identified under paragraphs (2) through (4) into existing analytic training programs.

“(6) To consult, as appropriate, with other elements of the intelligence community that conduct analysis of climate change or climate security and elements of the Federal Government that are not elements of the intelligence community that conduct analysis of climate change or climate security, for the purpose of sharing information about ongoing efforts and avoiding duplication of existing efforts.

“(7) To work with elements of the intelligence community that conduct analysis of climate change or climate security and elements of the Federal Government that are not elements of the intelligence community that conduct analysis of climate change or climate security—

“(A) to exchange appropriate data between such elements, establish processes, procedures and practices for the routine exchange of such data, discuss the implementation of such processes; and

“(B) to enable and facilitate the sharing of findings and analysis between such elements.

“(8) To assess whether the elements of the intelligence community that conduct analysis of climate change or climate security may inform the research direction of academic work and the sponsored work of the United States Government.

“(9) At the discretion of the chair of the Council, to convene conferences of analysts and non-intelligence community personnel working on climate change or climate security on subjects that the chair shall direct.

“(d) SUNSET.—The Council shall terminate on the date that is 4 years after the date of the enactment of this section.

“(e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

“(1) CLIMATE SECURITY.—The term ‘climate security’ means the effects of climate change on the following:

“(A) The national security of the United States, including national security infrastructure.

“(B) Subnational, national, and regional political stability.

“(C) The security of allies and partners of the United States.

“(D) Ongoing or potential political violence, including unrest, rioting, guerrilla warfare, insurgency, terrorism, rebellion, revolution, civil war, and interstate war.

“(2) CLIMATE INTELLIGENCE INDICATIONS AND WARNINGS.—The term ‘climate intelligence indications and warnings’ means developments relating to climate security with the potential to—

“(A) imminently and substantially alter the political stability or degree of human security in a country or region; or

“(B) imminently and substantially threaten—

“(i) the national security of the United States;

“(ii) the military, political, or economic interests of allies and partners of the United States; or

“(iii) citizens of the United States abroad.”.

(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of contents in the first section of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 119B the following new item:

“Sec. 120. Climate Security Advisory Council.”.

(c) INITIAL APPOINTMENTS.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall appoint the members of the Council under section 120 of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a).

SEC. 402. TRANSFER OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE UNIVERSITY TO THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.

(a) TRANSFER.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency shall transfer to the Director of National Intelligence the National Intelligence University, including the functions, personnel, assets, and liabilities of the University.

(b) DEGREE-GRANTING AUTHORITY.—

(1) REGULATIONS.—Under regulations prescribed by the Director of National Intelligence, the President of the National Intelligence University may, upon the recommendation of the faculty of the University, confer appropriate degrees upon graduates who meet the degree requirements.

(2) LIMITATION.—A degree may not be conferred under this section unless—

(A) the appropriate head of a Department of the Federal Government has recommended approval of the degree in accordance with any Federal policy applicable to the granting of academic degrees by departments and agencies of the Federal Government; and

(B) the University is accredited by the appropriate civilian academic accrediting agency or organization to award the degree, as determined by such appropriate head of a Department.

(c) CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS.—

(1) NOTIFICATION.—When seeking to establish degree-granting authority under this section, the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees—

(A) a copy of the self-assessment questionnaire required by the Federal policy specified in subsection (b)(2)(A); and

(B) any subsequent recommendations and rationale of the appropriate head of a Department specified in such subsection regarding establishing such degree-granting authority.

(2) MODIFICATION.—Upon any modification or redesignation of existing degree-granting authority, the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report containing the rationale for the proposed modification or redesignation and any subsequent recommendation described in paragraph (1)(B) with respect to the proposed modification or redesignation.

(3) ACTIONS ON NONACCREDITATION.—The Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report containing an explanation of any action by the appropriate academic accrediting agency or organization not to accredit the University to award any new or existing degree.

(d) CONFORMING REPEAL.—Effective 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, section 2161 of title 10, United States Code, is repealed, and the table of sections at the beginning of chapter 108 of such title is amended by striking the item relating to such section 2161.

SEC. 403. DEATH BENEFITS FOR SURVIVORS OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY PERSONNEL.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) officers of the Central Intelligence Agency who die during a period of assignment to a duty station in a foreign country should receive death benefits, regardless of whether the officers—

(A) were killed on or off duty;

(B) were killed due to an act of terrorism; or

(C) have surviving dependents;

(2) section 8 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3510) has provided the Agency an appropriate authority for compensating officers who die abroad who fall into any gaps in existing death benefit regulations of the Agency, even before the clarifying amendments made by this Act;

(3) notwithstanding that the improved authority provided by section 11(c) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 3511(c)), as added by subsection (e) of this section, is permissive, the Director of the Agency should promptly use such authority to modify the regulations on death benefits of the Agency to implement such section 11(c);

(4) the Director should not modify such regulations in a manner that limits or reduces the individuals covered by such regulations as in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act; and

(5) upon modifying such regulations, the Director should submit such regulations to the congressional intelligence committees pursuant to section 11(b) of such Act.

(b) CLARIFICATION OF CURRENT AUTHORITY.—Section 8 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3510) is amended by inserting before “rental of” the following: “payment of death benefits in cases in which the circumstances of the death of an employee of the Agency is not covered by section 11, other similar provisions of Federal law, or any regulation issued by the Director providing death benefits, but that the Director determines such payment appropriate;”.

(c) IMPROVEMENTS TO BENEFITS.—

(1) REQUIREMENTS.—Section 11 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 3511) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsections.

“(C) PAYMENTS.—(1) In carrying out subsection (a), the Director may pay to the survivor of a deceased covered individual an amount equal to one year’s salary 5313 of title 5, United States Code.

“(2) A covered individual may designate one or more persons to receive all or a portion of the amount payable to a survivor under paragraph (1). The designation of a person to receive a portion of the amount shall indicate the percentage of the amount, to be specified only in 10 percent increments, that the designated person may receive. The balance of the amount, if any, shall be paid in accordance with subsection (f)(2)(B).

“(d) EXCEPTION.—The Director may not make a payment under subsection (a) if the Director determines that the death was by reason of willful misconduct by the decedent.

“(e) FINALITY.—Any determination made by the Director under this section is final and may not be reviewed.

“(f) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

“(1) The term ‘covered individual’ means any of the following individuals who die during a period of assignment to a duty station in a foreign country, regardless of whether the death is the result of injuries sustained while in the performance of duty:

“(A) An employee of the Agency.

“(B) An employee of an element of the Federal Government other than the Agency who is detailed or assigned to the Agency at the time of death.

“(C) An individual affiliated with the Agency, as determined by the Director.

“(2) The term ‘State’ means each of the several States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and any territory or possession of the United States.

“(3) The term ‘survivor’ means, with respect to the death of a covered individual—

“(A) a person designated by the covered individual under subsection (c)(2); or

“(B) if a covered individual does not make such a designation—

“(i) the surviving spouse of the covered individual, if any;

“(ii) if there is no surviving spouse, any surviving children of the covered individual and the descendants of any deceased children by representation;

“(iii) if there is none of the above, the surviving parents of the covered individual or the survivor of the parents.

“(iv) if there is none of the above, the duly-appointed executor or administrator of the estate of the covered individual; or

“(v) if there is none of the above, other next of kin of the covered individual entitled under the laws of the last State in which the covered individual was domiciled before the covered individual’s death.”

(2) APPLICATION.—Section 11 of such Act, as amended by paragraph (1), shall apply with respect to the following:

(A) Deaths occurring during the period beginning on September 11, 2001, and ending on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act for which the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency has not paid a death benefit to the survivors of the decedent equal to or greater than the amount specified in subsection (c)(1) of such section 11, except that the total of any such death benefits may not exceed such amount specified in subsection (c)(1) of such section 11.

(B) Deaths occurring on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(3) DESIGNATIONS.—If the Director carries out subsection (c) of section 11 of such Act, as added by paragraph (1), the Director shall—

(A) request all covered individuals (as defined in such section 11) to make a designation under paragraph (2) of such subsection (c); and

(B) ensure that any new covered individual may make such a designation at the time at which the individual becomes a covered individual.

(d) BRIEFING ON PROVISION OF VA AND DOD HEALTH CARE SERVICES TO CIA OFFICERS.—

(1) FINDINGS.—Congress finds that officers of the Central Intelligence Agency—

(A) serve, and have served, overseas in dangerous areas or austere environments;

(B) may be wounded, incur brain or psychological trauma, or suffer from other chronic injuries as a result of such service; and

(C) face challenges in getting the expert medical and psychological care the officers need when the officers return to the United States.

(2) REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Deputy Director of the Agency for Operations, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Veterans Affairs for Health and the Director of the Defense Health Agency of the Department of the Defense, shall jointly provide to the appropriate congressional committees a briefing on—

(A) the extent to which the Director of the Agency believes that the officers of the Agency could benefit from health care services provided by the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, the Secretary of Defense, or both;

(B) the legal and policy constraints with respect to providing such services to such officers; and

(C) recommendations with respect to the legislative or regulatory actions that Congress, the

Secretary of Veterans Affairs, and the Secretary of Defense could implement to facilitate the provision of such services.

(3) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this subsection, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the congressional intelligence committees;

(B) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Veterans’ Affairs of the House of Representatives; and

(C) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Veterans’ Affairs of the Senate.

TITLE V—MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES

SEC. 501. ANNUAL REPORTS ON INFLUENCE OPERATIONS AND CAMPAIGNS IN THE UNITED STATES BY THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA.

(a) REPORTS.—Title XI of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3231 et seq.), as amended by section 2718, is further amended by adding at the end the following new section:

“SEC. 1106. ANNUAL REPORTS ON INFLUENCE OPERATIONS AND CAMPAIGNS IN THE UNITED STATES BY THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA.

“(a) REQUIREMENT.—On an annual basis, consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, the Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report on the influence operations and campaigns in the United States conducted by the Communist Party of China.

“(b) CONTENTS.—Each report under subsection (a) shall include the following:

“(1) A description of the organization of the United Front Work Department of the People’s Republic of China, or the successors of the United Front Work Department, and the links between the United Front Work Department and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

“(2) An assessment of the degree to which organizations that are associated with or receive funding from the United Front Work Department, particularly such entities operating in the United States, are formally tasked by the Chinese Communist Party or the Government of China.

“(3) A description of the efforts by the United Front Work Department and subsidiary organizations of the United Front Work Department to target, coerce, and influence foreign populations, particularly those of ethnic Chinese descent.

“(4) An assessment of attempts by the Chinese Embassy, consulates, and organizations affiliated with the Chinese Communist Party (including, at a minimum, the United Front Work Department) to influence the United States-based Chinese Student Scholar Associations.

“(5) A description of the evolution of the role of the United Front Work Department under the leadership of the President of China.

“(6) An assessment of the activities of the United Front Work Department designed to influence the opinions of elected leaders of the United States, or candidates for elections in the United States, with respect to issues of importance to the Chinese Communist Party.

“(7) A listing of all known organizations affiliated with the United Front Work Department that are operating in the United States as of the date of the report.

“(8) With respect to reports submitted after the first report, an assessment of the change in goals, tactics, techniques, and procedures of the influence operations and campaigns conducted by the Chinese Communist Party.

“(c) COORDINATION.—In carrying out subsection (a), the Director shall coordinate with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security

Agency, and any other relevant head of an element of the intelligence community.

“(d) FORM.—Each report submitted under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.”

(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of contents in the first section of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by section 2718, is further amended by inserting after the item relating to section 1105 the following new item:

“Sec. 1106. Annual reports on influence operations and campaigns in the United States by the Communist Party of China.”

(c) INITIAL REPORT.—The Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate the first report under section 1106 of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a), by not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 502. REPORT ON REPRESSION OF ETHNIC MUSLIM MINORITIES IN THE XINJIANG REGION OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

(a) REPORT.—Not later than 150 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report on activity by the People’s Republic of China to repress ethnic Muslim minorities in the Xinjiang region of China.

(b) CONTENTS.—The report under subsection (a) shall include the following:

(1) An assessment of the number of individuals detained in “political reeducation camps”, and the conditions in such camps for detainees, in the Xinjiang region of China, including whether detainees endure torture, forced renunciation of faith, or other mistreatment.

(2) A description, as possible, of the geographic location of such camps.

(3) A description, as possible, of the methods used by China to “reeducate” detainees and the elements of China responsible for such “reeducation”.

(4) A description of any forced labor in such camps, and any labor performed in regional factories for low wages under the threat of being sent back to “political reeducation camps”.

(5) An assessment of the level of access China grants to foreign persons observing the situation in Xinjiang and a description of measures used to impede efforts to monitor the conditions in Xinjiang.

(6) An assessment of the surveillance, detection, and control methods used by China to target ethnic minorities, including new “high-tech” policing models and a description of any civil liberties or privacy protections provided under such models.

(c) COORDINATION.—The Director of National Intelligence shall carry out subsection (a) in coordination with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security Agency, the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the head of any other agency of the Federal Government that the Director of National Intelligence determines appropriate.

(d) FORM.—The report submitted under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 503. REPORT ON EFFORTS BY PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA TO INFLUENCE ELECTION IN TAIWAN.

(a) REPORT.—Consistent with section 3(c) of the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8; 22 U.S.C. 3302(c)), and consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, not later than 45 days after the date of the election

for the President and Vice President of Taiwan in 2020, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report on any—

(1) influence operations conducted by China to interfere in or undermine such election; and

(2) efforts by the United States to disrupt such operations.

(b) ELEMENTS.—The report under subsection (a) shall include the following:

(1) A description of any significant efforts by the intelligence community to coordinate technical and material support for Taiwan to identify, disrupt, and combat influence operations specified in subsection (a)(1).

(2) A description of any efforts by the United States Government to build the capacity of Taiwan to disrupt external efforts that degrade a free and fair election process.

(3) An assessment of whether and to what extent China conducted influence operations specified in subsection (a)(1), and, if such operations occurred—

(A) a comprehensive list of specific governmental and nongovernmental entities of China that were involved in supporting such operations and a description of the role of each such entity; and

(B) an identification of any tactics, techniques, and procedures used in such operations.

(c) FORM.—The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 504. ASSESSMENT OF LEGITIMATE AND ILLEGITIMATE FINANCIAL AND OTHER ASSETS OF VLADIMIR PUTIN.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States should do more to expose the corruption of Vladimir Putin, whose ill-gotten wealth is perhaps the most powerful global symbol of his dishonesty and his persistent efforts to undermine the rule of law and democracy in the Russian Federation.

(b) ASSESSMENT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an assessment, based on all sources of intelligence, on the net worth and financial and other assets, legitimate as well as illegitimate, of Russian President Vladimir Putin and his family members, including—

(1) the estimated net worth of Vladimir Putin and his family members;

(2) a description of their legitimately and illegitimately obtained assets, including all real, personal, and intellectual property, bank or investment or similar accounts, and any other financial or business interests or holdings, including those outside of Russia;

(3) the details of the legitimately and illegitimately obtained assets, including real, personal, and intellectual property, bank or investment or similar accounts, and any other financial or business interests or holdings, including those outside of Russia, that are owned or controlled by, accessible to, or otherwise maintained for the benefit of Vladimir Putin, including their nature, location, manner of acquisition, value, and publicly named owner (if other than Vladimir Putin);

(4) the methods used by Vladimir Putin or others acting at his direction, with his knowledge, or for his benefit, to conceal Putin's interest in his accounts, holdings, or other assets, including the establishment of "front" or shell companies and the use of intermediaries; and

(5) an identification of the most significant senior Russian political figures, oligarchs, and any other persons who have engaged in activity intended to conceal the true financial condition of Vladimir Putin.

(c) FORM.—The assessment required under subsection (b) shall be submitted either—

(1) in unclassified form to the extent consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, and may include a classified annex; or

(2) simultaneously as both an unclassified version and a classified version.

(d) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this section, the term "appropriate congressional committees" means—

(1) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate; and

(2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Financial Services, and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives.

SEC. 505. ASSESSMENTS OF INTENTIONS OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, the Director of National Intelligence, and the head of any element of the intelligence community that the Director determines appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees each of the assessments described in subsection (b).

(b) ASSESSMENTS DESCRIBED.—The assessments described in this subsection are assessments based on intelligence obtained from all sources that assess the current intentions of the political leadership of the Russian Federation with respect to the following:

(1) Potential military action against members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

(2) Potential responses to an enlarged United States or NATO military presence in eastern Europe or to increased United States military support for allies and partners in the region, such as the provision of additional lethal military equipment to Ukraine or Georgia.

(3) Potential actions taken for the purpose of exploiting perceived divisions among the governments of Russia's Western adversaries.

(c) FORM.—Each assessment required under subsection (a) may be submitted in classified form but shall also include an unclassified executive summary, consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods.

(d) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—In this section, the term "appropriate congressional committees" means—

(1) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives; and

(2) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.

SEC. 506. REPORT ON DEATH OF JAMAL KHASHOGGI.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report on the death of Jamal Khashoggi. Such report shall include identification of those who carried out, participated in, ordered, or were otherwise complicit in or responsible for the death of Jamal Khashoggi, to the extent consistent with the protection of sources and methods.

(b) FORM.—The report submitted under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form.

TITLE VI—FEDERAL EFFORTS AGAINST DOMESTIC TERRORISM

SEC. 601. DEFINITIONS.

In this title:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term "appropriate congressional committees" means—

(A) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Homeland Security, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives; and

(B) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate.

(2) DOMESTIC TERRORISM.—The term "domestic terrorism" has the meaning given that term in section 2331 of title 18, United States Code.

(3) HATE CRIME.—The term "hate crime" means a criminal offense under—

(A) sections 241, 245, 247, and 249 of title 18, United States Code; and

(B) section 3631 of title 42, United States Code.

(4) INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM.—The term "international terrorism" has the meaning given that term in section 2331 of title 18, United States Code.

(5) TERMS IN ATTORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES FOR DOMESTIC FBI OPERATIONS.—The terms "assessments", "full investigations", "enterprise investigations", "predicated investigations", and "preliminary investigations" have the meanings given those terms in the most recent, approved version of the Attorney General's Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations (or successor).

(6) TERMS IN FBI BUDGET MATERIALS.—The terms "Consolidated Strategy Guide", "Field Office Strategic Plan", "Integrated Program Management Process", and "Threat Review and Prioritization" have the meanings given those terms in the materials submitted to Congress by the Attorney General in support of the Federal Bureau of Investigation budget for fiscal year 2020.

(7) TERRORISM.—The term "terrorism" includes domestic terrorism and international terrorism.

(8) TERRORISM INFORMATION.—The term "terrorism information" has the meaning given that term in section 1016(a) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485).

(9) TIME UTILIZATION AND RECORDKEEPING DATA.—The term "time utilization and recordkeeping data" means data collected on resource utilization and workload activity of personnel of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in accordance with Federal law.

SEC. 602. ANNUAL STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT OF AND COMPREHENSIVE REPORT ON DOMESTIC TERRORISM.

(a) REPORT REQUIRED.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter through 2025, the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis shall jointly submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on domestic terrorism containing the following:

(A) Strategic intelligence assessment under subsection (b).

(B) Discussion of activities under subsection (c).

(C) Data on domestic terrorism under subsection (d).

(2) RESPONSIBILITIES.—

(A) COORDINATION OF REPORTS AND INTEGRATION OF INFORMATION.—The Director of National Intelligence, acting through the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, shall be the lead official for coordinating the production of and integrating terrorism information into—

(i) each report under paragraph (1); and

(ii) each strategic intelligence assessment under subsection (b).

(B) INFORMATION SHARING.—The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis shall provide to the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center all

appropriate information requested by the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center to carry out this section.

(b) **STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT.**—The Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis shall include—

(1) in the first report under subsection (a)(1), a strategic intelligence assessment of domestic terrorism in the United States during fiscal years 2017, 2018, and 2019; and

(2) in each subsequent report under such subsection, a strategic intelligence assessment of domestic terrorism in the United States during the prior fiscal year.

(c) **DISCUSSION OF ACTIVITIES.**—Each report under subsection (a)(1) shall discuss and compare the following:

(1) The criteria for opening, managing, and closing domestic and international terrorism investigations by the Federal Government.

(2) Standards and procedures for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security, and the National Counterterrorism Center, with respect to the review, prioritization, and mitigation of domestic and international terrorism threats in the United States.

(3) The planning, development, production, analysis, and evaluation by the United States Government of intelligence products relating to terrorism, including both raw and finished intelligence.

(4) The sharing of information relating to domestic and international terrorism by and between—

- (A) the Federal Government;
- (B) State, local, Tribal, territorial, and foreign governments;
- (C) the appropriate congressional committees;
- (D) non-governmental organizations; and
- (E) the private sector.

(5) The criteria and methodology used by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security, and the National Counterterrorism Center, to identify or assign terrorism classifications to incidents of terrorism or investigations of terrorism, including—

(A) a comparison of the criteria and methodology used with respect to domestic terrorism and international terrorism;

(B) the identification of any changes made to investigative classifications; and

(C) a discussion of the rationale for any changes identified under subparagraph (B).

(d) **DATA ON DOMESTIC TERRORISM.**—

(1) **DATA REQUIRED.**—The Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis shall include in each report under subsection (a)(1) the following data:

(A) For each completed or attempted incident of domestic terrorism that has occurred in the United States during the applicable period—

(i) a description of such incident;

(ii) the number and type of completed and attempted Federal non-violent crimes committed during such incident;

(iii) the number and type of completed and attempted Federal and State property crimes committed during such incident, including an estimate of economic damages resulting from such crimes; and

(iv) the number and type of completed and attempted Federal violent crimes committed during such incident, including the number of people injured or killed as a result of such crimes.

(B) For the applicable period—

(i) an identification of each assessment, preliminary investigation, full investigation, and enterprise investigation with a nexus to domestic terrorism opened, pending, or closed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation;

(ii) the number of assessments or investigations identified under clause (i) associated with

each domestic terrorism investigative classification (including subcategories);

(iii) the number and domestic terrorism investigative classification (including subcategories) with respect to such investigations initiated as a result of a referral or investigation by a State, local, Tribal, territorial, or foreign government of a hate crime;

(iv) the number of Federal criminal charges with a nexus to domestic terrorism, including the number of indictments and complaints associated with each domestic terrorism investigative classification (including subcategories), a summary of the allegations contained in each such indictment, the disposition of the prosecution, and, if applicable, the sentence imposed as a result of a conviction on such charges;

(v) referrals of incidents of domestic terrorism by State, local, Tribal, or territorial governments to departments or agencies of the Federal Government for investigation or prosecution, including the number of such referrals associated with each domestic terrorism investigative classification (including any subcategories), and a summary of each such referral that includes the rationale for such referral and the disposition of the applicable Federal investigation or prosecution;

(vi) intelligence products produced by the intelligence community relating to domestic terrorism, including—

(I) the number of such products associated with each domestic terrorism investigative classification (including any subcategories); and

(II) with respect to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, at a minimum, all relevant data available through the Integrated Program Management Process;

(vii) with respect to the National Counterterrorism Center, the number of staff (expressed in terms of full-time equivalents and positions) working on matters relating to domestic terrorism described in clauses (i) through (vi); and

(viii) with respect to the Federal Bureau of Investigation—

(I) the number of staff (expressed in terms of full-time equivalents and positions) working on matters relating to domestic terrorism described in clauses (i) through (vi); and

(II) a summary of time utilization and record-keeping data for personnel working on such matters, including the number or percentage of such personnel associated with each domestic terrorism investigative classification (including any subcategories) in the FBI Headquarters Operational Divisions and Field Divisions.

(2) **APPLICABLE PERIOD.**—For purposes of this subsection, the applicable period is the following:

(A) For the first report required under subsection (a)(1)—

(i) with respect to the data described in paragraph (1)(A) of this subsection, the period on or after April 19, 1995; and

(ii) with respect to the data described in paragraph (1)(B) of this subsection, each of fiscal years 2017, 2018, and 2019.

(B) For each subsequent report required under subsection (a)(1), the prior fiscal year.

(e) **PROVISION OF OTHER DOCUMENTS AND MATERIALS.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—Together with each report under subsection (a)(1), the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis shall also submit to the appropriate congressional committees the following documents and materials:

(A) With respect to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, at a minimum, the most recent, approved versions of—

(i) the Attorney General's Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations (or any successor);

(ii) the FBI Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (or any successor);

(iii) the FBI Counterterrorism Policy Guide (or any successor);

(iv) materials relating to terrorism within the Threat Review and Prioritization process for the headquarters and field divisions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation;

(v) the Consolidated Strategy Guide (or any successor); and

(vi) the Field Office Strategic Plans (or any successor).

(B) With respect to the intelligence community, each finished intelligence product described in subsection (d)(1)(B)(vi).

(2) **NONDUPLICATION.**—If any documents or materials required under paragraph (1) have been previously submitted to the appropriate congressional committees under such paragraph and have not been modified since such submission, the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis may provide a list of such documents or materials in lieu of making the submission under paragraph (1) for those documents or materials.

(f) **FORMAT.**—The information required under subsection (d) may be provided in a format that uses the marking associated with the Central Records System (or any successor system) of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

(g) **CLASSIFICATION AND PUBLIC RELEASE.**—Each report under subsection (a) shall be—

(1) unclassified, but may contain a classified annex;

(2) with respect to the unclassified portion of the report, made available on the public internet website of the National Counterterrorism Center in an electronic format that is fully indexed and searchable; and

(3) with respect to a classified annex, submitted to the appropriate congressional committees in an electronic format that is fully indexed and searchable.

TITLE VII—REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS

SEC. 701. MODIFICATION OF REQUIREMENTS FOR SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS OF CERTAIN REPORTS.

(a) **MODIFICATION OF REPORTS RELATING TO GUANTANAMO BAY.**—

(1) **MODIFICATION.**—Section 506I(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3105(b)) is amended by striking “once every 6 months” and inserting “annually”.

(2) **MODIFICATION.**—Section 319(a) of the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (10 U.S.C. 801 note) is amended by striking “every 90 days” and inserting “annually”.

(3) **REPEAL.**—Section 601 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (division N of Public Law 115–31; 131 Stat. 827) is repealed.

(b) **MODIFICATION TO REPORTS ON ANALYTIC INTEGRITY.**—Subsection (c) of section 1019 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3364) is amended—

(1) in the heading, by striking “REPORTS” and inserting “BRIEFINGS”; and

(2) by striking “submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the heads of the relevant elements of the intelligence community, and the heads of analytic training departments a report containing” and inserting “provide to the congressional intelligence committees, the heads of the relevant elements of the intelligence community, and the heads of analytic training departments a briefing with”.

(c) **REPEAL OF REPORTS RELATING TO INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS.**—Section 506J of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3105a) is repealed and the table of contents in the first section of such Act is amended by striking the item relating to section 506J.

(d) **REPEAL OF REPORTS RELATING TO CUBA.**—Section 108 of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (22 U.S.C. 6038) is repealed.

(e) **REPEAL OF REPORTS RELATING TO ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY.**—Section 308 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (50 U.S.C. 3332) is amended—

(1) in subsection (b)(2)—

(A) by striking “paragraph (1) shall—” and all that follows through “permit an element” and insert “paragraph (1) shall permit an element”;

(B) by striking “approval; and” and inserting “approval.”; and

(C) by striking subparagraph (B); and

(2) by striking subsection (c).

SEC. 702. INCREASED TRANSPARENCY REGARDING COUNTERTERRORISM BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

(1) Consistent with section 601(a) of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C. 3306(a)), the recent practice of the intelligence community has been to release to the public—

(A) around the date on which the President submits to Congress a budget for a fiscal year pursuant to section 1105 of title 31, United States Code, the “top-line” amount of total funding requested for the National Intelligence Program for such fiscal year; and

(B) the amount of requested and appropriated funds for the National Intelligence Program and Military Intelligence Program for certain prior fiscal years, consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods.

(2) The Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning of the National Counterterrorism Center is responsible for producing an annual National Counterterrorism Budget report, which examines the alignment of intelligence and other resources in the applicable fiscal year budget with the counterterrorism goals and areas of focus in the National Strategy for Counterterrorism.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) despite the difficulty of compiling and releasing to the public comprehensive information on the resource commitments of the United States to counterterrorism activities and programs, including with respect to such activities and programs of the intelligence community, the United States Government could take additional steps to enhance the understanding of the public with respect to such resource commitments, in a manner consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods and other national security interests; and

(2) the United States Government should release to the public as much information as possible regarding the funding of counterterrorism activities and programs, including activities and programs of the intelligence community, in a manner consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods and other national security interests.

(c) BRIEFING ON PUBLIC RELEASE OF INFORMATION.—

(1) REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and not later than 90 days after the beginning of each fiscal year thereafter, the President shall ensure that the congressional intelligence committees receive a briefing from appropriate personnel of the United States Government on the feasibility of releasing to the public additional information relating to counterterrorism efforts of the intelligence community.

(2) ELEMENTS.—Each briefing required by paragraph (1) shall include a discussion of the feasibility of—

(A) subject to paragraph (3), releasing to the public the National Counterterrorism Budget report described in subsection (a)(2) for the prior fiscal year; and

(B) declassifying other reports, documents, or activities of the intelligence community relating to counterterrorism and releasing such information to the public in a manner consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods and other national security interests.

(3) RELEASE OF NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM BUDGET REPORT.—The President may satisfy the requirement under paragraph (2)(A) during a

fiscal year by, not later than 90 days after the beginning of the fiscal year, releasing to the public the National Counterterrorism Budget report (with any redactions the Director determines necessary to protect intelligence sources and methods and other national security interests) for the prior fiscal year.

SEC. 703. TASK FORCE ON ILLICIT FINANCING OF ESPIONAGE AND FOREIGN INFLUENCE OPERATIONS.

(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall establish a task force to study and assess the illicit financing of espionage and foreign influence operations directed at the United States.

(b) MEMBERSHIP.—The task force shall be composed of the following individuals (or designees of the individual):

(1) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

(2) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

(3) The Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Intelligence and Analysis.

(4) The Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research.

(5) Such other heads of the elements of the intelligence community that the Director of National Intelligence determines appropriate.

(c) CHAIRPERSON; MEETINGS.—

(1) CHAIRPERSON.—The Director of National Intelligence shall appoint a senior official within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to serve as the chairperson of the task force.

(2) MEETINGS.—The task force shall meet regularly but not less frequently than on a quarterly basis.

(d) REPORTS.—

(1) INITIAL REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the task force shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the illicit financing of espionage and foreign influence operations directed at the United States. The report shall address the following:

(A) The extent of the collection by the intelligence community, from all sources (including the governments of foreign countries), of intelligence and information relating to illicit financing of espionage and foreign influence operations directed at the United States, and any gaps in such collection.

(B) Any specific legal, regulatory, policy, or other prohibitions, or financial, human, technical, or other resource limitations or constraints, that have affected the ability of the Director of National Intelligence or other heads of relevant elements of the intelligence community in collecting or analyzing intelligence or information relating to illicit financing of espionage and foreign influence operations directed at the United States.

(C) The methods, as of the date of the report, by which hostile governments of foreign countries or foreign organizations, and any groups or persons acting on behalf of or with the support of such governments or organizations, seek to disguise or obscure relationships between such governments, organizations, groups, or persons and United States persons, for the purpose of conducting espionage or foreign influence operations directed at the United States, including by exploiting financial laws, systems, or instruments, of the United States.

(D) The existing practices of the intelligence community for ensuring that intelligence and information relating to the illicit financing of espionage and foreign influence operations is analyzed and shared with other elements of the intelligence community, and any recommendations for improving such analysis and sharing.

(2) ANNUAL UPDATE.—Not later than November 1, 2020, and each year thereafter through the date specified in subsection (e), the task force shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an update on the report under paragraph (1).

(3) FORM.—Each report submitted under this subsection may be submitted in classified form, but if submitted in such form, shall include an unclassified summary.

(e) TERMINATION.—The task force shall terminate on January 1, 2025.

(f) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means the following:

(1) The congressional intelligence committees.

(2) The Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives.

(3) The Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate.

SEC. 704. STUDY ON ROLE OF RETIRED AND FORMER PERSONNEL OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS.

(a) STUDY.—The Director of National Intelligence shall conduct a study on former intelligence personnel providing covered intelligence assistance.

(b) ELEMENTS.—The study under subsection (a) shall include the following:

(1) An identification of, and discussion of the effectiveness of, existing laws, policies, procedures, and other measures relevant to the ability of elements of the intelligence community to prevent former intelligence personnel from providing covered intelligence assistance—

(A) without proper authorization; or

(B) in a manner that would violate legal or policy controls if the personnel performed such assistance while working for the United States Government; and

(2) Make recommendations for such legislative, regulatory, policy, or other changes as may be necessary to ensure that the United States consistently meets the objectives described in paragraph (1).

(c) REPORT AND PLAN.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees—

(1) a report on the findings of the Director with respect to each element of the study under subsection (a); and

(2) a plan to implement any recommendations made by the Director that the Director may implement without changes to Federal law.

(d) FORM.—The report and plan under subsection (c) may be submitted in classified form.

(e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) COVERED INTELLIGENCE ASSISTANCE.—The term “covered intelligence assistance” means assistance—

(A) provided by former intelligence personnel directly to, or for the benefit of, the government of a foreign country or indirectly to, or for the benefit of, such a government through a company or other entity; and

(B) that relates to intelligence or law enforcement activities of a foreign country, including with respect to operations that involve abuses of human rights, violations of the laws of the United States, or infringements on the privacy rights of United States persons.

(2) FORMER INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL.—The term “former intelligence personnel” means retired or former personnel of the intelligence community, including civilian employees of elements of the intelligence community, members of the Armed Forces, and contractors of elements of the intelligence community.

SEC. 705. REPORT BY DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ON FIFTH-GENERATION WIRELESS NETWORK TECHNOLOGY.

(a) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on—

(1) the threat to the national security of the United States posed by the global and regional adoption of fifth-generation wireless network

(in this section referred to as “5G wireless network”) technology built by foreign companies; and

(2) possible efforts to mitigate the threat.

(b) **CONTENTS.**—The report under subsection (a) shall include—

(1) the timeline and scale of global and regional adoption of foreign 5G wireless network technology;

(2) the implications of such global and regional adoption on the cyber and espionage threat to the United States, the interests of the United States, and the cyber and collection capabilities of the United States; and

(3) the effect of possible mitigation efforts, including with respect to—

(A) a policy of the United States Government promoting the use of strong, end-to-end encryption for data transmitted over 5G wireless networks;

(B) a policy of the United States Government promoting or funding free, open-source implementation of 5G wireless network technology;

(C) subsidies or incentives provided by the United States Government that could be used to promote the adoption of secure 5G wireless network technology developed by companies of the United States or companies of allies of the United States; and

(D) a strategy by the United States Government to reduce foreign influence and political pressure in international standard-setting bodies.

(c) **FORM.**—The report submitted under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 706. ESTABLISHMENT OF 5G PRIZE COMPETITION.

(a) **PRIZE COMPETITION.**—Pursuant to section 24 of the Stevenson-Wylder Technology Innovation Act of 1980 (15 U.S.C. 3719), the Director of National Intelligence, acting through the Director of the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Agency, shall carry out a program to award prizes competitively to stimulate research and development relevant to 5G technology.

(b) **PRIZE AMOUNT.**—In carrying out the program under subsection (a), the Director may award not more than a total of \$5,000,000 to one or more winners of the prize competition.

(c) **CONSULTATION.**—In carrying out the program under subsection (a), the Director may consult with the heads of relevant departments and agencies of the Federal Government.

(d) **5G TECHNOLOGY DEFINED.**—In this section, the term “5G technology” means hardware, software, or other technologies relating to fifth-generation wireless networks.

SEC. 707. ESTABLISHMENT OF DEEPFAKES PRIZE COMPETITION.

(a) **PRIZE COMPETITION.**—Pursuant to section 24 of the Stevenson-Wylder Technology Innovation Act of 1980 (15 U.S.C. 3719), the Director of National Intelligence, acting through the Director of the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Agency, shall carry out a program to award prizes competitively to stimulate the research, development, or commercialization of technologies to automatically detect machine-manipulated media.

(b) **PRIZE AMOUNT.**—In carrying out the program under subsection (a), the Director may award not more than a total of \$5,000,000 to one or more winners of the prize competition.

(c) **CONSULTATION.**—In carrying out the program under subsection (a), the Director may consult with the heads of relevant departments and agencies of the Federal Government.

(d) **MACHINE-MANIPULATED MEDIA DEFINED.**—In this section, the term “machine-manipulated media” means video, image, or audio recordings generated or substantially modified using machine-learning techniques in order to falsely depict events, to falsely depict the speech or conduct of an individual, or to depict individuals who do not exist.

DIVISION B—INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATIONS FOR FISCAL YEARS 2018 AND 2019

TITLE XXI—INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

SEC. 2101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

(a) **FISCAL YEAR 2019.**—Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2019 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States Government:

(1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

(2) The Central Intelligence Agency.

(3) The Department of Defense.

(4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.

(5) The National Security Agency.

(6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force.

(7) The Coast Guard.

(8) The Department of State.

(9) The Department of the Treasury.

(10) The Department of Energy.

(11) The Department of Justice.

(12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.

(13) The Drug Enforcement Administration.

(14) The National Reconnaissance Office.

(15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

(16) The Department of Homeland Security.

(b) **FISCAL YEAR 2018.**—Funds that were appropriated for fiscal year 2018 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the elements of the United States set forth in subsection (a) are hereby authorized.

SEC. 2102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

(a) **SPECIFICATIONS OF AMOUNTS.**—The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 2101 for the conduct of the intelligence activities of the elements listed in paragraphs (1) through (16) of section 2101, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany this Act.

(b) **AVAILABILITY OF CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.**—

(1) **AVAILABILITY.**—The classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be made available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and to the President.

(2) **DISTRIBUTION BY THE PRESIDENT.**—Subject to paragraph (3), the President shall provide for suitable distribution of the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection (a), or of appropriate portions of such Schedule, within the executive branch.

(3) **LIMITS ON DISCLOSURE.**—The President shall not publicly disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any portion of such Schedule except—

(A) as provided in section 601(a) of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C. 3306(a));

(B) to the extent necessary to implement the budget; or

(C) as otherwise required by law.

SEC. 2103. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

(a) **AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**—There is authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2019 the sum of \$522,424,000.

(b) **CLASSIFIED AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**—In addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account for fiscal year 2019 such additional amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 2102(a).

TITLE XXII—CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

SEC. 2201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund \$514,000,000 for fiscal year 2019.

SEC. 2202. COMPUTATION OF ANNUITIES FOR EMPLOYEES OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

(a) **COMPUTATION OF ANNUITIES.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—Section 221 of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2031) is amended—

(A) in subsection (a)(3)(B), by striking the period at the end and inserting “, as determined by using the annual rate of basic pay that would be payable for full-time service in that position.”;

(B) in subsection (b)(1)(C)(i), by striking “12-month” and inserting “2-year”;

(C) in subsection (f)(2), by striking “one year” and inserting “two years”;

(D) in subsection (g)(2), by striking “one year” each place such term appears and inserting “two years”;

(E) by redesignating subsections (h), (i), (j), (k), and (l) as subsections (i), (j), (k), (l), and (m), respectively; and

(F) by inserting after subsection (g) the following:

“(h) **CONDITIONAL ELECTION OF INSURABLE INTEREST SURVIVOR ANNUITY BY PARTICIPANTS MARRIED AT THE TIME OF RETIREMENT.**—

“(1) **AUTHORITY TO MAKE DESIGNATION.**—Subject to the rights of former spouses under subsection (b) and section 222, at the time of retirement a married participant found by the Director to be in good health may elect to receive an annuity reduced in accordance with subsection (f)(1)(B) and designate in writing an individual having an insurable interest in the participant to receive an annuity under the system after the participant’s death, except that any such election to provide an insurable interest survivor annuity to the participant’s spouse shall only be effective if the participant’s spouse waives the spousal right to a survivor annuity under this Act. The amount of the annuity shall be equal to 55 percent of the participant’s reduced annuity.

“(2) **REDUCTION IN PARTICIPANT’S ANNUITY.**—The annuity payable to the participant making such election shall be reduced by 10 percent of an annuity computed under subsection (a) and by an additional 5 percent for each full 5 years the designated individual is younger than the participant. The total reduction under this subparagraph may not exceed 40 percent.

“(3) **COMMENCEMENT OF SURVIVOR ANNUITY.**—The annuity payable to the designated individual shall begin on the day after the retired participant dies and terminate on the last day of the month before the designated individual dies.

“(4) **RECOMPUTATION OF PARTICIPANT’S ANNUITY ON DEATH OF DESIGNATED INDIVIDUAL.**—An annuity that is reduced under this subsection shall, effective the first day of the month following the death of the designated individual, be recomputed and paid as if the annuity had not been so reduced.”.

(2) **CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.**—

(A) **CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT ACT.**—The Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2001 et seq.) is amended—

(i) in section 232(b)(1) (50 U.S.C. 2052(b)(1)), by striking “221(h),” and inserting “221(i),”;

and

(ii) in section 252(h)(4) (50 U.S.C. 2082(h)(4)), by striking “221(k)” and inserting “221(l)”.

(B) **CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949.**—Subsection (a) of section 14 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3514(a)) is amended by striking “221(h)(2), 221(i), 221(l),” and inserting “221(i)(2), 221(j), 221(m),”.

(b) ANNUITIES FOR FORMER SPOUSES.—Subparagraph (B) of section 222(b)(5) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2032(b)(5)(B)) is amended by striking “one year” and inserting “two years”.

(c) PRIOR SERVICE CREDIT.—Subparagraph (A) of section 252(b)(3) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2032(b)(3)(A)) is amended by striking “October 1, 1990” both places that term appears and inserting “March 31, 1991”.

(d) REEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION.—Section 273 of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2113) is amended—

(1) by redesignating subsections (b) and (c) as subsections (c) and (d), respectively; and

(2) by inserting after subsection (a) the following:

“(b) PART-TIME REEMPLOYED ANNUITANTS.—The Director shall have the authority to reemploy an annuitant on a part-time basis in accordance with section 8344(l) of title 5, United States Code.”.

(e) EFFECTIVE DATE AND APPLICATION.—The amendments made by subsection (a)(1)(A) and subsection (c) shall take effect as if enacted on October 28, 2009, and shall apply to computations or participants, respectively, as of such date.

TITLE XXIII—GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

SEC. 2301. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

The authorization of appropriations by this division shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the United States.

SEC. 2302. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY LAW.

Appropriations authorized by this division for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law.

SEC. 2303. MODIFICATION OF SPECIAL PAY AUTHORITY FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, ENGINEERING, OR MATHEMATICS POSITIONS AND ADDITION OF SPECIAL PAY AUTHORITY FOR CYBER POSITIONS.

Section 113B of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3049a) is amended—

(1) by amending subsection (a) to read as follows:

“(a) SPECIAL RATES OF PAY FOR POSITIONS REQUIRING EXPERTISE IN SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, ENGINEERING, OR MATHEMATICS.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding part III of title 5, United States Code, the head of each element of the intelligence community may, for 1 or more categories of positions in such element that require expertise in science, technology, engineering, or mathematics—

“(A) establish higher minimum rates of pay; and

“(B) make corresponding increases in all rates of pay of the pay range for each grade or level, subject to subsection (b) or (c), as applicable.

“(2) TREATMENT.—The special rate supplements resulting from the establishment of higher rates under paragraph (1) shall be basic pay for the same or similar purposes as those specified in section 5305(j) of title 5, United States Code.”;

(2) by redesignating subsections (b) through (f) as subsections (c) through (g), respectively;

(3) by inserting after subsection (a) the following:

“(b) SPECIAL RATES OF PAY FOR CYBER POSITIONS.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding subsection (c), the Director of the National Security Agency may establish a special rate of pay—

“(A) not to exceed the rate of basic pay payable for level II of the Executive Schedule under section 5313 of title 5, United States Code, if the

Director certifies to the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, in consultation with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, that the rate of pay is for positions that perform functions that execute the cyber mission of the Agency; or

“(B) not to exceed the rate of basic pay payable for the Vice President of the United States under section 104 of title 3, United States Code, if the Director certifies to the Secretary of Defense, by name, individuals that have advanced skills and competencies and that perform critical functions that execute the cyber mission of the Agency.

“(2) PAY LIMITATION.—Employees receiving a special rate under paragraph (1) shall be subject to an aggregate pay limitation that parallels the limitation established in section 5307 of title 5, United States Code, except that—

“(A) any allowance, differential, bonus, award, or other similar cash payment in addition to basic pay that is authorized under title 10, United States Code, (or any other applicable law in addition to title 5 of such Code, excluding the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.)) shall also be counted as part of aggregate compensation; and

“(B) aggregate compensation may not exceed the rate established for the Vice President of the United States under section 104 of title 3, United States Code.

“(3) LIMITATION ON NUMBER OF RECIPIENTS.—The number of individuals who receive basic pay established under paragraph (1)(B) may not exceed 100 at any time.

“(4) LIMITATION ON USE AS COMPARATIVE REFERENCE.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, special rates of pay and the limitation established under paragraph (1)(B) may not be used as comparative references for the purpose of fixing the rates of basic pay or maximum pay limitations of qualified positions under section 1599f of title 10, United States Code, or section 226 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 147).”;

(4) in subsection (c), as redesignated by paragraph (2), by striking “A minimum” and inserting “Except as provided in subsection (b), a minimum”;

(5) in subsection (d), as redesignated by paragraph (2), by inserting “or (b)” after “by subsection (a)”;

(6) in subsection (g), as redesignated by paragraph (2)—

(A) in paragraph (1), by striking “Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017” and inserting “Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Polard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019”; and

(B) in paragraph (2)(A), by inserting “or (b)” after “subsection (a)”.

SEC. 2304. MODIFICATION OF APPOINTMENT OF CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

Section 103G(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3032(a)) is amended by striking “President” and inserting “Director”.

SEC. 2305. DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REVIEW OF PLACEMENT OF POSITIONS WITHIN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ON THE EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE.

(a) REVIEW.—The Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the Office of Personnel Management, shall conduct a review of positions within the intelligence community regarding the placement of such positions on the Executive Schedule under subchapter II of chapter 53 of title 5, United States Code. In carrying out such review, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the Office of Personnel Management, shall determine—

(1) the standards under which such review will be conducted;

(2) which positions should or should not be on the Executive Schedule; and

(3) for those positions that should be on the Executive Schedule, the level of the Executive Schedule at which such positions should be placed.

(b) REPORT.—Not later than 60 days after the date on which the review under subsection (a) is completed, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate, and the Committee on Oversight and Reform of the House of Representatives an unredacted report describing the standards by which the review was conducted and the outcome of the review.

SEC. 2306. SUPPLY CHAIN AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE RISK MANAGEMENT TASK FORCE.

(a) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means the following:

(1) The congressional intelligence committees.

(2) The Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate.

(3) The Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Homeland Security, and the Committee on Oversight and Reform of the House of Representatives.

(b) REQUIREMENT TO ESTABLISH.—The Director of National Intelligence shall establish a Supply Chain and Counterintelligence Risk Management Task Force to standardize information sharing between the intelligence community and the acquisition community of the United States Government with respect to the supply chain and counterintelligence risks.

(c) MEMBERS.—The Supply Chain and Counterintelligence Risk Management Task Force established under subsection (b) shall be composed of—

(1) a representative of the Defense Security Service of the Department of Defense;

(2) a representative of the General Services Administration;

(3) a representative of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy of the Office of Management and Budget;

(4) a representative of the Department of Homeland Security;

(5) a representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation;

(6) the Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center; and

(7) any other members the Director of National Intelligence determines appropriate.

(d) SECURITY CLEARANCES.—Each member of the Supply Chain and Counterintelligence Risk Management Task Force established under subsection (b) shall have a security clearance at the top secret level and be able to access sensitive compartmented information.

(e) ANNUAL REPORT.—The Supply Chain and Counterintelligence Risk Management Task Force established under subsection (b) shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an annual report that describes the activities of the Task Force during the previous year, including identification of the supply chain and counterintelligence risks shared with the acquisition community of the United States Government by the intelligence community.

SEC. 2307. CONSIDERATION OF ADVERSARIAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND CYBERSECURITY INFRASTRUCTURE WHEN SHARING INTELLIGENCE WITH FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND ENTITIES.

Whenever the head of an element of the intelligence community enters into an intelligence sharing agreement with a foreign government or any other foreign entity, the head of the element shall consider the pervasiveness of telecommunications and cybersecurity infrastructure, equipment, and services provided by adversaries of the United States, particularly China

and Russia, or entities of such adversaries in the country or region of the foreign government or other foreign entity entering into the agreement.

SEC. 2308. CYBER PROTECTION SUPPORT FOR THE PERSONNEL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN POSITIONS HIGHLY VULNERABLE TO CYBER ATTACK.

(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) PERSONAL ACCOUNTS.—The term “personal accounts” means accounts for online and telecommunications services, including telephone, residential Internet access, email, text and multimedia messaging, cloud computing, social media, health care, and financial services, used by personnel of the intelligence community outside of the scope of their employment with elements of the intelligence community.

(2) PERSONAL TECHNOLOGY DEVICES.—The term “personal technology devices” means technology devices used by personnel of the intelligence community outside of the scope of their employment with elements of the intelligence community, including networks to which such devices connect.

(b) AUTHORITY TO PROVIDE CYBER PROTECTION SUPPORT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to a determination by the Director of National Intelligence, the Director may provide cyber protection support for the personal technology devices and personal accounts of the personnel described in paragraph (2).

(2) AT-RISK PERSONNEL.—The personnel described in this paragraph are personnel of the intelligence community—

(A) who the Director determines to be highly vulnerable to cyber attacks and hostile information collection activities because of the positions occupied by such personnel in the intelligence community; and

(B) whose personal technology devices or personal accounts are highly vulnerable to cyber attacks and hostile information collection activities.

(c) NATURE OF CYBER PROTECTION SUPPORT.—Subject to the availability of resources, the cyber protection support provided to personnel under subsection (b) may include training, advice, assistance, and other services relating to cyber attacks and hostile information collection activities.

(d) LIMITATION ON SUPPORT.—Nothing in this section shall be construed—

(1) to encourage personnel of the intelligence community to use personal technology devices for official business; or

(2) to authorize cyber protection support for senior intelligence community personnel using personal devices, networks, and personal accounts in an official capacity.

(e) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the provision of cyber protection support under subsection (b). The report shall include—

(1) a description of the methodology used to make the determination under subsection (b)(2); and

(2) guidance for the use of cyber protection support and tracking of support requests for personnel receiving cyber protection support under subsection (b).

SEC. 2309. ELIMINATION OF SUNSET OF AUTHORITY RELATING TO MANAGEMENT OF SUPPLY-CHAIN RISK.

Section 309 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112-87; 50 U.S.C. 3329 note) is amended by striking subsection (g).

SEC. 2310. LIMITATIONS ON DETERMINATIONS REGARDING CERTAIN SECURITY CLASSIFICATIONS.

(a) PROHIBITION.—An officer of an element of the intelligence community who has been nominated by the President for a position that re-

quires the advice and consent of the Senate may not make a classification decision with respect to information related to such officer's nomination.

(b) CLASSIFICATION DETERMINATIONS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in paragraph (2), in a case in which an officer described in subsection (a) has been nominated as described in such subsection and classification authority rests with the officer or another officer who reports directly to such officer, a classification decision with respect to information relating to the officer shall be made by the Director of National Intelligence.

(2) NOMINATIONS OF DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.—In a case described in paragraph (1) in which the officer nominated is the Director of National Intelligence, the classification decision shall be made by the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence.

(c) REPORTS.—Whenever the Director or the Principal Deputy Director makes a decision under subsection (b), the Director or the Principal Deputy Director, as the case may be, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report detailing the reasons for the decision.

SEC. 2311. JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY COUNCIL.

(a) MEETINGS.—Section 101A(d) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3022(d)) is amended—

(1) by striking “regular”; and

(2) by inserting “as the Director considers appropriate” after “Council”.

(b) REPORT ON FUNCTION AND UTILITY OF THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY COUNCIL.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—No later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Executive Office of the President and members of the Joint Intelligence Community Council, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the function and utility of the Joint Intelligence Community Council.

(2) CONTENTS.—The report required by paragraph (1) shall include the following:

(A) The number of physical or virtual meetings held by the Council per year since the Council's inception.

(B) A description of the effect and accomplishments of the Council.

(C) An explanation of the unique role of the Council relative to other entities, including with respect to the National Security Council and the Executive Committee of the intelligence community.

(D) Recommendations for the future role and operation of the Council.

(E) Such other matters relating to the function and utility of the Council as the Director considers appropriate.

(3) FORM.—The report submitted under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 2312. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ENVIRONMENT.

(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) CORE SERVICE.—The term “core service” means a capability that is available to multiple elements of the intelligence community and required for consistent operation of the intelligence community information technology environment.

(2) INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ENVIRONMENT.—The term “intelligence community information technology environment” means all of the information technology services across the intelligence community, including the data sharing and protection environment across multiple classification domains.

(b) ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES.—

(1) DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.—The Director of National Intelligence shall be responsible for coordinating the performance by

elements of the intelligence community of the intelligence community information technology environment, including each of the following:

(A) Ensuring compliance with all applicable environment rules and regulations of such environment.

(B) Ensuring measurable performance goals exist for such environment.

(C) Documenting standards and practices of such environment.

(D) Acting as an arbiter among elements of the intelligence community related to any disagreements arising out of the implementation of such environment.

(E) Delegating responsibilities to the elements of the intelligence community and carrying out such other responsibilities as are necessary for the effective implementation of such environment.

(2) CORE SERVICE PROVIDERS.—Providers of core services shall be responsible for—

(A) providing core services, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence; and

(B) providing the Director with information requested and required to fulfill the responsibilities of the Director under paragraph (1).

(3) USE OF CORE SERVICES.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in subparagraph (B), each element of the intelligence community shall use core services when such services are available.

(B) EXCEPTION.—The Director of National Intelligence may provide for a written exception to the requirement under subparagraph (A) if the Director determines there is a compelling financial or mission need for such exception.

(c) MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTABILITY.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall designate and maintain one or more accountable executives of the intelligence community information technology environment to be responsible for—

(1) management, financial control, and integration of such environment;

(2) overseeing the performance of each core service, including establishing measurable service requirements and schedules;

(3) to the degree feasible, ensuring testing of each core service of such environment, including testing by the intended users, to evaluate performance against measurable service requirements and to ensure the capability meets user requirements; and

(4) coordinate transition or restructuring efforts of such environment, including phaseout of legacy systems.

(d) SECURITY PLAN.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall develop and maintain a security plan for the intelligence community information technology environment.

(e) LONG-TERM ROADMAP.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and during each of the second and fourth fiscal quarters thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a long-term roadmap that shall include each of the following:

(1) A description of the minimum required and desired core service requirements, including—

(A) key performance parameters; and

(B) an assessment of current, measured performance.

(2) implementation milestones for the intelligence community information technology environment, including each of the following:

(A) A schedule for expected deliveries of core service capabilities during each of the following phases:

(i) Concept refinement and technology maturity demonstration.

(ii) Development, integration, and demonstration.

(iii) Production, deployment, and sustainment.

(iv) System retirement.

(B) Dependencies of such core service capabilities.

(C) Plans for the transition or restructuring necessary to incorporate core service capabilities.

(D) A description of any legacy systems and discontinued capabilities to be phased out.

(3) Such other matters as the Director determines appropriate.

(f) **BUSINESS PLAN.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and during each of the second and fourth fiscal quarters thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a business plan that includes each of the following:

(1) A systematic approach to identify core service funding requests for the intelligence community information technology environment within the proposed budget, including multiyear plans to implement the long-term roadmap required by subsection (e).

(2) A uniform approach by which each element of the intelligence community shall identify the cost of legacy information technology or alternative capabilities where services of the intelligence community information technology environment will also be available.

(3) A uniform effort by which each element of the intelligence community shall identify transition and restructuring costs for new, existing, and retiring services of the intelligence community information technology environment, as well as services of such environment that have changed designations as a core service.

(g) **QUARTERLY PRESENTATIONS.**—Beginning not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall provide to the congressional intelligence committees quarterly updates regarding ongoing implementation of the intelligence community information technology environment as compared to the requirements in the most recently submitted security plan required by subsection (d), long-term roadmap required by subsection (e), and business plan required by subsection (f).

(h) **ADDITIONAL NOTIFICATIONS.**—The Director of National Intelligence shall provide timely notification to the congressional intelligence committees regarding any policy changes related to or affecting the intelligence community information technology environment, new initiatives or strategies related to or impacting such environment, and changes or deficiencies in the execution of the security plan required by subsection (d), long-term roadmap required by subsection (e), and business plan required by subsection (f).

(i) **SUNSET.**—The section shall have no effect on or after September 30, 2024.

SEC. 2313. REPORT ON DEVELOPMENT OF SECURE MOBILE VOICE SOLUTION FOR INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of the National Security Agency, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a classified report on the feasibility, desirability, cost, and required schedule associated with the implementation of a secure mobile voice solution for the intelligence community.

(b) **CONTENTS.**—The report required by subsection (a) shall include, at a minimum, the following:

(1) The benefits and disadvantages of a secure mobile voice solution.

(2) Whether the intelligence community could leverage commercially available technology for classified voice communications that operates on commercial mobile networks in a secure manner and identifying the accompanying security risks to such networks.

(3) A description of any policies or community guidance that would be necessary to govern the potential solution, such as a process for deter-

mining the appropriate use of a secure mobile telephone and any limitations associated with such use.

SEC. 2314. POLICY ON MINIMUM INSIDER THREAT STANDARDS.

(a) **POLICY REQUIRED.**—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall establish a policy for minimum insider threat standards that is consistent with the National Insider Threat Policy and Minimum Standards for Executive Branch Insider Threat Programs.

(b) **IMPLEMENTATION.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the head of each element of the intelligence community shall implement the policy established under subsection (a).

SEC. 2315. SUBMISSION OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY POLICIES.

(a) **DEFINITIONS.**—In this section:

(1) **ELECTRONIC REPOSITORY.**—The term “electronic repository” means the electronic distribution mechanism, in use as of the date of the enactment of this Act, or any successor electronic distribution mechanism, by which the Director of National Intelligence submits to the congressional intelligence committees information.

(2) **POLICY.**—The term “policy”, with respect to the intelligence community, includes unclassified or classified—

(A) directives, policy guidance, and policy memoranda of the intelligence community;

(B) executive correspondence of the Director of National Intelligence; and

(C) any equivalent successor policy instruments.

(b) **SUBMISSION OF POLICIES.**—

(1) **CURRENT POLICY.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees using the electronic repository all nonpublicly available policies issued by the Director of National Intelligence for the intelligence community that are in effect as of the date of the submission.

(2) **CONTINUOUS UPDATES.**—Not later than 15 days after the date on which the Director of National Intelligence issues, modifies, or rescinds a policy of the intelligence community, the Director shall—

(A) notify the congressional intelligence committees of such addition, modification, or removal; and

(B) update the electronic repository with respect to such addition, modification, or removal.

SEC. 2316. EXPANSION OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY RECRUITMENT EFFORTS.

In order to further increase the diversity of the intelligence community workforce, not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with heads of elements of the Intelligence Community, shall create, implement, and submit to the congressional intelligence committees a written plan to ensure that rural and underrepresented regions are fully and consistently represented in such elements’ employment recruitment efforts. Upon receipt of the plan, the congressional committees shall have 60 days to submit comments to the Director of National Intelligence before such plan shall be implemented.

TITLE XXIV—MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Subtitle A—Office of the Director of National Intelligence

SEC. 2401. AUTHORITY FOR PROTECTION OF CURRENT AND FORMER EMPLOYEES OF THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.

Section 5(a)(4) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3506(a)(4)) is amended by striking “such personnel of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence may designate;” and inserting “current and former per-

sonnel of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and their immediate families as the Director of National Intelligence may designate;”.

SEC. 2402. DESIGNATION OF THE PROGRAM MANAGER-INFORMATION SHARING ENVIRONMENT.

(a) **INFORMATION SHARING ENVIRONMENT.**—Section 1016(b) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485(b)) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (1), by striking “President” and inserting “Director of National Intelligence”; and

(2) in paragraph (2), by striking “President” both places that term appears and inserting “Director of National Intelligence”.

(b) **PROGRAM MANAGER.**—Section 1016(f)(1) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485(f)(1)) is amended by striking “The individual designated as the program manager shall serve as program manager until removed from service or replaced by the President (at the President’s sole discretion).” and inserting “Beginning on the date of the enactment of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019 and 2020, each individual designated as the program manager shall be appointed by the Director of National Intelligence.”.

SEC. 2403. TECHNICAL MODIFICATION TO THE EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE.

Section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

“Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center.”.

SEC. 2404. CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

Section 103I(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3034(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following new sentence: “The Chief Financial Officer shall report directly to the Director of National Intelligence.”.

SEC. 2405. CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

Section 103G(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3032(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following new sentence: “The Chief Information Officer shall report directly to the Director of National Intelligence.”.

Subtitle B—Central Intelligence Agency

SEC. 2411. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SUBSISTENCE FOR PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO AUSTERE LOCATIONS.

Subsection (a) of section 5 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3506) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (1), by striking “(50 U.S.C. 403-4a).” and inserting “(50 U.S.C. 403-4a).”;

(2) in paragraph (6), by striking “and” at the end;

(3) in paragraph (7), by striking the period at the end and inserting “; and”;

(4) by adding at the end the following new paragraph (8):

“(8) Upon the approval of the Director, provide, during any fiscal year, with or without reimbursement, subsistence to any personnel assigned to an overseas location designated by the Agency as an austere location.”.

SEC. 2412. SPECIAL RULES FOR CERTAIN MONTHLY WORKERS’ COMPENSATION PAYMENTS AND OTHER PAYMENTS FOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY PERSONNEL.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 19 the following new section:

“SEC. 19A. SPECIAL RULES FOR CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS INJURED BY REASON OF WAR, INSURGENCY, HOSTILE ACT, OR TERRORIST ACTIVITIES.

“(a) **DEFINITIONS.**—In this section:

“(1) **COVERED DEPENDENT.**—The term ‘covered dependent’ means a family member (as defined

by the Director) of a covered employee who, on or after September 11, 2001—

“(A) accompanies the covered employee to an assigned duty station in a foreign country; and
“(B) becomes injured by reason of a qualifying injury.

“(2) COVERED EMPLOYEE.—The term ‘covered employee’ means an officer or employee of the Central Intelligence Agency who, on or after September 11, 2001, becomes injured by reason of a qualifying injury.

“(3) COVERED INDIVIDUAL.—The term ‘covered individual’ means an individual who—

“(A)(i) is detailed to the Central Intelligence Agency from other agencies of the United States Government or from the Armed Forces; or

“(ii) is affiliated with the Central Intelligence Agency, as determined by the Director; and

“(B) who, on or after September 11, 2001, becomes injured by reason of a qualifying injury.

“(4) QUALIFYING INJURY.—The term ‘qualifying injury’ means the following:

“(A) With respect to a covered dependent, an injury incurred—

“(i) during a period in which the covered dependent is accompanying the covered employee to an assigned duty station in a foreign country;

“(ii) in connection with war, insurgency, hostile act, terrorist activity, or other incident designated by the Director; and

“(iii) that was not the result of the willful misconduct of the covered dependent.

“(B) With respect to a covered employee or a covered individual, an injury incurred—

“(i) during a period of assignment to a duty station in a foreign country;

“(ii) in connection with a war, insurgency, hostile act, terrorist activity, or other incident designated by the Director; and

“(iii) that was not the result of the willful misconduct of the covered employee or the covered individual.

“(b) ADJUSTMENT OF COMPENSATION FOR CERTAIN INJURIES.—

“(1) INCREASE.—The Director may increase the amount of monthly compensation paid to a covered employee under section 8105 of title 5, United States Code. Subject to paragraph (2), the Director may determine the amount of each such increase by taking into account—

“(A) the severity of the qualifying injury;
“(B) the circumstances by which the covered employee became injured; and

“(C) the seniority of the covered employee.

“(2) MAXIMUM.—Notwithstanding chapter 81 of title 5, United States Code, the total amount of monthly compensation increased under paragraph (1) may not exceed the monthly pay of the maximum rate of basic pay for GS-15 of the General Schedule under section 5332 of such title.

“(c) COSTS FOR TREATING QUALIFYING INJURIES.—The Director may pay the costs of treating a qualifying injury of a covered employee, a covered individual, or a covered dependent, or may reimburse a covered employee, a covered individual, or a covered dependent for such costs, that are not otherwise covered by chapter 81 of title 5, United States Code, or other provision of Federal law.

“(d) TREATMENT OF AMOUNTS.—For purposes of section 104 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, amounts paid pursuant to this section shall be treated as amounts paid under chapter 81 of title 5, United States Code.”

(b) REGULATIONS.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall—

(1) prescribe regulations ensuring the fair and equitable implementation of section 19A of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as added by subsection (a); and

(2) submit to the congressional intelligence committees such regulations.

(c) APPLICATION.—Section 19A of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as added by subsection (a), shall apply with respect to—

(1) payments made to covered employees (as defined in such section) under section 8105 of title 5, United States Code, beginning on or after the date of the enactment of this Act; and

(2) treatment described in subsection (b) of such section 19A occurring on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 2413. EXPANSION OF SECURITY PROTECTIVE SERVICE JURISDICTION OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

Subsection (a)(1) of section 15 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3515(a)) is amended—

(1) in subparagraph (B), by striking “500 feet;” and inserting “500 yards;”; and

(2) in subparagraph (D), by striking “500 feet.” and inserting “500 yards.”

SEC. 2414. REPEAL OF FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY REQUIREMENT FOR CERTAIN SENIOR LEVEL POSITIONS IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

(a) REPEAL OF FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY REQUIREMENT.—Section 104A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3036) is amended by striking subsection (g).

(b) CONFORMING REPEAL OF REPORT REQUIREMENT.—Section 611 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-487) is amended by striking subsection (c).

Subtitle C—Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of Department of Energy

SEC. 2421. CONSOLIDATION OF DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY OFFICES OF INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 215 of the Department of Energy Organization Act (42 U.S.C. 7144b) is amended to read as follows:

“OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

“SEC. 215. (a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section, the terms ‘intelligence community’ and ‘National Intelligence Program’ have the meanings given such terms in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).

“(b) IN GENERAL.—There is in the Department an Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence. Such office shall be under the National Intelligence Program.

“(c) DIRECTOR.—(1) The head of the Office shall be the Director of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, who shall be an employee in the Senior Executive Service, the Senior Intelligence Service, the Senior National Intelligence Service, or any other Service that the Secretary, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, considers appropriate. The Director of the Office shall report directly to the Secretary.

“(2) The Secretary shall select an individual to serve as the Director from among individuals who have substantial expertise in matters relating to the intelligence community, including foreign intelligence and counterintelligence.

“(d) DUTIES.—(1) Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary, the Director shall perform such duties and exercise such powers as the Secretary may prescribe.

“(2) The Director shall be responsible for establishing policy for intelligence and counterintelligence programs and activities at the Department.”

(b) CONFORMING REPEAL.—Section 216 of the Department of Energy Organization Act (42 U.S.C. 7144c) is hereby repealed.

(c) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of contents at the beginning of the Department of Energy Organization Act is amended by striking the items relating to sections 215 and 216 and inserting the following new item:

“Sec. 215. Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence.”

SEC. 2422. ESTABLISHMENT OF ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY CENTER.

Section 215 of the Department of Energy Organization Act (42 U.S.C. 7144b), as amended by section 2421, is further amended by adding at the end the following:

“(e) ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY CENTER.—(1)(A) The President shall establish an Energy Infrastructure Security Center, taking into account all appropriate government tools to analyze and disseminate intelligence relating to the security of the energy infrastructure of the United States.

“(B) The Director of Intelligence and Counterintelligence shall appoint the head of the Energy Infrastructure Security Center.

“(C) The Energy Infrastructure Security Center shall be located within the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence.

“(2) In establishing the Energy Infrastructure Security Center, the Director of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence shall address the following missions and objectives to coordinate and disseminate intelligence relating to the security of the energy infrastructure of the United States:

“(A) Establishing a primary organization within the United States Government for analyzing and integrating all intelligence possessed or acquired by the United States pertaining to the security of the energy infrastructure of the United States.

“(B) Ensuring that appropriate departments and agencies have full access to and receive intelligence support needed to execute the plans or activities of the agencies, and perform independent, alternative analyses.

“(C) Establishing a central repository on known and suspected foreign threats to the energy infrastructure of the United States, including with respect to any individuals, groups, or entities engaged in activities targeting such infrastructure, and the goals, strategies, capabilities, and networks of such individuals, groups, or entities.

“(D) Disseminating intelligence information relating to the security of the energy infrastructure of the United States, including threats and analyses, to the President, to the appropriate departments and agencies, and to the appropriate committees of Congress.

“(3) The President may waive the requirements of this subsection, and any parts thereof, if the President determines that such requirements do not materially improve the ability of the United States Government to prevent and halt attacks against the energy infrastructure of the United States. Such waiver shall be made in writing to Congress and shall include a description of how the missions and objectives in paragraph (2) are being met.

“(4) If the President decides not to exercise the waiver authority granted by paragraph (3), the President shall submit to Congress from time to time updates and plans regarding the establishment of an Energy Infrastructure Security Center.”

SEC. 2423. REPEAL OF DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY INTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND BUDGET REPORTING REQUIREMENT.

Section 214 of the Department of Energy Organization Act (42 U.S.C. 7144a) is amended—

(1) by striking “(a)”; and

(2) by striking subsections (b) and (c).

Subtitle D—Other Elements

SEC. 2431. PLAN FOR DESIGNATION OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE COMPONENT OF DEFENSE SECURITY SERVICE AS AN ELEMENT OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence and Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives a plan to designate the counterintelligence component of the Defense Security Service of the Department of Defense as an element of the intelligence community by not later than January 1, 2021. Such plan shall—

(1) address the implications of such designation on the authorities, governance, personnel, resources, information technology, collection, analytic products, information sharing, and business processes of the Defense Security Service and the intelligence community; and

(2) not address the personnel security functions of the Defense Security Service.

SEC. 2432. NOTICE NOT REQUIRED FOR PRIVATE ENTITIES.

Section 3553 of title 44, United States Code, is amended—

(1) by redesignating subsection (j) as subsection (k); and

(2) by inserting after subsection (i) the following:

“(j) **RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.**—Nothing in this section shall be construed to require the Secretary to provide notice to any private entity before the Secretary issues a binding operational directive under subsection (b)(2).”

SEC. 2433. ESTABLISHMENT OF ADVISORY BOARD FOR NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE.

(a) **ESTABLISHMENT.**—Section 106A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3041a) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

“(d) **ADVISORY BOARD.**—

“(1) **ESTABLISHMENT.**—There is established in the National Reconnaissance Office an advisory board (in this section referred to as the ‘Board’).

“(2) **DUTIES.**—The Board shall—

“(A) study matters relating to the mission of the National Reconnaissance Office, including with respect to promoting innovation, competition, and resilience in space, overhead reconnaissance, acquisition, and other matters; and

“(B) advise and report directly to the Director with respect to such matters.

“(3) **MEMBERS.**—

“(A) **NUMBER AND APPOINTMENT.**—

“(i) **IN GENERAL.**—The Board shall be composed of 5 members appointed by the Director from among individuals with demonstrated academic, government, business, or other expertise relevant to the mission and functions of the National Reconnaissance Office.

“(ii) **NOTIFICATION.**—Not later than 30 days after the date on which the Director appoints a member to the Board, the Director shall notify the congressional intelligence committees and the congressional defense committees (as defined in section 101(a) of title 10, United States Code) of such appointment.

“(B) **TERMS.**—Each member shall be appointed for a term of 2 years. Except as provided by subparagraph (C), a member may not serve more than 3 terms.

“(C) **VACANCY.**—Any member appointed to fill a vacancy occurring before the expiration of the term for which the member’s predecessor was appointed shall be appointed only for the remainder of that term. A member may serve after the expiration of that member’s term until a successor has taken office.

“(D) **CHAIR.**—The Board shall have a Chair, who shall be appointed by the Director from among the members.

“(E) **TRAVEL EXPENSES.**—Each member shall receive travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, in accordance with applicable provisions under subchapter I of chapter 57 of title 5, United States Code.

“(F) **EXECUTIVE SECRETARY.**—The Director may appoint an executive secretary, who shall be an employee of the National Reconnaissance Office, to support the Board.

“(4) **MEETINGS.**—The Board shall meet not less than quarterly, but may meet more frequently at the call of the Director.

“(5) **REPORTS.**—Not later than March 31 of each year, the Board shall submit to the Director and to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the activities and significant findings of the Board during the preceding year.

“(6) **NONAPPLICABILITY OF CERTAIN REQUIREMENTS.**—The Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall not apply to the Board.

“(7) **TERMINATION.**—The Board shall terminate on the date that is 3 years after the date of the first meeting of the Board.”

(b) **INITIAL APPOINTMENTS.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office shall appoint the initial 5 members to the advisory board under subsection (d) of section 106A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3041a), as added by subsection (a).

SEC. 2434. COLLOCATION OF CERTAIN DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY PERSONNEL AT FIELD LOCATIONS.

(a) **IDENTIFICATION OF OPPORTUNITIES FOR COLLOCATION.**—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis shall identify, in consultation with the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration, the Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the heads of such other elements of the Department of Homeland Security as the Under Secretary considers appropriate, opportunities for collocation of officers of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis in the field outside of the greater Washington, District of Columbia, area in order to support operational units from U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and other elements of the Department of Homeland Security.

(b) **PLAN FOR COLLOCATION.**—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report that includes a plan for collocation as described in subsection (a).

TITLE XXV—ELECTION MATTERS

SEC. 2501. REPORT ON CYBER ATTACKS BY FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AGAINST UNITED STATES ELECTION INFRASTRUCTURE.

(a) **DEFINITIONS.**—In this section:

(1) **APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.**—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the congressional intelligence committees;

(B) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate;

(C) the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives;

(D) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and

(E) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

(2) **CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP.**—The term “congressional leadership” includes the following:

(A) The majority leader of the Senate.

(B) The minority leader of the Senate.

(C) The Speaker of the House of Representatives.

(D) The minority leader of the House of Representatives.

(3) **STATE.**—The term “State” means any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any territory or possession of the United States.

(b) **REPORT REQUIRED.**—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis shall submit to congressional leadership and the appropriate congressional committees a report on cyber attacks and attempted cyber attacks by foreign governments on United States election infrastructure in States and localities in connection with the 2016 Presidential election in the United States and such cyber attacks or attempted cyber attacks as the Under Secretary anticipates against such infrastructure. Such report shall identify the States and localities affected and shall include cyber attacks and attempted cyber attacks against voter registration databases, voting ma-

chines, voting-related computer networks, and the networks of Secretaries of State and other election officials of the various States.

(c) **FORM.**—The report submitted under subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 2502. REVIEW OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY’S POSTURE TO COLLECT AGAINST AND ANALYZE RUSSIAN EFFORTS TO INFLUENCE THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION.

(a) **REVIEW REQUIRED.**—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall—

(1) complete an after action review of the posture of the intelligence community to collect against and analyze efforts of the Government of Russia to interfere in the 2016 Presidential election in the United States; and

(2) submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the findings of the Director with respect to such review.

(b) **ELEMENTS.**—The review required by subsection (a) shall include, with respect to the posture and efforts described in paragraph (1) of such subsection, the following:

(1) An assessment of whether the resources of the intelligence community were properly aligned to detect and respond to the efforts described in subsection (a)(1).

(2) An assessment of the information sharing that occurred within elements of the intelligence community.

(3) An assessment of the information sharing that occurred between elements of the intelligence community.

(4) An assessment of applicable authorities necessary to collect on any such efforts and any deficiencies in those authorities.

(5) A review of the use of open source material to inform analysis and warning of such efforts.

(6) A review of the use of alternative and predictive analysis.

(c) **FORM OF REPORT.**—The report required by subsection (a)(2) shall be submitted to the congressional intelligence committees in a classified form.

SEC. 2503. ASSESSMENT OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE THREATS TO FEDERAL ELECTIONS.

(a) **DEFINITIONS.**—In this section:

(1) **APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.**—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the congressional intelligence committees;

(B) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate; and

(C) the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives.

(2) **CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP.**—The term “congressional leadership” includes the following:

(A) The majority leader of the Senate.

(B) The minority leader of the Senate.

(C) The Speaker of the House of Representatives.

(D) The minority leader of the House of Representatives.

(3) **SECURITY VULNERABILITY.**—The term “security vulnerability” has the meaning given such term in section 102 of the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 (6 U.S.C. 1501).

(b) **IN GENERAL.**—The Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security Agency, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the heads of other relevant elements of the intelligence community, shall—

(1) commence not later than 1 year before any regularly scheduled Federal election occurring after December 31, 2018, and complete not later than 180 days before such election, an assessment of security vulnerabilities of State election systems; and

(2) not later than 180 days before any regularly scheduled Federal election occurring after

December 31, 2018, submit a report on such security vulnerabilities and an assessment of foreign intelligence threats to the election to—

- (A) congressional leadership; and
 - (B) the appropriate congressional committees.
- (C) **UPDATE.**—Not later than 90 days before any regularly scheduled Federal election occurring after December 31, 2018, the Director of National Intelligence shall—

- (1) update the assessment of foreign intelligence threats to that election; and
 - (2) submit the updated assessment to—
- (A) congressional leadership; and
 - (B) the appropriate congressional committees.

SEC. 2504. STRATEGY FOR COUNTERING RUSSIAN CYBER THREATS TO UNITED STATES ELECTIONS.

(a) **APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.**—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means the following:

- (1) The congressional intelligence committees.
- (2) The Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate.
- (3) The Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives.
- (4) The Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
- (5) The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

(b) **REQUIREMENT FOR A STRATEGY.**—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of the Treasury, shall develop a whole-of-government strategy for countering the threat of Russian cyber attacks and attempted cyber attacks against electoral systems and processes in the United States, including Federal, State, and local election systems, voter registration databases, voting tabulation equipment, and equipment and processes for the secure transmission of election results.

(c) **ELEMENTS OF THE STRATEGY.**—The strategy required by subsection (b) shall include the following elements:

- (1) A whole-of-government approach to protecting United States electoral systems and processes that includes the agencies and departments indicated in subsection (b) as well as any other agencies and departments of the United States, as determined appropriate by the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Homeland Security.
- (2) Input solicited from Secretaries of State of the various States and the chief election officials of the States.
- (3) Technical security measures, including auditable paper trails for voting machines, securing wireless and Internet connections, and other technical safeguards.
- (4) Detection of cyber threats, including attacks and attempted attacks by Russian government or nongovernment cyber threat actors.
- (5) Improvements in the identification and attribution of Russian government or nongovernment cyber threat actors.
- (6) Deterrence, including actions and measures that could or should be undertaken against or communicated to the Government of Russia or other entities to deter attacks against, or interference with, United States election systems and processes.
- (7) Improvements in Federal Government communications with State and local election officials.
- (8) Public education and communication efforts.
- (9) Benchmarks and milestones to enable the measurement of concrete steps taken and progress made in the implementation of the strategy.

(d) **CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING.**—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall jointly brief the appropriate congressional committees on the strategy developed under subsection (b).

SEC. 2505. ASSESSMENT OF SIGNIFICANT RUSSIAN INFLUENCE CAMPAIGNS DIRECTED AT FOREIGN ELECTIONS AND REFERENDA.

(a) **RUSSIAN INFLUENCE CAMPAIGN DEFINED.**—In this section, the term “Russian influence campaign” means any effort, covert or overt, and by any means, attributable to the Russian Federation directed at an election, referendum, or similar process in a country other than the Russian Federation or the United States.

(b) **ASSESSMENT REQUIRED.**—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report containing an analytical assessment of the most significant Russian influence campaigns, if any, conducted during the 3-year period preceding the date of the enactment of this Act, as well as the most significant current or planned such Russian influence campaigns, if any. Such assessment shall include—

- (1) a summary of such significant Russian influence campaigns, including, at a minimum, the specific means by which such campaigns were conducted, are being conducted, or likely will be conducted, as appropriate, and the specific goal of each such campaign;
 - (2) a summary of any defenses against or responses to such Russian influence campaigns by the foreign state holding the elections or referenda;
 - (3) a summary of any relevant activities by elements of the intelligence community undertaken for the purpose of assisting the government of such foreign state in defending against or responding to such Russian influence campaigns; and
 - (4) an assessment of the effectiveness of such defenses and responses described in paragraphs (2) and (3).
- (c) **FORM.**—The report required by subsection (b) may be submitted in classified form, but if so submitted, shall contain an unclassified summary.

SEC. 2506. INFORMATION SHARING WITH STATE ELECTION OFFICIALS.

(a) **STATE DEFINED.**—In this section, the term “State” means any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any territory or possession of the United States.

(b) **SECURITY CLEARANCES.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall support the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis, and any other official of the Department of Homeland Security designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security, in sponsoring a security clearance up to the top secret level for each eligible chief election official of a State or the District of Columbia, and additional eligible designees of such election official as appropriate, at the time that such election official assumes such position.

(2) **INTERIM CLEARANCES.**—Consistent with applicable policies and directives, the Director of National Intelligence may issue interim clearances, for a period to be determined by the Director, to a chief election official as described in paragraph (1) and up to 1 designee of such official under such paragraph.

(c) **INFORMATION SHARING.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—The Director of National Intelligence shall assist the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis and the Under Secretary responsible for overseeing critical infrastructure protection, cybersecurity, and other related programs of the Department (as specified in section 103(a)(1)(H) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C.

113(a)(1)(H))) with sharing any appropriate classified information related to threats to election systems and to the integrity of the election process with chief election officials and such designees who have received a security clearance under subsection (b).

(2) **COORDINATION.**—The Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis shall coordinate with the Director of National Intelligence and the Under Secretary responsible for overseeing critical infrastructure protection, cybersecurity, and other related programs of the Department (as specified in section 103(a)(1)(H) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 113(a)(1)(H))) to facilitate the sharing of information to the affected Secretaries of State or States.

SEC. 2507. NOTIFICATION OF SIGNIFICANT FOREIGN CYBER INTRUSIONS AND ACTIVE MEASURES CAMPAIGNS DIRECTED AT ELECTIONS FOR FEDERAL OFFICES.

(a) **DEFINITIONS.**—In this section:

(1) **ACTIVE MEASURES CAMPAIGN.**—The term “active measures campaign” means a foreign semi-covert or covert intelligence operation.

(2) **CANDIDATE, ELECTION, AND POLITICAL PARTY.**—The terms “candidate”, “election”, and “political party” have the meanings given those terms in section 301 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (52 U.S.C. 30101).

(3) **CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP.**—The term “congressional leadership” includes the following:

- (A) The majority leader of the Senate.
- (B) The minority leader of the Senate.
- (C) The Speaker of the House of Representatives.

(D) The minority leader of the House of Representatives.

(4) **CYBER INTRUSION.**—The term “cyber intrusion” means an electronic occurrence that actually or imminently jeopardizes, without lawful authority, electronic election infrastructure, or the integrity, confidentiality, or availability of information within such infrastructure.

(5) **ELECTRONIC ELECTION INFRASTRUCTURE.**—The term “electronic election infrastructure” means an electronic information system of any of the following that is related to an election for Federal office:

- (A) The Federal Government.
- (B) A State or local government.
- (C) A political party.
- (D) The election campaign of a candidate.

(6) **FEDERAL OFFICE.**—The term “Federal office” has the meaning given that term in section 301 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (52 U.S.C. 30101).

(7) **HIGH CONFIDENCE.**—The term “high confidence”, with respect to a determination, means that the determination is based on high-quality information from multiple sources.

(8) **MODERATE CONFIDENCE.**—The term “moderate confidence”, with respect to a determination, means that a determination is credibly sourced and plausible but not of sufficient quality or corroborated sufficiently to warrant a higher level of confidence.

(9) **OTHER APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.**—The term “other appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Homeland Security, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(b) **DETERMINATIONS OF SIGNIFICANT FOREIGN CYBER INTRUSIONS AND ACTIVE MEASURES CAMPAIGNS.**—The Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall jointly carry out subsection (c) if such Directors and the Secretary jointly determine—

(1) that on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, a significant foreign cyber intrusion

or active measures campaign intended to influence an upcoming election for any Federal office has occurred or is occurring; and

(2) with moderate or high confidence, that such intrusion or campaign can be attributed to a foreign state or to a foreign nonstate person, group, or other entity.

(c) BRIEFING.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 14 days after making a determination under subsection (b), the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall jointly provide a briefing to the congressional leadership, the congressional intelligence committees and, consistent with the protection of sources and methods, the other appropriate congressional committees. The briefing shall be classified and address, at a minimum, the following:

(A) A description of the significant foreign cyber intrusion or active measures campaign, as the case may be, covered by the determination.

(B) An identification of the foreign state or foreign nonstate person, group, or other entity, to which such intrusion or campaign has been attributed.

(C) The desirability and feasibility of the public release of information about the cyber intrusion or active measures campaign.

(D) Any other information such Directors and the Secretary jointly determine appropriate.

(2) ELECTRONIC ELECTION INFRASTRUCTURE BRIEFINGS.—With respect to a significant foreign cyber intrusion covered by a determination under subsection (b), the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall offer to the owner or operator of any electronic election infrastructure directly affected by such intrusion, a briefing on such intrusion, including steps that may be taken to mitigate such intrusion. Such briefing may be classified and made available only to individuals with appropriate security clearances.

(3) PROTECTION OF SOURCES AND METHODS.—This subsection shall be carried out in a manner that is consistent with the protection of sources and methods.

SEC. 2508. DESIGNATION OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OFFICER TO LEAD ELECTION SECURITY MATTERS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Director of National Intelligence shall designate a national counterintelligence officer within the National Counterintelligence and Security Center to lead, manage, and coordinate counterintelligence matters relating to election security.

(b) ADDITIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES.—The person designated under subsection (a) shall also lead, manage, and coordinate counterintelligence matters relating to risks posed by interference from foreign powers (as defined in section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801)) to the following:

(1) The Federal Government election security supply chain.

(2) Election voting systems and software.

(3) Voter registration databases.

(4) Critical infrastructure related to elections.

(5) Such other Government goods and services as the Director of National Intelligence considers appropriate.

TITLE XXVI—SECURITY CLEARANCES

SEC. 2601. DEFINITIONS.

In this title:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the congressional intelligence committees;

(B) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;

(C) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;

(D) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate;

(E) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives;

(F) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives;

(G) the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives; and

(H) the Committee on Oversight and Reform of the House of Representatives.

(2) APPROPRIATE INDUSTRY PARTNERS.—The term “appropriate industry partner” means a contractor, licensee, or grantee (as defined in section 101(a) of Executive Order 12829 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note); relating to National Industrial Security Program) that is participating in the National Industrial Security Program established by such Executive Order.

(3) CONTINUOUS VETTING.—The term “continuous vetting” has the meaning given such term in Executive Order 13467 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note); relating to reforming processes related to suitability for government employment, fitness for contractor employees, and eligibility for access to classified national security information).

(4) COUNCIL.—The term “Council” means the Security, Suitability, and Credentialing Performance Accountability Council established pursuant to such Executive Order, or any successor entity.

(5) SECURITY EXECUTIVE AGENT.—The term “Security Executive Agent” means the officer serving as the Security Executive Agent pursuant to section 803 of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by section 2605.

(6) SUITABILITY AND CREDENTIALING EXECUTIVE AGENT.—The term “Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent” means the Director of the Office of Personnel Management acting as the Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent in accordance with Executive Order 13467 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note); relating to reforming processes related to suitability for government employment, fitness for contractor employees, and eligibility for access to classified national security information), or any successor entity.

SEC. 2602. REPORTS AND PLANS RELATING TO SECURITY CLEARANCES AND BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) ensuring the trustworthiness and security of the workforce, facilities, and information of the Federal Government is of the highest priority to national security and public safety;

(2) the President and Congress should prioritize the modernization of the personnel security framework to improve its efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability;

(3) the current system for security clearance, suitability and fitness for employment, and credentialing lacks efficiencies and capabilities to meet the current threat environment, recruit and retain a trusted workforce, and capitalize on modern technologies; and

(4) changes to policies or processes to improve this system should be vetted through the Council to ensure standardization, portability, and reciprocity in security clearances across the Federal Government.

(b) ACCOUNTABILITY PLANS AND REPORTS.—

(1) PLANS.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Council shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees and make available to appropriate industry partners the following:

(A) A plan, with milestones, to reduce the background investigation inventory to 200,000, or an otherwise sustainable steady-level, by the end of year 2020. Such plan shall include notes of any required changes in investigative and adjudicative standards or resources.

(B) A plan to consolidate the conduct of background investigations associated with the processing for security clearances in the most effective and efficient manner between the National Background Investigation Bureau and the Defense Security Service, or a successor organization. Such plan shall address required funding, personnel, contracts, information technology, field office structure, policy, governance, sched-

ule, transition costs, and effects on stakeholders.

(2) REPORT ON THE FUTURE OF PERSONNEL SECURITY.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Chairman of the Council, in coordination with the members of the Council, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees and make available to appropriate industry partners a report on the future of personnel security to reflect changes in threats, the workforce, and technology.

(B) CONTENTS.—The report submitted under subparagraph (A) shall include the following:

(i) A risk framework for granting and renewing access to classified information.

(ii) A discussion of the use of technologies to prevent, detect, and monitor threats.

(iii) A discussion of efforts to address reciprocity and portability.

(iv) A discussion of the characteristics of effective insider threat programs.

(v) An analysis of how to integrate data from continuous evaluation, insider threat programs, and human resources data.

(vi) Recommendations on interagency governance.

(3) PLAN FOR IMPLEMENTATION.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Chairman of the Council, in coordination with the members of the Council, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees and make available to appropriate industry partners a plan to implement the report's framework and recommendations submitted under paragraph (2)(A).

(4) CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATIONS.—Not less frequently than quarterly, the Security Executive Agent shall make available to the public a report regarding the status of the disposition of requests received from departments and agencies of the Federal Government for a change to, or approval under, the Federal investigative standards, the national adjudicative guidelines, continuous evaluation, or other national policy regarding personnel security.

SEC. 2603. IMPROVING THE PROCESS FOR SECURITY CLEARANCES.

(a) REVIEWS.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Security Executive Agent, in coordination with the members of the Council, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees and make available to appropriate industry partners a report that includes the following:

(1) A review of whether the information requested on the Questionnaire for National Security Positions (Standard Form 86) and by the Federal Investigative Standards prescribed by the Office of Personnel Management and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence appropriately supports the adjudicative guidelines under Security Executive Agent Directive 4 (known as the “National Security Adjudicative Guidelines”). Such review shall include identification of whether any such information currently collected is unnecessary to support the adjudicative guidelines.

(2) An assessment of whether such Questionnaire, Standards, and guidelines should be revised to account for the prospect of a holder of a security clearance becoming an insider threat.

(3) Recommendations to improve the background investigation process by—

(A) simplifying the Questionnaire for National Security Positions (Standard Form 86) and increasing customer support to applicants completing such Questionnaire;

(B) using remote techniques and centralized locations to support or replace field investigation work;

(C) using secure and reliable digitization of information obtained during the clearance process;

(D) building the capacity of the background investigation labor sector; and

(E) replacing periodic reinvestigations with continuous evaluation techniques in all appropriate circumstances.

(b) **POLICY, STRATEGY, AND IMPLEMENTATION.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Security Executive Agent shall, in coordination with the members of the Council, establish the following:

(1) A policy and implementation plan for the issuance of interim security clearances.

(2) A policy and implementation plan to ensure contractors are treated consistently in the security clearance process across agencies and departments of the United States as compared to employees of such agencies and departments. Such policy shall address—

(A) prioritization of processing security clearances based on the mission the contractors will be performing;

(B) standardization in the forms that agencies issue to initiate the process for a security clearance;

(C) digitization of background investigation-related forms;

(D) use of the polygraph;

(E) the application of the adjudicative guidelines under Security Executive Agent Directive 4 (known as the “National Security Adjudicative Guidelines”);

(F) reciprocal recognition of clearances across agencies and departments of the United States, regardless of status of periodic reinvestigation;

(G) tracking of clearance files as individuals move from employment with an agency or department of the United States to employment in the private sector;

(H) collection of timelines for movement of contractors across agencies and departments;

(I) reporting on security incidents and job performance, consistent with section 552a of title 5, United States Code (commonly known as the “Privacy Act of 1974”), that may affect the ability to hold a security clearance;

(J) any recommended changes to the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) necessary to ensure that information affecting contractor clearances or suitability is appropriately and expeditiously shared between and among agencies and contractors; and

(K) portability of contractor security clearances between or among contracts at the same agency and between or among contracts at different agencies that require the same level of clearance.

(3) A strategy and implementation plan that—

(A) provides for periodic reinvestigations as part of a security clearance determination only on an as-needed, risk-based basis;

(B) includes actions to assess the extent to which automated records checks and other continuous evaluation methods may be used to expedite or focus reinvestigations; and

(C) provides an exception for certain populations if the Security Executive Agent—

(i) determines such populations require reinvestigations at regular intervals; and

(ii) provides written justification to the appropriate congressional committees for any such determination.

(4) A policy and implementation plan for agencies and departments of the United States, as a part of the security clearance process, to accept automated records checks generated pursuant to a security clearance applicant’s employment with a prior employer.

(5) A policy for the use of certain background materials on individuals collected by the private sector for background investigation purposes.

(6) Uniform standards for agency continuous evaluation programs to ensure quality and reciprocity in accepting enrollment in a continuous vetting program as a substitute for a periodic investigation for continued access to classified information.

SEC. 2604. GOALS FOR PROMPTNESS OF DETERMINATIONS REGARDING SECURITY CLEARANCES.

(a) **RECIPROCITY DEFINED.**—In this section, the term “reciprocity” means reciprocal recognition by Federal departments and agencies of eligibility for access to classified information.

(b) **IN GENERAL.**—The Council shall reform the security clearance process with the objective that, by December 31, 2021, 90 percent of all determinations, other than determinations regarding populations identified under section 2603(b)(3)(C), regarding—

(1) security clearances—

(A) at the secret level are issued in 30 days or fewer; and

(B) at the top secret level are issued in 90 days or fewer; and

(2) reciprocity of security clearances at the same level are recognized in 2 weeks or fewer.

(c) **CERTAIN REINVESTIGATIONS.**—The Council shall reform the security clearance process with the goal that by December 31, 2021, reinvestigation on a set periodicity is not required for more than 10 percent of the population that holds a security clearance.

(d) **EQUIVALENT METRICS.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—If the Council develops a set of performance metrics that it certifies to the appropriate congressional committees should achieve substantially equivalent outcomes as those outlined in subsections (b) and (c), the Council may use those metrics for purposes of compliance within this provision.

(2) **NOTICE.**—If the Council uses the authority provided by paragraph (1) to use metrics as described in such paragraph, the Council shall, not later than 30 days after communicating such metrics to departments and agencies, notify the appropriate congressional committees that it is using such authority.

(e) **PLAN.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Council shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees and make available to appropriate industry partners a plan to carry out this section. Such plan shall include recommended interim milestones for the goals set forth in subsections (b) and (c) for 2019, 2020, and 2021.

SEC. 2605. SECURITY EXECUTIVE AGENT.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—Title VIII of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3161 et seq.) is amended—

(1) by redesignating sections 803 and 804 as sections 804 and 805, respectively; and

(2) by inserting after section 802 the following:

“SEC. 803. SECURITY EXECUTIVE AGENT.

“(a) **IN GENERAL.**—The Director of National Intelligence, or such other officer of the United States as the President may designate, shall serve as the Security Executive Agent for all departments and agencies of the United States.

“(b) **DUTIES.**—The duties of the Security Executive Agent are as follows:

“(1) To direct the oversight of investigations, reinvestigations, adjudications, and, as applicable, polygraphs for eligibility for access to classified information or eligibility to hold a sensitive position made by any Federal agency.

“(2) To review the national security background investigation and adjudication programs of Federal agencies to determine whether such programs are being implemented in accordance with this section.

“(3) To develop and issue uniform and consistent policies and procedures to ensure the effective, efficient, timely, and secure completion of investigations, polygraphs, and adjudications relating to determinations of eligibility for access to classified information or eligibility to hold a sensitive position.

“(4) Unless otherwise designated by law, to serve as the final authority to designate a Federal agency or agencies to conduct investigations of persons who are proposed for access to classified information or for eligibility to hold a sensitive position to ascertain whether such persons satisfy the criteria for obtaining and retaining access to classified information or eligibility to hold a sensitive position, as applicable.

“(5) Unless otherwise designated by law, to serve as the final authority to designate a Federal agency or agencies to determine eligibility for access to classified information or eligibility

to hold a sensitive position in accordance with Executive Order 12968 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to access to classified information).

“(6) To ensure reciprocal recognition of eligibility for access to classified information or eligibility to hold a sensitive position among Federal agencies, including acting as the final authority to arbitrate and resolve disputes among such agencies involving the reciprocity of investigations and adjudications of eligibility.

“(7) To execute all other duties assigned to the Security Executive Agent by law.

“(c) **AUTHORITIES.**—The Security Executive Agent shall—

“(1) issue guidelines and instructions to the heads of Federal agencies to ensure appropriate uniformity, centralization, efficiency, effectiveness, timeliness, and security in processes relating to determinations by such agencies of eligibility for access to classified information or eligibility to hold a sensitive position, including such matters as investigations, polygraphs, adjudications, and reciprocity;

“(2) have the authority to grant exceptions to, or waivers of, national security investigative requirements, including issuing implementing or clarifying guidance, as necessary;

“(3) have the authority to assign, in whole or in part, to the head of any Federal agency (solely or jointly) any of the duties of the Security Executive Agent described in subsection (b) or the authorities described in paragraphs (1) and (2), provided that the exercise of such assigned duties or authorities is subject to the oversight of the Security Executive Agent, including such terms and conditions (including approval by the Security Executive Agent) as the Security Executive Agent determines appropriate; and

“(4) define and set standards for continuous evaluation for continued access to classified information and for eligibility to hold a sensitive position.”

(b) **REPORT ON RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REVISING AUTHORITIES.**—Not later than 30 days after the date on which the Chairman of the Council submits to the appropriate congressional committees the report required by section 2602(b)(2)(A), the Chairman shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees such recommendations as the Chairman may have for revising the authorities of the Security Executive Agent.

(c) **CONFORMING AMENDMENT.**—Section 103H(j)(4)(A) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 3033(j)(4)(A)) is amended by striking “in section 804” and inserting “in section 805”.

(d) **CLERICAL AMENDMENT.**—The table of contents in the matter preceding section 2 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 3002) is amended by striking the items relating to sections 803 and 804 and inserting the following:

“Sec. 803. Security Executive Agent.

“Sec. 804. Exceptions.

“Sec. 805. Definitions.”

SEC. 2606. REPORT ON UNIFIED, SIMPLIFIED, GOVERNMENTWIDE STANDARDS FOR POSITIONS OF TRUST AND SECURITY CLEARANCES.

Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Security Executive Agent and the Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent, in coordination with the other members of the Council, shall jointly submit to the appropriate congressional committees and make available to appropriate industry partners a report regarding the advisability and the risks, benefits, and costs to the Government and to industry of consolidating to not more than 3 tiers for positions of trust and security clearances.

SEC. 2607. REPORT ON CLEARANCE IN PERSON CONCEPT.

(a) **SENSE OF CONGRESS.**—It is the sense of Congress that to reflect the greater mobility of the modern workforce, alternative methodologies merit analysis to allow greater flexibility for individuals moving in and out of positions that require access to classified information, while still preserving security.

(b) **REPORT REQUIRED.**—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Security Executive Agent shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees and make available to appropriate industry partners a report that describes the requirements, feasibility, and advisability of implementing a clearance in person concept described in subsection (c).

(c) **CLEARANCE IN PERSON CONCEPT.**—The clearance in person concept—

(1) permits an individual who once held a security clearance to maintain his or her eligibility for access to classified information, networks, and facilities for up to 3 years after the individual's eligibility for access to classified information would otherwise lapse; and

(2) recognizes, unless otherwise directed by the Security Executive Agent, an individual's security clearance and background investigation as current, regardless of employment status, contingent on enrollment in a continuous vetting program.

(d) **CONTENTS.**—The report required under subsection (b) shall address—

(1) requirements for an individual to voluntarily remain in a continuous evaluation program validated by the Security Executive Agent even if the individual is not in a position requiring access to classified information;

(2) appropriate safeguards for privacy;

(3) advantages to government and industry;

(4) the costs and savings associated with implementation;

(5) the risks of such implementation, including security and counterintelligence risks;

(6) an appropriate funding model; and

(7) fairness to small companies and independent contractors.

SEC. 2608. REPORTS ON RECIPROCITY FOR SECURITY CLEARANCES INSIDE OF DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES.

(a) **RECIPROCALLY RECOGNIZED DEFINED.**—In this section, the term “reciprocally recognized” means reciprocal recognition by Federal departments and agencies of eligibility for access to classified information.

(b) **REPORTS TO SECURITY EXECUTIVE AGENT.**—The head of each Federal department or agency shall submit an annual report to the Security Executive Agent that—

(1) identifies the number of individuals whose security clearances take more than 2 weeks to be reciprocally recognized after such individuals move to another part of such department or agency; and

(2) breaks out the information described in paragraph (1) by type of clearance and the reasons for any delays.

(c) **ANNUAL REPORT.**—Not less frequently than once each year, the Security Executive Agent shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees and make available to industry partners an annual report that summarizes the information received pursuant to subsection (b) during the period covered by such report.

SEC. 2609. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY REPORTS ON SECURITY CLEARANCES.

(a) **SENSE OF CONGRESS.**—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) despite sustained efforts by Congress and the executive branch, an unacceptable backlog in processing and adjudicating security clearances persists, both within elements of the intelligence community and in other departments of the Federal Government, with some processing times exceeding a year or even more;

(2) the protracted clearance timetable threatens the ability of elements of the intelligence community to hire and retain highly qualified individuals, and thus to fulfill the missions of such elements;

(3) the prospect of a lengthy clearance process deters some such individuals from seeking employment with the intelligence community in the first place, and, when faced with a long wait time, those with conditional offers of employment may opt to discontinue the security clearance process and pursue different opportunities;

(4) now more than ever, therefore, the broken security clearance process badly needs fundamental reform; and

(5) in the meantime, to ensure the ability of elements of the intelligence community to hire and retain highly qualified personnel, elements should consider, to the extent possible and consistent with national security, permitting new employees to enter on duty immediately or nearly so, and to perform, on a temporary basis pending final adjudication of their security clearances, work that either does not require a security clearance or requires only a low-level interim clearance.

(b) **IN GENERAL.**—Section 506H of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3104) is amended—

(1) in subsection (a)(1)—

(A) in subparagraph (A)(ii), by inserting “and” after the semicolon;

(B) in subparagraph (B)(ii), by striking “; and” and inserting a period; and

(C) by striking subparagraph (C);

(2) by redesignating subsection (b) as subsection (c);

(3) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new subsection (b):

“(b) **INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY REPORTS.**—(1) Not later than March 1 of each year, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate, and the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives a report on the security clearances processed by each element of the intelligence community during the preceding fiscal year. Each such report shall separately identify security clearances processed for Federal employees and contractor employees sponsored by each such element.

“(2) Each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall include each of the following for each element of the intelligence community for the fiscal year covered by the report:

“(A) The total number of initial security clearance background investigations sponsored for new applicants.

“(B) The total number of security clearance periodic reinvestigations sponsored for existing employees.

“(C) The total number of initial security clearance background investigations for new applicants that were adjudicated with notice of a determination provided to the prospective applicant, including—

“(i) the total number that were adjudicated favorably and granted access to classified information; and

“(ii) the total number that were adjudicated unfavorably and resulted in a denial or revocation of a security clearance.

“(D) The total number of security clearance periodic background investigations that were adjudicated with notice of a determination provided to the existing employee, including—

“(i) the total number that were adjudicated favorably; and

“(ii) the total number that were adjudicated unfavorably and resulted in a denial or revocation of a security clearance.

“(E) The total number of pending security clearance background investigations, including initial applicant investigations and periodic reinvestigations, that were not adjudicated as of the last day of such year and that remained pending as follows:

“(i) For 180 days or less.

“(ii) For 180 days or longer, but less than 12 months.

“(iii) For 12 months or longer, but less than 18 months.

“(iv) For 18 months or longer, but less than 24 months.

“(v) For 24 months or longer.

“(F) In the case of security clearance determinations completed or pending during the year preceding the year for which the report is sub-

mitted that have taken longer than 12 months to complete—

“(i) an explanation of the causes for the delays incurred during the period covered by the report; and

“(ii) the number of such delays involving a polygraph requirement.

“(G) The percentage of security clearance investigations, including initial and periodic reinvestigations, that resulted in a denial or revocation of a security clearance.

“(H) The percentage of security clearance investigations that resulted in incomplete information.

“(I) The percentage of security clearance investigations that did not result in enough information to make a decision on potentially adverse information.

“(3) The report required under this subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.”; and

(4) in subsection (c), as redesignated by paragraph (2), by striking “subsection (a)(1)” and inserting “subsections (a)(1) and (b)”.

SEC. 2610. PERIODIC REPORT ON POSITIONS IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY THAT CAN BE CONDUCTED WITHOUT ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION, NETWORKS, OR FACILITIES.

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and not less frequently than once every 5 years thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report that reviews the intelligence community for which positions can be conducted without access to classified information, networks, or facilities, or may only require a security clearance at the secret level.

SEC. 2611. INFORMATION SHARING PROGRAM FOR POSITIONS OF TRUST AND SECURITY CLEARANCES.

(a) **PROGRAM REQUIRED.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Security Executive Agent and the Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent shall establish and implement a program to share between and among agencies of the Federal Government and industry partners of the Federal Government relevant background information regarding individuals applying for and currently occupying national security positions and positions of trust, in order to ensure the Federal Government maintains a trusted workforce.

(2) **DESIGNATION.**—The program established under paragraph (1) shall be known as the “Trusted Information Provider Program” (in this section referred to as the “Program”).

(b) **PRIVACY SAFEGUARDS.**—The Security Executive Agent and the Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent shall ensure that the Program includes such safeguards for privacy as the Security Executive Agent and the Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent consider appropriate.

(c) **PROVISION OF INFORMATION TO THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.**—The Program shall include requirements that enable investigative service providers and agencies of the Federal Government to leverage certain pre-employment information gathered during the employment or military recruiting process, and other relevant security or human resources information obtained during employment with or for the Federal Government, that satisfy Federal investigative standards, while safeguarding personnel privacy.

(d) **INFORMATION AND RECORDS.**—The information and records considered under the Program shall include the following:

(1) Date and place of birth.

(2) Citizenship or immigration and naturalization information.

(3) Education records.

(4) Employment records.

(5) Employment or social references.

(6) Military service records.

(7) State and local law enforcement checks.
 (8) Criminal history checks.
 (9) Financial records or information.
 (10) Foreign travel, relatives, or associations.
 (11) Social media checks.
 (12) Such other information or records as may be relevant to obtaining or maintaining national security, suitability, fitness, or credentialing eligibility.

(e) **IMPLEMENTATION PLAN.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Security Executive Agent and the Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent shall jointly submit to the appropriate congressional committees and make available to appropriate industry partners a plan for the implementation of the Program.

(2) **ELEMENTS.**—The plan required by paragraph (1) shall include the following:

(A) Mechanisms that address privacy, national security, suitability or fitness, credentialing, and human resources or military recruitment processes.

(B) Such recommendations for legislative or administrative action as the Security Executive Agent and the Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent consider appropriate to carry out or improve the Program.

(f) **PLAN FOR PILOT PROGRAM ON TWO-WAY INFORMATION SHARING.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Security Executive Agent and the Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent shall jointly submit to the appropriate congressional committees and make available to appropriate industry partners a plan for the implementation of a pilot program to assess the feasibility and advisability of expanding the Program to include the sharing of information held by the Federal Government related to contract personnel with the security office of the employers of those contractor personnel.

(2) **ELEMENTS.**—The plan required by paragraph (1) shall include the following:

(A) Mechanisms that address privacy, national security, suitability or fitness, credentialing, and human resources or military recruitment processes.

(B) Such recommendations for legislative or administrative action as the Security Executive Agent and the Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent consider appropriate to carry out or improve the pilot program.

(g) **REVIEW.**—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Security Executive Agent and the Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent shall jointly submit to the appropriate congressional committees and make available to appropriate industry partners a review of the plans submitted under subsections (e)(1) and (f)(1) and utility and effectiveness of the programs described in such plans.

SEC. 2612. REPORT ON PROTECTIONS FOR CONFIDENTIALITY OF WHISTLEBLOWER-RELATED COMMUNICATIONS.

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Security Executive Agent shall, in coordination with the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report detailing the controls employed by the intelligence community to ensure that continuous vetting programs, including those involving user activity monitoring, protect the confidentiality of whistleblower-related communications.

TITLE XXVII—REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS

Subtitle A—Matters Relating to Russia and Other Foreign Powers

SEC. 2701. LIMITATION RELATING TO ESTABLISHMENT OR SUPPORT OF CYBERSECURITY UNIT WITH THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

(a) **APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.**—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(1) the congressional intelligence committees;
 (2) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives; and
 (3) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

(b) **LIMITATION.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—No amount may be expended by the Federal Government, other than the Department of Defense, to enter into or implement any bilateral agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation regarding cybersecurity, including the establishment or support of any cybersecurity unit, unless, at least 30 days prior to the conclusion of any such agreement, the Director of National Intelligence submits to the appropriate congressional committees a report on such agreement that includes the elements required by subsection (c).

(2) **DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AGREEMENTS.**—Any agreement between the Department of Defense and the Russian Federation regarding cybersecurity shall be conducted in accordance with section 1232 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114-328), as amended by section 1231 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (Public Law 115-91).

(c) **ELEMENTS.**—If the Director submits a report under subsection (b) with respect to an agreement, such report shall include a description of each of the following:

(1) The purpose of the agreement.

(2) The nature of any intelligence to be shared pursuant to the agreement.

(3) The expected value to national security resulting from the implementation of the agreement.

(4) Such counterintelligence concerns associated with the agreement as the Director may have and such measures as the Director expects to be taken to mitigate such concerns.

(d) **RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.**—This section shall not be construed to affect any existing authority of the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, or another head of an element of the intelligence community, to share or receive foreign intelligence on a case-by-case basis.

SEC. 2702. REPORT ON RETURNING RUSSIAN COMPOUNDS.

(a) **COVERED COMPOUNDS DEFINED.**—In this section, the term “covered compounds” means the real property in New York, the real property in Maryland, and the real property in San Francisco, California, that were under the control of the Government of Russia in 2016 and were removed from such control in response to various transgressions by the Government of Russia, including the interference by the Government of Russia in the 2016 election in the United States.

(b) **REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives (only with respect to the unclassified report), a report on the intelligence risks of returning the covered compounds to Russian control.

(c) **FORM OF REPORT.**—The report required by this section shall be submitted in classified and unclassified forms.

SEC. 2703. ASSESSMENT OF THREAT FINANCE RELATING TO RUSSIA.

(a) **THREAT FINANCE DEFINED.**—In this section, the term “threat finance” means—

(1) the financing of cyber operations, global influence campaigns, intelligence service activities, proliferation, terrorism, or transnational crime and drug organizations;

(2) the methods and entities used to spend, store, move, raise, conceal, or launder money or value, on behalf of threat actors;

(3) sanctions evasion; and

(4) other forms of threat finance activity domestically or internationally, as defined by the President.

(b) **REPORT REQUIRED.**—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Intelligence and Analysis, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report containing an assessment of Russian threat finance. The assessment shall be based on intelligence from all sources, including from the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence of the Department of the Treasury.

(c) **ELEMENTS.**—The report required by subsection (b) shall include each of the following:

(1) A summary of leading examples from the 3-year period preceding the date of the submittal of the report of threat finance activities conducted by, for the benefit of, or at the behest of—

(A) officials of the Government of Russia;

(B) persons subject to sanctions under any provision of law imposing sanctions with respect to Russia;

(C) Russian nationals subject to sanctions under any other provision of law; or

(D) Russian oligarchs or organized criminals.

(2) An assessment with respect to any trends or patterns in threat finance activities relating to Russia, including common methods of conducting such activities and global nodes of money laundering used by Russian threat actors described in paragraph (1) and associated entities.

(3) An assessment of any connections between Russian individuals involved in money laundering and the Government of Russia.

(4) A summary of engagement and coordination with international partners on threat finance relating to Russia, especially in Europe, including examples of such engagement and coordination.

(5) An identification of any resource and collection gaps.

(6) An identification of—

(A) entry points of money laundering by Russian and associated entities into the United States;

(B) any vulnerabilities within the United States legal and financial system, including specific sectors, which have been or could be exploited in connection with Russian threat finance activities; and

(C) the counterintelligence threat posed by Russian money laundering and other forms of threat finance, as well as the threat to the United States financial system and United States efforts to enforce sanctions and combat organized crime.

(7) Any other matters the Director determines appropriate.

(d) **FORM OF REPORT.**—The report required under subsection (b) may be submitted in classified form.

SEC. 2704. NOTIFICATION OF AN ACTIVE MEASURES CAMPAIGN.

(a) **DEFINITIONS.**—In this section:

(1) **APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.**—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the congressional intelligence committees;

(B) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives; and

(C) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

(2) **CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP.**—The term “congressional leadership” includes the following:

(A) The majority leader of the Senate.

(B) The minority leader of the Senate.

(C) The Speaker of the House of Representatives.

(D) The minority leader of the House of Representatives.

(b) **REQUIREMENT FOR NOTIFICATION.**—The Director of National Intelligence, in cooperation with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the head of any other relevant agency, shall notify the congressional leadership and the Chairman and Vice Chairman or Ranking Member of each of the appropriate congressional committees, and of other relevant committees of jurisdiction, each time the Director of National Intelligence determines there is credible information that a foreign power has, is, or will attempt to employ a covert influence or active measures campaign with regard to the modernization, employment, doctrine, or force posture of the nuclear deterrent or missile defense.

(c) **CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION.**—Each notification required by subsection (b) shall include information concerning actions taken by the United States to expose or halt an attempt referred to in subsection (b).

SEC. 2705. NOTIFICATION OF TRAVEL BY ACCREDITED DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR PERSONNEL OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION IN THE UNITED STATES.

In carrying out the advance notification requirements set out in section 502 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (division N of Public Law 115–31; 131 Stat. 825; 22 U.S.C. 254a note), the Secretary of State shall—

(1) ensure that the Russian Federation provides notification to the Secretary of State at least 2 business days in advance of all travel that is subject to such requirements by accredited diplomatic and consular personnel of the Russian Federation in the United States, and take necessary action to secure full compliance by Russian personnel and address any non-compliance; and

(2) provide notice of travel described in paragraph (1) to the Director of National Intelligence and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation within 1 hour of receiving notice of such travel.

SEC. 2706. REPORT ON OUTREACH STRATEGY ADDRESSING THREATS FROM UNITED STATES ADVERSARIES TO THE UNITED STATES TECHNOLOGY SECTOR.

(a) **APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.**—In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

- (1) the congressional intelligence committees;
- (2) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate; and
- (3) the Committee on Armed Services, Committee on Homeland Security, and the Committee on Oversight and Reform of the House of Representatives.

(b) **REPORT REQUIRED.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report detailing outreach by the intelligence community and the Defense Intelligence Enterprise to United States industrial, commercial, scientific, technical, and academic communities on matters relating to the efforts of adversaries of the United States to acquire critical United States technology, intellectual property, and research and development information.

(c) **CONTENTS.**—The report required by subsection (b) shall include the following:

(1) A review of the current outreach efforts of the intelligence community and the Defense Intelligence Enterprise described in subsection (b), including the type of information conveyed in the outreach.

(2) A determination of the appropriate element of the intelligence community to lead such outreach efforts.

(3) An assessment of potential methods for improving the effectiveness of such outreach, including an assessment of the following:

(A) Those critical technologies, infrastructure, or related supply chains that are at risk from

the efforts of adversaries described in subsection (b).

(B) The necessity and advisability of granting security clearances to company or community leadership, when necessary and appropriate, to allow for tailored classified briefings on specific targeted threats.

(C) The advisability of partnering with entities of the Federal Government that are not elements of the intelligence community and relevant regulatory and industry groups described in subsection (b), to convey key messages across sectors targeted by United States adversaries.

(D) Strategies to assist affected elements of the communities described in subparagraph (C) in mitigating, deterring, and protecting against the broad range of threats from the efforts of adversaries described in subsection (b), with focus on producing information that enables private entities to justify business decisions related to national security concerns.

(E) The advisability of the establishment of a United States Government-wide task force to coordinate outreach and activities to combat the threats from efforts of adversaries described in subsection (b).

(F) Such other matters as the Director of National Intelligence may consider necessary.

(d) **CONSULTATION ENCOURAGED.**—In preparing the report required by subsection (b), the Director is encouraged to consult with other government agencies, think tanks, academia, representatives of the financial industry, or such other entities as the Director considers appropriate.

(e) **FORM.**—The report required by subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex as necessary.

SEC. 2707. REPORT ON IRANIAN SUPPORT OF PROXY FORCES IN SYRIA AND LEBANON.

(a) **DEFINITIONS.**—In this section:
(1) **APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.**—The term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

- (A) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
- (B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

(2) **ARMS OR RELATED MATERIAL.**—The term “arms or related material” means—

- (A) nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological weapons or materials or components of such weapons;
- (B) ballistic or cruise missile weapons or materials or components of such weapons;
- (C) destabilizing numbers and types of advanced conventional weapons;
- (D) defense articles or defense services, as those terms are defined in paragraphs (3) and (4), respectively, of section 47 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2794);
- (E) defense information, as that term is defined in section 644 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2403); or
- (F) items designated by the President for purposes of the United States Munitions List under section 38(a)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778(a)(1)).

(b) **REPORT REQUIRED.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on Iranian support of proxy forces in Syria and Lebanon and the threat posed to Israel, other United States regional allies, and other specified interests of the United States as a result of such support.

(c) **MATTERS FOR INCLUSION.**—The report required under subsection (b) shall include information relating to the following matters with respect to both the strategic and tactical implications for the United States and its allies:

- (1) A description of arms or related materiel transferred by Iran to Hizballah since March

2011, including the number of such arms or related materiel and whether such transfer was by land, sea, or air, as well as financial and additional technological capabilities transferred by Iran to Hizballah.

(2) A description of Iranian and Iranian-controlled personnel, including Hizballah, Shiite militias, and Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps forces, operating within Syria, including the number and geographic distribution of such personnel operating within 30 kilometers of the Israeli borders with Syria and Lebanon.

(3) An assessment of Hizballah’s operational lessons learned based on its recent experiences in Syria.

(4) A description of any rocket-producing facilities in Lebanon for nonstate actors, including whether such facilities were assessed to be built at the direction of Hizballah leadership, Iranian leadership, or in consultation between Iranian leadership and Hizballah leadership.

(5) An analysis of the foreign and domestic supply chains that significantly facilitate, support, or otherwise aid Hizballah’s acquisition or development of missile production facilities, including the geographic distribution of such foreign and domestic supply chains.

(6) An assessment of the provision of goods, services, or technology transferred by Iran or its affiliates to Hizballah to indigenously manufacture or otherwise produce missiles.

(7) An identification of foreign persons that are based on credible information, facilitating the transfer of significant financial support or arms or related materiel to Hizballah.

(8) A description of the threat posed to Israel and other United States allies in the Middle East by the transfer of arms or related material or other support offered to Hizballah and other proxies from Iran.

(d) **FORM OF REPORT.**—The report required under subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 2708. ANNUAL REPORT ON IRANIAN EXPENDITURES SUPPORTING FOREIGN MILITARY AND TERRORIST ACTIVITIES.

(a) **ANNUAL REPORT REQUIRED.**—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and not less frequently than once each year thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report describing Iranian expenditures in the previous calendar year on military and terrorist activities outside the country, including each of the following:

- (1) The amount spent in such calendar year on activities by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, including activities providing support for—
 - (A) Hizballah;
 - (B) Houthi rebels in Yemen;
 - (C) Hamas;
 - (D) proxy forces in Iraq and Syria; or
 - (E) any other entity or country the Director determines to be relevant.
- (2) The amount spent in such calendar year for ballistic missile research and testing or other activities that the Director determines are destabilizing to the Middle East region.

(b) **FORM.**—The report required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 2709. EXPANSION OF SCOPE OF COMMITTEE TO COUNTER ACTIVE MEASURES AND REPORT ON ESTABLISHMENT OF FOREIGN MALIGN INFLUENCE CENTER.

(a) **SCOPE OF COMMITTEE TO COUNTER ACTIVE MEASURES.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—Section 501 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 115–31; 50 U.S.C. 3001 note) is amended—

- (A) in subsections (a) through (h)—
 - (i) by inserting “, the People’s Republic of China, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or other nation state” after “Russian Federation” each place it appears; and

(ii) by inserting “, China, Iran, North Korea, or other nation state” after “Russia” each place it appears; and

(B) in the section heading, by inserting “, **THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA, OR OTHER NATION STATE**” after “**RUSSIAN FEDERATION**”.

(2) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of contents in section 1(b) of such Act is amended by striking the item relating to section 501 and inserting the following new item:

“Sec. 501. Committee to counter active measures by the Russian Federation, the People’s Republic of China, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or other nation states to exert covert influence over peoples and governments.”.

(b) REPORT REQUIRED.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with such elements of the intelligence community as the Director considers relevant, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the feasibility and advisability of establishing a center, to be known as the “Foreign Malign Influence Response Center”, that—

(A) is comprised of analysts from all appropriate elements of the intelligence community, including elements with related diplomatic and law enforcement functions;

(B) has access to all intelligence and other reporting acquired by the United States Government on foreign efforts to influence, through overt and covert malign activities, United States political processes and elections;

(C) provides comprehensive assessment, and indications and warning, of such activities; and

(D) provides for enhanced dissemination of such assessment to United States policy makers.

(2) CONTENTS.—The report required by paragraph (1) shall include the following:

(A) A discussion of the desirability of the establishment of such center and any barriers to such establishment.

(B) Such recommendations and other matters as the Director considers appropriate.

Subtitle B—Reports

SEC. 2711. TECHNICAL CORRECTION TO INSPECTOR GENERAL STUDY.

Section 11001(d) of title 5, United States Code, is amended—

(1) in the subsection heading, by striking “AUDIT” and inserting “REVIEW”;

(2) in paragraph (1), by striking “audit” and inserting “review”; and

(3) in paragraph (2), by striking “audit” and inserting “review”.

SEC. 2712. REPORTS ON AUTHORITIES OF THE CHIEF INTELLIGENCE OFFICER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY.

(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.—The term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(A) the congressional intelligence committees;

(B) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate; and

(C) the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives.

(2) HOMELAND SECURITY INTELLIGENCE ENTERPRISE.—The term “Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise” has the meaning given such term in Department of Homeland Security Instruction Number 264–01–001, or successor authority.

(b) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Con-

gress a report on the authorities of the Under Secretary.

(c) ELEMENTS.—The report required by subsection (b) shall include each of the following:

(1) An analysis of whether the Under Secretary has the legal and policy authority necessary to organize and lead the Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise, with respect to intelligence, and, if not, a description of—

(A) the obstacles to exercising the authorities of the Chief Intelligence Officer of the Department and the Homeland Security Intelligence Council, of which the Chief Intelligence Officer is the chair; and

(B) the legal and policy changes necessary to effectively coordinate, organize, and lead intelligence activities of the Department of Homeland Security.

(2) A description of the actions that the Secretary has taken to address the inability of the Under Secretary to require components of the Department, other than the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department to—

(A) coordinate intelligence programs; and

(B) integrate and standardize intelligence products produced by such other components.

SEC. 2713. REVIEW OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WHISTLEBLOWER MATTERS.

(a) REVIEW OF WHISTLEBLOWER MATTERS.—The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, in consultation with the inspectors general for the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Reconnaissance Office, shall conduct a review of the authorities, policies, investigatory standards, and other practices and procedures relating to intelligence community whistleblower matters, with respect to such inspectors general.

(b) OBJECTIVE OF REVIEW.—The objective of the review required under subsection (a) is to identify any discrepancies, inconsistencies, or other issues, which frustrate the timely and effective reporting of intelligence community whistleblower matters to appropriate inspectors general and to the congressional intelligence committees, and the fair and expeditious investigation and resolution of such matters.

(c) CONDUCT OF REVIEW.—The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall take such measures as the Inspector General determines necessary in order to ensure that the review required by subsection (a) is conducted in an independent and objective fashion.

(d) REPORT.—Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a written report containing the results of the review required under subsection (a), along with recommendations to improve the timely and effective reporting of intelligence community whistleblower matters to inspectors general and to the congressional intelligence committees and the fair and expeditious investigation and resolution of such matters.

SEC. 2714. REPORT ON ROLE OF DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN FOREIGN INVESTMENTS.

(a) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of the elements of the intelligence community determined appropriate by the Director, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the role of the Director in preparing analytic materials in connection with the evaluation by the Federal Government of national security risks associated with potential foreign investments into the United States.

(b) ELEMENTS.—The report under subsection (a) shall include—

(1) a description of the current process for the provision of the analytic materials described in subsection (a);

(2) an identification of the most significant benefits and drawbacks of such process with respect to the role of the Director, including the sufficiency of resources and personnel to prepare such materials; and

(3) recommendations to improve such process.

SEC. 2715. REPORT ON SURVEILLANCE BY FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AGAINST UNITED STATES TELECOMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS.

(a) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means the following:

(1) The congressional intelligence committees.

(2) The Committee on the Judiciary and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate.

(3) The Committee on the Judiciary and the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives.

(b) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall, in coordination with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security Agency, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Secretary of Homeland Security, submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report describing—

(1) any attempts known to the intelligence community by foreign governments to exploit cybersecurity vulnerabilities in United States telecommunications networks (including Signaling System No. 7) to target for surveillance United States persons, including employees of the Federal Government; and

(2) any actions, as of the date of the enactment of this Act, taken by the intelligence community to protect agencies and personnel of the United States Government from surveillance conducted by foreign governments.

SEC. 2716. BIENNIAL REPORT ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT RISKS.

(a) INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP.—

(1) REQUIREMENT TO ESTABLISH.—The Director of National Intelligence shall establish an intelligence community interagency working group to prepare the biennial reports required by subsection (b).

(2) CHAIRPERSON.—The Director of National Intelligence shall serve as the chairperson of such interagency working group.

(3) MEMBERSHIP.—Such interagency working group shall be composed of representatives of each element of the intelligence community that the Director of National Intelligence determines appropriate.

(b) BIENNIAL REPORT ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT RISKS.—

(1) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and not less frequently than once every 2 years thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate, and the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives a report on foreign investment risks prepared by the interagency working group established under subsection (a).

(2) ELEMENTS.—Each report required by paragraph (1) shall include identification, analysis, and explanation of the following:

(A) Any current or projected major threats to the national security of the United States with respect to foreign investment.

(B) Any strategy used by a foreign country that such interagency working group has identified to be a country of special concern to use foreign investment to target the acquisition of critical technologies, critical materials, or critical infrastructure.

(C) Any economic espionage efforts directed at the United States by a foreign country, particularly such a country of special concern.

SEC. 2717. MODIFICATION OF CERTAIN REPORTING REQUIREMENT ON TRAVEL OF FOREIGN DIPLOMATS.

Section 502(d)(2) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 115-31) is amended by striking “the number” and inserting “a best estimate”.

SEC. 2718. SEMIANNUAL REPORTS ON INVESTIGATIONS OF UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.

(a) *IN GENERAL.*—Title XI of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3231 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

“SEC. 1105. SEMIANNUAL REPORTS ON INVESTIGATIONS OF UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.

“(a) *DEFINITIONS.*—In this section:

“(1) *COVERED OFFICIAL.*—The term ‘covered official’ means—

“(A) the heads of each element of the intelligence community; and

“(B) the inspectors general with oversight responsibility for an element of the intelligence community.

“(2) *INVESTIGATION.*—The term ‘investigation’ means any inquiry, whether formal or informal, into the existence of an unauthorized public disclosure of classified information.

“(3) *UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.*—The term ‘unauthorized disclosure of classified information’ means any unauthorized disclosure of classified information to any recipient.

“(4) *UNAUTHORIZED PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.*—The term ‘unauthorized public disclosure of classified information’ means the unauthorized disclosure of classified information to a journalist or media organization.

“(b) *INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY REPORTING.*—

“(1) *IN GENERAL.*—Not less frequently than once every 6 months, each covered official shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on investigations of unauthorized public disclosures of classified information.

“(2) *ELEMENTS.*—Each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall include, with respect to the preceding 6-month period, the following:

“(A) The number of investigations opened by the covered official regarding an unauthorized public disclosure of classified information.

“(B) The number of investigations completed by the covered official regarding an unauthorized public disclosure of classified information.

“(C) Of the number of such completed investigations identified under subparagraph (B), the number referred to the Attorney General for criminal investigation.

“(c) *DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE REPORTING.*—

“(1) *IN GENERAL.*—Not less frequently than once every 6 months, the Assistant Attorney General for National Security of the Department of Justice, in consultation with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives a report on the status of each referral made to the Department of Justice from any element of the intelligence community regarding an unauthorized disclosure of classified information made during the most recent 365-day period or any referral that has not yet been closed, regardless of the date the referral was made.

“(2) *CONTENTS.*—Each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall include, for each referral covered by the report, at a minimum, the following:

“(A) The date the referral was received.

“(B) A statement indicating whether the alleged unauthorized disclosure described in the referral was substantiated by the Department of Justice.

“(C) A statement indicating the highest level of classification of the information that was revealed in the unauthorized disclosure.

“(D) A statement indicating whether an open criminal investigation related to the referral is active.

“(E) A statement indicating whether any criminal charges have been filed related to the referral.

“(F) A statement indicating whether the Department of Justice has been able to attribute the unauthorized disclosure to a particular entity or individual.

“(d) *FORM OF REPORTS.*—Each report submitted under this section shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may have a classified annex.”.

(b) *CLERICAL AMENDMENT.*—The table of contents in the first section of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 1104 the following new item:

“Sec. 1105. Semiannual reports on investigations of unauthorized disclosures of classified information.”.

SEC. 2719. CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION OF DESIGNATION OF COVERED INTELLIGENCE OFFICER AS PERSONA NON GRATA.

(a) *COVERED INTELLIGENCE OFFICER DEFINED.*—In this section, the term “covered intelligence officer” means—

(1) a United States intelligence officer serving in a post in a foreign country; or

(2) a known or suspected foreign intelligence officer serving in a United States post.

(b) *REQUIREMENT FOR REPORTS.*—Not later than 72 hours after a covered intelligence officer is designated as a persona non grata, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a notification of that designation. Each such notification shall include—

(1) the date of the designation;

(2) the basis for the designation; and

(3) a justification for the expulsion.

SEC. 2720. REPORTS ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN VULNERABILITIES EQUITIES PROCESS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.

(a) *DEFINITIONS.*—In this section:

(1) *VULNERABILITIES EQUITIES POLICY AND PROCESS DOCUMENT.*—The term “Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process document” means the executive branch document entitled “Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process” dated November 15, 2017.

(2) *VULNERABILITIES EQUITIES PROCESS.*—The term “Vulnerabilities Equities Process” means the interagency review of vulnerabilities, pursuant to the Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process document or any successor document.

(3) *VULNERABILITY.*—The term “vulnerability” means a weakness in an information system or its components (for example, system security procedures, hardware design, and internal controls) that could be exploited or could affect confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information.

(b) *REPORTS ON PROCESS AND CRITERIA UNDER VULNERABILITIES EQUITIES POLICY AND PROCESS.*—

(1) *IN GENERAL.*—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a written report describing—

(A) with respect to each element of the intelligence community—

(i) the title of the official or officials responsible for determining whether, pursuant to criteria contained in the Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process document or any successor document, a vulnerability must be submitted for review under the Vulnerabilities Equities Process; and

(ii) the process used by such element to make such determination; and

(B) the roles or responsibilities of that element during a review of a vulnerability submitted to the Vulnerabilities Equities Process.

(2) *CHANGES TO PROCESS OR CRITERIA.*—Not later than 30 days after any significant change is made to the process and criteria used by any element of the intelligence community for determining whether to submit a vulnerability for review under the Vulnerabilities Equities Process, such element shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report describing such change.

(3) *FORM OF REPORTS.*—Each report submitted under this subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(c) *ANNUAL REPORTS.*—

(1) *IN GENERAL.*—Not less frequently than once each calendar year, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a classified report containing, with respect to the previous year—

(A) the number of vulnerabilities submitted for review under the Vulnerabilities Equities Process;

(B) the number of vulnerabilities described in subparagraph (A) disclosed to each vendor responsible for correcting the vulnerability, or to the public, pursuant to the Vulnerabilities Equities Process; and

(C) the aggregate number, by category, of the vulnerabilities excluded from review under the Vulnerabilities Equities Process, as described in paragraph 5.4 of the Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process document.

(2) *UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION.*—Each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall include an unclassified appendix that contains—

(A) the aggregate number of vulnerabilities disclosed to vendors or the public pursuant to the Vulnerabilities Equities Process; and

(B) the aggregate number of vulnerabilities disclosed to vendors or the public pursuant to the Vulnerabilities Equities Process known to have been patched.

(3) *NON-DUPLICATION.*—The Director of National Intelligence may forgo submission of an annual report required under this subsection for a calendar year, if the Director notifies the intelligence committees in writing that, with respect to the same calendar year, an annual report required by paragraph 4.3 of the Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process document already has been submitted to Congress, and such annual report contains the information that would otherwise be required to be included in an annual report under this subsection.

SEC. 2721. INSPECTORS GENERAL REPORTS ON CLASSIFICATION.

(a) *REPORTS REQUIRED.*—Not later than October 1, 2019, each Inspector General listed in subsection (b) shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report that includes, with respect to the department or agency of the Inspector General, analyses of the following:

(1) The accuracy of the application of classification and handling markers on a representative sample of finished reports, including such reports that are compartmented.

(2) Compliance with declassification procedures.

(3) The effectiveness of processes for identifying topics of public or historical importance that merit prioritization for a declassification review.

(b) *INSPECTORS GENERAL LISTED.*—The Inspectors General listed in this subsection are as follows:

(1) The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.

(2) The Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency.

(3) The Inspector General of the National Security Agency.

(4) The Inspector General of the Defense Intelligence Agency.

(5) The Inspector General of the National Reconnaissance Office.

(6) The Inspector General of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

SEC. 2722. REPORTS ON GLOBAL WATER INSECURITY AND NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS AND BRIEFING ON EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASE AND PANDEMICS.

(a) REPORTS ON GLOBAL WATER INSECURITY AND NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS.—

(1) REPORTS REQUIRED.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and not less frequently than once every 5 years thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the implications of water insecurity on the national security interest of the United States, including consideration of social, economic, agricultural, and environmental factors.

(2) ASSESSMENT SCOPE AND FOCUS.—Each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall include an assessment of water insecurity described in such subsection with a global scope, but focus on areas of the world—

(A) of strategic, economic, or humanitarian interest to the United States—

(i) that are, as of the date of the report, at the greatest risk of instability, conflict, human insecurity, or mass displacement; or

(ii) where challenges relating to water insecurity are likely to emerge and become significant during the 5-year or the 20-year period beginning on the date of the report; and

(B) where challenges relating to water insecurity are likely to imperil the national security interests of the United States or allies of the United States.

(3) CONSULTATION.—In researching a report required by paragraph (1), the Director shall consult with—

(A) such stakeholders within the intelligence community, the Department of Defense, and the Department of State as the Director considers appropriate; and

(B) such additional Federal agencies and persons in the private sector as the Director considers appropriate.

(4) FORM.—Each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(b) BRIEFING ON EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASE AND PANDEMICS.—

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this subsection, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the congressional intelligence committees; (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives; and

(C) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.

(2) BRIEFING.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall provide to the appropriate congressional committees a briefing on the anticipated geopolitical effects of emerging infectious disease (including deliberate, accidental, and naturally occurring infectious disease threats) and pandemics, and their implications on the national security of the United States.

(3) CONTENT.—The briefing under paragraph (2) shall include an assessment of—

(A) the economic, social, political, and security risks, costs, and impacts of emerging infectious diseases on the United States and the international political and economic system;

(B) the economic, social, political, and security risks, costs, and impacts of a major transnational pandemic on the United States and the international political and economic system; and

(C) contributing trends and factors to the matters assessed under subparagraphs (A) and (B).

(4) EXAMINATION OF RESPONSE CAPACITY.—In examining the risks, costs, and impacts of

emerging infectious disease and a possible transnational pandemic under paragraph (3), the Director of National Intelligence shall also examine in the briefing under paragraph (2) the response capacity within affected countries and the international system. In considering response capacity, the Director shall include—

(A) the ability of affected nations to effectively detect and manage emerging infectious diseases and a possible transnational pandemic;

(B) the role and capacity of international organizations and nongovernmental organizations to respond to emerging infectious disease and a possible pandemic, and their ability to coordinate with affected and donor nations; and

(C) the effectiveness of current international frameworks, agreements, and health systems to respond to emerging infectious diseases and a possible transnational pandemic.

(5) FORM.—The briefing under paragraph (2) may be classified.

SEC. 2723. ANNUAL REPORT ON MEMORANDA OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN ELEMENTS OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND OTHER ENTITIES OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT REGARDING SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES OR POLICY.

Section 311 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (50 U.S.C. 3313) is amended—

(1) by redesignating subsection (b) as subsection (c); and

(2) by striking subsection (a) and inserting the following:

“(a) IN GENERAL.—Each year, concurrent with the annual budget request submitted by the President to Congress under section 1105 of title 31, United States Code, each head of an element of the intelligence community shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report that lists each memorandum of understanding or other agreement regarding significant operational activities or policy entered into during the most recently completed fiscal year between or among such element and any other entity of the United States Government.

“(b) PROVISION OF DOCUMENTS.—Each head of an element of an intelligence community who receives a request from the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate or the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives for a copy of a memorandum of understanding or other document listed in a report submitted by the head under subsection (a) shall submit to such committee the requested copy as soon as practicable after receiving such request.”.

SEC. 2724. STUDY ON THE FEASIBILITY OF ENCRYPTING UNCLASSIFIED WIRELINE AND WIRELESS TELEPHONE CALLS.

(a) STUDY REQUIRED.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall complete a study on the feasibility of encrypting unclassified wireline and wireless telephone calls between personnel in the intelligence community.

(b) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date on which the Director completes the study required by subsection (a), the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the Director’s findings with respect to such study.

SEC. 2725. MODIFICATION OF REQUIREMENT FOR ANNUAL REPORT ON HIRING AND RETENTION OF MINORITY EMPLOYEES.

(a) EXPANSION OF PERIOD OF REPORT.—Subsection (a) of section 114 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3050) is amended by inserting “and the preceding 5 fiscal years” after “fiscal year”.

(b) CLARIFICATION ON DISAGGREGATION OF DATA.—Subsection (b) of such section is amended, in the matter before paragraph (1), by striking “disaggregated data by category of covered person from each element of the intelligence

community” and inserting “data, disaggregated by category of covered person and by element of the intelligence community.”.

SEC. 2726. REPORTS ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY LOAN REPAYMENT AND RELATED PROGRAMS.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) there should be established, through the issuing of an Intelligence Community Directive or otherwise, an intelligence community-wide program for student loan repayment, student loan forgiveness, financial counseling, and related matters, for employees of the intelligence community;

(2) creating such a program would enhance the ability of the elements of the intelligence community to recruit, hire, and retain highly qualified personnel, including with respect to mission-critical and hard-to-fill positions;

(3) such a program, including with respect to eligibility requirements, should be designed so as to maximize the ability of the elements of the intelligence community to recruit, hire, and retain highly qualified personnel, including with respect to mission-critical and hard-to-fill positions; and

(4) to the extent possible, such a program should be uniform throughout the intelligence community and publicly promoted by each element of the intelligence community to both current employees of the element as well as to prospective employees of the element.

(b) REPORT ON POTENTIAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY-WIDE PROGRAM.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in cooperation with the heads of the elements of the intelligence community and the heads of any other appropriate department or agency of the Federal Government, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on potentially establishing and carrying out an intelligence community-wide program for student loan repayment, student loan forgiveness, financial counseling, and related matters, as described in subsection (a).

(2) MATTERS INCLUDED.—The report under paragraph (1) shall include, at a minimum, the following:

(A) A description of the financial resources that the elements of the intelligence community would require to establish and initially carry out the program specified in paragraph (1).

(B) A description of the practical steps to establish and carry out such a program.

(C) The identification of any legislative action the Director determines necessary to establish and carry out such a program.

(c) ANNUAL REPORTS ON ESTABLISHED PROGRAMS.—

(1) COVERED PROGRAMS DEFINED.—In this subsection, the term “covered programs” means any loan repayment program, loan forgiveness program, financial counseling program, or similar program, established pursuant to title X of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3191 et seq.) or any other provision of law that may be administered or used by an element of the intelligence community.

(2) ANNUAL REPORTS REQUIRED.—Not less frequently than once each year, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the covered programs. Each such report shall include, with respect to the period covered by the report, the following:

(A) The number of personnel from each element of the intelligence community who used each covered program.

(B) The total amount of funds each element expended for each such program.

(C) A description of the efforts made by each element to promote each covered program pursuant to both the personnel of the element of the intelligence community and to prospective personnel.

SEC. 2727. REPEAL OF CERTAIN REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

(a) **CORRECTING LONG-STANDING MATERIAL WEAKNESSES.**—Section 368 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 110–259; 50 U.S.C. 3051 note) is hereby repealed.

(b) **INTERAGENCY THREAT ASSESSMENT AND COORDINATION GROUP.**—Section 210D of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 124k) is amended—

- (1) by striking subsection (c); and
- (2) by redesignating subsections (d) through (i) as subsections (c) through (h), respectively; and
- (3) in subsection (c), as so redesignated—
 - (A) in paragraph (8), by striking “; and” and inserting a period; and
 - (B) by striking paragraph (9).

(c) **INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT.**—Section 8H of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended—

- (1) by striking subsection (g); and
- (2) by redesignating subsections (h) and (i) as subsections (g) and (h), respectively.

SEC. 2728. INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY REPORT ON SENIOR EXECUTIVES OF THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.

(a) **SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE POSITION DEFINED.**—In this section, the term “Senior Executive Service position” has the meaning given that term in section 3132(a)(2) of title 5, United States Code, and includes any position above the GS–15, step 10, level of the General Schedule under section 5332 of such title.

(b) **REPORT.**—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the number of Senior Executive Service positions in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

(c) **MATTERS INCLUDED.**—The report under subsection (b) shall include the following:

(1) The number of required Senior Executive Service positions for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

(2) Whether such requirements are reasonably based on the mission of the Office.

(3) A discussion of how the number of the Senior Executive Service positions in the Office compare to the number of senior positions at comparable organizations.

(d) **COOPERATION.**—The Director of National Intelligence shall provide to the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community any information requested by the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community that is necessary to carry out this section by not later than 14 calendar days after the date on which the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community makes such request.

SEC. 2729. BRIEFING ON FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION OFFERING PERMANENT RESIDENCE TO SOURCES AND COOPERATORS.

Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall provide to the congressional intelligence committees a briefing on the ability of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to offer, as an inducement to assisting the Bureau, permanent residence within the United States to foreign individuals who are sources or cooperators in counterintelligence or other national security-related investigations. The briefing shall address the following:

(1) The extent to which the Bureau may make such offers, whether independently or in conjunction with other agencies and departments of the United States Government, including a discussion of the authorities provided by section 101(a)(15)(S) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(S)), section 7 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act (50 U.S.C. 3508), and any other provision of law under which the Bureau may make such offers.

(2) An overview of the policies and operational practices of the Bureau with respect to making such offers.

(3) The sufficiency of such policies and practices with respect to inducing individuals to cooperate with, serve as sources for such investigations, or both.

(4) Whether the Director recommends any legislative actions to improve such policies and practices, particularly with respect to the counterintelligence efforts of the Bureau.

SEC. 2730. INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT OF NORTH KOREA REVENUE SOURCES.

(a) **ASSESSMENT REQUIRED.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research and the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Intelligence and Analysis, shall produce an intelligence assessment of the revenue sources of the North Korean regime. Such assessment shall include revenue from the following sources:

- (1) Trade in coal, iron, and iron ore.
- (2) The provision of fishing rights to North Korean territorial waters.
- (3) Trade in gold, titanium ore, vanadium ore, copper, silver, nickel, zinc, or rare earth minerals, and other stores of value.
- (4) Trade in textiles.
- (5) Sales of conventional defense articles and services.
- (6) Sales of controlled goods, ballistic missiles, and other associated items.
- (7) Other types of manufacturing for export, as the Director of National Intelligence considers appropriate.
- (8) The exportation of workers from North Korea in a manner intended to generate significant revenue, directly or indirectly, for use by the government of North Korea.
- (9) The provision of nonhumanitarian goods (such as food, medicine, and medical devices) and services by other countries.
- (10) The provision of services, including banking and other support, including by entities located in the Russian Federation, China, and Iran.
- (11) Online commercial activities of the Government of North Korea, including online gambling.
- (12) Criminal activities, including cyber-enabled crime and counterfeit goods.

(b) **ELEMENTS.**—The assessment required under subsection (a) shall include an identification of each of the following:

- (1) The sources of North Korea’s funding.
- (2) Financial and non-financial networks, including supply chain management, transportation, and facilitation, through which North Korea accesses the United States and international financial systems and repatriates and exports capital, goods, and services; and
- (3) the global financial institutions, money services business, and payment systems that assist North Korea with financial transactions.

(c) **SUBMITTAL TO CONGRESS.**—Upon completion of the assessment required under subsection (a), the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a copy of such assessment.

SEC. 2731. REPORT ON POSSIBLE EXPLOITATION OF VIRTUAL CURRENCIES BY TERRORIST ACTORS.

(a) **SHORT TITLE.**—This section may be cited as the “Stop Terrorist Use of Virtual Currencies Act”.

(b) **REPORT.**—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit to Congress a report on the possible exploitation of virtual currencies by terrorist actors. Such report shall include the following elements:

(1) An assessment of the means and methods by which international terrorist organizations and State sponsors of terrorism use virtual currencies.

(2) An assessment of the use by terrorist organizations and State sponsors of terrorism of virtual currencies compared to the use by such organizations and States of other forms of financing to support operations, including an assessment of the collection posture of the intelligence community on the use of virtual currencies by such organizations and States.

(3) A description of any existing legal impediments that inhibit or prevent the intelligence community from collecting information on or helping prevent the use of virtual currencies by international terrorist organizations and State sponsors of terrorism and an identification of any gaps in existing law that could be exploited for illicit funding by such organizations and States.

(c) **FORM OF REPORT.**—The report required by subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

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Subtitle C—Other Matters**SEC. 2741. PUBLIC INTEREST DECLASSIFICATION BOARD.**

Section 710(b) of the Public Interest Declassification Act of 2000 (Public Law 106–567; 50 U.S.C. 3161 note) is amended by striking “December 31, 2018” and inserting “December 31, 2028”.

SEC. 2742. TECHNICAL AND CLERICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947.

(a) **TABLE OF CONTENTS.**—The table of contents at the beginning of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3001 et seq.) is amended—

(1) by inserting after the item relating to section 2 the following new item:

“Sec. 3. Definitions.”;

(2) by striking the item relating to section 107;

(3) by striking the item relating to section 113B and inserting the following new item:

“Sec. 113B. Special pay authority for science, technology, engineering, or mathematics positions.”;

(4) by striking the items relating to sections 202, 203, 204, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, and 214; and

(5) by inserting after the item relating to section 311 the following new item:

“Sec. 312. Repealing and saving provisions.”.

(b) **OTHER TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS.**—Such Act is further amended—

(1) in section 102A—

(A) in subparagraph (G) of paragraph (1) of subsection (g), by moving the margins of such subparagraph 2 ems to the left; and

(B) in paragraph (3) of subsection (v), by moving the margins of such paragraph 2 ems to the left;

(2) in section 106—

(A) by inserting “SEC. 106.” before “(a)”; and

(B) in subparagraph (I) of paragraph (2) of subsection (b), by moving the margins of such subparagraph 2 ems to the left;

(3) by striking section 107;

(4) in section 108(c), by striking “in both a classified and an unclassified form” and inserting “to Congress in classified form, but may include an unclassified summary”;

(5) in section 112(c)(1), by striking “section 103(c)(7)” and inserting “section 102A(i)”; and

(6) by amending section 201 to read as follows:

“**SEC. 201. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.**
“Except to the extent inconsistent with the provisions of this Act or other provisions of law, the provisions of title 5, United States Code, shall be applicable to the Department of Defense.”;

(7) in section 205, by redesignating subsections (b) and (c) as subsections (a) and (b), respectively;

(8) in section 206, by striking “(a)”; and

(9) in section 207, by striking “(c)”; and

(10) in section 308(a), by striking “this Act” and inserting “sections 2, 101, 102, 103, and 303 of this Act”;

(11) by redesignating section 411 as section 312;

(12) in section 503—

(A) in paragraph (5) of subsection (c)—

(i) by moving the margins of such paragraph 2 ems to the left; and

(ii) by moving the margins of subparagraph (B) of such paragraph 2 ems to the left; and

(B) in paragraph (2) of subsection (d), by moving the margins of such paragraph 2 ems to the left; and

(13) in subparagraph (B) of paragraph (3) of subsection (a) of section 504, by moving the margins of such subparagraph 2 ems to the right.

SEC. 2743. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY.

(a) NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION ACT.—

(1) CLARIFICATION OF FUNCTIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATOR FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY.—Subsection (b) of section 3212 of the National Nuclear Security Administration Act (50 U.S.C. 2402(b)) is amended—

(A) by striking paragraphs (11) and (12); and

(B) by redesignating paragraphs (13) through (19) as paragraphs (11) through (17), respectively.

(2) COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS.—Section 3233(b) of the National Nuclear Security Administration Act (50 U.S.C. 2423(b)) is amended—

(A) by striking “Administration” and inserting “Department”; and

(B) by inserting “Intelligence and” after “the Office of”.

(b) ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACT.—Section 4524(b)(2) of the Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2674(b)(2)) is amended by inserting “Intelligence and” after “The Director of”.

(c) NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947.—Paragraph (2) of section 106(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3041(b)(2)) is amended—

(1) in subparagraph (E), by inserting “and Counterintelligence” after “Office of Intelligence”;

(2) by striking subparagraph (F); and

(3) by redesignating subparagraphs (G), (H), and (I) as subparagraphs (F), (G), and (H), respectively.

SEC. 2744. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON NOTIFICATION OF CERTAIN DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.

(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) ADVERSARY FOREIGN GOVERNMENT.—The term “adversary foreign government” means the government of any of the following foreign countries:

(A) North Korea.

(B) Iran.

(C) China.

(D) Russia.

(E) Cuba.

(2) COVERED CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.—The term “covered classified information” means classified information that was—

(A) collected by an element of the intelligence community; or

(B) provided by the intelligence service or military of a foreign country to an element of the intelligence community.

(3) ESTABLISHED INTELLIGENCE CHANNELS.—The term “established intelligence channels” means methods to exchange intelligence to coordinate foreign intelligence relationships, as established pursuant to law by the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security Agency, or other head of an element of the intelligence community.

(4) INDIVIDUAL IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH.—The term “individual in the executive branch” means any officer or employee of the executive branch, including individuals—

(A) occupying a position specified in article II of the Constitution;

(B) appointed to a position by an individual described in subparagraph (A); or

(C) serving in the civil service or the Senior Executive Service (or similar service for senior

executives of particular departments or agencies).

(b) FINDINGS.—Congress finds that section 502 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3092) requires elements of the intelligence community to keep the congressional intelligence committees “fully and currently informed” about all “intelligence activities” of the United States, and to “furnish to the congressional intelligence committees any information or material concerning intelligence activities * * * which is requested by either of the congressional intelligence committees in order to carry out its authorized responsibilities.”

(c) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) section 502 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3092), together with other intelligence community authorities, obligates an element of the intelligence community to submit to the congressional intelligence committees written notification, by not later than 7 days after becoming aware, that an individual in the executive branch has disclosed covered classified information to an official of an adversary foreign government using methods other than established intelligence channels; and

(2) each such notification should include—

(A) the date and place of the disclosure of classified information covered by the notification;

(B) a description of such classified information;

(C) identification of the individual who made such disclosure and the individual to whom such disclosure was made; and

(D) a summary of the circumstances of such disclosure.

SEC. 2745. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON CONSIDERATION OF ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES WHEN CONSIDERING WHETHER OR NOT TO PROVIDE VISAS TO FOREIGN INDIVIDUALS TO BE ACCREDITED TO A UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN THE UNITED STATES.

It is the sense of the Congress that the Secretary of State, in considering whether or not to provide a visa to a foreign individual to be accredited to a United Nations mission in the United States, should consider—

(1) known and suspected intelligence activities, espionage activities, including activities constituting precursors to espionage, carried out by the individual against the United States, foreign allies of the United States, or foreign partners of the United States; and

(2) the status of an individual as a known or suspected intelligence officer for a foreign adversary.

The CHAIR. No further amendment to the bill, as amended, shall be in order except those printed in part B of House Report 116–154.

Each further amendment printed in part B of the report may be offered only in the order printed in the report, by a Member designated in the report, shall be considered as read, shall be debatable for the time specified in the report equally divided and controlled by the proponent and an opponent, shall not be subject to amendment, and shall not be subject to a demand for division of the question.

AMENDMENT NO. 1 OFFERED BY MR. STEWART

The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 1 printed in part B of House Report 116–154.

Mr. STEWART. Mr. Chairman, as the designee of the gentleman from Texas (Mr. BURGESS), I have an amendment at the desk.

The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

Page 224, line 15, insert “the Committee on Energy and Commerce,” after “Armed Services.”

Page 224, line 19, insert “the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions,” after “Armed Services.”

The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman from Utah (Mr. STEWART) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Utah.

Mr. STEWART. Mr. Chairman, my amendment is very simple. It adds the House Energy and Commerce Committee and the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee to the list of committees that will receive a briefing from the Director of National Intelligence on emerging infectious disease and pandemics.

The Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Health has jurisdiction over all public health and quarantine, as well as the Centers for Disease Control.

Given the Energy and Commerce Committee's and the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee's jurisdiction over the Assistant Secretary of Preparedness and Response, which plays an integral role in our Nation's public health and security, it is imperative that these committees be included in this briefing.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

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Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chair, I rise in opposition to the amendment, although I am not opposed.

The Acting CHAIR (Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi). Without objection, the gentleman from California is recognized for 5 minutes.

There was no objection.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chair, the gentleman from Texas' proposal would allow the congressional committees with jurisdiction over public health matters the opportunity to receive a briefing about the effects of emerging and infectious diseases and pandemics on national security and the international political and economic system, along with the Intelligence Committee and Armed Services Committee.

It is critical that Congress be well-informed on the posture of the United States and, indeed, the rest of the world to address a public health crisis that might arise in the face of a particularly rapidly spreading, devastating disease. It is crucial that committees that oversee public health responses understand how prepared we may be to address such a crisis.

I support this amendment, and I believe it will be helpful to our colleagues on the House Energy and Commerce Committee and the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee to receive this briefing and information from the DNI, along with the Intelligence, Armed Services, Foreign Affairs, and Appropriations Committees that are already included in the bill text.

For that reason, I support the amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. STEWART. Mr. Chair, I thank the chairman for supporting the amendment. I urge adoption of the amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Utah (Mr. STEWART).

The amendment was agreed to.

AMENDMENT NO. 2 OFFERED BY MR. STEWART

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 2 printed in part B of House Report 116-154.

Mr. STEWART. Mr. Chair, again I rise as the designee of Mr. BURGESS, and I have an amendment at the desk.

The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

At the end of title VII, add the following new section:

SEC. 7 ____ . REMOVAL AND NEUTRALIZATION OF IMSI CATCHERS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Homeland Security, in collaboration with the Director of National Intelligence, the Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, and the heads of such other Federal agencies as the Secretary determines appropriate, and following consultation with appropriate private entities, shall—

(1) undertake an effort to remove or neutralize unauthorized IMSI catchers installed by foreign entities or that have an unknown attribution, with prioritization given to IMSI catchers identified in the National Capital Region; and

(2) conduct further assessments, not less than once every 90 days, to identify new IMSI catchers for removal or neutralization.

(b) IMSI CATCHER DEFINED.—The term “IMSI catcher” means an international mobile subscriber identity-catcher or other device used for intercepting mobile phone identifying information and location data.

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman from Utah (Mr. STEWART) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Utah.

Mr. STEWART. Mr. Chair, once again, my amendment is simple. It directs the Secretary of Homeland Security, in collaboration with the Director of National Intelligence, Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, and appropriate private entities, to undertake an effort to remove or neutralize unauthorized international mobile subscriber identity catchers, or cell-site simulators, installed by foreign entities or that have an unknown attribution.

International mobile subscriber identities, IMSI, catchers, or cell-site simulators, are devices used for intercepting mobile traffic and location data. They appear to be legitimate cell phone towers that nearby phones may connect to. Once connected, phone locations can be tracked.

Some advanced IMSI catchers can even read content, such as messages and cell phone data. Much remains un-

known about the proliferation of these devices, particularly in the national capital region. However, we do know that foreign actors have access to and have used these devices.

It is imperative that our intelligence community, with the relevant agencies and private industry partners, undertake an effort to neutralize unauthorized IMSI catchers.

Mr. Chair, I urge support of this amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Utah (Mr. STEWART).

The amendment was agreed to.

AMENDMENT NO. 3 OFFERED BY MR. CARSON OF INDIANA

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 3 printed in part B of House Report 116-154.

Mr. CARSON of Indiana. Mr. Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.

The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

At the end of title VII, add the following new section:

SEC. 7 ____ . PLAN FOR STRENGTHENING THE SUPPLY CHAIN INTELLIGENCE FUNCTION.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, in coordination with the Director of the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency and other interagency partners, shall submit to Congress a plan for strengthening the supply chain intelligence function.

(b) ELEMENTS.—The plan submitted under subsection (a) shall address the following:

(1) The appropriate workforce model, including size, mix, and seniority, from the elements of the intelligence community and other interagency partners.

(2) The budgetary resources necessary to implement the plan.

(3) The appropriate governance structure within the intelligence community and with interagency partners.

(4) The authorities necessary to implement the plan.

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. CARSON) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Indiana.

Mr. CARSON of Indiana. Mr. Chair, first, I thank Chairman SCHIFF and Ranking Member NUNES for their work on the Intelligence Authorization Act this year. It is always a pleasure to serve under Chairman SCHIFF's leadership. Without it, the Intelligence Committee would not have been able to pass such a strong bill out of committee.

I rise today, Mr. Chair, in support of an amendment that I have offered to the underlying bill text. This amendment will help the United States protect the integrity of its economic supply chain infrastructure. I am pleased that my good friend Representative ELISE STEFANIK has joined me in co-sponsoring this amendment.

Today, businesses and organizations in the United States face an array of distinct and stealthy threats. The American supply chain is under repeated attack from foreign intelligence services, cyber hackers, and sophisticated criminal enterprises.

Unfortunately, experienced adversaries often exploit vulnerabilities in American companies' technological infrastructure or weak links in their organizational supply chain so that they can steal their intellectual property, co-opt equipment from suppliers, damage software, or conduct surveillance. Moving forward, we must be more vigilant to stop them.

The Carson-Stefanik amendment, Mr. Chair, will guard against these grave concerns, and it will lead to stronger safeguards for the supply chain by mandating the National Counterintelligence and Security Center to produce a plan within 6 months to strengthen the supply chain intelligence function within the intelligence community.

The plan, Mr. Chair, will identify personnel with the right expertise from the intelligence community workforce, outline budgetary and resource needs, and describe the necessary authorities and governance structure for future implementation of this plan.

It will inform both the executive branch and Congress' efforts to enhance our defenses against exploitation of the supply chain.

The United States remains one of the most technologically advanced economies in the world. Throughout the past century, America has enjoyed unprecedented economic growth because of the ingenuity of our people and the technological innovation that undergirds that entrepreneurial spirit.

While that economic growth has not always been evenly distributed, and we are still wrestling with debates about economic inequality, surrendering our technological edge and innovative advantages to strategic rivals would pose a huge risk to America's future prosperity and security.

I believe, Mr. Chair, it is very important to offer this amendment, recognizing the evolving and emerging threats to our Nation's supply chain infrastructure. In a very rapidly developing global economy, the intelligence community must work to safeguard the core of what America and her competitive strength is: economic, intellectual, and technological ingenuity.

My amendment proactively works toward that goal, ensuring that we stay on top of those varying threats to our supply chain infrastructure that emanate from strategic rivals.

In addition to this amendment, Mr. Chair, I would like to highlight another important part of the base bill. This year's Intelligence Authorization Act includes an entire section on domestic terrorism. It is important that we acknowledge domestic terrorism as a very serious threat, and we must do more than just talk about it as a societal problem. We must act.

Domestic terrorism incidents in the U.S. are on the rise, fueled by hatred, stoked by fear, and inspired by dangerous rhetoric. At a time when this President is ignoring the truth about domestic terrorism, and his administration is concealing and hiding the proliferation of white supremacist-inspired incidents, Congress and the public urgently need more information to better understand and prevent domestic terrorism.

Specifically, Mr. Chair, this bill would require the FBI, Department of Homeland Security, and NCTC to produce an annual report on domestic terrorism. With the reporting that is mandated in the underlying intelligence authorization bill, we can better determine how to change the law and make the necessary adjustments to procedures and to adequately shift current practices in order to fully address the threat of domestic terrorism and its root causes.

Much of the report, Mr. Chair, would be made available to the public, increasing transparency, while the full report would be provided to oversight committees in greater detail. It would be valuable information and would require an annual strategic assessment on trends and patterns. Ultimately, it will dramatically expand the information on domestic terrorism available to Congress and the public.

I urge my colleagues to support the Carson-Stefanik amendment and the underlying bill, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. CARSON).

The amendment was agreed to.

AMENDMENT NO. 4 OFFERED BY MR. HURD OF TEXAS

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 4 printed in part B of House Report 116-154.

Mr. HURD of Texas. Mr. Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.

The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

At the end of title V, add the following:

SEC. 5. ASSESSMENTS REGARDING THE NORTHERN TRIANGLE AND MEXICO.

(a) ASSESSMENTS OF ACTIVITIES BY DRUG TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS IN THE NORTHERN TRIANGLE AND MEXICO.—

(1) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Chief of Intelligence of the Drug Enforcement Administration and the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report containing an analytical assessment of the activities of drug trafficking organizations in the Northern Triangle and Mexico. Such assessment shall include, at a minimum—

(A) an assessment of the effect of drug trafficking organizations on the security and economic situation in the Northern Triangle;

(B) an assessment of the effect of the activities of drug trafficking organizations on the migration of persons from the Northern Triangle to the United States-Mexico border;

(C) a summary of any relevant activities by elements of the intelligence community in relation to drug trafficking organizations in the Northern Triangle and Mexico;

(D) a summary of key methods and routes used by drug trafficking organizations in the Northern Triangle and Mexico to the United States;

(E) an assessment of the intersection between the activities of drug trafficking organizations, human traffickers and human smugglers, and other organized criminal groups in the Northern Triangle and Mexico; and

(F) an assessment of the illicit funds and financial transactions that support the activities of drug trafficking organizations and connected criminal enterprises in the Northern Triangle and Mexico.

(2) FORM.—The report required by paragraph (2) may be submitted in classified form, but if so submitted, shall contain an unclassified summary.

(3) AVAILABILITY.—The report under paragraph (1), or the unclassified summary of the report described in paragraph (2), shall be made publicly available.

(b) ASSESSMENT OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING AND SMUGGLING FROM THE NORTHERN TRIANGLE TO THE UNITED STATES-MEXICO BORDER.—

(1) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis and the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report containing an analytical assessment of human trafficking and human smuggling by individuals and organizations in the Northern Triangle and Mexico. Such assessment shall include, at a minimum—

(A) an assessment of the effect of human trafficking and human smuggling on the security and economic situation in the Northern Triangle;

(B) a summary of any relevant activities by elements of the intelligence community in relation to human trafficking and human smuggling in the Northern Triangle and Mexico;

(C) an assessment of the methods and routes used by human traffickers and human smuggler organizations to move persons from the Northern Triangle to the United States-Mexico border;

(D) an assessment of the intersection between the activities of human traffickers and human smugglers, drug trafficking organizations, and other organized criminal groups in the Northern Triangle and Mexico; and

(E) an assessment of the illicit funds and financial transactions that support the activities of human traffickers and human smugglers and connected criminal enterprises in the Northern Triangle and Mexico.

(2) FORM.—The report required by paragraph (1) may be submitted in classified form, but if so submitted, shall contain an unclassified summary.

(3) AVAILABILITY.—The report under paragraph (1), or the unclassified summary of the report described in paragraph (2), shall be made publicly available.

(c) PRIORITIZATION OF INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES FOR THE NORTHERN TRIANGLE AND MEXICO.—

(1) REVIEW OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY EFFORTS IN NORTHERN TRIANGLE AND MEXICO.—The Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis, the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, the Chief of

Intelligence of the Drug Enforcement Administration, and other appropriate officials in the intelligence community, shall carry out a comprehensive review of the current intelligence collection priorities of the intelligence community for the Northern Triangle and Mexico in order to identify whether such priorities are appropriate and sufficient in light of the threat posed by the activities of drug trafficking organizations and human traffickers and human smugglers to the security of the United States and the Western Hemisphere.

(2) REPORT AND BRIEFINGS.—

(A) REPORT ON INITIAL REVIEW.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a comprehensive description of the results of the review required by paragraph (1), including whether the priorities described in that paragraph are appropriate and sufficient in light of the threat posed by the activities of drug trafficking organizations and human traffickers and human smugglers to the security of the United States and the Western Hemisphere. If the report concludes that such priorities are not so appropriate and sufficient, the report shall also include a description of the actions to be taken to modify such priorities in order to assure that such priorities are so appropriate and sufficient.

(B) QUARTERLY BRIEFINGS.—Not later than 90 days after the date on which the report under subparagraph (A) is submitted, and every 90 days thereafter for a 5-year period, the Director of National Intelligence shall provide to the congressional intelligence committees a briefing on the intelligence community's collection priorities and activities in the Northern Triangle and Mexico with a focus on the threat posed by the activities of drug trafficking organizations and human traffickers and human smugglers to the security of the United States and the Western Hemisphere. The first briefing under this subparagraph shall also include a description of the amount of funds expended by the intelligence community to the efforts described in paragraph (1) during each of fiscal years 2018 and 2019.

(3) FORM.—The report and briefings required by paragraph (2) may be submitted or provided in classified form, but if so submitted or provided, shall include an unclassified summary.

(d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Homeland Security, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

(2) HUMAN TRAFFICKING.—The term “human trafficking” has the meaning given the term “severe forms of trafficking in persons” by section 103 of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7102).

(3) NORTHERN TRIANGLE.—The term “Northern Triangle” means El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. HURD) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. HURD of Texas. Mr. Chair, I am proud to join my good friend and fellow

former CIA officer, the gentlewoman from the Commonwealth of Virginia, to offer this bipartisan amendment that would direct the intelligence community to prioritize resources to address the humanitarian crisis at the border, in the Northern Triangle, and also in Mexico.

I represent more of the southern border than any other Member of Congress. The root causes of this current crisis are violence, extreme poverty, and lack of economic opportunity in the Northern Triangle—El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.

Drug cartels, human traffickers, and human smugglers are making this crisis worse and putting innocent lives at risk. They profit while people in Central America suffer and entire nations are destabilized.

Our intelligence community is not maximizing the use of our intelligence to deny and disrupt these operations.

In June, we all know that 104,000 people were detained at our border. Almost every one of them had a phone number of a smuggler, a license plate of a bus that brought them here, or a pickup location in their home country.

Understanding and disabling these smuggling and trafficking networks should be a national intelligence priority. This amendment would require the Director of National Intelligence to conduct a review of intelligence collection priorities in the Northern Triangle and Mexico and then provide quarterly briefings to Congress regarding the intelligence community activities in this region.

These individuals and organizations threaten the security of the United States and the Western Hemisphere, and we should be using intelligence to stop them.

I urge my colleagues to support this amendment, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Ms. SPANBERGER. Mr. Chair, I rise in opposition to the amendment, although I am not opposed.

The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentlewoman from Virginia is recognized for 5 minutes.

There was no objection.

Ms. SPANBERGER. Mr. Chair, I am proud to introduce this amendment alongside my colleague, Congressman HURD from Texas, who is also a former CIA case officer.

Our bipartisan amendment, the Trafficking and Smuggling Intelligence Act, comes at a time of great hardship, violence, and heartbreak across Mexico and the Northern Triangle countries and at a time of crisis at our southern border.

The volatility in our backyard should be cause for serious concern. Here in the United States, we have experienced the devastating effects of the drug trade on the health of our citizens. On our southwest border, we have witnessed how ongoing violence and instability in Central America is a driving factor for increased migration toward the United States.

Our bipartisan amendment would require intelligence assessments of drug trafficking organizations, human trafficking organizations, and human smugglers across Mexico and the Northern Triangle.

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These would include reports that could be released publicly to the American people.

Our amendment would direct our public servants to use their expertise to better understand the root causes of violence, instability, and migration. With these improved assessments from DNI, we would be able to strengthen our national security in the face of threats from traffickers, smugglers, and other criminal organizations.

Like so many of our colleagues, Congressman HURD and I recognize that if we are to keep Americans safe while also responsibly addressing the situation at the border, we must address the conditions at the core of the instability we are seeing in Central America.

Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to join us in supporting this amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. HURD of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I am looking forward to working on more pieces of legislation with my friend from the Commonwealth of Virginia, and I want to thank both of the gentlemen from California and their teams for helping us perfect this to get this important piece of legislation onto the floor.

Again, Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support this amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. HURD).

The amendment was agreed to.

AMENDMENT NO. 5 OFFERED BY MR. THOMPSON OF MISSISSIPPI

The Acting CHAIR (Ms. SPANBERGER). It is now in order to consider amendment No. 5 printed in part B of House Report 116–154.

Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.

The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

Page 62, after line 4 insert the following:

(6) Applicable Federal requirements and compliance by the Federal Government with privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties policies and protections with respect to the production of the report, including protections against the public release of names or other personally identifiable information of individuals involved in incidents, investigations, indictments, prosecutions, or convictions for which data is reported under this section.

Page 62, after line 16 insert the following (and redesignate the succeeding clauses):

(i) the date and location of such incident;

Page 65, line 18, strike “and” at the end.

Page 66, line 9, strike the period at the end and insert “; and”.

Page 66, after line 9 insert the following:

(ix) with respect to the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of

Homeland Security, the number of staff (expressed in terms of full-time equivalents and positions) working on matters relating to domestic terrorism described in clauses (i) through (vi).

Page 69, after line 7 insert the following:

(h) INFORMATION QUALITY.—Each report submitted under subsection (a), to the extent applicable, shall comply with the guidelines issued by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget pursuant to section 515 of title V of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2001 (Public Law 106–554; 114 Stat. 2763A–154).

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman from Mississippi (Mr. THOMPSON) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Mississippi.

Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Madam Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Madam Chair, I rise to offer an amendment to title VI of H.R. 3494 titled Federal Efforts Against Domestic Terrorism. I am pleased to see that this title was significantly informed by my bill, H.R. 3106, the Domestic Terrorism DATA Act which the Homeland Security Committee will be considering tomorrow.

I am glad to have the opportunity to work with Chairman SCHIFF and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on this text.

My legislation, which requires the government to produce an annual domestic terrorism report, was the product of more than 5 months of engagement with outside stakeholders and experts. As a result of that consultation process, I included protections for civil rights, civil liberties, privacy, and data quality in my bill. These provisions made my bill stronger. My amendment to H.R. 3494 would require that these very protections are included.

Madam Chair, my amendment also requires additional information be included in the government’s domestic terrorism report. Requiring the date and location of each incident of terrorism or investigation of terrorism will help Congress and the public better understand the landscape of domestic terrorism.

Madam Chair, I urge my colleagues to support my amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, I was going to request the chairman yield me 1 minute of time.

Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Madam Chair, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California (Mr. SCHIFF).

The Acting CHAIR (Mrs. DINGELL). Does the gentleman seek unanimous consent to reclaim his time?

Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Yes.

The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from Mississippi is recognized for the balance of his time.

There was no objection.

Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Madam Chair, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from California (Mr. SCHIFF).

Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, this amendment clarifies section 602 of the bill dealing with domestic terrorism. This section would require the FBI, DHS, and the National Counterterrorism Center to produce an annual report and joint strategic intelligence assessment on domestic terrorism.

Chairman THOMPSON's amendment would add safeguards to protect the civil liberties and privacy of individuals whose information would be contained in the report and mandate compliance with the Data Quality Act.

It also would require DHS to disclose information on the allocation of personnel working domestic terrorism matters, enhancing oversight in this area.

I would like to recognize Chairman THOMPSON for his work that the House Homeland Security Committee has done on the issue of domestic terrorism. Together we will continue our lines of effort to address this significant threat.

Once again, Madam Chair, I thank my colleague for his work, and I urge support for the amendment.

Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Madam Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.

The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Mississippi (Mr. THOMPSON).

The amendment was agreed to.

AMENDMENT NO. 6 OFFERED BY MR. RUPPERSBERGER

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 6 printed in part B of House Report 116-154.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.

The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

At the end of title VII, add the following new section:

SEC. 7 ____ . SECURING ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE.

(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the congressional intelligence committees;

(B) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate; and

(C) the Committee on Homeland Security and the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives.

(2) COVERED ENTITY.—The term “covered entity” means an entity identified pursuant to section 9(a) of Executive Order 13636 of February 12, 2013 (78 Fed. Reg. 11742), relating to identification of critical infrastructure where a cybersecurity incident could reasonably result in catastrophic regional or national effects on public health or safety, economic security, or national security.

(3) EXPLOIT.—The term “exploit” means a software tool designed to take advantage of a security vulnerability.

(4) INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEM.—The term “industrial control system” means an operational technology used to measure, control,

or manage industrial functions, and includes supervisory control and data acquisition systems, distributed control systems, and programmable logic or embedded controllers.

(5) NATIONAL LABORATORY.—The term “National Laboratory” has the meaning given the term in section 2 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (42 U.S.C. 15801).

(6) PROGRAM.—The term “Program” means the pilot program established under subsection (b).

(7) SECRETARY.—Except as otherwise specifically provided, the term “Secretary” means the Secretary of Energy.

(8) SECURITY VULNERABILITY.—The term “security vulnerability” means any attribute of hardware, software, process, or procedure that could enable or facilitate the defeat of a security control.

(b) PILOT PROGRAM FOR SECURING ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall establish a 2-year control systems implementation pilot program within the National Laboratories for the purposes of—

(1) partnering with covered entities in the energy sector (including critical component manufacturers in the supply chain) that voluntarily participate in the Program to identify new classes of security vulnerabilities of the covered entities; and

(2) evaluating technology and standards, in partnership with covered entities, to isolate and defend industrial control systems of covered entities from security vulnerabilities and exploits in the most critical systems of the covered entities, including—

(A) analog and nondigital control systems;

(B) purpose-built control systems; and

(C) physical controls.

(c) WORKING GROUP TO EVALUATE PROGRAM STANDARDS AND DEVELOP STRATEGY.—

(1) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary shall establish a working group—

(A) to evaluate the technology and standards used in the Program under subsection (b)(2); and

(B) to develop a national cyber-informed engineering strategy to isolate and defend covered entities from security vulnerabilities and exploits in the most critical systems of the covered entities.

(2) MEMBERSHIP.—The working group established under paragraph (1) shall be composed of not fewer than 10 members, to be appointed by the Secretary, at least 1 member of which shall represent each of the following:

(A) The Department of Energy.

(B) The energy industry, including electric utilities and manufacturers recommended by the Energy Sector coordinating councils.

(C)(i) The Department of Homeland Security; or

(ii) the Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team.

(D) The North American Electric Reliability Corporation.

(E) The Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

(F)(i) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence; or

(ii) the intelligence community (as defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)).

(G)(i) The Department of Defense; or

(ii) the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security and America's Security Affairs.

(H) A State or regional energy agency.

(I) A national research body or academic institution.

(J) The National Laboratories.

(k) REPORTS ON THE PROGRAM.—

(1) INTERIM REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date on which funds are first disbursed under the Program, the Secretary

shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an interim report that—

(A) describes the results of the Program;

(B) includes an analysis of the feasibility of each method studied under the Program; and

(C) describes the results of the evaluations conducted by the working group established under subsection (c)(1).

(2) FINAL REPORT.—Not later than 2 years after the date on which funds are first disbursed under the Program, the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a final report that—

(A) describes the results of the Program;

(B) includes an analysis of the feasibility of each method studied under the Program; and

(C) describes the results of the evaluations conducted by the working group established under subsection (c)(1).

(e) EXEMPTION FROM DISCLOSURE.—Information shared by or with the Federal Government or a State, Tribal, or local government under this section—

(1) shall be deemed to be voluntarily shared information;

(2) shall be exempt from disclosure under section 552 of title 5, United States Code, or any provision of any State, Tribal, or local freedom of information law, open government law, open meetings law, open records law, sunshine law, or similar law requiring the disclosure of information or records; and

(3) shall be withheld from the public, without discretion, under section 552(b)(3) of title 5, United States Code, and any provision of any State, Tribal, or local law requiring the disclosure of information or records.

(f) PROTECTION FROM LIABILITY.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—A cause of action against a covered entity for engaging in the voluntary activities authorized under subsection (b)—

(A) shall not lie or be maintained in any court; and

(B) shall be promptly dismissed by the applicable court.

(2) VOLUNTARY ACTIVITIES.—Nothing in this section subjects any covered entity to liability for not engaging in the voluntary activities authorized under subsection (b).

(g) NO NEW REGULATORY AUTHORITY FOR FEDERAL AGENCIES.—Nothing in this section authorizes the Secretary or the head of any other department or agency of the Federal Government to issue new regulations.

(h) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—

(1) PILOT PROGRAM.—There is authorized to be appropriated \$10,000,000 to carry out subsection (b).

(2) WORKING GROUP AND REPORT.—There is authorized to be appropriated \$1,500,000 to carry out subsections (c) and (d).

(3) AVAILABILITY.—Amounts made available under paragraphs (1) and (2) shall remain available until expended.

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. RUPPERSBERGER) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Maryland.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Madam Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Madam Chair, I rise today in strong support of my amendment to protect the energy grid from cybersecurity threats.

In the 4 years since the Ukraine power grid attack, our enemies have doubled down on their effort to target cybersecurity vulnerabilities in our

Nation's energy infrastructure, especially within industrial control systems. The 2015 Ukraine grid intrusion orchestrated by the Russians was a turning point in industrial cybersecurity. For the first time, hackers penetrated industrial controls of a power plant with the goal of causing widespread disruption.

Both the security and economic consequences of a destructive attack on our energy grid cannot be overstated. We can no longer wait to address these threats. My amendment will ensure we continue to develop the ability to both discover vulnerabilities and keep an eye on emerging threats that could disrupt electricity generation or even cost lives.

I want to thank our government partners, including the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, CISA, the intelligence community, the Department of Energy, and national labs. I look forward to working with all these stakeholders to ensure that we are implementing grid security measures in a responsible way consistent with existing law and authorities. As a member of the Homeland Security Subcommittee on Appropriations, I fully intend to help leverage the authorization in this amendment to supplement the already great effort underway at CISA and other government agencies.

Also I want to thank the many talented computer scientists, cybersecurity experts, and engineers from the private sector, especially the team at Dragos, a cybersecurity firm focused on industrial controls, located in my district in Hanover, Maryland, for all the hard work they do in this space to not only defend against threats but to educate others.

Our amendment is simple and mirrors language already passed by the overwhelming bipartisan majority in the Senate's Intelligence Authorization Act. Senator KING from Maine has been a stalwart force on this issue, and none of this would have happened without his determination and vision on this issue.

The amendment sets up a 2-year pilot program to identify the classes of security vulnerabilities in the grid. It establishes a working group to evaluate the technology solutions proposed by the pilot program. The working group would include government agencies, the energy industry, and other experts.

Lastly, it requires the Department of Energy to submit a report to the relevant congressional committees describing the results of the program.

Finally, I want to thank Judge Carter from Texas who has led the charge on this issue with me in the House since last Congress. Judge Carter is a good friend, and I appreciate his help on this important issue.

Madam Chair, this amendment will help the intelligence community and the government at large better understand the vulnerabilities to certain aspects of our energy grid.

Madam Chair, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from

California (Mr. SCHIFF), who is the distinguished chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I rise in strong support of the amendment offered by my colleagues from Maryland and Texas which mirrors language passed in the Senate's intelligence authorization bill last month. This provision would bring together government entities and the energy sector in a pilot program for purposes of evaluating and strengthening industrial control systems and related critical infrastructure elements against security vulnerabilities and exploits.

The cyber threats faced by our critical infrastructure remain a persistent national security concern, as the former ranking member of our committee, the distinguished Mr. RUPPERSBERGER, knows all too well. DNI Coats likewise warned in the most recent unclassified Worldwide Threat Assessment about the capabilities of our adversaries to hold U.S. critical infrastructure at risk.

This measure is another line of effort toward securing that infrastructure against outside cyberattacks and disruptions, and I am very proud to support the work of my colleague and friend.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Madam Chair, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. CARTER).

Mr. CARTER of Texas. Madam Chair, I thank my friend for yielding.

Madam Chair, today I rise in strong support of the Ruppertsberger-Carter amendment to help secure the energy infrastructure. Now is the time to address electrical grid security. Grid attacks are a powerful weapon in the cyber toolkit of really bad actors.

As the two previous speakers said, a cyberattack in Ukraine wiped out their power grid, and over 225,000 people were without power. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence in their 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment makes numerous mentions of our adversaries' mapping out grid systems, identifying our weaknesses, and developing the very real and deadly capacity to attack our grid system. A targeted attack on our Nation could be devastating.

Securing our energy infrastructure is especially critical in Texas which maintains an independent electric grid.

The Acting CHAIR. The time of the gentleman from Maryland has expired.

Mr. CARTER of Texas. Madam Chair, I claim the time in opposition to the amendment, although I do not oppose the amendment.

The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from Texas is recognized for 5 minutes.

There was no objection.

Mr. CARTER of Texas. Madam Chair, the Electric Reliability Council of Texas is located in Taylor, Texas, which is about 19 miles from my house, and it manages 90 percent of my home

State's electrical load. Understanding where our system's weak spots are will enhance ERCOT's work to ensure that we have the most stable and secure energy network in the world.

Our amendment addresses the serious topic of electrical grid security by leveraging the unique aspects of national laboratories to establish solutions to defend the United States energy grid from attacks and to ensure the resiliency of operation during and after an event.

It establishes a 2-year pilot program to study and identify new classes of security vulnerabilities, and research and test technologies that could be used to isolate the most critical systems from cyberattacks.

It creates working groups to develop a national cyber-informed strategy to protect our energy grids.

This amendment is a commonsense approach to solving grid security. I am proud to work across the aisle with my good friend and colleague, DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, on this important issue.

Madam Chair, I urge support of this amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. RUPPERSBERGER).

The amendment was agreed to.

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AMENDMENT NO. 7 OFFERED BY MR. CHABOT

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 7 printed in part B of House Report 116-154.

Mr. CHABOT. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.

The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

Page 35, strike line 4 through page 42, line 5.

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. CHABOT) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. CHABOT. Madam Chair, I rise this evening to offer a commonsense amendment to H.R. 3494.

My amendment simply strikes Section 401, which creates the Climate Security Advisory Council. And I thank the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. DUNCAN) for his leadership, and also cosponsoring this particular amendment.

This council is not the most responsible use of the valuable manpower and funding of the intelligence community, especially since the Director of National Intelligence did not even request that we create such an organization. The Federal Government already has vast resources devoted to the climate issue.

Any climate security intelligence work should be in the context of larger intelligence matters affecting major regions around the world and the U.S. national security infrastructure.

Additionally, many of the existing intelligence organizations already do much of this work on their own, including the CIA. Section 401 would just create unneeded redundancy across the intelligence community.

If the goal is to ensure that we allocate our resources efficiently, we should instead require a report to Congress from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence outlining the necessity for the Climate Security Council before Congress establishes the organization or appropriates any funding.

Madam Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.

The Acting CHAIR. For what purpose does the gentleman—

Mr. DUNCAN. Madam Chair, I rise in favor of the Chabot amendment.

Our country faces serious threats around the globe. We have cyber threats coming from China, Russia, and Iran, and others. Iran is also pursuing nuclear weapons that threaten our friends and our ally, Israel, and indeed the rest of the world.

While ISIS is defeated and on the run, radical Islamic terrorism remains one of our Nation's greatest threats, thanks in part to Iran's actions as a leading state sponsor of terrorism.

It is, therefore, extremely irresponsible to take our attention and resources off of these known and proven threats to American national security and divert those funds and attention to climate change.

The intelligence community, which is tasked with protecting Americans from fiscal and cyberattacks, should not bear the burden of silly, politically correct, left-wing social policy. But just as Democrats politicized military policy with the NDAA, here they go again with the intelligence policy.

That is a mistake, it is irresponsible, and that is why I support this amendment to strip out this silly idea and refocus the intelligence community on the actual threats to our national security.

Madam Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. CHABOT. Madam Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.

The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Ohio has the only time remaining.

Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, I rise in opposition to the amendment and claim time in opposition, therefore.

The Acting CHAIR. The time in opposition has already been claimed.

Would the gentleman from Ohio yield to your colleague from—

Mr. CHABOT. Madam Chair, may I inquire as to how much time I have remaining?

The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Ohio has 2½ minutes remaining.

Mr. CHABOT. Madam Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Madam Chair, I want to quote a great American President, Ronald Reagan.

PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY

Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, may I make a parliamentary inquiry?

The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from California will state his parliamentary inquiry.

Mr. SCHIFF. Did the Chair offer time in opposition to the amendment?

The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from South Carolina claimed the time.

The Chair looked to see who was seeking recognition, and went to the gentleman who was standing.

Mr. HECK. Madam Chair, I was standing when he was recognized. The gentleman from Ohio did not yield to him. And when he asked to claim time in opposition, he did not say "although I am not opposed." And you did not, therefore, ask if there was no objection.

He was not legitimately recognized.

Mr. CHABOT. Madam Chair, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman be granted 5 minutes in opposition, but I have a little time left.

Madam Chair, I have no objection to the gentleman offering his opposition to this.

The Acting CHAIR. That unanimous consent request cannot be entertained in the Committee of the Whole.

Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, I am sorry. I couldn't hear the ruling of the Chair.

The gentleman asked for unanimous consent.

The Acting CHAIR. The Parliamentarian advised that the request cannot be entertained in the Committee of the Whole.

Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, well, if my colleagues in the minority—I don't know how much time they have both on the amendment and on the time in opposition to the amendment—but if they can yield to my colleague to make sure that he has time for his remarks out of both of their time, I think we can resolve this.

Mr. CHABOT. There is 2½ minutes left. Is that correct?

The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Ohio has 2½ minutes remaining.

Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, the gentleman offering the amendment has how much time? Because they claimed both the time on the amendment—

The Acting CHAIR. The proponent of the amendment has 2½ minutes remaining.

Mr. SCHIFF. So no one claimed the time in opposition?

The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from South Carolina claimed the time and yielded back.

Mr. SCHIFF. Okay. So there should be 5 minutes.

Mr. HECK. He asked for time in opposition but did not state that he was not opposed.

You did not ask if, therefore, there was no objection. He was not legitimately recognized.

The offerer of the amendment did not yield to him. The gentleman from South Carolina claimed time in opposition but did not say "although I am not opposed." He supported the amendment. And you did not ask if there was no objection.

The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman will suspend.

The gentleman claimed the time, and then he yielded back his time.

Mr. HECK. Madam Chair, you didn't ask if there was no objection, which is the customary practice.

The Acting CHAIR. All time claimed by the gentleman from South Carolina has been yielded back.

Mr. CHABOT. Madam Chair, I still have 2½ minutes, is that correct, because I reserved my time?

The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Ohio has the only time remaining.

Mr. CHABOT. Madam Chair, I would like to make a unanimous consent request that there be an opposition that gets 5 minutes and that I can close with my 2½ minutes.

We are trying to be fair here, and we are happy to give our colleagues on the other side of the aisle 5 minutes to offer their opposition.

The Acting CHAIR. The Parliamentarian advises that the request cannot be entertained in the Committee of the Whole.

Mr. CHABOT. Madam Chair, I yield 1½ minutes to the gentleman from Washington (Mr. HECK). I will just take 1 minute to wrap up.

The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman is recognized.

Mr. CHABOT. Madam Chair, I have 2½ minutes. Is that right?

The Acting CHAIR. Yes. The gentleman is recognized.

Mr. CHABOT. Madam Chair, I yield 1½ minutes to the gentleman from Washington (Mr. HECK).

The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman yields 1½ minutes to the gentleman from Washington?

Mr. CHABOT. Madam Chair, 2 minutes in opposition.

Mr. SCHIFF. If I could, Madam Chair, through the Chair to my colleague, I appreciate that. We will take you up on that. And on the next amendment that we have time, I will yield to my colleague, and your colleague may yield to you, if you have further comments you want to make on this issue.

Mr. CHABOT. Madam Chair, I have 2½ minutes. I yield 1½ minutes to the gentleman from Washington (Mr. HECK). So I have 1 minute left.

Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, I thank the gentleman through the Chair.

The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Washington is recognized for 1½ minutes.

Mr. HECK. Madam Chair, I thank very much the graciousness of the gentleman from Ohio, although I think his amendment is wrongheaded.

Here is what is real:

Climate change is real, number one.

Number two, it has significant national security implications.

Number three, the only smart thing to do is to borrow the old motto from the Boy Scouts, "Be prepared." Passage of this amendment, which would remove the Climate Security Advisory Council, renders us less prepared.

We all know that the intelligence community and the DOD have, time and again, assessed the measurable effects of climate change—rising sea levels, higher temperatures, more frequent extreme weather events, new stressors on natural resources and agriculture—have tangible impacts that exacerbate economic distress, human insecurity, political instability, and other humanitarian conditions detrimental to our national security.

The smart thing to do is to be prepared, to have the advisory council that can work across the intelligence community, that can collect the information, coordinate the information, so that we know what is coming, we know what we are being presented with, and we can confront it in a smart way.

Madam Chair, I urge my colleagues to please defeat this amendment and pass the underlying bill.

Mr. CHABOT. Madam Chair, I think I have 1 minute left.

I thought perhaps the gentleman wanted to support my amendment, but he called it wrongheaded. I am just shocked.

Madam Chair, in closing, this council is a redundant, unnecessary use of manpower funding. We need our intelligence community focused on the most critical threats facing our Nation, specifically, counterterrorism, Iran, China, Russia, North Korea.

If this council is something that the Director of National Intelligence believes is critical to our country, he should come to Congress and make such a request, and to my knowledge, that has not occurred. Madam Chair, until he does, I urge my colleagues to support this amendment and remove this provision from the bill.

I yield back the balance of my time.

The Acting CHAIR. All time for debate has expired.

The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. CHABOT).

The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the noes appeared to have it.

Mr. CHABOT. Madam Chair, I demand a recorded vote.

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Ohio will be postponed.

AMENDMENT NO. 8 OFFERED BY MR. SCHIFF

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 8 printed in part B of House Report 116–154.

Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, I rise to offer this amendment as the designee of Representative GREEN of Texas and Representative CONNOLLY.

The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

At the end of title VII, add the following new section:

SEC. 7. COLLECTION, ANALYSIS, AND DISSEMINATION OF WORKFORCE DATA.

(a) INITIAL REPORTING.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and subject to paragraph (3), the Director of National Intelligence shall make available to the public, the appropriate congressional committees, and the workforce of the intelligence community a report which includes aggregate demographic data and other information regarding the diversity and inclusion efforts of the workforce of the intelligence community.

(2) CONTENTS.—A report made available under paragraph (1)—

(A) shall include unclassified reports and barrier analyses relating to diversity and inclusion efforts;

(B) shall include aggregate demographic data—

(i) by segment of the workforce of the intelligence community and grade or rank;

(ii) relating to attrition and promotion rates;

(iii) that addresses the compliance of the intelligence community with validated inclusion metrics, such as the New Inclusion Quotient index score; and

(iv) that provides demographic comparisons to the relevant nongovernmental labor force and the relevant civilian labor force;

(C) shall include an analysis of applicant flow data, including the percentage and level of positions for which data are collected, and a discussion of any resulting policy changes or recommendations;

(D) shall include demographic data relating to participants in professional development programs of the intelligence community and the rate of placement into senior positions for participants in such programs;

(E) shall include any voluntarily collected demographic data relating to the membership of any external advisory committee or board to which individuals in senior positions in the intelligence community appoint members; and

(F) may include data in proportions or percentages to account for concerns relating to the protection of classified information.

(b) UPDATES.—After making available a report under subsection (a), the Director of National Intelligence shall annually provide a report (which may be provided as part of an annual report required under another provision of law) to the workforce of the intelligence community (including senior leadership), the public, and the appropriate congressional committees that includes—

(1) demographic data and information on the status of diversity and inclusion efforts of the intelligence community;

(2) an analysis of applicant flow data, including the percentage and level of positions for which data are collected, and a discussion of any resulting policy changes or recommendations; and

(3) demographic data relating to participants in professional development programs of the intelligence community and the rate of placement into senior positions for participants in such programs.

(c) EXPAND THE COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS OF VOLUNTARY APPLICANT FLOW DATA.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Director of National Intelligence shall develop a system to collect and analyze applicant flow data for as many positions within the intelligence community as practicable, in order to identify areas for improvement in attracting diverse talent, with particular attention to senior and management positions.

(2) PHASED IMPLEMENTATION.—The collection of applicant flow data may be implemented by the Director of National Intelligence in a phased approach commensurate with the resources available to the intelligence community.

(d) IDENTIFY ADDITIONAL CATEGORIES FOR VOLUNTARY DATA COLLECTION OF CURRENT EMPLOYEES.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Director of National Intelligence may submit to the Office of Management and Budget and to the appropriate congressional committees a recommendation regarding whether the intelligence community should voluntarily collect more detailed data on demographic categories in addition to the race and ethnicity categories specified in the statistical policy directive issued by the Office of Management and Budget entitled “Standards for Maintaining, Collecting, and Presenting Federal Data on Race and Ethnicity”.

(2) PROCESS.—In making a recommendation under paragraph (1), the Director of National Intelligence shall—

(A) engage in close consultation with internal stakeholders, such as employee resource or affinity groups;

(B) ensure that there is clear communication with the workforce of the intelligence community—

(i) to explain the purpose of the potential collection of such data; and

(ii) regarding legal protections relating to any anticipated use of such data; and

(C) ensure adherence to relevant standards and guidance issued by the Federal Government.

(e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) APPLICANT FLOW DATA.—The term “applicant flow data” means data that tracks the rate of applications for job positions among demographic categories.

(2) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Homeland Security, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(3) DIVERSITY.—The term “diversity” means diversity of persons based on gender, race, ethnicity, disability status, veteran status, sexual orientation, gender identity, national origin, and other demographic categories.

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman from California (Mr. SCHIFF) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.

Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, I am happy to support the amendment offered by Representative GREEN and Representative CONNOLLY, which would require the Director of National Intelligence to make publicly available its annual report that aggregates demographic data and other information regarding the diversity and inclusion efforts within the intelligence community.

The amendment would expand the elements that the DNI must report on to include grade-level attrition and promotion rates, as well as validated metrics, such as New Inclusion Quotient Index scores.

The IQ initiative is designed to help employees and managers foster diversity and inclusion in the workplace.

This amendment is important as we strive to significantly improve hiring and retention in the IC such that the workforce mirrors the American population. It is imperative that we have better visibility into the demographics of our current workforce to legislate well-informed change.

Again, I thank my colleagues for their work, and I am happy to support the amendment and urge my colleagues to do the same.

Madam Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.

The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. SCHIFF).

The amendment was agreed to.

AMENDMENT NO. 9 OFFERED BY MR. CASE

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 9 printed in part B of House Report 116–154.

Mr. CASE. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.

The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

At the end of title VII, add the following new section:

SEC. 708. REPORT ON BEST PRACTICES TO PROTECT PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OF CHINESE AMERICANS.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the People's Republic of China appears to be specifically targeting the Chinese-American community for intelligence purposes;

(2) such targeting carries a substantial risk that the loyalty of such Americans may be generally questioned and lead to unacceptable stereotyping, targeting and racial profiling;

(3) the United States Government has a duty to warn and protect all Americans including those of Chinese descent from these intelligence efforts by the People's Republic of China;

(4) the broad stereotyping, targeting and racial profiling of Americans of Chinese descent is contrary to the values of the United States and reinforces the flawed narrative perpetuated by the People's Republic of China that ethnically Chinese individuals worldwide have a duty to support the People's Republic of China; and

(5) the United States efforts to combat the People's Republic of China's intelligence activities should actively safeguard and promote the constitutional rights of all Chinese Americans.

(b) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, acting through the Office of Civil Liberties, Privacy, and Transparency, in coordination with the civil liberties and privacy officers of the elements of the intelligence community, shall submit a report to the congressional intelligence committees containing—

(1) a review of how the policies, procedures, and practices of the intelligence community that govern the intelligence activities and operations targeting the People's Republic of China affect policies, procedures, and practices relating to the privacy and civil liberties of Americans of Chinese descent who may be targets of espionage and influence operations by China; and

(2) recommendations to ensure that the privacy and civil liberties of Americans of Chinese descent are sufficiently protected.

(c) FORM.—The report under subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman from Hawaii (Mr. CASE) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Hawaii.

Mr. CASE. Madam Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Madam Chair, not far from here, on the slopes of Capitol Hill, is a small, serene, and unassuming memorial. On its walls are names not now known to too many Americans but indelibly etched in a dark chapter of our national story.

Tule Lake, Poston, Manzanar—these are the internment camps where 120,000 ethnic Japanese, most of them American citizens, were locked up in the hysteria of the Second World War just because they were Japanese.

This amendment, proudly sponsored by many of my colleagues in our Congressional Asian Pacific American Caucus, including our chair, the gentleman from California (Ms. JUDY CHU), asked us a question that must be asked: Are we repeating history or in danger of doing so?

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In these recent years of justifiably heightened scrutiny on the intelligence activities of the People's Republic of China, a disproportionate number of Americans of Chinese descent have been investigated and prosecuted for espionage.

Those convicted have received disproportionately high sentences, and the too many exonerated have had their careers ruined nonetheless.

No doubt, China seeks to recruit Chinese Americans to its goals, and no doubt, our government should and must review specific cases of potential espionage by China on specific facts. But have we fallen into the same trap all over again of justifying investigations and other actions toward the ends of national security by means of general profiling and targeting based solely on ethnic identity?

The Committee of 100, a group of prominent Chinese Americans in diverse fields, reviewed the empirical evidence and concluded that “Asian Americans, whether immigrant or native-born, may be facing unfair and increasing racial prejudice in this era of geopolitical competition.”

It stated, and I believe correctly: “A definite line can be drawn between appropriate prosecution that is based on actual evidence and free of bias and overreaching persecution that is triggered by unfounded suspicions and tainted by racial prejudice. All Americans, regardless of ethnicity, depend on that line.”

This resolution is a flashing red light to our intelligence community: Stop, look, and listen. Take some time to think it through to be sure you are staying on the right side of that line, and then report back to us here in Congress that you have done so and have the procedures and mindset in place to

ensure that we won't repeat history with Chinese Americans or any other broad ethnic or interest group.

Madam Chair, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. SCHIFF), the committee chair.

Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I strongly support the amendment. This amendment expresses the sense of Congress that racial profiling of Americans of Chinese descent is contrary to the values of the United States and reinforces flawed narratives perpetuated by the People's Republic of China that ethnically Chinese individuals worldwide have a duty to support the People's Republic of China.

Moreover, the amendment reaffirms that the United States Government has a duty to warn and protect all Americans, including those of Chinese descent, from intelligence operations executed by the People's Republic of China.

Finally, the amendment requires the ODNI Office of Civil Liberties, Privacy, and Transparency, in coordination with civil liberties and privacy officers throughout the intelligence community, to submit a report to the congressional intelligence committees. This report would review how the intelligence community policies that govern counterintelligence operations against China impact the civil liberties of Americans of Chinese descent who are the targets of Chinese espionage and provide recommendations to preserve these liberties and privacy interests.

Mr. CASE's important amendment reaffirms that Americans of all backgrounds deserve equal protection under the law and reminds our intelligence community of its duty to protect the privacy and civil liberties of all persons.

Madam Chair, again, I thank my colleague for his work, and I strongly support the amendment.

Mr. CASE. Madam Chair, I strongly urge adoption of this amendment. It is the right amendment. We certainly want our intelligence community to do its job, but we also want them to be very conscious of the decisions that they are making and are in line with our basic civil liberties.

Madam Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.

The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Hawaii (Mr. CASE).

The amendment was agreed to.

AMENDMENT NO. 10 OFFERED BY MS. FRANKEL

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 10 printed in part B of House Report 116–154.

Ms. FRANKEL. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.

The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

At the end of title VII, add the follow new section:

SEC. 708. INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WOMEN AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the head of any element of the intelligence community the Director determines appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an intelligence assessment on the relationship between women and violent extremism and terrorism throughout the world, including an assessment of—

(1) the historical trends and current state of women's varied roles worldwide in all aspects of violent extremism and terrorism, including as recruiters, sympathizers, perpetrators, and combatants, as well as peace-builders and preventers;

(2) how women's roles in all aspects of violent extremism and terrorism are likely to change in the near- and medium-term;

(3) the extent to which the unequal status of women affects the ability of armed combatants and terrorist groups to enlist or conscript women as combatants and perpetrators of violence;

(4) how terrorist groups violate the rights of women and girls, including child, early, and forced marriage, abduction, sexual violence, and human trafficking, and the extent to which such violations contribute to the spread of conflict and terrorist activities; and

(5) opportunities to address the security risk posed by female extremists and leverage the roles of women in counterterrorism efforts.

(b) FORM.—The assessment required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this section, the term "appropriate congressional committees" means—

(1) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Armed Services, of the Senate; and

(2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Armed Services, of the House of Representatives.

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. FRANKEL) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Florida.

Ms. FRANKEL. Madam Chair, this amendment takes an important step toward fighting terrorism. It would require the Director of National Intelligence to submit an intelligence assessment on the relationship between women and violent extremism and terrorism.

Madam Chair, to prevent ISIS 2.0 and to improve U.S. counterterrorism and peace-building efforts, we need to pay more attention to the roles that women play in violent extremism, including as victims, as perpetrators, and as preventers.

First, as victims, women are often the first targets of terrorism. We have seen it with the abduction and rape of thousands of women and girls by ISIS, the kidnapping of hundreds of girls by Boko Haram in Nigeria, and the attack

of girls just trying to go to school by the Taliban.

Secondly, Madam Chair, women are not only the victims of terrorism. Some are perpetrators. Recent research shows that women are turning to terrorist organizations because of false promises of protection, escape from abuse at home, and even, believe it or not, for leadership opportunities. As a result, women-led attacks are rising. In fact, now, 20 to 30 percent of foreign terrorist fighters are women. In sub-Saharan Africa alone, three out of four child suicide bombers are girls.

Madam Chair, women are not only victims and perpetrators of terrorism. They are also preventers, as mothers, wives, and daughters. They influence their spouses and children. They are on the front line of detecting early signs of radicalization in their families and communities.

Madam Chair, because of gender inequality, their warnings are often ignored.

Let me give you an example. Afghan women saw young men being recruited at a wedding, and they shared their concerns with law enforcement. They were dismissed. Later, those same recruits went on to kill 32 people in a bus attack.

I conclude, Madam Chair, by saying that understanding women's unique roles in terrorism is important to creating more peaceful communities around the world, which results in more security for the United States of America.

Madam Chair, I urge all of my colleagues to support this very important amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. FRANKEL). The amendment was agreed to.

AMENDMENT NO. 11 OFFERED BY MR. KENNEDY

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 11 printed in part B of House Report 116-154.

Mr. KENNEDY. Madam Chair, I wish to speak on behalf of the amendment.

The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

At the end of title IV add the following new section:

SEC. 403. FOREIGN THREAT RESPONSE CENTER.

(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3001 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 119B the following new section:

"SEC. 119C. FOREIGN THREAT RESPONSE CENTER.

"(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence a Foreign Threat Response Center (in this section referred to as the 'Center').

"(b) MISSION.—The primary missions of the Center shall be as follows:

"(1) To serve as the primary organization in the United States Government for analyzing and integrating all intelligence possessed or acquired by the United States Government pertaining to foreign threats.

"(2) To synchronize the efforts of the intelligence community with respect to coun-

tering foreign efforts to undermine the national security, political sovereignty, and economic activity of the United States and the allies of the United States, including by—

"(A) ensuring that each such element is aware of and coordinating on such efforts; and

"(B) overseeing the development and implementation of comprehensive and integrated policy responses to such efforts.

"(3) In coordination with the relevant elements of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the intelligence community, and other departments and agencies of the United States—

"(A) to develop policy recommendations for the President to detect, deter, and respond to foreign threats, including with respect to covert activities pursuant to section 503; and

"(B) to monitor and assess foreign efforts to carry out such threats.

"(4) In coordination with the head of the Global Engagement Center established by section 1287 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114-328), to examine current and emerging foreign efforts to use propaganda and information operations relating to the threats described in paragraph (1).

"(5) To identify and close gaps across the departments and agencies of the Federal Government with respect to expertise, readiness, and planning to address foreign threats.

"(c) DIRECTOR.—

"(1) APPOINTMENT.—There is a Director of the Center, who shall be the head of the Center, and who shall be appointed by the Director of National Intelligence, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State. The Director may not simultaneously serve in any other capacity in the executive branch.

"(2) REPORTING.—The Director of the Center shall directly report to the Director of National Intelligence.

"(3) RESPONSIBILITIES.—The Director of the Center shall—

"(A) ensure that the relevant departments and agencies of the Federal Government participate in the mission of the Center, including by recruiting detailees from such departments and agencies in accordance with subsection (e)(1); and

"(B) have primary responsibility within the United States Government, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, for establishing requirements for the collection of intelligence related to, or regarding, foreign threats, in accordance with applicable provisions of law and Executive orders.

"(d) ANNUAL REPORTS.—

"(1) IN GENERAL.—At the direction of the Director of National Intelligence, but not less than once each year, the Director of the Center shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on foreign threats.

"(2) MATTERS INCLUDED.—Each report under paragraph (1) shall include, with respect to the period covered by the report, a discussion of the following:

"(A) The nature of the foreign threats.

"(B) The ability of the United States Government to address such threats.

"(C) The progress of the Center in achieving its missions.

"(D) Recommendations the Director determines necessary for legislative actions to improve the ability of the Center to achieve its missions.

"(3) FORM.—Each report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

"(e) EMPLOYEES.—

“(1) **DETAILEES.**—Any Federal Government employee may be detailed to the Center on a reimbursable or nonreimbursable basis, and such detail shall be without interruption or loss of civil service status or privilege for a period of not more than 8 years.

“(2) **PERSONAL SERVICE CONTRACTORS.**—The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of State, may hire United States citizens or aliens as personal services contractors for purposes of personnel resources of the Center, if—

“(A) the Director of National Intelligence determines that existing personnel resources are insufficient;

“(B) the period in which services are provided by a personal services contractor, including options, does not exceed 3 years, unless the Director of National Intelligence determines that exceptional circumstances justify an extension of up to 1 additional year;

“(C) not more than 10 United States citizens or aliens are employed as personal services contractors under the authority of this paragraph at any time; and

“(D) the authority of this paragraph is only used to obtain specialized skills or experience or to respond to urgent needs.

“(3) **SECURITY CLEARANCES.**—Each employee detailed to the Center and contractor of the Center shall have the security clearance appropriate for the assigned duties of the employee or contractor.

“(f) **BOARD.**—

“(1) **ESTABLISHMENT.**—There is established a Board of the Foreign Threat Response Center (in this section referred to as the ‘Board’).

“(2) **FUNCTIONS.**—The Board shall conduct oversight of the Center to ensure the Center is achieving the missions of the Center. In conducting such oversight, upon a majority vote of the members of the Board, the Board may recommend to the Director of National Intelligence that the Director of the Center should be removed for failing to achieve such missions.

“(3) **MEMBERSHIP.**—

“(A) **APPOINTMENT.**—The Board shall consist of 7 members. The head of each department or agency of the Federal Government specified in subparagraph (B) shall appoint a senior official from that department or agency, who shall be a member of the Senior Executive Service, as a member.

“(B) **DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES REPRESENTED.**—The department or agency of the Federal Government specified in this subparagraph are the following:

“(i) The Department of State.

“(ii) The Department of Defense.

“(iii) The Department of Justice.

“(iv) The Department of the Treasury.

“(v) The Department of Homeland Security.

“(vi) The Central Intelligence Agency.

“(vii) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.

“(4) **MEETINGS.**—The Board shall meet not less than biannually and shall be convened by the member appointed by the Secretary of State.

“(g) **INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT.**—The Director of the Center may convene biannual conferences to coordinate international efforts against foreign threats.

“(h) **TERMINATION.**—The Center shall terminate on the date that is 8 years after the date of the enactment of this section.

“(i) **DEFINITIONS.**—In this section:

“(1) **APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.**—the term ‘appropriate congressional committees’ means—

“(A) the congressional intelligence committees;

“(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives; and

“(C) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.

“(2) **FOREIGN THREATS.**—The term ‘foreign threats’ means efforts to influence, through overt or covert malign activities, the national security, political sovereignty, or economic activity of the United States or the allies of the United States, made by the government of any of the following foreign countries:

“(A) Russia.

“(B) Iran.

“(C) North Korea.

“(D) China.

“(E) Any other foreign country that the Director determines appropriate for purposes of this section.”

(b) **CLERICAL AMENDMENT.**—The table of contents at the beginning of such Act is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 119B the following new item:

“Sec. 119C. Foreign Threat Response Center.”

(c) **CONFORMING AMENDMENT.**—Section 507(a) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 3106) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

“(6) An annual report submitted under section 119C(d)(1).”

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. KENNEDY) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. KENNEDY. Madam Chair, I begin by thanking the chairman of the committee and his staff for their dedication to getting this amendment here today and for their long and strong defense of our electoral system from foreign interference.

Madam Chair, a few weeks ago, Special Counsel Robert Mueller stood before the American people and issued a stern warning and an ominous challenge. In what he referred to as the central allegation of his 2-year-long investigation, he told us that there were “multiple, systemic efforts to interfere in our election. That allegation deserves the attention of every American.”

Our democracy was attacked, our government undermined, and our election system weakened. We were manipulated.

A foreign adversary exposed many of our worst impulses as they hacked, prodded, forged, stole, lied, and exploited in a coordinated and sustained effort to change the trajectory of this country.

We cannot change what happened in 2016, but we can learn from it because our adversaries certainly did. They watched as politicians were all too eager to use hacked material. They took notes as social media networks were used to inflame racial, geographic, and demographic divisions.

According to the “Worldwide Threat Assessment” by the Director of National Intelligence, Dan Coats, Russia, China, and Iran already have their eyes trained on 2020.

That is why we must proactively create a foreign threat response center tasked with identifying and rejecting

any attempts by any adversary to influence our political process because we cannot hold ourselves up as a beacon of democracy if we are not willing to defend the institutions upon which our democratic system rests.

By removing politics from this response and coordinating it under one roof within the intelligence community, we can rebuild that faith in our system.

In this body, we have no greater responsibility than to protect the sanctity of our elections, to protect the trust of our citizens, and to protect our faith in government. That is what this amendment codifies.

Madam Chair, I encourage all of my colleagues to support this amendment, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. CONAWAY. Madam Chair, I claim the time in opposition to the amendment.

The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Texas is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. CONAWAY. Madam Chair, before I get to my objections to the amendment, I want to congratulate the chairman, the majority members of the committee, as well as the majority staff for the great work they did in helping us bring a fully bipartisan bill to the floor, which I fully intend to support.

They also helped us navigate the intricacies of the Rules Committee so that what we are debating tonight, with the amendments that were put forward, we will be able to support this bill on the floor tomorrow or whenever they decide to bring it up. I thank the chairman for the good work that they put into it.

Madam Chair, I do, though, rise in opposition to this amendment. For the past several years, the House Intelligence Committee has spent a significant amount of time overseeing the intelligence community’s ongoing efforts to counter foreign malign influence targeting the United States. Although Russia gains significant and necessary attention given the events of 2016, the committee is also concerned about Chinese, Iranian, and other foreign powers that have designs on sowing discord in the United States or covertly influencing the American populace.

The amendment today would establish a foreign threat response center within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. While I believe my colleague from Massachusetts offers this amendment with the best of intentions, it is clearly redundant to existing efforts and creates an additional and potentially unnecessary bureaucracy within an organization that may not be best suited to take the lead on these actions.

This issue is not new. Last Congress, we worked with the gentleman from Massachusetts in adding a report to the fiscal 2018 and 2019 IAAs that would examine the necessity of a foreign malign influence response center. This report remains in the bill, given that it is a 3-year bill.

I am not convinced of the necessity of such a center, given the ongoing efforts by our intelligence community to address this problem. However, even assuming its necessity, I am concerned that the ODNI may not be the best place for such a center. Based on our ongoing oversight efforts, we know that the interagency is taking the threat of foreign malign influences very seriously. Given the significant counterintelligence impact to the homeland, it may make more sense to house such an entity within the FBI.

I don't believe in putting the cart before the horse. It is important for us to collect all the necessary information in order for Congress to make an informed decision after significant debate on the merits of such a center and whether the ODNI is the right home for it. This debate should happen within the Intelligence Committee. To date, that debate has not occurred.

This amendment would also set up a board to oversee the work of the Foreign Intelligence Center, which would then be overseen by the House and Senate Intelligence Committees. Again, a redundancy that is, in my estimation, not necessary.

Madam Chair, based on these foregoing reasons, I will oppose the gentleman's amendment and urge my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to vote against it, and I reserve the balance of my time.

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Mr. KENNEDY. Madam Chair, may I inquire how much time I have remaining?

The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Massachusetts has 2½ minutes remaining.

Mr. KENNEDY. Madam Chair, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished gentleman from California (Mr. SCHIFF).

Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

This amendment directs the intelligence community to expand upon its work in identifying and reporting foreign malign influence activity by establishing a center responsible for integrating all intelligence pertaining to foreign efforts to undermine our democratic institutions.

The committee and the intelligence community has seen all too clearly over the last 3 years that the malign influence threats to U.S. sovereignty and security are emerging as a new normal, all the while becoming more sophisticated and diverse.

Identifying and defending against these threats, particularly those committed by strategic adversaries of the U.S., requires a dedicated whole-of-intelligence-community effort in order to fully understand the nature of the threat and identify outstanding intelligence gaps that need to be filled.

In establishing an interagency Foreign Threat Response Center, this amendment lays out a framework for accomplishing this challenging task.

I thank my colleague for his work. I appreciate Mr. KENNEDY's commitment

to this area very much, and I support the amendment.

Mr. CONAWAY. Madam Chair, I yield myself the balance of my time.

In closing, I would like to reiterate that the establishment of such a center should be debated properly within the House Intelligence Committee. It should also be informed by the report that the gentleman was successful in adding to the fiscal 2018 and 2019 Intelligence Authorization Acts, and such debate should focus on the merits of the center, given existing efforts, as well as whether or not the ODNI should house the center.

Until that report is finished, and then the debate happens, I would urge a "no" vote on the amendment.

Madam Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. KENNEDY. Madam Chair, I yield myself the balance of my time.

I would just say, in closing, that I appreciate the gentleman's words and the work that they did with us to get the report language into the version last year. I would point out that much of the intent behind this legislation and this amendment is directly related to what the gentleman indicated around an ongoing threat assessment from Russia, China, and Iran.

The issue isn't so much, has that threat been identified? It is, what has the Intelligence Committee done to ensure the sanctity and the purity of those elections?

I think this amendment speaks for itself. I urge my colleagues to adopt it.

I yield back the balance of my time.

The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. KENNEDY).

The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

Mr. CONAWAY. Madam Chair, I demand a recorded vote.

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts will be postponed.

AMENDMENT NO. 12 OFFERED BY MISS RICE OF NEW YORK

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 12 printed in part B of House Report 116-154.

Miss RICE of New York. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.

The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

Page 238, line 15, insert "and the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis" before "; shall".

Page 239, after line 14, insert the following new subsection:

(d) DISSEMINATION TO STATE AND LOCAL PARTNERS.—Consistent with the protection of classified and confidential unclassified information, the Under Secretary shall share the report required by subsection (b) with State, local, and regional officials who operate within State, local, and regional fusion

centers through the Department of Homeland Security State, Local, and Regional Fusion Center Initiative established in section 210A of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C 124h).

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentlewoman from New York (Miss RICE) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from New York.

Miss RICE of New York. Madam Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I was pleased to see that my bill, the Stop Terrorist Use of Virtual Currencies Act, was included in the base text of the Intelligence Authorization Act. This bill requires the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of the Treasury to develop and submit a threat assessment report on the use of virtual currencies by terrorist organizations.

My amendment would simply include the DHS Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis into this report and require that this report be disseminated to State and local law enforcement officials.

In the 18 years since the deadliest terrorist attack in American history, the United States has led the global campaign to combat terrorism, thwarting plots and preventing attacks on American soil, identifying and disrupting terrorist networks around the world, hunting down terrorists wherever they hide, and proving that they can and will be brought to justice.

But we also know that the threat of terrorism is not the same as it was 18 years ago; it is a threat that constantly evolves, and we need to evolve with it. We need to evolve ahead of it. That is why I have offered this amendment.

In recent years, we have seen instances in which members of terrorist groups have turned to virtual currencies to finance and support their operations.

For example, in December of 2017, a woman in New York was arrested and pled guilty after she obtained \$62,000 in bitcoin and other virtual currencies to send to ISIS.

Using those virtual funds, she was able to send the money via shell entities in Pakistan, China, and Turkey that were fronts for ISIS.

In early 2017, Indonesian authorities reported that a Syria-based Indonesian with ties to ISIS used bitcoin and other virtual currencies to fund attacks in Indonesia.

The same things that make virtual currencies appealing to everyday consumers, speed and convenience, make these currencies appealing to those who want to finance illegal activities.

And many forms of virtual currencies also offer their users anonymity, making them particularly attractive to those seeking to circumvent American law enforcement and financial institutions.

In order to effectively confront this threat, we need to fully understand it. We need a comprehensive assessment of how virtual currencies might be abused for illegal and nefarious ends. That is why it is critical that we act now to assess and understand this emerging threat.

There is no denying it. Virtual currencies have exposed deep vulnerabilities in our counterterrorism efforts. And unfortunately, right now, our government lacks a comprehensive response and strategy to address this threat.

Passing this amendment will give counterterrorism and law enforcement officials at all levels the information and strategies they desperately need to confront this threat head-on with 21st-century solutions.

This is a commonsense, bipartisan priority, and I urge all my colleagues to support this amendment.

Madam Chair, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California (Mr. SCHIFF).

Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding.

This straightforward amendment adds the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis to the DNI's consultation requirement for its report on possible exploitation of virtual currencies by terrorist actors.

It also requires the report's dissemination to State and local law enforcement, consistent with the protection of classified information.

Ensuring that relevant counterterrorism information is distributed, as appropriate, to State and local law enforcement is a key priority and a major function of the Department of Homeland Security. Adding these entities as recipients of this report through the DHS fusion center mechanism improves the bill.

I want to encourage all my colleagues to support the amendment, as well as the underlying bill. I thank my colleague for her work.

Miss RICE of New York. Madam Chair, I want to thank Chairman SCHIFF and Ranking Member NUNES for supporting the amendment.

I yield back the balance of my time.

The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from New York (Miss RICE).

The amendment was agreed to.

AMENDMENT NO. 13 OFFERED BY MS. JAYAPAL

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 13 printed in part B of House Report 116-154.

Ms. JAYAPAL. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.

The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

At the end of title VII, add the following new section:

SEC. 3. REPORT ON USE BY INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY OF FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the use of facial recognition technology for the purpose of suppressing or burdening criticism or dissent, or for disadvantaging persons based on their ethnicity, race, gender, sexual orientation, or religion, is contrary to the values of the United States;

(2) the United States Government should not engage in the sale or transfer of facial recognition technology to any country that is using such technology for the suppression of human rights; and

(3) it is incumbent upon the intelligence community to develop clear policies and procedures that prevent the abuse of facial recognition technology.

(b) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the use of facial recognition technology by the intelligence community. Such report shall include each of the following:

(1) An analysis of the current use of facial recognition technology by the intelligence community.

(2) An analysis of the accuracy of facial recognition technology, including a discussion of the appropriate threshold for use, and data disaggregated by race, gender, ethnicity, and age.

(3) Whether the Government has adequate procedures in place to audit or test technology they purchase to assess its accuracy, including on the basis of race, gender, ethnicity, and age.

(4) The extent to which the intelligence community has codified policies governing the use of facial recognition technology that adequately prevent adverse impacts on privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties.

(5) An analysis of the ability of the intelligence community to use facial recognition technology to identify individuals in a way that respects constitutional rights, civil rights, civil liberties, and privacy of such individuals.

(6) Identification of risks and safeguards to uphold the constitutional rights, civil rights, civil liberties, and privacy of individuals, including for communities of color and religious minorities.

(7) Whether such technology is deployed in public areas or on photos of public areas in a manner that could raise First Amendment concerns.

(8) An identification of existing policies, procedures, or practices that permit the sharing of facial recognition data and technology with foreign governments or other non-United States Government entities.

(9) An identification of measures in place to protect data security.

(10) An identification of any redress procedures to address complaints in cases where the use of facial recognition resulted in harm to an individual.

(11) An analysis of existing transparency, oversight, and audits of the use of facial recognition to measure the efficacy of the technology on an ongoing basis, as measured against the cost and impact on individual rights.

(c) FORM.—The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(d) FACIAL RECOGNITION DATA DEFINED.—In this section, the term "facial recognition data" means any unique attribute or feature of the face of an end user that is used by facial recognition technology to assign a unique, persistent identifier, or for the unique personal identification of a specific individual.

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentlewoman from Washington (Ms. JAYAPAL) and a

Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Washington.

Ms. JAYAPAL. Madam Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I want to start by recognizing the work of our chairman, Mr. SCHIFF, on this bill.

Madam Chair, my amendment would require Congress to provide much-needed oversight to the intelligence community's use of face recognition technology. The amendment does three things.

First, it requires the Director of National Intelligence to submit a report to the Intelligence Committees in both the House and the Senate on the use of this new technology. This is a critical step in ensuring that there is a deeper understanding of the technology here in Congress and also, appropriate transparency.

Second, the amendment expresses the sense of Congress that using this technology to suppress dissent, or to target people based on ethnicity, race, gender, sexual orientation, or religion is contrary to our Nation's values.

And finally, it makes clear that Congress believes that the government should not sell or transfer face recognition technology to any country that is using this technology to suppress human rights.

I offered this amendment to the Intelligence Authorization Act because I am concerned that face recognition poses grave privacy concerns. As a Nation committed to democratic norms, including constitutionally-enshrined rights to freedom of speech and privacy, it is critical that we ensure that our national security activities do not come at the expense of our individual liberties and our right to privacy. And thus, it is critical that this body know exactly how this technology is being used.

In addition to the civil liberties concerns of those in our country, the technology does disproportionately impact people of color. The technology, unfortunately, misidentifies people of color and women at higher rates than Whites and men, which undermines its usefulness to the intelligence community, and makes it potentially problematic for large-scale use.

Finally, my amendment makes clear that the United States should not be providing this technology to countries who are using it to perpetuate human rights abuses. We should not be selling or transferring the technologies to countries like China, who are actively using this technology to suppress dissent and target minorities, like the Uighurs, a Muslim minority group.

Although this sense of Congress lays down an important marker, we do need to continue to work to ensure that there are proper controls on the sale and the transfer of this technology, and I look forward to doing that with my colleagues.

Madam Chair, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished gentleman from California (Mr. SCHIFF), the chairman of the committee.

Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding.

This amendment expresses a sense of Congress that conveys our firm opposition to any use of facial recognition technology to suppress criticism or dissent, as well as our opposition to the U.S. Government sale or transfer of facial recognition technology to countries using this technology to suppress human rights.

Critically, the amendment also acknowledges the IC's unique responsibility to develop robust policies and procedures that prevent the abuse of this technology.

To ensure that the intelligence community is held accountable, the amendment requires the submission of a comprehensive report analyzing any use of facial recognition technology by the IC, and the associated implications for privacy and civil liberties, especially among marginalized communities.

Ms. JAYAPAL's amendment requires the intelligence community to establish clear policies and procedures, enhance transparency, and increase oversight concerning the applications of these new capabilities.

Her amendment lays the groundwork for a thoughtful U.S. response to the emergence of divisive and disruptive technologies and how they would fit into existing civil liberties frameworks.

Again, I want to thank my colleague for her work. I am pleased to support Ms. JAYAPAL's amendment.

Ms. JAYAPAL. Madam Chair, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. GARCÍA).

Mr. GARCÍA of Illinois. Madam Chair, I rise in support of the amendment we have filed to study and limit the use of facial recognition technology.

The intelligence community collects large amounts of data with limited oversight about how and from whom data is collected. Facial recognition technology has shown to be less accurate on nonwhite faces, and its use disproportionately hurts communities of color because of algorithmic bias.

This amendment studies the potential for bias and expresses the sense that people should not be targeted for their ethnicity, race, or sexual orientation, or to suppress dissent. Given the U.S. Government's history of tracking protesters and activists, especially in minority communities, this is important.

Congress can and should exercise Federal oversight of emerging surveillance technologies. For facial recognition technology, this means our work is only just beginning. I urge support for this amendment.

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Ms. JAYAPAL. Madam Chair, I urge my colleagues to support this amend-

ment, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The Acting CHAIR (Ms. OMAR). The question is on the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from Washington (Ms. JAYAPAL).

The amendment was agreed to.

AMENDMENT NO. 14 OFFERED BY MRS. MURPHY

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 14 printed in part B of House Report 116-154.

Mrs. MURPHY. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.

The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

At the end of title VII, add the following:

SEC. 708. REPORT ON DEEPFAKE TECHNOLOGY, FOREIGN WEAPONIZATION OF DEEPFAKES, AND RELATED NOTIFICATIONS.

(a) REPORT ON FOREIGN WEAPONIZATION OF DEEPFAKES AND DEEPFAKE TECHNOLOGY.—

(1) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of the elements of the intelligence community determined appropriate by the Director, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on—

(A) the potential national security impacts of machine-manipulated media (commonly known as “deepfakes”); and

(B) the actual or potential use of machine-manipulated media by foreign governments to spread disinformation or engage in other malign activities.

(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report under subsection (a) shall include the following:

(A) An assessment of the technical capabilities of foreign governments, including foreign intelligence services, foreign government-affiliated entities, and foreign individuals, with respect to machine-manipulated media, machine-generated text, generative adversarial networks, and related machine-learning technologies, including—

(i) an assessment of the technical capabilities of the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation with respect to the production and detection of machine-manipulated media; and

(ii) an annex describing those governmental elements within China and Russia known to have supported or facilitated machine-manipulated media research, development, or dissemination, as well as any civil-military fusion, private-sector, academic, or non-governmental entities which have meaningfully participated in such activities.

(B) An updated assessment of how foreign governments, including foreign intelligence services, foreign government-affiliated entities, and foreign individuals, could use or are using machine-manipulated media and machine-generated text to harm the national security interests of the United States, including an assessment of the historic, current, or potential future efforts of China and Russia to use machine-manipulated media, including with respect to—

(i) the overseas or domestic dissemination of misinformation;

(ii) the attempted discrediting of political opponents or disfavored populations; and

(iii) intelligence or influence operations directed against the United States, allies or partners of the United States, or other jurisdictions believed to be subject to Chinese or Russian interference.

(C) An updated identification of the counter-technologies that have been or could

be developed and deployed by the United States Government, or by the private sector with Government support, to deter, detect, and attribute the use of machine-manipulated media and machine-generated text by foreign governments, foreign-government affiliates, or foreign individuals, along with an analysis of the benefits, limitations and drawbacks of such identified counter-technologies, including any emerging concerns related to privacy.

(D) An identification of the offices within the elements of the intelligence community that have, or should have, lead responsibility for monitoring the development of, use of, and response to machine-manipulated media and machine-generated text, including—

(i) a description of the coordination of such efforts across the intelligence community;

(ii) a detailed description of the existing capabilities, tools, and relevant expertise of such elements to determine whether a piece of media has been machine manipulated or machine generated, including the speed at which such determination can be made, the confidence level of the element in the ability to make such a determination accurately, and how increasing volume and improved quality of machine-manipulated media or machine-generated text may negatively impact such capabilities; and

(iii) a detailed description of planned or ongoing research and development efforts intended to improve the ability of the intelligence community to detect machine-manipulated media and machine-generated text.

(E) A description of any research and development activities carried out or under consideration to be carried out by the intelligence community, including the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity, relevant to machine-manipulated media and machine-generated text detection technologies.

(F) Updated recommendations regarding whether the intelligence community requires additional legal authorities, financial resources, or specialized personnel to address the national security threat posed by machine-manipulated media and machine generated text.

(G) Other additional information the Director determines appropriate.

(b) FORM.—The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(c) REQUIREMENT FOR NOTIFICATION.—The Director of National Intelligence, in cooperation with the heads of any other relevant departments or agencies of the Federal Government, shall notify the congressional intelligence committees each time the Director of National Intelligence determines—

(1) there is credible information or intelligence that a foreign entity has attempted, is attempting, or will attempt to deploy machine-manipulated media or machine-generated text aimed at the elections or domestic political processes of the United States; and

(2) that such intrusion or campaign can be attributed to a foreign government, a foreign government-affiliated entity, or a foreign individual.

(d) ANNUAL UPDATE.—Upon submission of the report in subsection (a), on an annual basis, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of the elements of the intelligence community determined appropriate by the Director, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees any significant updates with respect to the matters described in subsection (a).

(e) DEFINITIONS.—

(1) MACHINE-GENERATED TEXT.—The term “machine-generated text” means text generated using machine-learning techniques in

order to resemble writing in natural language.

(2) MACHINE-MANIPULATED MEDIA.—The term “machine-manipulated media” has the meaning given that term in section 707.

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. MURPHY) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Florida.

Mrs. MURPHY. Madam Chair, my amendment, which I am coleading with Congresswoman YVETTE CLARKE of New York, involves a looming threat to American security and American democracy from the use of deepfake technology by our Nation’s adversaries.

As policymakers, we must understand this challenge and put in place a whole-of-government strategy to address it in a way that protects our interests and is consistent with our values. The U.S. intelligence community has an important role to play in this effort.

The House Intelligence Committee, led by Chairman SCHIFF, recently held an illuminating and alarming hearing on deepfakes. As the witnesses at that hearing testified, technology now enables anyone with a computer, internet access, and technical skills to create fabricated and relatively convincing video and audio recordings that depict individuals doing or saying things that they did not do or say.

The technology behind deepfakes is rapidly evolving. Soon individuals will be able to create highly realistic and difficult to debunk video and audio content. At a time when Americans are already being inundated, especially online, by a flood of false or misleading information, deepfake technology has the potential to make it even harder for the American public to trust what it sees and hears.

It is easy to imagine the different ways in which deepfake technology could be exploited by America’s foes. Imagine a Russian intelligence service creating a video purporting to show an American Presidential candidate accepting a bribe or an audio recording purporting to reveal an American Secretary of State saying something inflammatory about an ally. Or imagine a Chinese-produced video that falsely depicts the commander of a U.S. military unit committing a war crime. Such efforts, if not quickly exposed as false by the United States, could create havoc.

In today’s world, perhaps the biggest national security threat we face is not the risk of direct military conflict between the United States and Russia, China, Iran, or another adversary. Instead, the threat lurks in the gray space short of kinetic action. It is illustrated by Russian efforts to intervene in the 2016 Presidential election, most notably in my home State of Florida. It is the threat from authoritarian governments using new technologies to spread disinformation, sow

discord, create divisions, and cause the American people to lose faith in our democratic form of government.

To address this threat, our amendment requires the DNI to prepare a report for Congress on how foreign countries are using or could use deepfake technology to harm the United States and to explain how the intelligence community is working to develop appropriate countermeasures. This report will help us to understand the problem and to combat it more effectively.

We must get this right because the stakes couldn’t be higher. I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.

Madam Chair, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California (Chairman SCHIFF).

Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding, and I rise in strong support of this amendment offered by my colleagues from Florida and New York, who have both been leaders in this body focused on national security challenges posed by deepfake technologies.

We in the Intelligence Committee held a hearing on this very topic last month, and the rate at which these capabilities are evolving is almost as breathtaking as what they can produce, high-quality video and other types of media that convincingly portray individuals saying or doing things that never happened.

The potential for a foreign adversary to undermine an election, foment chaos, or create a national security crisis with a sophisticated digital forgery means that we need to ensure the intelligence community is fully considering the wide-ranging implications of deepfakes, including the capacity of foreign entities and adversaries to weaponize machine-generated media.

This report will also give us a detailed picture about how the intelligence community is coordinating efforts, activities, and research surrounding this emerging technology and if there are lingering gaps in resources or assignments of responsibility, since we need to be clear-eyed about how disruptive and devastating a well-timed deep fake could be during an election or a tense diplomatic standoff.

I want to thank my colleague for her work on this amendment, and I am very proud to support it.

Mrs. MURPHY. Madam Chair, I urge support for this amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. MURPHY). The amendment was agreed to.

AMENDMENT NO. 15 OFFERED BY MRS. MURPHY

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 15 printed in part B of House Report 116-154.

Mrs. MURPHY. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.

The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

At the end of title V, add the following new section:

SEC. 5. SENSE OF CONGRESS AND REPORT ON IRANIAN EFFORTS IN SYRIA.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that, regardless of the ultimate number of United States military personnel deployed to Syria, it is a vital interest of the United States to prevent the Islamic Republic of Iran, Hizbollah, and other Iranian-backed forces from establishing a strong and enduring presence in Syria that can be used to project power in the region and threaten the United States and its allies, including Israel.

(b) REPORT.—

(1) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that assesses—

(A) efforts by Iran to establish long-term influence in Syria through military, political, economic, social, and cultural means; and

(B) the threat posed by such efforts to United States interests and allies.

(2) ELEMENTS.—The report under paragraph (1) shall include each of the following:

(A) An assessment of—

(i) how Iran and Iranian-backed forces, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Hizbollah, have provided or are currently providing manpower, training, weapons, equipment, and funding to the Syrian government led by President Bashar al-Assad;

(ii) the support provided by Iran and Hizbollah to Shia militias operating in Syria that are composed of domestic fighters from Syria and foreign fighters from countries like Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Pakistan;

(iii) the threat posed by Iran and Iranian-backed forces to the al-Tanf garrison and to areas of northeast Syria that are currently controlled by local partner forces of the United States;

(iv) the degree to which efforts of the United States to sustain and strengthen Kurdish forces in Syria may undermine the influence of Iran and Iranian-backed forces in Syria;

(v) how Iran and Iranian-backed forces seek to enhance the long-term influence of such entities in Syria through non-military means such as purchasing strategic real estate in Syria, constructing Shia religious centers and schools, securing loyalty from Sunni tribes in exchange for material assistance, and inducing the Assad government to open Farsi-language departments at Syrian universities; and

(vi) whether the prominent role of Iran in Syria, including the influence of Iran over government institutions, may increase the likelihood of the reconstitution of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria in Syria.

(B) An analysis of—

(i) how Iran is working with the Russian Federation, Turkey, and other countries to increase the influence of Iran in Syria; and

(ii) the goals of Iran in Syria, including, but not limited to, protecting the Assad government, increasing the regional influence of Iran, threatening Israel from a more proximate location, building weapon-production facilities and other military infrastructure, and securing a land bridge to connect Iran through Iraq and Syria to the stronghold of Hizbollah in southern Lebanon.

(C) A description of—

(i) how the efforts of Iran to transfer advanced weapons to Hizbollah and to establish a military presence in Syria has led to direct and repeated confrontations with Israel; and

(ii) the intelligence and military support that the United States provides to Israel to

help Israel identify and appropriately address specific threats to Israel from Iran and Iranian-backed forces in Syria.

(3) FORM.—The report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(4) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. MURPHY) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Florida.

Mrs. MURPHY. Madam Chair, our amendment would require the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretaries of State and Defense, to prepare a report for Congress on efforts by Iran to establish long-term influence in Syria using both hard and soft power and the threat that this proposes to U.S. interests and allies, including Israel.

Syria’s civil war, which began in 2011, has brought an influx of Iranian-backed forces into Syria. Iran and Syria are both designated by the United States as state sponsors of terrorism. Their military partnership dates back decades, and Iran regards Syria as one of its most important allies.

Iran and Iranian-backed forces, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Hezbollah, have provided manpower, training, weapons, and funding to the Syrian Government, led by President Bashar al-Assad. This assistance, coupled with support from Russia, has enabled the Assad government to retain or regain territory in Syria, and the Assad government currently maintains control over roughly two-thirds of the country.

Iran’s goals in Syria include protecting the Assad government, increasing Iran’s regional influence, threatening Israel from a closer location, building weapon production facilities and other military infrastructure, and securing a land bridge that would connect Iran to Hezbollah’s stronghold in southern Lebanon via Iraq and Syria.

It is clear that Iran is seeking long-term influence in Syria and is pursuing this objective through military, political, and social means.

Iran’s effort to establish a military presence in Syria has led to repeated confrontations with Israel. In February of 2018, Israel shot down an Iranian drone flying over Israeli territory and then targeted the base in Syria from which the drone was launched. In May 2018, Israel launched strikes against Iranian military installations in Syria. Iran responded by firing missiles at Israeli positions in the Golan Heights,

and Israel then targeted nearly all of Iran’s military infrastructure in Syria.

Iranian and Iranian-backed forces also seek to enhance their influence in Syria through nonmilitary means, such as purchasing strategic real estate, constructing Shia religious centers and schools, securing loyalty from Sunni tribes, and inducing the Assad government to open Farsi language departments at Syrian universities.

In a startling move, President Trump has proposed to withdraw all or most U.S. forces from Syria, a proposal I view as a profound mistake. But regardless of the number of U.S. troops deployed to Syria, I believe it is a vital U.S. interest to prevent Iran, Hezbollah, and other Iranian-backed forces from establishing an enduring presence in Syria.

Our amendment would require the DNI to assess how Iran is using hard and soft power to gain long-term influence in Syria. Among other things, the IC would examine how U.S. efforts to strengthen Kurdish forces in Syria could undermine Iran, how the U.S. helps Israel identify threats from Iran and Syria, and how Iran’s influence over Syrian institutions could increase the likelihood that the Islamic State will reconstitute itself inside Syria.

I urge my colleagues to support this amendment, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Madam Chair, I claim the time in opposition to the amendment, though I am not opposed to it.

The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from Illinois is recognized for 5 minutes.

There was no objection.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Madam Chair, I rise in support of the Murphy-Schneider amendment that makes abundantly clear it is of the utmost importance to prevent Iran from establishing any enduring presence in Syria.

The amendment also requires the Director of National Intelligence to report on Iran’s efforts to establish a foothold in Syria on the threat this poses to the United States and our allies, in particular Israel.

Madam Chair, I stood before Congress in the last Congress urging support for my amendment to require a report on Iran’s support for proxy forces in Syria and Lebanon, and I am pleased that this report remains in this bill. Today we are building on this important effort with the Murphy-Schneider amendment.

I thank my good friend from Florida, STEPHANIE MURPHY, for her leadership on this issue.

Iran is a bad actor that has spread its maligned influence and continued to engage in destabilizing activities throughout the Middle East region, as well as beyond. The Iranian regime has and continues to establish deep ties within Syria through military, political, economic, social, and cultural means. This is a dangerous behavior that must be checked. Iran must not be

allowed to maintain a permanent foothold in Syria that threatens our allies and stability in the region.

To stand up to Iran, we must first understand the full extent of Iran’s activities in Syria, and that is what this amendment does. I look forward to seeing this report and engaging on how we can prevent Iran from maintaining a permanent presence in Syria.

I hope my colleagues will join me in supporting this important amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mrs. MURPHY. Madam Chair, I urge support for the amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. MURPHY).

The amendment was agreed to.

AMENDMENT NO. 16 OFFERED BY MR. BRINDISI

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 16 printed in part B of House Report 116–154.

Mr. BRINDISI. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.

The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

At the end of title VII, add the following new section:

SEC. 708. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN CRIMES RELATING TO TERRORISM.

Nothing in this Act, or the amendments made by this Act, shall be construed to contradict chapter 113B of title 18, United States Code, including with respect to—

- (1) section 2332b (relating to acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries);
- (2) section 2339 (relating to harboring or concealing terrorists); and
- (3) section 2339A (relating to providing material support to terrorists).

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman from New York (Mr. BRINDISI) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York.

Mr. BRINDISI. Madam Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Madam Chair, I rise today urging adoption of my amendment, which makes clear that nothing in the underlying bill contradicts existing Federal law regarding acts of international terrorism, providing support to terrorists, or aiding terrorists.

The underlying bill helps keep our country safe by ensuring the intelligence community has the resources and authorities it needs to do its job. It also makes sure the intelligence community can improve and adapt to today’s rapidly changing threats and technologies by improving the collection and analytic capabilities against our adversaries like China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.

My amendment makes it crystal clear that our country will remain tough on international terrorism.

Terrorism continues to be a serious threat to our national security. This provision strengthens the underlying

bill by ensuring current law regarding terrorism is not changed, so terrorists and those who support them can be brought to justice.

Madam Chair, again, I urge my colleagues to support this amendment. I urge adoption of the amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.

□ 2100

The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. BRINDISI).

The amendment was agreed to.

AMENDMENT NO. 17 OFFERED BY MR. KINZINGER

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 17 printed in part B of House Report 116-154.

Mr. KINZINGER. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.

The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

At the end of title VII, add the following new section:

SEC. 7. REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL MOBILE SUBSCRIBER IDENTITY-CATCHERS AND UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY.

(a) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the heads of other agencies the Director of National Intelligence determines appropriate, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report describing—

(1) the threats that international mobile subscriber identity-catchers pose to national security and, specifically, the safety and security of Government personnel;

(2) the prevalence of international mobile subscriber identity-catchers used by both foreign actors and domestic law enforcement within the United States;

(3) actions taken by Federal agencies, as of the date of the report, to remove or neutralize international mobile subscriber identity-catchers installed by foreign entities, with a primary focus on the National Capital Region (as defined in section 2674(f) of title 10, United States Code);

(4) policy recommendations for Congress to consider that would empower law enforcement and the intelligence community to counter such foreign intelligence operations while minimizing interference with legitimate domestic law enforcement operations;

(5) the extent to which private entities, as well as Federal entities not primarily responsible for national security or homeland security, are able to remove, neutralize, or otherwise render ineffective international mobile subscriber identity-catchers; and

(6) recommendations for new software programs, or the hardening of existing software programs, to reduce mobile phone susceptibility to international mobile subscriber identity-catchers.

(b) FORM.—To the extent practicable, the report shall be submitted in an unclassified, law enforcement sensitive form for the purposes of distribution to other congressional committees, but may also include a classified annex.

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. KINZINGER) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. KINZINGER. Madam Chair, my amendment is very simple. It would require that the Director of National Intelligence and other relevant agencies report to Congress on the threat that international mobile subscriber identity catchers, also referred to as “cell-site simulators” or under the brand name “StingRay,” pose to U.S. Government personnel and national security.

In addition to providing this report, the DNI would need to provide recommendations to Congress regarding possible policy changes to counter these devices.

IMSI catchers send signals to mobile phones that appear to be coming from legitimate mobile networks. Once connected, the phones are used to track the locations of the users, which can be seen by whoever is controlling the IMSI catcher. The more advanced versions of these cell devices allow their owners even to access messages and phone call data.

Many of us were shocked when a report came out last year that the Department of Homeland Security had found these devices around the national capital region. Even more concerning was that many of these were located around sensitive government buildings.

My amendment would help Congress understand the proliferation of these devices around our Nation, with a focus on their prevalence in the national capital region. We need to know which actors, foreign or domestic, are deploying them and what Congress can do to ensure the safekeeping of our national security apparatus.

Madam Chair, I urge support for this amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. KINZINGER).

The amendment was agreed to.

AMENDMENT NO. 18 OFFERED BY MS. HILL OF CALIFORNIA

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 18 printed in part B of House Report 116-154.

Ms. HILL of California. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.

The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

At the end of title VII, add the following new section:

SEC. 7. WHISTLEBLOWER DISCLOSURES TO CONGRESS AND COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.

Section 2302 of title 5, United States Code, is amended—

(1) in subsection (b)(8)(B), by inserting “Congress (including any committee of Congress),” before “the Special Counsel”; and

(2) in subsection (c)(2)(C)(iii)(III), by inserting after “Congress” the following: “(including any committee of Congress)”.

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. HILL) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from California.

Ms. HILL of California. Madam Chair, I yield myself as much time as I may consume. I rise in support of an amendment to H.R. 3494.

I believe strongly in the principle of government transparency. It is something I ran on and talk about. I have spent my time in Congress working to deliver on accountability and transparency as the vice chair of the Oversight and Reform Committee and through other legislation.

Today, I am introducing this amendment to clarify what Congress already believes to be the law, that Federal whistleblowers have the ability to make protected disclosures to the appropriate congressional committee of jurisdiction, not just members of the Intelligence Committee.

At a time like this, we cannot afford ambiguity. This technical change will allow congressional committees to conduct their business in a more timely and effective manner.

This amendment is not my first effort to protect whistleblowers, nor will it be my last. Those with the courage to stand up and say something is not right should have every single protection that we, as Congress, can offer to them.

Madam Chair, I urge all of my colleagues to support this amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from California (Ms. HILL).

The amendment was agreed to.

AMENDMENT NO. 19 OFFERED BY MR. LEVIN OF MICHIGAN

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 19 printed in part B of House Report 116-154.

Mr. LEVIN of Michigan. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.

The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

Page 68, strike line 24 through page 69, line 3, and insert the following:

(2) with respect to the unclassified portion of the report, made available on the public internet websites of the National Counterterrorism Center, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Department of Homeland Security—

(A) not later than 30 days after submission to the appropriate congressional committees; and

(B) in an electronic format that is fully indexed and searchable; and

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. LEVIN) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. LEVIN of Michigan. Madam Chair, according to the Anti-Defamation League, domestic extremists killed at least 50 people in the United States in 2018, a sharp increase from

the 37 extremist-related murders documented in 2017. Indeed, that is a 26 percent jump in 1 year.

Given the disturbing rise of plots and incidents of domestic terrorism nationwide, I am pleased with the provision in this bill requiring that a joint report on domestic terrorism be submitted to Congress each year by the DNI, the FBI Director, and the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis.

My amendment requires that this comprehensive report on domestic terrorism be made available on the public websites not just of the National Counterterrorism Center but also of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Homeland Security.

The amendment also specifies that the report should be made publicly available no later than 30 days after submission to the appropriate congressional committees. We can't let something this important be delayed over and over again.

We need to ensure that this report is accessible not just to promote transparency but also to help policymakers nationwide recognize the scope of the threat that domestic terrorism poses and to encourage academic research necessary to understand the scourge of domestic terrorism better so that we might bring it to an end once and for all. I am talking about policymakers on the local and the State level as well as the Federal level.

Madam Chair, I thank, in particular, Chairman SCHIFF and his staff for their leadership on this bill and for working with me on this and other provisions.

Madam Chair, I urge my colleagues to support this amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. LEVIN).

The amendment was agreed to.

AMENDMENT NO. 20 OFFERED BY MR. SCHIFF

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 20 printed in part B of House Report 116–154.

Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, as the designee of the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. MALINOWSKI), I rise to offer an amendment.

The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

Page 49, after line 13, insert the following new paragraph:

(7) An assessment and identification of the technological and financial support provided by United States-based companies, including technological support for the development of facial recognition capabilities or technologies for digital surveillance, social control, or censorship, and financial support, including from financial institutions, investment vehicles, and pension funds, to China-based companies or Chinese government entities providing material support to the digital surveillance or repression of Uyghur and other ethnic minorities in Xinjiang by the Xinjiang authorities.

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman

from California (Mr. SCHIFF) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.

Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, I rise to support this amendment, which adds an additional requirement to section 502, a report on the repression of ethnic Muslim minorities in the Xinjiang region of the People's Republic of China.

The human rights crisis underway in Xinjiang is staggering in scale. Open-source analysis based on extensive reviews of satellite imagery and Chinese Government documents has concluded that as many as 1.5 million Muslims could be held in internment camps by the Chinese Government.

Despite this body of evidence, the executive branch has rebuffed attempts to clearly describe the scope and scale of this crisis.

H.R. 3494 calls for a comprehensive U.S. Government assessment that addresses the number of persons detained, a description of forced labor practices in the camps, and an assessment of the surveillance, detection, and control methods associated with China's new high-tech policing model.

Mr. MALINOWSKI's amendment adds an additional requirement for the intelligence community to assess and identify the technological and financial support provided by U.S.-based companies to the Chinese Government's repressive operations in Xinjiang.

In light of the alarming public reports detailing cooperation between prominent U.S. companies and foreign companies aiding and abetting the Chinese Communist Party's surveillance state, this amendment could not be timelier.

Madam Chair, I thank my colleagues, particularly Mr. MALINOWSKI for his tireless work to support human rights.

Madam Chair, I am happy to support the amendment. I urge support for the amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. SCHIFF).

The amendment was agreed to.

AMENDMENT NO. 21 OFFERED BY MR. SCHIFF

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 21 printed in part B of House Report 116–154.

Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, as the designee of the gentlewoman from Massachusetts (Ms. PRESSLEY), I rise to offer an amendment.

The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

Page 62, after line 4 insert the following:

(6) Information regarding any training or resources provided by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Homeland Security, or the National Counterterrorism Center, to assist Federal, State, local, and Tribal law enforcement agencies in understanding, detecting, deterring, and investigating acts of domestic terrorism, including the date, type, subject, and recipient agencies of such training or resources.

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman from California (Mr. SCHIFF) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.

Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, this amendment clarifies section 602 of the bill dealing with domestic terrorism.

Section 602 would require the FBI, DHS, and the National Counterterrorism Center to produce an annual report and strategic intelligence assessment on domestic terrorism. Ms. PRESSLEY's amendment would require more information regarding any training or resources on domestic terrorism provided by the FBI, DHS, and National Counterterrorism Center to assist Federal, State, local, and Tribal law enforcement agencies.

This would enhance oversight and transparency in this area and give us a better sense of how domestic terrorism training has been provided to law enforcement throughout the United States.

Madam Chair, I thank my colleague for her work, and I urge our colleagues to support the amendment and the underlying bill.

I yield back the balance of my time.

The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. SCHIFF).

The amendment was agreed to.

AMENDMENT NO. 22 OFFERED BY MR. ROSE OF NEW YORK

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 22 printed in part B of House Report 116–154.

Mr. ROSE of New York. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.

The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

At the end of title VII, add the following new section:

SEC. 7. REPORT CONTAINING THREAT ASSESSMENT ON TERRORIST USE OF CONVENTIONAL AND ADVANCED CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS.

(a) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for a period of 4 years, the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis, in coordination with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall develop and submit to the entities in accordance with subsection (b) a report containing a threat assessment regarding the availability of conventional weapons, including conventional weapons lacking serial numbers, and advanced conventional weapons, for use in furthering acts of terrorism, including the provision of material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization and to individuals or groups supporting or engaging in domestic terrorism.

(b) DISSEMINATION OF REPORT.—Consistent with the protection of classified and confidential unclassified information, the Under Secretary shall—

(1) submit the initial report required under subsection (a) to Federal, State, local, and Tribal law enforcement officials, including officials who operate within State, local, and

regional fusion centers under the Department of Homeland Security State, Local, and Regional Fusion Center Initiative established by section 210A of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 124h); and

(2) submit each report required under subsection (a) to the appropriate congressional committees.

(c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Homeland Security, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives; and

(B) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate.

(2) DOMESTIC TERRORISM.—The term “domestic terrorism” has the meaning given that term in section 2331 of title 18, United States Code.

(3) FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION.—The term “foreign terrorist organization” means an organization designated as a foreign terrorist organization under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189).

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman from New York (Mr. ROSE) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York.

□ 2115

Mr. ROSE of New York. Madam Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Madam Chair, I rise in support of my amendment to H.R. 3494.

Our law enforcement officers stand on the front lines of defending the American people from domestic and international terrorist threats. It is our job as Congress to make sure that they have the most up-to-date information about the evolving threats posed by terrorism, including the use of advanced conventional weapons.

One such evolving threat is the danger posed by terrorist use of conventional and advanced conventional weapons, including unregistered weapons that lack serial numbers.

To address this issue, my amendment to the Intelligence Authorization Act will require the Department of Homeland Security to conduct an annual assessment of the domestic and international terrorist threats posed by conventional weapons as well as advanced conventional weapons.

This is a simple, straightforward amendment that seeks to put important information about terrorist threats in the hands of our law enforcement officers.

Madam Chair, law enforcement needs to have the information they need to understand these threats. The assessment of the terrorist threat posed by conventional weapons and advanced conventional weapons that I call for in this amendment will do just that.

Additionally, this assessment will then be shared with Congress and with law enforcement so that our frontline

officers have the information they need to understand these evolving threats.

Madam Chair, I urge all of my colleagues to support my amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. ROSE).

The amendment was agreed to.

AMENDMENT NO. 23 OFFERED BY MR. ROSE OF NEW YORK

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 23 printed in part B of House Report 116-154.

Mr. ROSE of New York. Madam Chair, I have an amendment to the desk.

The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

Page 79, line 19, insert “, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate, and the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives” after “congressional intelligence committees”.

At the end of title VII, add the following new section:

SEC. 7. ASSESSMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY VULNERABILITIES ASSOCIATED WITH CERTAIN RETIRED AND FORMER PERSONNEL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

(a) ASSESSMENT REQUIRED.—Not later than the date that is 120 days after submission of the report required under section 704 of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Director of the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an assessment of the homeland security vulnerabilities associated with retired and former personnel of intelligence community providing covered intelligence assistance.

(b) FORM.—The assessment under subsection (a) may be submitted in classified form.

(c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the congressional intelligence committees;

(B) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate; and

(C) the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives.

(2) COVERED INTELLIGENCE ASSISTANCE.—The term “covered intelligence assistance” has the meaning given that term in section 704 of this Act.

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman from New York (Mr. ROSE) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York.

Mr. ROSE of New York. Madam Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Madam Chair, I rise to offer an amendment to title VII of H.R. 3494, entitled, “Reports and Other Matters.”

As a combat veteran, I can tell you firsthand that intelligence drives oper-

ations, and it is imperative to the security of our homeland that the U.S. maintains its superiority when it comes to intelligence. However, a growing concern I have is when our former or retired intelligence professionals choose to later work for a foreign government.

We saw it with former NSA employees working as hackers for the United Arab Emirates’ Project Raven. Interviews and documents showed that the NSA’s surveillance techniques were central to the country’s monitoring efforts.

Reporting showed that American ex-intelligence personnel would target the UAE Government’s opponents online. This information, provided to them by the country’s NSA equivalent, didn’t just target terrorists, but also human rights activists and journalists, those whom the UAE deemed unfavorable.

It is concerning when our best and brightest go off to conduct or advise on intelligence operations for foreign governments that, in some cases, are against the very people our American ideals protect. We need to understand the nature and impact of this expertise in the hands of a foreign government. What are the homeland security implications of this?

My amendment will do just that. It requires the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with other intelligence community partners, to conduct an annual assessment of the homeland security vulnerabilities associated with former intelligence community employees providing intelligence assistance to a foreign government.

Madam Chair, the invaluable training, tradecraft, and expertise developed by former or retired intelligence professionals to keep our country safe, to keep Americans safe, now in the hands of a foreign government for their benefit is absolutely chilling.

My amendment will tackle these concerns head-on with an annual assessment of any homeland security vulnerabilities that may be associated with this capability, cultivated from years of service to our country, now being provided to foreign governments.

Madam Chair, I urge all of my colleagues to support my amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. ROSE).

The amendment was agreed to.

AMENDMENT NO. 24 OFFERED BY MR. PENCE

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 24 printed in part B of House Report 116-154.

Mr. PENCE. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.

The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

At the end of title VII, add the following new section:

SEC. 7. EXPANSION OF AVAILABILITY OF FINANCIAL ASSETS OF IRAN TO VICTIMS OF TERRORISM.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) On October 23, 1983, terrorists sponsored by the Government of Iran bombed the United States Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon. The terrorists killed 241 servicemen and injured scores more.

(2) Those servicemen were killed or injured while on a peacekeeping mission.

(3) Terrorism sponsored by the Government of Iran threatens the national security of the United States.

(4) The United States has a vital interest in ensuring that members of the Armed Forces killed or injured by such terrorism, and the family members of such members, are able to seek justice.

(b) AMENDMENTS.—Section 502 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8772) is amended—

(1) in subsection (a)(1)—

(A) in subparagraph (A), by striking “in the United States” the first place it appears and inserting “by or”;

(B) in subparagraph (B), by inserting “, or an asset that would be blocked if the asset were located in the United States,” after “unblocked”;

(C) in the flush text at the end—

(i) by inserting after “in aid of execution” the following: “, or to an order directing that the asset be brought to the State in which the court is located and subsequently to execution or attachment in aid of execution.”; and

(ii) by inserting “, without regard to concerns relating to international comity” after “resources for such an act”;

(2) in subsection (b)—

(A) by striking “that are identified” and inserting the following: “that are—
“(1) identified”;

(B) by striking the period at the end and inserting “; and”;

(C) by adding at the end the following:

“(2) identified in and the subject of proceedings in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York in *Peterson et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran et al.*, Case No. 13 Civ. 9195 (LAP).”

(c) REPORT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report on threats against the United States military and defense interests, personnel, and their families, posed by organizations that are designated by the Secretary of State as a foreign terrorist organization pursuant to section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189) with connections to the Government of Iran, as determined by the Director.

(2) FORM.—The report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. PENCE) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Indiana.

Mr. PENCE. Madam Chair, I rise in support of my amendment, which is deeply personal.

Madam Chair, I was assigned to the 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines. In 1983, my battalion was ordered to Beirut, Lebanon.

On October 23 of that same year, an Iranian national affiliated with Hezbollah, a terror group founded,

trained, and financially supported by the Iranian regime, drove a truck bomb into the U.S. barracks in Beirut, killing 241 servicemen, 220 of which were my fellow marines.

It is by the grace of God that I am standing here today. My battalion shipped out 10 days before the bombing. I was lucky. I was able to come home to my wife, who was expecting our first child, and my family in Columbus, Indiana.

As proud U.S. marines, Congressman GALLEGRO and I authored this bipartisan, bicameral legislation to provide a sliver of justice for the 241 heroes who were not as lucky that day.

Madam Chair, our amendment is simple. The OORAH Act would allow the families of the bombing victims to execute on the \$1.6 billion in Iranian funds currently held by a European-based firm. These funds were laundered through New York before making their way to Europe, where they sit just outside the hand of justice.

Regardless of the party you conference with or the district you represent, we can all agree that terrorists and those who support them financially must be held accountable for their actions.

When I joined the Marines in 1979, I made a promise of *Semper Fidelis*. *Semper Fi* is a lifelong commitment held by every marine for the corps and America, a promise reciprocated by the corps to all marines.

Madam Chair, we must uphold this promise. Marines are the first to fight, and this time we are fighting for the Gold Star families who lost their loved ones.

Madam Chair, I urge my colleagues to support this amendment and stand with Congressman GALLEGRO and me and our colleagues in the Senate to honor the faith and loyalty of the 241 American servicemen who made the ultimate sacrifice.

Madam Chair, OORAH stands for Our Obligation to Recognize American Heroes, or as the Marines say, OORAH.

Madam Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. GALLEGRO. Madam Chair, I claim the time in opposition, although I am not opposed to the amendment.

The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from Arizona is recognized for 5 minutes.

There was no objection.

Mr. GALLEGRO. Madam Chair, I rise in proud support of the amendment sponsored by fellow marine and public servant, Mr. PENCE.

October 23, 1983, remains seared in the memory of all marines. On that day, over 300 innocent people were killed in a surprise terrorist attack sponsored by the Government of Iran. Most of the people killed 36 years ago were my brothers. They were U.S. marines. They were serving our country and doing their best to preserve the peace in war-torn Lebanon.

We know that the wheels of justice turn slowly, Madam Chair. It took over

35 years for victims to get traction in U.S. courts. But now that they are getting that traction and winning judgments, marines in Congress are here to help to ensure that Iranian funds cannot be hidden from them in secret foreign bank accounts.

This amendment helps the families of those killed and wounded by making sure that Iran is held liable for this attack. It makes it harder for Iran to hide money in overseas bank accounts when it should be paying for the pain and suffering of its victims. It shows that, even 36 years after the attack, we have not forgotten, and it once again proves that U.S. marines remain “no better friend, no worse enemy.”

Madam Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. PENCE. Madam Chair, I thank the chairman and ranking member for their leadership and my colleague and fellow marine from Arizona (Mr. GALLEGRO) for his faithful service and unwavering support on this legislation.

Madam Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.

The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. PENCE).

The amendment was agreed to.

AMENDMENT NO. 25 OFFERED BY MR. SCHIFF

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 25 printed in part B of House Report 116-154.

Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, as the designee of the gentlewoman from Michigan (Ms. SLOTKIN), I have an amendment at the desk.

The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

Page 203, line 1, strike “REPORT REQUIRED” and insert “REPORT ON FOREIGN MALIGN INFLUENCE RESPONSE”.

Page 204, after line 10, insert the following new subsection:

(C) REPORT ON ABILITY TO IDENTIFY FOREIGN INFLUENCE EFFORTS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report concerning the ability of the intelligence community to—

(A) identify foreign influence efforts aimed at sowing discord or interfering, or both, in the political processes of the United States; and

(B) report such efforts to appropriate authorities.

(2) CONTENTS.—The report under paragraph (1) shall include the following:

(A) A description of the current level of ongoing communication and coordination across the intelligence community and law enforcement, including the Department of Justice, the Department of State, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with respect to combating foreign influence efforts described in subparagraph (A) of such paragraph.

(B) Identification of the offices or components of the departments and agencies of the Federal Government that are tasked with any responsibility with respect to combating such foreign influence efforts.

(C) Identification of the number of personnel within each element of the intelligence community and other elements of

the Federal Government that are focused on combating such foreign influence efforts, whether on a temporary or permanent basis.

(D) Identification of the legal authorities that are most relevant to combating such foreign influence efforts, including—

(i) which such legal authorities pose challenges or barriers to effectively combat such foreign influence efforts and a description of the reasons for such challenges or barriers; and

(ii) which such legal authorities pose challenges or barriers with respect to elements of the intelligence community and other elements of the Federal Government working together to combat such foreign influence efforts and a description of the reasons for such challenges or barriers.

(E) A description of the current level of communication or engagement between the intelligence community and private internet-platforms or social media companies with respect to combating such foreign influence efforts.

(F) A description of the additional resources the Director determines is necessary to effectively identify such foreign influence efforts, and the roles and responsibilities across the intelligence community that would best support the shared objective of identifying such foreign influence efforts.

(G) Any other matters the Director determines appropriate.

(3) FORM.—The report under paragraph (1) may be submitted in classified form.

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman from California (Mr. SCHIFF) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.

Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, the Intelligence Committee has invested considerable time and focus the last 3 years to study the painful lessons of foreign interference in our democratic system.

Ms. SLOTKIN's amendment will enhance the work of the committee by compelling the Director of National Intelligence to identify barriers that prevent the intelligence community from fully understanding the scope and impact of these threats.

Our adversaries are committed to employing a whole-of-government approach to execute their plan to disrupt our democratic system. In order to defeat these efforts, we must understand the scope of the threat. We must enlist our intelligence community to identify the scope of and the means by which our adversaries are attempting to achieve their goal.

This amendment sets forth a framework by which the DNI will report to Congress on these threats and identify whether there are gaps in the IC's authorities that hinder its ability to find, assess, and enable action on foreign influence campaigns.

Madam Chair, I believe this is an important amendment. I encourage my colleagues to support it, as well as the underlying bill, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. SCHIFF).

The amendment was agreed to.

□ 2130

AMENDMENT NO. 26 OFFERED BY MR. SCHIFF

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 26 printed in part B of House Report 116-154.

Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chairwoman, I rise as the designee of Ms. SLOTKIN to offer her second amendment.

The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

At the end of title V, add the following new section:

SEC. 507. ANNUAL REPORTS ON INFLUENCE OPERATIONS AND CAMPAIGNS IN THE UNITED STATES BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

(a) REPORTS.—Title XI of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3231 et seq.), as amended by section 501, is further amended by adding at the end the following new section:

“SEC. 1107. ANNUAL REPORTS ON INFLUENCE OPERATIONS AND CAMPAIGNS IN THE UNITED STATES BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

“(a) REQUIREMENT.—On an annual basis, the Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the influence operations and campaigns in the United States conducted by the Russian Federation.

“(b) CONTENTS.—Each report under subsection (a) shall include the following:

“(1) A description and listing of the Russian organizations and persons involved in influence operations and campaigns operating in the United States as of the date of the report.

“(2) An assessment of organizations that are associated with or receive funding from organizations and persons identified in paragraph (1), particularly such entities operating in the United States.

“(3) A description of the efforts by the organizations and persons identified in paragraph (1) to target, coerce, and influence populations within the United States.

“(4) An assessment of the activities of the organizations and persons identified in paragraph (1) designed to influence the opinions of elected leaders of the United States or candidates for election in the United States.

“(5) With respect to reports submitted after the first report, an assessment of the change in goals, tactics, techniques, and procedures of the influence operations and campaigns conducted by the organizations and persons identified in paragraph (1).

“(c) COORDINATION.—In carrying out subsection (a), the Director shall coordinate with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security Agency, and any other relevant head of an element of the intelligence community.

“(d) FORM.—Each report submitted under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.”

(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of contents in the first section of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by section 501, is further amended by inserting after the item relating to section 1106 the following new item:

“Sec. 1107. Annual reports on influence operations and campaigns in the United States by the Russian Federation.”

(c) INITIAL REPORT.—The Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center shall submit to the congressional in-

telligence committees the first report under section 1107 of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a), by not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman from California (Mr. SCHIFF) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.

Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chairwoman, we are all too familiar with the influence operations perpetrated by the Russian Government during the 2016 U.S. election.

As the IC articulated in its January 2017 intelligence community assessment, those operations were merely the most recent in a long history of efforts to undermine the liberal democratic order. We must remain vigilant and fully informed about the operations executed by the Government of Russia to influence and undermine our democratic system.

To that end, this amendment requires an annual report from the Director of National Intelligence containing information about the influence operations and campaigns in the U.S. by the Russian Federation. I support the amendment and urge my colleagues to do the same.

I urge support for the amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The Acting CHAIR (Mrs. MURPHY). The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. SCHIFF).

The amendment was agreed to.

AMENDMENT NO. 27 OFFERED BY MR. YOHO

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 27 printed in part B of House Report 116-154.

Mr. YOHO. Madam Chairwoman, I have an amendment at the desk.

The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

Page 81, line 12, strike “and” at the end.

Page 81, after line 12 insert the following (and redesignate the succeeding paragraph):

(2) the threat to the national security of the United States posed by telecommunications companies that are subject to the jurisdiction of a foreign adversary; and

Page 81, line 22, strike “and” at the end.

Page 81, after line 22 insert the following (and redesignate the succeeding paragraph):

(3) the threat to the national security of the United States from acquisition, importation, transfer, installation, or use of any communications technology by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States that involves communications technology designed, developed, manufactured or supplied by, controlled by, or subject to, the jurisdiction of a foreign adversary; and

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. YOHO) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. YOHO. Madam Chairwoman, I stand in support of an amendment I

have offered to the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act.

I would like to thank Representative NUNES and Representative SCHIFF for their work on this important legislation.

My proposed amendment includes within the report on 5G technology, the threat to the national security of the United States posed by telecommunication companies that are subject to the jurisdiction of a foreign adversary; namely, China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and Syria.

This will cover threats from acquisitions, importations, transfers, or use of communications technology by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States that involved technology designed, developed or controlled by a foreign adversary.

As globalization continues to shape the world we live in, it is increasingly important that the United States prioritizes the security of our cyber networks and infrastructure. Today, China controls over 60 percent of the 5G networks in the world.

In 2012, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence deemed telecommunication companies, Huawei and ZTE national security threats. Seven years later, these companies continue to harm and undermine U.S. cybersecurity interests. Should the U.S. continue to let these companies and others like them continue to proliferate our networks, we are putting the security of our citizens at risk and our national security.

We must continue our maximum pressure campaign on these malicious companies until we can ensure that these actors do not pose threats to our national security.

I yield back the balance of my time.

The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida (Mr. YOHO).

The amendment was agreed to.

AMENDMENT NO. 28 OFFERED BY MR. YOHO

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 28 printed in part B of House Report 116-154.

Mr. YOHO. Madam Chairwoman, I have an amendment at the desk.

The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

At the end of title VI, add the following new section:

SEC. 6. REPORT CHARACTERIZING DOMESTIC TERRORISM ACTIVITY WITHIN THE UNITED STATES.

(a) REPORT.—Not later than 150 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on domestic terrorism activity within the United States.

(b) CONTENTS.—The report under subsection (a) shall include the following:

(1) Activities conducted by domestic terrorist groups to restrict free speech using violence or intimidation.

(2) Activities conducted by domestic terrorist groups that are dangerous to human life and are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State.

(3) The prevalence of any domestic terrorist group's activities within the United States and abroad.

(c) COORDINATION.—The Director shall carry out subsection (a) in coordination with the head of any other agency of the Federal Government that the Director determines appropriate.

(d) FORM.—The report submitted under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. YOHO) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. YOHO. Madam Chairwoman, I rise today to offer an amendment to H.R. 3494. My amendment No. 28 would require the FBI Director, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis to submit a report on domestic terrorist activity in the United States to the congressional intelligence committees.

The report will detail:

Activities conducted by domestic terrorist groups that restrict free speech using violence or intimidation;

Activities conducted by domestic terrorist groups that are a danger to human life and are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or any State; and

The prevalence of any domestic terrorist group within the United States and abroad or any group that claimed to be domestic yet have ties to foreign groups like al-Qaida or other terrorist organizations.

There are abhorrent groups of people within the United States today whose reasons for existence is violence. They do not respect the rule of law or the values of America. Yes, we have the First Amendment that allows for freedom of speech, religion, and assembly, but with those freedoms, one must exercise responsibility.

They seek to inflict harm on Americans or specific groups of Americans because of their race, religion, personal beliefs, or other reasons.

We have seen this evil in recent years with the deadly attacks on the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh, the attack on the Mother Emanuel AME Church in Charleston, and, sadly, too many more.

Moreover, we have seen violence used by groups that restrict free speech, most recently with the attack on Andy Ngo in Portland by the group Antifa.

We are the most extraordinary Nation because of our belief in and the adherence to the idea "that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," with the rule of law included.

Groups that threaten these notions threaten our country and our very

form of government. It is imperative that Congress be informed of domestic terrorist activities and understand the prevalence of these activities.

By keeping Congress informed of these activities, we, as legislators, may continue to ensure laws are appropriately crafted to protect all Americans and safeguard the liberties we hold dear.

I encourage my colleagues to support this amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida (Mr. YOHO).

The amendment was agreed to.

AMENDMENT NO. 29 OFFERED BY MS. OMAR

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 29 printed in part B of House Report 116-154.

Ms. OMAR. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.

The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

At the end of title VII, add the following new section:

SEC. 7. REPORT ON TERRORIST SCREENING DATABASE.

(a) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of State shall jointly submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report on the terrorist screening database of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

(b) MATTERS INCLUDED.—The report under subsection (a) shall identify the following:

(1) Which foreign countries receive access to the terrorist screening database.

(2) Which foreign countries have successfully petitioned to add individuals to the terrorist screening database.

(3) What standards exist for determining which countries get access to the terrorist screening database.

(4) The extent to which the human rights record of the government of a foreign country is considered in the determination to give the country access to the terrorist screening database.

(5) What procedures, if any, exist to remove access to the terrorist screening database from a foreign country.

(6) What procedures, if any, exist to inform an individual, or the legal counsel of an individual, of the placement of the individual on the terrorist screening database.

(c) FORM.—The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentlewoman from Minnesota (Ms. OMAR) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Minnesota.

Ms. OMAR. Madam Chairwoman, my amendment mandates reporting on the foreign governments with whom we share access to the Terrorist Screening Database. The database is shared with more than 60 foreign governments, including countries with appalling human rights records, such as Saudi Arabia and China.

An FBI official has acknowledged in sworn testimony that it has never stopped sharing watch-list information with a foreign government because of that government's human rights abuses. Many of the people who are included in the database have never been charged with a crime, and, yet, we share sensitive information about them with the same government that murdered Jamal Khashoggi.

I have also received credible reports that there have been Uighurs added to the database at the request of the Chinese Government. I ask the Chair to think about that.

There is universal outrage in Washington about the treatment of the Uighur population in China. What are we talking about?

Let's be clear. These are the precursors to genocide. And while it is happening, while Members of both sides of the aisle and the Secretary of State are condemning what is happening, we are allowing the Chinese Government to add Uighurs to the Terrorist Screening Database. We are allowing them to track Uighurs in the United States.

This is probably the most appalling aspect of our sharing this information with governments that violate human rights, but it is not the only appalling aspect. One thing we know for sure in almost two decades that we have been fighting the war on terror, is that dictators have been more than happy to call whoever opposes them a terrorist.

The Saudis, whose family has direct, proven, and clear financial links to al-Qaida, are given access to this database. The Saudis, who have rounded up human rights activists, tortured them, mass executed them, and claiming they are terrorists, get to add people on this list. It is entirely possible that they get to add American citizens to this list.

This isn't compatible with a free society. It isn't compatible with our essential concepts of civil liberties. It is important to note that the evidentiary standard for being placed in the database is very low. The government only needs reasonable suspicion that someone is involved in terrorism, which is not even enough to charge someone with a crime.

It is also significant that individuals added to this database are not informed of their placements and have suffered preventable harms as a result.

So my amendment asks some basic questions, questions that we as Members of Congress have not only a right to, but a responsibility to ask.

I ask my colleagues to support this amendment. If they are concerned about civil liberties, they should be concerned about this. If they are concerned about human rights abroad, they should be concerned about this. And no matter how they feel about the database itself, this amendment asks that we need answers in order to make informed decisions about our national security policy.

Madam Chair, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California (Mr. SCHIFF), the chairman.

Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding to me.

This amendment requires a report on a number of civil liberties questions regarding the Terrorist Screening Database. We need to structure our counterterrorism programs by thinking about not only what we can do and what is constitutional to do, but what we should be doing so that we get the maximum security benefit along with the maximum privacy.

Our aim is a healthy equilibrium between security and privacy. With that in mind, I support my colleague's amendment which will assist the Intelligence Committee with its oversight and inform the public about how the privacy security balance is being struck.

I want to thank Ms. OMAR for her work, and I encourage my colleagues to support her amendment.

Ms. OMAR. Madam Chair, I am thankful to the chairman and ranking member for their support, and with that, I yield back the balance of my time.

The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from Minnesota (Ms. OMAR).

The amendment was agreed to.

The Acting CHAIR. The Chair understands that amendment No. 30 will not be offered.

AMENDMENT NO. 31 OFFERED BY MR. CROW

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 31 printed in part B of House Report 116-154.

Mr. CROW. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.

The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

At the end of title VII, add the following new section:

SEC. 708. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON AMERICANS AND FOREIGN INDIVIDUALS WHO CONTRIBUTE TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES WHO ARE HELD CAPTIVE.

It is the sense of Congress that the United States Government should—

(1) prioritize the safety and protection for all Americans, including citizens of the United States who are wrongfully detained by foreign governments;

(2) make every effort to bring these Americans back home; and

(3) provide assistance to and, as appropriate, advocate on behalf of foreign individuals detained abroad who contributed directly to the national security of the United States.

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 491, the gentleman from Colorado (Mr. CROW) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Colorado.

Mr. CROW. Madam Chairwoman, I rise today to offer an amendment to highlight the importance of honoring our commitments, to keep Americans and those who serve our country around the world safe.

Unfortunately, by virtue of being Americans and representing the values of our country, our citizens are sometimes targeted by adversarial countries and wrongfully detained. In those situations, we must leverage all available tools and resources at our disposal to secure their safe return. We must employ a whole-of-government approach to return Americans wrongfully detained in foreign countries back to their families.

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We are a nation founded on the principle of due process. We must hold other countries to the same expectations of equal treatment under the law.

We must also support the foreign nationals who put their lives and the lives of their families at risk to contribute to our national security. We owe these extraordinary individuals our gratitude for their assistance, particularly in light of the dangers that they often face. Despite precautions, in some cases, their contributions have led to their detainment or imprisonment.

One of our greatest strengths is the network of individuals and nations that want to help us because they can rely on us to keep our promises. That is why we must continue to stand by our commitments to our partners, particularly when they are persecuted for their contributions to the U.S.

Simply stated, we must honor our commitments to those who have stood by us.

This amendment asserts the importance of this position, not just because it is in the best interests of the United States, but because it is the right thing to do, and that moral responsibility is an essential virtue of being an American.

Madam Chair, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from California (Mr. SCHIFF).

Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Securing the safe release of Americans held abroad is a top and urgent priority. Congress can play a role in keeping this issue at the forefront of public consciousness.

With that in mind, I salute my colleague for all of his efforts. I thank Mr. CROW for drafting this sense of Congress that keeps the spotlight on this important issue.

Madam Chair, I urge my colleagues to support the amendment and the underlying bill.

Mr. CROW. Madam Chair, in closing, I urge my colleagues to support my amendment and uphold our obligations to our fellow Americans and partners around the world. We are a country that keeps its promises, and we must do so well into the future.

Madam Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.

The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Colorado (Mr. CROW).

The amendment was agreed to.

Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, I move that the Committee do now rise.

The motion was agreed to.

Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Ms. OMAR) having assumed the chair, Mrs. MURPHY, Acting Chair of the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 3494) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2020 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, had come to no resolution thereon.

RECOGNIZING THE FRANK VARISCHETTI FOUNDATION AND HONORING COACH ANDY EVANKO

(Mr. THOMPSON of Pennsylvania asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. THOMPSON of Pennsylvania. Madam Speaker, on June 28, I had the privilege of attending the fourth annual Frank Varischetti All-Star Football Game in Brockway, Pennsylvania.

The Frank Varischetti Foundation hosts this annual event with support from the Brockway Gridiron Association and the Brockway Area School District. The event brings the region together for a great gridiron game in support of the academic futures of local students.

In addition to showcasing the best football talent in the region, \$1,000 scholarships are awarded by game sponsors. This year, I was proud to represent many players from Pennsylvania's 15th Congressional District in awarding 20 scholarships.

The event also recognized the late coach Andy Evanko, who passed away last month from ALS, with a moment of silence. Coach Evanko was a staple in his community and coached the Curwensville Golden Tide football team from 2000 to 2018 with an impressive career record, winning more than 70 percent of his games as head coach.

These young men and their coaches truly exhibited the value of hard work and the importance of good sportsmanship.

STOP UN-AMERICAN RHETORIC

(Mr. ABRAHAM asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ABRAHAM. Madam Speaker, I am concerned about the rhetoric I have continually heard from the other side. I believe that all Members of this body love our country, but some statements from this House are un-American in tone, such as comparing ICE detention centers to concentration camps and the Holocaust. There have been suggestions that terrorist organizations were

justified in attacking our great Nation. Members have even used language expressing how ashamed they are of this country.

I am fed up with those continued attacks on the very foundations of this great Nation.

I remind my colleagues that we, as Americans, pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States of America. We must not use rhetoric that leads other nations to question our loyalties.

Madam Speaker, I am not afraid to stand up for freedom, liberty, and justice. I am proud to be an American, and I will defend the values that make this Nation great until the day I die.

ADJOURNMENT

Mr. ABRAHAM. Madam Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to; accordingly (at 9 o'clock and 51 minutes p.m.), under its previous order, the House adjourned until tomorrow, Wednesday, July 17, 2019, at 10 a.m. for morning-hour debate.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

Under clause 2 of rule XIV,

1645. A letter from the Acting Assistant Secretary for Legislation, Department of Health and Human Services, transmitting the Department's report entitled "Annual Report to Congress on the Use of Mandatory Recall Authority" for FY 2017, was taken from the Speaker's table, referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 2 of rule XIII, reports of committees were delivered to the Clerk for printing and reference to the proper calendar, as follows:

Mr. GRIJALVA: Committee on Natural Resources. H.R. 205. A bill to amend the Gulf of Mexico Energy Security Act of 2006 to permanently extend the moratorium on leasing in certain areas of the Gulf of Mexico (Rept. 116-156). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union.

Mr. GRIJALVA: Committee on Natural Resources. H.R. 1941. A bill to amend the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act to prohibit the Secretary of the Interior including in any leasing program certain planning areas, and for other purposes (Rept. 116-157). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union.

PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 2 of rule XII, public bills and resolutions of the following titles were introduced and severally referred, as follows:

By Mr. COMER (for himself and Mr. JORDAN):

H.R. 3765. A bill to amend title 13, United States Code, to require that any questionnaire used for a decennial census of population contains a question regarding citizenship, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Oversight and Reform.

By Ms. JOHNSON of Texas (for herself, Mr. LUCAS, Ms. KENDRA S. HORN of Oklahoma, and Mr. BABIN):

H.R. 3766. A bill to require any Federal agency that issues licenses to conduct activities in outer space to include in the requirements for such licenses an agreement relating to the preservation and protection of the Apollo 11 landing site, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, and in addition to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.

By Mr. SCHNEIDER:

H.R. 3767. A bill to ensure an evidence-based funding approach to study the effects of health professions opportunity grant demonstration projects, and to evaluate the demonstration projects; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. BUDD:

H.R. 3768. A bill to amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to create a safe harbor for finders and private placement brokers, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Financial Services.

By Ms. HOULAHAN:

H.R. 3769. A bill to authorize the Secretary of State to waive certain requirements with respect to eligibility for civil service positions relating to the departmental formulation and direction of foreign affairs and international relations, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. BRENDAN F. BOYLE of Pennsylvania (for himself, Ms. SCHA-KOWSKY, Ms. NORTON, and Mr. SWALWELL of California):

H.R. 3770. A bill to require the chief election officials of the States to provide voter registration forms at certain naturalization proceedings, and for other purposes; to the Committee on House Administration.

By Mr. SCHRADER (for himself and Mr. YOHO):

H.R. 3771. A bill to establish an inter-agency One Health Program, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and in addition to the Committees on Agriculture, Natural Resources, and Foreign Affairs, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.

By Mr. PETERS (for himself, Mr. RUSH, and Mr. HOLDING):

H.R. 3772. A bill to amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to ensure equitable payment for, and preserve Medicare beneficiary access to, diagnostic radiopharmaceuticals under the Medicare hospital outpatient prospective payment system; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and in addition to the Committee on Ways and Means, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.

By Mr. JOHNSON of Georgia (for himself, Mr. GARCÍA of Illinois, and Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN):

H.R. 3773. A bill to direct the Secretary of Transportation to prescribe a motor vehicle safety standard requiring new commercial motor vehicles to be equipped with an automatic emergency braking system, to require automatic emergency braking installed in commercial motor vehicles to be used while in operation, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, and in addition to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.

By Mr. BAIRD (for himself, Ms. STEVENS, Mr. BURCHETT, and Mr. CROW):