[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
.
[H.A.S.C. No. 116-93]
U.S. DEFENSE POSTURE CHANGES IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER
__________
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
SEPTEMBER 30, 2020
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
43-480 WASHINGTON : 2021
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Sixteenth Congress
ADAM SMITH, Washington, Chairman
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY,
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island Texas
RICK LARSEN, Washington JOE WILSON, South Carolina
JIM COOPER, Tennessee ROB BISHOP, Utah
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
JOHN GARAMENDI, California MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
JACKIE SPEIER, California K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia
RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri
SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California MO BROOKS, Alabama
ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland, Vice PAUL COOK, California
Chair BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama
RO KHANNA, California SAM GRAVES, Missouri
WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
FILEMON VELA, Texas SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
ANDY KIM, New Jersey RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana
KENDRA S. HORN, Oklahoma TRENT KELLY, Mississippi
GILBERT RAY CISNEROS, Jr., MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
California MATT GAETZ, Florida
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania DON BACON, Nebraska
JASON CROW, Colorado JIM BANKS, Indiana
XOCHITL TORRES SMALL, New Mexico LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan PAUL MITCHELL, Michigan
MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey JACK BERGMAN, Michigan
VERONICA ESCOBAR, Texas MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
DEBRA A. HAALAND, New Mexico
JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine
LORI TRAHAN, Massachusetts
ELAINE G. LURIA, Virginia
ANTHONY BRINDISI, New York
Paul Arcangeli, Staff Director
Barron YoungSmith, Counsel
Kim Lehn, Professional Staff Member
Natalie de Benedetti, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services.................................... 1
Thornberry, Hon. William M. ``Mac,'' a Representative from Texas,
Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services.................... 4
WITNESSES
Allvin, Lt Gen David W., USAF, Director for Strategy, Plans, and
Policy, Joint Chiefs of Staff.................................. 6
Anderson, James H., Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,
Department of Defense.......................................... 5
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Anderson, James H............................................ 47
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Bacon.................................................... 59
Mr. Brown.................................................... 60
Mr. Conaway.................................................. 59
Ms. Escobar.................................................. 60
Mrs. Hartzler................................................ 61
Ms. Houlahan................................................. 59
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Carbajal................................................. 65
U.S. DEFENSE POSTURE CHANGES IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, September 30, 2020.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 12:01 p.m., in room
200, Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. Adam Smith (chairman of the
committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
The Chairman. Good morning. We will call the meeting to
order.
I thank you all for being here this morning. And our full
committee hearing is on U.S. defense posture changes in the
European theater. We have two witnesses this morning, hopefully
both here and present: Dr. James Anderson, who is the Acting
Under Secretary for Defense for Policy for the Department of
Defense; and Lieutenant General David Allvin, Director for
Strategy, Plans, and Policy with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Let me un-fog my glasses here for a second.
I would like to welcome members who are joining today's
markup remotely. Those members are reminded that they must be
visible on screen within the software platform for the purposes
of identity verification when joining the proceedings,
establishing and maintaining a quorum, participating in the
proceeding, and voting.
Members participating remotely must continue to use the
software platform's video function while attending the
proceedings, unless they experience connectivity issues or
other technical problems that render the members unable to
fully participate on camera.
If a member who is participating remotely experiences
technical difficulties, please contact the committee staff for
assistance, and they will help you get reconnected.
When recognized, video of remotely attending members
participating will be broadcast in the room and via the
television/internet feeds. Members participating remotely are
asked to mute their microphone when they are not speaking.
Members participating remotely will be recognized normally for
asking questions, but if they want to speak at another time
they must seek recognition verbally.
In all cases, members are reminded to unmute their
microphones prior to speaking. Members should be aware there is
a slight lag of a few seconds between the time you start
speaking and the camera shot switching to you.
Members who are participating remotely are reminded to keep
the software platform video function on for the entirety of the
time they attend the proceeding. These members may leave and
rejoin the proceeding. If members depart for a short period for
reasons other than joining a different proceeding they should
leave the video function on.
If members will be absent for a significant period, or
depart to join a different proceeding, they should exit the
software platform entirely and then rejoin it when they return.
Members are also advised that I have designated a committee
staff member to, if necessary, mute unrecognized members'
microphones to cancel any inadvertent background noise that may
disrupt the proceedings. Members may use the software
platform's chat feature to communicate with staff regarding
technical or logistical support issues only.
Finally, remotely participating members should see a 5-
minute countdown clock on the software platform's display but,
if necessary, I will remind members when their time is up.
The only additional note that I would make on that is as
you are asking questions, and even for the witnesses, when you
are not actually speaking it is helpful to turn the microphone
off because, believe it or not, with the microphone on it
creates feedback up there and it gets confusing because then
you have to go on and off and on and off. But, if you can do
that, it is helpful.
Well, I thank the witnesses for being here today, and the
members for being present. I think this is a very important
discussion. As we have heard a little while back, an
announcement was made of a change in our defense posture within
Europe. And I want to make clear at the outset that I think it
is always appropriate to reexamine our posture around the
world. This is a rapidly changing world, the threat environment
is dynamic, and our assets and allies are also reasonably
dynamic.
There are opportunities to be found in looking at ways that
we can better distribute our assets and our forces to meet
those challenges. But I was concerned about the way this
particular change in our posture was announced and is proposed
to be implemented within Europe. There was an announcement,
basically, of a need to reduce the troops in Germany by 12,000.
That number did not seem to be tied to any particular
requirement.
And then, in addition to that there was the requirement
that we get rid of all of our headquarters in Germany. The
reasons for that were far from clear. So, the number seemed to
be artificial.
Certainly, as we look at our needs in Europe, and as we
build and strengthen alliances with the relatively new Eastern
European partners within NATO [North Atlantic Treaty
Organization], there are clearly opportunities to build on
those partnerships and, potentially, station U.S. troops in
those Eastern European countries to improve our posture and
better meet our defense needs, particularly with regards to
deterring Russian aggression in that part of the world.
I don't think this plan was particularly well thought out,
and I am worried about a number of aspects of its
implementation, the biggest one being the artificial number of
pulling troops out of Germany. You know, where did that number
from?
And, in particular, when we were briefed, a few of us on
the committee were briefed a month or so ago about this, the
decision to move AFRICOM [United States Africa Command] out of
Germany, which does not seem to make any sense. It is not that
we couldn't have originally picked a better place in Europe, or
a different place in Europe at any rate, but having picked
Germany, and had AFRICOM there for the entirety of the command,
the reasons for moving it don't seem to make sense. Except, as
came out in the briefing, it was necessary to get to the 12,000
number.
That is not the way we should be making policy. And it is
going to be very, very expensive.
Now, on the European Command decision, we do have the
presence in Mons, Belgium, that we have always had with SHAPE
[Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe]. And an argument
could potentially be made. But, nonetheless, it is very
expensive to move these, these command structures. And what
does it truly net us?
The second aspect of this, as you are aware, some of the
forces that are being moved are, in a sense, being moved back
to the U.S., and they are becoming rotational. That has an
impact certainly on the members serving, but also on our
presence in those countries and our ability to respond.
Now, we have dramatically reduced the number of troops that
we have in the European theater. I think at the height of the
Cold War in the mid-1980s there was somewhere around 350,000
U.S. troops stationed in Europe. And in the current
environment, having 350,000 U.S. troops in Europe would not
make any sense whatsoever. But, we reduced that number down, if
I am correct, to roughly 62,000. So, so we have made that
response.
But if we didn't take some number of them and turn them
into rotational troops, what does that do to our ability to
meet our national security objectives in that part of the
world. Because Russia is becoming more aggressive, not less. I
think that is something that there is bipartisan consensus on.
Certainly, their efforts in Ukraine have been very aggressive.
Their efforts to disrupt democracy in any way that they can in
Europe, and the U.S., and elsewhere have grown.
So, I think our need to have a deterrence there is
enormously important. And, you know, I also am concerned about
the effect it has on our partnerships in Europe, because we
definitely need friends and allies more than ever. And I feel
very strongly that, as I think every member of this committee
does, that the NATO alliance has served our country very well.
And when we make these types of arbitrary decisions without
working closely with our partners, that undermines that
alliance.
In every partnership and every alliance difficult things
have to be done that maybe the partners won't like. But there
is a way to do that. I do not, for instance, disagree at all
that we should try to do everything we can to get our European
partners to contribute more to the defense of Europe. I think
that is appropriate. But, if we do things to undermine the
alliance in what appears to be a gratuitous way without working
with them, without listening to them, it undermines the
strength of that alliance and plays right into Russia's hands.
Because number one at the top of the list of the things
that Russia wants to accomplish, reducing the power, cohesion,
and strength of Western democracies is right at the top. They
want to see us divided. They want to see NATO weakened. They
want to see the NATO partners disagreeing and at each other's
throats. We should not play into their hands. We should work
with our European partners as we put these plans in place.
So, it would certainly make sense to always have the
conversation about what our posture should be in Europe. And I
think the committee, in a bipartisan way, has deep concerns
about the way this was done, the way it is going to be
implemented, and how it is going to impact the NATO alliance,
our alliances in Europe in general, and our defense posture in
Europe specifically.
And I look forward to hearing from our witnesses, and look
forward to the Q&A [questions and answers] to get greater
detail on how those decisions were made going forward.
With that, I yield to the ranking member, Mr. Thornberry,
for his opening statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY, A
REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate
having this hearing on this topic. I agree that it is important
and, in addition, there are provisions in the current
conference with the Senate on this year's NDAA [National
Defense Authorization Act] which touch on these issues.
And there are a lot of questions, as you point out. And I
fully agree that many of these questions arise from the way
that this announcement was made and has subsequently been
rolled out.
I realize that the witnesses today are not going to be able
to answer all of our questions about when or how much but,
hopefully, they can help clarify for us and the American people
what, and especially why. Some of these moves seem to make
sense on their face, for example, moving EUCOM [United States
European Command] to be closer to NATO headquarters, having a
greater presence in the Balkans, but there needs to be an
overall strategic plan that is coordinated with allies, rather
than have a bunch of rationalizations after the fact.
I fully agree that NATO is the most successful alliance in
history. Can it be improved? Absolutely. But we can't lose
sight of what it has accomplished and what it means today for
American national security. And so, however logical some of
these individual moves may be, there is still the broader
question of doing this in this way has some effects on the
strength and unity of the NATO alliance. And what is that?
And, so I hope our witnesses can shed a little light on the
consultations, on how this all fits together in the bigger
picture, because it does seem to me, however much or less sense
individual moves may make, the main thing is the strength of
NATO, especially when dealing with an aggressive Russia. That's
the main thing. And we need to have that in mind as we go
through these details as well.
I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you. And with that, I yield to Dr.
Anderson for his opening statement.
STATEMENT OF JAMES H. ANDERSON, ACTING UNDER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Dr. Anderson. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Thornberry,
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
invitation to testify on recent European force structure
posture realignment, alongside Lieutenant General David Allvin.
He is a great partner, and it is an honor to appear beside him.
The Department continues to prioritize implementation of
the National Defense Strategy, NDS, including the building of a
more lethal force and strengthening alliances. One important
initiative to advance the NDS and focus--and to ensure a focus
on these priorities is the ongoing comprehensive review of all
combatant commands. As part of U.S. European Command, USEUCOM,
review, Secretary Esper directed EUCOM to develop options for
reposturing our Europe-based forces to compete more effectively
and respond to contingencies both within Europe and globally.
These options will be guided by Secretary Esper's five core
principles: (1) enhancing deterrence of Russia; (2)
strengthening NATO; (3) reassuring allies; (4) improving U.S.
strategic flexibility and EUCOM's operational flexibility; and,
most importantly, (5) taking care of our service members and
their families.
On July 29th, Secretary Esper announced an update to the
status of our U.S. European Command Force Posture review,
following a decision by the President in early June to limit
the number of assigned Active Duty service members in Germany
to 25,000, as well as the DOD [Department of Defense] concept
to reposition some of our forces within Europe and back to the
United States to be better situated for great power
competition.
The review yielded a concept for nearly 12,000 military
personnel to be repositioned from Germany, with almost 5,600
re-stationed in other NATO countries, and approximately 6,400
returning to the United States. The realignment concept
includes consolidating headquarters to strengthen operational
agility, repositioning some forces in the United States to
focus on readiness and to prepare for rotational deployments,
and deploying rotational forces to the Black Sea region on
NATO's southeastern flank to improve deterrence.
The concept consists of the following four pillars.
First, the consolidation of various U.S. headquarters in
Europe outside Germany, including in some cases, collocating
headquarters at the same locations as their NATO counterparts
in Belgium and Italy. This would help strengthen NATO and
improve operational efficiency and readiness of more than 2,000
service members in these headquarters.
Second, the nearly 4,500 members of the 2nd Cavalry
Regiment would return to the United States as other Stryker
units begin rotations farther east in the Black Sea region,
giving us a more enduring presence to enhance deterrence and
reassure allies along NATO's southeastern flank.
Third, 2,500 airmen based at the Royal Air Force Base in
Mildenhall, United Kingdom, who are responsible for aerial
refueling and special operations, and who had been scheduled to
re-base to Germany, would remain in the U.K. [United Kingdom],
thus ensuring uninterrupted readiness and responsiveness of
these units.
Fourth, a fighter squadron and elements of a fighter wing
would be repositioned to Italy, moving them closer to the Black
Sea region and rendering them more capable to conduct dynamic
force employment and rotational deployments to NATO's
southeastern flank.
This concept to reposition our forces in Europe constitutes
a major strategic shift, wholly in line with the NDS, and
consistent with other adjustments the U.S. has previously made
within NATO. Over NATO's 71-year history, the size,
composition, and disposition of U.S. forces in Europe has
changed many times. As our planning for the current realignment
matures, we will be sure to communicate frequently with
Congress and with our NATO allies to maintain visibility and
foster cooperation.
As we continue to implement the NDS, our efforts at
enhancing our Europe posture beyond EUCOM combatant command
review have shown recent successes, including the signing of
the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement with Poland in
August that will enable an increased enduring U.S. rotational
presence in that country of about 1,000 U.S. military
personnel. These elements are in addition to the 4,500 U.S.
military personnel already on rotation in Poland and includes
infrastructure and logistical support provided by Poland.
Our continued efforts to streamline operations across
Europe, including through modernized and new agreements with
NATO allies, especially on the eastern flank, directly support
our NDS principles by improving operational flexibility and
enhancing deterrence. The Department is confident that these
continuing efforts will help us adapt the force and optimize
our force posture in Europe as we seek to deter malign actors.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Anderson can be found in the
Appendix on page 47.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
General Allvin.
STATEMENT OF LT GEN DAVID W. ALLVIN, USAF, DIRECTOR FOR
STRATEGY, PLANS, AND POLICY, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
General Allvin. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Thornberry,
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for inviting
me here to be with you today. As Dr. Anderson noted, the Joint
Staff partners closely with our OSD [Office of the Secretary of
Defense] and U.S. European Command, or EUCOM, colleagues to
provide credible military options to the Secretary of Defense
and the President on U.S. military presence in Europe in
support of national security objectives.
The 2018 National Defense Strategy describes the erosion in
longstanding roles based on our international order which has
created an increasingly complex and volatile global security
environment. Russian aggression and malign influence is
accelerating this decline in Europe, with cascading effects
across the globe.
As General Wolters, the commander of USEUCOM, stated in
testimony earlier this year, over the past 12 years Russia has
invaded two neighboring states; violated the Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces Treaty, leading to the treaty's termination;
developed new strategic platforms; and abrogated its
responsibilities under the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces
in Europe. This has been done at the expense of strategic
stability.
It is because of serious threats from Russia and China that
this January--January 2020--Secretary Esper directed a series
of combatant command reviews to focus on strategic priorities
across the globe and realign forces in support of the National
Defense Strategy.
Of particular relevance to Europe, the NDS calls for the
joint force to maintain a favorable balance of power in Europe,
deter adversaries from aggression against our vital interests,
and defend allies from military aggression, while bolstering
partners against coercion.
These objectives are accomplished through the three
distinct lines of effort: building a more lethal joint force;
strengthening alliances; and reforming the Department's
business practices.
Technological and geopolitical influence on the character
of war necessitates the evolution, and not only the tools with
which we fight, but the operational concepts and the general
posture of our forces. In many ways those concepts of U.S.
forces in Europe have not markedly changed since the last huge
force reduction following the fall of the Berlin Wall, as well
as subsequent changes since.
Large formations of permanent forces can present
vulnerabilities and are not best suited to flexibly respond to
emerging threats across the globe and outside of their current
area of operations. The current environment requires increased
strategic flexibility and freedom of action.
The National Defense Strategy unveiled the concept of
dynamic force employment, which prioritizes maintaining the
readiness of the joint force for major combat, while providing
options for proactive and scalable employment for deterrence
and assurance. This concept is critical to EUCOM posture, for
the EUCOM posture realignment.
Under the dynamic force employment concept, episodic
introduction of forces across the region presents dilemmas to
potential adversaries, while providing the Secretary and the
President with the flexibility and capacity to rapidly respond
to emergent threats across the globe.
Operational flexibility is equally important. Since the
dissolution of the Soviet Union, the ideological border
separating East from West has gradually shifted in favor of a
free and open international order. New allies are joining NATO,
but these gains must be reinforced. Nations along the Black Sea
and Baltic Sea, for instance, are under direct and persistent
military pressure from Russia. Presenting forces further east
would reduce the response time and increased the deterrence to
Russian aggression.
Moving forces in and out of the European theater, as is
done with rotational forces, also exercises the joint
reception, staging, onward movement, and integration
capabilities, which must be sharp to support ongoing
contingency plans in the region. None of this is possible
without allies and partners. And over the past 75 years, the
U.S. has benefitted from a growing constellation of alliances
and partnerships.
These bilateral and multilateral accords, with the North
Atlantic Treaty as a shining example, serve as a strategic and
asymmetric advantage against revisionist powers such as Russia.
The transatlantic alliance is strengthened by the complementary
capabilities, unique perspectives, relationships, and regional
access provided by our NATO allies. Collaborative planning is
necessary to coalesce these diverse viewpoints and competencies
into an interoperable force which acts together to achieve
common military objectives.
Collocation of the NATO headquarters with the EUCOM
headquarters will enhance the NATO collaborative planning with
the EUCOM staff and build upon recent enhancements to the NATO
command structure.
During Secretary Esper's 29 July briefing, he affirmed that
the realignment of U.S. forces in Europe plan is subject to,
and likely will, change to some degree as it evolves over time.
In his role as the global integrator, Chairman Milley continues
to capture the views of the combatant commanders and the Joint
Chiefs so that he may provide military advice to the Secretary
and President on updates and refinements to the plan to address
the strategic and operational threats at the speed of
relevance.
We also acknowledge that the best plans are born through
consultation with allies, and continued engagement with
Congress. We are committed to this collaborative approach.
During the 29 July brief, the Vice Chairman, General Hyten,
mentioned the Department's structure process required to
translate this concept into action. I would like to offer some
additional insight into the process and provide a bit of a
roadmap going forward.
The realignment of forces outside of U.S. territory
required structured engagements between the Department of
Defense, the interagency, allied host nations, and
international organizations, in addition to this body. These
engagements generally involve a three-part process: planning,
approvals, and implementation. Timelines for completion depend
on the complexity, scale, and scope of the proposed change.
The planning stage has already begun as the EUCOM commander
continues to iterate the posture concept with stakeholders
across the Department, and will provide updates and
considerations to the Secretary in the weeks and months to
come. As the plan matures, the Department's Global Posture
Executive Council, GPEC, co-chaired by the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities, and the
Director of the Joint Staff, will support this effort through a
deliberative, comprehensive process. This includes developing
the requirements for manpower, infrastructure, and agreements
in order to inform budgetary estimates.
The services will determine where the capacity exists to
support the additional forces, along with the funding
requirements for the military construction, if applicable, of
operational and support facilities which they will request from
Congress. These facilities can range from increases in apron
parking spaces for an arriving squadron, to new barracks,
family housing, school, or medical facilities.
The services must also evaluate support for service members
and their families residing in and around an installation, such
as morale and welfare programs, family service support, DOD
schools, and child care. If an installation is expanded or
closes--or closed, the services must account for impacts to our
U.S. and host nation civilian workforce.
The planning stage also involves early host nation
consultation. Building infrastructure requires adherence to
U.S. and host nation environmental regulatory requirements, as
well as negotiations with the host nation on utilities, air
space management, and historical site mitigations, for example.
Simultaneously, planning is necessary for divestment of
installations being closed. The approval----
The Chairman. I am sorry, General. If you could wrap up, we
do want to get to members' questions here.
General Allvin. Yes, sir.
Finally, we must remember that our most precious resources
are our military men and women and their families. Any
realignment will have an impact on our people, which is why
Secretary Esper and Chairman Milley are committed to ensuring
the needs of our service members and their families are
paramount as we execute this realignment.
Thank you again for this opportunity. And I look forward to
answer questions.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Dr. Anderson, can you explain the pros and cons balance
between permanent forces and rotational forces? That seems to
be one of the biggest changes on the posture side that was
contained in this, was to shift more towards rotational forces.
Dr. Anderson. Yes. The basic advantage of rotational forces
is they provide additional flexibility. And they do so both at
the strategic level, which is important for the President and
the Secretary, and also at the operational level, which is
important to the EUCOM combatant commander. That is the main
advantage of rotational forces.
The Chairman. Two questions about that. One, what are the
downsides? And two, flexibility to do what?
Flexibility sounds like a nice word, but it doesn't
actually tell us anything. So, flexibility to do what?
And then what are the downsides of the forces being
rotational instead of fully present?
General Allvin. So, I don't see any downsides to being
rotational, but there is a cost involved in transitioning from
permanent forces to rotational.
The Chairman. I guess I would ask if there are no downsides
to being rotational forces, why do we have any permanent
forces?
General Allvin. So, there are certain air bases and hubs
and logistical facilities that do need to be permanent. There
is virtue there, as we are able to move forces and flow forces
to various contingencies around the world.
So, saying that there are benefits to rotational forces
doesn't mean there is still some value in certain cases to
permanent forces.
And as to your other question on flexibility to do what, it
is the flexibility to meet those emerging or emergent crises or
conflicts which may arise, and the flexibility to take
different forces and move them to different regions of the
world, or move them within the European theater provides
advantages, and it complicates adversary decision making. And
that is, that is a good thing.
The Chairman. Okay.
Mr. Thornberry.
Mr. Thornberry. Dr. Anderson, you used the word ``concept''
several times. And, frankly, I am confused or not clear about
where this stands. Have we given an outline of moves that we
will make and now we are working through the details? Or is
this a concept in a sense that if our allies say we don't like
that, we could abandon it?
Dr. Anderson. So, we have outlined to our allies, our NATO
allies, the moves as we have described here. And it is, I
describe it as a concept with planning underway because there
is a great deal of that to be done going forward.
As you know, sir, the Department has very structured
processes to plan. And receiving the Secretary's guidance and
the President's direction we are proceeding along those lines.
I would also add that, as with any major plan, you know, it
is subject to revisions and modifications going forward. But
that is, that is how I would describe it. And as I said in my
opening statement, we commit to continuing to consult with
Congress going forward.
Mr. Thornberry. You mentioned several times in your opening
statement, well, actually you both did, the National Defense
Strategy. I brought the summary with me. There is a whole
section, as you will recall, about strengthening alliances and
attracting partners. There is a section on upholding the
foundation of mutual respect, responsibility, and priorities,
expanding consultative mechanisms, and so forth.
Are you aware of any consultation with allies that were,
that was made before the, roughly, June 2020 announcement that
we were going to remove troops from Germany?
Dr. Anderson. So, prior to the public rollout we did, we
did speak with our NATO allies. I personally reached out to my
counterparts, and I know my uniformed colleagues as well.
Mr. Thornberry. I am sorry to interrupt. But, the public
rollout, is this Secretary Esper's description of the specific
moves or----
Dr. Anderson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thornberry. Okay. So, my question was, back in June the
National Security Advisor had an op-ed in the Wall Street
Journal. There were announce--there were at least leaks before
that. Were there consultations, to your knowledge, before that
was, the announcement or op-ed were made?
Dr. Anderson. So, I was not involved in those
consultations. But I do know that Secretary Esper did task our
combatant commander early in--earlier this year, very early in
the year, to begin some planning for force posture adjustments.
I believe that in that context it is a fair assumption that
there were some discussions with close allies about different
possibilities.
Mr. Thornberry. Well, I met with several of either
ambassadors or defense ministers, and my sense is this caught
them all by surprise.
Let me just ask one other question.
Would you agree that the extent to which there is a chaos,
disunity within NATO actually is of assistance to the Russians?
Dr. Anderson. So, I, I would respectfully disagree with the
characterization of chaos.
Mr. Thornberry. No, I am just--I am not saying this creates
chaos. I am just trying to get back to my fundamental point
that the unity and strength of NATO is of paramount importance
when it comes to deterring Russia.
Dr. Anderson. And on that point I would agree
wholeheartedly. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thornberry. And we can agree this--we may not agree, or
I don't know, about whether individual actions may cause chaos.
But my main question I wanted is that unity of NATO is an
important deterrence.
Dr. Anderson. Yes, indeed.
Mr. Thornberry. Okay. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Okay. Mr. Langevin is recognized for 5
minutes. Mr. Langevin is participating remotely, so give him a
second to queue up. Jim, you are on.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Can you
hear me okay?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Langevin. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to
thank our witnesses for being here today to discuss the need to
maintain our defense posture in Europe. And I'm sure we can all
agree our greatest strength in deterring Russian aggression is
our allies.
So, my question, let me begin with this: a realignment
plan, certainly in my view and that of many others, should fix
something that isn't working. Dr. Anderson, what problems
currently exist that necessitates such a costly, large-scale
realignment?
And, additionally, how do you assess our existing allies,
such as Germany, will view this plan?
Dr. Anderson. I am sorry, could somebody repeat that
question? I couldn't quite hear it.
Mr. Langevin. Yes, I will try again.
The Chairman. I am sorry, let me--go ahead, Jim.
Mr. Langevin. Can you hear me better now if I speak up
closer?
The Chairman. We hear you fine, as near as I can tell. Go
ahead.
Mr. Langevin. Okay. I asked, a realignment plan should fix
something that isn't working. And so, Dr. Anderson, I wanted to
ask what problem currently exists that necessitates the costs
of large-scale realignment?
Additionally, how do you assess our existing allies, such
as Germany, will view this plan?
The Chairman. The basic question is what wasn't working,
what were you trying to fix, and how do you think Germany feels
about this?
Dr. Anderson. Thank you. So, as, you know, as mentioned and
discussed earlier, we look at posture on a routine basis, how
we are doing around the world. And certainly in the context of
the Secretary of Defense-directed combatant command reviews,
this is--and by the way which is not, wasn't just focused on
EUCOM but was, is an across-the-board review of all our
combatant commands--we looked at how well current posture is
deterring our competitors. And we looked at how efficient our
disposition of troops is.
And in that context we have come up with, you know, a plan
going forward to enhance that posture and to align with the
five principles articulated by Secretary Esper.
So, in the case of Germany, you know, they probably, you
know, they have some different ideas perhaps about what will be
the ideal posture. But these are our forces, at the invitation
of Germany. And I would argue that, you know, change can be
hard because change is different, but we are quite confident
that these changes will in fact be beneficial not only to the
United States but our, all our NATO allies.
I would also note in the broader context of European NATO
history, there have been multiple changes over time in terms of
our force posture in----
Mr. Langevin. Okay, let me, I am going to stop you there if
I could. My time is running down.
I have to be honest with you that I am really having
trouble connecting the dots where this is fixing a problem that
really I don't think exists right now. I think it is going to
cause more problems than anything it is going to solve.
But let me turn to this. Our approach to deterrence
obviously has to be a whole-of-government approach, not solely
reliant on the DOD. When deciding these realignment plans, what
role does and did the State Department play? And what inputs
have they provided during this process?
I think the ranking member touched on this. But I think it
is important to address and expand upon that.
Dr. Anderson. Yeah, I am sorry. What role did? Can somebody
summarize the question? I am having a hard time hearing.
Mr. Langevin. The State Department, what role did they have
in this and what inputs did they have in the process?
Dr. Anderson. So, I know that I talk to my State Department
colleagues all the time, and I know that Secretary Esper talks
to Secretary Pompeo. And, you know, prior to the rollout we did
discuss this posture realignment with our friends across the
river.
Mr. Langevin. Okay. It doesn't sound like--it sounds to me
then that it was ad hoc as opposed to a well thought-out State
Department process and involvement.
So, with that I know my time is running down, so I will
yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Wilson is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank each of you
for being here today to bring us up to date on the European
theater.
I am particularly grateful that President Trump has
expanded the troop presence in Poland. This is a deterrence to
Putin aggression. And it is special to me: I have a Polish-
American daughter-in-law, and so, the recognition of how
important that country is to all of us, and has been.
And then I had an opportunity to meet with President
Andrzej Duda in New York and thank him for the warm welcome of
American troops. In fact, there has been speculation that the
base could be called Fort Trump. The key point is that we
really appreciate and recognize the importance of Poland to
deter aggression.
And, Secretary Anderson, I was an election observer in
Bulgaria in 1990 for the parliamentary elections which
represented the historic transition to a democratic society, a
dream come true of democracy in Bulgaria. I visited our base
there in Novo Selo in 2008 at its meager beginning, and now it
is a world-class training facility which has been really
reinforced by Prime Minister Boyko Borissov.
Additionally, I visited MK [Mihail Kogalniceanu] Air Base
in Romania with Congresswoman Madeleine Bordallo when it was
established as a logistics hub for the global war on terrorism,
but is now modernized to be the heel-to-toe rotations for our
armored brigade combat teams in Europe.
What is your assessment of our relationship with NATO
allies Bulgaria and Romania, including the strategic locations
of Novo Selo and MK for the European Defense Initiative?
Dr. Anderson. So, first on Poland, we certainly agree they
are a strong NATO ally. And we believe the Enhanced Defense
Cooperation Agreement is going to make that partnership even
stronger with our rotational, our additional rotational forces
there.
Both Bulgaria and Romania are relatively new to NATO,
having joined in 2004 with other countries. But they have made
tremendous strides, as your question suggests, in terms of
modernization and professionalization. So, we absolutely are
looking to them as we reposition and move additional rotation,
move additional rotational forces through those two countries.
We think that this will strengthen deterrence along NATO's
southeastern flank in a very positive way. And so we are
excited about this possibility.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much.
And, Mr. Secretary, there is always going to be tensions
between commitments that we have in other areas of the world,
such as the INDOPACOM [United States Indo-Pacific Command]
region, recognizing the importance now of the alliance that we
have with India and how far that has come. The American
security commitments to EUCOM, though obviously we need to
maintain, how do we do this to be committed to our European
allies, to our Asian allies?
What is the latest on the strategic gains of our military
over the last year with our partners and allies in Europe?
How can we better prepare America and our strategic allies
to deter adversaries?
Dr. Anderson. So, in the context of great power
competition, which we outline in the National Defense Strategy,
we are very concerned, obviously, about our competitors, both
the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation. The
United States is a European power, it is also a Pacific power.
We can, and we are, and we will continue to have commitments in
both regions and deter on both those fronts.
I would add that the rotational element of this current
plan here gives us more flexibility both, again, at the
strategic level and at the operational level. So, what that
means in very practical terms is that some of the troops
currently positioned in Europe that will be coming back to the
United States, and then will have the inherent flexibility to
respond to any number of global contingencies. But they will
still retain a keen focus on deploying back to Europe on a
rotational basis.
Mr. Wilson. Excellent. Thank you.
And, General Allvin, there is no doubt that China and
Russia are our main competitors and they continue malign
activity in Africa. What is the Security Force Assistance
Brigade [SFAB] support for AFRICOM?
The Chairman. And I do apologize, but you have about 15
seconds to answer that question.
General Allvin. Absolutely. I would say this is one of the
great developments that the United States Army has done to be
able to adapt the environment and understand it is not all
about high-end combat, but sometimes you have to compete in
those mil-to-mil [military-to-military] cooperation
arrangements that the SFAB really primes on. It is important to
be able to compete across the globe.
Mr. Wilson. Hear, hear. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Larsen is recognized.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will yield my time
to Representative Houlahan of Pennsylvania.
Ms. Houlahan. Thank you, Mr. Larsen. And thank you all for
coming.
Before I start with my questions I don't--I want to kind of
pause for a minute on Representative Wilson's comments
regarding troops in Poland and respectfully disagree. I am not
certain that it is necessarily a deterrence but possibly an
escalation by moving troops to Poland.
And my father is Polish-born, and so I personally have
heard from him about the history of that war-torn area of our
planet, and I worry about that.
But my questions are for you, Dr. Anderson. And it is my
understanding that this realignment will affect our posture in
Africa. And so, what is the process that the Department will be
using to determine where it will be relocating AFRICOM
headquarters?
And could you please describe what assessment you have made
of how the realignment would affect our presence in Africa?
Dr. Anderson. So, as outlined on the 29th, the public
rollout, the AFRICOM headquarters, which is currently in
Stuttgart, Germany, will be moving to a different location to
be determined. And there will be a number of factors involved
there in making that determination, including cost and
receptivity of host nations, if it is going to be based in
Europe or even in Africa; or if it were to move back to the
United States, which is yet another possibility, obviously, you
know, the services would be involved in consultation with
Congress about potential destinations.
So, cost and operational efficiency would--as applicable,
any host nation permissions, those would all be among the
variables that the Department would have to assess.
Ms. Houlahan. So, do we have that sort of data on where it
currently exists so that we could compare whatever the two
options or three options are?
And why would we decide just to move just to move, without
any sort of information or data about where staying put would
put us in terms of a cost-benefit analysis?
Dr. Anderson. So, I don't have, I don't have those details
on the current cost of maintaining that headquarters. But, I am
confident that we will find operational efficiencies in moving
that, and also meeting the Presidentially directed cap of our
forces in Germany.
Ms. Houlahan. And how would you make an assessment of what
the effect would be with our relationships in Africa, our
presence in Africa? What sort of factors would come into play
there? You mentioned specifically maybe moving to the United
States, which sort of doesn't seem like a sensible solution.
Dr. Anderson. So, I worked in the Pentagon in the 2000s,
and I remember well the vigorous debates that ensued at that
time when AFRICOM was established, where it could or should be
located. And it is my full expectation that we will have a
similarly vigorous debate this time around on the potential
destinations of AFRICOM.
And I know that General Townsend, the combatant commander
for AFRICOM, is working with his staff to develop such options.
Ms. Houlahan. Thank you. And with the remainder of my time,
General Allvin, this question is probably in the classified
environment, but I would like to just put it out there and
potentially have a follow-up with you.
I would be interested to know if the Department has updated
operation plans for various Russian-related contingencies,
given the proposed changes to our posture in Europe?
General Allvin. Congresswoman, we can certainly go into
more detail at a higher level of classification.
I will tell you that the EUCOM staff did consider those
when they were developing this realignment posture and the
costs of this. They were considered, both the current ones and
including some of the shortfalls and the opportunities with
this.
But I can go at a higher classification with you.
Ms. Houlahan. And would we be able to follow up with you on
more details on that at a different classification level?
General Allvin. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Houlahan. Okay, thank you.
My last question is also for you. I am curious to see how
EUCOM is working with allied agencies to counter Russian cyber
threats, and how the proposed posture changes would affect that
work.
General Allvin. I know that the--actually from being on the
staff from 2015 to 2018 I have been heartened in the last
couple years to see the actual improvement in the capabilities
in the cyber realm within U.S. European Command to be able to
not only address those, but also reach out to some potentially
vulnerable--and that is about as much as I can go to in this
classification level--partners within the region.
I would say that the assessment I would have to defer to
U.S. European Command for a specific assessment. I would say in
general, though, the relationships and specifically how it
pertains to cyber engagements and movements on that front, I
would not anticipate a big change either way on that from the
current positive path that it is on.
But I would have to yield to, and we can get back to you
for the record, with EUCOM for more details, if you would like,
on that topic.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 59.]
Ms. Houlahan. Thank you. I appreciate it.
I have run out of time. And thank you, Representative. And
I yield back to the chair.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Turner is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to begin by stating that I share the chairman and
the ranking member's skepticism concerning this plan. But I
want to associate myself with the comments of Mr. Wilson.
I think it is very important for us to have forward-
deployed troops. And having participated in observance of war
games in Poland, I know how important our presence in Poland is
in deterrence with respect to Russia.
General, I want to begin with you. You were involved in the
formulation of this plan; correct?
General Allvin. I was not personally involved in the
formulation of this plan.
Mr. Turner. Okay. Have you reviewed the process upon which
the formulation occurred? Did you have conversations with those
who were putting the plan together?
General Allvin. I have.
Mr. Turner. Are you aware whether or not the NATO-Russia
Founding Act of 1997 had a, had an impact in the formulation of
this plan which prohibits the forward deployment of troops on a
permanent basis in former Warsaw Pact countries?
General Allvin. I did consult with those who are developing
the plan afterwards to ensure that the NATO-Russia Founding Act
was taken into consideration. And they assured me that it was
taken into consideration because the wording in the NATO-Russia
Founding Act talks about significant forces permanently
stationed rather than rotational.
Mr. Turner. Now, Russia doesn't see it that way; right,
General? I mean, Russia believes that rotational forces that
are--have a continuing presence are in fact permanent. Isn't
that their objection that they have made to this plan?
General Allvin. That is their objection. I don't know that
that is what they believe in their hearts or if that is part of
the competition rhetoric.
Mr. Turner. If there wasn't the NATO-Russia Founding Act
would we have approached this differently?
General Allvin. I would have to yield to the EUCOM staff
for that. I think we look at the evolution of the strategic
environment and take that into account. But I can't speak on
their behalf as to whether that would have significantly
altered the path.
Mr. Turner. General, if we are in a conflict with Russia,
do you believe that the Atlantic is contested space?
General Allvin. I do.
Mr. Turner. Wouldn't that mean that by having rotational
forces that it complicates our ability to rotate forces, to
augment, supplement, or to even, as Dr. Anderson was saying, to
give us the flexibility as to what we have in Europe?
General Allvin. Congressman, to keep it at this
classification level I would say that while our ability to
rotate forces into the theater would be challenged, the
existence of the amount of permanent presence forces there
would be insignificant--would not be significant enough to
successfully engage decisively the Russians in a conflict. So,
one would still have to deploy significant amounts of forces in
which the Atlantic would be contested, regardless.
Mr. Turner. General, when you commit to rotational forces
as opposed to permanent forces, isn't it true that rotational
forces can actually have an increased cost above what permanent
basing of forces would be?
General Allvin. I would yield to the services for that. But
it is my understanding that there is an increased cost. Now,
that can be, that can be mitigated through different means,
whether it be keeping the equipment there or not, there are
different ways that it can be mitigated. And the advantages of
rotational forces can outweigh that.
I would yield to the services for that.
Mr. Turner. Dr. Anderson, Russia has obviously been in
violation of the NATO-Russia Founding Act. They, too, had
representations in the agreement, which is not a treaty and is
not, therefore, binding to the United States. And their
incursions both into Georgia and to Ukraine would certainly be
violations of those acts, of that act.
If the Russian--if the NATO-Russia Founding Act was not
being adhered to by the United States in this plan, would you
have scoped it differently and would you have looked at placing
permanent troops forward based?
Dr. Anderson. I would also have to defer to the EUCOM staff
on those, on that particular question. But I would say that I
would just reemphasize the value of the rotational forces. The
cost is a consideration. In some cases it may go up, but in
other cases with the rotational forces you don't have the costs
associated with families being PCSed [permanent change of
station] overseas. So, that would in fact be a cost savings,
again, once you get through kind of a transition period, which
is envisioned to take years.
Mr. Turner. Well, Dr. Anderson, I am not a fan of the
United States adhering to agreements that Russia continuously
violates. And I do fear that in this instance we may be scoping
our plans and policies by limiting ourselves to an act that is
at this point meaningless.
Thank you. I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Courtney.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
hearing and to our witnesses for being here today.
You know, one aspect of this plan which we haven't talked
about which strikes me as one of the oddest part of the
proposal is the scaling back of the continuous presence of our
Marines in Norway. Again, last October Mr. Norcross and I spent
some time in Norway, again meeting with defense officials,
members of the Norwegian military. The tempo of antisubmarine
warfare activity that the U.S. is collaborating with Norway has
gone through the roof in the last few years, which I am sure
both witnesses are very familiar with.
And as a government and as a country they, again, for so
many reasons are so critical as an ally. (A) they are the NATO
member in the high north; they, again, are a whisper away from
hitting their NATO GDP [gross domestic product] target in terms
of defense spending. And we went through, again, the increases
that they have been investing in in a whole variety of areas
that are there. And they border Russia.
So, you know, the rationale about ending continuous
presence of the Marine Corps in Norway, this committee has
spent really the last 5 years on a bipartisan basis supporting
the European Defense Initiative as a way of reassuring our
allies. And that was a big part of the conversations that we
were having with defense officials and government officials
while we were there.
So, explain what was the rationale of doing that, again at
a very critical time with a country that is obviously really
hitting above its weight in the region as an ally of this
country? What has been the reaction?
And, given the fact that they did the Black Sea rotations
out of Norway with that Marine unit, and that purportedly is
one of the things that you are focused on, how is that any--how
is the newly planned rotations for the Black Sea any different
than what we are already doing with those troops that are in
Norway?
Dr. Anderson. So, a couple points. NATO, Norway remains a
key, actually, a founding member of NATO, and obviously
important for its geographic location, as you noted, sir.
The, you know, the Marine Corps is an expeditionary force
in readiness, you know, has decided that, you know, they are
going to continue to take advantage of the relationship that we
have with Norway and the fact that we have pre-positioned
equipment up there, but just do so in a different way, in a
more rotational way that will give, provide additional
flexibility, and also is very consistent with the National
Defense Strategy and the emphasis on dynamic force employment.
Where we don't necessarily telegraph, you know, all our
movements years in advance, you know, we can do things on short
notice. We can change the schedule up in a way that is
operationally unpredictable. And the Marine Corps is very
capable of moving quickly. And this is something that will, as
talked about earlier, provide the United States with some
additional benefits.
Mr. Courtney. So, do they, I mean, so you're saying this
actually enhances, you know, the ability to be--to have a
deterrence capability in that region? That is your statement
today?
Dr. Anderson. Yeah. Combined with the other moves described
with respect to this posture realignment, yes, I do believe it
is going to enhance deterrence.
Mr. Courtney. So, again, the question regarding the Black
Sea rotations which, again, already are occurring with those
Marines in Norway today, how is the newly planned rotations,
what is the change there? What is the benefit for not using
Norway's even as the resource?
Dr. Anderson. So, one of the main pieces envisioned with
the posture realignment is that there will be some Stryker
units that will be moving to the Black Sea region and on a
rotational basis. So, that is--I am not aware that Marines that
were up in Norway are necessarily moving or planning to rotate
to the Black Sea region. They might.
But, I mean, again, that is part of the value of having
this rotational flexibility.
Mr. Courtney. Yeah, they are actually doing precisely that.
And with that I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. Hartzler.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I wanted to focus, both Dr. Anderson and Lieutenant General
Allvin, on the 2020 agreement that was signed with Poland
setting the conditions for burden sharing and moving the
troops, 1,100 more service members into Poland.
So, was there or is there any discussion about moving more
of the troops from Germany into Poland instead of relocating
those troops back to the United States? And is a permanent U.S.
base in Poland something that you foresee may happen?
Dr. Anderson. So, I will start on that one. You know, we do
have approximately 4,500 troops on a rotational basis going
through Poland. And the agreement that was signed this summer
by the President and his counterpart envisions another 1,000
thereabouts being deployed on a rotational basis. And it will
include elements of the 5th Corps headquarters element. And
that, that will provide our Army units, clearly, in Europe with
additional sort of eastward presence that they do not currently
have.
And we think that, you know, on a rotational basis is the
appropriate agreement with the Polish Government.
Mrs. Hartzler. So, you don't see any of the troops that are
currently in Germany being moved to be part of the 1,100 over
in Poland?
Dr. Anderson. No, ma'am. Those are, they are, I would
describe the European force posture restructuring and the
Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement as separate but
complementary in their impact and their effect.
Mrs. Hartzler. So, I was in Poland last year with some of
my other colleagues here at HASC [House Committee on Armed
Services]. We were at Poznan, we were at Powidz Air Base there.
And can attest that a lot of the training facilities are pretty
austere in Poland. I understand that is one of the issues that
needs to be addressed, the development of training range
infrastructure. And it is my understanding that Poland has
agreed to help pay for that and to construct that.
Can you tell me both the timeline of that and what is the
nature of the training grounds that will need to constructed?
Dr. Anderson. So, the Enhanced Defense Cooperation
Agreement does allow for, does provide for the Polish
Government to assist with these infrastructure improvements.
I would have to get back to you on the particular timing of
those, ma'am.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 61.]
Mrs. Hartzler. Okay. And switching gears to the 2nd Cavalry
Regiment that is returning back to the United States, what is
the process to determine where their location is going to be,
their new home station?
And what is the timeline for stationing them back to the
U.S.?
And along with that, what infrastructure will be needed for
them to return?
Dr. Anderson. So, the timeline is, will take, will take
some time. I mean, as we have said consistently, this is months
of planning and years of execution, so that a precise timeline
is to be determined. And that will be, you know, in
consultation with, obviously, with Congress and also the
services on where, where they may end up in the United States.
Mrs. Hartzler. Do you have any idea how much infrastructure
will need to be built to sustain them? Or will that be
determined once you determine the location, I assume?
Dr. Anderson. The latter, ma'am.
Mrs. Hartzler. Okay. Thank you very much.
I will yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Is Mr. Norcross with us? I don't--Mr. Norcross, is he? He
is not.
Mr. Gallego. Mr. Gallego is with us remotely.
Ruben, are you hearing me there?
Mr. Gallego. Yeah, I can. Thank you very much.
I apologize. I am still in shock, to begin with, in regards
to--I am sorry, can you hear me?
The Chairman. Yes. Yes, we can hear you.
Mr. Gallego. I am still in shock, to begin with, like,
about the decision-making process that we saw going into this.
And that is kind of I wanted to make sure that you all
understand part of my statement here.
Many of us attended a briefing, a classified briefing, that
I think a lot of us came out not very satisfied in terms of
where the rationale, and not only where the rationale came from
but then the method that was used to hit the goals that were
set by the President. So, I just want to pick that out.
To go into other questions, though, General Allvin, have we
seen a decrease in Russian military activity or a general
decrease in the threat from Russia in the past couple years?
General Allvin. No, Congressman, we haven't.
Mr. Gallego. Okay. And I agree.
For the NDAA, I wrote the amendment in this year's NDAA
putting restrictions on troop withdrawals and moves to get rid
of infrastructure in Europe. So, tell me, how do we take the
troops out of Germany or Europe with all [inaudible] against
Russian attacks anything other than a, you know, soft gift, in
my opinion, to the Kremlin that is still actively trying to
assert its influence over Europe?
General Allvin. Well, Congressman, all I can really offer
on that front is that as we are looking to execute the National
Defense Strategy we take into account not only what Russia is
doing, but we also have to take into account what China is
doing.
We also have to take into account what is happening with
respect to our readiness, trying to recover readiness.
We also have to take into account the fact that despite the
fact that Congress has been very, very generous with the
budget, we can anticipate that there will be, probably,
downward pressure on the budget.
So, as we look at how we can best array the forces to deter
across the globe, if we were to take Europe in isolation it is
a very, very defensible argument to talk about that maybe we
should have more forces in Europe. And at the same time, one
might say we need to have more forces in the INDOPACOM AOR
[area of responsibility] to push back on that aggression.
But as those sort of conflict with each other, the idea
that we would develop a new approach to deterrence, and that
approach is founded on dynamic force employment, and in order
to do that some of these, these force alignments and these
force reposturing enable the Secretary to have more freedom to
be able to do dynamic force employment to not only deter in
Europe but also to deter in the Indo-Pacific.
Now, that is going to require something though. That is
going to require our ability to demonstrate that we can deploy
forces in a rapid manner, in an operationally unpredictable
manner, in that the new decision calculus, which is the
baseline of deterrence, the new decision calculus is based on
the idea that even though the forces may not be there in the
way that they were before, that malign influence that is being
considered is now perhaps deterred because of the idea that the
forces will be there in an unpredictable manner, maybe not
where they expected they would be. And it is still the costs
and the risks outweighs the benefit of that malign activity.
So, it really is trying to understand, with all those
conflicting pressures, how one best postures across the globe,
which is why, as Dr. Anderson mentioned, the Secretary has
directed the combatant commander reviews across all of the
combatant commands.
Mr. Gallego. I reclaim my time.
First of all, thank you. But to be clear, talking to many
of our European defense ministers, if we want to talk about
deterrence, the best deterrence, obviously, is having a strong
alliance that, you know, trusts each other and believes in each
other. These moves have really made a lot of our longstanding
allies question whether we are really going to be there should
the balloon go up.
And speaking of just cost, Dr. Anderson, why hasn't the
Department sent the committee a cost estimate; aside from
actively harming our national security, in my opinion we are
going to need money to make these changes. Just simply moving a
combatant command headquarters like AFRICOM is going to cost us
billions of dollars. Where is that money going to come from?
What is the estimate for all this stuff, how much it is going
to cost?
Dr. Anderson. So, as Secretary Esper pointed out on the
29th of July, you know, we are still formulating those cost
estimates. He did, he did note that it will be in the single-
digit billions, that that is rough order of magnitude at this
point. But, clearly, going forward, subject to further planning
and assessments, we will have a more refined estimate that we
will be able to share with the committee.
Mr. Gallego. Well, thank you. Thank you, Dr. Anderson.
This is just, just to be clear, we made a decision based on
the President's decision to move a certain amount of troops out
of Germany without any actual context of how this brings
deterrence or national security. And then we have, basically,
the Pentagon built a, I would say, a plan around that idea
without any actual understanding----
The Chairman. If you could wrap that up quickly, Ruben.
The gentleman's time has expired. Thank you.
Mr. Byrne is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Byrne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, I see that you got a master's from Troy State,
spent some time at Maxwell Air Force Base. Alabama proudly
claims you. So, glad you are here.
So, I am trying to understand some basics here. And I know
you can help me. So, a total of 12,000 military personnel are
being repositioned. And I think I understand that 5,600 of
those will be restationed within NATO, but 6,400 will be coming
back to the United States. Do I have that correct?
General Allvin. That approximate number, yes.
Mr. Byrne. Are the 6,400, are all of them going to be on a
rotational basis or are some of them not going to be on a
rotational basis?
General Allvin. To my understanding, as was briefed to the
Secretary and the Secretary released on the 29th, some are.
Some may be back maintaining readiness as well. So, they are
available.
Mr. Byrne. When they come back on a rotational basis are
they still considered to be a part of the EUCOM force?
General Allvin. Yes, Congressman, they are.
Mr. Byrne. Okay. So, they are part of the EUCOM force but
they are in the United States, can be brought back at the
pleasure of the commander.
How do they get back?
General Allvin. Well, sir, there is a process that is
called the Global Force Management process that I won't bore
the committee with here. But, really, the combatant command,
combatant commander will request on a rotating basis certain
types of forces for certain types of activities, and justify it
within the context of their global campaign plan and execution
of the National Defense Strategy.
That makes its way into the Department. The Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, as the global integrator, will evaluate
all of those requests and look at it from a global perspective
in the execution of the National Defense Strategy. And that
will make its way up his military advice up to OSD and up to
the Secretary for decision.
So, those rotational forces will be dispersed across the
globe in accordance with the National Defense Strategy
priorities. And that happens year to year.
But, on any given time, if you are counting noses in the
theater, I think General Wolters would say all of those,
whether rotational or assigned, those are the forces he
considers as part of the U.S. European Command force posture.
Mr. Byrne. But--make sure I understand what you are saying.
Even though they are part of EUCOM, they have rotated back to
the United States, they can be put into INDOPACOM if that was
the decision by the Department of Defense?
General Allvin. That's correct, Congressman. And another
unit could actually go into Europe.
Mr. Byrne. Right. So, it does seem like, even though you
are saying it is rotational, it does seem like we have a net
reduction of forces in-country and available to EUCOM, but
6,400, that is the way it seems to somebody that is not in
uniform. Where am I wrong about that?
General Allvin. Well, you are not wrong. The idea is it
could be at any time up to 6,400 fewer. However, at any given
time, depending on the nature of which rotational forces have
been requested and where, it could be no net loss. So, there
still is a variability; they are just no longer permanently
with their families stationed there. But they could be, they,
or other units, like units or different units, can be there
doing the same mission for the combatant command.
Mr. Byrne. But to do that you have to go through that
process that you described. And I don't know whether that is a
process that takes 5 minutes, 5 days, 5 weeks, or 5 months, but
it takes some time to make that decision?
General Allvin. Those decisions are made well ahead of
time. So, the decisions are going on right now for the types of
forces that will be deployed in the end of fiscal year 2021
into fiscal year 2022.
So there, those, those forces are known well ahead of time
so they can get trained up for the missions for which they have
been designated to be allocated to the combatant commander for.
Mr. Byrne. Well, I am certainly not in a position to
question someone that has your level of expertise and
experience, but from a layperson's point of view it looks like
we have reduced our troop presence in Europe at a time that
Russia is actually becoming more of a threat. And I hope you
understand, that is where some of us are coming from, we are
saying this looks like we are pulling back, and we think we
should be stepping forward.
I will never forget, I think it was my second month on this
committee that Russia basically invaded Ukraine. And nobody had
any notice. We didn't have 5 months to plan. They just did it.
And I have absolutely no confidence that Putin won't do that
again. In fact, I have all the confidence in the world he will
do it again, particularly if he thinks that we are weakening.
And I worry, and I think some of our allies are worrying,
that they are looking at this move as a weakening of American
presence, a weakening of American resolve, a weakening of
American capability operating with our NATO allies. So, I am
just registering to you, I don't have your background and I
can't question you on the details of it, but from that sort of
outsider's layman's perspective, it looks like were are pulling
back. And I think that bothers a lot of us.
And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
So, I am not sure from looking at the screen who we have
here. Ms. Horn is up next.
Kendra, are you on anywhere--does not appear that way.
Mr. Cisneros. Zero for two.
Mr. Crow, I saw you. There you are, Jason. Mr. Crow is up.
You are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Crow. Yes, I am here. Can you hear me? Great.
The Chairman. Yes, we got you.
Mr. Crow. I want to start with Mr. Anderson. I was
quizzical, to say the least, on your comment that there are no
downsides to rotational forces. I just want to flesh that out
for a minute.
One is, are rotational forces, do they have as much time to
train and develop relationships and interoperability with local
NATO partner forces as currently stationed forces do?
Dr. Anderson. So, even with the rotational forces, you
know, we will have a limited presence within a particular
country through which their rotational forces are moving.
Mr. Crow. But the forces themselves, they will have less
time than if they were permanently stationed; correct?
Dr. Anderson. They will have less time within the country.
That is correct.
Mr. Crow. Okay. Next question. Next question, do they have
as good awareness of the terrain and the surrounding area in
which they will operate as a permanently based force?
Dr. Anderson. So, again, there will be, there will be
liaisons, there will be forward elements.
Mr. Crow. Will the forces themselves? I am not concerned
about the liaisons, headquarter people, people sitting back in
headquarters offices; the forces themselves.
Dr. Anderson. So, the forces themselves will have a, I
would say, a broader pers--a broader understanding of possible
regions of the world that they may have to deploy to.
Mr. Crow. Okay. So you are saying that a rotational force
coming from the United States that rotates for 6 to 9 months or
a year will have a broader view--will have a greater or less
understanding of the terrain over which they operate in if they
were to be countering Russian aggression?
Dr. Anderson. So, they will not have the same degree of
understanding as forces that----
Mr. Crow. Okay.
Dr. Anderson. But they will retain a keen appreciation and
a focus----
Mr. Crow. I will reclaim my time, Mr. Anderson.
So, they will have less, they will have less time and less
awareness of the terrain.
Secondly, will they have as much time with their families
as a permanently stationed force in Europe would have?
Dr. Anderson. So, it depends on the nature and the
frequency of the rotations.
Mr. Crow. Okay. Mr. Anderson, the answer is no to that, and
you know that. They will be rotating away from their families.
Next is will they have as much time to train on ranges in
critical combat skills? Because if you are forward deploying or
rotating, obviously a significant amount of time is spent
deploying and redeploying. Will they have as much time doing
critical combat skill training?
Dr. Anderson. So, two points. Even forces that are
permanently stationed in Europe today deploy within Europe and
spend--are apart from their families at certain, at certain
times.
Secondly, for training, it really depends on the unit that
we are talking about and the available ranges. It may in some
cases actually have greater training and access in the United
States, again depending on the unit.
Mr. Crow. Okay. Well, Mr. Anderson, I think you and I both
know that when you are deploying and redeploying forces that
takes significant time that could otherwise be spent on
critical combat skills. And it strains credibility that you
would try to justify it that way. And there are, indeed, many
downsides for rotational forces in terms of the readiness of
our troops. And I believe you know that.
So, I don't appreciate you dodging those questions.
Mr. Anderson, the Secretary of the Army, Mr. McCarthy,
Secretary McCarthy on July 21st confirmed after returning from
Europe that he had had no discussions with our European allies
about rebasing or troop withdrawal as of July 21st. So, why
would the Secretary of the Army be unaware of this plan at that
point and not be consulting with our allies?
Dr. Anderson. I can't speak for the Secretary of the Army.
I can assure you, though, that I was in contact with my
counterparts at the policy level about this force structure
reposturing.
Mr. Crow. Okay. General Allvin, turning to you for a
moment. You have been in the military for a very long time and
have been a part of a lot of discussions around repositioning
and shifting of forces. Did the timeline and the process for
this decision, was that consistent with the prior timelines and
processes that you followed in the past?
General Allvin. Congressman, I would say that given the
timeline when the Secretary directed the combatant command to
do this, which was starting in January, I would say that this
is, this is not completely inconsistent. I would say that the
complexity of this also is the reason why the Secretary has
reserved the right to continue to make iterations as we get
smarter.
But this is a 6-month review. It is consistent. And I think
the devil will be in the details of the updates to it and the
implementation in order to make sure we measure twice and cut
once.
Mr. Crow. Okay. Thank you, General.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Conaway is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, gentlemen, thank
you.
Nobody likes to have their decisions second-guessed, but
that is the drill. So, appreciate your being here this morning.
I am a CPA [certified public accountant], and I kind of
approach everything from the dollar standpoint. Dr. Anderson,
did I hear you say earlier that there was a rigorous cost-
benefit analysis done of the overall project of what was
formally proposed in June? In other words, is it going to cost
more money, less money?
DOD budgets are always under pressure, given the tyranny of
personnel costs, costs increasing. So, what is the bottom line:
is it going to cost us more or less?
Dr. Anderson. So, we anticipate that this, in its totality,
will as a rough magnitude cost in the single digit billions.
That is the estimate at this time. And as we go forward and we
refine those estimates, that number may go, go up or could be
adjusted in some fashion.
Mr. Conaway. I understand. It would change if you changed
the plan. But would you describe the process as being rigorous?
Dr. Anderson. So, as earlier----
Mr. Conaway. On the back of a napkin it seemed like.
Dr. Anderson. Earlier, as my colleague has pointed out, we
are still in the process of developing and maturing this plan.
And there, it is a complex one. There are a lot of, lot of
moving pieces here, different headquarters going different
places, and rotational forces, and subject to further
refinement. So, we just do not have a clear----
Mr. Conaway. So, do you anticipate----
Dr. Anderson [continuing]. Estimate at this time.
Mr. Conaway [continuing]. A decision that we can't afford
to do all of this, that we unwind this if it costs too much
money? Or is cost not a factor?
Dr. Anderson. So, this is something, obviously, that is
going to be a, we are going to have to--we will need
congressional support, obviously, for any authorization or
appropriations.
It is my view that, notwithstanding the pressure on the
budget, that this is something that we will able to afford. And
the costs will be spaced out over time.
Mr. Conaway. Yeah. Dr. Anderson, that, I would prefer you
to have said that I've got a rigorous analysis to come to that
conclusion. I know that is what you want it to be.
But let me ask you this, and this is just a bit of a real
weird, odd observation. In your testimony you said the third
leg would be to move 2,500 airmen from Royal Air Force Base
Mildenhall to Germany, was planned to move to Germany, and that
you are not going to do that.
Is there a plan someplace in the bowels of the Department
that when that original decision was to move those air units,
the air refueling and special ops [operations], move to
Germany, was there some sort of a justification plan that was
done at that point in time that would have had some lofty
phrases as to why you made--why that made sense? And now we are
unwinding that decision. And the only rationale you put in your
statement is that they would remain in the U.K., thus ensuring
uninterrupted readiness and responsiveness of these units.
That leads me to believe that if we had gone through with a
move to Germany that it would have in fact interrupted their
readiness and responsiveness. That is not what you are telling
us, is it?
Dr. Anderson. So, I am--whatever the justification for
initially having the plan to move them to Germany, I am not
familiar with that. That I believe precedes my time in my
current position.
But what I, what we do know is that in order to meet the
cap of the reduction in Germany this was a----
Mr. Conaway. Okay. So, this----
Dr. Anderson [continuing]. Move that makes sense.
Mr. Conaway [continuing]. This wasn't driven by mission,
this was driven by the caps?
Dr. Anderson. Well, there is the cap and there is also the
added benefit, as pointed out in the statement, that there are
efficiencies to, you know, remaining in with our close
British----
Mr. Conaway. How much money was spent in Germany on the
receiving base before we unwound this decision?
Dr. Anderson. I don't have that detail, sir. I would have
to come back to you on that.
Mr. Conaway. Do you have any idea when that decision was
made to move that unit, those 2,500 airmen and, I assume, their
families to Germany? Would we have been spending money at the
receiving base in Germany at this point, or during that
timeframe?
Dr. Anderson. I will have to save that for the record and
come back to you on it, Congressman.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 59.]
Mr. Conaway. Okay. If you wouldn't mind doing that, I would
appreciate it.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
I do just have to make a comment. And I know you gentlemen
are doing the job that is assigned you by the Pentagon. This is
why we need an actual Under Secretary for Policy. And this is
why we need the positions of the Pentagon filled.
I understand, Dr. Anderson, you are in a difficult
position. You weren't here for the plans. You are in an acting
position now. But there is a level of detail in a bipartisan
way. This is just not acceptable from the Department of Defense
that, you know, on a move of this kind, you know, whatever you
guys may think of Congress, whatever you may think of this
committee, it is our responsibility to exercise oversight of
this.
The American people in their infinite wisdom have put us in
these chairs. And we are not getting the level of insight in
this decision that we should. And I don't know if it is because
you are in an acting position, acting in the role of, or
whatever, but, you know, I wasn't in on that, I didn't hear
that, I would have to talk to this person, I would have to talk
to that person.
You know, and again, you are doing what the Pentagon told
you to do, and I am not taking this out on you. But for the
Pentagon to send this over on a decision at this level and not
tell us about here is what we did, here is the timeline, here
is the person we talked to, we talked to this person, we didn't
talk to that person, I mean, the level of detail that we are
getting here is just not acceptable for us to exercise our
oversight and for what the Pentagon should be putting in front
of us.
So, I just want that on the record from my perspective. And
I have the strong sense that my colleagues on both sides of the
aisle would agree with me on that point.
So, on this and other decisions we just need to hear better
what the hell is going on so that we can exercise our
oversight.
And if you have a comment on that, you are welcome to. But
that is, it is a very frustrating briefing at this point.
Dr. Anderson. So, Congressman, it is clearly not the case
that we are not providing the details. We, at this stage of the
process we don't have that level of detail. But we commit, as
the plan matures and we develop those details, that we will, we
will share them with the committee.
The Chairman. That is alarming in its own right. But, but I
take your point.
Okay. Next up we have Ms. Davis, recognized for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for being
here, obviously doing your job. We totally understand that.
But I, I am taken aback as well by the language that you
are developing in maturing the plan. When do you think the plan
is going to be matured?
Dr. Anderson. So, so I would anticipate that, you know, by
early 2021, early in the new year that we will have a much more
mature plan to share with Congress.
Mrs. Davis. And, General Allvin, did you want to respond to
that as well? Is that your timeframe?
General Allvin. I don't have any better answer than that.
Quite frankly, a lot of it will depend upon what Dr. Anderson
has spoken about, all of the variables that need to come
together.
But to get the, as the chairman said, to get the details
that would be satisfying I would imagine would be into that
timeframe.
Mrs. Davis. And I wonder, Dr. Anderson, of the details that
you are talking about, what is it that concerns you the most
that you don't have a feel for, that you don't feel is cooked?
Dr. Anderson. So, from a policy perspective, I am very
comfortable with this plan. And, in fact, I think it is going
to serve the interests of the National Defense Strategy that we
promulgated in January 2018. So, at that level I am very, very
pleased with the approach. I think it is going to enhance
deterrence, and assure allies, and provide us more flexibility.
You know, I, too, am interested in the cost details. Cost
is, you know, as we think about budgets in the future,
obviously a large concern. So, that is something that we will
certainly be keeping an eye on.
Mrs. Davis. Okay. Thank you.
I know that in the testimony that you all presented you
pointed to airmen that had been scheduled to rebase to Germany
and that they would remain in the U.K. And you said that they
would do so to ensure that the uninterrupted readiness and
responsiveness of these units would be realized.
I am wondering about other units that have been designated
to be moved experiencing an interruption in their readiness and
responsiveness. What can we expect on that level?
Dr. Anderson. So, there will be a timing and a phasing and
a sequencing of all these moves. I can say with confidence they
are not going to all happen at once. They will be spaced out
over time. And because of that, we will be very attuned to any
temporary disruption or interruptions in readiness or
capabilities.
Mrs. Davis. And you will be planning for that?
Dr. Anderson. Yes, indeed. And I would also note, in the
broader sweep of NATO's history we have made moves, even larger
moves. And we have done so without compromising our overall
capabilities----
Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
Dr. Anderson [continuing]. Or readiness.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, sir. Thank you.
General Allvin, you mentioned, you did mention the
families. And we know how critical and how important that is.
The men and women who serve our country have a vote in this,
and they do it often by their feet. And so I wonder what you
are doing to mitigate the impact on those families? And what
costs do you incur as you attempt to realign them?
General Allvin. Congresswoman, primarily one of the five
that the Secretary laid out was take care of the service
members and their families. I think that goes to, largely, the
idea of planning this out ahead of time to be able to ensure
that when the move happens--and, of course, as you mentioned,
ma'am, the service members and their families they have to be
resilient because they move here, and there, and everywhere.
That is a part of life, but we don't need to make it more
complicated.
So, the idea that as the moves are being contemplated the
Department ensures, and the chairman is very engaged on this as
well, that the landing location, wherever that will be when
these moves happen, will be in, you know, full consultation
with the services who are responsible for the organize, train,
and equip to provide the combatant commands, as well as this
body and others to ensure that, as I said before, measure
twice, cut once. So, we won't----
Mrs. Davis. Do you have a sense that it is really important
to surge personnel in order to address the needs of families?
Often families feel that it takes forever for them to get the
attention that they need in order to plan themselves for a move
that can be detrimental in terms of the education of their
children, and many other facets of this. What will be done to
bring on more personnel in order to address this?
General Allvin. First of all, Congresswoman, I would say
the way you put it is very eloquent and very accurate. I
anticipate that the chairman will work with the Joint Chiefs,
as well as the service, active service chiefs to ensure that as
those moves, which are executed by the services, that they are
doing that, as you said, surge the personnel to where you are
able to communicate what is required and how they can
anticipate that, so they at least have some predictability.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, sir. My time is up.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Bacon is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I would just start off by congratulating
General Allvin. I have had multiple assignments with him. And
for him to be getting his fourth star, the Air Force is
selecting the right person. So, congratulations to you.
We have a little bit of a debate up here on the forward
presence of forces. And I believe that we absolutely need
forward presence in Poland and the Baltics. We have seen in the
past with Georgia and Ukraine how Russia responds to perceived
weakness. So, I am a big supporter of making sure we have a
presence. I would even prefer a permanent presence in Poland
and the Baltics to make our intentions and our deterrence
clear.
My first question is to Dr. Anderson, if I may. I used to
be the commander at Ramstein and I was the deputy at Third Air
Force. What's our plans for Spangdahlem in the long run?
Because I believe both Spangdahlem and Ramstein are strategic
bases that we have to preserve because of the airlift capacity.
The airlift capacity cannot go strictly on Ramstein. We
know that. And it is in the perfect spot for un-air-refueled C-
17s to get there and then get to the Middle East or Africa. And
without Spangdahlem I think we are in trouble.
So, I was just curious your perspective.
Dr. Anderson. So, certainly in the context of moving to
greater rotational forces there is still a role for hubs,
logistics hubs and air bases that can and should be retained.
So that is part of our thinking on the European force structure
reposturing.
Mr. Bacon. So, your intention is to retain Spangdahlem as
an airlift hub?
Dr. Anderson. So, I know that we are going to retain the
hubs. I want to be a little bit--I want to caveat this a little
bit because I am not familiar with the exact nature of what is
being planned for that particular base.
Mr. Bacon. Well, just let me put my perspective out there.
That whole capacity can't fall on Ramstein. I know it. I
just know it firsthand. And both those bases are your primary
conduits in the Middle East and Africa, and would be for the
rest of Europe if you had troubles in Poland or in the Baltics.
So, I just, I am worried about pulling out of Spangdahlem
totally.
I can see some force realignment. But that airlift hub is
critical.
Dr. Anderson. Yes. And there are defense planners who are
fully aware of those, those advantages. Yes, sir.
Mr. Bacon. Another question. I always was concerned about
pulling out of Mildenhall. The United Kingdom, Great Britain,
is our best ally in NATO. Through thick and thin they have been
with us. I didn't really care for how we handled that to begin
with. I am glad that we are maintaining force presence at
Mildenhall.
What is the plan for Fairford, because we were talking of
moving the RC-135s there?
Dr. Anderson. So, I am not, I am not sure. I don't know if
my colleague is aware of the particulars on that?
General Allvin. Congressman, I will take that for the
record because----
Mr. Bacon. Fine.
General Allvin [continuing]. I think that having
experienced Europe as you have as well, you understand that.
And so I will, in the context of what General Wolters is
currently pursuing, we will get, we will take that for the
record and get back to you.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 59.]
General Allvin. But to your point on Mildenhall, as you
recall it was a European infrastructure consolidation which was
made in a different time. And so Mildenhall, while not only
serving as a refueling, can also help augment that critical
through-flow for enabling global operations as an airlift hub
as well, can help to augment those two bases you mentioned in
Germany, sir.
Mr. Bacon. Let me just plant this thought, too. We need to
build a strong relationship with Great Britain when it comes to
reconnaissance. We have sold them RC-135s. We operate out of
there. I think it would be wise to have a joint base with the
U.K. and ourselves doing the RC-135 operations. You get great
synergy, and we both, and we both gain from it. It's a win-win.
So, I am a proponent for it.
Let me just close on this. I am a little concerned about
where we are going with Germany. I think we have a growing
rift. They used to be on the front lines, you know, obviously
in the Cold War, but now they are more of the logistics hub.
And I am concerned that we are burning bridges with the
populace and the political leadership there, with a country
that we absolutely have to have a good rapport with if we have
a conflict with Russia down the road.
Are we at threat of burning bridges too far with Germany?
Because that should be a concern to us.
I defer to you, Dr. Anderson.
Dr. Anderson. Well, a couple points. I mean, Germany
certainly plays a constructive role. They have been helpful in
Afghanistan, in Iraq, and also been an outstanding partner in
counterterrorism activities. All that said, the President and
the Secretary are absolutely right in asserting that Germany
can and should pay more in terms of its defense budget.
The Wales Pledge was agreed to unanimously in 2014 to get
to 2 percent within 10 years. And Germany is currently lagging
at about 1.5 percent.
They have, they do have a plan to get to 2 percent, but
that is not going to happen by, by their terms, by 2030. So, we
would certainly encourage Berlin to advance that timeline.
Mr. Bacon. So, Mr. Chair, I will just close with this, that
they are paying under 2 percent, but we still need them to have
a strong alliance. So, we have to find a way to make that work.
And I will just say, hey, we are going to have a great Vice
Chief of Staff.
Thank you.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Garamendi is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I think we lost you there, John. Are you
still with us?
Mr. Garamendi. I am more and more convinced--I am. I should
be, should be there.
The Chairman. Yeah. Keep going.
Yeah, if you are speaking we can no longer hear you.
Appreciate that helpful insight.
Yeah, I am sorry, John, we have a connection problem here
because we are not hearing you. You are moving stiltedly. So,
we will see if we can fix that.
In the meantime I have--I don't see him on the screen now.
Mr. Cisneros is the next one who is up.
Mr. Cisneros, you are recognized for 5 minutes if your
device functions. Go ahead.
Mr. Cisneros. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that.
And thanks to our panel for being here today.
And I know this has been asked, but I will kind of ask it
again. But based on Secretary Esper's comments, this
realignment will be expensive, not to mention the impact of
realignment on morale for our service members and their
families.
Does the Department expect any savings or increased burden-
sharing contributions from Germany as a result of the
realignment that would compensate for the cost of the proposed
force posture changes?
General Allvin, what is the plan for the military families
of U.S. service members who are affected by this realignment?
Dr. Anderson. So, let me start with the question on
Germany.
You know, certainly it is our hope, and it is our, indeed,
our expectation that Germany will live up to the Wales Pledge
going forward. And I would say even more broadly with respect
to this realignment plan for European force structure we will
look for opportunities where our allies can contribute in terms
of the funding element of this. Because this is a, this does
need to be a shared burden.
With respect to the families, and I will ask my counterpart
to elaborate, but certainly this ties in directly with
Secretary Esper's commitment that he stated on numerous
occasions that we are going to take care of our service members
and our families throughout this entire process.
And what that means in very practical terms is as the plan
matures and we have timelines, we will keep them informed.
And I would also note that there are no, there are no near-
term--by that, in the next couple months--PCS moves that are
currently envisioned. All that will be scoped out and
communicated appropriately.
General Allvin. And, Congressman, I will follow up with
what Dr. Anderson mentioned.
The plan really for the families is, as I mentioned when I
was speaking with Representative Davis, understanding the scope
and the ultimate destination which has to be, has to be, 100
percent in consultation with this body as well as the services.
The services who will eventually, they are the ones who do the
organize, train, and equip, they will be part and parcel of
understanding that particular puzzle and the right location for
those service members and families to go who will be rotated
back.
But, as Representative Davis said, I feel very confident
that I can speak on behalf of the services on this, to say that
surging ahead of time, surging the people to ensure that the
families are made well aware and have a predictability, because
that is--we understand families need to be resilient. The best
that we can do on this is to give them the predictability so
they aren't sort of whiplashing around between one eventuality
and the next.
Mr. Cisneros. Thank you.
So, Mr. Anderson, you know, there is talk about moving an
F-16 squadron to Italy from Germany, also moving 2,000 troops
to Belgium. But yet, you know, Belgium nor Italy meet NATO's
target for defense spending, which seems to be inconsistent
with the administration's reasoning of moving these troops out.
So, how can you speak towards the inconsistency of moving,
the President, with all the comments that the President has
made that Germany has not paid its due and not doing its part,
so we are moving troops out, but yet we are moving troops into
other areas of NATO that have also been--not met their part as
well, their financial obligations?
Dr. Anderson. So, in the formulation of the concept, which
is transitioning to a plan, the defense planners did not, you
know, look at a scorecard of who is paying what as a
determining factor on where rotationally units would go. They
made these assessments based upon their best military judgment
and what makes sense operationally in terms of the broader
restructuring.
Mr. Cisneros. All right. So, the President, you know, his
delinquent, his comment about delinquent and they haven't paid
their NATO fees, this is not the reason? We are not punishing
Germany for moving these troops out?
Dr. Anderson. So, again, going back to an earlier point,
you know, EUCOM has been thinking about force posture moves on
a continuous basis, and then received specific direction from
Secretary Esper in the January/February timeframe. And it is
fair to say that the President's guidance did accelerate the
process and has brought us to this point where we are sharing
the concept.
The Chairman. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
Ms. Gabbard is next, and is recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Gabbard. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And thank
you to the witnesses here.
I know earlier you briefly touched on impacts to AFRICOM.
But I wonder if you can go into a little bit more detail both
on where AFRICOM missions will pull their forces from with this
change, given the shared troops with the Europe AOR?
And, also, how will this change impact any intel-gathering
[intelligence-gathering] capabilities or other shared
capabilities that currently exist between the two commands?
Dr. Anderson. So, with respect to AFRICOM, ma'am, there,
too, the Department is undergoing a combatant command blank
slate review of missions, and tasks, and deployments. And that
is currently ongoing.
And when Secretary Esper makes final decisions with respect
to the positioning of those forces we will, we will share those
appropriately.
With respect to intelligence and warning, certainly agree
with the point or the importance of that on multiple fronts, to
include going back to our earlier discussion about moving
rotational forces to the European continent and back to the
United States. It is absolutely imperative that we have
appropriate intelligence and surveillance that will provide us
sufficient indications and warning time in order to make these
moves.
Ms. Gabbard. And forgive me if you already talked about
this. I didn't hear it. But, how will this new realignment
impact the burden-sharing contributions that come from Germany?
And how that will impact them as well as how it will impact us?
Dr. Anderson. So, moving forward on this realignment we
will look for opportunities where allies can contribute, you
know, financially in a meaningful way. You know, some of those
costs will obviously be ours, but we will look for those
opportunities.
Then I would say more broadly, we continue to expect our
European allies to live up and to fulfill the Wales Pledge that
was unanimously agreed to in 2014.
I would also say on the cost front and the financial front
that NATO has made progress. There are more countries now that
are at or above the 2 percent limit. Those include not only, of
course, ourselves, the United States, but Bulgaria, Greece, the
United Kingdom, Estonia, Romania, Lithuania, Latvia, and also
Poland. And there are some other countries that soon will be at
that 2 percent level. So, that is a positive trajectory.
Ms. Gabbard. So, specifically with Germany, I mean, you
have a very specific number of troops that will be repositioned
back here in the United States. Are you not able to speak
specifically to how that burden-sharing agreement will be
impacted, both in Germany and the United States, because it has
to be renegotiated, or you don't know?
Dr. Anderson. Well, with respect to the target for defense
spending, Germany, as with the other NATO partners, is expected
to reach the 2 percent. And they have articulated that they can
get there in 2030. It is our position that they can and they
should move that timeline much earlier to get to 2 percent.
And I would also say that it's, you know, we talk about the
2 percent level all the time, and for the appropriate reasons.
But there is also the, you know, we have to focus on not just
the number but what are actually the capabilities. And there
it's, you know, there is a 20 percent target of defense
spending that would be invested in actual no kidding military
capabilities.
Ms. Gabbard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. Torres Small is recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Torres Small. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you
both so much for being here. I really appreciate your service
to our country.
Acting Under Secretary Anderson, I wanted to follow up on
the conversation you had with Congressmembers Wilson and
Houlahan about AFRICOM headquarters. And really appreciate your
conversation mentioning the factors that you would discuss,
that you would review.
So, you mentioned cost and receptivity of the host nation
as factors for consideration in the relocation. Will you also
consider time zone?
Dr. Anderson. I think I am not sure how--I don't think that
would be a big consideration, ma'am.
Ms. Torres Small. Okay. In terms of ease of communication
and coordination?
Dr. Anderson. Yeah. I mean, we have now, we have certain,
obviously we have combatant commands that are in different time
zones. And, you know, both General Allvin and myself we, we
just manage that. Right? Sometimes we have late night calls or
early morning calls, depending on which combatant command we
are talking about. I do not see that as a big issue in the
considerations.
Ms. Torres Small. Okay. What about proximity to the
continent?
Dr. Anderson. So, there, again, I don't want to get beyond
the three broad possible destinations, whether it be in the
European continent, or in Africa, or the United States. They
all have particular advantages and disadvantages that need to
be sorted out.
Ms. Torres Small. And part of making that decisions
process--making that decision is identifying all of those
advantages and disadvantages; correct?
Dr. Anderson. Yes.
Ms. Torres Small. So, would you consider as one of those
advantages or disadvantages proximity to the continent?
Dr. Anderson. To----
Ms. Torres Small. To Africa.
Dr. Anderson. To Africa. That is among the other, the
other--among the considerations. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Torres Small. Okay. And are there any other
considerations that you think are important for determining the
headquarters for AFRICOM?
Dr. Anderson. I think the ones that we have talked about
are the main ones.
Ms. Torres Small. So, in your response to Congresswoman
Houlahan you committed to ensuring that the decision would be
made in consultation with Congress. And I deeply appreciate
that, and also appreciate you reaffirming that for Chairman
Smith and Congresswoman Davis regarding the entire realignment.
In regards to AFRICOM headquarters, will you commit to
ensuring that DOD provides an assessment of all the factors we
just identified and present them to this committee in advance
of that determination?
Dr. Anderson. Yes, I commit to that.
Ms. Torres Small. Thank you. I appreciate that because it
is deeply important. These are vital decisions that affect our
deterrence posture, our relationship with allies, and all of
our national security. Do you agree with that?
Dr. Anderson. Yes. The committee obviously has a tremendous
role to play in this process.
Ms. Torres Small. Thank you very much.
I wonder then why the decision was made to move AFRICOM
headquarters in the first place without such consultation?
Dr. Anderson. So, part of that, as mentioned previously in
the discussion, is to, is to seek operational efficiencies, and
also to, to meet the directed cap of the reductions regarding
Germany.
Ms. Torres Small. Would consultation with Congress have
impacted that?
Dr. Anderson. I'm not sure if it would or would not have
impacted that.
Ms. Torres Small. So, what is the difference between now as
you identify the future location and the importance of
consultation with Congress at that point compared to the
decision to relocate it in the first place?
Dr. Anderson. So, as for the actual, the consideration that
came up that the EUCOM staff came up with, I cannot speak to
that directly. I can say that, you know, we are, are on a bit,
have been on a bit of an accelerated timeline. But now we are
in a different place, and as the plan matures, as you have
heard, we absolutely will consult with Congress as this plan
matures.
Ms. Torres Small. So there is no articulable distinction
between the need for consultation to move headquarters in the
first place and the final location. Both are important
decisions that Congress should be part of and consulted about.
Dr. Anderson. And we have, we have briefed members, staff
members on these proposed moves.
Ms. Torres Small. Thank you. I yield the remainder of my
time.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Keating, are you with us?
Mr. Keating. Yes, I am, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. You are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Keating. Thank you.
Dr. Anderson, you said, quote unquote, that the decision
with removing the nearly 12,000 troops in Germany was a
``Presidential decision.'' Then you went on in your testimony
to talk about the fact that Secretary Esper has been doing a
review of rotations in Europe.
Now, I want to--it is important to this committee and our
relationship and our decision making to understand the joinder
of the two things because you didn't connect them one way or
the other.
I want to ask you specifically, was that review by
Secretary Esper then made concrete, did he place that on the
President's desk for a decision? Or, did the President make
that decision and then inform Secretary Esper? Which way was
it?
Dr. Anderson. So, Congressman, I am not privy to
discussions between the President and----
Mr. Keating. Well, but----
Dr. Anderson [continuing]. The Secretary, so I can't
comment on that.
Mr. Keating [continuing]. I want to, I want to echo what
the chairman said: then why are you here?
This committee deserves answers to it. That is critical to
our decision making. In fact, there were about 4 or 5 days
between this time that Germany informed the President, that
Chancellor Merkel informed the President that she is likely not
attending the G7 summit when this was announced. Do you think
that is a coincidence, a mere coincidence?
Or, more importantly, since you may not know the answer to
that, don't you think that creates a tension and a problem with
one of our central members of one of our central alliances to
our security? Don't you see the appearance of that?
Dr. Anderson. So, I would say it is articulated very
clearly in our National Defense Strategy, Line of Effort 2, we
are committed to our allies and partners----
Mr. Keating. Answer the question. Don't you understand the
problem with that appearance? Yes or no? This is the question--
--
Dr. Anderson. The problem with it, Congressman----
Mr. Keating. Sorry?
The Chairman. If I could translate, the question basically
is the appearance of, okay, Germany doesn't come to the G7
summit, which the President doesn't like. A couple days later
the President announces that he is pulling 12,000 troops out of
Germany.
It appeared to be a petulant response to something he
didn't like that Germany did. And I guess the question--sorry,
Bill, I will give you more time--would be twofold: would be,
one, doesn't that appearance look bad? And, two, what did the
Department do to try to make sure that that appearance didn't
create the obvious problem?
Dr. Anderson. Well, sometimes after the fact is not because
of the fact. And I would note historically, for example, that
in 2004 the Bush administration decided to remove 30,000 troops
from the European theater, including a lot of those from
Germany. And at the time that was, there was a lot of
speculation that that was because Germany did not support us in
the Gulf War.
And that----
Mr. Keating. May I reclaim my time?
Dr. Anderson. So, you know, I can only speak to the plan
and the connection to the NDS. And that is there is a very,
there is a very positive relationship there. This will improve
our security.
Mr. Keating. Mr. Chairman, could I reclaim my time and just
follow up?
The Chairman. Yes. Yes, go ahead.
So, it is, it is awkward with the back and forth on the
video. But, yes, Mr. Keating, please proceed.
Mr. Keating. Thank you.
Now, you also said that Secretary Esper's plan involved a
lot of strategy with rotation, make sure. One of the things you
cited in your testimony was the deterrence to Russia and the
importance of that. And clearly, we all agree, both--everyone
in this committee agrees with that.
But, at the same time, the President interceded with
cutting half a billion dollars extra out of the European
Deterrence Initiative [EDI] which was consistent in line with
our National Defense Strategy.
Now, how does that make sense? And, again, was that the
President's decision or was that part of Secretary Esper's
strategic plan? Because it is in contradiction with Secretary
Esper's strategic plan to be making those cuts and using them
to paint the wall at the border black. Half a billion dollars.
Now, tell me where the consistency of that is and who made
that decision? Was that part of a strategic decision by the
Secretary?
Dr. Anderson. So, with respect to the European Deterrence
Initiative, there have been a number of military infrastructure
projects that have come to completion. And because of that the
budget request has been--there is a slight, a slight decrease
in that, in that funding level.
But we are very confident that the funding level is indeed
appropriate, and that EDI is consistent with and will be
complementary to the proposed force structure posture----
Mr. Keating. I will say in closing I'd like----
Dr. Anderson [continuing]. Envisioned here.
Mr. Keating [continuing]. I would conclude saying I will
tell you what isn't consistent. What isn't consistent, given
even past relationships with this committee and our defense,
and our Secretary and, indeed, administrations, what is not
consistent is getting a straight answer to questions and
circumventing the will of this committee and Congress.
I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Garamendi wants to give it another shot.
So, we will, we will try that.
John, you are on again.
Mr. Garamendi. Well, here I am. Hopefully it will work.
I am going to make this very, very short. This hearing has
been extremely important and very [inaudible]. No justification
for what is being proposed here.
This whole thing started as the proceeding that his
comment--[inaudible] 6 months later with the entire Department
of Defense trying to figure out how to make it happen. Bottom
line is, it makes no sense whatsoever, not from beginning to
end. And we can go on for a couple days about that.
Bottom line is in the National Defense Authorization Act we
simply have to stop this, stop this foolishness.
I will yield back at this point.
The Chairman. Thank you. Thank you, John. I appreciate
that.
Mr. Brown is up next. Anthony? Anthony is with us. Go
ahead.
Mr. Brown. Yes, thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I
want to thank my colleagues on the committee on both side of
the aisle for their, you know, comprehensive set of questions.
And I, too, am disappointed with the incompleteness and in some
cases the shallowness of the responses.
Nevertheless, most of my questions have been asked. So, let
me ask about some specific issues. And both of my questions go
to General Allvin.
As part of the realignment plan Air Force F-16 fighters
are, the proposal is to shift them from Germany to Italy.
Secretary Esper stated, as many have commented today, that the
changes are not meant as a punishment to Germany but are part
of an effort to ``strengthen the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization and enhance the deterrence of Russia.''
So, my question is, how does a move of F-16s southeast in a
distance of less than 400 kilometers improve efforts to deter
Russian aggression?
What is the cost of moving the F-16s down to Aviano?
And will updates need be made to the bases, and the
hangars, and other facilities to house these additional
aircraft?
General Allvin. Congressman, I will address the last two
first. And that, again, those cost estimates are ongoing. I
don't have the answer to that. And I know if we go back to
EUCOM they haven't finalized those cost estimates to this
point.
To the question of what good does it do to move Air Force
fighters from Germany to Italy--I am quoting General Wolters
now, I believe in some of his earlier responses--is the idea is
you are sort of broadening the attack surface.
Really, the idea that Russia is just inclined to do things
in the Baltic region because that is where we first
strengthened up, I think they have perhaps designs for malign
influence throughout the periphery. And so, Southeast Europe
becomes as important as--so, the Black Sea becomes as important
as the Baltic Sea. And the idea that we would expand down into
Italy and enhance that ability in Aviano to be able to better
address some of the things that are happening in the Eastern
Mediterranean and the Black Sea as well.
It really, it puts another axis of approach for the EUCOM
commander. And that was why General Wolters opted for that
particular piece of the overall puzzle.
Mr. Brown. Well, I appreciate that. I do appreciate that
rationale and explanation.
The second question I had, again a very specific question,
the 7th Army Training Command in Grafenwoehr--and that, as you
know, is a very large training facility, 233 square kilometers
used by both U.S. and NATO allies for major training exercises,
field artillery exercises, large armor exercises--is there any
intention to close Grafenwoehr?
Are there intentions to open additional major training
centers anywhere else in Europe?
General Allvin. Congressman, that is a very important
question.
To my knowledge, there is not any plans to close it. But I
will take that for the record. Because your point is well taken
about the capabilities there. And we will take that for the
record and get back to you.
At this point, my understanding of it there is not a plan
to close that important training facility. But I owe you a more
complete answer, sir.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 60.]
Mr. Brown. And let me just finish then with this statement.
You know, we have heard a lot about dynamic force
employment today. And we find that in the National Defense
Strategy. That is a concept that deals, as I understand, with
operational deployment to eliminate predictability. And I get a
sense that we are using it in today's hearing interchangeably,
and perhaps inappropriately, with rotational force presence.
We have a strategic commitment to NATO to be present in
Europe, either it is rotational or it is permanent. But in many
ways it is predictable because rotational force deployments or
presence is heel to toe. So, I am not quite clear on how going
to a more rotational force presence in Europe maintains our
commitment to our strategic presence in Europe.
And you don't have time to really respond. If you could
take that for the record and just tell me how we are
accomplishing dynamic force employment at the same time as
rotational force present in Europe.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 60.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
I have Mr. Brindisi on the list here. I don't see him on
the screen anymore.
And Ms. Slotkin, is she up there somewhere? Or she is--
Okay.
I am sorry. So, Mr. Golden and Mrs. Trahan are not up there
either? Okay.
Ms. Escobar, you are not on the list but you are here. If
you wish, you may--I yield 5 minutes to you. Let's do that.
Ms. Escobar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And many thanks to
our witnesses.
I would like to join in the chorus of voices that on a
bipartisan basis have expressed disappointment at the lack of
detail during this hearing today. But I do appreciate that you
are here.
Lieutenant General Allvin, I have some questions for you. I
want to drill down just a little bit more on the question of
sort of cost-benefit analysis which began with the chairman's
initial question.
What impacts do you foresee the realignment having on the
Army's limited MFGI [Mobilization Force Generation
Installation] sites like Fort Bliss?
I represent Congressional District 16 in Texas, so
obviously there is a direct concern for me on that front.
General Allvin. Ma'am, I do have to start with that I am
not familiar with that. So, I will, that is one we will take
for the record because I am not, as far as site planning I am
not familiar enough to give you a complete answer on the
service impacts of the concept.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 60.]
Ms. Escobar. Okay. Also to be taken back and, hopefully, so
that we can learn a little bit more as you learn a little bit
more about this, one of the concerns that we have or that my
office has and that we have expressed to different parties
through leadership is that there are current infrastructure
limitations that prevent units from meeting Army standards for
efficiently deploying an armored brigade combat team. And so, I
would like for you to please look into that as well and get
back to me when possible.
And then would also like to learn more about whether there
would be infrastructure improvements that could be made in
order to address those deficiencies that, you know, that we may
see this domino effect down the line, so would like to hear
back on that.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 60.]
Ms. Escobar. And then just want to say, finally, 11,900
troops strikes me as a significant cut to the force in the
region. How do you expect this to impact operations? What will
we have to sacrifice?
General Allvin. So, ma'am, to be clear, understand by
saying this I don't want to diminish the point that you make
but, in fact, the 11,900 in the current concept aren't all
leaving the region. So, there will be about half those that
will come off, half of those will be better dispersed for the
region.
But your point is still a valid one in understanding how it
will affect our approach to the region. And I think that gets
to the point of understanding how we will execute the
rotational forces.
And to the point by Representative Escobar, I believe, on
difference between dynamic force employment and rotational
forces, this really does--is at the heart of trying to
institute this new approach to deterrence because the current
understanding of deterrence being presence, you have to be
present there, that is a way to impact adversary decision
calculus on when they are anticipating, whether they have a
cost-benefit analysis of, you know, proceeding with malign
behavior.
But the idea that if we are trying to do this in accordance
with the National Defense Strategy, with the myriad threats and
adversaries that are emerging across the globe the services
cannot maintain readiness and have all those forces forward.
So, to try and bridge that gap is this new concept. The idea
would be, through the operational unpredictability and the
continued episodic presence, to be able to put doubt in the
mind of an adversary who might be considering malign behavior.
Deterrence is decision calculus, decision calculus based on
perception. Perception is based on experience. So, we are
trying to change the experience that will still have the same
perception that that will have on the calculus. So, this is
arguably a new approach to deterrence rather than just a
forward presence.
So, the idea would be to manage the risk throughout that
transition in order to be able to have this idea of dynamic
force employment yield the results of putting doubt in the
minds of would-be adversaries.
Ms. Escobar. I thank you, sir. And I look forward to your
follow-up on those other questions.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
As far as I know, I don't think anyone else seeks time at
this point, so we are finished. I don't have anything.
Mr. Thornberry, do you have anything for the good of the
order?
Mr. Thornberry. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, I appreciate that conversation, but I don't
think we should pigeonhole current deterrence as presence only.
It is decision making. Now, presence can be, and forward-based
presence has been a fundamental part of our deterrence strategy
since the end of World War II.
I take your point, you can have different ways to evoke the
same result in an adversary's decision-making process, but I
don't think it is fair to categorize current deterrence as
presence only.
I just want to say, Mr. Chairman, that I do appreciate both
witnesses being here and trying to answer our questions. I
think the bottom line is that, as you and I know, Secretary
Esper has been conducting a review of all the combatant
commands. It has been going on for months. He has kept us
abreast of those reviews.
What is different is that a couple staffers in the White
House decided that they wanted to try to sell the President on
an absolute troop cap for Germany. And if you will remember, at
the beginning it had a cap on how many boots, American boots
could even be on the ground at the same time, which would
prevent Germany from being a transit point of our troops into
the Middle East or Africa.
They clearly hadn't thought through the consequences. They
didn't know how it would be implemented. And so what has
happened is Secretary Esper and folks at the Pentagon are
trying to put lipstick on the pig, or make lemons out of
lemonade, or whatever colloquialism you want to use.
There may be some benefit to some of these moves, as I said
at the beginning. My concern is, however, the underlying
strength and unity of the alliance has not been a foremost
consideration.
And, so all of that, plus the status of the decision making
at the Pentagon I think has to inform our conference
negotiations with the Senate this year, and I presume in years
to come.
I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you. I just want to associate myself
with you all. I completely agree with what Mr. Thornberry just
said. And I do think that what Secretary Esper has done with
the bottom-up review with the command by command, combatant
command analysis, is a very appropriate thing to be doing. And
he is trying to move our defense strategy forward.
But I also concur that the coordination between what DOD is
doing and what whims come into the heads in the White House has
undermined that incredibly important effort.
We just had the task force report that came out, led by
Seth Moulton and Mr. Banks, sort of outlining here is the
challenge we face. China and, you know, believe it or not, to
some degree Russia have leapt ahead of us on certain key
technologies, technologies that didn't exist, you know, 50
years ago or even 20 years ago in some cases. And we have
fallen behind in our ability to meet that threat.
So, rethinking the way we meet the threats that we face
within the Pentagon is enormously important. We can't keep
doing things the same way we have done them to date. But that
process takes thought focus. And, you know, I think we need to
let the DOD do their job and not interfere with that effort.
So, I certainly agree with that.
And I also agree with the point on presence, which I think
is very important. I get asked all the time, you know, we are
not at war with whoever, why do we have, you know, the Soviet
Union broke up, why do we have troops in Europe? You know, what
are they doing there?
They are there for a very important purpose. Mr. Thornberry
outlined it a little bit, and we have heard it today. I think
we need to make clearer to the American public why we have
troops deployed in Europe, why we have troops deployed in South
Korea, and Okinawa, and elsewhere. They serve an incredibly
important purpose. And I think we need to make that clear so we
can build support for what needs to be done to meet the threats
that we face.
So, I appreciate you gentlemen being here. Appreciate this
discussion. I think it has been very helpful.
And with that, we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 2:12 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
=======================================================================
A P P E N D I X
September 30, 2020
=======================================================================
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
September 30, 2020
=======================================================================
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
=======================================================================
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
September 30, 2020
=======================================================================
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. HOULAHAN
General Allvin. The USEUCOM Joint Cyber Center (JCC) coordinates
closely with NATO and Allied military organizations to counter Russian
cyber threats. The JCC conducts three mutually reinforcing activities
intended to enhance cyber defense of Allied and partner networks in
support of USEUCOM strategic objectives. Three particular initiatives
include:
(1) The USEUCOM Cyberspace Security Cooperation team builds Allied
and partner cyberspace capabilities to increase partner nation cyber
defenses, establishing trusted relationships with partner nation cyber
defense organizations.
(2) The JCC's Information Exchange Cell shares strategic and
operational reporting with Allies and partners across the theater to
maintain shared situational awareness of cyber threats, to include
Russian malign cyber activity.
(3) Finally, the JCC Cyber Analytics team conducts tactical and
technical cyber threat research that can be rapidly disseminated
between US Government, industry, and partner nation network defenders.
The team possesses deep technical expertise and leverages trust-based
relationships to conduct real-time coordination and technical
information sharing with Allies and partners.
Posture changes would not affect this work as there is no foreseen
impact to those capabilities in theater. [See page 16.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. CONAWAY
Dr. Anderson. The decision to divest of Royal Air Force (RAF)
Mildenhall was made as part of the 2013 European Infrastructure
Consolidation (EIC) process, the purpose of which was to reduce long-
term expenses through base consolidations. EIC was conducted at a time
when DOD's strategic focus was shifting to the Pacific, and U.S. force
presence was being reduced in Europe, including the inactivation of two
U.S. Army Brigade Combat Teams. After Russia's occupation of Crimea in
2014, the strategic environment in Europe changed significantly, with
Russia re-emerging as a more immediate threat to our NATO Allies. The
National Defense Strategy's (NDS) focus on Great Power Competition
further influenced the choice to reverse this EIC decision in order to
maintain the readiness of our special operations forces stationed at
Mildenhall, and to retain the base's critical role as a refueling hub
to support operations in Northern Europe.
The U.S. Air Force has spent approximately $14 million at
Spangdahlem Air Base in support of the EIC decision to close RAF
Mildenhall. Congress authorized and appropriated additional funds for
site preparation at Spangdahlem but these funds have not yet been
expended. [See page 27.]
______
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BACON
Dr. Anderson. The U.S. Air Force, with support from U.S. European
Command (USEUCOM), will maintain the RC-135s at RAF Mildenhall, which
offers future opportunities for co-located operations with similar
Royal Air Force capabilities.
The U.S. Air Force is planning for continued use of RAF Fairford as
an agile basing location to support rotational missions such as the
Bomber Task Force. RAF Fairford dynamically supports planned and
emergent surge operations, which are critical to U.S. Air Forces
Europe-Air Forces Africa's ability to deter Russia, strengthen NATO,
and improve strategic and operational flexibility within USEUCOM.
[See page 30.]
General Allvin. The Air Force plans for continued use of RAF
Fairford as an agile basing location to support rotational missions
such as the Bomber Task Force. RAF Fairford dynamically supports
planned and emergent surge operations which is critical to U.S. Air
Forces Europe-Air Forces Africa ability to deter Russia, strengthen
NATO, and improve strategic and operational flexibility within U.S.
European Command (USEUCOM).
The Air Force, with support from USEUCOM, plans to retain the RC-
135s at RAF Mildenhall at this time, which offers the future
possibility for co-located operations with the Royal Air Force
Airseeker mission. [See page 30.]
______
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BROWN
Dr. Anderson. Dynamic force employment (DFE) and continuous
rotational presence are not mutually exclusive. DOD currently employs a
mix of enduring, heel-to-toe rotational presence in Europe and
episodic, short-term DFE deployments, both to demonstrate our
commitment to Allies and partners and to promote operational
unpredictability to complicate adversary planning. Combined with our
existing permanently stationed units, DOD continues to maintain a
robust and ready force presence in Europe. [See page 39.]
General Allvin. There is no intention to close Grafenwoehr. Units
from within Germany and throughout Europe will continue to use it for
training.
We do not have plans to open additional major training centers in
Europe. However, we are aware of efforts by a number of Allies and
partners to enhance national training center capabilities and capacity
in Romania, Poland, Bulgaria, Ukraine, and Georgia. [See page 39.]
General Allvin. The NDS calls for U.S. forces to be strategically
predictable, but operationally unpredictable. The complementary nature
and utilization of rotational forces and Dynamic Force Employment (DFE)
are an example of this NDS principle in action.
DFE is a concept to proactively shape the strategic environment
while building and maintaining readiness. The DFE operating model
provides contingency response capabilities, ensures the long-term
viability of the Joint Force for major combat, and conducts strategic
engagement opportunities that shape the global environment.
USEUCOM leverages the DFE model to re-affirm our commitment to
Allies, deploy diverse military capabilities within the AOR to improve
our deterrent posture, and demonstrate operational unpredictability to
adversaries. DFE deployments have included posturing the HARRY S.
TRUMAN strike group from the Mediterranean to the High North, deploying
a Terminal High Altitude Defense (THAAD) battery to both Israel and
Romania, Bomber Task Force missions throughout the AOR, and an F-35
deployment to exercise with European Allies, demonstrating our ability
to rapidly generate significant combat power across the AOR.
Rotational Army, Marine, and Special Operations Forces (SOF)
maintain a presence on the ground in strategic locations across the
theater. These forces work alongside Allies and partners to deter
aggression and build host nation defense capacity, interoperability,
and readiness. In Eastern Europe, a rotational Armored Brigade Combat
Team and Combat Aviation Brigade are deployed as part of Operation
ATLANTIC RESOLVE to deter and are postured to respond if required.
Rotational Marine Forces in Norway have improved an important position
on NATO's northern periphery while training in Arctic conditions
alongside our Norwegian allies. [See page 39.]
______
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. ESCOBAR
General Allvin. The Army just completed a Mobilization Force
Generation Installation (MFGI) Assessment in March 2020, primarily
focusing on those installations that could support the Army's response
in a no-notice Contingency Plan activation. Fort Bliss, TX, is one of
the Army's four active MFGIs which also include Fort Hood, TX, Fort
Bragg, NC, and Schofield Barracks, HI. Fort Bliss, in particular brings
great capacity and capability to both the Active and Reserve Component
for the Army's force projection requirements around the world. Not only
does it serve as one of our four active MFGIs, it is also one of the
Army's Power Projection Platforms as well. The Army's MFGIs will
continue to play an important role in mobilizing and generating ready
Army capabilities for global employment. [See page 40.]
General Allvin. The Army routinely assesses deployment
infrastructure capability to meet deployment goals. Through these
assessments, the Army identified rail infrastructure projects needed to
fully meet armored brigade combat team (ABCT) deployment goals at Fort
Bliss, Fort Riley, and Fort Stewart.
Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC) and the
Transportation Engineering Agency (TEA) assess rail configuration and
loading capacity as Fort Bliss' most significant limitation toward
meeting the Army's 96-hour ABCT deployment goal. The Army validated
this assessment through the Installation Status Report (ISR) process.
A proposed rail project at Fort Bliss would construct a new
mainline connection north of the Rail Deployment Complex to enable more
efficient rail switching operations and consolidate operations away
from the cantonment area. Additionally, the proposed project includes
two loading tracks to increase the static end loading capacity and
better meet ABCT deployment needs. This project is currently competing
for funding in the FY 23-27 budget.
SDDC and TEA also endorse container storage and line haul facility
projects at Ft. Bliss to improve general deployment readiness. These
projects are also competing for funding. [See page 40.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MRS. HARTZLER
Dr. Anderson. The Polish Government agreed to make significant
structural improvements to its primary training base, Drawsko
Pomorskie, as well as other existing training areas throughout the
country. These improvements are primarily focused on increasing the
readiness of the Polish Armed Forces while providing opportunities for
U.S. participation. In addition to upgrading Poland's ranges and
maneuver areas, the Polish Government also agreed to invest in vehicle
maintenance facilities, living quarters, munitions and fuel storage,
and joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (JRSOI)
facilities to support U.S. force deployments to Poland. We are working
with the Polish Ministry of Defence to prioritize the construction of
more than one hundred identified projects and agreed-upon facilities to
support the U.S. presence in Poland. [See page 20.]
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
September 30, 2020
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CARBAJAL
Mr. Carbajal. Has the Department been asked by the White House to
study how quickly it can upload warheads if New START expires? Can you
commit to sharing the outcome of this study with Congress as soon as it
is finished?
Has the nuclear employment guidance changed? If so, when do you
plan to brief Congress?
General Hyten told the committee in 2019 that he saw no need to
alter force levels if New START expires. What reason is there to upload
additional warheads?
Dr. Anderson. The White House has asked the Department to study how
quickly it could upload warheads if the New START Treaty expires. At
present, the ability of U.S. nuclear forces to deter potential
adversaries is not at risk as a result of limits imposed by existing
arms control treaties. However, given the disparity in stockpile
quantities between the United States and the Russian Federation,
ongoing nuclear modernization efforts need to continue as planned in
order to ensure age-related sustainment issues do not undermine the
effectiveness or credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. If the New
START Treaty expires in February 2021, the United States has the
ability to make modest increases to its nuclear force structure by,
among other things, uploading additional warheads onto currently
deployed missiles. The dynamics of the security environment in addition
to Presidential and Departmental policy would guide the specifics of
any proposed nuclear force structure changes. President Trump signed
new nuclear employment guidance in 2019 which is currently being
implemented. Consistent with Congressional reporting requirements
pursuant to 10 U.S.C. Section 491, DOD will brief Congress on this
guidance when implementation is complete.
[all]