[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
SECURING AMERICA'S ELECTIONS PART II: OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 22, 2019
__________
Serial No. 116-60
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via: http://judiciary.house.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
45-400 WASHINGTON : 2021
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
JERROLD NADLER, New York, Chair
MARY GAY SCANLON, Pennsylvania, Vice-Chair
ZOE LOFGREN, California DOUG COLLINS, Georgia, Ranking
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas Member
STEVE COHEN, Tennessee F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr.,
HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr., Wisconsin
Georgia STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas
KAREN BASS, California JIM JORDAN, Ohio
CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana KEN BUCK, Colorado
HAKEEM S. JEFFRIES, New York JOHN RATCLIFFE, Texas
DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island MARTHA ROBY, Alabama
ERIC SWALWELL, California MATT GAETZ, Florida
TED LIEU, California MIKE JOHNSON, Louisiana
JAMIE RASKIN, Maryland ANDY BIGGS, Arizona
PRAMILA JAYAPAL, Washington TOM MCCLINTOCK, California
VAL BUTLER DEMINGS, Florida DEBBIE LESKO, Arizona
J. LUIS CORREA, California GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania
SYLVIA R. GARCIA, Texas BEN CLINE, Virginia
JOE NEGUSE, Colorado KELLY ARMSTRONG, North Dakota
LUCY MCBATH, Georgia W. GREGORY STEUBE, Florida
GREG STANTON, Arizona
MADELEINE DEAN, Pennsylvania
DEBBIE MUCARSEL-POWELL, Florida
VERONICA ESCOBAR, Texas
PERRY APELBAUM, Majority Staff Director & Chief Counsel
BRENDAN BELAIR, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Tuesday, October 22, 2019
Page
OPENING STATEMENTS
The Honorable Mary Gay Scanlon, Vice-Chair, Committee on the
Judiciary...................................................... 1
The Honorable Doug Collins, Ranking Member, Committee on the
Judiciary
Written Testimony.............................................. 6
The Honorable Jerrold Nadler, Chairman, Committee on the
Judiciary
Written Testimony.............................................. 48
WITNESSES
Matt Masterson, Senior Cybersecurity Advisor, Department of
Homeland Security
Oral Testimony................................................. 12
Written Testimony.............................................. 14
Nhikki Floris, Deputy Assistant Director, Counterterrorism,
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Oral Testimony................................................. 22
Written Testimony.............................................. 24
Adam Hickey, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, National Security
Division, Department of Justice
Oral Testimony................................................. 29
Written Testimony.............................................. 31
Ben Hovland, Vice Chair, U.S. Election Assistance Commission
Oral Testimony................................................. 42
Written Testimony.............................................. 44
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC. SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
An article for the record from The Hill, submitted by the
Honorable Matt Gaetz........................................... 72
An article for the record from The New York Times, submitted by
the Honorable Matt Gaetz....................................... 78
An article for the record from The Kyiv Post, submitted by the
Honorable Matt Gaetz........................................... 86
A report for the record from Graphica, submitted by Joe Neguse... 104
APPENDIX
Questions for the record, Matt Masterson, Senior Cybersecurity
Advisor, Department of Homeland Security....................... 146
Responses for the record, Adam S. Hickey, Deputy Assistant
Attorney General............................................... 153
Questions for the record, Ben Hovland, Vice-Chair Election
Assistance Commission.......................................... 168
Questions for the record, Nikki Floris, Deputy Assistant
Director, Counterintelligence Division......................... 173
Responses for the record, Masterson, senior cybersecurity
advisor, the Department of Homeland Security................... 178
SECURING AMERICA'S ELECTIONS PART II: OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
----------
Tuesday, October 22, 2019
House of Representatives
Committee on the Judiciary
Washington, DC
The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:10 a.m., in Room
2141, Rayburn Office Building, Hon. Mary Gay Scanlon,
presiding.
Present: Representatives Nadler, Lofgren, Jackson Lee,
Cohen, Johnson of Georgia, Deutch, Cicilline, Jayapal, Correa,
Scanlon, Garcia, Neguse, McBath, Stanton, Dean, Murcarsel-
Powell, Escobar, Chabot, Gohmert, Gaetz, Biggs, Lesko,
Reschenthaler, Cline, and Steube.
Staff present: Arya Hariharan, Deputy Chief Oversight
Counsel; David Greengrass, Senior Counsel; Madeline Strasser,
Chief Clerk; Moh Sharma, Member Services and Outreach Advisor;
Sarah Istel, Oversight Counsel; Priyanka Mara, Professional
Staff Member/Legislative Aide; Kerry Tirrell, Oversight
Counsel, Antitrust, Commercial, and Administrative Law
Subcommittee; Matt Robison, Counsel, Courts and Intellectual
Property Subcommittee; Brendan Belair, Minority Staff Director;
Bobby Parmiter, Minority Deputy Staff Director/Chief Counsel;
Jon Ferro, Minority Parliamentarian/General Counsel; Ryan
Breitenbach, Minority Chief Counsel, National Security; and
Erica Barker, Minority Chief Legislative Clerk.
Ms. Scanlon. The House Committee on the Judiciary will come
to order.
Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare
recesses of the Committee at any time.
We welcome everyone to this morning's hearing on Securing
America's Elections Part II: Oversight of Government Agencies.
I will now recognize myself for an opening statement.
Last month, this Committee held part one of a series of
hearings on securing America's elections. In that hearing, 3
witnesses, who had been jointly selected by the committee,
testified unequivocally that our Nation's elections are under
attack. Debora Plunkett, former director on the National
Security Council under both President Clinton and President
George W. Bush, warned, ``We must bold, decisive, and must take
expeditious steps to address cyber threats. We must treat
election security as imperative for safeguarding our
democracy.'' Secretary of State Kathy Boockvar from the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania elaborated: ``Election security is
a race without a finish line, and our adversaries are not
slowing down.''
This testimony has been confirmed by the leaders of our
intelligence community. Last month, the director of national
intelligence testified that, ``Foreign actors will view the
2020 elections as an opportunity to advance their interests. We
expect them to refine their capabilities and add new tactics as
they learn from each other's experiences and efforts in
previous elections.'' In short, there is no question that our
elections, the cornerstone of our free and democratic society,
are exposed. Protecting our Nation's democratic processes from
foreign attack must be among our top priorities, and we are
committed to doing that work.
Today we have representatives from the four Federal
agencies leading the charge on election security: The
Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Department of Justice, and Election
Assistance Commission. At their core, elections are run at the
State and local level, but our Federal Government must provide
critical support to help States to defend themselves from
hostile foreign actors. Protecting our elections requires a
whole of society approach that relies on coordinated actions by
government agencies at all levels, including the agencies
represented here today.
Federal agencies responsible for protecting our elections
have made significant progress since 2016. These efforts are
important and commendable, but significant vulnerabilities in
our system remain. To start, our efforts must be integrated and
coordinated. A simple Google search of ``report election
security issues'' turns up results for over 20 different groups
across these agencies and others. There must be clear lines of
authority to ensure that States know which of the multiple
programs across these agencies is in charge.
Equally important, we must do more to ensure better Federal
and State collaboration. That requires earning the trust of
States. At a public speech on October 3rd, 2018, DHS Director
Krebs explained that in 2016 when the Federal Government called
State officials to alert them of threats, there was, as he
said, no trust and there was no certainty or confidence in the
ability of the Federal Government. One way to strengthen trust
is through enhanced transparency.
In 2016, the specific intent of the Russians was not
initially made public. Today we can do better. We can educate
State and local officials and the public about influence
operations. By bringing our adversaries' tactics to light, we
can prevent them from succeeding. In addition, we must ensure
that the development and maintenance of our systems matches the
evolving nature of cyber threats. For example, current EAC
Federal guidelines for our certification processes were created
in 2005 and are woefully out of date. As our witness, Mr. Byrd
of Microsoft, testified last month, ``This process is more than
a decade old, and it is too slow and too burdensome to enable
voting officials to respond as quickly as needed to our agile
adversaries.''
Finally, and most importantly, we must ensure that State
and local officials, the frontline defenders of democracy, have
the resources and support they need to protect our systems. DHS
has made it clear that it requires additional resources to
fulfill this task. It has requested, for example, 20 additional
advisors to help States in anticipation of the 2020 election
cycle. On May 15th, 2019, the EAC likewise testified before the
Senate that the U.S. currently lacks sufficient funding in
critical areas to protect our 2020 elections.
Unfortunately, however, President Trump and his
Administration, rather than listening to the warnings of
Federal agencies about the seriousness of the threat picture
and request for more resources to secure our elections, has
done the opposite. The Trump Administration has cut senior
cyber positions, downsized by half DHS' election security
teams, and proposed significant budget cuts to DHS' major
election security program. All these actions leave us more
vulnerable to the ongoing threat to our democracy. We will not
let this happen. Elections cannot be a partisan issue. They
must be an American issue.
This Committee is committed to working together to protect
our democracy from all threats to our elections in all forms,
whether to our physical election infrastructure or the ongoing
disinforma-tion campaigns coming from adversaries like Russia.
I thank each of our witnesses for being here today. My
colleagues and I are looking forward to hearing your testimony
about your ongoing efforts to secure our elections and what
important work remains to be done.
Without objection, the Ranking Member's statement, Doug
Collins, will be placed in the record, and all other opening
statements will be included in the record.
[The information follows:]
MR. COLLINS FOR THE OFFICIAL RECORD
=======================================================================
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. Scanlon. I will now introduce today's witnesses. Matt
Masterson is the senior cybersecurity advisor at the Department
of Homeland Security, where he manages election security under
the National Protection and Programs Directorate. From 2014 to
2018, he served as a U.S. Election Assistance Commissioner.
Prior to his appointment, Mr. Masterson served as interim chief
of staff for the Ohio secretary of state, deputy chief
information officer, and deputy director of elections. Mr.
Masterson received his B.S. and B.A. from Miami University in
Oxford, Ohio, and his J.D. from the University of Dayton School
of Law.
Nikki Floris is the deputy assistant director of the
Counterintelligence Division of the FBI, where she oversees the
intelligence branch, which includes the Foreign Influence Task
Force System. Ms. Floris entered the Bureau in 2005 as an
intelligence analyst and served in many other positions,
including deputy assistant director of Operations Branch III in
the Counterterrorism Division, where she oversaw terrorism
financing operations, strategic operations, and
counterterrorism analysis. Ms. Floris has a bachelor's degree
in psychology from the University of Rhode Island and a
master's degree in criminology from George Washington
University.
Adam Hickey is a deputy assistant attorney general of the
National Security Division at the Department of Justice. In
that role, he manages the Division's effort to combat national
security threats, including threats to our election systems.
Before joining the Department of Justice, Mr. Hickey clerked
for Judge Jed Rakoff of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York, and Judge Robert Katzmann of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Mr. Hickey
received his bachelor's degree from Harvard College and his
J.D. from Yale Law School.
Ben Hovland is the vice chair of the Election Assistance
Commission, where he is the designated Federal offer for the
Technical Guidelines Development Committee, which develops the
voluntary voting system guidelines. Before being appointed vice
chair, Commissioner Hovland served as the acting chief counsel
for the U.S. Senate Committee on Rules and Administration.
Commissioner Hovland received his B.A. from the University of
Central Arkansas and his J.D. from the University of Oregon.
Please note that each of your written statements will be
entered into the record in its entirety. Accordingly, I ask
that you summarize your testimony in 5 minutes. To help you
stay within that time, there is a timing light on your table.
When the light switches from green to yellow, you have 1 minute
to conclude your testimony. When the light turns red, it
signals your 5 minutes have expired.
We want to thank you all for participating in today's
hearing. If you would please rise, I will begin by swearing you
in.
Do you swear or affirm under penalty of perjury that the
testimony you are about to give is true and correct to the best
of your knowledge, information, and belief, so help you God?
[A chorus of ayes.]
Ms. Scanlon. You may be seated. Let the record show that
the witnesses have answered in the affirmative.
All right, Mr. Masterson, you may begin, and you have to
push to button to turn your microphone on before you start.
Thank you.
TESTIMONY OF MATTHEW MASTERSON
Mr. Masterson. Well, thank you, and good morning, Members
of the committee. Thank you for this opportunity to testify
regarding the cybersecurity and infrastructure security
agencies' efforts to help secure our election infrastructure
across this country. My name is Matt Masterson. I'm the
election lead for CISA and the former chair of the U.S.
Election Assistance Commission, as well as an election official
in the State of Ohio.
CISA has a strong relationship with our federal partners
seated here at the table and with State and local election
officials across the country. Our election-related mission is
clear: To support election officials and their private sector
partners to identify and manage risk to their systems.
Elections are run at the State and local level by dedicated
professionals across America's more than 8,800 election
jurisdictions, and we work to ensure those officials don't have
to defend themselves from sophisticated and persistent threats
on their own.
Over the last 3 years, we've worked tirelessly to
strengthen our partnership with the election community. We
already provide free and voluntary resources and services to
all 50 States, over 2,100 local and territorial election
jurisdictions, 6 election associations, 12 election technology
providers, and political organizations, including presidential
campaigns. Our approach has been and continues to be threefold:
one, making sure the election community has the information
they need to defend their systems: Two, making sure they have
the technical support and tools to identify and mitigate risks
to their election infrastructure; and three, building enduring
partnerships to advance security efforts together.
CISA is laser focused on building scalable, repeatable
mechanisms to dramatically grow our information-sharing
capabilities. We share contextualized threat intelligence and
actionable information through our close partnerships with the
intelligence community, law enforcement, and the private
sector. More importantly, State and local election officials
are sharing what they see on their networks with us. We deploy
intrusion detection capabilities, or Albert sensors, to provide
real-time detection capabilities of malicious activity on
election infrastructure in all 50 States.
Second, we provide technical support and services to
election officials and vendors. As we refine our understanding
of election officials' needs, we are shifting to capabilities
that are quicker, lesser intrusive, and can scale to more
jurisdictions. For instance, in 2018 and 2019, we deployed a
remote penetration testing capability, thanks in part to the
funding provided by Congress. This remote penetration testing
capability allows us to identify risks and vulnerabilities to
network-connected election systems without having to deploy
teams into local election offices, and without interrupting
both their time and people.
CISA has also been working closely with election technology
providers to ensure that election systems and other
technologies undergo testing to discover and fix
vulnerabilities in their software. This scalability is critical
because while our initial efforts in 2016 were primarily
targeted at State election officials, we recognize the need to
increase our support to counties and municipalities who operate
elections. For example, the Last Mile Initiative provides no-
cost information sharing tailored to those jurisdictions to
identify cyber risks to their infrastructure and a checklist of
action items to mitigate those risks.
The final area of focus has been building on enduring
partnerships towards our collective defense. It may seem
mundane, but governance, communication, coordination, training,
and planning are the critical foundation elements of our
efforts to secure our Nation's elections. For this election
cycle, CISA has built off the lessons learned for the 2018
election and is expanding our work to prioritize the following
lines of effort: One, expanded engagement to local election
officials. We continue to work with election officials to
improve both their and our understanding of risk to their
systems. For instance, in June of this year, we did our second
annual tabletop devote exercise where 47 States, thousands of
local election officials, the private sector, and Federal
Government, worked together through scenarios to share
information and understand how we would all collectively
respond to threats to our election infrastructure. With a
better understanding of risk, we can identify and provide the
resources they need to secure their election systems.
CISA has expanded our level of engagement and sharing of
best cybersecurity practices with political organizations as
well, including the DNC and RNC. CISA has joined FBI and ODNI
in offering briefings to the Presidential campaigns who
register with the FEC and has engaged directly with campaigns
to offer our services. CISA, in coordination with our
interagency partners, is committed to helping Americans
recognize and avoid foreign disinformation operations impacting
our elections through innovative efforts, like our War on
Pineapple Campaign, where we educated Americans on the tactics
of foreign influence campaign using a topic everyone can relate
to, the divisive issue of pineapple on pizza. We will continue
to put out educational material to build resilience in the
American public on foreign influence operations.
Finally, we're working closely with our intelligence
community and the private sector to increase the quantity,
quality, and timeliness of intelligence analysis and production
at the unclassified levels to help election officials and the
public identify and expose foreign influence operations. We at
CISA are committed to working with Congress to ensure our
efforts cultivate a safer, more secure, and resilient homeland.
Once again, thank you for this opportunity to appear before
the committee, and I look forward to your questions. Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Masterson follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. Scanlon. Thank you very much. Ms. Floris?
TESTIMONY OF NIKKI FLORIS
Ms. Floris. Thank you. Good morning, Members of the
committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today to discuss the FBI's effort to secure America's
elections. As you've just heard, I'm Nikki Floris, deputy
assistant director for the FBI's Counterintelligence Division.
The FBI is the Federal lead for identifying and combatting
malign foreign influence operations which target U.S.
democratic institutions and values. This also includes the
investigation of election-related cyber intrusions and crimes.
To achieve their strategic geopolitical objectives, foreign
adversaries use malign influence operations to shift U.S.
policy, distort U.S. political sentiment and discourse,
undermine confidence in U.S. democratic institutions and
values, or interfere with U.S. electoral processes.
Most widely reported these days have been the attempts by
foreign adversaries to discredit U.S. individuals and
institutions using false personas and fabricated stories on
social media platforms. These operations have aimed to spread
disinformation, sow civil discord, and ultimately undermine the
confidence in our democratic institutions and values. Foreign
influence operations involve a wide spectrum of activities.
However, it is the subversive, undeclared criminal and coercive
aspects of these activities that forms the basis of FBI
investigative interests. It is why we talk about malign foreign
influence. This is by no means a new problem. However, global
interconnectedness and online anonymity have changed the
character of the overall foreign influence threat and how the
FBI and its partners must address it.
In my role at the FBI, I oversee the Foreign Influence Task
Force, or what we call the FITF. In the fall of 2017, Director
Wray established the FITF to combat foreign influence
operations targeting the United States. The FITF is led by the
Counterintelligence Division and is comprised of agents,
analysts, and professional staff from the Counterintelligence,
Counterterrorism, Cyber, and Criminal Investigative Divisions.
Following the 2018 midterm elections, the FBI expanded the
scope of the FITF. Previously our efforts were focused solely
on the threat posed by Russia. However, we now have units
working to confront malign foreign influence operations, not
just from Russia, but also from China, Iran, and other global
adversaries. We have refined and focused our strategy.
Through the FITF, the FBI takes a three-pronged approach to
the serious threat. The first prong focuses on our
investigations and operations. The FITF works with the FBI's 56
field offices to open investigations with a foreign influence
nexus. You might think of the FITF as a hub with FBI field
offices and its personnel as the spokes. Our investigative
approach seeks to impose costs on our adversaries, specifically
key influencers, and enablers. Investigations with a cyber
nexus are worked collaboratively with the FBI Cyber Division
and Cyber Task Forces. This way, the FBI can quickly respond to
threats to election infrastructure. Moreover, the FBI Cyber
Division works closely with the U.S. intelligence community to
work to determine attribution.
The second prong centers on information and intelligence
sharing. The FBI works closely with our fellow intelligence
community agencies as well as with State and local law
enforcement partners and election officials to share
intelligence to help, disrupt, and deter our adversaries. In
2018, that effort led to the creation of Protected Voices, a
joint initiative between the FBI, Department of Justice,
Department of Homeland Security, United States Secret Service,
and the ODNI. Through Protected Voices, we developed a series
of videos to help political campaigns better understand this
threat and made them available through the FBI's public
website.
In the past months, we have expanded Protected Voices,
providing webinars and in-person briefings to the Presidential
campaigns on cyber and malign influence threats. Currently, we
are expanding the audience to include congressional campaigns
and the general public. We collaborate extensively with our
U.S. government partners to provide information to State and
local governments, election officials, private election
vendors, and social media companies so that they can harden
their systems against cyberattacks. Collaboration builds a
common understanding of the threat landscape.
The last prong of our approach is private sector
partnerships. Technology companies have a frontline
responsibility to secure their own networks, products, and
platforms. We're doing our part by providing actionable
intelligence to better enable them to address abuse of their
platform by foreign actors. The FBI has established
relationships with these technology and social media companies
and maintains an ongoing dialogue to enable a rapid exchange of
threat information.
Across all these prongs, the FBI is constantly reviewing
the effectiveness of its coordination and its outreach. To our
knowledge, no foreign government has attempted to tamper with
U.S. vote counts. However, even doubts about whether it has
occurred can be damaging. We do know our adversaries are
actively trying to influence electoral processes and outcomes
in advance of the 2020 election. While our focus today is on
election security, I want to note these adversaries seek to
influence our national policies and public opinions in
important ways beyond just elections.
We look forward to continuing this important work and
appreciate the support of this committee. Thank you again for
the opportunity to appear before you today. I'm happy to answer
any questions you may have.
[The statement of Ms. Floris follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. Scanlon. Thank you very much. Mr. Hickey?
TESTIMONY OF ADAM HICKEY
Mr. Hickey. Good morning, distinguished Members of the
committee, and thank you for the opportunity to testify on
behalf of the Justice Department concerning our efforts to
ensure the safety and security of our Nation's election
infrastructure and to combat malign foreign influence.
By ``malign foreign influence,'' I'm referring to covert
actions by foreign governments intended to affect U.S.
political sentiment and public discourse, sow divisions in our
society, or undermine confidence in our democratic
institutions. And these can range from computer hacking that
targets election infrastructure or political parties to state-
sponsored media campaigns. This issue, protecting our Nation's
democratic processes, has been and remains a top priority of
the Department. Our principle role here is the investigation
and prosecution of Federal crimes, but malign foreign influence
efforts extend beyond efforts to interfere with elections, and
they require more than law enforcement responses alone.
Recognizing that, we approach this national security threat
the same as any other, by using our own legal tools as well as
supporting the tools and authorities of others. To the best of
our ability, we try to prevent crimes from occurring or disrupt
them in progress, in part by sharing information with people
and institutions to allow them to better protect themselves.
Reflecting the priority of these issues, last year the
Attorney General's Cyber Digital Task Force analyzed the types
of foreign influence operations and laid out a framework to
guide our responses. Since the 2016 election, we have taken a
number of steps to combat malign foreign influence and support
secure elections. First, as an intelligence-driven organization
and member of the intelligence community, the FBI pursues tips
and leads, including from classified information, to identify,
investigate, and disrupt illegal foreign influence activities.
To that end, and as DAD Floris already explained, the FBI
established the Foreign Influence Task Force to lead its
response to ensure information flow, resource allocation, and
coordination, both within the Department and among the
Department, our Federal partners, and the private sector.
Second, together with other agencies through a series of
outreach and education efforts, we've been helping public
officials, candidates, and social media companies to harden
their own networks and platforms against malign foreign
influence operations. Third, we have improved enforcement of
the Foreign Agents Registration Act, one of the statutory tools
that helps ensure transparency in the activities of foreign
entities and individuals. Effective FARA enforcement makes it
more difficult for those entities and individuals to hide their
role in activities occurring with the United States.
Fourth, our investigations have led to a number of criminal
charges and other enforcement actions that have exposed malign
influence efforts by foreign states and their proxies. While we
work with other nations to obtain custody of foreign defendants
wherever possible, just the charges themselves help educate the
American public about the threats that we face. Fifth, our
investigations have supported the actions of other U.S.
government agencies, such as financial sanctions imposed by the
Secretary of the Treasury. Finally, even outside the context of
criminal charges, we have used the information from our
investigations both to warn and to reassure potential victims
and the general public alike about malign foreign influence
activities.
Now, victim notifications, defensive counterintelligence
briefings, and public safety announcements are traditional
Department activities, but they must conduct with particular
sensitivity in the context of foreign influence and elections.
In some circumstances, exposure can be counterproductive or
otherwise imprudent. Given countervailing considerations, the
Department has adopted a public policy for evaluating whether
and how to disclose malign foreign influence activities, and
among its first principles, partisan political considerations
must play no role in our decisions.
Our adversaries will undoubtedly change their tactics, and
we will need to be nimble in our response, but the framework we
have developed to respond will have staying power. As you can
see, the Department plays an important role in combatting
foreign efforts to interfere in our elections. There are limits
to our role and that of the Federal Government as a whole.
Combatting malign foreign influence requires a whole of society
approach that relies on coordinated actions by government
agencies at various levels, support from the private sector,
and the active engagement of an informed public.
Thank you again, and I look forward to your questions.
[The statement of Mr. Hickey follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. Scanlon. Thank you very much. Mr. Hovland?
TESTIMONY OF BEN HOVLAND
Mr. Hovland. Good morning, Members of the committee. I
thank you for the opportunity to testify before you this
morning to detail the work of the U.S. Election Assistance
Commission, better known as the EAC, to fulfill its mission
under the Help America Vote Act, or HAVA. I also appreciate
this opportunity to highlight the great work of State and local
election officials around the country.
As you know, our Nation's elections are run at the State
and local levels, with each of the 50 States and U.S.
territories running elections in different ways. Election
officials in over 8,000 local jurisdictions are ultimately
responsible for conducting our elections, and their work truly
protects and ensures the most fundamental pillar of our
democracy, the vote.
Since 2016, there has been enormous increase and focus on
the security of our elections, which is just one of the many
responsibilities' election officials must address. I'm pleased
to report from my vantage point the elections community has
responded in an impressive fashion considering the challenges
we face. Nearly every conference I attend while traveling
around the country has a substantial focus on security and
protecting the integrity of elections is a constant topic in
meetings with election administrators, our Federal partners,
and external stakeholders.
Even so, we need to ask ourselves a key question: Will that
be enough if election officials do not have the sustained
resources they need to defend our democracy against potential
threats? The good news is that following the Department of
Homeland Security's designation of election infrastructure as
critical infrastructure, there has been a sea change in
information sharing between the Federal Government and State
and local officials. This includes the creation of a Government
Coordinating Council, which brings together State and local
officials with Federal partners, as well as a Sector
Coordinating Council, which has helped organize private sector
vendors and nonprofit entities that support local election
officials.
We've also seen the creation of the Election Infrastructure
Information and Sharing Analysis Center, or EIISAC, which now
has over 2,100 Members, including every State chief election
official's office. The deployment of Albert monitors, hardening
of systems, increased trainings, and promotion of tabletop
exercises around cyber events have all exponentially increased
since 2016. The Fiscal Year 2018 appropriations of $380 million
of HAVA funding, which the EAC distributed within months of its
allocation, has largely contributed to these improvements. It
doesn't cover everything election officials need, but States
have had the ability to essentially choose from a menu of
reforms, improvements, and priorities that could address their
most pressing needs and vulnerabilities.
As Chairwoman McCormick testified earlier this year, the
EAC projects that 85 percent of the Fiscal Year 2018 money will
be spent in advance of 2020. We've seen some States use the
funding to replace aging or paperless equipment. Other States
have replaced their statewide voter registration database or
added additional security measures, like multi-factor
authentication. Some have hosted essential training and
tabletop exercises ahead of 2020 to give election officials a
hands-on experience that can help them prepare for various
threats.
One of my personal favorite uses of the Fiscal Year 2018
funding is the implementation of cyber navigator programs.
Essentially, the State recognizes that many local jurisdictions
do not have the capacity or need for a full-time election
cybersecurity expert, so the State employs individuals with
regional responsibilities, and they provide technical
assistance to several counties or municipalities. This is the
kind of innovative program that will help bolster our
cybersecurity defenses and improve how States conduct
elections. It's also a model that the EAC would like to help
amplify nationwide should our funding support such an effort.
Unfortunately, not all the news is good. As you know, the
threat of foreign adversaries remains real, and ultimately our
State and local election officials do not have the resources to
thwart a truly determined and sophisticated nation-state actor.
That is why we must take action to build resilience here at
home and implement policies that deter adversaries abroad, such
as a real sanctions regime. Additional funding is crucial to
allow States to continue to make necessary improvements that
increase the strength and resiliency of our election systems.
When we talk about election Administration, we are talking
about the infrastructure of our democracy. To make meaningful
and lasting change requires a consistent investment over time.
It cannot just be about 2020 or any one election, but about all
our elections going forward. During a Senate Rules Committee
hearing in May, I shared a recent discovery that the EAC's
operating budget of $7.95 million is less than the amount
Kansas City spends on potholes. It's startling to think that
one city with a population of around 500,000 people invests
more to protect its residents' car titles and alignment than
our country invests in the only Federal agency dedicated
completely to improving election Administration and helping
more than 200 million registered voters cast their ballot.
I thank you for your time, and I'm happy to answer any
questions you may have.
[The statement of Mr. Hovland follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Nadler. [Presiding.] I thank the witnesses. I ask
unanimous consent that my opening statement be entered into the
record.
Without objection.
[The information follows:]
MR. NADLER FOR THE OFFICIAL RECORD
=======================================================================
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Nadler. We will now proceed under the 5-minute
Rule with questions. I will begin by recognizing myself for 5
minutes. Let me thank, before I start that, thank Vice Chair of
the committee, Mary Gay Scanlon, for presiding while I was
testifying in another committee.
In 2016, our elections were attacked. Three years later,
our intelligence community has universally confirmed that
foreign actors have redoubled their efforts and are preparing
as we speak to attack our 2020 elections. Yet the President has
blocked security efforts and cut programs designed to safeguard
our elections. His chief of staff, for example, apparently
issued instructions not to mention election security ``in front
of the President.'' The President also has disbanded the
Commission on Election Integrity, eliminated the cybersecurity
coordinator position on the National Security Council, and
dramatically downsized the two teams fighting foreign election
interference. The President's 2020 budget proposed cutting
funding for the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security
Agency, our main election security agency, even further.
The President is handicapping our agencies from securing
our elections. Most disturbing, the latest threat to our
elections comes from the President himself. The President asked
a foreign leader, President Zelensky of Ukraine, to interfere
in our elections. This isn't the first time. In 2016, President
Trump, then a candidate, publicly encouraged Russia to
illegally hack his adversary's emails. This past June,
President Trump said on national television that if offered
information on his adversary in 2020 from a foreign government,
he would take it. Just this month, President Trump publicly
suggested ``China should start an investigation into the
Bidens.''
I want to be clear. I believe it is unacceptable to ask
foreign adversaries to interfere in any way in America's
elections. If we ask other governments to interfere our
elections, if we undermine the public's confidence in the
integrity of our voting processes, we are doing our
adversaries' work for them. We cannot continue to undermine our
own democratic values on the world stage. The President's own
officials agree. Ambassador Sondland testified, ``Let me State
clearly, inviting a foreign government to undertake
investigations for the purpose of influencing an upcoming U.S.
election would be wrong.''
Each of you sitting here today are responsible for
protecting the integrity of, and public confidence in, our
elections. So, I would like to hear from each of you in turn,
yes or no, do you think it is appropriate for the President of
the United States to ask a foreign government to investigate
its political opponent in the 2020 elections. Mr. Masterson,
yes or no.
Mr. Masterson. No.
Chairman Nadler. Ms. Floris?
Ms. Floris. No, sir.
Chairman Nadler. Mr. Hickey?
Mr. Hickey. I am not going to comment on the President's
activities, but we are committed to confronting violations of
the law wherever we found them.
Chairman Nadler. Do you think it is appropriate for a
president, never mind this President, to ask for a foreign
government to investigate opponents in an election?
Mr. Hickey. I am focused on enforcing the criminal law.
Chairman Nadler. You won't answer. Mr. Hovland?
Mr. Hovland. No.
Chairman Nadler. Thank you. The Mueller report concluded
that, ``On approximately June 2016, the GRU, a Russian
intelligence organization, compromised the computer network of
the Illinois State Board of Elections,'' and ``gained access to
a database containing information on millions of registered
Illinois voters.'' The report confirms that the Russian hackers
successfully breached the databases but failed to alter or
delete voting records. Last month, I asked our expert witnesses
about the possible impact on our elections if the Russians had
been able to alter the database. Ms. Plunkett, former director
of the National Security Council under Presidents Bush and
Clinton, testified that altering those databases would have
been ``devastating,'' including because tens of thousands of
voters could have been turned away at the polls.
Our intelligence communities have confirmed that the threat
of this happening again is very real. The President, however,
had made it harder for Federal agencies to do their job and
keep our democratic processes safe. Indeed, the White House has
intentionally cut your budget and cut your staff going into an
election our intelligence community has confirmed is under the
biggest threat that our Nation has seen. The inspector general
reported that DHS' staff shortages are making it difficult for
DHS to do its job.
So, Mr. Masterson, let's say that in 2020 on Election Day,
a county reports that its voter registration poll books seem
incorrect, resulting in long lines and many voters being turned
away, like what we saw in Durham. What is the specific plan for
how DHS will ensure that it is immediately informed about any
such issues on Election Day? What is the plan to remedy any
such breach that occurs, and do you have sufficient staff to
protect against these types of threats?
Mr. Masterson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the question.
That preparation begins long before Election Day with the work
we are doing now with State and local election officials across
the country. At its core, our work is to work with the election
officials to build resilience. That is that ability to detect
if there is an issue with the voter rolls, and then identify
what the issues are and recover.
So that is the purpose of items like our tabletop devote
exercise, to work with those State and local election officials
about when or if they identify that information, how they will
communicate it both with the local election officials, State
election officials in their jurisdiction, with the Federal
Government, and what processes they and we have in place to
respond. For instance, DHS has incident response capabilities
both remotely and teams that can come and support election
officials in anticipation of possible or in reporting of
incidents.
In addition, we are working with State and local election
officials on preparations. For instance, having in place
provisional ballot materials such that if there is an issue
with the voter rolls on Election Day, they are prepared to
administer provisional ballots broadly and ensure that every
voter, while it may be messy, has the ability to cast their
vote and know that their vote was counted as cast.
Chairman Nadler. So, are you confident now that you have
the funding and the ability so that should a county, a large
county, let's say, in a key State is successfully hacked and
the voter rolls are messed up, that you will be able to step in
instantly and give whatever assistance is necessary, so we
won't have a long post-election dispute over a couple hundred
thousand votes not being properly cast?
Mr. Masterson. I am confident that the level of funding,
starting with the $33 million we got last year and the proposed
funding now, allows us to maintain that level of support to
ensure that election officials have what they need as they head
into Election Day, yes.
Chairman Nadler. Thank you very much. My time has expired.
The gentleman from Ohio.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We have wasted so much
time this year on a bogus Russian collusion allegation and on
various messaging bills which are ultimately not going to go
anywhere, that it is nice that we actually have the Departments
of Justice, Homeland Security, the FBI, and the U.S. Election
Assistance Commission before us to talk about a real issue, and
that is protecting America's elections from foreign influence.
There are various pieces of legislation that would, I
believe, help better protect our elections in the future. For
example, I am an original co-sponsor of H.R. 3442, which would
deny entry into the United States any individual who interferes
with our election. Let's hope that maybe this Committee could
work together in a bipartisan fashion to make sure our
elections are once again the gold standard, what the rest of
the world looks to as how you do it, how you get it right. We
generally have been that gold standard over the years, so we
need to get back to that.
Ms. Floris, let me begin with you, if I could. I will start
by asking you a question that relates to H.R. 3442, the
legislation that I just mentioned. What is the standard for
determining what kind of content posted by a foreign agent or
agents that rises to the level of being a foreign influence
operation? Is there a certain type of verbiage or rhetoric that
the FBI looks for, and do you think engaging in such behavior
online should bar an individual from entering the United
States?
Mr. Hickey. Thank you, sir, for your question. So, I will
start by saying that the FBI does not content or police
information on the internet. That is certainly not our job and
not something that we plan to get into. What we look at is
actually known nefarious actors, so if we have identified a
foreign actor who is participating in influence operations, and
as part of those operations seeks to propagate this information
or post derogatory content, that is of investigative interest
to us. We absolutely do not start with content and work our way
back.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you. Mr. Hickey, would you agree with
that, and is there anything you would like to elaborate on?
Mr. Hickey. No, I think the DAD got it exactly right. We
focus on known actors and tip the providers in a way that helps
them make determinations under their terms of service.
Mr. Chabot. Is there anything that the Department of
Justice is doing to work with social media companies in advance
of the 2020 elections?
Mr. Hickey. Principally through the FITF, but we also
support the FITF's efforts and sometimes accompany them in
working with the providers.
Mr. Chabot. Okay. Are there any other countries other than
Russia that you have seen or that you believe is showing some
interest in disrupting our elections in 2020 or in the future
in general?
Mr. Hickey. We have spoken and the IC has spoken about
foreign influence activities, malign foreign influence
activities from China, and we are certainly concerned about
others. Of course, in our FARA enforcement, obviously we have
seen actions by agents of other nations, like Turkey and
Ukraine.
Mr. Chabot. This is to any of the witnesses. What was your
agency's role in securing the 2018 congressional midterm
elections, and what specific efforts were made in that effort?
Mr. Masterson?
Mr. Masterson. Yeah, thank you, sir. Our role, as it is now
in helping to secure the 2018 midterm elections, was to provide
information sharing, support, and services to State and local
officials to help them manage risk to their systems. So, we
started by building those trusted relationships with those
State election officials that are, I think, appropriately
skeptical of a Federal role in elections and by providing
value, right? That the information we provide, the services,
help them identify and manage the risk to their systems.
So, we are doubling down on those efforts for 2020 to reach
those local election officials across the State, like Cheryl in
Jackson County, Ohio. How do we get to her and get her the
information sharing she needs to manage risk to her systems?
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much, and I am getting close to
being out of time. Mr. Floris, let me ask you this. Would you
agree that the FBI's reputation was significantly damaged by
political bias against the President, President Trump
specifically, that was exhibited by a number of top-level
officials in your organization?
Ms. Floris. Sir, I am not going to comment on any damage or
lack of damage to our reputation. Thank you.
Mr. Chabot. Okay. Well, it really was. People like Peter
Strzok and others, I think, very much damaged it. It is unfair
to the rest of the organization because the FBI is truly a
great organization, one of the best in this Nation. Thank you
very much. I yield back.
Chairman Nadler. The gentleman yields back. Let me just say
for the record that I think Peter Strzok acted in the highest
traditions of government workers. The gentlelady from
California.
Ms. Lofgren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to all
the witnesses for not only your testimony, but your service to
our country. It is recognized and appreciated. Just a note to
the gentleman from Ohio. The bill that he has co-sponsored, and
there are some variations on that theme about denying visas to
those who are interfering in our elections, will be made part
of the SHIELD Act through a manager's amendment. I just wanted
him to know that, that we are taking that good idea and moving
it forward.
You know, the Mueller report describes evidence that the
then Trump Campaign chairman, Paul Manafort, shared with a
Russian operative, Kilimnik, the campaigns, and this is a quote
from the report, ``strategy for winning Democratic votes in
Midwestern States,'' and ``internal polling data of the
campaign,'' which is I have always thought, what was going on
there. Why the internal polling data to this Russian agent? Ms.
Floris, I wouldn't ask you to comment on that particular item
because that is a fact. Generically, why would a campaign's
internal polling data and strategy for battleground States be
helpful to someone who was seeking to impact our elections?
Specifically, what could a hostile actor do to such information
with any campaign if they got internal polling data?
Ms. Floris. Thank you, ma'am, for that question. I will
answer from a strategic perspective. When you look at countries
like China, like Russia, they essentially take a whole of
government approach when it comes to their foreign influence
operations. They are not only looking at our Federal elected
officials, but they are also looking at State and local elected
officials as well because any one of those individuals can
potentially influence policy moving forward.
So, because they take this whole of government approach,
any bit of information could help inform their decisions and
how they move forward with their operations. So though on the
surface it might not seem as a great benefit to them, rest
assured that particularly China and Russia will use every tool
in their toolbox to get information that they deem potentially
as valuable.
Ms. Lofgren. Now, you all are the FBI and government
investigators. Each one of us, on both sides of the aisle, have
been candidates, and one of the things we know is that you
could do ads. If you were interested in polling data, you
couldn't do a poll without being caught. So, the only way you
would get his information was from a campaign that had actually
legitimately done a poll.
A report this month was released by the Senate Intelligence
Committee on Russia interference in our elections, and it said
that the Russian government used Facebook's geographic
targeting features to channel advertisements to intended
audiences in specific locations. And about 25 percent of the
ads purchased by IRA were targeted down to the State, city, or,
in some instances, university level. For example, in Michigan
and Wisconsin, they were targeted with advertisements
overwhelmingly focused on the subject of police brutality to
move populations in one direction or another.
Mr. Hickey, if a campaign made its internal information,
such as polling data, readily available to a foreign government
that then used it to target voters via social media, would that
be something the Department of Justice would investigate, or is
there no law on that that would allow or stimulate an
investigation?
Mr. Hickey. So, there are two basic categories of laws. One
I know. One I am less an expert in. I don't know whether
campaign finance, public corruption, fraud, or other statutes
would apply. With respect to the national security statutes I
am familiar with, they tend to focus on whether an American is
acting as an agent of a foreign government, meaning under the
direction or control of the foreign government. So, in the
example you have posited, you would have to analyze whether the
American is the reverse of that, whether they are directing and
controlling or procuring something from the foreign government,
in which they wouldn't be an agent of the foreign government.
Ms. Lofgren. Well, I would just note that we will have an
opportunity to, in the near future, to make this much clearer
by approving the SHIELD Act, which would prohibit the sharing
of internal data, campaign data, by an American campaign with
agents of a foreign power so that you would have a very clear
basis to proceed on that. I hope that we can get strong
bipartisan support for that measure. With that, Mr. Chairman,
my time has expired, and I yield back.
Chairman Nadler. The gentlelady yields back. The gentleman
from Arizona.
Mr. Biggs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would love to spend
this time talking about election security. I think that is
really critical. I think that I have prepared to ask those
questions, but we come to these hearings, and it is impeachment
all the time. That is what this is. We were told by Chairman
about the impeachment inquiry, but here we sit. Well, if you
want to ask the questions or want to mischaracterize the
telephone conversations, you probably ought to go try to get
down into the closed hearing downstairs. Well, you know what?
You can't get in because I have tried to get in.
So, when I hear Chairman open up with his opening statement
about the Ukrainian phone call and suggest that the President
asked President Zelensky to interfere in the 2020 election, I
have read the transcript. It is out there. It for everybody to
read. You can characterize it any way you want to, but I would
suggest that that isn't the proper characterization. The
telephone call itself mentioned CrowdStrike, Ukrainian
interference in the 2016 election, and that was what President
Trump was asking that President Zelensky look into. Now, when
he mentions Biden, here is my question. We have got FBI here.
We got DOJ there. So here is my question for you. Do you think
that a person who has admitted criminal conduct should have
immunity from investigation because that individual is a
potential political opponent in an upcoming election? What do
you think?
Mr. Hickey. So, I think nations should follow facts and law
where they lead in the course of criminal investigations
honestly--
Mr. Biggs. Regardless of whether they are a potential
political candidate or not.
Mr. Hickey. Regardless of status or without fear or favor.
Mr. Biggs. Right. The other thing that we are subjected to
in this Committee a lot is if I ask questions and Chairman
doesn't like the responses or the statement I make, when I am
done, he will offer his comment on it. That is why he said
Peter Strzok represented the highest ideals or highest
standards of the Agency. That is really unusual because
normally if he wants to make that comment, he is going to ask
somebody else to yield some time to him so he can rebut the
comment that he disagreed with. That happens perpetually here
because it is convenient. Got a mike. I am Chairman. I can do
whatever I want. I would suggest to you that is merely an
opinion with regard to Mr. Strzok because I think Mr. Strzok
does exactly the opposite. His misconduct actually reflected
poorly and has caused much division and heartache in this
country. That is just the way it is.
So, we have focused a lot on Russian interference in the
2016 election, the malign foreign influence of the Russians.
Are there other nation-states that engaged in 2016 and might
engage in 2020 elections?
Ms. Floris. So, sir, I will hit on the one big country that
we are focused on as we roll into 2020 outside of Russia, and
that is certainly China. Make no mistake, China is aggressively
pursuing foreign influence operations. They do a bit of a
different tactic than the Russians. They certainly prefer a
face-to-face interaction. They use economic levers. Their end
goal is really to cede us as a global economy superpower. So,
as we roll into 2020, though Russia was certainly a threat in
2016, 2018, and will continue to be so in 2020, we are also
aggressively looking at China as well.
Mr. Biggs. Did you see other states in 2016 besides China
and Russia involved?
Ms. Floris. I would refer back to the ICA, sir, that was
released after 2016, I believe in 2017.
Mr. Biggs. In fact, in the 2018 midterm elections, DOJ and
DHS found that there was no evidence to date that any
identified activities of a foreign government or foreign agent
had a material impact on the integrity or security of election
infrastructure or political campaign infrastructure used in the
2018 midterm elections. That goes to what you said, Ms. Floris,
when you said there was no hard evidence that any number of
votes were actually changed through the system. Mr. Hovland, I
have seen your biography. You previously worked on voter
registration list maintenance in Missouri. Can you tell me a
little bit about the importance of States maintaining lists
that are up to date?
Mr. Hovland. Absolutely. Thank you for the question, sir.
So, the National Voter Registration Act, or NVRA, sets out a
process for voter list maintenance, and that ensures that
individuals are able to get registered, but when someone is no
longer in a jurisdiction, it gives them the proper way to clean
those rolls. Frankly, having clean rolls allows jurisdictions
to save money and ensures that the right people are where they
need to be.
Mr. Biggs. My time has expired.
Chairman Nadler. The gentleman yields back. The gentlelady
from Texas is recognized.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank Chairman and Ranking Member for
this hearing, and I thank all the witnesses for your service to
the Nation. Let me ask the question for each of you, please.
How confident are you that we will have an impeccable, safe,
and secure election in 2020 from the work that you have now
done on the Federal level? Mr. Masterson? Without intrusion
from foreign operatives. Mr. Masterson?
Mr. Masterson. Thank you for the question, ma'am. Anyone
that has run an election could tell you there is no such thing
as an impeccable election, right? The goal is absolutely to
build resilience, and I am confident that the 2018 election was
more secure and resilient than 2016, and 2020 will certainly be
more secure and resilient thanks to the hard work of the State
and local election officials, the private sector that is
working with them, and our work with them.
Ms. Jackson Lee. The rest of you, yes or no, and one
sentence. Ms. Floris? Thank you.
Ms. Floris. I am confident that we are throwing every tool
we have against the threat to our election security.
Mr. Hickey. Agree.
Mr. Hovland. I would echo Mr. Masterson's sentiment and say
that traveling around the country, it is amazing to see the
hard work that State and local election officials are doing to
address this issue.
Ms. Jackson Lee. None of you have said, even though I
appreciate Mr. Masterson's comment about we cannot have an
impeccable election. I think the American people are owed an
impeccable election, to be very honest with you. So, I will
follow up my line of questioning about how secure are we and
proceed to raise the question with Mr. Hickey. In light of the
fact that there seems to be some loophole in how secure it is
going to be, what is the approach of the DOJ in prosecuting and
being proactive for what intrusions may occur in the 2020
election?
Mr. Hickey. We will be very proactive, ma'am. I think one
of the most important lessons coming out of 2016 and to the
present is how we handle information that a State or a campaign
may be targeted and getting what we will call victim
notifications to the right people and following up. I think we
are in a better position now than we were in 2016, both as a
matter of policy and our sensitivity to the importance of that.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Do you have a sufficient number of
lawyers, DOJ prosecutors, and resources to be ready for the
massiveness of the 2020 presidential election and other Federal
elections?
Mr. Hickey. I think we are well positioned. I also think
the budget for 2020 includes additional resources for the
sections I supervise that will improve our standing in that
regard.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I want to congratulate Congresswoman
Lofgren for the work of her Committee on the question of
shielding us from this kind of intrusion and congratulate her
for including my legislation that Mr. Johnson and I introduced
in April this year, H.R. 2353. The language in particular says
if a candidate or any individual affiliated with a campaign of
a candidate knowingly receives an offer for assistance with the
campaign from a source the candidate or individual knows is a
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, the candidate or
individual shall refuse the offer for such assistance and
notify the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the offer not
later than 72 hours after receiving the offer. Ms. Floris, if
this legislation passed, but really its intent, should be acted
upon by the FBI. What infrastructure do you have to ensure a
response to any reporting of this kind of activity?
Ms. Floris. Thank you, ma'am, for the question. The FBI
becomes interested in foreign influence activity, again, when
it hits those four categories I spoke about in the beginning:
The subversive nature of it, the undeclared nature of it, the
coercive and criminal nature of it. The FBI will respond as we
do in any investigation with the full might of not only the
Foreign Influence Task Force, but the, you know, hundreds of
agents and analysts out in all our 56 field offices who are
working the foreign influence threat day in and day out. We
will use all the tools we have in our toolbox as we do--
Ms. Jackson Lee. Do you have on enough staff? Have you
ramped up your staff for the 2020 election? Do you have enough
funding for staff to deal with the potential of this reporting?
Ms. Floris. Ma'am, we can always use more resources, but
rest assured we are putting everything we can against this
threat and facing it with absolute determination.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Masterson, I sit on the Homeland
Security Committee, so we appreciate the deep dive that you all
have taken. So, give me an understanding of how you have as a
priority efficiently sharing actionable intelligence in
identifying threats. How have you ramped up that very important
part of your work?
Mr. Masterson. Yeah, absolutely. I would highlight two
areas, ma'am. The first is the buildout of the election
Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis Center. This is
the hub of information sharing that we use to reach State and
local officials. We have all 50 States and the territories as
Members of the IISAC as well as over 2,100 local election
officials. So, this ensures that actionable, timely information
is reaching the field so that they can take the steps they need
to manage risk to their systems.
The second is our continued push with the intelligence
community to provide clearances and classified briefings,
whether through secure video teleconferences or in person, as
well as working with private sector threat intelligence
authorities. So, we have worked with private sector companies
to provide briefings to State and local election officials
about what they are seeing out internationally to help them
manage risk to the system. So, we are exploring all avenues
trying to find efficient ways to get this information to the
election officials.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you. I yield back.
Chairman Nadler. The gentlelady yields back. The gentlelady
from Arizona.
Mrs. Lesko. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My first question is
for Ms. Floris. Does anyone at the Foreign Influence Task Force
draft FISA affidavits or applications?
Ms. Floris. No, ma'am.
Mrs. Lesko. Looking back at the FBI's activities
investigating the 2016 election, it has been reported that FBI
never obtained the original servers from the Democratic
National Committee that had allegedly been hacked by Russia,
instead relying on imaged copies. First, is that correct?
Ms. Floris. Ma'am, I can't speak to that. I am sorry.
Mrs. Lesko. Can someone else on the panel speak to that?
Mr. Hickey. Yes, ma'am. We got the information that we
required for our investigation, and it is pretty common for us
to work with a security vendor in connection with an
investigation of a computer intrusion.
Mrs. Lesko. So, can either one of you answer, does the
DNC's cybersecurity consultant, CrowdStrike, still have
possession of the Clinton servers?
Mr. Hickey. I don't know what they have possession of now.
Mrs. Lesko. Does anyone on the panel know?
[No response.]
Mrs. Lesko. All right. My next question is for Mr. Hickey,
and I know that Mr. Chabot asked you what other countries have
shown an interest in disrupting the 2020 election, but what
other countries had shown an interest or tried to interfere in
the 2016 election?
Mr. Hickey. Based on what I have read, both from what the
IC has put out and also investigations by Congress, what I have
seen only refers to Russia that I am aware of.
Mrs. Lesko. Then earlier, there was a question by Chairman
Nadler, and I want to clarify what you think, if you think it
is appropriate for a President of the United States to ask a
foreign government to investigate previous election
interference, and I guess I would like all of you to answer
that question.
Mr. Masterson. Can you repeat the question, ma'am? I am
sorry.
Mrs. Lesko. Do you think it is appropriate for the
President to ask a foreign government to investigate previous
election interference if there was election interference going
on? To ask if there is anything he thinks was unlawful going on
in other countries, to ask the other country to help to
determine if there was something unlawful happening?
Mr. Masterson. I think it is appropriate to understand any
attempts at interference in our elections so that we can
continue to work to build resilience in the process.
Ms. Floris. The FBI is interested in any criminal violation
as relates to foreign influence, so long as there is that
foreign angle to the foreign influence operations.
Mrs. Lesko. Thank you.
Mr. Hickey. I will give the same answer I gave before,
which is I don't opine on appropriateness, per se, but I am
focused on enforcing the criminal law.
Mr. Hovland. I think it is important to understand what
occurred with our election so that election officials have the
information they need to prepare for future elections.
Mrs. Lesko. Thank you, and I yield back my time.
Chairman Nadler. The gentlelady yields back. The gentleman
from Tenessee?
Mr. Cohen. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
This is a question to anybody on the panel that has an
answer. In 2016, I understand there were reports that I think
were sound that Russia tried to interfere with a lot of State
election rolls, maybe all of them. Anybody here aware of those
reports?
Mr. Masterson, you seem to be first to go to bat, sir.
Mr. Masterson. Probably foolishly, sir. Thank you.
Yes. The DHS, in coordination with the FBI, released an
information product out to State and local election officials
that stated that based on the information we have as far as the
activity in 2016, that the pattern of behavior is likely that
the Russian government--or Russian actors conducted at least
research on election entities across all 50 States. That
doesn't necessarily mean that they attempted to access the
systems. It could be as simple as a Google search to understand
who runs elections in that State.
Based on the information that we and the intelligence
community have, that it is assumed that they were at least
researching all 50 States' election systems.
Mr. Cohen. Why would they have done that?
Mr. Masterson. Presumably--I don't want to speculate, but
presumably, just to understand how elections are run across the
United States.
Mr. Cohen. Spring training?
Mr. Masterson. To gather information.
Mr. Cohen. Kind of spring training?
Mr. Masterson. Yes.
Mr. Cohen. Yes, something like that. Anybody else have
knowledge of that, have any other thoughts about it? No?
[No response.]
Mr. Cohen. How about Florida? Was there not reports that
two different jurisdictions' voting systems were contacted by
the Russians? Mr. Hickey?
Mr. Hickey. So, I think we have briefed Florida officials
on activity targeting systems and leading successful intrusions
in two counties. I think it is important to be clear we have
also reached the conclusion that there was no material impact
on registration or vote counting, based on the evidence that we
have seen. So, I think it is clear--important to be clear about
that.
Mr. Cohen. Based on what happened in 2016 and based on what
Mr. Mueller told us that the Russians at the time he testified
were looking into effect being involved in our 2020 elections,
are you confident that giving our funds directly to States,
that they will use them to work against Russian cyber
interference and protect those State systems?
Mr. Hovland. I am happy to talk about that. So, at the EAC,
we distributed the $380 million from fiscal year 2018, and as I
mentioned in my opening statement, it appears that the vast
majority of that will be spent. We have seen over 90 percent of
that going toward improving security, again whether that is
replacing outdated equipment, hardening systems, implementing
audits. The States have done a number of things, but because of
the variations in how elections are administered State to
State, there have been different priorities.
Mr. Cohen. Mr. Masterson?
Mr. Masterson. Sir, just briefly on that, we worked with
our Government Coordinating Council, which has 24 State and
local election officials as a member, to identify priorities
for that funding. What we have seen is States have taken that
information, which is databased on our work with the States on
where risks lie and used it to apply. I will give you a very
specific example.
Prior to the 2018 election, the State of Wisconsin deployed
two-factor authentication out to all its local election
officials for the statewide voter registration database, which
may seem unremark-able until you realize they have 1,800 local
election jurisdictions in the State of Wisconsin and almost
3,200 users of the statewide voter registration database. So
that is a very focused, targeted step, base level, that they
have taken and used the money.
Mr. Cohen. Let me ask you this, Mr. Masterson. Director
Krebs has emphasized the importance of protecting the campaigns
based on what happened in 2016 with interference with the DNC,
the Clinton campaign stolen emails, et cetera. He said shame on
us if we are not ready this time around.
Have you consulted with the President, or anyone involved
in his re-election campaign?
Mr. Masterson. Sir, we have contacted not just the Trump
campaign, but campaigns across the Presidential election--
presidential campaigns to make sure that they are aware of our
services and information-sharing responsibility.
Mr. Cohen. So, Mr. Mulvaney did not contact you, as he did
your superior, and say this is a very sensitive subject for the
President, don't mention it, or dance around it, or whatever?
Mr. Masterson. No, sir.
Mr. Cohen. Okay. Ollie, Ollie, in free. That is great.
I want to thank the FBI and the Justice Department as well.
You all are stalwarts in the American system of government and
the Rule of law, and I would have to disagree with some
previous statements made that some individuals within your
organizations were responsible for hurting your organizations.
I think that an individual who is the President of the United
States was the one that caused it by questioning those people's
actions and making statements that were adverse to both the FBI
and the Justice Department, which we should uphold.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman Nadler. The gentleman yields back. The gentleman
from Florida?
Mr. Gaetz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I wish this were truly were a sincere hearing on election
security. If it were, we might be marking up some of the
bipartisan legislation that Members of the Committee have
worked on, including House Resolution 3529 by Congresswoman
Murphy, Mr. Deutch, Ms. Mucarsel-Powell, myself, to have
greater connectivity prior to any intrusion, or we might be
marking up the legislation by Mr. Ratcliffe, Mr. Himes, joined
by Mr. Collins and Mr. Khanna, 3238, that would create greater
consequence for those who engage in election interference. That
is not what this is about.
This is about smearing the President of the United States
and validating the corrupt people who have been involved in
delegitimizing his historic election. We know that because just
moments ago, Chairman said that Peter Strzok was acting in the
highest traditions of Government service.
Now, Ms. Floris, I believe you currently hold the job that
Mr. Strzok once held. Is engaging in an extramarital affair in
the FBI with a coworker acting in the highest traditions of
Government service?
Ms. Floris. I am not going to comment on that, sir.
Mr. Gaetz. Well, are there any regulations in the FBI
against it that you are aware of?
Ms. Floris. I am not going to comment on that, sir.
Mr. Gaetz. Well, you hold Mr. Strzok's job. Are you saying
that you don't know whether or not it is against FBI policy to
have an extramarital affair with a coworker?
Ms. Floris. Sir, I hold a slightly different job than Mr.
Strzok held. I am the DAD over the Intelligence Branch. He was
over our Operational Branch, not that we are held to a
different standard. I am just not going to comment on whether
or not Peter Strzok's behavior was out of conduct.
Mr. Gaetz. Well, is it in the highest traditions of
Government service at the FBI to engage in affairs with
coworkers? You should know that if you work there.
Ms. Floris. Sir, I am not going to comment on that.
Mr. Gaetz. Wow. Well, maybe I will ask you another one. The
Inspector General said in his report, ``We do not have
confidence that Strzok's decision to prioritize the Russian
investigation over following up on the midyear-related
investigation.'' So, if the Inspector General didn't have
confidence in the way that someone prioritized something, would
that be acting in the highest traditions of Government service?
Ms. Floris. Sir, I am not going to comment on that.
Mr. Gaetz. The Inspector General further said, ``The OIG
found it is not only indicative of a biased State of mind but,
even more suspiciously, implies a willingness to take action to
impact a presidential candidate's electoral process. This is
antithetical to the core values of the FBI and the Department
of Justice.''
If someone, anyone, is engaging in behavior that is
antithetical to the core values of the FBI and Department of
Justice, is that person acting in the highest traditions of
Government service?
Ms. Floris. Sir, we have an entire Inspection Division. We
have the OIG. There are several measures in place that take
into account those questions. I am not going to answer those
questions from the position I am in.
Mr. Gaetz. It is just really striking that someone in the
senior leadership at the FBI, like an unwillingness to be
critical of conduct that was so detrimental to our country. And
as people all over America are looking at the corruption that
negatively impacted our President and the institution of the
presidency, it doesn't really inspire confidence that current
officials from the FBI say, hey, you know what? It is a bad
idea to be having affairs with your colleagues and to be
undermining the trust that people have and to be prioritizing
investigations over politics. Nonetheless, here we sit.
In fact, here we do sit. It was more than a month ago, Mr.
Chairman, that you announced an impeachment inquiry in this
committee. I believed you that our Committee would be engaged
in that process. As we sit here today, three other committees
are in the basement of the Capitol conducting secret
interviews, engaging in selective leaks.
We have got Chairman Schiff then coming out and having his
theatrical reperformances of transcripts that didn't really
occur, and you have got lies about contacts with
whistleblowers.
Now regardless of how people feel about the President or
this impeachment, one would at least think that if Chairman of
the Judiciary Committee announces the launch of an impeachment
investigation, that Members of the Judiciary Committee might be
willing to--or able to participate in that investigation. When
I have gone to participate, Mr. Biggs has gone to participate,
and others have gone, we have been locked out.
So, it is my sincere hope, and I asked this the last time
we gathered, that you would take up the cause not just of
someone's partisan ambition to impeach the President, but that
you would take up the cause of our Committee and advocate for
our ability to participate. Because one can only suspect that
the reason that the House Judiciary Committee has been dealt
out of the hand on impeachment is because Speaker Pelosi didn't
like the outcomes that were going on in this Committee when the
current chairman was running it.
I mean, it wasn't a surprise to the country when you
brought in Mr. Lewandowski. House Democrats looked like a dog
that caught a car and didn't know what to do with it. When
House Democrats brought in Robert Mueller, there were promises
that this was going to sway the public, this was going to
create a flood of support for impeachment. That was obviously
something that didn't hold to bear.
So please stand up for our Committee and let us stop with
this busywork. If we want to markup bills, let us markup real
bills.
I yield back.
Chairman Nadler. The gentleman yields back. The gentlelady
from Washington?
Ms. Jayapal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank our witnesses for being here today. I would hardly
call this ``busywork'' to protect our elections. So, I wish our
colleagues on the other side would be as concerned with
election security.
Back in July, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
released its bipartisan report on Russian interference in our
2016 elections. Senate Intel found that ``Russian government-
affiliated cyber actors conducted an unprecedented level of
activity against State election infrastructure in the run-up to
the 2016 U.S. elections.''
They called for sweeping action to protect our 2020
elections. With Election Day just 378 days away, it is crucial
that we move quickly.
So, my questions. All of you are responsible for various
aspects of protecting our elections, and you are no doubt aware
that a significant concern of securing our elections is that
foreign actors will attack election reporting or the results of
elections. Take the following hypothetical.
Florida reports that candidate X won after counting the
votes. The next morning, Florida election officials report that
the results were tampered with, and, in fact, candidate Y won.
What is being done at the Federal level to, first, prevent
attacks on our election results, and second, if such an attack
occurs, to ensure public confidence in the reporting of our
elections?
Mr. Masterson, let us start with you and then move to
Floris, Hickey, and Hovland, please.
Mr. Masterson. Yes, thank you, ma'am.
Certainly, election night reporting systems, which are the
ones you are referencing, are an area that we have worked with
State and local election officials to secure, to understand
risk to. The first and most important thing to understand that
all the folks on the Committee here understand is that election
night results are, in fact, unofficial results, that there is a
canvas process that goes on after Election Day. So, ensuring
that voters have that information, understand the unofficial
nature of results, and that there is an entire reconciliation
process that election officials undergo following election
night to ensure the correctness.
The second is a top priority for us, and that is working
with election officials to have auditability of the results and
to ensure efficient and effective auditing of those results.
That is absolutely critical to ensure not just the loser that
they won or lost, but also to reassure the public that their
vote was counted as cast.
So that is two areas of high priority for us working with
State and local election officials to empower them to talk to
their voters about the steps they are taking both to protect
those systems, but to really offer reassurance and transparency
on the back end. I know election officials take that very
seriously.
Ms. Jayapal. Does anybody want to add anything?
Mr. Hickey. I would just add that in the circumstance where
we know or have indications that a State is being targeted, it
is really important that we get to State officials at the right
level and with a sense of urgency so they can do whatever they
can to mitigate on their systems.
Ms. Jayapal. Mr. Hovland?
Mr. Hovland. I would echo what Mr. Masterson said and add
that at the Election Assistance Commission, part of the work
that we have done is host IT trainings for election officials,
which is relevant to this topic, work with them on improving
audit processes, and certainly think that the issue you raise
is one of real concern.
There are a number of responsibilities that election
officials have, and I believe that the Election Assistance
Commission should be more empowered to work on those, but the
reality, as I mentioned in my opening statement, is that we are
a $7.95 million agency. We have one lawyer. We have one
financial person.
Since its inception, the Election Assistance Commission has
been kicked around like a political football, and we have never
been empowered or funded in a way to actually help election
officials in the way we can. I think that right now in this
time, we see the need for the Federal clearinghouse that the
EAC was created to be, and I would just ask you all to help
make that possible.
Thank you.
Ms. Jayapal. Thank you.
Mr. Masterson, as a senior cybersecurity adviser, how have
you engaged with local, State, and national media outlets to
ensure that unofficial vote reporting is protected from
malicious interference? What media networks specifically have
you met with, and have any refused to meet with you? What new
measures are you taking in 2020 that weren't applied in 2016
and 2018?
Mr. Masterson. Yes, thank you, ma'am, for the question.
The first is that the Associated Press, the team that
handles the election night results for the AP on election
night, is a member of our Sector Coordinating Council, which is
the private sector council that we work with on providing
support and services, information sharing. So, AP has been an
active participant in that coordinating council to understand
threat and risk, steps that they could take to secure their
results reporting, and I know is taking that very seriously.
Secondly is we held a tabletop exercise with Members in the
national media prior to the 2018 election to talk about what
are scenarios that could play out, how is information being
exchanged not just with State and local officials, but social
media companies, the political parties, and others to ensure
that media have access to the information they need before they
report on results or other items.
Heading into 2020, we anticipate engaging media outlets
individually and then having the tabletop exercise again
heading into the 2020 election to work through those scenarios
and ensure they have the information they need.
Ms. Jayapal. Thank you very much. Yield back.
Chairman Nadler. The gentlelady yields back. The gentleman
from Virginia?
Mr. Cline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank the witnesses for being here. I, too, am
concerned about foreign interference in our elections and have
cosponsored the Ranking Member's bill, H.R. 3442, which would
amend the Immigration Act to provide the aliens who have
engaged in improper interference in a U.S. elections are
inadmissible to and deportable from the U.S., and I also
cosponsored 3238, Mr. Ratcliffe's bill, which would prohibit
interference with voting systems in the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act.
I want to go ahead and ask Ms. Floris, in your testimony,
you say that we do know that our adversaries are actively
trying to influence public opinion and electoral processes in
advance of the 2020 election. You have mentioned in your
testimony influencing public opinion through various social
media activity. What electoral processes, what efforts to
interfere with electoral processes are you aware of at this
time?
Ms. Floris. So, sir, thank you for the question.
As we roll into 2020, the one thing I want to highlight is
that countries like Russia and China, they pose a pervasive and
persistent threat. It is not just based on the electoral cycle.
Their foreign influence operations are essentially always
present.
When it comes to the electoral process, you could look at
something as voter suppression. The whole concept of pushing
out false information, of highlighting places to vote that are
actually not true, this whole concept of disinformation that we
have really seen the Russians focus on, that, in and of itself,
can interfere with the electoral process.
Mr. Cline. Okay. Nothing to the extent of actively trying
to hack into or interfere with the electoral system?
Ms. Floris. To date, sir, we have not seen anything
specific regarding hacking into the electoral systems of the
2020 election.
Mr. Cline. All right. Thank you. I am going to yield the
remainder of my time to Mr. Gaetz.
Mr. Gaetz. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Chairman, I have a series of unanimous consent requests
that set up my question. The first is a request that it be
entered into the record an email from Nellie Ohr to Bruce Ohr
on the 30th of May, entitled ``Reported Trove of Documents on
Ukrainian Party of Regions' Black Cash Box.''
Chairman Nadler. Without objection.
[The information follows:]
MR. GAETZ FOR THE OFFICIAL RECORD
=======================================================================
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Gaetz. I also seek unanimous consent to enter into the
record a New York Times article, December 12, 2018, ``Ukrainian
Court Rules Manafort Disclosure Caused `Meddling' in U.S.
Election.''
Chairman Nadler. Without objection.
[The information follows:]
MR. GAETZ FOR THE OFFICIAL RECORD
=======================================================================
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Gaetz. Finally, also from December 12, 2018, from the
Kiev Post, ``Update: Publication of Manafort Payments Violated
Law, Interfered in U.S. Election, Kiev Court Rules.''
Chairman Nadler. Without objection.
[The information follows:]
MR. GAETZ FOR THE OFFICIAL RECORD
=======================================================================\
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Gaetz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
So, what is happening is that DNC pays a law firm to hire
Fusian GPS, which hires Nellie Ohr. Nellie Ohr then sends an
email to her husband about issues with Manafort and the
Ukraine. That then works its way into the U.S. election
dynamic, and a court in Kiev ruled that the activities to
disclose the Manafort activities in the United States proximate
to the 2016 election constituted election interference and was
illegal under Ukrainian law.
Is there anyone on the panel who has a reason to disagree
with the conclusion of the Ukrainian court that that
constituted election meddling?
[No response.]
Mr. Gaetz. Okay. So, no one has reacted, any basis to
disagree with the Ukrainian court, and the record can reflect
that.
So, my question to Ms. Floris is what are we doing as a
government to prevent future election meddling like that which
Ukraine engaged in, where information was disclosed in the
United States unlawfully in the foreign jurisdiction and then
entered into the bloodstream of our politics?
Ms. Floris. Thank you, sir, for the question.
So, I will harken back to what I said previously. So, the
FBI certainly is not in a position to police content on the
Internet. That being said, if the FBI can identify a foreign
actor, regardless of country, who is trying to push out
disinformation with the end goal of sowing discord, disrupting
our electoral process, and it is done in some sort of a
subversive or undeclared or criminal manner, that is where it
becomes an investigative interest to the FBI.
The trick, sir, is identifying that known foreign actor.
Again, we can't work back from content. We cannot police
content on the Internet. So, if we find that foreign actor
behaving in foreign influence operations and part of that
operation entails disinformation, the FBI will work with the
social media providers to provide as much actual intelligence
as we possibly can.
Mr. Gaetz. So, in this case, it looks like we must know the
actor because a court ruled that the disclosure of the
information was illegal. So, is there anything that the FBI is
doing now to follow up on the decision by a Ukrainian court
that there was illegal election meddling in the United States
that emanated from the Ukraine?
Ms. Floris. Sir, I can't address anything related to the
possibility or existence or non-existence of an FBI
investigation.
Mr. Gaetz. It would seem, I think that my colleague from
Washington, Ms. Jayapal, said with so few days between now and
the upcoming election, it is just--I know you can't comment
maybe on this setting, but I hope sincerely that this Ukrainian
election meddling is being identified and being pursued by our
government.
I yield back.
Chairman Nadler. The gentleman yields back. The gentleman
from Florida, Mr. Deutch?
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for holding
today's hearing. Thanks to the witnesses for being here.
We know that Russians interfered in our 2016 election. We
know that national security experts have warned that they will
do it again in 2020. The 2020 primaries are fast approaching.
So, we are running short on time to ensure that every State is
taking the necessary action to harden our election defenses,
guard against disinformation, and improve election
Administration generally.
Florida was one of fewer than 20 States that still had
elections with electronic machines without a paper trail to
verify the ballots in 2016. Thankfully, our State is moving in
the right direction. Between 2016 and 2018, the number of
counties who had paperless elections dropped from 24 to 4, with
efforts to move completely to paper-verified systems underway.
Now after learning that some of our systems were hacked in
2016, Floridians expect a strong response to bolster election
security, and we expect that whatever is done will improve
coordination with State and counties targeted by foreign
governments and other bad actors.
According to the Mueller report, the Russian military
intelligence agency was able to gain access to the network of
at least one Florida county government. Subsequently, Members
of our congressional delegation requested a briefing from law
enforcement agencies and were informed that the networks of at
least two Florida counties have been compromised.
Most recently, a report by the Republican-led Senate
Intelligence Committee suggests that as many as four Florida
counties may have been successfully attacked. Apparently, no
tabulation systems were accessed, only registration rolls.
Whatever the number of counties impacted, we have got to learn
the lessons of 2016 and guard against these vulnerabilities
before next year's elections. Florida clearly has work that it
needs to do, from hardening election systems to improving
auditing procedures, but we can't do it alone.
Mr. Masterson, certain breaches in 2016 were not
immediately detected. What signs should election officials look
for? What should they be trained to look for on Election Day to
ensure that there are no undetected attacks, and how are you
working with State officials to train them to detect such
signs?
Mr. Masterson. Yes, thank you for the question, sir.
It starts long before Election Day so that you may be
looking for those signs on Election Day, and I will talk about
our activity there, but there are indicators that election
officials are aware of and can be attuned to. For instance, in
the States that offer early voting, you may begin to see signs
of provisional ballots or registration roll activity that is
anomalous. The ability to detect that and investigate the
registration rolls to see if there is any kind of anomalies
there is important.
So, there are early indicators that can be gained through
something like early voting. In addition, and your home State
of Florida is a perfect example, the deployment of our Albert
intrusion detection sensors across all 50 States' election
infrastructure allows for real-time alerting to not just the
election official, but to our Elections Information Sharing and
Analysis Center regarding possible malicious activity targeting
election infrastructure.
I would note in the State of Florida, Florida was the first
State to deploy those Albert sensors across all county
governments, and so Florida is uniquely positioned for that
kind of intrusion detection and alerting.
In addition, having that auditability in place that you
mentioned, those auditable records. I think in Florida, there
was less than 100 ballots cast in 2018 on auditable systems,
and a drive towards complete auditability by 2020 is really
critically important so that we can detect and recover from
this.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Masterson.
In our hearing on election security last month, the
witnesses stressed the importance of treating elections as
``interconnected systems.'' We heard that any digital device
that touches election processes must be safeguarded. Device
security management should be centralized and streamlined.
So, I would like to hear from each of the witnesses what
your organization is doing to help centralize and streamline
the election security process. Mr. Hovland, we will start with
you.
Mr. Hovland. Yes. So, essentially, at the Election
Assistance Commission, we are participating in the Government
Coordinating Council. We consistently work to put out best
practices. Again, our capacity beyond our statutory
requirements is very limited.
As we have the World Series coming to Washington, I would
note that if we were a Major League Baseball player, we would
be the 173rd highest-played player. We would be a middle
reliever. We have no lack of ambition to take on these
challenges and help, but we need the resources to do it.
Mr. Deutch. Appreciate the World Series reference. Mr.
Hickey?
Mr. Hickey. Sir, I am going to answer a bit by analogy. We
have a number of department components that touch election
security. We have got FBI agents in the field and at
headquarters. We have got prosecutors in the field. We have got
public corruption prosecutors. We have got national security
prosecutors. We have got computer crime prosecutors.
All of them potentially touch this issue, and so it is on
us to train them, so they are aware of each other and
coordinated, and that is what we are doing this week. At the
end of the week--rather, on the end of the month, the FBI is
pulling together an all hands meeting with agents from around
the country to train them, including on how to react and relate
to State officials when it comes to victim notification.
Mr. Deutch. Ms. Floris?
Ms. Floris. Sir, thank you for your question.
I would just stress again the creation of the Foreign
Influence Task Force, whose purpose was to do just what you
asked, sir, to coordinate the efforts across the enterprise as
it relates to election security. We have got elections crimes
coordinators across all 56 of our field offices whose primary
goal is to interact with State and local election officials,
leading up to the day of the election.
We have got our cyber task forces across all 56 of our
field offices, and we are working to increase our CI task
forces as well. Again, the Foreign Influence Task Force really
is that hub that brings all that effort together, again leading
up to, during, and after the election.
Mr. Deutch. Thanks. Mr. Chairman, can Mr. Masterson just
quickly answer that question?
Chairman Nadler. The gentleman may answer the question.
Mr. Masterson. Yes, thank you for the question, sir.
Across CISA, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security
Agency, over a third of our employees in 2018 engaged in
election security work across the United States. We have field
representatives, protective security advisers, cybersecurity
advisers engaging directly with State and local election
officials. Then my team, the Election Security Initiative, is
the hub of that information.
So, as we get reporting, as we get requests for services,
we are able to quickly and efficiently serve the needs of the
community in order to make sure they have the information or
services to help to manage risk to their systems.
Mr. Deutch. Okay. Thanks for what you all do. Mr. Hovland,
I hope we have a chance to talk about what additional resources
would mean in this effort.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Nadler. The gentleman yields back. The gentleman
from Texas?
Mr. Gohmert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and appreciate the
witnesses being here today.
Ms. Floris, so did you replace Peter Strzok as Deputy
Assistant Director of Counterintelligence Division?
Ms. Floris. Sir, there are three Deputy Assistant Directors
in the Counterintelligence Division. My particular role is over
the Intelligence Branch. Mr. Strzok was not over the
Intelligence Branch. He was over one of our two operational
branches within the division.
Mr. Gohmert. He was the one that was briefed by the intel
community IG about Hillary Clinton's private server potentially
being hacked. Do you know why you were not included in that
briefing?
Ms. Floris. Yes, sir. I did not enter this position until
the fall of 2018. During the 2016 timeframe, I was in the
Counterterrorism Division.
Mr. Gohmert. Okay. So, you came into your current position
after Peter Strzok left?
Ms. Floris. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gohmert. Well, since the Foreign Influence Task Force
is a headquarters component, I am concerned that Peter Strzok
ran two of the biggest cases in FBI history as headquarters
special cases rather than the traditional way of running cases
through field offices. Is the Foreign Influence Task Force
running election cases from headquarters now?
Ms. Floris. No, sir.
Mr. Gohmert. Then can you tell us the reason they were
doing so when Peter Strzok was there?
Ms. Floris. Sir, I cannot speak to why things were done or
not done during Peter Strzok's time. I can just speak to
currently what we are doing in the Foreign Influence Task
Force, which is essentially program managing the cases across
our 56 field offices.
Mr. Gohmert. Well, I would think that since there is such a
big deal about influence peddling in 2016, even though you came
in after that, that you would be a little bit concerned about
the influence peddling when Peter Strzok was there. Are you
not? Have you not looked into that at all in your current
position?
Ms. Floris. Sir, my focus is on the 2020 elections and
moving forward. The creation of the Foreign Influence Task
Force happened in the fall of 2017. We are laser focused on the
elections moving forward.
Mr. Gohmert. So, you don't think there is anything to be
learned from looking at what occurred in the 2016 election to
help you prepare for what is going on and could go on in the
2020 election? Really, you don't think there is anything to
learn from history?
Ms. Floris. Sir, there are always lessons to be learned
from history. What we have learned in 2016--and I can speak
strategically, not just what was happening in the FBI--was
really a lack of coordination on the foreign influence threat
across the entire U.S. intelligence community. We are now
better engaged. We collaborate far more on a daily basis. We
are working with our social media companies. All of this,
lessons learned from 2016, lessons learned from 2018, and we
are going to continue to put best practices forward as we move
into 2020.
Mr. Gohmert. Well, since you are concerned about 2020, have
you--were you aware of President Petro Poroshenko dispatching
Olga Bielkova or any other Ukrainian officials to the U.S. to
influence our election in 2016?
Ms. Floris. Sir, I am not familiar with that.
Mr. Gohmert. Are you aware--do you know who Olga Bielkova
is?
Ms. Floris. Sir, again, I am not going to confirm or deny
the existence or non-existence of FBI investigations or persons
of interest to the FBI in this setting.
Mr. Gohmert. That was not my question. I didn't ask you
that. I asked you, do you know who that is?
Ms. Floris. Sir, I am not going to answer that question in
this setting. I am happy to come back in a closed setting and
go into detail about current investigations that we have
related to foreign influence.
Mr. Gohmert. So, you can't even say if you know a person?
Ms. Floris. No, sir.
Mr. Gohmert. Do you realize you are supposed to be telling
us about 2020, and you can't even tell us about whether you
know anything about people involved in 2016? It really hurts
the credibility when you can't do that.
Let me ask you, will the FITF run informants against
political campaigns?
Ms. Floris. Sir, much in the same vein that the FITF does
not run cases, we do not run sources either. We program manage
the sources that our 56 field offices run as it relates to
foreign influence.
Mr. Gohmert. Well, I have a real concern about the
credibility of what is happening for 2020 if you can't even
tell us that you even know people from the Ukraine. So, I am
very disturbed and concerned.
Chairman Nadler. The gentleman yields back. The gentleman
from California, Mr. Correa?
Mr. Correa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, I want to say to our panelists today thanks for
being here today and thank you for service to our country.
As you know, trust in our election system is the foundation
of our democracy, and when it comes to cyberattacks, time is of
the essence. When financial institutions are attacked or our
military, the response is within seconds. It is usually
coordinated throughout the industry--not institutions, not
individually, but the industry, if not worldwide.
So given the importance of America's democracy, I presume
that we are now and, Ms. Floris, you were talking about lack of
coordination, I believe you said, in 2016 among Government
agencies as being one of the lessons learned. I presume we have
a system in place now to coordinate that kind of information
when there is a cyberattack throughout Federal Government? Yes/
no question to all of you.
Ms. Floris. Sir, thank you for the question, and you are
absolutely correct. As it relates to cyber incidents, we do
have an extremely strategic plan in how we notify our victims.
So, simply put, and I will certainly yield to my colleague from
DHS to add on here, the FBI and DHS respond to incidents
jointly. You can almost look at it as the FBI lead in
essentially the threat response. If a crime has been committed,
the FBI will open an investigation.
DHS is the lead for protecting and mitigating whatever
vulnerability existed that led to the cyber intrusion in and of
itself.
Mr. Correa. So let me interrupt you. So, you open up an
investigation, but a cyberattack happens within seconds. So how
quickly--who is the lead or if you don't have a lead, how do
you get that information out to all of your investigative
agencies, your defense task force, instantaneously? Do you have
that system in place?
Mr. Masterson?
Mr. Masterson. Yes, sure. Thank you for the question.
Following 2016-2017, one of our top priorities was to work
with State and local election officials to establish
communications protocols for exactly this reason. As you may be
aware, in 2016, DHS, being new to the election space, didn't
even know who to call in the States if need be. We now have
points of contact in all the States. We have information
sharing going to all 50 States.
Mr. Correa. So, you do have points of contacts with each
and every State?
Mr. Masterson. Yes. More importantly, they know how to
share information with us because the most likely people to
report a cyber incident are the owners and operators--
Mr. Correa. So, you do have a specific individual at each
State that you talk to?
Mr. Masterson. Yes.
Mr. Correa. Is the information--are we talking silos here,
or is the information a two-way street, so to speak? Do you
have folks at the State level who you trust, who you can work
with to make sure you are all sharing the information on a
real-time basis?
Mr. Masterson. Absolutely, sir. Thank you for that
question.
We have points of contact and trusted relationships across
all 50 States so that they feel comfortable sharing that
information. Then we are able to take and not just respond to
that individual incident, but take the technical information in
that response and distribute it broadly across the entire
election community so they can take defensive actions or look
for possible compromises across the entire election
infrastructure.
That is the biggest area of improvement since 2016 is the
amount of information we are receiving from the State and local
election officials on a regular basis, whether it is reporting
or those Albert intrusion detection sensors.
Mr. Correa. So, if Secretary of State Alex Padilla from the
State of California calls one of you, and it is the wrong
telephone, do you return his call immediately, or how that
phone call get channeled into the system to get a quick
response?
Mr. Masterson. Yes--
Mr. Correa. Or is it even a phone call? Do you have a
digital system where somebody puts in a--types in an alert
saying something is going on over here, a certain virus is
being detected, so the rest of the country can essentially get
on their toes?
Mr. Masterson. Yes. So, first, Secretary Padilla has my
number and calls me regularly and is an incredibly active,
engaged partner with us. You have described it exactly
correctly. A report to one is a report to across the Federal
Government. Within CISA's operation center, we have Members of
the FBI, we have Members of the intelligence community, we have
Members of our Elections Information Sharing and Analysis
Center sitting on our operations floor such that as reporting
comes in, we are able to take that information, analyze it,
support the victim, but then begin the process of sharing
information broadly across the sector.
Mr. Correa. Let me shift very quickly. It was mentioned
earlier the elections are not just about Election Day, but that
election period. In California, that is about 3 weeks, as well
as other States.
How do you assure that whatever you begin to detect 3 weeks
out is something that you follow up on and is coordinated?
Mr. Masterson. Yes, again, working through our Information
Sharing and Analysis Center, as we get reporting, if there are
additional facts, additional jurisdictions, we are able to
coordinate that across the whole of Government and look for
those trends, look for that information that would connect
incidents.
Mr. Correa. Final question for you. I am out of time, but I
have been through a number of elections. I detected
irregularities. I try to call my local D.A. So, in 2020, I am
out there, walking door-to-door. I see something weird
happening. Who do I call? Or do I Google your telephone number?
Mr. Masterson. So, depending on the activity--
Mr. Correa. We talked about coordination of private and
public sector individuals out there.
Mr. Masterson. Yes. So, from our perspective at CISA, one
is you should report any anomalous activity to the local
election official, the local election administrator, who can
understand the activity you are seeing and remediate it. In
addition, we worked with voter protection groups in 2018 and
will again in 2020 to have points of contact on Election Day so
that if there is reporting that indicates trends, we are able
to respond, reach out to the election officials in coordination
and understand what is going on.
Mr. Correa. Mr. Chair, I yield.
Chairman Nadler. The gentleman yields back. I now recognize
the distinguished vice chair of the Committee and thank her
once again for beginning the hearing in my absence, the
gentlelady from Pennsylvania.
Ms. Scanlon. Thank you, Chairman.
Ms. Floris, on October 3rd, the FBI, along with DHS, issued
an advisory to State election officials that the Russian
government would be using voter suppression tactics to
interfere in the 2020 elections, and obviously, we are
extremely concerned about that.
Can you give us any idea about when the FBI learned about
these Russian tactics and any gap in time between when the
threat was identified and when the States were notified?
Ms. Floris. Thank you for the question, ma'am.
I cannot speak in specifics about the reporting. I am happy
to take that back for an after action. I will say as we roll
into 2020, as we did as we were rolling into 2018, it is our
goal--and not just the FBI's goal, but across the U.S.
intelligence community--to report threat information as quickly
as possible to the audience who needs to hear it, taking into
account certainly the sensitivity of the sources and methods of
how that intelligence was collected.
Ms. Scanlon. Okay. You have talked a little bit about the
Foreign Influence Task Force that was formed in 2017, and I
think you described how it was expanded after the 2018
election, and you described a growing list of foreign
adversaries that you are looking at. Can you tell us what
resources--can you describe the number of people who make up
that task force and whether that has grown from 2017 to the
present and if you need additional people or resources to do
that job?
Ms. Floris. Thank you, ma'am, for the question.
I am not going to get into specifics about the actual
number of individuals on the task force. What I will say is we
certainly surged resources as we rolled into 2018. Our
intention is that we again are going to surge resources as we
roll into 2020.
One thing I will note that individuals on the FITF are not
the only individuals in the FBI who are working the foreign
influence threat. Just given the nebulous nature of it, it is
wedded in so much of what we do in the investigative side of
the house, from criminal to cyber to counterterrorism as well.
So, there are agents and analysts and professional staff across
all 56 of our field offices who work foreign influence and
investigations tied to foreign influence.
Regarding your question about resources, as I stated
earlier, we are always happy to have more resources and can use
more resources. But the FBI is using everything we can right
now to mitigate this very serious threat.
Ms. Scanlon. Okay. Is the reason you can't give us numbers,
relative numbers between 2017 and the present, because you
don't have them, or is there some security reason?
Ms. Floris. There is no security reason. It is just it is
hard to compare since in 2017, we were focused only on Russia.
With the expansion to include all global actors who are
participating in foreign influence operations, it is not
necessarily a good one-to-one comparison of where we have come.
Ms. Scanlon. Okay. Mr. Hickey, you mentioned that one
aspect of the DOJ's efforts to disrupt malign foreign influence
operatives is stepped-up enforcement of FARA, the Foreign
Agents Registration Act, which requires people who Act as
agents of foreign principals to register with our government.
So, I guess we know some of those enforcement acts that
would include the guilty plea by Michael Flynn, who was Trump's
first National Security Adviser; the convictions of the Trump
campaign manager, Paul Manafort and Richard Gates; the possible
involvement of Mr. Giuliani and his associates who were
arrested last week for possible FARA violations. Are those all
the kind of things you are talking about?
Mr. Hickey. With respect to that last case, at the moment,
those are campaign finance violations. I think the charges
allege a connection to a foreign--foreign location, so the kind
of activity we want to be alert to.
Ms. Scanlon. Is included there?
Mr. Hickey. So, at the moment, the charges are campaign
finance allegations. I don't think FARA is pled there. Stepping
back from that specific case, if there are indications of a
foreign principal covertly trying to influence our politics,
whether through campaign finance or political activities under
FARA, that is something that we would be involved in.
Ms. Scanlon. Okay. The one I am really concerned about,
which is listed on DOJ's FARA enforcement actions, is the one
involving the 13 Russian nationals who worked on behalf of the
Russian government to interfere in the 2016 election by
manipulating social media to advocate for the Trump campaign
and against the Clinton campaign because that included
organizing political rallies in States like Pennsylvania, which
I represent. They literally took pictures of Pennsylvania coal
miners and slapped them on these rally things and tried to stir
up sentiment in a particular direction.
Does DOJ have the resources it needs to identify and
prosecute malign actors such as those I mentioned as we
approach the 2020 election?
Mr. Hickey. Well, indeed, we do because we have used those
resources to bring that case. Fortunately, I think the 2020
budget includes additional funding for the sections I
supervise, including the Counterintelligence Section, which is
devoted to foreign influence, countering malign foreign
influence, in addition to cyberthreats and other
counterintelligence activities.
Ms. Scanlon. How about moving proactively before the 2020
election because, unfortunately, those convictions came 2 years
after the influence in 2018?
Mr. Hickey. Yes. As I said in my opening statement, my
testimony, preventing a crime or disrupting it is more
rewarding and more important than convicting someone after the
fact, and we have put a lot of thought into how we will disrupt
that and whether we will provide notifications to Congress, to
the public, based on various factors, including wanting to make
sure that the public is as educated as we can make them.
Ms. Scanlon. Thank you to all the witnesses. I see my time
has expired.
Chairman Nadler. The gentlelady yields back. The gentlelady
from Texas?
Ms. Garcia. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As my colleague Ms. Jayapal noted earlier, the Senate
Intelligence Committee report on Russian interference in 2016
election states that many--disinformation campaigns and
cyberthreats do not just manipulate just one platform. The
information moves across various platforms where a cyberattack
threatens multiple companies' network security and data
integrity. There must be greater cooperation with the tech
sector and between the tech sector and the Government to
address these issues.
In fact, we saw today that Facebook removed a network of
Russian-backed accounts that posted as locals commenting on
political issues in swing States praising President Trump and
attacking former Vice President Joe Biden. This is a familiar
threat that we saw in 2016 and appears to be repeating as we
approach 2020.
The report we referenced represents formalized mechanisms
for collaborations that facilitate content sharing among social
media platforms to defend against foreign disinformation. This
occurred with violent extremist content.
My question is to Mr. Masterson and Ms. Floris, and this is
simply a yes or no. Have your organizations created a task
force to coordinate cooperation between Government and the tech
sector as they did with violent extremist content?
Mr. Masterson. So, I will defer to my colleague at the FBI
as well, but yes, we are working within my team at the Election
Security Initiative. We have a team working on countering
foreign influence that works regularly with the social media
and tech sector on these issues.
Ms. Garcia. Will be ready for 2020?
Mr. Masterson. Absolutely, yes.
Ms. Garcia. Okay. Ms. Floris?
Ms. Floris. Thank you, ma'am, for the question.
So, within the Foreign Influence Task Force is a
significant effort to increase engagement with both the tech
sector and the social media companies. Folks from the FITF meet
almost monthly with those companies. What we have tried to do
is create a bidirectional relationship wherein we share with
them actionable intelligence and threat indicators. They, in
turn, share with us information related to individuals who have
violated their terms of service. So, it is certainly one of our
primary strategies as we roll into 2020.
Ms. Garcia. Do you have a specific task force that helps
coordinate all of that, or are you just leaving it up to each
group to cooperate with each other?
Ms. Floris. It is actually within the Foreign Influence
Task Force. That is one of our goals is to coordinate that
engagement with social media companies as it relates to foreign
influence.
Ms. Garcia. All right. So, DHS' May 2019 report detailed
the disinformation model, including false information
operations, deep fake technology, and digital message creation
attacks. Can you please describe the impact of these type of
threats to our elections and what DHS is doing to combat them,
particularly regarding misinformation about voter registration?
Mr. Masterson?
Mr. Masterson. Yes, thank you, ma'am.
My team within the Election Security Initiative, starting
in 2018, began working with State and local election officials
to talk to them about ways to engage voters about
disinformation around the election process. Election officials
see this regularly, whether through social media or other
activity. It is not new to election Administration.
So, we wanted to work with them on a variety of products to
help them engage the electorate on what to look for, but more
importantly, how to empower themselves as voters. To check
their voter registration status to make sure it is up to date,
to make sure they understand when and where to vote, what is on
their ballot, how the election process works, and most
importantly, to understand who the trusted voices in their
communities are. Those local election officials and State
election officials that have the information they need, so that
they can head to the polls with confidence.
Building on that effort, heading into 2020, our team is
focused on expanding that engagement, working with trusted
voices across communities--whether that is mayors, governors,
or others--to engage the American people about how to identify
disinformation and how to build resilience so they are not
responsive--
Ms. Garcia. I heard your testimony on that, but I note your
written testimony, you also said that you wanted to raise
public awareness. With 8,800 jurisdictions--one of you all
testified to that. I forget which one of you. I mean, how are
you really getting the work out with 8,800 jurisdictions that
have to be on the lookout for this. I mean, you are talking
across the country.
When I saw, again in all testimony, I think you were
focused on like a handful of States that you have done some of
these tabletop exercises. So, what are you really doing to make
sure that all 8,800 election jurisdictions know how to detect,
report, and work with you on these issues?
Mr. Masterson. Yes, absolutely. Thank you for the question.
So, it is twofold. One is by building those relationships
with the State election officials, they reach the counties,
too. So, I mentioned in my testimony the Last Mile Initiative.
That is an initiative geared towards county election officials
specific to their jurisdictions about how to manage risk and
threat, including how to talk to voters about the process and
manage voters' expectations.
The second is, and you mentioned the tabletops, it is not
just the individual tabletops with States. We conduct national-
level tabletop exercises where thousands of local election
officials, in coordination with their State election
officials--so their chief State election official--participated
over 3 days this year.
Then next year, we anticipate a high level of participation
to talk through exactly what you said. How does information get
shared? How do we push it down to the locals? Then how do they
get it back up to us so that we have full awareness and can
push broadly to the elections community to understand what is
the threat of risk, and how do they protect the systems?
Ms. Garcia. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Chairman Nadler. The gentlelady yields back. The gentleman
from Colorado?
Mr. Neguse. Thank you, Mr. Chair, for holding this
incredibly important and timely hearing.
I also want to thank each of the witnesses for their
testimony and also for your service to our country. I must
confess I am disappointed by some, not all, but some of my
colleagues on the other side of the aisle who chose to use
their time impugning the integrity of former Government
officials instead of talking today with these distinguished
witnesses about the subject matter at hand, which is protecting
our republic and ensuring the integrity of our elections. I
realize that each of you, in your respective departments, work
with a wide range of colleagues on precisely that, and I thank
you for it.
I reviewed the written testimony of each of the witnesses.
Ms. Floris, in your testimony, you noted on page 3--and I
believe you alluded to this in your verbal testimony--that in
the run-up to the 2018 midterm elections, social media
companies deactivated more than 1,000 inauthentic social media
accounts linked to malign foreign influence actors. The
companies made these decisions informed by dialogue and
information exchanges with the FBI and other Government
agencies.
So, I take from that that you have a robust relationship
with the social media companies, both the FBI, the task force,
and obviously other apparatuses of DOJ. I take that to be true.
Is that a fair estimate?
Ms. Floris. Yes, sir.
Mr. Neguse. Okay. I very much appreciate the work that the
task force and that the FBI and the other entities within our
law enforcement community are taking, the steps that they are
taking to protect the integrity of our elections. Part of what
is the most disturbing for me and gives me the most pause, and
I suspect some of my colleagues, is what you mentioned earlier,
Ms. Floris, which is that it is happening in real time.
Foreign actors, by virtue of the disinformation and
misinformation campaigns that they are engaged in, utilizing
the ubiquitous social media engines that we all now use in our
daily lives, they are changing the way Americans think and
Americans interact with each other, the way in which we view
public policy issues.
I am sure you are familiar--there was a report recently--it
was covered by CNN--from Graphika, the IRACopyPasta campaign
issued on October 21, 2019. Russian accounts posing as
Americans on Instagram targeted both sides of polarizing issues
ahead of the 2020 election. Are you familiar with this report?
Ms. Floris. In title only, sir.
Mr. Neguse. In title only? Okay.
Ms. Floris. Yes, sir.
Mr. Neguse. Mr. Hickey, are you familiar with the report?
Mr. Hickey. Same answer.
Mr. Neguse. All right. So just for the benefit, with
unanimous consent, would ask that this report be submitted to
the record, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Nadler. Without objection.
[The information follows:]
MR. NEGUSE FOR THE OFFICIAL RECORD
=======================================================================
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Neguse. So, I would just quote from this, and then we
will get to my question. On October 21, 2019, Facebook
announced the takedown of 50 Instagram accounts posting about
U.S. social and political issues in the 2020 election. Facebook
concluded that the operation originated from Russia and showed
``some links'' to the Internet Research Agency, IRA, and the
Russian troll farm that previously targeted U.S. audiences in
the United States presidential election in 2016.
These accounts are attacking Kamala Harris, Elizabeth
Warren. Almost half of the accounts claim to be based in swing
States, especially Florida. What they are doing is not all that
dissimilar from what they did before, focusing on divisive
content.
Much of the content ``posted by these accounts was divisive
and served to reinforce each target group's hostility toward
other groups or individuals.'' Often the sets of accounts
posted on both sides of divisive issues. For instance, police
violence was a topic addressed by accounts in the set, some of
them posing with hashtags such as ``police brutality'' and
``black lives matter'' and other with, quote--or
#bluelivesmatter and #backtheblue.
I know you are familiar with these accounts--I suspect,
these kind of postings from before. Correct? Ms. Floris?
Ms. Floris. Yes, sir.
Mr. Neguse. All right. Mr. Hickey?
Mr. Hickey. Yes, sir.
Mr. Neguse. So, the question I have. Clearly, our law
enforcement agencies are working very hard to try to combat
this disinformation, but it strikes me that the root cause, or
at least one of the root causes, of the disinformation is the
reality of anonymous accounts in these social media engines.
There has been a lot of discussion as to whether or not
universal verification, as opposed to having to constantly be
reactive working with these social media companies like
Facebook is the prime example, that instead, we could get at
the root cause. It would eliminate so much of this
disinformation and misinformation that is being perpetrated at
the American public.
So, I would like to kind of get your sense, Ms. Floris and
Mr. Hickey, as to whether or not that is something that your
agencies, respectfully, have discussed internally and whether
or not it is something you might recommend we take up as a
matter of discussion on a policy basis.
Mr. Hickey. So, sir, I will agree with you that the
anonymity of the Internet generally poses a broad cybersecurity
challenge. I don't know I would say it is the number-one reason
why we have so many challenges of security on the Internet with
respect to foreign influence and others, but it is a leading
one. How you address that, I think, is very tricky. How you
have verification or authenticity in a way that you know who is
emailing--is sending you a message is actually the person they
claim to be.
At the moment, we are--I am not in a position to comment on
legislation or propose it. What we are trying to do is where we
see indications that someone isn't who they claim to be, along
the lines of what DAD Floris said, we will try to--and they tie
to individuals that we are investigating, we will try to tip
the providers to it so they can pierce behind that
anonymization.
We are also currently prosecuting entities that we allege
are tying to the Internet Research Agency in district court
right now, which limits my ability to comment on it. But
certainly, we are hoping to impose consequences for activity
related to 2016.
Chairman Nadler. The gentleman's time has expired. The
gentlelady from Georgia?
Mrs. McBath. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you so much for
convening this hearing today.
Thank you, each and every one of you, for being here.
Voting, I think all of us would agree, is just basically the
foundation of our democracy, and protecting our ability to be
able to vote and protecting our voting infrastructure from
foreign interference is paramount.
In Georgia, where I represent, we have learned that before
the 2016 election, a Russian agent visited the websites of Cobb
and Fulton counties, counties that I represent, looking for
vulnerabilities. While it appears that the agent didn't gain
access to our election system in 2016, we continue to face
attacks to this very day. Just last month, it was reported that
two computers were stolen from both--stolen from Fulton County,
there again, in my district. These computers contained very
sensitive information that relates to every single voter in
Georgia.
So, as we take on these threats I want to make sure that we
are working to build a collaboration and transparency across
the Federal Government, States, and for the American people.
I want to ask each of you about how we can increase this
transparency while also improving election security. Mr.
Hickey, I will start with you. I am curious about your thoughts
on whether States should be treated differently than other
victims that DOJ prosecutes, in terms of sharing victims'
identities. For example, it was reported that the election
systems in two Florida counties were breached, but the
government has not identified which Florida counties were
breached. On one hand, we want to encourage states to represent
and to talk about these vulnerabilities, to report them, and
sharing State-specific information publicly could discourage
such reporting. On the other hand, we want the public to have
confidence in our election system, and we want them to have
confidence in the transparency of our election process.
So, indeed, you testified--and I am sorry that I was not
here this morning, but I have your testimony--you testified,
and I quote, ``Exposure of foreign influence operations
ultimately may be one of the best ways to counter them,'' end
quote. So, can you speak how you think the Federal Government
should navigate disclosing such victim information in the
election security context?
Mr. Hickey. Thank you, ma'am. I appreciate your nuanced
treatment of that issue, because it does implicate a number of
competing values. We do, as the vice chair of the Committee
said, when she gave her opening statement, we want to encourage
and guard the trust of the States so that they are willing to
call the FBI and not worry that we are going to release their
identities or the problem publicly.
Two, I think, core principles. One, we think it is a matter
for State officials to decide when they disclose to their
publics what the threats to their particular infrastructure
have been. So, we will leave it to Florida officials to
communicate with the voters in that State, or any other State,
hey, we worked with the FBI, we have remediated, we have done
X, Y, and Z. We are going to leave it to that sovereign State.
The second key principle, I think, is that it is ultimately
State-level officials who are politically accountable for
certifying the results of an election. So, we are currently--
the FBI is currently reviewing guidance on how to handle victim
notification in the context of elections. It is not out yet, it
is not finalized yet, but I anticipate that we will continue to
notify system owners and operators, which may be local
officials, but also providing a heads-up to the politically
accountable chief State election official or board, so that
they are aware of what the FBI is doing at a more local level.
Mrs. McBath. Thank you. Mr. Masterson and Ms. Floris, I
would like to hear from each of you very briefly on your
agency's transparency policies and whether more transparency is
actually needed.
Mr. Masterson. So, I will speak to that very briefly. So,
as I mentioned prior in the hearing, we have established
communications protocols with the State and local election
officials on how information will be reported, to empower them
to speak to either activity targeting their systems or possible
incidents. Then, most importantly, being transparent in sharing
technical indicators broadly in an unclassified environment to
the entire elections community about what threats are targeting
election systems, so that they can not only take defensive
measures but talk to their voters about the threat being real
and the steps that they are taking to secure the process so
that voters know that they are taking it seriously and
responding.
I think this is where running elections at the State and
local level really is critical. Voters have the ability to
engage directly with those who run elections and have their
questions answered. They can be poll workers. They can watch
pre-election testing of the system. In many States they can
watch post-election auditing. So, how can we empower those
election officials with that information, whether about threat
or activity, to talk directly to the voters and respond.
Ms. Floris. Thank you, ma'am, for your question. Just one
thing I can add in addition to my colleagues on the panel. As I
mentioned in the opening statement, when it comes to being
transparent, one of the prongs of our strategy within FITF is
to share intelligence and information as quickly as possible
and to whoever needs to receive that information. Certainly,
that is not a decision the FBI can make unilaterally. It
involves all Members who are dabbling in the election security
space, including individuals outside just the four Members on
this panel. Rest assured, it is certainly one of our strategies
to be as forward-leaning as we can in sharing actionable
intelligence to the people who need to receive it.
Mrs. McBath. Thank you.
Chairman Nadler. The time of the gentlelady has expired.
The gentlelady from Pennsylvania?
Ms. Dean. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to sincerely
thank all of you for being here and representing to us the
important work you are doing to protect our elections. We take
this very, very seriously, and I can see that you do too. So,
for the viewing public, we have the Department of Homeland
Security. We have the FBI. We have the Department of Justice.
We have U.S. Election Assistance Commission. You are so
important on the front line, and we are here to partner with
you.
I will start this question kind of quickly to Ms. Floris.
On October 8th, just this month, 2019, the Senate Intelligence
Committee published its second volume of its investigation on
Russia's interference in the 2016 elections and the U.S.
Government's response to that attack. The report concluded that
in October of 2017, a counterintelligence division at FBI
tasked an outside contractor to identify Russian influence
activity on Twitter. As the report explains, that suggests,
quote, ``FBI either lacked resources or viewed the work in this
vein as not warranting more institutionalized consideration.''
Ms. Floris, the Senate committee's report is concerning. Do
you believe you have enough resources at FBI to investigate and
protect our elections?
Ms. Floris. Thank you, ma'am, for that question. As I have
said, we can always use more resources, but that being said, we
are throwing everything we have against the foreign influence
threat. We have shifted resources to the Counterintelligence
Division for that very purpose. We continue to engage with all
56 of our field offices to ensure that they are tracking the
threat as closely as we are within the FITF.
Ms. Dean. So, are you using--how often are you using
outside contractors, or are you moving away from that,
particularly in the issue of election security?
Ms. Floris. Ma'am, I can't speak specifically on the use of
outside contractors within our workforce. We do have
contractors throughout many parts of the FBI. I can't
specifically as to how many are working on the foreign
influence threat. I can certainly take that back.
Ms. Dean. Yeah, we would love that information if you could
share it with us. Can you tell us whether we have ever, or
would ever use an outside contractor from, say, Russia, Iran,
China, North Korea? Do you know?
Ms. Floris. Ma'am, I would defer that question to our Human
Resources Division and our Security Division.
Ms. Dean. Okay. We will follow up.
I would like to ask each of you the same thing. Do you have
adequate resources at each of your departments and do you use
outside contractors? I will start with Mr. Masterson.
Mr. Masterson. Thank you, ma'am. We have the resources we
need to build on the success that we had in 2018 and continue
to support State and local election officials. Certainly, with
more resources comes greater capacity and responsiveness, the
ability to increase support from the EI-ISAC or build on
something like remote penetration testing. But we certainly
have what we need to build on the success, and I defer you also
to Human Resources and Security.
Ms. Dean. Mr. Hovland?
Mr. Hovland. I would say that the Election Assistance
Commission absolutely does not have the resources that we need.
I would also echo that the fiscal year 2018 $380 million that
went to the States, while that was a great first step it did
not provide the States with the funding levels to solve all the
challenges that they face. As I mentioned earlier, we have seen
people prioritizing from a menu of options, but there are a
number of things that State and local election officials could
do, and additional funding is crucial to help them do that.
Ms. Dean. We would love that information. Thank you for
sharing that with us.
Mr. Hickey?
Mr. Hickey. Ma'am, briefly, the 2020 budget would increase
funding for the Counterintelligence Section, which I supervise,
which would help our efforts to confront maligned foreign
influence and national state-sponsored hacking.
I don't think we employ contractors specifically for this
area of work, though, of course, we do have contractors working
in the Justice Department, and they are vetted, and I will
defer to others to explain how they are vetted.
I will say choosing contractors sometimes reflects our
judgment. There are folks with particular technical expertise
that we can bring on and use them in our, you know, foreign
investment security reviews. We have contractors on board and
use them because they have particular experience that we, as
lawyers, do not have.
Ms. Dean. Do you use any foreign contractors from, say,
Russia, China, Iran?
Mr. Hickey. What I do know is that we vet contractors, and
they have to be screened for a security clearance. So, I can't
speak to their nationalities but I know they would be vetted.
Ms. Dean. Okay. What is concerning to us, or to me, is that
the President's fiscal year 2020 budget proposal would cut
funding to CISA, especially troubling since 2020 is the
Presidential election year. Each of you, Robert Mueller, and
many others have said the threat is persistent, pervasive,
sweeping, systematic.
Maybe I will end on this question, real quickly. I wanted
to follow up, Ms. Floris, that you talked about the
disinformation. Could you be specific as to the disinformation
that you were able--give us a concrete example of what it
looked like? How were we disinformed? How were voters
disinformed? Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Floris. Ma'am, are you talking about leading into the
2016 election--
Ms. Dean. Yes.
Ms. Floris. --or 2018 election? I can't speak in specifics
about that right now, but I can certainly take that question
back.
Ms. Dean. Okay. Thank you very much. Thank you.
Chairman Nadler. The gentlelady yields back. The gentlelady
from Texas.
Ms. Escobar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and many thanks to
our witnesses. I really appreciate your presence here today and
your work.
I am still very concerned, and I think the American public
should still be very concerned about our elections approaching
in 2020. We know that three years ago Russia was wildly
successful in attacking our democracy by attacking our
elections, and despite the information that we have and despite
the unified voice from our intelligence community, we have a
President who is cutting resources to our election security. It
is stunning to me that the President of the United States would
be willing to erode our election security instead of fighting
to keep it safe.
Our voting machines are still outdated. Many of the
vulnerabilities remain today. So, we should all be very
concerned, and I hope that you all will continue your work to
confront the obstacles ahead of you and to inform the American
public.
With that said, we know that Special Counsel Mueller's
indictment against several Russian entities noted that one of
the ways that they interfered with our 2016 election was by
encouraging minority voters not to participate in elections. In
fact, the Pew Research Center found that in 2016, African
American turnout dropped by 20 percent, despite the fact that
we had record turnout in the country. The report detailed the
complex strategies Russia used to target the African American
community and to discourage African Americans from voting.
Starting with Mr. Masterson, for each one of you, please,
what steps specifically are you taking to combat interference
efforts to discourage minority groups from voting, and are
those steps sufficient?
Mr. Masterson. Thank you for your question, ma'am. Our
focus, in coordination with the FBI's Foreign Influence Task
Force, is really on building resilience in the American people,
talking to them about how they are being targeted with
disinformation, where the source of information, the trusted
source of information regarding the election process or
otherwise would be.
So, we have created a variety of products and then are
working with various communities and groups, so reaching out to
groups like the NAACP, AARP, or others, to provide those
resources to them, recognizing they are the trusted voice in
that community that can talk to their Members about how they
may be targeted with disinformation and how to respond.
Ms. Floris. Thank you, ma'am, for your question. I will
just piggyback on that response, with this whole concept of
media literacy with the American public. We cannot stress
enough to every American city to understand when, how, where to
vote. Your vote matters and it is up to you to have that media
literacy to understand essentially truth in where you are
obtaining your information.
On the more practice side of the house, again, I will hit
on our engagement with social media companies and our
willingness to engage with them to share threat indicators as
it relates to disinformation, when we know that a foreign actor
is trying to propagate disinformation using their platforms and
continuing that dialogue and engagement with the social media
companies as we roll into 2020.
Mr. Hickey. DAD Floris referred to nefarious actors. Part
of what the Justice Department does is help the FBI investigate
those actors. So, we are often there to obtain legal process of
various forms, to investigate what foreign actors are doing,
and that information can be part of the information that
ultimately is shared with the providers, to confront the
disinformation you are suggesting.
Mr. Hovland. When the disinformation crosses over to talk
about the election process or election Administration issues,
like when you vote or how to register or how to participate,
that would certainly be where it would fall into our interest
area. In doing that we are really working with State and locals
to encourage their voters or their citizens to participate, to
be able to identify trusted sources of information, be able to
check their voter registration to make sure it is updated and
accurate, and those are--that is where our focus has been.
Ms. Escobar. Ms. Floris, I have two follow-up questions for
you.
Number one, you mentioned working with social media outlets
on preventing the spread of disinformation. We sometimes have
American candidates repeating disinformation provided by
Russia, for example. Do you alert social media about that kind
of disinformation that is coming from American candidates? That
is number one.
Number two, what specific steps did you take, if any, to
identify whether there were foreign efforts, similar to those
used in 2016, to discourage minority voters, whether they were
used again in 2018?
Ms. Floris. Thank you, ma'am, for your question. I will
address your first question. The FBI cannot be the truth
police. It is not our job to police content as to whether true
or false information is being propagated. Again, we start with
the foreign actors, that foreign aspect of what we do that is
of investigative interest to the FBI. That is the information
that we then provide to the social media providers, and it is
really up to those providers to determine whether or not that
content violates their own terms of service.
Regarding what steps we saw in 2018, if we saw the same
activity that we saw in 2016, certainly not at the same level,
and I really tout that to the success of the interagency
collaboration, and again, our work with the social media
companies.
Ms. Escobar. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Nadler. The gentlelady yields back. The gentleman
from Georgia?
Mr. Johnson of Georgia. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you all for being here today.
In February of 2019, DOJ and DHS issued a joint statement
concluding that there was, quote, ``no evidence to date that
any identified activities of a foreign government or agency had
a material impact,'' end quote, on the 2018 election. Now, Mr.
Hickey and Mr. Masterson, your agencies reached this conclusion
because the intelligence community didn't detect a threat.
Correct?
Mr. Hickey. I think that is more or less right. The EO,
which is what the report was issued under, sets forth a two-
step process--the IC, including the FBI, gather reports, and
then we evaluate the materiality of any impact.
Mr. Johnson of Georgia. I understand, but the intelligence
community did not detect a threat, and that is why you issued
your proclamation that no evidence to date was that any
identified activities of a foreign government had a material
impact on the election.
State and local officials also did not detect a threat.
Isn't that correct?
Mr. Hickey. Well, so I think the IC did gather a report of
actions that had the intent and purpose of interfering. So,
when you say threat, threat means, to us, intent and purpose.
State election officials--
Mr. Johnson of Georgia. They didn't detect a successful
threat.
Mr. Hickey. That is my understanding.
Mr. Johnson of Georgia. Okay. All right. Thank you.
Now you concluded also that Albert sensors did not detect a
threat. Correct?
Mr. Masterson. So, Albert sensors regularly, across the
country, regularly detect possible malicious activity against
election infrastructure.
Mr. Johnson of Georgia. None was detected for 2018.
Mr. Masterson. I am not aware of any foreign adversary
interfering or gaining access to election infrastructure in
2018.
Mr. Johnson of Georgia. Now isn't it possible that an
attacker could have accessed and changed voter databases
without being detected in 2018? Isn't it possible? Yes or no.
Mr. Masterson. So, we have no information to suggest that
occurred.
Mr. Johnson of Georgia. All right. Fair enough. Now Mr.
Hovland, your testimony was that 8,000 local jurisdictions
conduct elections. Many of those local jurisdictions used
direct recording electronic voting machines, also known as
touch-screen electronic voting machines, in the 2016
presidential elections and in the 2018 presidential elections.
In investigating election interference after the 2016
presidential election, how many of the tens of thousands of
direct recording electronic voting machines used in that
election were subjected to a forensic audit by any Federal
agency?
Mr. Hovland. I am not aware of forensic audits that were
performed.
Mr. Johnson of Georgia. What about any other type of
testing or analysis on any direct recording electronic voting
machines used in the 2018 elections?
Mr. Hovland. I would say that as far as the Election
Assistance Commission goes, that--
Mr. Johnson of Georgia. Are you aware of any Federal
agencies that have conducted any analysis of direct recording
electronic voting machines used in the 2018 or 2016 elections?
Mr. Hickey. So, we haven't been asked, and I don't think it
is our role to audit election systems. The States certify the
accuracy of the votes.
Mr. Johnson of Georgia. I understand. My question is just
simply having the Federal Government use its resources to look
at or conduct a forensic audit of any voting machines, any
direct recording voting machines, either in 2016 or 2018. It
appears that the answer is no. Would anybody disagree with
that?
Mr. Hickey. To the best of my knowledge that is correct. We
have not been asked to second-guess the State certification of
accuracy.
Mr. Johnson of Georgia. Okay. I am concerned about the 2020
election, especially considering the insecurity of our voting
machines that has come to light in the past three years, and I
would like to hear from the representative agencies the
response plan should our elections be successfully hacked in
2020. What would be the Federal response to a successful
hacking in 2020?
Chairman Nadler. The gentleman's time has expired. The
witnesses may answer the question.
Mr. Masterson. Thank you, sir. I will keep it short. DHS
stands prepared to offer a number of incident response
services, including deployment of teams to the locality or
State, depending on the impacted infrastructure, in order to
conduct analysis and work to mitigate the impacts of a possible
cyber intrusion on election infrastructure. In addition, we
have numerous analysis capabilities remotely that we can
provide to help determine if there is, in fact, an intrusion,
and the best way to mitigate it.
Ms. Floris. Sir, the FBI would work certainly in concert
with CISA if there were an intrusion detected. We would use all
our investigative might to ensure that we can determine
attribution and potentially bring about criminal charges, if
need be.
Mr. Hickey. Obviously we try to prevent it. If we got
indications that a State were being targeted, we would try to
help them batten down the hatches before an intrusion was
successful.
Mr. Hovland. I would say, on a positive note, that both
with the fiscal year 2018 $380 million and other resources that
the number of paperless machines that are left out there has
decreased substantially, and over 90 percent of Americans will
be voting with some type of paper audit trail.
Mr. Johnson of Georgia. Thank you.
Chairman Nadler. The gentleman's time has expired. The
gentlelady from Florida.
Ms. Mucarsel-Powell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
coming here this morning to such an important hearing.
It has been confirmed, and we have talked about this
several times today, that all the main intelligence agencies
confirmed that Russia interfered in the 2016 elections in a
sweeping and systematic fashion, and it wasn't just a single
attempt. We have heard from several witnesses in prior hearings
that they are actually engaging in interference currently, as
we speak.
So, I want to ask this, and I think Chairman may have asked
this previously, but I want to get an answer from each and
every one of you. Do you think it is appropriate for a sitting
President, or any elected official, for that matter, to ask a
foreign government to interfere in our elections?
Mr. Hovland. No.
Mr. Hickey. I don't like the word ``appropriate,'' ma'am,
but I will say that we would urge anyone who has indications of
such interference to come to the FBI and work with us so we can
investigate criminal violations.
Ms. Floris. I would echo what my DOJ colleague said. We are
certainly interested in any criminal activity as it relates to
foreign influence.
Mr. Masterson. No.
Ms. Mucarsel-Powell. Thank you. During the 2016 hacking,
Florida, my home state, was hacked and singled out by the
Russian government. They targeted voter registration systems
and they were able to successfully hack into at least the
systems of two different counties. We actually got a security
briefing from the FBI and others on that issue.
So, one of the things that I asked during that briefing is
if they could say with certainty that hackers didn't manipulate
the data, and I was told that they actually could not, that you
could not say with certainty that these hackers did not
manipulate the data. Can you confirm that again with me today,
please?
Mr. Hickey. I wasn't at the closed briefing, and I don't
know what touches on classified or unclassified information.
What I do know is we have said we have no indication to believe
that there was any material impact on the ability to vote or
the counting or tabulation of votes. I believe to be correct.
Ms. Mucarsel-Powell. I asked specifically about the data.
That is why I think that they answered that. Ms. Floris?
Ms. Floris. I would just echo what my DOJ colleague said,
ma'am. I certainly was not at the closed hearing, but I have no
reason to doubt what was briefed to you during that time.
Ms. Mucarsel-Powell. Thank you. I know that there is a
group now in DHS working with Federal, State, and local
officials to secure our elections. It is called the Election
Infrastructure Subsector Government Coordinating Council. The
council is working to improve security protocols and works with
local and State election officials so they can respond to
threats quickly.
So, Mr. Masterson and Mr. Hovland, is Florida part of that
council?
Mr. Masterson. Yes. Florida actually has two local
representative that are on the Government Coordinating Council,
and work with us.
Ms. Mucarsel-Powell. Can you just very briefly describe the
progress of that group?
Mr. Masterson. Absolutely. The growth and engagement of the
Government Coordinating Council since its establishment in 2018
has been great. We have 24 State and local Members that
represent a vast array of the community. So, they represent
secretaries of state, State election directors, local election
officials from across the country. The purpose of that group is
to inform CISA's approach to helping them secure elections. So,
what is their view of risk, what services support and
information sharing would be help them manage that risk, and
how do we grow that trusted relationship so that they feel
comfortable sharing back with us.
Ms. Mucarsel-Powell. Thank you. I am going to move on now
to a different topic here. Mr. Masterson, on May 1st, 2019,
Director Krebs testified that the President still had not
received a briefing on Russia interference in the 2020
elections. Yes or no? Are you aware of DHS briefing the
President on Russian interference in the 2020 elections?
Mr. Masterson. I am not aware but that doesn't mean it
didn't happen. I am operational so that is above my level. I
will say we engage regularly in coordination with the NSC
across the whole of government on this election security work.
Ms. Mucarsel-Powell. Do you know if your agency has tried
to meet with the President on election security?
Mr. Masterson. I don't know but that doesn't mean it hasn't
happened.
Ms. Mucarsel-Powell. Do you think it would be important for
the President to understand the threat picture facing the 2020
elections before he allocates resources to agencies on election
security?
Mr. Masterson. I think the work we have done across the NSC
has provided the information and work that we have done to
coordinate that, and so I assume that is part of the NSC's
coordination with us.
Ms. Mucarsel-Powell. Okay. Thank you. The same question,
Ms. Floris and Mr. Hickey. How many times has your agency met
with the President to discuss election security?
Ms. Floris. Thank you for the question, ma'am. I can't
answer that specifically. Again, that doesn't mean that it has
not happened. I just don't know personally.
Mr. Hickey. Same answer, ma'am.
Ms. Mucarsel-Powell. Okay. Do you think it would be
important, though, for your agencies to discuss election
security with the President?
Mr. Hickey. I think it is important for the President to
understand the national security threats facing the country,
yes.
Ms. Mucarsel-Powell. Ms. Floris?
Ms. Floris. I think it is important for everyone to
understand the national security threats facing the country,
especially as it relates to election security.
Ms. Mucarsel-Powell. Thank you so much.
Chairman Nadler. The gentlelady yields back.
This concludes today's hearing. We thank all our witnesses
for participating. Without objection, all Members will have
five legislative days to submit additional written questions
for the witnesses or additional materials for the record.
Again, we thank everyone. Without objection, the hearing is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:39 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX
=======================================================================
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]