[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]




 
   PROTECTING AND SECURING CHEMICAL FACILITIES FROM TERRORIST ATTACKS

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

             SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE

                                 OF THE

                    COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                     ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                           SEPTEMBER 11, 2019

                               __________

                           Serial No. 116-59
                           
                           
                           
                           
  [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]                         


      Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce

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             U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 
45-311 PDF           WASHINGTON : 2022                        
                        
                        

                    COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE

                     FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey
                                 Chairman
BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois              GREG WALDEN, Oregon
ANNA G. ESHOO, California              Ranking Member
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York             FRED UPTON, Michigan
DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado              JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois
MIKE DOYLE, Pennsylvania             MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas
JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois             STEVE SCALISE, Louisiana
G. K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina    ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio
DORIS O. MATSUI, California          CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
KATHY CASTOR, Florida                BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky
JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland           PETE OLSON, Texas
JERRY McNERNEY, California           DAVID B. McKINLEY, West Virginia
PETER WELCH, Vermont                 ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico            H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia
PAUL TONKO, New York                 GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York, Vice     BILL JOHNSON, Ohio
    Chair                            BILLY LONG, Missouri
DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa                 LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana
KURT SCHRADER, Oregon                BILL FLORES, Texas
JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,               SUSAN W. BROOKS, Indiana
    Massachusetts                    MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma
TONY CARDENAS, California            RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina
RAUL RUIZ, California                TIM WALBERG, Michigan
SCOTT H. PETERS, California          EARL L. ``BUDDY'' CARTER, Georgia
DEBBIE DINGELL, Michigan             JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina
MARC A. VEASEY, Texas                GREG GIANFORTE, Montana
ANN M. KUSTER, New Hampshire
ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
NANETTE DIAZ BARRAGAN, California
A. DONALD McEACHIN, Virginia
LISA BLUNT ROCHESTER, Delaware
DARREN SOTO, Florida
TOM O'HALLERAN, Arizona
                                 ------                                

                           Professional Staff

                   JEFFREY C. CARROLL, Staff Director
                TIFFANY GUARASCIO, Deputy Staff Director
                MIKE BLOOMQUIST, Minority Staff Director
             Subcommittee on Environment and Climate Change

                          PAUL TONKO, New York
                                 Chairman
YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York           JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois
SCOTT H. PETERS, California            Ranking Member
NANETTE DIAZ BARRAGAN, California    CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
A. DONALD McEACHIN, Virginia         DAVID B. McKINLEY, West Virginia
LISA BLUNT ROCHESTER, Delaware       BILL JOHNSON, Ohio
DARREN SOTO, Florida                 BILLY LONG, Missouri
DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado              BILL FLORES, Texas
JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois             MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma
DORIS O. MATSUI, California          EARL L. ``BUDDY'' CARTER, Georgia
JERRY McNERNEY, California           JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina
RAUL RUIZ, California, Vice Chair    GREG WALDEN, Oregon (ex officio)
DEBBIE DINGELL, Michigan
FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey (ex 
    officio)
    
                             C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
Hon. Paul Tonko, a Representative in Congress from the State of 
  New York, opening statement....................................     1
    Prepared statement...........................................     3
Hon. John Shimkus, a Representative in Congress from the State of 
  Illinois, opening statement....................................     4
    Prepared statement...........................................     5
Hon. Frank Pallone, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the 
  State of New Jersey, opening statement.........................     6
    Prepared statement...........................................     8
Hon. Greg Walden, a Representative in Congress from the State of 
  Oregon, prepared statement.....................................     9
    Prepared statement...........................................    10

                               Witnesses

David Wulf, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure 
  Protection, Department of Homeland Security....................    11
    Prepared statement...........................................    14
    Answers to submitted questions...............................   147
 John Paul Smith, Legislative Representative, United Steelworkers    47
    Prepared statement...........................................    50
Michele L. Roberts, National Co-Coordinator, Environmental 
  Justice Health Alliance........................................    58
    Prepared statement...........................................    60
Scott Whelchel, Chief Security Officer and Global Director of 
  Emergency Services and Security for Dow........................    63
    Prepared statement...........................................    65
    Answers to submitted questions...............................   149
Matthew Fridley, Corporate Manager of Safety, Health, and 
  Security, Brenntag North America, Inc..........................    70
    Prepared statement...........................................    73
    Answers to submitted questions...............................   155

                           Submitted Material

H.R. 3256 the Protecting and Securing Chemical Facilities from 
  Terrorist Attacks Act of 2019..................................    94
Letter of August 23, 2019, from The Chemical Facilities Anti-
  Terrorism Standards Coalition, to Mr. Pallone and Mr. Walden, 
  submitted by Mr. Tonko.........................................   131
Letter of September 11, 2019, from Ross Eisenberg, Vice 
  President, Energy and Resources Policy, the National 
  Association of Manufacturers, to Mr. Tonko and Mr. Shimkus, 
  submitted by Mr. Tonko.........................................   137
Statement of September 10, 2019, from Timothy R. Gablehouse, 
  Past-President/Director Government Affairs, the National 
  Association of SARA Title III Program Officials, submitted by 
  Mr. Tonko......................................................   141
Letter from Chris Jahn, President and CEO, The Fertilizer 
  Institute and Darrin Coppock, President and CEO, The 
  Agricultural Retailers Association, to Mr. Tonko and Mr. 
  Shimkus, submitted by Mr. Tonko................................   144


   PROTECTING AND SECURING CHEMICAL FACILITIES FROM TERRORIST ATTACKS

                              ----------                              


                     WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 11, 2019

                  House of Representatives,
    Subcommittee on Environment and Climate Change,
                          Committee on Energy and Commerce,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in 
the John D. Dingell Room 2123, Rayburn House Office Building, 
Hon. Paul Tonko (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
    Present: Representatives Tonko, Clarke, Peters, Barragan, 
Blunt Rochester, Soto, DeGette, Schakowsky, Matsui, McNerney, 
Ruiz, Dingell, Pallone (ex officio), Shimkus (subcommittee 
ranking member), Rodgers, McKinley, Johnson, Long, Flores, 
Mullin, Carter, Duncan, and Walden (ex officio).
    Staff present: Jacqueline Cohen, Chief Environment Counsel; 
Adam Fischer, Policy Analyst; Rick Kessler, Senior Advisor and 
Staff Director, Energy and Environment; Brendan Larkin, Policy 
Coordinator; Mel Peffers, Environment Fellow; Anthony 
Gutierrez, Professional Staff Member; Jerry Couri, Minority 
Deputy Chief Counsel, Environment and Climate Change; Peter 
Kielty, Minority General Counsel; Mary Martin, Minority Chief 
Counsel, Energy and Environment and Climate Change; Brandon 
Mooney, Minority Deputy Chief Counsel, Energy; and Brannon 
Rains, Minority Legislative Clerk.
    Mr. Tonko. The Subcommittee on Environment and Climate 
Change will now come to order.

   OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL TONKO, A REPRESENTATIVE IN 
              CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

    I recognize myself for 5 minutes for the purposes of an 
opening statement.
    The events of September 11th transformed how we think about 
what it means to be safe in our communities. America responded 
with a national mobilization to confront the threat of future 
attacks, including the establishment of programs like the one 
we will consider here today.
    We learned a hard lesson that we must always be vigilant 
and acknowledge that our federal government, including this 
Committee, plays a critical role in safeguarding the health and 
safety of the people working in, living near, and responding to 
incidents at our Nation's high-risk chemical facilities.
    Thank you to our colleagues on the Homeland Security 
Committee for starting this process. Mr. Richmond and Chairman 
Thompson's bill, H.R. 3256, the Protecting and Securing 
Chemical Facilities from Terrorist Attacks Act of 2019, is the 
basis for today's legislative hearing.
    Since 2007, chemical facilities have been regulated to 
address risks under the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism 
Standards, or CFATS, program that has been implemented by the 
Department of Homeland Security.
    CFATS is an important part of our Nation's counterterrorism 
efforts to secure high-risk chemical facilities. Under CFATS, 
around 3,300 manufacturing, handling, and storage facilities 
must implement risk-based performance standards in some 18 
areas.
    The program received its first multiyear extension in 2014. 
And in January of this year, Congress acted to extend the 
program through April of 2020 and prevent a potentially 
dangerous lapse.
    It is my hope that this committee will once again find 
bipartisan agreement on a multiyear CFATS extension that can be 
supported by the leadership of both House committees of 
jurisdiction from both sides of the aisle.
    Everyone here understands the importance of a multiyear 
extension, which would give the program a final measure of 
certainty and stability, but as Congress considers the CFATS 
reauthorization, we cannot afford to overlook this opportunity 
to reinforce what is working well and address what could be 
improved.
    Today, I expect to hear that this program generally enjoys 
support from chemical manufacturers, distributors, and workers 
at these sites. But there remain numerous ways in which it 
could be strengthened. I am open to hearing suggestions, 
especially those that help ensure workers in local communities 
are being consulted and participating appropriately in the 
program and receiving the information they need to stay safe.
    I also want to hear from our witnesses how the program can 
greater incentivize risk reduction, not just risk management. 
Risk reduction is ultimately the best way to ensure the 
protection of workers in frontline communities.
    With that said, I am skeptical of any change that would 
create new security gaps by allowing for additional exemptions 
to the program. We need, instead, to be looking more 
holistically at the threats facing these facilities. Without 
question, they are evolving, and not just from terrorism and 
malicious acts. When it comes to protecting workers, first 
responders in surrounding communities, safety and resilience 
are as important as security.
    Chemical fires, explosions, and releases can have serious 
consequences, regardless of whether an incident was an 
accident, a natural disaster, or an act of terrorism. We saw in 
the aftermath of Hurricane Harvey in Texas that extreme weather 
can be just as big a threat as more traditional security 
concerns.
    The people working at these facilities and living in nearby 
communities should be able to expect the same measure of 
protection and risk mitigation. And I hope the appropriate 
agencies will work to ensure the development of industry 
guidance to help facilities assess their risks from extreme 
weather.
    September 11, 2001, forever changed how our Nation thinks 
about security. We have achieved much in the 18 years since, 
but we cannot rest on our heels or become stagnant in our 
thinking. Threats to chemical facilities continue to evolve, 
from cybersecurity to extreme weather events. And the programs 
that guarantee the safety of workers, first responders, and 
frontline communities must also evolve to meet these threats.
    Thank you to Mr. Wulf for appearing before the subcommittee 
once again, and I also welcome our witnesses on the second 
panel.
    With that, I look forward to today's discussion, and I 
yield back.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Tonko follows:]

                 Prepared Statement of Hon. Paul Tonko

    The events of September 11th transformed how we think about 
what it means to be safe in our communities.
    America responded with a national mobilization to confront 
the threat of future attacks, including the establishment of 
programs like the one we will consider today. We learned a hard 
lesson that we must always be vigilant, and acknowledge that 
our federal government--including this Committee--plays a 
critical role in safeguarding the health and safety of the 
people working in, living near, and responding to incidents at 
our nation's high-risk chemical facilities.
    Thank you to our colleagues on the Homeland Security 
Committee for starting this process. Mr. Richmond and Chairman 
Thompson's bill, H.R. 3256, the Protecting and Securing 
Chemical Facilities from Terrorist Attacks Act of 2019, is the 
basis for today's legislative hearing.
    Since 2007, chemical facilities have been regulated to 
address risks under the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism 
Standards, or CFATS program implemented by the Department of 
Homeland Security.
    CFATS is an important part of our nation's counterterrorism 
efforts to secure high-risk chemical facilities.
    Under CFATS, around 3,300 manufacturing, handling, and 
storage facilities must implement risk-based performance 
standards in 18 areas.
    The program received its first multi-year extension in 
2014, and in January of this year, Congress acted to extend the 
program through April 2020 and prevent a potentially dangerous 
lapse.
    It is my hope that this Committee will once again find 
bipartisan agreement on a multi-year CFATS extension that can 
be supported by the leadership on both House committees of 
jurisdiction from both sides of the aisle.
    Everyone here understands the importance of a multi-year 
extension, which would give the program a vital measure of 
certainty and stability.
    But as Congress considers a CFATS reauthorization, we 
cannot afford to overlook this opportunity to reinforce what is 
working well and address what could be improved.
    Today I expect to hear that this program generally enjoys 
support from chemical manufacturers, distributors, and workers 
at these sites, but there remain numerous ways in which it 
could be strengthened.
    I am open to hearing suggestions, especially those that 
help ensure workers and local communities are being consulted 
and participating appropriately in the program and receiving 
the information they need to stay safe.
    I also want to hear from our witnesses how the program can 
greater incentivize risk reduction, not just risk management.
    Risk reduction is ultimately the best way to ensure the 
protection of workers and frontline communities.
    With that said, I am skeptical of any change that would 
create new security gaps by allowing for additional exemptions 
to the program.
    We need instead to be looking more holistically at the 
threats facing these facilities. Without question, they are 
evolving, and not just from terrorism and malicious acts.
    When it comes to protecting workers, first responders, and 
surrounding communities, safety and resilience are as important 
as security.
    Chemical fires, explosions, and releases can have serious 
consequences regardless of whether an incident was an accident, 
a natural disaster, or an act of terrorism.
    We saw in the aftermath of Hurricane Harvey in Texas that 
extreme weather can be just as big a threat as more traditional 
security concerns.
    The people working at these facilities and living in nearby 
communities should be able to expect the same measure of 
protection and risk mitigation.
    And I hope the appropriate agencies will work to ensure the 
development of industry guidance to help facilities assess 
their risks from extreme weather.
    September 11, 2001 forever changed how our nation thinks 
about security.
    We have achieved much in the 18 years since, but we cannot 
rest on our heels or become stagnant in our thinking.
    Threats to chemical facilities continue to evolve--from 
cybersecurity to extreme weather events--and the programs that 
guarantee the safety of workers, first responders, and 
frontline communities must also evolve to meet these threats.
    Thank you to Mr. Wulf for appearing before the Subcommittee 
once again, and I also welcome our witnesses on the second 
panel. I look forward to today's discussion, and I yield back.

    The Chair now recognizes the ranker of the subcommittee, 
Representative Shimkus of Illinois.

  OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN SHIMKUS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN 
              CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

    Mr. Shimkus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the time.
    Today, the subcommittee will not only check in on the 
progress of the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards 
program, commonly known as CFATS, at the Department of Homeland 
Security but also review legislation introduced to both save 
the program's authority from expiring as well as make 
significant changes to the program.
    The CFATS program, which Congress first authorized in the 
fall of 2006, was a continuation of congressional efforts since 
the terror attacks that occurred 18 years ago today. This law, 
then referred to as Section 550, surgically and directly 
addressed gaps in Federal law regarding terrorism and other 
intentional acts against high-risk facilities due to their use 
or possession of chemicals of concern at levels of concern.
    The core of this new security-focused law was a process 
where DHS issued risk-based performance standards that required 
vulnerability assessments and site security plans by covered 
facilities. Most importantly, to avoid overlapping with other 
Federal programs, CFATS was designed to foster collaboration 
between government and regulated parties.
    Unfortunately, the early years of CFATS program 
implementation were marked with several growing pains, some 
more hurtful than others. No one knows that more than our 
witness from the Department of Homeland Security, David Wulf. I 
said last June that his commitment and longevity with the 
program make him the Cal Ripken of CFATS, and I think others 
would agree with me.
    Last June, we learned that Mr. Wulf not only set many 
remedial goals to address the issues he and the Government 
Accountability Office found in the CFATS program, under his 
watch tremendous progress has been made towards correcting 
those programs, reinvigorating morale, improving communication, 
and reviving the confidence in the CFATS program.
    My congratulations to you.
    I think today CFATS has earned an extension of this program 
authority. That is great, but Congress needs to ensure the 
CFATS program is a success, because it is a success, and not 
just because of the leadership of one or two people. After Cal 
Ripken retired, his team took ten years to recover to a 
competitive position. Given that stopping terrorism is CFATS' 
job, we should not assume stability after so much change to 
correct this program's problems.
    That is why I don't believe that CFATS needs to expand its 
mission. I am concerned by provisions in H.R. 3256 that either 
provide DHS authority to offer CFATS to unregulated facilities 
or require study of those facilities exempted from CFATS 
facilities--exempted because Congress gave them their own anti-
terrorism programs for their unique circumstances.
    I am also concerned about the precedent for layering 
specific requirements onto site security plan approval, no 
matter how well-meaning, when meeting the risk-based 
performance standards already accomplishes those requirements.
    A third thing that bothers me in this legislation is the 
redefinition of ``risk'' for the CFATS program and the 
directive to deploy that new definition. The existing 
definition of ``risk'' for CFATS--vulnerability, threat, 
consequence--is based on GAO recommendations and the National 
Infrastructure Protection Program.
    One of the biggest problems DHS had to rectify is that the 
CFATS program used an incomplete definition of ``risk'' that 
discounted vulnerability and placed more facilities into the 
program and at higher-risk categories. DHS spent years undoing 
this mess, but the legislation acts as if the mistakes were 
correcting the risk formula to make it more consistent.
    More significantly, I am concerned that this legislation 
rolls back essential protection and vulnerability information 
that would create a roadmap for terrorists. There are multiple 
Federal laws that require disclosure of information to the 
public and first responders for any number of reasons. The 
difference between this bill and those laws is that CFATS 
information is not focused on pollution or accidents, but how a 
high-risk chemical is being protected from theft or intentional 
detonation. First responders and local officials already have 
access to this information if they have a need to know and are 
trained in handling it. Making this information public will 
cause material, physical, and economic harm to these facilities 
and their communities.
    My misgivings aside, I look forward to receiving language 
from you, Mr. Chairman, and meaningfully working with my 
colleagues to a good place where we can support this bill when 
it gets marked up.
    I want to thank our witnesses for being with us today, and 
I look forward to the meaningful dialogue with them.
    With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Shimkus follows:]

                Prepared Statement of Hon. John Shimkus

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman for yielding me this time.
    Today, the Subcommittee will not only check in on the 
progress of the Chemical Facilities Anti-Terrorism Standards 
Program at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), but also 
review legislation introduced to both save the program's 
authority from expiring as well as make significant changes to 
the program.
    The CFATS program, which Congress first authorized in the 
fall 2006, was a continuation of congressional efforts since 
the terror attacks that occurred eighteen years ago today. This 
law--then referred to as section 550--surgically and directly 
address gaps in Federal law regarding terrorism or other 
intentional acts against high-risk facilities due to their use 
or possession of chemicals of concern at levels of concern. The 
core of this new security-focused law was a process where DHS 
issued risk-based performance standards that required 
vulnerability assessments and site security plans by covered 
facilities. Most importantly, to avoid overlapping with other 
Federal programs, CFATS was designed to foster collaboration 
between the government and regulated parties.
    Unfortunately, the early years of CFATS program 
implementation were marked with several growing pains, some 
more hurtful than others. No one knows that more that our 
witness from the Department of Homeland Security, David Wulf. I 
said last June that his commitment and longevity with the 
program make him the Cal Ripken of CFATS--and I think others 
would agree with me.
    Last June, we learned that Mr. Wulf not only set many 
remedial goals to address issues he and the Government 
Accountability Office found in the CFATS program; under his 
watch, tremendous progress was made towards correcting those 
problems, reinvigorating morale, improving communication, and 
reviving confidence in the CFATS program. I think today's CFATS 
has earned an extension of its program authority.
    That's great, but Congress needs to ensure that the CFATS 
program is a success because it is a success and not just 
because of the leadership of one or two people--after Mr. 
Ripken retired, his team took ten years to recover to a 
competitive position. Given that stopping terrorism is CFATS's 
job, we should not assume stability after so much change to 
correct this program's problems.
    This is why I don't believe that CFATS needs to expand its 
mission. I am concerned by provisions in H.R. 3256 that either 
provide DHS authority to offer CFATS to unregulated facilities 
or require study of those facilities exempted from CFATS--
facilities exempted because Congress gave them their own anti-
terror programs for their unique circumstances.
    I am also concerned about the precedent of layering 
specific requirements onto site security plan approval, no 
matter how well-meaning, when meeting the Risk Based 
Performance Standards already accomplishes those requirements.
    A third thing that bothers me in the legislation is the 
redefinition of ``risk" for the CFATS program and the directive 
to deploy that new definition. The existing definition of risk 
for CFATS--vulnerability, threat, consequence--is based on GAO 
recommendations and the National Infrastructure Protection 
Program. One of the biggest problems DHS had to rectify is that 
the CFATS program used an incomplete definition of risk that 
discounted vulnerability and placed more facilities into the 
program and at higher risk categories. DHS spent years undoing 
this mess, but the legislation acts as if the mistake was 
correcting the risk formula to make it more consistent.
    Most significantly, I am quite concerned that this 
legislation rolls back essential protection of vulnerability 
information that would create a road map for terrorists. There 
are multiple Federal laws that require disclosure of 
information to the public and first responders for any number 
of reasons. The difference between this bill and those laws is 
that CFATS information is NOT focused on pollution or 
accidents, but how a high-risk chemical is being protected from 
theft or intentional detonation. First responders and local 
officials already have access to this information if they have 
a need to know and are trained in handling it. Making this 
information public will cause material physical and economic 
harm to these facilities and their communities.
    My misgivings aside, I look forward to receiving language 
from you, Mr. Chairman, and meaningfully working with my 
colleagues to a good place where we can all support this bill 
when it gets marked up.
    I want to thank our witnesses for being with us today and I 
look forward to a meaningful dialogue with them.
    With that, I yield back the balance of my time.

    Mr. Tonko. The gentleman yields back.
    The Chair now recognizes Representative Pallone, chairman 
of the full committee, for 5 minutes for his opening statement.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK PALLONE, Jr., A REPRESENTATIVE 
            IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY

    Mr. Pallone. Thank you, Chairman Tonko.
    Today, on the 18th anniversary of the September 11th 
terrorist attacks, we are here to discuss important security 
legislation that could help prevent another attack.
    We will never forget 9/11 and its longstanding impacts on 
families, first responders, and our Nation as a whole. The 
lessons we learned in the days and years after 9/11 should 
inform our efforts to strengthen the Chemical Facility Anti-
Terrorism Standards program, otherwise known as CFATS. And this 
program provides critical national security protections by 
requiring chemical facilities that are high-risk terrorist 
targets to assess and address their vulnerabilities.
    High-risk chemical facilities hold large stores of 
industrial chemicals that pose a safety and security risk to 
the American people if they are released or detonated. A recent 
report found that more than 134 million Americans live in the 
vulnerability zones around chemical facilities. That is more 
than one-third of Americans. And the communities most at risk 
are disproportionately low-income communities and communities 
of color.
    And, unfortunately, the threats to these facilities are 
only increasing as climate change makes extreme weather more 
and more common, and CFATS-regulated facilities have been 
impacted by hurricanes, floods, and wildfires, putting us all 
at risk.
    So I have been an advocate for increased safety and 
security at our Nation's chemical facilities for many years, 
well before the CFATS program was established in 2006. My home 
State of New Jersey, which has a high population density, also 
has a large number of chemical facilities, so the consequences 
of lax security could be devastating there. And that is why New 
Jersey led the way on chemical plant security, adopting 
requirements for the assessment of so-called inherently safer 
technology and adopting mandatory security standards before the 
Federal program was in place.
    Earlier this year, the CFATS program came close to lapsing. 
Despite the importance of the program and support on both sides 
of the aisle, the authorization came within ten days of 
expiring during the Trump government shutdown. A bill in the 
Senate also sought to seriously weaken the program with 
changes, including an ill-advised exemption for explosives.
    Fortunately, Ranking Member Walden and I were able to work 
with our colleagues on the Homeland Security Committee to 
extend the program through April of 2020 without these 
misguided changes. So now we have the opportunity to strengthen 
and improve the program, and I look forward to continuing to 
work in a bipartisan fashion to move the legislation forward 
again.
    It is critical that we get this done. Three major chemical 
incidents this year--one in Crosby, Texas, another in La Porte, 
Texas, and a third in south Philadelphia--underscore the need 
to do more.
    H.R. 3256, the Protecting and Securing Chemical Facilities 
from Terrorist Attacks Act of 2019, would extend the 
authorization for this important program and make some welcome 
improvements.
    The bill would strengthen the role of workers at covered 
facilities and improve reporting to Congress. It would require 
the Department of Homeland Security to verify information 
submitted by a covered facility before using it to lower that 
facility's risk tier. And it would eliminate the worrisome 
Expedited Approval Program.
    So I look forward to hearing from the stakeholders today 
about these and other improvements that can be made to the 
program. And I hope we can continue to work together to ensure 
the security of these facilities and protect the surrounding 
communities.
    I don't think anyone wants the time, so I will yield back, 
Mr. Chairman.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Pallone follows:]

             Prepared Statement of Hon. Frank Pallone, Jr.

    Today, on the 18th anniversary of the September 11th 
terrorist attacks, we are here to discuss important security 
legislation that could help prevent another attack. We will 
never forget 9/11, and its longstanding impacts on families, 
first responders, and our nation as a whole. The lessons we 
learned in the days and years after 9/11 should inform our 
efforts to strengthen the Chemical Facility Antiterrorism 
Standards program, otherwise known as CFATS. This program 
provides critical national security protections by requiring 
chemical facilities that are high risk terrorist targets to 
assess and address their vulnerabilities.
    High risk chemical facilities hold large stores of 
industrial chemicals that pose a safety and security risk to 
the American people if they are released or detonated. A recent 
report found that more than 134 million Americans live in the 
vulnerability zones around chemical facilities--that's more 
than one-third of Americans. The communities most at risk are 
disproportionately low-income communities and communities of 
color.
    And, unfortunately, the threats to these facilities are 
only increasing as climate change makes extreme weather more 
and more common. CFATS regulated facilities have been impacted 
by hurricanes, floods, and wildfires, putting us all at risk.
    I have been an advocate for increased safety and security 
at our nation's chemical facilities for many years, well before 
the CFATS program was established in 2006. My home state of New 
Jersey, which has a high population density, also has a large 
number of chemical facilities, so the consequences of lax 
security could be devastating. And that's why New Jersey led 
the way on chemical plant security, adopting requirements for 
the assessment of so-called ``Inherently Safer Technology" and 
adopting mandatory security standards before the Federal 
program was in place.
    Earlier this year, the CFATS program came close to lapsing. 
Despite the importance of the program and support on both sides 
of the aisle, the authorization came within ten days of 
expiring during Trump's government shutdown.
    A bill in the Senate also sought to seriously weaken the 
program, with changes including an ill-advised exemption for 
explosives. Fortunately, Ranking Member Walden and I were able 
to work with our colleagues on the Homeland Security Committee 
to extend the program through April of 2020 without these 
misguided changes.
    Now, we have the opportunity to strengthen and improve the 
program, and I look forward to continuing to work in a 
bipartisan fashion to move legislation forward again. It's 
critical that we get this done. And three major chemical 
incidents this year--one in Crosby, Texas, another in LaPorte, 
Texas and a third in South Philadelphia, Pennsylvania--
underscore the need to do more.
    H.R. 3256, the ``Protecting and Securing Chemical 
Facilities from Terrorist Attacks Act of 2019'' would extend 
the authorization for this important program and make some 
welcome improvements. The bill would strengthen the role of 
workers at covered facilities and improve reporting to 
Congress. It would require the Department of Homeland Security 
to verify information submitted by a covered facility before 
using it to lower that facilities risk tier. And it would 
eliminate the worrisome Expedited Approval Program.
    I look forward to hearing from the stakeholders today about 
these and other improvements that can be made in the program. I 
hope we can continue to work together to ensure the security of 
these facilities and protect the surrounding communities.

    Mr. Tonko. The gentleman yields back.
    The Chair now recognizes Representative Walden, the ranking 
member of the full committee, for 5 minutes for his opening 
statement.

  OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. GREG WALDEN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN 
               CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF OREGON

    Mr. Walden. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 
holding this really important hearing and your dedication to 
this issue.
    And I want to thank my colleague, the chairman of the full 
committee, for the work we did last Congress and the work that 
we are going to do in a bipartisan way this Congress. So thank 
you for that.
    On this day of 9/11, we should also remember our freedom is 
never free and never can be taken for granted. And that is kind 
of--that event led us to this bill.
    I remember being at a table much like this one--it was 
older and scratched up, because they have remodeled the 
building, but--after 9/11 when we had one of those discussions. 
And I remember we were talking about community right to know 
and how everything was posted on Web sites about where all the 
worst things were so your first responders would know, and then 
we realized that was a roadmap for the terrorists. And 
everything changed on that day and the way we approach these 
issues and how to protect and secure. And I will never forget 
some of those discussions about how things have changed.
    So we know CFATS was then created after that terrorist 
attack on 9/11. And at that time, Congress examined Federal 
authority to address theft and diversion and terrorism at 
chemical facilities and found the existing accident prevention 
and process safety laws were insufficient and inappropriate to 
tackle these concerns.
    Congress decided a separate and distinct body of law and 
requirements were needed to secure these facilities and that, 
leaving the Clean Air Act to address general safety and 
accident concerns that might affect air quality, Congress used 
CFATS to fill the legal gaps for addressing those intentional 
acts that compromise the security of this critical 
infrastructure sector.
    So CFATS was not intended to be your garden-variety 
regulatory program. CFATS not only covers huge chemical and 
petrochemical complexes but also racetracks and, importantly in 
our region, with my friend from Washington, wineries and 
breweries, universities and colleges, and hospitals and other 
healthcare providers.
    Due to the scope of the program and the fact that each 
facility faces different security challenges and to avoid 
overlapping with other Federal programs, CFATS was designed to 
foster collaboration between the government and the regulated 
parties. And this collaboration and compliance leads to 
facilities that are actually more secure. So it is a 
partnership.
    I mentioned at the start of our hearing last fall that the 
CFATS program had to overcome some tough years. Our 
subcommittee received testimony that day from the Government 
Accountability Office and other stakeholders that the 
Department spent four years correcting the program, including 
updating its application of the Department risk criteria, the 
decisions under CFATS.
    CFATS must provide value to taxpayers, the Federal 
Government, and the facilities that could fall victim to 
intentional attacks. And to do that, I believe the program 
improvements must be sustainable and they must be reliable. For 
this reason, I am skeptical of making major changes to the 
program that would either dilute or divert the Department from 
its statutory mission or replicate authorities that other 
Federal agencies have been given by Congress.
    Mr. Chairman, I know we are here to discuss legislation 
that keeps CFATS authority from expiring this coming April, and 
we should not have this anti-terrorism program expire, period. 
I understand the Homeland Security Committee marked up this 
bill 12 weeks ago, and it passed on a straight party-line vote 
with no Republicans supporting it, but I also understand they 
have not formally reported their bill.
    Our committee has been overseeing this program since its 
inception, and today continues the Energy and Commerce 
Committee's work. So I look forward to working with you, Mr. 
Chairman, and the full committee chairman to see where we can 
strike a bipartisan agreement that works for the country.
    So I want to welcome our witnesses for being here today and 
thank you all for sharing your views.
    And with that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back the balance 
of my time. And as a disclaimer, we have a second subcommittee 
hearing going on simultaneously, so I must depart for that one. 
But thank you for holding this hearing. We look forward to 
working with you in good faith.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Walden follows:]

                 Prepared Statement of Hon. Greg Walden

    Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding 
today's hearing.
    On this day that reminds us that our freedom should never 
be taken for granted and that we should never forget the 
sacrifices made or those that are necessary to keep us safe, I 
appreciate that you have focused the subcommittee's attention 
on legislation to maintain the authority of the Chemical 
Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards program--or CFATS.
    This program was created after the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001. At that time, Congress examined federal 
authority to address theft, diversion, and terrorism at 
chemical facilities and found that the existing accident 
prevention and process safety laws were insufficient and 
inappropriate to tackle these concerns. Congress decided a 
separate and distinct body of law and requirements were needed 
to secure these facilities. Leaving the Clean Air Act to 
address general safety and accident concerns that might affect 
air quality, Congress used CFATS to fill the legal gaps for 
addressing those intentional acts that compromise the security 
of this critical infrastructure sector.
    CFATS was not intended to be your garden variety regulatory 
program. CFATS not only covers huge chemical and petrochemical 
complexes, but also racetracks, wineries and breweries, 
universities and colleges, and hospitals, and other healthcare 
providers. Due to the scope of the program and the fact that 
each facility faces different security challenges, and to avoid 
overlapping with other federal programs, CFATS was designed to 
foster collaboration between the government and the regulated 
parties. And this collaboration and compliance leads to 
facilities that are more secure.
    I mentioned at the start of our hearing last fall that the 
CFATS program has had to overcome some tough years. Our 
subcommittee received testimony that day from the Government 
Accountability Office and other stakeholders that the 
Department spent four years correcting the program, including 
updating its application of Department risk criteria to 
decisions under CFATS.
    CFATS must provide value to taxpayers, the Federal 
Government, and the facilities that could fall victim to 
intentional attacks. To do that, I believe program improvements 
must be sustainable and reliable. For this reason, I am 
skeptical of making any major changes to the program that would 
either dilute or divert the Department from its statutory 
mission, or replicate authorities that other Federal agencies 
have been given by Congress.
    Mr. Chairman, I know we are here to discuss legislation 
that keeps CFATS authority from expiring this coming April--and 
we should not have this anti-terrorism program expire. I 
understand the Homeland Security Committee marked up this bill 
12 weeks ago--that it passed on a straight party line vote with 
no Republicans supporting it; but I also understand they have 
not formally reported the bill.
    Our committee has been overseeing this program since its 
inception and today continues Energy and Commerce's work. I 
look forward to working with you and the full committee 
chairman to see where we can strike a bipartisan agreement.
    I want to welcome our witnesses for being with us today and 
thank them for sharing their views with us. With that, Mr. 
Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

    Mr. Tonko. Well, thank you very much. The gentleman yields 
back.
    The Chair would like to remind Members that, pursuant to 
committee rules, all Members' written opening statements shall 
be made part of the record.
    Mr. Tonko. I now introduce our sole witness for our first 
panel, Mr. David Wulf, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
Infrastructure Protection at the Department of Homeland 
Security.
    Thank you, Secretary Wulf, for joining us. We appreciate 
your time and your ideas and thoughts on the legislation.
    Before we begin, I would like to explain the lighting 
system. In front of you are a series of lights. The light will 
initially be green at the start of your opening statement. The 
light will turn yellow when you have 1-minute remaining. Please 
begin to wrap up your testimony at that point. The light will 
turn red when your time expires.
    So, at this time, the Chair will recognize Mr. Wulf for 5 
minutes to provide his opening statement.
    Secretary Wulf?

                    STATEMENT OF DAVID WULF

    Mr. Wulf. Thank you. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, 
Ranking Member Shimkus, and other members of the committee.
    I really do appreciate the opportunity to be here today to 
provide an update on the progress the Chemical Facility Anti-
Terrorism Standards program, or CFATS, continues to make in 
fostering security at America's highest-risk chemical 
facilities.
    So, recognizing that we are here today on September 11th 
and recalling the devastating terrorist attacks carried out on 
the state 18 years ago, it is important to note that, as a 
Nation, we have made much progress in securing America's 
critical infrastructure.
    Of course, we can never let our guard down, however, which 
is precisely why we come to work every day at the Department of 
Homeland Security and in our new Cybersecurity and 
Infrastructure Security Agency focused on securing today and 
defending tomorrow.
    And with respect specifically to the CFATS program, a 
program that remains squarely focused on securing high-risk 
facilities and preventing acts of chemical terrorism, the same 
holds true.
    So it is no secret that the CFATS program faced some 
significant challenges in its early years. In 2012 and 2013, as 
we were laying the foundation for key improvements, I did come 
before this committee and I emphasized the importance of long-
term authorization for this critical national security program. 
And I am very grateful for the leadership the committee 
demonstrated in securing the 4-year CFATS authorization that 
was signed into law in December of 2014. And I am grateful, as 
well, for your role in attaining the 15-month extension of that 
authorization through April of 2020 that was enacted earlier 
this year. So I am appreciative that the committee is again 
working to ensure a continuing long-term authorization of 
CFATS.
    So the stability that was ushered in with long-term 
authorization has absolutely driven unprecedented progress as 
our team has worked with the CFATS-covered facilities to make 
America's high-risk chemical infrastructure a truly hard 
target. With literally tens of thousands of security measures 
having been put into place at high-risk chemical facilities 
across the Nation, these facilities have achieved, on average, 
a 55-percent increase in their security posture as a direct 
result of CFATS.
    The stability afforded by long-term authorization has 
facilitated our planning and execution of important 
programmatic improvements, a few of which I will detail in a 
moment, while it has also afforded regulated industry 
stakeholders with the certainty they deserved as they planned 
for and made capital investments in CFATS-related security 
measures.
    Later today, you will have the opportunity to hear directly 
from industry and other stakeholders about their experience 
with CFATS. The gains I have just noted would not have been 
possible without the commitment and hard work of companies 
across the Nation that have put CFATS-focused security measures 
and, in many cases--have put those measures in place and, in 
many cases, have provided important feedback and ideas that 
have helped us to improve our processes and our effectiveness.
    Many of those stakeholders are here in the room today. I 
appreciate their presence. And I am looking forward to the 
perspectives that will be shared by the next panel.
    And, of course, I do want to acknowledge our very 
hardworking CFATS team, 250 folks here in Washington and across 
the Nation, who have built a truly world-class program and who 
are laser-focused on securing America's high-risk chemical 
infrastructure.
    So about those programmatic improvements I mentioned, what 
have we been doing to make CFATS even stronger as we have 
enjoyed the stability of long-term authorization? We have 
improved processes, eliminated bottlenecks, and seen 
unprecedented progress in the pace of inspections and in the 
review of facility site security plans, eliminating a backlog 
of security plan reviews six years ahead of earlier GAO 
projections.
    We have developed and launched an improved risk-assessment 
methodology. We have implemented the CFATS Personnel Surety 
Program, affording CFATS-covered facilities the ability to 
ensure that individuals with access to critical assets have 
been vetted for terrorist ties. And we have dramatically 
reduced burden across our stakeholder community.
    And while the stability afforded by long-term authorization 
has yielded all of this progress over the past four or five 
years, we are not done yet, and continued long-term 
authorization will be absolutely critical to ensuring that we 
are able to focus on driving even more effective and even more 
efficient approaches to fostering chemical security.
    Now, as we look toward the future, I do think it is 
important to note that CFATS regulatory coverage is targeted to 
the Nation's highest-risk chemical facilities, a universe that 
currently is composed of approximately 3,300 facilities. And 
while CFATS has contributed to effectively hardening these 
high-risk facilities against the prospect of terrorist attack, 
we have actually received top-screen reports, the reports that 
are filed by companies to initiate the DHS risk-assessment 
process, from more than 30,000 additional facilities. And while 
we have determined that these additional facilities do not 
present a high risk of terrorism, they nonetheless maintain 
inventories of CFATS chemicals of interest, the very sorts of 
chemicals that are viewed as attractive by our adversaries and 
that are used in attacks around the globe.
    So, while these facilities are not considered high-risk 
under CFATS, they aren't no-risk facilities. And it is for this 
reason that we would very much like to work with this committee 
and the Congress on a path toward authorizing our chemical 
security inspectors to work with these facilities, completely 
at the option of the individual facility, on a voluntary, 
nonregulatory basis.
    And this is a point that is important to emphasize. We 
would like our inspectors to be able to share their expertise 
with these facilities, to provide assistance, and to offer 
consultation on security measures, not to extend CFATS 
regulation to these facilities. In our view, this is an 
important next step to build upon the culture of chemical 
security that CFATS has fostered.
    Now, as we are all too aware, the threat of chemical 
terrorism remains a real and a very relevant one. Around the 
globe, our adversaries continue to seek, acquire, and use in 
attacks chemicals of the sort that trigger coverage under 
CFATS, and the threat stream continues to reflect that chemical 
facilities themselves remain an attractive target for 
terrorists.
    I can tell you with certainty that the work we are doing as 
an extended chemical security community is making a real 
difference in protecting our Nation. And having had the 
opportunity to work with my counterparts in other nations, I 
can tell you that what we are doing here in the United States 
through CFATS, the culture of chemical security you have helped 
us to build with your support for long-term CFATS authorization 
is absolutely the envy of the world.
    With its targeted focus on the highest-risk facilities, 
with its 18 comprehensive risk-based performance standards 
addressing physical, cyber, and insider threats, and with its 
nonprescriptive, flexible approach to regulation, CFATS is 
well-suited to enhancing security across the very diverse 
landscape of high-risk chemical facilities.
    So I would like to again thank this committee and your 
topnotch staff for your leadership on CFATS authorization, for 
your patience with my extended statement as well. We are fond 
of saying that chemical security is a shared commitment. And 
not unlike the role of our industry and other stakeholders and 
the role of our very talented DHS team, the role of Congress in 
shaping and authorizing CFATS for the long term has been hugely 
important. And looking forward very much to working further 
with you as we drive toward a truly long-term reauthorization.
    So thank you so much. I look forward to the dialogue here 
today.

             [The prepared statement of Mr. Wulf follows:]

                    Prepared Statement of David Wulf
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]                   
                    

    Mr. Tonko. Thank you, Mr. Wulf. And we recognize the rather 
quick pace that you set, so we didn't want to stop that flow. 
So thank you so much, and thank you again for joining us this 
morning.
    We have concluded opening statements from our first panel. 
We now will move to member questions. Each Member will have 5 
minutes to ask questions of our witness. I will start by 
recognizing myself for 5 minutes.
    So, Mr. Wulf, again, thank you for joining us.
    Does the administration support a multiyear extension of 
the CFATS program?
    Mr. Wulf. We absolutely do.
    Mr. Tonko. And I mentioned in my opening statement the 
importance of going beyond risk management to promote actual 
risk reduction at these sites.
    The American Institute of Chemical Engineers' Center for 
Chemical Process Safety, which includes technical experts from 
chemical and oil companies, has produced risk-reduction 
guidance to promote measures that minimize, substitute, 
moderate, or simplify hazardous processes.
    It seems to me that there is a growing acknowledgment, 
including by industry, of the importance of and opportunities 
for risk reduction as an essential component of site security. 
This might include actions like consolidating chemicals into 
fewer sites, substituting chemicals for less hazardous 
alternatives, and reducing the quantity of a chemical held on-
site.
    Do you believe these are potentially effective measures to 
reduce risk?
    Mr. Wulf. I do. And I believe that CFATS has effectively 
reduced risk. And, in fact, I think one of the success stories 
out of CFATS is the fact that upwards of 3,000 facilities over 
the course of the program's history have made risk-based 
decisions to either reduce their quantities of CFATS chemicals 
of interest, eliminate those quantities, move to just-in-time 
delivery, change their processes such that they are no longer 
considered high-risk. So my belief is that CFATS kind of 
organically promotes those sorts of risk decisions.
    Mr. Tonko. Now, do you believe that additional risk-
reduction measures should be given significant consideration by 
facilities working to meet CFATS obligations?
    Mr. Wulf. I certainly think it is a good thing for 
facilities to be considering risk. I think CFATS does provide a 
very solid framework for doing exactly that across 18 risk-
based performance standards that kind of form the core of the 
program.
    Mr. Tonko. OK.
    And, right now, these types of risk-reduction measures are 
a potential option for some facilities, and I believe sites 
have taken these types of actions to fulfill CFATS 
requirements. Currently, how does the Department actively 
encourage facilities to implement risk-reduction measures?
    Mr. Wulf. So our inspectors, throughout the CFATS process, 
work directly--as do many of our headquarters expert staff--
work directly with facilities as they think through how to 
address the 18 risk-based performance standards, so standards 
that cover an array of different risk-reduction measures--
measures designed to deter, detect, delay a terrorist attack; 
measures focused on cybersecurity; measures focused on insider 
threat, background checks; measures focused on response and 
training and exercises.
    So we consult. As facilities develop their site security 
plans, we go back and forth, recognizing, as the ranking member 
noted, that the CFATS community is a very diverse group, so it 
is not a one-size-fits-all solution from facility to facility. 
So we go back and forth, work with facilities as they determine 
which measures are most appropriate for them, to the point at 
which they are determined to meet the intent of each of the 18 
risk-based performance standards.
    Mr. Tonko. Now, you listed an array of potential risk-
reduction opportunities. Do you believe any one of those holds 
the most promise for additional work?
    Mr. Wulf. Well, I think the beauty, in many ways, of the 
CFATS framework is that it is nonprescriptive and it is 
flexible. So I think it really depends on the facility, you 
know, which area or areas are in need of most focus. And we are 
able, within the CFATS framework, to work with those facilities 
to address, you know, which area or areas need that focus on a 
case-by-case basis.
    Mr. Tonko. Thank you.
    And while preserving flexibility in the program, can more 
be done to ensure a facility is implementing or, at the very 
least, assessing potential risk-reduction measures as part of 
their site security plans?
    Mr. Wulf. Well, I think a lot is being done already. And 
CFATS is very much already focused at those highest-risk 
facilities on working with the owners and operators and the 
security professionals on-site at those facilities and in those 
companies to reduce risk across those 18 risk-based performance 
standards.
    Mr. Tonko. Well, we thank you for your testimony and your 
appearing before the subcommittee today.
    The Chair will now recognize Mr. Shimkus, subcommittee 
ranking member, for 5 minutes to ask questions.
    Mr. Shimkus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Again, Mr. Wulf, thanks for being here.
    And to my colleagues on the subcommittee, this is really an 
important issue. It is driven from the terrorist attack. And 
many of us have in our districts facilities, chemical 
facilities. So the balance is making sure that they are 
protected as much as possible.
    And I think our concern--and I think we all acknowledge the 
fact that we want to get as long-term a reauthorization as we 
can. And I want to thank the chairman and the ranking member 
for their work in scratching, really, to get whatever it was, 
18 months. We have a problem with the Senate on this issue, and 
I think the due diligence for us doing this right could help us 
overcome that.
    Having said that, we want to continue to appreciate what is 
working and make sure that we don't, our position would be, put 
too much on the plate, that we start losing sight of the real 
goal and objective. And I really plead with my colleagues on 
the other side to help us find that narrow path so that we can 
be really united as we address and fight with the Senate for 
the long-term authorization.
    So, as a regulatory program with enforceable requirements, 
would IST-like requirements--the inherently safer technology 
debate, which we have had in this committee numerous times--be 
easy to understand and enforce?
    Mr. Wulf. I think as a prescriptive regulatory standard, it 
would not be a simple thing to do.
    Mr. Shimkus. And I think I raised this question maybe last 
time or in the numerous times we have been able to meet, and I 
don't think we have gotten an answer back. How many of the 
facilities that have gone through this evaluation have just 
decided to close?
    Mr. Wulf. I don't know that I have that number, but, you 
know----
    Mr. Shimkus. Have been there many?
    Mr. Wulf. There have been facilities that have closed. I am 
not certain that was as a direct result of CFATS. In fact, I am 
pretty certain not as a direct result of CFATS.
    Mr. Shimkus. OK. I mean--and we will mention it with the 
other panel. See, cost-benefit analysis, risk, additional 
costs, current markets--it is really tough to say what causes a 
sector to decide to close and to move. But that is a balance 
that we need to continue to address, with focus on safety, but 
if--I mean, we just want to be careful that we don't drive some 
good manufacturing in relatively safe areas in rural America 
out of rural America.
    Let me go to ask about your intense effort to realign your 
risk methodology. How difficult was that to do? And proposals 
for changes, would that be as difficult to redo?
    Mr. Wulf. And I appreciate that question. And we did, I 
think as you know, undertake a very intensive effort to retool 
our risk-tiering methodology.
    So kicked off in the 2013 timeframe with an extensive peer 
review. We brought together an expert panel composed of experts 
from across academia, government partner agencies, and industry 
to take a comprehensive look at our risk-tiering methodology, 
which at the time was pretty narrowly focused on the potential 
consequences of a terrorist attack and less so on 
vulnerabilities and threats.
    So, after 18 months or so, that peer-review panel came back 
with a series of very solid recommendations. And we set about 
working with a second external tiering review panel, similarly 
composed across those communities, to bounce ideas off of for 
building a new and improved risk-tiering methodology that fully 
accounts for all relevant elements of risk. And that is exactly 
what we did when we set about retiering the universe of 
facilities. So, beginning to end, it was about a 5-year 
process.
    Mr. Shimkus. Yes. So thanks. Let me make sure I put this in 
the record, that this relationship with DHS is because we are 
focused on security, and we want to put that--make sure that is 
on the table.
    And just for my colleagues, the initial roll-out of this 
program was a little tumultuous and challenging and with the 
GAO report, and that caused us to really get involved in 
looking deeply at this. And, again, Mr. Wulf was able to help 
right the ship, and we thank him for that.
    And, with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time.
    Mr. Tonko. The gentleman yields back.
    The Chair now recognizes Representative Peters for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And thank you, Mr. Wulf, for being here today.
    I note there are about 3,400 chemical facilities in the 
United States; 350 are in California; three are in San Diego. 
And of the 3,400, 3,321 are high-risk. And so I think that 
there is a general consensus that this is a program that needs 
to be reupped. I think that is pretty clear, so that is a big 
step.
    Are you familiar with the particular bill that came out of 
Homeland Security? Are you familiar with that draft?
    Mr. Wulf. I am a little bit familiar with it, yes.
    Mr. Peters. Does the administration or do you personally 
have issues with that bill that you would like to see changed, 
or are you OK with it, do you think?
    Mr. Wulf. So I think what we are concerned most about is 
that we achieve a long-term authorization for the program, as 
you noted. And that bill would afford us a 5-year period of 
authorization.
    You know, I am happy to discuss individual proposals in the 
bill here today, but, you know, from our perspective, getting 
to that long-term authorization is the absolute highest 
priority.
    Mr. Peters. Yes. And so five years is a good number of 
years, you think?
    Mr. Wulf. I feel like maybe a zero is missing.
    Mr. Peters. OK, 0.5.
    Mr. Wulf. But five is a good start.
    Mr. Peters. OK. Thank you.
    Mr. Wulf. Five is a good start.
    Mr. Peters. I get it. OK. Well, that is helpful, actually.
    Let me just ask you a specific question. On the next panel, 
one of the people who will be appearing is Mr. John Paul Smith 
from the United Steelworkers. I want to read you a quote and 
see if you have an issue with this.
    Reauthorization ``should include a requirement for CFATS 
facilities to generate, document, and effectively transmit 
actionable chemical and process information to first 
responders, including employees and their union representatives 
at self-responding facilities. DHS should also be required to 
generate, distribute, and make publicly available the practices 
facilities have used to tier out or tier down in the program. 
This information-sharing is critical to ensure that risks are 
not just being shifted and so that other facilities can use 
those lessons across the industry to reduce risks and 
hazards.''
    Do you have an opinion or anything you want to say about 
that? Is that something you agree with, disagree with, or is 
not important to the administration?
    Mr. Wulf. Yes, I think, broadly speaking, with respect to 
information-sharing, this is a security-focused program, so we 
need to strike the--continue to strike the correct balance 
between ensuring that we are able to share information with 
those who have a need to know that information--so law 
enforcement, first responders, emergency planners who are 
charged with protecting our communities--and ensuring that we 
don't provide a roadmap, that we don't----
    Mr. Peters. Right.
    Mr. Wulf [continuing]. Distribute information so widely 
that it does become available to those who would seek to do us 
harm.
    You know, that list of folks with whom information should 
be shared also includes employees with a security background 
who can contribute to the development of a facility site 
security plan.
    With respect to the sharing of best practices across the 
universe of chemical facilities, I think that is a good thing. 
It is, you know, certainly something we can talk some more 
about and work toward. But best practices that have been put in 
place by companies under CFATS to improve security, we 
absolutely want to share those to the greatest extent possible 
with other chemical facilities.
    Mr. Peters. Great.
    And as far as today, you don't have particular objections 
or suggestions for this draft bill to accommodate those 
concerns? Or do you?
    Mr. Wulf. Well, I think we are in a good place, actually, 
already, as is, with the program with respect to being able to, 
you know, continue with that appropriate balance between 
sharing of information and protecting sensitive information 
from the prying eyes of our adversaries, and already, 
certainly, have authority to share information across the 
community of chemical facilities.
    Mr. Peters. Great.
    Anything else you would like to tell us about this draft 
before we hear from the next panel?
    Mr. Wulf. Fifty years would be----
    Mr. Peters. Fifty years? OK. Awesome.
    OK. Thank you very much. I yield back.
    Mr. Tonko. The gentleman yields back.
    The Chair now recognizes Representative McKinley for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. McKinley. Sorry. I didn't realize that I was going to 
precede her.
    What I would like to know is, firstly, have there been any 
incidents since this has been put in place, challenges to the 
system that have been caught as a result of a risk assessment?
    Mr. Wulf. Terrorist attacks?
    Mr. McKinley. Yes, terrorist attacks, yes.
    Mr. Wulf. No. I mean, I firmly believe that the CFATS 
program has effectively hardened those 3,300 high-risk 
facilities as targets. So, no, we have not seen a terrorist 
attack.
    Mr. McKinley. OK.
    Secondly, apparently, we have 21 high-risk facilities in 
West Virginia. Are any of those in tier 1 or tier 2?
    Mr. Wulf. I would have to get that information back to you, 
but my initial inclination would be to say yes.
    Mr. McKinley. Your--would be what?
    Mr. Wulf. I believe so, but I will have to confirm that.
    Mr. McKinley. That is what I have been given the 
impression, that we may have some that would fall into that 
category.
    One of the concerns that I share with this is that this 
area, in northern West Virginia particularly, is embarking on 
quite a petrochemical complex of buildings and industries that 
is going to be popping up as a result of the shale gas and the 
location of the cracker facility in Monaca, Pennsylvania, and 
possibly one in Ohio. So we are seeing there is going to be a 
quite an influx of businesses that are going to be in the 
chemical business in northern West Virginia.
    I am curious to see the advantage of making a change at 
this point in how this works if it has been successful to date. 
That is what I am trying to understand, the value. What do you 
think is behind having this--other than extending--I would like 
to see it extended--but making changes to the program. Can you 
share with us the value in making the changes?
    Mr. Wulf. You know, I do think that CFATS provides a very 
solid framework now. It is a flexible framework, so we are able 
to stay ahead of the continually evolving threat curve.
    I do very much appreciate the work that has been done in 
the Committee on Homeland Security. You know, we see that bill 
as a very important first step toward long-term 
reauthorization. But that remains, you know, our key goal, is 
ensuring that long-term reauthorization.
    Mr. McKinley. So you have--and I think I picked up enough 
from your testimony and some of the responses some of the 
others have said, that sharing this data, does that put it more 
at risk, by putting this information out?
    Mr. Wulf. Sharing sensitive----
    Mr. McKinley. Because we all know that--any of us have sat 
in on enough briefings, we know people are hacking into our 
systems, they are paying attention to what we are talking 
about. If we start identifying and sharing information back and 
forth, that means that information is going to be exposed to 
the bad actors who are around the world. So help me a little 
bit understanding the value of why we want to make that change.
    Mr. Wulf. Yes. So I think we would not like to see much, if 
any, change on the information-sharing front. We want to retain 
the flexibility to have that balance, to be able to share 
information with those who have a need to know, who are charged 
with protecting our communities, but to ensure that we keep 
that sensitive information--and that is the reason we have 
within CFATS a chemical terrorism vulnerability information 
protection regime--to keep that sensitive information away from 
the eyes of our adversaries.
    Mr. McKinley. But you don't have a problem, necessarily, 
with the whistleblower aspect of it, strengthening the 
whistleblower concept?
    Mr. Wulf. I think we have whistleblower provisions 
already----
    Mr. McKinley. Maybe tightening it up, you know, the 
concept----
    Mr. Wulf. I think we are very much, you know, open to 
opportunities to tighten up the whistleblower language.
    Mr. McKinley. So where----
    Mr. Wulf. And I would say, too--I am sorry--there are other 
things for which additional tweaks might be helpful: the 
ability to execute a petition process, to more effectively be 
able to look at products that might pose less risk and to 
potentially let them out of the program----
    Mr. McKinley. Could you share some of that information with 
us, as to how we might tweak this, if you think that--other 
than what you have already testified to?
    Mr. Wulf. Yes. Absolutely.
    Mr. McKinley. If you could get that to our office, I would 
like to take a look at that.
    Mr. Wulf. Absolutely.
    And, you know, on that front, as well--and I noted in my 
opening statement the ability to be able to use our chemical 
security inspectors not only to implement the regulation with 
respect to those highest-risk facilities--and I think that 
continuing narrow focus for CFATS is important--but to be able 
to work on a voluntary basis with those other 30,000 facilities 
would be helpful to us as well.
    Mr. McKinley. Thank you very much. I look forward to 
getting the list, if you could, of the ones in West Virginia.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Tonko. The gentleman yields back.
    The Chair now recognizes Representative Blunt Rochester for 
5 minutes.
    Ms. Blunt Rochester. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And thank you to all of the witnesses today.
    It is such an important day. I had to step out to meet with 
representatives from our Delaware VFW. And I think all of us 
can remember where we were on September 11th. I was head of 
State personnel for the State of Delaware at the time, so there 
was a lot of concern about what would happen to employees. 
There was a lot of concern about communities and schools and 
Dover Air Force Base. And I am reminded of how important the 
role of Congress is and how important your role is in ensuring 
that Americans are protected. It means something, and 
especially today.
    And so I have a few questions, just a few.
    One, you mentioned getting rid of the backlog for 
inspections. Can you talk a little bit about that, what you 
did, how you did it?
    Mr. Wulf. Yes. So I appreciate that question.
    We, at one point, had a very significant backlog of 
facility site security plan reviews and approvals. GAO 
projected that it would take us up to nine years to eliminate 
that backlog. So that was during the early days of the program. 
We were getting our legs under us. We had some process issues.
    We rolled up our sleeves. We have a great team within the 
program. We retrained our workforce. We eliminated bottlenecks. 
And we were able to eliminate that backlog nearly six years 
ahead of those earlier GAO projections.
    Ms. Blunt Rochester. So you had the right amount of 
resources in terms of dollars. You had the right workforce. You 
didn't have any challenges there. And do you foresee any as you 
move forward?
    Mr. Wulf. Yes, we have a very highly qualified workforce. 
We have enjoyed and continue to enjoy great support from within 
the Department.
    Ms. Blunt Rochester. My second set of questions are really 
just related to, in your testimony, I didn't see much about 
engagement of local communities. And even, like, relatively 
minor release of chemicals from tampering could have an effect 
on communities, serious ramifications, especially for 
vulnerable populations or hospitals or senior homes.
    Can you describe or detail the work that you at DHS 
currently do to bring community and stakeholders into the 
process?
    Mr. Wulf. Sure. I am glad to, and I appreciate that 
question as well.
    Certainly the reason that CFATS exists is to protect our 
communities, to protect the American public from the threat of 
terrorist attack on facilities that might cause a release of a 
chemical into a surrounding facility or the theft or diversion 
of a chemical to be deployed in an attack offsite, away from 
the facility.
    And so we absolutely prioritize getting information to 
those who are charged with protecting those communities, so law 
enforcement, first responders, emergency planners. We have done 
extensive outreach with local emergency planning committees to 
ensure that they are aware of the CFATS program and, again, to 
share with cleared members of those communities, those who do 
have that need to know, sensitive information on CFATS 
facilities.
    Ms. Blunt Rochester. I think that is part of the challenge, 
is defining need to know and who needs to know. And you talked 
about the shared commitment, and I know you just referenced 
many stakeholders. But one of my questions is, how do you 
balance that, not just the need to know for law enforcement but 
community advocates?
    And could you tell us if you have any plans to increase 
those in affected communities in the planning process?
    Mr. Wulf. Yes. So we certainly include within the realm of 
those who have a need to know emergency planners who plan on 
behalf of those local jurisdictions for emergencies. And within 
the CFATS program, within our 18 risk-based performance 
standards, we have one, RBPS 9, focused on response.
    And with respect to release facilities, facilities that 
pose a threat of release of a chemical into the surrounding 
community, one of the requirements we place on covered 
facilities is a requirement to reach out to local communities, 
to members of the public, to ensure that they have awareness of 
shelter-in-place protocols and that sort of thing. So I think 
that is an important way in which we engage the community 
within CFATS.
    Ms. Blunt Rochester. I am currently working on legislation 
that will focus on community notification, and so we would love 
to follow up on this conversation.
    You know, we talk about need to know, and I think it is 
really important to drill down deeper. Some of the testimony 
that may be coming later references the fact that sometimes 
communities are confused and things are not clear to them. And 
so I think, as we move forward, if we can have some dialogue 
about that.
    And I thank you.
    And I yield back my time.
    Mr. Tonko. The gentlelady yields back.
    The Chair now recognizes Representative Johnson for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And, Mr. Wulf, thank you for being here again today to talk 
about this very important program. You know, it is imperative 
that we all understand this program and especially understand 
the impact that the proposed changes in H.R. 3256 will have on 
CFATS. We can't produce a bill that creates unintended 
consequences. Nobody wants to do that. So your participation is 
very much appreciated.
    A topic at our last CFATS hearing was improving training 
for compliance inspections and enforcement. Can you briefly 
tell us what steps DHS has taken to improve in this area?
    Mr. Wulf. Sure, and I am glad to. I appreciate the 
question.
    So we very highly prioritize training for our workforce. We 
continue to operate, you know, a robust training program that 
includes basic training for all of our new inspectors. It 
includes advanced training for our inspector cadre on topics 
such as cybersecurity, on topics such as the Personnel Surety 
Program.
    And, more recently, we have initiated--or we have 
established a corps of senior inspectors across the country. So 
these are folks who are in place to provide not only on-the-job 
training for our inspectors, to serve in sort of a mentorship 
role, but to focus on building and ensuring that we have a 
consistent approach as we work with facilities across the 
country.
    And on that front, as well, we have recently established an 
audit program. So we are internally looking at our own actions, 
we are auditing our inspections, we are generating best 
practices to share among and across our inspector corps, and, 
you know, identifying areas where we may need some improvement.
    Mr. Johnson. OK. All right.
    Does DHS have minimum qualification requirements for 
inspectors to demonstrate their knowledge and understanding of 
the facilities they encounter and relevant guidance on 
enforceable requirements?
    Mr. Wulf. Absolutely we do. So those inspectors, you know, 
need to get through the basic and advanced training. There are 
exams at the end of the training. There are basic requirements 
to be selected, to become a chemical security inspector.
    And, you know, we have, as a result, a very talented 
workforce. We have folks with vast experience across military, 
law enforcement, chemical industry----
    Mr. Johnson. Yes. Let's dig into that a little bit, because 
we have talked about training, but what types of professional 
development exists for these auditors and inspectors to stay 
proficient on industry, you know, new developments and that 
kind of stuff?
    Mr. Wulf. So there is that on-the-job training, that sort 
of internal training. But we ensure that our inspectors are 
active members of relevant associations and have access to 
those resources.
    So I, earlier this week, was at the annual Global Security 
Exchange put on by the American Society of Industrial Security. 
So we have membership for all our inspectors in that 
organization. They are all part of the local chapters, able to 
be part of that network and able to be plugged in and to stay 
on the leading edge of evolving----
    Mr. Johnson. Are there continuing education requirements or 
anything like that? Do you require them to go to any kind of 
seminars in their specific areas of concentration?
    Mr. Wulf. Yes. We manage that internally. So we----
    Mr. Johnson. OK.
    Mr. Wulf [continuing]. Develop training on, for instance, 
advanced cybersecurity and require that members who have the 
sort of certification to engage with the more complex cyber 
cases----
    Mr. Johnson. OK. All right.
    And I know this has been touched on a little bit already. 
You know, some people argue that greater public sharing of 
chemical vulnerability information is necessary for communities 
to be better protected.
    And I know you know that CVI is used to protect information 
developed under CFATS regulations that relate to 
vulnerabilities of high-risk chemical facilities that possess 
chemicals of interest for terrorist attacks.
    So, Mr. Wulf, is it wise to have CVI publicly available?
    Mr. Wulf. No, I do not believe it makes good sense from a 
security perspective to have CVI information, most sensitive 
information about high-risk chemical facilities available to 
members of the general public.
    Mr. Johnson. OK. All right.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back an entire eight seconds.
    Mr. Tonko. The gentleman yields back.
    The Chair now recognizes the chair of the full committee, 
Representative Pallone, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Pallone. Thank you, Chairman Tonko.
    The CFATS program is different from other regulatory 
programs overseen by this subcommittee, and it is different 
because it is implemented by your department rather than the 
EPA and because it does not have the same public recognition as 
landmark environmental laws that protect the public from 
contaminants in our air, our drinking water, our soil. And 
while this program is just as important to keeping the public 
safe, it is far less accessible and transparent to the public 
than other programs.
    And when we reauthorized the program in 2014, the law 
included a requirement that the Department prepare an outreach 
implementation plan for stakeholder engagement. You published 
an outreach plan for fiscal year 2019, so I wanted to ask a few 
questions about that.
    First, how have you engaged workers and their 
representatives under the outreach plan? And what mechanisms 
are in place to ensure that employees play a role in the 
implementation of CFATS?
    Mr. Wulf. So I appreciate that. We certainly, as we conduct 
outreach--and we very much prioritize outreach to all of our 
stakeholder communities. We think awareness of the CFATS 
program is very important to its success. We include in that 
outreach, efforts to maintain open lines of communication with 
labor organizations at the national level. And on a facility-
by-facility basis, you know, we require that facilities, as 
noted in the existing legislation, to the greatest extent 
practical, engage employees with relevant security-focused 
expertise in developing their site security plans, and that 
certainly includes employees of bargaining units with the 
relevant expertise at those facilities.
    So, as our inspectors go out and conduct inspections at 
those facilities, compliance inspections at those facilities, 
they are talking to employees; they are talking to members of 
the relevant bargaining unit about their role in the security 
plan, about their role in the facility's security----
    Mr. Pallone. And what about community groups and community 
members around the regulated facilities, does the Department 
engage them as well?
    Mr. Wulf. So we do. And we--within CFATS and with respect 
to facilities that pose a threat of release, as I mentioned a 
little earlier, we require facilities to do that community 
outreach to discuss things such as shelter-in-place protocols. 
And, you know, we are engaged. I have personally participated 
in community meetings with members of the community who live in 
areas close to CFATS-covered facilities. And, you know, we 
strive to be as open and transparent as we possibly can be, 
recognizing, of course, that this is a security-focused program 
and we want to strike the right balance between sharing 
information with those who have that need to know and keeping 
that information away from those who would do us harm.
    Mr. Pallone. I have got to get to the climate issue, but 
can I just ask about Native American Tribes, are they involved 
in developing and implementing CFATS?
    Mr. Wulf. Yes. Absolutely. And one thing I neglected to 
mention in my response is that we have very much prioritized 
outreach to local emergency planning committees, so more than 
800 of those committees in the last year and, as well, Tribal 
emergency response commissions. So absolutely included in that 
mix and, you know, very important that we get the word out 
about CFATS to those communities.
    Mr. Pallone. I mean, obviously I want to make sure all 
stakeholder voices are heard, and I find it--it bothers me when 
the Department talks about the stakeholders but seems to be 
referring to the regulated facilities because we do have to 
hear from the public. So I appreciate what you said.
    I just wanted to spend a minute on the serious concerns 
posed by these facilities because of climate change and 
increasing extreme weather. Can you tell me how many CFATS 
facilities approximately are vulnerable to extreme weather 
events?
    Mr. Wulf. I think you could argue that, you know, that we 
are all potentially vulnerable to weather events.
    Mr. Pallone. OK. And when Hurricane Harvey struck Houston, 
historic flooding impacted chemical facilities across that 
region. At one facility, the Arkema plant in Crosby, the 
flooding disabled all the control measures in place to contain 
their dangerous chemicals because they all depended on backup 
generators below the water line. Can you tell me how many CFATS 
facilities approximately have evaluated how their security 
systems would fare in an extreme weather event and then, I 
guess, also how many facilities have provisions in their site 
security plans to ensure that their target chemicals remain 
secure even in extreme weather?
    Mr. Wulf. Yes.
    Mr. Pallone. You only got about half a minute.
    Mr. Wulf. I will take my best shot at it.
    Mr. Pallone. All right.
    Mr. Wulf. You know, so CFATS, which is focused, I think 
appropriately, on the security of high-risk chemical 
facilities, you know, includes provisions to ensure that 
security systems are appropriately redundant, that there does 
exist backup power for, say, closed-circuit TV cameras and 
other security systems. So I would say that, you know, all of 
our CFATS-covered facilities have had that discussion and have 
put in place those sorts of redundancies, that, although put in 
place for the CFATS antiterrorism, security-focused purpose, 
have ancillary benefits when there is a weather event.
    Mr. Pallone. All right, thank you.
    Mr. Wulf. Of course.
    Mr. Pallone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Tonko. The chairman yields back.
    The Chair now recognizes Representative Duncan for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Back in 2014, when the CFATS was authorized by Congress, I 
sat on the Homeland Security Committee, so I remember the 
debates back then. Also, sitting here, listening to the 
conversations this morning, on the 18th anniversary of the 9/11 
terrorist attacks on our country, I can't help but think about 
why the Department of Homeland Security was stood up in the 
first place, and that was because we had a lot of agencies at 
the Federal Government working independently, sharing--or not 
sharing--information, stovepiping of that information, 
protecting their turf, their fiefdoms, and so we decided to put 
the security concerns of our Nation into one department, the 
Department of Homeland Security, to focus on areas that need to 
be protected and hedged against terrorist attacks of the 
future. I think protecting our chemical facilities that could 
be vulnerable to terrorist attacks is important. We talk with a 
lot of chemical companies in our State about these issues and 
did back in the early 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, before CFATS was 
passed.
    Mr. Wulf, I think there is an importance of maintaining a 
focus on site security. EPA plays a role when there is a 
chemical spill. OSHA plays a role when there are work-site 
accidents or sets forth guidelines for the protection of the 
employees at facilities around the country. That is their role. 
That is their mission--safety and hazard protection in the 
workplace and environmental protection if there is a chemical 
spill or the possibility of a chemical spill, putting 
guidelines in place to keep railcars or chemical facilities, 
55-gallon drums from being subject to spills and contaminating 
the environment.
    The Department of Homeland Security has a mission, and that 
is to keep me and you, my fellow Americans, safe from terrorist 
attacks. That is their role. That is why they were stood up. 
But now you want to bring two more agencies into that role, and 
I am fearful that we have gotten away from the lessons learned 
after 9/11. And that is, this stovepiping of information, the 
failure to share information between agencies because of turf 
battles. Come on, folks; 18 years ago, we learned these 
lessons. We are going to talk about climate change with 
regarding to chemical safety. My gosh, we are talking about 
keeping us safe from terrorist attacks.
    Mr. Wulf, I appreciate you being here, your perspective. 
From your perspective at DHS, why is it so important to avoid 
diluting the CFATS program's mission?
    Mr. Wulf. And I appreciate the question. And, you know, we 
feel it is important to retain a focus on security. That is our 
mission at the Department of Homeland Security.
    Mr. Duncan. You are not trying to protect your turf at 
Homeland Security, are you?
    Mr. Wulf. We are not.
    Mr. Duncan. You are trying to protect Americans?
    Mr. Wulf. Absolutely right. It is an antiterrorism program. 
The threat is as real and as relevant as it ever has been. It 
is as high as it has ever been from a chemical-terrorism 
perspective. It continues to evolve into, you know, realms such 
as unmanned aircraft systems, cyber attacks, and insider 
threat, and beyond, and I feel as though we do need to 
maintain, within the CFATS program, a laser focus on security. 
And with CFATS, we are talking about America's highest risk 
chemical facilities. It is a targeted program, I think 
appropriately so, and it has been a successful program, so we 
do not want to take our eye off that ball.
    Mr. Duncan. I appreciate that. How is further expanding the 
program into environmental and worker space--safety space 
deviating from the CFATS mission?
    Mr. Wulf. So CFATS is a security program. So the 18 risk-
based performance standards are focused on securing facilities 
against terrorist attacks. As I noted a few minutes ago, there 
are ancillary benefits in the--you know, in terms of reducing 
risk in weather scenarios, but, you know, our 150 chemical 
security inspectors are security professionals. They are 
trained and well equipped to work with facilities to put in 
place security measures, and that is what our program is here 
to do. It is a small program, but it is a successful one.
    Mr. Duncan. Yes, well, I thank you for that. And I just 
urge us to keep our eye on the ball and understand, again, why 
the Homeland Security Agency was stood up--to protect us 
against terrorist attacks, not to protect us against chemical 
spills, accidents in the workplace, whatever. We have agencies 
to deal with that. This is about protecting the chemical 
facilities from terrorist attacks. We are reminded on the 18-
year anniversary of 9/11, we ought to keep our eye on the ball 
to keep America safe. With that, I yield back.
    Mr. Tonko. The gentleman yields back.
    The Chair now recognizes Representative Soto for 5 minutes, 
please.
    Mr. Soto. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Acting Deputy Assistant Director Wulf, how far along are we 
on securing our chemical facilities since the beginning of 2007 
through now?
    Mr. Wulf. We are well along, and I think in a very good 
place. As discussed earlier, we eliminated that backlog of site 
security plan reviews and approvals, and we are very much in 
sort of steady state for the programs. So the vast majority of 
inspections we are conducting across the country are the post 
site security plan approval, compliance inspection variety of 
inspections, and I will say those inspections are going well. 
You know, on occasion, issues are noted, but they are typically 
very quickly resolved. We have tremendous commitment. We have 
tremendous buy-in across our industry stakeholder community, 
and I can tell you absolutely, those high-risk chemical 
facilities, those 3,300 or so, are hardened against terrorist 
attack.
    Tens of thousands of security measures have been put into 
place at those facilities, and on average, a CFATS-covered 
facility has increased security to the tune of 55 percent from 
the point at which the facility enters into the program to the 
point at which I sign their site security plan approval, and 
they enter into that regular cycle of compliance inspection 
activity.
    Mr. Soto. So, just so we are clear, all major chemical 
facilities in the Nation now are under this purview and are 
being maintained and get continual inspections?
    Mr. Wulf. So CFATS is a targeted program, and I think that 
is appropriate. We are focused on the highest risk facilities. 
So about 30,000 facilities across the country have recognized 
that they have threshold quantities of CFATS chemicals of 
interest and have submitted what we call a Top-Screen report to 
initiate the risk-assessment process through which we determine 
which facilities are at high risk.
    So about ten percent of facilities are determined by us to 
be at high risk of terrorist attack or exploitation. We have 
put those facilities into risk tiers, tiers 1 through 4, 
highest of the high risk, to lowest of the high risk but still 
high risk. And it is with those facilities that we work to 
develop site security plans and to put them through the regular 
cycle of compliance inspection activity.
    I noted earlier that we have those other 30,000 facilities 
out there. We would like very much to work with those 
facilities as well on a voluntary basis, you know, at those 
facilities' complete option, not on a regulatory basis, not 
extending the regulatory requirements to those facilities, but 
being able to lend a helping hand, to consult on potential 
security measures, to consult regarding potential 
vulnerabilities. So I think that is an important next step for 
us, from a chemical security perspective. But we are in a very 
good place with respect to those high-risk chemical facilities.
    Mr. Soto. In the proposed legislation, subsection F, it 
requires the Department of Homeland Security to share more 
information with State and local emergency officials. And, you 
know, it has been 18 years since the 9/11 terrorist attacks. I 
have a first responder who was--Vivian Rodriguez, in my own 
office who was there responding to that. We have a lot of 
retired NYPD in central Florida. I think that shouldn't 
surprise anybody. I have heard firsthand that they were told 
that the air was safe after the attack, and we saw obviously a 
large loss of life because government agencies said that all 
first responders were safe during the cleanup. So, with this, 
with the current law and with the new proposals, Homeland 
Security and other agencies responsible, should a chemical 
facility, God forbid, be attacked, they would be working with 
our local officials to let them know whether the air was safe, 
let them know whether the water around and under the facilities 
were safe, so we won't have this happen again. Is that fair to 
say given the current law and the reforms in this bill?
    Mr. Wulf. So, you know, my sense is that those are areas 
within the domain of our friends at EPA.
    Mr. Soto. But Homeland is supposed to be the point on a lot 
of these things, so you would be working with the EPA. So would 
this bill help make sure that our first responders and others 
would be told if the air wasn't safe to breathe or other 
aspects, given that you all are there to coordinate when we 
have a terrorist attack among the agencies?
    Mr. Wulf. Yes, I would have to take a closer look at the 
bill. My sense is that it doesn't contain provisions that would 
do that, with respect to our security-focused antiterrorism 
program, but I will say that within the CFATS program, we 
continue to prioritize that outreach, we continue to prioritize 
sharing of information about CFATS-covered facilities with 
those community--with those emergency planners, with law 
enforcement, with first responders who are charged with 
protecting the public.
    Mr. Soto. Well, obviously, we never want that to happen 
again, so a big issue, we hope to hear back from you soon on 
that.
    Mr. Tonko. The gentleman yields back.
    The Chair now recognizes Representative Rodgers for 5 
minutes, please.
    Mrs. Rodgers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank both 
the panels for being here today.
    Securing our critical infrastructure from terror attacks is 
vital, and we are especially reminded of that today, on this 
important anniversary, 9/11. The CFATS program has been 
instrumental in ensuring chemical facilities at risk of terror 
attacks are protected. As we consider reauthorization of this 
crucial program, I am interested in making sure we are 
particularly focused on ensuring DHS can effectively implement 
its core mission under this program--protecting our vulnerable 
chemical infrastructure from acts of terrorism and intentional 
attacks.
    Mr. Wulf, last June, you appeared before us for three hours 
to discuss DHS' efforts to correct the CFATS program-identified 
deficiencies. Have any new program deficiencies been 
discovered, and what are you doing about them?
    Mr. Wulf. Thank you for the question. So, recently, well, 
within the last couple of years, GAO conducted a comprehensive 
review of the CFATS program. It had only a couple of 
recommendations, noting broadly that the program has been 
successful, that we have made--had made significant, 
significant improvements and really were clicking on all 
cylinders. The couple of recommendations focused on defining 
metrics for success, how we could measure the effectiveness of 
the program and the reduction in vulnerability of facilities.
    And we took that on and we are able now to measure the 
extent of improvement in a facility's security posture over the 
course of the program, and that is that 55 percent average 
improvement in security at CFATS-covered facilities.
    The second finding was focused on outreach to local 
emergency planning committees, and we undertook to redouble our 
outreach efforts in those regards, reaching to more than 800 
LEPCs across the country, and actually hit within the last year 
or so local emergency planning committees for all counties that 
have five or more CFATS-covered facilities, and over the course 
of the program's history, literally thousands and thousands of 
outreach engagements with local emergency planning committees.
    No other deficiencies have been identified. As noted, we 
have addressed, confronted head-on areas where we thought 
improvement was necessary. We retooled that risk-tiering 
methodology. We eliminated that site security plan review and 
approval backlog. We are in steady state for the program. We 
are conducting inspections that are going well.
    The facilities covered under our program are really and 
truly hard targets and owes very much to the hard work not only 
of our dedicated team, but companies across the country that 
have embraced the program and that have put in place CFATS-
focused security measures.
    Mrs. Rodgers. Thank you. So what type of quality control 
has been established to catch these problems earlier on in the 
future?
    Mr. Wulf. One of the things we have done is to put in place 
an internal audit program. So we are sending some of our own 
senior personnel along on inspections to audit them and to 
identify where issue--you know, in the event issues arise, in 
the event there are things we can be doing better, to address 
those, and to identify where things are going well, and to 
ensure that we are able to foster consistency on a national 
basis across our ten regions so that facilities in California 
experience a CFATS inspection the same way as facilities in New 
York. So we have done that. We have put in place a cadre of 
senior inspectors who are also charged with, on a day-to-day 
basis, ensuring that we are acting consistently across the 
country and providing on-the-job training to our inspectors to 
ensure that the latest and greatest in terms of program 
guidance, policy guidance, is disseminated and taken in across 
our workforce.
    Mrs. Rodgers. OK. Earlier this year, Congress narrowly 
avoided having the authority for the entire CFATS program 
disappear. Previously, the CFATS program had been operating on 
a 4-year authorization. What is the difference between managing 
a program with a very short authorization and one with a longer 
lead time?
    Mr. Wulf. Thank you. I guess I have done both, and I will 
say that when we are on a short-term situation--and you could 
argue that this 15-month extension is sort of that--our team 
spends a lot more time up here with you all, focusing on 
getting long-term reauthorization. But, substantively, long-
term authorization offers us a stability that is so important 
for moving the program forward. You know, it is the stability 
that enables us to make improvements, that has enabled us to do 
things like enhance the risk-tiering methodology and eliminate 
that backlog and put in place online systems that reduce 
burden, among many, many other things. It provides certainty 
for our industry stakeholders as they think about making 
capital investments in security. It sends a message to those 
who might seek to avoid their obligations under CFATS, that the 
program isn't going anywhere, that it is here to stay, and it 
is super helpful from a morale standpoint in terms of our 
ability to recruit and retain the best and the brightest.
    Mrs. Rodgers. Super. Thank you. Thank you for your 
leadership.
    Mr. Wulf. Of course, and I thank you.
    Mr. Tonko. The gentlelady yields back. The Chair now 
recognizes Representative Ruiz for 5 minutes, please.
    Mr. Ruiz. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for holding 
this hearing on such an important topic.
    Mr. Wulf, in your testimony you talked about the rapidly 
changing threat environment that sensitive chemical facilities 
are facing. One unique aspect of that changing landscape I 
would like to touch on is cybersecurity. You see, we think of 
threats in terms of physical attacks, leakage, thefts, 
assaults, vandalism, but in the digital age that we live in, 
bad actors armed with a keyboard can cause extremely high 
levels of damage or act as an accomplice to those who may be 
seeking to gain access to harmful chemicals. Can you give me 
the worst-case scenarios in one of these facilities where a 
cybersecurity vulnerability manipulation attack, and what can 
it pose to the facility and to the surrounding communities?
    Mr. Wulf. Yes. I mean, I suppose that in the worst-case 
scenario, where a facility has cyber systems that are, you 
know, pretty fully integrated with its industrial control 
systems, with its chemical process systems, that a, you know, 
cyber attacker could work to manipulate those processes 
potentially causing a release of chemicals. You know, where 
cyber systems are integrated with business process systems, you 
know, a cyber attack could seek to divert a shipment of 
chemicals or something along those lines.
    Mr. Ruiz. In the required reporting of vulnerability 
assessments in site security plans, is cybersecurity 
specifically a reporting requirement for those facilities?
    Mr. Wulf. It is. Cybersecurity comprises one of our 18 
risk-based performance standards. The CFATS program, I think, 
was very much out front with respect to cybersecurity. Our 
risk-based performance standard eight is focused on cyber. Our 
inspectors engage in discussion during inspections and in the 
process of working with facilities as they develop their site 
security plans----
    Mr. Ruiz. One of the biggest concerns that we have as a 
Nation is a lack of cybersecurity experts to fill those spots. 
There are studies that have shown that we have a cybersecurity 
shortage in the workforce, and so we are looking into ways that 
we can help beef that up.
    Let me talk to you about another issue that has been 
mentioned by Ranking Member Pallone in terms of consulting with 
the surrounding communities. The majority of these locations 
are around communities, like you said, that are minority or 
underserved, and there is a quote here from the Environmental 
Protection Agency that says, catastrophic accidents at chemical 
facilities, historically about 150 each year, can result in 
fatalities, serious injuries, evacuations, and other harm to 
health and human health. We heard earlier that 134,000 people 
live around those areas. This is particularly concerning to me 
because this is an environmental-justice issue.
    So you mentioned earlier that you consult with surrounding 
communities. I would like to go a little more specific in that. 
How do you do it? How do you decide with which community, when, 
how frequent, and with who do you consult with? Give me an 
example.
    Mr. Wulf. Yes. So an example would be any one of the 
thousands of outreach engagements we have held with----
    Mr. Ruiz. What are those outreach engagements? Is it a 
newspaper article? How do you engage specifically?
    Mr. Wulf. So it will be plugging into a, you know, in 
person, to a local emergency planning committee meeting and 
talking there to----
    Mr. Ruiz. Like with who? Because oftentimes in these 
underresourced communities, rural areas, they don't have the 
technical assistance. So who exactly are you reaching out to? 
Are you reaching out to the city mayor? Are you reaching out to 
the environmental justice community stakeholders? Who exactly 
and how are you doing it? See, the problem is that we have 
learned from different examples that the Federal Government 
oftentimes has a check-the-box kind of attitude, where if they 
send a letter to somebody that might not have actual 
connections with the community, they have checked the box and 
say we have engaged. But we are trying to redefine what 
meaningful engagement, meaningful consultation is, so that 
communities actually have a voice and a say and a participation 
to help you mitigate risks. And, also, if there is a risk, who 
is responsible for cleaning it up? Is there any provision where 
the community can go to the chemical facilities and ask for 
compensation for the environmental or health damage that can 
result from these leaks, potential leaks?
    Mr. Wulf. Yes, so I would say there is a lot to unpack 
there, but we certainly do not pursue a check-the-box approach 
to outreach engagement with communities and local emergency 
planning committees in particular. So we send inspectors who 
work in those communities, who work in those regions to engage 
personally. And those LEPCs can include not only emergency 
responders from the community, law enforcement, and other, but 
members of the public as well, the news media in some 
instances. So we are out there in person, and we have made that 
a very high priority.
    Mr. Ruiz. At the next panel we have some environmental 
justice stakeholders, and I am curious to see what they say 
about that as well. Thank you.
    Mr. Wulf. Of course.
    Mr. Tonko. The gentleman yields back.
    The Chair now recognizes Representative Flores for 5 
minutes, please.
    Mr. Flores. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Tonko and leader Shimkus, we appreciate you 
holding this important hearing today.
    Mr. Wulf, thank you for appearing again today and welcome 
back to the committee.
    Reauthorizing CFATS is important to me and to my district, 
which includes the community of West, Texas. Since our last 
hearing in June of 2018, I am pleased to report that we were 
able to extend CFATS through April 2020, ensuring that the 
program does not expire as we work on a long-term solution. And 
as you have heard earlier, I am among the group that has strong 
concerns regarding the recent partisan bill that came out of 
the Homeland Security Committee. That said, I am hopeful that 
we can still work together to find consensus on a bipartisan 
bill that can also pass the Senate and be sent to President 
Trump's desk for signature. I would like to thank all of the 
witnesses on both panels for providing their perspectives.
    Mr. Wulf, questions about the personnel surety or the 
identity-verification processes against the terrorist screening 
base have constantly been an issue with CFATS. Now that you 
have finished with the highest risk, high-risk facilities, or 
tiers 1 and 2, DHS is now implementing these requests at the 
tier 3 and tier 4 facilities. How is this new universe of 
facilities different than the highest risk facilities in terms 
of sizes and challenges?
    Mr. Wulf. So I appreciate that question, and I would say 
the biggest difference is in the size of the population. So 
tier 1 and 2 facilities with which we have worked over the last 
three years to implement terrorist-ties vetting, pose about ten 
percent of our regulated population. But the other 90 percent 
falls within tiers three and four. So that is about 3,000 
additional facilities with which we will be working over the 
next three years to ensure that--and I think this is 
important--that they know and have the assurance that those who 
have access to their facilities, to those high-risk chemical 
facilities and the critical assets on those facilities, have 
been vetted for terrorist ties.
    Mr. Flores. OK. As you know, you had to get through the 
tier 1 and 2 facilities and a backlog build-up. You were able 
to resolve the backlog with respect to personnel surety 
verification. How does DHS intend to expand the personnel 
surety process to the tier 3 and tier 4 facilities without 
developing another critical backlog?
    Mr. Wulf. Our plan is to do this incrementally, to do sort 
of a--to take a phased approach, and to work with between 80 
and 85 companies--and 85 facilities on a monthly basis to talk 
them through their options for complying with the terrorist-
ties vetting piece of our personnel surety risk-based 
performance standard. We have the capability to do this. We 
have the capacity to do this. We anticipate working through the 
tier 3 and 4 facilities within the next three years.
    Mr. Flores. Let's assume that the worst case developed, and 
we hope--all of us hope it doesn't. And I know you will be 
committed to not having this happen. But let's assume that a 
big backlog did develop. What accommodations should be made to 
avoid jeopardizing the entire CFATS program if that backlog 
develops for the tier 3 and tier 4 facilities?
    Mr. Wulf. Well, I think that in going in a phased fashion, 
we will avoid the prospect of a backlog. But if we were to find 
ourselves with a backlog, we could--we would have the 
flexibility to ratchet back a little bit, but I am very 
confident we will not get a backlog in the personnel surety 
arena. And we are going to work with facilities, you know, 
those 80 to 85 a month. We are going to be sensitive to the 
operational needs of facilities, particularly where we have 
companies that have multiple CFATS-covered facilities. We don't 
want to hit them all at the same time with these requirements. 
So we have and expect to continue to work very successfully and 
cooperatively with the facilities as we move through the 
personnel surety process.
    Mr. Flores. OK. In an industrial-accident context, the EPA 
is required to consider worst-case scenarios from a community, 
health, and welfare perspective. When looking at CFATS for 
tourism purposes, how does DHS evaluate the communities 
surrounding high-risk facilities like schools, hospitals, and 
population density?
    Mr. Wulf. So we look at the entirety of the surrounding 
population. We model that based on potential directions of 
prospective plumes of released chemicals. We evaluate it with 
respect to daytime and nighttime populations, and that 
certainly includes those who are found in schools, those folks 
who are in hospitals.
    Mr. Flores. OK. Thank you for your important feedback, and 
I yield back the balance of my time.
    Mr. Tonko. The gentleman yields back.
    The Chair now recognizes the Representative from Michigan, 
Representative Dingell, for 5 minutes, please.
    Mrs. Dingell. Thank you, Chairman Tonko, and I thank you 
for having this hearing today.
    And, Mr. Wulf, I thank you for your work, because it really 
is very important, and I do hope we are able to find some 
bipartisan common ground on this. And it is particularly 
fitting that we are doing this on 9/11. And I come from 
Michigan, which actually my district has a number of those 
chemical facilities or borders on them, and I suspect I am 
probably one of the only people that--it was 2001, but earlier 
that year that I had a funeral in Riverview, had the explosion, 
and we went through an evacuation. So I remember the fear in 
that community--and it was an accident. I don't even know if 
you are familiar with it.
    So Michigan is one of the States that has got a lot of 
chemical facilities, and we have been hit hard by the PFAS 
contamination, so I am going to focus on that today. And I have 
got questions about the use of these chemicals in what we are 
doing to notify people in the area, and how quickly are we 
developing other replacements. I have spent a lot of time on 
this in the last month during the August recess talking to 
people, and it is clear when you have high-intensity fires, et 
cetera, that PFAS right now, foam, is one of the things that 
can deal with it the most effectively, but are there other 
things that are available? When the Intercontinental Terminals 
Company facility caught fire in Deer Park, Texas, in March of 
this year, PFAS firefighting foams were used to stop the 
blazes. When the EPA tested the nearby Galveston Bay, they 
found PFAS contamination at about a thousand times higher than 
it is currently allowed in drinking water. And while the ITC 
facility is not a DH facility--it is a maritime transportation 
security facility--it is emblematic of the larger concerns 
around chemical facility safety and the use of inter--foam, an 
emerging contaminant we have been talking about on PFAS. So, 
Mr. Wulf, I wanted to know what you have done to update your 
instructions to CFATS participants to limit the use of PFAS 
foams to fight fires at covered facilities, and are there 
alternatives, and are we moving fast enough to develop safe and 
effective alternatives?
    Mr. Wulf. Yes, so I appreciate that question, and I think 
certainly a significant concern. You know, I think that is 
something I am going to have to take back and reach back to you 
upon.
    Mrs. Dingell. I think that is really important. So, as you 
are doing this, do you know if you have got a--DHS has a plan 
to phase out firefighting foams as part of your site security 
plans?
    Mr. Wulf. I am going to have to get back to you on that as 
well.
    Mrs. Dingell. So let me keep asking questions that I--this 
is just real because I mean, I am living--Michigan has got more 
contaminated PFAS sites than any State. Quite frankly, I don't 
think we know whether we have got more than anybody, or we have 
tested more than any other State. So I suspect we are going to 
start to see this in a lot of other States. We just know about 
it.
    But when a chemical security inspector enters a facility 
for compliance, are they looking for or documenting how much 
PFAS chemicals are at the facility?
    Mr. Wulf. So those inspectors--and I appreciate the 
question--are looking across an array of risk-based performance 
standards and assessing the extent to which a facility is 
complying with the security measures it has promised to put 
into place within its site security plan. And those include 
measures related to incident response. So to the extent 
specific chemicals are used in that response, they would be 
looking at that.
    Mrs. Dingell. So, when you get back to me, is there a way 
to use safer chemicals or chemicals in lower thresholds and 
limit the need for PFAS firefighting foams? And are you working 
with the Department of Defense, who has contributed to this, to 
also develop those foams? I know you got to get back to me. But 
at the end of your testimony--and I have only got 25 seconds--
you say DHS is focused on ways to enhance and evolve the CFATS 
program. You also say you are taking a deep dive into 
efficiency and enhancements to CFATS. Does that include PFAS 
chemicals?
    Mr. Wulf. You know, it is not something that we have looked 
at, but----
    Mrs. Dingell. I am out of time, but if you lived in 
Michigan, and the one that I lived through, the spill closed, 
but I still have--my down rivers have lots of facilities. So we 
care, and so does--my whole district does but in different 
ways. So thank you for the work you do, but this one matters, 
too. Thank you.
    Mr. Tonko. The gentlelady yields back.
    The Chair now recognizes Representative Carter for 5 
minutes, please.
    Mr. Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And thank you, Mr. Wulf, for being here, this is extremely 
important. We appreciate your participation in this.
    I have had the opportunity during our August break, to 
visit a number of the chemical manufacturers in my district, 
and I have been very impressed. All of them are cooperative. 
They get it. They understand. They want to do what is right. 
What they don't want is just unnecessary changes that aren't 
really going to increase safety but instead just increase 
costs. And I noticed during your testimony that one of the 
things that you said was that, since you started the program, 
that there has been a dramatic improvement in the pace of 
inspections and reviews and approval. How has DHS done this? 
How have you been able to make this work?
    Mr. Wulf. So, you know, I appreciate that question. We 
rolled up our sleeves. We looked at areas where we had 
bottlenecks in processes. We looked at areas where we felt as 
though we could do more to train our workforce, and we got to 
work. And I will say that a big part of being able to do that 
was that we enjoyed, beginning in December of 2014, the 
stability that came along with long-term authorization of the 
program. Before that point, we were sort of going from fiscal 
year to fiscal year through the appropriations process or, 
worse, from continuing resolution to continuing resolution. We 
didn't know whether, in the event of a funding hiatus, a 
government shutdown, whether the program would cease to exist 
for a period of time. So that was really no way to operate, but 
the stability that long-term authorization has afforded has 
really enabled us to make those key improvements.
    Mr. Carter. It is my understanding that you had a GAO audit 
and that this led you to make some changes in your efforts, and 
I was just--and also in risk-reduction metric, as well as 
enhancing outreach to local emergency planners. How have you 
done that?
    Mr. Wulf. So, with respect to the metric, we have dug in 
and built a methodology through which we can assess the level 
of security at the beginning of a facility's entrance into the 
CFATS program, and the level of security increase that it has 
achieved at the point at which we get to approving the facility 
site security plan. And on average, facilities have shown a 55-
percent increase in security between those two periods.
    With respect to outreach, to local emergency planning 
committees, that has always been a priority of ours. We have 
redoubled our efforts over the last year or so and have 
personally engaged upwards of 800 separate, local emergency 
planning committees that represent the highest concentration 
counties--of counties with the largest number of CFATS 
facilities found in them.
    Mr. Carter. Would you describe your relationship working 
with the businesses as being good? I mean, do you feel like 
they are cooperating, feel like they are receptive?
    Mr. Wulf. Yes, I absolutely would. You will hear from a 
couple of our industry stakeholders on the next panel. 
Industry, writ large, has embraced this program, has worked 
with us to help improve the program over the years. We could 
not--we could not accomplish the chemical security mission 
without that level of commitment.
    Mr. Carter. OK. In my last minute and a half, I want to ask 
you specifically about some things related to my district. I 
represent the entire coast of Georgia, including two major 
seaports. Tell me what you would do differently, if anything, 
in the way of safety in the seaports, particularly when they 
are transferring the chemicals, if they are shipping them or if 
they are bringing them in, importing them?
    Mr. Wulf. Yes. So that is a good question, and we work 
closely with our friends in the U.S. Coast Guard who implement 
something called the Maritime Transportation Security 
Administration Program. So facilities that are on the water are 
regulated, from a security standpoint, by the Coast Guard, but 
sometimes there are facilities that are co-located. There may 
be a CFATS-covered facility that is in the midst of a MTSA 
facility regulated by the Coast Guard. And so we work hand-in-
hand with the Coast Guard captain of the port to harmonize our 
activities in those areas and ensure that everything is covered 
from a security standpoint.
    Mr. Carter. OK. So it is the Coast Guard's responsibility 
when it gets to the port. What about the transportation from 
the port to the end user?
    Mr. Wulf. So, if it is at a fixed facility, if it is 
sitting at a chemical distribution facility, for example, that 
facility will fall under, generally speaking--unless it sits on 
the water--the CFATS program, and we will work with that 
facility. Among the risk-based performance standards, among the 
security measures that will be in place will be measures 
related to the shipping and receiving of CFATS chemicals of 
interest. So we will work with those facilities as they put in 
place those measures. We will inspect against those measures 
when we go out for compliance inspections.
    Mr. Carter. Absolutely. Thank you very much, and I yield 
back.
    Mr. Tonko. The gentleman yields back.
    The Chair now recognizes the Representative from Colorado, 
Representative DeGette, for 5 minutes, please.
    Ms. DeGette. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, and I am so 
happy you are having this hearing.
    We have had a number of investigative hearings about the 
risk of chemicals over the years, and so looking at this 
legislation, it is really important. And I am glad to be here.
    Mr. Wulf, I wanted to ask you about some of the facilities 
that are reporting. The EPA says that my home district--I am 
like many of the members here; I have an urban district with a 
lot of facilities that manage hazardous material in Denver. And 
the EPA says Denver has 27 facilities that are managing enough 
hazardous material to be required to complete risk-management 
plans under the Clean Air Act, and it has 21 facilities that 
manage enough hazardous chemicals to be reporting under the 
Toxic Release Inventory. But Department of Homeland Security 
staff told my staff yesterday that only three facilities in my 
district are deemed high enough risk to be subject to the 
chemical facility anti-terrorist standards that are the subject 
of this hearing. So I am wondering if you can tell me what the 
difference is, why we would have all these facilities that have 
to have this other reporting, but yet only three that DHS has 
determined to be at a high enough risk.
    Mr. Wulf. Yes, no, I appreciate that question. So CFATS is 
a security-focused program, and it is focused on the highest 
risk facilities----
    Ms. DeGette. Right, I know that.
    Mr. Wulf [continuing]. And our antiterrorism security 
program, you know, means those facilities that, based on a 
number of different factors, are at the highest risk of 
terrorist attack or exploitation. So it may relate to the types 
and quantities and/or concentrations of the chemicals that may 
be of more or less interest to potential terrorists, 
adversaries. It may relate to the location of the facility in 
relation to populated areas. Those are a variety of the 
factors.
    Ms. DeGette. I mean, I know what the standards are, but I 
guess my question is, do you know--I mean, you may not know 
specifically about the first congressional district of 
Colorado. But does your agency review all of these other 
facilities that have these kinds of chemicals that have to do 
the reporting to determine whether they do meet that threshold 
or not?
    Mr. Wulf. So, yes, the sort of entry point for CFATS is the 
requirement to file a Top-Screen to initiate that risk-
assessment process. So, you know, more than 30,000 facilities 
have initiated the process because they have one or more of our 
CFATS chemicals of interest at or above the threshold 
quantities or concentrations. And so, you know, we have tiered 
as being at high risk of terrorist attack or exploitation about 
ten percent of those facilities. So it is very conceivable that 
some of those other facilities are among those 30,000 
facilities that have----
    Ms. DeGette. Right. They probably are.
    Mr. Wulf [continuing]. Have filed Top-Screens.
    Ms. DeGette. So they have been reviewed by your agency is 
what you are saying?
    Mr. Wulf. Yes. We----
    Ms. DeGette. OK. So----
    Mr. Wulf. Likely, if they have threshold quantities of 
CFATS chemicals, it is likely that they have submitted a Top-
Screen.
    Ms. DeGette. So the other thing is the DHS people wouldn't 
tell us which three facilities were listed. Is there some 
reason for that?
    Mr. Wulf. So, you know, certainly we strive to balance, you 
know, balance things on the information-sharing front, but I 
think we certainly can make that information available to you, 
yes.
    Ms. DeGette. Because what I am looking at is, in the First 
Congressional District, which, as I say, we have a lot of 
chemical facilities. You know, you have to balance between 
secrecy so that terrorists don't find out about it. You know, 
so I have to--they will find out so the public knows what is in 
their neighborhood, and that is why I asked the question.
    Mr. Wulf. Yes, it is a balance.
    Ms. DeGette. OK. All right. So they will let me know.
    Now, is it true that some facilities have minimized the 
inherent risk of their operations, for example, by reducing the 
storage of hazardous materials to the point where they are no 
longer considered high risk?
    Mr. Wulf. It is true that thousands of facilities over the 
course of the CFATS program's history have reduced their 
holdings of CFATS chemicals of interest.
    Ms. DeGette. And that would be in the public is interest, I 
would think.
    Mr. Wulf. We view that as a success of the program.
    Ms. DeGette. OK, great. Thank you.
    Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    Mr. Tonko. The gentlelady yields back.
    And we now recognize the Representative from Illinois, 
Representative Schakowsky, for 5 minutes, please.
    Ms. Schakowsky. Thank you. Thank you so much.
    I want to thank the chairman for calling this hearing, and 
also, Mr. Wulf, I want to thank you for returning to talk to 
our committee, especially on this day, on 9/11, about these 
critical programs. I also want to thank you for coming to 
Illinois last summer to present at DHS chem security talk that 
was held in Chicago, and at that event, you spoke about the 
importance of the CFATS program and the importance of taking 
the program on the road. And so I wanted to just ask you a bit 
about those sessions. First, are those sessions ongoing? Is DHS 
continuing to travel the country to bring important 
information--that is how we viewed it--about the CFATS program 
to people where they live?
    Mr. Wulf. Absolutely, we are. And I appreciate the comment 
on the chemical security talks we held last year, one of those 
events in Chicago, one in Oakland, as well as one in 
Philadelphia. This year, we held a larger forum chemical 
security summit in New Orleans, and it is great to bring the 
entire extended chemical security community together to share 
information about CFATS, to discuss sort of hot topics, policy 
updates, those sorts of things, and certainly best practices 
for securing chemical facilities. So it absolutely continues to 
be a priority.
    And on less of a big-splash level, we continue to 
prioritize getting out to local emergency planning committees, 
getting out to State-level industry associations to spread the 
word about the program and ensure that companies with 
facilities that have threshold quantities of CFATS-covered 
chemicals of interest know that they need to report those to 
us.
    Ms. Schakowsky. Well, first of all, I wish you fun in New 
Orleans. I was just there for a conference. Had a ball. 
Anyway----
    Mr. Wulf. It is a pretty fun spot.
    Ms. Schakowsky [continuing]. Second--yes--are there any 
efforts--when you think about stakeholders, are there any 
efforts to make sure that some of the labor unions are involved 
in these sessions at all?
    Mr. Wulf. Yes. We have a good relationship with the labor 
unions. You know, we certainly reach out across all stakeholder 
communities, and, you know, we hope that they will be part of 
sessions such as chemical security talks.
    Ms. Schakowsky. Right. I think it is absolutely essential 
that these stakeholders have a role in ensuring the security of 
individual facilities and would like to ask a few questions 
about the experience of workers. So what requirements are 
currently in place to ensure that employees have a role in the 
development of site security plans at covered facilities?
    Mr. Wulf. I appreciate that question, and I think employees 
now are very much involved in the development of site security 
plans. I think specifically--and I think this is appropriate--
employees who have security-related expertise or roles in the 
security process. The current, you know, the current state of 
play is that there is a requirement that facilities, to the 
greatest extent practicable, involve employees in the 
development of site security plans, employees with that 
relevant security-focused expertise, and that would include 
employees at facilities that are covered by bargaining units, 
collective bargaining units.
    Ms. Schakowsky. I think it is so important because it can 
differ from facility to facility, and the workers really know 
what is going on. Do you know if, are the workers allowed to 
pick their own representative when opportunities arise for 
worker input?
    Mr. Wulf. I believe the situation is that, you know, the 
facility security officer determines which employees are best 
positioned to provide meaningful input to the development of a 
site security plan.
    Ms. Schakowsky. Now, this is going to sound like a silly 
question. Do all employees at CFATS facilities know they work 
at a CFATS facility?
    Mr. Wulf. So, you know, again, that is kind of where we get 
to the balanced--striking the appropriate balance between 
sharing information with those who have a need to know it, and 
keeping sensitive information from those who might not have a 
need to know. So, at a CFATS-covered facility, all employees 
will be part of mandated training and exercise programs so that 
they are aware of how to deal with security at----
    Ms. Schakowsky. And who to go to, right?
    Mr. Wulf. Oh, yes.
    Ms. Schakowsky. OK. Great. Thanks. My time is up. I 
appreciate you very much.
    Mr. Wulf. Oh, thank you so much.
    Mr. Tonko. The gentlelady yields back. Excuse me.
    The Chair now recognizes the Representative from New York, 
Representative Clarke, for 5 minutes, please.
    Ms. Clarke. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank our 
Ranking Member Shimkus for convening this important hearing on 
how we can protect our workers and communities from the risk 
associated with hazardous chemical facilities. As a Member of 
Congress who sits on both the Energy and Commerce and Homeland 
Security Committees, this legislation is particularly important 
to me. Adding further significance is the fact that today is 
also the 18th anniversary of one of the most tragic days in our 
Nation's past, a day that me and my fellow New Yorkers still 
hold fresh in our memories.
    Chemical facilities throughout our Nation, which serve a 
range of important functions, also pose many unique risks to 
our communities. It is our duty in Congress to ensure that the 
proper protections are in place to keep our constituents safe. 
While a major focus of the CFATS program is to safeguard 
chemical facilities against acts of terrorism, it is also 
imperative that we consider the multiple risks that the climate 
crisis presents to these facilities, their workers, and 
surrounding communities. Many CFATS facilities are situated in 
areas that are highly vulnerable to natural disasters. This is 
especially concerning when you consider the fact that climate 
change is already increasing the frequency and severity of 
extreme weather events, including major storms and floods.
    Further concerning, although not so surprising, is the fact 
that low-income communities and communities of color are 
disproportionately located near these facilities, and, 
consequently, we are at greater risk of harm from potential 
disasters. Therefore, as we seek to better safeguard CFATS 
facilities from all risk, climate and otherwise, it is also 
important that we recognize this reality and ensure the 
vulnerable communities who are most impacted by these risks are 
also present at the table so that they can have a meaningful 
say in protecting their own futures.
    Mr. Wulf, thank you for being here today to offer testimony 
on this matter. According to the EPA's Toxic Release Inventory, 
there are currently 408 chemical facilities in and around 
Brooklyn, New York, that handle toxic chemicals, and you don't 
need to look too closely into a map--or at a map to realize 
that many of these facilities are located within or adjacent to 
high-risk flood areas. So can you please describe some of the 
major risks that CFATS facilities and their surrounding 
communities face due to flooding and severe storms?
    Mr. Wulf. And I appreciate the question, appreciate the 
support for the CFATS program. Of course, CFATS is an 
antiterrorism program, focused on security, but weather events 
certainly pose a threat to all manner of facilities as well. 
And though I think it is important that we retain within the 
CFATS program our laser focus on antiterrorism and on enhancing 
security at facilities that are at high-risk of terrorist 
attack or exploitation, the measures that facilities put into 
place, redundant--you know, redundant systems, emergency power 
to enhance their security, can have additional benefits in the 
weather-related realm.
    Ms. Clarke. I think it was the Houston storm that we saw a 
horrible incident with a chemical facility. Have we learned 
anything from that event?
    Mr. Wulf. So, you know, what we--we do engage, in the event 
of a weather scenario, with our CFATS-covered facilities. We 
are in frequent, in constant communication with those 
facilities to assess their status, to talk about whether they 
have any unmet needs, and I will say that, you know, those 
facilities are very--certainly very security aware, certainly 
very risk aware. And actually the recent hurricane scenario, 
Hurricane Dorian, we were in contact with one of our facilities 
in Florida that determined to make a risk-informed decision to 
move a railcar of potentially toxic-release chemicals off of an 
island and to an inland location.
    Ms. Clarke. Let me ask, do you work with FEMA and EPA to 
coordinate your programs that deal with chemical facility 
management? And given the administration's proposed rollbacks 
to EPA's risk-management program, do you believe that the CFATS 
program can and should incorporate measures to enable more 
first responder, community, and worker engagement, that will 
help the facilities better prepare for and protect against 
natural disaster threats or chemical incidents?
    Mr. Wulf. Yes, so I think we continue to prioritize within 
the CFATS program today that outreach and engagement with the 
first responder communities, having been in person--not 
myself--but our team to over 800 local emergency planning 
committees over the course of the past year. So that certainly 
continues to be a priority. And, you know, certainly remain in 
contact and coordination with our counterparts at EPA and FEMA.
    Ms. Clarke. Very well. Thank you very much for your 
response today.
    I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Tonko. The gentlelady yields back. That concludes our 
first panel.
    I would like to thank Mr. Wulf for joining us today. Mr. 
Wulf, I ask that you respond promptly to any questions for the 
record that you receive from our members following this 
hearing. At this time, I ask that staff prepare the witness 
table such that we may begin our second panel shortly.
    Mr. Tonko. OK. We will resume with the second panel now to 
share their thoughts.
    We will now hear from four witnesses. We will start with my 
left, with Mr. John Paul Smith, legislative representative for 
United Steel Workers.
    Thank you for joining us.
    Next to him we have Ms. Michelle Roberts, national co-
coordinator of the Environmental Justice Health Alliance.
    Thank you, Ms. Roberts.
    And next to Ms. Roberts, we have Mr. Scott Whelchel, chief 
security officer and global director of emergency services and 
security for Dow Chemical Company on behalf of the American 
Chemistry Council.
    Thank you, Mr. Whelchel.
    And, finally, Mr. Matthew Fridley, cooperate manager of 
safety, health, and security, Brenntag North America, Inc., on 
behalf of National Association of Chemical Distributors.
    We want to thank our witnesses for joining us today. We 
look forward to your testimony.
    At this time, the Chair will now recognize each witness to 
present 5 minutes' worth of opening statements.
    Before we begin, I would like to explain the lighting 
system. In front of you is a series of lights. The light will 
initially be green at the start of your opening statement. The 
light will turn yellow when you have 1-minute remaining. Please 
begin to wrap up your testimony at that point. The light will 
turn red when your time has expired.
    So, Mr. Smith, you may start. You have 5 minutes, please.

  STATEMENTS OF JOHN PAUL SMITH, LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATIVE, 
  UNITED STEELWORKERS (USW); MICHELE L. ROBERTS, NATIONAL CO-
  COORDINATOR, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE HEALTH ALLIANCE (EJHA); 
 SCOTT WHELCHEL, CHIEF SECURITY OFFICER AND GLOBAL DIRECTOR OF 
  EMERGENCY SERVICES AND SECURITY, DOW, ON BEHALF OF AMERICAN 
 CHEMISTRY COUNCIL; AND MATTHEW FRIDLEY, CORPORATE MANAGER OF 
SAFETY, HEALTH, AND SECURITY, BRENNTAG NORTH AMERICA, INC., ON 
    BEHALF OF NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHEMICAL DISTRIBUTORS.

                  STATEMENT OF JOHN PAUL SMITH

    Mr. Smith. Chairman Tonko, Ranking Member Shimkus, and 
members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to 
testify today. I am here on behalf of the United Steel Workers 
International Union. Our union is the largest industrial union 
in North America and represents the majority of unionized 
workers in the chemistry industry.
    Before coming to Washington, I worked in this sector for a 
little more than ten years and then as a police officer for 
four, where I received from basic homeland security training.
    In the very southern tip of Illinois, near the confluence 
of the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers, sits a uranium conversion 
facility where I was fortunate to earn for my family and serve 
the local union in several capacities, including chairing the 
Health and Safety Committee.
    This facility, currently idled, processes uranium later 
used in nuclear fuel. The facility housed large quantities of 
very dangerous chemicals, including hydrofluoric acid, sulfuric 
acid, liquid hydrogen, and potassium hydroxide. A release at 
the facility would have obvious catastrophic consequences. 
Worst-case-scenario models accounted for an affected radius 
that included several small towns and cities.
    The facility is not covered by CFATS because it is 
regulated in part by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. But the 
NRC does not regulate the areas of the plant where the vast 
majority of these chemicals are stored. Post-9/11, the NRC did 
issue a site security order and included the chemical storage 
in the restricted area of the plant, meaning everything inside 
the fenceline. The security order, however, did not require 
employee involvement, so the people most familiar working with 
the chemicals did not participate in the site security plan.
    Most of the people I worked with have never heard of CFATS. 
Our union makes an effort to educate our members, provides 
training in addition to what they receive from employers, and 
has an annual health, safety, and environment conference that 
convenes as we speak.
    Even with additional training and education, we have 
concerns that the CFATS program is widely unknown to our 
members and even more so to workers at nonorganized facilities 
that do not have the benefit of the additional resources the 
union provides.
    We have tried to address this issue with the Department, 
but meaningful progress has not been made. This is one issue 
that can be addressed by Congress by requiring, as an initial 
step, a worksite poster at CFATS facilities and additional 
worker participation.
    I know from my experience that every day our members 
manufacture and handle the most toxic and dangerous chemicals 
in the world. The knowledge and experience they have of these 
chemicals are invaluable. We know as much or more than anyone 
the hazards associated with these substances and the potential 
for damage to critical infrastructure, along with injury and 
loss of lives.
    It is crucial that the CFATS include language requiring 
worker involvement in the site security plan and that workers 
are able to choose the person to best represent them. That 
representative should participate throughout all phases of 
security planning, implementation, and inspections.
    Our members are tasked with dealing with minor accidental 
chemical releases, fires, and explosions on a more regular 
basis than most realize and with large-scale events, like the 
explosion and fire that happened on June 21st of this year, 
near HF Unit at the Philadelphia Energy Solutions refinery in 
south Philadelphia, where their quick, skilled actions saved 
the community from disaster.
    Whether from unintentional incidents or intentional 
terroristic threats, our members know the security of the 
facilities they work in is of grave importance. Many of the 
refineries like PES, where our members work and live, that fall 
under the jurisdiction of the Marine Transportation Security 
Act, are exempted from the CFATS program.
    We ask for the removal of that exemption and oppose any new 
exemptions. We are concerned about legislative proposals that 
exempt large categories of facilities and chemicals, such as 
explosives and mixtures.
    Our union supports stronger language for whistleblower 
protections with a provision for remedy in the bill 
reauthorization. Notifying workers that are at a CFATS facility 
and have whistleblower protection should be a priority. Having 
a remedy process makes workers more comfortable reporting 
violations.
    The legislation should also encourage facilities to employ 
industry practices that reduce risk and eliminate hazards. 
There are facilities that have instituted controls that have 
inherently reduced risks, and those lessons should be shared 
for implementation across the industry.
    Reducing or eliminating hazards has a far greater effect on 
protecting workers and communities and target reduction than 
adding fences, cameras, and guards. It is critical that 
relevant information be shared with local first responders, 
local officials, and unions. Workers in the public are 
important stakeholders in preventing and responding to 
incidents.
    Our union opposes any legislation that takes the industry 
down a path of self-regulation. Congress has the opportunity to 
strengthen the security of our country's chemical facilities 
and make workers in our community safer by closing some of the 
gaps of the CFATS program and making sure the working people at 
these facilities have a voice that is heard.
    Once again, thank you for the opportunity to testify.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Smith follows:]

                 Prepared Statement of John Paul Smith
                 
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    Mr. Tonko. Thank you so much, Mr. Smith.
    And next we will hear from Ms. Roberts. You have 5 minutes, 
please.

                STATEMENT OF MICHELE L. ROBERTS

    Ms. Roberts. Thank you. Dear members----
    Thank you very much for having the opportunity to present 
before you today. It is very important because today I stand 
for the many communities that many people don't see, those who 
live in the shadows of these facilities.
    My name is Michele Roberts. I am the national co-
coordinator of the Environmental Justice Health Alliance for 
Chemical Policy Reform. EJHA is what we refer ourselves to be. 
I am equally an environmental scientist.
    EJHA is a national collective of grassroots groups 
throughout the country working to achieve environmental and 
economic justice.
    As recent industrial disasters in Wisconsin, as you heard, 
Texas, and others, Pennsylvania, illustrate, a major industrial 
chemical release, fire, or explosion can injure workers, 
endanger communities, and cause the abrupt closure of important 
industrial facilities.
    While those specific incidents were not terrorism related, 
they show the serious vulnerability of facilities located in 
communities around the country. CFATS is a critical program to 
defend against these incidents. Reauthorizing CFATS represents 
an important opportunity to strengthen its effectiveness.
    The existing statute must be improved in several areas. To 
name a few examples, it should include water treatment and 
maritime facilities, include clear protections against 
cybersecurity threats, and require that the Department of 
Homeland Security verify statements submitted by facilities 
that claim to no longer fall within the jurisdiction of CFATS.
    In addition to those points, I refer you to a letter that 
we submitted to the committee from a coalition of health 
worker, environmental justice, and allied organizations by 
BlueGreen Alliance on August 23rd, 2019.
    More broadly, environmental justice communities like those 
affiliated with EJHA have issues with the following areas of 
the current insufficient CFATS program. Frankly, the entire 
CFATS program is secretive and confusing. Even experienced 
advocates are sometimes unsure about aspects of CFATS. Because 
it is impossible to know for sure what facilities are even 
required to participate in CFATS, it is impossible for 
community members or advocates to fully understand the level of 
danger, planning, preparedness, or the lack thereof, et cetera, 
in their neighborhoods.
    The best way to guess that a facility might be a CFATS 
facility is if it is an RMP, Risk Management Program facility, 
but that is not a sure thing.
    The emergence of new technologies and cybersecurity 
threats, coupled with this administration's attacks on the 
other foundational policies and programs that protect workers 
and communities from catastrophic events at hazardous 
facilities, means that a really strong and important CFATS bill 
and program are more important now than ever.
    The CFATS program is absolutely critical to protect the 
financial interests of these facilities, as well as the health 
and safety of their workers and the surrounding communities, 
particularly in the light of the total failure of the EPA's 
Risk Management Program to do so.
    Further, we need CFATS program to reduce and eliminate 
potential terrorists. We need best practices information, and 
lessons learned should be shared and used to guide the standard 
setting for other similar facilities. We need CFATS program 
should account for overburdened communities and vulnerable 
populations. The CFATS program and site planning decisions 
absolutely must be more inclusive of and transparent to workers 
at CFATS facilities.
    EJHA strongly supported and advocated for the 2017 modest, 
most deeply important improvements to the RMP rule. While the 
improvements didn't go far enough to be fully protective, they 
added critical elements that EPA is now trying to roll back.
    Though not the subject of this particular hearing, we need 
each of the members of this committee to join us in strongly 
calling for EPA to fully implement the 2017 improvements of the 
Risk Management Program and additionally strengthen the CFATS 
program for those folks who I said languish in the shadows, the 
ones you don't see, until an explosion occurs. And then, 
unfortunately, we are seeing traumatized folks, who, by the 
way, are living in trauma daily not knowing who is actually 
thinking about them should there be explosion.
    Thank you very much. We need a more protective bill for our 
people and for workers.
    Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Roberts follows:]

                Prepared Statement of Michele L. Roberts
                
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[
    Mr. Tonko. You are welcome. Thank you, Ms. Roberts.
    And now we will hear from Mr. Whelchel for 5 minutes, 
please, and welcome.

                  STATEMENT OF SCOTT WHELCHEL

    Mr. Whelchel. Good afternoon, Chairman Tonko, Ranking 
Member Shimkus, and distinguished members of the committee.
    My name is Scott Whelchel. I am chief security officer and 
global director of emergency services and security for Dow, a 
material science company headquartered in Midland, Michigan.
    In addition to my role at Dow, I am currently vice chair of 
the Chemical Sector Coordinating Council. Prior to joining Dow, 
I had the privilege of serving as homeland security and 
emergency preparedness director for St. Charles Parish, 
Louisiana, a community with a nuclear power facility and over 
20 other industrial sites.
    In St. Charles, industry and government work together in an 
all-hazards and whole community approach to emergency 
management. While in this role, I was honored to be elected by 
my peers to serve as president of the Louisiana Emergency 
Preparedness Association.
    I am also a member of the Security Committee of the 
American Chemistry Council, on whose behalf I am testifying 
today. And I hope to bring both the private and public sector 
perspectives to the discussion.
    I want to thank you for allowing me to participate in this 
important hearing, especially on this solemn occasion of 9/11, 
and I am pleased to provide important input on the CFATS 
program.
    Since its inception, CFATS has made many programmatic 
improvements. These include improved site security inspectors 
and inspections, risk-assessment processes, the security plan 
authorization process, and its collaboration with the regulated 
community and others.
    CFATS inspectors' levels of expertise has vastly improved, 
and the program demonstrates broad consistency across regions 
in the application of that expertise.
    CFATS has an effective model of centralized management and 
decentralized execution, which allows for headquarters and the 
compliance branch to resolve any confusion stemming from the 
variability and the interpretation of the CFATS performance 
standards. This consistency has brought trust.
    CFATS and the regulated community have not benefited from 
the uncertainty stemming from short-term reauthorization. 
Longer authorization periods provide important stability for 
covered facilities to effectively plan for security investments 
as well as enabling DHS to more efficiently and effectively 
manage their program.
    Given this, the ACC and its member companies see the value 
and the need for periodic congressional oversight and would not 
support permanent reauthorization.
    It has been said that failures in security happen at the 
seams, the seams of people, processes, and policy. Given that, 
security risk is a function of threat, vulnerability, and 
consequence, it takes both industry and government and others 
to work together on each of the factors in this equation.
    Therefore, it is imperative that DHS remains as transparent 
as possible regarding the specific factors driving the risk and 
resulting risk tier levels at facilities. CFATS should embrace 
the post-9/11 philosophy of need to know but responsibility to 
share.
    Having spent over 20 years in the intelligence community, I 
fully understand both sides of this equation and recognize the 
challenges inherent in sharing information that is sensitive or 
classified.
    In that same spirit, industry must share all relevant 
information needed for comprehensive emergency planning with 
local emergency managers and response agencies. Not only is 
this already addressed in the CFATS risk-based performance 
standards, it is best covered by safety regulations overseen by 
the EPA and OSHA.
    But even with those drivers, information sharing is only 
one step in the cycle. It is incumbent not only on industry to 
share but for emergency management officials to drive 
integrated planning, coupled with implementation of 
comprehensive and inclusive exercise and training strategies, 
to compliment the hazard awareness that comes with that 
information sharing.
    In St. Charles Parish, both government and industry adhered 
to a set of mutually supporting obligations. As we sit here 
today, local and State emergency planners and other agencies 
receive chemical inventory data. This data in many States is 
available in digital form and can be immediately uploaded by 
those State and local agencies into CAMEO, or Computer Aided 
Management of Emergency Operations, to facilitate enhanced 
emergency planning efforts.
    The CFATS program has made our industry, our communities, 
and our country more secure. CFATS will grow stronger by 
adopting the improvements outlined in the written testimony 
provided and through continued engagement of this committee to 
ensure the CFATS program stays on track.
    The long-term security of our Nation is a goal and a 
commitment that we all share.
    On behalf of both the American Chemistry Council and Dow, I 
appreciate this opportunity to present our views on this 
important issue. I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Whelchel follows:]

                  Prepared Statement of Scott Whelchel
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]                  
                  

    Mr. Tonko. Thank you, Mr. Whelchel.
    And, finally, we will hear from Mr. Fridley. Welcome. And 
you are recognized for 5 minutes, please.

                  STATEMENT OF MATTHEW FRIDLEY

    Mr. Fridley. Thank you, sir.
    Good afternoon, Chairman Tonko, Ranking Member Shimkus, and 
distinguished members of the committee.
    My name is Matthew Fridley, and I am the safety, health, 
and security manager for Brenntag North America, a chemical 
distribution company headquartered in Reading, Pennsylvania.
    In addition to my role at Brenntag North America, I am 
currently the chair of the Chemical Sector Coordinating 
Council. The Coordinating Council has a strong working 
partnership in both the private and public sectors to develop 
industry practice and to build culture in safety and security.
    I am also the vice chair of the Regulatory Affairs and 
Security Committee for the National Association of Chemical 
Distributors, on whose behalf I am testifying today.
    I thank you for allowing me to participate in this 
important hearing today, and I am pleased to provide input on 
the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standard.
    Brenntag is currently the largest chemical distributor 
globally and the second largest chemical distributor in the 
United States. Brenntag North America operates over 180 
facilities, employs over 5,100 people.
    Brenntag has been an active member of the NACD for over 35 
years. We have been participating in NACD's Responsible 
Distribution Program since its inception in 1991. This 
comprehensive program addresses environmental, health, safety, 
and security risks. Member companies are third-party verified 
to ensure quality and performance.
    While security has always been an inherent element of the 
Responsible Distribution after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, NACD 
added specific security elements to the program, and the 
association continues to enhance these requirements.
    In 2013, NACD added a specific security code to Responsible 
Distribution that consolidated many prior requirements and 
enhanced others. These requirements apply to all NACD members, 
including those that do not have facilities subject to the 
CFATS regulation.
    NACD and Brenntag support a long-term reauthorization to 
the CFATS. I believe the CFATS program has made the chemical 
industry in our Nation much more secure. From the time of the 
program's establishment in 2007, the industry has invested 
significant capital in training resources towards enhanced 
security measures at our facilities.
    In fact, Brenntag is one of most regulated companies under 
CFATS, knows the importance of this program better than most. 
While these resources did not necessarily assist us in growing 
business, they were nonetheless important to ensure the 
security of our company, our employees, and community.
    DHS has generally taken a non-adversarial, reasonable 
approach in implementing the CFATS regulation. DHS has made 
significant improvements in the program following the program's 
2014 reauthorization.
    Changes in leadership of the CFATS program help establish a 
commitment to work with the regulated chemical industries, 
including the Chemical Sector Coordinating Council.
    Another reason for the success of the CFATS program is the 
fact that DHS has taken the time to truly understand the 
diversity of the chemical industry and work with the regulated 
community on security measures.
    The clear objective of the CFATS program is to help 
facilities be more secure. While not taking a punitive 
approach, DHS has excelled in outreach in three key ways. They 
have published numerous fact sheets and lessons learned 
documents, interacting with facility owners and operators 
during the Chemical Sector Security Summits and other industry 
meetings and always making inspectors and headquarter personnel 
available to walk and talk through issues or questions.
    The program's 2014 reauthorization, which for the first 
time provided CFATS a multiyear reauthorization, further 
enhanced security efforts by providing regulatory certainty to 
both industry and DHS.
    This stability allowed DHS to increase efficiencies in the 
program while streamlining the information submission process 
for regulated facilities.
    It is my hope that Congress can pass a long-term 
reauthorization of the CFATS program. I believe the CFATS is 
strong and requires minimal change. One priority I can 
recommend is to require that any changes to the Appendix A 
Chemicals of Interest List remains subject to rulemaking.
    Changes to the COI List could have a major impact on my 
business operation and security investments. Changes may be 
needed upon discovery of a new threat information, but it is 
important for regulated communities like mine to be able to 
provide information to DHS and explain the impacts on any 
proposed changes.
    I also support the creation of a program where DHS would 
recognize companies that meet certain criteria, such as 
participation in a program like Responsible Distribution. By 
acknowledging responsible distributors, DHS would then be able 
to prioritize resources for the noncompliant outliers that may 
pose a greater security risk.
    CFATS is recognized globally as a model chemical security 
framework worldwide, and DHS frequently responds to requests to 
work with other governments as they seek to build cultures on 
chemical security similar to the United States.
    As the only Federal program focused solely on facility site 
security with COIs, this must remain as CFATS program's only 
purpose.
    On June 19th, the House Homeland Security Committee 
approved H.R. 3256, which will now be considered by this 
committee. While NACD applauds Congress' commitment to 
reauthorizing the CFATS program, we are concerned that 
provisions in H. R. 3256 would jeopardize the integrity of the 
program. Congress must ensure the CFATS reauthorization 
legislation only strengthens, not weakens, facility site 
security.
    On behalf of the NACD and Brenntag, I appreciate this 
opportunity to present our views on this important issue, and I 
look forward to answering your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Fridley follows:]

                 Prepared Statement of Matthew Fridley
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]                
                 


    Mr. Tonko. Mr. Fridley, thank you. Thank you to our entire 
panel.
    We have now concluded opening statements with our second 
panel, and we now move to member questions. And I will start by 
recognizing myself for 5 minutes.
    So, Mr. Fridley and Mr. Whelchel, it seems that good work 
is being done by industry in terms of seeking to reduce risks. 
And I fully understand that these types of risk reduction 
measures might not be possible at every site. But, generally, 
do you think these types of actions to minimize, substitute, 
moderate, or simplify hazardous processes are worthy of 
exploring when a facility is considering how to address 
security at those individual sites?
    Mr. Fridley. Well, we are a chemical distribution company, 
so our inventory and what we have on site is directly affected 
by our customers. So we are working with some of our customers 
on explaining this process. We actually have a Know Your 
Customer program through the Responsible Distribution program 
that we go out and we work with those customers so they 
understand that the chemicals that they may be ordering may be 
subject to CFATS regulation.
    In turn, we will work with them to maybe, is there an 
alternative to their process? If there is, then that would 
directly affect my inventory so I wouldn't have to carry as 
much inventory that I would have at my site.
    Mr. Tonko. Mr. Whelchel.
    Mr. Whelchel. Yes, sir. I appreciate the question.
    And I remember fondly being a part of a chemical--a CFATS 
reauthorization--excuse me--a CFATS Top-Screen meeting where we 
were assessing the facility for whether it should be screened 
in or out of the program.
    And it was during the discussion with the CFATS inspector 
that they put forth the opportunity to visit risk reduction in 
the way of changing either the inventory or the concentration 
or other variables within the COI, and it was very welcomed by 
the business. And the chemistry was changed, and we were able 
to make those changes to our chemical processes.
    We immediately started to replicate that potential to other 
sites. And I am pleased to say we did so at multiple sites.
    Mr. Tonko. Thank you. And do you believe there could be 
greater guidance or encouragement from the Department to assess 
these types of risk-reduction measures as part of the broader 
security plan?
    Mr. Whelchel. I actually believe that the right balance has 
been struck. So the conversation was initiated initially by 
CFATS inspectors, but it took our knowledge of chemistry and 
our ability to look at our processes to carry it the rest of 
the way.
    So I believe the CFATS program is doing the right thing in 
terms of initiating the action, and then industry then steps in 
to meet the rest of the way for developing how we do chemical 
production in a safer way.
    Mr. Tonko. OK. Thank you.
    Mr. Fridley, you would concur or----
    Mr. Fridley. Yes, I would absolutely concur with Scott's 
answer to that.
    And the biggest thing, to his point, it is a shared 
responsibility. You know, we have responsibility as well to 
educate our customers. And again, it goes back to your Know 
Your Customer program, which is a staple in our industry.
    Mr. Tonko. Thank you.
    Ms. Roberts and Mr. Smith, I want to get your thoughts on 
this because, to my mind, working to reduce risks from the 
outset is likely one of the most important ways to provide 
meaningful protection for workers in frontline communities.
    Can you give us some perspective on what it means to reduce 
risk for the people you are here to represent?
    Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I can give one example, at least the facility I worked at.
    They changed one of the processes from using anhydrous 
ammonia to aqueous ammonia, inherently reducing the risk of 
release of anhydrous ammonia--I am sorry--completely eliminate 
it from the facility. So removed that target to a much safer 
technology and also protected the workers at the site.
    Mr. Tonko. Thank you.
    And Ms. Roberts?
    Ms. Roberts. Yes. And just--also, it is important to 
understand that many of the communities who live fenceline to 
these facilities are in housing structures that are not 
conducive to even sheltering in place, if that be the case.
    So it is extremely important for--to minimize that, of the 
reduction of risk to communities by, as you heard, minimizing 
the amount of chemicals stored, the hazard of the chemical that 
is stored, if indeed there can be a safer substitution that can 
be utilized.
    In addition to that, I know that, as we say, we are not 
speaking about the climate crisis, but even that in and of 
itself impacts all of that. So it is extremely important to 
look at all of the negative externalities that impact these 
communities and workers.
    Mr. Tonko. Thank you. And what barriers might prevent these 
types of measures from being implemented? Is there a basis 
towards risk management over reduction?
    Mr. Smith. From my experience, the biggest barrier for a 
lot of companies is cost. It can be costly to change a process 
to make it safer. So I think encouragement from the Department 
to employ practices at these facilities is helpful.
    Mr. Tonko. OK. Ms. Roberts?
    Ms. Roberts. I do agree with that. And we are equally 
experiencing that with cost factor and now movement of 
industries.
    We recently learned that there are industries leaving the 
Gulf Coast because of the high rates of--that are attributed to 
that of the hurricanes, whether it is insurance or replacement. 
And so some of these industries are now seeking to move into 
what we are calling chemical valley in West Virginia and 
thereby placing additional burden on the communities in West 
Virginia. And so it is creating quite the conundrum for us at 
this moment.
    Mr. Tonko. I thank you.
    The Chair now recognizes Mr. Shimkus, the subcommittee 
ranking member, for 5 minutes to ask questions, please.
    Mr. Shimkus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I think we have got some agreement that long-term 
reauthorization of CFATS is important. Would everybody agree 
with that?
    And we heard the first panel, and then this panel, we still 
struggle with the difficulty between information available 
versus security of that information, getting it to the proper--
the right people because, in World War II, it was loose lips 
sink ships, and I think there is that concern. So it is how you 
balance that for information versus basic security.
    And then I think you hear from our side a concern about 
ensuring that we don't duplicate other agencies who are 
supposed to be doing their work, whether they are--you know, if 
the EPA--if there is a concern that the EPA is not doing risk 
management aspects, then we ought to kick EPA in the rear-end 
and do risk management, not give to a security agency that 
responsibility.
    But I think we are close. I mean, I actually--these have 
been good hearings.
    Let me go to Mr. Whelchel first. You know, because--in 
addressing this brief opening statement that I did here on this 
round of questioning.
    We have always had this debate on the personnel surety 
programs, risk-tiering processes, and that there is a concern 
that our information is not being shared. I think Mr. Smith 
kind of recognized that.
    Do you believe DHS needs to make changes to improve a 
regulated facility's awareness of the risk factors?
    Mr. Whelchel. I believe in a couple of areas, there is work 
to do. So I do believe the CFATS program has struck the right 
balance in looking at need-to-know and persons that are covered 
under that need-to-know provision.
    Chemical terrorism, vulnerability of information, their CVI 
is an important component of the program. But to your point on 
tiering, as an example, what moves a facility from one tier to 
another once we put the information into CFATS' black box, for 
lack of a better term? That is still a little bit unknown, 
right.
    Another thing that I think they can do more on information 
sharing is how do we--whenever we submit our personal 
identifying information for 12.4, our personnel surety, where 
does it go, how long does it sit there prior to actually 
getting bounced offer the TSDB, or terrorism screening 
database? What does that process look like?
    That is important for us to know because, if we are going 
to limit certain actions at the facility as a result of not 
having those people submitted or not having feedback from the 
TSDB, then our operations might languish while we are waiting 
for those processes to have an effect.
    And if there is a hit on the TSDB, will we be made aware of 
that? Will we be the partner at the table to help work through 
that risk potential?
    Mr. Shimkus. Great. Thank you.
    Mr. Fridley, I am going to lump my two questions together 
for the sake of time.
    You are the head of the Chemical Sector Coordinating 
Council. Can you kind of briefly explain, what does that mean? 
And then the followup would be, how do you differentiate 
between what is safety and what is security? Because that has 
been part of our debate today.
    Mr. Fridley. Well, first, Congressman Shimkus, I want to 
take a second and thank you for your 24 years of service to the 
great people of Illinois. As a constituent that lives in your 
district, you will be greatly missed.
    Mr. Shimkus. Thank you.
    Mr. Fridley. And wish you well.
    Mr. Shimkus. Thank you.
    Mr. Fridley. So, to briefly kind of--I pulled out the 
actual mission statement for the Sector Council, and if you 
will allow me, I will read it to you.
    The mission of the council is to advance the physical, 
cybersecurity, emergency preparedness in the national security 
sector infrastructure. The mission will be accomplished through 
voluntary actions through the infrastructure owners and 
operators represented in the council set forth in the 
Presidential Policy Directive, PPD-21, and related authorities.
    So the Chemical Sector Coordinating Council represents 
about 15 associations that are voluntarily there to work with 
and through, in collaboration with DHS, Coast Guard, and the 
others. And we are doing this right now, as the chemical sector 
that represents about 25 percent of the GDP. So we are a 
massive undertaking.
    But we are working across cross-sectors. We are starting to 
do this even more, especially to the national critical 
workgroup, to talk about some of these issues and 
interdependencies during natural disasters----
    Mr. Shimkus. OK. Safety versus security. So get that in.
    Mr. Fridley. All right. Fantastic. Sorry about that, sir.
    So safety versus security. Safety is OSHA; security is DHS. 
It is very two clear lines. They are very much segmented 
between the two, and I don't want to confuse the two and lump 
them together.
    Mr. Shimkus. My time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Tonko. The gentleman yields back.
    The Chair now recognizes the Representative from Delaware, 
Ms. Blunt Rochester.
    Ms. Blunt Rochester. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And, again, thank you to the panel.
    I just wanted to follow up on Mr. Shimkus' line of 
questioning.
    First of all, I can hear from the panel and also from Mr. 
Wulf that there is agreement that the CFATS program needs to 
continue, needs to continue long term. And, again, this is the 
perfect day to be having this hearing.
    I still am struggling with this conversation about the 
balance between need to know, security risk, and meaningful 
engagement.
    So I want to flip the table a little bit. Because as Mr. 
Smith was talking, it was interesting, Ms. Schakowsky asked in 
the last panel--asked Mr. Wulf about employees and do employees 
know that they are working for, you know, a company. And I 
understood you to say that it is--for some employees, it is 
widely unknown and that more training and things need to be 
done. And then as I heard Ms. Roberts talk about the fact that 
it is sometimes confusing; even people who are experts don't 
feel like they have the information they need. But then I also 
heard Mr. Whelchel talk about the fact that there has been that 
right balance struck.
    So it appears to me there is sort of like government and 
industry is good; it is golden. I haven't heard disagreement. 
But in terms of employees and the community, I don't hear that 
same thing.
    So can Mr. Whelchel and Mr. Fridley talk about what you 
think the community and employees do need to know, and they are 
not knowing now currently. And if you two could talk about what 
you think we don't need to know, we need to stay away from that 
for whatever reason?
    Do you get where I am going? I know you know what you need 
to know. So can we start with Mr.--and we have got to make it 
quick because I only have two minutes and 59 seconds.
    Mr. Fridley. Yes, absolutely. Great question.
    And what we do in our industry, and at least in our 
facilities, is everybody is trained. Everybody is aware. There 
is not a person there that is employed at our facilities that 
are not made aware. And we select certain ones to be able to 
participate in the development of if they have the knowledge 
and, you know, the expertise to be able to assist us in those 
programs.
    As far as the community, we are all members of LAPCs. We 
work with various agencies. We bring in those agencies. We do 
drills together. We review----
    Ms. Blunt Rochester. But are there things that they should 
know and don't know right now?
    Mr. Fridley. In my opinion, not in my experience.
    Ms. Blunt Rochester. In your opinion, not in your 
experience. OK.
    Mr. Whelchel.
    Mr. Whelchel. OK. What I will add to that is, I believe 
there is a responsibility on the part of local emergency 
management officials to bridge that gap, right? So they are 
getting a lot of information relative to the safety risk and 
then target information about any terrorism risk that might be 
related to chemical facilities in their district or their 
domain.
    Ms. Blunt Rochester. Let me stop you right there, because I 
get where you are going because I come from a government 
background.
    So it is people are elected, people are appointed, but 
sometimes the community, or even in a company, they don't get 
access to the information; it just doesn't get to them.
    So I am just curious if you think there are things that 
people need to know on a basic level that they are not getting 
information.
    Mr. Whelchel. At the risk of underscoring Mr. Fridley's 
point, general security awareness is a cornerstone of a good 
security program. So you want to broadly put that security 
awareness out into the community and to employees. So the See 
Something, Say Something doesn't just go out to the citizens of 
the U.S. We then target that message to our employees, and to 
the extent necessary, to the citizens out in the community as 
well through the emergency management program.
    Ms. Blunt Rochester. And I only have a minute left. But can 
I ask Ms. Roberts?
    Ms. Roberts. Yes, it is a challenge for us. Because on the 
local emergency planning commissions, those are great 
commissions, but oftentimes there is one community 
representative on that commission, and there are many 
communities that could be surrounding or--or within certain 
facilities.
    One of the things that we do with the Environmental Justice 
Health Alliance, in partnership with other entities, we 
produced a report, ``Who is in Danger? Race, Poverty, and 
Chemical Disasters,'' and equally we produced another report, 
``Life at the Fenceline,'' and we did so with some of our 
scientific and other partners because of the fact that the 
communities needed to have information that they didn't have 
access to.
    Ms. Blunt Rochester. Thank you.
    Ms. Roberts. So that is part of the challenge.
    Ms. Blunt Rochester. In seven seconds, Mr. Smith.
    Mr. Smith. I can only speak on behalf of workers to this 
effect. And workers who have went through the security process 
to be cleared to work in these facilities, it is my belief 
there is very little they should not know. But I can tell you 
there is a huge gap in what they should know and what they 
don't know.
    Ms. Blunt Rochester. Got you. Thank you. I yield.
    Mr. Tonko. The gentlelady yields back.
    The Chair now recognizes the Representative from Illinois, 
Representative Schakowsky, for 5 minutes, please.
    Ms. Schakowsky. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
    I have looked at the testimony, I want you to know, 
although I wasn't here in the room, and have a number of 
questions that I wanted to ask.
    So let me just start with this one. Hold on.
    I wanted to ask Ms. Roberts, in your testimony, you 
mentioned that water treatment--and you asked--here, I will 
read it. The existing statute must improve in several areas. To 
name a few specific examples, it should include water treatment 
and marine facilities and on.
    So what I wanted to ask you is if you could expand on what 
you think about the way that water ought to be considered when 
the investigators go out and look at the plants.
    Ms. Roberts. Well, with respect to water treatment 
facilities, they actually carry--they include chlorine and 
other chemicals on site. And so that is the reason why we are 
asking that those facilities be equally included in the CFATS 
program.
    Oftentimes, yet again, in environmental justice 
communities, especially, where there again it is--the disparity 
is race, then income, many of those communities are home to 
high-risk facilities as well as water treatment facilities. And 
so, therefore, there is cumulative impacts of high-risk 
chemicals that are in these areas.
    In addition to that, the maritime facilities, as you heard 
Representative Dingell earlier speaking to the PFOA issue. 
These are also challenges that our communities are confronted 
with.
    Ms. Schakowsky. Thank you. Do you feel as if, in general, 
the communities which you call--I think people in their 
shadows, are getting the kind of stakeholder attention that 
should be given when it comes to these plants and the 
information that you need?
    Ms. Roberts. Unfortunately, no. If the community is 
involved in--what do they call it--the CAP program, the Citizen 
Advisory Program, they are at the behest of the industry and 
the industry sharing the information that the industry wishes 
to share.
    If they are on a local emergency planning commission, as I 
said, equally as much, the community--there is one 
representative typically on the committee. When communities are 
seeking to try to find and get more information at times, 
sometimes they are confronted by Homeland Security and utilize 
Homeland Security laws against them as they are seeking to try 
to get more information on what is being stored in and around 
the facilities that are fenceline to their communities.
    They are not seeking to terrorize these industries. They 
are seeking information so that they can also equally better 
protect themselves because many of these communities do indeed 
have high rates of health challenges.
    And, again, the infrastructure around their communities, 
such as the roads, the housing structures, and what-have-you, 
are not conducive oftentimes to the amount of pollution that 
they are being----
    Ms. Schakowsky. I am going to interrupt you just for a 
second because I also wanted to deal with the issue of workers.
    The last question that I asked of Homeland Security was the 
question about, do workers even know that they are working at a 
CFATS facility? And the answer was, well, they get training.
    But do you feel, just as communities don't necessarily have 
all the information, do workers--are you considered as 
stakeholders sufficiently?
    Mr. Fridley. Yes, ma'am. In my opinion, we train every 
person; we educate every person that works at our facility that 
what we have are security measures, you know, what we want, 
what we expect if they see something suspicious, they get a 
phone call, suspicious order, anything of that nature. So we 
are educating those workforces to be able to, you know, to 
report that properly to get that to the right agencies.
    Ms. Schakowsky. OK. Thank you.
    I have ten seconds. Does Steelworkers want to respond at 
all to that?
    Mr. Smith. Thank you, Ms. Schakowsky.
    I can tell you, in our experience, most of our members do 
not know that they work at CFATS facility until after an issue 
with the program arises.
    Just as a very quick example--and I can followup with 
specifics--recently there was a Hill staffer visit to a CFATS 
covered facility. And on their visit, the local union president 
was unaware of the program or that the facility was covered by 
the program.
    Ms. Schakowsky. And that is a problem, right?
    Mr. Smith. Yes, ma'am.
    Ms. Schakowsky. I yield back.
    Mr. Tonko. The gentlelady yields back.
    The Chair now recognizes the Representative from Florida, 
who just got back, Representative Soto, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Soto. Thank you, Chairman.
    Thank you all for coming today.
    We had Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary Wulf in before, 
and we were talking about some of the lessons from 9/11 and the 
terrorist attacks--obviously, this is the 18th remembrance of 
that--and that we formed the Department of Homeland Security to 
be sort of the coordinator of all of these other agencies.
    So the big question that we ended up talking about was how 
so many other first responders and other workers worked at 
Ground Zero and weren't told that the air was poisonous. 
Obviously, we had to create the 9/11 Fund afterwards and just 
amended it to help out--I represent an area with a lot of NYPD 
retirees who worked and were there at the time, including some 
of my current staff.
    So a big issue for me and for everyone on the panel--and it 
would be great to hear from each of you--what role should the 
Department of Homeland Security play in making sure, as in 
subsection F of this legislation, that we are sharing more info 
with State and local emergency officials?
    And let's start with--well, we will go down the list from--
starting with you, Mr. Fridley, and continue on.
    Mr. Fridley. Thank you for the question.
    And we actually work very well with a lot of the emergency 
responders, specifically in your State. We did a large full-
scale exercise at a joint terrorism task group, DHS, TSA, FBI, 
bomb and arson. It was a live drill that we actually invited a 
Congressional Member to that event to witness the interagency 
working together.
    So we do a lot of those things. But to your question on the 
air quality, that would be more from an EPA standpoint. We 
would deal with DHS and those other agencies from a security 
standpoint and let the other agencies handle those points that 
you pointed out early on your thing.
    But we do a lot of outreach. We bring them on our site; we 
let them play on our site because we have the live--you know, 
the processes that they can't simulate somewhere else. So we do 
a lot of that outreach.
    Mr. Soto. Thank you.
    Mr. Whelchel.
    Mr. Whelchel. Yes, just to add to that a bit. And thank you 
for the question.
    One thing I will point out is, when you look at the cadre 
of folks that we have inside our company that we rely on for 
emergency response, whether they are in the emergency services 
and security function or they are operators that come to the 
incident to help respond, many of those folks are themselves 
volunteer fire service individuals in the community, reserve 
deputies in law enforcement, emergency medical technicians, or 
paramedics. And that is one of the powers that we harness by 
being able to look at our employee base as members of the 
community as well.
    So there is a very strong focus on the emergency responder 
and what they bring, whenever they increase the risk to 
themselves, to help respond to an incident. So we wrap around 
that any and all measures that need to be taken to protect 
them, to equip them, to train them, recognizing the fact that 
they are taking additional risk beyond what the average 
employee does.
    So that is one component, I think, is important to keep in 
mind.
    Mr. Soto. Thank you.
    Ms. Roberts, how critical is it to get out to the community 
and to our first responders the health issues?
    Ms. Roberts. It is exceptionally important. And not only 
first responders, but as you said, that of healthcare workers 
and others to be together in the community, to have a complete 
understanding of the landscape of communities.
    One that I can think about right now is the Manchester 
community of Houston, Texas, where you can't get--as well as 
the Mossville community in Louisiana. You cannot get in and out 
of those community without going over a railroad track. So, if 
indeed there is an incident, you can actually die on the other 
side waiting for a railroad track--for a railcar to be removed. 
So these are the types of things.
    In addition to that, the volunteer firefighters, as much as 
we love them, are not fully and adequately trained to really 
respond to these situations. And a case in point where--
unfortunately the Congresswoman from Delaware had to leave--
where the Croda plant actually shut down. It was ethylene oxide 
facility, and the community folks had no idea what was going 
on. And this was the weekend of Thanksgiving, one of the 
highest traveled times going back and forth across the Delaware 
Memorial Bridge. Each side of the bridge had to be shut down 
for six and one half hours.
    And so the communities had no idea what was going on, and 
indeed, as well as some of the local volunteer firefighters. So 
these are the things that must be shored up, these gaps. We 
must have that kind of communication.
    Mr. Soto. Because my time is limited, Mr. Smith, how 
important is it for United Steel Workers to be informed right 
away about health issues, particularly with Homeland being one 
of the first on the scene?
    Mr. Smith. I can tell you after spending years working in a 
chemical facility on an emergency response team and as a first 
responder in a municipal police department, that information 
sharing is both critical and deficient. There is a big gap 
between those who are formulating that emergency response plan 
and those who are executing the emergency response plan. And I 
would like to see the Department work to bridge that gap with 
the critical information sharing.
    Mr. Soto. Just to end--and thank you, Mr. Chairman, for 
your flexibility.
    I recognize that Homeland Security would work along with 
EPA, and this would be one of their fundamental issues. But 
they are there to coordinate the overall response to a 
terrorism event, and so they would be the first ones on the 
ground well before the EPA would ever get there.
    When we are talking about day two or three after an event, 
if there are carcinogens in the air, in the water, it is 
absolutely still the Department of Homeland Security's 
responsibility, as the coordinator of all of these other 
agencies, to make sure that our workers in our local 
communities and our first responders and other local 
governments are made aware of these things and correct those.
    Thank you, Chairman. I yield back.
    Mr. Tonko. The gentleman yields back.
    The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, 
Representative Ruiz, for 5 minutes, please.
    Mr. Ruiz. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    I am going to continue my line of questioning from the 
previous panel.
    And for this panel, I would like to talk to--or ask Ms. 
Fridley a question.
    We know that threats to the security of chemical plants 
come in different forms, physical in nature, terrorist threats, 
theft, leaks, whatnot. And I want to bring up the threat of 
cybersecurity hacks.
    So we heard earlier that the potential worst-case scenario, 
as described by Mr. Wulf, is a cybersecurity attack that, due 
to the production line, could actually create a scenario where 
chemicals could be released, just through by somebody in a 
computer halfway across the globe.
    So I want to talk to you about what your assessment of the 
cybersecurity threats could be in plants, in your plant, for 
example. And can you give me an example of what you do to 
address cybersecurity issues.
    Mr. Fridley. Thank you for the question.
    To your point and exactly what was described is something 
that we actually took as a threat and we eliminated.
    We have no industrial control----
    Mr. Ruiz. When you took as a threat, is that because it was 
mandatory for you to assess that, or you did it on your own?
    Mr. Fridley. It was a joint effort between DHS and our 
company to be able to look at the specific threats.
    Mr. Ruiz. It was a joint effort. But is it through policy 
that you were forced to do it, or did you guys kind of say, 
``Hey, this is a good idea''?
    Mr. Fridley. Through the assessment, when we were doing our 
site security plans----
    Mr. Ruiz. OK. That is part of your 18th point, yes.
    Mr. Fridley. Yes, we identified that as a risk.
    So a couple of those things, we eliminated that. We also 
eliminated anything that----
    Mr. Ruiz. When you say ``eliminated,'' what did you do?
    Mr. Fridley. We had broken that gap between--we have 
nothing on a computer system that controls any process any 
longer.
    Mr. Ruiz. OK.
    Mr. Fridley. So that was one of the big gaps that we 
identified. We eliminated it. So that way now our biggest 
threat right now is probably a suspicious order coming in. So 
we spend a lot of time training our----
    Mr. Ruiz. Yes. And who do you employ to help you with 
your--your cybersecurity systems? Do you contract out?
    Mr. Fridley. No, sir.
    Mr. Ruiz. Is it in-house?
    Mr. Fridley. It is all in-house, and they work----
    Mr. Ruiz. Is it difficult to find cybersecurity experts in 
your area?
    Mr. Fridley. We are lucky enough to have----
    Mr. Ruiz. A good area?
    Mr. Fridley [continuing]. Some very, very good people. And 
they work with the US-CERT on anything, malware, alerts, and 
different things that come up.
    Mr. Ruiz. OK. Thank you.
    Now, I want to talk with Ms. Roberts. Mr. Wulf said that 
the agency consults with neighboring communities regarding 
safety and other areas of consideration of that. And we know 
that the vast majority of these plants are near minority, 
underserved, and poor communities and that leaks can be 
catastrophic, depending on the amount of leak and what 
chemicals. And I know that you are with the national 
coordinator of the Environmental Justice Health Alliance.
    Do you think the Department of Homeland Security should 
consult with the environmental justice communities or 
stakeholders before planning, during planning, after an event, 
to protect chemical facilities against terrorist attacks? And 
do they do it?
    Ms. Roberts. We believe that they should before, during, 
and after, yes.
    Mr. Ruiz. And do they do it?
    Ms. Roberts. Do they do it? It depends. Unfortunately, we 
have just not seen them in our communities, on the communities 
we serve. Unfortunately, we see them after the fact.
    Mr. Ruiz. So you were saying how in every community, they 
address the first responders or specific people with titles. 
And I think that is important, obviously.
    But, oftentimes, those individuals are headquartered not in 
those communities, especially in rural counties. And so they 
are headquartered out in the big cities and not there. And so 
the actual local residents who will be primarily affected by it 
don't get consulted. Is that what I am hearing from you, like 
those environmental or organizations within the communities?
    Ms. Roberts. Yes. It is oftentimes after the fact. One 
thing that did happen under the previous administration, 
communities were indeed engaged. We were starting to try to 
engage in a process.
    Unfortunately, under this administration, it has not been 
the case.
    Mr. Ruiz. I have about a few seconds left.
    I just want to mention that I introduced a bill, H. R. 
3923, the Environmental Justice Act of 2019, which requires 
agencies to consider the environmental justice implications of 
their programs, policies, and activities, such as the Chemical 
Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards Program, helping ensure that 
we protect our communities in vulnerable populations and that 
there is meaningful consultations before decisions are made and 
even mitigation measures and cleanup measures as well. Because 
no community should--there should be no decision about an issue 
that will affect the health and well-being of a community 
without the community's input.
    Ms. Roberts. That is correct. And thankfully our 
communities were engaged in the drafting of that bill and so to 
try to make sure that they were protected by putting that 
language into that bill. So there was consultation at that 
point.
    Mr. Ruiz. Absolutely. We made sure of that. Thank you.
    Mr. Tonko. The gentleman yields back.
    The Chair now recognizes the very patient Representative 
from Colorado, Representative DeGette, for 5 minutes, please.
    Ms. DeGette. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
    And I want to thank the panel for coming. I watched your 
testimony in my office, so I have been looking at everything 
everybody said.
    And as I said to Mr. Wulf before, Denver, which is my 
hometown, is not usually considered a hotspot of chemical 
industry activity, but we have over two dozen facilities that 
manufacture, process, or use enough hazardous chemicals that 
they are required to develop risk management plans under the 
Clean Air Act.
    A lot of those facilities are concentrated near the 
neighborhoods of Elyria-Swansea and Globeville in north Denver, 
right next to a big industrial area of Commerce City. These are 
lower income communities with predominantly Hispanic 
households.
    And the same communities that bear a disproportionate share 
of the risk of terrorist attacks on chemical facilities also 
bear a disproportionate share of the pollution that they 
produce. I think Ms. Roberts can totally agree with that.
    And so like Mr. Ruiz and others, I really think that, as 
well as the safety issue, we are addressing an environmental 
justice issue here today.
    So I wanted to ask you, Ms. Roberts, given the 
vulnerability of what you call these fenceline communities, how 
important would you say it is for the neighbors to know about 
what is going on at these close-by chemical plants?
    Ms. Roberts. It is exceptionally important because, with 
the slightest incident, if there was a release or what-have-
you, that magic fence that the communities are told, you know, 
that will protect them, the magic fence----
    Ms. DeGette. Right.
    Ms. Roberts [continuing]. It will not hold that incident.
    So, once there is a release, it begins to move. And 
depending upon the wind velocity and what-have-you, that is how 
fast or how slow it can move.
    Ms. DeGette. Right. And, you know, in these communities I 
just mentioned, you are right. They are right along the border 
with this industrial area. And they are residential 
communities. So, you know, they don't--the chemicals don't just 
stop at the city and county of Denver.
    Is there something that community engagement can do to 
encourage a neighboring plant to reduce its vulnerability to 
attack? And what role does public scrutiny play in that?
    Ms. Roberts. There is a lot that community engagement can 
do, because communities do hold solutions. And there are 
practical solutions that can be incorporated to make sure that 
the safety of the community, as well as the worker, and, in 
addition, the bottom line that many of these industries are 
really concerned about will all be factored in.
    So it is extremely, extremely important for the health and 
well-being of that neighboring community.
    Ms. DeGette. So, you know, this was one of the things that 
I was talking about with Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary 
Wulf, is, one of the things that chemical plants can try to do 
is to reduce the amounts of explosive or toxic chemicals on-
site where it is feasible.
    Would you agree with that, Ms. Roberts?
    Ms. Roberts. Absolutely.
    Ms. DeGette. And, Mr. Fridley, what is your view on that? 
If it is feasible, wouldn't the best result be to reduce those 
on-site chemicals?
    Mr. Fridley. Yes, from a security standpoint, we are always 
looking to reduce our threat and whatnot.
    But from the EPA standpoint, what you were going with in 
your first line, we do a lot of different reports. We do the 
EPA 304, 311, 312, 313, TRI, RNP that you did, CERCLA. So we do 
a lot of the reporting out so that we are communicating out to 
those folks or to anybody, for that matter, what the hazards 
and what the risks are.
    Ms. DeGette. But what they need to know is what is there 
and what they can do.
    Now, Mr. Whelchel, I wanted to ask you the same thing. 
Would you agree that, if feasible, one of the best ways to 
reduce the risk is to remove unnecessary chemicals and 
hazardous substances?
    Mr. Whelchel. Thank you for the question. And yes.
    And we have actually seen this in practice. So I relayed 
earlier, during a CFATS inspection, it was communicated from 
the inspector that there was a potential for us to reduce 
either the concentration or the quantity of the chemicals that 
we had on-site. And the business took a look at that and 
immediately had a high interest in reformulating our processes 
to be able to do so and then replicated that same process in 
nonregulated facilities.
    Ms. DeGette. Thank you.
    Mr. Whelchel. So we absolutely value the ability to reduce 
our risk.
    Ms. DeGette. Great.
    Mr. Smith, what is your view of that?
    Mr. Smith. I would agree with the rest of the panel. If you 
can reduce a risk for the facility and the worker, I think it 
makes things safer and more secure.
    Ms. DeGette. Thank you.
    Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thanks again for having 
this hearing. I yield back.
    Mr. Tonko. You are welcome.
    And the gentlelady yields back.
    That, I believe, concludes all who were looking to ask 
questions of our second panel. And I thank all of our witnesses 
again for joining us at today's hearing.
    I remind Members that, pursuant to committee rules, they 
have ten business days by which to submit additional questions 
for the record to be answered by our witnesses. And then I ask 
that each witness respond promptly to any such questions that 
you may receive.
    [The information follows:]
    Mr. Shimkus. Mr. Chairman, before you do that, may I ask 
for a moment for personal privilege?
    Mr. Tonko. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Shimkus. I want to recognize my pastor, who just came 
into the back of the room. He is here to give the invocation, 
or the prayer, for tomorrow's session. And other than my wife, 
if you want to know who keeps me on the straight and narrow, it 
is Pastor Wright.
    So thank you for letting me introduce him.
    Mr. Tonko. Well, thank you.
    And thank you, Pastor, for joining us. And thank you for 
leading the ranking member in the right way.
    Mr. Shimkus. Amen.
    Mr. Tonko. We much appreciate it.
    So I do request unanimous consent to enter a list of 
documents into the record. They include a letter from a 
coalition of organizations providing recommendations for the 
CFATS reauthorization, a letter from the National Association 
of SARA Title III Program Officials, a letter from the National 
Association of Manufacturers, and a letter from the Fertilizer 
Institute and the Agricultural Retailers Association.
    Without objection, so ordered. So they are entered.
    [The information appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]
    Mr. Tonko. With that, the subcommittee is adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 1:11 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
    
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