[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                 HEARING ON PROTECTING SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY 
                            IN THE COVID-19 RESPONSE

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                         SUBCOMMITTEE ON HEALTH

                                 OF THE

                    COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                     ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                              MAY 14, 2020

                               __________

                           Serial No. 116-110                      
                                                   
                           
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


           Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce

                   govinfo.gov/committee/house-energy
                        energycommerce.house.gov
                               __________

                   U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
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                    COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE

                     FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey
                                 Chairman
BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois              GREG WALDEN, Oregon
ANNA G. ESHOO, California              Ranking Member
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York             FRED UPTON, Michigan
DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado              JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois
MIKE DOYLE, Pennsylvania             MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas
JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois             STEVE SCALISE, Louisiana
G. K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina    ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio
DORIS O. MATSUI, California          CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
KATHY CASTOR, Florida                BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky
JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland           PETE OLSON, Texas
JERRY McNERNEY, California           DAVID B. McKINLEY, West Virginia
PETER WELCH, Vermont                 ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico            H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia
PAUL TONKO, New York                 GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York, Vice     BILL JOHNSON, Ohio
    Chair                            BILLY LONG, Missouri
DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa                 LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana
KURT SCHRADER, Oregon                BILL FLORES, Texas
JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,               SUSAN W. BROOKS, Indiana
    Massachusetts                    MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma
TONY CARDENAS, California            RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina
RAUL RUIZ, California                TIM WALBERG, Michigan
SCOTT H. PETERS, California          EARL L. ``BUDDY'' CARTER, Georgia
DEBBIE DINGELL, Michigan             JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina
MARC A. VEASEY, Texas                GREG GIANFORTE, Montana
ANN M. KUSTER, New Hampshire
ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
NANETTE DIAZ BARRAGAN, California
A. DONALD McEACHIN, Virginia
LISA BLUNT ROCHESTER, Delaware
DARREN SOTO, Florida
TOM O'HALLERAN, Arizona
                                 ------                                

                           Professional Staff

                   JEFFREY C. CARROLL, Staff Director
                TIFFANY GUARASCIO, Deputy Staff Director
                MIKE BLOOMQUIST, Minority Staff Director
                         Subcommittee on Health

                       ANNA G. ESHOO, California
                                Chairwoman
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York             MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas
G. K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina,     Ranking Member
    Vice Chair                       FRED UPTON, Michigan
DORIS O. MATSUI, California          JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois
KATHY CASTOR, Florida                BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky
JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland           H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia
BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico            GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
KURT SCHRADER, Oregon                BILLY LONG, Missouri
JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,               LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana
    Massachusetts                    SUSAN W. BROOKS, Indiana
TONY CARDENAS, California            MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma
PETER WELCH, Vermont                 RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina
RAUL RUIZ, California                EARL L. ``BUDDY'' CARTER, Georgia
DEBBIE DINGELL, Michigan             GREG GIANFORTE, Montana
ANN M. KUSTER, New Hampshire         GREG WALDEN, Oregon (ex officio)
ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
NANETTE DIAZ BARRAGAN, California
LISA BLUNT ROCHESTER, Delaware
BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois
FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey (ex 
    officio)
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
Hon. Anna G. Eshoo, a Representative in Congress from the State 
  of California, opening statement...............................     1
    Prepared statement...........................................     3
Hon. Michael C. Burgess, a Representative in Congress from the 
  State of Texas, opening statement..............................     4
    Prepared statement...........................................     5
Hon. Frank Pallone, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the 
  State of New Jersey, opening statement.........................     7
    Prepared statement...........................................     8
Hon. Greg Walden, a Representative in Congress from the State of 
  Oregon, opening statement......................................    11
    Prepared statement...........................................    13

                               Witnesses

Richard A. Bright, Ph.D., Senior Advisor, National Institutes of 
  Health.........................................................    15
    Prepared statement...........................................    17
Mike L. Bowen, Executive Vice President of Prestige Ameritech of 
  North Richland Hills...........................................    85
    Prepared statement...........................................    87
    Answers to submitted questions...............................   301

                           Submitted Material

Letter of May 11, 2020, to Ms. Eshoo, on SUD, from Mr. Burgess, 
  submitted by Mr. Burgess.......................................   130
Letter of May 12, 2020, to Ms. Eshoo, on Dr. Bright, from Mr. 
  Burgess, submitted by Mr. Burgess..............................   135
Letter of May 12, 2020, to Ms. Eshoo, on Gaps in Overcomes 
  Demands from Mr. Burgess, submitted by Mr. Burgess.............   140
Letter of May 13, 2020, to Ms. Eshoo, on Strategic National 
  Stockpile, from Mr. Burgess, submitted by Mr. Burgess..........   143
Letter of May 13, 2020, to Ms. Eshoo, on Testing and PPE Demand, 
  from Mr. Burgess, submitted by Mr. Burgess.....................   146
Letter of May 8, 2020, to Ms. Eshoo, on SNS, from Mr. Burgess, 
  submitted by Mr. Burgess.......................................   150
Letter of May 10, 2020, to Mr. Burgess, from Ms. Eshoo, submitted 
  by Ms. Eshoo...................................................   153
Letter of May 12, 2020, to Mr. Burgess, from Ms. Eshoo, submitted 
  by Ms. Eshoo...................................................   154
Letter of May 13, 2020, to Mr. Burgess, from Ms. Eshoo, submitted 
  by Ms. Eshoo...................................................   157
Article of January 30, 2020, ``House panel plans coronavirus 
  hearing, citing public anxiety,'' Politico article entitled, 
  submitted by Mr. Burgess.......................................   158
SES, PMAP of May 2019, submitted by Ms. Eshoo....................   159
Report of October 2019, ``Global Health Security Index: Building 
  Collective Action and Accountability,'' from NTI, Johns Hopkins 
  University, submitted by Mr. Eshoo \1\
Article of May 2020, ``HHS Vaccine Expert to Detail Complaint in 
  House Testimony,'' Wall Street Journal, submitted by Ms. Eshoo.   170

----------
\1\ The information has been retained in committee files and also 
  is available at https://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF14/
  20200514/110967/HHRG-116-IF14-20200514-SD014.pdf.
Article of March 15, 2020, ``A Complete List of Trump's Attempts 
  to Play Down Coronavirus,'' New York Times, submitted by Ms. 
  Eshoo..........................................................   173
Article of May 2020, ``A nurse without an N95 mask raced in to 
  treat a `code blue' patient, L. A. Times, submitted by Ms. 
  Eshoo..........................................................   181
Tweet of March 19, 2020, from Bayer US, submitted by Ms. Eshoo...   189
Article of April 27, 2020, ``State Department says coronavirus 
  samples from China `critical' for developing vaccine; Experts 
  say that's not the case,'' CBS News, submitted by Ms. Eshoo....   191
Report of April 14, 2020, ``Characteristics of Health Care 
  Personnel with COVID-19, United States,'' CDC, Morbidity and 
  Mortality Weekly, submitted by Ms. Eshoo.......................   197
Article of May 14, 2020, ``Colleagues paint a mixed picture of 
  ousted vaccine chief,'' by Dan Diamond, Politico, submitted by 
  Ms. Eshoo \2\
Article of April 7, 2020, ``Communities of Color at Higher Risk 
  for Health and Economic Challenges due to COVID-19,'' Kaiser 
  Family Foundation, submitted by Ms. Eshoo......................   202
Update of May 13, 2020, COVID-19 Coronvirus Pandemic, from 
  Worldmeter, submitted by Ms. Eshoo \3\
Article of May 7, 2020, ``FDA Pulls Approval for Dozens of Mask 
  Makers in China'' by Austen Hufford and Mark Maremont, Wall 
  Street Journal, submitted by Ms. Eshoo.........................   213
Article of April 22, 2020, ``Health Chief's Early Missteps Set 
  Back Coronavirus Response'' by Rebecca Ballhaus and Stephanie 
  Armour, Wall Street Journal, submitted by Ms. Eshoo............   216
Report of February 27, 2020, ``Here's the Johns Hopkins study 
  President Trump referenced in his coronavirus news conference'' 
  Johns Hopkins University HUB, submitted by Ms. Eshoo...........   226
Letter of May 12, 2020, to Mr. Bright, by Jacob B. Land, OSC, 
  submitted by Ms. Eshoo.........................................   230
Letter of May 14, 2020, to Ms. Eshoo and Mr. Burgess, from Jaime 
  Pia Cortes, Executive President, Puerto Rico Hospital 
  Association, submitted by Ms. Eshoo............................   232
Fact of May 13, 2020, ``President Donald J. Trump is Committed to 
  Providing Support to Underserved Communities Impacted by the 
  Coronavirus Pandemic,'' submitted by Ms. Eshoo.................   236
Statement from CARES, submitted by Ms. Eshoo.....................   239
Article of April 14, 2020, ``The Huge Cost of Waiting to Contain 
  the Pandemic,'' by Britta L. Jewell and Nicholas P. Jewell, New 
  York Times, submitted by Ms. Eshoo.............................   250
Fact of May 11, 2020, ``The United States has Built the World's 
  Leading Coronavirus Testing System,'' submitted by Ms. Eshoo...   255
Release of April 11, 2020, ``The White House has invoked the 
  Defense Production Act to produce over 39 million N95 masks 
  over the next 90 days'' submitted by Ms. Eshoo.................   257
Remarks of May 13, 2020, ``President Trump, Vice President Pence, 
  and Members of the Coronavirus Task Force in Press Briefing,'' 
  by James S. Brady, White House Briefing, submitted by Ms. Eshoo 
  \4\
Article of May 14, 2020, ``Top Trump critic will testify before a 
  chairwoman who is a close ally,'' by Dan Diamond, Politico, 
  submitted by Ms. Eshoo.........................................   259

----------
\2\ The information has been retained in committee files and also 
  is available at https://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF14/
  20200514/110967/HHRG-116-IF14-20200514-SD021.pdf.
\3\ The information has been retained in committee files and also 
  is available at https://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF14/
  20200514/110967/HHRG-116-IF14-20200514-SD023.pdf.
\4\ The information has been retained in committee files and also 
  is available at https://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF14/
  20200514/110967/HHRG-116-IF14-20200514-SD031.pdf.
Statement of Alex Azar, submitted by Ms. Eshoo \5\
Article of April 15, 2020, ``True Toll of COVID-19 on U.S. Health 
  Care Workers Unknown,'' by Christina Jewett and Liz Szabo, 
  Kaiser Health News, submitted by Ms. Eshoo.....................   267
Article ``Trump administration pushed use of remdesivir, but 
  unequal rollout angers doctors,'' by Christopher Rowland, 
  submitted by Ms. Eshoo.........................................   270
Article of May 11, 2020, ``Trump's White House banner claims, 
  America leads the world in testing,'' That's wrong, by German 
  Lopez, VOX, submitted by Ms. Eshoo.............................   274
Article of May 14, 2020, ``U.S. medical stockpile wasn't built to 
  handle current crisis, former director says,'' Politico, 
  submitted by Ms. Eshoo.........................................   279
Article of May 4, 2020, ``The coronavirus pandemic is pushing 
  America into a mental health crisis, by William Wan,'' The 
  Washington Post, submitted by Ms. Eshoo........................   285
Article of Feb 13, 2020, ``Will the New Coronavirus `Go Away' in 
  April?,'' submitted by Ms. Eshoo...............................   292
Report of April 7, 2020, ``States Competing in `Global Jungle' 
  for PPE,'' by Andrew Soergel, Senior Writer, Economics, U.S. 
  News & World Report submitted by Mr. Lujan.....................   296
Letter of February 15, 2020, to Laura Wolf and Rick Bright, by 
  Mike Bowen, Prestige Ameritech, submitted by Mr. Walden........   299

----------
 \5\ The information has been retained in committee files and 
  also is available at https://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF14/
  20200514/110967/HHRG-116-IF14-20200514-SD036.pdf.

 
  HEARING ON PROTECTING SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY IN THE COVID-19 RESPONSE

                              ----------                              


                         THURSDAY, MAY 14, 2020

                  House of Representatives,
                            Subcommittee on Health,
                          Committee on Energy and Commerce,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m., in 
the John D. Dingell, Room 2123, Rayburn House Office Building, 
Hon. Anna G. Eshoo (chairwoman of the subcommittee) presiding.
    Members present: Representatives Eshoo, Engel, Butterfield, 
Matsui, Castor, Sarbanes, Lujan, Schrader, Kennedy, Cardenas, 
Welch, Ruiz, Dingell, Kuster, Kelly, Barragan, Blunt Rochester, 
Rush, Pallone (ex officio), Burgess (subcommittee ranking 
member), Guthrie, Griffith, Bilirakis, Long, Bucshon, Brooks, 
Mullin, Hudson, Carter, and Walden (ex officio).
    Also present: Representative O'Halleran.
    Staff present: Billy Benjamin, Systems Administrator; 
Jeffrey C. Carroll, Staff Director; Aisling McDonough, Policy 
Coordinator; Joe Orlando, Staff Assistant; Andrew Souvall, 
Director of Communications, Outreach and Member Services; 
Jennifer Barblan, Minority Chief Counsel, Oversight and 
Investigations; Mike Bloomquist, Minority Staff Director; Tyler 
Greenberg, Minority Staff Assistant; Peter Kielty, Minority 
General Counsel; Ryan Long, Minority Deputy Staff Director; 
James Paluskiewicz, Minority Chief Counsel, Health; Tiffany 
Haverly Minority Communications Director; and Elizabeth Allen, 
Burgess Health Counsel.
    Ms. Eshoo. The Subcommittee on Health will now come to 
order. Good morning colleagues. The Chair now recognizes 
herself for 5 minutes for an opening statement.
    Mr. Burgess. Parliamentary inquiry as we start this 
hearing?
    Ms. Eshoo. I want to do my opening statement. I already 
recognized myself. I will recognize you afterward.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ANNA G. ESHOO, A REPRESENTATIVE IN 
             CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

    I never thought I would be holding, or that we would be 
holding a hearing under these sad circumstances, but I think it 
is a necessary one.
    Our country is in pain. Americans are afraid, they are 
sick, they are hungry and jobless, and over 80,000 souls have 
been lost. And the government that was supposed to protect them 
has failed. They are heroes and they have risen, extraordinary 
ordinary Americans showing courage, compassion and a sense of 
self-sacrifice and duty beyond what could have or should have 
been asked of them. Regular Americans have risen when their 
leaders have not.
    We are the greatest country on Earth. And yet, we have the 
most cases and the most deaths from COVID-19 of any Nation in 
the world. Why? First is the inept, ineffective and extremely 
late effort to respond to what was clear to many scientists and 
public health experts in January. That basic delay cost 
precious lives, and is continuing to cost lives. We can't have 
a system where the price paid is unconscionable, mothers losing 
daughters, and daughters losing fathers because of 
incompetence, denial, delay, and a disorganized response.
    Frankly, I am tired of those who bear the responsibility, 
accepting none of it, while deflecting blame on others, the 
previous administration, the World Health Organization, the 
Wuhan lab, anywhere but where the blame belongs.
    Second, the United States has and remains dangerously 
dependent on foreign countries for our supply of critical 
lifesaving drugs and lifesaving equipment, masks, gloves, PPE, 
and ventilators. As a result, we can't treat our own people 
without relying on China and others to supply us. We can't 
outfit our first responders, our hospital workers, our nurses, 
our doctors. We can't care for our own Nation in crisis. This 
surely is a national security issue.
    I want to thank the gentlewoman from Indiana, Ms. Brooks, 
for her bipartisan work with me to address the drug supply 
chain issue, as well as other members, on a bipartisan basis, 
for their legislation on those issues as well.
    Today, we are going to hear about the disastrous Federal 
response to an approaching pandemic. Dr. Bright has filed one 
of the most specific and troubling whistleblower complaints I 
have ever seen. He was the right person, with the right 
judgment, at the right time. He was not only ignored, he was 
fired for being right. We can't have a system where the 
government fires those who get it right and reward those who 
get it completely wrong.
    Mr. Michael Bowen, the executive vice president of Prestige 
Ameritech, will speak to America's crippling dependence on 
foreign countries for critical medical supplies. A public 
health issue, and a national security issue.
    Our country is paying a terrible price today and it rests 
on Congress to address these threats where any effort of an 
adversary can cut off our supply of lifesaving drugs and 
supplies, our lifeline. And this would create a healthcare 
disaster on a scale never experienced before. I bear this 
responsibility, as does every Member of Congress.
    This subcommittee has jurisdiction over our country's most 
prestigious healthcare institutions, FDA, NIH, CDC, and BARDA. 
We have to listen, we have to learn, and we must work together 
for the people of our country who need us so, so much, 
regardless of inconvenient truths.
    Finally, I regret that Secretary Azar, Dr. Robert Kadlec, 
and Dr. Peter Navarro have all refused to testify today.
    I now ask for a moment of silence in honor of the over 
80,000 Americans who have lost their lives from COVID-19.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Eshoo follow:]

                Prepared Statement of Hon. Anna G. Eshoo

    I never thought I would be holding a hearing under these 
sad circumstances, but it is a necessary one.
    Our country is in pain.
    Americans are afraid, sick, hungry, and jobless, and over 
80,000 souls have been lost. And the government that was 
supposed to protect them, has failed.
    Heroes have risen . . . extraordinary/ordinary Americans 
showing courage, compassion, and a sense of self-sacrifice and 
duty beyond what could have, or should have been asked of them.
    Regular Americans have risen when their leaders have not.
    We are the greatest country on earth, and yet we have the 
most cases and the most deaths from COVID-19 of any nation in 
the world.
    Why?
    First is the inept, ineffective, and extremely late effort 
to respond to what was clear to many scientists and public 
health experts in January. That basic delay has cost precious 
lives, and is continuing to cost lives.
    We can't have a system where the price paid is 
unconscionable--mothers losing daughters, daughters losing 
fathers because of incompetence, denial, delay, and a 
disorganized zed response.
    I'm tired of those who bear the greatest responsibility 
accepting none of it, while deflecting blame on others--the 
previous Administration, the World Health Organization , the 
Wuhan Lab - anywhere but where the blame belongs.
    Second, the United States has and remains dangerously 
dependent on foreign countries for our supply of critical, 
lifesaving drugs, and lifesaving equipment--masks, gloves, PPE, 
and ventilators.
    As a result, we can't treat our own people without relying 
on China and others to supply us.
    We can't outfit our first responders, our hospital workers, 
our doctors. We can't care for our own nation in crisis.
    Today we will hear about the disastrous federal response to 
an approaching pandemic. Dr. Bright has filed one of the most 
specific and troubling whistleblower complaints I've ever seen. 
He was the right person with the right judgment at the right 
time. He was not only ignored, he was fired for being right. We 
can't have a system where the government fires those who get it 
right and reward those who get it completely wrong.
    Mr. Michael Bowen, the Executive Vice President of Prestige 
Ameritech, will speak to America's crippling dependence on 
foreign countries for critical medical supplies--a public 
health issue and a national security issue.
    Our country is paying a terrible price today, and it rests 
on Congress to address this threat where any effort of an 
adversary to cut off our supply of lifesaving drugs and 
supplies--our lifeline--would create a health care disaster on 
a scale never experienced before. I bear this responsibility as 
does every Member of Congress.
    Finally, I regret that Secretary Azar, Dr. Robert Kadlec, 
and Dr. Peter Navarro have all refused to testify today.
    I now ask for a moment of silence in honor of the over 
80,000 Americans who have lost their lives from COVID-19.

    Ms. Eshoo. The Chair now recognizes----
    Mr. Burgess. Before I am recognized for an opening 
statement. I wonder if I might be recognized for a 
parliamentary inquiry.
    Ms. Eshoo. The gentleman is recognized to state his 
parliamentary inquiry.
    Mr. Burgess. The inquiry is I would like clarification on 
the witness before us today. Is this witness testifying as a 
government witness or as an individual?
    Ms. Eshoo. Dr. Bright is testifying as a Federal employee, 
correct? And representing--he is a Federal employee 
representing himself.
    I now recognize the ranking member of the subcommittee.
    Mr. Walden. Madam Chair, just a question. Normally we have 
nameplates identifying who is at the table. I know Dr. Bright, 
but I am not sure who is next to him.
    Ms. Eshoo. You are correct. I don't know why we don't have 
nameplates. I didn't notice that when I came into the hearing 
room. Can the staff provide them? Is there any way the staff 
can provide them? I think we can.
    I also would like to inform the members that Dr. Bright's 
attorney, Debra Katz, is at the table, she has requested a 
microphone. She is not here as a witness, so we will not be 
asking her questions. She is simply here to--representing her 
client.
    I now would like to recognize the ranking member of the 
subcommittee, Dr. Burgess, for his 5 minutes for an opening 
statement.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL C. BURGESS, A REPRESENTATIVE 
              IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS

    Mr. Burgess. I thank the Chair. And the Energy and 
Commerce, particularly the Subcommittee on Health, is the 
premiere health subcommittee in the Congress. We have a broad 
jurisdiction, a longstanding tradition of tackling important 
healthcare issues in a bipartisan manner. I personally, like 
our witness today, have been very, very concerned, in fact, 
sounding the alarm about this novel coronavirus since January. 
So I ask, why is this the first official hearing that we are 
having on this topic? To say this is a disappointment would be 
an understatement.
    But not only disappointment, but, quite frankly, I am 
concerned it took five months to have a hearing on this novel 
coronavirus, instead of tackling any of the issues suggested in 
the letters that I have sent to you this week, we are examining 
a whistleblower complaint that is only one week old before a 
proper investigation. In these letters, I will find the 
importance of addressing the strategic national stockpile, 
COVID-19's impact on mental health, testing. Certainly, we 
should have a hearing on testing, racial disparities and 
provider relief. Lack of attention to these details is 
detrimental to our Nation's overall response to this pandemic, 
and it is the responsibility of this House and the 
responsibility of this committee. We continue to stand on the 
sidelines instead of becoming fully engaged.
    Every whistleblower deserves to be heard. Dr. Bright has 
raised serious allegations and they deserve investigation. 
Whistleblowers must have their rights protected and deserve to 
have their allegations investigated with policies and 
procedures that have been long-established and upheld as 
independent and fair.
    Madam Chair, on April 23rd, CNN reported that you planned 
to called Dr. Bright to testify. Dr. Bright did not actually 
file his whistleblower complaint with the Office of Special 
Counsel until Tuesday, May 5. That same day, it was announced 
on social media that you planned to hold a hearing, but it was 
not officially noticed until two days later. By Friday, May 8, 
the Office of Special Counsel recommended that Dr. Bright be 
temporarily reinstated as director of BARDA so that he could 
early conduct its investigation and move forward with its usual 
processes of reviewing whistleblower complaints.
    Despite the hearing memo, no final determination of a 
violation of a whistleblower statute actually has been made. 
Following a robust investigation process, the customary setting 
for a whistleblower hearing would be in our Energy and Commerce 
Committee under oath in the Oversight and Investigations 
Subcommittee. To say this hearing is premature and it is 
disservice to the investigations of Dr. Bright's complaint, I 
think, goes without saying.
    You have trampled on minority rights. You would have never 
tolerated that when you were in the minority. You neglected the 
tradition of this committee and the manner this hearing was 
called. The number of procedural fouls committed in advance of 
this hearing would certainly have led the Chair to foul out of 
multiple basketball games. Apparently in a world without 
sports, this subcommittee has become political sport.
    More than 80,000 American lives have been lost to this 
pandemic. It continues to wreak havoc on our communities, not 
only in terms of physical health, but mental health and 
certainly financial health. We should be conducting a hearing 
on the real-time implementation of the Pandemic All-Hazards 
Preparedness and Advancing Innovation Act, and we should have 
done it in February.
    As a Democratic counterpart to the primary author, Dr. 
Susan Brooks on this legislation, you, Madam Chair, should have 
a great interest in holding such a hearing.
    In my district, we have seen deaths amongst young African 
Americans from COVID-19. We are hearing about a new phenomenon 
of very young individuals who are dying from an intense 
inflammatory response, apparently sparked by infection with 
this virus.
    We should hear from some of these families and medical 
professionals to analyze why this virus has disproportionately 
affected some communities, particularly minority communities.
    So, I said it before: not all heroes wear capes hospitals, 
doctors, and other healthcare providers are on the front lines 
every single day battling this virus; they go to work so we can 
stay home, which we have done very successfully. The inability 
to conduct nonessential procedures in visits has led to 
financial harm to our hospitals and doctors. How our States and 
the country preparing to ease back into providing medical care? 
Is the distribution of provider relief funds in the CARES Act 
working?
    These are the questions we should be asking the experts 
today. I appreciate Chairman Pallone's willingness to hold 
telephone briefings, since we all have our own questions. But 
let me just say, this pandemic is about the public health of 
our Nation. I want to thank you for your commitment to hold 
future hearings on the strategic national stockpile, mental 
health, and racial disparities. I am happy to help you set the 
agenda for the rest of the year. I hope you will commit to 
additional hearings on testing and the provider relief fund. 
And I request that my letters and your responses be part of the 
record.
    I yield back.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Burgess follow:]

             Prepared Statement of Hon. Michael C. Burgess

    Thank you, Madam Chair. The Energy and Commerce 
Subcommittee on Health is the premier health subcommittee in 
Congress. We have a broad jurisdiction and a long-standing 
tradition of tackling important health care issues in a 
bipartisan manner. I have been sounding the alarm about COVID-
19 since January. So why is this the first official hearing we 
are having on the topic? To say this is a disappointment is an 
understatement.
    Not only am I disappointed but, quite frankly, I am 
concerned it took five months to have a hearing on COVID-19. 
Instead of tackling any of the issues suggested in the letters 
I wrote to you this week, we are examining a week-old 
whistleblower complaint before a proper investigation. In these 
letters, I outlined the importance of addressing the Strategic 
National Stockpile, COVID-19's impact on mental health, 
testing, racial disparities, and provider relief. The lack of 
attention to these issues is detrimental to our nation's 
overall response to this pandemic. Yet, we continue to stand on 
the sidelines instead of becoming fully engaged.
    Every whistleblower deserves to be heard. Dr. Bright has 
raised serious allegations that should be investigated. 
Whistleblowers must have their rights protected and deserve to 
have their allegations investigated with policies and 
procedures that have been long established and upheld as 
independent and fair.
    Madam Chair, on April 23, CNN reported that you planned to 
call Dr. Bright to testify. Dr. Bright did not actually file 
his whistleblower complaint with the Office of Special Counsel 
until Tuesday, May 5. That same day, it was announced on 
Twitter that you planned to hold a hearing, but it was not 
officially noticed until two days later.
    By Friday, May 8, the Office of Special Counsel recommended 
that Dr. Bright be temporarily reinstated as director of BARDA 
so that it could conduct its investigation and move forward 
with its usual process of thoroughly reviewing a whistleblower 
complaint.
    Despite your misleading hearing memo--no final 
determination of a violation of whistleblower statute has been 
made. Following a robust investigation process, the customary 
setting for a whistleblower hearing in the Energy and Commerce 
Committee would be under oath in the Oversight and 
Investigations Subcommittee. This hearing is premature and a 
disservice to the investigation of Dr. Bright's complaint.
    You disrespected [trampled] minority rights and neglected 
the tradition of this Committee in the manner this hearing was 
called. The number of procedural fouls committed in advance of 
this hearing would certainly have led the Chair to foul out of 
multiple basketball games. Apparently in a world without 
sports, this subcommittee has become a political football.
    More than 80,000 American lives have been lost to this 
pandemic. COVID-19 continues to wreak havoc on our communities 
not only in terms of physical health, but mental health and 
financial health. We should be conducting a hearing on the 
real-time implementation of the Pandemic and All-Hazards 
Preparedness and Advancing Innovation Act. As the Democratic 
counterpart to the primary author, Rep. Susan Brooks, on this 
legislation, you should have great interest in holding such a 
hearing.
    In my district, we have seen deaths among young African 
Americans from COVID-19. We should hear from some of these 
families and medical professionals to analyze why this virus 
has disproportionally impacted minority communities.
    Not all heroes wear capes. Hospitals, doctors, and other 
health care providers are on the front lines every day battling 
this virus. They go to work so we can stay home. The inability 
to conduct non-essential procedures and visits has led to 
financial difficulties. How are states and the country 
preparing to ease back into providing medical care? Is the 
distribution of the Provider Relief Fund in the CARES Act 
working? These are the questions we should be asking experts 
today.
    I appreciate Chairman Pallone's willingness to hold 
telephone briefings on testing since we all have our own 
questions about it. Because of its importance to re-opening the 
economy, it is critical that this subcommittee promptly holds a 
public hearing to hear from experts.
    In conclusion, this pandemic is about the public health of 
our nation. Thank you for your commitment to hold future 
hearings on the strategic national stockpile, mental health and 
racial disparities. I hope you will commit to additional 
hearings on testing and the Provider Relief Fund.
    I request that my letters and your responses be inserted 
into the record, and I yield back.

    Ms. Eshoo. The gentleman yields back. I think the gentleman 
will recall that I called for a hearing on January 30th. And on 
the heels of that, it was to be with Dr. Kadlec, Dr. Fauci, all 
the heads of our health agencies. And it was Secretary Azar 
that said, they cannot come. I am the top person and when I 
come, they will come with me. So that was January 30th.
    Mr. Burgess. Madam Chair, if I may. I used to go to the 
Oversight and Government Reform--for two days.
    Ms. Eshoo. I am not finished yet, Dr. Burgess. You have 
written several letters to me in the last week, and I 
communicated to you I am happy to sit down with you to review 
and to come up with all the appropriate hearings that this 
subcommittee should hold, and we will work together on that. We 
have a lot of work to do. You are absolutely right, the 
stockpile, testing, the list are as long as Pennsylvania 
Avenue. So we will work together on that, rest assured.
    Ms. Eshoo.Now, I would like to recognize the chairman of 
the full committee, Mr. Pallone for 5 minutes for opening his 
opening statement.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK PALLONE, Jr., A REPRESENTATIVE 
            IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY

    Mr. Pallone. Thank you, Madam Chair. And thank you, Ms. 
Eshoo, for initiating this hearing and putting all your energy 
into it so that we are here today with Dr. Bright.
    We are here as part of the Energy and Commerce Committee's 
ongoing work to confront the largest public health and economic 
crisis of our lifetimes. It has been mentioned more than 80,000 
Americans have lost their lives, while more than over 36 
million others have lost their jobs as of today. This is a 
national emergency that requires every aspect of government to 
work together to reduce the spread of this terrible virus so we 
can confidently begin to reopen our economy. While this 
Congress and the President have worked together to enact four 
laws to combat the pandemic and provide economic assistance to 
the American people, new laws are simply not enough.
    President Trump and his administration have failed to 
provide the consistent and stable leadership that is necessary 
to guide our Nation through this public health and economic 
crisis. For months, the President has delivered mixed messages 
and misinformation to the American people, creating confusion 
across the Nation. Instead of showing leadership, competence, 
and vision in a time of crisis, the administration has 
abdicated its responsibility and forced States to fend for 
themselves and find their own way out of this pandemic.
    And while States and frontline healthcare workers were 
pleading for personal protective equipment, testing supplies, 
and other resources to protect them and their patients, 
President Trump's response was to let States fight it out on 
the open market.
    For months, the President has refused to develop and 
implement a national testing program. For months, we have been 
promised millions of tests were right around the corner. The 
promises have been hollow. Testing is getting better, but 
nowhere where what it needs to be. It doesn't help that the 
President proclaimed about testing earlier this week, and I 
quote, ``We have met the moment, and we have prevailed.'' That 
could not be further from the truth, Mr. President.
    Dr. Rick Bright, the former director of BARDA, has come 
forward as a whistleblower and made serious allegations, 
including a lack of urgency by administration officials to 
respond to the virus, mismanagement, and failing to procure 
necessary supplies and disregard for public health and 
scientific integrity. His claims lie at the heart of this 
committee's concerns regarding the administration's response to 
the COVID-19 pandemic. We are here today to hear the 
perspective of Dr. Bright, who is positioned to discuss the 
administration's preparations in response to this pandemic.
    Now, the failures we have seen simply cannot persist. That 
is why the Energy and Commerce Committee continues to conduct 
robust oversight, and to propose bold legislative solutions. We 
have been demanding answers and information from the 
administration on testing, contact tracing, the supply chain, 
food safety and the safety of food production workers, and 
attempts to undermine science and public health. To date, we 
have yet to receive any sufficient responses from the Trump 
administration.
    And as for legislation, Congress has already passed four 
major coronavirus response packages that were improved by the 
work of this committee. And now, with the sense of urgency this 
moment requires, earlier this week, we proposed the HEROES Act, 
which is to be voted on tomorrow by the full House. The HEROES 
Act continues our ongoing commitment to providing the 
healthcare resources and support needed to combat the 
coronavirus crisis. Our legislation will strengthen testing and 
contact tracing by finally requiring the administration to 
develop comprehensive plans with clear benchmarks and timelines 
and public reporting of key metrics. This will allow 
transparency so we can see if the Trump administration is 
fulfilling their promises and hold them accountable if they are 
not.
    We also provide $75 billion to support robust testing, 
contact tracing, surveillance and containment activities. This 
is beyond the 25 that was in the last bill. And we simply 
cannot beat this virus without these efforts in place. Our 
legislation also ensures that all COVID-19 treatments, drugs 
and vaccines are free of cost for patients. The bill will help 
us shore up our public health infrastructure for the long road 
ahead.
    Our top priority is the health and safety of the American 
people. The HEROES Act builds on the progress we have made and 
lays the foundation we will need to ease social distancing, and 
safely reopen the economy.
    So, I just want to thank Dr. Bright for coming forward and 
for being here today. I want to thank you, Madam Chair, for 
bringing him here. And I am hopeful that this hearing will help 
us better understand the failures of the Trump administration 
so that, collectively, we can find solutions that will help us 
finally get a handle on this virus. It is the only way we will 
be able to protect the American people, and safely and 
confidently reopen our communities.
    I thank you, Madam Chair, and I yield back.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Pallone follow:]

             Prepared Statement of Hon. Frank Pallone, Jr.

    Today, we are here as part of the Energy and Commerce 
Committee's ongoing work to confront the largest public health 
and economic crisis of our lifetimes. More than 80,000 
Americans have lost their lives to COVID-19, while more than 36 
million others have lost their jobs.
    This is a national emergency that requires every aspect of 
government to work together to reduce the spread of this 
terrible virus so we can confidently begin to reopen our 
economy. While this Congress and the President have worked 
together to enact four laws to combat the pandemic and provide 
economic assistance to the American people, new laws are simply 
not enough.
    President Trump and his Administration have failed to 
provide the consistent and stable leadership that is necessary 
to guide our nation through this public health and economic 
crisis. For months, the President has delivered mixed messages 
and misinformation to the American people, creating confusion 
across the nation.
    Instead of showing leadership, competence and vision in a 
time of crisis, the Administration is abdicating its 
responsibility and forcing states to fend for themselves and 
find their own way out of this pandemic.
    While states and frontline healthcare workers were pleading 
for personal protective equipment, testing supplies and other 
resources to protect them and their patients, President Trump's 
response was to let states fight it out on the open market.
    For months, the President has refused to develop and 
implement a national testing program. For months, we've been 
promised millions of tests were right around the corner. The 
promises have been hollow--testing is getting better, but 
nowhere near where it needs to be. It doesn't help that the 
President proclaimed about testing earlier this week that, ``We 
have met the moment and we have prevailed.'' That could not be 
further from the truth.
    Dr. Rick Bright, the former Director of BARDA, has come 
forward as a whistleblower and made serious allegations - 
including a lack of urgency by Administration officials to 
respond to the virus, mismanagement and failure to procure 
necessary supplies, and disregard for public health and 
scientific integrity.
    His claims lie at the heart of this Committee's concerns 
regarding the Administration's response to the COVID-19 
pandemic. We are here today to hear the perspective of Dr. 
Bright who is positioned to discuss the Administration's 
preparation and response to this pandemic.
    The failures we have seen simply cannot persist--that's why 
this Committee continues to conduct robust oversight and to 
propose bold legislative solutions. We've been demanding 
answers and information from the Administration on testing, 
contact tracing, the supply chain, food safety and the safety 
of food production workers, and attempts to undermine science 
and public health. To date, we have yet to receive any 
sufficient responses from this Administration.
    As for legislation, Congress has already passed four major 
coronavirus response packages that were improved by the work of 
this Committee. And now, with the sense of urgency this moment 
requires, earlier this week we proposed The Heroes Act, which 
is to be voted on tomorrow by the full House.
    This legislation continues our ongoing commitment to 
providing the health care resources and support needed to 
combat the coronavirus crisis. Our legislation will strengthen 
testing and contact tracing by finally requiring the 
Administration to develop comprehensive plans, with clear 
benchmarks and timelines, and public reporting of key metrics. 
This will allow transparency so we can see if the Trump 
Administration is fulfilling their promises and hold them 
accountable if they are not. We also provide $75 billion--to 
support robust testing, contact tracing, surveillance and 
containment activities. We simply cannot beat this virus 
without these efforts in place.
    Our legislation also ensures that all COVID-19 treatments 
drugs and vaccines are free of cost-sharing for patients.
    The bill will help us shore up our public health 
infrastructure for the long road ahead.
    Our top priority is the health and safety of the American 
people. The Heroes Act builds on the progress we have made and 
lays the foundation we will need to ease social distancing and 
safely reopen the economy.
    I thank Dr. Bright for coming forward and for being here 
today. I'm hopeful that this hearing will help us better 
understand the failures of this Administration so that 
collectively we can find solutions that will help us finally 
get a handle on this virus. It is the only way we will be able 
to protect the American people, and safely and confidently 
reopen our communities.
    Thank you, and I yield back.

    Ms. Eshoo. The gentleman yields back. It is a pleasure to 
recognize the gentleman from Oregon, the ranking member of the 
full committee, Mr. Walden.
    Mr. Walden. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. And before I 
use my time, I do have just a parliamentary question for you, 
if you would yield to that. Madam Chair?
    Ms. Eshoo. State your parliamentary inquiry.
    Mr. Walden. So I know we are operating under really unusual 
conditions----
    Ms. Eshoo. We are.
    Mr. Walden [continue]. Because of the masks and everything 
else, which also affects the layout of the room. I know when we 
do oversight and investigation hearings, and I know that is not 
what we are doing here, there is script about whether an 
individual is accompanied by counsel, whether they want that 
counsel represented. I have got that script. The reason I am 
asking is we are not in Oversight and Investigations, but it is 
extraordinarily unusual to have a government witness as an 
individual with private counsel at the witness table and with a 
microphone. And so, I am just trying to get clarification for 
future precedent setting for the committee. And that is the 
only reason I am asking this, he obviously has counsel. If we 
should follow the protocol that is prescribed for the Oversight 
and Investigations Committee in similar circumstances.
    Ms. Eshoo. Well, I think this is the first time that it 
is----
    Mr. Walden. That is why I ask.
    Ms. Eshoo. We have another first here. When Dr. Bright came 
in this morning with his attorney, she requested a microphone. 
And so, as a courtesy, I extended the microphone to her.
    Mr. Walden. Yes, sure.
    Ms. Eshoo. Now, she is not a witness. We are not going to 
ask her questions. She is simply accompanying her client. So I 
don't----
    Mr. Walden. And I have no objection to any of that. Could I 
read you what this text is and maybe that resolves it?
    Ms. Eshoo. Well this isn't Oversight and Investigations. 
This is--are you suggesting that we need to follow what 
Oversight and Investigations does?
    Mr. Walden. I am just saying that the witness is not here 
in his whistleblowing capacity is what I am told, what you 
indicated. But this is his personal attorney, if I understand 
correctly, but we still don't even know for sure--I know who 
you are, but we haven't identified that for the record. And all 
we do in Oversight and Investigations, as you know, is, you ask 
if the witness wants to be accompanied by counsel; they respond 
yes or no. And then counsel is allowed to move forward, sit at 
the table. And then the question is asked, Will you give 
testimony or not? And if so, raise your hand and do all these 
things. That is all I am doing here is just--we don't usually 
do this type of activity in this--in the other policy 
committees. And we are not usually set up this way----
    Ms. Eshoo. So would you like to ask the----
    Mr. Walden. I just think we ought to follow for future 
precedent issues, nothing to do with this hearing, but future 
precedent is what we are dealing with.
    Ms. Eshoo. It is a good suggestion.
    Mr. Walden. We are all learning how to operate in this 
environment.
    Ms. Eshoo. Exactly.
    All right. The gentleman is recognized for his 5 minutes 
for an opening statement.
    Mr. Walden. Well----
    Ms. Eshoo. You don't think it is resolved?
    Mr. Walden. Well, are we going to ask if he wants to be 
represented by counsel, and who the counsel is?
    Ms. Eshoo. Dr. Bright, do you wish to be represented by 
counsel?
    Mr. Bright. Yes.
    Mr. Walden. OK. And then could she identify herself for the 
record?
    Ms. Eshoo. And for the record, would counsel please state 
your name?
    Ms. Katz. My name is Debra Katz. I am an attorney 
representing Dr. Rick Bright, with the law firm of Katz, 
Marshall & Banks.
    Mr. Walden. All right. I think that is all we needed to do.
    Ms. Eshoo. Good.
    Mr. Bucshon. Could I ask----
    Ms. Eshoo. The gentleman is recognized for----
    Mr. Walden. Well, you have a parliamentary question.
    Ms. Eshoo. The gentleman will state his parliamentary.
    Mr. Bucshon. Will the witness be under oath, because if you 
have a whistleblower testimony under Oversight and 
Investigations, a witness would normally be under oath? And if 
not today, he is under--not under oath, if we get into 
whistleblower allegations, how can we be sure that the witness 
is telling the truth under oath if they are not under oath? And 
if they are not under oath, then how can you talk about the 
whistleblower complaints?
    Ms. Eshoo. I thank the gentleman.
    Mr. Bucshon. In a fair and equitable manner.
    Ms. Eshoo. I thank the gentleman for his inquiry. All 
witnesses know that it is illegal to lie to Congress. And in 
our subcommittee, unlike Oversight and Investigations, they are 
the only subcommittee that--I mean, it is a practice, it is a 
tradition, but we don't swear people in, but witnesses know 
that it is illegal it lies to Congress.
    Mr. Walden. U.S.C. 1003 or something.
    Ms. Eshoo. The gentleman is recognized for his 5 minutes 
opening.

   OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. GREG WALDEN A REPRESENTATIVE IN 
               CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF OREGON

    Mr. Walden. Thank you, Madam Chair. And I know we are 
operating under unique circumstances.
    The world is coping with an historic deadly pandemic that 
we always knew was possible, but we prayed would not happen. In 
a bipartisan way, we did everything the experts said we needed 
to do to be prepared, should a pandemic or other hazard strike.
    Madam Chair, the work you, Dr. Burgess, Representative 
Susan Brooks, and I, and others did over two Congresses, when 
each party has controlled the House resulted in one product, 
the Pandemic All-Hazards Preparedness Act.
    Dr. Bright, I know you were part of our efforts in writing 
and reauthorizing that law, and we thank you for your work. In 
fact, given the role you once played at ASPR before going to 
BARDA, you had a big responsibility to make sure Congress 
provided the strategic national stockpile that it needed, or to 
inform us if there were shortcomings, especially as we were 
modernizing the Pandemic All-Hazards Preparedness Act.
    I went back over three hearings we held in the Oversight 
Investigations Subcommittee of this committee, where you 
testified regarding the Zika outbreak in May 23, 2017, the 
seasonal flu on March 8, 2018, and the hearing on June 15, 2018 
entitled the State of U.S. Public Health Biopreparedness 
Responding to Biological Attacks, Pandemics and Emerging 
Infectious Disease Outbreaks. You see, I wanted to make sure we 
hadn't missed anything. Nothing jumped out at me as I reread 
the record. Congress dramatically increased funding to ASPR and 
BARDA.
    We granted new authorities, we followed your 
recommendations and those of others who played a key role in 
this combined effort. Unfortunately, some of the systems we put 
in place to prepare for a pandemic, systems designed without 
actually living through something like this have not performed 
as expected. We have learned we didn't have enough of the basic 
supplies that we have always taken for granted. And while Chair 
Eshoo and I have warned about the potential vulnerabilities of 
our medical supply chains, especially from China, not enough 
was done to address the problem, and it still hasn't been fully 
addressed.
    I am thankful that President Trump invoked the Defense 
Production Act to ramp up U.S. manufacturing of masks and 
ventilators. And the President has used the emergency powers 
and money Congress has provided to launch unprecedented efforts 
to search the globe for supplies, to rapidly advance 
development of treatments and vaccines, though we still have 
much bipartisan work to do to respond and adapt to the 
challenges presented by COVID-19 and the lessons we are 
learning.
    We have asked for, and this committee should hold hearings 
to find a path forward to reform the Strategic National 
Stockpile, to increase domestic manufacturing of critical 
supplies and disentangle our supply chains from China. We 
should be exploring strategies for increased testing so we can 
begin to safely reopen our economy. We need to find ways to 
improve access to mental health and provide relief, both for 
our healthcare providers on the front lines treating COVID-19 
cases, and our healthcare workers who have been furloughed 
because their hospitals are closed. We should be conducting 
rigorous oversight of the trillions of dollars, and myriad of 
new policies Congress has appropriated and enacted in the last 
three months. And we should be investigating, really 
investigating, allegations like Dr. Bright's that that raise 
concern that about our Nation's coronavirus response.
    That does not appear to be why we are actually here today, 
and frankly, it saddens me. Dr. Bright, your allegations are 
serious. They deserve a real investigation. I know the Office 
of Special Counsel, with whom you filed your complaint, will do 
just that. And I know they take their work seriously and will 
hear you out. And importantly, will give those named in your 
complaint an opportunity to have their side heard as well.
    I must tell you that many of us on our committee were 
confused when we learned from a tweet this hearing was 
scheduled in the wake of your complaint. As you know, that is 
certainly not how we do things at the Energy and Commerce 
Committee. Not long after the notice of this being a 
whistleblower hearing, we were advised you were here as a 
government witness, not a whistleblower. But then we were told 
you were not representing the government, but yourself.
    The hearing title suggests the hearing is about protecting 
scientific integrity, yet the Chair invited a witness who will 
not be speaking to that issue. So it is all pretty confusing 
and unusual, to say the least.
    Here we are in the middle of a pandemic, and we aren't 
given time to secure our witnesses, conduct appropriate 
research or required documents that could aid in our 
understanding of the situation you face and the country faces.
    Our first discussion with majority unfortunately just 
occurred three days ago. This is really serious business. But, 
in my opinion, this is not the way we should run an 
investigation. We need to get to the heart of the matter, and 
we need to look forward to see what we haven't done right as a 
Congress and a country, and what can we band together and fix 
before fall arrives.
    And so, I thank you for being here. I have enjoyed working 
with you over the years and continue to look forward to working 
with you and others to get this right.
    And Madam Chair, we have a letter for you asking for a rule 
11 hearing that we will provide to you. And with that, I yield 
back.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Walden follow:]

                 Prepared Statement of Hon. Greg Walden

    The world is coping with an historic, deadly pandemic that 
we always knew was possible, but prayed would not happen. In a 
bipartisan way we did everything the experts said we needed to 
do to be prepared should a pandemic or other hazard strike.
    Madame Chair, the work you, Dr. Burgess, Rep. Susan Brooks, 
and I did over two Congresses--when each party has controlled 
the House--resulted in one product: The Pandemic All-Hazards 
Preparedness Act.
    Dr. Bright, I know you were part of our efforts in writing 
and reauthorizing that law. In fact, given the role you once 
played at ASPR before going to BARDA, you had a big 
responsibility to make sure Congress provided the Strategic 
National Stockpile what it needed, or to inform us if there 
were shortcomings, especially as we were modernizing the 
Pandemic All-Hazards Preparedness Act.
    I went back over the three hearings we held in the 
Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee where you testified 
regarding the Zika outbreak May 23rd of 2017, the seasonal flu 
on March 8, 2018, and the hearing on June 15, 2018, entitled: 
``The State of U.S. Public Health Bio- Preparedness: Responding 
to Biological Attacks, Pandemics, And Emerging Infectious 
Disease Outbreaks.''
    I wanted to make sure we hadn't missed something. Nothing 
jumped out at me. Congress dramatically increased funding to 
ASPR and BARDA. We granted new authorities. We followed your 
recommendations, and those of others who play a role in this 
combined effort.
    Unfortunately, some of the systems that we put in place to 
prepare for a pandemic--systems designed without actually 
living through something like this--have not performed as 
expected.
    We've learned we didn't have enough of the basic supplies 
that we've always taken for granted. While Chair Eshoo and I 
have warned about the potential vulnerabilities with our 
medical supply chains--especially from China--not enough was 
done to address the problem. And it still hasn't been 
addressed.
    I am thankful that President Trump invoked the Defense 
Production Act to ramp up U.S. manufacturing of masks and 
ventilators. And the President has used the emergency powers 
and money Congress has provided to launch unprecedented efforts 
to search the globe for supplies, to rapidly advance 
development of treatments and vaccines.
    But we still have much bipartisan work to do to respond and 
adapt to the challenges presented by COVID-19 and the lessons 
we're learning.
    We have asked for, and this committee should hold, hearings 
to find a path forward to reform the Strategic National 
Stockpile, increase domestic manufacturing of critical 
supplies, and disentangle our supply chains from China.
    We should be exploring strategies for increased testing, so 
that we can begin to safely reopen our economy.
    We need to find ways to improve access to mental health and 
provide relief both our healthcare providers on the front lines 
treating COVID-19 cases, and our health care workers who have 
been furloughed because their hospitals are closed.
    We should be conducting rigorous oversight of the trillions 
of dollars and myriad new policies that Congress has 
appropriated and enacted in the last three months.
    And we should be investigating--really investigating--
allegations like Dr. Bright's that raise concerns about our 
nation's coronavirus response.
    But that does not appear to be why we are actually here 
today, and frankly, that saddens me.
    Dr. Bright, your allegations are serious, and they deserve 
a real investigation. I know the Office of Special Counsel, 
with whom you filed your complaint, will do just that. I know 
they take their work seriously and will hear you out, and 
importantly, will give those named in your complaint an 
opportunity to have their side heard, too.
    I must tell you that many of us on this committee were 
confused when we learned from a tweet that this hearing was 
scheduled in the wake of your whistleblower complaint.
    As you know, that's certainly not how the Energy and 
Commerce Committee does its business. Not long after that 
notice of this being a whistleblower hearing, we were advised 
that you were here as a government witness, not as a 
whistleblower. But then we were told you were not here 
representing the government, just yourself. The hearing title 
suggests the hearing is about protecting scientific integrity--
yet, the Chairwoman invited a witness who will not be speaking 
to that issue.
    This is all very confusing and unusual, to say the least.
    Here we are in the middle of the pandemic, and we weren't 
given time to secure other witnesses, conduct appropriate 
research or acquire documents that could aid in our 
understanding of the situation. Our first discussion with the 
Majority occurred just three days ago.
    This is serious business, but this is no way to run a 
serious investigation.

    Ms. Eshoo. Thank you. The gentleman yields back.
    The Chair would like to remind Members that pursuant to 
committee rules, all Members' written opening statements will 
be made part of the record.
    I would now like to introduce our witness, the first panel 
today. Dr. Rick Bright is a highly regarded scientist with 
expertise in the fields of immunology, therapeutics, vaccines, 
and diagnostic development. For the last decade, he has been a 
career civil servant at the Department of Health and Human 
Services. In 2016, Dr. Bright was appointed the director of 
BARDA, the third director of BARDA, the Biomedical Advanced 
Research and Development Authority. As director of BARDA, he 
has testified before Congress as a government expert numerous 
times, including before this subcommittee.
    I share a special pride with Senator Richard Burr, because 
together, it was our legislation that created BARDA. So thank 
you for your willingness to join us today and to offer 
testimony, Dr. Bright. We look forward to your testimony. You 
are certainly familiar with the lights. I don't need to explain 
those to you. You have 5 minutes for your statement. Welcome 
and you have the microphone on? There we go. Good morning to 
you.

           STATEMENT OF Dr. RICHARD A. BRIGHT, Ph.D.

    Dr. Bright. Good morning, Chairwoman Eshoo, Ranking Member 
Burgess, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. I am 
Dr. Rick Bright, a career public servant, and a scientist, who 
has spent 25 years of my career focused on addressing pandemic 
outbreaks. I have a bachelor's degree in biology and physical 
sciences, and a Ph.D. In immunology and molecular pathogenesis. 
I have led teams of scientists developing drugs, vaccines, and 
diagnostics in government, private industry and for nonprofit 
organizations. I am here today in my private capacity. The 
views are my own and not those of the Department of Health and 
Human Services.
    I joined BARDA in 2010, and for the last 3-1/2 years, until 
April 21st of this year, I had the privilege of serving as its 
director. BARDA partners with private industry and others in 
government to address national health security threats.
    Today, the world is confronting a public health emergency 
unlike any we have seen in over a century. We are facing a 
highly transmissible and deadly virus, which not only claims 
lives, but also disrupts the very foundations of our society. 
The American healthcare system is being taxed to the limit. Our 
economy is spiraling downward and our population is being 
paralyzed by fear, stemming from a lack of a coordinated 
response, and a dearth of accurate, clear communication about 
the path forward.
    Americans yearn to get back to work, to open their 
businesses and to provide for their families. I get that. 
However, what we do must be done carefully, and with guidance 
from the best scientific minds.
    Our window of opportunity is closing. If we fail to improve 
our response now based on science, I fear the pandemic will get 
worse and be prolonged. There will be likely a resurgence of 
COVID-19 this fall, and it will be greatly compounded by the 
challenges of seasonal influenza. Without better planning, 2020 
could be the darkest winter in modern history.
    First and foremost, we need to be truthful with the 
American people. Americans deserve the truth. The truth must be 
based on science. We have the world's greatest scientists. Let 
us lead. Let us speak without fear of retribution. We must 
listen. Each of us can and must do our part now.
    On Tuesday, Dr. Fauci delivered a message in a voice that 
is clear and trustworthy, that has encouraged us to act with 
caution as we return to our daily lives. We should listen to 
him and other scientists sharing their expertise.
    While waiting for a cure and a vaccine, which I believe 
will come, there are things we must do immediately. We must 
increase the public education about the basics, washing hands, 
social distancing, appropriate face covering. They are simple, 
but critical steps to buy valuable time until there is a 
vaccine. We need to ramp up production of essential equipment 
and supplies, including raw materials and critical components; 
shortages of these increase the risk of our frontline 
healthcare workers, and they deserve the best equipment to 
protect themselves.
    We need to facilitate equitable distribution of essential 
equipment and supplies. And finally, we need a national testing 
strategy. The virus is here, it is everywhere. We need to be 
able to find it, isolate it and stop it. We need to have the 
right testing for everyone who needs it. We need to be able to 
trace contacts, isolate, quarantine, and appropriately, while 
striving to develop a cure.
    Initially, our Nation was not as prepared as we should have 
been, as we could have been. Some scientists raised early 
warning signals that were overlooked, and pages from our 
pandemic playbook were ignored by some in leadership. There 
will be plenty of time to look back to assess what has happened 
so we can improve. But right now, we need to focus on getting 
things right going forward. We need a comprehensive plan that 
everyone knows and everyone participates in. Congress has taken 
important steps to support the response, and there is much more 
we can do. With your help, we can get through this crisis.
    Working cooperatively with our global partners, we can and 
will succeed in finding a cure for COVID-19, but that success 
depends on what we do today. We will either be remembered for 
what we did, or for what we failed to do to address this 
crisis. I call on all of us to act. To ensure the health, 
safety and prosperity of all Americans. You can count on me to 
do my part.
    Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Bright follows:]
    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Ms. Eshoo. Thank you, Dr. Bright.
    We will now move to member questions. And I recognize 
myself for 5 minutes for questions.
    Thank you again, Dr. Bright. You have a distinguished 
career. You are one of our country's leading public health 
experts on how to respond to pandemics and national security 
health threats. You are the first government official who has 
been on the inside, seeing everything firsthand, to come 
forward and share unvarnished experiences about what really 
happened from January to the time you departed BARDA in April 
of this year in dealing with the virus. So I want to make sure 
I understand what you are telling us.
    You stated in your written testimony a window of 
opportunity is closing, but it is not yet closed. What do we 
need to do with the time left to get it right? And if we don't, 
what do you mean when you say 2020 will be the darkest winter 
in modern history?
    Dr. Bright. Chairwoman Eshoo, thank you for your question.
    The window is closing to address this pandemic because we 
still do not have a standard centralized coordinated plan to 
take our Nation through this response. I believe, with proper 
leadership and collaboration across government, with the best 
science leading the way, we can devise a comprehensive 
strategy.We can devise a plan that includes all Americans and 
help them help us guide us through this pandemic. But time is 
running out, because the virus is still spreading everywhere. 
People are getting restless to leave their homes. And we have 
to make critical decisions on how to balance the economy and 
science.
    My concern about this fall is compounded by my knowledge, 
and preparation, and response to many years of influenza 
outbreaks, pandemic influenza outbreaks and seasonal influenza 
outbreaks. In our country in 2017, we had nearly 79,000 people 
die in the U.S. from influenza. That, coupled with a COVID-19 
resurgence this fall, could be devastating for our healthcare 
systems and for Americans. We have a limited window of 
opportunity to get plans in place to address both of those.
    Ms. Eshoo. Thank you.
    When you look at the first four months of this year, would 
you describe the government's and the administration's response 
as a success or a failure?
    Dr. Bright. I believe we could have done better. I believe 
there are critical steps that we did not take in time.
    Ms. Eshoo. Was there a failure to respond when you 
correctly pushed to claim early virus samples from--or to 
obtain early virus samples from China so we could develop 
critical medical countermeasures?
    Dr. Bright. From my perspective in working with companies 
that develop drugs and vaccines and diagnostics, virus samples 
are critical. As soon as we were aware this virus could pose a 
significant threat to human lives, I began pushing for those 
virus samples, and I met frustration and----
    Ms. Eshoo. And when did you do that?
    Dr. Bright. I did that in the Office of Secretary Azar in 
January. The push for the virus samples initially mentioned on 
January 23rd and a strong push in January 27th for those virus 
samples.
    Ms. Eshoo. And was there a failure to respond with the 
needed urgency when you correctly pushed to ramp up production 
of masks, respirators, syringes, and swabs?
    Dr. Bright. Congresswoman, we have known for quite some 
time that our stockpile is insufficient in having those 
critical personal protective equipment. So once this virus 
began spreading and became known to be a threat, I did feel 
quite concerned that we didn't have those supplies, and I began 
pushing urgently in January, along with some industry 
colleagues as well. And those urges, those alarms were not 
responded to with action.
    Ms. Eshoo. Was there a failure to take immediate action 
when you correctly pushed to acquire additional doses of the 
drug, remdesivir, which is the only drug so far that appears to 
be at least mildly effective, thank God, for treating people 
with COVID-19?
    Dr. Bright. There was no action taken on the urgency to 
come up with a plan for acquisition of limited doses of 
remdesivir, nor to distribute those limited doses of remdesivir 
once we had the scientific data to support their use for people 
infected with this virus.
    Ms. Eshoo. And instead of acting on your recommendations, 
was the response of others to try and cut you out of key 
meetings, marginalize your participation?
    Dr. Bright. I was told that my urgings were causing a 
commotion and I was removed from those meetings.
    Ms. Eshoo. My time has expired.
    I now recognize the gentleman, the ranking member of the 
subcommittee, Dr. Burgess.
    Mr. Burgess. I thank the Chair.
    Dr. Bright, I hope that it is clear to you that everyone on 
this dais on both sides appreciates you coming before today, 
even if we are frustrated, we are having this hearing without a 
full understanding of the facts. Again, and just to clarify, 
you are testifying in personal capacity and not on behalf of 
the agency or the administration?
    Dr. Bright. That is correct, sir.
    Mr. Burgess. Thank you for that.
    Let me ask you about a question about hydroxychloroquine, 
really even maybe a little bit more broadly, the disease-
modifying antirheumatic drugs that have been looked at for 
therapy for this disease. I ask about hydroxychloroquine, 
because it does seem to be central to whatever disagreement you 
had with Department of HHS and the administration, but 
hydroxychloroquine was initially identified as a potential 
therapeutic because, number one, of its anti-inflammatory 
effects, and its ability to calm things in the immune system. 
As we know, one the features of this disease is the 
overwhelming cytacon response that overwhelms the host. There 
also may be an effect to blocking the virus at the point of 
contact with the cell, certainly something that probably 
deserves a little investigation.
    Again, it is not the only one. There were some other drugs. 
I think, if I am correct, BARDA supported with its investments 
Actemra and Kevzara, which are thought to have similar impacts 
on the ability to suppress the cytacon response is 
hydroxychloroquine. Am I correct in that?
    Dr. Bright. There are a number of drugs that we were 
evaluating initially, Congressman, that we were considering to 
conduct clinical studies to get further information that they 
really had an impact, and if they were safe to use in patients 
infected with this virus.
    Mr. Burgess. Do you have available to you the dollar 
amounts that BARDA appropriated or authorized for each of those 
two drugs, Actemra and Kevzara?
    Dr. Bright. I don't have those numbers available with me 
now.
    Mr. Burgess. Would you be able to make them available to 
the committee?
    Dr. Bright. I believe HHS could make those available, BARDA 
could probably make those investments available.
    Mr. Burgess. Were you concerned with hydroxychloroquine at 
the time you made those awards for Actemra and Kevzara, or was 
the concern with hydroxychloroquine, which became paramount in 
your disagreement with the administration, was it already 
established when you made these other investments in similar 
medications?
    Dr. Bright. My concerns around the safety of 
hydroxychloroquine in people infected with the COVID-19 virus 
reflective of the scientist review that we received from an 
interagency group of clinicians and regulatory experts and 
scientists. At the time that we learned about 
hydroxychloroquine and chloroquine, there was limited data 
available. And our proposal and actions were to see if we could 
identify a source of that drug so that NIH could conduct a 
randomized controlled clinical study.
    That is a similar action we took with remdesivir. Once we 
thought remdesivir had promise from data coming from China, NIH 
quickly established a clinical study, a randomized controlled 
study to evaluate remdesivir. So with hydroxychloroquine, that 
was also our preferred plan of action.
    Mr. Burgess. And you, of course, authored the letter to the 
FDA asking for the emergency use authorization for 
hydroxychloroquine?
    Dr. Bright. I was directed, as the BARDA director from the 
Office of the HHS Secretary, to put in place an expanded access 
ID program to make chloroquine donations from Bayer available 
to Americans through a unique opportunity that would utilize an 
app, and perhaps make it available to Americans who were not 
under close supervision of a healthcare provider. During that--
--
    Mr. Burgess. Of course, this hearing is not really a 
hearing on hydroxychloroquine. I would personally welcome a 
robust hearing on therapeutics and the research that is going 
on, what we have invested in, what seems to be panning out, 
what has not. I will note that both Kevzara and the other 
medication may not have panned out. And I think the 
manufacturing company for Kevzara announced that they will 
discontinue part of the clinical study because it looked 
unlikely to help COVID patients. I will tell you that since 
starting this, since you identified yourself for this hearing 
you got noticed, I am hearing from a lot of doctors, in my 
State and around the country, who have experience using 
hydroxychloroquine and chloroquine, coupled with Erythromycin 
and zinc, and they are reporting significant benefit if it is 
used early enough in the course, and may eliminate the need for 
hospitalization and ventilatory support.
    Ms. Eshoo. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Burgess. I don't think it is right.
    Ms. Eshoo. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Burgess. But I think it is important enough that we 
should look into it and would just be interested if you did 
that as part of your duties at BARDA.
    Ms. Eshoo. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Burgess. Can the gentleman answer the question?
    Ms. Eshoo. The Chair now recognizes----
    Mr. Burgess. Will the witnesses be able to answer the 
question?
    Dr. Bright. Sir, I believe it is important. I have heard 
those anecdotal stories well, and they were not conducted in 
the context of randomized controlled clinical study. It is very 
difficult to understand data from those types of observational 
studies or anecdotal stories. So the drug might have some 
benefit in some populations, but we won't know that until we 
have that information from a truly randomized, controlled 
clinical study.
    Many of those studies are ongoing now. Some of those 
studies, we are starting to see data from and those studies in 
those populations tested have not shown overwhelming evidence 
of benefit from the use of hydroxychloroquine in those 
patients, but different studies are devised to look at 
different angles, as you described.
    Mr. Burgess. Most studies are at the end, when someone----
    Ms. Eshoo. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Burgess. You do those studies without the drug, though. 
When you acquire the drug to perform the studies----
    Ms. Eshoo. The gentleman's time has expired. The 
gentlemen's time, please. We all want to be fair to each other. 
The gentleman's time has expired.
    The Chair recognizes the chairman of the full committee, 
Mr. Pallone, for his 5 minutes of questions.
    Mr. Pallone. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Let me just say, Dr. Bright, thank you for your courage in 
being here. When I was younger, we used to read a book by 
President Kennedy called Profiles in Courage. And your courage 
in being here reminds me of some of the people I read about in 
that book.
    I am concerned, Dr. Bright, that the Trump administration 
does not have plans for a nationwide vaccine program to ensure 
that once a vaccine is approved, we will be able to quickly 
make it available to everyone. In other words, I don't want to 
see the same mistakes by the Trump administration, the 
incompetence that they had with the supply chain and the 
testing repeated with the vaccine. And you stated at the outset 
of the pandemic in January, you began urgently pressing HHS 
officials to provide the necessary resources to begin vaccine 
development after your pleas fell on deaf ears. And as the 
pandemic progressed, you also stated you were alarmed by the 
pressures coming from some administration officials for your 
agency to invest in drugs and vaccines, and I quote, ``without 
proper scientific vetting or that lacked scientific merit.'' 
Can you tell us where we are now in the hunt for a vaccine and 
where we could have been, had HHS leaders made investment 
decisions sooner that were based on scientific merit?
    Dr. Bright. Thank you, Congressman.
    As we all know, vaccines are very difficult to make. It is 
nothing they can do quickly and you need multiple shots on goal 
to try to make a vaccine. There are many diseases, we have 
attempted to make vaccines through history and still hasn't 
been able to do so. So it takes many opportunities and many 
different approaches. Right now, there are over 100 different 
approaches for developing a vaccine for this coronavirus. So we 
are confident that hopefully, I should say, at least one of 
those or two of those will work. But you have identified key 
critical challenges that we need to anticipate and prepare for 
early. Number one is the supply chain for those vaccines, 
needed reagents and buffers and salts, and the various 
ingredients go into a vaccine, as well as the glass vials that 
the vaccines are put into, and needles and syringes, and then a 
carefully coordinated distribution and administration strategy.
    We haven't yet gotten to those downstream strategies yet in 
our government. And I think those are going to become a 
significant issue down the road if we don't plan for that now.
    The urgent need for funding at the outset of a pandemic is 
something we have known about through many years of pandemic 
exercises. Even in our August 2019 Crimson Contagion exercise, 
it was highlighted that we would need at least $10 billion from 
the outset of the pandemic to start the development of drugs 
and vaccines. Every day we delay delays the output of that 
vaccine or drug. So in those early days, my first meetings with 
Secretary Azar, I asked for funding for people and for those 
viruses, the three critical things to get the vaccine started.
    It took some time to get the funding available through 
various processes. What BARDA did is we began to look 
internally at other contracts and other programs we had to 
redirect some available fundings and minimal funding to even as 
early as January, be able to initiate contracts or agreements 
with some companies to start working on those vaccines as soon 
as possible. It is because of those actions now that not only 
have those vaccines started and made some progress, but also, 
the United States has a placeholder with some of those 
companies to be able to place orders for those vaccines when 
they are available. We did everything possible to ensure that 
those investments were in companies that would build capacity 
in the United States to manufacture those vaccines. We had to 
get in line first, even when the money wasn't fully there, to 
complete the development program, that is what we did.
    Mr. Pallone. I guess my concern is, I am very critical of 
the administration in terms of their, I call it incompetence 
with the supply chain, with lack of testing. I am afraid the 
same thing is going to happen with vaccines and the 
distribution. I mean, should I be concerned based on your 
experience?
    Dr. Bright. Absolutely, sir. We are already seeing those 
challenges with limited doses of remdesivir with data that we 
are getting that remdesivir has some benefit in people. And we 
have limited doses, and we haven't scaled up production, and we 
don't have a plan in how to fairly and equitably distribute 
that drug. If you can imagine the scenario this fall or winter, 
maybe even early next spring, when a vaccine becomes available, 
there is no one company that can produce enough for our country 
or for the world. There will be limited supplies. We need to 
have a strategy and plan in place now to make sure that we 
cannot only fill that vaccine, make it, distribute it, but 
administer it in a fair and equitable plan.
    Mr. Pallone. And that is not the case?
    Dr. Bright. We don't have that yet, and it is a significant 
concern.
    Mr. Pallone. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Ms. Eshoo. The gentleman yields back. I now have the 
pleasure of recognizing the ranking member of full committee, 
Mr. Walden.
    Mr. Walden. Thank you, Madam Chair. And again, I thank the 
witness for being here.
    I want to get some clarification. So BARDA's job is to do 
the vaccines, right?
    Dr. Bright. That is one of BARDA's roles, yes, to support 
industry to make the vaccines.
    Mr. Walden. OK. Is it BARDA's responsibility to direct the 
personal protective equipment acquisition distribution, the 
PPE? Is that part of your responsibility at BARDA?
    Dr. Bright. BARDA plays a role in pandemic preparedness for 
our Nation. And we prepare and align and exercise with our 
other Federal agencies. We also are familiar with the critical 
gaps in the supply chain. While BARDA isn't responsible for 
procuring those items for the Strategic National Stockpile, we 
are aware of those shortages and those needs. What I was doing 
in my capacity as BARDA director was raising those concerns and 
needs with the appropriate group within ASPR, the strategic 
national----
    Mr. Walden. But ASPR basically has a responsibility to go 
do that, right? That is not your direct responsibility. You are 
obviously in this discussion, but that is not how it was right 
in BARDA, correct?
    Dr. Bright. It is my responsibility to raise a significant 
concern about a limited supply or shortage that I think will 
affect the lives of Americans?
    Mr. Walden. Did you raise that concern with people up here 
on Capitol Hill? And if so, who and when?
    Dr. Bright. I raised that concern with my leadership, sir. 
I raised it with the appropriate folks in the Strategic 
National Stockpile and our Critical Infrastructure Protection 
Program.
    Mr. Walden. Not up here?
    Dr. Bright. My role is to raise it to my supervisor, Dr. 
Kadlec. I also did raise that concern, though, in the White 
House with Mr. Navarro.
    Mr. Walden. Yes, I am interested, because we are passing 
these bills. In the future, I hope you would or anybody out 
there listening in these agencies, if you are spotting 
something not working right, we need to know.
    Dr. Bright. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Walden. On the first case of SARS COVID 2 in the U.S., 
it was identified, I believe, in January 22, in Washington 
State. CDC put the positive specimen in culture that day, 
correct?
    Dr. Bright. I believe so. I think it was January 20th.
    Mr. Walden. OK. It is my understanding, the samples of the 
virus were made available to the U.S. Government and that the 
CDC expanded the virus stocks between January 29 and February 3 
and shared the BEI on February 4 to enable broad sharing.
    Now, according to your complaint, after virus samples were 
available to the U.S. Government from the Washington State 
case, and potentially even after the CDC's effort to grow the 
virus and then share with the BEI biorepository, you were still 
seeking to obtain a sample of the virus, correct?
    Dr. Bright. That is true, sir. But we need more than one 
virus.
    Mr. Walden. Right. I am going to get to that. Why were the 
strains not available within the U.S. Government, not available 
to you? Were they available to you?
    Dr. Bright. Sir, I was asking for viruses in January 
because we wanted to make sure that we had a head start on 
developing the vaccine.
    Mr. Walden. No, I get that.
    Dr. Bright. When they became available in February, I 
believe it was February 6 through the BEI resources, then those 
were distributed to laboratories.
    Mr. Walden. Did you ask for the virus sample from 
Washington State, though, as part of that?
    Dr. Bright. Absolutely.
    Mr. Walden. You did?
    Dr. Bright. BARDA did. We asked to make sure we had access 
to those viruses, and they were distributed to the right 
laboratories and the right companies.
    Mr. Walden. And where did you ultimately get the virus that 
you distributed?
    Dr. Bright. Some of the viruses came from the BEI resources 
at NIH, and some of those viruses came from laboratories that 
receive the initial seed from CDC.
    Mr. Walden. OK, that is helpful to know.
    In some conversations I have been a part of with some at 
NIH, they indicate that the real key here was to get the DNA 
sequence, which China did eventually put up, I believe, the end 
of December, early January, and that in terms of going after 
the vaccine, it was that sequencing that really mattered most 
to get started on vaccine development. And there are other 
scientists who are very distinguished who believe that the 
delay in getting the virus sample actually didn't set them 
back. Is that an accurate assessment, or do you have a 
disagreement in that view? I know scientists disagree, so do we 
up here. But I am kind of hearing that having the sequencing 
really mattered most--and getting the virus important, but did 
not set them back in proceeding to get the vaccine development 
underway.
    Dr. Bright. Sir, China posted the first sequence on January 
11, I believe and made it available January 10 or January 11. 
It is important to understand that when the sequence is 
available, some companies, or some technologies, can get 
started with that sequence information. You still are 
vulnerable because you have another country in their 
laboratories that post on the internet or database their 
sequence. So there could still be challenges, especially for 
national security integrity for that sequence.
    Mr. Walden. Before my time runs out--well, it has run out. 
I was just going to ask, did they begin efforts at that time 
once they got the sequence?
    Dr. Bright. The NIH began efforts on a synthetic messenger 
RNA vaccine candidate. However, without the viruses, you really 
cannot tell if the neutralizing antibodies listed by that----
    Mr. Walden. Right.
    Dr. Bright [continue]. Or your, diagnostics, or your 
therapeutics that actually work. You can try to synthesize a 
virus a sequence, but it is never going to be representative of 
the actual virus. And when we are spending billions of dollars 
on drugs, vaccines, and diagnostics, we want to have the most 
credible information possible.
    Mr. Walden. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Ms. Eshoo. The gentleman yields back. A pleasure to 
recognize the gentleman from New York, Mr. Engel, for his 5 
minutes of questions.
    Mr. Engel. Thank you, Madam Chair, for holding today's 
hearing.
    Doctor, if you were a betting man--oh, sorry. Thank you.
    Doctor, if you were a betting man, when would you bet that 
we would--time that we would have a vaccine?
    Dr. Bright. That is a very difficult question to answer. I 
know that there are companies and academic labs working very 
hard.
    Normally it takes up to ten years to make a vaccine. We 
have done it faster in emergency situations, when we had the 
starting material in the freezer for Ebola. But for a novel 
virus, it actually haven't been done yet that quickly.
    So, a lot of optimism is swirling around a 12- to 18-month 
timeframe if everything goes perfectly. We have never seen 
everything go perfectly.
    My concern is if we rush too quickly and consider cutting 
out critical steps, we may not have a full assessment of the 
safety of that vaccine. So, it is still going to take some 
time. I still think 12 to 18 months is an aggressive schedule, 
and I think it is going to take longer than that to do so.
    Mr. Engel. Twelve to 18 months from now or 12 to 18 months 
from when this all started, the beginning of the year?
    Dr. Bright. It would be 12 to 18 months from when the 
particular manufacturers first received the material or 
information that they needed to start developing that vaccine.
    It is critical to note, when we say 12 to 18 months, that 
doesn't mean for an FDA-approved vaccine. That means to have 
sufficient data and information on the safety and 
immunogenicity, if not efficacy, to be able to use on an 
emergency basis, and that is the consideration that we have in 
mind when we talk about an accelerated timeline.
    Mr. Engel. Thank you.
    I represent, in New York, Bronx County and Westchester 
County, which are at the epicenter of the U.S. coronavirus 
outbreak, New Rochelle, New York. While New Yorkers have really 
rallied together in support of their neighbors, the 
administration has failed at every turn. The President has 
sidelined our best scientists, pushed baseless conspiracy 
theories, and more recently prescribed unproven remedies, like 
Lysol, to suffering Americans.
    Since the early days of the outbreak, the President has 
encouraged doctors to prescribe chloroquine to suffering 
Americans despite a lack of evidence supporting its use. On 
April 24th, the President's hand-picked FDA commissioner even 
came out against the use of chloroquine for COVID-19 cases.
    Doctor, what are the dangers of chloroquine if prescribed 
incorrectly? And what happened when you raised the issue of 
chloroquine use in coronavirus patients with HHS leadership?
    Dr. Bright. Congressman, our concerns center around the 
potential use of chloroquine in people who are infected with 
this coronavirus. There are data of the effective use and safe 
use of chloroquine in malaria patients and other patients and 
other indications. We also knew that there were potential 
safety risks with chloroquine that cause irregular heart 
rhythms and even, in some cases, death.
    So our concern was with limited information and knowledge, 
especially of its use in COVID-19 infected patients and the 
potential for those at risk, then we should make sure that any 
studies with that drug were done in a carefully controlled 
clinical study under the close watchful eye of a physician so 
they could respond to a patient if they did experience one of 
those adverse events.
    There wasn't sufficient data at that time to support the 
use of this drug in patients with COVID-19 without close 
physician supervision.
    Mr. Engel. And when you raised that issue of chloroquine 
use in coronavirus patients with HHS leadership, what happened 
to you? You were removed as the director of BARDA, is that not 
true?
    Dr. Bright. I believe part of the removal process for me 
was initiated because of a pushback that I gave when they asked 
me to put in place an expanded access protocol that would make 
chloroquine more freely available to Americans that were not 
under the close supervision of a physician and may not even be 
confirmed to be infected with the coronavirus.
    The scientists at FDA, BARDA, NIH, and CDC worked hard to 
switch that to an emergency, use authorization with strict 
guardrails: that the patients would be in a hospital, confirmed 
to be infected with this virus, under close supervision of a 
doctor, and who could not otherwise participate in a randomized 
controlled study.
    My concerns were alleviated somewhat by being able to lock 
that in the stockpile with those conditions. However, my 
concerns were escalated when I learned that leadership in the 
Department of Health and Human Services were pushing to make 
that drug available outside of this emergency use 
authorization, to flood New York and New Jersey with this drug 
regardless of the EUA.
    And when I spoke outside of our government and shared my 
concerns for the American public, that, I believe, was the 
straw that broke the camel's back and escalated my removal.
    Mr. Engel. Thank you.
    Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Ms. Eshoo. The gentleman's time has expired. A pleasure to 
recognize the gentleman from Kentucky, Mr. Guthrie, for his 5 
minutes of questions.
    Mr. Guthrie. Thank you very much.
    Thank you, Dr. Bright, for being here. We appreciate it 
very much.
    Reading through your complaint, I just kind of want to 
point out, I think the chairman said earlier, talked about the 
lack of urgency, and implies the President's lack of urgency. I 
think most of my constituents want to know that things are 
getting done and where is the President on this.
    And you are having issues with the leadership at Health and 
Human Services, and you are giving them recommendations. So if 
they are not accepting your recommendations to them, I would, I 
think, fairly surmise, they are not passing that on to the 
White House.
    So the President is probably unaware of what you are 
putting forth because it says, in reading from your complaint 
on page 23:``Fortunately, White House Trade Advisor Peter 
Navarro shared Dr. Bright's sense of urgency.'' So that is a 
sense of urgency.
    So talking about the urgency in the White House. So you 
have a meeting with him on Saturday. He calls you back in on 
Sunday. You prepare your recommendations in a memo for Mick 
Mulvaney, Chief of Staff, so essentially the President.
    And then--so you meet with--you get around the leadership 
of HHS, meet essentially with the President, since with Mick 
Mulvaney, and it says--you have the meeting with Navarro on 
Saturday, the memorandum with Mick Mulvaney on Sunday, and on 
Monday, it says, the National Security Council Policy 
Coordinating Committee met with Doctor-- ''met and directed Dr. 
Kadlec and HHS to implement Navarro's recommendations. The push 
by the White House for HHS to act more swiftly created tension 
between Dr. Bright and HHS political leadership.''
    So it seems--I don't know how you could be more urgent in 
government than having a meeting on Saturday, a memorandum on 
Sunday, and actions on Monday once it got to the President's 
attention, the President's level. So we appreciate the 
President moving forward on that.
    I am on--the ranking member of Oversight and 
Investigations, the investigations, which you have testified in 
front of us before, and we appreciate that very much. So I am 
going to look at more of the process of putting this hearing 
together and some things.
    As we read through your complaint, the only way we have it 
is because you made it public. And in your complaint, there are 
different exhibits that you talk about, and we are having a 
hearing today, and there are actually 33 exhibits referenced in 
your complaint that is not public. I think we got them from--
the majority through The Washington Post or something like 
that. That is how we made documents available for this hearing, 
my understanding.
    So the 33 exhibits that are not made public that are 
referenced in your complaint, would you make those available to 
the committee?
    Dr. Bright.
    Mr. Guthrie. Do you have those to make them available to 
the committee?
    [Witness consults with counsel.]
    Mr. Guthrie. I mean, if we are using your complaint for 
this hearing, we need to have the documentation.
    Ms. Katz. May I address that?
    Mr. Guthrie. If the Chair--I don't have a problem with you 
addressing----
    Ms. Eshoo. [inaudible.]
    Ms. Katz. Yes, we will take that under advisement and get 
back to you.
    Mr. Guthrie. OK. Also, when we read through the----
     Voice. That is not an answer.
    Ms. Katz. There may be privacy considerations in some of 
the documents, so we do need to look at these documents 
carefully.
    Mr. Guthrie. So also if we read through the email chains 
that are made available, some appear complete, but some truly 
aren't. They are apparently not full email chains. And so you 
will wonder if the context of the email would relate to the 
inferences taken from the emails. Would you make all the 
complete email chains available to us?
    Ms. Katz. I would like to address that as well, which is a 
problem, is when Dr. Bright was removed from his position, he 
was locked out of his email. He does not have access to his 
full email.
    Mr. Guthrie. So the email chains that you have available, 
we have? We have?
    Ms. Katz. That is correct.
    Dr. Bright. I can address----
    Ms. Katz. He does not have a full set of his email.
    Dr. Bright. I can address this too. That is exactly right. 
So I was immediately locked out of my email on April 20th of 
this year, and so I didn't have full records available to me on 
that.
    However, I believe I have laid a solid foundation in my 
complaint, as detailed as I could be, for the Office of Special 
Counsel to be able to conduct an investigation.
    I believe as part of their investigation, they will be able 
to access those emails and individuals to get the full story 
and get the full information so they can get to the bottom of 
it.
    Mr. Guthrie. It would have been helpful for us as well.
    Have you shared any of these exhibits with the majority 
that has not been shared with us on the minority side?
    Dr. Bright. Sir, I believe you have probably what is 
available in the public domain, and I believe the rest has been 
submitted to the Office of Special Counsel. And I haven't made 
it available to anyone directly.
    Ms. Eshoo. To the gentleman, the minority and majority 
members all received the same packet of information----
    Mr. Guthrie. Which is available to the public.
    Ms. Eshoo [continue]. The emails, yes----
    Mr. Guthrie. OK.
    Ms. Eshoo [continue]. That was available, that was in the 
public domain.
    Mr. Guthrie. OK.
    So just one more. Are there any other documents in your 
possession or accessible to you that are not included as 
exhibits in the complaint but are nonetheless relevant to your 
allegations? If so, will you provide those to the committee?
    Dr. Bright. I believe I provided the information I have 
available to me at this point. If I had access to my email from 
HHS, there might be additional supporting information in that 
email. I do not know the status, if that has been deleted or 
wiped or--I just haven't had access to it since April----
    Mr. Guthrie. OK. What you have access to. I appreciate your 
answers. Thank you very much.
    I yield back.
    Ms. Eshoo. The gentleman yields back. A pleasure to 
recognize the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Butterfield, 
for his 5 minutes of questions.
    Mr. Butterfield. Thank you, Chairwoman.
    And to you, Dr. Bright, thank you, sir, for coming today, 
and thank you, most importantly, for your 25 years of public 
service.
    Dr. Bright, I would like to ask you about your efforts to 
address supply shortages for administering COVID-19 tests.
    According to your count, as COVID-19 testing ramped up, you 
asked for an inventory of the strategic national supply 
availability of testing supplies, including swabs, viral 
transport materials, and extraction buffers. You learned that 
the national stockpile did not stock these items.
    After that, you learned that FDA's source of swabs was a 
manufacturer in the region of Italy, which was the center of 
the COVID-19 outbreak in Italy. It is my understanding that 
this information then prompted you to reach out to the DOD 
agency that had previously assisted your office with 
international transportation of supplies related to Ebola.
    My question is why, why, sir, did your office contact DOD 
at this point?
    Dr. Bright. Sir, it was quite a surprise to me that the 
urgent ramp-up of testing did not include full consideration of 
all the critical supplies needed to support that ramp-up of 
testing, including those materials you mentioned--swabs, viral 
transport media, buffers, et cetera. And I was quite alarmed to 
learn, from sitting behind CDC Director Redfield, that we were 
going to experience a shortage of swabs. And I was even more 
surprised that our Strategic National Stockpile did not plan or 
have any of those in supply.
    So my urgency to find a solution to that was supported by 
the FDA director of the Center for--CDRH, that is, devices and 
diagnostics at FDA.
    And once I confirmed that there was a shortage, it was 
critical that we find a solution, and that was by partnering 
with our Department of Defense colleagues who worked with us 
for the Ebola response. We actually worked with them to ship 
doses of Ebola vaccine from Germany to the United States so it 
could be filled rapidly to respond to the outbreak in Africa.
    So it was a natural occurrence or response for me and my 
colleagues in BARDA to come up with a solution to that critical 
supply chain.
    Mr. Butterfield. Let me ask you this. Were there any 
restrictions in place in Italy that would require Secretary 
Azar to move forward with the request to DOD?
    Dr. Bright. What we needed to enact that air bridge with 
the Department of Defense we needed our Secretary of--Secretary 
Azar to make a request of the Secretary of Defense. And I and 
my colleague, Dr. Gary Disbrow, raised this issue with our--at 
our senior leadership meeting with Dr. Kadlec, who chairs that 
meeting, the ASPR, and it clearly was not a topic that he 
wanted to discuss on that day. And actually we were rebuffed by 
him saying that he did not really want to talk about swabs 
right now. And both Dr. Disbrow and I raised this concern 
repeatedly in that call.
    So, knowing that it was critical and time-sensitive, and we 
had a critical shortage of these swabs, I placed a call to Mr. 
Navarro's office once again and asked if Mr. Navarro could 
offer some assistance in contacting the Secretary of Defense to 
get clearance for DOD to put those airplanes in place under the 
contract we have. And that happened in a very quick turnaround, 
a matter of minutes.
    With that permission from the Secretary of Defense, we were 
able to start those flights within two days. We have now 
transferred back over 25 million swabs.
    Mr. Butterfield. So you are saying that you alerted White 
House adviser Peter Navarro about this issue. Is that right?
    Dr. Bright. Yes.
    Mr. Butterfield. And within hours, literally within hours, 
he had coordinated with DOD to start these flights to transport 
the swabs.
    Dr. Bright. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Butterfield. This seems like a logical response to the 
analysis that you provided. What is truly perplexing to me is 
why anyone would resist such an initiative. That is a 
rhetorical question. I won't ask you to answer that.
    Finally, we still don't have enough testing supplies. I 
don't understand how and why that is possible. I understand 
that converting an auto plant to build ventilators might take a 
little time, but how can we be struggling to get adequate 
supplies of simple supplies like swabs? What does this say 
about the Federal response to the coronavirus outbreak?
    Dr. Bright. It says to me, sir, that there is no master 
coordinated plan on how to respond to this outbreak. We don't 
have a strategy or plan in place that identifies each of those 
critical components, and we don't have a designated agency that 
is sourcing those critical components and coming up with a 
strategy to make sure that we have those supplies when we need 
them.
    We need this comprehensive national strategy that is end-
to-end, it includes every component to make sure we can respond 
and protect American lives.
    Mr. Butterfield. Thank you, Dr. Bright. You are a great 
American. Thank you very much.
    I yield back.
    Ms. Eshoo. The gentleman yields back. A pleasure to 
recognize the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Griffith, for his 5 
minutes of questions.
    Mr. Griffith. Thank you, Mr. Chair--Madam Chairman. 
Appreciate that.
    It seems like Mr. Navarro has done a pretty good job in 
listening to the questions. I do wish we had more of the 
information available, and it is one of the reasons why--it is 
not your fault--but why I wish we had done this through the 
regular channels.
    But I would ask this. On some of the questions that were 
just asked about supplies being available, I kind of got the 
impression from prior testimony that Project BioShield, which 
you urged us to put money into and we put $700 million in 2018 
and $735 million in 2019, was supposed to take care of some of 
that. Am I misunderstanding Project BioShield?
    Dr. Bright. Project BioShield is used to invest in late-
stage development of drugs and vaccines----
    Mr. Griffith. It was for the drugs.
    Dr. Bright [continue]. Primarily and some diagnostics and--
--
    Mr. Griffith. So that didn't help on this at all?
    Dr. Bright. It didn't help on this at all, sir.
    Mr. Griffith. All right. Now, that being said--and I did 
say, you know, and I would hope that we would have had 
everything available to us, and I understand that may not be 
your fault, but it does create issues. But everything is going 
crazy; people have all kinds of things going on, and this 
hydroxychloroquine comes up. And there are some email exchanges 
in Exhibit 54 from your documents indicate that--a Chris--
Christopher Houchens writes and he says, you know, we should 
probably take a look at this--I am paraphrasing, but the line I 
took out of it was--especially when we have few or no options.
    One of the frustrations I have had for years with our 
community trying to respond to all kinds of different diseases 
is we want to have the double-blind studies in place; we want 
to have all the science there, which makes sense if you have an 
alternative. But when you have few or no options, it seems to 
me you would go after those things that are available. And if 
hydroxychloroquine is one at one point, then remdesivir I am 
assuming, have they done the double-blind studies related to 
COVID on remdesivir? Has that already happened?
    And then I have got an article from the Richmond Times-
Dispatch, April 15th, where a doctor used high doses of vitamin 
C and a drug called Actemra. Also--Actemra.
    All of these are floating out there; doctors are using all 
kinds of things, because we don't have other options. And so I 
am wondering, what was the great hesitancy to at least let 
doctors try? And even if anecdotally it was having some effect, 
wouldn't you have to have that available in order to be able to 
do the tests? And if you have got few or no options, why 
wouldn't you want to go down that pathway?
    Dr. Bright. We want to make sure that the drugs that we 
consider are safe and effective. The highest priority is 
safety. So many of these studies that we had or anecdotal 
evidence or reports we had did not include a thorough safety 
vetting of those drugs.
    There are some known side effects with some of the drugs. 
Many of these drugs were repurposed, so they weren't built de 
novo. So we knew about some of those potential safety concerns, 
and we didn't have any evidence of how those safety concerns 
would appear in people infected with this virus.
    This virus takes over a lot of your body. It actually 
infects multiple organs in your body and causes significant 
inflammation and multi-organ shutdown in some cases before 
death and acute respiratory distress syndrome that really turns 
your lungs into a brick.
    Mr. Griffith. It is scary stuff. And you said, though on 
hydroxychloroquine that, you know, one of the problems was you 
might have an irregular heartbeat. If you are worrying about 
not having a heartbeat at all, that is really not--you are not 
worried about irregular if you don't have one at all. Am I not 
correct about that?
    I mean, that is the concern. People were dying out there, 
and here was the first one that showed some promise. Why 
wouldn't we want to accept, you know, an offer from a 
manufacturer to give us a lot of this and have it out there for 
widespread use, if the doctors chose, just like the doctor in 
Richmond?
    That didn't work in that case. They actually used it there, 
in that case, and it didn't work, so he tried something else. I 
mean, I think that is really what we are going to have to do in 
an emergency situation. Am I not correct?
    Dr. Bright. We need to do it carefully, sir. We have to 
make sure that when we have that information available with 
those potential drugs available, we are thinking outside the 
box--
    Mr. Griffith. Can't we be so careful that we accidentally 
kill people?
    Dr. Bright. We need to move swiftly, sir. And we have 
actually shown that we can put up a clinical study in the 
matter in less than a week.
    Mr. Griffith. OK.
    Dr. Bright. It is important to use available clinical data. 
And if we know there are potential risks, and we need to make 
sure that we are cognizant of those risks and make sure those 
drugs are used in a very safe and controlled manner.
    Mr. Griffith. Yes, sir. And I appreciate that.
    And let me just say this. You know, it is our job to ask 
some tough questions sometimes, but, you know, just like you 
found friendly ears at the White House, you might have found 
some friendly ears on our side of the aisle here as well.
    And I would note that in 2018 you were talking about 
vaccines, and you were talking about offshore production. And I 
said, let me know what I can do to help get more production 
onshore. But I never heard from you.
    I am happy to help. I want onshore production. I am with 
you on a lot of these issues. I don't know what is going on 
behind the scenes. We have got to investigate that. Today, 
unfortunately, was not the day to do that investigation. We 
don't have enough information. A lot of stuff is not here for 
us.
    But don't hesitate in the future. If you see something, let 
us know on both sides of the aisle what is going on.
    I appreciate it, and I yield back.
    Dr. Bright. Thank you.
    Ms. Eshoo. The gentleman yields back. A pleasure to 
recognize the gentleman from California, Ms. Matsui, for her 5 
minutes of questions.
    Ms. Matsui. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
    And thank you, Dr. Bright, for appearing before us today, 
and thank you for your public service.
    Dr. Bright, you have described a series of missed 
opportunities that have left our country woefully unprepared 
for the pandemic's impact. Many Americans are eager to return 
to normalcy, as we can all understand. But to even begin safely 
reopening, we need widespread testing capacity, an organized 
contact tracing workforce, and a healthcare system that can 
handle further surge. And, ultimately, a vaccine or therapeutic 
cure is required.
    I would like to ask you a series of questions about your 
warnings to the administration while at BARDA. I am hoping you 
can succinctly answer whether you believe each scenario will 
ultimately shorten or lengthen the time it takes for our 
country to safely reopen and recover from the coronavirus 
pandemic.
    On January 10, you began pushing HHS leadership to obtain 
sequencing on virus samples. Given the importance of these 
samples for vaccine and diagnostic development, has the 
administration's inaction shortened or lengthened our timeline 
for reopening?
    Dr. Bright. Those samples were critical to get started as 
early as possible. There was a delay in getting those samples. 
That means there will be a delay in getting those 
countermeasures. Those countermeasures are critical to 
reopening our country.
    Ms. Matsui. OK. Throughout the month of January, you made 
HHS aware of the urgent need to increase funding to combat the 
virus. HHS leadership believed that BARDA's budget was 
sufficient. Has the delay of these resources shortened or 
lengthened our timeline for reopening?
    Dr. Bright. Delay of those resources have extended the 
ability--the timeline to make drugs available and vaccines, 
therefore, has extended our ability to respond to this 
pandemic.
    Ms. Matsui. On January 18, you pushed Dr. Kadlec to 
coordinate COVID-19 planning activities across the government. 
Dr. Kadlec initially rejected your request, suggesting it was 
not time-sensitive. Did this delay in coordination shorten or 
lengthen our timeline for reopening?
    Dr. Bright. That lengthened the timeline of our reopening. 
We needed those early policy discussions to happen as soon as 
possible.
    Ms. Matsui. From January through March, you pushed for HHS 
to ramp up production of N95 masks, swabs, and syringes. HHS 
failed to act quickly. Has this inaction shortened or 
lengthened our timeline to reopening?
    Dr. Bright. That inaction has put a lot of lives at risk in 
our frontline healthcare workers, and no time to reopen our 
country will bring those people back to us.
    Ms. Matsui. Certainly. Thank you, Dr. Bright. Of course, 
there are many decisions made outside of these scenarios that 
influence when we can safely reopen, but from what I am hearing 
today, HHS, if they heeded your warnings early, we could have 
proactively limited the toll this pandemic has taken on our 
country.
    It appears clear from the whistleblower report that the 
Trump administration prioritized political calculations above 
public health with regard to chloroquine and 
hydroxychloroquine. Despite the lack of data supporting the 
clinical benefits for the treatment and prevention of COVID-19, 
the Trump administration promoted the drug's use to the 
American people because it was seen as a big, immediate win.
    Dr. Bright, do you believe there are other instances where 
the administration relied on politics rather than science to 
make coronavirus response decisions? And what consequences 
might those decisions have had on public health?
    Dr. Bright. We have a very rigorous scientific review 
process for all of the investments that we make for the drugs, 
vaccines, and diagnostics through BARDA and through our 
department actually. And so there were some attempts to bypass 
that rigorous vetting process that caused me great concern and 
actually increased the tension between me and Dr. Kadlec.
    Without that scientific vetting, that does increase the 
risk of a drug being evaluated or supported that could have 
safety concerns. And we really needed to have the best 
scientists in our country weigh in on whether or not that drug 
should be evaluated and how it should be evaluated to address 
those safety concerns.
    Ms. Matsui. Certainly.
    The Trump administration waited until April to invoke the 
Defense Production Act to increase the production of life-
saving medical supplies, like masks, months after doctors began 
experiencing shortages and three months after your initial 
January warnings.
    Should HHS have invoked the Defense Act earlier to increase 
the domestic production of critical medical supplies like masks 
and swabs?
    Dr. Bright. I am actually not an expert on the Defense 
Production Act and how it is used most effectively. I do 
believe that we should have been doing everything possible--
placing orders early, ramping up supply, ramping up production 
of those critical medical equipment--as quickly as possible. 
Whether or not that is through the Defense Production Act or 
other mechanisms, it should have been a high priority.
    Ms. Matsui. OK. Well, thank you very much, Dr. Bright. I 
have run out of time, and thank you very much for appearing 
before us today.
    Ms. Eshoo. The gentlewoman yields back. A pleasure to 
recognize the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Bilirakis, for his 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate it very 
much.
    And I want to thank Dr. Bright as well for your service to 
our country.
    I have a few questions, and I am focusing on the 
hydroxychloroquine. When was the potential use of chloroquine 
and hydroxychloroquine as treatment for the COVID-19 first 
brought to your attention, sir?
    Dr. Bright. I believe it was probably mid-March, between 
March 10th and March 17th, somewhere in that timeframe.
    Mr. Bilirakis. And not prior to that?
    Dr. Bright. Not that I recall. The first I heard of the 
drug itself was a call I received from Dr. Woodcock at the FDA 
asking if I had heard of the drug. And I hadn't heard of the 
drug, and I hadn't heard of its potential use for COVID-19 
patients. She said there might be something interesting to look 
at. And she forwarded a manuscript, a draft manuscript, and 
that is the first I learned of the drug itself.
    Mr. Bilirakis. So you won't--you didn't--you weren't aware 
of any news articles and research papers in January discussing 
the potential benefits of the drug?
    Dr. Bright. I heard anecdotal stories and reports, sir.
    Mr. Bilirakis. You had?
    Dr. Bright. I had--I can't recall if I did it specifically 
for chloroquine, but I tried to track the media and the 
scientific journal as well. However, I rely on the guidance of 
the science within HHS, and the first I had heard of that was 
from my colleague, Dr. Woodcock, at the FDA, and then a summary 
report from our scientists at FDA, CDC, NIH, and BARDA, that 
indicated that the evidence for its benefit was weak and the 
evidence for its safety concerns was stronger. And they did not 
believe at that point it was something that should be 
supported.
    Mr. Bilirakis. OK. Now, again, what was your reaction 
personally? Did you think it was something worth pursuing 
initially when you heard it from Dr. Woodcock?
    Dr. Bright. Initially, I said, I do believe--I mean, I 
trust Dr. Woodcock and her scientific judgment immensely, and 
if she mentioned it as something that we should look at and as 
something we should consider testing in a randomized controlled 
clinical study, I would be supportive of the team reviewing 
that protocol and that information to see if it should be used.
    Mr. Bilirakis. Sir, you know, I understand, I have heard it 
from experts--and I am certainly not an expert in this area--
that the drug, the one that we are talking about in this case, 
hydroxychloroquine, if it is used, first of all, timely, 
because I now understand there is a window there as far as the 
patient, the effective--the efficacy of the drug.
    Have you heard this, that if it is administered properly, 
there is a small window there for the patient as far as risk is 
concerned? Can you elaborate a little bit on that if you have 
heard that? And again, this is not from a layperson. This is 
from an expert.
    Dr. Bright. We have seen anecdotal, heard of anecdotal data 
from different physicians that they believe they have seen 
benefit or patient improvement from the use of this drug in 
either combination with an antibiotic, azithromycin, or in 
combination with zinc or other--vitamin C or other things, but 
there was never sufficient evidence from a randomized 
controlled study to show its benefit would actually outweigh 
the potential risk.
    That is why the NIH and probably 40 other institutions 
around the world is conducting randomized controlled clinical 
studies to look at the benefits either in late-stage treatment 
or early-stage treatment. Most of the data coming out from 
those clinical studies to date, haven't shown an overwhelming 
level of evidence that it has benefits in those patients.
    It doesn't mean that it might still have some benefits in 
individuals or a case or two in different studies or that 
physicians believe they see a benefit in their patients. But in 
the context of a randomized controlled study, we haven't seen 
an overwhelming level of benefit.
    Mr. Bilirakis. Have you reviewed the studies in other 
countries, such as France and possibly Japan, on these? I mean, 
are you--I just want to know, because my constituents ask these 
questions. Do you take those studies into consideration when 
you make these decisions?
    Dr. Bright. We absolutely do. We look at the quality of 
those studies. We look to see if they were done with the right 
controls in place and the right sample size. Was it 
statistically relevant or was it just a few people, was it 20 
people or was it 2,000 people? All of that adds to the power of 
the data itself.
    Many of studies that we saw early only included a few 
number of patients, and so it was unclear, even from the 
description of some of those studies that were not in peer-
reviewed journals, whether all the patients were treated the 
same, whether they had full participation throughout the 
clinical study itself. And looking at the statistical power of 
many of those studies, they were very small. So it is really 
difficult to understand the impact, the benefit.
    We also saw a study that the VA hospital conducted with 
hydroxychloroquine that showed people who are treated with 
hydroxychloroquine appeared to have a higher rate of death than 
people who were not treated with hydroxychloroquine.
    So that study too has weaknesses. No study is actually 
perfect. You take all of that evidence into account when you 
make a decision on how to further study the drug or how to use 
that drug.
    Mr. Bilirakis. It is my understanding that, not my 
constituent, but a U.S. citizen who--a veteran--was cured--
again, this is just what I heard--from the drug. And that was a 
late-stage case, but I have also heard of early-stage cases as 
well. So I wanted to get that on the record.
    Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Ms. Eshoo. The gentleman's time has expired. He yields 
back. A pleasure to recognize the gentlewoman from Florida, Ms. 
Castor, for her 5 minutes of questions.
    Ms. Castor. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Dr. Bright, thank you for speaking out to save lives.
    I read your whistleblower filing, and I want to ask you 
about the N95 respirators. These respirators are essential 
personal protective equipment. They are not the cloth masks or 
surgical masks that everyday Americans are encouraged to wear 
by the CDC.
    Dr. Bright, are N95 respirators necessary to protect the 
lives of nurses, doctors, EMTs, and those on the front line?
    Dr. Bright. Yes, they are required essential personal 
protective equipment to protect those frontline healthcare 
workers from getting infected.
    Ms. Castor. And this is not a hypothetical concern. Just 
last week the L. A. Times reported a tragic story about a 
heroic nurse, Celia Marcos, who appears to have died because 
she lacked an N95 respirator when she rushed into a hospital 
room to try to save a COVID-19 patient who had stopped 
breathing.
    And this brave nurse is not the only one. According to 
another report, over 700 staff at just one Detroit area health 
system have tested positive for COVID-19, and the CDC reported 
over a month ago that over 9,000 healthcare workers had already 
contracted COVID and dozens have died.
    And I checked with my Tampa Bay area health providers, and 
one Tampa hospital said N95s are still very difficult to 
procure. She said there is a dire need for N95s. One of my 
community health centers says, we continue to struggle to get 
N95s.
    And there are so many folks trying to sell knock-offs. And 
then a large Tampa Bay area health system said the supply chain 
remains inconsistent and irregular, and BayCare remains 
concerned as we head into the fall for N95 masks. The demand 
will continue to increase due to the flu season and the 
continued presence of COVID-19.
    Dr. Bright, you understood that America would face a 
shortage of respirators in January. Is that right?
    Dr. Bright. We understood America would face a shortage of 
N95 respirators for a pandemic response in 2007. And we have 
exercised and known and evaluated that number almost every year 
since 2007.
    It was exercised even as late as--early as 2019 August, in 
Crimson Contagion, that we would need 3.5 billion N95 
respirators in our stockpile to protect our healthcare workers 
from a pandemic response.
    Ms. Castor. And you sounded the alarm repeatedly but were 
ignored by the senior leadership at the Department of Health 
and Human Services. Please explain what steps that you took and 
the response you received.
    Dr. Bright. We knew going into this pandemic that critical 
medical equipment would be in short supply. I began getting 
alerts from industry colleagues in mid- and early--mid- and 
late January telling me that from an outside view, from the 
industry view, that the supply chain was diminishing rapidly, 
telling me that other countries that we relied on to supply 
many of these masks were blocking export and stopping transfer 
of those masks to the United States.
    I learned that China was trying to buy the equipment from 
the United States producers to have it shipped to China so they 
could make more.
    And each of those alerts--and there were dozens of these 
alerts--I pushed those forward to our leadership at ASPR, to 
Dr. Kadlec and his senior leadership team. I pushed those 
warnings to our Critical Infrastructure Protection team. I 
pushed those warnings to our Strategic National Stockpile team 
who has the responsibility of procuring those medical supplies 
for our stockpile.
    In each of those, I was met with indifference, saying they 
were either too busy, they didn't have a plan, they didn't know 
who was responsible for procuring those. In some cases, they 
had a sick child and would get back to it later in the week. A 
number of excuses but never any action.
    It was weeks after my pushing that finally a survey was 
sent out to manufacturers or producers of those masks, a 5-page 
survey, asking producers or companies if they actually made 
those masks.
    Ms. Castor. And in your whistleblower filing you discuss a 
February 7th meeting of the Department leadership group at 
which you urged the Department to focus on securing N95 masks. 
Can you describe what happened at that meeting?
    Dr. Bright. They informed me that they did not believe 
there was a critical urgency to procure masks. They conducted 
some surveys, talked to a few hospitals and some companies, and 
they didn't yet see a critical shortage. And I indicated that 
we know there will be a critical shortage of these supplies, we 
need to do something to ramp up production.
    They indicated, if we notice there is a shortage, that we 
will simply change the CDC guidelines to better inform people 
who should not be wearing those masks so that would save those 
masks for our healthcare workers. My response was, I cannot 
believe you can sit and say that with a straight face. That was 
absurd.
    Ms. Castor. In fact, it took three months from your initial 
warnings, until mid-April, for the Federal Government to invoke 
its authority under the Defense Production Act, to require the 
production of millions of more N95 masks. And even then the 
administration required the production of only 39 million 
masks, which is far fewer that you and other experts said that 
we would need.
    What was a consequence of this 3-month delay and inadequate 
response? Were lives endangered?
    Dr. Bright. Lives were endangered and I believe lives were 
lost. And not only that, we were forced to procure these 
supplies from other countries without the right quality 
standards. So even our doctors and nurses in the hospitals 
today are wearing N95-marked masks from other countries that 
are not providing the sufficient protection that a U.S. 
standard N95 mask would provide them. Some of those masks are 
only 30 percent effective. Therefore, nurses are rushing into 
hospitals thinking they are protected and they are not.
    Ms. Castor. Thank you for your courageous efforts.
    Ms. Eshoo. The gentlewoman's time has expired. A pleasure 
to recognize our colleague from Indiana, Dr. Bucshon, for his 5 
minutes of questions.
    Mr. Bucshon. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
    And thank you, Dr. Bright, for testifying. I appreciate it.
    I was a cardiovascular and thoracic surgeon and been in 
healthcare for over 30-some years. So I want to comment on--I 
am not going to ask a question about hydroxychloroquine. I just 
want to comment on how the medical community responds to this 
type of thing.
    Doctors across the country will use drugs off label in a 
circumstance where they don't have or they don't see a viable 
alternative to that, and I think this is one of those 
circumstances. I am hearing from doctors across the country.
    And look, I am with you. You have to have double-blind 
studies, you have to have proof under normal circumstances. But 
in this situation, I think a little bit of understanding and 
leeway from the Federal Government is in order.
    We do want to ensure the safety. This is a drug that has 
been proven safe for many, many years. In the appropriate 
doses, it does prolong the QT interval, as you have outlined, 
which can lead to cardiac arrhythmias if not used to properly.
    But I mean to tell you, when States tried to stop doctors 
from using this, there was such a backlash they had to back 
away from it, because the physicians and the community wanted 
to use it.
    And so doctors like me, out in the real world, if things 
are working, even anecdotally, they are not going to wait for 
the government bureaucracy to approve it. I just want to get 
that on the record. I am just saying, this is why doctors are 
using this drug. Whether it is right or not, data will show.
    But, you know, if two years from now we have the studies, 
and we say, hey, that stuff really would have worked and the 
government stopped that from being used, if I was a family of a 
person that was stopped from getting hydroxychloroquine, I 
would be pretty mad.
    I want to talk about the supply chain issues as it relates 
to PPE, the personal protective equipment, and I think there is 
enough blame to go around in the Federal Government about what 
happened there for--you know, after H1N1, when our national 
stockpiles were depleted, we didn't replenish them. We have had 
people on both sides of the aisle talking about this and it 
is--I think there is some--something to--some blame to go 
around.
    But, you know, I don't want to be accusatory, but I do want 
to go over some of the facts about BARDA's situation as it 
relates to the masks, OK?
    According to a Washington Post report, in 2015 the Obama 
administration and a company now known as O&M Howard--Halyard, 
H-a-l-y-a-r-d, announced a project to develop rapid pandemic 
mask production line. According to Federal contracting records, 
in 2017 HHS signed off on a $3.3 million, with an ``m,'' 
payment to Halyard to build a machine that could churn out 
millions of protective respiratory masks at a high rate of 
speed during a pandemic.
    However, in September of 2018 CNBC reported that the 
machine was never built. And despite BARDA's $1.5 billion, with 
a ``b,'' budget, The Washington Post reported there wasn't 
money to pay for the project.
    Why was the project scrapped, and did you sign off on that 
decision?
    Dr. Bright. So that project with Halyard was to build a 
novel, a new machine to make respiratory protection, face masks 
faster, as you have described accurately.
    Mr. Bucshon. Right.
    Dr. Bright. Actually, the technical team must have reviewed 
that proposal on the next step or further investment in that 
machine. I believe that the investment to date was made to 
design the machine, build the blueprint for the machine, and I 
am not even sure if it was to build an actual prototype of the 
machine.
    Mr. Bucshon. At that time, in September 2018, were you the 
head of BARDA?
    Dr. Bright. In 2018, I was the director of BARDA.
    Mr. Bucshon. Right. So did you sign off on the decision? 
Because I would expect a decision like that, a contract, money 
was allocated apparently from HHS to BARDA to do this, I 
wouldn't expect that to be scrapped without the director of 
BARDA signing off on that, right? So did you sign off on it? It 
is a yes-or-no question.
    Dr. Bright. Not necessarily a scrapped project, sir. I 
don't know what the proposal was. We rely on a very thorough 
vetting process----
    Mr. Bucshon. Understood.
    Dr. Bright [continue]. Through our contracting office. So 
that proposal to further continue that project never made it to 
me. So if it wasn't approved, it didn't make it through the 
proper vetting process in BARDA. The decision to end or 
continue that project was not brought to me.
    Mr. Bucshon OK. I find that surprising, but I will take 
your word for it.
    Nicole Lurie, who hired you, told The Washington Post that 
the Halyard contract was part of an explicit strategy to ensure 
we could surge mask production in the next crisis. Well, now we 
are here and we don't have it. So we are dealing with the 
consequences of that decision.
    And in addition, I guess, to the Howard--Halyard--I keep 
saying that wrong--it is my understanding--well, I am running 
out of time. So what I am going to just say is, look, to 
doctors across America, you know, it is easy for us to sit in 
Washington, D.C., whether we are Members of Congress or whether 
we are agencies, and talk in the abstract about people dying in 
our intensive care units, but when you are the physician at the 
bedside and there is a medication that has promise and that has 
a safety profile that we understand, doctors will use this 
medication off, you know, offline. And that is what is 
happening. And, you know, whether that is right or wrong, we 
might take years to prove, but in the meantime people can die.
    I yield back.
    Ms. Eshoo. The gentleman's time has expired. It is a 
pleasure to recognize the gentleman from Maryland, Mr. 
Sarbanes, for his 5 minutes of questions.
    Mr. Sarbanes. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Dr. Bright, welcome back to this committee.
    The United States Government deploys millions of dedicated 
public servants working together to achieve our shared goals as 
a Nation, to promote effective government and to protect the 
public interest, in this instance, to protect the public 
health. As a scientist and public health official, that was 
your charge, and you took it seriously.
    Unfortunately, the record shows that your superiors at HHS, 
and potentially beyond, instead of valuing your expertise and 
experience, squandered it in ways that in this moment, in the 
face of this crisis, amount to gross negligence. They ignored 
your science-based pleas to pursue critical strategies, for 
example, your repeated calls to obtain virus samples from China 
and to find supplies, masks, respirators, and swabs. They 
dismissed your science-based warnings about pursuing unproven 
strategies. They dismissed your concern, for example, about the 
stampeding towards hydroxychloroquine. We have heard about that 
today.
    And they sent you on errant missions to find treatments 
with little therapeutic value, all for the sake of satisfying 
political cronies. And you have testified about the miracle 
cure drug that was an example of that.
    Ignoring, dismissing your input, was not harmless 
malpractice, because there is every reason to believe that if 
that input had been heeded, particularly your pleas for action 
in the early days of the pandemic, it might have saved 
thousands of lives.
    I want to thank you for coming forward. I want to thank you 
for blowing the whistle on the misguided and chaotic response 
to this pandemic.
    I am sure there are specific conversations, emails, moments 
in time that you remember like they happened yesterday, the 
inflection points where if the response to your warnings had 
been heeded, things might have been different. And I am sure 
they haunt you and keep you up at night.
    From January of this year, tell me about just one specific 
moment when you had that sinking feeling in the pit of your 
stomach because you were not seeing a response that you knew 
needed to happen.
    Dr. Bright. Congressman, I will never forget the emails I 
received from Mike Bowen indicating that our mask supply, our 
N95 respirator supply, was completely decimated, and he said, 
we are in deep shit, the world is, and we need to act.
    And I pushed that forward to the highest levels I could in 
HHS and got no response. From that moment, I knew that we were 
going to have a crisis for our healthcare workers because we 
were not taking action. We were already behind the ball. That 
was our last window of opportunity to turn on that production, 
to save the lives of those healthcare workers, and we didn't 
act.
    Mr. Sarbanes. Thank you.
    Listening to your testimony gives me chills because it all 
adds up to one inescapable conclusion: It didn't have to be 
this way. There was another path. Things could have gone 
differently. The Federal response to the pandemic could have 
been much more effective.
    So here we are at a moment when our country needs the kind 
of expertise and science-based guidance that you and others 
like you can offer us. These voices are too often being 
sidelined. Things are upside down. In you we have someone who 
made the right call in the early days and has been removed from 
your position, while so many people who made the wrong call 
still have their jobs.
    Dr. Bright, when the counsel that you and others offer is 
cast aside--and I know you know this--it means that science and 
reason are also being cast aside. That is a dangerous impulse. 
It is an attitude that deprives our country in this critical 
moment of any real chance of getting ahead of this pandemic.
    But hopefully we can learn from this. There is still time 
to put science and reason back into the national strategy for 
fighting COVID-19. We need people like you to help lead us 
through this.
    The Federal response has got to get smarter. It has to put 
science ahead of politics and cronyism and wishful thinking.
    Our committee will continue to press for that in the days 
ahead, and I know that you want to look forward. So tell us, 
what can we do now to learn from the mistakes of January and 
February and March and make sure that we navigate and lead our 
country through this public health crisis?
    Dr. Bright. Congressman, we need to install and empower 
leadership, and we need to unleash the voices of the scientists 
in our public health system in the United States, so they can 
be heard. And their guidances need to be listened to, and we 
need to be able to convey that information to the American 
public so they have the truth about the real risk and dire 
consequences of this virus, and they have the truth about the 
consequences of their actions if they don't follow those 
guidances.
    And we don't have a single point of leadership right now 
for this response, and we don't have a master plan for this 
response. So those two things are absolutely critical.
    I would also encourage Congress to ensure there is 
oversight in this response. Large sums of funding have become 
available to help us, as scientists and others, respond to this 
outbreak, and without proper oversight of those dollars, I am 
concerned that they could be misdirected and lost and not put 
to the right fight.
    So I would urge Congress to continue and increase their 
oversight in how those funds are being spent and making sure 
they are prioritized and used appropriately to end this 
pandemic.
    Mr. Sarbanes. Thanks for that caution. I yield back.
    Ms. Eshoo. The gentleman's time has expired and he yields 
back. A pleasure to recognize the gentlewoman from Indiana, 
Mrs. Brooks, for 5 minutes for her questions.
    Mrs. Brooks. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
    Dr. Bright, with all due respect, the Vice President was 
named the head of the coronavirus White House Task Force, which 
was actually a recommendation from a bipartisan blue-ribbon 
study panel that issued recommendations years ago and thought 
the Office of the Vice President ought to be in charge of the 
response. And so, with all due respect, I believe there is that 
coordination.
    And part of what I am very, very concerned, relative to 
this hearing, is that there is the impression being made that 
there has been no plan. And, in fact, that is part of what the 
reauthorization of PAHPA, that I worked closely with you, Dr. 
Kadlec, that Congresswoman Eshoo, Dr. Burgess, so many of us 
relied on you all to share with us what we needed to do to 
reauthorize PAHPA, which most Members of Congress really didn't 
know what that was, Pandemic All-Hazards Preparedness Act. Most 
Members of Congress and most members of the American public 
didn't know we had strategic national stockpiles and that we 
might actually be short some of these things, until this all 
hit.
    But we did get that reauthorized, and it was signed into 
law in June of 2019. Do you recall that?
    Dr. Bright. Yes.
    Mrs. Brooks. And, Dr. Bright, you joined BARDA to lead the 
influenza division in 2010, right after H1N1, because of your 
expertise, and we rely on your expertise, and you became 
director in 2016. After--and you mentioned it in 2007, but 
after the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, the supply of masks in the 
Strategic National Stockpile was not resupplied. You have 
mentioned that actually you have had a problem since 2007.
    But I have to share with you, Members like Congresswoman 
Eshoo and I, who have had discussions about this, many of us 
really didn't know that. We, as members of this committee, did 
not know and were not told of these shortages of masks as we 
worked through reauthorization of this important law.
    Were you aware of this issue, and did you push HHS to 
maintain mask production for purposes of replenishing the 
Strategic National Stockpile before this happened in January?
    Dr. Bright. Before 2017, we actually held an annual review 
of the Strategic National Stockpile. That was chaired by Dr. 
Lurie, the previous ASPR.
    Since we moved the Strategic National Stockpile from the 
CDC management, under the ASPR management, we have not yet had 
an interagency, across-departmental review of the supplies in 
that Strategic National Stockpile. We went through an annual 
prioritization process. There has always been limited funding 
and never enough to completely top off the stockpile.
    Mrs. Brooks. Did you know Greg Burel?
    Dr. Bright. I do.
    Mrs. Brooks. He retired prior to all of this happening.
    Dr. Bright. Yes.
    Mrs. Brooks. He led the Strategic National Stockpile. Did 
you have conversations with Greg Burel from 2009 until 2020 
about what was in the Strategic National Stockpile?
    Dr. Bright. Absolutely. The Flu Risk Management Meeting met 
on a monthly basis, and each year they reviewed and prioritized 
items that should be purchased by the Strategic National 
Stockpile.
    Mrs. Brooks. OK.
    Dr. Bright. That body--which I actually directed for some 
time--made recommendations and prioritizations to the Strategic 
National Stockpile. However, it was the Strategic National 
Stockpile's responsibility to make those purchases.
    Mrs. Brooks. And how about PHEMCE? Does BARDA participate 
in PHEMCE? And would you please--very, very briefly, because my 
time is limited--explain what PHEMCE is? This is a plan that 
experts like yourselves participate in.
    So I want the American people to know there have been 
plans, there have been plans, that PHEMCE had forth a 2017-2018 
implementation plan. The White House put forth in September of 
2018 a National Biodefense Plan. Did you participate in that 
National Biodefense Plan?
    Dr. Bright. I did, and many of us did.
    Mrs. Brooks. And it was the first time that our country had 
actually put forth a National Biodefense Plan. Many said it was 
kind of landmark, and same thing with PHEMCE putting forth many 
plans.
    So I want the American people to know a lot of folks, over 
a long period of time, have been focused, but yet we did not 
still have enough. We didn't have enough swabs. We didn't have 
enough masks. We don't have enough gowns for all those 
incredible healthcare providers.
    So I don't want everyone to be given the impression that 
you raised the flag just in January, OK, when you saw it was 
short, because you hadn't gotten the job done prior to January. 
And you were at those tables, as were so many others. This 
happened over a very, very long period of time. And those of us 
have been very the disappointed to learn what was and what was 
not in the Strategic National Stockpile.
    I thank you for your service. I thank you for your 
expertise. But across the board, over many administrations, we 
did not do enough.
    And I yield back.
    Ms. Eshoo. Do you want to respond, Doctor?
    Dr. Bright. I can say that those plans have been in place, 
and it was disappointing they were not pulled out in January of 
this year and followed. They were not put on the table with a 
strong leader indicating these are our plans, everyone falls in 
line and follows through with this plan.
    I can also--I think it is important to emphasize the 
PHEMCE, it is the Public Health Emergency Medical 
Countermeasure Enterprise, which is comprised of many great 
scientists from across our government who put these plans in 
place, but since 2017 we have largely disbanded, dismantled 
that PHEMCE organization. We have not had those interagency 
discussions for a number of years, the Executive Enterprise 
Committee and the Executive Leadership Committee. We may have 
had one or two meetings at most in a new restructured or 
reorganized PHEMCE organization.
    So the partners and colleagues across government haven't 
had those venues to even talk or coordinate for a number of 
years to understand what that plan looked like and how they 
would work together to implement that plan when the day came to 
need it.
    Ms. Eshoo. The gentlewoman's time has expired and she has 
yielded back. A pleasure to recognize the gentleman from New 
Mexico, Mr. Lujan, for your 5 minutes of questions.
    Mr. Lujan. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Dr. Bright, you have described pressure from senior Trump 
administration officials to promote the malaria drug 
chloroquine and hydroxychloroquine to treat COVID-19 despite 
the lack of scientific support for this treatment. According to 
your account, when they are offered to donate chloroquine pills 
to the Strategic National Stockpile on March 17, your team of 
experts at HHS determined that, quote, ``There are safety 
liabilities associated with the drug,'' close quote, and that, 
quote, ``accepting the donation could lead to widespread use 
that is not supported by any clinical data,'' close quote.
    Further, one of the public health experts advising you 
said, quote, ``No data available to support that chloroquine 
provides clinical benefit to the treatment or prevention of 
COVID-19'' close quote.
    Yes or no, Dr. Bright, are there safety liabilities 
associated with chloroquine?
    Dr. Bright. There are, yes.
    Mr. Lujan. According to your whistleblower complaint, at 
the time of the Bayer offer the consensus from BARDA and FDA 
scientists was that it was advisable to wait for additional 
clinical data before making any recommendations on the use of 
chloroquine to treat COVID-19.
    Is that correct, yes or not?
    Dr. Bright. That is correct.
    Mr. Lujan. Yet on March 19th, Bayer moved forward and 
announced the donation of chloroquine and President Trump told 
the country at a White House press conference that the drug 
had, quote, ``shown very, very encouraging early result,'' 
close quote.
    Yes or no, was the President's statement accurate?
    Dr. Bright. I do not think that was the best-informed 
statement.
    Mr. Lujan. At that press conference the President also said 
had that the drug had, quote, ``been around for a long time, so 
we know things don't go as planned. It is not going to kill 
anybody,'' close quote.
    Yes or no, is that statement accurate?
    Dr. Bright. The drug had been around a long time for its 
use in malaria, but it had not been around for a long time for 
its use in COVID-19 patients. That is a different indication, 
different clinical outcome, and the drug can behave differently 
in those people.
    Mr. Lujan. Yes or no, is it true that within days of that 
press conference, you received urgent instructions from HHS 
general counsel, passed from the White House, directing you to 
obtain the authorization necessary to make the drugs widely 
available to the public?
    Dr. Bright. That is true.
    Mr. Lujan. Yes or no, did the pressure from the White House 
and HHS general counsel put you in a difficult position?
    Dr. Bright. Yes.
    Mr. Lujan. And how did you handle this pressure while still 
trying to protect the American people?
    Dr. Bright. We had to come up with an alternate solution 
that our administration would accept.
    Mr. Lujan. Yes or no, did the administration respect this 
compromise?
    Dr. Bright. They accepted it eventually. The emergency use 
authorization use option was accepted by Dr. Kadlec and the 
administration, yes.
    Mr. Lujan. What I am aware of, and I would agree with that, 
that the HHS assistant secretary for health, Admiral Brett 
Giroir, on April 4 the said, this compromise, quote, ``matters 
not,'' close, and that the drug needed to go to pharmacies, as 
well as hospitals.
    Dr. Bright, there are only 24 hours in a day, and every 
hour you and your team had to spend on chloroquine is an hour 
you couldn't work on fighting this virus.
    Yes or no, did the President's obsession with this issue 
distract you and others on your team from your mission of 
saving lives?
    Dr. Bright. The directive we received to prioritize and put 
an expanded access protocol in place within 48 hours was 
extremely distracting to dozens of Federal scientists who were 
focused on the coronavirus outbreak. They had to set aside all 
other work to try to put together this protocol in the 48-hour 
directed time period.
    Mr. Lujan. Yes or no, did it distract from efforts to 
prepare for this crisis, including securing PPE and wrapping up 
testing and the production of other essential supplies?
    Dr. Bright. It distracted them from their efforts of 
developing other vaccines and drugs that they were focused on 
at that time. It was a different group of individuals who were 
focused on procuring PPE.
    Mr. Lujan. Dr. Bright, just yesterday the President 
questioned the testimony of Dr. Fauci when discussing children 
and schools. The President insisted that, quote, ``It has very, 
very little impact on young people.''
    Dr. Bright, yes or no, do we know that the President's 
statement is accurate.
    Dr. Bright. There is a lot we don't yet know about this 
virus. And it is really concerning over the last few weeks that 
we are getting more and more data out of New York and other 
places where they have had high numbers of infections of the 
impact of this virus in children. It is a very different 
presentation and outcome in children that we see in adults and 
it is very concerning and we don't yet have an answer for that. 
But we should proceed very cautiously and not have any hope or 
knowledge that we know everything about this virus.
    Mr. Lujan. Dr. Bright, I want to end by quoting your 
testimony. Quote, ``Without clear planning and implementation 
of the steps that I and other experts have outlined, 2020 will 
be the darkest winter in modern history.''
    The darkest winter in modern history.
    Yes or no, do you believe this administration is doing 
everything it can to prevent the darkest winter? And what more 
should they be doing?
    Dr. Bright. I believe there is a lot of work that we still 
need to do. And I think we need still--I don't think, I know--
we need still a comprehensive plan, and everyone across the 
government, and everyone in America needs to know what that 
plan is and what role they play.
    There are critical steps that we need to do to prepare for 
that fall, for that winter coming. We do not still have enough 
personal protective equipment to manage our healthcare workers 
and protect them from influenza and COVID-19. We still do not 
have the supply chains ramped up for the drugs and vaccines. 
And we still don't have plans in place in how we distribute 
those drugs and vaccines. And we still do not have a 
comprehensive testing strategy so Americans know which test do 
what, what do with that information, and we know how to find 
this virus and trap it and kill it. There is a lot of work we 
still have to do.
    Mr. Lujan. Thank you, Doctor.
    Ms. Eshoo. The gentleman yields back. A pleasure to 
recognize the gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. Mullin, for his 5 
minutes of questions.
    Mr. Mullin. Thank you, Madam Chair. And I would be remiss 
not to thank you for your continued prayers for my son. That is 
very kind of you and I really appreciate it.
    Dr. Bright, you are here on your own time as an individual 
that. Is that correct?
    Dr. Bright. Yes.
    Mr. Mullin. Where are you currently employed?
    Dr. Bright. I am currently an employee of the Department of 
Health and Human Services. And I am in the middle of a 
transition, I guess you would say, between BARDA and NIH.
    Mr. Mullin. So you have accepted the reassigned position to 
NIH?
    Dr. Bright. That position is under discussion at this 
point. I have not yet accepted that role.
    Mr. Mullin. So are you currently being paid?
    Dr. Bright. I am currently being paid.
    Mr. Mullin. Where are you being paid from, out of BARDA or 
from NIH?
    Dr. Bright. It is not completely clear to me, but I believe 
it is out of NIH.
    Mr. Mullin. So are you getting a paycheck since you have 
been--you have been over there since mid-April, right? That is 
correct?
    Dr. Bright. I have received one paycheck, sir. And it is my 
understanding--
    Mr. Mullin. From NIH?
    Dr. Bright. I think it was still part BARDA and part NIH. I 
have had discussions about my onboarding at NIH.
    Mr. Mullin. So are you--at BARDA you made $285,000. Is that 
correct?
    Dr. Bright. That is true.
    Mr. Mullin. So how much are you currently making at NIH?
    Dr. Bright. I don't think my salary has changed.
    Mr. Mullin. It is still the same? So you have been there 
over there for approximately four weeks, a month?
    Dr. Bright. It has been about three weeks since I was 
removed from my office at BARDA.
    Mr. Mullin. So have you reported to NIH, yet.
    Dr. Bright. I have checked in with the NIH director's 
office and we have discussed the onboarding process, the 
fingerprinting process. And we had a call just last evening to 
discuss the framework of my responsibilities that they have 
envisioned for me at NIH.
    Mr. Mullin. So haven't actually reported to work, but you 
are still getting paid, correct?
    Dr. Bright. I have been on sick leave since I was pushed 
out of my position at BARDA.
    Mr. Mullin. Sick leave for what?
    Dr. Bright. For very high blood pressure, and I have been 
under treatment from my physician.
    Mr. Mullin. For hypertension?
    Dr. Bright. For hypertension, sir, yes.
    Mr. Mullin. So you are on medical leave.
    Dr. Bright. I have been on medical leave. This week, 
however, I transitioned from that medical leave to annual leave 
so I can manage this.
    Mr. Mullin. What is annual leave? What do you mean?
    Dr. Bright. Vacation time.
    Mr. Mullin. So you are on vacation time right now?
    Dr. Bright. I am on vacation time.
    Mr. Mullin. Did you inform your supervisors about you 
coming here today or did you need to do that?
    Dr. Bright. I have informed them about my leave status. I 
had a conversation with them last night.
    Mr. Mullin. So you transferred from medical leave to 
vacation this week or does it start next week?
    Dr. Bright. I had a conversation with my physician about my 
hypertension and how we have been managing it over the last 
three weeks because this has been very stressful to be removed 
suddenly without explanation from my role and position. It is a 
life change for me. And my physician has been working very 
closely with me to manage my hypertension and stress. And the 
conversation I had with him last night indicated that----
    Mr. Mullin. I guess I am kind of confused here, because you 
say you have hypertension, but yet you were are able to do 
these interviews, you are able to make the report, and you are 
able to prepare for this hearing. Yet, you are too sick to go 
into work, but you are well enough to come here, while you are 
still getting paid from the United States Government. Is that 
correct?
    Dr. Bright. Sir, I have been under medical leave until----
    Mr. Mullin. I get that. But if you have been on medical 
leave, too sick to do that, but yet you can prepare for a 2-
hour hearing. I am just having a hard time tracking that. I 
have a hard time understanding that. And if you have 
hypertension and you are too sick to go to NIH, but yet you 
are--but you didn't ever experience that in BARDA, right, you 
never had issues in BARDA with hypertension?
    Dr. Bright. I didn't have the level of stress of being 
removed from my position while I was in BARDA. So this has been 
very stressful. And my physician was very concerned and we have 
working on managing that.
    Mr. Mullin. No, I get it. People handle pressure quite 
differently. But as the director of BARDA I would feel like you 
are in quite a bit of a stressful position when you are trying 
to manage a pandemic, but you can't manage that--or you could 
manage that, but you can't manage your own hypertension when it 
comes because you got removed from the office. But yet, you can 
still receive pay from NIH, but you can't show up for work. And 
then all of a sudden you can prepare for this, but you can't do 
that.
    I just have a hard time understanding it. I know you are a 
bright individual and very smart, but you are an employee of 
the Federal Government. And I just want to make sure you are 
not doing something to deceive the American people at this 
time, getting paid from the United States Government.
    With that, I am going to yield to Ranking Member Walden.
    Mr. Walden. I thank the gentleman.
    Dr. Bright, your lawyer appears to have a pretty 
substantial binder there. And I know Mr. Guthrie asked about 
the documents that are there on the table. Are those the 
exhibits to your complaint to the Office of Special Counsel?
    Dr. Bright. I don't know what my--I don't know----
    Mr. Walden. I will direct it to the Counsel, then, since 
she is answered other questions.
    Are those the exhibits to the complaint to the Office of 
Special Counsel.
    Ms. Katz. Some are and some are my work product and some 
are my notes, and they are not appropriate to turn over to 
Congress.
    Mr. Walden. So is it appropriate to turn over the documents 
that are referenced in the complaint--not your work product, I 
respect that--to this committee? And would you do that?
    Ms. Katz. You asked that question initially and I said we 
would look at the documents to determine whether they are 
appropriate to turn over.
    Mr. Walden. I am just talking about the ones--we have 
partial email chains, we have screen shots of emails. I think 
we should have the right to see those documents if we are going 
to effectively know the full extent of this complaint. And I 
just wish you would commit to turning those over.
    Dr. Bright, will you turn those over?
    Ms. Katz. I think I addressed that.
    Mr. Walden. Dr. Bright. I am asking Dr. Bright now.
    Are you willing to turn over----
    Dr. Bright. I have submitted my full complaint to the 
Office of Special Counsel and that is the process I know to 
follow.
    Mr. Walden. But you are here as an individual citizen 
whistleblower.
    Ms. Eshoo. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Walden. We just want to see what you have submitted so 
we can evaluate it ourselves.
    Dr. Bright. Sir, I don't understand the full process, other 
than I was supposed to submit it to the Office of Special 
Counsel, which I have done so. I don't understand the 
legalities of sharing that before they have had their 
opportunity to review that.
    Mr. Walden. They have certainly been shared out into the 
public and press. The Washington Post has them from some 
source. They look a lot like what is referenced in your 
complaint. None of us--I don't know where those came from. But, 
you know, other media outlets are certainly seeing them.
    Ms. Eshoo. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Walden. I just think as part of this investigation, 
Madam Chair, you should request them.
    Ms. Eshoo. We will seek all information that is appropriate 
to be submitted to the committee. And what I circulated--or we 
circulated--to all members of the subcommittee were the emails 
that were public, as well as the complaint. That is what was 
out there.
    Mr. Walden. I know, but----
    Ms. Eshoo. I haven't tracked daily who says what. I mean, 
Politico has something too. I don't know the veracity of----
    Mr. Walden. But, you know, any other investigation we would 
both be going we need to see all the documents as a committee. 
So that is all I am asking.
    Ms. Katz. Madam Chair, may I address one point?
    Ms. Eshoo. No. I think that we need to move on.
    The gentleman from Oregon is recognized, Mr. Schrader.
    Mr. Schrader. Thank you.
    Thank you for being here, Dr. Bright. Really appreciate it. 
Tough to do. Very impressive that you are here.
    Could you describe the tone and reactions of Dr. Kadlec and 
Dr. Azar, in your January 23rd meeting when they had the all-
agencies meeting on the COVID virus? Could you describe how up-
to-speed they seemed to be?
    Dr. Bright. In that meeting, sir, it was one of our first 
meetings that we had about how to address the outbreak, and 
because we had practice, I came in with my list of needs and 
those lists for money, people, and viruses.
    My request was met with a bit of surprise and puzzlement. I 
remember Secretary Azar looking around the room and saying: 
Money, you need money? Maybe there is money somewhere. I mean, 
it was just something----
    Mr. Schrader. This is despite the fact that we had had the 
outbreak in China for some time?
    Dr. Bright. This was January 23rd at this point.
    Mr. Schrader. Could you describe January 25th, if you 
remember, email exchange with Mr. Bowen on the mask situation.
    Dr. Bright. I don't remember that specific, but I am sure 
it was urgent. I am sure that Mr. Bowen was sending me a notice 
saying--asking if this----
    Mr. Schrader. So you didn't ask him to come and talk to 
you; he just reached out to you?
    Dr. Bright. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Schrader. OK. How about an email exchange with Dr. Kerr 
on January 27th? Did you reach out to Dr. Kerr? Did he come and 
ask----
    Dr. Bright. Dr. Kerr reached out to me, I believe. This was 
because, again, he is a pandemic influenza expert as well 
response and he knows the vital nature of needing those 
viruses. And he was involved in prepping our Secretary for a 
call he had with minister, Vice Minister Ma in China. And we 
knew a high priority was for our Secretary to ask for those 
viruses.
    We have had challenges in the past of getting viruses from 
China from avian influenza strains and viruses. So this was a 
high priority because we needed that to get started. And he was 
alarmed when he wrote to me that morning indicating that the 
CDC director had reprioritized and actually indicated that we 
did not need to--or he did not need to--the Secretary did not 
need to ask China for viruses. And it was alarming to us 
because we knew how critical it was.
    Mr. Schrader. That sounds incredible in light of what has 
transpired since then.
    So I guess my major point here is that we have a brave 
individual coming forward as a whistleblower. But he is not 
alone. There are many other experts, scientists and 
manufacturers, that realize we were in, if I may say, deep 
shit, not--a long time ago, long before the administration and 
the White House began to wake up.
    What do you think would have happened if Mr. Navarro had 
not reached out to you and actually responded to you? Where 
would we be now if you hadn't been able to at least get one 
person in the White House's attention.
    Dr. Bright. It is difficult to speculate where we were, 
sir. Even when Mr. Navarro reached out and strongly suggested 
action be taken on February 10th--February 9th is the email, 
February 10th it was conveyed to Dr. Kadlec that we needed to 
ramp up production of N95 masks--that order did not go out, 
that solicitation did not close until March 18th.
    So even with the pressure of Mr. Navarro, who I think 
shared the sense of urgency about this outbreak, that pressure 
alone still did not spur Dr. Kadlec and our Strategic National 
Stockpile to that urgently needed action.
    Mr. Schrader. That is very disconcerting and the reason we 
are here today, perhaps.
    Last question, if I may, switching gears and going to the 
other side of the spectrum. While it has been hard to get 
folks' attention here in Washington, DC, in the administration 
on the seriousness of this, I think most people now are 
convinced this is a very serious issue. And I am a little 
concerned we are going too much the other way in terms of 
information.
    You alluded to here on the vaccines. I think some people 
are under the impression there is a vaccine going to be 
developed in a couple of months and everything is going to be 
fine and I can go back to work. And, you know, we, 
unfortunately, have to juxtapose economic issues, they have to 
have realistic expectations at home. And you, I think, 
accurately indicated, well, it can take up to ten years. And 
the quickest we did I guess was Ebola and that was, I believe, 
five years.
    So it is a tough question to as;, I suppose, you don't have 
to answer. But to be--I don't want America to think they can 
just not get back to some semblance of a new post-COVID life 
until a vaccine comes out, because that could take years. And 
there is a chance the vaccine will maybe not be as effective, 
much like our flu vaccines with the flu mutating year to year.
    So I just want to make sure that you would--well, I would 
ask you if you would agree that we can't wait to open up 
America up entirely until a vaccine is there, we have to use 
some of the other parameters you have already suggested.
    Dr. Bright. We have to make sure that we have some 
scientifically led and driven decisions on how and when it is 
safe to reopen America. If it happens before we have a 
vaccine--I mean, if we have a vaccine faster, that is great. 
But we do need to open America up sooner. We need to make sure 
everyone understands the risk, and understands the risk of 
their activities, and everyone has to play a critical part in 
following those activities to reduce the risk.
    We have to have a testing plan in place, and enough tests 
to make sure that we know when people are exposed so they can 
be quarantined and isolated and not continue to infect others.
    And we are also developing a number of therapeutics that 
could offer some potential benefit prophylactically or protect 
you almost like a vaccine before you are infected. Those are 
being developed and maybe even faster than a vaccine. And if 
healthcare workers and frontline workers can use those 
therapeutics, that might offer them some protection as well 
until there is a vaccine.
    So there are a number of steps in between now and a 
vaccine. I believe if we let science lead the discussion, and 
we inform America of the risk and the clear guidance on what 
needs to happen, and people follow that guidance, then there is 
a step-wise process to getting back to work and back about out 
of our homes.
    Mr. Schrader. Thank you very much. I yield back.
    Ms. Eshoo. The gentleman's time has expired and he yields 
back. A pleasure to recognize the gentleman from North 
Carolina, Mr. Hudson, for his 5 minutes of questions.
    Mr. Hudson. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    First let me say, I believe any whistleblower should be 
respected and allowed to be heard as a core component of 
keeping our government accountable and running smoothly. But 
this hearing is not about a whistleblower complaint. It is 
about undermining the administration during a national and 
global crisis, as evidenced by the fact that hearing is being 
held in the wrong subcommittee and well before the Office of 
Special Counsel finishes its work.
    To disregard the minority so spectacularly in the 
organization of this hearing only highlights the partisan and 
political nature of this hearing. I hope today will be held up 
in the future as a lesson of what not to do and the respect and 
gravity that should be given to whistleblower complaints so 
that they are not abused for political expediency.
    More importantly, though, we have vital work we should be 
doing. My constituents want Congress to get back to work. So I 
am glad to be here to highlight the important work that needs 
to be done.
    I heard from an ophthalmologist in my district this week 
about the need for relief. She says she will consider this year 
a success if her practice group even breaks even.
    Long story short, we should be examining the $175 billion 
authorized and appropriated in a bipartisan manner for 
providers, and what providers still need, and recommendations 
for moving forward.
    We should also be examining why there are gaps in outcomes 
and assess for minority communities. Fayetteville, North 
Carolina, in my district, has a large and diverse community, 
and understandably the folks back home are scared because 
coronavirus hits them hardest. Why are we not spending our time 
today examining this crisis within a crisis more closely?
    I hear from providers and hospitals about issues with PPE. 
I know this administration has done extraordinary things to 
secure more PPE. I want to thank President Donald Trump for his 
strong leadership. Not only did his administration moving 
quickly to coordinate a response, but his travel ban on January 
30th was a bold move, though it was panned by his critics as an 
overreaction at the time.
    The administration has gone to great lengths to overcome an 
inadequate system they inherited, and as you testified earlier, 
moved quickly to start programs like Project Airbridge to 
expedite more PPE coming in. But questions remain about why 
there is a global shortage and what more Congress can do to 
support the administration's efforts to secure sufficient PPE. 
This committee should be working on that question.
    We have multiple pieces of bipartisan legislation waiting 
to be considered to improve the operations of the Strategic 
National Stockpile. We should be examining why our stockpile 
was allowed to dwindle under previous administrations.
    The answers to these questions and solutions to these 
problems are timely and critical to helping this administration 
combat this virus and the deadly disease it causes.
    I hear from constituents every day who are suffering under 
these stay-at-home orders. This crisis is hard for anyone, even 
if they weren't suffering from substance use disorder or mental 
health challenges before they were confined to their homes, and 
this crisis has exacerbated this problem. Why are we not 
examining access issues to mental health providers and the 
effects this crisis has had on our constituents' mental health?
    Dr. Bright, you are no doubt an accomplished scientist, and 
I appreciate the service you have rendered this country. You 
deserve to be heard and your whistleblower complaints should be 
given the serious consideration any whistleblower complaint 
deserves.
    But we also deserve to have the opportunity to ask 
questions about serious allegations that have been made against 
you. And I will note again, this is not the time or place for 
that hearing. The time is after the Office of Special Counsel 
has completed its work and the place is the Oversight and 
Investigations Committee.
    But, Dr. Bright, building on questions from Mr. Walden and 
others, Politico released an article yesterday stating that 
your complaint left out a lot of information and context 
regarding agency decisions to require hydroxychloroquine. You 
chose not to elevate your concerns to the Office of Inspector 
General, but instead kept selective screen shots that didn't 
include full context.
    Another example, The Wall Street Journal reported on an 
email today that seems to show that you were in support of 
acquiring and using hydroxychloroquine.
    Can you elaborate on what was missing from your screen 
shots and why you didn't elevate your concerns at any to the 
Office of Inspector General?
    Dr. Bright. So the early days when I was aware that 
hydroxychloroquine, we were interested in acquiring that drug 
for its used in the randomized controlled clinical study. 
Actually, when I heard from Dr. Woodcock that it is something 
that we should try to investigate in a randomized controlled 
study, I even reached out to a company that was licensed and 
approved to make that drug in the United States to see if they 
could donate that drug to the NIH to conduct those clinical 
studies.
    I was aware of other efforts that were ongoing to try to 
acquire some of that drug for its use in randomized controlled 
clinical studies. As long as it was going to be used at that 
time for those randomized controlled clinical studies, I 
thought we should look into the supply chain the same way I did 
with remdesivir.
    It was only after I learned that that supply that was being 
discussed was coming in from Pakistan and from India, from 
facilities that were not approved by the FDA, and the drug was 
not approved for use in the United States, I became 
increasingly alarmed of having that drug in the United States.
    Second, it was when I learned that the plan was to make 
that drug available through an expanded access program so 
people could potentially get that drug and not be under the 
close supervision of a healthcare provider, that caused 
particular concern.
    It was because of that in the cascading days afterwards, 
that we put in that emergency use authorization with the safety 
bumpers and barriers that we could feel comfortable with that 
drug would only be used under close clinical supervision.
    In the earlier days, in that email exchange that you are 
referring to, was before we knew about this information on 
Pakistan, before we knew it was going to be used for expanded 
access clinical--expanded access protocol. It was when I 
thought our efforts to obtain some of that drug would be used 
at the NIH to conduct randomized controlled clinical studies. 
So I was relieved that we did identify some supplies of that 
drug for those clinical studies.
    Mr. Hudson. My time has expired, Madam Chair. I yield back.
    Ms. Eshoo. The gentleman yields back.
    A pleasure to recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts, 
Mr. Kennedy, for his 5 minutes of questions.
    Mr. Kennedy. Dr. Bright, thank you very much for being here 
and thank you for your service to our country.
    Let's ground this hearing a little bit. As of this morning, 
which means these numbers have increased, there are nearly 1.4 
million cases diagnosed of COVID-19 in the United States and 
over 80,000 fatalities. Experts believe both of those numbers 
are an undercount because after five months of this virus being 
on our shores, we have still have a systemic problem with 
regards to robust testing. Is that right?
    Dr. Bright. [Nonverbal response.]
    Mr. Kennedy. Cases in many States across the country are 
still actually increasing in number, despite that lack of 
testing. Is that right?
    Dr. Bright. [Nonverbal response.]
    Mr. Kennedy. You have mentioned in your testimony that, 
quote, ``We missed early warning signs and forgot important 
pages from our pandemic playbook.'' Is that right?
    Dr. Bright. Yes.
    Mr. Kennedy. Sir, you have been the head of BARDA since 
2016. Is that right?
    Dr. Bright. Yes.
    Mr. Kennedy. Until recently.
    Have you experienced any pandemics prior to this one over 
your course of time either there or in your prior government 
service?
    Dr. Bright. We responded to the Zika outbreak, we responded 
to the Ebola outbreak. They didn't rise to the level of 
pandemic.
    Mr. Kennedy. Of course. Thank you for the clarification.
    Sir, you are aware at the end of the Obama administration 
the Obama team put together a playbook to try to guide 
succeeding administrations in how to handle an outbreak, 
correct?
    Dr. Bright. Yes.
    Mr. Kennedy. Sir, you are also aware that there was a 
simulation done from an outgoing Obama administration in 
early--in January 2017 with an incoming administration about 
how to respond a pandemic. Is that right?
    Dr. Bright. Yes.
    Mr. Kennedy. And you are aware that the Trump 
administration cut the number of CDC staff located in China 
from 47 to 14. Is that right?
    Dr. Bright. I don't know the exact number. I know it was 
reduced.
    Mr. Kennedy. OK. And, sir, you referenced already the 
simulation called Crimson Contagion. That was a simulation done 
by HHS began in January 2019. Can you shed just very briefly a 
little bit of light as to what the findings of Crimson 
Contagion were?
    Dr. Bright. Significant findings. It was actually 
participants where beyond HHS, it covered broad areas of 
government, in Federal, State, and locals. Some of the 
significant findings were the need for improved coordination 
and communication, an alignment between the Federal, State, and 
local, Tribal territory governments, and the significant need 
for personal protective equipment, and the shortage, and the 
significant need for funding initially.
    Mr. Kennedy. And, sir, simulation was based off of a flu-
like virus that was initially detected in China, spread by 
global air travel, and resulted in the infection of 110 million 
Americans, leading to 7.7 million hospitalized and nearly 
600,000 dead. Is that right?
    Dr. Bright. Yes.
    Mr. Kennedy. Sir, when did you first have concerns about 
the potential impact of COVID-19 on the United States?
    Dr. Bright. In early January.
    Mr. Kennedy. And were you aware that your supervisor, Dr. 
Kadlec, suggested that--the activation of the Defense 
Production Act in mid-January?
    Dr. Bright. I wasn't aware of him are doing that. No.
    Mr. Kennedy. OK. You mentioned that you had two meetings 
with Secretary Azar, I am sure you had others, but you 
referenced so far in your testimony meetings on January 23rd 
and 27th, where you raised concerns directly to the Secretary. 
Is that right?
    Dr. Bright. Yes. The Secretary was not at the second 
meeting. Deputy Secretary Hargan was there.
    Mr. Kennedy. Thank you.
    You are aware that top National Security Council staff, 
including National Security Advisor Mr. O'Brien and his deputy, 
Matthew Pottinger, raised significant warnings that China was 
downplaying the impacts of this virus.
    Dr. Bright. I did learn of that in a meeting at the White 
House, yes.
    Mr. Kennedy. You are aware that we sent 17.8 tons of 
medical supplies to China in early February?
    Dr. Bright. I have learned of that.
    Mr. Kennedy. Are you aware the Trump administration's 
budget proposal released in February of 2020 called for a cut 
to CDC by nearly $700 million?
    Dr. Bright. I am not aware of that. I have heard of it.
    Mr. Kennedy. Are you familiar with a memo written by Peter 
Navarro that warned of the impact of the virus?
    Dr. Bright. Yes.
    Mr. Kennedy. Are you aware that it was spread among senior 
administration and White House officials?
    Dr. Bright. Yes.
    Mr. Kennedy. Are you aware that it was on about April 2nd 
when the Trump administration finally activated and expanded 
the Defense Production Act months after being warned by you and 
other senior administration officials?
    Dr. Bright. I have learned of that.
    Mr. Kennedy. Are you aware that that order itself did not 
extend to the full authority of the DPA and left a haphazard 
allocation process to States and hospitals to compete against 
each other?
    Dr. Bright. I don't know the details of that authority, 
sir.
    Mr. Kennedy. Has the Coronavirus Task Force actually 
developed a plan for reopening the country?
    Dr. Bright. I am not aware of the full plan to reopen, sir.
    Mr. Kennedy. Have they developed some principles that the 
White House has touted as some principles or guidelines as to 
how to reopen the country?
    Dr. Bright. I have heard of some principles.
    Mr. Kennedy. Are States following that plan?
    Dr. Bright. It doesn't appear that there is a nationwide 
coordinated plan that States are following, sir.
    Mr. Kennedy. So after this recitation of the actions and 
inactions of this administration over the course of the past 6 
months or so, can we possibly say that this administration has 
prepared our country for the moment that we are in and how we 
could possibly be prepared for the distribution--development, 
manufacturing, and distribution of a vaccine to try to address 
330 million Americans over the course of the months ahead?
    Dr. Bright. I think we have a lot of work to do to be 
prepared, sir, to be fully prepared.
    Mr. Kennedy. Thank you, sir. I yield back.
    Ms. Eshoo. The gentleman yields back. A pleasure to 
recognize the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Long, for his 5 
minutes of questions.
    Should we go to--you want to pass?
    OK. You can reserve and we will go to the gentleman from 
California, Mr. Cardenas, for his 5 minutes of questions.
    Mr. Cardenas. Thank you, Dr. Bright, for being here today. 
And I just want to tell you that my family, my community, and 
myself, we appreciate your 25 years of focused service, 
specifically when it comes to addressing pandemic outbreaks. 
And it is my understanding that you have spent those 25 years 
leading teams of scientists when it comes to drugs, 
diagnostics, and vaccine development, and we appreciate that.
    When an administration or decisionmakers prioritize 
politics over science, does that tend to increase or decrease 
the likely results of the loss of life in the middle of a 
pandemic?
    Dr. Bright. I believe that scientists are best equipped to 
understand how to manage a public health crisis and I believe 
scientists should lead.
    Mr. Cardenas. And therefore, to my question again, I will 
phrase it differently, if the scientists are not leading and 
the politicians are leading with the final decisions when 
trying to address the issues of pandemics that are taking 
people's lives, that way of handling it, does that likely 
increase the loss of life, or it likely to increase the loss of 
life?
    Dr. Bright. I believe that scientists leading will actually 
increase the likelihood that we can survive this pandemic and 
move through it. So if scientists are not allowed to lead and 
speak up, I believe it could increase the loss of lives.
    Mr. Cardenas. Thank you.
    How many times in your career have you personally activity 
said, ``I need to enact my right to be a whistleblower?''
    Dr. Bright. I am sorry, could you repeat that?
    Mr. Cardenas. How many times in the last 25 years have you 
decided to enact your right to be a whistleblower?
    Dr. Bright. This is my first time, sir.
    Mr. Cardenas. OK. I just--I knew that answer was simple and 
I think I confused you because I made it so simple. And the 
reason why I want to say that is because I believe that you 
have been incredibly consistent in your willingness to dedicate 
yourself, your expertise, and your career to saving lives.
    Is the loss of life on your mind, was that on your mind 
when you decided that you needed to enact your right to be a 
whistleblower?
    Dr. Bright. I have spent my career focused on saving lives. 
And, sir, everything I have done to come forward now is to 
raise awareness of challenges we have, things that are not 
getting done, because I do think it will save more lives.
    Mr. Cardenas. Are you aware of the fact that the lack of 
testing in the United States America is affected by many pieces 
of the puzzle in order for people to get testing, whether it is 
swabs, whether it is N95-rated equipment for the caregivers to 
be able to enact safely with the public? Are those all factors 
that have contributed to our lack of having adequate testing in 
America?
    Dr. Bright. They are factors, sir. I don't think anyone has 
thought through the entire plan completely to understand those 
critical components for testing. I think there is a lot of 
confusion about the different types of tests, and I think our 
national narrative is focused on a number of tests, and it is 
not about the number so much as the right types of tests and 
Americans know how to use them and what to do with that 
information. And no one has really thought through the raw 
material supply chain to make sure we can sustain the need to 
test.
    Mr. Cardenas. OK. That sounds a little confusing from 
somebody who actually had been working at a high level of the 
United States Government in this space that we are discussing 
at this moment.
    So my question is, if we are not implementing in this 
pandemic to the degree or ability that the United States should 
or could, what has contributed the most to that? Was it the 
lack of scientists recommending up the chain of command or was 
it the people at the top of the chain of command deciding to do 
things differently than the scientists are strongly 
recommending.
    Dr. Bright. There is evidence of scientists raising 
concerns about shortages and other actions that are important 
to take that were not being taken. It is a different level. In 
my personal situation as the leadership at HHS and my ASPR Dr. 
Kadlec that I believe was dismissive of the early warnings that 
I was raising.
    Mr. Cardenas. OK. And you said early warnings. And despite 
the early warnings, have there been other examples where 
warnings and strong recommendations were either being ignored 
or set aside and other actions were taken?
    Dr. Bright. Sir, I believe that I have learned from others. 
I think the CDC has written several guidelines for reopening 
America and getting people out of their homes and back to work. 
I am not sure if all of those guidelines have been reviewed or 
are being publicly considered at this point. So there is 
another example of I think really hardworking career scientists 
and their information and their hard work not probably getting 
the proper vetting and proper exposure to the American public.
    Mr. Cardenas. One of the things--I have no idea how much 
time I have, because the clock has been slipping back and 
forth, but hopefully I have a little bit of time.
    Ms. Eshoo. You are almost out of time.
    Mr. Cardenas. We have heard boasting from the White House 
about millions of personal protective equipment, PPEs as 
everybody knows them as, millions have gone out to America. But 
fact, to date, we should have had billions gone out throughout 
America. Isn't that the disparity?
    Dr. Bright. It is a huge disparity. And healthcare workers 
are having to compromise their protection and their health and 
safety because they are having to be creative and reuse a 
single mask for the entire week or come up with novel 
sterilization practices that are not proven or tested yet.
    So that disparity actually is impacting our frontline 
workers and those are the people whose lives we really need to 
preserve so they can treat others.
    Mr. Cardenas. I have family members who are working in 
hospitals today on the front lines who have been telling me 
that they are wearing equipment for days at a time that they 
are supposed to be disposing of several times a day and are 
having to use them over and over.
    Ms. Eshoo. The gentleman's time has expired. I thank the 
gentleman.
    Mr. Cardenas. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. And if 
somebody could do a better job with the clock, I would 
appreciate it. It kept flipping back and forth. I was trying 
to----
    Ms. Eshoo. You are absolutely right. It went from--it got 
stuck at 4:44, went to zero, and popped up to 1:21. So I am 
watching too. My father was a watchmaker, and clock repairman. 
Where is daddy when we need him?
    A pleasure to recognize Mr. Long from Missouri for his 5 
minutes of questions.
    Mr. Long. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
    And, Dr. Bright, you contend that your removal was because 
the Trump administration and HHS leadership, in particular 
lacked scientific integrity. Do you think that Dr. Fauci lacks 
scientific integrity?
    Dr. Bright. Sir, I don't think my removal was anything 
associated with Dr. Fauci at all. I think my removal was 
because of tensions and actions I took between my supervisor, 
Dr. Kadlec, and myself.
    Mr. Long. You know about Dr. Fauci's testimony two days 
before at the Senate HELP Committee?
    Dr. Bright. I am aware of that testimony, yes.
    Mr. Long. If HHS leadership is so hostile to scientific 
integrity as you say, as you allege, how do you explain Dr. 
Fauci being allowed to testify forthrightly, to serve in a 
prominent role on the White House task force, the 
administration, and direct NIAID's extensive research efforts?
    Dr. Bright. Sir, I am not sure what decisions are involved 
in allowing Dr. Fauci to testify or not. That is not 
something----
    Mr. Long. Can you say that again? I am having----
    Dr. Bright. I am not sure--I am not aware of what process 
or decisions are involved in allowing Dr. Fauci to testify or 
not.
    Mr. Long. But he was allowed to testify.
    Dr. Bright. I know he was, but I thought I understood you 
to ask me if that was appropriate or if he was not being 
allowed to. Maybe you can repeat your question if I 
misunderstood it.
    Mr. Long. OK. What I am saying is you are saying HHS is 
hostile to scientific integrity. And if that is the case, can 
you explain why Dr. Fauci was allowed to testify forthrightly 
in the committee? If they are hostile, why would you let him 
come out and testify without any--no holds barred?
    Dr. Bright. I am saying that my supervisor was not 
following proper scientific process that we have in place for 
BARDA. I am not actually saying the administration is hostile 
against scientific integrity in all cases. So I am saying in my 
particular situation, as in my claim, my supervisor was 
conducting inappropriate activity that was going around proper 
scientific vetting. That is what I put in----
    Mr. Long. Why did you not bring these concerns to Secretary 
Azar, or his chief, or the inspector general? Why did you not 
bring any of them into the loop and say, ``Hey, I have these 
concerns?''
    Dr. Bright. Sir, I believe some of the activities were 
not--it is isolated with Dr. Kadlec. I think some of his senior 
staff were also aware of some of the processes that were being 
utilized to go around our traditional review process, 
scientific review process.
    Mr. Long. But wouldn't normal protocol in any situation be 
that you go to the Secretary at HHS, or his chief of staff, or 
the inspector general with your concern, instead of just 
gathering them up and deciding that one day you are going to--
--
    Dr. Bright. Well, I didn't decide that. I was pushed out, 
sir, and involuntarily transferred, without my knowledge.
    Mr. Long. But you had these concerns. So why didn't you 
take them to your superiors when you had the concerns and maybe 
none of this--maybe we wouldn't be here today? It wasn't easy 
for any of us to be here today.
    Dr. Bright. Sir, I requested an IG investigation, as in my 
claim, I think it was in 2018, that they looked into what I 
believe was inappropriate pressure, political pressure on some 
of our contracting activities and discussion about procurement 
integrity. And I do not think that that was ever followed 
through on. So----
    Mr. Long. Did you bring your concerns to the inspector 
general?
    Dr. Bright. I do not believe they were followed through and 
submitted to the inspector general. I raised those concerns to 
our HHS----
    Mr. Long. But you personally didn't talk to the inspector 
general, didn't raise concerns with the inspector general----
    Dr. Bright. I did not.
    Mr. Long [continue]. Or with Azar's chief or with Azar, 
correct?
    Dr. Bright. I raised those with the Secretary's Office of 
General Counsel, they were present in the meeting, sir.
    Mr. Long. I will take that as a no. OK.
    You state in your testimony that HHS leadership was 
dismissive about your predictions about the broader outbreak 
and the pressing need to act. However, it is my understanding 
that it was Dr. Redfield at CDC who alerted the White House's 
National Security Council about the risk of the virus on 
January the 2nd and a high level team with the NSC's 
Counterproliferation and Biodefense Directorate quickly began 
meeting to address the possibility of a pandemic. Do you 
consider Dr. Redfield's actions here to be dismissive about the 
threat of a coronavirus?
    Dr. Bright. Sir, people were aware of the urgency. What was 
lacking was the action and how to address the urgency. So when 
we were raising issues on critical supply chain of medical 
equipment to protect doctors and nurses, if they are aware the 
urgency of the situation and still failed to act, I think that 
is even more unconscionable than not being aware of the 
emergency and not acting.
    Mr. Long. In your new position, I would recommend that if 
you have issues, you might go to the head of the department, 
his chief, and some folks like that.
    I yield back.
    Ms. Eshoo. The gentleman yields back. A pleasure to yield 
to the gentleman from Vermont, Mr. Welch.
    Mr. Welch. Thank you very much.
    Your job, our job, is to protect the American people. And 
this fierce virus can be managed if done correctly, correct?
    Dr. Bright. I believe so.
    Mr. Welch. And in fact the playbook is established. It is 
testing, contact tracing, and then isolation, starting with 
first social isolation, correct?
    Dr. Bright. Yes. Those nonpharmaceutical interventions and 
testing are critical first steps.
    Mr. Welch. Right. And in fact this virus is across the 
world, and many countries that have followed that tried and 
true protocol have done far better than the U.S. Is that 
correct?
    Dr. Bright. We have seen differences in the response and 
the outcomes of that response around the world.
    Mr. Welch. I will go through some of those. You know, the 
Johns Hopkins study that said that the U.S. had the best 
preparedness, it turned out we have the worst response, 
correct, with the most cases and the most deaths?
    Dr. Bright. We had the most cases and the most deaths.
    Mr. Welch. And I did some calculations. On January 19th, 
South Korea determined its first case. On January 19th, the 
U.S. determine its first case, correct?
    Dr. Bright. January 20th was the U.S. case, yes.
    Mr. Welch. And if we have the same response in South Korea 
by population, they had 33,000 deaths, we would have saved 
50,000 lives.
    In Taiwan, they had the same virus, 22,000 deaths. And 
again, adjusting for population, that is 60,000 more deaths we 
have had here. Singapore, 82,000 more deaths. New Zealand, 
65,000.
    The question for us here, and for the American people, is, 
why, when we had the best plan, we had the worst execution?
    So let me go through a few things that you have 
established. One, beginning in January, before that case here, 
FDA chief Hahn asked the HHS if he could start contacting 
companies about possible shortages of protective equipment and 
he got blown off by HHS, correct?
    Dr. Bright. What I understand.
    Mr. Welch. And on January 18th, before our first case, you 
pushed Dr. Kadlec to convene high-level meetings about the 
virus but that was initially rejected, correct?
    Dr. Bright. True.
    Mr. Welch. And then On January 23rd you demanded urgent 
access to funding personnel and clinical specimens to develop 
lifesaving medicines, but you were told that the spread was 
under control, correct?
    Dr. Bright. There wasn't a shared sense of urgency.
    Mr. Welch. On January 25th you warned others in the 
administration there is a critical need for procuring surgical 
masks. That was ignored, correct?
    Dr. Bright. True.
    Mr. Welch. On January 27th you participated in the daily 
COVID-19 meeting where you expressed frustration with the slow 
pace of accessing virus samples and clinical specimens from 
China. You were reprimanded and you were no longer part of 
those meetings. Is that right?
    Dr. Bright. That is true.
    Mr. Welch. So you and others actually were seeing over the 
horizon what was coming to our shores, even before our first 
case was confirmed, correct?
    Dr. Bright. We had spent many years preparing for a 
pandemic, sir. And we understood the threat, we understood what 
we needed to do.
    Mr. Welch. Exactly. It is knowable and it is manageable. It 
is fierce and fearsome. But what you have to do is established. 
Is that more or less correct?
    Dr. Bright. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Welch. We just didn't do it.
    February 25th, President Trump gave an assurance that the 
stock market is starting to look very good and the coronavirus 
was very much under control. Were you aware of any medically 
involved people who had the view that the virus at that time 
was very much under control?
    Dr. Bright. No, sir. I don't think the virus was under 
control. I don't think many people would agree with me in the 
scientific realm.
    Mr. Welch. Now, in those countries I mentioned, that 
includes Germany, Taiwan, New Zealand, South Korea, Singapore, 
the leaders of those countries accepted that there was a role 
only the nation could play and the provinces would have to 
depend on them for that. And I want to go through some of those 
things.
    One, establishing a testing protocol. Was that done here.
    Ms. Bright. No.
    Mr. Welch. Two, acquiring and allocating and distributing 
the personal protective equipment to where it was needed when 
it was needed. Was that done here?
    Dr. Bright. No, sir.
    Mr. Welch. In fact, we had governors and hospitals 
competing with each other to try to get desperately needed 
equipment. Isn't that correct?
    Dr. Bright. There was a lot of confusion, and a lot of 
competition, and bad decisions made to acquire poor-quality 
product.
    Mr. Welch. In any of those other countries that I just 
mentioned, are you aware of the leader of that country at a 
press conference making recommendations on what kind of 
medication people should use?
    Dr. Bright. I don't know the details of what happened in 
those countries, sir, so I don't know.
    Mr. Welch. All right. We had governors here, Republicans 
and Democrats, Republicans like Hogan, like Phil Scott from 
Vermont, who have done a tremendous job, but no matter how good 
they do their job, can they protect their people without the 
aggressive intervention of the Federal Government playing its 
role?
    Dr. Bright. I think the Federal Government plays a critical 
role in coordinating and aligning and making an equitable 
distribution of those critical supplies. I believe that is what 
we practice and exercise in the past that there would be a 
critical role for the Federal lead in coordination at the 
State, local, and Tribal and territorial levels.
    Mr. Welch. Thank you Dr. Bright.
    I yield back.
    Ms. Eshoo. The gentleman yields back. A pleasure to 
recognize the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Carter. Do you wish 
to question or do you want to pass?
    Mr. Carter. I will reserve it.
    Ms. Eshoo. You reserve. OK.
    The gentleman from California, Mr. Ruiz, is recognized for 
5 minutes of questions. Dr. Ruiz.
    Mr. Ruiz. Thank you.
    Thank you, Dr. Bright. Thank you for your testimony here 
and thank you for your service to our country.
    My heart aches for the family and friends of the over 
80,000 in America who have died of COVID-19 in such a short 
period of time. In fact, my heart aches for those closer to me. 
Riverside County has reported 228 deaths.
    As a doctor, I appreciate your written testimony that 
states that science, not politics or cronyism, must lead the 
way to combat this deadly virus. There has been a lot of hype 
about cures for COVID that have been shown to be ineffective 
and even dangerous. We are now seeing the very real dangers and 
consequences of not making decisions based on science. 
Hydroxychloroquine, which FOX News commentators and then the 
White House repeatedly touted and actually encouraged people to 
use, is Exhibit A on this list.
    But there is one drug that appears to provide some 
therapeutic benefit, remdesivir. Two weeks ago, Dr. Fauci 
announced that remdesivir showed a clear-cut, significant, 
positive effect in diminishing the time to recovery.
    My understanding is that in January and early February you 
launched a comprehensive review to assess which existing drugs 
may prove a therapeutic benefit and you quickly identified 
remdesivir as the most likely drug to be effective against 
COVID-19. Can you describe how you came to that conclusion, who 
you told within HHS and what the response was?
    Dr. Bright. Yes, sir. That conclusion came about by a 
technical review from a number of scientists within HHS, the 
CDC, FDA, NIH, and BARDA. It was also aligned with a scientific 
assessment from WHO and a number of global experts who rapidly 
looked at every potential drug and ranked remdesivir as the 
drug that had the most potential for benefit.
    Mr. Ruiz. Who did you tell and what was their response?
    Dr. Bright. We shared that information with Dr. Kadlec. We 
shared that information within HHS leadership as well. We had 
discussions about the actions that could be considered for 
acquiring the limited supply of remdesivir.
    Mr. Ruiz. What was the response?
    Dr. Bright. We had discussions about how to ramp up 
production of more remdesivir in case the randomized controlled 
clinical study that the NIH was conducting came through with 
positive----
    Mr. Ruiz. So you had a discussion and what was the 
response? Did anything happen?
    Dr. Bright. No decision was made at that time.
    Mr. Ruiz. OK. My understanding is that Peter Navarro, the 
White House trade advisor, reached out to you on February 7th 
to seek your counsel. You told them about your top three 
concerns: the shortage of N95 masks, the need for a, quote, 
unquote, Manhattan Project to develop vaccines, and securing 
adequate supplies of remdesivir. Can you tell us if Mr. Navarro 
agreed with you and what steps you and he took?
    Dr. Bright. Mr. Navarro did agree with me on the 
remdesivir, the N95 masks, and the vaccine Manhattan Project, 
and he drafted a memo on February 9th to the White House chief 
of staff and Mick Mulvaney to share with the White House task 
force.
    Mr. Ruiz. The directive for HHS to act on remdesivir 
occurred on February 10th. What happened next? And did the 
Department promptly procure the needed supplies of remdesivir?
    Dr. Bright. We did not proceed with procuring any supplies 
of remdesivir.
    Mr. Ruiz. OK. You were removed from your position on April 
22nd. By the time you were removed, had the Department settled 
on a plan and procured the remdesivir?
    Dr. Bright. No, sir. They were still discussing with slide 
presentations about potential donations of remdesivir at that 
time.
    Mr. Ruiz. So what you are describing is a gang that 
couldn't shoot straight. And yet, we are in the middle of a 
pandemic. There is one drug the experts say could make a 
difference and in fact has been shown to make a difference. 
Yet, the Department can't seem to figure out how to acquire it.
    A week ago The Washington Post published an article on the 
rollout of remdesivir, describing it as, quote, ``confusing, 
unfair, and marred with incomplete medical information'' 
unquote. Doctors described how they can obtain the drug and 
don't understand the process for accessing it. Dr. Benjamin 
Linas from the Boston Medical Center said, quote, ``There is no 
transparency. The process is just a staggering injustice.''
    Dr. Bright, you were warned about this over three months 
ago. If the Department had listened to you and the other 
experts at your agency, could this fiasco have been avoided?
    Dr. Bright. We would have had a plan, sir. We should have 
had a plan for that drug and any other drug in limited supply.
    Mr. Ruiz. So it didn't have to be this way.
    Dr. Bright. Right.
    Mr. Ruiz. Here is what I don't understand. You were right 
about the dangers of hydroxychloroquine, you were right about 
the benefits of remdesivir, you were right about N95 masks and 
other critical issues, yet you got fired from your job, while 
officials who botched the response and ignored your warnings to 
stay in theirs. Not only is this unfair to you, it is 
completely dangerous to the American people.
    I yield back my time.
    Ms. Eshoo. The gentleman yields back. I would like to 
clarify something just very quickly. Relative to your leave, 
Dr. Bright, are you on accrued vacation time now?
    Dr. Bright. I am sorry?
    Ms. Eshoo. Are you on accrued vacation time now?
    Dr. Bright. I am on approved vacation leave today, yes. I 
talked to the----
    Ms. Eshoo. And would you be willing to share the exhibits 
once you personally--once you remove personally identifiable 
information?
    Dr. Bright. Congresswoman, I am having trouble 
understanding you through the mask.
    Ms. Eshoo. Oh, I am sorry.
    Dr. Bright. Sorry.
    Ms. Eshoo. I am getting so comfortable wearing a mask, I 
forgot I had it on. Would you be willing to share the other 
exhibits once you remove personally identifiable information?
    Dr. Bright. Yes.
    Ms. Eshoo. Thank you. All right.
    Ms. Katz. Chairwoman, we will make them available after the 
hearing today when we have had a chance to review it.
    Ms. Eshoo. Thank you.
    Mr. Walden. Madam Chair, will they be made available to the 
minority as well as the majority?
    Ms. Katz. Absolutely.
    Ms. Eshoo. They will be made available to the entire 
committee.
    Mr. Walden. Perfect. Thank you.
    Ms. Katz. We have never shared anything with the majority 
that hasn't been shared--
    Ms. Eshoo. Right.
    Ms. Katz [continue]. This is a bipartisan issue.
    Mr. Walden. Thank you.
    Mr. Griffith. Madam Chair, if there is anything in those 
exhibits that hasn't already been released to the public that 
might be degrading, will that be kept in confidence amongst 
committee members?
    Ms. Eshoo. I am sorry. I didn't hear you.
    Mr. Griffith. Not knowing what is in the emails, I am 
wondering if there is any information in there that might be 
deemed to be degrading, would that be kept in confidence 
amongst the committee members as opposed to being released to 
the public?
    Ms. Eshoo. We will follow the rules.
    Mr. Griffith. And that is in compliance with rule 11. Thank 
you.
    Ms. Eshoo. Thank you, sir.
    OK. I now have the pleasure of recognizing the only 
pharmacist in the United States Congress, Mr. Carter.
    Mr. Carter. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Thank you, Dr. Bright, for being here, and thank you for 
your service to our country. And before I begin, let me extend 
my condolences to those 80,000-plus who have lost their lives 
and to their families as a result of this pandemic, and a 
shout-out to all of our healthcare professionals, as well as 
our other essential workers who have put their own health in 
danger in order to provide services to our citizens.
    Dr. Bright, it is my understanding that in 2017, BARDA-
funded a project with Applied Research Associates of 
Albuquerque to develop respirators that could be sanitized and 
reused during public health emergencies, such as what we are 
going through today. However, according to recent reports by 
The Washington Post, none of these next-generation respirators 
are available for us today. Why is that? Do you have any idea?
    Dr. Bright. I am not aware of those. Are you talking about 
the ventilator, sir, that we developed?
    Mr. Carter. That is correct. I am talking about those that 
were developed, the respirators that were developed and could 
be sanitized and reused during public health emergencies. It is 
my understanding that that was contracted and that that project 
was scrapped.
    Dr. Bright. Sir, I am not familiar with that project to 
resanitize the respirators.
    Mr. Carter. You are not familiar with that project, and you 
didn't sign off on that project, to your knowledge?
    Dr. Bright. I am not familiar with that project to 
resanitize respirators.
    Mr. Carter. OK. Fair enough if you are not familiar with 
it.
    Let me ask you this: We have had a lot of discussion today 
about hydroxychloroquine, about chloroquine, and I am a little 
bit confused here because it is my understanding that this is 
what BARDA--do you want to clarify something here? I see you--
OK. It is my understanding that that is what the role of BARDA, 
the mission of BARDA is, to look at things like this, in fact, 
when we in Congress appropriate, allocate money to go toward 
this, that you are supposed to be looking--that BARDA is 
supposed to be looking at things that could possibly have 
merit, such as hydroxychloroquine and chloroquine. And early 
on, it appeared that you embraced that.
    And early on, it seemed that you were in favor of looking 
at that. And I am just wondering because of this pandemic, 
because we didn't have any vaccine or any kind of agreed-upon 
treatment, we should be testing, and we should--that is what we 
are appropriating that money for. Would you agree with that, 
that that is what we are trying to do is to look at what could 
possibly work, and work with public companies to try to 
encourage them to come up with those kinds of solutions?
    Dr. Bright. Absolutely. We should look at all options and 
make sure we evaluate the potential risk and safety and benefit 
of those in the context of a randomized controlled clinical 
study. In the context of emergency, we should move swiftly and 
get that clinical data as urgently and quickly as possible, 
that we should not proceed recklessly without that clinical 
data on its potential adverse events in an emergency.
    Mr. Carter. So you are referring--when you say, we should 
not proceed adversely, you are referring to hydroxychloroquine 
and the chloroquine?
    Dr. Bright. We are--we were promoting the standing up of 
randomized controlled clinical studies at the NIH with 
hydroxychloroquine. I worked with a company to even ask if they 
would donate drug to the NIH to be used in the context of a 
randomized controlled clinical study.
    Mr. Carter. Right.
    Dr. Bright. Yes. So that is what BARDA would do.
    Mr. Carter. And, in fact, I think you worked with the FDA 
to get an emergency use for hydroxychloroquine. Is that 
correct? And it was actually approved by the FDA.
    Dr. Bright. That was in the context of the directive we 
received from the Secretary's office to stand up an expanded 
access protocol. Our clinicians----
    Mr. Carter. So are you saying you were instructed to do 
that, and you did it against your will, or----
    Dr. Bright. Sir, we were instructed to put in place an 
expanded access protocol. So in the context that Americans be 
able to access this drug and not be under the close supervision 
of a physician. The scientists at FDA, NIH, CDC, and BARDA 
worked together to change that directive to the context of 
emergency use authorization with guardrails in there so 
patients would be under the close supervision of a physician.
    Mr. Carter. Understood. Let me ask you this: Initially, you 
appeared to be encouraged by what could possibly be a result of 
the effect of hydroxychloroquine. When did that change? When 
did you sour, if you will, on the use of hydroxychloroquine?
    Dr. Bright. I believe that we have seen many drugs that 
could have benefits, and some of these are really interesting 
things we have never heard of, some we have.
    Mr. Carter. I understand that, but my question was, when 
did you sour on it?
    Dr. Bright. When it was determined that this drug should be 
made available to Americans outside the context of a close 
physician supervision. So I supported conducting a randomized 
controlled clinical study for hydroxychloroquine at the NIH. 
When I learned that there was a directive to make it more 
broadly available, not under close supervision of a physician, 
I was--
    Mr. Carter. When was that? When did that directive go out?
    Dr. Bright. That was March 23rd.
    Mr. Carter. March--and that is the time that you decided, 
no, this is not what we should do, and we should not be looking 
at hydroxychloroquine at all?
    Dr. Bright. I didn't think that was the proper, safe way to 
evaluate that drug in the context of this outbreak. I believe 
it should be only done under close supervision of a physician. 
When we put the EUA in place that locked this drug down, to 
only be used in patients under close supervision of a 
physician, we were satisfied we had those guardrails in place. 
When an email string followed a week later saying ignore the 
EUA, push this drug into the retail pharmacies in New York and 
New Jersey, that is when I became more concerned.
    Mr. Carter. And who put that directive out?
    Ms. Eshoo. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Carter. Who put that directive out?
    Ms. Eshoo. The gentleman's time is expired. You can answer, 
Dr. Bright.
    Dr. Bright. Which directive, sir?
    Mr. Carter. That it should be put out to the public without 
physicians approving it.
    Dr. Bright. That directive was an email string that had a 
number of individuals on it, and I believe it first came from 
Dr. Giroir, the Assistant Secretary of Health, that indicated 
the White House was asking for that drug to be more broadly 
available.
    Mr. Carter. So was it because the President was encouraged 
by the use of this drug that you became discouraged by it?
    Dr. Bright. It had nothing to do with politics, sir. I 
wanted to make sure that Americans were aware of the risk of 
this drug. It was only available under very----
    Mr. Carter. But it is a drug that is indicated and has been 
used safely in the past.
    Ms. Eshoo. The gentleman's time has been exceeded by 
almost----
    Dr. Bright. In one area.
    Ms. Eshoo [continue]. One-and-a-half minutes.
    You can finish your answer, Dr. Bright, and then we are 
going to move to the next member.
    Dr. Bright. The drug had been used safely for malaria for a 
number of years. We didn't have a database----
    Mr. Carter. But it is being used in the same dosage as it 
is for malaria.
    Ms. Eshoo. The gentleman's time is--please, please. I know 
that I am overly generous with both sides of the aisle, but I 
think that we need to move on. I mean, two minutes of extra 
time is two minutes of extra time, and I am not going to ask 
that it be shared over here. The gentleman's time is expired.
    It is a pleasure to recognize the gentlewoman from 
Michigan, Mrs. Dingell, for her 5 minutes of questions.
    Mrs. Dingell. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you to both you 
and Ranking Member Dr. Burgess, and Dr. Bright, for your being 
here today. You are doing a great service.
    I think we are here today because COVID is real. I share 
the sentiments of many of my Republican colleagues that have 
expressed thanks to the frontline workers asking questions. I 
want to look at the last few months. COVID's really real in my 
State. Michigan's the 10th largest State in the country, and we 
were third in the number of cases for weeks. We were third and 
remained there until this week in the number of deaths. We 
managed to move to fourth place two days ago, which is not a 
number anybody wants to be. My family alone, a cousin woke up 
with 104 temperature and was dead that afternoon.
    There are people still dying every single day. I have lost 
someone I have known. Sunday, Monday, a brother, a brother-like 
friend to me, Tuesday and Wednesday. And then we hear the 
scientific experts, yourself, but Dr. Fauci, other scientists 
around the country saying to us, if we don't listen to them, we 
could begin to see--we are going to see a return. You call it a 
dark winter. I call it, I don't want to see any more spikes. I 
don't want to see anybody else die. I am losing too many 
friends that I know, and people across the country are.
    So I want to focus on an area that is not your area of 
expertise, but it is mine; car safety. We expect our cars to be 
safe. And we expect car manufacturers to be responsible and 
making sure defective cars aren't sold. And if they fail in 
that responsibility, we hold them accountable. If an engineer 
in a car company realized a model had serious defects and 
warned her management about that, we would all think she had 
done her job responsibly. And if management ignored her, and 
our committee found out, I will bet you right now, we would be 
having hearings. And if Americans died driving those cars, the 
companies would be sued, and they would be charged with 
criminal negligence.
    In fact, several years ago, before my time, this committee 
investigated airbag defects and vehicle safety. At the time, 
the subcommittee's ranking member, Dr. Burgess, sad, there are 
no room for going slow when it comes to safety. And certainly 
deception cannot and will not be tolerated. Dr. Burgess was 
right then, and our car makers have to be accountable. But what 
I am concerned about is that we aren't applying these same 
standards to coronavirus. And I want to learn from what has 
happened, so we keep that dark winter you are talking about 
from happening.
    It seems to me, Dr. Bright, you acted the same way the auto 
engineer I mentioned should act. You identified serious 
problems, and then suggested fixes when it came to diagnostics, 
N95 masks, other equipment, and medicines. Is that right?
    Dr. Bright. That is true, and, Congresswoman, we still have 
those challenges.
    Mrs. Dingell. Do you believe if your suggestions were 
implemented, lives would have been saved, and the severity of 
the pandemic might have been lessened?
    Dr. Bright. I believe lives would have been saved if we had 
proper medical protective equipment for our healthcare workers, 
yes.
    Mrs. Dingell. So people died because you weren't listened 
to?
    Dr. Bright. People died because they didn't have 
appropriate protective equipment to save their lives and 
protect them from getting infected.
    Mrs. Dingell. The problems aren't limited to just ignoring 
your advice. The American people are confused, given mixed 
signals, and quite frankly, some days just simply deceived. Let 
me give you an example. There was a visit to the CDC on March 
6, and at that visit, the administration said, anybody who 
wants a test will get a test. Was that true then?
    Dr. Bright. There still are not enough tests.
    Mrs. Dingell. So even this week as we are being told, 
anybody who wants a test can have a test. Is that true in the 
United States of America?
    Dr. Bright. No.
    Mrs. Dingell. In fact, all the experts say we are doing is 
only a small fraction of the tests we need to do to reopen 
safely. I am running out of time, so let me ask you about 
vaccines. We keep being told by the White House that we have 
heard very soon, quick numbers, a matter of months for that 
vaccine to be developed. This is your area of expertise. You 
are a top immunologist in the world. Was there any scientific 
basis to suggest in March that we will have a vaccine in the 
next few months?
    Dr. Bright. There is a lot of optimism, there is a lot of 
hope, but that doesn't make a vaccine. There is a lot of work 
that needs to be done to make a vaccine.
    Mrs. Dingell. Will we be able to vaccinate people in the 
next few months?
    Dr. Bright. It is very unlikely.
    Mrs. Dingell. Thank you, Doctor.
    Ms. Eshoo. The gentlewoman yields back. It is my 
understanding the minority is passing, reserving. So with 
pleasure, I recognize the gentlewoman from New Hampshire, Ms. 
Kuster.
    Ms. Kuster. Thank you, Dr. Bright, for being with us today. 
I want to thank you for your courage, for helping us to do our 
job to protect the American people.
    I want to start today by restating what I said at a hearing 
February 26th with Secretary Azar, right here, right at that 
table. The key to a public health crisis is trust and 
credibility. On that day, I urged Secretary Azar to provide 
clear, credible updates from this administration to the 
American public. However, your whistleblower complaint and 
testimony today unveil unheeded warnings about personal 
protective equipment, testing supplies, and vaccine supplies.
    Over the past several months, I have held countless 
conversations with doctors and nurses and hospitals and 
community health centers and our Republican Governor and every 
other person in New Hampshire, trying to get access to personal 
protective equipment, to protect our frontline workers, to 
protect our grocery clerks.
    We have been trying to get testing supplies, and we were 
told that because we were not a hotspot, we were on our own. 
And we literally had to turn to entrepreneurs. Thank God they 
exist, and thank you to them for flying to China and bringing 
us the equipment we need that should and could have been 
distributed, had we planned ahead.
    These conversations have informed my roadmap to recovery on 
how to safely reopen our economy, and key to those efforts is 
adequate testing, contact tracing, supported isolation, and 
vaccine development--your specialty. So I want to focus on your 
role as Director of BARDA in vaccine development and 
distribution.
    On page 28 and 29 of your addendum to your complaint, it 
states that BARDA estimated that between 650 million and 850 
million needles and syringes would be needed for a vaccine to 
be administered here in the United States for everyone to be 
safe. Your team at BARDA also estimates it could take up to two 
years to manufacture these vaccine delivery supplies.
    To your knowledge, Dr. Bright, at this time, has the 
administration placed any orders to prepare for how a vaccine 
will be delivered when one becomes available to every American?
    Dr. Bright. I learned that they placed an order; the first 
order for needles and syringes on May 1st, and another order 
was placed today.
    Ms. Kuster. And were the amounts adequate?
    Dr. Bright. I believe it is for 320 million needles and 
syringes.
    Ms. Kuster. And could you please describe the situation if 
every American does not have access to the vaccine due to a 
supply shortage?
    Dr. Bright. That situation would be catastrophic, honestly. 
The decisions have not been made yet who to vaccinate first, 
how to identify those individuals, and how to stretch those 
limited supplies appropriately. And it is important to 
remember----
    Ms. Kuster. Let me ask you a simple question.
    Dr. Bright [continue]. That it is not just the United 
States, so there is has limited supplies. When I said it would 
take 2 to 2-1/2 years to make those, that was assuming there 
wouldn't be global competition for those limited supplies. 
Those are not made in the United States, some of them, so----
    Ms. Kuster. Does a lack of preparation in vaccine supplies 
make us more vulnerable to future spikes in COVID-19?
    Dr. Bright. Absolutely.
    Ms. Kuster. And do we have enough supplies to distribute 
both the flu vaccine next winter as well as the coronavirus 
vaccine?
    Dr. Bright. It is going to be extremely challenging.
    Ms. Kuster. Do we know yet of the interactions of the full-
fledged flu season in combination with COVID-19?
    Dr. Bright. We haven't seen that yet. Luckily this spring, 
flu was winding down when COVID-19 was emerging.
    Ms. Kuster. And without adequate supplies to vaccinate all 
Americans for COVID-19, does this slow down the goal of fully 
reopening our economy, and getting back to the normal that 
every American wants?
    Dr. Bright. It certainly brings caution and significant 
consideration that must be taken into consideration before 
reopening. We need to make sure that not only the guidelines 
for reopening are clear to each individual, and each individual 
follows those guidelines. Otherwise, it puts us all at risk.
    Ms. Kuster. So can I ask you a question? I know you are not 
political, and certainly, we are all trying not to be 
political. In fact, I am very proud in our State that our 
delegation and our governor are working so well together. But 
Dr. Bright, does this virus give a damn whether a patient is 
Republican or Democrat?
    Dr. Bright. No, it doesn't. This virus just wants to infect 
people, and unfortunately, a lot of those people get really 
sick, and many of them die.
    Ms. Kuster. Thank you. I am so grateful, not just for your 
knowledge, for your humility, and for your service to our 
country. Thank you, and I yield back.
    Dr. Bright. Thank you.
    Ms. Eshoo. The gentlewoman yields back. Minority reserves?
    Pleasure to call on the gentlewoman from Illinois, Ms. 
Kelly, for her 5 minutes of question.
    Ms. Kelly. Thank you so much, and thank you for being here 
and your patience. As chair of the Congressional Black Caucus 
Health Brain Trust, I am deeply concerned by the disparities 
that this pandemic has brought to light due to our Nation's 
history of discriminatory policies, leading to differences in 
health outcomes for people of color. Time and time again, when 
resources are scarce, some communities are forced to do without 
the goods and services they need. You identify multiple 
situations in which the United States would face a shortage of 
supplies needed to respond to COVID-19, from masks to swabs and 
other testing materials, and potentially, the supplies that 
deliver a vaccine when one is ready.
    During COVID-19, we have seen some States forced to pay 
significantly more because they are on their own to procure 
those medical supplies. Not every State or locality can afford 
to do this. Knowing what we do know about how scarce resources 
are procured and distributed, what impact will shortages have 
on lower-income communities?
    Dr. Bright. The syringes will impact across all of America, 
and unfortunately, it actually increases the concern in 
communities that aren't part of the mainstream and might have 
lower socioeconomic status. So I think it has a significant 
chance of increasing the risk in those communities.
    Ms. Kelly. How have you seen this impact the devastation of 
the disease in these communities?
    Dr. Bright. In these communities, the data are showing that 
they are hit very hard, and we don't actually have the 
information yet to understand fully what is behind that or why, 
and health status or access to healthcare or other immunization 
status or healthcare status. So, we are still learning a lot 
about that.
    However, it is really important to think about when we have 
diagnostic tests and other things available, that they are 
available to everyone. And many of these tests that we are 
developing today are very expensive, or are in very rare 
supply. So we need to make sure that we are developing and 
making available tests that are not just rapid and accurate, 
but low cost, and so everyone who needs a test can access those 
tests.
    Ms. Kelly. Did you attempt to urge HHS leadership or the 
administration to consider preparedness, outreach, or targeted 
resources for these populations, or are you aware of any HHS 
administration actions to target resources outreach to these 
vulnerable groups?
    Dr. Bright. I am--I have had some conversations. There have 
been some conversations, I should say, focusing on groups that 
are harder to reach and in different socioeconomic statuses. I 
am not sure that there is a solidified plan in place just yet 
to make sure that it is more than a conversation.
    Ms. Kelly. Doesn't sound like there is. In your testimony, 
you recommend establishing a national standard and coordinating 
equitable distribution of equipment and supplies. Will this 
help to ensure that every community can access the equipment 
and supplies they need?
    Dr. Bright. That is what is needed.
    Ms. Kelly. Will more equitable distribution of equipment 
and supplies help to address the inequities we are seeing in 
the impact of COVID-19 on communities of color?
    Dr. Bright. Yes, absolutely.
    Ms. Kelly. And do you feel that in the last bill that we 
passed, we made sure that there was passed in the bill better 
data, as far as race and not just who died, but who was 
hospitalized and so on and so forth? Because we are hoping that 
better data will inform policy. How do you feel like that will 
help?
    Dr. Bright. I think that is very important. I think it is a 
wise move.
    Ms. Kelly. OK. Good. And we are supposed to get a report 21 
days from when the President signed the bill, then 30 days, and 
then 180 days.
    Dr. Bright. I am not aware of those guidelines. It comes in 
a different area, but I think reporting and oversight of that 
is important.
    Ms. Kelly. And then lastly, you have been sitting in that 
seat for a while, but is there anything that we haven't asked 
you that you want to say?
    Dr. Bright. It is a really important question, and I have 
thought a lot about that. I want to, I think, highlight the 
things I talked about in my opening statement: we need 
transparency in the science, and America needs to know the 
truth. This is a devastating pandemic and not just for health, 
but also for society, our economy, our jobs, and our 
livelihood. And if we do not take it seriously the call for 
action to put specific things in place, a coordinated national 
plan for testing and response, an equitable distribution of 
these limited supplies, and ramp up and prepare for what will 
be a very devastating fall if we don't have the right supplies 
in place and raw materials, then this virus will overcome us in 
significant ways still.
    So we have limited time. My message is, we have limited 
time. We have the ability to do it. We have the greatest 
scientific minds in our country to do it. We need to listen to 
them, put the plan in place, and everyone get busy stopping 
this virus.
    Ms. Kelly. Right. I know it is very--I have had three 
people in my family with it, and I lost my uncle, maybe, like, 
ten days ago now from the virus. So it does definitely touch 
everybody. Thank you, and thank you for your patience.
    Dr. Bright. Thank you.
    Ms. Eshoo. The gentlewoman yields back. The minority 
reserve?
    All right. Then we will go to the gentlewoman from 
California, Ms. Barragan, for her 5 minutes of questions.
    Ms. Barragan. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
    Dr. Bright, one striking aspect of your account in your 
complaint to the Office of Special Counsel is the contrast 
between the public updates by the President and Secretary Azar 
on COVID-19 versus the analysis you and other experts were 
providing behind the scenes. I would like to explore this 
disconnect, and ultimately that the administration shared 
information that I believe was misleading. We need to do this 
to better understand what happened, and how we can ensure that 
the administration provides the public accurate and 
constructive information going forward.
    Dr. Bright, you had learned of the COVID-19 threat by in 
early January. Is that correct?
    Dr. Bright. Yes.
    Ms. Barragan. And according to your complaint, it was clear 
to you, almost immediately, that the, quote, ``virus was highly 
contagious, spreading rapidly, and could have a high mortality 
rate,'' end quote. Is that correct?
    Dr. Bright. We were learning that from the outbreak in 
China at the time, yes. And each day we learned more 
information, it was actually more concerning.
    Ms. Barragan. And the World Health Organization confirmed 
your view that the virus was a big problem in a January 20 call 
to agencies, including HHS. Over the course of January, you 
pressed HHS leadership about the urgent need to devote 
increased resources to address the outbreak. On January 23rd, 
you briefed Secretary Azar directly that funding, personnel, 
and clinical specimens, including viruses, were critically 
necessary to begin development of life-saving medicines needed 
in the likely event the virus spread beyond Southeast Asia. 
Yet, on January 24th, in a tweet regarding the virus, the 
President asserted, quote, ``It will all work out well,'' end 
quote.
    On January 29, Secretary Azar reportedly told the President 
that the epidemic was, quote, ``under control,'' and the 
President echoed that comment publicly the following day. This 
disconnect between the analysis of public health experts and 
the public statements by the administration leaders continued 
through February.
    Let me give you some more examples. In early February, you 
continued to raise the alarm bell within HHS about the imminent 
mask shortages and the lack of preparations for the wave of 
infections that you saw coming. Thank you for doing that. Yet, 
in public remarks on February the 10th, President Trump stated, 
``It looks like by April, in theory, when it gets a little 
warmer, it miraculously goes away,'' end quote. Then he added, 
``I think it is all going to work out good. We only have 11 
cases, and they are all getting better,'' end quote.
    You said that experts knew that the number of N95 
respirator masks needed to protect healthcare workers and other 
Americans in a pandemic was close to 3.5 billion. Yet, in 
testimony on February 25th, Secretary Azar said the U.S. would 
only need 300 million N95 respirators. That is an order of 
magnitude so much less than what you stated.
    Throughout February, you continued your warnings. I would 
say that your hair was on fire about the dangers millions of 
Americans faced from this virus. But on February 26, President 
Trump characterized the number of cases this way. Quote, ``When 
you have 15 people, and the 15 within a couple of days is going 
to be down to close to zero, that is a pretty good job you have 
done,'' end quote. By March 10th, there were over a thousand 
diagnosed COVID-19 cases in the United States, and over 30 
deaths had been attributed to the virus in this country. Yet, 
the President that day told the country, quote, ``It will go 
away. Just stay calm. It will go away,'' end quote. He couldn't 
have been more wrong. Today, we have over 1.4 million cases.
    Dr. Bright, what impact do you believe that statements by 
the administration leaders downplaying the COVID-19 crisis 
throughout February had on the ability of our public health 
system to mount an effective response to the COVID-19 virus?
    Dr. Bright. I believe Americans need to be told the truth. 
I believe that the best scientific guidance and advice was not 
being conveyed to the American public during that time. I 
believe by not telling America the truth, or being fully 
transparent regardless of where the information was coming 
from, people were not as prepared as they could have been and 
should have been. We did not forewarn people. We did not train 
people. We did not educate them on social distancing and 
wearing a mask as we should have in January and February. All 
of those forewarnings and all of those educational 
opportunities for the American public could have had an impact 
on further slowing this outbreak and saving more lives.
    Ms. Barragan. Well, thank you, Dr. Bright. I want to thank 
you for sharing your perspective with us today. I hope that 
over the course, I hope that your courage in coming forward 
helps our country forge a better path than the disastrous 
course charted by this administration to date. I yield back.
    Ms. Eshoo. The gentlewoman yields back. Minority reserves?
    Pleasure to recognize the gentlewoman from Delaware, Ms. 
Lisa Blunt Rochester----
    Ms. Blunt Rochester. Thank you.
    Ms. Eshoo [continue]. Five minutes for questions.
    Ms. Blunt Rochester. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, and thank 
you, Dr. Bright, so much for your testimony, but also for your 
courage here today. As you can hear from our colleagues, there 
is not a person in this room or in this country who hasn't been 
personally touched by COVID-19. And your statement that we need 
to be told the truth is probably the most important statement 
we have heard all day, because we know that if we don't face 
it, we can't fix it. So I want to personally thank you on 
behalf of all Americans for your courage to testify before us 
today.
    And I want to say that my focus for this hearing is really 
on three things: Number one, what have we learned? Number two, 
what do we need to do now? And number three, what can we do to 
prevent or mitigate the risks of an additional wave of COVID-
19?
    It is clear since January of this year that there has been 
a failure on the part of the administration to use the 
scientific evidence that has been prevented by the Nation's top 
public health officials to take comprehensive--and I will use 
that word again--comprehensive, appropriate, and urgent action 
to respond to COVID-19.
    One of the most pressing outstanding needs that has yet to 
be addressed is the need for a national testing strategy. Dr. 
Bright, in your testimony, you mentioned the need for such a 
strategy that ensures tests are, among other things, available 
to everyone who needs them. I, along with Congressman Collin 
Peterson and Representative Vela from Texas, wrote a letter to 
the Democratic and the Republican House leadership in the House 
and the Senate, and we really impressed upon them the need for 
outlining the importance of a robust testing plan for testing 
and tracing. And while current testing capacity is 1.6 million 
diagnostic tests per week, healthcare experts say that we are 
woefully short of the estimated 30 million tests per week that 
we need to get America back to work as safely and confidently 
as possible, and to avert or mitigate a second wave of COVID-19 
which is one of my biggest concerns.
    Dr. Bright, what are the immediate steps that HHS needs to 
be taking to ramp up testing capacity now through the fall, and 
what targets should they be held accountable for?
    Dr. Bright. I think what is really interesting about the 
testing story that gets lost in the narrative sometimes is the 
confusion about the different types of tests. There is an 
antigen test that tells you if you have the virus in you. There 
is a PCR test that says it is made of fragments of the virus, 
and there is an antibody test that looks at your antibody titer 
to try to tell you you have been exposed already and may be 
immune to that, the virus.
    There is a lot of confusion, and I think the first thing 
HHS needs to do is determine which of those tests is, most 
important, to achieve which objective. If the antigen test is 
what is needed because it is faster and lower cost, and more 
readily available in some cases, what does it tell Americans? 
What does it tell employers? What does it tell schools about 
the potential for an individual who has a positive or negative 
on that test and their potential to have a different result the 
next day or later that day?
    There is a lot of confusion about these tests. So I think 
the first thing that HHS should do is determine the type of 
test, and how that test would be used effectively and then make 
sure that we have enough of those types of tests, and they are 
in the right place, and the people using them know what the 
data tells them and how to do it effectively.
    I think there is a lot of confusion there, and they need 
leadership in HHS to distinguish those challenges and clarify 
that for the American public. It is not just a test. There are 
many different tests, and they tell you different things.
    Ms. Blunt Rochester. Thank you. Thank you. And why do you 
think that our Nation has struggled with ramping up the testing 
capacity, unlike other countries? And were there contingencies 
in place or a backup in light of this situation we are in now?
    Dr. Bright. I think part of the struggle is waiting too 
late to think about it and to get it started. And when we have 
had conversations with some manufacturers, they have been very 
creative in how they can ramp up. Another part of the challenge 
is we have allowed many of these capabilities to be offshored. 
And, so, we have much more capability in expanding domestic 
capacity when it is in our country, and we can ramp up and 
bring innovation to those companies in the U.S. But if the 
supply chain is offshore, and there is a global need and 
competition for that supply chain, that also significantly 
impairs our ability to ramp up.
    Ms. Blunt Rochester. Again, I just want to thank you so 
much for the time that you have contributed to our country, but 
also, for your courage to be here right now. Many of us are 
challenged, as Democrats and Republicans, to make sure that our 
country is safe and healthy, and it really is--it really--I 
don't think I have ever in my lifetime seen anything like this, 
and it does require us to look back, and at the same time look 
forward, and make sure that we have what we need as a country. 
So I thank you again, and I yield back the balance of my time.
    Ms. Eshoo. The gentlewoman yields back. Does the minority 
reserve?
     Voice. We don't have any further questions.
    Ms. Eshoo. All right. Then it is a pleasure to recognize 
the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Rush, for his 5 minutes of 
questions.
    Mr. Rush. I want to thank you, Madam Chair--Chairwoman.
    Ms. Eshoo. Do you have your microphone on?
    Mr. Rush. I have it on now.
    Ms. Eshoo. Good. Now I can hear you. OK.
    Mr. Rush. I want to thank you, Madam Chairman.
    Dr. Bright, it is so good to see you. I have been watching 
you this morning, and it just amazes me about your courage and 
your insight and your commitment, and I am just so delighted to 
be in the same room with you. Your contributions are 
impressive, and your reports on how the scientific process was 
pushed aside for short-term political points are extremely 
troublesome to me and to the American people, I am sure.
    I am absolutely convinced that both you and the Chinese 
doctor, Dr. Li, the doctor who first raised the alarm over the 
coronavirus while in China, you two will be remembered as two 
titans of this pandemic. You took the path that was right 
rather than the path that was easy, and I commend you for it. 
And that said, Dr. Bright, it has been widely reported that 
President Obama's White House National Security Council left 
the administration a detailed, very thorough document on how to 
proceed through a pandemic. And did you have any input in that 
playbook?
    Dr. Bright. Yes, sir, I did. A number of our agencies 
across the government had input in that playbook.
    Mr. Rush. And as far as you know, have any of those 
recommendations been enacted upon in this administration?
    Dr. Bright. I believe some of those principles have been 
reviewed and considered, but I think the playbook has changed 
in this outbreak. I don't think they followed that playbook.
    Mr. Rush. Like you, I think it is critically important that 
we focus on the path forward. While we must learn from the past 
and correct as they occur, our response has to be forward-
thinking, forward-moving. And I am the sponsor of a bipartisan 
COVID-19 Trace Act. I have been working on developing a 
comprehensive, $100 million strategy for mobile testing and 
door-to-door tracking. And my legislation--my bipartisan 
legislation empower community groups to hire and train and pay 
workers to engage in testing and contact tracing. It 
prioritizes hotspots in medically underserved areas, as well as 
entities who are hiring locally, and as such, I was very 
interested in your view on the national testing and tracing 
strategy. In your testimony, you said, the virus is out there. 
It is everywhere. We need to be able to find it, to isolate it, 
and to stop it from affecting more people. And with that, I 
could not agree with you more.
    My question might be outside of the scope of the NIH or 
BARDA, I believe that it should, that it is a question that is 
relevant to today. And I need to hear more about what you, as 
an expert on pandemic outbreaks, believes should be our 
national strategy for testing and tracing.
    Dr. Bright. Sir, I think it is important. You are spot on, 
that we need to have a strategy that everyone follows, the same 
strategy, to test for where the virus is, who is infected with 
this virus. Then we have to appropriately isolate that person 
and quarantine so they don't infect others. And we rapidly need 
to trace their contacts, understand who they may have been 
exposed to, and be able to test those individuals. And if they 
have been infected as well, we need to be able to isolate 
those.
    Through concerted, coordinated effort across the country, 
we can be able to identify where that virus is, who has been 
exposed, give those people proper treatment and isolation, and 
can slow the spread of this virus significantly. But that has 
to be in a coordinated way. We have to have the right tests and 
enough of those tests. It is not something we do once and we 
are done. It is something we have to continually do in a 
community. So it is not just that we need one test for every 
person in America; we need multiple tests, and the right types 
of tests, and we need the right types of individuals and 
professionals who know how to use those tests to trace the 
individual contacts and to isolate that virus and stop it from 
spreading.
    Mr. Rush. Well, I certainly thank you so very much, and 
thank you for, again, for being here and letting the American 
people know what really is going on in our Nation with this 
pandemic. I thank you. And Madam Chair, I yield back the 
balance of my time.
    Dr. Bright. Thank you.
    Ms. Eshoo. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman yields 
back. There is no request from the--
    Mr. Walden. We are out of speakers.
    Ms. Eshoo. You are out of speakers. OK.
    It is a pleasure to recognize the gentleman from Arizona, 
Mr. O'Halleran, who is a member of the Energy and Commerce 
Committee, and according to our rules, we can, as members of 
the full committee, we can waive onto a subcommittee. And so we 
welcome you this afternoon and recognize you for 5 minutes of 
questions.
    Mr. O'Halleran. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Ms. Eshoo. Put your microphone on.
    Mr. O'Halleran. Thank you, Madam Chair, and, Dr. Bright, 
thank you for your remarks today, your insight, your knowledge, 
and your caring for the American people. You have touched on 
several concerns I share with my colleagues about how the 
United States has responded to COVID-19. We must address the 
health crisis head-on if we want to tackle the economic crisis 
that has overtaken our country.
    We are going to need a coordinated, as you mentioned, 
national testing and contact tracing plan, spearheaded by the 
Federal Government, to prevent States from competing with one 
another for resources and planning for hotspot attacks and 
other issues that will come up. This is the only way that 
people will feel safe returning to work, eating at restaurants, 
enjoying Arizona's public lands, and being out in public and 
close to others. This flexibility piece is critical, and you 
can't have that unless you have a coordinated process.
    In my district, the Navajo Nation has, for months, been 
going under this process, and it is 170,000 people. The area is 
the size of West Virginia. So they are not all gathered in a 
group, though. So this fallacy that only urban areas are 
impacted is--and that it can't spread very fast, 16 people died 
yesterday. And, in fact, on a per capita basis, this currently 
has more cases than any State in the country, and yet, this 
hotspot is still not being addressed in the appropriate way. 
More resources are needed, and they are needed now, and they 
were needed more than a month ago when we started trying to get 
this done.
    They continue to struggle to see the Federal Government's 
promised payments in a timely manner. It came through finally, 
but it has to be timely in order to respond. This will bolster 
the health system and provide people with water, food, and 
supplies during this time of great crisis.
    Dr. Bright, as an infectious disease expert, what is the 
one thing that the Federal Government must do to ensure that 
hotspots, like Navajo Nation, or anywhere else in our country, 
are successfully mitigated in a timely way so that this virus 
does not continue to spread throughout communities and to bring 
back the faith of the citizens of our country, to be able to 
understand that we will respond quickly with the necessary 
supplies?
    Dr. Bright. Congressman, that is an excellent question. I 
believe that there is a need to recognize that it is a hotspot, 
and understand the per capita outbreak of a number of 
infections in different areas and not treat every area in the 
United States the same. The rural areas, the less dense areas, 
are not the same as a dense city, such as New York City. 
However, you can have just as significant a challenge in a 
rural area or a less dense area as you described in Arizona.
    So I think the first recognition is to get the data across 
the country into the Federal Government, so they can make the 
right prioritization decisions and allocation--equitable 
allocation of those limited supplies and resources to areas 
such as yours with a hotspot area. I don't think there is a 
full recognition yet of how to define necessarily the hotspots 
in a standardized way across the country. So we need to have 
the scientists review this challenge and come up with an 
equitable distribution and recognition of those areas.
    Mr. O'Halleran. Thank you, Doctor. I want to point out that 
this enemy goes much faster than one of our jet planes. Our 
fighters go fast, but this goes microseconds, one person to 
another, and it passes on and on and on. So I appreciate your 
comment. But statistics have to be relevant and timely.
    Dr. Bright. Yes.
    Mr. O'Halleran. In order to be able to do that, it needs a 
central database. Dr. Bright, we are currently seeing the 
number of COVID-19 tests that are being administered increase 
nationwide. What major hurdles stand in our way from increasing 
our testing capacity quickly, moving forward, and how can the 
Federal Government address these now or within a quick period 
of time? It has taken--White Mountain Apache are going through 
a hotspot right now in my district. They cannot get tests, and 
that is--they have had 400 cases out of 14,000 people. I mean, 
this is a critical issue. Please.
    Dr. Bright. Sir, I still think we need to recognize the 
importance of the different types of tests. And when we 
identify those different types of tests are essential for what 
we need to do to isolate the virus, or identify people infected 
with the virus. Then we need to put all efforts into ramping up 
production of all supplies for those tests.
    We found many times that we have ramped up now test 
production, but we have not thought about the critical reagents 
that accompany those tests. We haven't thought about the swabs. 
We are asking equipment--diagnostic equipment that might 
normally run 100 tests a day, to run 10,000 tests a day in a 
24-hour period. So there hasn't been a real thought-through 
plan about how to maintain that equipment, and that equipment 
now is failing in many places.
    So as we ramp up capacity to test, and we haven't thought 
all the way through the raw materials and maintenance of that 
equipment, those supplies, then we can find ourselves a few 
days down the road, not having the tests we thought we had, not 
having the supply we thought we needed. So again, this is where 
a coordinated strategy and plan for testing comes into place, 
not just how to use the tests, but how to make sure we are 
sustaining that supply, how to make sure that we have thought 
of every component, if it is a swab, if it is a buffer, if it 
is a lubricant for the instrument itself, making sure that all 
of those things are considered and in that national strategy, 
so we don't ramp up in one area and crash in another. We have 
to ramp up in all areas at once.
    Mr. O'Halleran. Thank you, Doctor, and Madam Chair, I 
yield.
    Ms. Eshoo. The gentleman yields back. Seeing no other 
Members to speak, I want to close. Dr. Bright, you have been 
here for just shy of four hours of straight testimony, and my 
observation is the following: I think that you are the finest 
ambassador in our country for scientists. Your encyclopedic 
knowledge, the depth and the breadth of it, I think as the 
American people have listened this morning, that you have given 
them confidence. You have also issued your warning. And I 
pray--and I sincerely mean that word--I pray that we will work 
together successfully so that that window that is closing, we 
will optimize the time that we have while it is still open.
    You know, facts are really stubborn things, and sometimes 
it is uncomfortable to have to deal with the facts that we are 
facing. But we, the United States, still has more cases, more 
deaths, by far, than any other nation on earth. And by that 
definition, we have, in my view, a profound failure. You have 
given this committee a roadmap today, and we all have been--
witnessed your integrity. So thank you for your service to our 
country. Thank you for your willingness to testify here today. 
Thank you for your courage, which has raised your blood 
pressure with all of what one contends with when you become a 
high-profile witness. But I think you should rest assured that 
you have made a difference today. And on behalf of all of my 
colleagues, I thank you and salute you and thank you for your 
family being here as well. Thank you.
    Dr. Bright. Thank you.
    Ms. Eshoo. I will ask the--yes?
    Mr. Burgess. I was going to ask if I could be recognized 
for concluding remarks.
    Ms. Eshoo. Yes, I would be glad to. Dr. Burgess, you are 
recognized.
    Mr. Burgess. Thank you. And as I outlined at the beginning 
of this hearing, there are a number of things that we do need 
to look into, and I hope that we will. This crisis has been 
going on for several months. We had an hour tacked onto a 
budget hearing at the end of February, and then this is the 
first glancing blow we have had against this crisis. So I 
welcome the hearing today. I think it is important, I 
appreciate Dr. Bright being here. I appreciate him bringing his 
guest.
    I do think we need to look into the issue of testing. I 
simply do not understand how the CDC got so far behind the 
curve at the beginning, and I would like to know that. But I 
also feel like there has been--in previous administration, 
there was an effort to really regulate what are known as 
laboratory-developed tests and move those away from clear 
regulated products to FDA-regulated products, and that really 
did put us behind. The innovators have now stepped up. I am 
thankful that they have, but we shouldn't have excluded them in 
the first place. And I think when we look back on this, that is 
going to be one of the failings at the Federal level. And that 
is not a recent failing. That goes back to guidances and rules 
that were issued back in 2012, 2014.
    As far as testing are concerned, and the ancillary 
supplies, there are tests that might just involve taking a 
salivary sample. That would be great. Spit into a cup, not have 
to deal with those obnoxious swabs going halfway down your 
throat. I suspect those cups are probably in greater supply and 
more readily available.
    And then, Dr. Bright, you will remember I had an 
interaction with you in March. I have had people pounding on 
the door with all kinds of ideas. I had people that wanted to 
make personal protective equipment. They turned their furniture 
shop into a PPE manufacturing shop. They had difficulty getting 
through the bureaucratic cul-de-sacs of the various Federal 
agencies. I have got a man that has got a breathalyzer test for 
COVID-19. I don't know whether it works. If it does, it is 
pretty intriguing. A mobile unit, about the size of a bread box 
that you can take from place to place. You simply blow into a 
tube and--we would have to have more straws. We have outlawed 
them recently, but that could be dealt with. There are some 
innovative things out on the horizon.
    The vaccine worries me, too, because I recognize there are 
some illnesses for which we have never found a vaccine--H1N1. 
And I realize it is different because that was a flu vaccine, 
but that did happen in about eight months if I recall 
correctly. The outbreak happened at spring break. We didn't 
know if we were going to be able to open the schools in 
September, but the vaccine was generally available mid-
September to early October, depending on what part of the 
country you were in.
    So that success story gives me some hope that perhaps there 
is going to be life at the end of this tunnel in the form of a 
vaccine, but I do welcome that we had the hearing today. I look 
forward to a number of additional hearings.
    The ranking member of the full committee was quite correct 
to invoke rule 11. We will keep that as an option going 
forward. And I thank our witnesses for being here today, and I 
will yield back.
    Ms. Eshoo. The gentleman yields back. Thank you, again, Dr. 
Bright. And the first panel has completed testimony, and I 
would just ask the staff to prepare the table for our next 
witness, and then we will begin in just a few minutes.
    [recess.]
    Ms. Eshoo. Mr. Bowen, you can be seated at the witness 
table. Good afternoon and welcome to you. I know Members have 
really missed being together, but we are going to begin our 
second panel. I want to introduce Mr. Mike Bowen. Mr. Bowen is 
the executive vice president of Prestige Ameritech, which is 
America's largest domestic surgical mask maker.
    I want to thank you, Mr. Bowen, for flying from Texas to be 
with us today. Your story is a very powerful one. And to my 
colleagues, Mr. Bowen has been, I think, really, he wins an 
award for tenacity, because over three presidential 
administrations, he has been banging on the door, warning, 
asking for, pointing out, that America has a dangerous 
dependence on foreign countries for products that we need here 
at home. So this is a very important testimony, and we welcome 
you; we thank you for traveling to be with us today, with all 
of the extenuating circumstances to travel, and we are very 
grateful to you. So you are now recognized for your statement, 
and then we will--and then you will hear from the Members, and 
I am sure both your statements will provoke questions and that 
you will get good ones from both sides of the aisle.
    I should add something here, and that is this issue of our 
terrible dependence on foreign countries for not only our 
drugs, our Nation's critical drug supply, but also all of the 
materials that we have been talking about, is an issue that has 
been--is shared, the concern is shared on both sides of the 
aisle. As I said previously today--I think it was this morning 
and not this afternoon--that we have had bipartisan legislation 
on it.
    But we want to hear from you. We want to hear your story. I 
think it is a very important one and I know the members will as 
well. I want to invite at this point the ranking member to 
welcome our guest because he is his constituent. So to Dr. 
Burgess.
    Mr. Burgess. Always good to welcome a Texan to our 
committee. It is always a good day when we have a Texan at the 
witness stand. We know we are going to hear the truth. I will 
say, I have been on this committee since 2005. In my second 
term on the committee, in the year it started, 2007, then-
Chairman Dingell had a hearing on the amount of active 
pharmaceutical ingredients that we imported from other places, 
in particular, China. Shortly after that, we had a problem with 
heparin contamination. We have had a number of hearings on this 
with lead-based toys, melamine in our pet food, and there has 
been a number of concerns about why we continue to use a supply 
chain when, from time to time, it is detrimental to us.
    So if there is any bright spot in this current crisis that 
we are in, it may be that finally, after 13 or 14 years, we 
seriously move to make stuff here, be our providers for 
ourselves, and quite frankly, you know, America first really 
should mean something. But I welcome you here today, Mr. Bowen. 
We are anxious to hear what you have to say.
    Ms. Eshoo. I think made-in-America. Anyway, welcome, Mr. 
Bowen, and it is your--you have the floor now. You have 5 
minutes for your testimony. If you want to place your statement 
in the record and just speak or readit , it is up to you, but 
welcome and thank you for joining us today.

                   STATEMENT OF MIKE L. BOWEN

    Mr. Bowen. Good morning.
    Ms. Eshoo. It is already afternoon. You need to turn your 
microphone on.
    Mr. Bowen. Good morning, Chairwoman Eshoo, and Ranking 
Member Burgess. Thank you for your invitation. It is my 
pleasure to testify.
    My name is Michael Bowen and I am the executive vice 
president of Prestige Ameritech of North Richland Hills, Texas. 
And I have been in the medical industry since 1986 and with 
Prestige Ameritech since 2006.
    Prestige Ameritech was founded by President and CEO, Dan 
Reese in 2005. I am going to give a brief overview of my 
interactions with BARDA and its directors, but first, I will 
give you some pertinent mask industry history.
    Until 2004, 90 percent of all surgical masks worn, and I am 
including surgical respirators, were domestically made. That 
year or around that year, all of the major domestic mask 
sellers switched from selling domestically made masks to 
selling imported masks.
    Prestige Ameritech was founded in 2005, recognized this as 
a security issue in 2006. We thought that once America's 
hospitals learned that their mask supplies were subject to 
diversion by foreign governments during pandemics, they would 
switch back to U.S. made masks. We were wrong.
    In November of 2007, we received a phone call from BARDA, 
asking for a tour of our mask factory. BARDA was acting on 
George W. Bush's Presidential Directive 21, the purpose of 
which was to review America's disaster plans. Brenda Hayden 
with BARDA gave a presentation which showed that BARDA was 
concerned about the foreign controlled mask supply. We were 
thrilled that BARDA had discovered the issue until Brenda said 
that BARDA was only charged with studying the problem.
    We were disappointed but we took consolation in the fact 
that we finally a Federal agency knew that the mask supply was 
in danger. We were very happy to have an ally. Two years later, 
I received a call from Brenda Hayden, she started the 
conversation by saying, we have a situation. Her serious tone 
caused me to ask her if she was talking about a pandemic. And 
she said yes. She asked if we could ramp up production and I 
said, yes. We built more machines, bought an abandoned Kimberly 
Clark mask factory and tripled our workforce. America's 
hospitals needed us and we rose to the occasion. We told them 
about the high cost of ramping up. And they said they would 
stay with us. Unfortunately, most returned to buying cheaper, 
foreign made masks when they became available. The company 
survived by laying off the 150 people who helped save the U.S. 
mask supply by taking pay cuts and by taking on more investors.
    The H1N1 pandemic, this is 2009, 2010 wasn't severe enough 
to cause the foreign health officials to cut off mask shipments 
to America so our predictions didn't come true yet. In a 
weakened state but undaunted, Prestige Ameritech continued 
saying that the U.S. mask supply was headed for failure; we 
just didn't know when.
    In 2004, to give my security story more issue, I formed the 
Secure Mask Supply Association. You can find it at 
securemasksupply.org. Paraphrasing Ben Franklin, I told three 
competing domestic mask makers that if we didn't hang together, 
we would hang separately, as China was poised to put all of us 
of business and put the country at even greater risk. Crosstex, 
Gerson, and Medicom, all with domestic mask-making factories, 
agreed and joined the SMSA. Unfortunately, the Secure Mask 
Supply Associations's warnings were also unheeded.
    During my quest to secure the U.S. mask supply, I had the 
privilege of working with three BARDA directors, Dr. Robin 
Robinson, Dr. Richard Hatchett, and Dr. Rick Bright. They were 
helpful and they encouraged me to continue warning people about 
the mask supplier. I will say a little bit more about that.
    After years of doing this, I quit many times and the only 
reason I kept doing it is because of the directors at BARDA, 
they would encourage me and ask me not to quit. They said that 
they would express their concerns about the mask supply to 
anyone that I could get to call them, anyone except reporters. 
They weren't allowed to talk to reporters, which was very 
frustrating to me.
    They also weren't allowed to endorse the Secure Mask Supply 
Association. Dr. Robinson was going to do so until HHS 
attorneys told him that it could cost him his job. He called me 
personally on vacation to tell me that.
    I can confirm that the emails in Dr. Bright's complaint are 
mine. They are merely the latest of 13 years of emails I sent 
to BARDA in an effort to get HHS to understand that the U.S. 
mask supply was destined for failure. Robinson, Hatchett, and 
Bright all wanted to remedy the problem. In my opinion, they 
didn't have enough authority. Their hearts were in the right 
places.
    America was told after 9/11 that governmental silos had 
been torn down so that different Federal agencies could work 
together for national securities. But I didn't see any of that. 
The DOD, the VA, the CDC, and HHS could have worked together to 
secure America's mask supply. I had suggested this to BARDA and 
to the CDC on several occasions.
    I will be happy to answer any questions that you have about 
Prestige Ameritech, the U.S. mask supply or my interactions 
with BARDA, the CDC or Rick Bright. And again it is my pleasure 
to be here. Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Bowen follows:]
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3689.187
    
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3689.188
    
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3689.189
    
    Ms. Eshoo. Thank you very much Mr. Bowen, again for 
traveling across the country to be with us and for your 
testimony. We will now move to Member questions, an I will 
recognize myself for 5 minutes.
    You already touched on your acknowledgment of your emails 
or description about your actions that were in Dr. Bright's 
complaint so I will move past that. To the best of your 
knowledge, is the section of Dr. Bright's complaint about the 
mask supply accurate?
    Mr. Bowen. Yes.
    Ms. Eshoo. Should HHS and the administration have been able 
to foresee, in your view, the mask shortages caused by the 
pandemic?
    Mr. Bowen. Yes.
    Ms. Eshoo. How many of your mask lines are not activated 
right now?
    Mr. Bowen. Four.
    Ms. Eshoo. Four. My goodness. And as we have a run, a run 
on supplies, you have four lines that could be working and 
manufacturing high-grade masks for those that need them in our 
country?
    Mr. Bowen. Yes. But not like turning on a light switch. It 
is a very large process.
    Ms. Eshoo. And just spend a moment to tell us what it takes 
to bring those up.
    Mr. Bowen. Well the machines were built----
    Ms. Eshoo. If you were to receive orders now to activate 
those lines, explain that to us. And how many more masks could 
you be manufacturing right now?
    Mr. Bowen. We could be making about seven million N95 
respirators a month. However, again----
    Ms. Eshoo. Did you say a month?
    Mr. Bowen. Yes, a month.
    Ms. Eshoo. Say that again the number of masks.
    Mr. Bowen. Seven million N95 respirators per month. But 
again its not like turning on a switch. We didn't build these 
particular machines; they were from China and we got them in an 
acquisition several years ago. So my email to Rick Bright, in 
that email I said, I think we are in trouble. We have these 
machines, it would be expensive and hard to get them going, but 
if we are--if this is going to be bad, that could happen, so 
that was my offer.
    Ms. Eshoo. Very often, especially for lawyers in courtrooms 
and elsewhere, when you are going to ask a question, they say 
you should know the answer. I think I know the answer to this 
question, but I want to hear your view on it. We have lost--we 
have allowed, we have allowed this supply, this very important 
supply of protective articles to other countries. Do you 
believe it is because of saving nickels, dimes, and quarters?
    Mr. Bowen. I call it chasing pennies to China. It is that 
insistence----
    Ms. Eshoo. And look what it has cost us.
    Mr. Bowen. It has cost us lives.
    Ms. Eshoo. It has cost us lives. It has cost us lives.
    If there is someone that would like me to yield the rest of 
my time, I would be glad to. If not, we can go to the ranking 
member of the full committee, Mr. Walden.
    Thank you, Mr. Bowen.
    Mr. Bowen. Thank you.
    Mr. Walden. Thank you, Madam Chair. And I will let you 
reset the clock too, so I don't go over my allotted time. There 
we go.
    And Mr. Bowen, thank you. Thank you for being here. And I 
appreciate your testimony, which I read last night. Toward the 
end of the last panel, I received a copy of an email that you 
sent to Dr. Bright on January 31 of this year. This email 
appears to be the one included in Dr. Bright's complaint. 
Though it is one of the exhibits that was not publicly posted 
by the Washington Post, interestingly enough. Here is what the 
complaint says, two days later Mr. Bowen of Prestige Ameritech 
sent yet another email to Dr. Bright and Dr. Wolf once again 
issuing a dire warning about the imminent mask shortage. Among 
other things he advised, and I quote, ``This week we sent 1,000 
masks to China and Hong Kong. Now I believe your email actually 
says a million masks to China and Hong Kong. He continued, 
quote In all my years of predicting the U.S. mask supply would 
one day collapse, I never pictured myself selling masks to 
China. I have it from two reliable sources China's he begun 
telling Chinese mask makers not to let masks leave China.'' 
close quote. He concluded, I think China will cut off masks to 
the USA. If so, U.S. hospitals are going to have a very rough 
time as up to up to half the supply is made in China, a 
horrible situation will become unbearable.
    Mr. Bowen. That is my email. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Walden. That is your email, OK. In the complaint this 
is cited an email from L. Wolf to R. Bright on January 29, 2020 
I think that citation is obviously wrong since even the 
complaint acknowledges that it is an email from you, Mr. Bowen, 
to Dr. Bright, right? That is your email.
    Mr. Bowen. That was my email. I don't know how it got to 
him. I mean, I don't know what email chain you are looking at, 
but yes, sir, that was my email.
    Mr. Walden. I was reading from Mr. Bright's complaint and I 
just received I think what appears to be a copy of this email. 
But I think it is cited wrong in the complaint.
    The email I received is dated January 31, 2020. It includes 
all the language that I read to you from the complaint. And 
this is exactly why the committee--and I know it needs all the 
exhibits cited by Dr. Bright, not just the ones selectively 
obtained by the Washington Post. And needs the full email 
chains, not the selective excerpts from Dr. Bright.
    Because this document also says and I will quote, this is 
your email to Dr. Bright and to Laura Wolf, it says, and I 
quote, ``My government strategy is to help the U.S. Government 
if and only if the VA and DOD become my customers after this 
thing is over.''
    Mr. Bowen. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Walden. So Madam Chair, I would like to submit the 
email for the record. We will send you an electronic copy as 
per our agreements here.
    Ms. Eshoo. So ordered.
    [The information follows:]
    Mr. Walden. Mr. Bowen, you said you want to help U.S. 
Government, you want to help Americans get the masks.
    Mr. Bowen. Yes.
    Mr. Walden. Yet it appears that there seems to be a 
condition here--I assume that is because in the past, you 
ramped up, things went away, and people bought from other 
manufacturers. And so here you are saying, and I have it here 
in the email, my strategy is to help my existing customers and 
only bring on new customers who are willing to sign a long-term 
contract. My government strategy is to help the U.S. 
Government, if and only if the VA and DOD become my customers 
after this thing is over. And here we were in a crisis as masks 
were going overseas.
    Now, the U.S. Government is not your only purchaser, right?
    Mr. Bowen. The U.S. Government has never bought from me 
except during a pandemic, sir. And that email, and that 
statement was basically saying that I don't want the government 
to only call me in a pandemic.
    Mr. Walden. OK.
    Mr. Bowen. Give me business during peace time so that I can 
survive to help you during a pandemic.
    Mr. Walden. Did you ever ask for a sole-source contract?
    Mr. Bowen. I have bid on the DOD and the VA business and I 
continually lose to masks that are made in Mexico, because the 
DOD does not obey the Berry Amendment. They buy foreign masks 
made in Mexico because Mexico is a friend of ours and it is 
called a TAA-compliant country----
    Mr. Walden. Were your masks NIOSH-n95 approved----
    Mr. Bowen [continue]. Make the decision based on price, 
national security----
    Mr. Walden. Sir, if I could reclaim my time.
    You said you couldn't turn on these lines of manufacturing 
very quickly. How long, if you got a big order from the 
government today, would it take you to produce masks?
    Mr. Bowen. Three or four months. And the government wants 
to do that right now. HHS is asking me to do that. I told 
them----
    Mr. Walden. Three or four months?
    Mr. Bowen. Yes. I told them it is going to take 3 or 4 
months. They only want masks to the end of year. So I would 
have to hire 100 people, train 100 people and then fire them at 
the end of the program. I am not going to do that. Again, I 
don't want the government to only deal with me when----
    Mr. Walden. My time has expired, Madam Chair. I yield back.
    Ms. Eshoo. The gentleman yields back.
    It is a pleasure to recognize the gentleman from New York, 
Mr. Engel, for his 5 minutes of questions.
    Mr. Engel. Well, thank you. Let me get this down. Voila. 
Thank you, Mr. Bowen. And thank you, Madam Chair, this is an 
excellent hearing and it is an issue that we need to focus on 
because it has repercussions that just continue and continue.
    Every day I hear from my constituents, including doctors 
and nurses serving on the frontlines of this pandemic about the 
dire shortages of personnel, protective equipment and 
therapeutics, PPEs as they call them. Recently, I helped to 
author the Preventing Drug Shortages Act with several of my 
colleagues on this subcommittee, provisions which were included 
in the recently enacted CARES Act. This all ties together. I 
have used my role as chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee 
to cut through red tape and bring much needed supplies, like 
100,000 antibody tests to New York City from China.
    All these actions as you point out, Mr. Bowen, are symptoms 
of a larger problem most U.S. medical products are manufactured 
abroad. And as this pandemic has highlighted, this leaves the 
United States vulnerable in public health crises and obviously 
poses a national security threat the way I look at it.
    So Mr. Bowen, as we can tell this afternoon in reading all 
about you, the things you have said, the things you have 
written, you have certainly being a leading advocate for this 
issue, specifically as it pertains to face masks, which have 
never been more in demand it than now.
    In your written testimony, you note that in 2004, major 
domestic surgical mask sellers switched from making surgical 
masks domestically to importing them. I know you spoke a little 
bit about it, but can you go into more detail and explain what 
prompted this change?
    Mr. Bowen. Mask companies wanting to make more profit. So 
they go to countries--well, it is not just mask companies, it 
is people who are in the hospital industry, who are competing 
for contracts for supplies and it is a bid-type situation most 
of the time. And the way you make products cheaply is to make 
them in China and Mexico and other places.
    So that is why the U.S. mask supply left. It wasn't a 
coordinated effort, it was a bunch of companies coincidentally 
deciding to save money at the same time and destroying maybe 
4,000 jobs in America and putting the U.S. mask supply under 
foreign control and that has been my message since 2006 
actually.
    Mr. Engel. Well it is really unbelievable because it isn't 
just foreign control; it is, to a very large degree China 
control. I am chairman the Foreign Affairs Committee, when we 
look at the geopolitical parts of the world, China is probably 
the biggest adversary to the United States. And not only are we 
leaving it in their hands, we are leaving it in the hands of an 
adversary. We are sort of beholden to that country. And I 
cannot think of much that is more dangerous than that. I am 
sure you agree.
    Mr. Bowen. China controls most of the world's mask supply. 
China can sell a box of max for $1 a box--no, let me say thins, 
China sells a box of masks for $1. I don't think anybody is 
making any profit doing that, because I sell them for about $5. 
So their prices are so cheap that they have captured most of 
the world's mask market.
    Mr. Engel. Does the government subsidize, the Chinese 
Government, the Beijing Government?
    Mr. Bowen. I don't know that. All I know is their masks 
cost less than the materials. If I take my labor costs totally 
out, I am still nowhere near the cost of their products.
    Mr. Engel. Do the Chinese masks meet our standards?
    Mr. Bowen. Some do, some don't.
    Mr. Engel. What steps can the Federal Government take to 
incentivize more medical manufacturing of critical equipment 
like surgical face masks in the United States?
    Mr. Bowen. Well, as in a letter that I sent to President 
Obama, I don't think it requires money. I think it requires the 
government saying it is a national security problem. It 
requires the CDC telling America's hospitals they are too 
dependent on foreign made masks and put them in legal 
liability. They have to protect their patients and staff. If in 
a public forum like this you say, this, is a national security 
issue, then those hospitals' attorneys are probably going to 
get on the ball and tell their hospitals to buy American made 
products. And they don't cost that much.
    The whole market is only a couple of hundred million 
dollars. This is a $30 million problem, folks, just for people 
trying to save pennies across the whole United States. It is 
not some multi-billion dollar problem.
    Ms. Eshoo. Would you repeat that again? And lean forward 
into that microphone so that everybody hears it again.
    Mr. Bowen. I said this is a $30 million problem. It is not 
billions and billions of dollars. I have never asked for money. 
In a letter to President Obama, and I wrote President Trump as 
well, but in a letter to President Obama I said, this isn't 
about money, this is about information. Tell America's 
hospitals that they are going to be in a position to not be 
able to protect their staff and their patients. And their 
attorneys, those hospital attorneys, will tell their hospital 
to buy American made masks. I don't need your money. I don't 
need subsidies. Just tell people about the problem.
    And that was my problem with BARDA. Not my problem, BARDA 
wanted to do it, but they weren't allowed it. This issue needed 
publicity and try to get them to talk to the infection control 
prevention magazine--Infection Control Today. Sorry. I wanted 
them to talk to the New York Times. Every time we had some kind 
of a flu bump I wanted them to be able to talk and they 
couldn't do it.
    Mr. Engel. Well, thank you very much; your testimony has 
certainly been very enlightening. I know the chairwoman and I 
are kind of looking at each other, almost in disbelief. I 
certainly think that this is something that the Congress has to 
get involved with and the sooner the better.
    Thank you very much for your testimony.
    Mr. Bowen. Can I point out something?
    Mr. Engel. Sure.
    Mr. Bowen. I have watched all of this in a room a little 
while ago. It seemed like everybody who was beating up on Mr. 
Bright, Dr. Bright was a Republican and everybody who was 
defending him was a Democrat. I am a Republican, I voted for 
President Trump. And I admire Dr. Bright. I don't know what he 
did in all of his other activities, but I think everything I 
have heard, and every time I have talked to him, and everything 
he said here made a lot of sense, and I believe him.
    Ms. Eshoo. Thank you, Mr. Bowen.
    I now have the pleasure of recognizing the gentleman from 
Kentucky, Mr. Guthrie for his 5 minutes of questions.
    Mr. Guthrie. Thank you very much. I appreciate that. I 
appreciate you coming today. I have a manufacturing background 
myself. And I know that the President has asked General Motors 
and Ford to make ventilators and everybody's business is their 
business. They make decisions based on what is right for their 
business.
    But during a pandemic, there is an upload and if every 
business person says, we are not going to adjust our lines for 
a pandemic--and understand Ford and GM have different access to 
capital than some others. It is just something that everybody 
needs to be concerned about, because in a pandemic, you do have 
increased orders, but I understand you want some long-term 
guarantees as well, but there are a lot of people making 
decisions. There are people now with their businesses shutdown 
because of what is going on with the pandemic.
    I am just trying to understand the mask manufacturer 
process. And so my questions are what masks, what type of masks 
do you manufacture? And do they represent the totality of mask 
variations solved by the Strategic National Stockpile? And--if 
we can get all these questions in--do you make all masks that 
are in demand that other domestic product producers make?
    Mr. Bowen. The only mask that I don't make is a cone style 
mask, the hard cone style. All the masks like you all are 
wearing, we make all of those, and we make N95 respirators, 
yes----
    Mr. Guthrie. So you make the N95----
    Mr. Bowen. And our factory used to make 87 percent of the 
U.S. masks supply.
    Mr. Guthrie. So as you know, the Strategic National 
Stockpile procedure procures medical countermeasures and other 
supplies to be deployed in a public health agency.
    Mr. Bowen. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Guthrie. I understand you worked with Dr. Bright at 
BARDA to get Federal funding to produce masks. Did you have any 
conversations with Steven Adams, the acting director of the 
Strategic National Stockpile?
    Mr. Bowen. Let me go back before that. The Strategic 
National Stockpile I met with Greg Burel face to face 5 or 6 
years ago. And Greg Burel had no problem whatsoever buying 
Chinese masks. And I had a conversation with him in the hallway 
after a meeting when I said, don't you find this a problem that 
America is dependent on Chinese masks? And he said, no, I 
don't. And I--as far as Mr. Adams, I believe I may have emailed 
him. I don't know, sir. The last 100 days, I have talked to so 
many people. I don't know what day it is most of the time.
    Mr. Guthrie. So you thought it was necessary to through Dr. 
Bright. You couldn't get anybody else to listen to--Dr. 
Bright----
    Mr. Bowen. No, no, no. You have go it all wrong.
    Mr. Guthrie. I am just trying to find the information so 
yes.
    Mr. Bowen. First of all, I wasn't looking for business. I 
opened my email, I don't need your business. My phones are 
ringing off the wall. I thought of BARDA, Dr. Robinson, Dr. 
Hatchett, and Dr. Bright. I thought of them as brothers at 
arms. They knew they couldn't buy my products. I knew that. But 
they were the only people who believed it.
    I would like everybody to go to YouTube put in Michael 
Burgess and Prestige Ameritech, you will see Mr. Burgess 
talking at our factory ten years ago. You see him say that only 
ten percent of the mask supply is made in the United States. I 
talked to Michael Burgess, Ron Wright, Joe Barton, Patrick 
Leahy. My associate Matt Conlon talked to Chuck Schumer.
    I wrote Barack Obama sub 20 letters, wrote President Trump 
and everybody in his early administration. Defense Secretary 
Mattis, General Jeffrey Clark, Nicole Lurie, Anita Patel with 
CDC, National Academies of Sciences, Greg Burel, hundreds of 
hospitals, hospital purchasing groups, the hospital risk 
managers association. Hospital Risk Managers Association, told 
them the mask supply was going to collapse, this is a risk. 
Nobody listened. Association of Operating Room Nurses, the 
Defense Department, the Veterans Department, Texas governor 
Rick Perry, State Texas rep Bill Zedler. By the way, Bill 
Zedler, Bill Zedler got it. Dozens of reporters, I have been on 
every news show. I have done this for 13 years. Nobody 
listened.
    And my conscience is clean, Mr. Guthrie. I have been 
working on this damn issue for 13 years, trying to save lives. 
Nobody listened and now I am not going to take any of this, 
what you are trying to do.
    Mr. Guthrie. I am not sure what I am trying to do. I am 
just trying to find out about who you talked with before.
    Well, the issue is is that we do have to figure out what is 
strategic and move forward and there is a lot of stuff, not 
just masks, a lot of stuff comes from China. A lot of our 
pharmaceuticals and so moving forward, and that is something 
this committee needs to dig in and move forward and figure out 
what is moving forward. But I am not sure why you are accusing 
me of trying to do, but I will yield back.
    I apologize if I offended you. I didn't intend to.
    Ms. Eshoo. The gentleman yields back.
    I think my colleagues will agree that my description of Mr. 
Bowen is that he is a force of nature. I mean, he has refused 
to give up since what year 2006 you began your crusade?
    Mr. Bowen. 2006.
    Ms. Eshoo. 2006.
    It is a pleasure to recognize the gentlewoman from 
California, Ms. Matsui, for her 5 minutes of questions.
    Ms. Matsui. Thank you very much, Madam Chair, for convening 
this hearing. And, Mr. Bowen, thank you very much for being 
here today.
    Mr. Bowen. My pleasure.
    Ms. Matsui. Mr. Bowen, having been in the PPE business for 
over a decade, I understand you have worked with several 
administrations and BARDA directors in your efforts to secure 
the Federal Government's mask supply. Were you utilizing formal 
channels with BARDA, including Dr. Bright?
    Mr. Bowen. I am not sure what your question is.
    Ms. Matsui. Well, were you going towards not only Dr. 
Bright, but other people above him also at the same time?
    Mr. Bowen. No. I never spoke with anyone above the 
director.
    Ms. Matsui. OK.
    Mr. Bowen. Well, actually that is not true. I did 
correspond with Nicole Lurie one time.
    Ms. Matsui. OK. All right. While facts are not completely 
known, this reporting indicates there might have been 
favoritism among administration officials regarding companies 
awarded supply production contracts.
    Mr. Bowen, I understand your company was eventually awarded 
a $9.5 million FEMA contract for the production of masks on 
April 7th.
    Mr. Bowen. Yes.
    Ms. Matsui. OK. It was reported in the Washington Post that 
senior U.S. official said that the government did not have the 
money to take you up on your offer to help procure masks when 
you initially reached out in January, but the government 
alternately awarded contracts to inexperienced manufacturers 
that charged as much as $5.55 a piece for masks, nearly seven 
times the 79 cents per mask you offered. Given this, do you 
think it is fair to say that the government ultimately lost 
money by not partnering with Prestige to procure masks earlier?
    I think it is an easy question.
    Mr. Bowen. Well, yes. My masks would have cost 79 cents, 
yes.
    Ms. Matsui. Right, exactly. I think even more important is 
is that we would have had more masks earlier.
    Mr. Bowen. Yes, but in their defense again, it wasn't just 
like turning on a switch. This was a difficult process and I 
think they had to look at it like, OK, it is going to take 
these guys four months to ramp up. Is it worth it? And it is an 
evolving situation. I don't want to hammer on--you know, when I 
was talking to Mr. Navarro, he was acting in good faith, I was 
acting in good faith and I wouldn't beat anybody up about that.
    Ms. Matsui. OK. Well, thank you, Mr. Bowen. I do still have 
serious concerns with the way this administration has assessed 
the risk and need for supplies.
    And I believe, Madam Chairwoman, that the committee should 
continue to investigate the administration's emergency 
purchasing processes so we are procuring medical equipment and 
protective gear in the most efficient and transparent way 
possible.
    Now, we are preparing for a second wave of COVID-19 
outbreaks that could coincide with the fall flu season. Mr. 
Bowen, from your perspective you have had experience in this, 
what gaps remain in the mask supply chain? And where should we 
be focusing our efforts now to ensure we are prepared to 
protect public health for the remainder of 2020?
    Mr. Bowen. Well, this is an unprecedented situation. There 
is no way anybody could have made enough masks to protect all 
of American citizens. But we could have done a lot better to--
we could have protected America's healthcare workers and 
patients. And that is more where my world is. That is the 
products that we make and that is what we have tried to do.
    And in this pandemic, for instance, we were making 75,000 
respirators a month. That is not a lot. And we have been making 
them ten years, we just couldn't get business because our 
products are made-in-America and they are more expensive.
    Now we are making 2 million, from 75,000 to 2 million, we 
are bringing on another 2 million. And these are machines that 
we have built. So you know--I have seen a lot of people kind of 
like what he was saying, you got four machines, what is up? Why 
are you not running those machines? We are not sitting on our 
hands, folks. We have gone from one shift to three, we have 
gone from 80 people to 200. We are working our tail off and 
producing millions and millions of products.
    Setting those machines up is going to be difficult, and 
expensive, and it requires a long-term commitment from a 
partner, not somebody who can just say, hey, do this. Because 
we are a small business. Again, I am not 3M. And if we do 
this--my partner and I euphemistically called it a suicide 
mission. Yes, OK, let's go. Let's hire 100 people and order 
truck loads of material and then somebody says the pandemic is 
over and we are stuck with it again. We don't want to do that.
    So we are not mercenary. Like I say, my conscience couldn't 
be any cleaner. You know, I have been telling this message 
forever. For somebody to say you could have done better, I am 
offended by that.
    Ms. Matsui. No, I am not saying that at all.
    So thank you very much, Mr. Bowen, for coming before us. 
You have brought a lot of things to our attention that I think 
are necessary so thank you so much.
    Mr. Bowen. It was my pleasure, my pleasure to be here.
    Ms. Eshoo. The gentlewoman yields back.
    It is my pleasure to recognize the gentleman from Virginia, 
Mr. Griffith, for his 5 minutes of questions.
    Mr. Griffith. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
    I represent that line of Virginia down there on the south 
side right next to North Carolina and a lot of our folks had 
experience in the industry, in the textile industry, before 
both Mexico and China did the same thing that they have done to 
you. And they have ramped up and they are making all kinds of 
masks and so forth. And their concern is is if we ramp up, will 
there be something down the road where buy made-in-America. And 
I agree with you on that. We need to figure out a way to do 
that, not only on masks and PPE but on drug supply, et cetera. 
We need to make sure a significant portion of that is made in 
the United States so we don't find ourselves in this situation 
again.
    That being said, your phone is ringing off the hook. And I 
think maybe you have already answered this, but if you could 
just briefly just state why. If your phone is ringing off the 
hook, why do you need to have a guarantee on the other end, 
knowing that the policy is going to shift, but we may not be 
able to give you a contract in advance.
    Mr. Bowen. Well, for me to hire the people and build the 
machines, I can't do that for a temporary need.
    Mr. Griffith. So you don't have the machines built right 
now?
    Mr. Bowen. No. I am saying to go more than we have already 
gone, which we have already built as much as we can risk.
    Mr. Griffith. OK. But you said you had four lines sitting 
empty so I thought the machines are already there. Is that not 
accurate?
    Mr. Bowen. Yes, yes. Please ask your question again, I am 
confused.
    Mr. Griffith. I am trying to figure out understanding that 
how somehow the policy is going to change. We can't guarantee 
you a contract, but I think everybody agrees we have go to have 
more made-in-America.
    Mr. Bowen. Right.
    Mr. Griffith. Why not ramp up with the understanding that 
the policy is likely to change and I think it will change, 
because I think we don't--whether it be masks, or other PPE, or 
drug supply, we are going to have to have a significant portion 
of these items made in the United States going forward.
    Mr. Bowen. Yes.
    Mr. Griffith. Knowing that, and your phone is ringing off 
the hook, why not ramp up those four lines?
    Mr. Bowen. Because one day the pandemic is going to end and 
the usage will go down to the basement again where it was. 
There will be ten times less usage and I will have all these 
machines, and people, and these materials that and have nothing 
do with them. And that is what happened to us before. This is a 
very difficult thing to ramp up.
    Let me say this again: let me remind you that we have 
ramped up. We have gone from making 75,000 respirators a month 
to about--in 40 days, we will be ramped to making 4 million 
respirators per month. So don't concentrate on these four 
Chinese machines that we really don't know much about and would 
be a total pain of going, on top of I am trying not to kill my 
business partner who is in charge of getting all this stuff 
done.
    He is working 20 hours a day now with all the projects we 
have already got, now to dump on this on top for some business 
that may or may not come, absolutely not.
    Mr. Griffith. Well, I would say to you that I believe I 
think the folks in my district who are doing this, there are 
four or five companies that have retooled and gone back up, not 
to your size, but----
    Mr. Bowen. They are making things that look like masks. 
They are not making masks. They are making things that look 
like masks.
    Mr. Griffith. One of these companies used to make masks 
before they got run out of the industry. With that being said, 
I believe that Americans are going to be wearing masks a lot 
more at various places, movie theaters and so forth. I don't 
think the number is going back down.
    All right. In your testimony you stated that in 2009 you 
were instructed by then BARDA director Brenda Hayden to ramp up 
mask production to respond to H1N1 pandemic. Did you have a 
contract with the Department of HHS to produce masks at that 
time? And if not, why not?
    Mr. Bowen. No, we didn't and----
    Mr. Griffith. OK. The after H1N1, did you continue to 
produce masks for the purposes of restocking the Strategic 
National Stockpile?
    Mr. Bowen. I can't do that without the Strategic National 
Stockpile wanting to buy them.
    Mr. Griffith. Did you have conversation with BARDA, SNS, 
and HHS at that time about supplying the masks for the national 
stockpile?
    Mr. Bowen. I have talked to Greg Burel on many occasions, 
sir. And have I also offered those machines to him. And I have 
offered those machines to the Department of Defense.
    Mr. Griffith. You are just going to give them the machines 
or you are going to give them production?
    Mr. Bowen. No, no. Listen it on this, here is what I wanted 
to do. I wanted CDC, and VA, and DOD to get together. I had 
four machines. I had very little money and they could make a 
whole bunch of masks and for years--I have 13 years worth of 
emails, I can document all this stuff--I said to the CDC, hey, 
we can fix--we can make sure that the Department of Defense and 
the Veterans Administration always has masks. I have got these 
four machines sitting here doing nothing.
    Mr. Griffith. You were willing to give them production but 
not the machines.
    Mr. Bowen. No. Well, let me finish the----
    Mr. Griffith. I am just trying to sort it out.
    Mr. Bowen. Well, here is what I was going to say. Let's use 
one machine, it will make your whole annual usage for one 
machine and we will let three of them sit there in our factory 
just ready to go. When you need them, we can turn those things 
on. And I couldn't get anybody interested in them.
    Mr. Griffith. Were you going to give them to them or lease 
them?
    Mr. Bowen. It didn't matter. I didn't have any money in 
them. I said, give me your peace time military hospital 
business and we will give you these machines, they will just 
sit there. Now, we would have had to have had some kind of a 
plan kind of a plan, you know, to get materials and thing like 
that. But I was basically saying, we have got a warm base 
operation and it is not going to cost you guys anything. I made 
that offer to several agencies.
    Mr. Griffith. I see my time is up. I yield back, Madam 
Chair.
    Mr. Bowen. And by the way, forgive me for being angry. I am 
angry because I have done this for so, so long. And I have been 
ignored for so long and I apologize.
    Ms. Eshoo. Well, Mr. Bowen, I don't think you need to 
apologize; at least that is my view. I think shame on us. I 
think shame on all of us that we have allowed this to happen. 
And this is powerful testimony. It underscores what we need to 
do, the position that we are in, our crippling dependence on 
foreign countries for what is--we all realize now with this 
pandemic what has been laid bare.
    Mr. Bowen. I totally agree.
    Ms. Eshoo. So your testimony is I think, some of the most 
important testimony that Congress could be hearing.
    I now have the pleasure of recognizing the gentlewoman from 
Florida, Ms. Castor, for her 5 minutes of questions.
    Ms. Castor. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Bowen, I think you heard 
Dr. Bright as well this morning say the inaction has cost us 
lives. And I relayed some of the--what I understand is that you 
were first contacted by the Department of Homeland Security in 
January because they wanted masks for airport screeners. Is 
that correct?
    Mr. Bowen. Yes. And let me clarify. That was probably a 
low-level purchasing person looking for products. And a lot was 
going on. And I am trying to figure out if this is real. And so 
they were asking for masks. And I said, I can't help you. But I 
said tell me, just tell me as two Americans over the back 
fence, are you worried about this? And he said, I am really 
worried about it.
    Ms. Castor. So that flipped a light switch for you in 
January?
    Mr. Bowen. That and a lot of other things. At the end of 
January my phone started exploding. And it was really weird. It 
was Chinese Americans calling to buy masks and they were 
sending them home. So--by the way, the reports that I was 
sending masks to China is inaccurate. I was sending masks to 
Americans who were sending masks to China.
    Ms. Castor. And then I understand that you began emailing 
with Dr. Bright in--was it January 26 when you emailed Dr. 
Bright and said that here in America, our mask supply is in 
imminent risk.
    Mr. Bowen. Yes. Again, as I said in my opening statement, 
those emails were just the latest of 13 years of emails to the 
directors of BARDA. I consider them my only allies. I couldn't 
get anybody in else in the government to understand the issue, 
they understood it. So any time something would happen, we get 
a flu or the MERS comes out in the Middle East or whatever I 
would send them an email, hey is this a big one? Should I ramp 
up?
    Ms. Castor. And then Dr. Bright, as he testified, he 
elevated your concern and sent it to Dr. Robert Kadlec, the HHS 
assistant secretary for preparedness and emergency response. 
Did you hear at that point from Dr. Kadlec?
    Mr. Bowen. No, I never met him--or never talked to him 
before.
    Ms. Castor. And do I understand from the accounts you have 
previously provided, you did not hear back really until a month 
later when you received a form letter from FDA?
    Mr. Bowen. I don't relate to those two events. And the 
timing I would have to go back and look at emails. But the form 
letter from the FDA, I don't think had anything to do with 
those other things. I think that was separate.
    Ms. Castor. Well, here is the frustration that I have. This 
continues to be a problem. After you sent that original notice 
email and Dr. Bright elevated it to our assistant secretary for 
preparedness and emergency response, at the end of January, it 
is February, March, April, May. And what I heard from my 
hospitals just today and yesterday N95s are still very 
difficult to procure. They are in dire need for N95s. Another, 
my community health center, we continue to struggle to get N95s 
and there are so many folks trying to sell knockoffs.
    And one of our largest health systems says the supply chain 
remains inconsistent and irregular. They remained concerned as 
they headed into the fall. They are going to be squeezed 
because of flu season and the coronavirus. I mean, why haven't 
we been able to get a handle on--I know that they have issued 
contracts. And what do you have to say? There was a contract 
apparently issued for $55 million to a company with no history 
of procuring medical equipment for a cost of $5.50 apiece. What 
do you know about that?
    Mr. Bowen. Just what I read in the paper. Nothing more than 
you do.
    Ms. Castor. What do we say to my hospitals, my nurses, my 
doctors, the EMTs on the frontline right now that it is months 
later and they are still struggling with the supply chain and 
they are worried.
    And we have nurses dying who could in to save a COVID 
patient who stopped breathing. In Detroit area, they have 700 
staff members in one health system and dozens of doctors, what 
do you----
    Mr. Bowen. I say that we, as a country and as the people 
who are supposed to be on top of this stuff, messed up. And it 
is not what happened in January. It is what has happened since 
2007, actually since 2004, you know. Presidential Directive 21 
by George Bush identified this as a problem in 2007. I have 
been on CNN, and Lou Dobbs and Neil Cavuto ad infinitum for all 
this time. And----
    Ms. Castor. Is there not something a little more insidious 
here when you have an administration who downplayed it, and 
said that it was going to disappear, and didn't follow the 
scientists, and told Dr. Bright instead, of we respect you and 
hear you, in fact, we are going to can you, and we are going to 
reassign you, and we are going to bury you, because you are 
speaking truth to power? Isn't that a little bit different 
right now?
    Mr. Bowen. Now that you ask, again, I am a Republican, I 
have been a lifelong Republican. And I am embarrassed by how 
that has been handled. Like Rick Bright said, it is the 
scientists we need to be listening to and we are not. That has 
got to change or more lives are going to be lost.
    Ms. Castor. Thank you.
    Ms. Eshoo. The gentlewoman's time has expired.
    It is a pleasure to recognize the gentleman from Florida, 
Mr. Bilirakis, for your 5 minutes of questions.
    Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair, I 
appreciate it. Thank you, Mr. Bowen for testifying or 
presenting today.
    Considering the made in China 2025 initiative, can you 
describe how China is working to corner the Personal Protective 
Equipment, the PPE market? If you can't, I understand, but if 
you can, it would be very informative.
    Mr. Bowen. Well It is--America has a weakness for low 
prices. And the--I think Chinese prices are so low--you know, a 
few years ago I decided to go buy 12 things from Lowe's, Lowe's 
Home Improvement Center. And I decided I was going to pay 
whatever it took to buy American. I couldn't make that 
decision. That decision was taken away from. I bought one item, 
it was a plunger, a toilet plunger was the only thing I could 
find that was made-in-America. What it is is it is the people 
like the Lowe's, and the Home Depot, and the Walmarts, and the 
medical companies that the way they want to make money is to 
lower their costs. The way they lower their costs is to go to 
China. The line is long and wide for people going to China. And 
that is why we are dependent on them for everything.
    I mean, go look in your closet, look at your tools, look at 
everything, it is all from China. And the stuff that is in from 
Mexico, let me say this: half of the U.S. mask supply is in 
Mexico it has got reservations to go to China. Mexico is not 
cheap enough. And hospitals are cash strapped and they are 
bidding out things.
    If this hadn't have happened, Mexico would have lost the 
business and in five years, China would have made all masks and 
respirators, like they do the gowns.
    Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you.
    What safeguards does the U.S. have against substandard PPE 
infiltrating critical industries like the medical industry, 
which they have? What standards do we have? What safeguards do 
we have in protecting our constituents?
    Mr. Bowen. Well, that is not a question I can answer. That 
is up to the FDA.
    Mr. Bilirakis. OK.
    Mr. Bowen. And NIOSH.
    Mr. Bilirakis. I understand.
    OK. In addition to reports of substandard Chinese masks 
infiltrating markets like Canada and the price gouging that is 
going on, even here in the United States, I have also seen the 
discontinued masks for sale on e-commerce sites here in the 
U.S. along with fake websites and email addresses utilizing 
American brand names.
    How is Prestige Ameritech working to crack down on 
potential counterfeiting and price gouging of its products, of 
your products in other words? How are you protecting yourself, 
and your business.
    Mr. Bowen. We are a small company. We are a family company. 
We don't have people to do that. But we never had to do that 
before, nobody cared about our products. My phone never rang. 
And now I am working with the FBI on a daily basis because I am 
getting myself and my business partner have been impersonated.
    Mr. Bilirakis. That happens frequently, obviously, 
impersonating.
    Mr. Bowen. Yes our website has been copied, our images have 
been copied.
    Mr. Bilirakis. Continue to elaborate on that, please.
    Mr. Bowen. Well, here is how it goes. I will get an email 
from someone--I got an email from the CEO of a company in 
Dallas last month that said I am about to wire you $1.6 
million. I just got a feeling I want to make sure you are for 
real. I said, that is not me. And someone in India copied our 
entire website. And what they are trying to do is use our good 
reputation and our worldwide press coverage now and they are 
saying, hey, we are with Prestige Ameritech, we are offering 
you hundreds of millions of masks and wire money to this 
account. They even have Texas phone numbers. So anybody 
watching this who is being offered a lot of Prestige Ameritech 
masks, don't--don't do it.
    Mr. Bilirakis. OK. Give us some advice, how might Congress 
further support efforts to protect consumers from price gouging 
and counterfeit goods? What would you recommend? Do you have 
any advice for us with regard to legislation, or ideas, what do 
you think?
    Mr. Bowen. No, actually, that is something I haven't 
thought about. If you gave me a couple of days, I could think 
about it.
    Mr. Bilirakis. OK. Well, yes, if you could get that 
information to us we would appreciate it very much.
    Mr. Bowen. I probably won't remember it after this. If 
someone could send me a letter, that would be great.
    Mr. Bilirakis. Well, Madam Chair, maybe we can communicate 
with him. Thank you very much, sir.
    Mr. Bowen. My pleasure, sir.
    Ms. Eshoo. The gentleman yields back. Every member will 
have the opportunity to submit questions to our witnesses. So 
you will have those questions, Mr. Bowen. And as timely as 
possible, then you can respond to the gentleman's question and 
anyone else who submits one to you.
    Mr. Bowen. I would be happy to.
    Ms. Eshoo. OK? All right. Now I would like to recognize the 
gentleman from Maryland, Mr. Sarbanes, for his 5 minutes of 
questions.
    Mr. Sarbanes. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you, Mr. Bowen.
    You don't know me, but I feel like I know you because when 
I listen you to you talk, I think about a lot of people in my 
district, Republicans, Democrats, Independents who scratch 
their head a lot of the time and wonder why we can't get these 
things fixed, why we can't do simple stuff. Why we can't get 
from point A to point B. And I would say to you that I think 
your composure today has been remarkable, given the fight you 
have been waging for 15 years.
    In ancient mythology there is a character called Cassandra. 
Cassandra had the ability to see into the future, but was 
cursed by Apollo that no one would ever believe her prophesy. 
And sitting here, listening to you today, that is immediately 
what I thought of. And so thank you for maintaining composure 
at a time when you could literally, without apology, stand on 
that desk and just scream at the top of your lungs, I told you 
so over, and over, and over, and over again.
    This is a report from 2007, the U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services discussion with respirator protection device 
manufacturers on preparedness and surge capacity.
    The first page is the bottom line. I am just going to read 
some of these things. 2007, there will be a significant 
increase in the need for respiratory protection devices, RPD, 
during an influenza pandemic. There will be significant needs 
across all sectors: healthcare, public safety, business, 
government, public. The industrial surge capacity of RPD will 
not be able to meet needs and supplies will be short during a 
pandemic.
    There are several RPD options. I am sure you probably 
described some of them. They can be employed to meet the 
projected needs. All sectors must contribute to efforts to 
prepare in order to meet the needs for RPD or find safe ways to 
work around limited supplies during a pandemic.
    So this is 2007. This is when you were starting on your 
crusade, well-founded obviously, given what the Department was 
identifying as needs at that time. And here we are 13 years 
later, in the midst of a pandemic, that you and others 
cautioned us about and we are not ready.
    And I have to say that I am embarrassed on behalf of the 
government's failure to respond to these warnings for so many 
years. I actually was elected in 2006 and came here in 2007. So 
my time here kind of tracks your journey to try to get us to 
wake up to this pandemic, to get things to be made again here 
in America.
    And I have been an advocate for those things, but not 
enough of an advocate, I confess, given what you are saying. So 
I apologize on behalf of the U.S. Government that we have not 
responded better to the warnings that you have given us for so 
many years. And now we are paying for it and the cost is lives 
unfortunately. So shame on us.
    And, you know, ten years from now they will play back a 
video of this hearing and will we mark that as the beginning of 
getting with the program finally and actually changing our 
policy, and beginning to make things here, protecting our 
national security as you say. And that is absolutely the right 
frame in this moment and in the midst of this crisis.
    Shame on us if we don't learn from this. And I am sure 
people said it before, policymakers behind microphones and here 
we are.
    So I hope the public measures our commitment to change on 
this and to stand up what America needs to do to anticipate 
these things in the future.
    Mr. Sarbanes. I have almost run out of time, but let me ask 
you a question. Do you think we can do it?
    Dr. Bright. I think----
    Mr. Sarbanes. Do you think--do you believe that if we put 
our minds to it, that if we collaborate, the private sector and 
government, to create these manufacturing supply chains, to 
bring this back from offshore, that we can do what we need to 
do to keep our people safe? Do you believe that?
    Mr. Bowen. I can give you a confident yes.
    Mr. Sarbanes. Thank you. Thank you.
    Mr. Bowen. Because I am being contacted by a lot of the 
healthcare organizations that didn't listen, and they are 
coming to me and saying, you were right, let's fix this.
    Mr. Sarbanes. Well, let's fix it. Thank you for being here 
today.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Bowen. My pleasure.
    Ms. Eshoo. The gentleman yields back. I want the gentleman 
to know that I especially appreciate your Greek oratorical 
skills.
    Mr. Bowen. Oh, by the way, I would like to say that I 
didn't know about Cassandra until just recently and was told 
about that myth by Maryn McKenna. She is the author of 
``SuperBug,'' and she has been one of my sisters in arms on 
this, and she told me about Cassandra.
    Mr. Sarbanes. OK.
    Ms. Eshoo. All right. It is a pleasure to recognize the 
gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Long, for his 5 minutes of 
questions.
    Mr. Long. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
    And thank you, Mr. Bowen, for being here today.
    Earlier I was a little confused, so I want to ask you about 
what type of masks you make. And I thought you said you did not 
make the hard masks, that you make more of the masks like we 
are wearing today when we are not on a microphone. Your FEMA 
contract for nine-point-whatever million dollars, was that not 
an N95 mask contract?
    Mr. Bowen. Yes. That is an N95, but it is a flat mask, not 
a cone mask.
    Mr. Long. OK.
    Mr. Bowen. It is more of a pocket-style mask.
    Mr. Long. OK. Well, that is fine. I just was wanting some 
clarification there.
    How are those packaged, roughly? I mean, how many are in a 
box or whatever, when you ship them out to FEMA and they ship 
them to our States?
    Mr. Bowen. Ours are packaged 50 per box, and six boxes per 
case.
    Mr. Long. OK.
    Mr. Bowen. Three hundred per case.
    Mr. Long. We have been fighting this battle to get more N95 
masks for our States and fighting back and forth between States 
and getting them from FEMA. So if our State received N95s from 
FEMA within the last 20 days, let's say, would those have been 
your masks?
    Mr. Bowen. Well, I think they have contracts with multiple 
people, so they could have been my masks, but not necessarily.
    Mr. Long. OK. Have you heard any complaints about the boxes 
that FEMA is shipping arriving with missing masks? Sometimes 
over half the box is filled with filler material. Have you been 
approached about that?
    Mr. Bowen. No. In fact, quite the opposite. We are having 
hospitals--Baylor, for instance, in Dallas, got some masks from 
FEMA, of ours, and they liked them so much they want to start 
buying them. So we are actually hearing the opposite of that. 
That is probably----
    Mr. Long. Oh, no, no, no, I am not accusing you of shipping 
out half-filled boxes.
    Mr. Bowen. Yes.
    Mr. Long. But the State of Missouri, that is what we are 
receiving from FEMA.
    Mr. Bowen. It probably----
    Mr. Long. Boxes that have obviously been cracked open 
somewhere else, masks removed----
    Mr. Bowen. Are those Prestige Ameritech masks? Oh, you are 
asking me, so you don't know, right?
    Mr. Long. No. I have texted the governor here a minute ago, 
but he didn't----
    Mr. Bowen. Yes.
    Mr. Long. It just came to me when you were talking about 
what masks you make a while ago, so I am waiting for an answer 
from the governor's chief of staff. If that is an ongoing 
problem with other States, or if you have heard anything about 
it, but we are just trying to get the bottom of these masks, 
that FEMA ships out boxes and you open them up and there is a 
bunch of filler material and half the masks or three-fourths 
are gone.
    Mr. Bowen. That doesn't make sense.
    Mr. Long. No, it doesn't.
    Mr. Bowen. Yes. We ship full cases to FEMA, and we are not 
in the habit of putting fillers in our boxes.
    Mr. Long. No, no, no, I am sure your company, don't get me 
wrong.
    Mr. Bowen. Oh, no, no, no, no, I understand that, but I am 
just saying, if that is happening, it is probably from 
somewhere else.
    Mr. Long. Well, that is what we need to find out, where 
that somewhere else is.
    Mr. Bowen. Yes. Well, and remember I am only selling them a 
million a month. They are getting lots, lots and lots and lots, 
millions and millions from other people.
    Mr. Long. We are thankful for anything we get in Missouri, 
trust me, we tried for a long time to get a hold of them.
    Mr. Bowen. I have a little bitty contract.
    Mr. Long. One of the two largest hospitals in my district 
ordered masks, and I am not even--I am sure they were N95s they 
ordered. They paid eight times what was the going rate pre-
corona outbreak. They got their N95 masks in great shape; 
everything was fine, the boxes were full, and they were 
counterfeit.
    So that is one of reasons for this hearing here today, 
trying to sort out some of these things and figure out, like 
you say, if people are stealing your website, it is obvious, I 
guess, where some of the counterfeit masks at eight times the 
going rate are coming from.
    I got a little off-subject here. Let me ask my question 
here before I get too far out there on a limb. But it is my 
understanding that you were able to get connected with the 
White House economic adviser, Peter Navarro, in March.
    Mr. Bowen. I am not sure--yes, I guess it was March, yes.
    Mr. Long. That is correct, OK.
    Mr. Bowen. Yes.
    Mr. Long. NBC News reported that after you connected with 
Peter Navarro, that Dr. Bright wrote to his deputy asking him 
to explore whether BARDA could divert money that was expressly 
reserved for vaccines and other biodefense measures to buy 
masks.
    Mr. Bowen. OK.
    Mr. Long. According to NBC News, this was an example of how 
Trump and his top aides have played favorites in awarding 
contracts and allocating scarce resources. Your company, 
Prestige Ameritech's deal with FEMA is one of only two 
identified in the history of the Federal contracting database 
that explicitly says it was directed by the White House.
    My question, what is your response to these allegations 
from NBC? I am only asking since Dr. Bright's whistleblower 
allegations accuse others at the Department of Health and Human 
Services of cronyism.
    Mr. Bowen. I am really glad you brought that up, because 
NBC is--that article was only one article of two that were 
critical about us, and both of those articles were written by 
people who didn't talk to me and got the article wrong. If you 
would like, I can tell you how that all came about.
    Mr. Long. Certainly.
    Mr. Bowen. OK. I was on either NPR or BBC, and one of Steve 
Bannon's producers heard me on the show and asked me to be on 
their show. And they called me, and I--one of their producer 
guys named George called and said, hey, would you be on Steve 
Bannon's show?
    And I don't know a lot about Steve Bannon, but I know he is 
a lot farther to the right than I am. And I said, well, in all 
fairness, I need to tell you, I am not a Trump supporter. And 
he said, I don't care.
    So--but I just wanted to get that out of the--I said, I 
don't want to be on this show if you think I am a Trump 
supporter. And he said, no, I don't care.
    So then the show went really well, and I was invited back. 
And I enjoyed talking to Steve Bannon. It was fun. And Steve 
got it, he got the cause, and he said, I am going to tell a 
friend of mine, Dr. Hatfield and Dr. Navarro about you guys. 
And I said, who is Dr. Navarro? And he told me, and I said 
great, OK.
    So then Doctor--somebody from Dr. Navarro's office called 
me, and I went through the same spiel. I know you think I am a 
nut, but that is just the way I am, I want to make sure 
everybody knows everything. And so somebody from Dr. Navarro's 
office called and asked me about my company and everything. I 
said, yes, I make masks. I said, but, again, in all fairness, I 
need to tell you, I am not a Trump supporter. In fact, I did an 
article in the Dallas Morning News two years ago that was very 
critical, and that is going to come out. And he said, I don't 
care.
    So--and then, to make matters--to beat a dead horse, when 
Dr. Navarro called me, I did the same thing. I said, hey, just 
FYI, this--you give me a contract, this article is going to 
come out, and this might embarrass you, just to let you know. 
And he laughed. Dr. Navarro laughed at me. And he said, send me 
the article, and I did.
    So I have told my friends recently, that article should 
have been titled ``Trump administration gives mask contract to 
Biden supporter.'' That is the real deal.
    Mr. Long. OK.
    Mr. Bowen. So it was not cronyism, sir.
    Mr. Long. Do what?
    Mr. Bowen. It was not cronyism at all. And let me tell you, 
too, Peter Navarro was a gentleman, acted in good faith. He was 
concerned about the mask supply, so was I, and that is what we 
talked about.
    Mr. Long. I think the team----
    Mr. Bowen. No cronyism. And by the way, if you want to take 
that FEMA contract away from me, please do. I can make a lot 
more money selling those masks somewhere else. I got a pure 
heart, sir. I really do.
    Mr. Long. No, no, yes. But I think Trump's advisers and 
close people, you see them at the press conference out there--
--
    Mr. Bowen. Yes.
    Mr. Long. Several of those people are not Trump supporters 
either.
    Mr. Bowen. Yes.
    Mr. Long. But the President has picked them because they 
are the best in the business, which I think that is good.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Bowen. Well, that was the farthest--farthest from 
crony. I pretty much tried to talk myself out of that. That is 
probably why Mr. Navarro said I was difficult to work with. I 
don't know.
    Ms. Eshoo. The gentleman's time has expired. A pleasure to 
recognize the gentleman from New Mexico, Mr. Lujan, for his 5 
minutes of questioning.
    Mr. Lujan. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Mr. Bowen, thank you so much for being with us today, sir.
    As you outlined in your testimony, you have been raising 
the alarm about the national security risk from the loss of 
domestic mask production for some time. Does the United States 
need to change that and dramatically increase the manufacturing 
of medical supplies?
    Mr. Bowen. Well, there is a short-term issue and a long-
term issue. Right now, there is a lot of masks that are needed, 
and there are a lot of people going into the business. 
Unfortunately, a lot of them don't know what they are doing and 
were making masks out of fabric and other things that don't 
work.
    What I call that is making a life jacket out of lead. You 
know, I can make a life jacket out of lead and I can paint it 
orange, but don't go in the pool. Some of these masks that are 
being made are worthless. So--I am sorry. I got--I lost the 
question.
    Mr. Lujan. I think you answered the question, that, yes, 
the United States needs to take this seriously, and to up 
manufacturing, but we need to do it the right way.
    Mr. Bowen. Yes. I don't think we need to up manufacturing 
that much. I just think we need to have it be in the United 
States so it can't get cut off, like a lot of the Chinese 
supply was cut off.
    Mr. Lujan. Appreciate that, sir.
    On January 22nd, you emailed officials at HHS and offered 
to reactivate four of your company's unused production lines 
for N95 respirators, correct?
    Mr. Bowen. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Lujan. And what was the response to your offer?
    Mr. Bowen. Well, Dr. Bright was kind of all over it. I 
mean, he really thought this was an important thing. So he 
said, I am going to forward you to Laura Wolf, she is in charge 
of infrastructure. And my attitude was, it is a little bit 
too--this is too little, too late, but we have got these four 
machines, we could at least protect some people, maybe our 
infrastructure.
    So they asked me to get with her and tell her what we could 
do. So I did, I sent a big long email that said, here is what 
we can do. And then there wasn't a lot of response after that.
    And again, I wasn't looking for a contract. I am just 
trying to be helpful at this point. So--and again, I think that 
the travesty here isn't what happened in January, in that time. 
Laura Wolf is no more responsible than all these other 
thousands of people that I told, hospitals and everybody I 
told. So to look at her and go--or to look at them and go, hey, 
they didn't listen, and you were right, well, I might not have 
been right. They are all making decisions in a battlefield 
situation. I am not going to be too hard on those folks.
    I think that the real issue is that, I mean, look at the 
HHS presentation from 13 years ago. They said, here it is, we 
are going to have a problem.
    And that day--that is why I say when Brenda Hayden came and 
gave us that presentation, Brenda, you are preaching to the 
choir, we can't believe this, this is so wonderful. And then 
Brenda goes, but we are not allowed to fix it. I said, you have 
got to be kidding.
    So that is why I latched onto BARDA, because they were the 
only people who believed it, and I kept thinking--and I will 
tell you how bad it was and how the responsibility of this goes 
far and wide, is all three of those directors believed it and 
knew that it was going to happen, and they tried to work with 
me.
    Dr. Robinson got on a plane and went and talked to a 
hospital group in Houston because I asked him to. And then 
because of that, MD Anderson Cancer Center today has enough 
masks, and they are the only hospital system in Texas--sorry--
in Houston who does because Dr. Robinson got on a plane.
    Mr. Lujan. Mr. Bowen, just because my time is going to run 
out here, sir. In that communication, it is my understanding 
that you shared how many masks you could make. And what I was 
led to believe was 1.7 million masks per week or 7 million per 
month. Is that correct, sir?
    Mr. Bowen. That is correct. If we ran 24/7, yes, sir.
    Mr. Lujan. And the price you offered was 79 cents, I think 
I heard you say earlier?
    Mr. Bowen. Well, back then, there was no talk of price. I 
just said these machines are available. And again, I wasn't 
looking for a contract. I just said, this is here, remember 
this, this is here, don't forget.
    Mr. Lujan. Earlier in the testimony, though, I think you 
had said the price was 79 cents for some other----
    Mr. Bowen. Since then, we have priced them at 79 cents.
    Mr. Lujan. I appreciate that, sir. And when the government 
finally acted on the need for masks and entered into contracts 
with less experienced manufacturers, they ended up paying as 
much as $5.50 per mask. Is that correct?
    Mr. Bowen. I just know what I read in the paper.
    Mr. Lujan. I read that as well. It sounds like price-
gouging to me.
    Look, Dr. Bright testified that there is still a shortage 
of PPE. There should be no question to everyone in this hearing 
that there is a shortage of PPE, including masks.
    Now, instead of the Trump administration accepting 
responsibility and ensuring critical PPE is manufactured at the 
level needed and coordinating with States to distribute PPE 
where it is needed, the administration left States bidding 
against one another.
    Jared Kushner, who was appointed by the President to be in 
charge of medical supplies, said at a press conference, quote, 
``The notion of the Federal stockpile is that it is supposed to 
be our stockpile. It is not supposed to be States' stockpiles 
that they then use.'' A day after Jared Kushner was on that 
press conference, the website was changed to reflect his 
remarks.
    Madam Chair, I just want to submit into the record an 
article from U.S. News & World Report, ``States Competing in 
Global Jungle for PPE.''
    Ms. Eshoo. So ordered.
    [The information appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]
    Mr. Lujan. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Ms. Eshoo. Does the gentleman yield back?
    Mr. Lujan. I yield.
    Ms. Eshoo. The gentleman yields back. A pleasure to 
recognize the gentleman from Illinois, Dr. Bucshon, for his 5 
minutes of questions.
    Mr. Bucshon. Yes. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
    Thank you for being here.
    So it is just you and 3M that makes these types of masks in 
the U.S. pretty much.
    Mr. Bowen. No.
    Mr. Bucshon. I mean prior--predating the pandemic.
    Mr. Bowen. Predating the pandemic----
    Mr. Bucshon. There is not much U.S. competition?
    Mr. Bowen. Well----
    Mr. Bucshon. Not much U.S.----
    Mr. Bowen. Well, a formal----
    Mr. Bucshon. On a large scale. That is what I am saying.
    Mr. Bowen. Not on a large scale.
    Mr. Bucshon. Yes, yes, yes.
    Mr. Bowen. No, we are all small. The members of the Secure 
Mask Supply Association that I started in 2014, there are four 
of us and then a few others that are small, but we make 
probably less than ten percent of the supply.
    Mr. Bucshon. OK. I mean, this has been a longstanding 
issue. I mean, your testimony has shown us that. Comments from 
Members have shown us that. And honestly it is an issue that 
should have been addressed probably in Congress. I mean, you 
know, Congress can tell agencies what to do and how to act and, 
you know, government contracting rules, agency rules and 
regulations.
    I mean, I have been at this, this is my tenth year in 
Congress, and it has always amazed me about how not very 
prescriptive we are in Congress. We give--it is more broad on 
what we say. I mean, the recent stuff that we have done is an 
example.
    For the most part, it has turned out OK, but we do give 
agencies a lot of leeway to set rules, regulations, and other 
things. And it is clear you have interacted with these agencies 
for years. And even though maybe we knew up here and talked 
about it, that we had to fix this problem, it was really never 
fixed. Unless Congress tells them to do it, they are probably 
not going to.
    You know, the other thing is the private sector 
marketplace. I know you talked about that, how hospitals get 
products from--you know, buy cheaper products that are not made 
in the United States. For your products, say for an N95 mask, 
the FDA has to approve those products to be used in the United 
States?
    Mr. Bowen. Yes, sir. Well, I think just now, I think that 
has changed. I believe it is just NIOSH for N95s.
    Mr. Bucshon. OK. But there is a Federal agency that has to 
certify this is something we----
    Mr. Bowen. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Bucshon. Right. So, you know, we--so, I mean, we do 
have some control over what, in certain respects, about the 
quality of the masks that we import into the United States. 
Clearly there has been, you know, some counterfeits, but 
probably also some products brought from China and other places 
that maybe don't go through. Do they go through the same 
certification process that you do?
    Mr. Bowen. Well, they are supposed to, but I know, for 
instance, every once in a while a Chinese respirator--well, let 
me say what NIOSH will do. They will take masks out of the 
market.
    Mr. Bucshon. Yes.
    Mr. Bowen. They will go buy masks and test them.
    Mr. Bucshon. Yes.
    Mr. Bowen. And if they fail, you can lose your 
registration.
    Mr. Bucshon. Yes, OK. And they do that for the Chinese-made 
masks, too, right?
    Mr. Bowen. So the Chinese masks, a lot of those have 
gotten--lost their registration.
    Mr. Bucshon. OK. And for the Federal--for the national 
stockpile, I mean, it seems to me that we are going to have to 
really consider changing how we deal with that. I mean, you 
know, you have a stockpile of something; you buy all of this 
stuff, and then it updates, right? And then you buy it all 
again.
    Mr. Bowen. Right.
    Mr. Bucshon. So what is the outdate on a--say just an N95 
mask. How long are those certified to be used? It is sitting on 
a shelf, you pull it off there.
    Mr. Bowen. They are all different.
    Mr. Bucshon. For how long?
    Mr. Bowen. They are all different. Five, 10, 15 years. They 
are all----
    Mr. Bucshon. They are all different.
    Mr. Bowen. They are all different. But I have never thought 
that stockpiling was the way to go.
    Mr. Bucshon. Right. So this mask here may be--might be--you 
know, if it sat on a shelf in a closed box, it might say on 
their ten years.
    Mr. Bowen. It might be fine.
    Mr. Bucshon. Or it might be fine, OK.
    Mr. Bowen. Yes, yes. Or the elastic could rot and----
    Mr. Bucshon. Which has happened by the way. I have had 
people at hospitals tell me they have pulled masks off the 
shelf and the elastic has popped when they tried to put it on.
    Mr. Bowen. Yes. I don't think stockpiling is the----
    Mr. Bucshon. So what do you think we should do? I mean, 
should we----
    Mr. Bowen. Well----
    Mr. Bucshon. For example, in the stockpile, if they were 
outdated, or start to outdate, should we be able to sell that 
stuff before it outdates? I mean, what would be the length of 
time before an outdate that you would feel comfortable selling 
a product?
    Mr. Bowen. I don't believe in stockpiling, sir, because of 
all the problems that we have already identified.
    Mr. Bucshon. OK.
    Mr. Bowen. I think what we should do is come up with a new 
kind of mask that can be made extremely fast. Talking about 
hundreds of millions a week.
    Mr. Bucshon. So some innovative stuff?
    Mr. Bowen. Absolutely.
    Mr. Bucshon. Yes, OK.
    Mr. Bowen. And then ramp up. I presented a program or an 
idea called Hypersurge to CDC several years ago, and that is 
what I said. And they said it was the best presentation of the 
meeting. Now, we never did it because I couldn't figure out a 
way to make it profitable, to go and build a machine that is 
not going to be used.
    Mr. Bucshon. Right, right, right.
    Mr. Bowen. I am not in that business.
    Mr. Bucshon. Yes. So I get that because, like, I was a 
heart surgeon before, and so we would have--we used to when I 
first started 25 years ago, we would have a stockpile of heart 
valves, of all sizes.
    Mr. Bowen. Right.
    Mr. Bucshon. The hospital bought them. They sat there. They 
had outdates on them. And over the years, ultimately, we got a 
point where they don't stockpile those anymore at the hospital 
because things would outdate and they would have to get rid of 
them. So now basically things rotate--you know, when you are 
going to do a heart surgery case, you can get--the products 
will come through, and you will be--it is consignment, 
basically, right? You don't buy them anymore.
    That's kind of what you are saying as a stockpile. You 
don't stockpile this stuff, but you have a way of quickly 
getting things----
    Mr. Bowen. Well, and a stockpile will work in some 
situations. For instance, the government does buy masks. The VA 
and the DOD buys millions of masks.
    Mr. Bucshon. Right.
    Mr. Bowen. So that can rotate through. So they need a 
coherent plan, and that is what I tried to present. I said, we 
have got these four machines. Let's use one machine for your 
peacetime use. We will rotate that stock for you.
    Yes, that was the plan.
    Mr. Bucshon. I am just saying, the U.S. Government could 
help create a consistent marketplace for U.S.-made masks.
    Mr. Bowen. Yes. OK.
    Mr. Bucshon. We could be part of the solution.
    Mr. Bowen. It can be done for healthcare workers. To do it 
for the whole United States for something that happens every 
hundred years to protect all of Americans is probably not 
practical.
    Mr. Bucshon. Understood.
    Mr. Bowen. But protecting America's healthcare workers is 
absolutely possible.
    Mr. Bucshon. Fair enough.
    All right. I yield back. Thank you.
    Ms. Eshoo. The gentleman yields back. A pleasure to 
recognize the gentleman from Oregon, Mr. Schrader, for his 5 
minutes of questions.
    Mr. Schrader. Hi, Mr. Bowen, welcome. We are doing a lot of 
things these days that aren't real practical, but we are being 
forced into them.
    Mr. Bowen. It is surreal.
    Mr. Schrader. Yes.
    To some of the communications with Dr. Bright, one of the 
references he made was to a Department of Homeland Security 
request or communication with you back in mid-January to 
procure some masks. Could you talk about that just a little 
bit, what was the nature of that?
    Mr. Bowen. Yes. What I would classify as some sort of a 
purchasing agent kind of a person, not a high-ranking official, 
called, and said they were looking for masks, I believe for 
their screeners. And I said, I don't have any, we are sold out.
    And then I just asked him, what do you think, is this real? 
I said, give me your honest opinion. And he said, I think it is 
going to be bad. And I said, yes, I do too.
    So to pick up the phone and call Rick Bright--again, these 
folks to me were brothers in arms. I called him for 15 years--
13 years. And every time something like this would happen, I 
would pick up the phone and go, hey, is this it, is this the 
big one, you know, can I help you? Yes.
    Mr. Schrader. Well, it is interesting that while HHS was 
not receiving this information in a productive manner, DHS--at 
least some folks in DHS were very aware, kind of a situation.
    Mr. Bowen. I don't know, but we never--we were never able 
to sell the government masks. The government was never a 
customer of ours until the H1N1 pandemic, and they bought masks 
from us in emergency, and then never bought again. And 
tragically----
    Mr. Schrader. Well, I would like, just, if I may, I would 
like to get at that.
    Mr. Bowen. All right, go ahead.
    Mr. Schrader. But before we do, on February 3rd, there was 
communication with you and Dr. Wolf----
    Mr. Bowen. Laura Wolf?
    Mr. Schrader. Yes. And a comment was made, I think--and Dr. 
Bright referred to this--that if we weren't responding now, 
that our masks would forever be under foreign control. Do you 
remember that comment?
    Mr. Bowen. I don't know.
    Mr. Schrader. OK.
    Mr. Bowen. But I----
    Mr. Schrader. I was curious what you meant by----
    Mr. Bowen. I said that?
    Mr. Schrader. Yes.
    Mr. Bowen. Oh, yes, yes. What I meant was, if we--I am glad 
you asked that question. What I meant was, if we don't fix the 
U.S. mask supply now, while everybody is thinking about it, 
while people are dying, we are going to do exactly what we did 
after H1N1.
    During H1N1, I am on the news just like now. And we 
thought, it is over; we have finally been vindicated. We 
couldn't believe it when everything went right back. And it is 
worse. Things are worse now than they were before H1N1.
    Mr. Schrader. So getting back to your earlier comments and 
a bit of what Dr. Bucshon was talking about, you know, pretty 
clear we need to make some of this stuff in America.
    The question is--you know, I have a little tiny veterinary 
practice--or had a very small veterinary practice, and we use 
masks. The question--but I was always worried about the dollar, 
and my job here is also to protect the taxpayer dollar. And, 
you know, $5 a box, $1 a box, you got to think about it at 
least a little bit.
    So what is the right mix there? How do we protect the 
taxpayer dollar and make sure we protect made-in-America so 
that we can react to these----
    Mr. Bowen. What I am going to say is going to make no 
accounting sense. What I am going to say is that the dollar is 
not real. It should be ignored. They are not making a profit. 
Just because some country can sell a mask and lose money on it, 
to us, does that mean we ought to buy that and think that it is 
viable? It is not. It is not. We ought to buy everything that 
has to do with a critical product, like a mask, in the United 
States.
    Masks cost less now. My masks cost less now than masks cost 
30 years ago. You can buy two Class 2 medical devices, which 
are called surgical masks, for less than a gumball. OK, the 
fact that China can make them for two cents, or sell them for 
two cents; let's ignore that. It is not real. And it is a 
threat to national security.
    Mr. Schrader. So last question, if I may, and you have 
alluded to this again, you know, it would be nice to have a 
stockpile, but a stockpile is not the total answer for what you 
and Larry were just talking about.
    What role does the Federal Government have in setting up 
maybe a platform that businesses could use when times are 
tough? In other words, it is not worth your while to set up 
this platform, produce it for a couple of months, and then try 
and shut this down, unemploy a ton of people.
    Mr. Bowen. Absolutely.
    Mr. Schrader. What role could the Federal Government have? 
We face this with drugs. The chairwoman has been very adamant 
and concerned about all our active ingredients are made in 
China or India. That is not a healthy situation either, 
especially right now.
    Mr. Bowen. No.
    Mr. Schrader. So what is the role, what is the right 
public-private partnership with you guys to stand up a platform 
that could being activated and we bear some of the costs and 
you guys can tool right up?
    Mr. Bowen. Start by tearing down the silos between the CDC 
and VA and DOD and BARDA and HHS. Get all of those people in a 
room. Because the VA and the DOD use millions and millions of 
masks. So that it can rotate a stockpile. That can justify 
having machines sitting here ready to be used.
    It needs to be--there needs to be a coordinated plan 
between all of these organizations. And then there needs to 
be--again, the government needs--and the government can't tell 
hospitals to buy American-made masks, but they can sure put 
them on notice that if you don't, you are probably going to get 
sued at some point.
    You know, I have to laugh. I told my wife the other day, I 
said I am probably going to spend the last ten years of my 
career being a paid witness. Because I think these--I think all 
these people who can't protect their employees are going to 
say, hey, why did you do this to us? You know?
    And let me say one more thing too. I have dealt with this 
thing for so long, and it has been so illogical, and I have 
tried to figure it out, and who is at fault, who is at fault, 
and some people ask me that, who is to blame? And I got to the 
point where it is human nature. It is all of us.
    I couldn't convince doctors. I couldn't--listen to this. I 
had three directors of BARDA said that, Mike, if you get 
somebody to call me, I will verify that what you are saying is 
true. I will tell them it was true.
    Mr. Schrader, I couldn't get them to call. I couldn't get 
hospitals to make that call. I don't think they wanted to hear 
it. They are programmed to save money. They are not programmed 
to say, I want to make sure my masks are going to be here. It 
didn't compute. I was speaking Greek to everyone.
    So to look at this story and look back and blame everybody, 
I am not even going to do that. I am looking at this pandemic. 
There is a silver lining. This silver lining is, it has told 
everybody there is a big problem. And we can fix this problem 
and never go through this again.
    Mr. Schrader. Thank you so much.
    Mr. Bowen. Thank you.
    Ms. Eshoo. The gentleman yields back. A pleasure to 
recognize the gentlewoman from Indiana, Mrs. Brooks.
    Mrs. Brooks. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
    And thank you, Mr. Bowen, for being here. It is so 
interesting to hear. And I want to thank you actually for not 
blaming and trying to educate all of us as to what you have 
been telling America and government officials for a very, very 
long time.
    In fact, the chairwoman and I have been a part of--and I 
entered into the record many--a few hearings ago, a group 
called CSIS, strengthening America's public health security. 
And the title of this big report that a bunch of professionals 
came together, a bunch of medical professionals came together, 
the title of the report is ``Ending the Cycle of Crisis and 
Complacency in U.S. Global Health Security.'' It was led by 
Julie Gerberding, who had been a health official. It was led by 
Senator Kelly Ayotte, who had been in the U.S. Senate. It was 
all focused on--and it came out in November of 2019. It came 
out in November of 2019. And it had a lot of great 
recommendations that I hope, once again, because I talked about 
it before, in early 2020, we always go into the cycle of 
dealing with something, then we become complacent, and we lose 
focus once again.
    And we have done it, you have said, since 9/11. President 
George W. Bush had a focus on it, tried to bring attention to 
the mask problem, and others. And then we lost it during the 
Obama administration. And you wrote lots of letters. And we 
didn't ramp up.
    But I have to tell you that during all of that time 
participating in that commission, I don't--we talked about 
therapeutics, we talked about vaccines, we talked about 
diagnostic testing. I don't recall anyone ever talking about 
masks. OK? They didn't talk about PPE. And these were all 
professionals who have been at this, sitting around the table.
    And I am glad that Chairwoman Eshoo is agreeing with me. We 
didn't have that discussion. And now we are all suffering. Our 
medical professionals, really, and our law enforcement and 
fire, who are truly on the front lines, are the ones now 
suffering the consequences, and now we have this huge issue.
    I want to talk briefly about the stockpile since you don't 
believe the stockpile is the way to go. Most of America didn't 
even know there was a stockpile until this all happened. Most 
of America didn't know anything about all of these types of 
things until this pandemic hit.
    So we have to have some supply. I come from Indiana, a 
manufacturing State. We have to have a supply chain. We have to 
be able to ramp up production. BARDA is all about partnering 
with the private sector. Many BARDA directors didn't get the 
job done, based on what you said, not just Dr. Bright, but Dr. 
Hatchett and Dr. Robinson, they couldn't get the job done.
    So what do you--and we are going to welcome your comments 
later on, as a manufacturer, and I represent a lot of 
manufacturers. If we don't have a stockpile and if we don't 
have a dramatic need for PPE, and let's, God forbid, hope we 
don't, a year from now or two years from now, but we might be 
going forward for a while, what is the magic formula about 
ramping up production when we need it versus when we don't need 
it?
    Mr. Bowen. This is just my opinion. My opinion is to have a 
small stockpile that can be rotated through America's hospital 
system.
    But as far as the general--the bulk of the masks, I think 
we could come up with a different kind of mask that could be 
made so fast that you wouldn't need to stockpile. Because the 
problem isn't--the problem is, how do you get masks to the 
right--how do you get masks to people, how do you get millions 
of masks to people?
    Well, you can do it two ways. You can either have them in a 
stockpile where they could rot, or you learn how to make them 
faster. And with a concerted effort, with a group like I was 
talking about, where you get some people and some smart people 
in the room, and, hey, make it lucrative, tell the American 
mask industry, here is what we want to do, I want to--figure 
out how to make a million masks a day on one machine.
    Mrs. Brooks. But would that be a government contract, or 
would that be turning on the spigot so that the private sector 
can call those mask makers, the hospitals can call those mask 
makers? Because that is what is happening right now.
    Mr. Bowen. I think it could be both. I think the government 
should use the VA and DOD's business as a carrot. DOD and VA 
are buying millions and millions of dollars worth of masks. I 
would love to have that business.
    So what I am saying is, me or another American mask maker 
or combination, gets that business and builds the machine or 
whatever. You know, I can't think through the whole thing, but 
there are ways to do that.
    Mrs. Brooks. We could use your counsel. And while I have 
just a few colleagues here, the chairwoman and I have a bill, 
H.R. 6517, which is all about modernization of the stockpile 
inventory, and it is about making sure that we can move out 
expiring products, like expiring masks, before they expire, so 
that they don't get shipped to States, which I do think is 
happening, that some expired products are going to States.
    But I would encourage everyone; we are trying to modernize 
the stockpile, and improve the stockpile, and we welcome your 
ideas and thoughts. And certainly wish that America had 
listened more to you starting in 2007 when you said the whole 
HHS information came to light. So thank you.
    Mr. Bowen. My pleasure.
    Ms. Eshoo. The gentlewoman yields back. The Chair now 
recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Cardenas, for his 
5 minutes of questions of Mr. Bowen.
    Mr. Cardenas. Thank you very much, Mr. Bowen. Appreciate 
your persistence.
    I am going to label you as someone who cares. It sounds 
like you care about employees.
    Mr. Bowen. I care about a lot of things. I love my country.
    Mr. Cardenas. Yes, I was going to get to that.
    Mr. Bowen. Yes.
    Mr. Cardenas. I was going to crescendo into how much you 
love our country. And I think that you love people beyond our 
country, because we are such an amazing example to the world 
when we do things to the level of our capability. Do you agree 
with that?
    Mr. Bowen. I totally agree.
    Mr. Cardenas. And on this issue, I think you know as well 
as anybody, we are not doing our part the way we can show the 
world how to do things right, how to do things for the right 
reasons.
    It sounds to me that you have 13 years of trying to get 
many people, including the Federal Government, to understand 
that something is wrong, but it is not going to take a genius, 
nor is it going to take more money than we could put together 
to do it. It just means that people need to listen, pay 
attention, and then implement. Is that a----
    Mr. Bowen. Yes. I always said it didn't take a lot of 
money. It just takes some change. We have got to do things 
differently.
    Mr. Cardenas. I have never been accused of being a genius. 
Are you a genius, sir?
    Mr. Bowen. I am not a genius, and I am not stable, 
sometimes.
    Mr. Cardenas. You are normal?
    Mr. Bowen. I am normal.
    Mr. Cardenas. Yes, thank you. I figured that.
    Mr. Bowen. I describe myself as a goober with a conscience. 
I am just a normal guy.
    Mr. Cardenas. There you go.
    When you hear the term ``national security,'' the issue we 
are talking about today, just specifically masks, does it have 
something to do with national security? Eighty thousand people 
have died, and not that every single one of them could have 
been saved, but 80,000 people have died during this pandemic in 
America.
    I personally believe that number didn't have to be that 
high had we done more things better, including getting PPEs, or 
personal protective equipment, specifically masks. The right 
kind, by the way.
    Mr. Bowen. I agree with you.
    Mr. Cardenas. So you said something earlier. I have been 
listening and I really do appreciate you very much and your 
willingness to come and speak to the American people. Because 
you know you are speaking to Congress, but you are really 
speaking to the American people. This is life. Thank God some 
people are watching.
    You said something about stockpiling and you mentioned a 
couple times, like the VA, et cetera.
    I used to own a little business. I wasn't a manufacturer 
specifically, but I used to own a little business. I know what 
it is like to care about your employees, to know that if you 
had to shutter your doors, or shut down a part of your factory, 
you know families are going to suffer, people you are close to, 
people that you depended on. So I understand, I am getting that 
from you, that you do care about a lot of things, including the 
people that if you are going to put them to work, you don't 
want to lay them off later for no good reason.
    Mr. Bowen. Correct.
    Mr. Cardenas. So the issue of stockpile, old-fashioned 
stockpile, where we allow these kinds of things, for the rubber 
bands to break or what have you, which that happens, what I 
envisioned is--you may have alluded to and I may be wrong--a 
rotation of some sort, a cooperation of some sorts, between a 
big entity like the VA, to actually get a synergy of orders, 
and then also rotate that stuff--legally and appropriately and 
safely and properly--to other users before those items expire 
so that we maximize not only production, but we minimize waste, 
and we actually, get those products where they need to be when 
they need to be there.
    Mr. Bowen. If you got everyone involved, all of the big 
three hospital distributors, like Medline and Owens & Minor and 
Cardinal involved, and the government really would only have 
to--I am thinking through this--but it wouldn't cost as much as 
a government stockpile. If these people and us, all the people 
in the mask industry, if we all carried more inventory and the 
government subsidized just that part of it, they wouldn't have 
to buy--I don't know. I am not an economist. But if we all work 
together, we could do that.
    Mr. Cardenas. And the thing that conservative taxpayers and 
conservative elected officials don't like it when you talk 
about subsidizing. But in reality, the example you just gave, 
the brief example you just gave, in the long run, the taxpayers 
would end up spending less, the government would end up 
spending less, everybody would end up spending less, if we just 
try to figure out how to fill that gap properly.
    Mr. Bowen. Right.
    Mr. Cardenas. That is what you are talking about, right?
    Mr. Bowen. Right.
    Mr. Cardenas. So what I would like to invite you to do, and 
you may have done it already, is I would like to invite you to 
call my office, Congressman Tony Cardenas, and I will work with 
any of my colleagues so that we can introduce a bill to 
actually enlist and require that activity from the Federal 
Government of the United States, enlisting voluntarily, and 
required by the government side, to the government to require 
itself, to damn well do that once and for all.
    And I believe that this would be an example about masks, 
but we are going to be able to cross-pollinate that amazing, 
cost-saving, life-saving example in other areas of 
responsibility.
    Mr. Bowen. The one thing that would be mandatory for that 
to happen is for America's hospitals to be willing to pay a 
little more for a mask, because nobody can match the prices, 
yes.
    Mr. Cardenas. I know some of my colleagues don't like the 
word ``mandate,'' but we could mandate that in a way where they 
welcome it.
    Mr. Bowen. Yes.
    Mr. Cardenas. And not with a stick but truly a carrot. But 
like you said, they just have to understand how it would work 
in their benefit.
    Mr. Bowen. Yes, I don't know what the solution is, but I 
think it is probably some sort of a government and private 
industry partnership.
    Mr. Cardenas. Yes. It is called a PPP.
    Mr. Bowen. The medical industry is full of people who care. 
You guys are people who care.
    Ms. Eshoo. Right. The gentleman yields back.
    Mr. Cardenas. I yield.
    Ms. Eshoo. It is a very interesting line of questions.
    I would just place something on the table here, the empty 
table, and that is that it is one thing for a foreign country, 
China, you know, to make sneakers and, you know, T-shirts and 
whatever. But we are talking about commodities that truly are 
part of our national security. And if anything has laid that 
bare, it is this pandemic. So this is another category, and we 
have to treat it as such.
    The Chair is very pleased to recognize the gentleman from 
Georgia, Mr. Carter, for his 5 minutes.
    Mr. Carter. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Mr. Bowen, very quickly, I have been in and out, so I am 
still a little confused. Just help me clear up, because I owe 
my friend, the chairlady, two minutes, so I am going to give 
those back to her.
    But I am still confused about your current capabilities.
    Mr. Bowen. OK.
    Mr. Carter. You said you have four lines that are just 
sitting dormant, sitting empty right now. Is that correct?
    Mr. Bowen. We have four idle respirator manufacturing 
lines, yes, sir.
    Mr. Carter. And they are just--I mean, they are not being 
used right now?
    Mr. Bowen. Yes, but--go ahead, and finish your question.
    Mr. Carter. Yes, they are not being used?
    Mr. Bowen. Correct.
    Mr. Carter. Correct?
    So you have said you have already gotten machines for those 
lines. You don't have to procure them. The only thing you are 
going to have to do is to get staff in order to use those 
lines.
    Mr. Bowen. No. There is three things. We need to hire a 
hundred people, we need to train a hundred people, we need to 
get all the materials for that, and we need to get NIOSH 
approval. We bought those systems from a defunct Vermont mask 
company seven years ago.
    Mr. Carter. OK.
    Mr. Bowen. We really don't even know how to use those 
machines. They are kind of a last resort. And if you will go 
back and look at my email to Dr. Bright, I said, this would be 
basically a pain to do, but they are here, and if we need this 
for infrastructure, let's talk about it.
    But what we have done in the meantime is we have gone from 
making 75,000 respirators a month--think of that number, 
75,000--to 2 million. And then in another 40 days, we will be 
at 4 million, from 75,000. So that is thousands and thousands 
of percent increase.
    Mr. Carter. But you said you bought those. You bought them 
for a purpose. You bought them to use them, right?
    Mr. Bowen. No. Thank you for asking that question. No, they 
came as part of an acquisition. We bought a defunct medical 
company. Those machines came as part of the acquisition.
    Mr. Carter. OK.
    Mr. Bowen. And they are made in China. Again--go ahead.
    Mr. Carter. But did you say earlier that your phone was 
ringing off the hook, you got orders coming out of the yazoo 
and----
    Mr. Bowen. Yes, yes, yes, OK, but I can't go on a suicide 
mission. I can't ramp up, and hire all these people for 
something that I don't know how it is going to end, or how long 
it is going to last. And we did this.
    You have got to remember, we almost went out of business 
doing this before. We ramped up, and we spent money and built a 
bigger factory, hired 150 people, built more machines, and then 
one day the business not only went away, it went smaller than 
it was. And we had to raise a million dollars, we had to take 
pay cuts, and we had to fire 150 people.
    Mr. Carter. So what you are saying, and I am not trying to 
put words in your mouth.
    Mr. Bowen. I am saying I need a long-term contract.
    Mr. Carter. You are saying you are not going to use them, 
you are not going to fire them up unless you get a long-term 
contract from the government?
    Mr. Bowen. I am not going on a suicide mission. Absolutely.
    Mr. Carter. So, that is yes, you are not going to use them 
unless you get a long-term contract?
    Mr. Bowen. Unless I get a customer who is going to use--
commit to use those machines so I don't have to fire a hundred 
people.
    Mr. Carter. So that means that you would have to have a 
long-term contract from the government in order to do it?
    Mr. Bowen. Yes.
    Listen, we have gone from one shift to three, 80 people to 
200. We are making four times the products we made. We are 
making over a million masks a day. Don't you look at me and act 
like I am sitting on my ass and not firing up four machines. It 
is not like just turning on a switch. It is putting people's 
lives that is going to--I am not going to--listen----
    Mr. Carter. Sir, I understand. I am a businessman, too, and 
I understand what it takes.
    Mr. Bowen. Listen. Let me tell you this. I sat and watched 
my business partner cry when he had to lay those people off. We 
are not doing that again.
    Mr. Carter. So in order--so it is going to have to be a 
long-term contract from the government, though. That is my 
point.
    Mr. Bowen. From somebody.
    Mr. Carter. And I get it, from somebody. But why----
    Mr. Bowen. I can't hire a hundred people based on a maybe.
    Mr. Carter. I am sorry?
    Mr. Bowen. I can't hire a hundred people based on a maybe, 
based on a when is this going to end, who knows.
    Mr. Carter. None of us can, whether we are in the private 
sector or the public sector, we can't do that. We all 
understand that.
    Mr. Bowen. OK. You don't--you are not risking your 
livelihood and----
    Mr. Carter. Sir, I risked my livelihood for 30 years as an 
independent retail pharmacist. I never had--I had contracts 
with nursing homes.
    Mr. Bowen. Why don't you buy my--why don't you buy my 
machines and hire a hundred people? I will tell you what, I 
will give you my machines if you want to hire a hundred people.
    Mr. Carter. But the point is that, you are here saying, I 
am not going to do it unless I get a long-term contract from 
the government. I am just trying to get clear----
    Mr. Bowen. Wait, wait, wait, wait, wait, wait, wait. No, 
no, no, no, no, no, no. Go back to the context. The context of 
that was, in those emails, in, hey, here is four machines, 
let's--they are here, but I can't turn them on unless it is a 
long-term deal. I am not just going to flip them on and have 
you flip them off and leave me hanging like everybody did last 
time.
    And let me tell you what happened last time. The government 
sits around, doesn't buy American-made products, comes to me in 
a pandemic, buys millions of masks in 2010. You know what they 
did with those masks? They stored them for ten years. Then they 
auctioned them to some knucklehead who put them on eBay and 
sold them for ten times what they were worth.
    So not only did--have I not seen the government in ten 
years, I have got to compete with my own masks, and I have got 
to have thousands of phone calls for me--to me from people who 
bought that 10-year-old mask of mine on eBay for $10, ten times 
the price, yelling at me. And I had nothing to do with it. It 
is because the government waited and sold this stuff.
    I have been hit from every side on this thing. We have bled 
for this country. We have created jobs. We put our factory in 
Texas when everybody else had already left the country.
    So don't sit here and judge me for four machines that 
aren't running, that I would have to hire and fire a hundred 
people for. I am not going to do it.
    Mr. Carter. Not unless you have a long-term government 
contract?
    Ms. Eshoo. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Bowen. How many times do we have to say this?
    Ms. Eshoo. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from 
California, Dr. Ruiz, for his 5 minutes of questions.
    Mr. Ruiz. Thank you, Mr. Bowen, for your testimony today, 
and thank you for trying to sound the alarm on the issues of 
mask shortage and reliance on foreign manufacturing for over a 
decade now, before anyone had ever heard of COVID-19.
    As you state in your written testimony, relying so heavily 
on imported masks is a national security risk, and, 
unfortunately, the last few months have shown us how vulnerable 
it leaves us during a pandemic.
    You, of course, already knew that and tried to do something 
about it, and, unfortunately, those efforts were stifled.
    If your warnings had been heeded, we would not be in this 
situation now where doctors and nurses cannot find the personal 
protective equipment that they need to protect themselves and 
do their job safely.
    We all have heard the stories--doctors reusing masks that 
are meant for single use, nurses wearing garbage bags because 
they are out of gowns. This is unacceptable. This is the United 
States of America, and our frontline health workers don't even 
have access to these basic supplies.
    That is why I introduced the Commission on America's 
Medical Security Act, which would direct the National Academies 
of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine to assess the United 
States' dependence on foreign manufacturing for drugs and 
medical devices. That bill was included in the CARES Act, which 
was signed into law in March.
    Of course, the ultimate goal is a system that doesn't put 
our own access to critical supplies and equipment is at risk 
because we are at the mercy of other countries during a 
pandemic when they need those supplies for their own 
populations. It is a health security risk that puts American 
lives on the line, and, therefore, it is a national security 
risk.
    Mr. Bowen, when we get past this crisis and analyze the 
mistakes that were made in order to not repeat them in the 
future, how do we restructure a system so that we aren't caught 
in another preventable mask or other PPE shortage in future 
pandemics?
    Mr. Bowen. I am not sure. I think we should put together a 
group of people that includes some of you all and the mask 
makers and the mask distributors, the VA and the DOD, and come 
up with a plan. It is not rocket science. It is just logistics, 
and the military is really good at logistics.
    Mr. Ruiz. Great.
    Mr. Bowen. And also I think too, just to be fair, again, I 
want to be fair with this, we couldn't--this is an 
extraordinary situation. I make masks for MD Anderson Cancer 
Center and the Texas Health Resources hospitals in Fort Worth 
and Cook Children's Hospital. Those are my three biggest 
accounts. And they are using, my goodness; they are using so 
many more masks. It is not just 10 percent, 20 percent. It is 
hundreds of percent.
    So could we have made sure everybody had masks? Probably 
not. But it would have been a lot better than it is now.
    Mr. Ruiz. Well, if we would have heeded the warnings 
decades ago and created them and ramped up our ability to 
produce them, then I believe that we could have.
    There have been reports regarding the safety issues of some 
of the masks that have been imported in the past week and also 
reports about the FDA pulling approval for over 60 
manufacturers in China for N95 masks after tests showed that 
they did not meet quality standards.
    N95 masks filter out 95 percent of particles, hence their 
name, but some tests showed that many masks produced by Chinese 
manufacturers were, according to one CDC official, grossly 
under that number. One of the companies who had their approval 
removed filtered out only 24 to 35 percent of particles.
    As a doctor who was in the emergency department, I am an 
emergency physician, during the H1N1, the prospect of this is 
horrible. It leaves those in the front lines taking the highest 
risk with a false sense of security and even higher 
vulnerability. And while I acknowledge that the FDA eventually 
pulled their approvals, it wasn't done before these masks were 
already in circulation here in the U.S.
    Can you comment on this development and outline steps we 
can take to protect our healthcare workers against substandard 
masks in the future?
    Mr. Bowen. That is not an area of my expertise. I don't 
know how masks get in the country. I don't know what foreign--I 
don't know how that works, so I don't have a solution for that, 
but it is definitely a problem.
    Mr. Ruiz. OK. Let's say the President fully and 
comprehensively used the Defense Production Act and worked with 
multiple companies in multiple industries to massively produce 
masks and all the ingredients needed and created a supply 
chain, and also created a rapid response team of all the CEOs 
from those different companies. Would you be willing to 
participate in that rapid response team to handle a surge in 
the future?
    Mr. Bowen. No. I am open to any reasonable type of thing. I 
am not sure if----
    Mr. Ruiz. Great, thank you.
    Mr. Bowen. The government doesn't do real well managing a 
lot of different things, so I am not sure if that would help.
    Mr. Ruiz. Well, I think that is why the CEOs, as a rapid 
response adviser team, would be very helpful.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Bowen. All right.
    Ms. Eshoo. The gentleman yields back. A pleasure to 
recognize the gentlewoman from Michigan, Mrs. Dingell, for her 
5 minutes of questions.
    Mrs. Dingell. Thank you, Madam Chair. And I want to say, 
too, I want to start out by thanking our Chairwoman Eshoo and 
Representative Susan Brooks for their leadership in 
understanding the stockpile and the need for the country to be 
producing these. And I think we really need to be talking about 
the medical supply chain.
    I am also going to tell you, I am a car girl, I am a 
manufacturing girl, and I think we need to be making a lot more 
in America. I think that these times have changed us. I don't 
think people understood supply chain when we used to talk about 
it.
    I also think there is going to be a much stronger customer 
base for respirator--I used to call them ventilators, or 
respirators, but the N95 masks that we are talking about. I 
think that there is going to be a permanent need in this 
country, and I think we have to talk about the stockpile as we 
go forward.
    It is not a new issue, Mr. Bowen, as you have, and my 
colleagues have highlighted. And that is why we are all talking 
about the bills that we have got in, and I have got a good, 
strong, bipartisan bill with my colleague, Congresswoman Jackie 
Walorski, the Medical Supplies for Pandemics Act, that would 
reform the Strategic National Stockpile--I still think we need 
it--to strengthen domestic production of PPE.
    And I am also going to say that now you are just talking 
about a need for frontline doctors and nurses, but as people 
are going back to work there is even a broader need for PPE 
equipment. We are reopening factories, and the supplier 
community and the car manufacturers are putting stringent 
production, new protocols into place, and they are going to 
have a need as well.
    So I think we are going to have to talk about what is 
supply and demand in this country and how do we make sure that 
there is enough. And it is not only in times of crisis. I think 
there is going to be a market there. I mean, the fact of the 
matter is, Ford Motor--you may not know that--is now producing 
N95 masks in my district in Flat Rock, Michigan.
    You were going to say something?
    Mr. Bowen. General Motors was kind enough to send 
consultants to us. They have worked with us for the last 30 
days.
    Mrs. Dingell. I know. So the companies are stepping up.
    But I want to ask you a question. I mean, Ford has, without 
any Federal Government order, has produced 23--I can't read 
this number, but they have been producing a lot of these masks 
so far, so there is a market out there.
    But I want to ask you a question. Do you have any sense of 
how many more N95 masks would be on the market had the Federal 
Government has taken you up on your offer to reactivate N95 
manufacturing lines in January?
    Mr. Bowen. Well----
    Mrs. Dingell. And can we be a little short because I have 
got a lot of questions.
    Mr. Bowen. Yes. Seven million a month.
    Mrs. Dingell. OK. And the Medical Supplies for Pandemics 
Act that Congresswoman Walorski and I have introduced would 
authorize funding to increase supply chain elasticity, but 
purchasing additional capacity for manufacturers like Prestige 
Ameritech for emergencies, and this situation underscores the 
need for future investment in the area.
    But, Mr. Bowen, you talked about previously that you had 
ramped up production of masks and hired over 150 new workers 
during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic to meet the increased demand. But 
you have since then described this decision as a mistake. Why? 
I mean, you don't think you could keep the--I actually agree 
with you.
    Mr. Bowen. No, because people stopped buying my products 
after the pandemic. I didn't need 150 people. We went--our 
sales went down. And there was such a glut in the marketplace, 
my biggest customer didn't order for seven months. So not only 
did sales go down, some of my customers didn't order for a long 
time.
    Mrs. Dingell. But you kept the equipment, the capital 
equipment that you had.
    I guess I am trying to figure out, how do we keep 
production in America. I had three hospital systems that spent 
just a million dollars, just a million dollars, on the plane 
from Chinese to the U.S. to get these N95 masks and paid 
quadruple the price of what they normally pay to get the masks 
here.
    Mr. Bowen. Well, if they would pay 15 or 20 percent more 
during peacetime, they wouldn't have to do that. Because what 
they have done is, the hospitals have created this problem by 
trying to save money and chasing these products to China.
    Mrs. Dingell. Well, I think we have got to bring the supply 
chain back to this country, period, so we don't have to chase 
them, and we have got to figure out what----
    Mr. Bowen. But, you know, what is funny, though, is I see 
hospitals now, in the middle of this, saying, yes, we are going 
to switch back to American, but only 25, 30 percent. They still 
want to buy China products. So it is not going to all come 
back, because people aren't going to pay for it.
    Mrs. Dingell. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Ms. Eshoo. The gentlewoman yields back. And now I would 
like to--there isn't anyone on the minority side, right? OK. 
The gentlewoman from New Hampshire, Ms. Kuster, for her 5 
minutes of questions is recognized.
    Ms. Kuster. Thank you, Mr. Bowen. And thank you for being 
with us, we appreciate it.
    This here is a homemade mask, which is what people in my 
State of New Hampshire have had to do because we couldn't get 
the masks. And we tried in a bipartisan way. We have a Federal 
delegation that is Democrat, we have a governor who is 
Republican. We all scrambled behind the scenes. And eventually, 
we were told, because we weren't a hot spot, we are a small 
State, we are a rural State, but we have plenty of COVID-19, 
and we couldn't get it.
    And so luckily, eventually, our entrepreneurs, like 
yourself, stepped up. You may know Dean Kamen. He took two 
flights to China and came back with all the equipment, the 
supplies, the masks.
    And so we need to understand how we got here and why nobody 
was listening to you about the production of masks here in 
America.
    I want to just quickly revisit your exchange with Mr. 
Carter, because I don't think it is outrageous that you would 
be looking for a contract with a price knowing that that you 
would have a market. We do that in the Department of Defense 
all the time. How many tank manufacturers do you expect to make 
a tank not knowing whether the government was going to buy it? 
Right?
    Mr. Bowen. Yes.
    Ms. Kuster. I mean that is where we are, right? We need 
your product to protect our people, to protect the American 
people.
    And my colleague Mrs. Dingell is absolutely correct. Yes, 
it is the frontline workers, and I every night am thinking of 
sleepless nights of people going home who have been exposed all 
day long and they are going home to their children because they 
didn't have the equipment that they needed. We wouldn't send 
our troops into harm's way and we are sending our healthcare 
providers into harm's way.
    So just walk me through, if you will, what is it when you 
warned of the mask shortage, what did you think? You said the 
U.S. mask supply is at imminent risk. Walk me through what you 
were trying to convey.
    Mr. Bowen. What I was trying to convey to Dr. Bright was 
that China was in the process of cutting the mask supply and 
that China supplies about half of the mask supply. The mask 
supply was already tight. So imagine half of it going away.
    Now, here is what I didn't say, Mexico makes the other 
half. If Mexico gets in really big trouble, we might not get 
that supply, too. Had China not been able to get their supply 
or their disease under control and Mexico been in trouble, the 
entire U.S. mask supply would have been cut off. We dodged a 
bullet by just having part of it cut off.
    Ms. Kuster. Are you familiar in the Department of Defense 
with the made-in-America and why we do that?
    Mr. Bowen. I sent Mr. Trump a letter in 2017. I sent it to 
everybody in his staff. And it said, please--I can give you the 
letter--it said, please, make the DOD and VA--or make the DOD 
use the Berry amendment. Masks are covered under the Berry 
amendment. We spent thousands and thousands of dollars with a 
government type attorney who made a case that masks should be 
under the Berry amendment because they are clothing and the 
Berry amendment handles military clothing and they shot it 
down. And then I didn't get any response from the Trump 
administration.
    But I also wrote the Obama administration 20 letters and 
they sent me a form letter back. So this is everybody, this is 
everybody. I am not throwing any administration under the bus. 
This is everybody.
    Ms. Kuster. You feel disrespected, though, in the process. 
And you were trying to protect the American people.
    Mr. Bowen. No, no, no, no. What is funny is I get really 
mad about this, and I tend to pop off and I am sorry. I didn't 
used to be like this. Let me say this----
    Ms. Kuster. You are frustrated.
    Mr. Bowen. I didn't use to swear. I swear now, I didn't use 
to swear before.
    Ms. Kuster. We are all frustrated. Let me tell you, I have 
let lose a few words that my mother would be shocked by. 
Because people are hurting, right? We can't protect ourselves.
    What is your most fundamental--are you a parent?
    Mr. Bowen. I have five children, four living. My oldest son 
died of the same thing that Mr. Biden's son died of. And I have 
16 grandchildren.
    Ms. Kuster. And every night you go to bed, you would do 
anything to protect them. And that is the position we are in; 
we are trying to protect the American people. We are trying to 
protect our own families. And I wish you had been listened to.
    Mr. Bowen. Let me say this, I am get 500 to 1,000 emails a 
day. I am getting emails from people, not businesses, I am 
getting emails from moms, I am getting emails from old people; 
please send me masks. And I----
    Ms. Kuster. You make a product that can protect people.
    Mr. Bowen. I can't help these--I can't help all these 
people. And what is so frustrating, because I said this for 
years, I have got every email I have ever sent all these 
people. And I have said for years you can't, we can't wait 
until the pandemic happens before we do something about it it 
is and time to fix it. We had 13 freakin' years to fix it. And 
that is the travesty.
    But, again, the thing that I couldn't figure out is why 
nobody hardly would listen. It was universal. It was like, 
whew.
    Ms. Kuster. Well, I will just close by saying this: Note to 
self, don't eliminate the Office of Pandemic Preparedness.
    So thank you for being here with us today.
    And I yield back.
    Mr. Bowen. My pleasure.
    Ms. Eshoo. The gentlewoman yields back.
    Well, this concludes our second panel. I want to thank you 
again, Mr. Bowen, not only for coming here today, flying across 
the country, all the complications that are a part of that, so 
many flights canceled.
    When I spoke to you on the phone and urged you to actually 
come to Washington, you said, why? And I said, because I think 
you are a patriot. You have been on this for more than a 
decade. And I think you have more than proven that today, to 
every single Member that is here.
    Your story and your tenacity about a commodity that is a 
part of our national security, I wish people had listened 
to.But now it is our job to listen to you and to make sure that 
your crusade can essentially come to an end. You shouldn't have 
to spend another 10, 15 years knocking on doors.
    So your testimony I think has really moved the needle. And 
you should--I hope that you will go home feeling gratified. You 
will be totally satisfied when we really get this done. But I 
think that your testimony has been--you are a truth teller, 
totally unvarnished and refreshing, I might say.
    We listen to a lot of witnesses here and there are all 
kinds of styles and that, but yours is a special form of truth-
telling, it is refreshing, and it is filled with the kind of 
content for us to not only understand, but that we take it and 
we run with it.
    I started out the hearing today by saying I never thought 
that I would Chair a hearing that is really so sad. And the 
backdrop of all of this is 80,000 souls that have been lost, 
that we are not meeting the needs of the American people in 
this crisis.
    When it comes to what you make we can't even keep up with 
and make sure that doctors, nurses, healthcare workers have the 
supplies, the critical supplies that they need. It is shameful 
in our country.
    So we are very grateful to you for coming.
    Mr. Bowen. Thank you.
    Ms. Eshoo. And we want you to stay healthy. We need you.
    And Members will be able to submit; they all know that they 
can submit questions. And pursuant to the committee rules, they 
have ten business days to submit additional questions for the 
record to be answered by the witness, in this case yourself. 
And also again we ask you to respond promptly to any such 
request.
    So thank you again.
    And I have just a little bit of housekeeping here. I 
request unanimous consent to enter the following documents into 
the record.
    Mr. Griffith. Madam Chair, unless it is absolutely 
required, I will waive that reading of the list, if that is all 
right. And it is my understanding there are some documents that 
we have had a hard time getting to you, and if we could ask 
that they be placed in the record without objection, as well 
with the understanding that you have to take a look at it to 
make sure it is appropriate.
    Ms. Eshoo. Exactly. I reserve the right for the majority to 
review them, and having done so, then place them in the record. 
And I appreciate the gentleman agreeing or waiving the 
unanimous consent request.
    Ms. Kuster. Madam Chair?
    Ms. Eshoo. Yes. You are recognized.
    Ms. Kuster. Could I just ask for the record that Mr. 
Bowen's letter that he made reference to be entered into the 
record?
    Ms. Eshoo. And what letter is that?
    Ms. Kuster. You referenced a letter that you had sent to 
the administration about the making of masks.
    Mr. Bowen. Yes. I can send the letters I sent to both the 
Obama administration and the Trump administration.
    Ms. Eshoo. If you can get that to us, Mr. Bowen, then both 
sides can review. And with the approval, the agreement of both 
sides, we can place them in the record.
    Mr. Griffith. Yes, ma'am.
    Mr. Bowen. Would you like the letters I sent to Secretary 
Mattis and other people as well?
    Ms. Eshoo. Whatever you want to give us, we will review. Be 
happy to.
    Mr. Griffith. And if I might, Madam Chair, I know it was 
probably said in frustration, but as I indicated to you that I 
had a number of companies that had gotten back into the 
business. And one of those, Integrated Textile Solutions, says 
they will take the machines if you really want to get rid of 
them. Just letting you know.
    Mr. Bowen. We will work something out.
    Mr. Griffith. I will put you all together and y'all can 
figure it out.
    Mr. Bowen. We will work something out.
    [The information appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]
    Ms. Eshoo. On behalf of all of the Members, we want to 
thank the committee staff on both sides. This is our new way of 
operating. And as everyone makes the adjustments, you are doing 
the hard work so that we can make the adjustments to make sure 
that the directives of the Capitol physician's office has put 
out.
    And I can't thank you enough. I mean, you have been--I have 
been watching you. I even said to Mike, you don't have gloves 
on.
    So thank you to all of you. I salute you.
    And again, Mr. Bowen, thank you.
    To the rest of the guests in the room, thank you.
    Now, maybe some of us are going to go off and have 
breakfast and lunch combined, something like that. I think we 
kind of earned our keep today with 4-6 hours of well-spent time 
on behalf of the people of our country.
    So, with that, the Health Subcommittee is adjourned.
    Mr. Bowen. Thank you for the invitation.
    [Whereupon, at 4:13 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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